UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


LAW  LIBRARY 


a 


i 


University  of  California 

Southern  Regional 

Library  Facility 


i 


V.I 

copy  2 


A    TREATISE 


ON   THE 


LAW  OF   EVIDENCE 


BY 


SIMON/  GREEKLEAF,  LL.D. 

U— — 


Quorsum  enim  sacrae  leges  inventae  et  sancitse  f  uere,  nisi  ut  ex  ipsarum  justitia  unicuique 
jus  suum  tribuatur? — MASCARDUS  EX  ULPIAN. 


IN   THREE  VOLUMES 
VOL.   I 

SIXTEENTH  EDITION 
REVISED,  ENLARGED,  AND  ANNOTATED 

BY 

JOHN    HENRY  WIGMORE 

PBOFBSSOB   OF  THE   LAW  OF  EVIDENCE   IN  THE   LAW   SCHOOL   OF 
NOKTHWESTERN   UNIVEBSITT 


BOSTON 
LITTLE,    BROWN,    AND    COMPANY 

1899 


V  -  1 

/•    ,  "T. 

.   Vf\j   .    *"• 

\    • 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1858, 

By  JAMES  GREENLEAF, 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1863, 

By  JAMES  GREENLEAF, 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1866, 

By  MRS.  JAMES  GREENLEAF, 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  Massachusetts. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1876, 

By  C.  K.  FULLER  AND  C.  A.  CROSWELL, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1883, 

By  C.  K.  FULLER, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1892, 

By  C.  K.  FULLER, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1899, 

By  C.  K.  FULLER, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


UNIVERSITY  PRESS: 
JOHN  WILSON  AND  SON  (!NC.),  CAMBRIDGE,  MASS. 


JOSEPH   STORY,  LL.  D., 


ONE    OF   THE    JUSTICES    OF    THE    SUPREME    COURT   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES, 
AND   DANE    PROFESSOR    OF    LAW    IN    HARVARD    UNIVERSITY. 


SIR,  —  In  dedicating  this  work  to  you,  I  perform  an  office  both 
justly  due  to  yourself  and  delightful  to  me,  —  that  of  adding  the 
evidence  of  a  private  and  confidential  witness  to  the  abundant 
public  testimonials  of  your  worth.  For  more  than  thirty  years 
the-  jurisprudence  of  our  country  has  been  illustrated  by  your 
professional  and  juridical  labors;  with  what  success,  it  is  now 
superfluous  to  speak.  Other  Jurists  have  attained  distinction  in 
separate  departments  of  the  law ;  it  has  been  reserved  for  your- 
self, with  singular  felicity,  to  cultivate  and  administer  them  all. 
Looking  back  to  the  unsettled  state  of  the  law  of  our  national 
institutions,  at  the  period  of  your  accession  to  the  bench  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  considering  the  un- 
limited variety  of  subjects  within  the  cognizance  of  the  Federal 
tribunals,  I  do  but  express  the  consenting  opinions  of  your  con- 
temporaries, in  congratulating  our  country  that  your  life  and 
vigor  have  been  spared  until  the  fabric  of  her  jurisprudence  has 
been  advanced  to  its  present  state  of  lofty  eminence,  attractive 
beauty,  and  enduring  strength. 

But  many  will  regard  the  foundation  of  the  present  Law 
School  in  Harvard  University  as  the  crowning  benefit,  which, 
through  your  instrumentality,  has  been  conferred  on  our  profes- 
sion and  country.  Of  the  multitude  of  young  men,  who  will 
have  drunk  at  this  fountain  of  jurisprudence,  many  will  adminis- 
ter the  law,  in  every  portion  of  this  widespread  Republic,  in  the 
true  spirit  of  the  doctrines  here  inculcated;  and  succeeding 
throngs  of  ingenuous  youth  will,  I  trust,  be  here  imbued  with 


iv  DEDICATION. 

the  same  spirit,  as  long  as  our  government  shall  remain  a  gov- 
ernment of  law.  Your  anxiety  to  perpetuate  the  benefits  of  this 
Institution,  and  the  variety,  extent,  and  untiring  constancy  of 
your  labors  in  this  cause,  as  well  as  the  cheerful  patience  with 
which  they  have  been  borne,  are  peculiarly  known  to  myself; 
while,  at  the  same  time,  I  have  witnessed  and  been  instructed 
by  the  high  moral  character,  the  widely  expanded  views,  and 
the  learned  and  just  expositions  of  the  law,  which  have  alike 
distinguished  your  private  Lectures  and  your  published  Com- 
mentaries. With  unaffected  sincerity  I  may  be  permitted  to 
acknowledge  that,  while  my  path  has  been  illumined  for  many 
years  by  your  personal  friendship  and  animating  example,  to  have 
been  selected  as  your  associate  in  the  arduous  and  responsible 
labors  of  this  Institution,  I  shall  ever  regard  as  the  peculiar 
honor  and  happiness  of  my  professional  life.  Beatb  vixissc  videar, 
quiet  cum  Scipione  vixerim. 

Long  may  you  continue  to  reap  the  rich  reward  of  labors  so 
vast,  so  incessant,  and  of  such  surpassing  value,  in  the  heartfelt 
gratitude  of  our  whole  country,  and  in  the  prosperity  of  her 
institutions,  which  you  have  done  so  much  to  establish  and 
adorn. 

I  am,  with  the  highest  respect, 

Your  obliged  friend, 

SIMON  GKEENLEAF. 
CAMBRIDGE,  Massachusetts, 
February  23,  1842. 


PREFACE   TO   THE  SIXTEENTH  EDITION. 


SIMON  GKEENLEAF  was  born  at  Newburyport,  Massachusetts, 
December  5,  1783,  but  during  his  childhood  the  family  removed 
to  the  District  now  Maine.  He  began  the  study  of  law  at  New 
Gloucester,  with  Ezekiel  Whitman,  afterwards  Chief  Justice.  In 
1806  he  began  the  practice  of  law  in  Standish,  removing  in  1818 
to  Portland.  He  acquired  a  high  standing  in  the  profession ;  and 
in  1820,  when  Maine  was  set  off  and  admitted  as  a  State  and  a 
Supreme  Court  was  established,  Mr.  Greenleaf  was  appointed  its 
reporter,  —  a  position  then  and  long  thereafter,  in  some  of  the 
older  States,  of  such  distinction  that  it  often  served  as  a  stepping- 
stone  to  the  Bench.  In  1833  he  was  appointed  Royall  professor 
of  law  in  the  Law  School  of  Harvard  University;  and  in  1846  he 
became  Dane  professor  of  law,  in  the  same  school,  in  succession 
to  Mr.  Justice  Story,  long  his  colleague,  to  whom  he  dedicated 
the  present  work.  In  1848  he  resigned,  and  became  professor 
emeritus.  He  died  on  October  6,  1853. 

In  1842,  in  the  tenth  year  of  his  professorate,  he  published  the 
present  treatise  on  the  law  of  Evidence.  At  that  time  the  only 
treatise  of  American  origin  on  that  subject  was  the  small  volume 
of  Chief  Justice  Swift,  of  Connecticut,  published  in  1810;  be- 
sides this,  the  profession  at  that  time  made  chief  use  of  the 
American  editions  of  the  works  of  Mr.  Starkie  and  Mr.  Phillipps. 
The  professional  approval  of  Mr.  Greenleaf 's  work  was  immediate 
and  constant.  There  have  been  printed  down  to  the  present 
time  fifteen  editions  of  the  first  volume,  the  dates  of  which  were 
as  follows:  1842,  1844,  1846,  1848,  1850,  1852,  1854,  1856, 
1858,  1860,  1863,  1866,  1876,  1883,  1892.  It  will  thus  be  seen 
that,  up  to  the  time  of  the  twelfth  edition,  a  new  edition  was 
called  for  at  almost  regular  intervals  of  two  years,  —  a  fortune 
that  has  fallen  to  few  even  of  the  classical  treatises.  Of  these 


VI  PREFACE    TO   THE   SIXTEENTH   EDITION. 

editions,  his  own  hand  prepared  the  first  seven;  the  seventh, 
indeed,  appeared  (in  1854)  only  after  his  death;  but  all  the 
alterations  and  additions  had  been  made  by  him,  except  a  few 
citations  of  decisions  rendered  since  his  death ;  and  the  text  of 
this  edition  has  always  been  taken  as  the  text  for  the  succeeding 
ones.  The  twelfth  edition  (of  1866)  was  prepared  by  Isaac  F. 
Redfield,  the  eminent  legal  author,  and  Chief  Justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Vermont;  the  thirteenth  edition  (of  1876)  was 
prepared  by  John  Wilder  May,  also  a  legal  author  of  repute,  and 
Chief  Justice  of  the  Municipal  Court  of  Boston ;  the  fourteenth 
and  fifteenth  editions  (of  1883  and  1892)  were  prepared  by  Simon 
Greenleaf  Croswell,  a  grandson  of  the  author  of  the  work,  and 
himself  the  author  of  well  known  legal  treatises. 

In  none  of  these  posthumous  editions  was  there  any  attempt  to 
deal  with  the  text,  except  in  a  few  instances,  chiefly  by  the  in- 
sertion of  brief  references  to  statutory  changes.  But  for  the 
present  edition  a  different  treatment  seemed  to  have  become 
necessary.  The  broad  statutory  changes  in  the  past  two  genera- 
tions, the  detailed  development  of  many  doctrines,  the  numerous 
novel  applications  of  established  principles,  required  not  only 
many  additions  which  could  not  be  conveniently  relegated  to 
cumbrous  notes,  but  also  the  omission  of  some  portions  of  the 
text  rendered  obsolete  by  statutory  abolitions.  Moreover,  in  the 
expositions  of  principle,  account  could  not  fail  to  be  taken  of 
the  new  epoch  in  the  understanding  of  the  rules  of  evidence,  due 
to  the  historical  studies  of  Professor  James  Bradley  Thayer,  the 
great  master  of  the  law  of  evidence.  No  book  purporting  to 
represent  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  could  omit  to  recog- 
nize and  make  use  of  his  results,  in  the  exposition  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  evidence.  In  this  as  well  as  in  other  respects  an  effort 
has  been  made,  in  the  present  edition,  to  bring  the  text  into  har- 
mony with  the  established  results  of  modern  research. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  necessary  to  leave  the  original  text 
still  available  in  its  classical  integrity.  The  profession  has  long 
been  accustomed  to  rely  on  this  work.  In  the  opinions  of  every 
Court  for  the  last  fifty  years  occur  references  to  its  sections ;  and, 
even  of  the  errors  that  are  to  be  found  in  its  pages,  it  may  often 
l>e  said  that  they  have  become  law  in  many  jurisdictions  because 
they  were  put  forth  in  these  pages.  The  innumerable  judicial 
references  to  its  text  rendered  it  necessary,  in  any  new  edition,  to 


PREFACE    TO    THE    SIXTEENTH   EDITION.  vii 

permit  the  original  text  to  remain  available  to  those  who  wished 
to  verify  such  citations  and  consult  the  original  phraseology. 

The  effort  has  been  to  answer  both  of  the  requirements  above 
described,  —  to  make  the  work  as  useful  as  possible  to  the  pro- 
fession and  to  the  student  of  the  present  time,  while  still  leaving 
the  original  text  available  for  those  who  might  wish  to  consult  it. 
Accordingly  the  following  plan  has  been  pursued.  All  portions 
of  the  text  omitted  for  any  reason  have  been  placed  in  the  Ap- 
pendix (except  that  brief  sentences  omitted  have  been  placed  in 
a  footnote),  under  the  original  section-number;  at  the  point  in 
the  text,  the  original  section-number  alone  is  preserved,  with  a 
reference  in  a  footnote  to  the  Appendix ;  so  that  one  who  has  a 
reference  to  the  original  text  will  easily  find  it  by  the  cross-refer- 
ence at  the  place  of  omission.  All  editorial  insertions  in  the 
text  have  been  indicated  by  full-faced  brackets  [  ],  if  made  by  the 
present  editor,  and  by  braces  {},  if  representing  the  statements 
of  prior  editors ;  most  of  such  insertions  are  of  the  former  charac- 
ter. In  many  instances,  transpositions  of  the  original  sections 
have  been  required,  in  order  to  remedy  clear  errors  in  the  order 
of  treatment;  in  such  cases  the  original  section-number  is  pre- 
served at  the  place  of  omission,  and  a  footnote  gives  a  cross- 
reference  to  the  section  as  newly  numbered  and  placed.  The 
new  numbers  in  such  instances  are  designated  by  letters  of  the 
alphabet,  so  as  to  avoid  any  change  in  other  numbers ;  thus,  one 
who  is  referred  to  the  original  section  249  will  find  at  that  place 
the  section-number  249,  with  a  cross-reference  to  its  new  num- 
ber, 254  c  ;  and  at  254  c  the  transferred  section  has  also  the  origi- 
nal number,  249,  bracketed.  Thus,  there  need  be  no  confusion 
in  the  use  of  references  based  on  the  former  editions,  nor  any 
break  in  the  continuity  of  usage  of  the  work. 

The  notes  have  been  more  freely  treated.  The  author's  own 
notes  have  been  in  some  instances  elevated  to  the  text;  in  most 
instances  they  have  been  preserved  intact;  but  in  a  few  cases, 
particularly  where  they  consisted  of  cumbrous  and  unnecessary 
quotations,  and  where  they  did  not  involve  any  personal  opinion 
of  the  author  and  the  citations  were  amply  covered  by  the  edi- 
torial material  added  in  detail,  they  were  omitted.  The  material 
of  prior  editors  in  the  notes  is  represented  by  braces  {  }  ;  and  for 
this  matter  the  present  editor  assumes  no  responsibility.  The 
material  added  by  the  present  editor  is  invariably  represented  by 


viii  PREFACE   TO   THE    SIXTEENTH   EDITION. 

full-faced  brackets  [];  except  that  in  the  three  chapters  and 
the  Appendix  inserted  entire  from  his  hands,  these  brackets  have 
been  omitted  in  the  notes. 

The  omissions  from  the  original  text  (to  be  found  in  Appendix 
II)  consist  chiefly  of  portions  rendered  obsolete  by  statutory 
changes,  namely,  the  portions  dealing  with  variance  (never,  in 
truth,  an  evidential  topic)  and  the  portions  dealing  with  incom- 
petency  by  reason  of  interest.  Much  more  than  the  space  thus 
gained  has  been  taken  up  by  the  present  editor's  additions, 
namely,  three  entire  chapters  (IV,  V,  and  XI),  and  more  than 
a  hundred  new  sections,  besides  additions  to  the  original  sec- 
tions; together  with  an  Appendix  giving  in  full  all  constitu- 
tional provisions  about  evidence  and  the  statutory  enactments 
upon  the  competency  of  witnesses,  and  another  Appendix  deal- 
ing in  necessary  detail  with  the  subject  of  confessions  before 
magistrates.  The  cases  cited  in  the  preceding  edition  num- 
bered, in  all,  nearly  ten  thousand;  in  the  present  edition,  they 
number  some  fifteen  thousand.  The  main  intention  has  been 
to  add  the  useful  decisions  of  the  last  seven  years;  but  on  a 
large  number  of  questions  having  particular  interest  or  subject 
to  special  difference  of  opinion,  the  editor's  effort  has  been  to 
make  the  citations  as  full  as  possible  by  furnishing  all  the  avail- 
able authorities.  The  notes  to  §§  14  k  (notes  7,  8),  14  o  (note 
50),  195  d  (note  2),  439  h,  444  (note  5),  461 J,  461  c,  will  serve 
as  examples  of  this.  In  many  such  instances  it  has  been  thought 
most  useful  to  give  the  mere  citations,  without  indicating  in 
detail  the  precise  tenor  of  the  decision;  for  space  would  not 
suffice  to  do  this  accurately  for  each  citation;  and  the  practitioner 
is  to-day  usually  better  served  by  giving  him  the  mere  citations 
for  his  own  jurisdiction,  to  be  consulted  by  himself  in  the  origi- 
nal, than  by  furnishing  a  few  cases  from  other  jurisdictions,  fully 
stated,  perhaps,  but  not  of  service  as  representing  the  utterances 
of  his  own  Court.  For  the  benefit  of  teacher  and  student,  an 
attempt  has  also  been  made,  on  subjects  of  particular  interest 
or  difference  of  opinion,  to  note  expressly  the  leading  cases,  — 
that  is,  either  the  classical  cases  establishing  the  doctrine,  or  the 
cases  best  worth  consulting  for  learning  the  arguments  of  policy 
on  both  sides.  The  notes  to  §§  13/  (note  9),  14  b  (note  14),  195  b 
(note  1),  238  (note  3),  310  (note  14),  441  b  (note  3),  441  e  (note 
8),  461  a  (notes  1,  4),  461  d  (notes  1,  2,  3,  4,  5),  462  (note  6), 


PREFACE    TO    THE   SIXTEENTH   EDITION.  IX 

will  serve  as  illustrations  of  this.  A  few  typographical  improve- 
ments have  also  been  attempted.  The  original  text  contained  no 
section-headings;  in  the  thirteenth  edition  these  were  introduced; 
but,  in  all  editions  except  the  twelfth,  the  separate  chapters  and 
the  general  table  of  contents  contained  no  summaries  of  the 
section-topics ;  in  the  present  edition  the  section-headings  have 
been  revised,  and  detailed  summaries  of  them  prefixed  to  each 
chapter  and  placed  also  in  the  general  table  of  contents.  In 
the  previous  editions  the  running  title  at  the  top  of  the  page 
gave  only  the  chapter-subject ;  in  the  present  edition  this  running 
title  is  made  to  give  not  only  the  chapter-subject  but  the  secfcion- 
subject ;  moreover,  the  number  of  chapter  and  section  is  inserted 
at  the  head  of  each  page  for  convenience  in  turning  to  a  passage 
cited.  The  recent  citations  end  with  the  number  of  the  National 
Reporter  System  appearing  December  31,  1898;  except  that  a 
few  important  rulings  in  the  numbers  up  to  March  1,  1899,  have 
been  added  while  the  work  was  going  through  the  press. 


J.  H.  W. 


NORTHWESTERN  UNIVERSITY  LAW  SCHOOL,  CHICAGO, 
May  1,  1899. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION. 


THE  profession  being  already  furnished  with  the  excellent 
treatises  of  Mr.  Starkie  and  Mr.  Phillipps  on  Evidence,  with 
large  bodies  of  notes,  referring  to  American  decisions,  perhaps 
some  apology  may  be  deemed  necessary  for  obtruding  on  their 
notice  another  work,  on  the  same  subject.  But  the  want  of  a 
proper  text-book,  for  the  use  of  the  students  under  my  instruc- 
tion, urged  me  to  prepare  something  to  supply  this  deficiency; 
and,  having  embarked  in  the  undertaking,  I  was  naturally  led  to 
the  endeavor  to  render  the  work  acceptable  to  the  profession,  as 
well  as  useful  to  the  student.  I  would  not  herein  be  thought  to 
disparage  the  invaluable  works  just  mentioned;  which,  for  their 
accuracy  of  learning,  elegance,  and  sound  philosophy,  are  so 
highly  and  universally  esteemed  by  the  American  Bar.  But  many 
of  the  topics  they  contain  were  never  applicable  to  this  country; 
some  others  are  now  obsolete;  and  the  body  of  notes  has  become 
so  large,  as  almost  to  overwhelm  the  text,  thus  greatly  embar- 
rassing the  student,  increasing  the  labors  of  the  instructor,  and 
rendering  it  indispensable  that  the  work  should  be  rewritten, 
with  exclusive  reference  to  our  own  jurisprudence.  I  have  en- 
deavored to  state  those  doctrines  and  rules  of  the  Law  of  Evi- 
dence which  are  common  to  all  the  United  States ;  omitting  what 
is  purely  local  law,  and  citing  only  such  cases  as  seemed  neces- 
sary to  illustrate  and  support  the  text.  Doubtless  a  happier 
selection  of  these  might  be  made,  and  the  work  might  have  been 
much  better  executed  by  another  hand ;  for  now  it  is  finished,  I 
find  it  but  an  approximation  towards  what  was  originally  desired. 
But  in  the  hope  that  it  still  may  be  found  not  useless,  as  the 
germ  of  a  better  treatise,  it  is  submitted  to  the  candor  of  a  liberal 
profession. 

CAMBRIDGE,  Massachusetts, 
February  23,  1842. 


CONTENTS. 


TABLE  OF  CASES .     .          xxvii 


CHAPTER   I. 


PRELIMINARY  OBSERVATIONS 


§  1.    Definitions. 

§  2.    Distinctions. 

§  2  a.   Scope  of  the  Rules  of  Evidence  ; 


Criminal  Law  and  Equity  ;  Federal  Courts 
Constitutional  Aspects. 
§  3.    Division  of  the  Subject. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OP    WHAT    PROPOSITIONS    EVIDENCE    NEED    NOT    BE    OFFERED; 
JUDICIAL  NOTICE . 


§  3  a.  Matters  that  may  be  judicially 
noticed. 

§  4.  Public  Functionaries,  Seals,  Acts 
of  State,  etc. 

§  5.  General  Usages,  Matters  of  Noto- 
riety, etc. 

§  6.    Political  Divisions. 


§  6  a.  Public  Officials,  their  Duties 
and  Acts. 

§  6  b.    Laws. 

§  6  c.    Jury's  Knowledge. 

§  6  d.   Implications  of  the  Doctrine. 

§  6  e.  Other  Senses  of  the  term  Judi- 
cial Notice. 


CHAPTER   III. 


KINDS  OF  EVIDENCE       .... 

§§  7-9.  Human  Testimony;  the  Sanc- 
tion of  Instinct. 

§  10.  Human  Testimony  ;  the  Sanc- 
tion of  Experience. 

§§  11,  12.    Circumstances. 


21 

§  13.  Testimonial  Evidence  and  Cir- 
cumstantial Evidence. 

§  13  a.  Real  Evidence  ;  Profert  ;  In- 
spection ;  View  ;  etc. 


CHAPTER  IV. 
REAL  EVIDENCE  (ATJTOPTIC  PROFERENCE) 27 


§  13  b.   General  Principle  ;  Instances. 

§  13  c.  Discriminations  ;  Independent 
Principles  not  to  be  confused  :  (1)  Ir- 
relevancy. 

§  13  d.  Same  :  (2)  Privilege  ;  (3)  Sun- 
dry Principles. 

§  13  e.  Limitations  germane  to  the  Pres- 
ent Principle  :  (1)  Prejudice  of  an  Accused 
Person. 


§  13/.  Same:  (2)  Prejudice  of  a  Civil 
Defendant. 

§  13#.  Same:  (3)  Immodesty  or  other 
Impropriety. 

§  13  h.    Same  :  (4)  Technical  Matters. 

§  13  i.  Same:  (5)  Inconvenience;  View 
by  Jury. 

§  ]  8j.  Same  :  (6)  Non-transmission  to 
Appellate  Court. 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   V. 

Page 

RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE 35 

Evidence     to    prove    Design, 


§  14.    General  Principles  of  Relevancy. 

§  14  a.  Doctrines  of  Collateral  Incon- 
venience. 

1.    Character  as  Evidence  or  in  Issue. 

§  14  b.  Character  as  Evidence  of  an 
Act  done. 

§  1 4  c.  Character  as  otherwise  eviden- 
tiary. 

§  14d.    Character  in  Issue. 

2.    Evidence  to  prove  Character. 

§  14e.    In  general. 

§  14/.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evidence 
of  an  Accused's  Character. 

§14</.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evi- 
dence of  other  Persons'  Character  used 
evidentially. 

§14/i.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evi- 
dence of  Character  in  issue. 

3.  Other  Human  Qualities  as  Evidence  of 

an  Act. 

§  1 4  i.  Physical  Capacity,  Skill,  Means, 
etc. 

§  14  j.    Habit,  Custom. 

§  14  &.    Design,  Intention,  Plan. 

4.  Evidence  to  prove  Capacity,  Knowledge, 

Plan,    Intent,    Habit,    Custom,    and 
other  Human  Qualities  or  Conditions. 
§  14  I.    Evidence  to  prove  Physical  Ca- 
pacity, Skill,  Age,  Sanity,  etc. 


§  14  m. 
Plan. 

§  14  «.  Evidence  to  prove  Habit,  Cus- 
tom. 

§  14  o.  Evidence  to  prove  Motive, 
Emotion,  Malice,  etc. 

§  14  p.  Evidence  to  prove  Knowledge, 
Belief,  Notice,  Consciousness  of  Guilt, 
etc. 

§  14g.  Other  Similar  Crimes  or  Mis- 
conduct as  Evidence  of  Knowledge,  Intent, 
Plan,  etc. 

5.  Sundry  Evidence  to  prove  or  disprove  a 

Human  Act. 

§  1 4  r.  Alibi,  Commission  by  others, 
etc. 

§  1 4  s.  Traces,  and  other  Evidence  a 
posteriori. 

6.  Evidence  of  the  Condition,  Quality,  Ca- 

pacity, of  Inanimate  Objects. 

§  14<.  Prior  or  Subsequent  Existence 
of  a  Thing,  Place,  Condition,  etc. 

§  14  u.  One  Part  evidencing  another  ; 
Samples. 

§  14  v.  Similar  Instances  as  Evidence 
of  a  Quality,  Tendency,  Capacity,  etc. 


CHAPTER   VI. 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF,  AND  PRESUMPTIONS 

1.   General  Theory. 
§14w.   Burden    of    Proof;    Presump- 


tion  ;  In  general. 

§  14  x.  Burden  of  Proof ;  Senses  of  the 
Term  ;  Tests  for  ascertaining  the  Burden  ; 
Shifting  of  the  Burden. 

§  14  ?/.  Presumptions  of  Law  and  of 
Fact ;  Conclusive  Presumptions  ;  Conflict- 
ing Presumptions;  Prima  facie  Evidence. 

2.    Various  Specific  Presumptions. 

§  15.  Kinds  of  Presumptions. 

§16.  Limitation  of  Claims. 

§  17.  Title  by  Prescription. 

§  18.  Natural  Consequences  of  Acts  ; 

Intent  ;  Murder,  Libel,  etc. 

§  19.  Correctness  of  Records. 

§  20.  Observation  of  Legal  Formalities. 

§  21.  Genuineness  of  Ancient  Instru- 
ments. 


§22. 

§23. 
Deeds. 

§24. 
general. 

§25. 
Lessor. 

§26. 


93 

Estoppels. 

Same  :   Estoppel  by  Recitals  in 

Same :    Estoppel    by    Deed,    in 
Same :  Estoppel  of  Lessee  as  to 


Same :  Estoppel  by  Deed  Re- 
citals as  to  Consideration. 

§27.  Same:  Estoppel  by  Statements 
acted  upon. 

§  28.  Incapacity  ;  Legitimacy  ;  Hus- 
band's Coercion. 

§§  29,  30.    Survivorship. 

§  31.    International  Law. 

§  32.  Principle  of  Conclusive  Presump- 
tions. 

§  33.  Disputable  Presumptions  ;  In 
general. 

§34.  Innocence;  Ownership;  Stolen 
Goods. 


CONTENDS. 


XV 


§  35.  Innocence  ;  Life  and  Death  ; 
Conflicting  Presumptions. 

§  36.    Libel. 

§  37.  Spoliation  ;  Fabrication  of  Evi- 
dence. 

§  38.  Course  of  Trade  ;  Payment ;  De- 
livery. 

§  38  a.  Execution  of  Attested  Instru- 
ments ;  Regularity  of  Official  Acts  ;  Ap- 
pointment to  Office. 

§  39.    Payment,  from  Lapse  of  Time. 

§  40.  Course  of  Business  ;  Post-office  ; 
Telegrams  ;  etc. 

§  41.    Continuity  ;  Life  ;  Death. 

§  42.  Continuity  ;  Partnership  ;  In- 
sanity. 

§  43.    Foreign  Law. 

§  43  a.  Identity  of  Name  ;  Sundry 
Presumptions. 

§§  44,  45.  Presumptions  of  Fact  ;  In 
general. 


§  45  a.  Lapse  of  Time  ;  Grants  from 
the  Sovereign. 

§  46.    Same  :  Grant  from  an  Individual. 

§  47.    Same  :  Personalty. 

§  48.  Presumptions  of  Fact ;  Summary. 

3.  Burden  of  Proof  in  Specific  Cases. 

§  74.    In  general. 

§  75.  Damages ;  Eight  to  open  and 
close. 

§  76.   Same:  Unliquidated  Damages. 

§  77.    Will  Cases. 

§§  78-81.   Sundry  Instances. 

§  81  a.    Sanity. 

§  81  b.  Criminal  Cases  ;  Alibi;  Self- 
defence. 

§  81  c.  Measure  of  Persuasion  ;  Proof 
beyond  a  Reasonable  Doubt. 

§  81  d.  Same :  Proof  by  Preponder- 
ance of  Evidence. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

LAW  AND  FACT;  JUDGE  AND  JURY  .     .     . 

§  81  e.    Admissibility  of  Evidence. 
§  81 /.    Questions   of   Fact   sometimes 
determined  by  the  Judge. 


162 

§  81  g.   Questions  of   Law   sometimes 
determined  by  the  Jury. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 


1.   General  Principle. 

§  81  h.  History  and  Scope  of  the  Phrase. 

§§  82-84.   General  Principle. 

§  85.  Applications  of  the  Principle. 

§  86.  Same:   (1)  Act  required  by  Law 
to  be  in  Writing. 

§  87.  Same  :  (2)  Same :  Act  reduced  to 
Writing  by  the  Parties. 

§§  88-90.   Same  :  (3)  Contents  of  Writ- 
ing to  be  proved. 


169 


2.  Specific  Rules  included  under  the  Best 
Evidence  Principle. 

§  97  a.  Rules  covered  by  the  Term 
"Best  Evidence." 

§  97  b.  (1)  Proving  the  Contents  of  a 
Writing. 

§  97  c.  (2)  Testing  a  Witness  by  Oath 
and  Cross-examination. 

§  97d.  (3)  Classes  of  Witnesses  pre- 
ferred to  others. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
THE  HEARSAY  RULE  182 


§§  98-99  a.   General  Principle. 
Hearsay  Rule  not  applicable. 

§  100.  Rule  applies  only  to  Testimonial 
Assertions. 

§  101.  Words  used  Evidentially,  though 
not  Testi menially. 


§  108.  Verbal  Acts,  or  Verbal  Parts  of 
an  Act. 

§110.  Same:  Statements  after  the  Act 
ended,  inadmissible. 

§  110  a.  Words  Material  as  a  Part  of 
the  Issue. 


XVI 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  X. 

Page 

EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE  HEARSAY    RULE  :  DECLARATIONS  IN    PEDI- 
GREE CASES  (OR,  DECLARATIONS  ABOUT  FAMILY  HISTORY)        195 


§  114«.  General  Principle  of  the  Ex- 
ceptions to  the  Hearsay  Rule. 

Declarations  in  Pedigree  Cases. 

§  114  b.  Necessity  for  this  Evidence  ; 
Death. 

§  114  c.  Whose  Declarations  are  receiv- 
able. 


§  114  d.    Form  of  the  Declaration. 

§  114  e.  Post  litem  motam;  No  interest 
to  deceive. 

§  114 /.  Kind  of  Fact  that  may  be  the 
Subject  of  the  Declaration. 

§  114*7.  Kind  of  Litigation  in  which 
such  Declarations  are  receivable. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE  (continued) :  REGULAR  EN- 
TRIES IN  THE  COURSE  OF  BUSINESS  204 


§  120  a.  Regular  Entries  made  in  the 
Course  of  Business. 

§  120  b.  Parties'  Shopbooks  ;  History  of 
the  Exception. 


§  120  c.  Same :  Rules  for  Use  of  Par- 
ties' Shopbook  Entries. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE  HEARSAY   RULE    (continued) :    REPUTATION 
ON  MATTERS  OF  PUBLIC  OR  GENERAL  INTEREST     .          .     . 


214 


1.  Reputation  as  to  Matters  involving  Prop- 
erty-rights and  the  like. 

§  128.    General  Principle. 

§§  128  a,  129.  Reputation  must  come 
from  a  Competent  Source. 

§  130.  Rights  must  be  ancient,  and 
Declarant  dead. 

§§  131-133.  Reputation  must  be  ante 
litcm  motam. 

§§  135,  136.  Interest  as  a  Member  of  the 
Community  does  not  exclude. 

§  137.    Matters  of  Private  Interest. 

§  138.   Particular  Facts. 

§  138  a.  Reputation  as  to  Private  Boun- 
daries ;  American  Doctrine. 


§  139.  Vehicle  of  the  Reputation  ;  In- 
dividual Declarations,  Maps,  Leases,  Ver- 
dicts, etc. 

§  1 40.  Immaterial  whether  for  or  against 
a  Public  Right. 

§  140  a.  American  Doctrine  as  to  Indi- 
vidual Declarations  about  Private  Boun- 
daries. 

2.    Reputation  as  Evidence  of  other  Matters. 

§  140  b.  Character,  Insanity,  Solvency, 
etc. 

§  140  c.  Marriage. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE  (continued)  :  DECLARATIONS 

AGAINST  INTEREST  .  .  23*2 


§§  147-149.    General  Principle. 

§  150.  Facts  against  Pecuniary  Inter- 
est ;  in  General. 

§  151.  Same :  Preponderance  of  In- 
terest. 

§152.  Same:  Statement  admissible  for 
all  Facts  contained  in  it. 

§§  152  tf,  b.  Same:  Indorsements  of 
Payment  of  Debt  barred  by  Limitation. 


§  152  c.  Facts  against  Proprietary  In- 
terest. 

§  152  d.  Facts  against  other  than  a 
Pecuniary  or  Proprietary  Interest. 

§  153.    Competency  of  Declarant. 

§  154.  Authentication  of  Entries  by 
Agents,  Stewards,  etc. 

§  155.    Vicar's  Books. 


CONTENTS. 


XVU 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


Page 


EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE  (continued}  :  DYING  DECLA- 

RATIONS    .............     ...          245 


§  156.    In  general. 

§  156  a.  Limitations  as  to  Kind  of  Is- 
sue, Person  declaring,  and  Subject  of 
Declaration. 

"    §  157.   Competency  of  Declarant ;  Re- 
ligious Belief. 

§  158.  Consciousness  of  Impending 
Death. 

§  159.  Testimonial  Aspect  of  the  Dec- 
larations. 


§  159  a 
quired. 

§  159  b. 

§  161. 

§  161  a 
roborating 

§  1616. 
the  Court. 

§  161  c. 

§162. 


.   Same :     Substance    only    re- 
Same  :  Declarations  by  Signs. 

Same  :  Declarations  in  Writing. 

,    Same :   Impeaching  and  cor- 

the  Declarant. 
Admissibility  a  Question  for 

Sundries. 
Weight  of  Declarations. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE  (continued)  :  DECLARATIONS 
OF  A  MENTAL  OR  PHYSICAL  CONDITION;  SPONTANEOUS  DEC- 
LARATIONS ;  LEARNED  TREATISES  AND  TABLES  ;  REGULAR 
COMMERCIAL  PUBLICATIONS  ;  OFFICIAL  STATEMENTS. 

SUNDRY  APPLICATIONS  OF  THE  RULE     .          .     .  254 


Declarations  of  a  Mental  or  Physical  Con- 
dition. 

§  162  a.  General  Principle. 

§  162  b.  Statements  of  Pain  and  Suf- 
fering. 

§162c.  Statements  of  Design,  Plan, 
Intent. 

§  162  d.  Statements  of  Reason,  Mo- 
tive, Feeling,  Emotion. 

§  162  e.  Statements  by  a  Testator. 

Spontaneous  Declarations  (Res  Gestce). 

§  162/.    General  Principle. 

§  162  g.   Limits  of  the  Principle. 

§  162  h.  Sundry  Doctrines  ;  Complaint 
of  Rape  ;  Charge  by  Seduced  Woman  ; 
Complaint  after  Robbery. 


Learned  Treatises  and  Statistical  Tables. 

§  162  i.    Exception  generally  denied. 
§  162.;'.    Partial  Forms  of  Recognition. 
§  162  k.  Application  of  the  Prohibition. 

Regular  Commercial  Publications. 

§  ]  62 1.  Reports  of  Market  Prices  ; 
Reports  of  Legal  Decisions ;  etc. 

Official  Statements. 

§  162  in.   General  Principle. 

§  162  n.  Application  of  the  Principle. 

Sundry  Applications  of  the  Hearsay  Rule. 

§  1620.  View  by  Jury;  Testimony  at 
a  View  ;  Juror's  Private  Knowledge. 

§  162  p.  Interpreter  ;  Counsel  ;  Ex 
parte  Experiments. 


CHAPTER  XYI. 

THE  HEARSAY  RULE  SATISFIED  ;  TESTIMONY  BY  DEPOSITION  AND 

TESTIMONY  AT  A  FORMER  TRIAL  .  276 


§  163.   In  general. 

§  163  a.  Opportunity  of  Cross-exami- 
nation :  (1)  Testimony  at  a  Former  Trial. 

§  163  b.  Same  :  (2)  Depositions  de  bene 
esse. 

§  163  c.  Same :  (3)  Depositions  in  per- 
petuam  memoriam. 

§  163  d.  Same  :  (4)  Testimony  at  Pres- 
ent Trial. 

§  1 63  e.  Same  :  Incomplete  Cross-ex- 
amination. 

VOL.  i. — b 


§  163/.  Confrontation  ;  General  Prin- 
ciple. 

§  163  g.  Same  :  Decease,  Absence,  Ill- 
ness, etc.,  of  Witness  ;  (a)  Testimony  at 
a  Former  Trial. 

§163  h.    Same:  (b)  Depositions. 

§  163  i.  Same  :  Witness  Present  in 
Court,  or  otherwise  Available. 

§  165.  Proving  the  Substance  of  For- 
mer Testimony. 

§  166.  Mode  of  proving  Former  Testi- 
mony. 


xvm 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


ADMISSIONS 

1.  In  General. 

§  169.   General  Principle. 

§  170.  Admissions  and  Confessions 
distinguished. 

§  170  a.  Party  need  not  be  asked  be- 
fore proving  an  Admission. 

2.  Persons  whose  Statements  are  receivable 

as  Admissions. 

§  171.   Parties  to  the  Record. 

§§  172,  173.     Same  :  Nominal  Parties. 

§174.  Same:  Joint  Promisors;  Par- 
ties in  a  Testamentary  Cause  ;  etc. 

§  175.  Same:  Town  Corporators. 

§  176.  Same:  Mere  Community  of  In- 
terest not  enough. 

§  177.  Same:  Interest  must  first  be 
shown. 

§  178.  Same :  Answers  of  Parties  in 
Chancery. 

§  179.  Same :  Interest  must  exist  at 
Time  of  Admission  made. 

§§  180,  181.  Persons  not  Parties  to  the 
Record  ;  In  general. 

§§  182-184.  Same:  Referees;  Appoint- 
ees ;  Interpreters. 

§  184 a.    Same:  Conspirators. 

§  184  b.    Same:  Partners. 

§§  184  c,  184c?.    Same:  Agents. 

§  185.   Same:  Husband  and  Wife. 

§  186.  Same :  Attorneys  of  Record  ; 
Pleadings. 

§§  187,  188.  Same  :  Principal  and 
Surety. 

§  189.  Same:  Privity  of  Estate  ;  An- 
cestor or  Grantor  during  Ownership. 

§  190.  Same :  Vendor  or  Assignor  of 
Personalty. 

§  191.  Party  or  Privy  need  not  be  called. 

3.  What  Kinds  of  Conduct  or  Utterances 

amount  to  an  Admission. 
§  192.    Offers  of  Compromise. 
§  193.    Statements   made   under    Con- 
straint. 


Page 

290 

§  194.  Statements  made  incidentally 
or  in  unrelated  Transactions. 

§  195.    Assuming  a  Character. 

§  195  a.  Conduct :  (1)  Falsehood  and 
Fraud ;  Manufacturing  and  destroying 
Evidence. 

§  195  b.  Same  :  (2)  Failure  to  produce 
Evidence. 

§  195c.  Same:  (3)  Failure  to  produce 
Documents. 

§  195  c?.  Same:  (4)  Repairs  and  Pre- 
cautions after  an  Injury. 

§  196.  Same :  (5)  Sundry  Kinds  of 
Conduct. 

§§  197,  198.  Same:  (6)  Failure  to  repu- 
diate another's  Assertion  ;  Statements 
made  in  a  Party's  Presence. 

§  199.  Same:  (7)  Possession  of  Docu- 
ments ;  Unanswered  Letters  ;  Books  of  a 
Society  or  Corporation. 

4.   Sundry  Limitations. 

§  200.  Weight  and  Value  of  Admis- 
sions. 

§  201.  Explanations  ;  Putting  in  the 
whole  of  a  Conversation,  Document,  or 
Correspondence. 

§  201  a.   Same  :  Other  Modes. 

§  202.    Admissions  based  on  Hearsay. 

§  203.  Parol  Admissions  of  Title  or  of 
Contents  of  Documents. 

5.    Conclusive  Admissions  (Estoppel;  Ju- 
dicial  Waiver). 

§  204.  Admissions  as  Estoppels  between 
Parties. 

§  205.    Judicial  Admissions. 

§  206.    Same  :  Admissions  by  Mistake. 

§§  207-210.  Admissions  acted  upon,  as 
giving  rise  to  Estoppels. 

§  211.    Admissions  in  Deeds. 

§  212.  Non-judicial  Admissions,  not 
conclusive. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


CONFESSIONS 

1.  In  general. 

§  213.    What  is  a  Confession. 
§§  214,  215.    Weight  of  Confessions. 

2.   Co'ftfessions  as   Sufficient   Evidence  for 
Conviction. 

§  216.   Judicial  Confessions  ;   Plea  of 
Guilty. 


346 

§  217.    Proof  of  Corpus  'Delicti  as  Cor- 
roboration. 

§  21 7  a.    Confessions  of  Treason. 

3.  Construction  of  Confessions. 

§  218.  Confession    to-  be  taken  as  a 
Whole. 


CONTENTS. 


XIX 


4.  Admissibility  of  Confessions. 

§  219.    General  Principle. 

§  219  a.  Tests  in  applying  the  Prin- 
ciple. 

§219&.   Judge  and  Jury. 

§§  220,  220  a.  Various  Specific  Induce- 
ments. 

§  220  I.  Confessions  induced  by  Spirit- 
ual Exhortations,  by  Trick,  etc. 

§  220c.  Confessions  while  under  Ar- 
rest. 


§  221.  Removing  the  Improper  Induce- 
ment. 

§§  222,  223.    Persons  in  Authority. 

§§  224-226.  Confessions  at  an  Exami- 
nation before  a  Magistrate. 

§§  227,  228.  Magistrate's  Report  of 
Examination  conclusive. 

§§  231,  232.  Corroborative  Discoveries, 
as  curing  a  Defective  Confession. 

§  233.  Confessions  of  other  Persons  ; 
Conspirators. 

§  234.   Same  :  Agents. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 
EXCLUSIONS  BASED  ON  PUBLIC  POLICY  ;  PRIVILEGE 


Page 

373 


§  236.   In  general. 

1.  Attorney  and  Client. 

§  237.   General  Principle. 

§  238.    Reason  for  the  Privilege. 

§  239.   Who  is  a  Legal  Adviser. 

§  240.  Purpose  and  Nature  of  the  Com- 
munication. 

§  240  a.   Same  :  Opinion  of  Counsel. 

§  241.  Same  :  Consultation  as  Convey- 
ancer ;  Title-deeds  and  other  Documents. 

§  242.   Same  :  Attorney  as  a  Party. 

§  242  a.  Same :  Consultation  for  Un- 
lawful Purpose. 

§  243.   Death  ;  and  Waiver. 

§  244.  Communications  not  within  the 
Principle. 

§  245.   Same:  Illustrations. 


2.    Other  Confidential  Relations. 

§  247.   Priest  and  Penitent. 
§  247  a.    Physician  and  Patient. 
§  248.   Ordinary  Private  Relations. 
§  250.    Government  and  Informer. 
§  251.   Confidential  Official  Business. 
§  252.    Proceedings  of  Grand  Jurors. 
§  252  a.   Proceedings  of  Traverse  Jurors. 
§  254.   Communications  between  Hus- 
band and  Wife. 

3.   Other  Exclusions  based  on  Public  Policy. 

§  254  a.  Evidence  procured  by  Illegal 
Means. 

§  254  6.    Indecent  Evidence. 

§  254  c.  Judge ;  Juror  ;  Arbitrator  ; 
Attorney. 


CHAPTER  XX. 

NUMBER  OF  WITNESSES;  QUANTITY  OF  EVIDENCE;    CORROBORA- 

TION 397 

Same  :  Inconsistent  Statements 


§  255.  Treason. 

§  256.  Same :  Overt  Act  and  Evidence 
of  it. 

§  257.  Perjury. 

§  257  a.   Same :  Several  Assignments. 

§  258.  Same :  Corroborating  Circum- 
stances. 


§259. 
as  Proof. 

§  260.   Answers  in  Chancery. 

§  260  a.   Usage  ;  Wills  and  Deeds. 

§  260  b.   Accomplice  ;   Complainant  in 
Rape  or  Seduction. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 
THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  RULE 404 

1.    The  Parol  Evidence  Rule. 


§§  275,  276.    General  Principle. 

§  277.    Interpretation. 

§  278.  Same  :  Words  taken  in  their 
Ordinary  Sense. 

§  279.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  applicable 
to  Parties  only. 


§  280.   Local  Usage. 

§§  281,  282.    Collateral  Agreements. 

§  283.  Agreement  in  more  than  one 
Writing. 

§  284.  Instrument  may  be  shown  Void 
or  Voidable. 

§  284  a.  Transaction  partially  reduced 
to  Writing. 


XX 


CONTENTS. 


§  285.    Contradicting  a  Recital. 

§§  286-288.  Interpretation  of  Terms  of 
the  Instrument. 

§§  289-291.  Interpretation  of  Wills  ; 
Declarations  of  Intention. 

§  292.    Interpretation  by  Special  Usage. 

§  293.  Usage,  applied  to  Statutes,  Char- 
ters, and  Deeds. 

§  294.  Usage,  applied  to  annex  Inci- 
dents. 

§§  295,  295  a.  Standard  of  Usage  as 
aiding  Interpretation. 

§  296.  Will  Cases  ;  Rebutting  an 
Equity. 

§  296  a.  Mutual  Mistake ;  Deed  Abso- 
lute as  Security. 

§§  297-300.  Interpretation  of  Ambigui- 
ties. 

§  301.  Interpretation  of  False  Descrip- 
tions. 

§  302.   Showing  a  Discharge. 

§§  303,  304.  Showing  an  Additional  or 
Substituted  Agreement. 

§  305.   Contradicting  Receipts. 

2.    Another    View   of  the    Parol  Evidence 
Hide  ;   Integration  and  Interpretation. 

§  305  a.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  not  a 
Rule  of  Evidence. 


§  305  b.  Constitution  and  Interpreta- 
tion of  Legal  Acts ;  Parol  Evidence 
Rule. 

§  305  c.  (I)  Constitution  of  Legal  Acts  ; 
(1)  Whether  an  Act  has  been  consummated 
at  all. 

§  305  d. .  Same:  (2)  Whether  a  Defence 
or  Excuse  exists,  rendering  the  Act 
voidable. 

§  305  e.  Integration  of  Legal  Acts  by 
Intent  of  Parties ;  (1)  Whether  the  Act  has 
been  integrated  at  all . 

§  305 /.  Same:  (2)  Whether  the  Part 
of  the  Act  in  question  has  been  inte- 
grated. 

§  305  g.  Integration  by  Requirement  of 
Law. 

§  305  h.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  applica- 
ble only  between  the  Parties. 

§  305  i.  (II)  Interpretation  of  Legal 
Acts. 

§  305  j.  Same :  General  Principle  of 
Interpretation. 

§  305  k.  Same:  (1)  Rule  against  using 
Declarations  of  Intention. 

§  305  L  Same  :  (2)  Rule  against  dis- 
turbing a  Clear  Meaning. 

§  305  m.  Same :  (3)  Rule  against  cor- 
recting a  False  Description. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


Page 


WITNESSES  :  ATTENDANCE   IN  COURT,  AND  TESTIMONY  BY  DEPO- 

SITION .  468 


§§  306-308.    Classification. 

1.   Attendance  to  testify  in  Person. 

§  309.  Subpcena. 

§  310.  Fees  and  Expenses  :   (1)  Civil 
Cases. 

§311.  Same:  (2)  Criminal  Cases. 

§312.  Witness  in  Custody. 

§  313.  Recognizance. 

§  314.  Time  of  Service  of  Subpoena. 

§  315.  Manner  of  Service. 

§  316.  Protection  from  Arrest. 


§  317.  Same  :  Persons  included. 

§  318.  Same  :  Remedy. 

§  319.  Failure  to  attend,  as  a  Con- 
tempt. 

2.    Testifying  by  Deposition. 

§  320.   At  Common  Law. 

§§  321,  322.    By  Statute. 

§  323.  Same  :  Magistrate's  Certificate  j 
Mode  of  objecting. 

§§  324,  325.  Dedimus  Potestatem  ;  Dep- 
ositions in  Perpetuam, 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  QUALIFICATIONS  .     . 

§§  326,  327.    In  general. 

§  328  a.   Proof  of  Incoinpetency. 

1.   Interest. 

§  328  b.  Interest  in  general  as  a  Dis- 
qualification. 

§  328  c.  Parties  in  Civil  Cases  ;  Testi- 
mony to  Own  Intent. 


485 


§  333  a.   Defendants  in  Criminal  Cases. 

§  333  b.  Survivors  of  a  Transaction 
with  a  Deceased  Person. 

§  333  c.    Husband  and  Wife. 

§§  334,335.  Same:  Common-law  Rule, 
in  general. 

§  336.  Same :  Matters  occurring  be- 
fore Marriage. 


CONTENTS. 


xxi 


§§  337,  338.     Same :     Testimony  after 
Death  or  Divorce. 

§339.   Same:  Marriage  must  be  lawful. 

§340.  Same:  Waiver  of  Privilege  by  the 
other  Spouse. 

§  341.   Same:  Spouse  not  a  Party,  but 
directly  interested. 

§  342.  Same :  Spouse  not  legally  inter- 
ested. 

§  343.    Same 
Necessity. 

§  344.    Same 

§  345.   Same 

§  346.   Same 


Exceptions  in  Cases  of 


Secret  Facts. 
High  Treason. 
Dying  Declarations. 


2.   Oath. 

§  364  a.  Object  and  Nature  of  the  Oath. 

§  364  b.  Form  of  the  Oath. 

§  367.  Capacity  to  take  the  Oath  ; 
Children. 

§  368.    Same :   Atheists. 

§  369.  Same :  Nature  of  Theological 
Belief. 

§  370.  Same  :  Mode  of  ascertaining 
Bel'ief. 

§  370  a.    Statutory  Changes. 

3.  Mental  Capacity. 

§  370  b.   In  general. 
§  370  c.   Insanity. 
§  370  d.   Infancy. 
§  370  e.   Intoxication. 

4.  Moral  Capacity. 

§,  372.   Infamy  ;  Conviction  of  Crime. 
§  373.   Same  :  Kind  of  Crime. 
§  374.   Same  :  Exception  for  a  Party. 
§  375.    Same :    Judgment    necessary  ; 
Production  of  Record. 


§  376.  Same  :  Conviction  in  another 
Jurisdiction. 

§§377,378.  Same:  Removed  by  Pardon. 

§  378  «.   Same  :  Statutory  Changes. 

§  378  b.   Race,  Religious  Belief. 

§  379.   Accomplices.  - 

§  380.   Same  :   Corroboration. 

§381.  Same:  What  amounts  to  Cor- 
roboration. 

§  382.   Same :  Who  are  Accomplices. 

5.   Experiential  Capacity. 

§  430  a.   In  general. 

§  430  b.   Foreign  Law. 

§  430  c.    Medical  Matters. 

§430d.  Handwriting;  Paper- money, etc. 

§  430  e.   Value. 

§  430  /.  Discretion  of  Trial  Court. 

§  430  g.  Opinion  Rule. 

6.   Knowledge;  Personal  Observation. 

§  430  h.   In  general. 

§  430  i.  Quality  of  Knowledge  ;  "Be- 
lief," "Impression,"  "Opinion." 

§  430,;'.  Personal  Observation,  not  Hear- 
say Knowledge. 

§  430ya.  Same:  Contents  of  Documents. 

§  430  k.  Same:  Testimony  to  one's  own 
Age. 

§  430  1.  Same  :  Medical  Man's  Knowl- 
edge. 

§  430  m.  Same  :  Knowledge  of  For- 
eign Law. 

§  430  n.  Same :  Knowledge  of  Values 
and  Prices. 

§  430  o.  Same  :  Sundries. 

§  430  p.  Adequacy  of  Opportunities  of 
Observation  ;  (1)  Sanity;  (2)  Value. 

§  430  q.  Testimony  based  on  Telephonic 
Communication. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

Page 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  MODE  OF  EXAMINATION 535 

§  431.    In  general. 


1 .   Sequestration. 

§  432.    Allowable  in  Discretion. 

§  432  a.    Who  may  be  excluded. 

§  432  b.    Exclusion  of  some  only. 

§  432  c.   Consequences  of  Disobedience. 

2.  Leading  Questions. 
§  434.    General  Rule. 
§  435.    Exceptions. 

3.   Recollection. 

§  439  a.    Two  Kinds  of  Recollection, 
Past  and  Present. 

§  439  b.   Record  of  Past  Recollection. 


§  439  c.   Stimulating  (Refreshing)  Pres- 
ent Recollection. 

4.   Modes  of  giving  Testimony. 
§  439  d.   In  general. 


§  439  e. 
§439/. 
§  439  g. 
Models. 
§  439  h. 


Interpretation. 
Writing. 
Maps,   Drawings, 

Photographs. 


Diagrams, 


5.   Opinion  Rule. 

§  441  b.    General  Principle. 
§  441  c.   Matters  of  Law. 
§  441  d.   Conduct  as  to  Care,  Reason- 
ableness,  Safety,  etc. 


XX11 


CONTENTS. 


§  441  e.  Insurance  ;  Increase  of  Bi?k. 
§  441  /.    Sanity. 
§  441  g.   Value. 

§  441  h.  State  of  Mind  (Intention,  Feel- 
ings, Meaning,  etc. )  of  another  Person. 
§  441  i.   Same  :  Discriminations. 


§  441  j.   Sundries. 

§  441  k.  Hypothetical  Questions  ;  Gen« 
eral  Principle. 

§  441 1.  Same  :  Rules  for  the  Use  of 
Hypothetical  Questions. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


Page 


WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  IMPEACHMENT  AND  DISCREDITING  ;  CROSS- 
EXAMINATION     563 


1.    Who  may  be  Impeached. 

§  442.   Impeaching  one's  own  Witness. 

§  443.  Same  :  Rule  not  applicable  to  a 
Compulsory  Witness. 

§  443  a.  Same  :  (1)  By  Evidence  of 
Bias,  Interest,  or  Corruption. 

§  443  b.  Same  :  (2)  By  Evidence  of 
Error ;  Contradicting  the  Witness. 

§444.  Same:  (3)  By  Evidence  of  Prior 
Inconsistent  Statements. 

§  444  a.  Same :  Who  is  one's  own  Wit- 
ness. 

§  444  b.   Accused  as  a  Witness. 

§  444  c.  Impeaching  Witness  im- 
peached. 

§  444  d.  Hearsay  Statements  ;  Attest- 
ing Witness. 

2.   Cross-examination,  in  general. 

§  445.  Putting  in  one's  own  Case  on 
Cross-examination. 

§S  446-449.   Sundries 


3.  Kinds  of  Impeaching  Evidence. 

§  450.   Bias. 

§  450  a.   Corruption. 

§  450  b.   Insanity,  Intoxication,  etc. 

§  461  a.   Character  ;  (1)  Kind  of  Char- 
acter. 

§  461  b.    Character  ;  (2)  Proof  by  Par- 
ticular Acts  of  Misconduct. 

§  461  c.  Character  ;  (3)  Proof  by  Per- 
sonal Knowledge  or  Opinion. 

§461d.  Character;  (4)  Proof  by  Bepu- 
tation. 

§  461  e.  Contradiction;  Collateral  Error. 

§  461 /.  Prior  Inconsistent  Statements. 

§  462.  Same :  Witness'  Attention  must 
be  called. 

§  462  a.  Same  :  What  is  an  Inconsist- 
ent Statement. 

§  462  6.  Same  :  Explanations ;  Whole 
of  Statement. 

§§  463-465.  Same  :  Inconsistent  State- 
ments in  Writing ;  Rule  in  The  Queen's 
Case. 

§  465  a.  Same  :  Theory  and  Policy  of 
the  Rule. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  REHABILITATION  ;  RE-EXAMINATION  AND 

REBUTTAL 600 


1.   Re-examination  and  Rebuttal,  in 
general. 

§  466   a.   Order  of  Topics ;  Discretion 
of  Trial  Court. 


Facts. 


2.   Rehabilitation  of  a  Witness. 
§  467.    Explaining  away  Discrediting 


§  468.  Re-examination  on  Irrelevant 
Matter. 

§  469  a.  Supporting  by  Evidence  of 
Good  Character. 

§  469  b.  Corroboration  by  Evidence  of 
Prior  Similar  Statements. 

§  469  c.  Same  :  Fresh  Complaint  of 
Rape  ;  Constancy  of  Accusation  in  Bas- 
tardy. 


CHAPTER    XXVII. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  PRIVILEGE 611 


§  469  of.  Self-crimination;  (1)  By  Testi- 
mony on  the  Stand. 


§  469  e.    Same:    (1)  By  Exhibition  of 
the  Person,  or  the  like. 


CONTENTS. 


XX1U 


§  4C9/.  Same:  (3)  By  Production  of 
Documents. 

§  469  g.    Civil  Liability  or  Loss. 

§  469  h.   Forfeiture. 

§  469  i.  Infamy  or  Disgrace:  (1)  Mat- 
ters Material  to  the  Issue. 

§469/.  Same:  (2)  Matters  Collateral 
to  the  Issue. 


§  469  k.  Same  :  (3)  Indirect  Exposure. 

§  469  I.  Same  :  Summary. 

§  469  m.  Corporal  Inspection  of  Civil 
Party. 

§  469  n.  Witness'  Production  of  Title- 
deeds. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


PUBLIC  DOCUMENTS 

§  470.   Classification  of  Writings. 

1.    Inspection  of  Records  and  Public 
Documents. 

§§  471,  472.    Records  of  Royal  Courts. 

§  473.    Records  of  Inferior  Tribunals. 

§  474.    Quasi-public  Records. 

§  475-    Books  of  Public  Officers. 

§  476.    Inspection  Injurious  to  Public 
Interest. 

§§  477,  478.    Procedure    in    obtaining 
Inspection. 

2.   Mode  of  Proof  of  Public  Documents. 

§  479.   Acts  of  State. 
§§  480,  481.    Legislative  Acts. 
§  482.    Legislative  Journals. 
§§  483-485.  Official  Registers. 


Page 

623 


§  485  a.    Registered  Conveyances. 
§§  486-488.    Foreign  Laws. 
§  489.   Same :  Laws  of  Domestic  States. 
§  490.   Same  :  Judicial  Notice. 

3.   Admissibility  and  Effect  of  Public 
Documents. 

§  491.  Legislative  Recitals  and  Jour- 
nals, Proclamations,  Diplomatic  Corre- 
spondence, etc. 

§  492.   Government  Gazette. 
§  493.    Official  Registers. 
§  494.    Same :  Ship's  Register. 
Ship's  Log-book. 
Requisites    of    Official 


§  495.    Same 
§  496.    Same 
Character. 
§  497.   Same 


Historical  Works. 


§  498.    Official  Certificates. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 
RECORDS  AND  JUDICIAL  WRITINGS    ,  644 


1.    Mode  of  proving  Judicial  Records. 

§  500.    Statutes. 

§  501.    Judicial  Records,  in  general. 

§  502.  Same  :  Production  of  the  Record 
itself. 

§  503.    Same  :  Court  Seals  recognized. 

§  504.  Domestic  State  Records  ;  Proof 
under  Federal  Statute. 

§  505.    Same  :  Kind  of  Record  affected. 

§  506.    Same  :  Form  of  Attestation. 

§  507.    Office  Copies. 

§  508.    Examined  Copies. 

§  509.    Lost  Records. 

§  510.    Verdicts. 

§  511.   Decrees  in  Chancery. 

§  512.    Answers  in  Chancery. 

§  513.   Records  of  Inferior  Courts. 

§  514.    Foreign  Judgments. 

§  515.    Inquisitions. 

§  516.    Depositions  in  Chancery. 

§  517.    Depositions  under  Commission. 

§  518.    Testaments. 

§  519.   Letters  of  Administration. 


§  520.   Magistrates' 
Criminal  Cases. 
§  521.   Writs. 


Examinations    in 


2.    Admissibility  and  Effect  of  Judgments 
and  Records. 

§  522.    In  general. 

§  523.  General  Principle :  Judgments 
bind  Parties  and  Privies,  but  not  Strangers. 

§  524.    Binding  Effect  must  be  Mutual. 

§  525.  Exception  for  Judgments  in 
Rem. 

§  526.  Exception  for  Judgments  on 
Public  Matters. 

§  527.  Exception  for  Judgments  on 
Collateral  Facts. 

§  527  a.    Judgments  as  Admissions. 

§  528.  Judgments  bind  only  for  Mate- 
rial Issues. 

§  529.  Proceedings  must  have  been 
Final. 

§  530.  Judgment  must  have  been  on 
Merits. 


XXIV 


CONTENTS. 


§  531.    Former  Recovery. 

§  532.    Same  :  Identity  of  Issue. 

§  533.  Same :  Former  Kecovery  in 
Tort. 

§  534.  Judgment  conclusive  if  Issue 
necessarily  involved. 

§  535.   Who  are  Parties. 

§  536.    Who  are  Privies. 

§  537.    Judgments  in  Criminal  Cases. 

§§  538,  539.    Judgments  as  Facts. 

§  539  a.  Judgment  against  Joint  and 
Several  Contractors. 

§  540.    Foreign  Judgments. 

§  541.    Same  :  In  Item. 

§  542.  Same  :  In  Garnishment  or  Trus- 
tee Process. 

§  543.    Same  :  Couclusiveness. 


§§  544,  545.  Same  :  Affecting  Personal 
Status. 

§§  546,  547.   Same  :  In  Personam. 

§  548.  Same :  Judgments  of  Domestic 
States. 

§549.  Same:  Parties  in  Foreign  Judg- 
ments. 

§  550.  Judgments  of  Ecclesiastical 
Courts. 

§  551.  Decrees  in  Chancery. 

§  552.  Depositions. 

§  553.  Same  :  Cross-examination. 

§  554.  Same  :  In  Equity. 

§  555.  Same :  As  involving  Reputa- 
tion. 

§  556.  Inquisitions  of  Lunacy,  etc. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 


PRIVATE  WRITINGS 
§  557.   In  general. 


1.    Production  and  Inspection. 

§§  559,  560.  Production  by  Bill  or 
Order. 

§  563.  Mere  Inspection  as  making  Doc- 
uments Evidence  for  Producing  Party. 

2.   Proving  Contents. 
§  563  a.    General  Principle. 

(a)  General  Rule :  the  Writing  itself  to 
be  produced  or  accounted  for. 

§  563  b.  Loss  or  Destruction  ;  Dili- 
gence of  Search. 

§  563  c.  Possession  of  Opponent ;  No- 
tice to  Produce. 

§  563  d.  Same  :  Procedure  in  giving 
Notice. 

§  563  e.  Writings  in  a  Third  Person's 
Control  ;  Writings  out  of  the  Jurisdiction. 

§  563 /.    Public  Documents. 

§  563  g.    Appointments  to  Office. 

§  563  h.  Summaries  of  Voluminous 
Entries. 

§  563  i.   Non-portable  Writings. 

(b)    Exceptions  to  the  Rule. 

§  563  j.    VoirDire. 

§§  563  k,  563  I.  Admissions  of  Oppo- 
nent. 

§  563  m.    Sundry  Exceptions. 

(c)   Rule  not  Applicable. 

§  563  n.  Writings,  as  distinguished 
from  Other  Objects. 

§  563  o.  Contents  of  a  Writing,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  Other  Facts. 


Page 
679 

§  563  p.  What  Writing  is  the  Original 
to  be  proved. 

(d)   Kinds  of  Secondary  Evidence. 
§  563  q.    Preferred  Copies. 
§  563  r.    Copy  of  a  Copy. 

3.    Alteration  of  Documents. 

§  564.  Presumption  as  to  Time  of  Al- 
teration. 

§  565.  Effect  of  Alteration  as  Avoiding 
the  Instrument. 

§  566.  Same :  Alteration  and  Spolia- 
tion. 

§§  567,  568.  Same:  Immaterial  Altera- 
tions. 

§  568  a.   Same  :  Alterations  by  Consent. 

4.    Proving  Execution  of  Attested 
Documents. 

§  569.  Attesting  Witness  must  be 
Called. 

§  569  a.    Kind  of  Document  affected. 

§  569  b.  Opponent's  Admission,  as  dis- 
pensing with  the  Rule. 

§  569  c.     Who  is  attesting  Witness. 

§  569  d.  Number  of  Witnesses  to  be 
Called. 

§  570.  Exceptions :  (1)  Ancient  In- 
struments. 

§  571.  Same  :  (2)  Claim  by  Opponent 
under  the  Instrument. 

§  572.  Same :  (3)  Attesting  Witness 
Unavailable. 

§  572  a.   Same  :  Diligent  Search. 

§  573.  Same:  (4)  Official  Bonds ;  Regis- 
tered Deeds. 

§  573  b.  Same:  (5)  Instrument  not 
Directly  in  Issue. 


CONTENTS. 


XXV 


§  575.  Witness  Unavailable  in  Person  ; 
Proof  of  Signature. 

5.  Proving  Execution  of  Other  (Unattested) 
Writings. 

§  575  a.   In  general ;  Identity  of  Signer. 

§  575  b.  Genuineness  of  Ancient  Docu- 
ments. 

§  575  c.    Replies  received  by  Mail. 

§  576.  Proof  by  Comparison  of  Hand- 
writing. 

§  577.   Same  :  Qualified  Witnesses. 


§  578.    Same  :  Ancient  Writings. 

§  578  a.  Same:  Comparison  of  Speci- 
mens by  the  Jury. 

§  578  b.     Same  :  Testing  the  Witness. 

§§579-581.  Same:  Expert  Testifying 
from  Comparison  of  Specimens. 

§  581  a.  Discriminations  ;  Comparison 
of  Spelling ;  Testimony  to  a  Feigned 
Hand;  etc. 

6.    Conclusion. 
§  584.  Conclusion. 


APPENDIX  I. 
"  II. 
"  HI. 


Page 

CONSTITUTIONS  AND  STATUTES 731 

PASSAGES  OMITTED  FROM  ORIGINAL  TEXT  .     .  817 
CONFESSIONS     ON     EXAMINATION     BEFORE     A 

MAGISTRATE  .  ...  931 


INDEX  OF  TOPICS 961 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 

A. 

Adams  v.  Power 

73 

v,  Sanders 

212 

A.  M.  R.  Co.  ».  Griffith 

Mil' 

v.  Stanyan 

130,  131,  139 

Aaron  v.  State 

220 

r.  State                            13  e 

,  439  g,  439  h 

Abbey  v.  Lill 

440 

v.  Weaver 

163  i 

Abbot  v.  Heath 

1626,  430  I 

v.  Wordley 

275 

v.  Inhabitants  of  Hermon 

197 

v.  Wright 

498 

v.  Massie 

291 

Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Schlessinger 

430/> 

v.  Plumbe 

5696,  572 

Adamthwaite  v.  Synge 

508 

Abbott  r.  Abbott 

569  d 

Addams  v.  Seitzinger 

152  a,  1526 

v.  Coleman 

581 

Addington  v.  Wilson 

439  c 

r.  Mitchell 

385 

Adler  v.  State 

5 

v.  Pearson 

1846 

Advocate-Gen'l  v.  Hancock 

4616 

w.  People 

14  c,  App.  Ill 

JEtna.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Deming 

247  a 

Abbv  v.  Goodrich 

428 

Aflalo  v.  Fourdrinier 

356,  563  d 

Abeel  v.  Radcliff 

268 

Agnew  v.  U.  S. 

34 

v.  Gan  Gelder 

14  n 

Agriculturist  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald 

568 

Abel  v.  jWrett 

184  d 

Ahern  v.  McCarthy 

305  d 

Abercrombie  v.  Allen 

197 

Ah  Tong  v.  Fruit  Co. 

4506 

Abernethy  v.  Com. 

14  k,  467 

Aiken  v.  Kennison 

14  n 

Abington  v.  N.  Bridgewater 

137 

v.  Kilburne 

240 

Ablard  ».  R.  Co. 

184  c 

Aitcheson  v.  Madock 

80 

Abney  v.  Kingsland 

51  a,  152  c 

Aitken  v.  McMeckan 

441/ 

Abrahams  v.  Bunn 

414,  422 

Ake  v.  State 

233 

Abram  v.  Ehle 

30 

Akerlev  v.  Haines 

14  d 

Abrath  v.  R.  Co. 

14, 

Ala.  G".  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Collier 

14  v 

Abshire  v.  Mather 

461  d 

Alban  v.  Pritchett 

185,  341 

Acad.  of  M.  Co.  v.  Davidson 

162  d 

Albert  v.  Ins.  Co. 

184  c 

Acerro  et  al.  v.  Petroni 

435 

».  R.  Co. 

14  v 

Ackerman,  Matter  of 

41 

Alberti  v.  People 

439  A 

Acklen  v.  Hickman 

439  b,  439  c 

Alberty  v.  U.  S. 

Up 

Ackroyd  &  Warburton's  Case 

220  c 

Albion  ».  Maple  Lake 

328  c 

Adae  v.  Zangs 

4396 

Albricht  v.  State 

14  a 

Adams  v.  Balch 

539 

Albrittin  v.  Huntsville 

64 

v.  Barnes 

22,  531,  536 

Alcock  v.  Ass.  Co. 

14  1 

r.  Betz 

502,  509 

v.  Cooke 

139 

v.  Board 

439  6,  563  h 

v.  Whatmore 

6a 

v.  Broughton 

533 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

439  c 

v.  Carlisle 

146 

Alcott  v.  Strong 

1846 

v.  Clark 

41 

Alden  t>.  Dewey 

352 

v.  Coulliard 

564 

Alderman  v.  French 

Ud 

v.  Cuddy 

397 

Alderson  v.  Clay 

42,  199,  563  1 

v.  Davidson 

189 

Aldrich  v.  Griffith 

5756 

v.  Davis 

305,  416 

v.  Kinnev 

548 

v.  Field 

581 

v.  Pelham 

14  v 

v.  French 

152  c 

v.  R  Co. 

195  d 

r,  Frye 

568 

Aldridge  v.  R.  Co. 

14« 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

14  n,  461  c 

Alexander  v.  Caldwell 

189 

v.  Kelly 

563  p 

v.  Gibson 

4436 

v.  Kerr 

572,  575 

r.  Harris 

58 

v.  Lawson 

14  d 

v  .  Milwaukee 

66 

v.  Lloyd 

469  d 

v.  Moore 

281 

v.  McMillan 

268,  269,  551 

v.  Smoot 

120  c 

v.  Morgan 

284 

v.  Thompson 

305 

v.  Pearson 

534 

v.  U.  S. 

14  r 

XXV111 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Alexander,  Succession  of 
Alford  v.  State 
Alfred  v.  Anthony 
Alger  0.  Andrews 
Alghieri  v.  State 
Alivon  v.  Furnival 
Allan  0.  Comstock 
Allard  v.  R.  Co. 
Allbright  v.  Hannah 
Allcott  0.  Strong 
Allegheny  v.  Nelson 
Allegheny  Co.  0.  Watt 
Alleman  v.  Stepp 
Allen  v.  Allen 

0.  Bennet 

v.  Coit 

v.  Denstone 

v.  Duncan 

v.  Furbish 

v .  Hawks 

v.  Killinger 

T.  Kingsbury 

v.  McKeen 

v.  Mill  Co. 

•0.  Pink 

v.  Portland  Stage  Co 

0.  Root 

v.  Sayward 

v.  State 

0.  Taylor 

r.  Trustees  of  School  Fund 

v.  U.  S. 

v.  Watson 

Allensworth  v.  Coleman 
Allgood  0.  Blake 
Allin  v.  Milllison 

c.  Whittemore 
Allington  v.  Bearcroft 
Allison  v.  Com. 

v.  Little 

v.  Matthieu 

v.  U.  S. 
Allison's  Estate 
Allman  v.  Owen 
Almgren  v.  Dutilh 
Aliny  0.  Church 
AIna  0.  Plummer 
Alner  v.  George 
Alpin  0.  Morton 
Alsabrooks  v.  State 
Alsager  0.  St.  Katherini 
Alston  v.  State 

v.  Taylor 
Alt  0.  Syrup  Co. 
Altham  v.  Anglesea 
Altham's  Case 
Altman  0.  Anton 
Altschul  0.  Assoc. 
Alvord  0.  Baker 
Alward  0.  Oaks 
Ambrose  0.  Clendon 
Amendaiz  0.  Stillman 
Amer.  Ace.  Co.  v.  Fiddler 
Amer.  Bible  Soc'v  0.  Pratt 
Amer.  E.  N.  B'k"0.  First  N.  B'k 
Amer.  Ex.  Co.  v.  Haggard 

v.  Land  ford 

Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  0.  Hazen 
Amer.  Fur  Co.  c,  U.  S. 
Amer.  L.  I.  T.  Co.  r.  Rosenagle 
Amer.  M.  Co.  ».  Hill 
Amer.  Surety  Co.  0.  Pauly 


34 

Ames  0.  Brooks 

275 

6a 

0.  McCamber 

162  1 

227 

0.  Phelps 

305  # 

190 

v.  Whitington 

427 

81  c 

Ames  (Succession  of) 

337 

488,  546,  563  6 

Ames  Ironworks  v.  Pulley  Co. 

184  c 

292 

Amey  v.  Long                             246,  309,  469  n 

14  v 

Amherst  v.  Hollis 

469  d 

254 

Ainherst  Bank  v.  Root 

572 

177 

Ainidon  v.  Hosley 

461  d 

66 

,  20,  152  a,  152  c 

Amory  v.  Melrose 

140 

310 

Amos  v.  Hi.ghes 

14  c,  74 

4506 

AmoskeagCo.  v.  Head 

140 

301 

Anchor  Milling  Co.  v.  Walsh 

120  c 

208 

Anderson  0.  Anderson 

6«,  66 

199,  493 

v.  Bank 

163  e 

184  c 

v.  Brock 

333,  427 

108 

v.  Cecil 

6a 

281,  284 

v.  Cramer 

81  a 

392,  420,  430 

v.  Duckworth 

195  d 

182 

v.  Dunn 

319 

293,  305  I 

v.  Hamilton 

251 

197 

v.  Jarrett 

305  i 

305  e 

v.  Kent 

189 

305  e 

v.  Life  Ass'n 

199 

521 

V.  Long                             146, 

14  d,  54,  55 

245 

v.  Maberry 

5636 

24 

V.  McPike 

186 

14  c 

v.  Mining  Co. 

14re 

322 

v,  Nagle 

507 

Fui 

id                   528 

v.  Robson 

5636 

34,  163  6,  195  a 

v.  Root 

563 

489 

v.  Sanderson 

185 

14  o 

v.  State             13  e,  14  6,  14^ 

161,  461  a, 

305/ 

App.  Ill 

14  q 

v.  Taft 

14  v 

462 

v.  U.  S. 

14  c,  14  g 

392 

v,  Weston                            38, 

152  a,  1526 

161 

v.  Whallev 

4396 

5756 

v.  White 

190 

14  q 

Uk 

Anderson  B.  Co.  v.  Applegate 
Anderson  T.  Co.  0.  Fuller 

5636 
466  a 

572 

Andre  v.  State 

14  h,  461  d 

5,  162; 

Andrews  v.  Andrews 

305  c,  319 

287 

v.  Askey                              14  h,  Us,  170  a 

575  6 

0.  Beck 

34 

264 

0.  Beecker 

173 

172,  173,  305 

v.  Black 

572 

14  o 

v.  Brown 

534 

Uo 

v.  Davison 

485  a 

s  Dock  Co.           278 

v  .  Dyer 

291 

230 

,  469  d,  App.  Ill 

v.  Frye 

469  d 

120 

v.  Hoxie 

6 

430,r> 

v.  Lembeck 

317 

163  h 

v.  Mining  Co. 

184  c 

305  k 

v.  Palmer 

168 

305  c 

v.  Parker 

322 

287 

v.  Solomon 

239 

38 

0.  Van  Duzer 

55 

450  a,  462  a 

Androscoggin  Bank  v.  Kimball 

38  a 

110 

Angel  1  v.  Duke 

305./ 

441  / 

i'.  State 

220  c 

r 

441  / 

Anglesea  Case 

156 

tt 

305  I 

Anglesey  0.  Hatherton 

14  n 

N. 

B'k              163  6 

Angus  v.  Smith 

462 

•d 

H; 

Anheuser-Busch    Brew.    Ass.    v. 

Hut- 

184  d 

macher 

563  p 

en 

146 

Ankerstcin  v.  Clarke 

69 

184  a,  233 

Annandale  v.  Harris 

14  » 

-rlK 

igle              4306 

Amiap.  &  E.  R.  Co.  0.  Gautt 

14  »' 

38  n 

Annesley  v.  Anglesea 

13  6,  37 

y 

14  q,  120  a 

Annesley's  Trial 

230 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Annis  v.  People  461  d 

Anniston  Bank  v.  Committee  14  w 

Anon.  4,  5,  13  i,  Ud,  Ug,  Us,  28,  37, 

43  a,  156.  173,  195  n,  237,  243, 

244,  247,  254  e,  259,284,  310, 

319,  320,  339,  349,  367,  378  b, 

409,  432  c,  435,  439  c,  461, 

461  a.  461  b,  461  c,  479, 

480,  509,  572 

Anscomb  v.  Shore  137,  405 

Anson  v.  Evans  195  d 

v.  People  14  q 

Answer  of  Judges  to  House  of  Lords     6  d, 

81  f,  1Q2J,  328  c,  441  h 

Anthony  v.  Grand  14  b 

v.  R.  Co.  484 

v.  State  163/,  461  b 

v.  Stephens  14  d 

v.  Stinson  120  c 

Apgar's  Estate  28 

Apollon,  The  6  « 

Apothecaries'  Co.  v.  Bentley  79 

Appleton  v.  Boyd  172,  330,  469  <j 

v.  Lord  Braybrook  514 

v.  People     '  81  b 

v.  State  162  // 

Arayo  v.  Currel  6  b 

Arbon  v.  Fussell  38  a 

Arbouin  v.  Anderson  81 

Arbuckle  v.  Templeton  153,  195  b,  245 

Archer  v.  English  205 

v.  R.  Co.  439  h 

v.  Walker  205 

Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Gilson  430  f 

Arding  v.  Flower  316,  317 

Arents  v.  R.  Co.  114  c,  441  c 

Argabright  v.  State  466  a 

Armory  v.  Delamirie  34,  37,  195  b 

Armstrong  v.  Acklev  14p 

v.  Advance  T.  Co.  575  c 

v.  Andrews  305  c 

v.  Granite  Co.  305  i,  305  I 

v.  Hewitt  485 

v.  State  42,  81  a,  441  / 

v.  Timmons  370  c 

v.  U.  S.  430  b,  488 

Arnd  v.  Amling  370 

Arnegaard  v.  Arnegaard  189 

Arnfield  v.  Bate  60 

Arnold  v.  Arnold  364  b,  369,  528,  532 

v.  Bishop  of  Bath  and  Wells  484 

»..  Cessna  281 

v.  Jones  567,  568 

v.  Norton  14  p 

v.  Nye  461  b 

v.  Revoult  69 

v.  State  444 

v.  Tourtellot  498 

Arnold's  Case  220  b 

Arnott  v.  Redfern  546 

Arrison  v.  Harmstead  568 

Arthur  v.  Roberts  279,  280 

Artope  v.  Goodall  *     461  c 

Artz  ?,\  R.  Co.  444  a 

Arundel  v.  Arundel  554 

Arun-lell  c.  White  513 

Ashcraft  v.  De  Armond  14  /,  140  b,  44  Ic 

Ashe  v.  De  Rosset  14  j 

Asher  v.  Terr.  444  6,  461  b 

Ashley  ?;.  Ashley  305  h 

v.  Martin  5 

Ashmore  v.  Hardy  204,  563  I 


Ashton  v.  Parker 
Ashworth  v.  Kittredge 
Askew  v.  People 
Aslin  v.  Parkin 
Ast<  n  v.  Perkes 
Astor  v.  Union  Ins.  Co. 
Atalanta,  The 
Atcheson  v.  Everitt 


XXIX 


361 

162  f,  162  k 
461? 

535 
81 

280 
31 
364  a,  364  b,  374 


Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackshire  6  b 

v.  Campbell  14  v 

v.  Cattle  Co.  184  c 

v.  Frazier  3626,  430  / 

v.  Harper  14  v 

v.  Headland  5 

v.  Osborn  14  v,  184  c 

v.  Retford  195  d 

v.  U.  S.  430  i 

Atherfold  v.  Beard  475 

Alkins  v.  Hatton  485 

v.  Sanger  et  al.  174 

v.  State  14  k,  14  o,  230,  439  c 

11.  Tredgold  174,  176 

Atkinson  v.  Atkinson  43 

v.  Burt  120  c 

v.  Cummins  290 

v.  Nash  163  h 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

Atl.  Ave.  R.  Co.  c.  Van  Dyke  441  d 

Atl.  C.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bates  "  14  q 

Atl.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Conard  332 

Atl.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker  162  b,  430  c 

Atl.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Rieger  445 

Atlanta  Journal  v.  Mayson  81  d 

Atterbury's  Trial         '251,  254  o,  469  d,  578  b 

Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Boston  293 

v.  Bowman  54,  55 

v.  Bradlaugh  369 

v.  Briant  250 

v.  Bulpit  432  c 

v.  Cast  Plate  Glass  Co.  280 

v.  Davison  163  a,  554 

v.  Dean  195  c 

v.  Drummond  295 

v.  Ewelme  Hospital  45  a 

v.  Glasgow  College  295 

v.  Green  13  i 

v.  Hitchcock          370  c,  443  b,  450  a,  461, 

461  e,  461 V 

v.  Jefferys  6'0 

v.  Kohler  114/ 

v.  I,e  Merchant  563  d 

v.  Mico  216 

v.  Parntlier  42,  81 

v.  Pearson  2U5 

v.  Proprietors,  etc.  46 

v.  Radloff  146 

v.  Shore  295 

v.  Theakstone  479,  492  ' 

v.  Windsor  37 

Attwood  v.  Small  171 

Atwater  v.  Schenck  6 

Atwood  0.  Cornwall  430  d 

v.  Impson  461  a 

v.  Marshall  445 

v.  Scott  14  f,  310 

v.  Welton  369,  370,  450 

Atwood's  Estate  305  n 

Auberle  v.  McKeesport  441  d 

Aubert  v.  Walsh  38 

Audrey's  (Lord)  Case                      •  343 

Augier  v.  Ash  14  q 

Augur  Co.  v.  Whittier  563  o 


XXX 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Augusta  v.  Hafers 

14  v 

Bailey  v.  Bailey 

392 

v.  Hudson 

81 

v.  Haines 

3 

v.  Windsor 

115,  116 

v.  Hole 

430 

Augusta  (Hank  of)  v.  Earle 
Augusta  Factory  v.  Barnes 

5,43 
162/ 

v.  Hyde 
v.  Lumpkin 

14  d,  55 

386 

Aug.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Daly 

162  p 

v.  Musgrave 

73 

v.  Dorsey 

14  v,  441  d 

v.  N.  H.  &  N.  Co 

14  v 

v.  Randall 

14  a,  143  0,  406  a 

v.  O'Bannon 

186 

Aulls  v.  Young 

162  / 

r.  State 

213 

Aultman  v  Timm 

43  a 

v.  Taylor 

564 

Aultnian  Co.  v.  Ferguson 

441  / 

v.  Trumbull 

14  t> 

Aumick  v.  Mitchell 

581 

v.  Woods 

163  a 

Aurora  ».  Brown 

14  v 

Bailiffs  of  Tewkesbury  v. 

Bricknell              58 

v.  Cobb 

461  d 

Baillie  v.  Hole 

392 

Austen  v.  Vesey 

237 

v.  Jackson 

485 

Austin  v.  Austin 

14  o,  20 

Bain  v.  Cushman 

441  g 

f.  Bostwick 

112,  184  b 

v.  Mason 

493 

v.  Chamber 

171 

v.  Whitehaven  &  Furness  R.  Co.            3 

v.  Hanchet 

14  d 

Bainbridge  r.  State 

14  q 

v.  Holland 

40 

v.  Wade 

288,  289 

v.  Runisey 

572 

Bainbridge's  Trial 

469  d 

v.  Sawyer 

271 

Baird  v.  Baird 

180,  305  / 

v.  State 

5,  14  q,  445 

v.  Cochran 

469  g 

v.  Thomson 

563 

v.  Daly 

14  v.  195  d 

v.  Willes 

384 

v.  Gleckler 

466  a 

Austine  v.  People 

220 

v.  Rice 

139 

Australasia  (Bank  of)  v.  Nias                      546 

Baiz,  Re 

4 

A  vary  v.  Searcy 

441  c 

Bakeman  v.  Rose 

461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

A  very  v.  Avery 

120  a 

Baker  v.  Arnold 

245 

v.  Burrall 

14  v 

v  .  Blount 

572 

v.  Miller 

275 

v.  Blunt 

572 

v.  Pixley 

273 

v.  Bradley 

43  n 

v.  Stewart 

288 

v.  Dening 

272 

v.  Woodruff 

163  h 

v.  Dewey 

26 

Aveson  v.  Kinnaird    1G2  b 

254,  337,  341,  462 

v.  Dobyns 

260  a 

Ax  son  v.  Belt 

581 

v.  Fairfax 

IMg 

Aver  v.  Austin 

76 

v.  Gas  Co. 

81 

v.  Mfg.  Co. 

305  / 

v.  Hagey 

14» 

Avers  v.  Duprey 

461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

v.  Haines 

581 

v.  Harris 

439  h 

v.  Irish 

Wj 

v.  Hewett 

5736 

v.  Joseph 

450 

v.  Watson 

140  a,  462 

v.  Mfg.  Co. 

194 

Ayrey  v.  Davenport 

510 

v.  Milburn 

152  a 

v.  Monk 

43  a 

v.  Mygatt 

6  a 

B. 

v.  People 

Uq 

v.  Stackpole 

1846 

B  v.  I  

Ud 

v.  State 

14  q 

B.  &  I.  R.  Co.  ».  Bailey 

441  / 

v.  Thompson 

254  c 

Baa  lam  f.  State 

Ho 

v.  Tyrwhitt 

392,  428 

Babb  v.  Clemson 

180,  508 

Balbcc  v.  Donaldson 

43  n 

Babcock  v.  People 

444 

Balbo  v.  People 

220  c 

t>.  R.  Co. 

14  « 

Balcetti  v.  Serani 

14  9,  52 

v.  Smith 

563j 

Baldnev  v.  Ritchie 

563  c 

Baber  v.  Rickart 

14  v 

Baldridge  v.  Penland 

120  c 

Baccio  v.  People 

469  c 

Baldwin  v.  Bricker 

162  A 

Bachelderv.  Nutting 

5636 

v.  Carter 

287 

Bachmeyer  v.  Assoc. 

14  I 

v.  Dixon 

397 

Backenstoss  v.  Stabler 

294 

v.  Hale 

502 

Backhouse  t>.  Middleton 

552 

v.  K.  Co. 

14  6,  461  c 

Bacon  v.  Bacon 

322 

«.  Soule 

14  o 

v.  Charlton 

162  b,  205 

Bales  v.  State 

162  » 

r.  Chesney 

187 

Balfour  r>  .  Chew 

505 

r.  Towne 

14  c,  14  d.  101 

v.  Fresno  C.  &  I.  Co. 

305  I 

v.  Williams 

430/,  581 

Balkum  v.  State 

14  a 

Bacot  v.  Lumber  Co. 

444 

Ball,  Re 

162  e 

Badger  r.  Titcotnb 

532 

Ball  v.  U.  S. 

14  r,  184  n 

Baeder  v.  Jennings 

108 

Ballard  v.  Ballard 

439  b 

Bagley  v.  Eaton 

5636 

».  Noaks 

357 

v.  McMickle 

5636 

».  State 

333  n 

v.  Mason 

14  1,  162  6,  469  m 

v.  Walker 

304 

Bagot  v.  Williams 

532    Ballenger  r.  Barnes 

165 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ballew  r.  U.  S. 

Ballou  v.  Ballou  523 

Balls  v .  Westwood 

Balston  77.  Bensted  17 

Baltimore  f .  State  « 

77.  War 

Baltimore  Elev.  Co.  v.  Neal  14  £,  14  h 

Baltimore  Traction  Co.  v.  Appel 

Baltimore  &  L.  T.  Co.  v.  Cassell  430  c 

Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  t>.  Baugh  2  a 

v.  Camp  14  ft 

v.  Col  via  146 

v.  Cooney  146 

•       r.  Glenn  66,  162 1 

v.  Griffiths  81/ 

v.  Hackett  441  d 

v.  Hellenthal  14  v 

v.  Henthorne  14  c 

v.  Knee                            .  469  6 

v.  Leonhardt  14  77,  441  d 

v.  Pitman  14  j 

v.  Rambo  1626,  4616 

v.  State  14  k,  14  v 

v.  Thompson  430  i 

v.  Tripp  14  v 

Bam  field  v.  Massey  14  d,  14  h,  54,  469  a 

Banbtirv  Peerage  Case  14 1/,  28,  81 

Bancroft  v.  Grover  287 

Bank  v.  Brown  201,  430  i 

o.  Cowan  439  6 

v.  Jacobs  581 

v.  Keeler  461  c 

v.  Lacy  166 

v.  Magruder  423 

v.  Mersereau  242  a,  245 

v.  Rutland  1406 

v.  Sill  5636 

v .  Slemmons  461  6 

v.  Webb  305  c 

v.  Williams  581 

v.  Zorn  439  6,  439  c 

Banking  Co.  v.  Shoemaker  581 

Banking  House  v.  Darr  439  6 

Bank  of  Augusta  v.  Earle  5,  43 

Bank  of  Australasia  v.  Nias  546 

Bank  of  Hindustan  v.  Alison  22 

Bank  of  Lansingburg  ».  Crary  271 

Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Culver  115 

v.  Field  184  c 

Bank  of  Newbury  v .  Greenville  R.  R.  Co.  6  b 

Bank  of  North.  Liberties  v.  Davies     435,  444 

Bank  of  Tennessee  v.  Cowan  115 

Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dandridge  21,  563  g 

v.  Dunn  385 

Bank  of  Utica  v.  Hillard  385,  474 

v.  Mersereau  422 

v.  Smalley  430 

Banks  v.  Btirnam  6  a 

v.  Farquharson  572 

77.  Kain  420 

v.  State  220 

Banning  v.  Banning  430  q 

v.  Marleau  190 

v.  R.  Co.  13  c 

Barada  v.  Carondelet  331 

Barb  v.  Fish  533 

Barbat  v.  Allen  334 

Barber  v.  Gingell  14  n 

».  Holmes  43  a,  484,  493 

v.  Lvon  37 

v.  Merriam  162  6,  430 1 

v.  Terrell  569  a 


Barber  Co.  v.  Ullinan 
Barber's  Estate 
Barbour  v.  Archer 

v.  Watts 

Barbre  v.  Goodale 
Barcello  v.  Hapgood 
Barclay  v.  Hopkins 

v.  Wainwright 
Barden  v.  Keverberg 
Bardsley  v.  Sternberg 
Barfield  «.  Britt 
Baring  v.  Clark 

v.  Reeder 
Barker  v.  Bell 

v.  Bushnell 

77.  Com. 

v.  Dixie 

v.  Haskell 

v.  Kuhn 

v.  Macrae 

v.  Parsons 

v.  Perry 

v.  Pope 

v.  Ray 

Barkley  v.  Vestal 
Barkly  v.  Copeland 
Barlew  v.  Vowell 
Barley  v.  Byrd 
Barlow  v.  Dupuy 

r.  Vowell 

v.  Waters 
Barnard  v.  Darling 

v.  Gantz 
Barnard's  Trial 
Barnes  v.  Camack 

v.  Com. 

v.  Harris 

i'.  In  gal  Is 

v.  Lucas 

v.  Mawson 

v.  State 

v.  Trompowsky 

77.  Trust  Co. 
Barnewall  77.  Murrell 
Barney's  Will 
Barnstable,  The 
Barnum  77.  Barnum 


XXXI 


163 t 

77,  441 1 

102  I 

505 

305  c 

485 

284  o 

275,  284  a 

14  » 

498 

156 

184  c 

342 

444  a 

192 

1406 

334,  340 

120  c,  439  6 

243 

416 

310 

13/,  439  h 
1406 

37, 116,  147,  149,  195  a 
4696 

450  a,  450  6 

167 

120  c 

510 

418 

162  e 

302 

43  a 

14;?,  14  g 
337 

238,  239 
14  n 
207 

14w,  137,  139 

14  o,  219  6,  220,  221 

572,  575 

201 

572,  572  a 

43  a,  162  e 

305  k 

323 


Barony  of  Saye  and  Sele,  The  28 

Barough  77.  White  171,  190 

Ban-  v.  Armstrong  563  c 

77.  Gratz  539,  575  6 

17.  Hack  14  d,  461  d 

v.  Moore  14  o 

Barranger  v.  Baum  6  d 

Barrenberg  v.  Boston  14  t 

Barret  77.  Gore  347,  356 

Barrett  77.  Allen  288 

v.  Buxtou  284 

v.  Hammond  1477 

77.  Long  14  o 

7?.  Murphy  439  g 

77.  Rogers  305 

t>.  Stow  287 

77.  Thorndike  265,  568 

t7.  Union  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

Barretto  77.  Snowden  391 

Barrick  77.  Austin  174 

Barrie  77.  Smith  305  / 

Barrington  77.  Bank  of  Washington  564 

Barron  77.  People  14  p 

Barronet's  Case  18 

Barrow  v.  Humphreys  319 


XXX11 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Barrows  p.  Downs 

430  6,  488    Bauman  v.  Trust  Co. 

6 

r.  State 

101 

Bauskett  v.  Keith 

444 

Barrs  r.  Jackson 

550 

Baxter  v.  Abbott 

14  I,  77 

Barry  v.  Bebbington 

150,  153,  154 

v.  Cedar  Rapids 

247  a 

v.  Butlin 

77 

v.  Doe 

14  v 

v.  (Jolville 

305  d 

v.  Graham 

398 

v.  Ransom 

281 

v.  Hamilton 

581 

v.  Ryan 

5096 

v.  McDonnell 

5 

Barstow's  Case 

218 

v.  Knowles 

191,  201  a 

Bartli  v.  State 

220  c 

v.  Knox 

441  1 

Bartholomew  v.  Farwell 

120  « 

v.  Rodman 

422 

v.  People 

375,  401  b 

v.  State 

163  /' 

v.  Stephens 

563  i 

Bay  v-  Gunn 

400 

Bartlet  v.  Delprat 

180 

Bayard  v.  Malcolm 

275* 

Bartlett  r.  Bank 

14  to 

Bayard's  Trial 

252 

v.  Boyd 

3059 

Bayha  v.  Munford 

43d 

v.  Clough 

334 

Bay  ley  v.  Osborn 

427 

v.  Emerson 

140  a 

v.  Wylie 

516 

v.  Pickersgill 

302 

Baylies  v.  Fettyplace 

58 

v.  Remington 

305  A; 

Baylis  v.  Att'y-Gen. 

291,  305  k 

v.  Smith 

81  e 

Bayliss  v.  Cockcroft 

328  c 

v.  Tarbox 

192 

Bayly's  Adm'r  v.  Chubb 

66 

v.  Wyman 

281 

Bayne  v.  Stone 

89 

Bartlev  v.  People 

217,  2196 

Baynes  v.  Forest 

70 

0.  "State 

34,  503  A 

Bay  View,  etc.  Ass.  v.  Williams 

6630 

Barton  v.  Com. 

4446 

Beach  v.  Brown, 

162  d 

v.  Dundas 

120  c 

v.  Mills 

118,  120  c 

v.  State 

14  a 

v,  Packard 

26 

v.  Thompson 

81  d 

v.  R.  Co. 

284  a 

Bartow  v.  Brands 

14o 

Beachcroft  ».  Beachcroft 

288 

Barwell  v.  Adkiiis 

14  o 

Beacon  L.  &  F.  Ass.  Co.  v.  Gibb 

292 

Bas  v.  Steele 

559 

Beadles  v.  Alexander 

102  e 

Bass  v.  Give 

196,  207 

Beakes  v.  Da  Cunha 

14; 

v.  State 

14  o,  105 

Beal  v.  Robeson 

146 

Bass  Furnace  Co.  v.  Glasscock                   430  i 

v,  Thompson 

322 

Bassett  v.  Marshall 

86 

Beale  v.  Boston 

14  v,  4417 

v.  Shares 

14  v 

v.  Com. 

19 

v.  Spofford 

120  c 

v,  Posey 

Up 

Basshor  v.  Forbes 

284  a 

Bealev  v.  Shaw 

17 

Bast  v.  Bank 

275 

Beall't.  Beck 

187 

Basve  v.  State    146,  14  &, 

158,  239,  245,  40  Id 

v.  Hearing 

563  e 

Bate  v.  Hill 

14  A,  54,  458.  469  a 

v.  Poole 

663  e 

v.  Kinsey 

241,  563  c,  563  a! 

Beaman  v.  Russell 

5G4 

v.  Russell 

356,  358 

Beamon  v.  Ell  ice 

432,  432  o 

Bateman  v.  Bailey 

180 

Bean  v.  Quimby 

239 

v.  Rutland 

14  r 

Bearce  r.  Jackson 

24 

Bates  v.  Barber 

461,  461  c,  461  d 

Beard  v.  Bovlan 

305  c 

v.  Bates 

162  e 

v.  Talbot 

140  a 

v.  Cain 

38 

Beardsley  v.  Bridgman 

14  o 

v.  McCully 

66 

v.  Columbia  Tp. 

14  1,  439  A 

v.  Morris 

1956 

Beardslown  v.  Virginia 

78 

v.  N.  Y.  Ins.  Co. 

173 

Beards  v.  Copley 

402 

v.  Preble 

4396 

Beasley  v.  Magrath 

179 

v.  Ryland 

423 

Beatson  v.  Skene 

251 

v.  Sabin 

4396 

Realty  v.  Clement 

152  a 

v.  Sharon 

4416 

Beattyville  Coal  Co.  v.  Hoskins 

194 

v.  Thompson 

532 

Beatv  v.  Knowle 

66 

Bateson  v.  Hartsink 

469  n 

Beaubien  ».  Cicotte             430  p,  439  c,  441  6, 

Bath  v.  Bathersea 

163  a,  201 

450  a,  462  a 

Bathrick  v.  Post 

14  d,  14  o 

Beauchamp  v.  Parry 

190 

Batten  v.  State 

Up 

v.  State 

4696 

Batthews  v.  Galindo 

207,  339 

Beaufort  v.  Smith 

129 

Battin  r.  Bigelow 

41 

v.  Swan 

45a 

Battle  ».  State 

462 

Beaumont  ».  Fell 

291,  305  I 

Battles  r.  Holler 

46,  563  7 

v.  Field 

277 

r.  Laudensfager 

us 

v.  Mountain 

66,481 

Bat  tun  r.  Sellers 

198 

Beavan  v.  M'Donnell 

14  / 

Bauer  v.  Indianapolis 

14  v 

Beaver  v.  Lane 

69 

Bauer,  Re 

245 

Beavers  v.  State 

81  c,  439  A 

Bauerman  r.  Radenius 

172 

Bebee  v.  Tinker 

444  n 

Baulec  v.  R.  Co. 

14  g,  14  A 

Becker  v.  Koch 

444 

Baiun  v.  Lyuu 

'  305/ 

v.  Quigg 

1636,  563  i 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


xxxm 


Becker  v.  R.  Co. 

14  v,  441  g 

Bemis  v.  R.  Co. 

430/ 

Becket  v.  Aid  Assoc. 

Uv 

v.  Temple 

liv 

Beckham  v.  State 

2Wa 

Ben  v.  State 

156 

Beckley  v.  Freeman 

392,  430 

Bend  v.  Ins.  Co. 

292 

Beckman  v.  Souther 

14  c 

Bender  v.  Fromberger 

180 

Beckrow's  Case 

568 

v.  Pitzer 

139,  140  a 

Beckwith  v.  Benner 

245 

Benedict  v.  Flanagan 

581 

v.  Sydebotham 

440,  441  k 

v.  State 

14yfc 

Becquet  v.  McCarthy 

546 

Benham  v.  Gary 

14$ 

Bedell  v.  Berkey 

439  A 

v.  Dunbar 

14  v 

v.  Chase 

328  c 

v.  Hendrickson 

290 

v.  R.  Co. 

430^9 

v.  Richardson 

14s 

v.  Russell 

76 

Benjamin  v.  Hathaway 

4690 

Bedford  v.  R.  Co. 

166 

v.  Porteus 

115,  416 

Bedgood  v.  McLain 

564 

v.  R.  Co. 

163  i,  441  rf 

v.  State 

140,140,4616 

v.  Sinclair 

305 

Bedingfield's  Case 

162  a 

Benner  v.  Frey 

73 

Beebe  r.  Debaua 

4416 

Bennet  v.  Robison 

167,  572 

v.  Knapp 

4616 

v.  Watson 

313,  319 

v.  Parker 

14  n,  130,  139 

Bennet's  Case 

228 

v.  U.  S. 

6 

Bennett  v.  Bennett 

506 

Beech  v.  Jones 

4396 

v.  Fail 

441  i 

Beech's  Case 

65 

v.  Francis 

205 

Beeching  v.  Gower 

421 

v.  Holmes 

532 

Beektnan  v.  Hamlin 

484 

v.  Hyde 

14  d,  55 

Beers  v.  Beers 

284 

v.  Libhart 

43  a 

Beery  v.  U.  S. 

220,  221,  232 

v.  Marion 

5 

Beets  v.  State 

161,  439  6 

v.  Mathewes 

581 

Beever  v.  Hanson 

195  d 

v.  Morley 

548 

Beggarly  v.  State 

223,  App.  Ill 

v.  Runyon 

21 

Behrens  v.  Behrens 

162  e 

v.  State 

6  a,  165,  369,  441  / 

Beidelman  v.  Foulk 

397 

v.  Tillmon 

805  d 

Beitz  v.  Fuller 

174,  184  6 

Benning  v.  Nelson 

140 

Belcher  v.  Magnay 

421 

Bennison  v.  Walbank 

439^ 

Belden  v.  Lamb 

51  a 

Benoist  v.  Darby 

Up 

v.  Seymour 

26 

Benoit  v.  R.  Co. 

14  w,  14  y 

Belhaven  &  Stenton  Peeragt 

»                 14,  81  c 

Benson  v.  Lundy 

190 

Bel  knap  v.  Stewart 

435 

v.  Olive 

41,  575  b 

Bell  v.  Ansley 

180 

v.  Shotwell 

1630 

v.  Bank 

H/ 

v.  11.  S. 

333  « 

v.  Brewster 

581 

Bent  v.  Baker      167,  386,  389,  390,  418,  328  6 

t».  Brueii 

283 

Bentley  v.  Cooke 

334,  339,  343 

v.  Chambers 

445 

v.  Hollenback 

118 

v.  C  hay  tor 

571 

v.  O'  Bryan 

189 

v.  Fireman's  Ins.  Co. 

288 

v.  Ward 

120  c 

v.  Hagerstown  B'k 

4396 

Benton  v.  Burgot 

548 

0.  Hull  Railw.  Co. 

430 

v.  R.  Co. 

81 

v.  Martin 

287 

v.  State 

162  o 

v.  Morrison 

174,  184  b,  323 

Bentzing  v.  Scott 

73 

v.  Parke 

14  d 

Berberich  v.  Bridge  Co. 

14w 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

Berckmans  v.  Berckmans 

14  w 

v.  Radford 

14  o 

Berd  v.  Lovelace 

237 

v.  Rinker 

Ud,  Uh 

Bergen  v.  Bennet 

46 

v.  Rinner 
v.  Smith 

4506 
395 

v.  People 
Bergere  v.  U.  S. 

163/7,  217 
•U  s  38 

v.  State                5,  158, 

162/>,  197,  444  6, 
469  a,  App.  Ill 

Berkeley  Peerage.  Case  114  e,  128,  131,  133,  134 
Berkey  v.  Judd                                            328  c 

v.  W.  C.  S.  Co. 

v.  Woodman 
v.  Young 

195  d 
279 
201 

Bermon  v.  Woodbridge 
Bernasconi  v.  Atkinson 
v.  Farebrother 

201 
305  Jc,  305  m 
181 

Bellamy  v.  Cains 

347 

Berneker  v.  State 

461  c 

Belle  tf.  D.  Co.  v.  Riggs 

469  m 

Bernett  v.  Taylor 

K79 

Bellet,  Ex  pnrte                                              13  q 
Belleville  Stone  Co.  v,  Comben                  14  v 
Bellew  v.  Russell                                            347 

Berney  v.  Mitchell                                      163  g 
Berrington  d.  Dormer  «.  Fortescue      359,  360 
Berry  v.  Banner                                             13<l 

Bellinger  v.  People 

465  a,  469  d 

v.  Com. 

218 

v.  Wood 

463 

v.  Jourdan 

439  c 

Bellows  v.  Ingham 
Belmont  v.  Morrill 

548 
66 

v.  Raddin 
v.  State 

563  / 
14  g,  4fi  1  'b 

Belt  r.  State 

170  a 

v.  Stevens 

329,  334,  341 

Belt  E.  L.  Co.  v.  Allen 

469  m 

Berrvhill  v.  Kirchner 

581 

Beltzhoover  v.  Blackstock 

240 

Berryman  v.  Wise 

58,  195,  563  a 

VOL.    I.  —  C 

XXXIV 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bersch  v.  State 

14  q,  461  b 

Birt  v.  Hood 

395 

Bertha  Zinc  'Co.  ».  Martin 

441  rf,  466  a 

v.  Kershaw 

391,  416 

Berthon  ».  Loughman 

441,  441  e 

v.  White 

163  h 

Bertie  v.  Beaumont 

15  4,  5756 

Bischof  v.  Mikels 

14 

Bessette  v.  State 

4616 

Bishop  v.  Averill 

445 

Besson  e.  Cox 

329 

v.  Chambre 

564 

Best  v.  Sinz 

275 

v.  Cone 

38  a,  484 

Bestor  v.  Roberts 

581 

v.  Doty 

271 

Betbam  v.  Benson 

184  c 

v.  Morgan 

305  m 

Bethea  v.  Byrd 

140  a 

v.  Spiuing 

441  / 

Betts  t.  Baager 

571 

v.  State 

14  q,  581 

v.  Bagley 
v.  Jackson 

548 
162  e 

Biss  v.  Mountain 
Bissell  v.  Briggs 

3'J7 
542,  548 

v.  Jones 

427 

v  .  Edwards 

505 

v.  R.  Co. 

441  d 

v.  Morgan 

81 

v,  Starr 

531 

v.  Starr 

4616 

v.  State 

Up 

v.  West 

81  d 

Bevan  v.  Waters 

241,  245 

Bissenger  v.  Guiteman 

284  a 

v.  Williams 

195 

Bixby  v.  Bridge  Co. 

162  t 

Bevelot  v.  Lestrade 

341 

v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co. 

494 

Bever  v.  Bever 

305  d 

Bixler's  Adm'x  v.  Parker 

66 

Beveridge  v.  Minter 

254,  337 

Black  v.  Black 

439/ 

Beverley  v.  Beverley 

41 

v.  Fizer 

120  c 

Beverley's  Case 

189 

v.  Hill 

287 

Beverly  v.  Williams 

430  t 

v.  Lamb 

284 

Bey's  Succession 
Beyerline  v.  State 

77 
254 

v.  Lord  Braybrook 
v.  State 

70,  514 
14* 

Biub  v.  Thomas 

273 

v.  Woodrow 

165 

Bickenstaff  v.  Perrin 

Ud 

Blackburn  v.  Com. 

444 

Bickley  v.  Bank 

563  c 

v.  Crawfords 

114  c,  243 

Bickne'll  v.  Mellett 

190,  563  h 

r.  Hargreave 

311 

Biddis  v.  James 

480,  489,  505 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

8ld 

Biddulph  v.  Ather 

139 

v.  Mann 

461  d 

Bidinger  v.  Bishop 

328  c 

v.  Scholes 

205 

Bielschofsky  v.  People 
Bigelow  v.  Collamore 

14  q 

277 

v.  State 
Black  ett  v.  Ass.  Co. 

14  r,  41,  364  a 
292,  294 

v.  Hall 

439  c 

v.  Lowes 

137 

v.  Legg 

292 

v.  Weir 

356,  389,  395 

v.  Sickles     • 

254 

Blackham's  Case 

550 

i?.  Windsor 

532 

Blackington  v.  Johnson 

186,  445 

Biggs  v.  Lawrence 

284 

«.  Kockland 

563  k 

Bigler  v.  Reyher 

243 

Blackman  v.  Collier 

14  v 

Bilbie  t'.  Lumley 

212 

v.  Bowling 

563  g 

Billings  ».  Billings 

281 

v.  State 

146 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

462 

Blackwell  v.  Bull 

288 

r.  State 

14  0,140,462 

v.  State 

469  e 

Bine  v.  Carver 

"MB 

Blad  v.  Bamfield 

541,  543 

Binford  v.  Young 

192 

Blade  v.  Noland 

563  6.  568 

Bingel  ».  Volz 

305  m 

Blague  v.  Gold 

301 

Bingham  v.  Cabot 

491 

Blair  v.  Bank 

1636 

v.  Dickie 

65 

v.  Charleston 

441  a 

v.  Rogers 

348 

v.  Pelham 

439  A 

v.  Stanley 

81 

v.  Seaver 

369 

Binns  v.  State 

14  o,  81  6,  159 

Blake  v.  Ass.  Soc. 

13  a,  14  q 

Birch  v.  Depeyster 

280 

v.  Damon 

1623 

Birchard  v.  Booth 

188 

v.  Doherty 

288 

Bird  «.  Com. 

66 

v.  Fash 

5636 

r.  Halsy 

163  e 

v.  Howard 

14  a 

v.  Hueaton 

153,  254 

v.  Ladd 

356 

r.  Miller 

581 

v.  Lyon  Co. 

.19 

r.  Randall 

531 

r.  People 

430  1 

r.  State 

13/ 

v.  Pilfold 

251 

Bird's  Case 

430  i 

v.  Sanderson 

25 

Birmingham  v,  McPoland 

4396 

c.  White 

152  c 

v.  Pettit 

498 

Blakemore  v  Canal  Co. 

536,  537 

».  Stan- 

Hf 

Blakemore,  Re 

469m 

Birmingham  M.  R.  Co.  v. 

Wilmer            162  ; 

Blakeslee  ».  Hughes 

Ud 

Birmingham  Nat.  B'k  v.  Bradley             681  a 

Blakev  v.  Blakey 

461  e 

Birmingham  Un.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexander      14  r 

Blalock  v.  Randall 

14o2 

r.  Hale 

401  a 

Blanrhnrd  «.  Ellis 

24,  26 

Birney  «.  Hann 

114c 

r.  Steamboat  Co. 

14» 

Dirt  c.  Barlow 

43  a,  140  c,  493 

r.  Young 

142 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


XXXV 


Bland  r.  Swafford 

319 

Boiling  t1.  State 

162  h 

v.  Warren 

152  a 

Bolton  v.  Carlisle 

265,  568 

Blandy's  Trial 

14  m 

v.  Corp.  Liverpool 

238,  240,  244 

Blapey  v.  Rice 

301 

v.  Cummings 

485  a 

Blanton  v.  Miller 

349 

v.  Jacks 

26 

Blatz  v.  Rohrback 

5 

Boltz  v.  Ballman 

39 

Blevins  v.  Pope 

434 

Boman  v.  Plunkett 

581 

Blewett  v.  Tregonning 

468 

Bond  v.  Douglas 

14  o 

Blewitt  v.  Boorum 

305  c 

v.  Fitzpatrick 

190 

Bligh  v.  Brent 

270 

t'.  State 

14  c,  14  k,  333  a 

Blight  v.  Fisher 

316 

v.  Ward 

180 

v.  Rochester 

25 

Bond's  Trial 

1956 

Bliss  v.  Brainard 

79,  310 

Bonebrake  v.  Board 

441  d 

v.  Johnson 

14  1,  Up,  1406 

Bonelli's  Goods,  Re 

430  m 

».  Mclntvre 

568 

Boner  v.  Com. 

166 

Block  v.  R.  Co. 

430  / 

Bonfield  v.  Smith 

441  » 

Blocker  v.  Burness 

369 

Bonham  v.  Craig 

284 

Blodget  v.  Jordan 

505 

Bonnemort  v.  Gill 

462  a 

Blodgett  Paper  Co.  v.  Farmer                  328  c 

Bonner  v.  State 

219  n,  2196 

Blomgren  v.  Anderson 

14  o 

Bonnet  v.  Glattfeldt 

439  6,  445 

Blood  v.  Goodrich 

304 

Bonnet'  r.  Morrill 

284  a 

v.  Rideout 

108 

Bonsall  t>.  State 

14  q 

Bloodgood  v.  Jamaica 

331 

Boon  v.  State 

461  c 

Bloomer  v.  State 

4696 

v.  Weathered 

461  a,  461  d 

Bloomington  v.  Legg 

14  p,  14  v,  195  d 

Boorman  v.  Am.  Exp.  Co. 

38 

».  Shrock 

162  i,  162  k 

v  Browne 

394 

Bloor  v.  Davies 

392 

v.  Johnston 

275,  278 

c.  Delafield 

14  v 

B  >osey  v.  Davidson 

563  p 

Blossom  v.  Cannon 

20,  46 

Boot  v.  Sweezey 

190 

v.  Griffin 

288,  297 

Booth  v.  Cook 

485  a 

Blough  v.  Parry 

77,  444,  461  b 

v.  Swezey 

190 

Blower  v.  Hollis 

511 

Boothby  v.  Stanley 

564 

Bloxam  v.  Elsie 

563  A; 

Bootle  v.  Blundell 

569  d 

Bluinau  v.  State 

342 

Borland  v.  Walrath 

581 

Blumenthal  v.  Meat  Co. 

5 

Born  v.  Rosenow 

14  o 

Blumer,  Exparte 
Blundell  v.  Gladstone 

162  c 
291,  305  /,305m 

Borrego  v.  Terr.             81  b, 
Borthwick  v.  Carruthers 

184  a,  4616,  469  1 
81 

v.  Howard 

14  n 

Borum  v.  Fonts 

239 

Blurton  v.  Toon 

572 

Bost  v.  Bost 

441  c 

Board  v.  Lee 

310 

Boston  v.  Richardson 

108 

v.  Mav 

484 

v.  State 

6.  14  D.  466  a 

v.  State 

6 

Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dana  14*!  197/252  a. 

Boardman  v.  Gore 

568  a 

469,  563  A 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

13  i 

v.  O.  C.  &  F.  R.  Co. 

14w 

v.  Reed 

138  a,  301 

Boston  India-Rubber  Factory  v.  Hoit          546 

v.  Spooner 

260  o 

Boston  Water  Power  Co.  r.'Hanlon           128 

v.  Woodman 

146,  441/ 

Bostwick  v.  Leach 

271 

Boatright  v.  Porter 

146 

Boswell  v.  Blackmail 

461  d 

Bob  v.  State 

197 

v.  Smith 

38 

Boddy  v.  Boddy 

14  o 

Bosworth  v.  Clark 

563  e 

B  id  man  v,  American  Tract  Soc.              305  fc 

v.  Cotchett 

1526 

Bodwell  v.  Osgood 

18 

v.  Crotchet 

153 

v.  Swan 

14  d,  14  A,  14  o,55 

Botham  v.  Swingler 

422,  563  j 

Body  v.  Jensen 

41 

Botkin  v  Cassadv 

4506 

Boecker  v.  Naperville 

14  o 

Botna  V.  S.  B'k  0.  Silver  C. 

B'k                  41 

Boettger  v.  Iron  Co. 

461  c 

Botsford  v.  Chase 

14o 

Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church    14  n,  138  a,  139 

r.  Morehouse 

265 

Bogart  ».  Brown 

563d 

Bott  P.  Wood 

37,  195  a,  462 

Bogert  v.  Cauman 

275.  281 

Bottomlev  v.  Forbes 

292 

Boggs  v.  Ass'n 

3057 

v.  U"  S. 

14  q,  53 

Bogerus  v.  State 

581 

v.  Wilson 

391,  401 

Bogle  v.  Kreitzer 

461  c 

Bottoms  v.  Kent 

146,  461  c 

Bogue  ».  Bigelow 

43  a 

Boudereau  v.  Montgomery 

114e 

Bohannon  v.  Com. 

14  c,  14  k 

Boulden  v.  State 

816,  158,  161 

Boileau  v.  Rudlin 

551 

Bouldin  v.  Massie 

430  i,  5636 

0.  Rutlin 

186 

Boulter  v.  Peplow 

365  k 

Boisbanc,  Succession  of 

34 

Bound  v.  Lathrop 

174 

Bolden  v.  G.  R.  &  B.  Co. 

252  a 

Bounds  v.  Bounds 

108 

Boldron  r.  Widdows 

14  v 

Bourne  v.  Gatliff 

14  »,  2->3 

BO!PP  f.  State 

461  a,  461  6,  469  I 

v.  Turner 

406 

Bolivar  Man.  Co.  v.  Neponset  Man.  Co        17 

Bours  r.  Tuckerman 

316 

Boiling  v.  Fannin 

120  c    Bovee  v.  McLean 

86,  563.X 

xxxvi 


Bowden  v.  Achor 

0.  Home 
Bowditch  0.  Boston 

v.  Jordan 

v.  Mawley 
Bowdle  v.  R.  Co. 
Bowen  v.  Allen 

0.  Bell 

v.  Huntington 

v.  Jones 

v.  Rutherford 
Bower  v.  Bower 

v.  State 

Bowerbank  v.  Monteiro 
Bowers  v.  State 
Bowes  0.  Broadhead 
Bowie  v.  Maddox 

0.  State 
Bowl  by  v.  Bell 
Bowles  v.  Langworthy 

v.  Neale 

v.  Orr 

r.  State 

Bowling  v.  Helm 
Bowl  us  v.  State 
Bowman  v.  Norton 

v.  Noyes 

v.  Rostron 

v.  Sanbora 

v.  Taylor 

v.  Weltig 

0.  Woods 
Bowsher  v.  Galley 
Boyce  v.  R.  Co. 
Boyd  v.  Bank 

v.  Jones 

0.  Ladson 

0.  McConnell 

v.  McLean 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[^References  are  to  sections.] 


189,  563  q 

532 

140 

41 

69 

370  c 

305m 

26 

441 1 

581 

1406 

14  Z,  247  a 
218 
283 

14  h,  14  o 
482 

14,  81  c 

14  c,  Uq 

267 

5696 

81 

546 

Up 

97  d 

14  c,  Ug,  14  fc,  461  c 

239,  243 

356,  357 

211 

322,  577,  581 

22 

14  n 

162  i,  440 
180 
14  v 
166 
189 
118 
566 
266 


0.  State         14  r,  14  v,  52,  219  b,  220,  343, 

375 

v.  U.  S.  377,  469/ 

Bovdell  0.  Drummond  268 

Boydtn  v.  Burke  108 

r.  Moore  110,  205 

Bovkin  0.  People  81  c 

0.  State  Up,  575  c 

Boylan  0.  Meeker  162  e,  444  d,  462,  575 

Boyle  v.  State  14  c,  14  g,  14  o,  162  k 

0.  Wiseman  563  d 

Boynton  0.  Kellogg  Ud,  54,  461 

v.  Miller  185 

v.  Turner  408,  427 

0.  Willard  40 

Boys  0.  Williams  291 

Bozeman  v.  Browning  563  e 

Brace  0.  Ormond  474 

Bracegirdle  v.  Bailey  14  A,  445 

Bracken  0.  State  14  A,  5636 

Bracket!  0.  Bartholomew  305 1 

v.  Hoitt  513 

v.  Mountfort  569  c 

0.  Norton  488,  489 

Braddee  v.  Brownfield  444  d,  46!»  n 

Bradfield  0  Tupper  174 

Bradford  0.  Cooper  430 1 

v.  Cunard  Co.  6  c 

v.  Ins.  Co.  14  q,  140 

v.  Manl.-y  305 

r.  People  469  d,  578  6,  581 .  581  n 

lJrii.ll.-c  r.  Nca!  353,  356 

Bradley  v.  Arthur  491 


Bradley  0.  Beckett 

0.  Bradley 

0.  Cramer 

v.  Geiselman 

0.  Gibson 

v.  Goodyear 

v.  Holdsworth 

v.  Myrick 

0.  Obear 

0.  Ricardo 

r.  State 

0.  Wash.,  etc.  Co 
Bradshaw  0.  Atkins 

0.  Bennett 

0.  Combs 


22 

41,527a,537 
14  o 
163  i 
14  d 
118 
270 

163  a,  163  d 
Uq 
4436 
Ul 
288 
430  p 
571 
435 


Bradstreet  0.  Neptune  Ins.  Co.  18,  541 

Brady  0.  Brady  430 p 

v.  Cassidv  286 

0.  McArdle  14  0 

0.  Parker  108 

0.  State  244 

Bragg  0.  Col  well  581 

Brailsford  0.  Williams  14/ 

Brain  0.  Preece  116 

Brainard  v.  Buck  197 

Bralev  v.  Braley  441  h 
Bram"  0.  U.  S.  14  r,  213,  219  a 

Branch  0.  Libbey  14  v 

Branch  B'k  0.  Parker  Up 

v.  Porter  140  6 

Brandao  0.  Barnett  5 

Brander  0.  Ferriday  Up 

Brandigee  0.  Hale  420 

Brandon  0.  Cabiness  171 

0.  People  461 6 

Brandram  v.  Wharton  112,  174 
Brandt  v.  Klein  241,  245,  561 

Brannon  0.  Hursell  444 

Brantly  v.  State        '  14  0 

Brard  v.  Ackerman  241 

Brashier  v.  Jackson  73 

Brattle  St.  Ch.  0.  Bullard  17,  46,  189 

Braun  0.  Campbell  469  a 

Brave  Peerage  Case  20 

Brayley  0.  Kelly  575  a 

Brazen  Nose  College  0.  Salisbury  491 

Brazier's  Case  162  A 

Breadalbane  v.  Chandos  162^ 

Breadalbane  Case  ]  40  c 

Breinig  0.  Metzler  120  c 

Breitenwischer  0.  Clough  166 

Brembridge  0.  Osborne  38 

Bremer  0.  Freeman  162,;,  488 

Brent  0.  State  18 
Breton  0.  Cope  38,  484,  563 1,  563  o 
Brett  v.  Bealcs  137,  139, 143,  481,. 

570,  5756 

Bretto  0.  Levine  305/ 

Brevaldo  0.  State  14  o 

Brewer  r.  Knapp  38 

0.  Palmer  87,  563  k 

v.  Porch  444 

0.  R.  Co.  14  o 

Brewster  0.  Countryman  303 

v.  Doane  115 

Brewton  0.  Glass  305/ 

Brhmt  v.  F.icke  73 

I'.ri. ,.  ,•    Bauer  192 

Bricelaml  v.  Com.  14  r 

Brick  r.  Brick  284 

Bride  0.  Clark  489 

Bridge  r.  Eggleston  53,  180,  397 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bridge  v.  Gray 

v.  Sumner 

v.  Wellington 
Bridger  v.  R.  Co. 
Bridges  v.  Armour 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  State 

Bridgewater  v.  Plymouth 
Bridgewater's  (Lord)  Case 
Bridgman  v.  Jennings 
Brierly  v.  Davol  Mills 
Brigg?  v.  Crick 

v.  Greenfield 

v.  Henderson 

v.  Hervev 

v.  Partridge 

t).  Prosser 

v.  Wells 

v.  Whipple 
Brigham  v.  Fayerweather 

v.  Palmer 

v.  Peters 

v.  Rogers 

v.  Smith 
Bright  v.  Sugg 
Brighton  v.  Walker 
Brill  v.  Car  Co. 
Brimhall  t>.  Van  Campen 
Brind  v.  Dale 
Bringloe  v.  Goodson 
Brinkerhoof  v.  Remsen 
Brisco  v.  Lomax 
Brister  v.  State 
Bristol  v.  Dann 
Bristow  v.  Cornican 

v.  Sequeville 

v.  Wright 
Britain  v.  Kinnaird 
Bi'itt  v.  State 
Brittain  v.  Allen 
Britton  v.  State 
Britton's  Case 
Broad  v.  Pitt 


184  b,  532 
529 
423 

Up,  Uv 
354 

14  w,  81  / 
14  o 
252  a 
497 
189 
Uv 

397,  398 

357 

5756 

40 

305  c 

46 

532 

.    66 

462  a 

5696 

114,  184  d,  577 

281,  303 

26 

73 

322 

1956 

43 

81 

5696 
272 
139 

218,  232 
171 

14  n,  108 
430  m 

51,  58,  60,  63,  66 
548 
14  q 
14  o 
502 
226 
240,  247,  247  a 


Broad  St.  Hotel  Co.  v.  Weaver's  Adm'rs    6  6 

Broadwell  v.  Stiles  563  6 

Brobston  v.  Cahill  581 

Brock  v.  Ins.  Co.  563  d 

v.  Kent  182 

v.  Milligan  369,  370 

v.  State  14  q,  462  a 

v.  Sturdivant  303 

Brockbank  ».  Anderson  423 

Brocket  v.  Foscue  26 

Broder  v.  Saillard  14  v 

Broderick  v.  Hijrginson  146,  14  q,  185 

Brodhead  v.  Wiltse  162 1 

Brody  v.  Chittenden  305  / 

Brogy's  Case  469  c 

Broniage  v.  Rice  678  a,  580 

Bromfield  v.  Jones  51 

Bromley  v.  Wallace  14  h 

Brookbank  v.  State  469  6 

Brooke  v.  People  34,  466  a 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Winters  14  t 

Brookes  v.  Tichbourn  581  n 

Bmok  field  v.  Warren  108 

Brooks  v.  Acton  14  u 

v.  Barrett  75,  77 

v.  Bemiss  70 

v.  Blanshard  73 

v.  Brooks  14  o 


Brooks  v.  Claiborne  Co. 

v.  Clay 

v.  Com. 

v.  Duggan 

v.  Lowrie 

v.  M'Kinney 

v.  R.  Co.     " 

v.  State 

v.  WTeeks 

v.  White 

Broome  v.  Wooton 
Brotherline  v.  Hammond 
Brotherton  v.  Livingston 

v.  People 
Brough  v.  Perkins 
Brouillette  v.  R.  Co. 
Brounker  t'.  Atkyns 
Brower  v.  Bowers 
Brown  v.  Bellows 

v.  Benson 

v.  Booth 

v.  Brooks 

v.  Brown 


XXXV11 


276 

H4/ 

141 

108 

68 

356 

462  a 

34,  162  h 

444 

305 

533 

43  a 

358,  573 

81  6, 159 

168jf 

14j 

139 

290 

443,4436,444,462 

14  v 

563  c 

292 


81  a,  280,  356,  395,  429, 
563  q,  582 

v.  Burrus  358 

v.  Byrne  292,  305  6,  305/ 

v.  Castellow  41 

v.  Com.  14  ff,  53, 156,  163/,  432  c 

v.  County  Corn's  86 

v.  Doyle  305 1 

v.  Edson  513 

v.  Fales  286 

v.  Foster  13  6,  292 

v.  Getchell  316 

v.  Greenly  163  h 

v.  Griffith  485  a 

v.  Hicks  485,  493 

v.  Howard  358 

v.  Hufford  441  / 

r.  Ins.  Co.  247  a,  430  /,  439  h 

v.  Jewett  186 

v.  Kenyon  108 

v.  Kimball  43  a,  575 

0.  King  42 

v.  Kohont  13 1, 108 

v.  Laselle  341 

v.  Leach  14  u 

v.  Leeson  254  6 

v.  Leuhrs  .                              4396 

v.  Lutz  5 

v.  Lynch  420 

v.  McGrau  81 / 

v.  Metz  43  a 

v.  Mitchell  441  c,f 

v.  Mooers  469  a 

v.  Mt.  Holly  162  6 

v.  Oldham  46 

v.  Paj-son  245 

v.  People  469  6 

v.  Perez  461  d 

v.  Pinkham  567 

v.  R.  Co.  14  6,  247  a,  441  g 

v.  Saltonstall  290 

v.  Schock  2  a,  14,  195  6 

v.  Sheppard  162  i 

v.  Shiappacassee  305  I 

v.  Slater  286,  287 
v.  State          14  a,  14  g,  14  q,  18,  159,  217, 
2196,  230,  370  c,  445, 
461  a,  46  Id,  466  n 

v.  Swineford  13y,162p 

v.  Thorudike  287,  288 


XXXV111 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Brown  v.  T'hurber 

279  |  Buell  t?.  Warner                                              fi  h 

v.  Tourtelotte 

81  d 

Buffum  v.  R.  Co.                                         441  b 

».  U.  S. 

184  a,  461  d 

Buford  v.  M'Luny                         14  d,  14  h,  55 

v.  Walker 

469  d 

v.  Tucker                                                     5 

».  White 

163  a 

Builder's  Co.  17.  Cox                                  184  c 

v.  Wood 

19,  254,  443 

Bulger  17.  Ross                                                  77 

v.  Woodman 

563/> 

Bulkeley  v.  Butler                                        43  a 

r.  Wright 
v.  Zachary 

43 
163  a 

Bulkley  v.  Dayton                                         427 
v.  Devine                                                 286 

Brown's  Case 

218,  343 

t7.  Landon                                                  68 

Brown,  Ex  parte 

248 

v.  Smith                                                572 

Browne,  v.  Gumming 

471 

Bull  17.  Loveland                  469  g,  469  n,  563  6 

v.  Murray 

74 

v.  Strong                                                  356 

t7.  Philadelphia  Bank 

5 

Bull's  Case                                                 161  6 

Brownell  v.  People 
i?.  R.  Co. 

14  c,  14  fc 
156,  162  f 

Bullard  17.  Briggs                                           266 
v.  Hascall                                                435 

Browning  v.  Flanagin 

120  a,  498 

17.  Lambert                                461  c,  401  d 

».  Gosnell 

5786 

17.  Pearsall                                                444 

17.   Huff 

519 

Bullen  17.  Michel                       139,  569  d,  575  b 

17.  State 

81  c 

Bulley  17.  Bulley                                             211 

Broyles  17.  Prisock 

13  c,  162  6 

Bullinger  v.  Marshall                                 469  b 

V  State 

230 

Bullis  v.  Easton                                           563  e 

Brubaker  17.  Taylor 

170  a,  444  a 

v.  Eaton                                                   577 

Bruce  17.  Beall 

439  h,  441  d 

Bullock  17.  Hunter                                      439  c 

17.  Nicolopopulo 

38  a,  563  e 

v.  Knox                                                   28 

17.  Slemp 

284 

r.  Koon                                                      87 

Brucker  17.  State 

6  a,  14  c 

17.  Wallingford                                        498 

Brumell  v.  A.  S.  M.  Co. 

14  M 

Bunbury  17.  Bunbury                             239,  240 

Brundred  17.  Del  Hoyo 

492 

17.  Matthews                                         563  g 

Brune  17.  Rawlings 

578 

Bundv  17.  Hart                                                  43 

17.  Thompson 

6 

Bunker  v.  Shed                                               116 

Brunson  17.  Lynde 

14  d 

Bunker  Hill  Co.  17.  Schmeiling                 439  g 

Brunswick  17.  McKeen 

20 

Bunn  v.  Winthrop                                          288 

Brusberg  17.  R.  Co. 

14  17 

Bunzel  17.  Mass                                            444  « 

Brush  17.  Blanchard 

513 

Burbank  v.  Gould                                            26 

17.  Gibbon 

559 

Burchrield  v.  Moore                            568,  568  n 

v.  Taggart 

521 

Burdette  v.  Com.                    444  b,  461  6,  469  I 

17.  Wilkins 

488 

Burdge  17.  State                                         2196 

Bryan  17.  Duff 

305  c 

Burdick  17.  Hunt                                     252,  581 

17.  Farnsworth 

505 

Burditt  17.  Howe                                          305  e 

17.  Forsyth 

491 

Burford  17.  McCue                                       43  n 

17.  Harrison 

280 

Burg  ».  R.  Co.                         14  17,  162  i,  162  /> 

17.  Moring 

4396 

Burges  17.  Steer                                                 58 

17.  Wagstaff 

563  d 

Burgess  v.  Lane                              167,  177,  418 

17.  Walton 

Us 

17.  Merrill                                                 356 

v.  Wear 

484 

D.  Seligman                                              2  n 

Bryant  v.  Foot 

5,  46 

v.  Tel.  Co.                                               43 

r.  Kelton 

485 

Burghardt  ».  Turner                                      57  L 

».  Owen 

305  q 

Burghart  v.  Angerstein                                 493 

r.  Pierce 

162  e 

Burgin  v.  Chenault                                        301 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  b,  14  v 

Burgovne  17.  Showier                           38  a,  564 

v.  Rittersbush 

385 

Burke"  r.  Elliott                                         563  g 

v.  State 

34 

v.  Miller                      14  d.  14  o,  447,  532 

Bryce  ».  R.  Co. 

14  c 

t>.  Rav                                                   305 

Buchanan  v.  Cook 

466  a 

17.  T.  "M.  W.  Co.                                 563  d 

v.  Grocery  Co. 

572 

Burkhart  v.  Gladish                                      14  / 

v.  Moore 

138  a 

Burh-igh  17.  Stibbs                                        563  I 

v.  Rucker 

514 

i?.  Stott                                                  174 

v.  State 

461  <1,  469  ./ 

Burlen  17.  Shannon                                         525 

Bucher  v.  Jarratt 

563  c,  563  a 

Burley's  Case                                       220  6,  229 

Buchman  v.  State 

310 

Burling  r.  Paterson                              38  a,  572 

Buck  v.  Appleton 

385 

Burlington  17.  Calais                                       175 

v.  Boston 

14  17 

Burlington  Nat.  B'k  17.  Beard                     190 

r.  Maddock 

170  a 

Burn  t7.  Miller                                                303 

Buckey  v.  Buckey 

81  a 

Burnand  v.  Nerot                                           507 

Buckingham  »7.  Roar 

254,  341 

Btiniell  v.  Weld                                              506 

Buckler  t7.  Millerd 

284 

Burnett  v.  R.  Co.                                         44  U 

Buckley  17.  Beardslee 

268 

t'.  Simpkins                                            14  d 

t?.  Buck  lev 

445 

17.  Smith                                                   532 

Buck  1  in  r.  State 

461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

?'.  State                                                      14  o 

Buckminster  r.  Perry 

77,  440    Buniey  v.  Ball 

Bucknam  v.  Burnum 

177    Burnhum  r.  Adams                                        118 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Burnham  v.  Allen  14  x,  74 

v.  Aver  430  i 

v.  Ellis  184  c 

v.  Morrissey 

v.  Stevens  322 

t7.  Webster  6  6 

Burns  v.  Barenfeld  441  k 

v.  Burns  273 

v.  Fay  118,  120  c 

v.  Sennett  14  v 

v.  State  14  k 

Burns'  Will 
Burr  v.  Harper 

v.  Sim 

v.  Willson 
Burr's  Trial 
Burrell  v.  Nicholson 

v.  North 

v.  State 

Burress  v.  Com. 
Burris  v.  State 
Burrough  v.  Martin 
Burrows  v.  Lake  Crystal 
Burson  i?.  Edwards 
Burt  v.  Palmer 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Walker 

».  Wigglesworth 
Burtenshaw  v.  Gilbert 
Burton  v.  Driggs 

«.  Hinde 

v.  Issitt 

v.  March 

v.  Plummer 

v.  Railway 

17.  Scott 

v.  State       13  e,  14  jfc,  162  g,  163  h,  219  6, 
220  6,  220  c,  439  g 
Burwell  v.  Sneed 
Busby  v.  Greenslate 
Bush  17.  Com. 

v.  Delano 

v.  Hicks 

v.  Jackson 

17.  Railing 

17.  Stowell 
Bushel  v.  Barrett 
Bushnell  v.  Colony 
Bushwood  v.  Pond 
Bussard  v.  Levering 
Buswell  Trimmer  Co.  v.  Case 
Butcher  v.  Brownsville 

17.  R.  Co. 

17.  Steuart 

Butcher  &  Aldworth's  Case 
Butchers'  Co.  17.  Jones 
Butler  17.  Allnut 

17.  Benson 

v.  Butler 

17.  Carver 

v.  Cooke 

v.  Gale 

17.  Glass  Co. 

17.  Ins.  Co. 

17.  Moore 

17.  Mountgarret 


577 
41 
Sid 

251,  252,  469  d 
76,  474 
563  n 

163/,  469  a 
577 
14  p 

436,  439  b 
Up,  U» 
Uo 
27,  182 
6  « 
572 
75 
273 

120  a,  509,  563  e,  563  h 

391,  405 

1846 

146 

436,  437 

163  h 

147 


v.  Price 
v.  R.  Co. 
v.  Tufts 
v.  Warren 
v.  Watkins 
V.  Wright 


439  g,  441  c 
397 

165,  370  a 
77,  162  e 
305  c 
14..* 
413 
174 
373 
563d 
58,72 
40 
14  a 
66 
14  v 
285 
502 

422,  563  j 
40 
436 
423 

422,  563  j 
392 
280 
534 
484 
247 

114  e,  563  n 
185 
461  c 
421 

391,  402 
14  9  I 
1161 


Batman  v.  Howell 
Butterfiekl  v.  Smith 
Buttrick  v.  Allen 

v.  Holden 
Butts  v.  Eaton  Rapids 

v.  Swartwood 
Buzard  v.  McAnulty 
Bvers  v.  R.  Co. 

v.  State 

v.  Wallace 
Byerts  v.  Hobitison 
Byrket  v.  Monohon 
Byrne  v.  Harvey 

v.  Packing  Co. 


XXXIX 


284 
523 
514 
532 

Up,  162  b 
369 

186,  439  h 

14  v,  162  k 

14  o,  461  a 

114  e,  114  / 

120' c 

146 

563d 

292 


C. 


C.  C.  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Newell  1626 
C.  &  F.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  May  441  J,  461  d 

C.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Minns  441  g 

C.  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith  184  c 

C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ball  4410 

C.  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Staton  466  a 

C.  &  T.  R.  Co.  17.  Perkins  430  » 

Cable  v.  R.  Co.  14  w 

Caddy  n.  Barlow  471 

Cadwell  v.  State  54 
Cady  t7.  Shepherd  174,  1846 

v.  Walker  245 

Caha  v.  U.  S.  66 

Cahn,  In  re  290 

Cain  v.  State  219  6 

Caine  v.  Horsefall  280,  294 

Cake  v.  Potsville  Bank  275 

Calcraft  v.  Guest  245 

Calder  v.  Bull  2  •« 

v.  Rutherford  78 

Caldwell  v.  McDermit  120  c 

v.  Melvedt  245 

v.  Murphy  162  b 

v.  Nav.  Co.  14* 

v.  State  14  h,  461  d,  563  n 

Caley  v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.  284 a 

Calhoun  v.  Dunning  535 

Calkin  v.  Evans  260 

Calkins  v.  Calkins  162  e 

v.  Hartford  14  o 

v.  State  581 
Call  v.  Dunning  569,  569  6,  572 

v.  Perkins  322 
Callagan  v.  Burns  14s,  162  e 

Callaghan  v.  S.  P.  C.  A.  14 1 

Callahan  v.  Ingrain  441  i, 

Callan  v.  Gaylord  581 

v.  Lukens  284  a 

Callanan  v.  Hurley  2  a 

v.  Shaw  465  a 

Callen  v.  Rose  193 

Calliand  v.  Vaughan  320,  324 

Call  sen  v.  Hope  66 

Calmacly  v.  Rowe  45  n 

Calvert'v.  Bovill  541 

v.  Flower  5^3 

Cambridge  r.  Lexington  47.  293 

Camden  «.  Doremus  421 

n.  Williams  162/ 

Camden.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Steward  563  f 

v.  Williams  ]gO 

Camerlin  v.  Palmer  Co.  162/> 

Cameron  v.  Blackman  439  c 

v.  Ligbtfoot  210 


xl 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Cameron  r.  Peck  563  g 

Camneld  v.  Bird  14  o 

Camoys  v.  Blundell  305  m 

Camovs  Peerage  114  d 

Camp'c.  Dill  174 

v.  Hall  441  d 

v.  State  14  a 

Campau  v.  Dubois  192 

v.  Moran  14  o 

v.  North  247  a 

Campbell  v.  Bannister  14  d,  14  h,  14  o 

r.  Brown  466  a 

v.  Butts  14  o 

v.  Campbell  14  d 

v.  Carruth  38 

v.  Cnace  254 

v.  Coon  190 

».  Dearborn  284,  305  d 

v.  Hastings  177 

v.  Hodgson  281 

v.  Hood  356 

».  Kalamazoo  14/>.  14  u 

v.  People  14  k,  380 

v.  Phelps  533 

r.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Rickards  441 

v.  Russell  430y 

v.  State       13  i,  14  g,  14;?,  34,  81  c,  163/, 

215,  370  c,  439  g,  444,  461  b 

v.  Tousey  392 

v.  Twemlow  339 

v.  Wilson  1146 

v.  Wood  6  b 

v.  York  162.; 

Canal  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  6  b,  490 

Canale  v.  People  488 

Candrian  v.  Miller  14  d 

Cane  v.  Lord  Allen  80 

Canfield  v.  Jackson  14  u 

Cannady  r.  Lynch  370  c 

Caunell  v.  Curtis  563  q 

v.  lust  Co.  441  e 

Cannev's  Case  165 

Canning's  Trial  195  b 

Cannon  v.  Jones  402 

Capital  &  Counties  B'k  v.  Henty  8 1./ 

Card  v.  Grinman  273 

r.  State  14?,  184  « 

Careless  «.  Careless 

Carey  r.  Adkins  185 

v.  Hubbardston  439  A 

v.  Pitt  577,  58 la 

Cargill  *.  Atwood  120  c 

«.  Com.  14.9 

Caricoc.  Com.  14  « 

Cariss  v.  Tattersall  564 

Carleton  v.  Whitcher 

Carlisle  v  Burley  392 
v.  Eadv                          95,422,426,563; 

v.  Garland  180 

r.  State  97  d 
Carlisle  (Mayor  of)  v.  Blamire 

Carlos  v.  Brook  461 
Carlson  v.  Winterson           461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

Carlton  v.  Hescox  14  o 
v.  Patterson 

v.  People  14  r 

r.  Wine  Co.  275 

Carmack  v.  Com.  180 

Cnrmalt  »-.  Post  430 1,  440 

Carmel  N.  G.  &  I.  Co.  ».  Small  14  m 

Carnaroon  v.  Villebois  139 


Carne  v.  Litchfield 

v.  Nicoll 
Carnell  v.  State 
Carpenter  v.  Ambroson 

v.  Buller 

v.  Calvert 

v.  Carpenter 

v.  Corinth 

v.  Crane 

v.  Dame 

v.  Dexter 

v.  Groff 

v.  Hatch 

v.  Hayward 

v.  Hollister 

v.  King 

r.  Nixon 

v.  Snow 

«.  Wall 
Carpenter's  Estate 


469  d 

152  c 

Uq 

434 

26 

441  ft 
189 

14  v,  430/ 

357 

563g 

66 

163  h 

430 /,  441/ 

81  e 

190 

281 

4616 

305  n 

14  d,  14  A,  450,  462 
430.p 


Carpenters  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Hayward       405 

Carpmael  v.  Powis  239,  240 

Can-  f.  Burdiss  571 

».  Cornell  334 

v.  Daveis  421 

v.  Dooley  305  / 

v.  Griffin  App.  Ill 

v.  Moore  14  v 

v.  Sellers  120  c 
v.  State                  14  a,  162  c,  162  g,  219  6 

Carradine  v.  Hotchkiss  447  a 

Carrico  v.  Neal  430  i 

v.  R.  Co.  13/,  163gr,  230 

Carrington  v.  Cornock  516 

v.  Jones  155 

v.  Roots  271 

v.  Stimson  322 

v.  Ward  430  i 

Carroll  v.  Com.  380 

v.  Norwood  575  b 
r.  State                     14  c,  14  *,  162  c,  162  o 

v.  Tyler  116,  120 

Carskadden  v.  Poorman  11 4  g 

Carson  v.  Smith  66 

Carson's  Appeal  577 

Carson's  Case  65 

Carstens  v.  Hanselman  13/' 

Carter  v.  Bennett  197,  204,  210,  523 

v.  Boehm  440,  441,  441  e 

v.  Buchannon  108, 110 

v.  Carter  469  6 
v.  Cnvenaugh           14  b,  14  d,  461  a,  461  c 

v.  Chambers  195  * 

n.  Com.  461  d 
v.  Gregory 

v.  Jackson  &ei 

v.  Jones  "6 

u.  McDowell  14  o 

u.  Montgomery  114  c,  114  / 

v.  Pearce  408,  409 

v.  People  461  6.  469  n 

v.  Prvke  '  14  n,  52 

v.  Seattle  146 

«.  State  162  A,  367,  430 1 

v.  Tinicum  Fishing  Co.  45  «.  4(i 
v.  Wilson 

Carthage  T.  Co.  v.  Andrews 

Cartwrlsrht  v.  Cartwright  430  m 

v.  Williams 

Cnruthers  v.  Kldridge  676« 

Carver  r.  Huskey  **" 

v.  Jackson  22,  23,  189,   523 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


xli 


Carver  v.  People                                         14  q 

Chaffee  v.  Thorn  a? 

420 

v.  Tracy                                                   173 

Chalmers  v.  Mfg.  Co. 

195  d,  441  1 

v.  U.  S.                         157,  158,  161  a,  462 

».  Shackell 

81  d 

Carver,  In  re                                                 272 

Chamberlain  v.  Carlisle 

527,  531 

Carville  v.  Stout                                          444  a 

v.  Gorhara 

349 

v.  Westford                                           462 

v.  Enfield 

14  b,  14  g 

Cary  v.  Gerrish                                                38 

».  Pierson 

14  V 

v.  Hotaling                                             14  q 

v.  Sands 

439  b,  444 

Case  v.  Case                                                   34 

0.  Torrance 

444  d 

v.  Mobile                                                  66 

v.  Willson 

469  d 

v.  Potter                                                118 

Chamberlain's  Case 

311 

v.  Reeve                                                523 

Chamberlain,  Re 

201 

Case  Plow  Work  v.  N.  &  S.  Co.              305/ 

Chambers  v.  Bernasconi 

115,  120  a,  152  c 

Casev  v.  O'Shaunessy                                 114  c 

v.  Hill 

201 

Cash"  v.  Taylor                                              14  n 

v.  Hunt 

563  o 

Cass  v.  Cameron                                             409 

v.  People 

501 

v.  R.  Co.                                         14  r,  14  x 

v.  Prince 

162  c 

Cass's  Case                                             220,  222 

».  State 

218 

Cassady  v.  Trustees                                    163  g 

v,  Watson 

305  k 

Cassin  v.  Delaney                                            28 

Chamblee  v.  State 

Up 

Casson  v.  Dade                                              272 

Chamness  «.  Chamness 

430  p 

Castellano  v.  Peillon 

Champ  v.  Com. 

14  v,  441  /,  444 

Castelli  c.  Groom                                           320 

Champion  v.  Atkinson 

14  » 

Castner  «'.  Sliker                                         162  g 

c.  Plummer 

268 

Castle  v.  Bullard                                         14  q 

Champney's  Case 

257 

v.  Fox                                                      290 

Champneys  «.  Peck 

40,  116,  120  a 

Caswell  v.  R.  Co.                                           14  v 

Chance  v.  Gravel  Road  Co.                         581 

Cates  v.  Hardacre                                        469  d 

v.  Hine 

423 

v.  Loftus                                                 43  a 

v.  R.  Co. 

461  d 

Cathcart  v.  Com.                                           14  6 

Chancellor  v.  Milly 

13  c,  14* 

Catlett  v.  Ins.  Co.                                         484 

Chandler  v.  Allison 

445 

v.  R.  Co.                                              14  w 

v.  Aqueduct 

14  v 

Catlin  v.  Bell                                                  284 

r>.  Freeman 

444  a 

Caton  v.  Lenox                                              165 

v.  Grieves 

5 

Cator  v.  Stokes                                               498 

v.  Home 

432  c 

Catt  v.  Howard                             179,  201,  439 

v.  Le  Barraa 

578  a,  581 

Cattison  v.  Cattison                                   162  d 

v.  Mason 

385 

Caufman  v.  Cong,  of  Cedar  Spring         138  a 

v.  Morton 

385 

140(7 

Chanoine  v.  Fowler 

5,4306,488 

Caujolle  v.  Feme"                     28,  41,  104,  156 

Chapel  v.  Bull 

24 

Caune  v.  Sagory                                            416 

v.  Washburn 

187 

Cavallaro  v.  R.  Co.                                          43 

Chapin  v.  Curtis 

523 

Cavan  v.  Stewart                                         514 

v.  Dobson 

284  a,  305/ 

Cavanah  v.  State                                         465  a 

Chaplain  v.  Briscoe 

563  e,  569  c 

Cavanaugh  v.  Noble                                     14  o 

Chapman  v.  Beard 

196 

Cavelier  v.  Collins                                          118 

v.  Callis 

285 

Cavender  v.  Guild                                           6  b 

v.  Chapman 

99  a,  114  c,  114  e 

Cazenove  v.  Vaughan         163d,  516,  553,  554 

v.  Cooley 

461  c,  469  a 

Central  Branch,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Butman       114, 

v.  Cowlan 

135 

184  d.  192 

v.  Davis 

319 

Central  Bridge  Co.  v.  Lowell             136,  563  g 

v.  Emden 

81 

Central  M.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rockafellow          369, 

r.  Graves 

356,  357 

370  a 

v.  James 

445 

Central  Penn.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Thompson         184  d 

v.  Ordway 

14  d,  14  h 

Central  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson                       14  v 

v.  R.  Co. 

41,  202 

Centra]  R.  Co.  v.  Ingram                             14  « 

v.  Searle 

207,  208 

v.  Murray                                             163  g 

v.  Tavlor 

14  h 

v.  Phillips                                             432  b 

v.  Twitchell 

138  a,  182 

v.  Richards                                            162; 

v.  Walton 

441,  441  e 

v.  Skellie                                              430  n 

Chardon  v.  Oliphant 

1846 

w.  Whitehead                                        563  o 

Charkieh,  The 

6d 

Central  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Kelly                   441  g 

Charles  v.  State 

462  a 

Central  Vt.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruggles      14  b,  14  c.  14  g 
Chabbock's  Case                          219,  219  b,  222 

Charles  L.  Jeffrey,  The 
Charleston  R.  Co.  v.  Blake 

81 

184  c 

Chad  v.  Tilsed                                              293 
Chadron  v.  Glover                                   469  m 

Charlotte  v.  Chouteau 
Charlton  v.  Barret 

6  6,  81  g,  162  1,  488 
14  o 

Chadsey  ».  Greene                                         182 

v.  Lawry 

118 

Chadwick  v.  Fonner                                    189 

v.  Unis 

461  e,  461  f 

v.  Upton                                                  402 

Charnock  ».  Dewings 

432  a 

Chad  wick's  Trial                                           450 

Charnock's  Case 

379 

Chaffee  v.  Baptist  M.  C.                                272 

Charter  v.  Charter        291. 

305  ;',  305  k.  305  m 

v.  Jones                                                 316 

Chase  v.  Blodgett             376,  461  o,  461  b,  467 

xlii 


Chase  0.  Chase 

v  Hathaway 

t?  Jewett 

v  Lincoln 

v  Lowell 

v  R.  Co. 

r   Smith 

v  State 

v   Surry 

Chasemore  "v.  Richards 
Chat.  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Owen 
Chatfield  v.  Fryer 

v.  Lathrop 
Chattaes  v.  Raitt 
Chauraud  v.  Angerstein 
Cheek  v.  State 
Cheetham  v.  Ward 
Cheever  v.  Congdon 
Chelmsford  Co.  v.  Demarest 


TABLE    OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 

162  c    Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker 
503,  513,  518 


281 
440 
162  d 
6c 
120 
14  c 
40 
46 
6c 
138 
423 
5C2 

280,  440*441  e 

Uo 

427 

480  £ 

187 


Chelsea  Water  Works  (Gov.,  etc.  of)  v 

Cowper 

Chemical  E.  L.  Co.  v.  Howard 
Chenango,  Supervisors  of,  «.  Birdsall 
Chenault  v.  Walker 
Cheney  v.  Cheney 
Cheny  v.  State 
Cherokee  v.  Land  Co. 
Cherokee  Co.  v.  Dickson 


Cherry  c.  Bovd 

v.  Slade 

v.  State 

Chesapeake  Club  v.  State 
Chesley  v.  Chesley 

v.  Frost 
Chess  v.  Chess 


Chester  Emery  Co.  v.  Lucas 

Chesterfield  v'.  Ratcliff 

Cheyne  v.  Koops 

Cheyney's  Case 

Chicago  0.  Powers 

Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor 

Chicago  D.  "D.  Co.  v.  Chic".  D.  Co. 

Chicago  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Hewitt 


570 
278 
356 

441  c 
199 
14  q 
14t> 
14  c,  184  c, 

441  d 

138, 138  a 

301 

1146,  114  c,  114  fir 

469  d 

146,14o 

568 

163  h,  165, 166, 
167 
290 
81/ 
395 

305  k 
Up 
14  v 
Uq 

120  a 


4396 

Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler          439  b,  439  c 

v.  Allen  461  e 

v.  Becker  162  g 

v.  Rivans  430/> 

v.  Blake  430 p 

v.  Buel  430/> 

v.  Chancellor  162  c 

v.  Clark  146,  14  o 

v.  Clausen  13/,  13  q 

v.  Dickson  305 1 

v.  Gilbert  14  v 

v.  Glenny  441 

v.  Hart  14  v 

v.  Hyatt  6  a 

v.  Ingersoll  441 1 

r.  Jones  2 1 

v.  Kepgun  162 

v.  Kellogg  432 

v.  Langston  469  m 

v.  Maroney  14  v 

v.  Martin  430 

v.  Mr  Million  195  a 

v.  Mitchell  441 

v.  Myers  163 

v.  Parsons  6c.  13 j 

v.  R.  Co.  441 


v.  Stewart 


162  6,  430  I 
140 

v.  Sullivan  14  c 
r.  Wolcott  563  h 
hicot  Co.  v.  Davies  482 
Child  v.  Chamberlain  358 
v.  Grace  198 
v.  Kingsburv  140  a 
Ihildrens  v.  Saxby  348 
Childress  v.  Cutter  484,  493,  498 
hilds  v.  Merrill  469  d 
Chipman  i-.  Peabody  6  b 
v.  People  14  q 
v.  R.  Co.  176 
hippendale  v.  Thurston  174 
Chirac  r.  Reinicker  73,  237,  245 
Chisholm  v.  Machine  Co.  120  a 
Jhism  v.  State  444 
Shitty  v.  Dendy  6  a 
Jhoate  v.  Burn  ham  293 
Dhoile  v.  State  430/> 
Christ  v.  State  581 
v.  Webster  City  252  a 
Christensen  v.  U.  T.  Line  14  g,  195  d 
!hristensen's  Estate  441  f 
Christian  v.  Coombe  212 
v.  Williams  317 
Christie  v.  Bishop  178 
Christie,  Re  370  c 
~  hristman  v.  Pearson  581  a 
Chubb  v.  Salomons  251 
v.  Westley  14  o 
Chumasero  »:/Gilbert  66 
Chung  Singfl.  U.  S.  146 
Church  v.  Case  305  c 
v.  Drummond  146 
v.  Hubbart                       4,  5,  487,  488,  514 
v.  Milwaukee  439  h,  441  (j 
v.  Shelton  186,  195 
Churchill  v.  Holt  532 
v.  Suter  379,  385 
v.  Wilkins  58 
Churchman  v.  Smith  118 
Chute  v.  State  13  f,  439  6 
Chytraus  v.  Chicago  466  a 
Cicely  v.  State  14/> 
Cicero  v.  State  230,  App.  Ill 
Cilley  v.  Tenny  284  a 
Cincinnati  «.  White  207 
Cincinnati,  Ham.  &  Ind.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clif- 
ford 6  6 
Cincinnati,  N.  0.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dis- 

brow  563  6 
Cincinnati,  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Cham- 
pion 14  v 
Cist  v.  Zeigler  531 
Citizens'    Bank  v.  Nantucket  Steam- 
boat Co.  426 
Citizens'  R.  T.  Co.  v.  Dew  14  6,  114  c 
Citizens'  8.  R.  Co.  v.  Willoeby  13/ 
City  Bank  v.  Adams  281 
v.  Bateman                        184  c,  332,  469  g 
v.  Young  462  a 
Citv  Council  v.  King  331,  332 
City  of  Berne  v.  Bank  of  England 
City  of  London  v.  Clerke 
Claflin  v.  Ballance 
v.  Carpenter 
i).  Dodson 
v.  R.  Co. 

Clagett  t'.  Phillips 
Clancey's  Case 


139 
190 
271 

4436 
41,  46 

240  a 
373 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


xliii 


Clap  v.  Ingersoll 

152  a 

Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse 

108,139,5756 

Clapp  v.  Balch 

73 

Clary  t».  Clary 

430/>,  440,  441  / 

v.  Fullerton 

441  f 

v.  Grimes 

189 

v.  Herrick 

523,  532 

Clawson  i?.  State 

81a 

v.  Mandeville 

389 

Claxton  v.  R.  Co. 

441  d 

«.  Norton 

439  g 

v.  Swift 

533 

17.  State 

469  d 

Clay  v.  Alderson's  Adm'r 

581 

v.  Tirrell 

26 

v.  Kirkland 

392 

v.  Wilson 

465  a 

0.  Langslow 

181 

Clapton,  Re 

305  A 

v.  Robinson 

581 

Clara,  The 

66 

v.  Stephenson 

320 

Clarges  v.  Sherwin 

539 

v.  Williams 

241 

Clark  v.  Alexander 

42,  174 

Clayton  v.  Gregson 

280 

v.  Bailey 

461  a 

v.  Greshain 

550 

v.  Bigelow 

430  i,  440 

v.  Wardell 

140  c 

v.  Bond 

469  a 

Clealand  ».  Huey 

163  a,  164 

v.  Bradstreet 

14s 

Cleave  v.  Jones 

249 

v  Brown 

14d,14o 

Cleaveland  ».  Flagg 

301 

v.  Carter 

426 

Cleavelands  v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

v.  Clark 

290,  441/,  46  1/ 

Cleaves  v.  Foss 

269 

v.  Com. 

Up 

Cleavland  v.  Burton 

200 

v.  Courtney 

575 

Cleghorn  v.  R.  Co. 

1*> 

v.  Eckstein 

564 

Cleland  v.  Thornton 

Uu 

17.  Ellsworth 

430  p 

Clem  v.  State 

469  a 

v.  Faunce 

17 

Clemens  v.  Conrad 

461* 

v.  Fisher 

4416 

Clement  v.  Brooks 

457,  461  b 

v.  Fletcher 

14  i,  563 

v.  Durgin 

302,  304 

v.  Gifford 

284 

v.  Packer 

138  a,  140  a 

v.  Gill 

310 

Clement,  The 

4411 

v,  Gleason 

1846 

Clement!  v.  Golding 

$ 

v.  Hills 

131,  138  a 

Clementine  v.  State 

Ud 

v  Hopkins 

39 

Clements  v.  Benjamin 

163d 

«.  Hornbeck 

5636 

v.  Kyles 

140  a 

r.  Houghan 

191 

v.  McGinn 

370  c 

r.  Houghton 

201 

Clementson  v.  Gandy 

288 

v.  Huffaker 

209 

Clerke  v.  Isted 

69 

v.  Irvin 

537 

Cleveland  v.  Spillman 

305  m 

».  Lucas 

394,  397 

Cleveland,  C.  C.  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.  e.  Jenkins    5 

v.  Morrison 

6  a,  174 

v.  Monaghan 

439  A 

v.  Munyan 

301 

v.  Prewitt 

1626 

v.  Periam 

14  A 

».  Walter 

14  v 

v.  Reese 

444  6,  461  6,  469  I 

Cleveland,  Col.  C.  &  Ind. 

R.  Co.  c. 

v.  Rhodes 

581 

Newell 

14  M.  162  6 

v.  Sanderson 

575 

Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Perkins    162  /,  '563  c, 

v.  State 

14  q,  441/ 

563  p 

17.  Trinity  Church 
v.  Turner 

120  a,  493 
162  e 

v.  Wynant                                              14  o 
Cleveland  Ref.  Co.  v.  Dunning                 305  c 

v.  Van  Riemsdyk 

260,  351 

Cleverly  v.  Cleverly 

286,  287 

v.  Vorce 

437 

Clicquot's  Champagne 

162  /,  430  » 

v.  Water  Power  Co. 

14  v 

Clifford  v.  Burton 

185 

v.  Wilmot 

116,  151 

v.  Drake 

4396 

Clark's  Case 

65 

v.  Hunter 

445 

Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Carrington 

180 

t\  Parker 

564 

v.  Van  Riemsdyk 

178,  184  6,  257 

v.  Richardson 

4416 

Clark's  Lessee  v.  Hall 

375,  376 

v.  Turril 

285,  304 

Clarke  v.  Bank  of  Mississippi                       489 

Clifton  v.  Granger 

469  d 

v.  Baruwell 

305 

v.  U.  S. 

195  c 

v.  Clarke 

196,  204,  207 

Clinan  v.  Cooke 

269 

v.  Courtney 

575,  575  6 

Clinch  Co.  v.  Willing 

305  c 

v.  Duunavent 

572 

Cline  v.  Little 

427 

v.  Gannon 

408,  430 

v.  State 

163  «r 

v.  Gray 

66,  69 

v.  U.  S. 

163  f 

v.  Lyman 

40 

Clinton  v.  Hooper 

296 

v.  Magruder 

116,  120  6 

v.  State 

364  a,  369,  370  a 

v.  Mead 

2a 

Clipper  (The)  v.  Logan 

440 

v.  Robinson 

551,  563  n 

Close  17.  Olney 

469  d 

v.  Saffery 

435 

v.  Samm 

i-V 

v.  Spence 

81,  348 

Clothier  ».  Chapman 

52,  137,  138  a 

v.  State 

14  k,  343 

Clough  t7.  Bowman 

290 

v.  Waite 

180 

v.  Little 

120  a,  120  c,  439  6 

v.  Wvburn 

361 

».  State 

439  c 

Clarke's  Ex'rs  17.  Canfield 

41 

Clouse  v.  Coleman 

469m 

xliv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Cloutman  v.  Tunison 

495 

Cluck  v.  State 

162^ 

Cluff  v.  Hut.  Benefit  Life  Ins 

.  Co.                43 

Cluggage  v.  Swan 

116,  120 

Clime  v.  U.  S. 

184  a 

Clunnes  v.  Pezzey 

37 

Clute  v.  Small 

5636 

Cluverius  v.  Com. 

14  k 

Coates  v.  Birch 

241,  245 

v.  Early 

305  c 

v.  R.  Co. 

162.;,  195  d 

v.  Sulan 

461  a,  461  d 

v.  Wilkes 

444  a 

Coats  v.  Gregory 

201 

Cobb  17.  Boston 

4396 

o.  Haynes 

43  a 

Cobbett  v'.  Hudson 

432  c 

v.  Kilminster 

578  a 

Cobden  «.  Boulton 

563s 

Coble  v.  State 

140,4616,469^ 

Cobleigh  v.  Young 

20 

Cobleskill  N.  B'k  v.  Emmitt 

34 

Cobum  v.  Odell 

469  d 

v.  Storer 

184  a 

Cochran  v.  Retberg 

305  / 

Cochrane  v.  W.  D.  Co. 

14  o 

Cocke  v.  Jennor 

533 

Cockerham  v.  Nixon 

Up 

Cockrill  v.  Hall 

4616 

Cocks  v.  Purday 

488 

Cockshot  v.  Bennett 

172 

Codrnan  ».  Caldwell 

120  c 

Coe  v.  Huttou 

199 

Cofer  11.  Thermond 

41 

Coffin  17.  Anderson 

4696 

v.  Bradbury 

170  a 

v.  Bucknam 

152  o 

»  Jones 

254,  338 

f.  U.  S. 

34 

v.  Vincent 

439  c 

Coggswell  v.  Deliver 

118,  120  c 

Coghlan  ».  Williamson 

572 

Colien  v.  Templar 

469  » 

Cohen,  Ex  parte 

469  d 

Cohn  v.  Kingsley 

482 

Coit  v.  Millikin 

4,  479 

v.  Starkweather 

288 

v.  Tracy 
Coker  v.  Guy 

174,1846 
275 

».  State 

14  fc 

Colbern's  Case 

340 

Colchester  v.  Culver 

43  a 

Colchester  (Mavor  of)  v.  —  — 
Coldwater  N.  B"'k  v.  Buggie 

333 
185 

Coldwell  v.  State 

14  d 

Cole  i'.  Anderson 

118 

v.  Andrews 

239 

v.  Cheshire 

108 

v.  Cole 

192 

v.  Com. 

14  a 

v.  Hall 

1636 

r.  Hawkins 

316 

r.  Howe 

284 

v.  R.  Co. 

101,  441  h 

r.  State 

14  o,  230 

Cole's  Lessee  r.  Cole 

376 

Coleman  v.  Com. 

370  c,  370  e 

v  Dobbins 

6a 

r.  Fobes 

174 

v.  Frazier 

152  d 

v.  People 

14  q,  195  a 

r.  State 

4616 

Coleman  v.  Wolcott 
Coleman's  Will 
Coles  v.  Brown 

v.  Trecothick 
Colette's  Estate 
Coif  v.  R.  Co. 
Coll.  v.  Transit  Co. 
Collagan  v.  Burns 
Colledge  v.  Horn 
Collender  v.  Dunsmore 
Collery  v.  Transit  Co. 
Collett  i?.  Lord  Keith 
Collier  v.  Dick 

17.  Nokes 

17.  Simpson 

v.  State 

Colling  v.  Treweek 
Collins  v.  Bayntun 

v.  Blantern 

T.  Carnegie 

v.  Com. 

v.  Crummen 

17.  Dorchester 

17.  Elliott 

v.  Godefroy 

17.  Grantham 

17.  Hall 

v.  Lemasters 

17.  Lynch 

v.  Mack 

17.  Mathews 

17.  Maule 

17.  R.  Co. 

17.  Richart 

17.  State 

v.  Stephenson 
Colman  v.  Anderson 
Colman,  In  re 
Colo.  C.  C.  M.  Co.  v.  Turck 
Colo.  M.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Rees 
Colpoys  17.  Colpoys 
Colsell  i?.  Budd 
Colson  ».  Bonzey 
Columbia  v.  Harrison 
Columbia  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lawrence 
Columbia  R.  Co.  17.  Hawthorne 
Columbia  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Tillman 
Columbian  Man.  Co.  17.  Dutch 
Columbus  v.  Sims 
Columbus  &  li.  R.  Co.  v.  Christian 


349 
244 
4436 
269 
291 
14  v 
162.9 
14s,  162  e 
186 
282 
444  a 

193,  App.  Ill 
197 
192 

162  i,  440 
161 

563  c,  563  p 
571 
284 
195 
159 
420 
14  v 
1G2e 
310 

114  e,  114  g 
444 
437 
38 

170,  247  a 
502 
563  q 
14  » 
1636 

1620,  466  a 
162  d 
20,46 
272 
14  w 

Up,  14  i 
288 
39 

484,  494 
4396 
14 

195  d 
563  c 
353,  356 
162./ 
14  A, 
461  c 
30 
46 

240  o 
210 
563  e 

430  i,  461  d 
186 
14* 

461/,  462 
5636 


Colvin  17.  Procurator-General 

v.  Warford 
Combe  v.  Corp.  of  London 

17.  Pitt 
Combs  17.  Breathitt  Co. 

v.  Com. 

17.  Hodge 

17.  State 

17.  Winchester 
Comer  v.  Hart 

v.  Way 

Comfort  17.  People 
Commander  «.  State 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Barksdale 

17.  Ins.  Co.  . 

Commercial  Bank  of  Albany  v.  Hiighes 
^Commercial  Bank  of  Buffalo  17.  Kort- 

wright 

Commercial  Bank  of  Natchez  ».  King 
Commons  v.  Walters 
Com'rsr.  Clark 


162  c 
14  k,  Uo 
498 
328  c 
387 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


xlv 


Commonwealth  0.  Abbott 

14  o,  14  r  \  Commonwealth  0.  Davidson                        563 

0.  Acton 

14  q,  254  a 

0.  Dean 

79 

0.  Alburger 

139 

0.  Dearborn 

14? 

0.  Allen 

578  a 

0.  Densmore 

1523 

0.  Anthes 

49 

0.  Desmond 

G 

0.  Babcock 

79 

0.  Doherty 

81  c 

0.  Bachelor 

369,  370 

v.  Donahoe 

444 

v.  Bagley 

18 

0.  Downey 

195  a 

0.  Baird 

331 

0.  Downing 

382,  501 

0.  Beckley 

65 

0.  Drake 

220  a,  247 

0.  Bell 

14  o,  34 

0.  Dudley 

265 

0.  Berchine 

81  a 

0.  Eagan 

28 

0.  Berry 
0.  Bigelow 

14  q 
Uq,  563? 

v.  Eastman 

14  q,  199,  358,  363,  578  a, 
581 

0.  Billings 

14  1,  461  d 

0.  Eberle 

233 

0.  Bishop                   158, 

161  b,  184  a,  380, 

0.  Edgerly 

14? 

38  L 

0.  Elisha 

537 

v.  Blanchette 

34 

0.  Emery 

469  d,  485  a 

0.  Blood 

14  q,  19,  563  n 

v.  Evans 

537 

0.  Bolkom 

513 

0.  Farrigan 

146 

0.  Bond 

219  b,  220  c 

0.  Feely 

316 

0.  Bonner 

444  b,  461  6 

0.  Ferrigan 

14  c,  14  o 

0.  Bosworth 

381 

0.  Ferry 

14? 

0.  Boj'nton 

382 

0.  Finnerty 

14  s 

0.  Bradford 

14? 

0.  Fitzgerald 

4506 

0.  Bravman 

441/ 

0.  Flaherty 

28 

«.  Brefsford 

13  fir 

0.  Ford 

439  c,  513 

0.  Brennan 

4446 

0.  Frost 

414 

0.  Brewer 

1616 

0.  Galavan 

435 

v.  Briant 

36 

0.  Gallagher 

467 

v.  Briggs 

341 

0.  Galligan 

200 

0.  Brown 

162  1,  216 

0.  Gannett 

14  d,  14  h 

0.  Brownell 

1956 

0.  Gibson 

158 

0.  Bullard 

284 

0.  Gillou 

195  a 

0.  Burk 

23 

0.  Goodman 

14  t 

0.  Burke 

13  e,  450  a 

0.  Goodwin 

14  k,  87,  195  a,  220  6 

0.  Burroughs 

2196 

0.  Gorham 

4616 

0.  Butler 

28 

0.  Gormley 

28 

0.  Buzzell         52,  374  6,  378  6,  449,  450  a, 

0.  Graham 

4446 

461  e 

0.  Gray 

14  6,  14  o,  162  c 

v.  Call 

198 

0.  Green 

375,  376,  421,  505 

v.  Campbell 

14  1,  Uq,  439  A 

0.  Griffin 

254 

v.  Cardoza 

14  d 

0.  Hackett 

162  # 

0.  Carey                   81  c, 

163/,  577,  581  n 

0.  Hall 

14  £,  53,  195  a,  430  f 

0.  Casey 

1596 

0.  Haney 

161 

0.  Castles 

5736 

0.  Hanlon 

2206 

0.  Chabbock 

152  d 

0.  Hardy 

146 

0.  Chase 

14  A: 

0.  Hargesheimer                                    430 

0.  Choate 

14  i,  14  m,  81  6 

0.  Harman 

81  c,  220,  221,  App.  Ill 

0.  Churchill 

461  a 

0.  Harris 

14  6,  14  q 

0.  Clark 

1956,  App.  Ill 

0.  Harvev 

197 

0.  Cleary 

469  c 

v.  Haskell 

1956 

.0.  Coe 

14?,  581 

0.  Hawkins 

18,  462  a 

0.  Connors 

439  h 

0.  Haydeu 

484 

0.  Conrad 

28 

0.  Hayes 

36,  44,  48,  254,  381 

0.  Cooper 

4506 

0.  Heffron 

493 

0.  Corkin 

14  q 

0.  Hersey 

14  m,  14;> 

0.  Costello 

186,  195  6 

v.  Hie:gins 

310 

0.  Costley 

81  c 

0.  Hill 

28,  51  a,  366,  439  e,  461  6 

0.  Cotton 

14? 

0.  Hilliard 

14  c 

0.  Crane 

66 

0.  Hobbs 

305  I 

0.  Crowe 

14  k 

0.  Hogan 

33 

0.  Crowley 
0.  Crowninshield 

162  d,  432  c 
184  a 

0.  Hollis 
0.  Hollister 

13  c,  14  /,  114  c 

382 

0.  Cuffee 

199,  219  6.  220  c 

0.  Holliston 

439  q 

0.  Cullen 

219  6,  221 

0.  Holmes 

14  k,  14  o,  381 

0.  Culver 

2196 

0.  Homer 

156 

0.  Curran 

79 

0.  Hopkins 

14  h,  28 

0.  Curtis 

14  o 

0.  Horton 

14  o,  537 

0.  Daily 

195  a           0.  Hockins 

14  6,  14  k 

0.  Damon 

14  o           0.  Howe 

220  b,  223,  370  « 

0.  Dana 

254  a  ,         0.  Huggeford 

316 

xlvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.} 


Commonwealth  v.  Hunton        184  a,  App.  Ill 

Commonwealth  t).  Mullins 

370  d 

v.  Hurley 

254  a 

D.  Mulrey 

Us 

v.  Hutchinson 

367 

v.  Munsey 

28 

v.  Ingrahain 

469  a 

v.  Murphy 

54,  461,  461  a 

v.  Jackson 

14/,  14  q 

v.  Murray 

161  b,  449 

v.  James 

97  d 

v.  Myers 

221 

v.  Jardine 

254 

v.  Nefus 

430  / 

v.  Jeffries       14,  14  j,  14  o,  40,  199,  578  a 

v.  Key  Ion 

14  q 

v.  Jeffs 

439  c 

v.  Nichols 

14  o,  469  d 

v.  Jeffts 

6« 

v.  Norcross 

86 

v.  Jenkins 

4696 

v.  Nott 

220 

v.  Julius 

328  c 

v.  O'Brien 

461  c,  461  d 

t\  Kane 

563  g 

v.  Parmenter 

65 

v.  Kelley 

465  a 

v.  Paull 

403 

v.  Kendrick 

14  u 

v.  Pease 

284 

r.  Kennedy 

14  a.  14  v,  430  i,  466  a,  501 

v.  Peckham 

5,  6c 

v.  Kenney 

43,  197 

v.  Pejepscot  Proprietors 

23 

v.  Kimbail 

14  d,  79 

v.  Phelps 

439  c 

v.  King                       5,  158,  498,  App.  Ill 
v.  Knapp      13  i,  200,  220,  220  6,  231,  379 

v.  Phillips 
v.  Pierce 

498,  501 
14  o 

v.  Kneeland 

5 

v.  Piper 

14  17,  101,  2196 

v.  Kohlmeyer 

14  q 

v.  Pitsinger 

218 

v.  Lahey 

14  o 

v.  Place 

14  o 

v.  Lahy 

79 

v.  Pollard 

257 

v.  Lannan 

App.  Ill 

v.  Pomeroy 

14  /,  81  a 

v.  Lawler 

461  c 

v.  Pope 

563  « 

v.  Lenox 

14  c,  14  k 

v.  Porter 

81  9 

v.  Leo 

79 

v.  Powers 

14  * 

v.  Levy 

14  q 

v.  Pratt 

469  d 

v.  Lindsey 

28 

v.  Preece 

2196 

v.  Littlejohn 

484 

17.  Price 

14  q,  469  d 

v.  Locke 

79 

v.  Quin 

4616 

v.  Luscomb 

195  a 

v.  Quinn 

14* 

r.  Lyolen 

447 

v.  Randall 

34 

t'.  Lynes 

367 

v.  Read 

81  c 

v.  Madan 

14  k,  14  o 

v.  Regan 

14o,4616 

v.  Magee 

14  w 

v.  Reid 

342 

v.  Maloney 

14s 

v.  Reyburg 

14  v 

v.  Manson 

335,  363 

v.  Reynolds 

App.  Ill 

».  Marsh 

330,  334,  353,  357,  363 

v.  Richards 

163/ 

v.  Marzynski 

5,  6  d,  162  i 

v.  Roark 

509 

r.  Mason 

4616 

v.  Bobbins 

341 

v.  Matthews 

14  q.  158,  159 

v.  Roberts 

158 

v.  Maxwell 

78 

v.  Robertson 

439  A 

v.  McCabe 

195  b,  197,  370  e. 

v.  Robinson               14  5, 

110  a,  370  d,  407 

».  McCarthy 

Ug 

v.  Roddy 

156,  159 

v.  McCue 

563  g 

17.  Rogers 

373,  461  d 

v.  McCullow 

14? 

v.  Ryan 

14  1,  14  n,  195  a 

v.  McDermott 

233 

17.  Sacket 

195  a,  450  a 

v.  McDonald 

14  g,  461  6 

77.  Samuel 

78 

p.  McGortv 

34 

r.  Sanborn 

215 

v.  McGrath 

35 

v.  Saulsbury 

14  a 

v.  McHugh 
v.  McKenna 

195  a 
163  a 

».  Savary 
».  Schaffner 

4616,  409  1 
14  u,  4616 

v.  McKie 

14  x,  18 

v.  Scott 

14  2 

v.  McNamee 

14  A 

17.  Sego 

223 

v.  McPike 

158.  162  q 

17.  Shaw 

461  6,  469  d 

v.  Mead 
v.  Merriarn 

14  c,  252 
14o 

v.  Shepard 
17.  Shepherd 

140 

28,  254  6,  344 

v.  Messenger 
v.  Mika 

563  c 
81  b 

t7.  Slocum                                               '^76 
17.  Smith     2  a,  219  b,  220,  252,  254  a,  370, 

v  Miller 

14  q,  186 

462  a,  469  d 

r.  Mitchell 

14  *.  220 

».  Snell 

362 

v.  Mooney 

462  a 

17.  Snelling 

146,  14  d 

v.  Moore 

14  h 

v.  Stearns 

140 

v.  Morey 

219  a,  219  b,  223 

t'.  Stevenson 

36,  430  A; 

v.  Morpan 

14  /,  280,  439  h,  445,  4(i!t  ,1 

v.  Stone 

14  g 

r.  Morrell 

448 

v.  Storch 

14  7 

v.  Mosler 

220  c,  222 

r.  Stow 

80 

v.  Moulton 

412 

«.  Straesser 

140,1*0 

v.  Mud  gelt 
v.  Mullen 

14  q 

4094 

v.  Sturtivant 
17.  Sullivan 

162  i 
101,  195  a,  461  b 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


xlvii 


Commonwealth  v.  Switzer                        439  g 

Connors  v.  People 

4616,  469  d 

v.  Talbot                                            14s,  34 

v.  State 

220  c 

v.  Tarr                                                      217 

Conover  v.  Bell 

4690 

v.Taylor                                       14s,  2196 

Conrad  v.  Griffey 

4696 

v.  Thompson                                   233,  432 

v.  State 

162  o 

v.  Thrasher                                              14  o 

Conroe  v.  Conroe 

Ud 

v.  Thurlow                                                 79 

Consaul  v.  Sheldon 

450 

v.  Tibbetts                                             254  a 

Consol.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cashow 

4307/1 

v.  Tilden                                                252 

Consol.  T.  L.  Co.  v.  Pien 

189 

v.  Tolliver                                   1±P,  469  d 

Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delpeuch 

14  m 

v.  Towle                                                   79 

v.  Horton 

430  p 

v.  Trefethen                                  14  r,  162  c 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

14.7 

v.  Tuckerrnan                                 14  q,  220 

Continental  Nat.  Bank  v.  McGeoch             6  b 

v.  Tuey                                                    74 

Converse  v.  Allen 

Uk 

v.  Turner                              14  g,  53,  469  of 

v.  Wood 

1621 

v.  Vass                                            158,  159 

Conway  v.  State 

441  /,  444 

v.  Van  Horn                                        162  o 

Conyers  v.  Jackson 

71 

v.  Vaughan                                           14  o 

Good  v.  Cood 

493 

13.  Vincent                                                14  q 

Coogler  v.  Rhodes 

434 

v.  Vose                                                 162  p 

Cook  v.  Ashmead 

117 

v.  Waite                                         414,  423 

v.  Barr 

186 

v.  Walker                                       197,  233 

v.  Brown 

450,  462 

r.  Wallace                                             195  a 

«.  Com'rs 

14  v 

v.  Weber                                                1956 

v.  Cook 

42 

0.  Webster        13  i,  14,  14  6,  14  v,  18,  37, 

v.  Field 

14  o 

81  c,  195  a,  195  6,  576, 

v.  Hunt                           461  a,  461  c,  563  6 

581  a 

v.  Mason 

14  o 

V.  Welch            79,  195  a,  254  a,  284,  563  n 

v.  Moore 

14  q 

v.  Wesley                             563  k,  App.  Ill 

v.  Par  ham 

14  c 

v.  Wentz                                                    28 

v.  Parsons 

272 

v.  Wheeler                                                6 

v.  Perry 

14  q 

v.  White                                        14  q,  252  a 

v.  R.  Co. 

Uv 

v.  Whitney                                              14  h 

v.  Remington 

349 

v.  Williams       14  m,  14  q,  49,  161  b,  430  jf, 

».  Soltau 

46 

430? 

v.  State 

81  c 

v.  Wilson       14  o,  162  k,  387,  461  a,  46  1  6, 
4696 

v.  Stearns 
v.  Stout 

270 
163  g 

r.  Woelper                                             493 

v.  Totton 

21 

v.  Wood                                       382,  462  a 

v.  Wood 

305  g,  563  q 

t>.  Worcester                                            14  6 

Cooke  v.  Booth 

293 

v.  Wright                                                38  a 

v.  Curtis 

4696 

v.  Yerkes                                        14  o.  14  q 

v.  Lamotte 

43  a 

v.  York                                           •   14  c,  18 

v.  Loxley 

207 

Compare!  v.  Jernegan                                    489 

v.  Maxwell 

251,  375 

Compton  v.  Wilder                                         3J7 

v.  Wilson 

5 

Comstock  v.  Carnley                                 563  e 

v.  Woodrow 

572,  575 

v.  Hadlyme          74,  75,  76,  77,  162  e,  409 

Cookson  v.  R.  Co. 

441  d 

».  Paie                                              392,  430 

Cooler  v.  Norton 

184  c,  450 

v.  Ravford                                               390 

Coolidge  v.  Ins.  Co. 

484 

v.  Smith                               14  v,  4306,  564 

v.  Learned 

17 

Conant  v.  Bauk                                            305/ 

Coolt  v.  McConnell 

245 

v.  Leslie                                                   14  o 

Coombs  v.  Coether 

139,  484 

Concord  R.  Co.  v.  Greely                             14  v 

Coon  v.  State 

215,  218 

Condit  v,  Blackwell                                        6  6 

v.  Swan 

239 

Confed.  L.  Ass.  v.  O'Donnell                      151 

C'ooney  v.  Packing  Co. 

5756 

Congdon  v.  Morgan                            563  6,  572 

Coonrod  v.  Madden 

563  o 

v.  Scale  Co.                                          14  v 

Coons  v.  Renick 

563/ 

Conkey  v.  Carpenter                                 461  d 

Cooper  v.  Bockett 

564,  581  a 

v.  People                                                    14  q 

v.  Dedrick 

41 

Conklin  v.  Stamler                                      120  c 

v.  Gibbons 

37 

Con  ley  v.  Meeker                                           467 

v.  Granberry 

40 

Connecticut  v.  Bradish                       331,  575  c 

v.  Marsden 

120  a,  572 

v.  Penn                                                 138  « 

v.  Morrell 

118 

Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellis    162  k 

v.  Mowry 

207 

v.  Lathrop                                  430  c,  441/ 

v.  Phipps 

14  d 

r.  Schenck                      114  c,  114  y,  120  a 

v.  Randall 

Uv 

v.  Trust  Co.                                              2  a 

v.  R.  Co. 

439  h 

Connecticut  River  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clapp           75 

v.  Reaney 

43 

Connell  v.  McLaughlin                               195  c 

v.  Shepherd 

533 

v.  McNett                                      197,  441  1 

v,  Slade 

36 

Conner  v.  State                                            439  e 

v.  Smith 

201,  268 

Connors  v.  Morton                               14  <j,  14  h 

v.  Wakley 

76 

xlviii 


Cooper  v.  Whitehouse 
Coot  v.  Berty 
Coote  v.  Boyd 
Cootli  v.  Jackson 
Coots  v.  Farnsworth 
Cope  v.  Cope 
Copeland  v.  State 

t>.  Watts 

Copland  v.  Toulmin 
Copp  v.  Upham 
Copperinan  v.  People 
Corbett  v.  Corbett 

v.  Gibson 

».  State 

Corbett  et  al.  v.  Barnes 
Corbin  v.  Adams 
Corbishley's  Trusts,  In  re 
Corcoran  ».  Detroit 

v.  Peekskill 
Corfield  v.  Parsons 
Cornelieson  v.  Foushee 
Cornelius  v.  Com. 

v.  State 
Cornell  v.  Dean 

v.  Green 

v.  Vanartsdalen 

v.  Woolley 
Cornet  v.  Bertelsmann 

v.  Williams 
Cornina  v.  Exeter 
Cornish  v.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Pugh 

v.  Searell 
Cornish's  Trial 
Cornwall  v.  Richardson 

v.  State 

Corn  well  v.  I-ham 
Corps  i'.  Kobinson 
Corr  v.  Sellers 
Corse  v.  Patterson 

v.  Peck 

Corsen  v.  Uubois 
Corser  v.  Paul 
Cort  v.  Birkbeck 
Cortland  Co.  v.  Herkimer  Co 
Corwein  r.  Hames 
Cory  v.  Bretton 

v.  Jenkins 

v.  Silcox 

Cosgrove  v.  Pitman 
Cossens  v.  Cossens 
Cossens,  Exparte 
Cossham  r.  Goldney 
Costigan  v.  Lunt 

v.  R.  Co. 
Costley  v.  State 
Cotes  v.  Davis 
Cottle  v.  Payne 
Cotton  v.  James 

v.  Luttrell 

r.  State 

v.  Witt 

Cottrill  v.  Myrick 
Couch  v.  Meeker 
Coughlin  r.  Haenssler 
Couloni  v.  Dnull 
Coutaon  v,  Walton 
Coulter  v.  Am.  Ex.  Co. 
Counselman  r.  Hitchcock 

v.  Reichart 

Countryman  v.  Bunker 
County  v.  Leidy 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


73 

Courcamp  v.  Weber 

564 

54 

Courteen  v.  Touse 

435 

296 
260 

Courteuay  v.  Hoskius 
Courvoisier  v.  Raymond 

554 
441  1 

275 

Covanhovan  v.  Hart 

14  o 

28,  2546,  344 

Coveney  v.  Tannahill 

245 

146,  Uyfc 

Covert  v.  Hertzog 

1146 

469  n 

v.  Sebern 

305  k,  305  m 

171 

Covington,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

v.  Ingles          184  d 

469  g 
14  q 

Covington  Drawbridge  Co 
Cowan  v.  Cooper 

.  v.  Shepherd        6  6 
304 

75 

v.  Kinney 

177,  184  6 

319 

v.  State 

14  q 

218 

Coward  v.  Clanton 

186 

533 

184  d 

Cowden  v.  Reynolds 
Cowen  v.  Truefitt 

443,  443  6,  444 
305  m 

41 

Cowles  v.  Merchants 

441/ 

Up,  14  v 

Cow  ley  v.  People 

14  1,  82,  439  h 

195  d 

Cowling  v.  Ely 

179 

43  a 

Cowper  v.  Earl  Cowper 

37 

6a 
14  fc 

Cowper's  Trial      14  r,  14  v,  162  c,  162  d,  162  i 
Cox  v.  Alliugham                                        518 

99  a,  162/ 

v.  Brain 

•   205 

430/> 

v.  Brower 

39 

165,  4416 

v.  Com. 

380 

338 

v.  Copping 

474 

569  d 

v.  Couveless 

563 

563  k 

v.  Davis 

572 

563  q,  563  r 

v.  Eavres 

444 

328  c 

v.  Hill 

469  g 

441  e 

v.  Jones 

506 

341 

r.  Montague 

248 

207 

v.  Morrow 

66,  43 

201,  254  c 

v.  Painter 

73 

55,  146 

v.  Parry 

27 

219  a,  2206 

v.  Pearce 

163  a 

333 

v.  Pruitt 

146 

199 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  c 

120  c 

v.  State 

128 

334 

v.  Strickland 

146,  lid 

275 

v.  Williams 

385 

469  n 

Coxe  v.  Deringer 

14* 

197 

v.  England 

201,  438  j<* 

139 

Coxon  v.  Lyon 

61 

328  c 

Coxwell  v.  State 

14  k 

331 

Cove  v.  Leach 

30 

192 

Coyle  v.  Cole 

563 

4696 
162  k 

v.  Gozzler 
Cozzens  v.  Higgins 

14V 

439  A 

Itj 

Crabtree  v.  Clark 

564 

23,  26 

v.  Hagenbaugh 

461  c,  461  d 

469  d 
395 

v.  Kile 
Craft  v.  Com. 

461  a,  461  c,  461  d 
462 

165 

v.  State 

461  a 

74 

Crafts  v.  Hibbard 

301 

146 

Cragin  v.  Carleton 

527o 

185 

Craib  v.  D'Aeth 

173 

39 

Craig  v.  Anglesea            99  a,  114  c,  238,  240, 

76 

242  a,  243 

358,  361 

v.  Brown 

505,  506 

14  c 

v.  Craig 

444,  469  6 

310 

v.  Cundell 

392 

302,  440 

v.  Proctor 

79 

283,  284 

v.  R.  Co. 

441  1 

166 

v.  State 

461  a,  461  c 

2« 

Craigin  v.  Lambkin 

162  I 

5G4 

Cram  v.  Ingalls 

575 

444 

v.  Spear 

120  < 

469  d 

Cramer  v.  Burlington 

195  d 

328  c 

v.  Shriner 

90,  563o 

120  r 

Crandall  v.  Slaid 

347 

348 

Crane  v.  Bark  doll 

241 

TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Crane  v.  Crane  329 

v.  Elizabeth  284  a 

v.  Horton  439  h 

V.Marshall  152  c,  570 

«.  Morris  14  y,  23,  33 

v.  People  14  w 

v.  Reeder  H4/ 

v.  Thayer  461  a 

Crane  Co.  v.  Col.  C.  Co.  441  d 

v.  Tierney  563  r 

Crary  v.  Sprague  163,  163  ff,  444  a 

Crauford  v.  Blackburn  1146 

Craven  v.  Shaird  118 

v.  Walker  14  o 

Craven's  Case  65 

Crawford  v.  Abraham  310 

v.  Elliott 

v.  Morrell  58 

v.  State  2  a,  13  e,  14  r,  195  b,  461  a, 

461  c,  466  a 

r.  Williams  162  i 

Cray  v.  Halls  201 

Crease  v.  Barrett         3,  114  c,  128  a,  130,  136, 

139,  152  c,  153,  166,  189 

Creevy  v.  Carr  445 

Crenshaw  v.  Davenport  51  a 

v.  Johnson  434 

Crescent  C.  I.  Co.  v.  Ermann  195  c 

Crew  v.  Blackburn  475 

v.  Saunders  475 

Cribbs  v.  Adams  43 

Criddle  v.  Criddle  190 

Crippen  v.  Dexter  550 

Crisp  v.  Platel  240 

Crispen  v.  Hannaven  563  r 

Crispin  v.  Doglioni  114  c 

v.  Williamson  60 

Critchlow  v.  Parry  196 

Crocker  v.  AgenbVoad  444,  444  a 

v.  Crocker  289 

v.  McGregor  14  v 

Crofter  v.  R   Co.  14  v 

Crofton  v.  Poole  195 

Crofts  v.  Marshall  280 

Cromack  v.  Heathcote  240,  241 

Cronk  v.  Frhh  572 

Cronkrite  v.  Trexler  462 

Crook  v.  Rindskopf  328  c 

Crookham  v.  State  14  r,  156 

Crooks  v.  Bunn  469  b 

Crooin  ».  State  14  c,  14  # 

Crosby  v.  Percy  101,  572 

v.  Wadsworth    .  271 

Crosby's  Trial  377 

Crose  v.  Rutledge  146,  14  d 

Cross  v.  Bell  37, 195  c 

v.  Cross  28,  163  6,  444 

v.  Kaye  195,  5630 

v.  Martin  43  a 

v.  Mill  Co.  498 

v.  R.  Co.  441  d 

v.  Wilkins  14  v 

Crossfield's  Trial  14p,  213 

Crouch  v.  Drury  120  b 

Croudsou  v.  Leonard  5,  541 

Croughton  v.  Blake  575  b 

Grouse  v.  Holman  42 

Crow  v.  Jordan  13  c,  14s 

Crowell  v.  Bank  430  i 

Crowley  v.  Page  52,  81,  449,  462 

Crowninshield  v.  Crowninshield    14  x,  74,  75, 

77 
VOL.  I.  —  d 


Crowther  v.  Hopwood 
Crozier  v.  People 
Crum  v.  State 
Cubbison  v.  McCreary 
Cuddy  v.  Brown 
Cudlip  v.  Bundle 
Cuff  v.  Penn 
Culbertson  v.  Hill 
v.  R.  Co. 


xlix 


373 

14  h 

Uq 

369 

114  c 

60 

304 

14* 

146 


Culbertson  &  B.  P.  Co.  ».  Chicago      13 j,  14  v 

Culkin's  Case  65 

Cullen's  Case  469  d 

Cullmans  v.  Lindsay  275 

Gulp  v.  Wilson  43  a 

Culver  v.  Lumber  Co.  120  c,  439  c 

v.  Marks  120  a 

t).  R.  Co.  441  d 

Cumberland  Bank  v.  Hall  564 

Cummin  v.  Smith  195 

Gumming  v.  French  192 

Cummings  v.  Arnold  302,  303,  304 

v.  Com.  6  c 

v.  McCullough  14  q 

v.  McKinney  563  d 

v.  Nichols  14  i 

v.  Stone  6 

Cummins  v.  B.  Co.  14  v 

Cundell  v.  Pratt       454,  456,  459,  469  i,  469  jfc 

Cunliffe  v.  Sefton  572,  572  a,  574,  575 

Cunningham  v.  Bank  43  a 

v.  Com.  217 

v.  Cunningham  163  h 

v.  Freeborn  328  c 

v.  Milner  279 

11.  Otis  320 

v.  B.  Co.  Uff,  14  h 

v.  State  81  a,  432  c 

v.  Stein  14  v 

v.  Wrenn  296  a 

Cupper  v.  Newark  356 

Curby  v.  Terr.  260  b 

Curle'wis  v.  Corfield  195  c 

Curran  v.  Stange  Co.  162  b 

Curren  v,  Crawford  117 

Currie  v.  Child  572 

Currier  v.  Gale  147 

Curry  v.  Colburn  305  c 

v.  Lyles  26 

».  Baymond  563/ 

Curtin  v.  B.  Co.  14  v 

Curtis  v.  Aaronson  138  a,  140  a 

v.  Belknap  5736 

v.  Bradley  439  6,  439  c 

v.  Graham  358,  389 

v.  Groat  533 

v.  Herrick  40 

v.  Marsh  5 

v.  Rickards  38 

v.  State  581 

v.  Wheeler  74 

Curtiss  v.  Strong  364  a,  369,  370 

Curzon  v.  Lomax  130,  139 

Gushing  v.  Billings  74 

v.  Friendship  328  c 

v.  R.  Co.  16  TO,  498 

v.  Rice  284 

Cushman  v.  Coleman  563 

v.  Loker  375,  420 

Cussons  v.  Skinner  569,  569  c 

Cutbush  v.  Gilbert  116,  120 

Cuthbert  v.  Furrier  41 

Cutler  v.  Newlin  187 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Cutler  v.  Pope 

v.  Skeels 

v.  Wright 
Cuts  v.  Pickering 
Cutter  v.  Powell 
Cutts  v.  U.  S. 
Cuyler  v.  Ferrill 

v.  McCartney 
Czezewski  v.  R.  Co 


271 

162/> 

66,43 

245 

292 

566 

5 

189 
441  d 


D. 


D.  &  C.  Towboat  Co.  v.  Starrs  430/ 

Dacey  v.  R.  Co.  195  d 

Da  Costa  v.  Jones  13  g,  254  b 

Bade  v.  Ins.  Co.  40,  563  c,  563  d 

Daggett  i\  Johnson  275 

v.  Shaw  140  a,  152  c 

v.  Tolman  462 

0.  Willey  130,  138  a 

Daigneault  ».  Woonsocket  14  v 

Daily  v.  R.  Co.  156 

v.  State  469  b 

Daines  v.  Hartley  441  i 

Dainese  v.  Hale  6  b 

Dakota  v.  O'Hare  581 

Dale  r.  Livingston  241 

v.  R.  Co.  195  d 

Dalgleish  v.  Hodgson  541 

Dalison  v.  Stark  90 

Dalrymple  v.  Dalrymple  162,;,  488 

Dalston  v.  Coatsworth  37 

Dalton  0.  Dregge  162  d 

Daly  v.  Byrne  14  o 

V  Maguire  439  A 

v.  Multnomah  Co.  310 

v.  Webster  484,  496 

Dame  v.  Kenney  14  d,  461  d 

Dan  v.  Brown      108,  162  e,  172,  174,  176,  273 

Dana  r.  Boyd  563  c 

v.  Fiedler  ,          292 

v.  Kemble  40,  563  c 

v.  Tucker  252  a 

Daniel  v.  Daniel  245 

v.  Guy  13  c,  14s 

v.  North  17 

v.  Pitt  182 

v.  State  14  c,  14  o 

v.  Wilkin  129,  139,  498 

Daniels  v.  Conrad  449,  462  a 

r.  Ins.  Co.  441  e 

v.  Potter  176, 184  a 

v.  Woonsocket  192 

Denser  v.  Boyle  120  c 

Dantzler  v.  D.  C.  &  I.  Co.  162/ 

Danville,  etc.  Plank  Road  Co.  v.  State        6  b 

Darby  v.  Ouseley  162^',  169,  201,  3786,  450  a 

Darling  v.  Banks  81  d 

v.  Westmoreland  14  »> 

Darrah  v.  Watson  506 

Darrigan  ».  R.  Co.  162  b 

Dartmouth  ».  Roberts  43  a,  46,  189,  512 

Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward  331 

Dave  '-.  State  461  c 

Davenbagh  v.  M'Kinnie  569 

Davenport  v.  Freeman  385 

V.  McKee  4696 

v.  Ogg  432  c 

r.  Russell  146, 14  d 

v.  State  14  #,  46  In 

Davey  r.  R.  Co.  81/ 


David  v.  Moore  348 
David  Adler  £  S.  C.  Co.  v.  Hellman          245 

Davidson  v.  Bodley  303 

v.  Cooper  568 

v.  Cornell  162  6,  430  I 

v.  Harrison  174 

v.  Kimpton  28 

v.  Peck  563  o 

v.  People  14  c,  Uk 

v.  Peticolas  6  a 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Shuler  305  m 
f.  State  13  e,  369,  App.  Ill 

Davie  v.  Briggs  41 

v.  Jones  195  c,  439  c 

Davies  v.  Davies  408,  463 
V.Edwards                            112,174,1846 

v.  Humphreys  115,  152 

v.  Lewis  137 
v.  Morgan  135,  139,  154,  333,  395 
v.  Pierce  147,  152  c,  152  d,  189 

v.  Ridge  176 

v.  Waters  241 

Davis  v.  Barr  421 

v.  Byrd  432,  432  c 

v.  Best  6  a 

v.  Calvert  13  a,  14 

v.  Com.  152  d 

v.  Cook  434 

v.  Cotey  14  v 

v.  Dale  445 

v.  Davis  469  n 

v.  Dinwoody  334,  340,  341 

v.  Dodd  563  6 

v.  Field  439  6 

v.  Franke  461  d 

v.  Fredericks  581 

v.  Fuller  115,  130 

v.  Fulton  Bank  6  b 

v.  Glenn  280 

v.  Gray  563  f 

v.  Hare  90 

v.  Howard  305  y 

v.  Ins.  Co.  441 1 

f.  Jenney  564 

v.  Jenny  13  j 

v.  Kneale  14  n 

v.  Lees  13  i 
v.  Lloyd  115, 120  a,  152  d 

v.  Lowndes  539 

r.  Lvon  14  n 

v.  Mason  75,  440 

v  McEnaney             .  6  a 

v.  Morgan  240 

v.  People  14  c 

v.  Powder  Works  461  6 

v.  Power  Co.  439  g 
v.  R.  Co.  14  c,  14  h,  14  v,  241 

».  Rainsford  301 

v.  Reynolds  563  o 

v.  Road  Co.  296  a 

v.  Robertson  269 

v.  Robinson  575  c 

v.  Salisbury  349 

v.  San  ford  120  c 

v.  Shields  268 

v.  Sigourney  81  d 

v.  Spooner  397  508, 
v.  State             14  c,  14  q,  14  v,  81  6,  81  c, 
162  fc,  182/>,  163  o,  163/,  217,  220  c, 
328  c,  367,  441  /,  450,  466  a,  469  a 

v.  U.  S.  81  a,  162  » 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Davis  v.  Vories 

v.  Walter 

v.  Wood 

Davis  &  Carter's  Case 
Davis  Sewing  M.  Co.  v.  Stone 
Davis'  Sons  v.  Sweeney 
Davison  v.  Bloomer 

v.  Cruse 
Davison's  Trial 
Davlin  v.  Hill 
Dawes  v.  Shedd 
Dawkins  v.  Smithwick 
Dawson  v.  Callaway 

v.  Coles 

v.  Dawson 

v.  Massey 

v.  Peterson 

v.  State 
Day  v.  Cooley 

v.  Day 

v.  Donohue 

v.  Floyd 

v.  Lumber  Co. 

v.  Moore 

v.  Ross 

v.  State 

v.  Sticknev 

v.  U.  S.    " 
Dayrell  v.  Bridge 
Deacle  v.  Hancock 
Deacon's  Case 
Deady  v.  Harrison 
Deal  i'.  State 
Dean  v.  Com. 

v.  Newhall 

v.  State 
Dean's  Case 

Dean,  etc.  of  Ely  o.  Caldecott 
Dearborn  v.  Cross 
De  Annan  v.  State 
De  Armond  v.  Neasmith 
Deas  v.  Darby 
Deathridge  v'.  State 
De  Baker  v.  R.  Co. 
De  Bode's  Case 
Deck  v.  Johnson 
Decker  v.  Decker 
Decker,  Kxparte 
Dedericks  v.  R.  Co. 
Deering  v.  Sawtel 

v.  Shumpik 
De  Forest  v.  State 
Def  reese  v.  State 
Def ries  v.  Davis 
De  Haven  v.  De  Haven 
De  Kalb  Co.  v.  Smith 


14  q 

430  q 
99,  524 
374 
277 
14  v 
572 

14  s,  81  d 
14  b,  Uf,  461  c 
283 
187 
5 

430  i 
173 
6  a 
260 
488 
14  q 
444 

14  s,  367,  461  d 
450 
550 
195  d 
513 

14  b,  461  c 
461  a,  461  c,  469  e 
162  d,461f 
14  b,  461  c 
510 
135 
256 
180 
430  q 
Up 
305  d 
28,  197 
1956 
150 

302,  304 
14  c,  461  d 
120  a 
118 
232 
6 

152  c,  162.;,  430  m,  488 
185 
305m 
568  a 
439  h 
385 
430  o 
142 

14  q 
14  o 

114  c,  435 
461  a 


De  la  Chaumette  v.  Bank  of  England  81 

Delacroix  ».  Bulkley  303 

Delatield  v.  Freeman  392 

v.  Hand  503 

De  la  Motte's  Trial  450  6 

Deland  v.  Dixon  Nat.  Bank  81  c 

Delano  v.  Bartlett  14  x 

v.  Goodwin  328  c 

Delany  v.  Delany  575 

De  Lavallette  fl.'Wendt  282 
Delaware  Countv  v.  Diebold  Safe  Co.  186 

Delaware  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Converse  14  w 

v.  Roalefs  162  6,  430  I 

Delaware,  The  305  e 

Delegall  v.  Highley  14  o 

Delesline  v,  Greenland  27,  184 


li 

Delk  v  State  152  d 

Dellone  v.  Rehmer  387 

Deloach  v.  Worke  510 

Delogny  v.  Rentoul  192 

Delphi  v.  Lowery  Up,  14  v 

Demars  v.  Mfg.  Co.  450 

De  Mav  v.  Roberts  14  » 

De  Meli  v.  De  Meli  334,  444 

Dement  v.  State  432  6 

Dement,  Exparte  310 

Demenstein  v.  Reichelson  469  m 

Demerit!  v.  Miles  14  i 

Demerritt  v.  Randall  581 

Demming  v.  Butcher  14  /,  244,  247  a 

Democrat  P.  Co.  v.  Lewis  163  b 

Demombreum  v.  Walker  305  h,  573  6 

Den  v.  Clark  556 

v.  Downam  437 

v.  Johnson  335,  341 

v.  Oliver  208 

v.  Southard  138  a 

v.  Vreelandt  503 

v.  Vancleve  370,  370  c 

Dench  v.  Dench  14  k 

Denison's  Appeal  162  e 

Denmead  v  Maack  5 

Denn  v.  Fulford  507 

v.  McAllister  563  q 

v.  Spray  139 

v.  White  185,  341 

Dennett  v.  Crocker  87 

v.  Dow  443,  443  6,  444 

Dennie  v.  Williams  186 

Denning  v.  Roome  484 

Dennis  v.  Brewster  14  s 

v.  Codrington  237 

v.  Holsapple  305  k 

v.  Pawling  14  d,  14  h 

v.  State  163  g 

v.  Weeks  162  e 

Dennis's  Case  224,  537 

Denny  r.  Dana  14  p 

v.  Williams  14  w 

Denslow  v.  Fowler  559 

Dent  v.  Portland  14^ 

Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ditch  Co.  l-ty 

v.  Glasscot  14  n 

v.  Spencer  162  c 

v.  Wilson  441  d 

Denver  T.  Co.  v.  Owens  240,  245 

Depeau  v.  Hyams  416 

Depue  v.  Place  581 

Derby  v.  Rounds  174 

De  Rosne  v.  Fairlie  389 

Derr  v.  Greenwalt  260  a 

De  Rutzen  (Baron)  v.  Farr  3,  150,  154 

Desborongh  v.  Rawlins  242,  244 

Desbrack  v.  State  14  g 

Descadillas  v.  Harris  416 

De  Sobry  v.  De  Laistre  444 

Despau  v.  Swindler  6  a 

De  Symonds  v.  De  la  Cour  394 

Detroit  Po«t  Co.  ».  Me  Arthur  14  o 

Detroit  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Van  Steinburg      14  g 

Detzur  v.  Brewing  Co.  441 1 

Devereux's  Estate  39 

Devine  v.  Rand  14  q 

Devonshire  v.  Lodge  293 

v.  Neill  139 

v.  Peters  466  n 

Devoto  v.  Com.  14  q 

Devries  v.  Phillips  451 


Ill 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

Dewdney  v.  Palmer 

421 

Dixon-  Woods  Co.  v.  Glass  Co.                 305/ 

Dewees  v.  Colorado  Co. 

6« 

Uoak  v.  Wiswell                                             532 

Dewey  v.  Algire 

556 

Doan  v.  State                                                    34 

v.  Dewey 

38  a,  272,  572 

Doane  v.  Glenn                                            323 

v.  Field 

207 

D'Obree,  Exparte                                          19 

v.  Williams 

14  1,  14  1> 

Dobson  v.  Whisenhart                              439  g 

De  Whelpdale  v.  Milburn 

189,  210 

Dock  v.  Com.                                                 14  c 

Dewhurst's  Case 

228 

Dodd  v.  Norris    14  d,  14  h,  54,  451,  458,  469  a, 

Dewit  v.  Greenfield 

146,  Ud.  Uh 

469  d 

Dewitt  v.  Barley 

441/ 

Doddington  v.  Hudson                                409 

De  Witt  v.  Berry 

275,  292 

Doddington's  Case                                           26 

De  Wolf  v.  Strader 

239 

Dodge  v.  Bache                                          430  i 

Dexter  v.  Booth 
v.  Hall 

254 

441  / 

v.  Freedman's  Saving,  etc.  Co.            189 
v.  Haskell                                             14  q 

Devbel's  Case 

6 

v.  Hollinshead                                    305  g 

Dezell  v.  Odell 

207 

v.  State                                               430  /fc 

Diana,  The 

488 

v.  Zimmer                                           284  a 

Dibble  v.  Nash 

14  q 

Doe  v.  Allen                               197,  291,  305  k 

Dicas  v.  Lawson 

319 

v.  Andrews                                        41,  245 

Dickenson  v.  Fitchburg 

441* 

v.  Arkwright                       162  TO,  484,  493 

Dickerman  v.  Graves 

344 

v.  Askew                                         108,  484 

Dickerson  v.  State 

195  a,  App.  Ill 

v.  Auldjo                                             114  c 

».  Talbot 

563  e 

v.  Austin                               152  c,  189,  207 

Dickey  v.  Malechi 
Dickinson  v.  Commissioner 

260« 
281 

v.  Barnes                          75,  92,  493,  563  q 
v.  Bell                                                      263 

v.  Coward 

195 

v.  Benjamin                                              3 

v.  Dickinson 

192,  384 

v.  Benson                                                 280 

v.  Dustin 

4616 

v.  Beviss                                     3,  152,  300 

v.  Me  Craw 

519 

v.  Beynon              21,  142,  291,  305  I,  575  6 

v.  Prentice 

399 

v.  Biggers                                             563  6 

v.  Shee 

445 

v.  Biggs                                                   197 

v.  Valpy 

207 

v.  Bingham                            265,  406,  568 

Diehl  v.  Rogers 

378 

v.  Bird                                                     186 

Diers  v.  Mallon 

81/ 

v.  Brawn                                            563  g 

Dietrick  v.  Dietrick 

146 

v.  Brav                                          120  a,  485 

Diffenderfer  v.  State 

443 

v.  Burclett                                              570 

Diffin  v.  Daw 

441? 

t).  Burt                                             286,  287 

Digby  v.  People 

158 

v.  Campbell                                          152  c 

v.  Stedman 

116 

v.  Caperton                                           272 

v.  Steel 

163  / 

v.  Cartwright         89,  90,  150,  152,  305  e, 

Diggins  v.  Hartshorne 

6 

484,  493 

Diggins'  Estate 

120  c,  577 

v.  Catamore                                           564 

Diggs  v.  Kurtz 

305* 

«.  Chichester                          287,  291,  301 

Dillard  v.  Scruggs 

108 

v.  Clifford                                           469  » 

r.  State 

14  v,  466  a 

v.  Cockell                                           563  d 

Dillingham  v.  Ellis 

4616 

v.  Cole                                         189,  563  1 

Dillon  v.  Anderson 

328  c 

v.  Cooke                                                  46 

v.  Dillon 

386,  440  6 

v.  Coombs                                               81 

v.  Harris 

288 

v.  Da  vies                                    81  e,  114  e 

r.  Pinch 

444 

v.  Davis                                         272,  570 

Dillon's  Case 

220 

v.  Peakin                               41,  570,  575  6 

Dimick  v.  Downs 

14  a,  140,  461  a 

v.  Derby                                                164 

Dimsdale  v.  Dimsdale 

43  a 

v.  Durnford                                        569  « 

.Dinkins  v.  Samuel 

35 

v.  E.  of  Jersey                                      287 

Dismukes  v.  State 

1620 

v.  E.  of  Pembroke                            114  d 

v.  Tolson 

120  c 

v.  Edwards 

D'Israeli  v.  Jowett 

484 

v.  Errington                                            73 

District  of  Col.  v.  Armes 

14  r,  370  c 

v.  Eslava                                             575  6 

Ditchburn  v.  Goldsmith 

2546 

w.  Evans                                             163  g 

Diven  v.  Johnson 

275 

v.  Flanagan 

Divoll  v.  Leadbetter 

195,  207,  339 

«.  Fleming                                          140  c 

Dix  v.  Atkins 

563  c 

v.  Ford                                284,  285,  430  * 

v.  Otis 

281 

v.  Forster                                               197 

Dixon  v.  Cooper 

115,416 

v.  Foster                                     163  a,  164 

v.  Hamond 

207 

v.  France                                            162  m 

v  Ins.  Co. 

305  d 

v.  Galloway                                           301 

r.  Niccolls 

5 

v.  Green                                              152  c 

v.  People 

310 

v.  Greenlee                                         563  q 

v.  Ramsay 

544 

D.  Grev                                                  563  c 

v.  Sinclear 

530 

«,  Griffin                  41,  114  c,  114  d,  114/ 

v.  State 

14*,  14  o,  444 

».  Gwillim                                             277 

r.  Vale 

469  d 

t).  Harris                   240,  241,  444  d,  469  a 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


liii 


Doe  v.  Harvey 

87,  114  c 

Doe  v.  Sleeman 

136 

v.  Hatheway 

572  a,  574 

v.  Smart 

75 

v.  Hawkins 

184  c 

v.  Smythe 

207 

v.  Hertford 

469  n 

v.  Somerton 

563  c 

v.  Hilder 

5 

v.  Stacey 

154 

v.  Hirst 

46,  568 

v.  Staple 

46 

r.  Hiscocks 

289,  305.;,  305  k,  305  m 

v.  Statham 

23 

v.  Hodgson 

563  d 

v.  Steel 

210 

v.  Holtom 

287 

v.  Stephenson 

469 

v.  Hubbard 

291,  301 

v.  Stiles 

570 

v.  Hubbart 

535 

v.  Suckermore 

576,  577,  579,  580,  581 

v.  Huthwaite 

288,289,  305  m 

v.  Sybourn 

46,  212,  551 

r.  Jack 

563  q 

v.  Tarver 

578 

v.  Jesson 

41 

v.  Taylor 

291 

v.  Johnson 

78,  573 

r.  Thomas 

138,  138  a,  469  n 

v.  Joinville 

288 

v.  Tooth 

333,  391 

v.  Jones 

147,  152  c,  189 

v.  Turford 

40,  115,  1206.147 

v.  Keeling 

49,  142,  575  b 

v.  Turnbull 

5756 

v.  Kelly 

559 

v.  Twigg 

572 

v.  Kemp 

14  n,  53  a 

v.  Tyler 

3,  152,  386,  390 

v.  Lambly 

208 

v.  Vowles 

116,  151 

v.  Langdon 

241,  469  n 

v.  Wainwright 

180 

v.  Langfield 

3,  152  c 

v.  Walker 

469  a 

v.  Lea 

280 

i'.  Watkins 

241,  245 

v.  Lewis 

5636 

».  Watson 

563  / 

v.  Lloyd 

24 

v.  Webber 

110 

w.  Long 

73 

v.  Webster 

286 

v.  Lord  Geo. 

Thynne                          154 

v.  Westlake 

305  k 

v.  Lyford 

301 

v.  Wilde 

406 

v,  Maisey 

389 

v.  Wilkins 

571 

v.  Manifold 

272 

v.  Wilkinson 

462 

v.  Martin 

277,  287,  291 

v.  Williams 

147,  392,  406 

v.  Mason 

130 

v.  Wilson 

45  a,  578  a 

v.  Mew 

518 

v.  Wittcomb 

115,  154 

v.  Miles 

563  1 

v.  Wolley 

21,  570,  575  6 

v.  Murray 

166 

v.  Wombwell 

197 

v.  Needs 

290,  305  k 

v.  Wrighte 

46 

v.  Nepean 

41 

v.  Young 

92,  563  g 

v.  Newton 

578  a,  580 

Dogan  v.  Seekright 

301 

v.  Palmer 

Uk,  162  e,  563  p,  564 

Doherty  v.  Gilmore 

162  e 

v.  Passingham                                    575  b 

Dohmen  v.  Ins.  Co. 

120  a 

v.  Payne 

25,  152  c 

Doker  v.  Hasler 

254,  337 

v.  Pearce 

5756 

Dolan  v.  State 

1639 

v.  Pegge 

207 

Dolby  v.  lies 

207 

v.  Penfold 

41 

Dolder  v.  Huntingfield 

6a 

0.  Perkes 

273 

Dole  v.  Allen 

86 

v.  Perkins 

436,  437,  438,  439  b,  439  c 

v.  Johnson 

162  i,  430/ 

v.  Pettett 

108,  152  c,  189 

v.  Wilson 

66 

v.  Phelps 

5756 

v.  Wooldredge 

445 

v.  Phillips 

5756 

Dollner  v.  Lintz 

461d 

v.  Preece 

406.  535 

Dominici  v.  U.  S. 

66 

v.  Pulman 

108,  563  b 

Domschke  v.  R.  Co. 

97  d 

«•  Pye 

197 

Don  v.  Lippman 

546 

v.  Randall 

114  c 

Donahue  v.  Donahue 

43  a 

v.  Reed 

46 

Donaldson  y.  Jude 

510 

v.  Richards 

186 

v.  R.  Co. 

182* 

v.  Rickarby 

152  c,  189 

v.  Winter 

509 

v.  Ricketson 

163  a 

Doncaster  (Mayor  of)  v.  Day               163,  166 

v.  Ridgway 

99  a 

Donehow  v.  Johnson 

305  m 

v.  Roast 

291 

Donelson  v,  Taylor 

421 

v.  Roberts 

5756 

Donkle  v.  Kohn 

370 

v.  Robson 

116,  147,  152,  153 

Donnelly  v.  State 

156,  157,  158,  159 

v.  Roe 

138  a,  145,  491,  581 

Donohoo  v.  Brannon 

506 

i?.  Rogers 

14  n 

Dono%ran  v,  R.  Co. 

120a 

i?.  Ross 

73,  84,  241,  245,  560, 

v.  Terr. 

8a 

563  q 

Doolittle  v.  State 

14  o 

v.  Rowe 

73 

Doon  i).  Donaher 

563d 

v.  Rowlands 

74,  81 

v.  Rarey 

192 

v.  Samples 

21 

Doran  ».  Mullen 

434,  435 

v.  Seaton 

189,  240,  241,  245,  484,  493 

Dorin  v.  Dorin 

305  1 

v.  Shelton 

23 

Dorlon  v.  Douglass 

201 

v.  Sisson 

14  n,  52,  130 

Dorman  0.  Ames 

14  v 

liv 

TABLE   OF    CASES. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

Dorman  v.  State 

6rt 

Drinkwater  v.  Porter 

139.  140 

Dormoy,  In  re 

488 

Driscoll  v.  Fall  River 

14  c 

Dome  v.  Southwork  Man.  Co. 

114,  184  c 

v.  People 

162  h,  4616,  467 

Dorr  v.  Fenno 

69 

Drish  »>.  Davenport 

14  d,  Uh 

v.  Munsell 

284 

Drosdowski  v.  Chosen  Friends                   163  6 

f.  Tremont  Nat.  Bank 

75 

Orouet  v.  Rice 

20 

Dorset  v.  Girdler 

163  f 

Drown  v.  Smith 

207 

v.  Ld.  Ha  warden 

291 

Drowne  v.  Stimpson 

349 

Dorsey  ».  Clapp 

14  c,  Up 

Drucker  v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

v.  Dorsey 

189,  545 

Drumin  v.  Cessnun 

563  r- 

v.  Habersack 

439  h 

Drummond  ».  Magruder 

506 

v.  State                        13  e, 

14  c,  14  Tc,  Up 

v.  Prestman 

187,  288 

Dosset  v.  Miller 

4696 

Drummond's  Case 

156 

Doster  v.  Brown 

430  p 

Drumright  v.  Philpot 

1846 

Dotton  v.  Albion 

Up 

v.  State 

215 

Doty  v.  Wilson 

421,  426,  429 

Drurv  v.  Hervev 

197 

Dougan  ».  Cham  plain  Co. 

14t> 

v.  Midland  R.  Co. 

137,  139 

Douglas  v.  R.  Co. 

6« 

Druse  v.  Wheeler 

14  o 

Douglas  Peerage  Case 

14  s,  156  a 

Du  Barre  ».  Livette 

239,  247 

Douglass  v.  Hart 

118 

Dublin  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery 

Uw,  81  f 

v.  Reynolds 

288 

Dubois  v.  Baker 

581 

v.  Sanderson 

349,  575 

Du  Bois  v.  Mason 

43 

v.  Spears 

268 

Du  Best  v.  Beresford 

162  d 

v.  Tousey                14  d,  54,  55,  461,  461  d 

Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case 

19 

Douglass'  Case 

13  a 

Ducoign  v.  Schreppel 

118 

Dove  v.  State 

14  q,  441/ 

Dudley  v.  Bolles 

4696 

Dover  v.  Maestaer 

378 

v.  Gravson 

484 

t%  Winchester 

14  6,  14  a.  14  r 

v.  McCluer 

146 

Dow  ».  Sawyer 

116 

v.  Sumner 

572 

».  Spenny 

Hi 

v.  Vose 

280 

v.  Tuttle* 

305  d 

Duel  v.  Fisher 

390 

Dowden  v.  Fowle 

180 

Duffield  v.  Morris 

14?,  162  e 

Dowley  v.  Wintield 

41 

v.  Scott 

180 

Dowling  v.  Dowling 

14  i 

Duffin  v.  People 

439  h 

v.  State 

Uf 

v.  Smith 

240,  242,  245 

Downer  v.  Dana 

462 

Duffy  D.  People 

232 

v.  Rowell 

436 

Duffesne  v.  Weise 

461  c 

v.  Society 

328  c 

Dugan  v.  Com. 

217,  2196 

Downev  v.  D'illon 

14  6,  14  o 

Duke  v.  Pownall 

427 

v.  Murphy 

461  c 

Dukehart  v.  Caughman 

Bid 

v.  Sawyer 

195  d 

Dukes  v.  State 

14  6,  14  c 

Downing  v.  Butcher 

14  c 

Duling  v.  Johnson 

156 

v.  Haxton 

498 

Dumas  v.  State 

1616 

v.  Plate 

195  a 

Dumbach  v.  Bishop 

254 

Downs  v.  Belden 

189,  190 

Dunbar  v.  McGill 

108 

v.  Cooper 

25,  183 

v.  Marden 

572,  575 

v.  R.  Co. 

4396 

v.  U.  S. 

461  6,  563  k 

Dows  v.  McMichael 

531 

Duncan  v.  Beard 

5756 

Dowton  v.  Cross 

181 

v.  Gibbs 

201 

Dovle  v.  Bradford 

66 

v.  Hodges 

568  a 

"  v.  R.  Co. 

Uv 

v.  Meiklehatn 

389 

r.  State 

2606 

v,  Seeley 

439  c 

Drake  v.  Drake 

305  h,  305  m 

v.  State 

14  o 

v.  Glover 

66 

Dundas  v.  Lansing 

Up,  140,1626 

v.  Henly 

385 

Dundass  v.  Lord  Weymouth 

69 

v.  Merrill 

532 

Dungan  v.  Miller 

317 

v.  Mitchell 

533 

Dunham  v.  Averill 

291 

v.  State 

14  fc,  201 

».  Chicago 

563  / 

v.  Sykes 

180 

v.  Gannett 

287 

Drakeford  v.  Adams 

81  d 

v.  Rackliff 

146,  14  c 

Dranguet  v.  Prudhomme 

74 

v.  Riley 

559 

Draper  v.  Draper 

369,  370  d 

Dunklee  v.'  Goodenough 

305  (/ 

v.  Garratt 

60 

Dunlap  v.  Berry 

563  r 

v.  Hatfield 

192 

v.  Richardson 

444 

Dravo  v.  Fabel 

443  6,  444  a 

v.  Waldo 

506 

Draycott  v.  Talbot 

43  a 

Dunlop  v.  Berry 

430  c 

Drarton  v.  Dale 

207 

v.  Servas 

114  c 

'».  Wells 

163.7 

Dunmore  r.  State 

162;? 

Drennen  v.  Lindsay 

444  a 

Dunn  v.  Aslett 

443  a,  444,  407 

Drew  v.  New  River  Co. 

Hid 

v.  Dunn 

163  i 

v.  Wood 

450 

v.  Dunnaker 

444 

Drew's  Case 

2196 

v.  Eaton 

46,  108 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Iv 


Duun  v.  Murray 

v.  Packwood 

t\  People 

v.  Price 

v.  Snell 

v.  State        14  o,  158, 

v.  Whitney 
Dunne  v.  Park  Com'rs 
Dunning  v.  R.  Co. 
Dunraven  v.  Llewellyn 
Du  Pont  v.  Davis 
Dupree  v.  State 
Dupuy  v.  Truman 
Durden  v.  Cleveland 
Durfee  v.  Abbott 
Durgin  v.  Danville 

v.  Somers 

Durham  e.  Beaumont 
Durkee  v.  R.  Co. 
Durkin  r.  Cobleigh 
Durland  v.  U.  S. 
Durnell  ».  Sowden 
Durore's  Caee 
Durrell  v.  Bederley 
Durst  r.  Masters 
Durston  v.  Tuthan 
Dushane  v.  Benedict 
Dutch  &  Co.  v.  Mooney 
Dutcher  v.  Justices 
Dutillet  v.  Blanchard 
Duttenhofer  v.  State 
Dutton  »>.  Gerrish 

v.  Woodman 
Duval  r.  Bibb 
Du  Val  ».  Marshall 
Duvall  ».  Griffith 
Duvall's  Ex'r  17.  Darby 
Dwight  v.  Brown 

17.  Linton 
Dwinel  ».  Pottle 
Dwyer  v.  Collins 

».  Dunbar 
Dye  v.  Young 
Dyer  17.  Ashton 

17.  Dyer 

17.  Fredericks 

r.  Morris 

17.  Kosenthal 

17.  Smith 

17.  State 

17.  Tymewell 
Dyke  17.  Aldridge 
Dysart  t'.  Furrow 
Dyson  v.  R.  Co. 

».  Wood 


E. 


532 

254  c,  386 
14  g,  435,  4(32 


190 

161,  230,  469  c,  469  d 

118,  120  c 

221 

14  17,  186 
138  a 

114/,  114.9 
Uk 

438,  563  h 

551 

120  a 

1956 

192 

462,  469,  469  a 

184  c,  563  p 

305  f 

4616 

581 

65 

441,  441  e 

439  h 

60 

441  g 
5 

310 
491 
243 
281 

177,  1846,199,  532 

26 

43 

14  o 

430  1 

147,  154 

288 

118 

241,  245,  563  c 

563  e 

162  e 

205 

441  h 

5636,  563  p 

432  c 

430  p 

488 

466  a 

348 

180 

120  c 

14  1,  439  h 
513 


E.  0.  St.  R.  Co.  17.  Godola  43 

Eade  v.  Lingood  163  a 

Eady  ».  Shivey  485  a 

Eagan  17.  Larkin  49 

17.  State  5 

Eagle  v.  Emmett  41 

Eagleton  v.  Gutteridge  568  a 

Eames  v.  Eames  41,  42 

«.  Whittaker  449 

Eardley  17.  Turnock  72 

Earl  17.  Baxter  20 

v.  Leffler  439  g 

v.  Lewis  142,  575  6 


102,1626,165 
101 

45,  96.  200,  203,  563  k 
284,  284  a,  305  c 
118 
81  c 
51  a 
221 
81/ 
14* 
118 
451  c 
451,  469  d 


Earl  v.  Tupper 
Earle  v.  Earle 
v.  Picken 
r.  Rice 
v.  Sawyer 
Earll  t7.  People 

Early  17.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co. 

Early' s  Case 

Earnshaw  v.  U.  S. 

Easdale  v.  Reynolds 

Easly  v.  Eakin 

Eason  v.  Chapman 

East  v.  Chapman 

East,  etc.  Co.  17.  Gaskell 

East  India  Co.  17.  Campbell  451,  469 d 

v.  Evans  348 

v.  Gosling  416 

East  Kingston  v.  Towle  485  a 

Eastland  r .  Caldwell  14  d 

v.  Jordan  485  a 

Eastman  v.  Bennett  108 

v.  Cooper  532 

v.  Crosby  6  b 

17.  Martin  114  d 

v.  Moulton  120  c 

v.  R.  Co.  162.9 

v.  Tuttle  207 

v.  Winship  167,  418 

East  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Heister  14  v 

East  T.  T.  Co.  v.  Simms  184  c 

East  T.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Hesters  14  v 

v.  Maloy  156 

17.  Wright  441  d 

East  Tennessee  R.  Co.  v.  Duggin  108 

Eastwood  17.  People  13  i 

Eaton  v.  Alger  14  x 

17.  Campbell  484,  485  a 

17.  Gladwell  305 1 

i?.  Hall  509 

17.  Ogier  208 

17.  Rice  201 

17.  Tallmadge  103 

t?.  Telegraph  Co.  14  »,  171, 186 

Eaton's  Trial  201 

Eborn  v.  Zimpelman  84,  439  A,  581 

Eccles  ».  Shackelford  14  o 

Eckert  17.  Triplett  189 

Eckford  17.  Eckford  305 1,  305  m 

Eckles  ».  Bates  430* 

Eddings  17.  Brown  170  a 

Eden  v.  Blake  304 

Eddy  v.  Gray  14s 

t7.  Wilson  276 

Edelhoff  r.  State  14  q 

Edsar  v.  Richardson  96 

Edge  17.  Pemberton  52 

Edgell  v.  Bennett  254 

Edgerley  v.  Kmerson  279 

Edgett  17.  Stiles  570 

Edgington  17.  Fitzmaurice  162  a 

Edie  17.  East  India  Co.  5 

Edinb.  R.  L.  M.  Co.  v.  Peoples  305  g 

Edington  v.  Ins.  Co.  247  a 

Edme,  Exparle  317,  318 

Edmiston  v.  Schwartz  506 

Edmonds  v.  Lowe  391,  401,  416 

v.  Rowe  371,  374  6 

v.  State  14  o 

».  Walter  435 

Edmondson  c.  Stevenson  34 

Edmonson  v.  R.  Co.  163 1 

Edson  v.  Muusell  46, 144 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Edward  Altham's  Case 

301 

Ellsworth  v.  Potter 

450 

Edwards  v.  Crenshaw 

443 

Elmer  v.  Fessenden 

162  a! 

v.  Crock 

102,  162  d 

Ehnondorff  ».  Carmichael 

491 

v.  Currier 

328  c 

Elmore  v.  Overtou 

439  c 

v.  Evans 

3 

Elsam  v.  Faucett 

Uh,  54,  162  d 

«.  Matthews 

76 

Eisner  v.  Supreme  Lodge 

Ul 

v.  Noyes 

430/a 

Elster  v.  Seattle 

Up,  14  v 

r.  Publishing  Co. 

5 

Elston  v.  Wood 

179 

v.  Rives 

201 

Elting  v.  Scott 

186,  212 

v.  State 

34 

Elton  v.  Larkins                186,  441  e,  449,  462  a 

v.  Three  Rivers 

13  f,  Up,  14  u 

Elwood  v.  Deifendorf 

189,  420,  421 

v.  Tracv 

96,  177,  563  k 

Ely  v.  Caldecott 

150 

v.  Weeks 

302 

v.  Elv 

564 

v.  Williams 

197 

v.  R.'Co. 

195  d 

v.  Worcester 

Hi1 

Emerson  v.  Blonden 

185 

Eel  River,  etc.  Co.  i?.  Topp 

66 

v.  Brigham 

398 

Egan  ».  Bowker 

195  a 

v.  Fisk 

195  c,  563  d 

v.  Gordon 

14  A,  1406 

v.  Lebanon 

14  u 

Egg  v.  Barnett 

14s,  38 

v.  Manuf.  Co. 

420 

Eggler  v.  People 

14  g 

v.  Stevens 

462  a 

Eggleston  v.  Buardman 

14  v 

Emerton  v.  Andrews 

396 

v.  Speke 

179 

Emery  v.  Berry 

488 

Ehrensperger  v.  Anderson 

563  d 

v.  Fowler 

523 

Ehrman  v.  Hoskins 

305  k 

v.  Grocock 

46 

Eicke  v.  Nokes 

241,  245 

v.  Haven 

305  w 

Eidt  v.  Cutter 

13  b,  14  v 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

292,  303 

Eighmie  v.  Taylor 

305  /' 

v.  State 

81  c,  165,  462  6 

Eiland  v.  State 

14  a,  14  c,  218 

17.  Twombly 

572 

Eisenhart  v.  Slaymaker 

563  c 

Emig  r.  Diehl 

163.9 

Eisenlord  v.  Clum 

114(7 

Emmerson  v.  Heelis 

269,  271 

Elbin  r.  Wilson 

430  i 

Emmert  v.  Hayes 

305  w 

Elcessor  v.  Elcessor 

441/ 

Emmet  v.  Butler 

356,  358 

Eld  v.  Gorhain 

482 

Emmons  v.  Barton 

189,  337 

Elden  v.  Kesdell 

519 

v.  Havward 

75 

Elder  v.  Coal  Co. 

441  d 

v.  Littlefield 

26 

v.  Warfield 

118 

v.  Oldham 

20 

Elderton's  Case 

6a 

v.  R.  Co. 

441  g 

Eldridge  v.  Hawley 

195  c 

Emporia  v.  Schmidling 

195<i 

v.  Knott 

20,  45  a 

Empson  v.  Griffin 

73 

Eldridge's  Case 

217 

Endaily  v.  State 

140 

Elfe  v.  Gadsden 

286 

Enders  v.  Sternbergh 

201,  563  6 

Elkin  v.  Janson 

80 

Enrield  v.  Ellington 

484,  575  6 

Elkins  v.  Hamilton 

108 

England  v.  Slade 

25,  46 

Elkinton  v.  Brick 

77 

Engles  v.  Bruington 

572 

Ellicott  v.  Pearl      137,  138, 

140  a,  469  b,  469  c 

English  v.  Sprague 

507 

El  ling  wood  v.  Bragg 

430/ 

Engrer  v.  R.  Co. 

81 

Elliot  v.  Porter 

533 

Ennis  v.  Smith 

5,  488,  525 

v.  Shultz 

444  a 

Enos  v.  Enos 

14  o 

Elliott  v.  Boyles 

14  o,  461  6,  469  / 

v.  Tuttle 

108 

v.  Dycke 

120  a 

Ensign  v.  Webster 

212 

v.  Edwards 

6a 

Ephraims  v.  Murdoch 

164,  165 

r.  Piersol      114  c,  114  d,  114  e,  132,  305  g 

Epperson  v.  State 

161 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  w 

Eppinger  v.  Scott 

40 

Ellis  v.  Burrell 

81d 

Epps  v.  State                     14  u, 

14  r,  162  i,  435 

v.  Dempsey 

184  a 

Equitable  Ace.  I.  Co.  v.  Stout 

563ft 

v.  Ellis 

86 

Equitable  Secur.  Co.  v.  Talbert                305  e 

v.  Houston 

290 

Erb  v.  Pobritz 

146 

v.  Lindley 

14  o,  81  d 

Erd  v.  R.  Co. 

430  i 

v.  Park 

5 

Erfert  v.  Lytle 

43  a 

v.  Reddin 

6a 

Krhart  t>.  Cietrich 

38 

v.  Saltau 

254  c 

Erie  Preserving  Co.  v  .  Miller 

439  c 

v.  Short 

14  i,  14  / 

Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Cochran 

i-V 

v.  State 

14*,  4616,467 

v.  Decker 

lit 

r.  Thompson 

110  a,  292 

Ernest  v.  Brown 

73 

r.  Watson 

210 

Erskine  r.  Boyd 

322 

v.  Willard 

305 

r.  Davis 

41 

Ellis's  Appeal 

505 

v.  Murray 

5 

Ellison  r.  Cookson 

896 

v.  Plunimer 

271 

v.  Gray 

305  c 

Erwin  v.  Bulla 

162o 

Ellinnker  r.  Buckley 

445,  447 

v.  Saundera 

281,  304 

Ellniore  r.  Mills 

605 

r.  State 

444 

Ellsworth  r.  Moore 

43  a 

Eskridge  r.  State 

220  b,  370  « 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ivii 


Eslava  v.  Mazange                                         323 

Faire  ».  State 

14  o 

Eslow  v.  Mitchell                                           563  q 

Fairfield  County  Turn.  Co. 

v.  Thorp          332 

Essex  Bank  v.  Rix                                        356 

Fairley  v.  Smith 

162  /,  430  n 

Estes  v.  Bridgforth                                      254  c 

Fairlie  t>.  Denton 

198,  199 

Estev  v.  Birmbaum                                   184  c 

e.  Hastings 

184  c,  184  d 

Estill  v.  Taul                                           530,  531 

Fairly  ».  Fairly 

443  a 

Estrella,  The                                                    4 

v.  State 

14  v 

Etheridge  v.  Palin                                        275 

v.  Wappoo  Mills 

305  / 

Etna  v.  Brewer                                             162  c 

Fairmaner  v.  Budd 

212 

Ettingc.  U.  S.                                             146 

Fail-title  v.  Gilbert 

24 

Eureka  F.  Co.  r.  R.  Co.                              81/ 

Falconer  v.  Hanson 

163  A 

Evans  v,  Beattie                                             187 

Falkner  v.  Earle 

14  n 

v.  Birch                                           Uj,  80 

Falkner  &  Bond's  Case 

217 

v.  Browne                                              482 

Fall  v.  Overseers 

14  b,  14  h,  14  s 

v.  Chamberlain                                    14  w 

Falls  v.  Bel  knap 

331 

v.  Eaton                           389,  421,  423,  552 

Falmouth  v  Thomas 

271 

v.  Gas  Co.                                             14?; 

v.  Moss 

248 

v.  Getting                                        139,  497 

v.  Roberts 

564 

v.  Gibbs                                                   354 

v.  George 

405 

v.  Grav                                                     423 

Fancher  v.  De  Montegre 

305  m 

v.  Hettich                             365,  370  c,  389 

Fancourt  c.  Bull 

396 

v.  King                                                      69 

Fanning  v.  State 

14  p 

v.  Morgan                                              140  c 

Fant  v.  Miller 

1636 

v.  People                          430  c,  430  h,  441  b 

Farar  v.  Warfield 

440 

v.  Reed                                               163  g 

Farley  v.  C.  B.  &  V.  Co. 

195  d 

v.  Rees                                     139,  313,  319 

v.  King 

552 

v.  Roberts                                                271 

v.  Peebles 

244 

v.  Rothschild                                        163  b 

v.  State 

461  a,  461  6 

v.  Smith                                                   341 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Saling 

140  6,  430  » 

v.  State                              14*,  14  »,  461  d 

v.  Whitehill                  115,  116,  430  f,  581 

v.  Tatem                                                548 

Farmers'  &  Mech.  Bank  v.  Boraef    437,  439  6 

v.  Thomas                                                510 

Farnsworth  v.  Briggs 

518,  519 

v.  Yeatherd                                              395 

Farnsworth  Co.  v.  Rand 

86 

Evansich  v.  R.  Co.                                      461  b 

Farnum  v.  Farnum 

14  n 

Evanston  v.  Gunn                              162  m,  484 

v.  R.  Co. 

305  / 

Evansville  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Tuthil          14  h 

Farr  v.  Payne 

41 

Evarts  v.  Young                                          140  a 

0  Rouillard 

186 

Evening  Journal  Ass'n  v.  McDermott        14  o 

v.  Thompson 

469  a 

Everage  v.  State                                          184  a 

Farrah  v.  Keat 

319 

Everett  v.  Lowdham                                   432  a 

Farrar  v.  Farrar 

265 

v  State                                                    14  k 

».  Merrill 

46 

Everingham  v.  Roundell                 563  q,  563  r 

v.  Stackpole 

286,  293 

Evers  v.  State                                              14  c 

Farrell  v.  Brennan 

441  c,  563  e 

Ewell  v.  State                                              114c 

v.  Weitz 

14  s,  152  d,  439  h 

Ewens  v.  Gold                                                392 

Farrer  v.  State 

Uq 

Ewer  v.  Ambrose                        442,  4436,  512 

Farrington  v.  Sinclair 

14  q 

Ewing  v.  Goocle                                            14  w 

Farris  v.  Com. 

18 

Exall  v.  Partridge                                       563  c 

v.  State 

14  o 

Excelsior  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Owens                        38 

Farrow  v,  Blomfield 

465  a 

Exon  v.  State                                               4616 

v.  Hayes 

275 

Express  Pub.  Co.  v.  Aldine  Press               275 

Farwell  v."  Cramer 

34 

Eyler  v.  State                                                 14  o 

v.  Hilliard 

539 

Eyman  v.  People                                         38  a 

Fassett  v.  Brown 

572 

Faucett  ».  Nichols 

14  f 

Faulder  v.  Silk 

556 

Faulk  v.  Iowa  Co. 

14  p,  14  t 

. 

v.  State 

81  c 

Faulkner  v.  Terr. 

81  a,  220  c 

F.  E.  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Marley              441  g 

Faunce  v.  Gray 

176,  App.  Ill 

F.  M.  L.  Ass'n  ».  Winn                                180 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

284 

Fabens  r.  Tirrill                                      14  c,  81 

Faust  v.  U.  S. 

466  a 

Fabrigas  v.  Mostyn                    101,  162  p,  183 

Faxon  v.  Hollis 

117,  118,  120  c 

Fabyan  v.  Adams                                           322 

Fay  v.  Gray 

275 

r.  Russell                                                 6  a 

v.  Guynon 

254 

Fachina  v.  Sabine                                     364  6 

v.  Prentice 

5 

Faerber  v.  Lumber  Co.                                 14  v 

Fayerweather  v.  Ritch 

244 

Fahey  r.  Crotty                                             14  6 

Fayette  v.  Chesterville 

430  /,  441  / 

Fahnestock  v.  State                           14  c,  461  d 

Fazakerley  v.  Wiltshire 

6 

Fahr  v.  Hayes                                               14  o 

Fearing  c.  Kimball 

199 

Fairchild  o.  Ada  Co.                                      310 

Fee  v.  Taylor 

581 

v.  Bascomb                                              444 

Feemster  v.  Ringo 

5 

v.  Dennison                                             118 

Feeney  v.  Howard 

284 

Iviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Feeney  v.  R.  Co. 
Feibelman  v.  Assur.  Co. 
Feilding's  Trial 
Fell  v.  Young 
Fellowes  v.  Williamson 
Fellows  v.  Menasha 

v.  Smith 
Felska  v.  R.  Co. 
Felter  v.  Mulliner 
Feltz  v.  Walker 
Fengar  v.  Brown 
Fenn  v.  Granger 
Fenner  v.  Lewis 

v.  R.  Co. 

Fennerstein's  Champagne 
Fenno  ».  Weston 
Fenton  v.  Hughes 
Fenwick  v.  Bell 

v.  Read 

v.  Reed 

r.  Thornton 

Fenwick's  (Sir  J.)  Case 
Ferguson  v.  Clifford 

v.  Harwood 

v.  Hubbell 

v.  Mahon 

v.  Miles 

v.  Moore 

v.  Stafford 

v.  State 

Fernandez,  Exparte 
Fero  v.  Roscoe 
Ferrand  v.  Milligan 
Ferrars  (Ld.)  v.  Shirley 


247  a 

192,  444 

563  » 

575  b 

162  d 

66 

189 

162.9 

510 

305  d 

275 

330,  353,  354,  469  g 
187 
239 

120  a,  102  I 
198,  199 
443  a 

440,  441  b,  441  d 
154 
239 
179 

163 /,  252,  254  c 
14  v,  485 
56,  68.  69,  506 
441  at 
546 
563  c 
2606 
441  g 

213,  260  b,  328  c 
469^ 
14  o 
3 
577 


Ferrer's  Case  14  I,  19,  441  k,  441 1 

Ferrers  v.  Arden  533 

Ferris  «.  Bank  6  a 

v.  Shaw  430  i 

v.  Ward  19 

Fertig  r.  State  201 

Fetherly  v.  Waggoner  570 

Feversham  «.  Emerson  22 

Fiedler  ».  Damn  328  c 

Field  v.  Brown  46 

0.  Holland  178 

*.  Mitchell  394 

v.  Munson  287 

r.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Thompson  120  c 

v.  Winlow  69 

Fielden  *.  Lahens  323 

Fielder  r.  Collier  120  a 

Fields  v.  State  14  b,  14  c 

Fife  v.  Com.  219  a,  219  6 

Fifield  r.  Smith  422 

Figg  r.  Wedderburne  114  g 

Filer  r.  Smith  81  f 

Filmer  r.  Gott  284 

Finch  v.  Barclay  439  c 

v.  Bishop  of  Ely  474 

v.  Mansfield  18 

Fincher  r.  State  14j 

Find  v.  Garrett  43  a 

Findlav  r.  Prtiitt  14  6 

Findlav  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bauer  14  v 

I-'inli-y'r.  Widmer  14  b,  14  d 
Finn  r.  Com.                           14  q,  163 /,  163  g 

Franegan  r.  Dugan  13  c,  14  .- 

v.  Gasworks  Co.  430  / 

Finnerty  v.  Tipper  14  o 

Finney'n  Appeal  284 

Firkin  v.  Edwarda  563  d 


Firkins  ».  R.  Co.  162  b 

First  Cong.  Church  v.  Ins.  Co.  441  e 

First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Allen  578  b 

v.  Assur.  Co.  81  d 

v.  Booth  441  h 

v.  Carson  581 

v.  Com.  U.  Ass.  Co.  469  a 

v.  Foote  305  c 

v.  Linn  Co.  184  c 

v.  Marshall  184  c 

v.  McManigle  40 

v.  Robert  581 

v.  Wirebach  14  I.  163  e.  430 /,  441  /; 

44U 
First  Nat.    Bank   of  B.   v.  First  Nat. 

Bank  of  N.  563  o 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Hoopeston  v.  R.  Co.     14  v 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Nashville  v.  R.  Co.     305  I 

Fish  v.  Hubbard  300 

v.  Skut  34 

v.  Travers  75,  76 

Fish,  Re  305  / 

Fisher  v.  Bartlett  207 

v.  Conway  461  d 

v.  Diebert  296  a 

v.  Fisher  469  d 

v.  Greene  563  e 

v.  Kaufman  38  a 

v.  Kitchingman  510 

v.  Kyle  165 

v.  La'ne  18,  513 

v.  Mayor  39,  120  a 

v.  Patterson  14  d,  14  k,  14  o 

v.  Ronalds  469  d 

v.  Saunda  430  ja 

v.  True  190 

v.  Tucker  1846 

v.  Willard  421 

Fisk  v.  Chester  328  c 

v.  Woodruff  489 

Fisk,  Ex  parte  163  6 

Fiske  v.  Gowing  441  h 

v.  Ins.  Co.  80,  441  e 

Fitch  v.  Bogue  349,  563  6 

v.  Chapman  147 

v.  Hill  342 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Smalbrook  375 

Filler  v.  Shotwell  485,  493 

Fitzgerald  v.  Elsee  572 

».  F.  &  M.  C.  Co.  43 

v.  Fauconberge  564 

v.  Hay  ward  44 1^ 

Fitzhugh  0.  Wiman  305 

Fitzpatrick  v.  Fitzpatrick  305  m 

Fitzwalter  Peernge  Case  580,  581  a 

Fladong  v.  Winter  14  » 

Flagg  v.  Mann  421 

v.  Mason  140  a 

v.  People  223 

v.  Wiliington  14  q 

Flaherty  v.  Powers  14  v 

Flamingham  v.  Boucher  14  o 

Flanagin  v.  State  14/»,  367 

Flanders  r.  Davis  38  a 

v.  Merritt  41 

Flato  v.  Mulhall  43 

Fleet  v.  Murton  292 

Fleming  v.  Clark  86 

r.  Gilbert  302,  304 

v.  Gooding  2U7 

p.  Parry  305  g 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


lix 


[References  are  to  sections.] 

Fleming  v.  State                                          14  1 
Flemming  v.  Lawless                                  563d 

Forney  v.  Ferrell 
v.  Hallagher 

174 

163  ff 

Fletcher  v.  Braddyll                                        40 

Fornes  v.  Wright 

Uw 

v.  Fletcher     '                                        462 

Forrest  v.  Kissam 

163d 

v.  Froggatt                                              201 

v.  Shores 

26 

v.  Henley                                                 462 

Forrester  v.  Pigou                  167 

392,  395,  418 

v.  Home                                                573 

Forshaw  v.  Lewis 

559 

v.  Jackson                                             563  b 

Forster  v.  Hale 

266 

v.  State                   14  b,  195  6,  444  b,  461  a 

Forsyth  v.  Doolittle 

441  f 

v.  Willard                                                305 

v.  Ganson 

176 

Flight,  Ex  parts                                              285 

Forsyth  Boulevard  v.  Forsyth 

14  v 

Flindt  v.  Atkins                                             514 

Forsvthe  v.  Norcross 

117 

Flinn  ».  Calow                                               281 

Fort'v.  Clarke 

114  d,  204 

v.  M'Gonigle                                      5636 

v.  State 

34 

v.  Prairie  Co.                                          310 

Fort  Wayne  v.  Coombs 

14  «,  430/ 

v.  R.  Co.                                                 14  v 

Fortescue  &  Coak's  Case 

349 

Flint  v.  Allvn                                                 356 

Foscue  v.  Lvon 

5 

v.  Clark                                                  14  o 

Fosdahl  v.  State 

14  q,  4616 

Flint's  Estate                                               247  a 

Foss  ».  Haynes 

469  k 

Flood  v.  Russell                                152  c,  162  e 

Foster  v.  Allanson 

303 

v.  Mitchell                                            439  b 

v.  Beals 

194 

Flora  v.  Anderson                             114  c,  305  I 

v.  Brooks 

,  1406 

Florence  Mach.  Co.  v.  Daggett                    292 

v.  Collner 

581 

Flourenoy  v.  Durke                                       548 

v.  Earl  of  Derby 

536 

Flournoy'w.  Newton                                    563  k 

v.  F.  &  C.  Co. 

110  a 

v.  Warden                                              43  a 

v.  Gray 

2a 

Flower  v.  Herbert                                          207 

v.  Hall                    14  q,  237,  239,  240,  241 

t>.  R.  Co.                                               13j 

0.  Jolly 

281,  304 

v.  Young                                                  494 

v.  Mackinnon 

305  c 

Flowers  v.  Haralson                                    114c 

v.  McDivit 

532 

Flovd  v.  Ricks                                                   5 

v.  McGraw 

287 

"  t\  State                                       465  a,  469  d 

v.  Newbrough 

461  c 

Flvnn  v.  Coffee                                              41 

v.  People 

13  6,  469  d 

v.  State                                                 162  g 

v.  Pointer 

563  d 

Flvnt  v.  Bodenhamer                                  430/ 

c.  Shaw                       165, 

166,  4696,  539 

Fo'gel  v.  R.  Co.                                            441  d 

v.  Sinkler 

118 

Fogg  v.  Hill                                                   14  v 

v.  State 

13/,  162  o,  375 

Folev  v.  Royal  Arcanum                           247  a 

«.  Trull 

521 

r.  State                                                   14  h 

v.  Worthing 

462  a 

Foley-VVadsworth  Co.  v.  Solomon               564 

Foster's  Appeal 

14s 

Folkes  v.  Chadd                                    14  v,  440 

Foster's  Case 

65 

Follain  v.  Lefevre                                           6  a 

Foster's  Will 

439  h,  581 

Follett  v.  Jefferyes                                      242  a 

Fotheringham  v.  Greenwood 

387,  395 

Folsom  v.  Brown                                           81  d 

Foulke's  Case 

97  d 

v.  Cook                                                      40 

Foulkes  v.  Sellway     14d,  14  h 

,54,  101,  461  d 

v.  Cressey                                                502 

Fountain  v.  Brown 

Ul 

v.  Log  Driving  Co.                               439  c 

v.  Coke 

347 

v.  Manchester                                       252  a 

v.  Lynn 

485 

v.  Mussev                                                304 

v.  Young 

239 

v.  R.  Cor                                      14  »,  441  d 

Fowke's  Trial 

4506 

Foltz  v.  State                                            430  k 

Fowler  v.  Coster 

75,76 

Folwell  v.  Journal  Co.                                  14  h 

v.  Fowler 

14  d 

Fonda  v.  R.  Co.                                  14  b,  1956 

v.  Hoffman 

563  r 

Fonnereau  v.  Poyntz                                     288 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

14  6,  54 

Fonte  v.  State     "                                         14  q 

v.  Lewis 

162  i 

Foot  v.  Glover                                             532 

v.  Merrill 

323 

«.  Tracy                                   Ud,  14  A,  55 

v.  Pierce 

482 

Foote  ».  Beecher                                          189 

v.  Savage 

539 

v.  Cobb                                                    572 

v.  Sergeant 

1956 

f.  Hayne                                               239 

Fox  v.  Cilfton 

207 

Forbes  r.  Mvers                                          14  o 

».  Jones 

472 

t>.  Wale"                          21,  349,  570,  575  b 

v.  Lambson 

14  s,  563^ 

v.  Waller                                              328  c 

v.  Mining  Co. 

5,  14  M,  37 

Force  v.  Martin                                      14  s,  444 

v.  Pedigo 

5636 

Ford  v.  Beach                                              305  d 

v.  Peninsular  Worka 

162  k 

v.  Ford           114  c,  114  g,  461,  461  c,  461  d 

v.  People 

14  q,  563  k 

v.  Savage                                              305/ 

r.  R.  Co. 

305  1 

v.  State                14  fc,  14  g>,  14  r,  App.  lf[ 

v.  Reil 

5696 

v.  Wiley                                                 14  v 

v.  Whitney 

347,  385 

Fonle's  Case                                              461/ 

v.  Widgery 

25 

Fordice  t>.  Scribner                                      275 

Foxcroft  v.  Nevins 

187,  356 

Forgey  v.  Bank                                              581 

Foxley's  Case 

14.p 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Foxworth  v.  Brown                                       573 

Friend  v.  Ingersoll 

162J 

Foye  t?.  Patch                                                 284 

Friendly  v.  Lee 

439  6,  439  c 

Framingham  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Barnard              147 

Fries  v.  Brugler 

461  b,  462,  469.;' 

France  v.  Lucy                                            563  d 

Frink  v.  Potter 

163  i 

Franchot  v.  Leach                                          284 

Frith  v.  Barker 

280 

Francia's  Case                                    217,  217  a 

Froman  v.  Com. 

466  a,  581 

Francis  v.  Edwards                                     184  d 

Frome  v.  Dennis 

108 

v.  Francis                                                  41 

Frontine  v.  Frost 

80 

».Rosa                                          14*,  434 

Frost  v.  Brigham 

275 

Frank  ».  Bank                                            439  h 

i?.  Everett 

304 

v.  Longstreet                                      563  c 

v.  Holloway 

459 

v.  Morley                                                 245 

v.  Shapleigh 

521 

Frankford  v.  B.  T.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.                14  v 

v.  Spaulding 

301 

Frankland  v.  Johnson                                 305  c 

Frost's  Trial 

441  h 

Franklin  v.  Franklin                    14*,  14<?,  581 

Fry  v.  Bennett 

14  o 

v.  State                                        14  c,  439  g 

v.  State 

197 

Franklin  Bank  v.  Freeman                           416 

v.  Stowers 

189 

v.  Navig.  Co.                                           444 

v.  Wood 

163  g 

Franklin  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gruver               441  e 

Fryer.  Bank 

461  «,  461  c 

Franklin's  Adminis.  App.                              28 

v.  Barker 

118,  174 

Fraser  ».  Berkeley                                         101 

Fudge  v.  Payne 

81  d,  305  i 

v.  Charleston                                           484 

Fulkerson  v.  Thornton 

329 

v.  Fraser                                             439  b 

Fullam  v.  Rose 

430  i 

v.  Harding                                              430 

Fuller  v.  Critt.endeu 

212,  305 

v.  Hopkins                                              494 

v.  Fox 

581 

v.  Jennison                      H4/,  114  g,  247  a 

v.  Fuller 

370  a 

v.  Marsh                                          179,  427 

v.  Hampton 

192 

Frazee  v.  State                               469  d,  563  » 

v.  Jackson 

Up,  14  1 

Frazer  v.  State                                   14  q,  469  d 

v.  Liuzee 

30 

Frazier  v.  Brown                                             46 

v.  Rice 

163  d,  163  e 

v.  Laughlin                                              356 

v.  State 

439.9 

r.  McCloskey                                          14  o 

v.  Wheelock 

417 

v.  R.  Co.                                       14  h,  461  c 

Fullerton  v.  Fordyce 

441  /,  466  a 

v.  State                                                  201 

Fulmer  v.  Com. 

14  o 

Frear  v.  Evertson                   172,  329,  347,  353 

Fulmore  v.  R.  W. 

14(7 

v.  Hardenbergh                                       271 

Fulton  v.  Andrew 

305  c 

Fred  M.  Laurence,  The                              195  b 

v.  Bank 

445 

Fredin  v.  Richards                                      110  a 

v.  Hughes 

462 

Frederick  v.  State                                          232 

v.  McCracken 

430  i 

Free  v.  Buckingham                              3G9,  370 

Fulton's  Estate 

120  c 

v.  Hawkins                                              281 

Fulton  Bank  v.  Benedict 

461  c 

Freeholders  of  Hudson  Co.  c.  State               20 

t?.  Stafford 

445 

Freel  v.  R.  Co.                                            247  a 

Fulton  Works  v.  Kimball 

195  d 

Freeland  v.  Burt                                            286 

Funk  v.  Davis 

305  k,  305  T» 

v.  Heron                                                  197 

Funston  v.  R.  Co. 

441  d 

Freeman  v.  Arkell                                         252 

Furber  v.  Hilliard 

362 

v.  Brewster                            151,  179,  245 

Furbush  v.  Goodwin 

281,  305,  468 

v.  Brittin                                                  385 

Furly  r.  Newnham 

312,  320 

v.  Luckett                                              387 

Furman  v.  Peay 

118 

0.  Morev                                                    40 

Furneaux  v.  Hatching 

14  n,  52 

r.  Phillipps                  114  e,  132,  135,  139 

Furneaux's  Case 

65 

v.  Price                                                   14  d 

Fursdon  v.  Clogg 

184  c 

v.  Thayer                                                  20 

Fussell  v.  State 

430« 

9.  Walker                                                210 

Fyler  v.  Givens 

268 

Freeny  v.  Freeny                                      370  d 

Fyson  v.  Kemp 

Wj* 

Freind's  Trial     "                     3786,  450  a,  469  b 

Fremont  B.  &  E.  Co.  c.  Peters                   462 

Fremoult  v.  Dedire                                        66 

G. 

French  v.  Day                                             81  d 

v.  French                                                 550 

Gabay  v.  Lloyd 

292 

v.  Merrill                                            469  6 

Gable  v.  Ranch 

14  b,  572 

t?.  Millard                      461  a,  461  c,  46  Id 

Gablick  v.  People 

34 

v.  Piper                                                 14  1? 

Gaffnuy  ».  People 

465  a 

v.  Sale                            461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

Gage  v.  Bulkeley 

162J 

v.  Spinning  Co.                                    14  v 

v.  Campbell 

563  b,  563  d 

v.  State                                        14  /,  14  m 

v.  Eddy 

4616 

v.  Ware                                           254,  337 

v.  Meyers 

14  r,  563  c 

v.  Wilkinson                        13  c,  13/,  14  t 

v.  Smith 

Ifi2o 

Freyman  ».  Knecht                                      14  1 

Gagg  v.  Vetter 

13  j,  14t> 

Frick  v.  Barbour                                       195  c 

Ganagan  v.  R.  Co.            14  b, 

14  c,  14  n,  461  c 

r.  Kcynnlds                                             190 

Gaines  v.  Relf    162  rf,  444  c,  461  «,  461  c,  4(i  I  d 

Friedlandur  v.  London  Assur.  Co.             443  b 

v.  State 

tfOd 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixi 


Gainsford  v.  Grammar 
Galbraith  v.  Galbraith 

v.  Zimmerman 
Galhreath  v.  Cole 
Gale  v.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Lincoln 

v.  Nixon 

r.  People 
Galena  &  C.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Fay 


245 

423 

163.7 

184 '(/ 

328  c 

197 

268 

4016 

14  v 


Gallagher  w.  Assur.  Co.  563  o,  572  a 
v.  R.  Co.                            130, 162  i,  162/ 

v.  State  6  b 

Galveston  v.  Barbour  362  17 
Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis    461  c 

Gamble  v.  Mfg.  Co.  305  i 

Ganahl  v.  Shore  120  c 

Ganaway  v.  Dram.  Ass'n  162  g 
Gandolfo  v.  State                      14  b,  14  c,  461  c 

Gamly  ».  R.  Co.  14  v 

Gannon  v.  Gaslight  Co.  14  w 

v.  Stevens  434 

Ganong  v.  Green  14  q 

Ganson  v.  Madigan  290 

Gant  v.  Carmichael  563  h 

Gantling  v.  State  81  c 

Ganton  v.  Size  151 

Gants  v,  Vinard  81  d 

Garbutt  v.  People  162j 

Garcia  v.  State  1620 

Garber  v.  State  162  c 

Garden  v.  Creswell  319 

Garden  City  S.  Co.  v.  Miller  505,  514 

Gardenhire  v.  Parks  444  d,  461  c 

Gardere  v.  Ins.  Co.  514 

Gardiner  v.  Croasdale  61 

v.  People  13  e,  37 

Gardner  o.  Barney  482 

v.  Bartholomew  461  b 

v.  Brookline  14  v 

v.  Chace  305 

v.  Eberhart  6,  563^ 

v.  Frieze  162  e 

v.  Gardner  14  k,  14  o,  28 

v.  Granniss  570,  575  b 

v.  Lewis  162 1 

v.  Lightfoot  284 

v.  Madeira  14  o 

v.  McMahon  1846 
v.  Meeker                            14  n,  163  h,  186 

v.  Preston  14  a 

v.  R.  Co/  81/,  4616 

v.  Way  14  q,  4616 

Gardner's  Adm'r  v.  Vidal  581 

Garey  v.  Nicholson  201 

Garlock  v.  Geortner  38 

Garner  v.  State  14  c,  14  g,  14  k 

Garnet  v.  Ball  184 
Garrard  v.  State                        184  a,  219  6,  232 

Garrells  v.  Alexander  430  i,  577 

Garrett  v.  Heflin  43  a 

v.  Sparks  444,  444  a 

v.  Stuart  26 

v.  Tel.  Co.  441  h,  441  i 

Garrison  v.  Blanton  430  p 

v.  Owens  305  c 

Garrott  v.  Johnson  165,  532 

Garth  v.  Howard  184  c 

Gartside  v.  Outrara  242  « 

Garvin  v.  Carroll  43  a 

v.  State  136,  13  c,  581 

v.  Wells  6  6 
Garwood  v.  Dennis         23,  114  a,  201  a,  469  6 


Garwood  v.  Garwood  288 

v,  Hastings  41 

v.  R.  Co.  162^ 

Gaskill  v.  Skene  190 

Gass  v.  Stinson  421,  445,  461,  461  c,  554 

Gassenheimer  v.  State  Up,  14  q 

Gassert  v.  Noyes  328  c 

Gassett  v.  Glazier  81  f 

Gaston  c .  Merriam  305  g 

v.  State  14  q 

Gately  v.  Irvine  284 

Gates-  o.  Fleischer  441 1 

v.  People  14s 

v.  R.  Co.  81/ 

Gathercole  v.  Miall  563  6 

Gaul  v.  Fleming  75 

Gaunt  v.  State  13  a,  13  c,  14  s 

Gay  v.  Bates  192 

v.  Bowen  1846 

Gazelle,  The  275 

Geach  v.  Ingall  73 

Geary  i;.  Stevenson  146,  14  c,  184  c 

Gebhart  v.  Burket  146 

v.  Shindle  365,  370  e,  430 

Gedney  v.  Logan  189 

Gee  v.  Ward  114  e 

Geer  v.  Goudy  254 

v.  M.  L.  £  M.  Co.  439^,581 

Geery  v.  Hopkins  474 

Gelott  v.  Goodspeed  569  d,  572  a 

Gelston  r.  Hoyt  5,  541,  543 

Geng  v.  State  441/ 

Gentrv  v.  McGinnis  13  a,  13  6,  13  c,  14  s 

George  v.  Joy  288 

v.  Kimball  409 

v.  Pearce  167 

v.  Pilcher  469  a 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Sargent  356 

v.  Stubbs  423 

v.  Surrey  577 

v.  Thompson  563  d 

v.  Triplett  444 

Georgia  v.  Bond  14  d,  4446 

Georgia  H.  I.  Co.  v.  Wart  en  184  c 

Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Lybrend    195  a,  469  d 

Geralpulo  v.  Wieler  147 

Gerdes  v.  I.  &  F.  Co.  81  / 

Gerding  v.  Walter 

Gerhauser  v.  Ins.  Co.  163  i 

German  Bank  v.  Citizens'  B'k  430  q 

German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gibe  305  c 

German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Leonard  194 

German  Theol.  School  v.  Dubucpe  439  h 

Germania  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Ross-Lewm  556 

Gerrish  «.  Sweetser  192 

v.  Towne  287 

Gertz  v.  R.  Co.  467 

Gest  v.  R.  Co.  507 

Getchell  v.  Heald  174 

Geter  v.  Martin  118 

Geth in  v.  Walker  563  c 

Gettelman  v.  Assur.  Co.  305 d 

Getzlaff  v.  Seliger  241 

Geuing  v.  State  79 

Gevers  v.  Mainwaring  394,  417 

Geyer  v.  Irwin  316 

Gibbes  v.  Vincent  41 
Gibblehouse  v.  Stong                  148,  152  c,  190 

Gibbon  v.  Featherstonhaugh  38 

Gibbon's  Case  484,  493 

Gibbons  v.  Coggon  563  I 


Ixii 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

Gibbons  v.  Powell 

563d 

Glenister  v.  Harding 

493 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

Globe  A.  I.  Co.  v.  Gerisch 

14,  1626,  162  g 

Gibbs  v.  Bryant 

358,  427 

Globe  Printing  Co.  v.  Stahl 

430  a 

v.  Linsley 

4696 

Glossop  v.  Pole 

v   1 

556 

v.  Pike 

3 

Glover  v.  Patten 

243 

Giberson  v.  Mills  Co. 

163  #,  184  c 

v.  Scotten 

14  v 

Gibney's  Case 

2206 

Gloystine  v.  Com. 

162  d 

Gibson  v.  Gibson 

162  e 

Glubb  v.  Edwards 

572 

r.  Hatchett 
v.  Hunter 

14* 

14  n,  Uq,  53 

Glynn  v.  Bank  of  England 
Goblet  v.  Beechey 

117,  120  6,  152  a 
288,  299 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

81  q 

Goddard  r.  Gardner 

245 

v.  Jeyes 

80 

v.  Ingram 

1846 

v.  McCarty 

362 

Goddard's  Case 

24 

v.  Peebles 

152  a 

Godefroy  v.  Jay 

508 

r.  Poor 

575  6 

Godfrey  v.  Macauley 

Up 

».  Trowbridge 

581 

v.  Norris 

572 

v.  Waterhouse 

78 

v.  State 

1596 

v.  Winter 

173 

Godkin  v.  Monahan 

305  / 

Gifford  v.  Ford 

581 

Goersen  v.  Com. 

14'o 

v.  People 

4616 

Goggans  v.  Monroe 

34 

Gilbert  v.  Anthony 

568  a 

Goins  v.  Moberly 

4616 

».  Bulkley 

265 

Golder  v.  Lund 

461  c 

v.  Gooderham 

462  a 

Golden  v.  State 

Up 

v.  Kennedy 

563  o 

Goldie  v.  Gunston 

207 

v.  McGinnis 

305  b,  305  f 

v.  McDonald 

38  a 

v.  Manchester  Iron  Co. 

.    430 

v.  Shuttleworth 

186 

v.  N.  C.  R.  Co. 

6 

Goldsboro  v.  R.  Co. 

439  A 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  /,  439  A,  444 

Goldsborough  v.  Pidduck 

14  n,  439  g 

»  State 

18 

Goldshede  v.  Swan 

285 

v.  Thompson 

532 

Goldsmith  v.  Picard 

14  d 

Gilbraith  v.  State 

Uq 

v.  Sawyer 

5 

Gilchrist  v.  Bale 

1626,  162  d,  341 

Goldstein  v.  People 

28 

v.  McKee 

461  a 

Goldstone  v.  Davidson 

513 

Gildersleeve  v.  Caraway 

165 

Goldthorp's  Estate 

162  e 

v.  Mahonv 

201 

Gooch  v.  Bryant 

564 

Gill  v.  Caldwell 

3646 

Golson  v.  Ebert 

162  / 

Gillard  v.  Bates 

244 

Gonge  v.  Roberts 

14  v 

Gillebrand,  Exparte 

166 

Good  r.  Knox 

444,  444  a 

Gilleland  v.  Martin 

41 

Goodacre  v.  Breame 

395 

Gilles  v.  O'Toole 

440 

Goodall  v.  State 

157 

Gillespie  v.  People 

163/,  334 

Goodbar  v.  Lidikay 

162  e 

Gil  let  v.  Sweat 

564 

Goode  v.  Biley 

305  I 

Giltett  v.  Co.  Commissioners 

86 

f.  State 

461  6,  469  6 

Gilliam  v.  State 

461  a,  461  c 

Goodell  v.  Gibbons 

14  w 

Gilligan  v.  Tebbetts 

1846 

Goodere's  Trial 

App.  Ill 

Gillrie  v.  Lockport 
Gilman  v.  Gross 

14  v 

305  c 

Good  hay  v.  Hendry       95,  3 
Goodier  v.  Lake 

92,  422,  426,  563.; 
5636 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  c 

Gooding  v.  Morgan 

6 

v.  Sheets 

43  a 

Goodinge  r.  Goodinge 

288 

v.  Strafford 

443.1 

Goodlett  v.  Kelly 

163  a 

Gilmanton  v.  Ham 

13  c,  14« 

Goodman  v.  Goodman 

140  c 

Giliner  r.  Atlanta 

Uv 

v.  Harvey 

81 

Gil  more  v.  Bowden 

348 

v.  James 

506 

v.  Paper  Co. 

184  c 

v.  Kennedy 

468 

v.  Swi«her 

581 

v.  State 

Uq 

Gilpin  v.  Vincent 

333,  388 

Goodrich  v.  Conrad 

485 

Gimbel  ».  Hufford 

563  c 

v.  Longley 

281 

(riiin  i?.  Com. 

14  1 

r.  Stevens 

280 

Girard  v.  Kalamazoo 

1626 

v.  Stone 

14  o 

Gilt  p.  Watson 

43  n 

v.  Tracy 

185 

(iittings  t>.  Hall 

5756 

v.  Weston 

563  q,  563  r 

Givens  v.  Bradley 

14  d,  55 

Goodright  v.  Downshire 

288 

Glascock  v.  Hays 

632 

r.  Hicks 

55 

Glass  r.  Beach 

163 

v.  Moss        114c,  114rf, 

114e,  134,  163  a, 

v.  Bennett 

162  d,  4(i!i  6 

2546 

Glaasell  v.  MnRon 

5636 

v.  Saul 

114  d,  344 

Glaze  v.  Whitlev 

46!)  n 

v,  Strapham 

568  a 

Gleadow  v.  Atkin        115,  116,  149,  152  6,  153 

Goodson  v.  Brothers 

138  a 

Gleason  r.  Kinney 

120  c. 

Goodtitle  r.  Baldwin 

45  n 

Glenn  v.  Grover 

MO 

v.  Braham 

14i,  76,  581« 

v.  Hunt 

489 

v.  Clark 

162  o 

v.  Rogers 

563  6,  563  d 

v.  Clayton 

443 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixiii 


Goodtitle  «,  Southern  301,  305  m 

v.  Welford  347,  419,  429 

Goodwin  v.  Appleton  6 

v.  Ass.  Soc.  40,  43,  489 

p.  Hubbard  266 

17.  Jack  570 

v.  Scott  430/ 

v.  West  311 

Goodwin  Co.'s  App.  245 

Goodw3»n  i?.  Goodwvn  430  t,  450  6 

Goon  Bow  v.  People"  432  c,  461  6  i 

Goon  Gan  v.  Richardson  305  d  I 

Good  v.  Needs  290  i 

Gordon  v.  Burris  14  k,  77,  305  k,  305  m 

v.  Hadsell  81  e 

».  Jeffery  568  a 

v.  Kitrell  305  m 

v.  Montgomery  6  6 

v.  Niemann  275 

77.  Parmelee  81  d 

v.  People  195  6 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  State  146,  461  d 

Gordon's  Will  1C2  e 

Gore  t).  Curtis  14 d,  Uh 

v.  Elwell  509 

Gorham  v.  Canton  162  c 

v.  Carroll  385,  409  # 

Gorrell  v.  Ins.  Co.  305  c 

Gorrissen  v.  Perrin  292 

Gorton  v.  Dyson  518,  571 

Goslin  17.  Corry  3 

Gosling  v.  Birnie  207 

Goss  17.  Lord  Nugent  302,  305  d 

v.  Tracy  168,  572 

v.  Watfington  116,  147,  150, 187 

Goss  P.  P.  Co.  17.  Scott  469  n 

Gosse  17.  Tracy  163  g 

Gosset  v.  Howard  38  a 

Gossler  v.  Refinery  430y 

Gottlieb  t7.  Danvers  563  c 

v.  Hartman  441 1 

Gough  v.  Cecil  575 

».  Gough  5756 

17.  St.  John  146,  54,201 

Gould  v.  Barnes  69 

17.  Crawford  165,  370  e 

v.  Excelsior  Co.  305/ 

17.  Gould  552 

v.  James  331 

c.  Jones  578 

17.  Lakes  14 k,  Us 

i?.  Lead  Co.  461  f 

v.  Oliver  205 

v.  Smith  114  c 

Goulding  v.  Clark  540 

Cove  17.  State  233 

Governor  17.  Bell  498 

17.  Jeffreys  498 

17.  McAffee  498 

Governor     of    Chelsea    Waterworks    v. 

Cowper  21 

Gowen  17.  Bush  162  g,  197 

v.  Glaser  14  e 

Gower  v.  Emery  245 

Craddy  c.  R.  Co.  184  c 

GrafFam  17.  Pierce  305/ 

Graft  17.  Lord  Bertie  Up 

Grafton  Bank  17.  Moore  177 

Graham  c.  Anderson  6  a 

v.  Bowham  166 

17.  Campbell  563  q 


Graham  i?.  Chrystal  461  d 

v.  McReynolds  469  6 

17.  Nowlin  14p 

17  Sadlier  81/ 

Grand  Isle  17.  Kinney  305  c 

Grand  Lodge  v.  Wieting         14  I,  441/,  441  /, 

556 

Grand  Rapids  17.  R.  Co.  441  # 
Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Huntley      14  u, 

1626 

Grand  T.  R.  Co.  17.  Richardson  14 17 

Graney  v.  R.  Co.  14 17 

Granger  17.  Warrington  237 

Grannis  17.  Branden  •  146 

Grant  v.  Coal  Co.  489 

17.  Dreyfus  439  6 

17.  Frost  284 

17.  Grant  162  e,  305 1 

i?.  Jackson  177,  204,  210 

».  Maddox  292,  305  I 

17.  McLachlin  541 

v.  Ridley  320 

17.  Thompson  440 

17.  Varney  44  ld_ 

Grantham  i?.  State  14^' 

Grattan  v.  Ins.  Co.  201,  247  a 

Gravely  17.  State  81  6 

Graves  ».  Battle  Creek  13/,  469  m 

17.  Colwell  43  a 

v.  Davenport  4436 

v.  Graves  328  c 

v.  Joice  535 

17.  Key  207,  212 

17.  People  14  o 

17.  U.  S.  14 p,  1956,  469  d 

Gray  17.  Davis  502 

17.  Gardiner  46 

17.  Harper  .  280,  292,  295 

i?.  Palmer  174,  177 

17.  Pentland  251 

17.  Pingry  531 

i:  State  14  o 

Grayson  17.  Atkinson  272 

t7.  Com.  Uk 

17.  Lynch  430  o 

Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  17.  Harrison  287 

Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  17.  Bacon  79 

Green  17.  Barker  38  a 

Green  17.  Batson  284 

17.  Brown  41, 

17.  Campagnia  163  c 

17.  Caulk  430  n,  4396 

t?.  Cawthorn  439  6 

17.  Chelsea  570 

17.  Chicago  6  c 

17.  Com.  14  q 

17.  Fall  River  14 1? 

17.  Howard  288 

17.  Jones  392 

r.  New  River  Co.  394,  527 

v.  Pratt  118,  120  c 

17.  Proude  609,  5756 

u.  Rugely  43 

17.  Salmon  392 

r.  State  14  k,  14 1, 197,  220,  220  c, 

App.  Ill 

«.  Sutton  356 

«.  Waller  5 

v.  Water  Co.  19"^ 

17.  Weller  482 

17.  Welles  6  a 

v.  Wilkie  305  c 


Ixiv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Green  v.  Woodbury 

195  a 

Grossfield's  Case 

255 

Greenawalt  v.  Kohne 

275,  284 

Grote  v.  Grote 

47 

Green  v.  Clarke 

532 

Groundwater  v.  "Washington 

469  m 

Greenfield  v.  Camden 

114  c 

Guardhouse  v.  Blackburn 

305  c 

v.  People 

14  ;> 

Gude  v.  Mankato 

14  p 

v.  State 

Up 

Guernsey  v.  Carver 

532 

Greenfield  Bank  v.  Crafts 

40 

Gugins  v.  Van  Gorder 

5636 

Greenlaw  v.  King 

240 

Guidery  v.  Green 

305  c,  305  d 

Green  leaf  v.  Quincy 

1846 

Guidon  v.  Robson 

207 

v.  R.  Co. 

114o 

Guild  v.  Lee 

179,  537 

Greenough  v.  Eccles 

4436 

Guild's  Case               217,  219  b, 

220,  221,  222, 

v.  Gaskell 

237,  239,  242,  244 

223 

v.  Greenough 

572 

Guinan's  Appeal 

108 

v.  West 

385 

Guinness  v.  Carroll 

546 

Greenshields  v.  Crawford 

43  a,  575 

Guiteau's  Trial 

136 

Greenslade  v.  Dare 

Up 

Guiterman  v.  S.  S.  Co. 

441  f 

Greenwell  v.  Crow 

430  i,  44  Id 

Gulf  Citv  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stephens 

322 

Greer  v.  Fergerson 

485 

Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton           14  v, 

v.  Higgins 

462 

441  d,  441  I  . 

v.  State 

328  c 

v.  Evansich 

14  v 

Gregg  v,  Forsyth 

479 

v.  Harriett 

14  v 

Gregory  v.  Baugh 

14s,  114  c 

v.  Johnson 

140 

v.  Cheathaiu 

462,  465  a 

v.  McGowan 

195  d 

v.  Dodge 

420 

v.  Norfleet 

469  m 

v.  Howard 

192 

v.  Schieder 

81 

v.  McPherson 

563  r 

v.  Smith 

14  o 

v.  Parker 

185 

Gulick  v.  Gulick 

245 

v.  Sherman 

276 

Gully  v.  Grubbs 

26 

f.  Tavernor 

439  c,  447  a 

Gunter  v.  State 

14  Te,  465  a 

v.  Thomas 

14c,  14  »,  55 

v.  Watson 

435 

Grellier  v.  Neale 

572 

Guntner  v.  State 

441  A 

Grenfell  v.  Girdleston 

14*,  39 

Gunz  v.  Giegliug 

305  c 

Gresley  v.  Mouseley 

43  a 

Gurley  v.  Park 

244,  247  a 

Grever  v.  Taylor 

328  c 

Gurney  v.  Langlands 

581  a 

Greville  v.  Chapman 

441 

Gutherless  v.  Ripley 

120  c 

Grey  v.  Young 

162  6,  430 

Guthrie  v.  Lowry 

540 

Gribble  v.  Press  Co. 

14  o 

v.  Shaffer 

370  c 

Grierson  v.  Mason 

284 

Gutteridge  v.  Smith 

205 

Grieve  ».  R.  Co. 

166 

Gutterson  v.  Morse 

4616 

Griffin  v.  Auburn 

14  v 

Guy  v.  Hall 

385 

v.  Brown 

342,  395,  539 

v.  Sharp 

287,  291 

v.  Marquardt 

328  c 

Guyette  v.  Bolton 

430  i 

v.  R.  Co. 

184  c 

Gwin  v.  Gwin 

162  e 

v.  Smith 

254 

Gwinnet  v.  Phillips 

60,  66 

v.  State 

14  q,  461  d,  469  c 

Gyles  v.  Hill 

430  j« 

Griffin's  Case 

220 

Griffing  v.  Harris 

385 

Griffith  v.  Davies 

245 

H. 

v.  Diffenderfer 

162  e 

v.  Griffith. 

254 

H.  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Burke 

439  c 

v.  Huston 

563k 

Habenicht  v.  Lissak 

286 

v.  Rive 

4397 

Habershon  v.  Troby 

254  c 

v.  State 

227,  461  d,  462 

Hacker  v.  Young 

484 

v.  Williams 

578  a,  580 

Hackett  v.  Callendar 

197,  207 

Griffiths  v.  Hardenbergh 

288,  2'J7 

v.  Martin 

190 

v.  Williams 

27,  186 

Hackman  v.  Fernie 

73 

Griffits  v.  Ivery 

678  6,  580 

Hackney  v.  State 

469  d 

v.  Payne 

14  1 

Haddow  v.  Parry 

116,  147 

Grigg's  Case 

339,  340,  345 

Hadduck  v.  Wifmarth 

385 

Grimes  v.  Bnstrop 

46 

Hadfield  v.  Jameson 

139 

Grimes  >•.  Fall 

663  k 

Hadio  v.  Gooden          461  c,  461  d,  469,  499  a 

v.  Hilliary 

88,83d 

Hartley  v.  Carter 

162  d,  1G2  f 

v.  State 

162  c 

v.  Green 

632 

Grimes  D.  G.  Co.  v.  Malcolm                      190 

v.  Rowe 

140  a 

Grimston  v.  Cunningham 

305  f 

Hadra  v.  Bank            • 

163  e 

Grim  wood  v.  Barritt 

CO 

Hadrick  v.  Heslop 

357 

Gnswold  p.  Pitcairn 

4,218 

Haffelfinger  v.  Sluitz 

564 

v.  State 

218 

Hagaman  v.  Case 

118 

Grob  r.  Cushmnn 

6a 

v.  Gillis 

663  e 

GrofT  v.  Ramsey 

663  b 

Hagertorn  v.  Allnut 

310 

Groll  v.  Tower 

247  a 

v.  Reid 

116,  120  6 

Groom  v.  Bradley 

394 

Hagen  v.  Ins.  Co. 

664 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixv 


Hagenlocher  v.  R.  Co. 

1626 

Halsted  v.  Colvin                                           34 

Hagerman  v.  Wigent 

254 

Ham  17.  Ham                                                6,  25 

Hahn  v.  Penney 

1406 

17.  Salem                                                  14  v 

Haig  v.  Newton 

437,  439  6 

Hambel  17.  Davis                                                6 

Haigh  v.  Belcher 

52,  449 

Hamblin,  Succession  of                                 550 

v.  Brooks 

285 

Hamburg  B.  F.  I.  Co.  17.  Mfg.  Co.           252  a 

Haile  v.  Palmer 

485,  493 

Hainby  v.  State                                           162  c 

Haines  v.  Dennett 

385 

Homer  v.  Bank                                         441  h 

v.  Gibson 

5 

v.  McFarlin                                            14  d 

v.  Guthrie 

1149 

v.  Sowerby                                              559 

v.  Hayden 

U'J 

Hamilton  v.  Cutts                                  180,  394 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

14  f,  465  a 

17.  Hamilton                                     329,  334 

v.  Trust  Co. 

14  w 

v.  Marsden                                       572,  575 

v.  Hanrahan 

66 

v.  Menor                                   138  «,  140  a 

Haire  v.  Wilson 

18 

17.  Nickerson                                         430  i 

Haish  v.  Payson 

14  17 

17.  People       111,  184  a,  201,  461  a,  461  6, 

Halbert  v.  Skyles 

66 

461  c,  461  d,  461  e 

Hale  v.  Finch 

523 

v.  R.  Co.                                    14  v,  441  b 

•c.  Ins.  Co. 

14  k,  14  r,  162  c 

17.  State                                      461  6,  461  d 

v.  McGettigan 

482 

17.  Williams                                     167,  572 

v.  Rich 

439  g 

Hamlin  i?.  State                                           219  6 

v.  Rose 

489 

Hammargren  v.  St.  Paul                            195  d 

v.  Russ 

567,  568  a 

Hammatt  17.  Emerson                          113,  184  c 

v.  S.  N.  Co. 

6b,6d 

Hammett  17.  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.       6  6 

v.  Smith 

398 

Hammick  v.  Bronson                                  140  c 

v.  Taylor 

328  c 

Hammon  17.  Huntley                                     176 

Kale's  Trial 

14  i 

Hammond  v.  Bradstreet                              136 

Haley  v.  Godfrey 

427 

17.  Dike                                                     462 

v.  Lane 

207 

i?.  Inloes                                                    6  6 

v.  State 

461  d 

17.  State                                               260  6 

Haliburton  v.  Fletcher 

563  k 

17.  Stewart                                              314 

Halifax's  Case 

40 

Hammond's  Case           578,  578  a,  580,  581  a 

Hall  v.  Augustine 

43 

Hampshire  v.  Pierce                              289,  291 

v.  Austin 

14  t,  195  b 

Hampton  v.  McConnell                                 504 

v.  Ball 

563  g 

17.  R.  Co.                                     14  t,  439  h 

v.  Baylies 

392 

Hamrick  v.  Hamrick                                  44iy 

v.  Bishop 

484,  563  e 

Hanawalt  17.  State                        13  c,  13  j,  14* 

v.  Brown 

Uj 

Hanck  17.  Wright                                        305  c 

v.  Cazenove 

285 

Hanbury  17.  Ella                                               73 

v.  Cecil 

395,  401 

Hancock  u.  American  L.  Ins.  Co.                 41 

v.  Costello 

430  m 

v.  Cook                                               1526 

v.  Davis 

290 

77.  Kelly                                                 120  c 

v.  Fisher 

301 

v.  Welsh                                                  531 

v.  Giddings 

138  a 

Hancock  County  17.  Leggett               102,  ]62  6 

v.  Hale 

391 

Hancock  Nat.  Bank  17.  Blackwell            461  6 

17.  Hill 

185 

v.  Ellis                                                181  g 

17.  Hoddesdon 

552 

Hand  17.  Brookline                             440,  441  I 

17.  Huse 

581 

Handler  17.  Edwards                                    402 

».  Manchester 

509 

17.  Ward                                                   434 

17.  Manson 

444,  444  «,  469  m 

Handy  v.  Canning                                      462  a 

17.  Mayo 

128,  138  « 

17.  State                                               140  6 

v.  Murdock 

162  k 

Hank  17.  State                                 152  d,  162  c 

17.  Nay  lor 

Uq 

Hankinson  r.  Lombard                             163  6 

17.  Odber 

.546 

t'.  Vantine                                          305  h 

t7.  People 

14  o 

Hanley  v.  Banks                                       163  h 

(7.  Phelps 

5696 

17.  Donoghue                                           66 

f.  Ran  kin 

146 

17.  Grandy                                                581 

v.  Rav 

4396 

v.  Huntington                                        SI./" 

17.  Sta'te 

14  v,  450 

Hanlon  v.  Doherty                                         245 

17.  Steamboat  Cot 

426 

Hannaford  v.  Hunn                                       531 

v.  Taylor 

434 

Hannay  17.  Stewart                                     184  c 

v.  White 

208 

Planners  17.  McClelland            14  6,  14  d,  461  d 

17.  Williams 

502,  548 

Hannon  17.  State                                          469  c 

Hall,  Matter  of 

41 

Hanoff  v.  State                                            461  6 

Halladv  v.  Hess 

305  TO 

Hanover  (K.  of)  v.  Wheatley               467,  554 

Hallahan  v.  R.  Co. 

14  17 

Hanover  F.  I.  Co.  1?.  Stoddard                    192 

Halleck  v.  Boylston 

493 

Hanover  Water  Co.  v.  Iron  Co.        430^,  484 

Hal  let  v.  Mears 

310 

Hans  17.  State                                                 14  q 

Hallett  v.  Cousens 

462 

Hansard  v.  Robinson                                  563  6 

Halliday  v.  Martinet 

116,  120  a 

Hansberg  v.  People                                           5 

Halsey  17.  Sinsebaugh 

4396 

Hansbrough  v.  Stinnett                                14o 

Halstead  v.  Mullen 

140  a 

Hanscom  v.  Burmood                                  462 

VOL.  i.  —  e 

Ixvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  seotions.] 


Hanselman  p.  Doyle 

563  c 

Harris  p.  Rosenberg 

37 

Hansentliick  v.  Com. 

434 

»•  State                    14  c,  14  Jc.  163  a.  469  a, 

Hanson  f.  Chiatovich 

41 

v.  Tippett      52,  423,  449, 

459,  461  e,  461  / 

p.  Eustace 

195  c 

v.  Wilson 

177,  423,  425 

v.  Parker 

180 

Harris's  Case 

227 

v.  Shackleton 

5 

Harrisburg  Bank  P.  Forster 

385 

v.  South  Scituate 

498 

Harrison  v.  Baker 

186 

v.  Stetson 

281 

v.  Barn  by 

61 

Haralson  v.  Campbell 

441  <7 

p.  Blades 

147,  572 

Harbold  v.  Kuster 

294 

v.  Courtauld 

421 

Hard  v.  Ashley 

328  c 

v.  Glover 

162  Z,  430  n 

v.  Brown 

1406 

».  Gordon 

449,  461  f 

Hardeman  v.  English 

166 

v.  Howe 

305/ 

Harden  v.  Gordon 

212 

v.  Middleton 

439  6,  439  c 

v.  Hays 

444,  444  d 

«.  More 

563  k 

Hardiman  v.  Brown 

430  c,  430  I 

17.  R.  Co. 

247  a 

v.  Herbert 

19 

17.  Rowan                      434,  435,  445.  462  6 

Harding  v.  Brooks 

14  i,  14  d 

p.  South 

35 

p.  Carter 

208 

17.  Tate 

305  1 

v.  Greening 

36 

p.  Tiernans 

568  a 

v.  Hale 

532 

v.  Val  lance 

180,  190 

v.  Harding 

572 

Harrison's  Case 

79,  163  q 

P.  State 

Uq 

Harrod  v.  Barretto 

548 

Hardman  v.  Willcock 

207 

Hart  ».  Alexander 

Hj 

Hardy  v.  Merrill 

441/  44iy 

v.  Deamer 

556 

v.  Moore 

14  ? 

p.  Hammett 

287 

Hardy's  Trial    169,  201, 

250,  435,  439  b,  439  c, 

».  Hart 

38  a 

461  c 

p.  Hicks 

184  a 

Hare  v.  Munn 

76 

v.  McElroy 

482 

Harger  v.  Edmonds 

440 

p.  Newman 

196,  209 

Hargrave  v.  Everard 

43  a 

r.  Powell 

162/ 

».  Hargrave 

166 

f.  Pratt 

170  a 

Harkins  c.  Forsj'th 

305  g 

p.  Randolph 

189 

Harkrader  v.  Carroll 

38  a 

p.  R.  Co. 

66,  81  /,  195  d 

Harlan  v.  Howard 

5756 

p.  State                  5,  13  e. 

13  j,  14  c,  333  a 

Harland  v.  Eastman 

1146 

p.  U.  S. 

466  a 

Harlesa  v.  Harless 

244 

17.  Walker 

162  i 

Harm  v.  Wilson 

146,  14  d 

p.  Wilson 

116,  444  6 

Harman  v.  Harman 

305/ 

Hart's  Case 

408 

v.  Lasbrey 

391,  401 

Hartford  p.  Palmer 

365,  370  c,  370  e 

Harman's  Case 

225 

Hartford  Bank  p.  Hart 

332 

Harmar  v.  Davis 

207 

Hartford  Bridge  Co.  17.  Granger                 192 

Harmers  v.  McClelland 

14  0,4616 

Hartford  Deposit  Co.  p.  Sollitt                    14  v 

Harmon  v.  Arthur 

427 

Hartford  L.  1.  Co.  p.  Gray 

305  c,  572 

v.  Harmon 

14  o 

Hartley  p.  Brooks 

117 

v.  State 

14c 

p.  Maiison 

568  a 

v.  Terr. 

4G9c 

p.  Wilkinson 

283 

Harnett  P.  Johnson 

81 

Hartman  p.  Diller 

189 

Harp  v.  Pan- 

14  /,  77,  162  e 

p.  Evans 

14  n 

Harper  v.  Burrow 

163  a,  164 

p.  Ins.  Co. 

441  e 

v  Gilbert 

277 

Hartman  Steel  Co.  P.  Hoag 

201,  201  a 

r.  Scott 

5636 

Hartness  p.  Thompson 

356 

Harrel  v.  State 

370 

Hartnett  p.  McMahan 

162  9 

Harriman  v.  Brown 

130,  138  a,  140  a 

Hartranft's  Appeal 

251 

p.  P.  P.  C.  Co. 

146 

Hartwell  p.  Root 

40,  80 

p.  Stowe 

162  f 

Hart  wig  p.  Schiefer 

305m 

Harrington  v.  Fry 

575  c,  577 

Hartjr  p.  Malloy 

469  c 

v.  Lincoln 

469  a 

Harvard  P.  Stiles 

434 

v.  Mining  Co. 

445 

Harvey  p.  Alexander 

26 

p.  R.  Co. 

252  a 

17.  Coffin 

392 

p.  State 

34 

p.  Grabham 

302 

Harris  v.  Forman 

284  a 

p.  Kay 

563  1 

p.  Harris 

215 

p.  Mitchell 

663  c 

v.  Johnston 

305 

p.  Osborn 

14  o 

p.  Knight 

162  e 

P.  Richards 

528 

P.  Lumber  Co. 

328  c 

p.  State 

162  k,  439  c 

r.  Mantle 

52 

p.  Thomas 

663  q 

p.  Murphy 

.       805  d 

p.  Thorpe 

305  </,  563  q 

».  Quincy 

43!»  h 

p.  Towers 

78 

v.  Kathbun 

tn 

Harvey's  Case 

231 

v.  Rnvner 

58 

Harvv  P.  Broad 

5 

r.  Rickett 

285    Harwood  v.  Goodright 

37 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixvii 


Harwood  v.  Keys 
v.  Mulry 

180 
120  c,  439  6 

Hayden  v.  Madison 
v.  Mitchell 

197 
5636 

v.  People 

Uk 

v.  Stone 

189 

v.  R.  Co. 

Uv 

Hayes  v.  Burkham 

174 

v.  Sims 

135,  138 

v.  Chatham 

4696 

».  State 

163.9 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v,  441  d 

v.  Wentworth 

482 

v.  Seaver 

187 

Haseltine  v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

v.  Wells 

140  6,  441  c 

Haskill  v.  Commonwealth 

79 

Hayne  v.  Maltby 

25 

Haskins  v.  Lumsden 

14  d 

Haynes  v.  Burlington 

14  v 

v.  Warren 

14  9,  81 

v.  Hillsdale 

14  a 

Hassam  v.  Barrett 

284 

v.  Ledyard 

445 

Hassard  v.  Municipality 

66 

v.  McRae 

1956 

Hastings  v.  B.  H.  T.  Corp. 

305  a,  484 

v.  State 

13  a,  14  k 

v.  Lovejoy 

303 

v.  Young 

301 

r.  Stetson 

195  a 

Haynie  v.  State 

213 

v.  Stone 

14  d 

Hays  v.  Briggs 

Uv 

Hatch  v.  Dennis 

190 

"  v.  Harden 

575 

v.  Elkins 

187 

v.  Havden 

462 

v.  Fuller 

1626 

v.  Millar 

14  6.  461  c 

v.  Hatch 

568 

v.  Northwestern  Bank 

66 

Hatcher  v.  Dunn 

162  /.  430  o 

v.  Richardson 

422 

Hatchet  t  v.  Gibson 

Uv 

v.  State 

4446 

Hatelv  v.  Pike 

305  c 

v.  Terr. 

162  o 

Hattield  v.  R.  Co. 

469  m 

Hays'  Appeal 

1636- 

v.  Thorp 

341 

Hayslep  v.  Gymer 

198 

Hathawav  v.  Brown 

441  .i 

Havward  v.  Knapp 

162  o 

v.  Clark 

20 

Hayward  Rubber  Co.  v.  Duncklee    201,  563  e 

r.  Crocker 

461  6,  462 

Hay  wood  v.  Rogers 

441  e 

r.  Haskell 

176 

Hazard  v.  Loring 

305 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

14  I,  430  c,  441  1 

v.  R.  Co. 

462 

v.  Tinkham 

201 

Hazer  r.  Streich 

4396 

Hathaway's  Trial 

14  q,  162  d 

Hazleton  v.  Union  Bank 

581 

Hathorn  v.  King 

440 

Hazzard  v.  Vickery 

581 

Hathorne  v.  Hodges 

14  q 

Heacock  v.  Lubukee 

43  a 

Halt  v.  Nay 

14  g,  14  h. 

Head  v.  Hargrave 

6c 

Hatton  v.  Robinson 

238 

v.  McDonald 

539 

Hauberger  v.  Root 
Hauer  v.  Patterson 

176 
282 

v.  Shaver 
v.  State                461  a, 

172 

461  6,  469  6,  469  I 

Haughey  v.  Strickler 
Hauk  v.  State 

51  a 
219  6,  247  a,  461  d 

Heady  v.  Turnpike  Co. 
Heald  v.  Thing 

Wj[ 

430  J 

Hauser  v.  Leviness  . 

120  c 

Healey  v.  Thatcher 

192 

Haussknecht  v,  Claypool 

2a 

v.  Thome 

45  a 

Haven  v.  Brown 

184  c 

Healey,  In  re 

317 

v.  Wendel 

437,  439  6 

Heane  v.  Rogers 

204,  207 

Haverly  v.  Railroad  Co 

305 

Heap  v.  Parish 

328  c 

Havis  v.  Barkley 

387 

Heard  v.  Wadham 

303 

Hawartb's  Case 

225 

Hearn  v.  N.  E.  Marine  Ins. 

Co.                   292 

Hawes  v.  Dingley 

Uj 

v.  Tomlin 

25 

v.  Draeger 

28 

Hearne  v.  De  Young 

14  o,  81  d,  184  c 

v.  State 

239,  484,  505 

Heaston  v.  Cincinnati,  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.          6  6 

v.  Watson 

207 

Heath  v.  Com. 

14  q 

Hawkes  v.  Kennebeck 

6a 

v.  Glisan 

4413 

Hawkesworth  v.  Showier 

357,  407 

v.  Hall 

408 

Hawkins  v.  Finlayson 

394 

v.  Page 

14  q 

v.  Grimes 

581 

v.  Waters 

163  e 

v.  Howard 

469  n 

Heaton  v.  Findlay 

240 

v.  Luscouibe 

179 

Hecht  v.  Eherke 

484 

v.  Ross 

5696 

Heckert  v.  Fegely 

358 

f.  State 

14  k 

r.  Hainei 

569  a,  573  6 

v.  Ware 

89 

Hecla  P.  Co.  v.  Signa  I.  Co.                        488 

Hawks  r.  Baker 

3646 

Hedden  v.  Roberts 

40,  292 

v.  Charlemont 

14  r 

Heddle  v.  R.  Co. 

1626 

v.  Chester 

1626 

Hedge  v.  Clapp 

462 

Hawle  v.  R.  Co. 

305  n 

Heely  v.  Barnes 

421 

Ha  worth  v.  Bostock 

39 

Heermance  17.  Vernoy 

398 

Haws  v.  Hand 

163  q 

Heeter  17.  Glasgow 

284 

Hawthorne  v.  State 

18 

HefBebower  v.  Dietrick 

1956 

Hay  v.  Miller 

441  / 

Heffron  v.  Gallupe 

252  n 

v.  Peterson 

37,  120  c 

Heilman  v.  Lazarus 

80 

Haycock  v.  Greup 

581 

Heinemann  v  .  Heard 

14* 

Hayden  r.  Goodnow 

564 

Heland  v.  Allen 

Uj 

Ixviii 


Helfenstein  v.  Medart 
Helliard  v.  Jennings 
Helm  v.  State 
Helms  v.  Green 
Helmsley  v.  Loader 
Helwig  v.  Lascowski 
Helzer  ».  Helzer 
Hematite  M.  Co.  v.  R.  Co. 
Hemenway  v .  Smith 
Hemingway  v.  Garth 
Hemmi  v.  R.  Co. 
Hemming  v.  English 

v.  Parry 
Hammings  v.  Gasson 

v.  Smith 
Hemon  v.  R.  Co. 
Hempstead  v .  Reed 
Hendershott  v.  Tel.  Co. 
Henderson  v.  Anderson 

v.  Haynes 

v.  Henderson 

v.  Jones 

v.  Kenner 

v.  R.  Co. 

»'.  State 

v.  Wanamaker 

v.  Wild 
Hendrick  v.  Crowley 

v.  R.  Co. 
Hendrick's  Case 
Heiidrickson  v.  People     14 
Hendron  v.  Robinson 
Henfree  v.  Bromley 
Heukin  v.  Gerss 
Henley  v.  Phillips 
Henman  v.  Dickinson 

v.  Lester 
Hennell  v.  Lyon 
Hennequin  v.  Naylor 
Hennershotz  v.  Gallagher 
Hennessy  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Henry  v".  Adey 

v.  Bishop 

v.  Brown 

v.  Cleland 

v.  Hall 

v.  Lee 

v.  Leigh 

v.  Norwood 

t'.  R.  Co. 

P.  Risk 

v.  Willard 
Hensel  v.  Maas 
Henshaw  v.  Davis 
Henson  v.  Veatch 
Henthorne  ».  Doe 
Hepburn  v.  Auld 
Hepler  v.  Bank 
Herbert  v.  Ashburner 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Tuckal 
Hercules,  The 
Herman  v.  Drinkwater 

v.  State 

Hermann  v.  State 
Herrick  v.  Malin 

v.  Noble 

r.  Swomley 
Herring  e.  Boston  Iron  Co. 

r>.  Clobery 

v.  Good  son 

v.  Levy  1] 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


14  v 

Herring  v.  Rogers 

571 

392 

v.  Skaggs 

435 

152  d 

Hersom  v.  Henderson 

461  d 

444  o 

Herster  v.  Herster 

t          162  e 

196 
461  b,  461  e 

Hervey  v.  Hervey 
Hesler  v.  Degant 

140  c 
14  o 

563d 

Hess  v,  Lowrey 

162  k 

4396 
243 

v.  Oregon  Bank 
v.  R.  Co. 

81f 
469  m 

444 

Hester  v.  Com. 

4696 

195  d 

v.  Smith 

1846 

429 
73 

Hetherington  v.  Kemp 
Heuston  v.  Simpson 

Uj 
247  a 

14  o 

Heward  v.  Shipley 

384,  413 

43  a 

Hewes  v.  Fruit  Co. 

184  c 

Uv 

v.  Glos 

34 

488,  489 

Hewitt  v.  Clark 

201,  441  h 

247  a 

v,  Corey 

4696 

385 

v.  Piggott 

199 

461  c,  461  d 

v.  Prime 

247  a 

546 

Hewlett  v.  Cock 

5756 

469  b 

v.  Wood 

163  d.  441  c 

532 
14  v 

Hewley  (Lady)  Charities,  Case  of          '    295 
Heydon's  Case                                                293 

14  b,  14  c,  469  d 

Heyward  v.  Hazard 

441  / 

389 

v.  Heyward 

430  p 

172,  174 

Heywood  r.  Reed 

14  6,  Up,  469  a 

304 

Hihbard  v.  Russell 

328  e 

14  v 

Hibbert  v.  Knight 

241 

Ua 

,  219  a,  App.  Ill 

Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine 
Hibshman  v.  Dulleban 

568,  568  a 
528,  550 

466  a 

Hice  v.  Cox 

444 

566 

Hickenbottom  v.  Leach 

14  d 

2546 

Hickey  v.  R.  Co. 

Uv 

2« 

Hickman  v.  Alpaugh 

43 

342,  564 

v.  Upsall 

41 

4616 

Hickory  v.  U.  S. 

444,  578  a,  581 

43  a,  507,  512 

Hicks  v.  Pearson 

581 

14? 

Hieronymus  v.  Glass 

305  d 

275 

Higbee  v.  Dresser 

242  a 

163  h 

v.  McMillen 

254 

514 

Higbie  v.  Ins.  Co. 

430  t,  441  e 

5696 

Higdon  v.  Rice 

305  TO 

69 

v.  Thomas 

26 

69 

Higgins  v.  Cal.  P.  &  A.  Co. 

305  / 

162  e 

v.  Dellinger 

197 

436.  439  c,  484 

v.  Dixon 

58 

496 

v.  Higgins 

430/ 

14  d,  14  h 

v  .  Spahr 

189 

Uv 

».  Watson 

5636 

280 
1846 

Higgs  v.  Dixon 
High  u.  Pancake 

569  a 
108,  140  a 

41 

Higham  v.  Ridgway     116,  147,  149,  150,  151, 

120  c 

152,  152r/ 

14  d 

Highfield  v.  Peake 

507,  516.  517 

66,  21 

Highland  Turnp.  Co.  v.  McKean                493 

46 

Higley  v.  Bid  well 

138  a 

165 

Hihn  v.  Peck 

498 

473 

Hildeburn  v.  Curran 

46  1/ 

81  / 

Hilder  v.  McCartney 

Uv 

116 

Hildreth  r,  Martin 

198 

495 

v.  O'Brien 

305 

348 

Hill  v.  Bacon 

5 

14  q,  18 

v.  Barge 

272 

13  c,  14  /,  305  q 

v.  Buckminster 

304 

504 

v.  Coombe 

434 

281 

v.  Crosby 

17 

166,  5HI 

v.  Eldredge 

430* 

288 

v.  Goode 

444 

240 

v.  Grigsby 

43 

28 

v.  Hill's  Adm'r 

430  i 

,  117,  118,  120  a 

v.  Home  Ins.  Co. 

430/ 

TABLE   OF  -CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixix 


Hill  v.  Miller 

43  a,  284    Hodges  v.  Bearse 

14  v 

v.  Nisbet 

5756 

v.  Hodges 

114  e,  430  ja 

v.  Packard 

5U8 

v.  Holder 

75,  76 

v.  Proctor 

140  « 

v.  Horsfall 

288 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v,  305 

v.  Percival 

Ittd 

v.  Salt 

73 

v.  Windham 

14  A 

v.  State    14  *,  157,  439  c,  444  b,  461  b,  467, 

Hodgkinson  v.  Fletcher 

185 

469  / 

v.  Willis 

43  a,  512 

v.  Waterworks 

26 

Hodgson  v.  Merest 

179 

v,  Whidden 

305/ 

Hodnett  ».  Forman 

572 

v.  Winston 

163  ff 

Hodsdon  v.  Wilkins 

394,  402 

Hill  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  &  N.-Y 

S.  Co.             14  v 

Hodsou  v.  Marshall 

396 

Hill's  Case                           65,  161  6,  162  <7,  248 

v.  Sharpe 

207 

Hillary  v.  Waller 

39 

Hoe  v.  Nelthrope 

518 

Hilliard  v.  Beattie 

14  1 

Hoey  v.  Fur  man 

532 

Hillis  v.  Wylie 

461  a,  46  Ic 

Hoffman  v.  Ins.  Co. 

81  d 

Hills  v.  Barnes 

564 

v.  Kemerer 

14  d,  14  h 

v.  Farmington 
v.  Ins.  Co. 

305/ 
441  e 

v.  Peck 
v.  R.  Co. 

563  h 
13  j,  14  v,  439  b 

v,  Ludwig 

189 

v.  Smith 

248 

Hilt  v.  Campbell 

58,  66 

Hogan  v.  State 

1406 

Hilton  v.  Scarborough 
Hilts  v.  Colvin 

14  1 
375,  4616,  563  q 

Hoge  v.  Fisher 
Hoggan  r.  Craigie 

81,  440 
140  c 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  c 

Hoggett  v.  Exley 

76 

Hincklev  r.  Beckwith 

5 

Hohinan  v.  R.  (Jo. 

14  v 

v.  R.  Co. 

81  f 

Hoit  v.  Russell 

Uv 

v.  Somerset 

Up 

Hoitt  ».  Moulton 

461  a,  461  6,  461  c 

v.  Thatcher 

295 

Hoke's  Ex'rs  v.  Fleming 

469  6 

Hinde  v.  Vattier 

6  b,  490 

Holbert's  Estate 

529 

Hindman  v.  Van  Wyck 

HI 

Holbrook  v.  Debo 

138  a 

Hinds  v.  Barton 

14  v 

v.  Dow 

444  6,  461  6 

v.  Keith 

Up 

v.  Gay 

118,  120  c 

Hine  v.  Pomeroy 

Uj,  14  n 

v.  Holbrook 

189 

v.  R.  Co.     ' 

14  v,  162  d 

v.  McBride 

74 

Hine,  Re 

434 

v.  Tirrell 

265 

Hiukle  c.  R.  Co. 

4616 

Holcomb  v.  Cornish 

513 

v.  State 

232 

v.  Holcomb 

365,  370  c,  441  / 

v.  Wanzer 

260 

Holcombe  0.  Hewson 

14  v,  52 

Hinman  v.  Rees 

521 

Holden  v.  Hearn 

392 

Hinshaw  v.  State         14  o, 

81  c,  195  a,  195  b, 

Holder  v.  State 

4616 

230,  252,  469  b 

r.  U.  S. 

432  c 

Hinxman's  Case 

227 

Holdfast  v.  Dowling 

569  d 

Hipsley  v.  R.  Co. 

14  t,  14  u,  14  v 

Holding  v.  Elliott 

288 

Hirsch,  Re 

250 

v.  Pigott 

294 

Hirschman  ».  People 

461  c 

Holdsworth  v.  Mayor  of  Dartmouth           444 

Hiscocks  v.  Hiscocks 

289,  291 

Holladay  v.  Littlepage 

116,  120 

Hitchcock  v.  Moore 

450 

Holland  v.  Barnes 

461  a 

v.  Tyson 

205' 

v.  Kindregan 

14  w 

Hittner  v.  State 

14  p 

v.  Reeves 

447  a 

Hitz  v.  Algreen 

41 

».  State 

2196 

t'.  Burgett 
Hix  v.  Whittemore 

14  r,  162  g,  441  I 
42 

Hollenback  v.  Fleming 
Hollenbeck  v.  Rowley 

569,  569  c 
439  A 

Hoar  v.  Goulding 

290 

v.  Shutts 

281 

Hoard  v.  State 

195  b,  469  a 

v.  Stanbeny 

563  c,  563  » 

Hoare  v.  Coryton 

181 

Holler  v.  State 

141 

v.  Graham 

281,  305  d 

Hollev  i'.  Burgess 

14  d 

v.  Silverlock 

5 

v".  State           14  Ic,  14  o,  334,  444  6,  469  a 

Hobart  v.  Bartlett 

422 

Hollingham  v.  Head 

Un 

v.  Hobart 

572,  575 

Hollingsworth  v.  State 

461  a,  461  6,  469  I, 

Hobbs  v.  Duff 

230 

563  A 

t>.  Lowell 

207 

v.  Walker 

41 

v.  Parker 

528 

Hollingsworth's  Will 

162  e 

v.  State 

4696 

Hollis  v.  Sales 

152  c 

Hobby  f.  Alford 

571 

Holloway  v.  Raikes 

147 

Hobson  v.  Ogden 

186 

Holly  v.  Com. 

450 

Hockin  v.  Cooke 

5,  280 

v.  State 

14  k 

Hockless  v.  Mitchell 

427 

Holman  v.  Bank 

163  a 

Hockley  v.  Lamb 

405 

v.  Burrow 

5,  6  a 

Hodempyl  v.  Vingerhoed 

1846 

v.  Kimball 

239 

Hodgdon  v.  Wight 

38 

Holme  v.  Green 

174 

Hodge's  Case 

34 

Holmes  ».  Baddeley 

237,  240,  240  a,  243 

Hodges  v.  Bales 

469  b           v.  Brown 

14  o 

Ixx 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Holmes  v.  Broughton 

43    Horseman  v.  Todhunter 

563  q 

v.  Goldsmith 

14  n,  581 

Horsley  v.  Garth 

305  q 

v.  Johnson 

41 

Hosford  v.  Rowe 

150,  152  c 

v.  Love 

78 

Hoshauer  v.  Hoshauer 

162  e 

v.  Marden 

120  a 

llosic  v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

v.  Marsden 

4396 

Hoskins  r.  Miller 

519 

•o.  Pontin 

572 

v.  State 

14  q 

v.  Remsen 

542 

Hoskison  v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

v.  State 

461  c,  461  d 

Hosmer  r.  Groat 

463 

v.  Stateler 

461  d 

Hosteller  v.  Auman 

275 

v.  W.  K.  E.  Co. 

201  a 

Hotchkiss  v.  Gen.  Ins.  Co. 

469 

Holmesly  v.  Hogue 

14  q 

v.  Lyon 

187 

Holsten  v.  Jumpson 

287 

Hotham  v.  East  India  Co. 

304 

Holt  v.  Collyer 

278 

Houdeck  v.  lus.  Co. 

192 

v.  Miers 

529,  563  H 

Houghtaling  v.  Kilderhouse 

146 

v.  Pie 

278 

Houghton  v.  Koenig 

84,  563  p 

v.  Squire 

186,  194 

Houghton  (Bank  of)  «.  Robert 

578 

v.  State 

Up,  184  a,  469  d 

Houlditch  i.  Donegal 

546 

».  Whatley 

81 

Houliston  v.  Smvthe 

38,  102,  162  d 

Holten  v.  Board 

140  a 

Houlton  v.  Manteuffel          114  c.  114  a,  430  k 

Homan  r.  Thompson 

75 

House  v.  Metcalf 

Uv 

Homans  v.  Corning 

328  c 

v.  Robertson 

564 

Homblin,  Succession  of 

550 

Houseman  v.  Roberts 

563  d 

Home  v.  Lord  Bentinck 

250,  251 

Houser  v.  State 

14  b,  14  * 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Berg 
v.  Warehouse  Co. 

244 
192 

Housh  v.  People 
Houstman  v.  Thornton 

14  q 
41 

Homer  v.  Brown 

530 

Houston  v.  Blythe 

163  g,  439  h 

v.  Everett 

195  a 

v.  Brush 

441  d 

v.  Wallis 

568,  572,  581 

v.  Gran 

Uk 

Hone  v.  Ins.  Co. 

292 

v.  McCluny 

189 

Honeywood  v.  Peacock 

572 

v.  State 

6c 

Hood  v.  French 

108 

Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v. 

Campbell 

v.  Maxwell 

430  p 

184  c 

v.  R.  Co. 

Uq 

Houston  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowser 

14  v 

v.  Reeve 

182 

Hovey  v.  Chase 

430  t 

Hook  v.  Pagee 

13  c,  14  s 

v".  Grant 

14y 

Hooper  v.  Moore 

6  6,  6  d,  461  c 

Hovill  v.  Stephenson            167 

386,  418,  572 

Hoopes  v.  De  Vaughn 

163  A 

How  v.  Hall 

563  c 

Hoover  v.  Gehr 

120  c 

Howard  v.  Braithwaite 

384 

Hope  v.  Evans 

200 

v.  Brower 

334 

v.  Harman 

568  a 

v.  Canfield 

438 

v.  People 

14  q 

v.  Chadbourne 

392,  428 

Hope's  Appeal 

14  k 

v.  Ins.  Co.                       14  n,  110  a,  4616 

Hope  well  v.  De  Pinna 

41 

v.  McDonough 

439  b,  439  c 

Hopkins  v.  Albertson 

575 

v.  Mitchell 

531 

v.  Banks 

112,  184  b 

v.  Patrick 

163^ 

v.  De  Graffenreid 

575 

v.  Peete 

64 

t).  Knapp  Co. 

6c 

v.  Providence 

430/ 

v.  Megquire 

430  t 

v.  Quattlebaum 

563  r 

v.  Millard 

498 

v.  Russell 

439  h,  572  a 

v.  Neal 

347 

v.  Sexton 

14  o 

v.  School  District 

288 

v.  Smith 

203,  563  k 

v.  State 

14  A; 

v.  State 

342 

Hoppe  v.  Bvers 

14  fc,  14  * 

r.  Tucker 

208 

Hopper  v.  tieck 

439  c 

Howard  H.  I.  Co.,  Exparlt 

482 

Hopps  v.  People 

14  b,  14  I,  81  a 

Howe  v.  Fleming 

563  b 

Hopson  ».  Caswell 

14  w 

t>.  Howe 

162  e,  388 

Hopt  «.  Utah 

2  a,  219  b 

v.  Peabody 

568  a 

Horah  v.  Knox 

441  c 

v.  Reed 

14  q 

Horbach  v.  State 

14  c,  14  k 

t\  Thayer 

14m 

Horford  v.  Wilson 

3 

v.  Walker 

281 

Horn  v.  State 

14? 

Howell  v.  Barden 

162  e 

Hornberger  v.  State 

79 

v.  Cheathara 

14  o 

Home  r.  Haverlull 

322 

v.  House 

46 

v.  Mackenzie 

436,  439  b 

v.  Howell 

189 

v.  Smith 

319 

v.  Huyck 

563  c 

Home  Tooke'n  Case 

199,  430  t,  441  h 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

81  d 

Horner  v.  Stillwell 

290 

».  Lock 

421 

v.  Yance 

162  d,  2:.4 

v.  Moores 

28  1 

Horner,  Re 

305  / 

v.  Richards 

69 

Horniah  v.  People 

81 

v.  State 

141 

llorry  District  v.  Hanion 

564 

v.  Thomaa 

73 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Howes  v.  Colburn 

14  I,  441  1 

Rowland  v.  Lenox 

310 

17.  R.  Co. 

14  g,  441  d 

Howser  v.  Com. 

86,  101,  163  a,  163/ 

Hoxie  v.  Wright 

548 

Hoxsie  v.  Lumber  Co. 

430  n 

Hoy  v.  Morris 

245 

Hoye  v.  State 

141 

Hoyle  v.  Cornwallis 

5 

Hoyt  v.  Beach 

41 

v.  Des  Moines 

14  «,  14  v 

v.  Hammekin 

323 

».  Hoyt 

247  a 

v.  Jeffers 

140 

v.  McNeil 

66 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

v.  Wildfire 

389 

Hubbard  v.  Briggs 

462 

t\  Hubbard 

77,  432  c 

v.  Knous 

205 

v.  Lees 

114  d 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  17 

u.  Russell 

563  p 

Hubbert  v.  Borden 

281 

Hubbly  v.  Brown 

391,  399 

Hubley  v.  Vanhorne 

581  a 

Huckman  v.  Fernie 

74,  76 

Hudgins  v.  State 

14% 

v.  Wrights 

13  c,  14  s 

Hudnutt  v.  Comstock 

439  c 

Hudson  v.  Appleton 

1636 

v.  Brown 

81 

v.  Guestier 

541 

v.  Harrison 

197 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  17,  195  d,  430  n 

v.  Revett 

568  a 

v.  State 

14  o,  Up,  156 

Hudspeth  v.  State 

461  c 

Huet  v.  Le  Mesurier 

493 

Huff  v.  Bennett 

254  c,  439  e 

v.  Hall 

430  p 

v.  Nims 

581 

v.  State 

461  b,  466  a 

Huffman  v.  Click 

162  i,  162  k 

Hughes  v.  Biddulph 

240  a,  243 

^  v.  Blake 

530 

v.  Budd 

563d 

v.  Canal  Co. 

185 

v.  Clark 

163  a 

v.  Com. 

162  g 

v.  Cornelius 

5 

v.  Hampton 

118 

v.  Hughes 

162  e 

v.  R.  Co. 

370  d 

».  Rogers 

578  b,  580 

»;.  Wilson 

43  a 

Hughes'  Case 

82 

Hughey  v.  State 

14  A; 

Huguley  v.  Holstein 

430  i 

Huidekoper  v.  Cotton 

252 

Hulettv.  Hulett 

328  c 

Hulett's  Estate 

199 

Hulin  v.  Powell 

163  a 

Hull  v.  Blake 

529,  542 

«.  R.  Co. 

444 

v.  State 

444 

Huls  v.  Kimball 

430  ja 

Humble  17.  Hunter 

281 

17.  Mitchell 

267 

t'.  Shoemaker 

444 

Hume  ».  Scott 

461,  461  a 

Humes  v.  Bernstein 

439  fir 

Humes  ».  O'Bryan 
Hummel  v.  Kistner 
Humphrey  17.  Archibald 

17.  Humphrey 

v.  Knapp 

17.  State 
Humphreys  v.  Budd 

17.  Guillow 

17.  Miller 

t7.   V.  CO. 

Humphries  17.  Parker 
Hunneman  v.  Fire  District 
Hunnicutt  r.  Kirkpatrick 

17.  Peyton 

Hunscom  v.  Hunscom 
Hunt  v.  Adams 

v.  Bridgham 

v.  Coe 

v.  Dubuque 

17.  Gaslight  Co. 

17.  Gray 

17.  Hort 

17.  Livermore 

v.  Lvle 

v.  Massey 

17.  Roylance 

17.  Strew 

v.  Van  Alstvne 

Hunt  B.  T.  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Decker 
Hunter  (The) 
Hunter  v.  Hunter 

v.  King 

17.  Leathley 

17.  New  York,  0.  &  W.  R.  Co. 

17.  State 

Huntingdon  R.  Co.  17.  Decker 
Huntington  v.  American  Bank 

17.  Attrill 

17.  Cast 
Huntlev  17.  Terr. 

17.  \Vhittier 
Huntly  17.  Comstock 
Hnnton  v.  Hertz  &  H.  Co. 
Huntress  17.  R.  Co. 
Huntsman  17.  Nichols 
Huntsville  R.  Co.  17.  Corpening 
Kurd  17.  Moring 

v.  R.  Co. 
Hurlburt  17.  Bellows 

v.  Hurlburt 
Hurlburt's  Estate 
Hurley  ».  O'Sullivan 

17.  State 
Hurst  17.  Beach 
Hurst's  Case 
Hurt  i;.  Evans 
Hussey  v.  State 
Hussman  v.  Wilke 
Huston  v.  Council  Bluffs 
Hutcheon  17.  Manningtou 
Hutchings  17.  Castle 

».  Cavalier 

i?.  Corgan 
Hutchins  v.  Adams 

v.  Hutching 

17.  State 

Hutchinson  v.  Tatham 
Hutchison  17.  Bowker 

v.  Sinclair 
Hutton  t'.  Warren 
Hutton,  In  re 
Huyett ».  E.  Co. 


Ixxi 


14^,  150.  163  i 
245 
250 

14  6,  54 
319 

14  »,  466  a 
6 

564 
402 
14  v 
430  i 
276 

430 /,  430^ 
140  a 
369 

276,  281,  565,  567 
112, 174 
444  a 
14  t,  14  w 
14  17,  441  I 
275,  564 
305* 
283 
505 
152  a 

209,  469  6,  563  h 
185 
482 

31,  37 
35 

404,  409 
416 
5 

162  c,  184  a 
184  c 
205 

14  17 

5 

4626 
14  j,  40 
120  a 
309 
6c 
14  n 
445 
245 

14  17 

444 
444 

1146, 114  c 
76 

163  g,  439  c,  444 
296 

316,  318 
140  a 

146, 14/,  14  A,  461  c,  461  d 
27!) 
484 
5 

189 
461  n 
163  a,  166 
61 
189 
310 
292 

81  e,  280 
26 
294 
41 
14* 


Ixxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Hyam  v.  Edwards                                      120  a 

Iowa  V.  S.  Bank  v. 

Sigstad                     305  e 

Hyatt  v.  Adams                                           162  b 

Ireland  v.  Powell 

138 

Hyckman  v.  Shotbolt                                      69 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

Hvde  v.  Buckner                                           444 

v.  Stiff 

465  rt 

v.  Woolfolk                                             581 

Irish  v.  Smith 

Ul,  162  e 

Hvde  Park  v.  Canton                                      41 

Irish  Soc.  v.  Deny 

3 

Hydrick  v.  Burke                                            43 

Irlbeck  v.  Bierl 

184  c 

Hvlton  v.  Brown                                            559 

Iron  Mountain  Bank  v.  Murdock                14  n 

Hvnde  v.  Vattier                                             21 

Ironton  Land  Co.  v 

Butchart                   441  g 

Hj-nes  v.  McDermott                 439  h,  488,  581 

Irvine,  Ex  parte 

469  if 

Irving  v.  Irving 

575 

v.  Motly 

14  q 

I. 

Irwin  v.  Lever 

563  c 

v.  Patchin 

108 

I.  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Anthony       461  a,  461  c, 

v.  Reed 

163  h 

461  d 

i\  Shumaker 

356 

lasigi  v.  Brown                                     477,  559 

v.  State 

Uk 

Icehour  v.  Martin                                           319 

Irwin's  Case 

227 

Ide  v.  Stanton                                                 268 

Isaac  v.  U.  S. 

81  c 

Iglehart  v.  Jernegan                                    439  c 

Isaack  v.  Clark 

81/ 

Ihinger  v  State                                           13  j 

Isack  v,  Clarke 

5756 

Ilderton  v.  Atkinson                              391,  416 

Isbell  v.  R.  Co. 

40 

Illinois,  etc.  Co.  v.  Bonner                        563  q 

Isham  v.  Cooper 

305  c 

111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashline                 145,166 

v.  Post 

14  v 

v.  Greaves                                                 6  c 

Isler  v.  Dewey 

450  b,  469  a 

v.  Griffin                                              469  m 

Israel  v.  Benjamm 

205 

v.  Le  Blanc                                         305  m 

v.  Clark 

210 

v.  McClelland                                       14  v 

Itata,  The 

4 

v.  Sutton                                     162  b,  430  / 

Ivat  v.  Finch 

147,  189 

Illinois  Ins.  Co.  v.  Marseilles  Co.                430 

Ives  v.  Leonard 

480? 

Illinois  Land  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Bonner            284 

v.  Niles 

118 

Imhoff  v.  McArthur                                    444  a 

Ivey  v.  Young 

73 

Imlay  v.  Rogers                                             252 

Impe'rial  Gas  Co.  v.  Clarke                           474 

Imperial  Land  Co.,  In  re                             320 

J. 

Independence  v.  Pompton                         114./' 

Independence,  The                                         2  a 

Jack  v.  Dougherty 

26 

Independence  Boulevard,  Re                          6 
Indiana  Car  Co.  t>.  Parker                           13  f 

v.  Woods 
Jackman's  Will 

163  g 
162  e 

Indianapolis  v.  Kingsbury                            44  i 

Jacks  v.  Adamson 

3059 

v.  Scott                                                    13.; 

Jackson  v.  Bailey 

163  a,  164,  165 

Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell           66 

v.  Bard 

152  c,  189 

v.  Stout                                                 163  rt 

v.  Benson 

390 

Ing  v.  Brown                                                260 

v.  Betts 

162  e 

Ing's  Trial                                                     13  e 

v.  Blanshan 

21,  575  6 

Ingalls  v.  State                            14  1,  34,  461  b 

v.  Boneham 

484 

Inge  v.  Murphv                                            I62  * 

v.  Boone 

430  I 

Ingersol  v.  Hopkins                                   305  n 
f.  Me  Willie                                      469  d 

v.  Boucham 
v.  Brooks 

lUf 
389,  578 

Ingersoll  v.  Truebody                                    285 

v.  Browner 

114  c 

Inglebright  .v.  Hammond                            1406 

v.  Burtis 

237,241 

Inglehart  v.  Jernegan                                 439  c 
1  11  L'li-  v.  State                                                  6  b 

v.  Burton 
v.  Chase 

572,  575 

265 

Ingraham  v.  Bockius                           117,  439  6 

v.  Christman 

43  a,  437,  570 

v.  Hutchinson                                           17 

v.  Cody 

43  a 

Ingram  v.  Dada                                              426 

v.  Com. 

Ul,  14o,159,  328  c,  4326 

v.  Lea                                                      89 

v.  Cooley 

114  c,  114d 

v.  State                             6«,  14  &,  461<2 

t>  Crissey 

163  a 

Inman  t>.  Foster                                    14  o,  55 

v.  Davis 

21 

v.  State                                                  337 

v.  Denn 

34 

Innes*  ».  R.  Co.                                14  k,  162  c 

v.  Dobbin 

207 

Innis  e.  Campbell                                            41 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Eshelmann                               441  e 

r.  Ely 
v.  Etz 

305  e 
114  c,  114/,  4696 

v.  Forcheitner                                         6  6 

v.  Fairbank 

174 

v.  Moslev                                           162  f 

v.  French 

239 

r.  Throop                                                 280 

v.  Frier 

349,5636 

v.  Tobin                                     140,  441  d 

v.  Galloway 

427 

v.  Weide                       14,  14  n,  14  e,  439  6 
v.  Weides                                           439  b 

v.  Goes 
v.  Gould 

43  a 
568 

v.  Woodruff                                113,  184  c 

v.  Gridlev 

367,  369,  370 

Inslee  r.  Prall                                            120c 

v.  Hesketh 

74,  75,  76 

lonides  ».  Fender                                      441  e 

v.  Jackson 

114  c,  140  c,  421,  461  d 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxiii 


Jackson  v.  Jones 

559 

James  v.  Salter 

74 

v.  King 

43  o,  484 

v.  State 

81  c 

v.  Kingsley 

571 

v.  Trollop 

5754 

v.  Kniffen 

156,  162  e 

c.  Walruth 

69 

p.  La  Grange 

575 

v.  Wharton 

120 

v.  Lamb 

563  b,  575  6 

James,  Exparte 

341 

v.  Laroway 

570,  575  b 

Jamesen  v.  Drinkald 

440 

t\  Lawson 

163  a,  164 

Jamieson  v.  R.  Co. 

14p 

v.  Leek 

4436 

Jamison  v.  People 

81  c 

v.  Legrange 

569  d 

Jansen  v.  Ostrander 

69 

v.  Luquere 

21,  575  b 

J'Anson  v.  Stuart 

14  d,  55 

v.  Malin 

566 

Janvrin  v.  Fogg 

201  a 

v.  Mann 

319 

v.  Scammon 

469  d 

v.  Marsh 

301 

Janzeu  v.  People 

14  q 

v.  Matsdorf 

24 

Jaques  v.  Horton 

439  b,  563  q 

v.  M'Call 

45  a,  138  a 

Jardine  v.  Sheridan 

192,  239 

v.  McVey 

195  c,  241,  245 

Jarrett  v.  Jarrett 

81  a 

v.  Miller 

138  a,  498 

v.  Leonard 

181 

v.  Mills 

24 

Jarvis  v.  Albro 

39 

v.  Murray 

46 

v,  Robinson 

64 

v.  Myers 

284 

Jeacock  v.  Falkener 

288 

v.  Nelson 

389 

Jeanes  v.  Fridenburgh 

245 

v.  Osborn 

564 

Jeans  v.  Wheedon 

227.  563  q 

v.  Pesked 

19 

Jefferds  v.  Alvard 

108 

v.  Phillips 

581,  581  a 

v.  People 

220  b,  370  e 

v.  Pratt 

426 

Jeffers  v.  Kadcliff 

550 

p.  R.  Co. 

81/ 

Jefferson  v.  Chapman 

llOa 

v.  Reynolds 

207 

v.  Burhaus 

14o 

v.  Robinson 

519 

Jefferson  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cotheal 

441,  441  e 

p.  Rumsev 

167,  418 

Jeffersonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 

Bowen           13  j 

v.  Russell 

lUd 

Jeffery  v.  Walton 

304 

v.  Scissam 

207 

Jeffries  v.  Harris 

146,  54 

v.  Seager 

319 

Jelf  v.  Oriel 

73 

p.  Sill 

305  TO 

Jemison  v.  Planters',  etc.  Bank                   66 

v.  Smith 

14  n,  207 

Jenk's  Case 

65 

v.  Spear 

207 

Jenkins  v.  Blizzard 

Up 

v.  Sprague 

301 

v.  Eldredge 

296  a 

v.  State  14  c,  14  k,  Up,  161  b,  166,  461  b, 

v.  Irrig.  Co. 

14  p 

461  c, 

461  d,  469  d,  App.  Ill 

v.  Phillips 

73 

v.  Stetson 

14  o,  179 

p.  R.  Co. 

13  i 

p.  Thomason 

444,  462 

v.  State                          166,  252,  App.  Ill 

v.  Timmerman 

14  q 

Jenner  v.  Joliffe 

86,  203,  521 

•».  Tollett 

441  d 

Jenney  v.  Rodman 

207 

p.  Vail 

174 

Jenney  El.  Co.  v.  Branham 

6c 

v.  Vanderheyden 

24 

Jennings  v.  Machine  Co. 

4616 

v.  Van  Dusen 

272,  581 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  p 

v.  Varick 

445 

v.  Sturdevant 

244 

v.  Waldron 

575 

v.  Whittaker 

204 

v.  Williamson 

252  a 

Jennison  v.  Stafford 

14* 

v.  Winchester 

164 

Jensen  v.  McCorkell 

40 

p.  Wood 

539 

Jermain  v.  Denniston 

190 

v.  Wooley 

174 

Jessup  v.  Cook 

163  a 

v.  Wright 

24 

p.  Osceola  Co. 

14  1 

Jackson's  Case 
Jackson,  Exparte 

259 
251 

Jessup,  Re 
Jester  p.  Steiner 

13  c,  14  s,  439  h 
581 

Jackson  Co.  v.  Arnold 
Jacob  v.  Lee 

6a 
563  d 

Jesus  College  p.  Gibbs 
Jevens  v.  Harridge 

563  e 
349 

v.  Lindsay 

90,  436,  439,  439  b 

Jewell  v.  Center 

5 

v.  U.  S.             ' 

563  ff 

p.  Chamberlain 

572 

Jacobs  v.  Hesler 

254 

p.  Jewell 

114  c 

v.  Humphrey 

180 

v.  Parr 

14  w 

v.  Layburn 

421,  424 

Jewett  v.  Adams 

394,  420 

v.  Phillips 

5756 

p.  Brooks 

4411 

v.  Shorey 

184  a 

p.  Sundback 

305  A 

v.  Whitcomb 
Jacobson  v.  Fountain 

162  d 
331,  428 

p.  Torrey 
Jewison  v.  Dyson 

207 
14  n 

Jacocks  v.  Gilliam 

474,  484 

Joannes  r.  Bennett 

37,  84,  663  6 

James  v.  Biou 

37,  195  c,  196 

Job  p.  Tebbetts 

573 

v.  Brawn 
v.  Hacklev 

563  g 
176 

Jochumsen  p.  Suffolk  Savings  Bank     41.  550 
Jodrell,  Re                                                ans  I 

v.  Hatfield 

347 

John  P.  Currie 

73 

v.  Phelps 

81  e 

John's  Case 

158,  1616 

Ixxiv 


Johnican  v.  State 
Johnson  v.  Arnwine 
v.  Beardslee 
v.  Blackinan 
v.  Bolton 
v.  Brailsford 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


432  b 

5636 

174 

190,  353 

430/" 

273 


v.  Brown    14  k,  162  e,  461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

v.  Browning  352 

v.  Com.  469  e 

v.  Cunningham  409 

v.  Dalton  281 

v.  Daverne  245,  577 

v.  Durant  254  c 

v.  Gulick  14  q 

v.  Gwin  439  c 

v.  Haight  563  c 

v.  Harder  14  o 

v.  Hocker  498 

v.  Indianapolis  6  b 
v.  Johnson                              248,  272,  305 

v.  Knight  167 

v.  Lawson  114  c 

v.  Leggett  444 

v.  Lyford  563  q 

v.  McGruder  260 

??.  Merithew  30,  41 

v.  Morgan  btiSp 

v.  Patterson  4696 
v.  People                                  461  a,  461  c 

v.  Portwood  305  h 

v.  Powers  201 

v.  R.  Co.  6  c 

v.  Rannels  505 

v.  Russell  186 

v.  Sargent  163  h 

v.  Shaw  570 
v.  State     13  a,  13  e,  14  Ic,  14  o,  14  p,  14  q, 
156,  158,  161  b,  217,  219  b,  223, 
370  d,  461 6,  469  a,  469  c 

v.  Stevens  77 

v.  Territory  34 

v.  Thoroughgood  58 

v.  Varick  443  a 
v.  Ward                              114,  184  d,  484 

v.  Wiley  445,  461  f 

Johnson's  Case  563  6 
Johnson's  Will                         14 s,  162  e,  260  a 

Johnston  v.  Breedlove  118 

v.  Caulkins  54 

v.  Cottingham  27,  532 

v.  Ins.  Co.  430 1 

v.  R.  Co.  81, 162  i 

v.  Spencer  462  a 

Johnstone's  Case  65 

Joliet  v.  Blower  162/ 

Joliet  S.  R.  Co.  0.  Caul  469  m 

Jolley  v.  Taylor  89,  563  c 

Jolly  v.  State  146,  14  c 

Jonau  v.  Ferrand  448 

Jones  >-.  Albee  282 

v.  Atterburn  575 

v.  Rarkley  304 

v.  Boyce  441  d 

r.  Brewer  572 

v.  Brinkley  572 

V.  Brooks  391,401 

v.  Carrington  189 

v.  Chiles  430 1 

v.  Com.  159,  162  h 

v.  DeKay  118 

v.  Duchow  4616 

v.  Edwards  663  d 


Jones  v.  Ellis 
.     v.  Flint 
v.  Foxall 
v.  Fuller 
v.  Gale 
v.  Georgia 
v.  Greaves 
v.  Harris 
v.  Hays 
v.  Henry 
v.  Herbert 
v.  Hoar 
v.  Hoey 
v.  Howard 
v.  Ins.  Co. 


14  n 

179,  271 
192 
441  g 
60 
379 
81  d 
369' 
66 
147 
174 
205 
260  a 
186 
14  »,  38 


v.  Jones  13  c,  14  s,  34,  43  a,  77, 114  d,  168, 
189,  245,  329,  461  a,  469  6,  575 

v.  Kennedy  74 

v.  Knauss  37,  317 

v.  Lake  272 

v.  Lake  View  6  6 

v.  Lanier  469  g 

v.  Long  117,  120  c 

v.  Lumber  Co.  14  v 

v.  Mason  374,  572 

v.  McNeil  533 

17.  Morrell  197,  215 

v.  Neale  323 

r.  Newman  289,  291 

v,  Overstreet  5 

v.  People  81  a 

i\  Perry  101 

v.  Phelps  572 

17.  Pitcher  494 

v.  Portland  162  b 

v.  Pugh  240 

v.  R.  Co.  163  i,  441 1 
v.  Randall                       482,  491,  508,  511 

17.  Roberts  445,  575 

v.  Robinson           «  563  c 

v.  Sasser  26 
v.  State  Ug,Uk,  14  Z,  14i>,81c,  158, 159, 
195  a,  209,  363,  450,  469  6,  581 

v.  Stevens  14  b,  14  h,  55 

v.  Stroud  438 

17.  Tarlton  663  i 

V.Thompson  162d 

v.  Tucker  430/ 

v.  Turberville  178 

17.  Turpin  252 

v.  U.  S.  4 

v.  Vanzandt  51  a 

v.  Ward  26 

17.  White  537 

v.  Williams  14  n,  53  a 

v.  Witter  190 

v.  Wood  163  a 

Jones'  Case  225 

Jones'  Will  669  d 
Jordaine  v.  Lashbrooke 

Jordan  17.  Fenno  260 

17.  Foster  430 1 

v.  Lewis  264  a,  471 

v.  Osgood  14  q 

17.  State  Up 
v.  Van  Epps 
v.  Wilkins 
Joseph  17.  Bigelow 

17.  Nat.  Bank  681 

Joseph  B.  Thomas,  The  195  * 

Joseph!  r.  Furnish  189,  197 

Josephine  t7.  State  App.  Ill 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Joske  v.  Irvine 
Josselyu  v.  McAllister 
Jovce  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Joyner  c.  Roberts 
Judd  v.  Brentwood 

v.  Gibbs 
Judge  v.  Briggs 
Judges,  Answer  of  the 
Judges,  Resolutions  of 
Judice  v.  Chretien 
Judson  v.  Blanchard 
Judy  v.  Gilbert 

v.  Johnson 
Jumpertz  v.  People 
Juniata  Bank  v.  Brown 
Jupitz  v.  People 
Jury  v.  Orchard 
Jus  ten  v.  Scharf 
Justice  v.  Com. 
Justices,  Opinions  of  the 
Justus,  Succession  of 

K. 


14  w 

14  o 

441  e 

81/ 

469  6 

186,  195,  App.  Ill 

503.  513,  518 

Qd,  81  f,  328  c,  441  h 

230 

485 

349 

305  k,  305  m 
444 

13  <r,  14  r,  14  v,  581 

120  c 

14« 

563  c 

439o 

4446 

482 

484,  493 


Kaines  ».  Knightly  281 

Kaiser  v.  Alexander  120  c 

Kalamazoo  Nov.  Man.  Co.  t>.  McAlister    284 

Kane  v.  Johnston  79 

v.  R.  Co.  14 1- 

Kannon  v.  Galloway  439  h,  581 

Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.' v.  Allen  441 3 

v.  Baird  13/ 

v.  Horan  439  g 

v.  Miller  30, 195  d 

v.  Murray  247  a 

v.  Peavey  441  d 

v.  Smith  439  h 

v.  Spencer  441  d 

v.  Splitlog  14  v 

v.  Stoner  1626 

v.  Vickroy  14  v 

Kansas  C.  M.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Burton  14  w 

Kansas  M.  O.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rammels- 

berg  81 d 

Kansas  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Couch  14  t 

Karr  v.  State  14  c 

v.  Stivers  120  a 

Kassing  v.  Walter  192 

Kaufer  v.  Walsh  14  q 

Kaufman  v.  Coughman  162  e,  163  h 

v.  State  816 

Kaufman's  Estate  162  e 

Kay  v.  Brookman  575 

Kaye  o.  Waghora  302 

Kay  wood  v.  Barnett  114c 

Kean  v.  McLaughlin  14  o 

v.  Rice  489,  505 

Kearney  v.  Farrell  162  d 

v.  King  6 

v .  State  159,  461  d 

v.  Themanson  439  b 

Keating  v.  People  13  e,  34 

v.  Price  304 

Keaton  v.  Jones  305  e 

Keator  ».  People  461  c,  461  d 

Kee  v.  State  14  b 

Keeling  t?.  Ball  572 

Keen  v.  Keen  14  k,  162  e 

Keenan  v.  Hayden  14  p 

Keene  v.  Deardon  46 

Keener  v.  State  14  C,  14  /;,  461 '/ 


Keenholts  ».  Becker 
Kehoe  v.  Com. 
Keightley  v.  Birch 
Keith  v.  Lathrop 

v.  N.  H.  &  N.  Co. 

v.  Taylor 

v.  Wilson 
Kelch  v.  State 
Kell  v.  Nainby 
Kellenberger  v.  Sturtevant 
Keller  v.  Donnelly 

v.  Gihnan 

77.  Nutz 

v.  State 

v.  Stuck 

v.  Webb 
Kelley  v.  Andrews 

v.  Kelley 

».  People 

v.  Proctor 

17.  Richardson 

c.  Schupp 

v.  State 
Kello  v.  Maget 
Kellogg  v.  Clyne 

v.  Smith 

t7.  Tompson 
Kelly  t7.  Anderson 

v.  Cunningham 

v.  Dillon 

17.  Elevator  Co. 

v.  McGuire 

».  Oliver 

t7.  People 

v.  Powlet 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Sharp  S.  Co. 

v.  Small 


v.  State 

17.  Thuey 

p.  U.  S. 

Kelsea  ».  Fletcher 
Kelsey  v.  Bush 

f.  Hanmer 

v.  Ins.  Co. 
Kelton  17.  Hill 
Kelway  t7.  Kelway 
Kemble  v.  Lull 
Kemp  v.  King 
Kempland  v.  Macaulay 


Kendig's  Appeal 
Kendrick  v.  Com. 


Ixxv 


14  o 

1616 

394 

577 

13  6,  14  k 

14  a 

432  c 

81  a 

207 

527  « 

14  o 

1626 

114  d 

14  A,  382,  4326 
41 

275,  287 

254 

43 

184  a 

461  c,  461  d 
430  p 
14  » 
215 
573 
14o 
301 

279,  305  h 

146 

328  c 

14  d 

563  p 

114  c 

305  c 

197 

288 

14w,  14i7 
572 
185,  341 


252  a,  370  d,  App.  Ill 
564 
430  c 

14  »,  439  6 
201,  461  d 
563  6,  572  a 
4616 
120  c 
237 
295 
469  n 
181 

Kempsey  c.  McGinness         441  c,  441  k,  441 1 
KendallV  Field  120  c,  420 

v.May  370  c,  430  p 

».  Mifligan  305  c 

17.  Powers  510 

276 
469(2 

17.  Dellinger  38 

17.  Kemp  14  d,  14  o 

17.  State  14  A,  163y 

Keniston  v.  Rowe  14  * 

Kennard  v.  Kennard  162  I 

Kennedy  17.  Com.  6  a,  14p 

r.  Doyle  120  <* 

17.  Erie,  etc.  Plank  Road  Co.  281 

17.  Gifford  14  d,  14  o 

17.  Hensley  14  o 

17.  Labold  140  a 

v.  Niles  356 

v.  People  14  o 

v.  R.  Co.  162  g 

17.  Spring  14  A 


Ixxvi 


Kennedy  r.  State 

v.  Upshaw 
Kennedy,  Re 
Kennett  v.  Chambers 

v.  Fickel 

v.  Greenwollers 
Kennon  v.  Cilmer 
Kenny  0.  Clarkson 
Kenrick  v.  Kenrick 
Kensington  v.  Inglis 
Kent  v.  Garvin 

v.  Lincoln 

v.  State 

v.  White 

Kent  Lumber  Co.  v.  Abney 
Kenyon  v.  State 
Kerkow  v.  Bauer 
Kern  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Kernin  v.  Hill 
Kerr  v.  Chess 

v.  Com'rs 

v.  Love 

v.  Lunsford 
Kerr's  Case 
Kerrains  v.  People 
Kerrison  v.  Coatsworth 
Kerwin,  Ex  parte 
Kessel  v.  Albetis 
Ketchingman  v.  State 
Ketland  v.  Bissett 
Kettering  r.  Jacksonville 
Kettredge  v.  Hodgman 
Key  v.  Dent 
"  v.  Shaw 

v.  Thompson 
Keyes  0.  State 
Kevs  v.  Williams 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Up 

162  e,  461  a,  581 

444 

4 

392 

Ug 

4306 

200  a 

436,  437,  563  6 

120  a,  120  c,  439  6 

140 

380 

74 

432.  432  a 

Uh 

5 

441  e 
581 
532 
14  v 
118 

162  e,  441  / 
2206 

14  a,  328  c 

396 

568  a 

66 

14o,461  a,  4616 

146 

1636 

341 

523,  527 

101,  197 

441  / 

439  A 

200 


Keystone  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Johnson  190 

Kibbe  0.  Bancroft  120  a 

Kibler  0.  Com.  34 

Kidd  v.  State  466  a 
Kidd's  Trial                                        146, 14  q 

Kidder  0.  Blaisdell  6  a 

v.  Dunstable  14  0 

Kidney  v.  Cockburn  114  d 

Kidwell  r.  Com.  333  a 

K it-ran  0.  Sandars  207 

Kilbourn  v.  Thompson  319 

Kilburn  v.  Bennett  41,108 

v.  Mullen  461  a 
Kilgore  0.  State                                  14  6,  195  6 

Kilheffer  0.  Herr  531 

Killian  v.  R.  Co.  4616 

Killins  v.  State  14  q 

Kilpatrick  v.  Com.  6  a 

Kilpatrick  Co.  v.  Box  186 

Kilvcrfs  Trusts,  In  re  2!)1 

Kimliall  v.  Borden  140 
0.  Davis                                          43  a,  575 

0.  Hnntington  173 

r.  Morrell  .r'0;i  <> 

v.  Myers  287 

f.  Saguin  400  n 

Kimberly's  Appeal  441./ 


Kiiiihii-1  0.  Kinunel 
Kimpton  v.  Glover 
Kjnrade  0.  Bradshaw 
Kincaid  r.  Howe 
Kinchelow  0.  State 
Kimli-1  r.  I,i-  Bert 
Kim-  r.  Bcnumont 
King  0.  Uadeley 


481,  461  c,  401  d 
168  i 
81 '/ 
43  a 
14* 
6a 

°2H.S 


King  v.  Chase 
v.  Cole 
0.  Donahoe 
0.  Harborne 
v.  Hersey 
0.  Hoare 
v.  Kent 
».  King 
v.  Little 
v.  McCarthy 
v.  Paddock 
f.  R.  Co. 
0.  Robinson 
v.  Root 
v.  Ruckman 
0.  Shepard 


527,  528,  531 

563  k 

578  a 

35 

461  d 

533 

6 

39,77 

20,  575  6 

162  c,  103  g 

41 

136,  140 
66 

Ud,  HA,  Ho 
296,  461  a.  461  c 
386 


0.  State      13  e,  14  c,  Ug,  81  a,  81 6,  161, 
220,  466  a,  469  m 

v.  Waring  55 

r.  Worthington  563  p 

King  (The)  v.  Harris  257 

Kingtield  0.  Pullen  310 

Kingham  0.  Robins  205 

Kingman  0.  Cowles  501,  505 

Kingsbury  0.  Davidson  34 
r.  Mo'ses                          14  0,  90,  201,  430  t 

Kingsford  0.  Hood  290 

Kingsley  0.  Kingsley  162  I 

Kingston  0.  Lesley  163  6 

0.  Leslie  46,  493 

0.  R.  Co.  146,  Hy,  4616 
Kingston's  (Duchess  of)  Case   245,  247  «,  248, 
436,  523,  531,  541 

Kinleside  v.  Harrison  440 

Kinnersley  0.  Orpe  484,  523,  535 

Kinney  0.  P'arnsworth  138  a,  207 

0."Flynn  43  a,  282,  575  c 

Kinsley  0.  Robinson  385 

Kinsman  0.  Kershaw  305 

Kip  0.  Brigham  180,  539 

Kirby  0.  Ins.  Co.  441  e 

v.  Sisson  563  6 

0.  Tallmadge  1956 

Kirk  0.  Carr  572 

v.  Eddowes  296 

0.  Garrett  81/,  170  a,  252 

Kirkendall  v.  Omaha  H0 

Kirkham  0.  People  461  d 

Kirk  land  0.  Smith  506 

Kirkpatrick  0.  Clark  563  o 

0.  Jenkins  162  e 

v.  Stingley  539  « 

Kirksey  v.  Kirksey  581 

Kirsclmer  0.  State  461 6,  469  d,  469  I 

Kirwan  v.  Cockburn  479 

Kissam  0.  Forrest  445,  554 

Kitchen  0.  Campbell  531,  f>.',3 

0.  Tyson  118,  401  c 

Kitner  0.  Whitlock  H  x 

Kittredge  v.  Elliott  14  p 

Kittridge  0.  Russell  201 

Klanowski  0.  R.  Co.  140 

Klare  0.  State  5 

K  It-,  la-rg  0.  Schrader  469  I,  563  e 

Klein  0.  Landman  35 

Kline  0.  Baker  66,80,81^,488 

Kloku  0.  Martin  43  n 

King  0.  State  462 

Knapp  v.  Fuller  Ho 

'••  Maltliv  .M',7,  568 n 

Kn.-.pp-s  Cane  219,2196,222,223 

Knanl  v.  Hill  no  6 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxvii 


Knick  ».  Knick 
Knickerbocker  v.  Wilcox 
Kuigtit  »/  Clements 

v,  Dauler 

».  Goodyear  Mfg.  Co. 

v.  House 

v.  Macomber 

v.  Martin 

v.  Packard 

v.  S  my  the 

r.  Waterford 
Knobell  v.  Fuller 
Knoll  v.  State 
Kuowles  v.  Cromptou 

v.  People 

v.  Scribner 

v.  State 
Knox  v.  Jenks 

v.  Waldoborough 
Koammen  v.  Mill  Co. 
Koch  v.  Howell 
Koehler  v.  Hill 
Kohl  v.  State 
Kohn  v.  Marsh 
Kokes  v.  State 
Kolsti  «.  R.  Co. 
Koons  v.  R.  Co.    , 

v.  State 

Koontz  v.  R.  Co. 
Kornegay  v  Kornegay 
Kost  v.  Bender 
Koster  v.  Reed 
Kotwitz  v.  Wright 
Kraft  v.  Wickey 
Kramer  ».  Com. 

v.  Goodlander 

v.  Messner 
Krebs  v.  State 
Kreitz  v.  Behrensmeyer 
Krekeler  v.  Ritter 
Kretzschmar  v.  Meehaa 
Kreuziger  v.  R.  Co. 
Kribs  v.  People 
Krider  ».  Lafferty 

v.  Philadelphia 
Kring  v.  Missouri 
Krise  v.  Neason 
Krueger  v.  Sylvester 
Kuen  v.  Upmier 
Kuglar  v.  Garner 
Kumler  v.  Ferguson 
Kurtz  v.  Hibner 

?;.  R.  Co. 
Kuteuer  v.  Love 


L.  R.  R.  Co.  P.  Leverett 

L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawk 

L.  &  P.  G  T.  Co.  v.  Heil 

La  Beau  v.  People 

Labaree  v.  Wood 

La  Bau  v.  Vanderbilt 

La  Caygas  f .  Larionda 

Lacey  v.  Hill 

Laclede  F.  B.  M.  Co.  p.  Hartford  Co. 

Lacon  v.  Higgins  75,  76,  162  j, 

Lacy  v.  Kossuth  Co. 

v.  McXeile 
Ladnier  v.  Ladnier 
Ladd  v.  Blunt 


286 

Lade  v.  Holford 

46 

563  e 

Lafayette  C.  M.  Corp.  v.  Magoon 

275 

564 

v.  Weaver 

195  d 

509 

Laing  v.  Barclay 

469  n 

14  v 

v.  Kaine 

572 

461  c 

v.  R.  &  C.  Co. 

14  v 

39 

Lainson  v.  Tremere 

22 

571 

Laird  v.  Assur.  Co. 

Uk 

385 

Lake  v.  Auburn 

420 

430  c 

v.  Munford 

61  a 

152,  563  c 

p.  People 

441  k,  441  / 

14/i 

Lake's  Case 

1206 

162  k 

Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Craig 

14m 

I3j 

v.  Middlecoff 

Uv 

1956 

v.  Mugg 

Uv 

Sid 

v.  Rooker 

186 

Uv 

Lake  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Herrick 

162  c 

46 

Lalance  &  G.  M.  Co.  v.  Haberman  M. 

529 

Co. 

239 

14  o 

Lalone  v.  U.  S. 

81  d 

117 

Lalor  v.  Lalor 

148 

482 

Lamar  v.  Micoa 

6  a 

444 

v.  Pearre 

507 

27,  206 

Lamb  v.  Hart 

118 

5,  6« 

v.  Lamb 

289 

14  v 

p.  Lippincott 

441  f 

Uv 

v.  State 

Ua,  380 

581 

Lambe's  Case          90,  215,  224,  228,  App.  II[ 

14  v 

Lambert  r.  Cooper 

569  d 

581 

v.  Hale 

81 

430/1 

v.  People 

162  A,  182 

41,  97  d 

Lnmbertson  v.  Traction  Co. 

1626,  340  1 

120  c 

Lambeth  v.  State 

163/ 

544 

v.  Vawter 

1846 

14  q 

Lambie's  Estate 

162  e,  195  n 

140a 

Lamev  v.  Bishop 

73 

14  o 

L'Am'itie,  The 

387 

156 

Lammiman  v.  R.  Co. 

274  a 

114  c,  162  c 

Lamoreaux  v  Att'y-Gen'l 

114  g 

531 

Lamos  v.  Snell 

14  d,  U'h 

6 

Lamoureux  v.  R.  Co. 

6  c,  467 

162  i,  441  1 

Lampen  v.  Kedgewin 

530 

Uq 

Lampley  v.  Scott 

99  a 

279 

Lampon  p.  Corke 

26,  212 

462  a 

Lampton  ».  Haggard 

5 

2a 

Lamson  v.  Boyden 

469  d,  469  / 

5636 

Lanahan  v.  Com. 

140 

162  /.  163  a 

Lanauze  v.  Palmer 

87 

44U 

Lancaster  v.  Lancaster 

way 

Up 

v.  Lane 

513 

14  o 

v.  State 

14 

305m 

Lanctot  v.  State 

254 

189 

Lancum  v.  Lovell 

139 

192 

Lander  v.  Goodenough 

140 

v.  State 

14  Jb 

v.  Seaver 

146 

Landers  v.  Bolton 

485  a,  575 

Landis  v.  Turner 

120  c 

16*2  f 

Landsberger  v.  Gorham 

239 

430> 

Lane  v.  Brainerd 

163  a 

4696 

v.  Chandler 

172 

4616 

v.  Crombie 

78,81 

341 

v.  Dighton 

14  1 

174 

v.  Harris 

491 

479 

v.  Harrison 

530 

195  « 

v.  Moore 

162  e 

Co.        14  w 

v.  R.  Co. 

14; 

2j,  392,  488 

v.  Stanhope 

288 

461  c 

v.  Soc. 

14 

1846 

».  State 

159,  1'il 

305  w 

Lane's  Case 

6a 

501 

Lanfer  v.  Traction  Co. 

14* 

Ixxviii 


Lang  r.  Phillips 

v.  Terry 
Langdon  v.  Goddard 

».  Hulls 

v.  Langdon 
Langford  v.  Jones 
Langhorn  v.  Allnutt 
Langhorne  v.  Com. 
Laiigley  v.  Fisher 

v.  Lord  Oxford 

v.  Wadsworth 
Langston  v.  R.  Co. 
Langworthy  v.  Green 
Lanuing  v.~R.  Co. 
Lsinpher  v.  Clark 
Lansdowne  v.  Lansdowne 
Lansing  v.  McKillip 
Lanter  v.  McEwen 
Lapham  v.  Ins.  Co. 

T.  Kelly 

v.  Whipple 
Laplante  v.  Mills 
Lapsley  u.  Grierson 
Larbalestier  v.  Clark 
Larned  »  Buffington 
Laros  v,  Cora. 
Larrabee  v.  Tribune  Co. 
Larrison  v.  R.  Co. 
Larry  v.  Sherburne 
Lascelles  v.  State 
Lassing  v.  James 
Latham  v.  Renniston 

v.  Latham 
Lathropr.  Mitchell 

v.  Stuart 
Latimer  v.  Elgin 
Latkow  v.  Earner 
Lattimore  v.  Harsen 
Lau  r.  Fletcher 
Langhlin  v.  Com. 
Laurence  v  Laurence 
Lavalle  v.  People 
Lavretta  v.  Holcomb 
Law  v.  Law 

».  Merrills 

v.  Scott 

Lawder  *.  Henderson 
Lawes  v.  Reed 
Lawhorn  v.  Carter 
Lawless  r.  Guelbreth 

v.  Queale 

Lawley's  (Lady)  Case 
Lawrence  r.  Barker 

v.  Boston 

».  Campbell 

v.  Clark 

c.  Dana 

v.  Haynes 

c.  Houghton 

v.  Hunt 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

r.  Kimball 

r.  Mt.  Vernon 

v.  State 

v.  Tennant 

v.  Thacher 
Lawrence,  Ex  parte 
Lawson  r.  Gloss 

v.  Orear 

v.  State 

v.  Swinney 
Lawtou  v.  Chase 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


19 

441  d 

550 

563  c 

279,  281 

444 

184  c 

450,  4616,  461  c 

341 

186 

447 

461  c 

It/ 

14  v 

14  A 

288 

68 

14  o 

441  e 

4396 

284  a 

14 1 

41 

391 

55 

Ul,  232 

14  o 

482 

198 

14o 

806  i 

177,  395 

1636 

563  d 

6  a,  19 

162  I 

556 

303 

441  d 

2  a,  221 

162  of 

66 

569  c 

322 

200 

251 

445 

436,  439  c 

120  c 

444  d 

563  k 

343 

443  6,  444,  449 

430/ 

240 

563d 

14  q,  563  h 

140  a 

3646 

531 

559 

147 

146 

14} 

140  a 

184  c 

248 

43!)  <• 

Up,  1406 

215,  461,  4<il  >l 

14  o 

14  r 


Lawton  v.  Kittredge 

v.  Sweeney 
Lawyer  v.  Smith 
Laybourn  v.  Crisp 
Layer  v.  Wagstaff 
Layer's  Case 
Layman's  Will 
Layton  v.  Chaylon 
Lazear  v.  Bank 
Lazier  r.  Westcott 
Lea  v.  Henderson 

v.  Polk  County  Copper  Co. 

t;.  State 
Leach  v.  Hall 

v.  Hill 

v.  Leach 

v.  Shepard 

v   Simpson 

v.  State 

v.  Thomas 
Leach,  In  re 
Leader  v.  Barry 
Leahey  v.  R.  Co. 
Leake  v.  Marquis  of  Westmeath 
Learmouth,  Ex  parte 
Learned  v.  Bryant 

v.  Hall 

Leather  v.  Wrecking  Co. 
Leathes  v.  Newitt 
Leavitt  v.  Baker 

v.  Kinnicutt 

v.  Simes 

LeBaron  v.  Crombie 
Lechmere  v.  Fletcher 
Leckey  v.  Bloser 
Leconfield  v.  Lonsdale 
Lederman  v.  R.  Co. 
Ledford  v.  Vandyke 
Ledgard  v .  Thompson 
Lee  v.  Alexander 

v.  Angas 

v.  Birrell 

v.  Brown 

v.  Dick 

v.  Gansel 

v.  Heath 

v.  Howard,  etc.  Co. 

v.  Huson 

v.  Kilburn 

v.  Meecock 

v.  Murphy 

v.  Pain 

v.  R.  Co. 

r.  State 

t".  Tinges 

c.  Water  Co. 

v.  Wheeler 
Lee's  Case 
Leech  v.  Armitage 
Leeds  v.  Cook 

v.  Lancashire 


260 
37 

162  e 
139 
439  c 

90,  228,  461,  578  6 
243 
4306 
296  a 
4 

14  A 
40 

461  d 
35 
186 
550 
120  c 

2  a,  161,  166,  227,  230 
2206 
390 
38  a 

140  c,  493 
162  .<? 
511 
166 
207 
1956 
439  A 
138 
323 
305  / 
563  c 

163/,  103  g 
539,  539  a 
4416 
46 
195  d 

568  a 

569  c 
566 
309 
248 
187 
283 

372,  375 
186 
281 
14o 


508 
43  a 

14 /,  291 
186 

213,  4616 
14n» 
441 9 
14  o 

449,  461,  461  / 
75 

37,  563  c 
283 

v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  of  Alexandria         178 
Lees  v.  Hoffstadt  81 

v.  Smith  430 

v.  U.  S.  469  d 

Leese  v.  Clark  195  c,  563  e 

Leeson  v.  Holt  14  p 

Leete  v.  Greshnm  L.  Ins.  Co.  74 

Ix)  Farrnnt  r.  Spencer  288 

Lefavour  v.  Ynndcs  1846 

Lefebure  r.  Wonlcn  117,  120  6 

Le  Fuvre  v.  Le  Fevre  302 


Lefferts  17.  De  Mott 

w.  State 

Lefforge  v.  State 
Legatt  v.  Tollervey 
Legg  17.  Drake 
Legge  v.  Boyd 

v.  Edmonds 
Leggett  i?.  Boyd 

v.  Cooper 

v.  State 
Legh  v.  Legh 
Legore  v.  State 
Lehan  t?.  Good 
Lehigh  V.  C.  Co.  ».  Chicago 

17.  McKeen 
Lehmann  17.  Chapel 
Lehmicke  i?.  R.  Co. 
Leiber  v.  Com. 
Leicester  17.  Walter 
Leideman  17.  Schultz 
Leidlein  ».  Meyer 
Leighton  v.  Perkins 
Leinkauf  v.  Brinker 
Leitch  t7.  Ins.  Co. 
Leke's  (Sir  Francis)  Case 
Leland  t'.  Cameron 

0.  Wilkinson 
Le  Master  17.  Dickson 
Lemayne  17.  Stanley 
Le  Mere  v.  Me  Hale 
Lemons  17.  State 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 

395,  427 

97  d,  575  a 

14  o 

254  a,  471 

162  A; 

73 

28,  179 

114  b,  430 

205 

227 

173 

466  n 

532 

14(7 
14  17 

185 

14  v,  430  p 
156 

14  d,  55 
280 

13  i,  14  t,  439  h 
428 
146 
441  e 
61,  56,  60 
120  a 
490 
185 
272 
310 
461  a,  461  d 


Lench  v.  Lench  14 1,  200,  214,  266 

Lendrum  17.  Deazley  14  n 

Lenox  v.  Fuller  461  d 

Leo,  The  310 

Leonard  17.  Bolton  469  c 

».  Columbia,  etc.  Co.  43 

17.  Davenport  291 

17.  Dunton  305 

17.  Kingsley  465  a 

17.  Leonard  550 

17.  Mixon  439  6 

17.  R.  Co.  14  17 

v.  State  14  g,  14  * 

17.  Tillotson  199 

v.  Vredenburg  208 

Leport  t7.  Todd  41 

Lernerd  v.  Morrill  301 

Lesher  17.  Levan  572 

Leslie  17.  Com.  461  6 

«.  De  la  Torre  281 

v.  State  Up,  34,  195  b 

Lessee  17.  Hoge  42 

Lester  v.  Jenkins  521 

v.  Pitsford  14  v 

v.  State         14  k,  158,  161  a,  220  6,  333  a, 

370  e,  444  b 

Lester,  Re  254  c 

Lethulier's  Case  292 

Letton  v.  Young  14  o 

Levers  17.  Van  Buskirk  244,  245 

Levi  c.  Essex  400 

v.  Gardner  189 

17.  Mylne  81  g 

Levine  v.  Ins.  Co.  120  c 

Levison  v.  State          14.p,  14  r,  74,  195  a,  218 

Levy  v.  Cadet  184  6 

v.  Merrill  268 

».  Pope  245 

17.  State  6  6 

Lewes'  Trusts,  In  re  41 

Le  win  v.  Simpson  14 1 


Ixxix 

Lewis  v.  Adams  189 

17.  Barker  14  q 

v.  Boston  528 

u.  Brewster  304 

».  Burns  108 

17.  Clerges  164 

17.  Emery  461  c 

«.  Fermor  14  r 

17.  Freeman  430  i 

17.  Fullerton  563  h 

17.  Gaslight  Co.  14  g 

17.  Gray  284  'a 

17.  Harris  6 

r.  Hart  46 
v.  Hartley                                   563  6,  563  ra 

17.  Hodgdon  420 
17.  Ins.  Co.                      163  d,  430  n,  441  g 

17.  Kramer  439  6 

v.  Marshall  484 

r.  McClure  5 

v.  Payn  566,  508 

17.  Peake  397 

v.  Post  462 

17.  Powell  469  n 

tf.  Rowlo  163  g 

v.  Sapio  577 

v.  Smith  14  » 
17.  State                               Up,  14  q,  469  a 

Lexington  17.  Long  14  17 

Lexington  &  E.  R.  Co.  17.  Lyons  14  n 

Ley  v.  Ballard  572 

Ley  field's  Case  568 

Libby  17.  Brown  152  6 

17.  Clark  305  d 

17.  Land  Co.  305  h 

17.  Scherman  14  » 

Lichtenheim  v.  R.  Co.  292 

Liddle  17.  Bank  462  a 

Life  &  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.  195  c 

Liggett  17.  Glenn  240,  245 

Lightfoot  17.  Cameron  316 

r.  Com.  14  k 
17.  People                                      14  q,  465  n 

Lightner  v.  Wike  163,  437 
Ligon  17.  Ford                                      14  d,  461 « 

Lihs  t'.  Lihs  342 
Like  v.  Howe                                  196,  204,  207 

Liles  17.  State  195  a 

Lilienthal  v.  U.  S.  81  6 

Lillibridge  17.  McCann  6  c 

Lillstrom  v.  R.  Co.  81 

Lily  17.  Kitzmiller  429 

t».  Waggoner  42 

Lime  Rock  Bank  17.  Hewett  165 

Limerick  Nat.  B'k  17.  Adams  14  n 

Liach  17.  Linch  162  e 

Lincoln  17.  Barre  430  f 

17.  Battelle  4,  488 
17.  Chrisman                                 14  d,  14  o 

w.  Claflin  14  q 

v.  Com.  430  p 

».  Mfg.  Co.  14 17 

v.  Power  6  e 

17.  R.  Co.  441 6 

Lincoln,  etc.  Co.  17.  Buckner  14  / 
Lincoln  &  B.  H.  R.  Co.  17.  Sutherland      430 /> 

Lind  v.  Lind  41 

Lindauer  v.  Cummings  284 

»'.  Meyberg  563  6 

Lindeman  17.  Desborough  441  e 

Lindenberger  v.  Beall  40 

Lindenthal  r.  Hatch  441 1 


Ixxx 


.  TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Linderberg  v.  Min.  Co.  184  c 

Lindley  v.  Lacey  284 

v.  Lindley  81  d 

Lindner  ».  Ins.  Co.  186 

Lindsay  v.  People  Up 

Liudsev  v.  Attorney-General  6  a 

v.  "State  Uq 

Lindsley  v.  R.  Co.  441  d 

Line  v.  Mack  488 

v.  Taylor  13  i 

Linehan  v.  State  14  k,  439  g 

Lingan  v.  Henderson  26 

Lingle  v .  Chicago  563  o 

Lingo  v.  State  14  k 

Link  v.  R.  Co.  14  t 

v.  Sheldon  162  b,  441  / 

Links  v.  State  14  q 

Linn  v.  Sigsbee  441  g 

Linscott  v.  Trask  34 

Llnsday  v.  People  14  v,  430  c 

Linsley  v.  Lovely  288,  445 

Lipe  v.  Eisenlerd  461  6 

Lipes  v.  State  162 p,  469  e 

Lipscomb  v.  Lyon  439  6 

17.  State    "  81  c,  159 

Lipscombe  v.  Holmes  195,  205 

Liscomb  v.  Eldredge  43  a 

Lissak  v.  Crocker  Est.  Co  162  g,  247  a 

Lister  v.  Perrvman  8l/ 

v.  Priestley  195 

Little  v.  Beazley  581 

v.  Keon  254  c,  386 

u.  Knox  43  a 

17.  Larrabee  252  a 

17.  Libby  152  c 

v.  Marsh  195  « 

r.  State  162  c 

v.  Thompson  78 

17.  Wingfield  45  a,  46 

17.  Wyatt  120  c 

Littlefield  v.  Portland  397 

v.  Rice  334,  439  6 

v.  Storey  173 

Little  R.  G.  Co.  n.  Dallas  Co.  120  a 

Little  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrell  14  g 

Littlehale  v.  Dix  163  h,  323 

Littlejohn  17.  Fowler  14  w 

Littler  v.  Holland  302 

Littleton  v.  Clavton  563  d 

Livermore  ».  Aldrich  26,  296 

v.  Herschell  532 

Liverpool  Steam  Co.  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.     6  6 

Livett  v.  Wilson  46 

Livingston  17.  Bishop  533 

».  Cox  166 

v.  Kiersted  365 

r.  Livingston  46 

v.  Rogers  563  6 

v.  Tenbroeck  293 

v.  Wagner  245 

Llanover  v.  Homfray  163  a 

Llewellyn  v.  Winkworth  14  n 

Lloyd  v.  Lynch  194 

"  r.  Mos'tyn  663  d 

v.  Passinghani  460 

w.  Saiulilnnds  38 

v.  Spillctt  200 

v.  Willan  27,  184 

r.  Williams  358 

Ix>1>b  t7.  Stnnley  285 

Lochlibo  (The)  443  6 

Lock  17.  Miiyno  485  a 


Locke  v.  Norborne 

17.  R.  Co. 

v.  Winston 
Lockhart  v.  Harrell 

17.  White 
Lockhart's  Case 
Lockhead  v.  W.  &  I.  Co. 
Lockwood  17.  Lockwood 

17.  Smith 

17.  Sturdevant 
Lockyer  v.  Lockyer 
Loder  v.  Whelpley 
Lodge  17.  Phipher 
Lofts  t7.  Hudson 
Logan  v.  State 

17.  U.  S. 

Lohnian  v.  People 
Lorn  bar  v.  East  Tawas 
Lombard  v.  Oliver 
Lonchester  17.  Murray 
London  17.  Lynn 
Lonergan  v.  "Assurance 

17.  Whitehead 
Long  w.  Bailie 

17.  Barett 

17.  Booe 

v.  Brougher 

v.  Cotton 

17.  Drew 

17.  Hitchcock 

D.  Lamkin 

r.  McDow 

17.  Ferine 

v.  State 
Long's  Case 

Long-Bell  L.  Co.  v.  Thomas 
Longabatigh  v.  R.  Co. 
Longenecker  v.  Hvde 
Longman  v.  Winchester 
Loomis  v.  Green 

17.  Ins.  Co. 

17.  Jackson 

17.  Loomis 
Lopes  17.  De  Tastet 
Lornnger  v.  Jardine 
Lord  17.  Beard 

v.  Bigelow 

17.  Colvin 

17.  Moore 
Loree  v.  Abner 
Loring  v.  Brackett 

17.  Norton 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

17.  Steineman  41 

Lorton,  Viscount,  w.  E.  of  Kingston  551 

Losee  ».  Losee  444  d,  461  d,  462,  575 

Lothrop  v.  Adams  195  6 

i/'.  Blake 

17.  Muzzy 
Loud  w.  Merrill 
Loudermilk  17.  Loudermilk 
Louis  17.  Easton 

Louisiana,  ex  rel.  Hatch,  w.  City  Bank 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  17.  Berry 

t>.  Bowen 

17.  Buck 

v.  Ellis 

v.  Falvey 

17.  Foley* 

v.  Fox 

v.  Frnwley 

».  Hart 


536 
439  h 
527 
14  q 
35 
231 
66 

162  d,  4406 
176 
24 
14  o 
247  a 
581  a 
192 

158,  184  a 

2  a,  376,  377 

461  6 

14^,14 17,  195  d 
'  328  c 
166 
493 
310 
118 

167,  387,  418 

14  o,  53 

162  d,  450 

14  d 

138  a,  140  a 
563 
462 

Uq,  450 
5756 
305  / 

14  I,  14  q,  461  c,  469  d 
217,  220 
110  a 

14  17 

116,  120,  187 
14  q 
532 

441  e 
301 

1846 
58,64 

563  c 

4506 
186 

439  c 

120  a,  323 
66 
174 
301 


489 

397 
40 

305  d 
3336 

474 
439  ff 
441  'd 
102/ 
184  c 
430  I 
•III  / 
Uu 
469  a 

444 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxxi 


Louisville  v.  Henry                                      14  «    Ludtke  v.  Herzog 

461  e,  563  h 

v.  Hill                                    14  q,  14  v,  243    Ludwig  v.  Blackshere 

186 

v.  Howell                                              162  k 

Lufkin  v.  Haskell 

331.  405 

v.  Kellv                                                 162/ 

Luke  17.  Calhoun  Co. 

5,  439  h 

v.  Malone                                    14  v,  195  d 

Lund  17.  'lyngsborough 

108 

v.  Miller                                       14  »,  162  6 

Luning  17.  State 

162  i 

v.  Pearson                                              13./ 

Lunniss  v.  Row 

422,  563  i 

v.  Pedigo                                                 14  v 

Lurton  v.  Gilliam 

479,  491 

v.  Ueagan                                             441  d 

Lush  17.  Druse 

301,  430  n 

v.  Richardson                                       461  d 

17.  Me  Daniel 

14  r,  162  b 

v.  Shires                                                441  / 

Luther  t7.  Clay 

186 

v.  Snvder                                            430  I 

17.  Skeen 

14  d 

v.  Spain                                                441  d 

17.  State 

461  d 

v.  Stewart                                             184  c 

Lutterell  v.  Reynell            168,  469,  469  b,  533 

v.  Wallace                                               14  v 

Lycoming  Ins.  Co.  17.  Wright 

81  g 

v.  Williams                                               43 

Lyell  17.  Kennedy 

120  a 

v.  Wood                    13/,  14  I,  430  /,  441  I 
v.  Wright                                     14  v,  192 

Lygon  17.  Strutt 
Lyle  v.  Ellwood 

142,  575  6 
140  c 

Louisville  Ins.  Co.  v.  Monarch       163  a,  466  a 

Lyles  17.  Lyles 

469  b 

Louisville  Water  Co.  v.  Upton                 163  g 

Lyman  17.  "Boston 

14  17 

Lovat's  Trial                                               466  a 

t7.  City 

461  c 

Love  i'.  Masoner                                  14  d,  14  h 

17.  Ins*.  Co. 

441  e 

v.  People                                               333  a 

17.  Lyman 

207,  521 

Lovebridge  v.  Botham                                  212 

Lynch  v.  Clerke 

484 

Lovejoy  v.  Howe                                          430  i 

17.  Coffin 

195  a 

v.  Lovett                                                290 

17.  Com. 

81  a 

Lovell  v.  Briggs                                               14  q 

v.  McHugo 

118 

v.  Payne                                                    79 

17.  Peabody 

195  b 

i?.  State                                                 14  o 

v.  Petrie 

118 

Loving  v.  Warren  County                             484 

Lynde  17.  Judd 

430  j«,  505 

Low  v.  Mitchell                           14  b,  54,  469  d 

17.  McGregor 

14  q 

v.  Perkins                                                175 

Lynn  v.  Cumberland 

563  A 

i;.  R.  Co.                                               441  g 

17.  Lj'erle 

245 

Low's  Case                                                      252 

Lynne,  Ex  parte 

316 

Low's  Estate                                           254,  337 

Lyon  17.  Ely 

323 

Lowber  v.  Shaw                                     399,  416 

17.  Hancock 

14  o 

Lowden  v.  Watson                                      563  / 

17.  Home 

43  a 

Lowe  v.  Boteler                                            174 

v.  Lyman                         430  i,  581,  581  a 

v.  Jolliffe                                        384,  443 

17.  Marine 

5 

v.  Peers                                                      19 

17.  Miller 

281 

v.  State                                          232,  462  b 

17.  Prouty 

254 

17.  Vaughn                                             163  g 

v.  R.  Co. 

469  m 

Lowell  v.  Cora'rs                              14  v,  430  / 

Lyons  17.  Gregory 

563  q 

v.  Daniels                                                  24 

17.  Marcher 

163  a 

Lowenfeld  v.  Curtis                                     305  c 

v.  Ward 

186 

Lower  v.  Winters                                             58 

Lowerv  ».  People                                            339 

p."  State                                                 163  g 

M. 

Lowry  v.  Cady                                     521,  563  q 

v.  Harris                                         88,  563  e 

M.  D.  &  S.  R.  Co.  17.  Moore 

162/ 

v.  Pinson                                                14  q 

M.  &  0.  R.  Co.  17.  Stinson 

162  g 

v.  State                                                 152  d 

Mabe  17.  Mabe 

163  a 

Lovd  t7.  Freshfield                      248,  437,  439  6 

Maberley  17.  Robins 

6a 

17.  Stretton                                               392 

Maby  17.  Shepherd 

69 

Lubbock  v.  Tribe                                        563  b 

Macaulav  17.  Shackell 

320 

Lubbv  i'.  Com.                                             159  b 

Mat-bride  v.  Macbride             458,  469  d,  469  k 

v.  R.  Co.                                               184  c 

Macclesfield's  Trial 

469  d 

Lucas  v.  Bristow                                            280 

Macdonnell  17.  Evans 

563/ 

17.  Brooks                                              195  a 

Mace  17.  Reed 

4506 

17.  De  La  Cour                                177,  281 

Macey  v.  Titcombe 

66 

17.  Flinn                                                    450 

Mack  17.  Porter 

162  c 

17.  Groning                                               280 

t?.  R.  Co. 

14^ 

».  Nichols                                               14  o 

17.  State 

14  o 

v.  Nockells                                                59 

Mack  ay  v.  Easton 

162  1 

t7.  Novosilieski                                      14  j 

Mackell  v.  Winter 

288 

v.  U.  S.                                               152  d 

Mackenzie  17.  Yeo 

245,  341 

17.  Williams                                          563  n 

Mackintosh  r.  Marshall 

199 

Luce  v.  Ins.  Co.                                           441  e 

Maclean  v.  Scripps 

439  A 

Lucker  v.  Commonwealth                            6  b 

Macomber  v.  Scott 

581 

Luco  17.  U.  S.                                               439  h 

Macon  &  G.  R.  Co.  ».  Williams 

469  a 

Ludlam,  ex  d.  Hunt                              84,  563  q 

Macon  &  W.  R.  Co.  17.  Johnson 

430  » 

Ludlow  c.  Union  Ins.  Co.                             430 

Madden  v,  Koester 

4616 

VOL.  I.  —  /     . 

Ixxxii 


Maddison  v.  Nuttal 
Maddox  v.  Maddox 

t>.  Sullivan 
Maden  v.  Taylor 
Maesters  v.  Abraham 
Magee  v.  Allison 

v.  Mark 

v.  Raiguel 

r.  Scott 

Magennis  ».  McCullogh 
Maggi  v.  Cutts 
Magill  v.  KauSman 
Magoun  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Maguire  »>.  Baker 

v.  R.  Co. 
Mahaffy  v.  Byers 
Mahaska  v.  Ingalls 
Mahoney  v.  Hardware  Co. 
Mahurin  v.  Bickford 
Maier  v.  Ben.  Ass'n 
Main  v.  Newsoii 
Main,  In  re 
Maine  v.  Harper 
Maine  Stage  Co.  v.  Longley 
Mainwaring  v.  Mytton 
Mair  v.  Culy 
Mair,  In  re" 
Maitland  v.  Bank 

r.  Zanga 
Major  v.  State 
Majoribanks  v.  Green 
Majors  v.  State 
Makepeace  v.  Bancroft 
Makin  v.  Att'y-Gen'l 
Malcolm  v.  Scott 
Malcolmson  v.  O'Dea 
Maley  v.  Shattuck 
Malin  v.  Malin 
Mallery  v.  Young 
Malloiiee  v.  Duff 
Malone  v.  Hawley 
Maloney  r.  Bartley 
Malony's  Case 
Mai  pas  v.  Clements 
Malpica  v.  McKown 
Maltby  v.  Christie 
Multon  v.  Nesbit 
Malynek  v.  State 
Man  v.  Rickets 
Manahan  v.  Halloran 
Manatt  v.  Scott 
Man  by  v.  Curtis 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


189 
77 

260,  281 
28 

184  d 
564 
380 
190 

34,  513 
265 
14  g 

163  g,  332 

541 

287 

M* 

81/ 

147 

186 

505 

466  a 

409,  423 

41 

120  c 

430 

401 

444  a 

5736 

4696 

254  c 

6a 

152  c 

461  a,  461 c 
301 

14(7 

171 

108,  186 

543 

200 

162  e 

4696 

Ho 

469  d 

227 

38 

66 

194 

440,  441  d 

441  k,  441 1 

5756 

441  h 

14? 

142. 154,  575  6 
328  c 


Manchester  F.  A.  Co.  v.  Feibelman 

Manchester     Iron     Manuf.  Co.     v. 

Sweeting  418 

Manchester  Mills  (The  Case  of)  139 

Manchester  (The)  184  c 

Manderschid  v.  Dubuque  195  </ 

Mandeville  v.  Reynolds  305  a.  563  A- 

v.  Welch  172,  173 

v.  Wilson  73 

Manifold  v.  Pennington  72 

Manle}'  v.  Patterson  41 

Mann  v.  Godbold  563  p 

v.  Locke  184  6 

v.  Mann  296 

r.  Pi-arson  301 

Mann  B.  C.  Co.  v.  Dupre  305  e 

Manners  ».  Pontan  569 

Mannintr  r.  Ix-chmere  147,  162  d 

r.  K.  Co.  «C 

Mansfield  C.  &  C.  Co.  v.  McEnery  14  v 


Mant  v.  Mainwaring 

Many  v.  Jagger 

Manuf.  A.  I.  Co.  v.  Dorgan 


353,  356 
190 
441  / 
305  c 
251 


Manuf.  Furn.  Co.  v.  Kremer 
Marbury  v.  Madison 
March  v.  Commonwealth 

r.  Harrell  469  a,  469  6 

v.  P.  &C.  R.  Co.  14  v 

Marcly  v.  Shults  439  6,  439  c 

Marconi  v.  Adams  14  6 

Marcy  v.  Barnes  14  o,  430/,  439  A 

«.  Stone  147 

Mardis  v.  Shakleford  14 

Marguerite  v.  Chouteau  430  6 

Maria  Das  Dorias,  The  484 

Marianski  v.  Cairns  186 

Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hodgson  73 

Mariner  v.  Dyer  349 

v.  Saunders  563  q,  572 

Marion  v.  Lambert  461  d 

v.  State  439  h 

Market  &  F.  N.  B'k  v.  Sargent  14  w 

Markham  v.  Gonaston  568  a 

v.  Russell  14  o 

Marks  v.  Lahee  115,  116,  149,  150,  152 

Marland  r.  Jefferson  392,  402 

Marlerp.  State  14  o,  163  g 

Marquand  v.  Webb  395 

Marriage  v.  Lawrence  484,  493 

Marsden  v.  Stansfield  331 

Marsh  t).  Case  120  c 

v.  Collnett  484,  570 

».  Davis  110 

v.  Gold  192 

v.  McNair  284 

v.  Pier  531 

Marshall  v.  Baker  303,  304 

v.  Brown  162  k,  430 1 

v.  Cliff  186,  194 

v.  Gougler  566,  5G8 

v.  Ins.  Co.  81  d,  441  e 

v.  Lynn  302,  304 

v.  R.  Co.  99  a 

v.  State  213,  220  c 

v.  Thrailkill  395 

Marshall's  Appeal         /  287 

Marske  v,  Willard  3054 

Marston  v.  Dingley  14 1,  441  d 

v.  Downes  241 

v.  Hobbs  24 

Martendale  v.  Follett  568 

Martin  v.  Barnes  450  a 

v.  Bowie  575  6 

».  Clarke  284 

v.  Cole  305  c,  305  d 

v.  Com.  14  q 

v.  Curtis  140  a 

v.  Elliot  469  m 

v.  Farnham  450 

v.  Gunby  484 

».  Hardesty  14  c 

v.  Horrell  416 

r.  Ins.  Co.  444 

r.  Kelly  397 

v.  Martin  6,  461  c,  461  d 

v.  Nicolls  546 

p.  Perkins  572 

p.  Root  174,  184  6 

p  Smith  14y 

p.  State  14;;,  14  q,  195  « 

p.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  292 

Martin's  Case  65 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxxiii 


Martineau  v.  Woodland 

416,  420 

Maxted  v.  Fowler 

201,  465  a 

Martinntein  v.  His  Creditors 

118 

Maxwell  v.  Hardy 

162  A 

Marts  v.  State 

14  b,  14  c,  461  c 

v.  Hill 

162  e 

Marvin  v.  New  Bedford 

Uv 

v.  Kennedy 

14  d 

v.  Richmond 

192 

v.  Rives 

312 

Marx  v.  Hawthorn 

2a 

v.  Warner 

201 

v.  Hilsendegen 

4616 

v.  Wilkinson 

439  c 

v.  McGlynn 

162  e 

May  v.  Babcock 

305 

Marv  Grigg's  Case 

345 

v.  Bradlee 

441  c,  441/ 

Mary  Stewart  (The) 

40 

v.  Brown 

63 

Mary,  The 

18,  541 

v.  Dorsett 

430  d 

Mash  v.  Densham 

73 

v.  Shumway 

317 

v.  Smith 

357,  360 

v.  State 

14* 

Mask  v.  State 

445,  461  d 

v.  Taylor 

180 

Maskall's  Trial 

461  b,  461  d 

Mayer  v.  Building  Co. 

14  v 

Mason  v.  Fuller 

114  9 

"  v.  People                          14  q,  461  c,  462  a 

v.  Libbey 

5636 

v.  R.  Co. 

Uq 

v.  Mason 

14d,  14  o,30 

Mayfield  v.  Wadsley 

271 

v.  Phelps 

4396,  461  c 

Mayhew  v.  Gay  Head 

276 

v.  State 

14  q 

v.  Mining  Co. 

14  v,  441  d 

v.  Vestal 

4696 

Maynard  v.  Buck 

Uv 

Masons'  F.  F.  A.  v.  Riley 

152  d,  491 

v.  Render 

305  k 

Massey  v.  Allen 

120  a,  151 

Mayo  v.  Jones 

77 

v.  Bank 

461  c 

v.  Mayo 

469  d 

v.  Colville 

317 

v.  Wright 

441 

v.  State 

14  k 

Mayor  v.  Caldwell 

370  c 

Massure  v.  Noble 

441  c 

v.  Harwood 

482 

Mast  v.  Pierce 

305/ 

v.  Horner 

14  i 

Master  v.  Miller 

173 

v.  Johnson 

6636 

Masterman  r.  Judson 

73 

v.  R.  Co. 

4396 

Masters  v.  Drayton 

392 

Mayor  of  Carmarthen  v.  Lewis 

73 

v.  Miller 

565,  566,  568  a 

Mayor  of  Exeter  ».  Warren 

45  a 

Matchett  v.  R.  Co. 

5 

Mayor  of  Kingston  v.  Horner 

20,  45  a 

Mather  v.  Clark 

349 

Mays  v.  Mays 

572 

v.  Goddard 

87 

Maywood  Co.  v.  Maywood 

13/ 

v.  Trinity  Church 

45  <7 

McAdam  v.  Walker 

Ul 

Matherly  v.  Com. 

158 

McAdams  v.  Stilwell 

163  a 

Mathes  v.  Robinson 

118,  120  c 

McAdory  v.  State 

Up,  221,  223 

Mathews  v.  Cedar  Rapids 

14  v 

McAleer  v.  Horsey 

4696 

v.  Coalter 

430ya,  564 

v.  Murray 

14 

v.  Colburn 

163  a,  164 

McAllister  v.  McAllister 

581 

v.  R.  Co. 

5 

McAllister's  Case 

51  a 

v.  State 

469  c 

McAlmont  v.  McClelland 

14  o 

Mathias  v,  O'Neill 

Uj,  439  6 

McAlpine  v.  State 

81  c,  461  c 

Mat  lock  v.  Glover 

581 

McAnally  v   State 

14  o 

Matson  v.  Buck 

14  o 

McArdle  v.  McArdle 

4616 

Matteson  v.  Hartman 

189 

McArthur  v.  Hurlburt 

4436 

v.  R.  Co. 

162  6,  430  1 

McAulav  v.  Earnhart 

5636 

Matthew  v.  Osborne 

22 

McBethV  McBeth 

14  s,  162  e 

Matthews  v.  Dare 

462 

McBrain  v.  Fortune 

417 

v.  Haydon 

416 

McBride  v.  Com. 

162  c 

v,  Houghton 

513 

v.  Thompson 

108 

v.  Huntley 

146,  81  d 

v.  Wallace 

435 

v.  Lumber  Co. 

195  a,  450  a 

v.  Watts 

199 

v.  Marchant 

429 

McCabe  v.  Platter 

146,  14  d 

v.  Mattrass  Co. 

305  c 

McCabe,  JKe 

162  p 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v 

McCampbell  v.  McCampbell 

469  / 

v.  Sheehan 

284 

McCann  v.  State 

215 

v.  Smith 

392 

McCartee  v.  Camel 

41 

v.  Tufts 

317 

McCarthy  v.  Duck  Co. 

441  d 

Matthews'  Estate 

28,  239 

v.  R".  Co. 

441  d 

Matthewson  v.  Burr 

•  461  d 

McCartney  v.  State 

14  q 

Mattocks  v.  Lyman 
».  Stearns 

197,  201 
563  6,  563  d 

McCartv  v.  Leary 
McCask'ill  v.  Elliot1 

Uj,  469  a 
Up 

v.  Wheaton 

310 

McChesnev  v.  Chicago 

305  i 

Mattox  t;.  U.  S.     158,  159,  159  o,  161  c,  252  a, 

McClane  v.  White 

284 

462 

McClellan  v.  F.  W.  &  B.  I.  B. 

Co.           462  a 

Maugham  v.  Hubbard            9C 

,  436,  437,  439  6 

v.  State 

432 

Mauran  v.  Lamb                   33C 

,  353,  452,469  g 

McClenkan  v.  McMillan 

198,  201 

Mauro  v.  Plutt 

200 

McCleod  v.  Bishop 

108 

Mawman  v.  Tegg 

14  a 

McCleskey  v.  Leaclbetter 

163  e 

Mawson  v.  Hartsink 

461,  461  d 

McClory  v.  Wright 

380 

Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


McCollum  v.  Boughton 

v.  Seward 
McCombs  v.  State 
McConeghy  v.  Kirk 
McConnellV  Wildes 
McConnells  v.  Ins.  Co. 
McCool  v.  Grand  Rapids 
McCord  v.  State 
McCorkle  v.  Binns 
McCormick  v.  Huse 

v.  R.  Co. 

McCormick  Co.  r.  Faulkner 
McCormick  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Gray 
McCracken  v.  West 
McCraw  v.  Gentry 
McCray  v.  R.  Co. 
McCrea  v.  Marshall 

v.  Purmort 
McCreary  v.  Grundy 
McCulloch  v.  Tvson 
McCullough  v.  Dobson 
McCully  v.  Malcolm 
McCully's  Case 
McCurragher  v.  Rogers 
McCurtain  v.  Grady 


305  c 
44H 

Ub,lig,  14  o 

43  a 

441/ 

81  d 

14 1' 

4696 

581 

441  i 

439  b,  439  c 
305  c 
14  v 
162  d 
772 
441  d 
81 
26 
14  d 
392 
462 

97  d,  352 
65 
14  w 
189 


McCutchen  v.  McCutchen 

v.  Loggins 
McDaniel  v.  Hughes 

v.  State  ' 

McDeed  v.  McDeed 
McDermott  v.  Hoffman 


461  a,  461 c 
461  a 
542 

14  A,  1616,  444 
488 
276 


v.  State  14  6,  14  g,  14  o,  461  d,  467 

McDonald  v.  Bowman  190 

v.  Carnes  120  a 

v.  Com.  4446 

v.  Cutter  163  o 

v.  Jacobs  430  t 

v.  Longbottom  287 

v.  Mallorv  43 

v.  McCall  138  a 

v.  McDonald     162  e,  239,  441 1,  578  6,  581 

v.  People  14  k 

v.  R.Co.  162; 

v.  Rainor  530 

v,  Rooke  81  e 

v.  Savoy  14  6 

McDonel  v.  State  13  e,  461  d 

McDonnell  v.  Evans  463,  464 

McDonough  v.  O'Neil  1956 

McDowell  v.  Ins.  Co.  40,  563  d 

v.  Langdon  532 

v.  Preston  4506 

v.  Simpson  41,  417 

McElhannon  v.  State  14  r,  163  e 

McElmoyle  v.  Cohen  548 

McElroy  v.  Ludlum  174,  178,  184  6 

McElwee  v.  Sutton  14  q,  462 

McEwen  v.  Bigelow  430  / 

v.  Portland  34 

v.  Springfield  469  a 

McFadden  v.  Ellmaker  189 

v.  Kingsbury  89 

v.  Murdock  14  n 

McFadin  v.  Catron  77 

McFarland  v.  Shaw  156 

McGahan  v.  Crawford  193 

McGahey  v.  Alston  187,  563  g 

McGarrahan  v.  R.  Co.  0  c 

McGean  v.  R.  Co.  14  t; 

McGee  r.  Prouty  281 

v.  Scott  41 

v.  State  14  q 


McGennis  v.  Allison  572  a 

McGill  v.  Rowand  348 

McGinness  v.  School  District  '563  d 

McGinnis  v.  State  333  a,  563  c 

McGinniss  v.  Sawyer  430^'" 

McGlemery  v.  Keller  14  o 

McGowan  v.  McDonald  184  c,  439  6 

v.  R.  Co.  466  a 

McGrath  v.  Cox  563  p 

v.  Seagrave  305  g,  513 

McGregor  v.  Keily  40 

v.  Me  Arthur  14  d 

v.  Wait  671 

McGuerty  v.  Hale  195  d,  441  d,  461  c 

McGuff  v.  State  367,  370  d 

McGuire  v.  Maloney  338 

v.  People  367 

v.  Sayward  507 

McGuire' s  Case  82 

McGunnagle  v.  Thornton  416 

Mcllroy  v.  Mcllroy  430 

Mcllvain  v.  State  14  p 

Mclnerny  v.  Irvin  461  a 

Mclntire  v.  Oliver  174,  184  6 

v.  Young  14  o 

Mclntosh  v.  Lee  5 

Mclntvre  v.  Mancius  451,  469  d 

v.'Min.  Co.  195  c 

Mclsaac  v.  Lighting  Co.  441  c 

Mclver  v.  Humble  356,  494 

v.  Walker  301 

McKavlin  v.  Bresslin  474 

McKay  v.  Myers  14  ;' 

McKee  v.  Bidwell  195  'd 

v.  Hicks  568  a 

v.  Jones  469  6 

v.  Nelson  440,  441  h 

v.  People  197 

McKeigue  v.  Janesville  162  6,  162,; 

McKenire  v.  Eraser  21,  575  6 

McKenney  v.  Dingley  14  q,  53 

McKenzie"  v.  Lautenschlager  162  d,  254 

v.  State  184  a 

».  Wimberlev  286 

McKeon  v.  R.  Co.  441 1 

McKeone  v.  Barnes  577,  581 

McKeown  v.  Harvey  43d 

McKern  v.  Calvert  14  6,  14  4 

McKerney  r.  Reading  444 

McKesson  v.  Sherman  461  6,  469  I 

McKim  v.  Foley  195  6 

McKinder  v.  Littlejohn  575 

McKinney  v.  Grand  R.  Co.         243,  244,  248, 

247  a 

v.  Neil  462 

McKinnon  v.  Bliss      6  d,  129,  130,  138  a,  139 

McKnight  v.  Lewis  352 

McKonkey  v.  Gaylord  675,  575  c 

McKormick  v.  West  Bay  City  162  6 

McKown  v.  Hunter  328  c 

McLain  v.  Com.  163  a,  163  g 

v.  Winchester  563  c 

McLanahan  v.  Ins.  Co.  441  e 

McLanathan  v.  Patten  190 

McLaughlin  v.  Cowley  14  A 

v.  Gilmore  237,  239 

v.  Mencke  461  6 

McLean  v.  Clark  443  6 

v.  Hertzog  89,  563  c 

v.  State  14  /.  430  r 

McLear  v.  Succession  of  Hunsecker  93 

McLellun  v.  Crofton  118 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxxv 


STcLellan  v.  Cumberland  Bank 

v.  Longfellow 

p.  Richardson 
McLenon  v.  Bank 
McLeod  v.  Bullard 

v.  Gunther 

v.  State 

v.  Wakley 
McLoghlin  v.  Bank 
Mc-Mahan  v.  McGrady 
McMahon  v.  Burchell 

v.  Davidson 

v.  Harrison 
McManus  v.  Mason 

v.  State 
McMaster  v.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Morse 
McMicken  v.  Beauchamp 

v.  Com. 
McMillan  v.  Baxley 

v.  Davis 

McMillan  v.  State 
Me  Minn  v.  "Whelan 
McMunn  v.  State 
McMurrin  v.  Rigby 
McNair  v.  Com. 

v.  Hunt 

McNaghten's  Case 
McNamara  v.  People 
McNamee  v.  Hunt 
McXeely  v.  Duff 

v.  McNeely 
McNeil  v.  Holbrook 

v.  Perchard 

».  Phillip 
McNeil,  Exparte 
McNeil!  v.  Arnold 
McNutt  v.  Young 
McPetres  v.  Ray 
McPherrin  v.  Jennings 
McPherson  «.  State 
McQueen  v,  R.  Co. 

v.  State 

McQuillan  v.  Light  Co. 
McQuirk  v.  State 
Mcliae  v.  Lilly 

v,  Malloy 

v.  Morrison 

McReynolds  v.  McCord 
McTyer  v.  Steele 
McVicker  v.  Conkle 
Me  Williams  v.  Nisly 
Mead  v.  Boston 

v.  Daubigny 

v.  Harris 

v .  Husted 

v.  McGraw 

v.  Robinson 

v.  Steger 
Meade  v.  Black 

v.  McDowell 

v.  Smith 

Meadows  v.  Meadows 
Meagoe  v.  Simmons  . 
Mealer  v.  State 
Meann  v.  State 
Meath  v.  Ld.  Belfield 

r.  Winchester 
Mechanics'  Bank  of  Ales 

of  Columbia 

Medomak  Bank  v.  Curtis 
Medway  v.  U.  S. 


uk                    275 

Meeker  v.  Jackson                                         349 

239 

v.  Meeker                                              441  I 

252 

Meekins  v.  Smith                                           316 

503  c 

Meeks  v.  Willard                                          81/ 

581 

Meighen  v.  Bank                                           14_/ 

162  f 

Meiss  v.  Gill    •                                                531 

14  o 

Melcher  v.  Flanders                                   569  d 

Uo 

Melen  v.  Andrews                          197,  198,  233 

14  n 

Melendy  v,  Spaulding                                441  c 

569  « 

Melhuish  v.  Collier                    51  a,  444,  461  « 

171 

Mellish  v.  Richardson                                    73 

163  e 

Melton  v.  State                                             14  q 

14  h 

Melville's  Case          2  a,  6  a,  37,  65,  170,  234, 

466  a 

441  k,  482, 

14  o 

Melvin  v.  Bullard                                        152  c 

279 

v.  Easly                                      162  f,  162  k 

6 

v.  Prop's  of  Locks,  etc.                          46 

564 

v.  Whiting                                 17,  164,  310 

276 

Menard  v.  R.  Co.                                13  j,  195  d 

563  c 

Mener  v.  R.  Co.                                                43 

1406 

Menomenie  R.  S.  &  D.  Co.  ».  R.  Co.  14  v,  14  w 

14  k 

Merced  Water  Co.  v.  Cowles                       6  a 

43  a 

Mercer  v.  Mackin                                      162  e 

163  g 

v.  State                   254,  333  c,  461  a,  469  a 

14  v.  162  Ji,  469  'c 

v.  Whall                                                    76 

581 

v.  Wise                                                  207 

46 

Merchants'  Bank  v.  Cook                            332 

440 

r.  Gleudon  Co.                                   563  g 

816 

v.  Spicer                                                430 

81/ 

Merchants'  Exch.  B'k  v.  McGraw                 6  6 

439  c 

Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Leyser              323 

28 

Meredith  v.  Footner                                     185 

2a 

».  Gilpin                                                   532 

43oy« 

Meriam  v.  Harsen                                          293 

207 

Merkle  v.  Bennington          162  6,  162  g,  441  d 

316 

v.  State                                                162  i 

1406 

Merle  v.  More                                               243 

Ud 

Merriam  v.  Ins.  Co.                                   441  e 

430  p 

v.  Langdon                                                73 

14  r 

Merrick  v.  Wakley                                  162m 

14  k,  462 

Merrill  v.  Blodgett                                       294 

34 

v.  Dawson                                              6  b 

158 

v.  Hershfield                                       441  / 

450 

v.  R  Co.                                                437 

14  6,  14  g,  14  o 
14  6,  54 

v.  Sypert                                            305  g 
Merrima'n  v.  State                           461  a,  461  c 

162  e 

Merritt  v.  Merritt                                      450  6 

430  i 

v.  R.  Co.                                                196 

195  a 

v.  Seaman                                             441  c 

305 
569  b,  581 

Mersey  &  Irwell  Nav.  Co.  v.  Douglas          62 
Mershon  v.  State                                         444  b 

24 

Mertens  v.  Nottebohms                                352 

537 

Mertz  v.  Detweiler                              14  6,  14  i 

14  0 

Messimer  v.  McCrary                                     2  a 

370  c 

Mestayer  v.  Biggs    *                                      284 

Bid 

Metropolis  (Bank  of  the)  v.  Jones                385 

4396 

Metrop.  Dist.  Asylum  v.  Hill                     14  v 

413 

Metrop.  L.  I.  Co."  v.  Anderson                    493 

26 

Metrop.  N.  B'k  v.  Com.  St.  B'k              184  c 

186 

Metrop.  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson                          81  / 

187 

v.  White                                               14  'v 

252  a 

w."  Wright                                             81  / 

268 

Metrop.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson                     14  v 

436,  449 

Metrop.  W.  S.  E.  R.  Co.  c.  Dickinson      14  v 

14  i 

Metiers  v.  Brown                                           179 

218 

Metzgar  v.  R.  Co.                                       14  v 

137,  138 

Metzger  v.  Assur.  Co.                               430  p 

154,  240,  575  6 
dria  v.  Bank 

Metzger's  Case                                             552 
Meunier,  Re                                                380 

184  c 

Mevey  v.  Matthews                                      356 

304 

Meyer  v.  Bohlfing                                          14  o 

681 

v.  Casey                                                284 

Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Meyer  v.  Huneke  568 

v.  Krauter  5 

v.  Seftou  563  h 

Meyers  v.  Com.  816 

v.  State  163  a 

Meyncke  v.  State  461  d 

Meynell's  Case  221 

Miami  &  M.  T.  Co.  v.  Baily                     469  m 

Michael  v.  Foil  241,  245 

Michaels  ».  Shaw  521 

Michener  v.  Lloyd  86 

Michigan,  etc.  K.  Co.  v.  Carrow  184  c 

v.  Gilbert  14  g,  14  h 

Mickle  v.  State  81  c 

Middleton  v.  Brewer  205 

v.  Mass  5756 

v.  Melton  116,  120,  147, 150,  152  d, 

15.3,  187 

v.  Sandford  43  a 

Middletown  Savings  Bank  v.  Bates            333 

MifBin  v.  Bingham  118 

Milbourn  v.  Ewart  286 

Milburn  v.  Phillips  181 

Miles  v.  Loomis  581 

v.  McCullough  316 

v.  O'Hara  165, 166 

v.  Sheward  51 

v.  United  States  81  c 

v.  Van  Horn  146, 14  a! 

v.  Woodward  186 

Milford  v.  Worcester  484 

Millar  v.  Heinrick  488 

Millard  v.  Truax  6  6 

Millay  v.  Butts  34 

Mill-Dam  Foundry  v.  Hovey                      333 

Miller  v.  Baker  271 

v.  Bingham  190 

r.  Boykin  484 

v.  Butterfield  275 

v.  Com.  14  q 

v.  Cook  444 

v.  Covert  532 

v.  Curtis  14  d,  14  g,  14  h,  14  q 

v.  Dill  461 6 

v.  Electric  Co.  305/ 

v.  Falconer  396,  417 

r.  Feenane  108 

v.  Gilleland  568,  568  a 

v.  Goodwin  304 

v.  Hackley  14.;,  4396 

v.  Hale     '  502 

«.  Irvine  268 

v.  Jones  581 

v.  Kerr  14  o 

v.  Lamb  14  o 

v.  Mariner's  Ch.  333,  422,  563 j 

v.  Matthews  60 

t>.  McKinnon  563  e 

v.  McQuerry  6  b 

v.  Miller  189,  445,  461  d 

v.  People  220 

e.  R.  Co.  14  v,  439  h,  469  a 

v.  Russell  163.9 

v.  S.  8.  Co.  14' i 

v.  Salomons  304  6 

v.  Shay  120  c,  4396 

v.  State  81  d,  163 /,  469  d,  663  6 

v.  Stevens  280 

t).  Travers    288,  290,  291,  297,  801,  305  k 

c.  Wild  Cat,  etc.  Co.                         668.7 

v.  Williams  206 

v.  Wilson  43 


Miller  v.  Wood 
Miller's  Case 
Milliken  v.  Coombs 

v.  Corunna 

Milling  v.  Hillenbrand 
Millman  v.  Tucker 
Millner's  Estate,  Re 
Mills  v.  Barber 

v.  Catlin 

v.  Com. 

v.  Dennis 

•».  Duryee 

v.  Gore 

v.  Lee 

v.  Mayor 

v.  Oddy 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Twist 

v.  Wj-man 
Milne  v.  Leisler 
Milnor  v.  Tillotson 
Milton  v.  Edgworth 

v.  Hunter 

v.  Rowland 

v.  State 
Milward  v .  Forbes 

v.  Hallett 

v.  Hibbert 

v.  Ingram 


191 

440,  430  i 
269 
13  i 
190 

457,  469  d 
28 
74 

J62J 

2606 

179 

504 

361 

356 

46 

75,  237,  241 

469  m 

572 

304 

13  a 
563  g 

302 

174 

430  c 

14  q,  333  a,  444  a 
193 
416 

14  n 
302 


Milwaukee  B.  Co.  v.  Duncan  305/ 

Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg  441  e 

Mima  Queen  v.  Hepburn  99,  99  a,  125 

Minis  v.  Sturtevant  163  g,  439  6 

v.  Swartz  6  6 

Miner  v.  Phillips  328  c,  439  c 

Mineral  Point  R.  Co.  v.  Keep  165,  439  6 

Minet  i.'.  Gibson  53 

v.  Morgan  240 

Minkley  v.  Springwells  466  a 

Minneapolis  Mill  Co.  v.  R.  Co.  163,  1630 

Minneapolis  T.  Co.  v.  Nimocks  563  « 

Minns  v.  State  14  K 

Minor  v.  Mechanics'  Bank  356 

v.  Powers  305  m 
v.  Tillotson                         82,  5636,  563 p 

Minton's  Case  65 

Minturn  v.  State  370  d 

Mishler  v.  Baumgardner  254  c,  386 

Miss.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayres  162/9 

Misso.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Colburn  6  b 

v.  Moore  439  h 

Misso  P.  R.  Co.  t>.  Collier  162  g 

v.  Heidenheimer  430  o 

P.  Hennessey  195  a 

v.  Moffatt  14  v 

v.  Palmer  430/>,  563  p 

Mitchell  v.  Allison  441  •> 

v.  Belknap  118,  468 

v.  Clark  118 

v.  Com.  461  d 

v.  Henry  305 1 

v.  Ins.  do.  441  e 

v.  Jacobs  663  e 

v.  Judge  317 

v.  Kinsman  284 

v.  Mitchell  163  a 

v.  R.  Co.  13y,  14  v 

v.  Sawver  443  b 

v.  Sell  man  468 
v.  State                     13 e,  1630,  165,  46 la 

v.  Wixon  317 

v.  Work  14  d,  14  A 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxxvii 


Mitchum  v.  State  162/,  162  fir 

Mix  v.  Woodward  1*  o 

Moale  v.  Baltimore  14  » 

Moberlv  v.  Preston  14  d 

Mobile'Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Walker  163 1 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcraft       14  v,  162  d, 

162  g 

v.  Whitney  6  6 

Mobley  v.  Hamit  461  a,  461  c 

Mock  V.  Kelly  430 p 

Mockabee  v.  "Com.  159,  159  6 
Mockbee  r.  Gardner 

Modawell  p.  Holmes  5 

Mode  v.  Beasley  43  a 
Moehn  v.  Moehn 
Moehring  v.  Mitchell 
Moellering  v.  Evans 
Moffit  v.  Manes 

v.  State 

Mohawk  Bank  v.  Atwater  421 
Mohun's  Trial                           156,  156  a,  439  e 

Moilliett  v.  Powell  73 
Moises  t>.  Thornton              58,  195,  426,  563  g 

Molesworth  v.  Sleeman  136 

Molina  v.  U.  S.  4306 

Mollett  v.  Wackerbarth  568 

Molton  v.  Harris  87 

Molyneaux  ».  Collier  192 

Moiiahan  v.  Worcester  14  c 
Moncrief  v.  State 

Monfort  v.  Rowland  421 
Monkton  v.  Att'y-Gen.       114  c,  114  d,  114  e, 
131, 134, 135 
Monro  v.  De  Chemaiit 

Monroe  v.  Berens  275 

v.  Cooper  81 

v.  Ins.  Co.  14  w 

v.  State  14  c,  14  k 

v.  Twistleton  254,  337 

Montague  v.  Dougan  120  c 

Montana  R.  Co.  v.  Warren  430/>,  441  # 

Montclair  R.  Co.  v.  Benson  14  v 

Montgomery  v,  Bevans  41 

v.  Com.  4446 

v.  Deeley  66 

v.Ohio  81  e 

v .  Page  305  c 

v.  Pickering  243 

v.  Richardson  205 

v.  State  156, 158, 159  a 

Monticello  v.  Bryant  6  a 

Moody  v.  King  356 

v.  Rowell        435,  445,  447,  448,  577,  581, 

581  o 

Mooers  v.  Bunker  43  a 

Moon  v.  State  439  g 

Moon's  Adm'r  v.  Crowder  581 

Mooney  v.  Ins.  Co.  292,  295 

v.  Kennet  66 

v.  Olsen  162  e 

Moons  v.  De  Bernales  550 

Moore  ?.  Burlington  14  p 

v.  Com.  App.  Ill 

v.  Griffin  405 

».  Hitchcock  388,  563  k 

v.  Jones  138  a 

v.  Kalamazoo  14  p 

v.  King  272 

v.  Oastler  14  A 

w.  Palmer  14  f.  163  f,  583 

v.  R.  Co.  444 

v.  Salter  568 


Moore  v.  Smead  305/ 

v.  Smith  198 

v.  State    14 p.  14  o,  14  v,  158, 161  c,  162  p, 

369,  461  6,  461  d,  462 

v.  Stone  81  d 

v.  Terrell  240 

v.  Triplett  163  6 

v.  U.  S.  14  o,  14  j,  581 

v.  Wright  201 

Moore's  Case  227,  484 

Moorhouse  v.  De  Passou  421 

Moots  v.  State  439  * 

Mora  v.  People  156,  213 

More  o.  Watts  533 

More's  Estate  430  o 

Morehouse  v.  Morehouse  466  a 

Moreland  v.  Lawrence  461  a 

Morewood  v.  Wood      58,  114  c,  128, 130, 136, 

137, 138  a,  578 

Morey  v.  Hoyt  563  k 

Morgan  v.  Barker  532 

v.  Brydges  445 

v.  Burrow  5,  290 

v.  Com.  14  r 
v.  Griffith                                 284  a,  305/ 

v.  Halberstadt  469  d 

v.  Livingston  14  o 

v.  Morgan  101 

v.  Purnell  114  e 
v.  State                          146,  14  q,  81  c,  158 

v.  Thome  523 

Moriarty  v.  Moriarty  77 

v.  R.  Co.  195  a 
v.  State                                14  c,  14  3-,  14  fe 

Morish  v.  Foots  394,  396 

Morison  v.  Tumour  272 

Moritz  v.  Brough  162  e 

Morler  v.  State  163  g 
Morley's  Case                                   163  a,  163  g 

Morrell  v.  Dickey  544 

v.  Lumber  Co.  430  q 

v.  Morrell  305  c 

Morrill  v.  Otis  566 

v.  Tegarden  441 1 

v.  Titcomb  140  a 

Morris  v.  Bethel  14  m 
v.  Briggs                            117,  120  c,  439  6 

v.  Burdett  197 

v.  Daubisny  409 

v.  Davidson  6  b 

v.  Davies  28,  81 

v.  East  Haven  14  6,  14  g 

v.  Guffey  444 

v.  Hammerle  166 

v.  Harmer  497 

v.  Hauser  563  d 

v.  Hubbard  43 

v.  Ins.  Co.  441  d 

v.  Keyes  532 

v.  Lessees  130, 139 

v.  Lotan  76 

v.  Miller  209 

v.  Morris  243,  247  a 

v.  Nixon  178,  296  a 

v.  Patchin  506 

0.  Pugh  521 

v.  R.  Co.  247  (i,  462 

w.Sargent  4396,581 

v.  State  469  / 

v.  Stokes  430  i 

v.  Vanderen  563  c,  564 

v.  Wadsworth  573 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Morrison  v.  Kelly 

471 

Munderson  v.  Reeve 

174 

r.  Leonard 

366,  370  c,  439  e 

Munford  v.  Green 

305  d 

r.  Madison 

81/ 

Munkers  v.  Ins.  Co. 

14  6,  581 

v.  Myers 

465  a 

v.  State 

14  h 

v.  Porter 

581 

Munkwitz  v.  R.  Co. 

Vj 

v.  Woolson 

19 

Munn  p.  Baker 

Up 

Morrissey  v.  Ferry  Co. 

43  a 

i?.  Burch 

5 

v.  Ingham 

1626 

Munro  v.  De  Chemant 

207 

Morrow  v.  R.  Co. 

14  h 

v.  Merchant 

46 

Morse  v.  Blanchard 

136 

Munroe  v.  Gates 

46 

v.  Hewett 

66 

v.  Godkin 

146 

v.  Pineo 

461  a 

v.  Perkins 

303 

v.  Potter 

120  e 

Munshower  v.  State 

162;,  162  1 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  M,  184  c,  195  d 

Munson  v.  Atwood 

81  d 

*.  Royal 

178 

v  .  Hastings 

4696 

v.  Shattuck 

26 

Murchie  v.  Peck 

305  c 

v.  Stearns 

290 

Murdock  v.  Union  Bank 

38 

Morsman  v.  Forrest 

5 

Murphree  v.  Senn 

142 

Morss  v.  Palmer 

461  d 

Murphy  v.  Backer 

14  n 

Mortimer  v.  McCallan 

3,  184  c,  474,484, 

v.  Collins 

43 

563  i 

v.  Deane 

81 

v.  Mortimer 

215 

v.  Hendricks 

6 

Mortlock  v.  Williams 

563  d 

v.  Jack 

430? 

Morton  v.  Chandler 

284 

v.  Manning 

14  v 

v.  Folger 

138  a,  140  a 

v.  Orr 

41 

v.  Heidorn 

77 

v.  People 

14  o 

Morton's  Case 

533 

v.  State                             223, 

461  6,  466  a 

Moscati  v.  Lawson 

409 

v.  St.  Louis  Type  Foundry 

186 

Mose  v.  State 

13  e,  461  c,  461  d 

v.  Waterhouse 

81  d,  245 

Moseley  v.  Davies 

130,  135,  138,  139 

Murphy's  Trial 

14  d 

».  Hanford 

281 

Murray  v.  Bethune 

441  i 

v.  Martin 

290 

v.  Board 

441  d 

Moseley's  Adm'r  v.  Mastin 

5 

v.  Bogue 

14  a 

Moses  v.  Ins.  Co. 

441  e 

v.  Buchanan 

5636 

Mosey  's  Case 

231 

v.  Carre  tt 

5636 

Mosler's  Case 

222 

v.  Coster 

192 

Mostyn  v.  Fabrigas 

49,  320,  488 

v.  Elston 

309 

Motes  v.  Bates 

461  a 

v.  Gregory 

563  k 

Mott  v.  Dawson 

81  d 

v.  House 

427 

v.  Doughty 

572,  575 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

80 

v.  Hicks 

423 

v.  Judah 

430 

Moulin  v.  Dallison 

14  n 

v.  Lord  Stair 

284 

Moulton  v.  Mason 

563  d 

v.  Marsh 

430 

r.  State 

461  c,  46  Id 

v.  Milner                         114  c, 

114  d,  140  c 

Mount  r.  Bogert 

192 

v.  Murray 

35 

Mountstephen  v.  Brooke 

191 

v.  Shadwell 

361 

Moyer  v.  Moyer 

14  d 

v.  Toland 

197 

Movie  v.  Congreg.  Soc.                              184  c 
Mt."  Adams  &  E.  P.  I.  R.  Co.  r.  Lowery    14  w 

Murray,  In  re 
Murrell  v.  State 

30 
14  p 

Mt.  Terrv  M.  Co.  v.  White 

4396 

Murry  v.  Hennessey 

77 

Mudsill  M.  Co.  v.  Watrous 

14  q 

Musser  v.  Stauffer 

43 

Mueller  v.  Rebhan 

189 

Mussey  v.  Beecher 

184  d 

Muetze  P.  Tuteur 

14  A 

ti.'Curtis 

296  a 

Muhlig  v.  Fiske 

275 

Musson  v.  Fales 

379 

Muir  v.  Miller 

162  e 

Mut.  Ben.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v  .  Brown 

581 

Mulcahey  v.  R.  Co. 

163  A 

v.  Robinson 

5 

Mulcairns  v.  Janesville 

441  d 

v.  Tisdale 

550 

Mullaney  v.  Duffy 
Mullen  v.  Ins.  Co. 

137 
lQ2p 

Mut.  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Usaw 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hillmon 

81  d 
162  c 

v.  Sackett 

5 

Mutter  v.  Lime  Co. 

184  c 

Muller  r.  Hospital  Assoc. 
».  Morris 

461  6,  469  1 
489 

Myatt  v.  Walker 
Myers  v.  Baker 

81  a 

200 

Mullery  v.  Hamilton 
Mullin'g  Estate 

43  a 
244,  247  a,  44H 

v.  Callaghan 
v.  Carrie 

14  q 
14  d 

Mulrv  v.  Ins.  Co. 

441  e 

v.  Sari 

305  I 

Mulvev's  Case 

227 

v.  State                              14*,  218,  4616, 

Mulville  v.  Ins.  Co. 

14; 

M9a 

Mumford  v.  Gething 

287 

v.  Tosonn 

581 

v.  Tolman 

305  c 

Mygatt  v.  Tarbell 

14  o 

Muncey  v.  Ins.  Office 

!!)() 

Mynatt  r.  Hudson 

461  d 

Muiide  v.  Lambie 

275 

Myrick  v.  Dame 

281 

TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ixxxix 


N. 

N.  E.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier 
Naanes  v.  State 
Nadin  v.  Bassett 
Nailey  v.  Carpet  Co. 
Names  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Nash  v.  Classen 

v.  Gilkeson 
Nasoii  v.  Jordan 
Nass  v.  Vanswearingen 
Natchbolt ».  Porter 
Nathan  v.  Brand 
National  Ace.  Soc.  v.  Spiro 
National  Bank  v.  Bank 

v.  Galland 


430  p,  441  (] 

556 

163  h 

195  d 

439  f 

81/1  162  / 

146,  54,  55 

563  q 

469  g 

265 

14  v 

575  c,  581 
248 
498 


National  Bank  of  St.  Charles  v.  De 

Bernales  203 

National  Trust  Co.  v.  Gleason  376 

Naugher  v.  State  14  c 

Naumberg  v.  Young  305/ 

Nave  v.  Flack  14  v 

v.  Tucker  110  a 

v.  Williams  14s 

Naylor  v.  Semmes  469  g 

Nayson  v,  Thatcher  333 

Neaderhouse  v.  State  5 

Neal  v.  Fry  497 

v.  Neal  578  b 

v.  Thornton  192 

v.  Wilding  114  d 

Neale  v.  Parkin  197 

Neally  v.  Greenough  663  c 

Nebraska  Exp.  Ass'n  v.  Townley  305  c 

Nebraska  National  Bank  v.  Johnson          81  d 

Needham  v.  Law  333 

v.  Smith  421 

Neel  v.  Potter  162  e 

Neeley  v.  Lock  81  d 

Neelson  v.  Sanborne  268 

Neil  v.  Cheves  304 

v.  Childs  444,  444  a 

v.  Neil  272 

Neile  ».  Jakle  197 

Neill  v.  Devonshire  14  n,  139 

Neilson  v.  Harford  8iy 

v.  McDonald  361 

v.  R.  Co.  13  j,  163  i,  441  g 

Nelius  v.  Brickell  572 

Nelms  v.  State  159  a,  462 

v.  Steiner  14,  14  q,  81  d,  195  b, 

4616 

Nelson  v.  Bank  120  a,  184  c 

v.  Bridport  162/,  162  k,  488 

v.  Evans  14  d 

v.  Hall  301 

v.  Ins.  Co.  430/ 

v.  Oneida  247  a 

v.  Price  81  d 

v.  R.  Co.  162; 

v.  State  230,  432 

v.  Terr.  140  b 

v.  U.  S.  323 

Nelson's  Will  162  e 

Nepean  v.  Knight  41 

Neptune,  The  2  a 

Nesbit  v.  People  247  a 

v.  State  157 

Nesbitt  v.  Turner  564 

Neubrandt  v.  State  14^,34 

Neuffer  v.  Moehn  189 


Neville  v.  Northcutt  123 

Nevling  v.  Com.  14  k 

Newbolt  v,  Pryce  291 

Newcastle  (Duke  of)  v.  Broxtowe      129,  131, 

136,  139 

v.  Kinderley  37 

Newcomb  v.  Drummond  509 

v.  Griswold  461  b,  465  a 

v.  Noble  563  e 

v.  Presbrey  564 

v.  State     "  14  k 

Newell  v.  Mayberry  565,  508 

v.  Newton  6  a 

v.  Nichols  30 

v.  Simpkin  474 

New  England  Bank  v.  Lewis  530 

Newhall  v.  Appleton  292 

v.  Holt  203 

v.  Jenkins  193 

Newham  v.  Raithby  493 

New  Hampshire  F.'lns.  Co.  v.  Healey       252 
New  Haven  County  Bank  v.  Mitchell       14  s, 
38,  38  a,  40,  115, 116,  439  b, 
572 

Newhill  v.  Ireson  301 

New  Jersey  Z.  &  I.  Co.  v.  L.  Z.  &  I.  Co. 

120  a,  162  i,  162  k 

Newman  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  310 

v.  Doe  498 

v.  Dodson  162  b 

v.  Jenkins  41,  550 

v.  Mackin  461  a 

v.  Newman  364  b 

v.  Stretch  563  I 

v.  Studley  46 

New  Milford  v.  Sherman  110 

New  Portland  v.  Kingfield  462,  563  g 

Newsam  v.  Carr  14  b,  55 

Newsom  v.  Luster  575 

Newstrom  v.  R.  Co.  254 

Newton  v.  Beersford  240 

v.  Belcher  37,  97,  206,  207,  563  I 

v.  Fay  284 

v.  Harland  310 

v.  Harris  450 

v.  Higgins  118 

v.  Jackson  469  a 

v.  Liddiard  204,  206,  207 

Newton  Mfg.  Co.  v.  White  184  c 

New  York  &  B.  F.  Co.  v.  Moore  81  d 

New  York  C.  B'k  v.  Madden  439  b 

New  York  El.  Eq.  Co.  v.  Blair  441 1 

New  York  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Aitkin  305m 

New  York  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Benedict  5756 

New  York  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas        14  v 

New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Haws  34 

Nias  ».  N.  &  E.  Ry.  Co.  240 

Nicholas  v.  Com.  14  m,  14  q 

v.  Lansdale  43  a 

Nicholls  ».  Dowding  184  a,  434,  435 

v.  Downes  19fi.  209 

v.  Parker  131, 135,  138,  138  n 

v.  Webb  115,  120  6, 152  a 

Nichols  v.  Alsop  38 

v.  Boston  46 

v.  Dowding  177.1846 

«.  Goldsmith  116,  1-0  a 

v.  Haynes  120  c 

v.  Hofgate  385 

v.  Johnson  268,  566 

v.  Jones  186 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Nichols  v.  Kingdom  430/a 

v.  Lodge  6  e 

v.  Munsell  14  x 

n.  Stewart  469  b 

Nicholson  v.  Com.  14  i 

v.  State  219  b,  220 

v.  Withers  118,  439  b 

Nickersou  v.  Gould  14m 

v.  Spindell  563  p 

Nickle  v.  Baldwin  118,  120  c 

Nicolay  v.  Mallery  14  q,  184  a 

Nicto>  v.  Carpenter  46 

Nieman  *.  Ward  138  a 

Niles  v.  Brackett  421 

r.  Culver  305 

Nino  v.  People  81  a 

Niosi  v.  Laundry  13  i 

Nix  v.  Cutting  398 

Nixon  v.  Beard  445 

v.  Mayoh  241 

v.  Palmer  41 

v.  Porter  491 

v.  State  14  q 

Noble  v.  Kennoway  14  n,  292 

».  People  369 

*.  K.  Co.  195  d 

Noble's  Trial  14  fc 

Nobles  i?.  State  220  c 

Nodin  r.  Murray  563  p 

Noel  v.  Dickey  461  a 

Noke  v.  Ingham  356 

Nolan  v.  R.  Co.  461  b 

Nolin  v.  Farmer  439  <j 

Noonan  v.  State  197 

Norcott  v.  Orcott  .  409 

Norcutt  v.  Mottram  73 

Norden  v.  Williamson  172,  354 

Norfolk  v.  Gaylord  469  d 

v.  Germaine  14  o 
Norfolk  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Lumber  Co.  441  d 
Norfolk  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoover  14  c,  14  A 

Norma,  The  120  a,  439  b 

Norman  v.  Cole  284 

Normanshaw  v.  Normaushaw  247 
Norris  v.  Beach                              316,  317,  318 


14  w 
43 

162  b 
76 
14  o 
441/ 
180 
441  / 
120  a 


v.  Chinkscales 

v.  Harris 

v.  Haverhill 

v.  N.  Am.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Spofford 

v.  State 
North  v.  Miles 

North  A.  A.  Ass'n  ».  Woodson 
North  Bank  v.  Abbot 
North  Brookfield  v.  Warren  114  of, 

North  Chic.  R.  M.  Co.  v.  Monka  162  i 

North  Chic.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Louis  81 

North  River  Meadow  Co.  v.  Shrewsbury 

Church  564 

Northampton  Bank  ».  Whiting  266 

Northampton  Co.  v.  Innes  310 

Northern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bank  14  w 

v.  Keyeo  120  a,  563  h 

v.  Lewis  14  v 

v.  Peterson  81/ 

r.  Urlin  1626,  441  d 

Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Hiltgen  306  c 

Northrop  ».  Hale  114  c 

v.  Wright  21,  575 

Northrup  c.  Jackson  87 

Norton  ».  Coons  281 

t>.  Doherty  632 


Norton  v.  Parsons  201,  435,  441  h 

v.  Pettibone  109,  152  c,  189 

17.  Willis  14  v 

Norwegian  Plow  Co.  v.  Munger  575  c 

Norwood  v.  Marrow  14  I,  409 

Nostrum  17.  Halliday  184  c 

Nottidge  t7.  Prince  43  a 

Nourse  v.  McCay  116 

v.  Nourse  22,  110 

Novelli  v.  Rossi  547 

Nowell  17.  Chipman  184  d 

v.  Davies  389,  408 

Noyes  t7.  Brown  140  b,  441  c 

17.  Gardner  14  p 

t7.  Merrill  189 

t7.  Ward  110,  139 

Nueva  Anna,  The  4 

Nugent  17.  State  14s,  461  a 

Nuncomar's  Trial  251, 450  a 

Nusscar  17.  Arnold  146 

Nute  v.  Nute  430  i,  462  a 

Nute's  Case  219  6,  221 


197 

485,  498 


O. 

Oakapple  v.  Copous 

Oakes  v.  Hill 

Oaks  v.  Weller 

Gates'  Trial  163  "q 

Oats  17.  U.  S.  46l'6 

Oberg  17.  Breen  152  b 

Obermann  Brewing  Co.  t7.  Adams  430  q 

O'Blenis  c.  State  146 

O'Boyle  17.  State  260  6 

O'Brien  v.  Davis  385 

17.  Gilchrist  305 

17.  La  Crosse  469  m 

v.  Louisiana  State  Bank  416 

v.  Spalding  239,  244 

O' Bryan  v.  Allen  2n 

O'Callaghan  17.  Murphy  554 

O'Connell  v.  O'Leary  81  d 

v.  People  81  6 

O'Connor's  Estate  186 

O'Connor's  Trial  14  f 

Odell  17.  Culbert  118 

17.  Koppee  370 

O'Dell  17.  State  364  6,  450  a 

Odenbaugh  r.  Bradford  284 

Odewald  17.  Woodsum  14* 

Odiorne  v.  Bacon  502 

v.  Wade  331,405 

v.  Winklev  52,  421,  423,  449,  461  e 

O'Donnell  17.  Clinton  284,  305  c 

Offutt  ».  Expos.  Co.  14  w 

Ogden  r.  Dodge  108 

».  Dodge  Co.  190 

».  Illinois  430  <? 

v.  Miller  117 

Ogle  17.  Atkinson  207 

v.  Paleski  421 

O'Hagan  v.  Dillon  435,  449 

Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Heaton  430 1 

v.  Ridge  6  b 

r.  Stein  430 1 

Ohl  17.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.  261 

Ohlaen  t7.  Terrero  434 

Oil  City  Fuel  &  Supp.  Co.  v.  Boundy      184  c, 

O'Kellv*.  O'K.-lly  110 

Oidiuil']  o.  Deakin  21 

Oldtown  (Bank  of)  v.  Houlton  332 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


XC1 


Oleson  v.  State 
Oliphant  v.  Taggart 
Olive  ».  Guin 

v.  State 
Oliver  v.  Morawetz 

v.  Pate 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  State 

t\  Walking 
Olmsted  v.  Gere 
Olsen  r.  Andrews 

v.  Rogers 

Omaha  Bridge  Cases 
Oiuaha  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Beeson 

v.  Elkins 

Omberg  v.  Mut.  Ass'n 
O'Mellia  v.  R.  Co. 


469  c 
575 
503 

1956,  46  Id 
14  n 

14  c,  250,  461  d 
163  a,  44 II 
Up,  14  q 
69 

441 1 

14  <7,  14ft 
Un 
466  a 
439  A 
163  g 
1626 

Omichund  r.  Barker    97  c,  156  a,  364  a,  364  £ 

368,  369 

O'Neale  v.  Walton  439  b,  439  c 

O'Neil  P.  R.  Co.  441  d 

v.  State  81  c 

v.  West  Branch  14  p 

O'Neill  r.  Allen  45 a 

Onverson  v.  Grafton  81,  441  d 

Ord  v.  Nash  163  c/ 

v.  Ord  189 

Ordronaux  v.  Chegaray  343 

Ord  way  v.  Haynes  439  g 

Oregon  S.  Co. "».  Otis  14/,  40,  563 p 

0'  Riley  e.  Clampet  186,  463,  465  a 

Ormsby  v.  People  184  a 

Orne  v.  Townsend  495 

Orr  v.  Hadley  163  a 

v.  Morrice  571 

r.  R.  Co.  430  i 

v.  State  441  d 

Ort  v.  Fowler  581 

Ortiz  v.  State  439  h,  App.  Ill 

Osborn  v.  Dock  Co.  469  d 

v.  Robbins  328  c 

v.  Simerson  14  v 

v.  Thompson  74,  81 

v.  U.  S.  Bank  178 

Osborne  v.  Bell  14  v 

v.  Detroit  13/,  14  u,  14  v,  195  d 

Osgood  v.  Chicago  14  t 

v.  Manhattan  Co.  174, 176 

Oskamp  v.  Gadsden  430  q 

Osmun  v.  Winters  14  o,  581 

Osterhout  v.  Roberts  533 

O'Sullivan  v.  Overton  569  d 

Oswald  v.  Legh  39 

Otey  v .  Hovt  14  v,  581 

Ottawa  v.  Perkins  482 

Ottawa  G.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Graham  14  v 

Otto  ».  Trump  505,  563  e,  563  v 

Outlaw  v.  Hurdle  58l 

Outran*  v.  Morewood          22.  137,  138,  138  a, 

145, 164,  531,  536 

Ovenston  v.  Wilson  575  c 

Over  v.  Blackstone  358 

v.  Schiffling  328  c 

Overlack  v.  Hall  81  d 

Overstreet  v.  State  140  b 

Overton  ».  Davison  14  » 

Owen  v.  Bartholomew  301 

v.  Bo  vie  485,  488 

v.  Flack  196 

v.  Mann  420 

v.  Owen  252 

v  Warburton  252  a 


Owens  r.  Collinson  402 

v.  Frank  248 

v.  R.  Co.  469  m 

v.  State  4396 

Owings  v.  Beall  519 

v.  Henderson  118 

v.  Hull  6  6,  490,  519 
v.  Low  112,173,174,1846 

v.  Speed  389,  484 

v.  Wyant  86 

Oxenden  v.  Chichester  291 

Oxier  v.  U.  S.  34,  461  6,  469  / 


P. 

P.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard  163  a 

Pabst  B.  Co.  v.  Lueders  197 

Pacheco  v.  Mfg.  Co.  14  q 

Packard  v.  Hill  488,  489,  514 

v.  Richardson  268,  385 

Packer  r.  Gonsalus  180,  469  d 

Packet  Co.  r.  Clough  2  a 

Packett  v.  State  41 

Paddock  v.  Bartlett  275 

v.  Forrester  192 

v.  Salisbury  14  d 

Padgett  v.  Lawrence  189 

Page  v.  Danaher  329 

v.  Faucet  5 

v.  Homans  577,  578  b 

v.  Osgood  75 

v.  Page  349,  563  6 

v.  Parker  434 

v.  Sheffield  284  a 

v.  State  441  / 

v.  Stevens  195  c 

Page,  Re  14  *,  162  e,  260  a 

Paget  v.  Paget  567 

Pngett  v.  Curtis  6<i 

Paige  v.  Cagwin  190 

v.  Carter  439  c 

v.  Hazard  440 

v.  Monks  284  a 

Pain  v.  Beeston  462 

Paine  v.  Aldrich.  441  f 

v.  Boston  14  v 

v.  Edsell  564 

v.  Hussey  420 

v.  Mclntier  281 

v.  Schenectady  66 

v.  Tilden  354,  469,  469  a 

v.  Tucker  563  k 

v.  Woods  439  g 

Painter  v.  Hall  484 

v.  People  14  o,  14$r 

Palethorp  v.  Furnish  185 

Palmer  v.  A  Idridge  66 

v.  Fogg  823 

v.  Haight  462 

v.  Lord  Aylesbury  163  A.  516 

v.  Rowan  '  317 

v.  Stephens  272 

v.  Trower  449 

Palmer's  Trial  162  A 

Palmore  v.  State  146,  14  c,  14ft 

Pancoast  v,  Graham  162  e 

Pangborn  v.  Young  482 

Pan  hell  v.  Com.  441  / 

Panton  r.  Holland  60,  64 

r.  Williams  81  e,  81  f 

Papendick  c.  Bridgwater  152  o 


XC11 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Paradise  ».  Ins.  Co. 

461  c 

Patterson  v.  Winn 

349 

Parent  v.  Walmsly's  Adm'rs                         6  b 

Patteson  v,  R.  Co. 

14» 

Paris  v.  Hughes 

361 

Pattillo  v.  Alexander 

43 

Park  v.  Johnson 

469  d 

1'attle  v.  Hornbrook 

305  c 

v.  Mears 

572 

Patton  v.  Allison 

162  e 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  c,  14  h 

v.  Ash 

38 

Parke  v.  Bird 

5636 

v.  Coates 

484 

v.  Blackiston 

Ub,Ud 

v.  Craig 

116 

v.  Smith 

385 

v.  Goldsborough 

180 

Parker  t;.  Carter 

239,  241 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  f,  81/ 

».  Chambers 

430  i 

v.  Ryan 

117 

v.  Cleveland 

507 

v.  Wilson 

337 

v.  Coburn 

14  o 

Paty  v.  Martin 

430  1 

v.  Green 

184  c 

Paul  v.  Meek 

563  I 

r.  Grout 

190 

v.  Paul 

4616 

v.  Haskins 

572 

Paulk  v.  State 

13  c,  14* 

•>.  Hill 

568  a 

Paull  v.  Brown. 

389,  408 

v.  Me  William 

432  c 

Pavey  v.  Pavey 

581 

v.  Merrill 

1846 

Pawashick,  Th'e 

162  /,  162  1 

v.  Mitchell 

331,  405 

Paxton  v.  Douglass 

451,  469  d 

v.  Morrell 

178 

v.  Dye 

469  a 

v.  Palmer 

66 

Pavne  v.  Com. 

14  c 

i'.  Publishing  Co. 

14  r 

*  v.  42d  St.  R.  Co. 

192 

v.  Staniland 

271 

v.  Ibbotson 

437 

v.  State             14  k,  79, 

1620,4616,  469  d 

v.  Rogers 

172,  173 

v.  Vincent 

402 

v.  Stiitc 

Uk,  156,  159,462 

v.  Yates 

243 

v.  Treadwell 

66 

Parkes  v.  U.  S. 

432 

v.  Troy  R.  Co. 

81  / 

Parkhurst  v.  Berdell 

523 

Payson  v.  Everett 

162  i,  162; 

v.  Ketchum     t 

Ud,Uh,  461  d 

v.  Good 

191 

v.  Lowten 

459,  469  d,  469  k 

Peabody  v.  Denton 

5636 

v.  Van  Cortlandt 

268 

Peaceable  v.  Keep 

429 

Parkin  v.  Moon 

434,  435 

v.  Watson 

147,  152  c 

Parkins  v.  Hawkshaw 

186,  239 

Peacock  v.  Harris 

195 

Parkinson  v.  People 

14  q 

Pearce  v.  Furr 

230 

Parks  v.  Boston 

6c,  13  j,  75,  162  o 

v.  Gray 

528 

v.  Caudle 

165 

v.  Hooper 

571 

v.  Dunkle 

5636 

v.  Lansdowne 

81/ 

v.  Edge 

73 

v.  Ormsby 

14  o 

v.  Gen.  Ins.  Assur.  Co. 

288 

v.  State 

14? 

v.  State 

14  q 

Pearcey  v.  Fleming 

430 

Parret  v.  Craig 

108 

Pearl  v.  Allen 

186 

Parrish  v.  Thurston 

328  c 

Pearse  v.  Pearse 

240 

Parrott  v.  Thacher 

200  a 

Pearson  v.  Coles 

75 

Parry  v.  Com. 

370  a 

v.  Cox 

81/ 

v.  Fairhurst 

73 

v.  Fletcher 

469  n 

r.  May 

563  c 

v.  Hardin 

Uq 

Parsons  v.  Copeland 

195,  527  a 

v.  Le  Maitre 

14  o,  53 

r.  Huff 

322 

v.  McDaniel 

577 

v.  Parsons 

162  e,  305  I 

v.  Spartanburg  Co. 

14  v 

v.  Purall 

563  k 

v.  Wightman 

4396 

v.  Thornton 

286 

Pease  v.  Hirst 

174 

Partridge  v.  Coates 

563  c 

v.  Smith 

1956 

Patapsco  Ins.  Co.  v.  Southgate  163  h,  163  t,  323 
Patch  v.  Boston                                           14  v 

Peaslee  v.  R.  Co. 
v.  Robbins 

14  fc 
42 

v.  White 

305m 

v.  Ross 

40 

Patchin  v.  Ins.  Co. 

462  a 

Peat's  Case 

339 

Pate  v.  People 

581 

Peck  v.  Abbe 

120  c 

Patek  v.  Waples 

305/ 

v.  Callaghan 

681 

Patrick  v.  Jack 

120  c 

v.  Clark 

140  a 

Patten  v.  Glover 

239 

v.  Parchen 

663  e 

v.  Poulton 

11  5,  162e 

v.  Pierce 

120  c 

t.  U.  S. 

430  1 

u.  Ryan 

197 

Patterson  v.  Choate 

174,  1846 

v.  State 

14  q 

v.  Collier 

575  6 

v.  Valentine 

4396 

v.  Pagan 

163  6,  163  c. 

Pederaon  v.  Stoffles 

388 

r.  Gainea 

28 

Pedigo  v.  Com. 

14s 

v.  Hansel 

la 

Pedler  v.  Pnige 

572 

v.  Hickey 

162  « 

Podley  v.  Wellesley 

336,  340 

p.  State 

461  d 

Peele  v.  Merch.  Ins.  Co. 

197 

v.  Tucker 

437 

Peerless  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gates 

44  U 

c.  Wilson 

275    Peery  v.  Peery 

162  e 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


XC111 


Peet  v.  Dougherty                                         384 

People  v.  Bernal 

370  d 

Pefferling  v.  State                                         469  c 

v.  Bernor 

469  c 

Peile  v.  Stoddart                                            240 

v.  Bidleman 

Ua 

Peirce  v.  Butler                                      399,  401 

v.  Bill 

363 

Peisch  v.  Dickson                                  280,  288 

v.  Blakeley 

150,  458,  461  a 

Peiepscot  Prop's  v.  Ransom                    20,  40 
I'elamourges  v.  Clark                                 441  h 

v.  Bodine 
v.  Bonney 

1956 
162  o 

Pell  v.  Ball                                                       30 

v.  Bowen 

Uq 

v.  Pell                                                      356 

v.  Brennan 

163  a 

Pelletreau  v.  Jackson                              22,  101 

v.  Brewer 

14  ft,  461  d 

Pelton  v.  Schmidt                                          192 

v.  Briggs 

81  d 

Pelzer  v.  Cranston                               118,  120  c 

v.  Brotherton 

14  t,  14  v 

Pelzer  Mfg.  Co.  t>.  Sun  Fire  Office           441  e 

v.  Brown 

162  h,  461  6,  46.4  d 

Pember  v.  Mathers                                        260 

p.  Buchanan 

14  o,  245,  466  a 

Pen.  &  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Bartlett                     162  / 

v.  Buddensieck 

439  h 

Pence  v.  Waugh                                          244 

v.  Burgess 

441/,  444 

Pender  ».  Fobes                                             281 

v.  Burns 

461  d 

Pendock  v.  Mackinder                          372,  373 

v.  Burwell 

W 

Pendrell  v.  Pendrell                                      146 

v.  Bush 

13  j,  162  o,  469  a 

Penn  v.  Bibby                                                 3 

v.  Bushton 

444 

Penn  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  M.  S.  B.  &  T.  Co. 

v.  Cady 

183/,  163  g 

14?.  441  e 

v.  Caldwell 

Up,  14  q 

Pennell  t>.  Meyer                               201,  201  a 

v.  Carlton 

14  1 

Penniman  v.  Hartshorn                                 268 

v.  Carolan 

4616 

v.  Hill                                                   432  a 

v.  Carrier 

14  o 

Pennock  v.  McCormick                               284 

v.  Case 

163/,  443 

Pennsylvania  v.  Farrel                                  414 

».  Casey 

146,4616,461  c 

v.'  Robertson                                         14  c 

v.  Chapleau 

App.  Ill 

Penns.  Co.  v.  fioylan                                   14  1 

v.  Chee  Kee 

6  d,  1G2J 

v.  Marion                                              247  a 

v.  Chegaray 

343 

v.  McCaffrey                                      120  a 
v.  Newmeyer                                     469  m 

v.  Chin  Hane 

163/195  a,  439  0,461  a. 
4616 

v.  R.  Co.                                                 Uq 

v.  Chin  Mook  Sow                             461  e 

v.  Watson                                               14  v 

v.  Ching  Hing  Chang                        465  a 

Penns.  Coal  Co.  v.  Kelly                          439  g 

v.  Christman 

81  d 

Penns.  R.  Co.  v.  Books                               14y 

v.  Clark 

14  A,  14o,46l6 

v.  Bridge  Co.                                      184c 

v.  Cole 

163  d,  247  a 

v  .  Henderson                                        195  d 

v.  Com'rs 

482 

v.  Lyons                                                162  g 

p.  Conroy 

4446 

v.  Page                                                 14  v 

v.  Considine 

97  d,  432 

v.  Righter                                             81  f 

v.  Constantino 

136 

v.  Stranahan                                         14  v 

v.  Cook 

14  w 

Penns.  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Bunnell  430^,  441  q 

v.  Copsey 

450  a 

Penny  v.  Brink                                              310 

v.  Corbin 

Uq 

v.  Porter                                            58,  66 

v.  Corey 

14  k,  163  f,  577,  581 

Penny  Pot  Landing  v.  Philadelphia 
Penobscot  Boom  Corp.  v.  Lamsou               563 

v.  Costello 
v.  Coughlin 

380 
14  q 

Penruddock  v.  Hammond                             240 

v.  Court 

4616 

Pensacola  R.  Co.  v.  Schaffer                     563  e 

v.  Craft 

162 

Pentecost  ».  State                                          213 
People  p.  Abbot     14  b,  14  g,  14  o,  461  c,  461  d 
v.  Abbott           14  6,  14  g,  14  o,  14  q,  46  1  a 

v.  Craig 
v.  Crapo 
v.  Creagan 

14*,  14  q,  370  d 
461  6,  469  I 
380,  381 

v.  Ah  Choy                                           Up 

v.  Creegan 

14? 

v.  Ah  Chung                                        81  c 

v.  Crespi 

444 

v.  Ah  Fat                                           469  a 

t\  Cronin 

144 

o.  Ah  Sing                                                34 
v.  Ah  Yute                          162  p,  197,  435 

v.  Cunningham 
v.  Daniels 

14? 
201 

v.  Alden                                              254  a 

v.  Davis 

156,  461  c 

v.  Alivtree                                            14  k 

v.  Dean 

362,  414 

v.  Allender                                           81  a 

v.  De  France 

247  a 

<'.  Amanacus                             461  b,  469  a 

v.  Devine 

1630.230,  462 

v.  Ammermann                                     213 

v.  Dice 

201,  462  a 

v.  Anderson                                          14  c 

v,  Dillwood 

461  6,  465  a 

v.  Arnold                13  a,  14  Tc,  195  a,  444  b 

v.  Dimick 

14  q 

v.  Ash                                                   81  c 

v.  Doggett 

146 

v.  Ashmead                          14  p,  81  c,  213 

v.  Dole 

1956,4446,  469  d 

v.  Augsbury                                        441  1 

v.  Donovan 

462  a,  465  a 

v.  Baker                                                328  c 

v.  Dorthy 

4616 

v.  Baldwin                                         370  d 

v.  Douglass 

163^ 

v.  Barker                            81  c,  219  b,  239 

v.  Dowling 

14o 

v.  Barthleman                                      Uo 

v.  Downs 

816 

v.  Benson                                     14  b,  14  g 

v.  Doyell 

4696 

XC1V 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


People  0.  Doyle 
v.  Driscoll 

1956 
197,  461  b 

People  v.  Hong  Ah  Duck       14  *,  430  c,  465  a 
v.  Hooghkerk                                       381 

v.  Druse 

146 

u.  Hope                                                 14  v 

v.  Dubois 

14  q 

v.  Hopson                                    14  q,  563  a 

v.  Duncan 

162  A 

v.  Hovey                                               1956 

v.  Durrani 

14  o,  14  «,  248,  439^439  h, 

v.  Howard                                               14  c 

441  /,  444 

v.  Howell                                                 414 

v.  Dye 

U/ 

v.  Howes                                             219  6 

v.  Ebanks 

6  a 

v.  Hughes                                  97  d,  328  c 

v.  Edwards 

14  c 

v.  Hulse                                                469  a 

v.  Elyea 

4396 

v.  Hunt                                                      18 

v.  English 

184  a 

v.  Hurley                                                   34 

v.  Etting 

6 

v.  Ins.  Co.                        114  c,  114  e,  162/ 

v.  Evans 

14m 

v.  Irving                                    461  6,  469  g 

v.  Everhardt 

14  q 

v.  Irwin                                                   284 

v.  Fair 
v.  Farrell 

146 
13  a,  14  q,  328  c 

v.  Jackson      14  6,  14  ff,  14  o,  439  h,  461  6, 
462  a 

v.  Faust 

6 

v.  Jacobs                                                  444 

t;.  Fehrenbach 

14  q 

v.  Jenness                                       14  o,  370 

v.  Ferguson 

328  c 

v.  Johnson    14  6,  162  o,  221,  439  g,  439  h, 

v.  Finley 

81  c 

'461  a 

v.  Fish 

163/,  439  h 

v.  Jones                                14  q,  217,  3786 

v.  Fitzgerald 

14  o,  14?,  469  d 

v.  Josephs                                             146 

v.  Foglesong 

162  b,  441  I 

v.  Kelley                                      App.  Ill 

v.  Fong  Ah  Sing                           81  6,  156 

v.  Kelly                                                   444 

v.  Foote 

4616 

v.  Kemmler                               247  a,  469  e 

v.  Forbes 

469  d 

v.  Kennedy                                   14  k,  14  q 

v.  Fowler 

197,  342 

v.  Kern                                                 Ho 

v.  Frank 

14  q 

v.  Kessler                                      162  g,  197 

v.  Franklin 

65 

v.  Knapp             14?,  14  h,  159,  185,  4616 

v.  Fultz 

14  q,  450 

v.  Koerner    114/,  197,  247  a,  441/,  466  « 

0.  Gage 

162  h,  469  c 

v.  Kohler                                              461  6 

v.  Gallagher 

243,  469  d 

v.  Kruger                                                 444 

v.  Gallo 

162  o 

v.  Kuches                                       14  6,  14  g 

v.  Garbutt 

146,  14  c,  14  k,  14  /,  81  a 

v.  Lamb                                                14  c 

v.  Gay 

461  6,  469  a 

v.  Lambert            14  q,  430  6,  465  a,  469  c 

17.  Gelabert 

218 

v.  Lane                                       14  1,  247  a 

V.  Genung 

4506 

v.  Lange                                             563  6 

v.  Gibbons 

App.  Ill 

v.  Lansing                                              14  q 

«.  Gibbs 

14  q 

v.  Larubia                                              14  q 

v.  Giblin 

4616 

v.  Lawrence                                          462 

v.  Gibson 

430  c 

v.  Lee                                                    313 

v.  Gillespie 

444 

v.  Lee  Fat                                           162  p 

v.  Glenn 
v.  Glover 

161  a,  163/ 
162  A 

v.  Lilly                                                   14* 
v.  Linkshaw                                       439  g 

v.  Goldenson 

434,  441  1,  450 

r.  Lohman                                               407 

v.  Gordon 

195  6,  230 

v.  Lombard                                  14  c,  14* 

v.  Graham 

469  c 

v.  Lopez                                               14  o 

v.  Gray 

14  q 

t'.  Luchetti                                              34 

v.  Green 

162  o,  346 

v.  Lynch                                             162  h 

v.  Greenwall 

461  c 

v.  JVfachen                                               14  a 

v.  Gress 

14  o 

v.  Malaspina                                       195  o 

v.  Griffin 

Ul 

v.  Manning                                           4616 

v.  Haas 

Uq 

v.  Marble                                              14  q 

v.  Hall 

152  d,  162  t,  162* 

v.  Markham                             461  a,  461  d 

v.  Hamblin 

4616 

r.  Mason                                               195n 

v.  Hun-is 

Uff,  14  o,  247  a 

r.  Mather       434,  461,  466  o,  469  d,  469  i, 

v.  Harrison 

4616 

469* 

v.  Hart 

34 

v.  Mathis                                          430./o 

v.  Hawes 

13e 

v.  Matteson 

v.  Hawkins 
».  Hawley 

14  q 
163  t 

v.  Mausaunan                                     461  6 
v.  Mayes                        5,  6  d,  4446,  461  </ 

v.  Hayes 

254 

v.  Mavhew 

v.  Henderson 
«.  Hennessey 

14  ff 
2lV 

r.  Mavne                                  1146,  114  o 
v.  McCann 

9.  Henssler 

14  ? 

v.  McCarthy                                         14  v 

».  Herrick 

375,  457,  461  b 

v.  McCarty                                            432 

v.  Hickman 

213,4446 

v.  McConiiell                                          6  a 

v.  Hicks 

162  A 

v.  McCormack                                    461  b 

v.  Hoch 

UL  U74,469<2 

r.  McCrea                           162  A,  197,  215 

v.  Holbrook 

563  c 

v.  McCurdy                                          13  e 

v.  Holmes 

14  v,  461  c 

v.  McDona'ld                                     461  6 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


XCV 


People  t'.  McElvaine 

441  k,  441  / 

People  t7.  Restell 

163  a 

17.  McGarren 

369 

17.  Rice 

5 

17.  McGee 

370  c,  439  e,  469  c 

v.  Riordan 

816 

v.  McGilver 

Uq 

p.  Roat 

434 

17.  McGloin 

220  c,225,  App.  Ill 

i?.  Robinson 

2206 

v.  McKane 

430  q 

v.  Robles 

14  q,  230 

v.  McKeller 

449 

17.  Rodrigo 

4616 

17.  McLaughlin 

14  n,  14  o,  161  c,  439  6, 

17.  Roemer 

461  e 

441  A 

17.  Rolfe 

43  a,  430  i 

r.  McLean 

146,  Ug,  Uo,  46!)  / 

i?.  Safford 

444 

17.  McMahon 

219  a,  App.  Ill 

17.  Sam  Lung 

432  c 

f.  McNair 

367 

•p.  Samonset 

461  c 

17.  McQuade 

111,  184  a 

v.  Sanchez 

158,  159 

r.  Mead 

101,  469  e 

17.  Sanders 

14  q,  469  d 

17.  Methvin 

461  c 

17.  Sanford 

157 

r.  Millard 

162  i,  162  A 

v.  Saxton 

328  c 

r.  Miller 

14  q,  213,  254  c 

17.  Schmitt 

42 

17.  Mills 

461  6.  469  d 

17.  Schoon  maker 

343 

v.  Milner 

13  j,  162  o 

p.  Schweitzer 

14  q 

r.  Minck 

484 

17.  Scoggins 

ul 

v.  Mitchell 

14  r,  34,  444 

».  Scott 

14  m,  14  o 

r.  Mondon 

225,  App.  Ill 

i?.  Seaman 

Uq 

».  Montgomery 

Up,  310 

17.  Searcy 

439  g 

17.  Moore 

444  a,  469  6 

17.  Sears 

4446 

t'.  Morrigan 

14  v,  162  h, 

17.  Sessions 

14  Q 

r.  Morrow                                               81  c 
17.  Murphy        14  q,  165,  166,  430  /,  5786, 

v.  Sharp     14  q,  195  6,  441  h,  469  d,  563  5 
17.  Shattuck     '                                      162  6 

581 

r.  Shaw 

Up,  159,  462 

v.  Murray 

146,  14  c 

17.  Shay 

146 

r.  Myers 

14  v 

v.  Shea 

14? 

17.  Newman 

163  a 

i?.  Sheriff 

242  « 

i\  Niles 

4616 

r.  Shulman 

Uq 

17.  Nino 

14  1 

17.  Sickles 

v.  Noelke 

4616 

17.  Sierp 

162  p,  163/ 

i?.  O'Brien 

34 

v.  Silva 

461  a,  461  6 

17.  Oldham 

34,  184  a 

17.  Simpson 

162  A 

t>.  O'Neil 

375 

17.  Skutt 

14  o 

17.  O'Neill 

252,  444 

17.  Slater 

lUd 

v.  Osmond 

14  o 

v.  Sligh 

163/ 

v.  Ostrander 

34 

17.  Sliney 

247  n 

17.  0'  Sullivan 

14  q,  469  c 

17.  Smith 

14  q,  161  6,  439  A 

r.  Packenham 

441  f 

v.  Snellie 

4616 

v.  Palmer 

Uk 

17.  SotO 

2196 

17.  Parker 

581 

17.  Spiegel 

469  / 

v.  Parmelee 

4446,  4616 

v.  Squires 

14  A 

17.  Parton 

213 

t.  Stack 

14  c 

17.  Patterson 

14  o 

v.  Stackhouse 

462  a 

r.  Pease 

378 

17.  Stanley 

Up,  184  a 

17.  Peckens 

14  q,  184  a 

17.  Sternberg 

381,  469  d 

17.  Phillips 

247 

r.  Stevens 

152  d 

17.  Pico 

1406 

v.  Stewart 

146 

t7.  Piercy 

4616 

v.  Stone 

816 

v.  Piper 

432  c 

r.  Stout 

14  o 

i?.  Pitcher 

Up 

17.  Strait 

14  I,  430  I,  44  If 

17.  Plyler 

333  a 

t7.  Streuber 

1956 

r.  Pope 

163d 

17.  Strong 

14^,  213 

u.  Porter 

217 

i).  Supervisors 

482 

17.  Potter 

14m 

v.  Sutherland 

14  A,  14  o,  444  6,  461  6 

17.  Powell 

14  c,  14  q 

v.  Swetland 

2196 

17.  Poyllon 

471 

v.  Taing 

14  A 

17.  Prather 

461  n 

v.  Taylor 

156,  441  /,  App.  Ill 

v.  Purdy 
17.  Pustolka 

482 
439  A 

17.  Thacker 
».  Thiede 

14  y 
254  c,  445 

17.  Ramirez 

220  c,  370  e 

17.  Thomas 

333  a,  444  6 

».  Rando 

Uq 

r.  Thompson 

220 

v.  Ranged 

Uo 

r.  Thorns 

14? 

17.  Ratnburri 

Up 

17.  Thorn 

162  o 

v.  Ratz 

lUd,  430  A 

v.  Tliroop 

474 

«.  Rector       14  A.  461  a,  461  b,  469  a,  469  6 

v.  Tiley 

461  6 

».  Reed 

4446 

v.  Travis 

14  A 

v.  Reinhart 

213,  4446,  4616 

r.  Tvler 

461  c 

v.  Kesh 

97  d 

17.  Un  Dong 

461  d 

XCV1 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


People  v.  Van  Dam  14  6 

v.  Vanderhoof  162  t,  162  k,  441  / 

v.  Vane  195  6,  469  6 

v.  Van  Horn  184  a 

v.  Van  Tassel  14  9 

v.  Wade  260  6,  461  c 

v.  Wakely  14  q 

v.  Walker  370  a 

v.  Wallace  444 

v.  Walters  14  q 

v.  Warner  220  c 

v.  Water-Front  Co.  6  e 

v.  Webster  439  h,  450  6 

v.  Weiger  App.  Ill 

v.  Wells  461  6 

v.  West  247  a 

v.  Wheeler  162  i,  162  k 

v.  Whipple  375,  379 

v.  White  13  i,  195  b 

v.  Whiteman  14  q 

v.  Whitson  461  6 

v.  Williams  5,  14  r 

v.  Wilson  14  q 

v.  Winthrop  13  e,  Up 

v.  Wirth  462  a 

v.  Wolcott  219  a,  220 

v.  Wolf  18 

r.  Wong  Ah  Ngow  14  p 

v.  Wong  Chuey  156 

v.  Wood  14  I,  14  q 

v.  Woon  Tuck  14  v 

v,  Wright  -A.pp.  Ill 

•».  Young  197,  439  e,  441/,  441 1 

v.  Yslas  461  a 

People's  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geisthardt  575  c 

People's  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Green  439  h 

Peoples  v.  Com.  156 

Peoria  A.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Sawyer  13  j 

Peoria  D.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice  469  m 

Peoria  G.  &  C.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

Peoria  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnum  13  j 

Pepoon  v.  Jenkins  501,  505 

Pepper  v.  Barnett  577 

Peppin  v.  Solomons  51,  63 

Percival  v.  Nanson  115, 152 

Perdicaris  v.  Bridge  Co.  6  6 

Perdue  v.  C.  &  C.  Co.  466  a 

Perham  v.  Raynal  174 

Perigal  v.  Nicholson  155,  421 

Perkins  v.  Adams  201 

p.  Augusta  Co.  120  a 

v.  Bank  469  d 

v.  Perkins  81  a 

v.  Roberge  461  e 

v.  State  469  6 

v.  Stickney  430  / 

v.  Towle  152'c 

v.  Walker  531 

v.  Webster  301 

Perley  p.  Perley  14  x 

Pernam  v.  Wead  301 

Ferret  v.  Ferret  162  e 

Perrin  v.  Noye«  81 

r.  Wells  163  g 

Perry  r.  Bailey  252  a 

9.  Baird  462  a 

v.  Bank  40 

v.  Fleming  429 

v.  Gerbeau  200 

v.  Gibson  445 

v.  Manser  443  6 

c.  Mfg.  Co.  186 


Perry  ».  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  6  b 

v.  People  461  6 
v.  State                        97  d,  156,  161,  245, 

254  a 

Perry's  Case  343 

Perrvman  v.  Greenville  6  6 

v.  Steggall  427,  428 

Person  v.  Grier  317,  318 

Perth  Peerage  Case  114  d,  162  j 

Peter  v.  State  221 

v.  Thickston  162  I 

Peterborough  v.  Jaffrey  440 

Peterhoff,  The  5 

Petermans  r.  Laws  398 

Peters  v.  Ins.  Co.  541,  543 

Peterson  v.  J.  W.  Co.  441  d 

v.  Morgan  U  d 

v.  R.  Co.  441  / 

v.  State  14  k,  370  d 

Peterson,  Exparte  6  a 

Petherick  r.  Turner  184  6 

Peto  v.  Blades  398 

Petrie  v.  Benfield  509 

Petrie's  Case  243 

Pettibone  v.  Derringer  163  h,  352 

v.  Smith  14  « 

Pettingill  v.  Dinsmore  55 

Pettit  t1.  State  5,  162  d 

Petty  v  Anderson  185 

Peverly  v.  Boston  14  » 

Perrons  r.  Howard  6  a 

Peytoe's  Case  302 

Peyton  r.  Hallett  392 

f.  Morgan  Park  463,  465  o 

v.  State  14  r,  81  6 

Pfan  «.  State  34 

Pfefferkorn  v.  Seefield  444  a 

Pfeifer  v.  Ins.  Co.  305  k 

Pflueger  v.  State  556 

Phelan  v.  Slattery  305  k 

Phelin  v.  Kenderdine  469  d 

Phelps  t'.  Abbott  305  d 

v.  Com.  81  d 

v.  Conant  14  n 

v.  Cutler  80 

v.  Foot  101 

v.  Mankato  14  v 

v.  Prew  563  e 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

v.  Riley  167,  418 

v.  Town  430  6 

Phen^'s  Trusts,  In  re  30,  41 

Phenix  v.  Baldwin  163  i 

Phila.  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hendrickson  14  v 

Phila.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Stimpson        423,  445,  449 

Phila.  &  T.  R.  Co.  r.  Simpson  110 a 

Phila.  W.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehman  5 

Philbrook  v.  Eaton  284 

Philips  c.  Com.  14  k 

Philipson  v.  Chase  563  c,  563  o 

Phillips  v.  Allen  28 

v.  Berick  532 

v.  Cornell  40 

t'.  Earner  445 

r.  Gregg  430  6 

r.  Hall  207 

r.  Hunter  612 

v.  Kelly  1626 

r.  Kinpfield  461,  461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

r.  Miirluehead  461  / 

r.  Pnillips  4.'i  a 

v.  Slmw  70 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


xcvn 


Phillips  v.  Smith 
i>.  State 
v.  Wells 
v.  Willow 
v.  Wimburn 


186 

14  &,  14  r,  184  a,  469  c 

568  a 

14  v 

227 


Philliskirk  v.  Pluckwell 
Phipps  v.  Mahon 

v.  Pitcher 

v.  Seulthorpe 
Phoenix  •:.  Ingraham 
Pticenix  Assur.  Co.  v.  Lucker 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Am.  Co. 

v.  Moog 

v.  Phillip 

v.  Shoemaker 

v.  Sullivan 
Piatt  v.  McCullough 
Pick  v.  R.  H.  Co. 


78 
14  x 
409 
207 

180,  392 
14  w 
4396 

435,  465  a 

14  w 

254 

4396 

20 

13  i 


Pickard  v.  Bailev          81  g,  430  b,  430/«,  514, 

5636 

v.  Bryant  462 

v.  Sears  204 

Pickens  v.  Davis  103, 162  e 

v.  State  81 6,  46 1  d 

Pickering  v.  Bp.  of  Ely  115 

17.  Cambridge  108 

17.  Dowson  281 

i;.  Noyes  469  n 

v.  Reynolds  189,  201  a 

v.  Townsend  163  6 

Pickup  v.  Thames  Ins.  Co.  14  a; 

Picton's  Case  13  e,  162/,  488,  492 

Pictorial  League  v.  Nelson  14  n 

Pidcock  v.  Potter  14 1 

Piddock  v.  Brown  361 

Piedmont  B'k  v.  Hatcher  14  <? 

Pier  v.  Duff  189 

Pierce  v.  Boston  14  v 

v.  Butler  399 

t7.  Chase  423 

v.  Gilson  450 

v.  Indseth  488 

v.  Kimball  6  6 

i;.  Myrick  146,  461  c 

v.  Newton  461  a 

v.  Northey  581 

v.  Parker  288 

v.  Roberts  184  6 

17.  Weymouth  304 

v.  Wood  174 

Piercy's  Case  14  s,  497 

Piersbn  v.  Hutchinson  5636 

17.  People  14o,243,  247  a 

Pigg  17.  State  466  a 

Piggot  ».  R.  Co.  14  v 

Pigot  t7.  Davis  521 

Pigott  v.  Holloway  437 

Pike  v.  Chicago  13  i,  430  p,  441  q 

v.  Crehore  14  q,  152  d.  513 

17.  Hayes  152  c 

Pile  v.  Benham  428 

Pillow  v.  Impr.  Co.  328  a 

Pillsburv  ».  Locke  439  b 

Pirn  t7.  Curell  139 

Pinch  17.  Willard  305  d 

Pingery  v.  R.  Co.  441  e 

Pingree  v.  Johnson  439  6 

Pinkard  v.  State  14  p 

Pinkham  17.  Benton  439  6 

Pinnev  ».  Andrus  439  6 

p.CabUl  14 1>,162  * 

Pinney's  Trial  201 

VOL.  I.  —  g 


14 1,  441  c 
356 

117,1206 
14  k 


Piuuey's  Will 

Pipe  i?.  Steel 

Pitman  17.  Maddox 
i?.  State 

Pitt  u.  Cnappelow  2o7 

Pitt's  Estate 

Pittam  r.  Foster  176 

Pittimau  v.  Slate  163  # 

Pitton  17.  Waiter  510 

Pittsb.  C.  C.  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.  ».  Lewis         444 

17.  Noftsger  108 

17.  Sheppard  162 1 

Pittsb.  F.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  t>.  Ruby  146,  14  c, 

Pitlsb  V.  &  C.  R-  Co.  r.  Rose  14  v 

i ..Vance  14  17,  430  i,  430^ 

Piltsb.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson  14  o 

i?.  Thompson  370  c 

Pittsfield  &  F.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrison  2  a 

Pittsford  17.  Chittendon 

Pizarro,  The  31,  37 

Place  17.  Clark  14  n 

Plainiield  F.  N.  B'k  17.  Dunn  305  k 

Plank-Road  Co.  17.  Bruce  20 

17.  Wetsel  568  a 

Plant  17.  Condit  284 

v.  McEwen  179 

17.  Taylor  114  e 

Planters'  Bank  i?.  George  469  g 

Planters'  M.  Ins.  Co.  17.  Rowland  441  e 

Plainer  17.  Plainer  189 

Plattekill  v.  New  Paltz  331 

Plattsmouth  17.  Mitchell  14_p 

Plaxton  i?.  Dare  139, 150,  575  6 
Pleasant  v.  State  14  o,  14  6, 14 .9,  432  c,  461  a, 
4616,  461 'c,  461  d,  469  c 

Plimmer  17.  Sells  185 

Plumb  17.  Curtis  14/,  14  o 

17.  Whiting  387 

Plumer  v.  Brisco  184  c,  207,  563  g 

v.  French  308 

17.  Guthrie  284 

Plummer  v.  Com.  14  p 

17.  Currier  192 

17.  Mercantile  Co.  120  c,  466  a 

17.  Ossipee  14,/,  14  M 

Plunket  17.  Bowman  575 

Plunketl  17.  Cobbett  14  o,  251 

Plymouth  v.  Painter  563  g 

Po'cock  17.  Billings  190 

Poignard  v.  Smith  349 

Poindexter's  Case  14  q 

Pointer  17.  U.  S.  14  o 

Pole  17.  Rogers  320 

Polhill  17.  Brown  498 

Polin  17.  State  14  v 

Poling  t).  R.  Co.  439  g 

Polini  17.  Gray  114  c,  120  a 

Polk  v.  Bulterfleld  6  6 
r.  State                      14  h,  14  jfc,  441 1,  469 1 

Pollard  t7.  Bell  541 

t>.  Lively  43  a,  485  a 

Pollock  v.  Wilcox  563  b 

Poison  v.  State  254, 469  c 

Polston  r.  See  81  d 

Pomeroy  17.  Baddeley  432  a 

Pomfrey  17.  Saratoga  Springs  14  v 

Pond  17.'  Hartwell  420 

Ponder  17.  Shumans  501 

Ponsford  v.  O'Connor  320 

Pontifex  17.  Jollv  81 

Pontius  ».  People  14  i,  14 1 


XCV1U 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[Befereuces  are  to  sections.] 


Pool  v.  Bridges 

108    Prater  v.  State 

14  k,  461  d 

Poole  v.  Deaiie 

4416,  441  c,  441/ 

Prather  v.  Johnson 

116,  120 

v.  Dicas 

115,  120  a 

V.  Palmer 

41 

v.  Palmer 

395,  406 

Pratt  v.  Andrews 

14  6,  14  d 

v.  Richardson 

440,  44iy 

v.  Battles 

4J^   n 

Pooler  v.  tkate 

163  a 

v.  Jackson 

*Oi>   ft 

Poor  v.  Robinson 

563  A 

v.  Patterson 

1f4 

Poorman  v.  Miller 

86 

v.  White 

.loo  o 

Pope  v.  Allis 

186 

Preedy  i>.  Haltom 

287 

i\  Askew 

577 

Prell  v.  McDonald 

6  6 

Poplin  v.  Hawke 

550 

Prentice  v.  Achorn 

284 

Porath  ».  State 

14  o 

Prentis  v.  Bates 

77 

Porter  ».  Byrne 

276 

Presbrey  v.  R.  Co. 

Up 

v.  Cooper 
v.  Ferguson 

508 
5636 

Prescott  v.  Ward 
v.  Wright 

461  6,  461  f 

284 

v.  Judson 

5 

Presser  v.  State 

469  a 

v.  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Pillsbury 

441  d 
322 

Pressley  v.  State 
Prest  v.  Mercereau 

232 
118 

v.  Poquonoc  Man.  Co.                           440 

Preston  v.  Bowmar 

301 

f.  Seller 

146 

v.  Carr 

240 

v.  State 

Up,  1956,220,  221 

o.  Harvey 

531 

v.  Waring 

66 

v.  Merceau 

275,  281 

v.  Warner 

130,  140  a 

Prestwood  v.  Watson 

186 

Portland  v.  Kamm 

441  a 

Prettvman  v.  Dean 

358 

Postal  T.  C.  Co.  v.  Brantley              108,  184  c 

Prewit  v.  Tilly 

831,  430 

v.  Le  Noir 

184  c 

Prewitt  v.  Martin 

465  « 

Poston  v.  Jones 

38 

Price  v.  Bridgman 

163  A 

Poteete  v.  State 

156 

v.  Dewey 

528 

Potez  v.  Glossop 

38 

v.  Dewhurst 

541,  546 

Pott  v.  Todhunter 

304 

v.  Garland 

120  c 

Potter  f.  Baker 

532 

v.  Harwood 

208 

v.  Gas  Co. 

14.p,  14  *,  14  » 

v.  Hollis 

183 

v.  Nat.  Bank 

2a 

v.  Littlewood 

137 

t>.  Sewall 

296  a 

v.  Lqrd  Torrington 

116,  120  6 

v.  Ware 

254  c,  386 

v.  Mazange 

14  p,  140  6 

v.  Webb 

14  6,  55 

v.  Page 

305  k 

Pough  v.  Mitchell 

564 

v.  Powell 

440 

Poulson  v.  Stanley 

254 

v.  Price 

41 

Poulter  v.  Killing'beck 

271 

v.  Wolfer 

563o 

Poultney  v.  Ross 

118,  120  c 

Prichard  v.  Fafrar 

523 

Pound  v.  State 

14  c,  Ug,  14  i.  14  o 

Pridgen  v.  Green 

5756 

v.  Wilson 

444 

Priest  v.  State 

217,  233,  370  a 

Povall,  Ex  parte 

505 

Prime  v.  Eastwood 

14  o 

Powel  v.  Gordon 

392 

Primm  v.  Stewart 

41 

v.  Hord 

394 

Primrose  v.  Browing 

563o 

Powell  v.  Biddle 

305^ 

Prince  v.  Blackburn 

572,  575 

v.  Blackett 

572 

v.  Samo 

201,  462  6,  467 

v.  Bradbury 

473,  559 

v.  Shepard 

420 

v.  Edmunds 

281 

v.  Smith 

118 

v.  Ford 

577 

v.  Swett 

118 

v.  Harper 

14  d  152  d 

Prindle  v.  Glover 

14  m 

v.  Milburn 

35 

Prine  v.  State 

Uk 

v.  Monson 

26 

Pringle  v.  Miller 

162  p 

v.  Olds 

14  k 

v.  Pringle 

163  d,  189 

v.  Powell 

108 

Printup  v.  Mitchell 

184  d,  200,  564 

v.  State      13  e,  Ug, 

14  fc,  1626,213,227, 

Prior  v.  State 

4616 

430  p 

Pritchard  v.  Bagshawe 

203,  563  k 

».  Waters 

164 

v.  Brown 

26,  266 

Power  v.  Kent 

239 

v.  Draper 

1846 

Powers  v.  Armstrong 

146 

v.  Foulkes 

243,  245 

v.  Leach 

461  c,  46  le 

v  McOwen 

118 

v.  McFerran 

575 

v.  Walker 

195 

v.  McKenzie 

430/,  581 

Pritchett  r.  State 

14  c,  1  4  k 

v.  Mitchell 

441) 

Pritt  r.  Fairclough 

40,  116,  120  6 

v-  Presgroves 

14  d,  461  d 

Probasco  v.  Cook 

Up 

v.  Russell 

14  x 

Proctor  v.  Houghtaling 

Ud,  14  A,  14  o 

v.  Shepherd 

322,  323 

v.  Lainson 

180 

v.  Silsby 

140  a 

Proper  v.  State 

14  o,  14  q 

v.  State 

159,  444  a 

Prop'rs  of  Brattle  St.  Church 

v.  Bullard      17 

v.  Ware 

566 

Propsam  v.  Leatham 

14;, 

Poyner  ».  State 

146 

Protection  Ins.  Co.  v.  Harmer 

4416,  441  ; 

Prader  r.  Ace.  Ass'n 

247  a 

Prouty  v.  Ruggles 

322 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Provis  r.  Reed 

469,  469  a 

R.  v.  Antrobus 

128,  138 

Pruden  v.  Alden 

305  g,  510 

v.  Appleby 

197,  198,  215,  233 

Prudential  Assurance  Co.  v 

Edmonds         41 

v.  Arnold          163  a,  220  b,  224,  App.  Ill 

Pruitt  v.  Cox 

469  a 

i;.  Arundel 

37,  482 

Publishing  Co.  v.  Keller 

Uq 

17.  Ashton 

158,  162 

Pugh  v.  Mcliae 

147 

v.  Atkins 

195 

Pullen  v.  Hutcbinson 

564,  575,  575  a 

17.  Attwood 

220 

v.  People 

335 

v.  Atwood 

380 

v.  Shaw 

564 

r.  Avery 

243,  245 

Pulley  v.  Hilton 

485 

17.  Azire 

343 

Pulliam  v.  Cantrell 

461  d,  469  a 

v.  Babb 

474 

Punderson  v.  Shaw 

118 

«7.  Bailey 

14  q 

Purcell  v.  Macnamara 

56,  60,  78 

17.  Baker 

156 

Purdy  v.  People 
Purviance  v.  Dryden 

14;; 
358,  395 

17.  Baldry          219  b,  220,  220  a,  App.  Ill 
v.  Ball                              14  i,  14  q,  53,  435 

Puth  v.  Zimbleinan 

162  d 

v.  Bannen 

381 

Putnam  v.  Bond 

290 

v.  Barber 

580 

v.  Clark 

528 

17.  Barker 

14  b,  461  f,  563  c 

v.  Goodell 

563  o 

17.  Barnard 

380,  459 

«.  Lewis 

212 

v.  Barnes 

195,  518 

v.  U.  S. 

435,  439  c 

17.  Barnet 

439  c,  465  a 

Putt  v.  Rawstera 

533 

17.  Bartlett 

197,  215,  App.  Ill 

v.  Roster 

533 

r.  Basingstoke 

563  / 

Pye's  Case 

65 

v.  Bate 

220,  221 

Pvke  r.  Crouch 

536 

v.  Bathwick 

342,  570 

Pyle  v.  Clark 

81  / 

17.  Beardmore 

319 

r.  Pyle 

341,  441  I 

17.  Beavan 

403 

Pym  u.  Campbell 

305  c 

v.  Bedfordshire 

128,  1  38  a 

Pytt  17.  Griffith 

572 

r.  Bedingfield 

162  g 

v.  Beeston 

163  a 

v.  Bell 

227,  228,  Aop.  Ill 

Q. 

17.  Bellamy 

508 

t7.  Bennet 

App.  in 

Quaife  v.  R.  Co. 

162  b,  430  I 

r.  Benson 

38  a,  82,  512 

Quarterman  17.  Cox 

422 

17.  Bentley 

227 

Queen  17.  Morrow 

4696 

v.  Berger 

138 

».  Muscot 

257 

17.  Berriman         220  b, 

225,  232,  App.  Ill 

p.  State 

444 

17.  Bird 

166 

Queen's  (The)  Case          88,  184  a,  195  a,  201, 

v.  Birkett 

381 

218,  234,  364  b,  370,  450, 

450  b,  462,  462  a, 

17.  Birmingham 

13  a,  152.  152  c 

462  b,  463,  465,  465  o,  467 

17.  Bishop  of  Ely 

474 

Quessenbury  v.  State  . 

14  c 

17.  Blake 

184  a,  233 

Quick  17.  Quick 

162  e,  563  g 

v.  Bleasdale 

14  q 

17.  Staines 

207,  210 

17.  Bliss 

139 

Quimby  r.  Buzzell 

38  a,  572 

v.  Bodkin 

App.  Ill 

v.  Wroth 

430 

17.  Bond 

65,  221,  App.  Ill 

Quin  v.  Assur.  Co. 

441  e 

17.  Conner 

158,  161  b 

_  v.  State 

35 

v.  Borrett 

195 

Quincey  r.  Quincey 

285 

17.  Boston 

362,  390,  414,  537 

Quinlan  v.  Utica 

14  17 

17.  Boulter 

257 

Quinn  17.  Champagne 

6 

r.  Bowen 

218 

».  Com. 

276 

17.  Boyes 

380.  469  d 

i1.  Eaglesron 

101,  108,  575  b 

v.  Boyle 

432  c 

1?.  Halbert 

370  c 

v.  Braintree 

5636 

v.  Higgins 

441  I 

17.  Braithwaite 

257 

v.  Moss 

305  / 

17.  Brandreth, 

184  a 

v.  People 

469  d 

i?.  Brangan 

471 

v.  State 

444 

£.  Brasier 

367,  370  d 

Quinsigamond  B'k  v.  Hobbs 

430  /,  461  a 

17.  Brewer 

244 

17.  Briggs 
17.  Britton 

14  q 
App.  Ill 

R. 

17.  Broadhempston 

38  a 

17.  Brommick 

195 

R.  v.  Adderbury 

175 

17.  Brooke 

445 

v.  Addis 

381 

17.  Brown                   45  a,  449,  461  c,  461  e 

v.  Adey 

469  d 

v.  Bryan 

221 

17.  Aictles 

162  m,  484,  493 

17.  Buckley 

120  a,  162  c 

v.  Alexander 

162  A 

v.  Burdett 

2  a,  14  y,  78,  195  6 

«.  Allgood 

473,  475 

17.  Burley 

379 

i?.  Allison 

86 

17.  Burton 

34 

17.  All  Saints 

38  a,  342 

17.  Butler 

218,  227 

v.  Almon 

36,  234 

17.  Cain 

232 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


R.  v.  Calder 
v.  Caldwell 
v.  Callaghan 
v.  Careinion 
v.  Carter 
v.  Carty 

v.  Castell  Careinion 
v.  Castle  Morton 
v.  Castleton 


Uq 
580 
161 
563  k 
Uq 
227 

372,  375 
563  k 
563  6,  563  e 


17.  Castro       14  s,  163  a,  163  g,  195  a,  247, 

439  h 

v.  Chambers  14  q 

c.  Champney  257,  259 

17.  Chapman  435 

1?.  Chappel  90,  224 
17.  Cheverton                        220  b,  App.  Ill 

v.  Child  166 

v.  Christie  158 

17.  Christopher  227 

17.  Claphara  493 
».  Clarke      146,  14  g,  54,  162  h,  210,  469, 

469  a 

17.  Clay  14  b,  54 
v.  Clewes                14  o,  201,  218,  221,  223 

v.  Cliviger  342 

f.  Cockcroft  14^,  14  o 

17.  Cockin  34 

v.  Cohen  28 

t7.  Cole  390 

c.  Coley  220 

v.  Col  ley  32  c 

v.  Collier  221 

v.  Cook  432 

i?.  Cooper  14  q,  220,  221 

v.  Cope  120« 

v.  Cotton  145,131 
17.  Court             219  b,  220,  220  b,  App.  Ill 

17.  Coveney  227,  465  a 

v.  Cox  242  a 

v.  Cranage  62 

17.  Crickmer  14  q 

v.  Crockett  158 
17.  Crouch                          162 1,  162 /,  162£ 

v.  Cuffey  184  « 

17.  Culpepper  563  b 
v.  Davis                 14  q,  225,  373,  App.  Ill 

17.  Dawber  380 

v.  De  Berenger  6  a,  491 

t7.  Denio  5636 

*.  Dent  488 

v.  Derrington  220  6,  254  a 

t7.  Despard  382 

v.  Devlin  App.  Ill 

».  Dewhurst  430  i 

v.  Dillon  230 

t7.  Dilmore  163  o 

17.  Dixon  18,  36,  243 

17.  Dogherty  220 

17.  Doherty  343 

v.  Doran  87 

v.  Dossett  14  a 

v.  Doyle  232,  App.  Ill 

«.  Drage  14  q 

v.  Dredge  34 

v.  Dr.  Hay  30 

17.  Drummond  157 

17.  Duffey  4<il  b 

r.  Duncoinbe  4U.'! 

r.  Dunn  147,2-2.'} 

r.  Durham  asu.  :;xi 

».  Dvcr  Jii-J  /' 

v.  Dyke  381 


R.  v.  Dytche  14  r,  443  b 

v.  Edge  563  i 

v.  Edmonds  201 
v.  Edwards        439  c,  449,  457,  463,  465  a 

v.  Egerton  14  q 
v.  Ellis                   14 o,  14  q,  225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Elworthy  563  c 

v.  Emden  305  g,  512 

v  Enoch  213,  220,  222 

v.  Eutrehman  364  b 

v.  Erdheim  227,  App.  Ill 
v.  Eriswell  99,  138,  163,  163  a,  163y,  553 

r.  Erith  114/,  114  g 

v.  Esdaile  3 

v.  Esop  18 

v.  Exall  14,  14  s,  34 

v.  Exeter  152 
v.  Eyre                               102,  162  A,  469  c 

v.  Fagent  158,  159 

0.  Fagg  224,  App.  Ill 

v.  Fairlie  14  v 

v.  Farler  380 

v.  Farley  239,  245 

v.  Farr  444,  563  n 

v.  Farrell  163  g 

v.  Farringdon  21,  575  b 

v.  Farrington  34 

c.  Fearshire  227 

v.  Fennell  219  a,  220 

v.  Ferrers  343 

v.  Ferry  Frystone  125 

v.  Findge  14  q 

v.  Fitzgerald  384,  493 

v.  Flannagan  144  o,  14  q 

v.  Fleming  220 

v.  Fletcher  218,  363,  379 

v.  Forbes  14  q,  163  a 
v.  Ford       372,  373,  378,  436,  439  c,  465  a 

v.  Forster  14  q 

v.  Forsyth  479,  480 

v.  Foster  162/J  228 

v.  Fox  167 

v.  France  554 

v.  Francis  14  d,  14  q,  563  » 

v.  Francklin  491 

v.  Frederick  335 

v.  Frost  184  a,  328  a 

v.  Fuller  14  s,  34 

v.  Fursey  563  h,  563  o 
v.  Garbctt           193,  225,  469  d,  App.  Ill 

v.  Gardiner  257 

v.  Gardner  195,  374,  479 
v.  Garner                  14  q,  219  a,  219  b,  220 

v.  Gavin  App.  Ill 

v.  Gay  161 

v.  Gazard  166,  254  c 

v.  Geering  14  q 

v.  Gibbons  222,  223,  247  a 
v.  Gibney                   220  b,  220  c,  App.  Ill 

v.  Gilham  2206,  App.  Ill 

v.  Gillis  220,  App.  Ill 

v.  Gilroy  459 

v.  Gilson  87 

c.  Gisburn  422,  bMj 

v.  Goldshede  App.  Ill 

v.  Goode  13  b 

v.  Goodere  432 

r.  Goodwin  14  7 

v.  Gordon  (Lord  George)  482,  563  g 

r.  Gould  231.  L'.'l-i 

r  (ininaUjlli  254  a,  469/ 

t'.  Grant  14  o 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Cl 


R.  v.  Gray 
v.  Green 
v.  Greepe 
v.  Griffin 
v.  Grimwood 
v.  Gully 
v.  Gutch 
v.  Guttridge 
v.  Hagan 
v.  Hall 
v.  Harborne 
v.  Harding 
v.  Hardwick 
v.  Hardy 
v.  Hare 
v.  Hargrave 
v.  Harringworth 
v.  Harris 
v.  Harwood 
v.  Hassett 
v.  Hastings 
v.  Hawkins 
v.  Haworth 
v.  Hay 
v.  Hayman 
v.  Hay  ward 
v.  Hazy 
v.  Hearn 
v.  Hearne 
v.  Hebden 
v.  Heesom 
v.  Hemp 
v.  Heseltine 
v.  Hewett 
v.  Higgins 
v.  Hill 
v.  Hind 
v.  Hinks 
v.  Hinley 
v.  Hirst 
v.  Hodgkiss 
v.  Hodgson 
v.  Holder* 
v.  Hollister 
v.  Holmes 
v.  Holt 

v.  Holy  Trinity 
v.  Hopkins 
v.  Hornbrook 
v.  Homer 

v.  Hostmen  of  Newcastle 
v.  Hough 
v.  Howard 
v.  Howell 
v.  Howes 
v.  Hube 
v.  Hucks 
v.  Hughes 
v.  Hulme 


14? 

2206,229,  App.  Ill 
378 

222,  232 
484 
6rt 

36,  234 
469  c 

14  #,  163  d,  163  ff 
184  c,  App.  Ill 
35 
220 

174, 175,  184  b,  223,  331 
184  a,  250 
257  a 
380 
5696 

14  q,  34,  230,  231 
Uo 

App.  Ill 
380 
35,  80 

563  c,  App.  Ill 
30 
227 
158 

14;.),  78 
222,  232 
218 
536 

14  q,  163.9 
461  c 
14  v 

156,  220,  222 
218 
365 
156 

233,  363,  375 
14  q,  563  n 
228 

461,  461  d 

14/,  14  q,  54,  220  6,  458 
462,  465,  465  n 
478 

146, 14  o,219  a,  220,  369 
Uy,  479,  492 
87,  563  k,  563  o 
14.9 

219  a,  221 
221 
475 

14?,  53 
563  f,  563.9 
14  q,  158 
221 

86,  563  £ 
49,  65,  161  6 

34,  252,  259,  430>,  App.  Ill 
414,  469  d 


v.  Hunt  14  q,  90,  184  a,  461 6,  563  »,  563  q 
v.  Hunter  469  n 

v.  Hutchinson  156 

v.  Hyde  163  d 

v.  Jacobs  227 

v.  Jagger  343 

v.  Jarvis  14  m,  14  q,  78,  220,  380 

v.  Jenkins  158,  222,  232 

v.  John  28 

w.Johnson  14s,  40,  503  » 

v.  Johnston        2206,  220  c,  225,  App.  Ill 
v.  Jones  6  a,  218,  220,  222,  232,  239,  241, 
319,  380,  381,  563  g 


R.  v.  Jordan  28 

v.  Justices  of  Buckingham  474 

v.  Just  ices  of  Surrey  478 

v.  Kea  253  6 

•v.  Kerr  App.  Ill 

v.  Kenilworth  563  6 

v.  Kerne  195 

v.  Kimber  App.  Ill 

v.  King  484,  493 

v.  Kinglake  469  d 

v.  Kingston  220,  223 

v.  Kird'ford  331 

v.  Kirkwood  14  q 

r.  Kitsen  563  d 

v.  Knill  257,  259 

v.  Kohl  81  c 
v.  Labouchere                     14  A,  1956,  498 

v.  Lafone  363 

v.  Laindon  285 

v.  Lambe  14  i 

v.  Langmead  34 

v.  Langton  439  6 

v.  Laugher  222 

v.  Leathaiu  563  e 

v.  Lee  163  a 

v.  Leefe  65 

v.  Levy  43  a 
v.  Lewis      225,  226,  457,  469  d,  App.  Ill 

v.  Lilly  man  162  A,  469  c 

v.  Lingate  223 

v.  Little  444 

v.  Llanfaethly  563  e 
v.  Lloyd                               14  q,  156,  220  6 

v.  Locker  335,  407 

v.  Lockhart  232 

v.  Long  App.  Ill 

v.  Long  Buckby  21,  38  a,  46 

v.  Lucas  473 

v.  Luckhurst  220,  223 

v.  Luck  up  403 
v.  Luffe                               5,  28,  254  6,  344 

v.  Lyons  363 
v.  Magill                              220  6,  App.  Ill 

v.  Maidstone  28 

v.  Mailloux  14  q 

v.  Main-waring  38  a 

v.  Mai  ings  333  a 

v.  Mallorv  2«,  182 

v.  Mansfield  28,  220 

v.  Marshall  163  h 
v.  Martin     14  o,  Uq,  13  i.  54.  201,  219  6, 
227,  484,  493 

v.  Mashiter  280 

v.  Matthews  18 

v.  May  14  q 

v.  Mayhew  257 

v.  Mayor  of  London  331 

v.  Mayor  of  York  536 

v.  McDonnell  14  n 

v.  McHugh  App.  Ill 

v.  McKenna  450 

v.  Mead  156,343 

v.  Medley  36 

v.  Megson  162  h,  469  c 

v.  Merceron  App.  Ill 

v.  Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  474 

0.  Merthyr  Tidvil  563  o 
v.  Mick                                   225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Middlezoy  571 

v.  Millard  14  q 

v.  Miller  6  a 

v.  Millhouse  333 a 


Cll 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


R.  v.  Mills 
v.  Milton 

220,  222 
130,  139 

R.  v.  Proud                                                   14  q 
v.  Purnell                                                474 

v.  Mitchell 

439,7 

v.  Quin                                                  439  c 

v.  Mobbs 

14? 

v.  Radford                                          2206 

0.  Mogg 

14? 

v.  Ramsden                                   437,  439  c 

v.  Mooney 

158 

0.  Rankin                                                14  e 

v.  Moore    14  q,  219  a, 

220,  223,  370  a,  381 

0.  Rawden                                      87,  563  b 

v.  Moreau 

184,  362,  537 

v.  Reading                                      344,  457 

v.  Morgan 

158,  364  b,  378  a 

v.  Reaney                                                158 

v.  Morris 

43  a,  512 

v.  Reardon                                             14  q 

v.  Morse 

227 

v.  Reason    13  e,  156,  159,  161,  219  a,  227 

v.  Morton 

5636 

0.  Redman                                            13  i 

v.  Mosey 

232 

v.  Reed                                            227,  228 

v.  Mosley 

158 

v.  Rees                                          App.  Ill 

v.  Mudie 

257  a 

v.  Reeve                                                220 

v.  Mullins 

380,  382 

v.  Regan                                       14  q,  563  p 

v.  Murphy        432,  434,  435,  446,  576,  580 

v.  Rhodes                             469  d,  484,  493 

v.  Mutineers 

363 

v.  Richards                             221,  App.  Ill 

0.  Nattrass 

Uq 

v.  Richardson                                 ]4j,  101 

v.  Neal 

381 

v.  Riley                                 146,  14  9,14  o 

v.  Netherthong 

333 

v.  Rivers                 224,  225.  227,  App.  lit 

v.  Neville 

209 

v.  Roberts                       14  h,  14  q,  53,  257 

v.  Newton 

465  a,  563  g 

0.  Robins                                     14  o,  461/ 

v.  Nicholas 

162  h,  367 

v.  Robinson                 140,  563  d,  App.  ill 

v.  Noakes 

381 

v.  Roddam                                               312 

v.  Noel 

467 

v.  Roden                                                  14  q 

v.  Northampton 

53 

v.  Roebuck                                           14o 

v.  North  Petherton 

120  a,  493 

v.  Rogan                                             461a 

v.  Nuneham  Courtney 

125 

0.  Rogers                                                   78 

v.  Nutt 

36 

v.  Rook                                                 254  b 

v.  O'Brien 

250,  432  b 

v.  Rook  wood                                         461 

v.  O'Connell 

184  a,  201,  250 

v.  Rosser                                        6  c,  254  c 

v.  O'Connor 

14  e 

v.  Row                                                     223 

0.  Oddy 

14  e,  14  q 

v.  Rowland                                             363 

v.  O'Doherty 

14  y 

v.  Rowley                                                165 

v.  Oldroyd 

444 

v.  Rowton                 14  6,  14  e,  461  c,  461  d 

0.  Orton" 

4616 

v.  Rudcl                                   335,  386,  413 

v.  Osborne 

162/t 

0.  Russell  (Lord  J.)                      319,  559 

v.  Overton, 

448,  461  e 

0.  Ruston                                            370  c 

v.  Owen 

226,  App.  Ill 

0.  Kyan                                                   14  b 

v.  Oxford 

14  1,  441  1 

0.  Ryton                                                    21 

v.  Page 

14  g,  14  q 

v.  Saddler                                               311 

v.  Pah-mah-Gay 

3646 

0.  Saffron  Hill                                      563  b 

v.  Paine 

163  a,  218 

v.  Sandys                                       App.  Ill 

v.  Palmer 

I*  ft  140 

0.  Sansome                     221,  225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Parker 

222,  257,  257  a,  469 

0.  Saunders                           14  q,  224,  575  c 

v.  Parnell 

469  f 

v.  Savage                                           163  g 

v.  Parratt 

222 

0.  Scaife                                     161  e,  163^ 

v.  Partridge 

34,  220,  222 

0.  Scammonden                             285,  305 

v.  Pedlej' 

440 

0.  Schulz                                            441  6 

v.  Pegler 

469  d 

0.  Scott                                 225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Peltier 

163  a 

0.  Searle                                                  440 

v.  Perkins 

157,  158 

0.  Serjeant                                      336,  343 

0.  Petcherini 

162  c 

0.  Sextons                                               222 

v.  Perrv 

14o 

0.  Shaw                220  6,  225,  237,  248,  257 

v.  Pettit 

225,  App.  Ill 

0.  Shellard                   462,  463,  465,  465  a 

v.  Philips 

28 

0.  Shelley                      83,  475,  478,  563  (/ 

v.  Phillips 

14» 

0.  Shepherd                                     220,  222 

v.  Philpotts 

436,  439  b 

0.  Sheriff  of  Chester                             473 

v.  Picton 

488 

0.  Sherman                                             363 

0.  Pike 

157,  367 

0.  Shimmin                                          333  a 

0.  Pikesley 

224,  227 

v.  Shipley                                               18 

0..  Pitcher 

458,  460 

0.  Silverfock                                        581  a 

0.  Plumer 

14  «,  40,  199 

0.  Simons                45,  200,  220  b,  224,  254 

0.  Plummer 

166 

0.  Simpson                                              222 

0.  Pollard 

28 

0.  Slanev                                              469  d 

0.  Pountney 

222,  223 

v.  Slaughter                                          223 

0.  Povey 

488 

0.  Sleeman                  220  6,  223,  App.  Ill 

v.  Pratten 

78 

0.  Slogett                                      App.  Ill 

0.  I'reraly 

90,  228 

0.  Slomwn                                                319. 

0.  Priddle 

372,  373 

0.  Smith    Uq,  53,  163  a,  195  c,  225,  227. 

0.  Primelt 

14  q 

243,  335,  473,  482,  608,  513,  App.  Il{ 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


cm 


R.  v.  Smith  &  Homage 
v.  Smithies 
v.  Southwood 
v.  Spencer 
v.  Spicer 


224,  225 
21 
Uq 

223,  512 
65 


v.  Spilsbury    158,  161  b,  220  b,  227,  370  e 

v.  St.  George  462 

v.  St.  Giles  572 

v.  St.  Martin's  436,  437,  439  b 
v.  St.  Mary  Magdalen,  Bermoudsey    333 

v.  St.  Pancras  531,  534 

v.  Stafford  255 

v.  Stainforth  38  a 

v.  Stapleton  -  28 

v.  Steel  App.  Ill 

v.  Stenson  14  q 

v.  Stephens  14  ?,  39 

v.  Steptoe  218 

v.  Stoke  upon  Trent  292 

v.  Stone  78,  184  a 

v.  Stourbridge  563  b 

v.  Stripp  225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Stubbs  380 

v.  Sullivan  217 

v.  Sunderland  14  q 

v.  Sutton  5,  140,  491 

v.  Swatkins  222,  228,  App.  Ill 

v.  Tanner  41 

v.  Tarrant  90,  228 

v.  Taverner  14  q 
v.  Taylor  142,  162 1,  162*,  222,  223,  230, 
449,  463,  578  o 

v.  Teal  383,  458,  459 

v.  Teasdale  412 

v.  Telicote  228 

v.  Thanet  (Earl  of)  254  c 
v.  Thomas        219  a,  219  b,  220,  223,  227, 
248,  App.  Ill 

t7.  Thompson  163  ry,  219  a,  219  b 

v.  Thornton  220  b,  220  c,  222,  225, 

App.  II [ 

v.  Tidd  381 

v.  Tissington  14  J,  14  g,  43  a 

•<7.  Toole  App.  Ill 

v.  Torpey  28 

v.  Totuess  38  a 

v.  Tower  473 

v.  Towey  2  a 

v.  Tubby  225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Tucket  14  I 

v.  Turberfield  14  c 

17.  Turner  78,  79, 152  d,  233 

v.  Twyning  35,  41 

V.  Tyler  213,  223 

v.  tinkles  217 

V.  Upchurch  222,  223 

e.  Upper  Boddington  239 

v.  Upton  Gray  38  a 

v.  Van  Butchell  158,1616 

17.  Vandercomb  14  q 

v.  Vaughan  432 

v.  Verelst  563.9 

v.  Vernon  223 

v.  Vickery  563  g 

v.  Vincent  97  d,  162  d 

«.  Virrier  257  a 

v.  Voke  14  q 

v.  Wade  367 

r.  Wamwrigb.t  162c 
v.  Walker                 102,  162  h,  225,  467  c, 
App.  Ill 

v.  Walkley  218,  223 


R.  v.  Walkling  333  a 

v.  Waller  65 

17.  Walter      ,  36,  227,  234 

17.  Warickshall  232 

17.  Waring  14  d 

v.  Warringham  219  b,  220 

17.  Waters  65 

v.  Watkinson  245 

v.  Watson  40,  52,  65.  90,  101,  184  «, 

199,  228,  250,  256,  423,  439  c, 

449,  459,  460,  461  b,  469  d, 

563  p 

v.  Weaver  43  a,  484 

v.  Webb  14 17,  225,  381,  App.  Ill 

v.  Weeks  14  q 

17.  Weller  227 

v.  Wellings  163  g 

v.  Wells  381 

17.  Westbeer  379 

17.  Whalley  13 1,  162  o 

17.  Wheater  -A-PP-  HI 

17.  Wheatland  259 

v.  Wheeley  226,  App.  Ill 

v.  Wheeling  217 

v.  Whiston  38  a 

D.  White  13  a 

17.  Whitehead  14 1,  14  q,  365,  367,  370  c 

17.  Whitley  Lower  175 

17.  Wick  ham  285 

17.  Widdop  -App-  HI 

17.  Wild  220  b,  220  c,  App.  Ill 

17.  Wilkes  381 

17.  Wilkinson  227 

17.  Williams  163  a,  335,  363,  367,  392, 
403,  412,  439  c,  444 

v.  Williamson  14 1 

17.  Willshire  35 

1?.  Wilson  14m 

v.  Winkworth  14  q 

17.  Winslow  14  q 

v.  Withers  237,  479 

17.  Woburn  175,  330,  331,  353,  469  g 

17.  Wood  162  h,  461  d,  469  c 

17.  Woodburne  App.  Ill 

v.  Woodcock  156,  158,  159,  161, 346 

17.  Woodley  409  n 

17.  Wooldale  69 

17.  Worth  147,  150,  151 

«.  Wrangle  305  e 

1?.  Wright  440,  441  / 

17.  Wylie  14  q,  53 

17.  Yates  257 

17.  Yewin  450,  459 

v.  Yore  343 

17.  Young  380 

R.  &  T.  Cos.  17.  Board  5 

R.  Co.  v.  Ayres  162/ 

17.  Bixby  430/ 

17.  Botsford  469  m 

17.  Durant  287 

f.  Henderson  120  a 

17.  Jones  14  v 

17.  Kenney  81 

17.  Rogers  14  v 

v.  Yeiser  14  v 

Xabeke  17.  Baer  28,  254  b 

3ackemann  v.  Impr.  Co.                             305/" 

riadburn  17.  Morris  428 

Sadcliff  i'.  United  Ins.  Co.  479,  491 

^adcliffe  «.  Fursman  240 

Radford  v.  Mclntosh  195.  563  g 

v.  State  156 


CIV 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Rafe  v.  State 

220 

Rayburn  v.  Lumber  Co.                              569  8 

Rafferty  *.  State 

Uq 

Raymond  v.  Coffey 

287 

Raffles  v.  Wichelhaus 

288,  305  1 

v.  Raymond 

281 

Ragan  v.  Smith 

575  c 

r.  Squire 

173 

Raggett  v.  Musgrave 

199 

Rayner  v.  Lee 

87 

Railing  v.  Com. 

356 

Raynes  17.  Bennett 

254 

Railway  P.  &  F.  C.  Assoc.  v.  Robinson    110« 

Raynham  17.  Canton 

488,  489,  505 

Raines  r.  Raines 

150,  151 

Razor  17.  Razor 

199 

Raleigh's  Trial 

156 

Rea  17.  State 

81  c 

Ralph  v.  Brown 

563  & 

Read  v.  Brookman 

566 

Ralston  v.  Miller 

128,  138  a 

v.  Dunsmore 

73 

Ramadge  v.  Ryan 

441 

17.  Gamble 

563  c 

Rambert  v.  Cohen 

90,  436 

17.  Passer 

140  c,  493 

Rambler  v.  Tryon 

162  e,  440 

17.  Tacoma  Assoc. 

305  1 

Ramey  v.  State 

14  o 

Reade's  Case 

210 

Ramkissenseat  v.  Barker 

3646 

Readman  v.  Conway 

195  d 

Rainsbottom  v.  Tunbridge' 

87,  89,  305  e, 

Real  17.  People 

4616 

563  k 

Real  Eat.  Co.'s  App. 

284  a 

Ramsdell  v.  Clark 

38,  305  e 

Ream  17.  State 

466  a 

Ramuz  v.  Crowe 

5636 

Reamer  17.  Nesmith 

288 

Rancliff  (Lord)  v.  Parkins 

5756 

Rearden  17.  Minter 

571 

Rand  v.  Dodge 

152  c,  5736 

Reay  17.  Richardson 

201  a 

v.  Mather 

303 

Rector  v.  Bernaschina 

305  f 

Randall  v.  Chase 

439  A 

17.  Rector 

37,  444  c,  450'6 

v.  Gurney 

316 

Red  v.  State 

4696 

».  Holsenbake 

14  d,  14  A,  14  o 

Redd  17.  State    14  k,  161  a,  163  g,  219  6,  563  g, 

v.  Lynch 

205 

577 

v.  Jsfews  Assoc. 

14  o 

Reddick  ».  Leggat 

301 

v.  Parramore 

551 

v.  State 

469  d 

v.  Phillips 

392 

Reddin  17.  Gates 

439  h 

v.  State 

461  a,  46  Id 

Redding  v.  McCubbin 

138  a 

v.  Tel.  Co. 

14  u 

17.  Redding's  Estate 

14  a,  577 

Randall's  Case 

340 

Redfern  v.  Smith 

13  t 

Randegger  v.  Ehrhardt 

189 

Redfield  v.  R.  Co. 

441  d 

Randel  v.  Chesapeake  &  Del.  Can.  Co.       563 

Redfield's  Estate 

247  a 

Randle  ».  Blackburn 

201 

Redford  v.  Birley 

101,  108,  162  d,  430  i 

Randolph  v.  Easton 

28 

Redmond  17.  Ben.  Ass'ii 

247  a 

v.  Gordon 

5756 

Reece  17.  Trye 

240 

r.  Loughlin 

581 

Reed  17.  Anderson 

563 

v.  Woodstock 

465  a 

17.  Board  man 

427,  436 

Rands  v.  Thomas 

383 

v.  Brookman 

45  a 

Rangely  v.  Webster 

540 

17.  Dick 

14  17,  110 

Rank  v.  Shewey 

87 

v.  Dickey 

152  c 

Rankin  r.  Blackwell 

564 

v.  Jackson               19,  135,  137,  138  a,  139 

v.  Homer 

194 

v.  James 

445 

v.  Ten  brook 

108,  152  c 

v.  Kemp 

567 

Banner  v.  R.  Co. 

14*7 

v.  King 

444 

Ransom  v.  Keyes 

427 

v.  Lamb 

3 

Rapelye  v.  Prince 

523 

».  Passer 

86 

Raper  v.  Birkbeck 

566 

17.  Propr's  of  Locks 

297 

Rapp  v.  Le  Blanc 

444 

17.  R.  Co. 

14  u,  102,  1626,  195  d 

Rash's  Estate 

35 

17.  Spaulcling 

581 

Rastall  17.  Stratton 

70 

17.  State 

14  q,  563  e 

Rat  cliff  v.  Courier-Journal 

14  d,  14  A 

17.  Williams 

14  d,  14  A 

v.  Pemberton 

302 

17.  Wilson 

5 

v.  Planters'  Bank 

563  a 

Reeder  v.  Holcomb 

328  c 

t?.  Trimble 

485  a 

Reel  v.  Reel 

162  e 

v.  Wales 

344 

Rees  r.  Overbaugh 

566 

Ratcliffe  v.  Chapman 

130 

t7.  Smith 

74 

Ra%-ee  v.  Farmer 

632 

17.  Walters 

5756 

Raven  v.  Dunning 

356 

17.  Williams 

672 

Rawles  v.  Ford 

14  * 

Reese  v.  Harris 

43 

v.  State 

461  a,  461  d 

t7.  Hershey 

14  c 

Rawley  v.  Brown 

34 

t7.  State 

Uo 

Kawlitis  17.  Desborough 

74,  441 

Reeside,  The 

299 

liawls  t7.  Ins.  Co. 

441  e 

Reeve  17.  Dennett 

14  »,  284 

Kawaon  >•.  Haigh 

108,  110 

Reeves  17.  Slater 

69 

v.  Plaisted 

189 

17.  State 

1ft/ 

r.  Turner 

5-33 

Reffell  17.  Reffell 

284 

r.  Walker 

281,  304 

Reformed  Dutch  Ch.  v. 

Ten  Eyck               4G2 

Bav  P.  I',.-  11 

462 

filicide's  Caso 

256 

"  t.  Castle 

120  a 

Reguier  v.  Cabot 

461  d 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


CV 


Reid  v.  Bnttie 

v.  Ladue 

v.  Louisiana  Lottery 

v.  Margison 

v.  Reid 

v.  Warner 
Reifsnider  v.  R.  Co. 
Reilly  v.  Fitzgerald 
Reitau  v.  Goebel 
Reitenbach  v.  Reitenbach 
Reitz  v.  State 
Rema  v.  State 
Remon  v.  Hayward 
Remy  v.  Olds 
Renaud  v.  Abbott 

v.  Pageot 

Renihan  v.  Dennin 
Rennell  v.  Kimball 
Renner  v.  Bank 
Rens  v.  Relief  Ass'n 
Rensch  v.  Cold  Storage  Co. 
Rensens  v.  Lawson 
Republican  P.  Co.  v.  Miner 
Resolutions  of  Judges 
Respublica  v.  Davis 

v.  Keating 

v.  McCarty 

v.  Ross 

Retan  v.  R.  Co. 
Revel  v.  State 
Revett  v.  Braham 
Rev  v.  Simpson 
Reynell  ».  Sprye 
Reyner  v.  Hall 
Reynolds  v.  Adams 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Magness 

v.  Powers 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Robinson 

v.  Rowley 

v.  State        14  k,  14  o,  8: 
Reyons  v.  State 
Rhea  v.  State 
Rhine  v.  Ellen 
Rhoades  v.  Fuller 
Rhode  v.  Louthain 
Rhodes  ».  Ainsworth 

v.  Bunch 

Ribbans  v.  Crickett 
Ricard  v.  Williams 
Rice  v.  Austin 

v.  Com. 

v.  Gunn 

v.  Howard 

v.  Marine  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Oatfield 

v.  Peet 

v.  Rice 

v.  State 

v.  Wilkins 
Rich  v.  Eldredge 

v.  Flanders 

v.  Jackson 

v.  Minneapolis 

v.  Topping 

v.  Trimble 
Richards  v.  Bassett 

v.  Frankum 

v.  Goddard 

v.  Howard 

v.  State 


89 

Richards  v.  Stewart 

563  e 

Uq 

Richards  Co.  v.  Hiltebeitel 

305/ 

184« 

Richardson  v.  Allan 

4436 

430/«,  508 

v.  Anderson 

173,  487 

461  d 

v.  Carey 

116,  389 

201  a 

v.  Dorr 

24 

441  d 

v.  Emery 

120  c 

114  e,  131 

v.  Fell 

81 

14o 

v.  Foster 

305  c 

233 

v.  Freeman 

333,  427 

14s 

v.  Green 

581 

97  d 

v.  Hooper 

303 

280 

v.  Hunt 

387 

14  v 

».  Learned 

341 

66 

v.  Newcomb 

581 

162e 

v.  State 

14  o 

247  a 

v.  Stringfellow 

577 

14  o 

v.  Turnpike  Co. 

14 

292,  563  b,  563  q 

v.  W.  &  R.  T.  Co. 

195  d 

162  c 

v.  Watson 

288 

184  c 

v.  Williams 

362 

Un,  38,  189 

Richardson,  In  re 

19 

44H 

Richley  v.  Farrell 

162  1 

230,  405  a 

Richmond  v.  Patterson 

484 

187 

v.  Richmond 

444  a,  469  a 

414 

Richmond  L.  &  M.  W.  v.  Ford                   Uv 

218 

Richmond  R.  Co.  v.  Jones 

5696 

362 

Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v. 

Briggs              162/ 

14  v 

v.  Powers 

81/ 

Up 

Rickards  v.  Murdock 

441,  441  e 

76 

Rickerson  v.  Ins.  Co. 

305  1 

288 

Rickets  v.  Salwey 

63,  72 

245 

Ricketts  v.  Rogers 

81/ 

212 

Rickman  v.  Carstairs 

305  1 

162  e 

Rickman's  Case 

34,  53 

14n 

Riddle  v.  Moss 

402 

279 

Rideout's  Trusts,  In  re 

28 

163  g 

Rider  v.  People 

Up 

469  a 

Ridgway  v.  Bowman 

281 

284,  441  / 

v.  Ewbank 

81 

184  c,  469  » 

Ridgway  (Matter  of) 

30 

c,  156,  254,  469  b 

Ridley  v.  Gyde 

108 

Q7d 

v.  Ridley 

81  c 

461  a 

Rigby  v.  Logan 

120  o 

304 

Rigden  v.  Wolcott 

14  o 

14i 

Rigg  v.  Cook 

108 

430  i 

v.  Curgenven 

200,  210 

139,  405 

Riggs  v.  Myers 

305m 

146,  55 

v.  Powell 

162  c,  577,  581 

205 

v.  Tayloe 

349,  430  i,  563  b 

17 

Right  v.  Price 

272 

420 

Riley  v.  Boehm 

120  c 

1956 

v.  Com. 

14  c 

163i 

v.  Gerrish 

,281 

444 

v.  Gregg 

281 

444 

v.  Hall 

581 

4436 

v.  Iowa  Falls 

14« 

284 

v.  Suvdam 

185 

245 

Riney  v.  Vanlandingham 

4696 

Ug 

Ringgold  v.  Tyson 

385 

394 

Ringhouse  v.  Keener 

114  c 

120  c 

Riordan  v.  Guggerty 

14/,  445,  563  p,  581 

177 

Rios  v.  State 

342 

275,  281 

Rioters,  Case  of  the 

412 

186 

Ripley  v.  Babcock 

81  a 

399 

v.  Hebron 

41 

581 

v.  Thompson 

395 

130,  131,  137 

v.  Warren 

6a 

198 

Ripon  v.  Bittel 

Up,  162  1,  162  k 

310 

v.  Davies 

245 

118 

Rippe  t>.  R.  Co. 

439  1 

432  a 

Ripple  v.  Ripple 

505,  546 

CV1 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Rippy  r.  State 

14  k 

Robinson  v.  Woodford 

195* 

Rise"».  State 

146 

17.  Yarrow 

196 

Rishton  v.  Nesbitt 

114  d,  114  f 

Robinson's  Case 

53 

Risk  r.  State 

14s 

Robison  v.  Swett 

108,  195,  527  n 

Ritchie  i?.  Kinney 

563  h 

Robson  v.  Alexander 

193,  App.  Ill 

17.  Richards 

482 

v.  Drummond 

281 

Ritchey  ».  People 

370  c 

».  Kemp 

108,  181,  245 

Ritter  v.  Daniels 

430  p 

Roche  17.  Coleman 

14  q 

Rives  17.  Lamar          * 

162  d 

v.  R.  Co. 

1626 

Rixford  v.  Miller 

41 

17.  Ware 

120  c 

Roach  v.  Garvan 

545 

Rochester  v.  Chester 

440 

Roath  «.  Driscoll 

46 

Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  17. 

Brewing  Co.          13  / 

Kobards  v.  McLean 

563  e 

17.  Potter 

430  q 

Robb  17.  Hackley 

4696 

Rockey's  Estate 

581 

Robb's  Estate 

114  c,  305  / 

Rockford  v.  Russell 

439  A 

Robbins  v.  Fletcher 

14  o 

Rockland  v.  Farnsworth                                186 

17.  Otis 

58.  68 

Roddy  v.  Finnegan 

469  d 

v.  R.  Co. 

466  a 

Roden  v.  State 

816 

17.  Spencer 

189,  467 

Roderigas  17  E.  River  Saving  Institution       41 

v.  State 

163/ 

Rodgers  17.  Rodgers 

42,  556 

Rober  17.  Herring 

441  / 

v.  State 

6  a,  563  6 

Roberge  r.  Burn  ham 

Sid 

Rodman  «.  Forman 

70 

Robert's  Case 

221,  222 

17.  Hoops 

118 

Roberts  v.  Allatt 

469  d 

Rodriguez  v.  Tadmire 

14  c,  Up,  55 

v.  Com. 

450  a,  461  6 

Rodwell  J7.  Phillips 

271 

».  Doxon 

563  h 

v.  Redge 

35 

v.  Johnson 

276 

Roe  v.  Davis 

5680 

17.  People 

146 

17.  Day 

201 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  17,  441  # 

v.  Ferrars 

201,  202 

v.  Simpson 

469  n 

v.  Harvey 

195  6,  195  c 

v.  Spencer 

563  c 

17.  Ireland 

45  a 

v.  State 

14  c,  14  k 

».  Jeffery 

130 

17.  Tennell 

201,  551 

17.  Jones 

163  g 

r.  Trawick 

392 

17.  Lowe 

46 

17.  Whiting 

420 

17.  Rawlings 

21,  149,  152,  570 

Robertson  v.  Allen 

6681" 

17.  Reade 

46 

i'.  Baldwin 

163  / 

17.  Strong 

139 

r.  French 

278 

Roehl  v.  Porteous 

43 

v.  Knapp 

430  p 

Roelke  17.  Andrews 

189 

».  Lynch 

58 

Roelker,  Ex  parte 

310 

17.  Rowell 

305  c 

Roesel  17.  State 

219  6,  220 

17.  Smith 

427 

Rogero  •».  Zippel 

489 

v.  Stark 

440 

Rogers  17.  Allen 

58,  71,  108,  130,  575  6 

Robey  v.  Howard 

76 

17.  Berry 

427 

Robin  v.  King 

254,  334 

v.  Burton 

4396 

Robinius  ».  State 

18»" 

t7.  Cady 

6 

Robinson  17.  Batchelder 

304 

17.  Cram 

1626 

v.  Blakely 

1146,  169 

17.  Custance 

563d 

.  v.  Burton 

14  d,  14  h,  461  c 

r.  Dibble 

421 

17.  Craig 

5756 

r.  Lamb 

146 

v.  Cushman 

211 

v.  Lewis 

461  d 

v.  Cutter 

201 

17.  Moore 

533,  469  a 

V.  Dana 

365,  370  c 

17.  Pitcher 

207 

v.  Dewhurst 

140  a 

v.  Ritter 

581 

w.  F.  &  W.  R.  Co. 

146,  14  g 

17.  Roborg 

1680 

t7.  Fitchburg  R.  Co. 

184  c 

v.  State 

254  c,  563  h 

v.  Flight 

240  a 

r.  Turner 

395 

17.  Gallier 

30 

17.  Tyley 

681 

v.  Oilman 

163  f,  479 

17.  Vems 

6a 

f.  Hutcbinson 

162  e,  174,  462 

17.  Wood 

129,136,  139 

v.  Jones 

543 

Rohan  17.  Hanson 

284  a 

r.  Mahon 

27 

Rohr  17.  Alexander 

38 

r.  Markis 

163  h 

Rohrer  v.  Morningstar 

385 

«7.  Nahorr 

207 

Roland  17.  District 

305  q 

v.  Prescott 

605 

Roles  v.  Mintzer 

14  n 

r.  R.  Co. 

184  c 

Rolf  v.  Dart 

430  jo,  508 

v.  Randall 

81  d 

Rolfe  v.  Rolfe 

197 

».  Reynolds 

4436 

Roller  p.  Kling 

77,  174 

v.  State          2  a,  14  q,  163  a,  461  a,  4'!  1  <\ 

Rollins  17.  Board 

663  A 

461  d 

e.  DycT 

305 

v.  Trull 

311 

v.  Henrv 

498 

v.  United  States 

260  a,  292    Romertze  v.'Bank 

463,  465  a 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


CV11 


Ronkendorff  v.  Taylor 
Roof  v.  Pulley  Co. 
Rook  v.  Wilson 
Rooker  v.  Perkins 
Rookwood's  Trial 
Rooney  v.  S.  &  D.  C.  Co. 
Roop  v.  State 
Roosa  c.  Loan  Co. 
Root  v.  Fellowes 

v.  Hamilton 

v.  King 

v.  Lowndes 
Roper  v.  State 

».  Terr. 

Ropps  v.  Barker 
Roscoe  v.  Hale 
Rose  p.  Blakemorc 

v.  Bryant 

v.  First  Nat.  Bank 

v.  Himely 

v.  Lewis 

v.  Otis 

v.  Rose 

Roseboom  v.  Billington 
Rosenbaum  v.  Shoffner 

v.  State 

Rosenberg  v.  Jett 
Rosenthalp.  Bishop 

v.  Walker 
Roskee  v.  Pulp  Co. 
Ross  v.  Anstill 

v.  Boswell 

p.  Bruce 

v.  Brusie 

v.  Buhler 

v.  Espy 

v.  Gould 

v.  Kiger 

v.  Laphara 

v.  McQuiston 

v.  Miner 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Reddick 

v.  Rhoads 

v.  Sebastian 

v.  State 

v.  White 
Roten  v.  State 
Roth  p.  Smith 
Rotherham  v.  Green 
Rotheroe  v.  Elton 
Rothrock  ».  Gallagher 
Rouch  v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Zehring 
Rounds  v.  State 
Roupell  v.  Hawes 
Rowan's  Trial 
Rowe  v.  Brenton. 

v.  Canney 

v.  Grenfel 

r.  Hasland 
Rowell  v.  Fuller 
Rowland  v.  Ashby 

v.  Miller 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Walker 


Rowlandson  v   Wainwright 
Rowley  v.  Ball 

v.  Bigelow 

v.  R.  Co. 
Rowutree  v.  Jacob 


484,  493 
305  h 
305  TO 
46 

377,  461  b 
HP 

14  q,  461  b,  469  I 
1626 
532 
4446 

14  A,  140,55,482, 
491 
14  o 
245 
14  £ 
286 
174 

451,  460,  469  d 
152  a 
581 

4,  5,  540,  541 
563  c 
170  a 
192 
152  a 
14  t 
186 
564 
14  t 

14/,  40,  563  c 
14  c 
6a 
5 

563  c 
110  a 
254  c 
282 

81  e,  161  6,  425,  564 
305  /,  305  TO 
14  d,  55 
14  I,  152  d 
140 
14  v 
6 

139 

14  I,  581  a 

14  p,  142,  328  c,  444 
108 
14  c 
166 
71 
396 
163.9 
108 

14  I,  430  / 
435,  439  b 
Uo 
4615 

14  n,  151,  512.  517 
252  a 
5 

41 

439  h,  581 
224,  227,  230 
5 

1626 
1626 


563  o 
5636 
14  ? 
162; 


Rowt  v.  Kile  14  6,  14  TO,  14  r,  581 

Royal  v.  Chandler  140  a,  201  a 

Royal  S.  G.  F.  v.  McDonald  120  a,  484 

Ruan  v.  Perry  14  6,  54 

Rubino  v.  Scott  14  o 

Ruch  v.  Rock  Island  163, 165,  166, 

4396 

Rucker  r.  Beaty  461  d,  462  a 

v.  Eddings  466  a 

v.  McNeely  563  « 

v.  Palsgrave  205 

Rudd  v.  Rounds  162  d 

Rudd's  Case  222 

Rudge  v.  Ferguson  392 

Rudolph  p.  Lane  563  6 

p.  R.  Co.  13  t 

Rudsdill  v.  Slingerland  461  a,  461  c 

Rudv  v.  Com.  81  6 

Rufer  v.  State  219  6 

Rufus  v.  State  14  c 

Rugg  P.  Kingsmill  38  a 

Ruggles  v.  Buck  nor  323 

v.  Gatton  120  c 

v.  Nevada  14jt> 

Ruloff  v.  People  217,  329,  439  h 

Rum  pel  v.  R.  Co.  14  a 

Rumrillr.  Ash  195* 

Rumsey  v.  Tel.  Co.  120  c 

Rundle  v.  Foster  245 

Runkle  v.  Burnliam  195  c 

Runyan  v.  Price  462 

Rupert  v.  Penner  43  a 

Ruppe  v.  Steinbach  195  b 

Rush  P.  Flickwire  402 

v.  R.  Co.  252  a 

v.  Smith  445 

Rush  worth  v.  Pembroke  164 

Rushton  v.  Hallett  305  TO 

Russel  v.  Werntz  287 

Russell  v.  Barry  303 

v.  Blake  395 

v.  Buckley  40 

v.  Coffin  437,  469,  469  a 

v.  Frisbie  108 

p.  Jackson.  237,  242  a,  243 

p.  Marks  46 

p.  Martin  5 

p.  R.  Co.  439  b 

v.  Rider  437,  447  n 

v.  Stocking  140 

Russian  Steam  Nav.  Co.  ».  Silva  292 

Rust  v.  Raker  41 

Rustell  P.  Macquister  14  o,  53 

Ruston's  Case  439  e 

Rutherford  v.  Com.  162  o 

p.  Rutherford  272 

Rutland  &  B.  R.  Co.  P.  Thrall  563  c, 

563  o 

Ryall  v.  Hannam  305  I 

Ryan  v.  Bindley  2  a 

v.  Bristol  441  d 

v.  Cooke  305  c 

v.  People  14  n,  163  b.  163/.  461  6, 

462 

v.  Sams  207 

v.  State  14^,4616 

Ryberg  p.  Smith  444 

Ryder  v.  Hathaway  46 

p.  Wombwell  14  w 

Ryerson  P.  Abington  444 

p.  Grover  439  6 


CV1U 


S. 

S.  G.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  77.  Riley 
Sabine  17.  Strong 
Safford  7?.  Home 
Sage  v.  McAlpin 

«.  State 

17.  Wilcox 
Sahlinger  77.  People 
Sailor  r.  Hertzogg 
Sainthill  v.  Bound 
Salem  v.  Williams 
Salem  Bank  ».  Gloucester  Bank 
Salem  I.  R.  Co.  77.  Adams 
Salem  S.  &  L.  Co.  77.  Griffin 
Salisbury  77.  Clark 

77.  Connecticut 
Salmer  77.  Lathrop 
Salmon  7?.  Ranee 
Salmon's  Estate 
Salte  77.  Thomas 
Salter  17.  Applegate 

77.  Turner 

Sammis  77.  Wrightman 
Sample  77.  Frost 

77.  Wynn 
Sampson  r.  State 

».  Yardly 

Samson  v.  Overton 
Samuel  v.  Borrowscale 

v.  People 

Samuels  v.  Griffith 
Sanborn  77.  Neilsou 
Sanchez  77.  People 
Sanders  77.  Cooper 

77.  Johnson 

17.  Karnell 

».  Reister 

v.  Wakefield 
Sanderson  v.  Caldwell 

17.  Collman 

77.  Nashua 

v.  Symonds 

San  Diego  Land  Co.  77.  Neale 
Sand  i  lands  v.  Marsh 
Sandilands,  In  re 
Sanford  77.  Chase 

77.  Hunt 

77.  Raikes 

t7.  Remington 

77.  Rowley 
Sanger  77.  MeVritt 
Sangster  77.  Mazzarredo 
San  Joaquin  Co.  v.  Budd 
San  Pedro  L.  Co.  77.  Reynolds 
Santissima  Trinidad,  The 
Sappenfield  77.  R.  Co. 
Sarbach  77.  Jones 
Sarpeant  v.  Sargeant  172, 

Sargent  77.  Adams 

v.  Fitzpatrick 

77.  Hampden 
Sarle  v.  Arnold 
Sasscer  77.  Farmers'  Bank 
Sa.sse  o.  State 
Sasser  v.  Herring 
Satterthwaite  v.  Powell 
Saunder*  77.  Bates 

77.  Baxter 

v.  Ferrill 

77.  Gallagher 

r.  Harria 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


4396 

163  A 

333  c 

532 

461  d 
268 

34 

43  a 

449 

208 

208,  581 

1477 

14  v 

284 

412 

163  n 

392 

305  n 

484,  493 

6  6,  38  a 

43  a 

66 

239 

126, 14  rt 

App.  Ill 

124 

506 

573 

469  d 

462 

192 

430  i,  441 1 

275 

14  d 

563  A; 

81 

439  c 
533 
207 

462  a 
565 

430  p 

1846 

38 

316,  317,  318 

75 

287 

245 

14  6,  401  d 

485,  575  6 

177 

Gn 

199,  563  h 

195  d 
370  c 

190,  353,  354 

287,  288 

532 

239,  240 
430/ 

13;',  162  o 

139, 140  a 

30 

34 

14  o 

672 

14  o 

485  a 


Saunders  ».  Hendrix  338 

v.  Mills  53 

p.  People  461  6 

77.  R.  Co.  461  /,  462  a 

v.  Wakefield  203 

Saunderson  77.  Judge  40 

17.  Piper  297 

Saussy  v.  R.  Co.  14  6,  409  a 

Sauter  77.  R.  Co.  162j 

Savage  77.  Balch  180 

77.  Blanchard  163  e 

v.  O'Neil  43 

r.  Smith  60 

Savannah  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  77.  Ono  254  c 


17.  Wainwright 

77.  Wideman 
Saveland  17.  Green 
Sawrey  77.  Murrell 
Sawyer  v.  Baldwin 

v.  Boston 

v.  Eifert 

77.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Shoe  Co. 

77.  State 

77.  Steele 
Sawyer,  In  re 
Saxfon  77.  Johnson 

17.  Nimms 
Sayer  77.  Glossop 

17.  Kitchen 

77.  Wagstaff 
Sayles  v.  Bradley  &  M.  Co. 

17.  Briggs 
Savior  77.  Com. 
Sayre  77.  Reynolds 
Sayres  77.  Com. 
Say  ward  77.  Stevens 
Scaggs  77.  State 
Scaife  77.  Land  Co. 
Scales  77.  Jacob 

77.  Key 

Scalf  7>.  Collin  Co. 
Scammon  77.  Scammon 
Scales  77.  Henderson 
Schaben  v.  U.  S. 
Schack  77.  Anthony 
Schaefer  77.  R.  Co. 

77.  State 

Schafer  77.  Schafer 
Schall  77.  Miller 
Schaser  v.  State 
Schattgen  ».  Holnback 
Schaub  77.  Griffin 
Schauber  v.  Jackson 
Schearer  77.  Harber 
Scheerer  77.  Agee 
Scheffer  r.  R.  Co. 
Schell  7).  Plumb 
Schenck  77.  Griffin 

77.  Ins.  Co. 

v.  Schenck 

Schermerhorn  77.  Schermerhorn 
Schillinger  77.  McCann 
Si  hinotti  17.  Bumstead 
Schlaff  77.  R.  Co. 
Schlicht  77.  State 
Schlottman  77.  Hoffman 
Schmidt  77.  Dunham 

17.  Ins.  Co. 

77.  Packard 
Schniissetir  77.  Beatrie 
Schneider  v.  Manning 


162  6,  469  m 
461  c 
200 

444,  444  a 
484 

1477 

14  h,  65,  14  d 
541 

195  d,  441 d 
Ul 
563  g 
374 
58 

305  g,  484 
43  a,  563  i 
563 
438 
563  e 
305  g 

14  g,  161,  462  a,  469  d 
564 
14  o 
281 
162  g 
140  a 
1846 
41 

4416 

1636,168,  190,  314 
305m 
479 
303 

120  a,  163  e 
380 
166 

167,  249,  254  c 
14  o,466  a,  468 


30,41 
46,  47 
162  p 
816 
6e 

162j,  462  a 
292 
441  e 
14  o 
356 

26,  420.  421 
474 

14  77 

6 

305  A; 
4436 

6c,  146,  81  d,  441  e 
14  n 
35 

mi 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


C1X 


Schnertzell  v.  Young 

506 

Seattle  F.  N.  B'k  v.  Harris 

38 

Schoeffler  v.  State 

App.  Ill 

Seattle  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilchrist 

Uv,  4410 

Schoep  v.  Ins.  Co. 

184  c,  46  Id 

Seaver  v.  Bradley 

392 

Schofield  v.  Schiffer 
Schotield,  Ex  parte 

Uq 

469  d 

v.  Dingley 
Seavy  v.  Dearborn 

14  a 
401> 

Scholes  t'.  Hilton 

319 

Sebree  v.  Dorr 

87 

Schoolcraft  v.  People 

14  k,  14  r 

Seckinger  v.  Mfg.  Co. 

430  c 

School  Furn.  Co.  v.  Warsaw  School  Dist. 

Seckler  v.  Fox 

275 

184  c 

Security  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fay 

22 

Schooner  Reeside 

292 

SeddonV  Tutop 

532 

Schooumaker  r.  Wilbraham                         14  v 

Sedgwick  v.  Tucker 

328  c 

Schoonover  v.  Rowe 

14  o 

v.  Watkins 

340,  343 

Sehradsky  v.  Stimson 

Uv 

Seefield  v.  R.  Co. 

18jf 

Schreger  y.  Garden 

205 

Seekright  v.  Bogan 

349 

Schrimper  v.  Heilman 

14  o 

Seeley  v.  Star  Co. 

163a 

Schroeder  v.  R.  Co. 

469  m 

Seely  v.  Blair 

461  c 

Schubkagel  v.  Dierstein 

239 

».  Cole 

14  o 

Schuchardt  v.  Aliens 

if; 

Seibright  v.  State 

18 

Schuenke  v.  Pine  River 

Ut 

Seiler  v.  People 

28 

Schultz  »>.  Schultz 

162  c 

Seip  v.  Deshler 

14  o 

v.  Terr. 

816 

Seitz  v.  Refrig.  Co. 

305/ 

Schwass  v.  Hershey 

275 

v.  Seitz 

163  g,  254 

Schwerdtle  v.  Placer  Co 

6 

Selby  v.  Hills 

316 

Schwerin  v.  De  Grass 

14  re,  14  o 

Seld'en  ».  Myers 

284 

Scoggin  v.  Dalrymple 

UOn 

v.  Williams 

295 

Scorell  v.  Boxall 

271 

Selfe  v.  Isaacson 

432  a 

Scotia,  The 

66 

Seliger  v.  Bastian 

441  d 

Scotland,  The 

66 

Sellars  v.  Sellars 

462  « 

Scott  v.  Bank 

108 

Selleck  v.  Janesville 

44U 

V.  Ill  a  lie  hard 

505 

Sellen  v.  Norman 

39 

v.  Burton 

284 

Seller  v.  Jenkins 

461/,  462  a 

v.  Clare 

86,  203,  563  Ic 

Sells  v.  Hoare 

3646 

v.  Cleveland 

505 

Selover  v.  Bryant 

444 

v.  Com. 

254 

Selwood  v.  Mildmay 

305  k 

v.  Delany 

5756 

Selwyn's  Case 

30 

v.  Hartley 

806? 

Semple  v.  Callery 

81  e 

r.  Hawk 

162  e,  575 

Senior  v.  Armytage 

294 

v.  Hooper 

370 

Senior,  Ex  parte 

469  d 

v.  Hull 

75,76 

Senrer  v.  Horst 

140 

v,  Hyde 

43  a 

Serchor  v.  Talbot 

69 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

81  d 

Sergeant  ».  Biddle 

163  t 

v.  Jones 

563  c,  563  o 

Sergeson  v.  Sealey 

556 

v.  Lifford 

426 

Serle  v.  Serle 

397 

v.  Lloyd 

354,  385 

Settle  v.  Alison 

506,  572 

v.  Marshall 

180 

Seven  Bishops'  Trial 

435 

v.  McKinnish 

14  d,  14  o 

Seventh  D.  A.  P.  A.  v.  Fisher 

120  c 

v.  McLellan 

391,  399,  401 

Sever  v.  Lyon 

6 

v.  Mortsinger 

14  o 

Severance  v.  Carr 

328  c,  435 

v.  New  Orleans 

14  v,  439  h 

v.  Hilton                            146, 

14  d,  466  a 

v.  Oxford 

14  o 

Sewell  v.  Baxter 

304 

v.  Sampson 

Ud,  14  /« 

».  Cohoes 

195  d 

v.  State 

254  a,  461  6,  469  b 

v.  Evans 

43  a 

v.  Waithman 

207,  571,  573 

v.  Gardner 

444 

v.  Wells 

416 

v.  Stubbs                             422,  5637,  563  1 

v.  Wood 

14a; 

Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Gordon 

f8l 

Scott's  Case 

219  a 

Seymour  v.  Beach 

519 

Scougull  v.  Campbell 

166 

v.  Delancy 

284 

Scovill  ».  Baldwin 

1956 

v.  Fellows 

441  I 

Scovillev.  R.  Co. 

165 

v.  Merrill 

Ud,  14  h 

Scribner  v.  McLaughlin 

421 

v.  Strong 

429 

Scrimshire  v.  Scrimshire 

545 

v.  Wilson 

328  c 

Scroggin  v.  McClelland 

43 

Seymour's  (Sir  E.)  Case 

563  q 

Scull's  App. 

1846 

Shackelford  v.  State 

163  <?,  230 

Seaborn  v.  State 

App.  Ill 

Shad  v.  Livingston 

305  d 

Sealy  v.  State 

14t; 

Shaddock  v.  Clifton 

202 

Searcy  v.  Miller 

369,  370 

Shaeffer  v.  Kretizer 

510 

Searle  v.  Harrington 

1526 

v.  State 

441  / 

v.  R.  Co. 

14t> 

Shafer  v.  Stonebraker 

531 

Searight  v.  Craighead 

1846 

Shaffer  v.  Gaynor 

138  a 

Sears  v.  Brink 

268 

v.  McCracken 

J20c 

v.  Dillingham 

347,  409,  572 

v.  State 

14  d,  1406 

Seaton  v.  Benedict 

205 

Shaffner  v.  Com. 

14  2 

ex 


Shailer  v.  Bumstead 

Shaller  v.  Brand 

Shamburg  v.  Commagere 

Shaner  v.  Alterton 

Shank  v.  Groff 

Shankland  v.  C.  of  Washington 

Shanklin  v.  McCracken 

Shannon  v.  Commonwealth 

Sharkey  v.  Miller 

Sharon  v.  Sharon 

Sharp  v.  Emmet 

v.  Hicks 

v.  Johnson 
Sharpe  v.  Bingley 
Shattuck  v.  Myers 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  State 

Shaufelter  v.  Baltimore 
Shaughnessey  v.  Lewis 
Shaver  v.  McCarthy 
Shaw  v.  Broom 

v.  Emery 

t\  Moore 

v.  Persliing 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


162  e,  174 

5756 

385 

247  a 


281 

254 

423 

303 

4616 

462 

462 

35 

437 

Ud,  Uh 
140 
252 
66 
284 
441  / 
190 
461  a 
369 
570 


v.  State     5,  6  6,  14  Js,  14  o,  14  q,  21 3,  432, 
439  h,  4616 

v.  Sun  Prairie  14  p 

Shea  r.  Glendale  Co.  14  v 

v.  Hudson  430 p 

v.  Murphy  189 

Sheafe  v.  Rowe  440 

Sheahan  v.  Barry  14  h 

r.  Collins  Ud,  Uh 

Shear  v.  Van  Dyke  439  6 

Shearer  v.  State"  79 

Shearman  v.  Atkins  116,  120,  147 

Shears  v.  State  14  q,  46 1 6,  46 1  d 

Shedden  v.  Patrick  114  e,  468 

Sheehan  v.  Hennessey  120  c 

v.  Kearney  77,  162  e,  441/ 

Sheehy  v.  Mandeville  69,  539  a 

Sheer'0.  Sheer  305  c 

Sheffield  v.  Page  284  a 

v.  Sheffield  441  c 

Shells  v.  West  564 

Shelburne  v.  Jachiquin  81  d 

Shelby  ».  Smith  420 

r.  The  Governor,  etc.  187 

Sheldon  v.  Barbour  164 

v.  Benham  280 

v.  Clark  79 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

Shelley  v.  Wright  23,  26,  531 

Shelling  v.  Farmer  474 

Shelton  r.  Cocke  184  6 

v.  Deering  568  a 

v.  Livius  271 

Shepard  v.  Giddings  563  e 

v.  Palmer  416 

r.  Parker  461 6 

v.  R.  Co.  469  ro 

Shephard  v.  Little  26 

Shepherd  v.  Camden  13  j 

v.  Chewter  212 

v.  Currie  38 

9.  Hamilton  Club  663  h 

v.  Thompson  138  a,  140  a 

Sheppard  v.  Yocum  469  a 

Sherbtirne  v.  Shaw  268 

Sheridan  &  Kirwan's  Case  90 

KhrrU-k  V.  R.  Co.  14  V 

Sherman  v.  Barnes  390 


Sherman  v.  Crosby  116,  120 

v.  Gundlach  317 

v.  Need  ham  305  q 

v.  R.  Co.  441  'g 

v.  Sherman  197 

v.  Story  482 

v.  Wilder  14?,  284 

Sherratt  v.  Mountford  290 

Sherrington's  Case  221 

Sherwood  v.  Burr  17 

v.  Fitman  14  o 

v.  Sioux  Falls  13/ 

Shields  v.  Boucher  114  e,  114/ 

v.  State  180,  254  a,  469  e 

Shifflet's  Case  218,  223 

Shinners  v.  Locks  195  d 

Shipman  v.  Seymour  14  q 

Shipp  v.  Coin.  14 17 

Shipply  v.  People  14  (7 

Shires  v.  Glascock  272 

Shirley  v.  Shirley  268 

v.  Todd  190 

Shirreff  v.  Wilks  174 

Shirwin  v.  People  14  b,  14  g,  14  o 

Shisser  v.  Burlington  163  </ 

Shitler  v.  Bremer  430  f 

Shock  v.  McChesney  14  o 

Shockey  v.  Mills  328  c,  434 

Shockley  v.  Morgan  254  c 

Shoecraft  v.  State  162  h 

Shoemaker  v.  Benedict  174 

Shook  v.  Pate  138  a,  439  g 

Shorb  v.  Kinzie  581 

Shore  v.  Bedford  239,  245 

Shorey  ».  Hursey  443 

Short  v.  Lee    115, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 

155,  563  g 

v.  Mercier  469  a 

v.  State  14s,  136 

v.  Yelverton  14  o 

Shorten  v.  Judd  14  s,  439  h 

Shortley  v.  Miller  81  d 

Shortz  v.  Unangst  563  6 

Shott  v.  Streatfield  101 

Shotwell  v.  Harrison  6  b 

Shove  v.  Wiley  439  6 

Showman  v.  Lee  563  o 

Shown  v.  Barr  506 

Shrewsbury  Peerage  Case  114  c 

Shriedley  "v.  State  14  q 

Shrimpton  v.  Netzorg  563  b 

Shrowders  v.  Harper  563  6 

Shrover  v.  Miller  14  d 

Shufeldt  v.  Shufeldt  Ho 

Shuler  v.  State  13/,  162  o 

Shultz  v.  State  81  d 

Shuman  v.  Hurd  35 

v.  Shuman  35 

Shumway  v.  Holbrook  518 

r.  Stillman  548 

Shurtleffr.  Willard  421 

Sinister  v.  State  461  d 

Sliute  v.  Mfg.  Co.  14  v 

Shutte  v.  Thompson  130 

Shuttleworth  v.  Bravo  392 

Siberrv  v.  State  97  d 

Sibley  ».  Watflo  239 

Sicilies  (King  of)  ».  Wilcox  469  d 

Sickles  0.  Mather  120  c 

Sidebottom  v.  Adkins  469  d 

Sidolinger  v.  Bucklin  461  a,  469  h 


Sidney's  Case 


676 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Siebert  v.  People  15p,  14  r,  162  c,  430  c 

Siegbert  v.  Stiles  5 

Sievers  f.  P.  B.  &  L.  Co.        14 1, 195  d,  441  d 

Sigafus  v.  Porter  81  d 

Sigfried  v.  Levan  430  i 

Signa  Iron  Co.  v.  Greeve  305  h 

Sikes  v.  Marshall  1206 

Siberman  v.  Clark  280 

Silberry  v.  State  201 

Silk  c. "Humphrey  81 

Sill  v.  Reese  577,  581 

Sillick  v.  Booth  30,  41 

Sills  v.  Brown  440,  441  d,  441 1,  553 

Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  Harding  505 

Silverstein  v.  O'Brien  462  a 

Sim  v.  Russell  14  k 

Simanovitch  v.  Wood  284 

Simmonds,  In  re  272 

Simmons  v.  Bradford  27,  208 

v.  Havens  466  o 

v.  Holster  14  d 

v.  Leonard  572 

v.  Simmons  257,381 

v.  State  99  a,  414,  465  a 

v.  Trumbo  5 

Simms  v.  Exp.  Co.  43 

Simon  v.  State  254  b 

Simons  v.  Cook  506 

v.  People  14  o 

v.  Vulcan  Co.  14  ^ 

Simonson  v.  R.  Co.  430 1 

Simpson  v.  Davis  14  x 

v.  Dix  290 

».  Norton  509,  563  6 

v.  Robinson  14  o,  197 

v.  Stackhouse  564 

v.  State  14  s 

v.  Thoreton  479 

v.  Westenberger  146 

Sims  v.  Hundley  2  a 

v.  Kitchen  314 

v.  Sims  376,  4616,  467,  5636 

v.  Southern  Express  Co.  6  6 

Sinclair  v.  Baggaley  38,  121, 152  a 

v.  Eraser  516 

v.  Sinclair  545 

v.  Stevenson      275,  284,  437,  447  a,  563  c 

v.  Wood  140  a 

Singer  Mfg.  Co.  v,  Revnolds  187 

Singleton  v.  Barrett    "  90,  305  e,  563  I 

v.  Ins.  Co.  280 

v.  State  462 

Sinnott  v.  Columbet  5,  162j 

Sintonr.  Butler  14  v 

Sioux  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlayson  162  i 

Sirrine  v.  Briggs  430  »,  563  o 

Sisson  v.  R.  Co.  162  I,  430  » 

Sissons  v.  Dixon  35 

Sitlerc.  Gehr  43  a,  114  c 

Sivenson  n.  Aultman  184  c 

Sixth  A.  R.  Co.  v.  El.  R.  Co.  441  g 

Sizer  v.  Burt  201,  439/ 

Skaggs  v.  State  14  c,  14  A,  439  e 

Skaife  v.  Jackson  172,  173,  174,  212 

Skeen's  Case  App.  Ill 

Skilbeck  v.  Garbett  40 

Skinner  v.  Brighara  573  6 

v.  Henderson  5636 

v.  Shew  162  d 

v.  Perot  374 

Skipp  v.  Hooke  6  a 

Skipworth  v.  Green  26 


Slack  v.  Buchanan 

v.  Moss 

Slade  v.  Teasdale 
Sladden  v.  Sergeant 
Slaney  v.  Wade 
Slater  v.  D.  S.  &  H.  Co. 

v.  Hodgson 

v.  Lawson 
Slatterie  v.  Pooley 
Slaymaker  v.  Gundacker's  Ex'r 

v.  Wilson 

Sleeper  v.  Van  Middlesworth 
Sleght  v.  Rhinelander 
Slinghoff  v.  Bruner 
Sloane  Peerage  Case 
Slocovich  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Slocum  v.  Swift 
Sloman  v.  Herne 
Slubv  ».  Champlin 
Sly  0.  Sly 
Small  v.  Leonard 
Smallcombe  v.  Bruges 
Smalley  v.  Appleton 
Smalls  v.  State 
Smart  v.  Rayner 

v.  Wetumpka 

v.  Williams 
Smets  v.  Plunket 
Smiley  v.  Dewey 

v.  Gambill 
Smith  v.  Andrews 

v.  Arnold 

v.  Asbell 

v.  Ass.  Co. 

v.  Axtell 

v.  Bank 

v.  Barker 

v.  Battens 

v.  Beadnall 

v.  Bell 

v.  Benef.  Soc. 

v.  Blackham 

v.  Blagge 

v.  Blakey 

v.  Blandy 

0.  Brandram 

v.  Brown 

v,  Burnham 

0.  Burton 

v.  Castles 

v.  Chambers 

v.  Clark 

v.  Coffin 

v.  Com. 

v.  Cramer 

v.  Crooker 

v.  Croom 

v.  Davies 

v.  Dawley 

v.  De  Wfuitz 

v.  Downs 

v.  Dunbar 

v.  Fell 

v.  Fenner 

v.  Flanders 

v.  Forrest 

».  Fuge 

v.  Galloway 

v.  Gardner 

v.  Gifford 

v.  Griffith 

v.  Gugerty 


CXI 


192 
385 
118 
465  a 

114  d,  114  e,  134,  204 
441  i 
570 

174,  176 
203,  563  k 
176 
577 

461,  461  d 
280 
569  d 
480j« 

162 1,  430 /,  430/> 
275 

180,  181 
14s,  572,  575 
152  c 
532 
181 
430  c 

14/,  14  m 
75 
66 
1206 
146 
349 

14s,  162  e 
484 
268 
462 
444  a 
563  q 
ttO/i 
68 

152  a 

193,  App.  Ill 
287 
14  r 
390 
506 

120  a,  150,  152,  152  c 
201 
73 

305,  375,  563  6 
171,  200,  214 
275 
4616 
392 
14»' 

369,  370 
333  a 
108 

567,  568  a 
30 
81 

162  ff,  444 
190 

387,  388 
568 
239 
581 
278 
140(7 
43  a 
301 
38 

201  a 
163d 
440 


CX11 


Smith  v.  Hall 
v.  Hawley 
t;.  Henderson 
v.  Hickenbutton 
v.  Hine 
v.  Jackson 
v.  Jeff  ryes 
v.  Kelley 
v.  Keyset 
v.  Kiinball 
v.  King 
v.  Knowelden 
v.  Knowlton 
v.  Lane 
v.  Lanier 
v.  Lindsey 
v.  Lorrillard 
v.  Ludlow 
v.  Lyon 
v.  Martin 
v.  Mason 
v.  Mayneld 
v.  Moore 
v.  Morgan 
v.  Nowells 
v.  Olsen 
v.  Palmer 
v.  Powers 
v.  Prager 
v.  Prewit 
v.  Price 
v.  R.  Co. 
t\  Rankin 
v.  Redden 
v.  Rentz 
v.  Ruckecker 
v.  San  ford 
t'.  Scudder 
v.  Sherwood 
v.  Shumway 
v.  Simmes 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


14  d,  Uo 

163  a 

43  a 

44U 

461  d 

439  c 

281 

305  d 


305  I 

469m,  5786 
73 

41,  540 

437 

1846 

Up,  14  v 

34 

112,  184  b 
180 

152  c,  485  a 

5636 

201  a 

78 

179,  436,  439  c 

130,  138  a 

186 

563  k 

140  a,  152  c 

409 

138  a 

442,  444 

Up,  14  v,  430  n 

570,  575  6 

513 

120  c 

Ud 

120  c,  334,  439  6 
185 

Up,  14  v 
Ud 
180 


v.  Smith        14  /,  14  k,  14  q,  38,  41,  140  c, 

189,  461  b,  469  d,  563  6 

v.  Sparrow  351,  421 

v.  State      13;,  14  c,  14  f>,  Up,  14  r,  14  v, 

152  d,  158,  162;,  163  a,  333  <«, 

367,  450,  461  a,  461  6, 

461  c 

v.  Surman  271 

v.  Tarbox  184  a 

v.  Taylor  63,  195 

v.  Th'ompson  300 

v.  Towle  108 

v.  U.  S.  14c,4616,  461  d 

v.  Vincent  176 

v.  Westmoreland  174 

v.  Whitaker  43 

v.  Whittier  14^,101 

v.  Whittingham  187 

v.  Wilkins  14  n 

t.  Wilson  49,  280,  292 

v.  Wyman  14  d,  14  h,  U  o 

v.  Yarvau  14  h 

v.  York  370  a 

v.  Young  90,  503  d 

Smith's  Case  217  n,  21!)  6 

Smith,  Re  251 

Smith  Charities  v.  Connolly  675 

Smitlia  v.  Flournoy  6 

Smithies  «.  Harrison  14  h 

Smithwick  «.  Evans  461  a,  401  c 

bm. A: k  v.  Pierson  461  o,  461  d 


Smucker  v.  Penns.  R.  Co. 
Smyth  v.  Caswell 

v.  Jefferies 

v.  Sandeman 
Smythe  v.  Banks 
Sneed  v.  State 
Sneider  v.  Geiss 
Snelgrove  v.  Martin 
Snell  v.  Bray 

v.  Eckerson 

r.  Moses 
Snelling's  Will 
Snider  v.  Burks 
Snodgrass  v.  Chicago 
Snow  v.  Alley 

v.  Batchelder 

v.  Benton 

v.  Grace 

v.  Paine 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  State 

Snowball  v.  Goodricke 
Snowden  v.  Coal  Co. 
Snyder  v.  Albion 

v.  Com. 

v.  Nations 

».  R.  Co. 

v.  Snyder 

Sociedade  Keliz,  The 
Society  v.  Young 
Solari  v.  Snow 
Solarte  v.  Melville 
Solita  v.  Yarrow 
Solomon  v.  Dreschler 

v.  Solomon 

Solomon  R.  Co.  v.  Jones 
Solomons  v.  Bank  of  England 
Solver  v.  Romanet 
Somes  v.  Skinner 
Son  v.  Terr. 
Sonneborn  v.  Bernstein 
Sorenson  v,  Dundas 
Soresby  r.  Sparrow 
Sorg  v.  Congregation 
Sorrelle  v.  Craig  461  a,  461  c, 

Soulden  v.  Van  Rensslaer  430 

Soule  v.  Bruce  146 

Soule's  Case  343 

South  Bend  t'.  Hardy      14  6,  14  d,  14  g,  14  h, 
444  6,  461  6, 469  I 

South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins  81  g 

Southampton,  Mavor  of,  v.  Graves  474 

Southard  v.  Rexford  460,  469  d 

v.  Wilson  401,  422,  426 

Southern  Bell  T.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Watts  14  g 

Southern  I.  C.  Line  v.  R.  Co.  430  o 

Southern  Ins.  Co.  v.  White  461  6 

Southern  Kans.  R.  Co.  v.  Michaels         430 1, 

469  m 

v.  Painter  170  a 

v.  Robbins  146, 14  r/,  14  v 

Southern  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson  114 .7 

Southern  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson  81 

Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Covenia  6  e 

V.    I  [.'!:•. -Hi  5 

«.  Hubbard  201 

v.  Kinchen  184  c 

v.  Williams  462 

Southern  R.  N.  Co.  v.  Russell  4fiO  h 

Southey  v.  Nash  432 

Southwest  S.  D.  ».  Williams  114 a,  128 

Southwick  v.  Hapgood  281 


575  i 

581 

79 

563  d 

316 

163  # 

348 

152  c,  190 

195  a 

120  c 

58 

44H 

575,  581 

430^ 

284  a 

75,  192 

Ul 

461  c,  461  d 
328  c 

348,  4416.441o 

152  d 

180 

14  v 

Uu 

Uq,  462  a 

366,  370  a,  439  e 

81 

334,  341,  434 

495 

20,46 

186 

388 

578  a 

79 

206 

165,  439  6 
81 
6 

14 /,  14  7,  24 
14o 

467,  469  6 
110 
349 
430/ 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Southwick  v.  Southwick 

v.  Stephens 

v.  Stevens 

Southworth  v.  Bennett 
Soward  v.  Leggett 
Sowden  ».  Quartz  Mining  Co. 
Sowell  v.  Bank 

0.  Champion 
Sowers  v.  Terr. 
Spalping  v.  Lowe 

v.  People 

Spangler  v.  Jacoby 
Sparf  o.  U.  S. 


254,  333  c 

89 

36,  234 


Spargo  v.  Brown 
Sparhawk  v.  Bullard 
Sparks  v.  Rawls 

v.  Sparks 
Sparta  n.  Lewis 
Spaulding  v.  Hood 

v.  Mfg.  Co. 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Sherman 

r.  Vincent 
Spear  ».  Coate 

v.  Richardson 
Spearbracker  v.  Larrabee 
Spears  v.  Burton 

v.  Forrest 

».  Ohio 

».  Ward 
Spence  v.  Sanders 

v.  Stuart 


74,81 

430/ 

569  d 

358 

2606 

328  c 

81  c 

482,  491 
81  g 


116,  120,  147,  171 
38 
97  d 
239,  245 
Sid 
14  x,  75 
14  r 

101,1630,444 

14/> 

488 

140  a 

441 1 

Up 

35 

461,  461  a 

2196 

292 

118,  120  c 
317 


Spenceley  v.  De  Willott  or  Wilmot  14  ra, 
x  449,  469 / 

Spencer  v.  Billing  563  7* 

v.  Boardman  563  c 

r.  Com.  14  q 

v.  Curtis  6  a 

v.  Goulding  416 

v.  Robbins  461 6 

v.  Roper  41 

v.  State  14  A  233 

t?.  Thompson  40 

v.  White  443  6 

v.  Williams  521 

Sperry  v.  Moore  163  d 

Spicer  v.  Cooper  280 

Spiegel  v.  Hays  461  6 

Spiers  v.  Brown  14  q 

v.  Clay  26 

v.  Morris  120 

».  Parker  19,  78 

v.  Willison  87 

Spies  v.  People    13  e,  14  m,  184  a,  461  a,  461  c 

Spiller  v.  Rink  Co.  320 

Spittle  v.  Walton  370  c 

Spivey  v.  State  14  c 

Spottiswood  v.  Weir  563/>,  577 

Spragins  ».  White  81/ 

Sprague  v.  Dodge  81  a 

v.  Litherberry  19 

Sprigg  v.  Moale  41 

Spring  v.  Lovett  281 

Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  v.  Evans  37 

Springer  ».  By  ram  197,  247  a 

v.  Chicago  13  i 

v.  Hall  581 

v.  State  382 

Springfield  v.  Coe  441  d 

v.  Dalby  466  a 

v.  Schmook  14  v 

Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeffner      6  c,  1626 

VOL.  I.  — h 


Sprowl  r.  Lawrence 
Spurr  v.  Pearson 

».  Trimble 

».  U.  S. 

Squier  v.  Evans 
Squires  v.  Amherst 
St.  Asaph's  Trial 
St.  Clair  v.  U.  S. 
St.  George  v.  Biddeford 

v.  St.  Margaret 
St.  John  v.  Lofland 


cxiii 


41 

^,  461  d,  469  a 
305  / 
305 
81/ 
434,  444 
14 1 
28,  40 
3336 


St.  Joseph  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Chase  14  v, 

195  d 

St.  Katherine's  Hospital  139 

St.  Louis  v.  Rankin  4410 

St.  Louis  P.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen                 563  e 

St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark  14  o 

v.  Dobbins  469  m 

v.  Fowler  14  v,  176 

v.  Greenthal  14 1 

v.  Haller  14  v 

v.  Sweet  1630,  166 

r.  Warren  370  d 

v.  Weaver  66,  195  d,  444 

St.  Mary's  College  v.  Att'y-Gen.  46 

St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  I.  Co.  v.  Gotthelf          120  c 

Stables  v.  Eley  208 

Stackpole  v.  Arnold      212,  276,  281,  304,  305 

Stacy  v.  Graham  461  c,  462,  469  a 

v.  Kemp  305 

Stafford  v.  Assoc.  14  d 

v.  Clark  531,  532 

v.  State  14  & 

Stafford's  (Ld.)  Case  217  a,  235,  255,  450  a 

Stahl  v.  Duluth  439  6 

Stainer  v.  Droitwich  497 

Staines  v.  Stewart  162  e 

Stalker  v.  State  14  q 

Stall  t'.  Catskill  Bank  387,  430 

Stallings  r.  State  14/> 

Stambaugh  v.  Smith  14  u 

Stammers  v.  Dixon  293 

Stamper  v.  Griffin  461  c,  465  a,  469  a 

Standage  ».  Creighton  186 

Standard  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Leslie  305 1 

Standback  v.  Thornton  575 

Standen  v.  Standen  152  d 

Standish  v.  Washbura  14  v 

Stanford  v.  Priest  162  / 

Stanhilber  v.  Graves  245,  466  a 

Stanley  v.  Stanley  439  c 

v.  State  375 

-  v.  White  14  re,  147,  197 

v.  Wilkerson  120  a 

Stansfeld  v.  Levy  76 

Stanton  v.  Embery  14 1; 

i;.  Parker  461  c 

r.  Willson  334 

Stanwood  v.  McLellan  439  b 

Staples  r.  Goodrich  532 

Stapleton  v.  Nowell  205 

Starace  v.  Rossi  5 

Starchman  v.  State  13  e,  245  a 

Starin  v.  Kelly  328  c 

Stark  v.  Bosw'ell  152  c 

Starks  r.  People  444  c,  469,  469  a 

Starkweather  v.  Loomis  505 

v.  Mathews  420 

Starr  v.  IT.  S.  14/> 

Staser  o.  Hogan  461/ 

State  of  Ohio  v.  Hinchman  6  b 

State  r.  Abbey  162 1 


CX1V 

TABLE    OF   CASES. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

State  v.  Abbott 

14  fc 

State  v.  Boise 

482 

v.  Adams 

14  k,  14  m,  14  q,  14  v,  34, 

v.  Bokien 

14  q,  162  p 

162  o,  444  a 

v.  Bonsor 

Uq 

v.  A  damson 

4616 

v.  Boomer 

563  c 

v.  Ah  Chuey 

469  e 

v.  Boswell 

461,  461  a,  461  c 

v.  Ah  Lee 

157,  162  o 

v.  Bowe 

186,  App.  Ill 

v.  Ah  Tom 

184  a 

v.  Bowen 

6« 

v.  Albright 

14  fc 

v.  Bowser 

10  o,  430  k 

».  Alexander 

Uk 

v.  Boyd 

444,  469  a 

v.  Alford 

14  o 

v.  Borland 

14  q 

v.  Allen 

430  h,  461  d 

v.  Bradley 

14*,  14  r,  220  c,  430  1 

v.  Anderson 

220 

v.  Bradnack 

162a- 

v.  Antonio 

14  q 

v.  Brady 

14?,  4396,  568  A 

r.  Archer 

469  a 

v.  Branham 

227,  App.  Ill 

v.  Ardvin 

81  b 

v.  Brant 

444  c 

v.  Arnold 

13  c,  Ul,  142,1620,461d 

v.  Braskamp 

5 

v.  Arthur 

Up 

v.  Breckenridge 

14  a 

v.  Asbell 

Ur,  14  v 

».  Breeden 

461  a 

v.  Asbury 

333  a 

v.  Brewing  Co. 

5 

v.  Ashworth 

159 

v.  Bridgman 

14  o,  Uq,  342 

T.  Atkinson 

254  o,  469  e 

v.  Brien 

14  c 

v.  Aughtry 

81  c 

v.  Briggs 

14  o,  App.  Ill 

v.  Austin 

14  q 

v.  Britt 

14s 

v.  Aver 

252  a 

v.  Brockman 

220 

v.  Bable 

430  i 

v.  Brooks 

14  i-,  162  »,  2206 

v.  Badger 

1629 

v.  Brookshire 

432  c 

v.  Bailey 

457 

v.  Broughton 

213,  225,  App.  Ill 

v.  Bailor 

2606 

v.  Brown        14  <?,  Uk,  170  a,  195  a,  215, 

v.  Baldoser 

469  d 

247,  252,  441  h 

v.  Baldwin 

Up.  157,  161,  161  a,  162  d. 

v.  Brownlow 

139 

162  i,  162  /fc,~430  1,  439  6,  441  h,  462  a 

v.  Bruce 

195  a,  461  a 

v.  Ballou 

466  a 

v.  Brunell 

144 

v.  Baptiste 

441  1 

v.  Brunetto 

99  a,  163  / 

v.  Barrield 

Ub 

v.  Bryan 

H* 

v.  Barker 

Uk,  14  r,  156 

v.  Bryant 

14  c 

v.  Barringer 

816 

v.  Buckley 

14  d 

v.  Barren 

14  r,  195  a 

v.  Buffington 

254 

v.  Bartlett 

469  d,  502,  513 

v.  Bunker 

81  d 

v.  Bartmess 

14  i,  166,  444,4446 

v.  Buie 

257 

v.  Bates 

14  <7 

v.  Burks 

444 

v.  Bauerkemper                           260  b,  434 

v.  Burlingham 

335 

v.  Baxter 

14  r 

i\  Burns 

14  6,  14  c 

v.  Bazile 

81  c 

v.  Butler 

469  d 

v.  Beach 

2a 

t'.  Byers 

163/ 

v.  Beal 

4446,  461  a 

v.  Byrd 

146,  14  c,  Uk,  816 

v.  Beatty 

14  p 

v.  Byrne 

469  c 

v.  Beaudet 

14  q 

v.  Cadotte 

213 

v.  Beck 

14  c 

v.  Cady 

4696 

v.  Bedard 

439  c 

v.  Caffey 

70 

v.  Behrman 

163/ 

r.  Cain 

430  k 

v.  Benerman 

441/ 

v.  Cake 

485 

v.  Benner 

13  a,  252,  435 

v.  Caldwell 

223,  563  h 

v.  Bennet 

34 

r.  Call 

Uq 

v.  Bennett 

14  s 

v.  Callahan 

380 

».  Berry 

2206 

v.  Callegari 

465  a 

v.  Bertm 

162  o 

t'.  Cameron 

816 

r.  Best 

Uf,lUe 

v.  Campbell 

99  a,  163  a 

v.  Beswick 

5 

v.  Candler 

376 

v.  Biggerstaff 

162-7 

v.  Cannon 

219  b,  220  6 

v.  Bibnsky 

469  / 

r.  Cardoza 

439  c,  468 

v.  Birdwell 

14  c,  14  A;,  14  o 

v.  Carlisle 

218 

r.  Bishop 
v.  Black 

14  r,  34.  152  d 
379,  4616,  469  / 

t;.  Carr 
v.  Carrick 

1956,220,221,  382,489 
223 

v.  Blackburn 

161  a 

v.  Carrington 

159,  161 

v.  Blize 

Uh 

0.  Carroll 

App.  Ill 

r.  I'lodget 

563  n 

v.  Carron 

Uk 

».  Bloom 
v.  Bloor 

14  6,  444  6,  461  a 

444,  409  a 

v.  Carter 
v.  Cass 

2a,14c,  254,  462 
805  d 

v.  Blue 

146 

v.  Cater 

140 

v.  Bodie 

14  k 

v.  Caveness 

461  c 

r.  Bogue 

333  « 

v.  Chamberlain 

195  a,  445 

r.  Bohan 

156 

v.  Chambers 

221,  343 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


cxv 


State  17.  Chandler 

14c 

State  17.  Depass                                           14  * 

17.  Chase 

14o 

17.  Derrick                                             466  a 

17.  Chavis 

14  6,  14  c 

17.  Desforges                                         469  a 

v.  Chee  Gong                            162  o,  430  i 

v.  Desroches                        14  q,  162  g,  218 

v.  Cheek 

430  d,  439  c 

v.  De  Witt                                            163  a 

17.  Cherry 

14,146,  14  o,  444  c,  4616 

v.  De  Wolf                                   366,  439  e 

17.  Chiles 

430  I 

v.  Dickinson                               156,  162  c 

v,  Chingren 

5,4616 

17.  Dickson                                   14  *,  195  a 

17.  Christian 

14  c,  461  c 

17  .  Dill                                          Uy,  461  i 

17.  Church 

5 

17.  Dilley                                               466  a 

17.  Clancy 

81  c 

17.  Dillon                                                328  c 

17.  Clark 

4412 

v.  Dodge                                                 34 

v.  Claude 

14  c 

17.  Donelson                                218,  461  d 

17.  Clifford 

App.  Ill 

17.  Donnelley                                       401  6 

17.  Clifton 

461  d 

17.  Douglas                                         370  d 

17.  Clinton 

4446,4610,4616,  581 

v.  Dove                                       461  a,  469  6 

v.  Clyburn 

466  a 

17.  Downs                                       6  a,  328  a 

17.  Coatney 

349 

17.  Drake                                          221,  232 

17.  Cochran 

1406 

v.  Dudoussat                             461  6,  469  6 

v.  Cohn 

4446 

17.  Duestrow                            14  /.  14  o,  434 

17.  Colby 

14  o 

17.  Duffey                              146,  432,  461  a 

17.  Cole 

430/ 

v.  Duffy                                        13  e,  254  c 

17.  Coley 

1406 

17.  Dufour                                                14  p 

17.  Collins 

14  i,  184  a,  439  c,  462,  465  a 

v.  Dumphev                        14  6.  14  c,  14* 

17.  Compagnel 

14  c,  14  k 

17.  Duncan  "  14  r,  81  c,  152  d,  162  y,  184  a. 

v.  Condotte 

380 

219  6,  469  d 

17.  Conkle 

4616 

v.  Dunwell                                                6 

17.  Connelly 

2606 

17.  Durham                                    14  7,  563  e 

17.  Conway 

163,7 

v.  Durnam                                      14  q,  382 

17.  Cook 

220  c 

v.  Dyer                           444  6,  461  a,  461  6 

v.  Cooper    6  b,  14  k,  14  o,  444  b,  462,  469  a 

17.  Earnest                                           441  h 

17.  Cornish 

1616 

17.  Eaton                                                  14  * 

17.  Cosgrove 

14  c,  14* 

17.  Edwards                                            367 

17.  Costello 

370  e 

17.  Egan                                    461  a,  461  c 

17.  Con  per 

14  w 

17.  Eisenhour                                       466  a 

».  Cousins 

1956 

17.  Electric  Co.                                        6  a 

17.  Covington 

218 

17.  Elkins                                      14  c,  14* 

17.  Cowan 

201,  218,  220,  App.  Ill 

».  Elliott                                       14*,  157 

17.  Cowell 

14  q 

17.  Ellsworth                                          450 

17.  Craine 

158,  161  a 

17.  Ellwood                                439  g,  439  h 

v.  Cram 

184  a 

17.  Emery                                                 14  a 

v.  Crawford 

.    14*,  14?,  14  r,  81  a 

i?.  Evans      14  c,  14  *,  Up,  79,  158,  328  c, 

v.  Crocker 

140  a 

343 

17.  Cross 

254  a,  461  c 

17.  Faile                                                 14* 

17.  Crowell 

79 

v.  Farmer                                 444  6,  461  6 

17.  Crowley 

14  o 

17.  Farrington                                           581 

17.  Cruise 

4696 

17.  Feister                                            305  g 

17.  Cueller 

4306 

v.  Felter                                       14  L  441* 

i?.  Cummings 

444 

v.  Feltes                    215,  217,  220  6,  370  e 

17.  Cunningham                                       14  / 

17.  Felton                                                  14  * 

17.  Curnazy 

469  d 

17.  Fenerhaken                                       381 

17.  Curran 

146 

17.  Ferguson                      14/,  461  a,  461  6 

r.  Curtis 

4616 

v.  Field                                          14  c,  482 

17.  Cushing 

13  e,  14*,  14?,  81  c,  163/, 

17.  Finch                                                 430» 

17.  Dale 

461  tf 

430  i 

v.  Findley                                563  g,  563  A 
v.  Finley                                                439  c 

17.  Dalton 

146 

17.  Fisher                                               14  * 

v.  Dan  forth 
t'.  D'Angelo 

14  « 
14  c,  14  o,  14  r 

17.  Fitzgerald    14  k,  14  r,  163/,  165,  195  6, 
245,  466  a 

17.  Daniel 

201 

17.  Fitzsimon                              14  g,  162  A 

v.  Darnell 

2206.  223 

17.  Flanagin                                           215 

V.  Dart 

1626 

17.  Flanders                                430  t,  563  c 

17.  David 
w.  Davidson 
v.  Davis 

581  a,  App.  Ill 
461/,  462  a 
14*,  14$,  14r,220c,  2606, 

v.  Fletcher                  14  r,  14  v,  152  d,  158 
v.  Flint                                       14  »,  469  6 
v.  Flovd                                                146 

343,  432  c 

v.  Flvnn                                     14  q,  469  f 

r.  Degonia 
v.  De  Graff 
v.  Delaney 

1956 
681,  App.  Ill 
14  r,  14  17 

17.  Fdley               14  p,  140  6.  197,  376,  377 
17.  Fontenot                         14  g,  14  o,  14  q 
v.  Foot  You                                           159 

t).  Demoreste 
0.  Denis 

14* 

370  d 

17.  Ford            14  c,  14  *,  14  g,  195  6,  461  c 
v.  Forschner    146,  Ug,  14  o,  461  a,  461  d 

».  Dennin 

4696 

17.  Forsythe                                         170  a 

CXV1 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  v.  Fortner  220  c 

v.  Foster  362 

v.  Foulk  34 
«.  Fournier  14  *,  162  b,  218,  461  a,  461  b 

v.  Fowler  14  p 

v.  Fox  5,439^ 

».  Franks  333  a 

v.  Fraunberg  161 

v.  Frazier  161  b,  221 

v.  Frederic  Up 
v.  Freeman  14?,  170  a,  252  a 

t.  Fritz  581 

v.  Fruge  469  a 

v.  Gailor  14  m 

v.  Garic  14  6,  14  c 

17.  Garrett  461  6,  469  e 
v.  Garvey  219  b,  App.  Ill 

v.  Gaubert  466  a 

v.  Gedicke  1626 

v.  George  163  g,  469  6 

«.  German  217 

v.  Gesell  461  6 

v.  Giese  305  e 

17.  Gile  159 

v.  Gilman  213,  App.  Ill 

v.  Gilmour  App.  Ill 

v.  Gin  Pon  364  b 

v.  Giroux  441  d 

v   Glave  469  d 

v.  Gleim  461  b 

v.  Gleiu  450  b 

v.  Glenn  81  c 

v.  Glynn  450,  462 

v.  Go'ddard  581 

v.  Goetz  14  q 

v.  Goff  14  k,  444  a 

v.  Goforth  342 

v.  Goodbier  450,  462 

v.  Goodrich  14  k 

v.  Goodwin  430  i,  577 

17.  Gorman  14  q 

v.  Gossett  218,  219  6,  220 

v.  Goyette  5 

v.  Grace  313 
v.  Graham  14  q,  254  a,  469  e 
v.  Grant  14  fc,  219  6,  461  a,  461  b 

v.  Grear  370  e 
v.  Green  14  c,  14  A,  14  m,  14  o,  380 

r.  Greenburg  461  6 

r.  Greenwade  U  q 

0.  Gregor  14  k 
v.  Griswold  254  a,  444  b,  46fJ/ 

v.  Guild  14;; 

r.  Gurnee  563  p 

v.  Hack  152  d 

v.  Hairston  146,  114  d 

v.  Hall  14fc 

17.  Hallock  14  q 

v.  Halstead  563  p 

v.  Hamilton  461  a 

v.  Hand  1406 

0.  Harding  14  o 

v.  Harlan  97  d 

v.  Harman  2196 

v.  Harper  156 

v.  Harr  439  g 

v.  Harrington  328  c 
v.  Harris  14  c,  14ft,  14  f,  14 p 

v.  Harrold  14? 

v.  Harvey  816,  430 1 

«.  Hastings  581 

v.  Hatcher  195  6,  App.  HI 


State  v.  Hayden 
v.  Hayes 
v.  Haynes 
v.  Hays 
v.  Hayward 
v.  Heacock 
u.  Head 
v.  Healey 
v.  Heaton 
v.  Heed 
v.  Helm 
v.  Henderson 
v.  Hendricks 
v.  Henry 
v.  Hersom 
v.  Hess 

v.  Hessenkamp 
v.  Hice 
v.  Hicks 
v.  Higdon 
v.  Hill 

v.  Hinchman 
17.  Hinkle 
v.  Hobbs 
v.  Hocker 
v.  Hodge 
v.  Hodges 
17.  Hoffman 
17.  Hogan 
v.  Hogue 
17.  Holden 
17.  Hollenbeck 
v.  Holmes 
v.  Hooker 
17.  Hopkins 
v.  Hopkirk 
v.  Hopper 
r.  Home 
v.  Houser 
r.  Houseworth 
'».  Houston 
t;.  Howard 

17.  Howell 


441 1 
2a 

14  r,  152  d 

Uk,Ul,  Up 

14  J,  162  c,  257,  4506 

14  6,  461/ 

5636 

14  p 

18 

257 

14  £ 

581 

14  d,  140  6 

14  6,  14  g,  Up 

439  A 

14  o 

18 

146 

14  c 

14  A 

163  a,  197 
540 

14  m,  14  o,  195  b,  430  c 

App.  Ill 

6  a,  482 

81a 

14  q,  34 

34 

195a 

146 

439  A 

14/7,  I*  o 

14  q,  469  d 

165 

439  c,  563J9,  581,  App.  Ill 

430 1,  430  q 

Up 

14 1, 14  k,  469  d 

163  a,  163 /,  163.9 

245 

14} 

162  c,  370  c,  439  e,  461  a, 
461  c,  461  d 
10,  199 


17.  Hoy  t    14  k,  14 1, 14  m,  140  6,  162  k,  254 


v.  Hudson 
v.  Huff 
v.  Hull 
r.  Humason 
v.  Hunter 
17.  Kurd 
17.  Hutchinson 
v.  Hymer 
v.  Ingerson 
17.  Isaacson 
17.  Isenhart 
v.  Isham 
17.  Jackson 


u.  Jacobs 
D.  Jaeger 
v.  James 
17.  Jamison 
v.  Janvier 
v.  Jeandell 
v.  Jefferson 
t?.  Jeffries 
v.  Jenkins 
17.  Jerome 
v.  Johnson 


195  a 

444  6,  461  b,  469 1 
Hrf,  469cZ 
Uq,  163  A 
439  g,  469  c 
14o,  343 
14  o 
14  I- 
322 

14  k,  14  v 
466  n,  498 
502 

14  b,  14  c,  14  k,  14  o,  14?, 
184  a,  370  d 
466  a 
185 
14* 
14a 

14  c,  14  it. 
14  o,  435 

146,  14  <7, 14  o,  192 
14  q 
232 

14  d,  461  c 

5,  146,  Uq,  14 1,  Uq,  14 r, 

14*,  220\  434,  444.  450, 

4G1  c,  461  c/,  469  d,  409  J 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


CXVH 


[References  are  to  sections.] 

State  v.  Jolly                                                337 

State  v.  Mahon 

218 

v.  Jones        13  e,  14  I,  81  a,  81  6,  158,  165, 

v.  Maier 

441/ 

218,  219  a,  220  c,  221,  230, 

v.  Main 

6,  (id 

432  c,  469  a,  469  c 

v.  Mairs 

461  a 

v.  Juneau                                              370  d 

v.  Mai  loll 

14p 

t.  Justus                                                  14  v 

v.  Maloy 

14* 

v.  K  469  d 

v.  March 

4616 

r.  Kaiser                                               162  q 

v.  Marcks 

260  6,  409  c 

v.  Keeler                                                  217 

v.  Marion  Co.  Court 

5 

v.  Keene                               14  c,  14  k,  44  11 

v.  Markins 

14o 

v.  Kellev                14  1,  14  q,  34,  439  h,  462 

v.  Marks 

461  a,  461  r,  40  Id 

v.  Kelly"                                                  34 

v.  Marsh 

14  r,  15,  5636 

v.  Kemp                                          14  o,  197 

v.  Marshall             81  c,  114  c,  114  g,  260  b 

v.  Kennade                                           14  c 

v.  Martin 

14  q,  461  6 

t>.  Kent                                          379,  439/ 

v.  Marvin 

14  o 

t>.  Kenyon                                           .  461  d 

v.  Maxwell 

81  c 

v.  Kervin                                                 14  c 

v.  May                  14  r, 

152  d,  184  a,  461  a 

v.  Kessler                                                 159 

v.  Mayberry 

563  c 

v.  Kidd                                               247  a 

v.  McAllister 

14  q 

v.  Kindle                                             163/ 

v.  McCann 

184  a 

v.  King           14  b,  14  fc,  14j9,  260  6,  401  c, 

».  McCanon 

1616 

461  d 

v.  McCartey 

4616 

v.  Kingsbury                              14  a,  462  a 

v.  McCauley 

563  p 

v.  Kinley                                                 146 

v.  McClain 

220  c 

v.  Kinney                                              102  h 

v.  McCormick 

252  a 

v.  Kirby                                            220,  223 

v.  McCoy 

441  d 

v.  Kirkpatrick                    230,  444  b,  461  a 

v.  McCullnm 

197 

v.  Kline                                          14o,  816 

v.  McCune 

146 

v.  Knapp       13  c,  14  b,  14  g,  14  Z,  14  o,  37, 

v.  McDonald 

380,  461  d 

469  c 

v.  McDonnell 

18 

v.  Knight                             18,  439  g,  439  A 

v.  McDonough 

140.441./ 

t?.  Knowles                                              213 

»,  McDowell 

14  d,  140  6 

v.  Koontz                                                 581 

v.  McFarlain 

450 

v.  Kouhns                                                382 

r.  McGee 

461  d 

v.  Krause                                                 498 

v.  McGonigle 

14  c,  14  A; 

v.  Kremling                                        439  c 

v.  McGregor 

Ud,  14/t 

r.  Labuzan                                             14  k 

v.  McGuire 

43  a,  444  6 

v.  Lagrange                                               34 

v.  McKean 

382 

v.  Lamb                                           App.  Ill 

«.  McKinstry 

461  e 

v.  Langford                        14  o,  469  b,  469  c 

r.  McLain 

430  k 

v.  Lamer                                             461  d 

v.  McNally 

Uk 

v.  Lapage                                 14,  14  b,  14  e 

v.  McNamara 

163  a,  163/,  163  g 

v.  Larkin                           14  o,  184  a,  461  a 

v.  McNeely 

14  c,  14  o 

D.  Larkins                            14  k,  445,  469  d 

v.  McNeil 

163  a 

v.  Later                                               46  1  a 

v.  McNinch 

163d 

v.  La  Vigne                                           581 

v.  McO'Blenis 

163/ 

v.  Lawlor                                               14  o 

v.  Medlicott 

99  a,  441  k 

v.  Laxton                                    146,  461  d 

v.  Melton 

498,  App.  Ill 

v.  Lavcock                                            466  a 

v.  Merkley 

14  a 

v.  Leabo                                                162  p 

v.  Metcalf 

97  d 

r.  Lee    14  a,  81  n,  163/,  163£r,461c,461d 

v.  Meyers 

370  c,  469  c 

v.  Lenihan                                            14  d 

v.  Michael 

369,  370  d 

v.  Levy                                                  370  d 

v.  Miles 

461  c 

v.  Lewenthal                                      563  h 

r.  Miller 

14  q,  461  a,  461  6 

v.  Lewis  .            14  1,  14  q,  20,  441/,  469  d 

v.  Minard 

14  p 

v.  Lindven                                            14  v 

v.  Minnick 

6  a 

v.  Lingle                                         6  c,  162  p 

v.  Minton 

14  q,  577,  581 

v.  Litchfield                                    248,  380 

v.  Mix 

14  q 

».  Littlefleld                                   186,  195 

v.  Moelchen 

Uo 

v.  Lodge                                                 462 

v.  Molier 

257 

v.  Long                                                 219  a 

v.  Moody 

156 

v.  Lord                                                    38  n 

v.  Moon 

97  d 

v.  Lowhorne                                           221 

v.  Moore    34,  41,  43  a, 

162  p,  184  a,  444  c, 

v.  Lucas                                                 430  i 

469  d 

v.  Lull                                         14  c,  439  c 

v.  Moran 

162  o 

v.  Lvon                                                4?9  b 

v.  Morey 

14  c.  97  d 

v.  Lytle                                                430  i 

v.  Morgan 

14  d 

v.  Iff.  &  L.  Railroad                     14  6,  14  c 
f.  Mace                                          145,159 

v.  Morris                     6  e,  14  o,  162.;,  162p 
v.  Morrison                                             79 

v.  Madison                                    163  g,  218 

v.  Morse 

14  6,  461  n 

v.  Magone                                184  a,  333  a 

v.  Morton 

14q 

v.  Magooa                                             197 

v.  Motley 

232 

CXV111 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 

State  v.  Moy  Looke 

162  I 

State  v.  Poll 

158,  161  b 

v.  Mulholland 

14  0 

v.  Pomeroy 

34,  469  6 

v.  Mulkern 

469  c 

v.  Porter 

146,  81  c,  213,  430  i 

v.  Mullen 

14/fc 

17.  Potter 

14  c,  14  o,  220 

17.  Munson 

213,  220  c 

v.  Potts 

44iy;  461  d 

v.  Murfreesboro 

66 

17.  Powers 

6 

17.  Murphy    13  e,  14  q,  162  g,  163/,  444  6, 

v.  Prather 

370  d 

4616 

17.  Prudhomme 

469  e 

v.  Murray 

197 

17.  Pruett 

14  k,  466  a 

17.  Musgrave 
v.  Mustek 

13  t 
14jo 

17.  Pugh 
i?.  Punshon 

162  g 
14  r,  162  c,  462  6,  App.  Ill 

i?.  Mj'ers 

441  c 

17.  R.  Co. 

14  j,  14  n 

17.  Nash 

14  6,  14  c,  163  f 

r.  Raby 

337 

v.  Neagle 

14? 

17.  Ramsey 

162  g 

r.  Neill 

344 

.  v.  Rand 

14  p 

».  Nelson 

270  d,  430^,  469  a 

v.  Randolph 

461  6,  461  c 

17.  Nett 

14  c 

17.  Raper 

14  f 

v.  Nettlebush 

159 

17.  Rash 

140 

17.  Newman 

14* 

D.  Rawls 

198,  437 

v.  Niles 

469  c 

17.  Raymond 

14  o,  34 

17.  Noe 

581 

17.  Reasby 

469  e, 

17.  Nolan 

4506 

v.  Reavis 

14  q 

v.  Nordstrom 

469  e 

t7.  Reddington 

370  d 

17.  Norris 

444 

17.  Reed       14  6,  14  g,  14  k,  14  o,  81  6,  159, 

v.  Northrup 
v.  Norton 

146,1956 
!4Jb 

195  a,  379,  461  6,  462,  462  a 
462  6,  469  6 

v.  Norwood 

81  c 

v.  Reidel 

163/ 

v.  Nowell 

469  d 

17.  Reinhart 

195  a 

17.  Nugent 

14o,147 

17.  Reitz 

816 

i'.  Ober 

469  d 

17.  Renard 

254  a 

r.  O'Brien 

162  1,  4446,  4616,  465  a, 

v.  Renton 

14  q 

App.  Ill 

r.  Rice 

184  a,  469  a 

».  O'Conner 

66 

v.  Richart 

34 

t>.  O'Hara 

469  d 

v.  Richie 

367 

17.  Olds 

163/ 

17.  Ricks 

14  c 

17.  Oliver 

163/,  1G3  i 

v.  Riddle 

14  c 

c.  O'Neal 

1956 

».  Ridenhour 

370  d 

r.  O'Neale 

461  a,  461  c,  46  Id 

17.  Rider        14  6,  14  k,  14  m,  444  6,  461  a 

r.  O'Neil 

162  &,  162  /> 

v.  Ridgely 

375,  376 

17.  O'Reilly 

439  A 

17.  Riggs 

14  o 

v  .  Osborn 

563  ra 

17.  Rights 

34 

17.  Osborne 

4616 

17.  Riuey 

379 

v.  Owsley 

34 

t\  Rivera 

14  7 

v.  Pain 

461  d 

17.  Roberts 

221 

«.  Fancoast       14  o,  14;?,  14  <?,  162;?,  445, 
461  b,  469  d 

17.  Robertson 
v.  Robinson 

14  c,  14  £,  14  o 
14  o,  14  q,  445,  4506, 

v.  Parham 

161 

App.  Ill 

«.  Parish 

14  s,  227,4696 

17.  Roby 

14  o 

».  Parker 

146,  14  e,  461  a,  461  c 

v.  Roe 

469  a 

v.  Parks 

461  c,  46  Id 

17.  Rogers 

14  o,  81  d,  162  k,  184  a, 

r.  Paterno 

14c 

App.  Ill 

r.  Patterson 

14  h,  14*,  18,159,4616, 

u.  Rollins 

14  c 

469  k,  482,  App.  Ill 

v.  Rood 

488 

e.  Patza 

14  q 

v.  Rosier 

1956 

«.  Payne 

97  d,  4616 

17.  Rugan 

444  6,  461  6 

i>.  Pearce 

14  6,  14  c,  156,  461  c 

v.  Ruhl 

466  a 

v.  Pennington 

6 

17.  Russell 

239,  380 

v.  Perkins 

461  a 

17.  Ryan 

14  k,  346 

r.  Perry 

13  i,  162o 

».  Sanders 

14  q,  195  6 

D.  Petsch 

156 

»-  Sargent 

469  c 

17.  Pettaway 

28,  344 

v.  Sauer 

444  6,  461  6 

r.  Pettit 

14  c,  461  d 

v.  Saunders 

14  C,  14  q,  156,  159,  161  c, 

«.  Pfefferle 

14  r,  444  b,  461  6,  469  / 

163/ 

v.  Phelps 

380 

«.  Sawtelle 

254  a,  370  d 

v.  Phillips 

14jt> 

17.  Saxton 

Uq 

v.  Pierce 

14* 

v.  Savers 

445 

v.  Pike     14  q,  49,  81  a,  441  b,  44  If,  441  g 
v.  Pippin                                               14  o 

17.  Scott 
17.  Severson 

14  c,  14  *,  81  o,  380,  581 
367,  439  e 

v.  Plant 

1406 

17.  Sexton 

1616,  162  ff,  162  t 

v.  Platt 

14  y,  482 

17.  Seymore 

14  o,  14  p,  430  i 

v.  Plunkett 

14  q 

».  Shaffer 

462 

*.  Plym 

35           v.  Shattuck 

43 

TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


CX1X 


State  v.  Shaw                            14  j,  14  n,  14  a 

State  v.  Thomason                          444  rf,  469  b 

v.  Shea                                                   81  6 

v.  Thompson           2  a,  14  q,  162  g,  184  «, 

v.  Sliean                                                 14  h 

430/,  581 

v.  Shelton                                        14  o,  79 

v.  Thornton                                           14  w 

v.  Sherman                                              6  b 

v.  Thurston                                            81  b 

v.  Shettleworth                                    469  c 

v.  Thurtell                                             14  q 

v.  Shields                         14*,  14  g,  461  « 

v.  Tice                                          184  a,  581 

v.  Shinborn                                  439  b,  581 

v.  Tilghman                                        163/ 

0.  Shonhausen                                     443  u 

v.  Tilly                                                 146 

0.  Shroyer                                            461  a 

v.  Timberlake                                    163  g 

V.  Shuford                                                14  q 

v.  Timmens                                            14ft 

v.  Sibley                                               461  a 

0.  Tisdale                                                  5 

v.  Simon                                                  444 

v.  Tobie                                                 380 

v.  Simons                                              195  c 

0.  Toland                                                 6  a 

v.  Simpson                                                6 

v.  Tomblin                                            163  h 

0.  Skidmore                                         14  k 

v.  Tompkins                                            581 

v.  Slack                              97  d,  443.  4G1  b 

v.  Towle                                                  322 

v.  Sloan                                               14  I: 

v.  Tozier                                               195  6 

v.  Smalley                                     14  k,  14  q 

v.  Traylor                                             444  6 

v.  Smarr                                                 14  r 

v.  Trivas                                                 18 

v.  Smith   13  c,  13  e,  14  c,  14  fc,  14m,  Up, 

v.  Trusty                                              220  c 

14  q,  14  s,  14  v,  18,  162  c,  163  a, 

v.  Turlev'                                                  14  q 

215,  247  a,  333  a,  382,  444  b, 

v.  Turne'r  14  c,  184  a.  444  b,  450  a,  461  c, 

450,  46  la,  4616 

461  d 

w.  Snell                                                   34 

0.  Turpin                              14  b,  14  c,  14  fc 

0.  Snow                                                       6 

v.  Twitly                                               469  6 

v.  Soper                                                   233 

0.  Twitty                                                14  q 

0.  Sorton                                       App.  Ill 

v.  Twombly                                          461  e 

v.  Sorter                                                  444 

v.  Upham                                             195  b 

0.  South  Kingston                                    5 

v.  Vaigneur       14  p,  213,  219  a,  App.  Ill 

0.  Southern                               444  b,  461  6 

v.  Vale  Mills                                           128 

v.  Sparrow                                    432,  432  c 

v.  Vallery                                       14c,  201 

v.  Spell                                                   14  A; 

v.  Vance                                        14  c,  14  k 

0.  Spencer                         14  1,  466  a,  469  c 

v.  Van  Houten                                     14  q 

v.  Spendlove                               14  b,  14  k 

v.  Vann                                         14  /,  219  6 

v.  Stade                                            489,  505 

v.  Van  Tassel              14  1,  254  a,  App.  Ill 

v.  Stair                                           13  e,  13/ 

v.  Van  Winkle                             Up,  14  q 

».  Stalev                                       220,  462  a 

v.  Vaughan                                   14  c,  14  q 

0.  Stallfngs                                           461  « 

v.  Vickers                                      14  it,  444 

0.  Stanton                                                414 

v.  Vincent                13  e,  227,  461  a,  469  6 

0.  Staples                        195  a,  461  6,  469  I 

0.  Vittuin                                               43  a 

v.  Staton                                             439  c 

v.  Wagner                                            162/" 

v.  Stearns                                                 467 

v.  Waldron                                           163  / 

c.  Steeves                            227,  444,  465  a 

v.  Walker                          108,  162  c,  162  y 

v.  Stein                                                 450  a 

v.  Wallace                                     14  o,  14  r 

v.  Sterrett                                  461  c,  461  d 

v.  Wallis                                               305  c 

v.  Stevens                                             14^ 

v.  Walsh                                                 14  k 

v.  Stewart                                       14  c.  379 

v.  Walters                                        14  q,  34 

v.  Stinson                                                370 

v.  Walton                                               14  q 

v.  Sullivan                                            161 

v.  Ward      14  q,  14  s,  14  r,  53,  81  6,  430  «, 

v.  Sumniar                              461  a,  461  d 

432,  432  c,  4616,  469  a,  469  1 

v.  Sutton                                               81  b 

v.  Washington                             369,  370  a 

v.  Swafford                                              239 

v.  Watkins                                    13  a,  14  o 

v.  Swayze                                                18 

v.  Watson         14  c,  444  6,  461,  461  b,  467 

v.  Swett                                               14  A 

v.  Way                                                    14  o 

v.  Svmmes                                              13  e 

».  Weasel                                                233 

v.  Tackett                                             14  6 

v.  Weeden                                         461  a 

v.  Talbot                                               469  I 

v.  Welch                                                  342 

v.  Tall                                             243,  444 

v.  Weldon                                           370  c 

v.  Tarter  '                                                14  k 

v.  Wells                                            14  b,  34 

v.  Tatro                                        220  b,  229 

v.  Welsor                                              158 

v.  Taylor  14/,  Up,  14  r,  444,  444  b,  461  a, 
4616,  461  d,  4696,  563  o 

v.  Wentworth                  14  /,  220  6,  469  d 
v.  Wesley                                                146 

v.  Teeter                                               444  b 

v.  West                               13  e,  152  rf,  218 

v.  Teipner                                                310 

t>.  Westfall                                           14  o 

v.  Terrell                                       156,  430  I 

v.  Whisenhurst                            3646,371 

v.  Testerman                               14  q,  444  b 

v.  Whitacre                                          162/9 

v.  Thawley                                              14  c 

v.  White         14  q,  14  r,  152  d,  163  g,  243, 

v.  Thibeau                                               233 

370  e 

v.  Thibodeaux                                     184  a 

».  Whiteacre                                      439  q 

».  Thomas        14  d,  14  k,  Up,  252,  432  c, 

v.  Whitesell                                            146 

444,  469  b 

v.  Whitfield                                          220 

cxx 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  v.  Whitson 
v.  Whittier 
v.  Whitworth 
v.  Wickliff 
v.  Wieners 
v.  Wiggins 
illia 


18,  161 
367,  370  d 
4326 
14s,  434 
13  a 

14  jfe,  462 

v-  Williams         14  c,  14  ife,  14  p,  14  q,  159 

v.  Williamson  441  f 

v.  Willinghain  445 

v.  Willis  2196,221 

v.  W liner  42,  81  a 

v.  Wilson  14  Jfc,  14  q,  34,  156 

v.  Windahl  439  h 

v.  Wings  14  a; 

v.  Wirikley  462  6 

v.  Winston  232 

v.  Wintzingerode  34<y 
r.  Wisdom          13  a,  14  jo,  11  q.  App.  Ill 

v.  Witham  14  o,  14  q,  4446,  469  d 

v.  Wolff  .         14  q 
v.  Wood   14  q,  162  c,  162  Jfc,  252,  430  I,  440 

v.  Woodruff  13  c,  14  s,  581 

v.  Woodson  14  k 

v.  Woodward  14  g 

v.  Worthing  335,  363 

v.  Worthington  218 

».  Wright  14  Jfc,  45  «,  192,  441  / 

v.  Wyse  14  Jfc,  4616 

f.  York  220 

v.  Young  App.  Ill 

v.  Zeigler  81 6 

v.  Zellers  Wife,  230,445 

State  Bank  v.  Brewer  439  6 

Stauffer  v.  Young  14  i,  14  I,  ]4  o 

Stayner  v.  Burgesses  139,  162  I 

Stead  v.  Heatou  150,  152 

Steamship  Ville  du  Havre  195  b 

Stearns  v.  Bank  444 

v.  Cox  14  o 

v.  Doe  563  i 

v.  Field  441  I 

v.  Gosselin  328  c 

v.  Hall  302,  304 

t;.  Hendersass  147 

Stebbing  v.  Spicer  43  a 

Stebbins  v.  Duncan  575 

v.  Miller  14  t 

v.  Sackett  422,  423,  465  a 

Steed  v.  Oliver  361 

Steele  v.  Lord  563  6 

v.  People  14  b,  14  q 

v.  Price  14  a,  162  e 

v.  Prickett  130 

v.  Smith  548 

v.  State  14  c,  14  k,  333  a 

u.  Steele  «                    86 

r.  Stewart  239 

v.  Worthington  20 

Steene  v.  Aylesworth  461  6 

-Steenerson  "v.  R.  Co.  6  e,  162  j 

Steeples  v.  Newton  461  b 

Steer  v.  Little  434 

Steers  v.  Carwardine  397 

Stein  v.  Bowman  19,  254,  334,  337 

v.  Fogartv  305  c 

Steinbach  v.  Jus.  Co.  444  a 

Steiner  v.  Trainum  573  6 

Steinhnfer  v.  R.  Co.  162  g 

Steinke's  Will  162  e 

Steinkeller  v.  Xewtnn  88,  438,  439  c,  563  e 

Steinman  v.  McWilliaras  14  d 

Steinmetz  v.  Currey  430 


Steinmetz  v.  Versailles  Turnpike  Co.  6 

Steketee  v.  Kimm  162  d 

Stennett  v.  Ins.  Co.  441  e 

Stephen  v.  Gwenap  147 

v.  State  469  c 

Stephens  v.  Bernays  2  a 

v.  Foster  447  a 

v.  People  14  o,  14  q,  461  e,  406  a 

v.  Vroman  200,  202 

v.  Winn  268 

Stephens,  Re  439  h 

Stephenson  v.  Bannist  506 

v.  State  13  j 

v.  Stephensou  162  e 

Stepp  r.  State  430  q 

Sterling  v.  Potts  563  b 

Sterling  L.  Co.  v.  Stinson  194 

Stern  v.  Lowenthal  14  o 

v.  R.  Co.  180 

Sterret  v.  Bull  117,  120  a,  120  b 

Stetson  v.  Gulliver  563  r 

Stetson's  Will  186 

Stettauer  v.  White  120  a,  439  b 

Stevens  v.  Com.  81  c 

v.  Haskell  275 

v.  Irwin  461  c 

v.  McNamara  41 

v.  Miles  108 

v.  Pinney  89 

v.  State  6  c 

v.  Taft  20 

v.  Thacker  184 

Stevenson  v.  Dunlap  571 

v.  Gunning  469  a,  581  a 

v.  Hoy  14  n,  563  q 

v.  Mudgett  429 

v.  Nevinson  405 

v.  Stewart  14, 14  o 

v.  U.  S.  14  k 

Stevison  v.  Earnest  254  a,  502 

Stewart  v.  Allison  498 

v.  Doughty  271 

v.  Everts  162  b 

v.  Hood  443  a 

v.  Huntingdon  Bank  332 

v.  Johnson  335 

v.  Kip  389,  392,  409 

v.  Nashville  81 

v.  People  469  b 

v.  R.  Co.  305/ 

f.  Say  brook  331 

v.  Sonneborn  81  f 

v.  State  14  k 

Stewartson  v.  Watts  184  c 

Steyner  v.  Droitwich  139,  162  I 

Stier  v.  Oskaloosa  6  b 

Stiles  v.  Danville  184  c 

v.  The  Western  Railroad  Co.     110,  184  c 

Still  v.  Hoste  305  k 

v.  Hutto  41 

Still  ing  v.  Thorp  162  t 

Stillingfleet  v.  Parker  563  q 

Stillwell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Phelps  430 /,  430;; 

Stimmel  ».  Underwood  387,  388 

Stinchiield  v.  Emerson  41 

Stiiule  v.  Goodrich  30 

v.  Ridgwav  30 

Stinson  v.  K.  Co.  14t> 

Stirling  v.  Stirling  461  d 

Stittgen  v.  Rundle  6  b 

Stobart  v.  Dryden  156,  462,  575 

Stockbridge  v.  W.  Stockbridge  21,  509 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


CXXl 


[References  are  to  sections.] 

Stockbridge  Co.  v.  Hudson  Co.                305  c 

Stout  v.  Rassel 

457 

Stockdale  n.  Young 

5636 

v.  Wood 

421 

Stockdale  s  Trial 

201 

Stouvenal  ».  Stephens 

41 

Stockfleth  v.  De  Tastet     193,  254  a,  App.  Ill 

Stover  v.  People 

469  d 

Stockham  v.  Jones 

358 

Stoves  v.  Menhem 

13  1 

v.  Stockham 

284 

Stow  v.  Converse 

146,  14  d,  461  c 

Stockton  v.  Derauth 

184  c,  442.  443  b,  444, 

Stowe  v.  Querner 

5636 

462  a 

Stowell  v.  Moore 

323 

Stockton  C.  H.  &  A. 

W.  v.  Ins.  Co.          14  v 

v.  Robinson 

302 

Stockwell  ».  Blarney 

189 

Stracy  v.  Blake 

179 

v.  R.  Co. 

13  b,  13  h,  162  o 

Stradling  v.  Morgan 

293 

v.  Silloway 

528 

Strafford  Bank  v.  Cornell 

416 

Stoddard  v.  Burton 

34 

Strait  v.  State 

232 

v.  Doane 

174 

Straker  v.  Graham 

252  a 

v.  Hill 

577 

Strand  v.  Springfield, 

138  a 

v.  Winchester 

441  J 

Strang  v.  People 

14.7 

Stoddart  v.  Palmer 

56,  70 

v.  State 

14  q 

Stodder  v.  Hoffman 

341 

Strange  v.  Dashwood 

572 

Stoddert  ».  Manning 

469  g 

v.  Donohue 

108 

Stoever  ».  Whitman 

280 

Stranger  v.  Searle 

577 

Stoher  v.  R.  Co. 

14  t 

Stratford  v.  Ames 

163  e 

Stokes  v.  Dawes 

114  d,  556 

Straton  v.  Rastall 

207,  212,  305 

v.  Macken 

66,43 

Stratton  v.  Dole 

14A 

V.  People    14  k, 

140,18,816,4616,  461  c, 

v.  Hawks 

5636 

461  I 

v.  State 

461  d 

v.  State 

34,  461  a,  469  e 

Street  v.  Nelson 

563  o 

v.  Stokes 

115 

v.  State 

184  a 

Stokoe  v.  R.  Co. 

241 

Streeter  v.  Bartlett 

5696 

Stolp  r.  Blair 

14  «,  469  6 

Strickler  v.  Todd 

17 

Stolze  v.  Term.  Co. 

14  v 

Strimpfler  v.  Roberts 

14i 

Stonard  v.  Dunkin 

207 

Stringer  v.  Gardiner 

305  1 

Stone  v.  Bibb 

356 

Stroble  v.  New  Albany 

81  f 

v.  Blackburn 

421 

Strode  v.  Magowan 

28 

v.  Clark 

293,  301 

v.  McGowan 

35 

v.  Covell 

430/> 

v.  Russell 

305  k 

v.  Crocker 

471 

v.  Winchester 

147 

v.  Damon 

550 

Strong  v.  Bradley 

513 

v.  Forsyth 

518 

v.  State 

14  y 

v.  Ins.  "Co. 

146,  14  v 

v.  Stewart 

192 

v.  Knowlton 

58,  68 

Strother  v.  Barr 

2  a,  87,  563  fc,  563  o 

v.  Langworthy 

146,  14  h 

v.  Lucas 

6  6,  581 

v.  Metcalf 

283 

Stroud  v.  Com. 

162  g 

v.  R.  Co. 

1626 

v.  Springfield 

140  a 

v.  Ramsey 

200 

udgeon  v.  Sand  Beach 

Up,  1626,  469m 

v.  Sanborn 

201,  5636 

Struawick  v.  Brodnax 

444  a 

v.  State 

14o,2-206 

Strutt  v.  Bovingdon 

531 

v.  Vance 

385 

Stuart  v.  Havens 

469  m 

».  Varney 

146,  14  d 

v.  Lake 

423 

v.  Watson 

162  6,  430  c 

v.  Lovell 

14  o 

Stone's  Case 

2  a,  97  d,  217 

v.  People 

14  r,  34 

Stoner  v.  Ellis 

498 

Stubly  v.  Beachboard 

14  q 

Stoner's  Appeal 

287 

Stuckslager  v.  Neel 

120  c 

Stones  v.  Byron 

254  c,  386 

Studdv  v.  Sanders 

43  a,  210,  507 

Stoop's  Case 

346 

Stukeley  v.  Butler 

60,  301 

Stoops  v.  Smith 

287 

Stumm  v.  Hummel 

14* 

Stoppert  v.  Nierle 

14  6,  14  *,  469  c 

Stump  v.  Napier 

385 

Storer  v.  Batson 

266 

Sturdy  v.  Arnaud 

303 

v.  Freeman 

288 

Sturge  v.  Buchanan 

116,  201,  563  d 

v.  Ins.  Co. 

288 

Sturgeon  v.  Waugh 

138  a 

Storer's  Will 

4412 

Sturgis  v.  Work 

305  m 

Storey  v.  State 

14  c 

Sturfa  v.  Freccia 

162m 

Storr'w.  Watson 

73 

Sturm  v.  Ins.  Co. 

]f.:5d 

Storr  et  al  v.  Scott 

196 

Sudlow  v.  Warshing 

581  a 

Story  v.  Finnis 

205 

Suffern  r.  Butler 

287 

v.  Kimball 

513 

Sugden  v.  St.  Leonard      14  k,  14  *,  162  a,  162  e 

v.  Saunders 

114/,  390,  444,  444  a, 

Sullivan  v.  Collins 

sos; 

466  a,  469  6 

v.  Com. 

14» 

v.  State 

13  e 

0.  Foley 

441  / 

Stoudenmeier  ».  Williamson                      162  i 

v.  Gold'man 

34 

v.  Wilson 

110  a 

v.  Hense 

5 

Stouffer  v.  Latshaw 

284 

v.  Kellv 

28 

Stough  v.  Ogden 

564 

v.  Kuykendall 

14;,  430  2 

CXX11 


Sullivan  v.  O'Leary 

v.  Oshkosh 

v.  Salt  Lake 

«.  State 

Summarsett  v.  Adamson 
Summer  v.  Sebec 
Summerour  ».  Felker 
Summers  v.  Moseley 

v.  State 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


159, 


14  o 

14^ 

149 

,  1G2> 

203 

484 

5736 

445 

310 


Summons  v.  State  2  a,  163  a,  163/,  165 

Stunner  v.  Child  17 

v.  Williams  101 

Sun  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barrel  Co.  14  n 

Supreme  Council  v.  Conklin  114  d 

Supreme  Lodge  v.  Jaggers  163  b 

Surgart  v.  State  13_/ 

Susque.  M.  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Mardorf  166 

Sussex  (Earl  of)  v.  Temple  189 

Sussex  Peerage  Case  120  o,  152  d,  162;, 

430  6,  488 

Suter  ».  Page  444  a 

Suther  v.  State  14  h,  260  b 

Sutor  v.  McLean  163  g 

Sutter  v.  Rose  201  a 

Sutton  v.  Bishop  413 

v.  Davenport  195  c 

v.  Devonport  37 

v.  Gregory  1206 

v.  Lumber  Co.  305/ 

v.  R.  Co.  6  a,  444 

».  Sadler  77 

T.  Walters  466  a 

v.  Kettell  281 

Suydam  r.  Jones  302 

Swain  v.  Cheney  14  v,  120  c 

v.  Comstock  6  6 

v.  Lewis  563  c 

Swallow  v.  Beaumont  58,  66,  68 

Swamscot  M.  Co.  i>.  Walker  14  » 

Swan  v.  Com.  14  q 

v.  Gilbert  441  c 

v.  Middlesex  Co.  430/,  430^,  441  g 

v.  Thurman  120  a 

Swanson  v.  Mellen  441 1 

Swartz  v.  Chickering  439  6 

Sweeney  v.  Hjul  466  a 

Sweet  v.  Gilmore  450  a,  461  c 

v.  Lee  282 

V.  Sherman  469,  469  a 

Sweetland  v.  Porter  43  a 

Sweetser  v.  Bates  14 o,  14p 

Sweigart  P.  Berk  529 

Swerdferger  v.  Hopkins  110, 152  c 

Swett  v.  Shumway  14  v,  280,  286,  292 

Swift  r.  Dean  421 

«.  Dickerman  14  o 

v.  Evres  301 

v.  ftfadden  465  a 

v.  Stevens  563  b 

Swings.  Sparks  .                       118 

Swiuk  v.  French  H4.y 

Swinnerton  v.  Marquis  of  Stafford        21,  485, 

5756 

Swinnej'  v.  Booth  430 » 

Swire  v.  Bell  572 

Swisher  v.  Com.  161  6 

Sybray  v.  White  183 

8yers"tf.  Jonas  294 

Sykes  v.  Dunbar  252 

Sykes,  Goods  of  162  e 

Sylvester  v.  Crapo  190 

v.  State  Up,  163  a 


Syme  v.  Stewart 
Symmons  «;.  Knox 
Symonds  v.  Carr 

v.  Carter 

v.  Lloyd 


T. 


T.  B.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner 
T.  F.  Oakes,  The 
Tabb  v.  Cabell 
Taft  v.  Dickinson 
Taggart  v.  Bosch 
Taitv.  Hall 
Talbot  (Lord)  v.  Clark 
v.  Cusack 


6J 

60 
66 

14  o 
292 


14  /,  439  h 
140 
186 
277 
445 

108,  430  i 
421 
4396 


v.  Seeman  6  6,  487,  491 

v.  Wilkins  230,  279 

Talbott  v.  Bradford  163  6 

Talcott  v.  Harris  199 

Tallassee  F.  M.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.  305  e 

Tallman  v.  Dutcher  421,  426 

Talmadge  v.  Baker  14  h 

Tandy's  Trial  441 A 

Tanner  v.  Hughes  469  g 

v.  Taylor  438,  439  c 

Tannett's  Case  65 

Tarbox  v.  State  14  q 

Tarleton  v.  Tarleton  543 

Tarplev  v.  Blabey  14  o 

Tarrant  v.  Ware  572 

Tate  u.  Humphrey  14  o 

v.  Penne  28 

v.  Southard  138  a 

v.  Tate  150 

Tatham  v.  Wright  569  d 

Tatum  v.  State  14  p 

Taunton  Bank  v.  Richardson  349 

Tawney  v.  Crowther  268 

Tayloe  v.  Riggs  201,  349 

Taylor  v.  Bank  of  Alexandria  489 

v..Bank  of  Illinois  489 

v.  Barclay  5,  6  a,  6  d,  6  e 

v.  Beck  385 

t\  Blacklow  240 

v.  Boardman  6  6 

v.  Briggs  278,  280,  292 

v.  Bryden  548 

v.  Buttrick  81  a 

v.  Com.  13  e,  441/,  469  d 

v.  Cook  139 

v.  Croker  196,  207 

v.  Diplock  30 

v.  Dundass  521 

v.  Fomby  138  a 

v.  Forste'r  386,  239 

v.  Henry  805  #,  484 

v.  Horsey  14  q 

».  Hunt  305  c 

v.  Johnson  568  a 

v.  Kinloch  181 

v.  Lawson  432 

v.  Luther  385 

v.  McGonigle  139 

v.  Monroe  14  u,  441 6 

v.  Mosely  564 

v.  Peck  563  k,  563  o 

v.  Pegram  42,  77, 162  e,  244 

v.  People  441  h 

v.  R.  Co.  14  r,  120  a,  195  d,  430  I 

v.  Robinson  .  14  q 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Taylor  v.  Roe 
v.  Ross 
v.  Sayre 
v.  Shufford 
v.  Smith 
v.  State 


138  a 

268 

280 

138  « 

40  Id 

111,  21  :J 


v.  Steamer  Robert  Campbell  575  c 

v.  Tucker  118, 120  c 

v.  U.  S.  13  h,  14  v 

v.  Webb  189 

v.  Weld  284 

17.  Willans  49,  101,  186,  195  b,  319 

v.  Witham  151 

Taylor,  Re  108,  140  c 

Taylor's  Trustees,  Re  28 

Taylor  Will  Case  439  h 

Tea  v.  Gates  37 

Teachout  P.  People  1626,  App.  Ill 

Teagle  v.  Deboy  14  o 

Teague  v.  Williams  14o,  201 

Teall  v.  Van  Wyck  572 

Teass  v.  St.  Albans  34 

Tebo  t>.  Augusta  162  6, 441 1 

Tedens  v.  Schumers  14  6,  461  o,  469  a 

Teegarden  v.  Lewis  77 

Teele  v.  Boston  14  v 

Teese  v.  Huntington  461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

Tefft  v.  Wilcox  441 1 

Teipel  v.  Hilsendegen  81/ 

Tempel  v.  Hunter  43 

Temperance  Hall  Ass'n  v.  Giles  14  v 

Tempest  v.  Kilner  267 

Templeton  v.  Luckett  575  b 

v.  People  14  o 

Tenbroke  v.  Johnson  118 

Ten  Eyck  v.  Whitbeck  43  a 

Tenna'nt  v.  Dudley  192 

v.  Hamilton  14  »,  192 

v.  Strachan  392 

Tennessee  C.  I.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Haley  467 

Tenney  v.  Evans  179,  252  a 

v.  Tuttle  14  b 

Tenny  v.  Jones  46 

Tenth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Darragh  187 

Terre  Haute  &  Ind.  R.  Co.  v.  Clem          195  d 

Terrett  v.  Taylor  24,  331 

Terrill  v.  Beecher  118 

v.  Colebrook  86 

Territory  v.  Chavez  4616 

v.  Oe  Guzman  370  d,  444  6,  461  a 

17.  Lucero  18 

v.  McKern  430  i 

v.  Owings  81  c 

v.  Padilla  81  c.  441/ 

v.  Roberts  14  k,  441/ 

77.  Williams  257 

Territt  v.  Woodruff  162  I 

Terry  v.  Belcher  337 

v.  Milwaukee  6  b 

v.  State  461  d 

Terryberry  v.  Woods  38 

Tesney  v.  State  461  d 

Tewkesbury  17.  Bricknell  58,  72 

17.  Howard  305  c 

Texas  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirby  441  </ 

Texas  £  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Donovan  430  n 

r.  Johnson  14  c 

v.  Reed  14  n 

v.  Robertson  162  a 

y.  Volk  81 

Texira  v.  Evans  568  a 

Thacher  v.  Phiuney  328  c 


Thalheim  v.  State 
Thallhimer  t?.  Brinckerhoff 
Thanet's  Trial 
Thatcher  v.  Kautcher 

v.  R.  Co. 
Thayer  17.  Boyle 

v.  Grossman 

v.  Davis 

17.  Deen 

17.  Finton 

17.  Ins.  Co. 

w.  Lombard 

17.  Stearns 

17.  Thayer 

Thelluson  r.  Gosling 
Theobald  v.  Tregott 
Thibault  w.  Sessions 


CXX111 


14  q,  201,  445 

14  j,  184  c 

441  h 

430  n 

14  v 

14  b,  461  a 

385,  401 

14  o,  441  I 

120  c 

286 

195  c,  441  e 
156 

305  g,  484 
14  o 
491 

416,  417 
14  d,  14  o 


Thiede  v.  Utah  14  i,  14  o,  254  c,  461  b 

Thiele  v.  Newman  444 

Thielmann  17.  Burg  6  a 

Third  Gt.  West.  T.  Co.  r.  Loomis  461  b 

Third  Nat.  Bank  v.  Robinson  469  b 

Thistlethwaite  v.  Thistlethwaite  110 

Thoen  v.  Roche  138  a 

Thomas  v.  Ansley  563  k 

v.  Com.  5,  6  a 

v.  Connell  103 

77.  Croswell  14  o 

r.  Cummins  319 

17.  Dakin  482 

».  David  432  c,  450,  461  e 

r.  Dyott  118,  120  c 

17.  Grand  Lodge  180 

v.  Graves  260  a 

17.  Hamilton  441  g 

i?.  Hargrave  341 

17.  Jenkins  137,  138  a 

w.  Ketteriche  550 

17.  Loose  275,  284  a,  447 

17.  Mallinckrodt  430 p 

17.  McDaneld  444  a 

17.  McDonald  190 

17.  Newton  469  d 

v.  People      14  b,  14  c,  14  h,  14  q,  18,  461  d 

17.  Porter  439  b 

v.  Price  439  b 

v.  R.  Co.  14  v 

17.  Robinson  505 

17.  Scutt  305  d 

v.  Springville  14j9,14  v 

17.  State  14  t,  14  q,  219  6,  444,  469  d 

v.  Tanner  506 

17.  Thomas  197,  291,  305  k 

v.  Turnley  575 

Thomas's  Case  228 

Thomas  &  Henry,  The  v.  U.  S.  323 

Thomas  Fruit  Co.  17.  Stuart  13  b 

Thomas  Jefferson,  The  6  a 

Thomason  t?.  Ins.  Co.  430^ 

Thompson  v.  Armstrong  399 

v.  Bell  284 

r.  Bertrand  430  c 

«.  Blanchard  444 

t7.  Boston  14  v 

17.  Bowie  14  y 

v.  Bryant  305. /' 

v.  Bullock  575  b 

v.  Clendening  14  d,  14  /» 

v.  Donaldson  550 

r.  Freeman  341 

v.  Gregor  462 

v.  Ish  347  a 


CXX1V 


Thompson  v.  Kctchum 
v.  Libby 
v.  Lockwood 
i:.  Maxwell 
v.  Missouri 
r.  Mosely 
r.  Musser 
r.  Nye 
v.  Roberts 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


281 
305  f 
284 
305 
2a 

14  t,  14  q,  469  n 
489 
14  A 
531 


v.  State          163  a,  165,  260  b,  444,  461  b, 
461  d,  469  c 

r.  Stevens  120 

v.  Stewart  5,  514 

v.  Thompson  174,  186,  563  b 

v.  Travis  563  b 

v.  Trevanjon  162  d,  162  f,  162  g 

v.  Whitman  540 

Thompson's  Case      219  a,  219  b,  220,  222,  317 

Thompson,  Re  14  v 

Thomson  v.  Austen  192,  201 

v.  Davenport  196 

v.  Porter  120  a,  120  c 

Thomson  H.  El.  Co.  v.  Palmer  6  d 

Thorington  ».  Smith  280,  283,  287 

Thorn  ».  Kemp  432  c 

v.  Knapp  14  o 

Thornburgh  v.  R.  Co.  563  h 

Thorndike  v.  Boston  108 

v.  Richards  301 

Thornell  v.  Brockton  286 

Thornes  v.  White  210 

Thornton  ».  Britton  163  g 

v.  Jones  66 

v.  Royal  Ex.  Ass.  Co.  440 

v.  Thornton  443 

v.  Wikes  69 

Thornton's  Case  220 

•  Thoroughgood's  Case  305  c 

Thorp  v.  State  14  q 

Thorpe  v.  Barber  357 

r.  Cooper  532 

v.  Gisburne  577 

Throckmorton  v.  Chapman  195  b 

Throgmorton  v.  Davis  14  o 

v.  Walton  41,  81 

Thruston  v.  Clark  469  d 

Thurman  v.  Bertram  13  i 

v.  Cameron  573 

v.  Virgin  461  a,  461  c 

Thruston  v.  Cornell  328  c 

v.  Masterson  21 

v.  Slatford  305  ff,  510 

v.  Whitney  369 

Thurtell  v.  Beaumont  81  d 

Tibbetts  ».  Flanders  430  i 

Tice  v.  Bay  City  14  p 

Tichborne'"s  Case        13  b,  163  a,  163  g.  195  a, 

247,  439  A,  461  b 

Tickel  v.  Short  197 

Ticknor  v.  Calhoun  87 
Tidmarsh  v.  Washington  F.  &  M.  Ins. 

Co.  80 

Tier  man  v.  Jackson  172 

Tiffany  r.  Com.  81  b 

Tilev  u.  Cowling  195,  527  « 

TUghman  v.  Fisher  196 

Tilk  r.  Parsons  162  d 

Tillettc.  R.  Co.  81f,  441c/ 

Tillolson  P.  Warner  501,  509 

Tillou  v.  Clinton,  &c.  Ins.  Co.  564 

TilUon  r.  Moulton  284 

Tilum  v.  Amer.  Bible  Soc'y  305  I 


Tilton  v.  Miller 
Timberlake  ».  Thaj'er 
Timmons  v.  Timmons 
Tinckler's  Case 
Tingle  v.  U.  S. 
Tingley  v.  Land  Co. 
Tinkham  v.  Arnold 
Tinkler  v.  Walpole 
Tinley  v.  Porter 
Tippet's  Case 
Tisdale  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Title  i'.  Grevett 
Titlow  v.  Titlow 
Titus  v.  Ash 
v.  Mvera 


14  t 
432  c 
162  c 
157,  158 
4616 
120  a 
17 
494 
319 
217 
550 
384 
81  a 
450 
284 

f.  State    14  b,  Ug,  230,  462,  465  a,  469  I 
v.  Sumner  14  o 

Tla-koo-yel-lee  v.  U.  S.  461  b 

Tobey  v.  Leonard  279 

Tobin  v.  Jones  40 

r.  Shaw  195  c,  441  A,  563  b 

Tod  v.  Winchelsea  163,  272 

Todd  v.  Keene  14  n 

v.  Rowley  14  h 

v.  Stafford  385 

Toledo  S.  L.  &  K.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey       146 
Toler  v.  State  195 

Toll  ».  State  14  q 

Tolleson  v.  Poser  484 

Tolman  v.  Emerson  575  b 

Tome  v.  R.  Co.  439  h,  581 

Tomkius  v.  Ashby  551 

Tomline  v.  Tyler  251 

Tomlinson  v.  Derby  14  v 

v.  Earnshaw  14  v 

v.  Greenfield  5 

Tompkins  v.  Att'y-Gen'l  484 

v.  Curtis  430 

Toms  v.  Whitmore  189 

Tong's  Case  233 

Toohey  v.  Plummer  166,  465  a 

Tooke"'s  Trial  14/ 

Tooker  ».  Beaufort  6  a 

Toole  v.  Nichol  445 

v.  Toole  254 

Toomey  v.  R.  Co.  14  w 

Topeka  v.  Martineau  13  ,/ 

v.  Sherwood  14  v 

Topeka  Water  Co.  v.  Whitney  14  v 

Topham ».  McGregor  •         433,  439  b 

Toplitz  v.  Hedden  465  « 

Torkington,  Exparte  322 

Torre  v.  Summers  14  h,  469  I 

Torrey  v.  Burney  439  b 

Torris  v.  People  App.  Ill 

Tousley  v.  Barry  190 

Towle  v.  Blake  162  b 

v.  P.  I.  Co.  14  b 

Town  v.  Needham  421 

Townley  v.  Wooly  118 

Towns  f.  Alford  435 

«.  State  469  a 

Townsend  v.  Atwater  563  e 

v.  Briggs  162.; 

v.  Bush  379,  385 

v.  Downer  575  b 

v.  Downing  391 

v.  Graves  14  b,  14  q,  54 

v.  State  14  s,  81  e,  461  b 

v.  Weld  281 

Traber  v.  Hicks  663 ;> 

Trabue  ».  Sayre  14j 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Tracy  v.  McManus 

441  % 

Turner  v.  Com. 

v.  People 

14o,157 

v.  Crisp 

Tracy  Peerage  Case 

1956 

r.  Evles 

Traders'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Catlin 

441  d 

v.  Fish 

Trambly  ».  Kicard 

284 

».  Hearst 

Trammell   v.  Thurmond 

5756 

v.  Keller 

Transportation  Line  v.  Hope 

441  d 

v.  King 

Trask  v.  People 

254  « 

v.  Lazarus 

Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sheppard                439  h 

v.  Me  Fee 

Travis  v.  Brown 

581 

v.  Pearte 

0.  January 

469  n 

v.  R.  Co. 

Treager  f.  Mining  Co. 
Treat  v.  Browning 

184  c 
14  d 

v.  Tyson 
v.  U.S. 

Treat  ».  Orono 

81 

v.  Waddington 

v.  Strickland 

152  c,  288 

».  Warren 

Tregany  ».  Fletcher 

6a 

v.  Yates 

Trelawney  v.  Colman 

38,  162  d 

Turner's  Estate 

v.  Thomas 

387 

Turner's  Trial 

Tremain  v.  Barrett 

310 

Turney  v.  State 

Tremblay  v.  Harnden 

14  r 

Turnpike  Co.  v.  I  learn 

Trenton  R.  Co.  ».  Cooper 

162^,  434 

Turpin  v.  State 

Trevivan  v.  Lawrence 

22,  204,  531 

Turquand  v.  Knight 

Trewhitt  v.  Lambert 

89 

Tuskar,  The 

Tribette  v.  R.  Co. 

140 

Tuttle  v.  Brown 

Trimmer  c.  Trimmer 

165 

v.  Burgett 

Tripp  v.  Garey 

86 

v.  Com. 

Trischet  v.  Ins.  Co. 

199,  201,  201  a 

v.  Russell 

Trogdon's  Case 

2  a,  14? 

Tutton  v.  Darke 

Trotter  v.  McLean 

120  a 

Tuxbun'  v.  French 

v.  Mills 

502 

Twamblv  v.  Henley 

Troup  v.  Sherwood 

461  a,  461  c 

Tway  r.'State 

Trowbridge  v.  Baker 

195 

Twemlow  v.  Oswin 

Trowel  v.  Castle 

611,  564 

Twiss  v.  Baldwin 

Trowter's  Case 

1G1 

Twohig  v.  Learner 

True  v.  Bullard 

305  c 

Twombly  v.  Leach 

v.  Sanborn 

Un 

Twomley  v.  R.  Co. 

Trull  v.  True 

14  n 

Twyman  v.  Com. 

Truslove  v  .  Burton 

186 

Tj'er's  Case 

Trustees,  &c.  v.  Bledsoe 

184(1 

Tyler  v.  Carlton 

v.  Peaslee 

290,  291 

v.  Flanders 

Trustees  Ep.  Ch.  Newbern 

v.  Trustees 

v.  Nelson 

Newbern  Acad. 

21 

v.  Todd 

Trusty  v.  Com. 

4446 

v.  Tvler 

Tuberville  v.  State 

81  c 

v.  tTlmer 

Tucker  v.  Barrow 

193,  App.  Ill 

v.  Wilkinson 

v.  Call 

81  d 

Tyler's  Estate 

v.  Hvatt 

578  6,  581 

Tynan  v.  Paschal 

».  Maxwell 

212,  305 

Tyner  v.  State 

v.  McDonald 

162  i 

Tyree  v.  Magness 

v.  People 

484 

Tyrwhitt  v.  Wynne 

v.  Railroad                                430  /,  441  g 
v.  Seaman's  Aid  Soc'y   305  j,  305  k,  806? 

Tyson  v.  Chestnut 

v.  Smith 

140  a 

v.  So.  Kingston 

252  a 

v.  Tucker 

75,  461  a,  461  6 

. 

v.  Welsh 

89 

Tudor  0.  Com. 

14  fc 

Udderzook  v.  Com. 

Tudor  Iron  Works  v.  Weber 

13  /,  439  ff 

Uhl  v.  Com. 

Tufts  v.  Hathaway 

1956 

Uhler  v.  Adams 

v.  Haves 

207 

LJlen  P.  Kittredge 

Tug  R.  C."  &  S.  Co.  v.  Brigel 

305  c 

Ulmer  v.  Leland 

Tuggle  v.  Barclay 

51  a 

[Jlrich  v  .  People 

Tullis  17.  Rankin" 

4412 

v.  Ulrich 

Tullock  v.  Dunn 

176 

Underbill  v.  Hernandez 

Tully  v.  Canfield 

485  a 

v.  Wilson 

v.  R.  Co. 

IV 

Underwood  v.  Wing 

Tunstall  v.  Cobb 

581 

Union  v.  McDonald 

Turnbull  ».  O'Hara 

4696 

v.  Novak 

»'.  Richardson 

430  p,  441  I 

r.  O'Brien 

Turner  v.  Austin 

394 

v.  Plainfield 

v.  Cates 

572 

v.  Reese 

v.  Coe 

341 

v,  Yates 

CXXV 


140,816,  195  b 

152  a 

56 

5 

195  d 
328  c 

114  c,  461  d 

356 

430  i 

421 

14  «,  439  h 

152  c 

439.7 

506 

245 

182,  563  e 
244 
146 
434 
146 
14  fc 
239 
305 
184  d 
305/ 
14o 

14?,  4506 

163/ 

287 

24,  384 

2606 

41 

60,  64 

165 

441  / 

14  v 

184  a 

65 

26 

114  f 
14  o 
581 
245 

180,  394,  539 

17 

572 

162  e 

Up 

5636 

3 

162? 


6  e,  439  ft 

461  a,  461  c 

14  o 

269 

78 

14  r,  223 

43  a 

4 

180 
30 

14  w 

430 1 

435 

114  g 

461  e 

2  a,  162 1 


CXXV1 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


v.  Owen 

17.  Stone 

Union  Electric  Co.  v.  Theatre  Co. 
Union  Elevated  Co.  17.  R.  Co. 
Union  G.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Robinson 
Union  Ins.  Co.  17.  Pollard 
Union  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson 
Union  P.  R.  Co.  17.  Botsford 
Union  S.  Co.  v.  Conoyer 
Union  Savings  Ass.  ».  Edwards 
Unis  17.  Charlton 
United  States  r.  Amedy 

v.  American  Gold  Coins 

v.  Anthony 

17.  Babcock 

17.  Battiste 

17.  Bell 

17.  Benner 

v.  Breed 

17.  Breedmeyer 

v.  Britton 

r.  Brooks 

17.  Buford 

r.  Burns 

17.  Cantril 

v.  Castro 

17.  Chaves 

r.  Clark 

v.  Collins 

v.  Craig 

v.  Crandell 

17.  Cross          14.p,  120  a,  46: 

vi  Cushman 

17.  Darnaud 

77.  Davis 

17.  De  Quilfeldt 

17.  Dickerson 

v.  Dickinson 

17.  Doebler 

t7.  Dunbar 

17.  Durling 

v.  Edme 

17.  Faulkner 

V.  Flemming 

r.  Foulke 

17.  Gibert 

v.  Glass  Ware 

v.  Gooding 

17.  Graff 

v.  Hair  Pencils 

v.  Hanway 

v.  Hart  we  11 

».  Havward 

r.  Ho  fanes  1' 

v.  Howe 

r.  Hatchings 

r.  Imsand 

v.  Johns  4, 377, 

v.  Jones 

v.  King 

r.  Kirk  wood 

r.  La  Vengeance 

v.  Lead  Co. 

r.  Leffler 

r.  Macomb 

v.  Mathias 

v.  McGlue 

v.  McKee 

r.  McMillan 

v.  McNeal 


0  a,  168,  388, 

United  States  17.  Mitchell 

479 

474 

17.  Moore 

311 

430 

17.  Moses 

14  q,  250 

Uj,  195  6 

17.  Murphv 

350,  412 

>.             120  c 

v.  Nelson* 

568  « 

430  .p,  441  g 

v.  Neverson 

14  k,  461  b,  469  b 

184  rf 

v.  Nott 

219  6,  232 

114rf 

v.  Palmer 

4 

n              281 

v.  Percheman 

485,  563» 

139 

17.  Philadelphia 

6* 

81 

v.  Porter 

65,  563  e 

187 

17.  Randall 

195  a 

462 

».  Reed 

1417 

489 

v.  Reid 

2a 

5 

17.  Re3rburn 

82,  563  q 

18 

17.  Reynes 

d 

14/,  40,  309 

17.  Reynolds 

163/.  163  g 

81  y,  563  / 

v.  Ross 

14 

469  d 

v.  Roudenbush 

14  q 

479 

17.  Schindler 

1956,  46  1/ 

280 

17.  Schneider 

158 

461  a 

v.  Seufert  B.  Co. 

13/ 

65,  563  q 

v.  Shapleigh 

Bid 

140 

17.  Six  Lots  of  Ground 

251 

73,  498 

17.  Smith 

430 

5.  14m,  14(7 

v.  Snowden 

469  c 

300 

«.  Snyder 

14  0 

563  p 

v.  Spalding 

566 

66 

».  Stone 

219  a,  219  b,  223 

3286 

v.  Sutler 

563  p 

145 

v.  Teschmaker 

Qd 

162  c 

17.  Trumbull 

4 

14  o 

17.  Turner 

66 

6,  469  e,  484 

v.  Van  Sickle 

461  a,  461  c 

539  a 

17.  Wagner 

4 

581 

v.  Whitaker 

461  d 

450 

17.  White 

461  a,  461  c 

28 

17.  Wiggins 

33 

435 

17.  Wilson 

412 

461  n 

v.  Wood 

14  a,  165,257,258 

14  q 

United  States  Bank  17.  Burson  "               120  c 

663  p 

17.  Dandridge 

40 

311 

v.  Johnson 

416 

316 

v.  Stearns 

416 

430  I 

United  States  Felting  Co 

.  17.   Asbestos 

195  c 

Felting  Co. 

528 

81  c 

United  Slates  Ins.  Co.  17.  Wright                14  q 

233,  495 

United  States  Sugar  Ref.  17 

.  AllisCo.      1956 

488 

Unsell  17.  State 

140 

233 

Upstone  17.  People 

14$ 

App.  Ill 

Upton  17.  Hume 

14  o 

421 

».  Winchester 

14  o 

256 

Utica  Bank  v.  Hillard 

559 

184  « 

17.  Smalley 

430 

79,80 

Utica  Ins.  Co.  t7.  Cadwell 

430 

6,  14  1,  462  n 

310 

4 

18 

V. 

484,  485,  489 

581 

Vail  17.  Nickerson 

3646 

162  tj 

v.  Rice 

260  a 

App.  Il'l 

17.  Smith 

601 

Oa 

v.  Strong 

197 

469/ 
284,  385 

Vaillant  v.  Dodemead 
Vairin  17.  Canul  Ins.  Co. 

243,  248 
394 

163  a,  163/ 
581 

Vaise  r.  Delaval 
Valentine  17.  Piper 

252  « 
46,  475 

441  £ 

v.  State 

220 

184  a 

Valentine's  Will 

162  e 

681 

Vallance  v.  Dewar 

292 

65,70 

Valley  v.  R.  Co. 

140 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


cxxvu 


Valley  L.  Co.  v.  Smith 
Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Keegan 
Van  v.  Corpe 

Van  Aernam  v.  Van  Aernam 
Vananken  v.  Horn  beck 
Van  Bokkelen  ».  Berdell 
Van  Btiren  v.  Wells 
VanBuskirk  v.  Mulock 
Vance  v.  Campbell 

v.  Reardon 

v,  Schuyler 

v.  Vance 

Vancleave  v.  State 
Vandenheuvel  v.  Ins.  Co. 
VanderDonckt  v.  Thelusson 
Vanderhoven  v.  Romaine 
Van  Derveer  v.  Sutphin 
Vanderwerker  v.  People 
Van  Deusen  v.  Frink 

v.  Newcomer 

v.  Turner 

v.  Van  Slvck 
Van  Dyck  v.  Van  Beuren 
Vandyke  v.  Thompson 
Vane  v.  Evanston 
Vane's  (Sir  Henry)  Case 
Van  Etten  v.  Howell 
Vanhook  v.  Barnett 
Vanhorne  o.  Dorrance 
Van  Keuren  v.  Parmelee 
Van  Nuys  v,  Terhune 
Van  Omeron  v.  Dowick 


Van  Reimsdyk  v.  Kane 

Van  Sandau  v.  Turner 
Van  Shaack  v.  Stafford 
Van  Sickle  v.  People 

v.  Schenck 
Van  Skike  v.  Potter 
Van  Storch  v.  Griffin 
Van  Svckel  v.  Dalrymple 
Van  Valkenburgh  v.  Rouk 
Van  Vechten  v.  Graves 

v.  Smith 
Van  Winkle  v.  Crowell 

v.  R  Co. 

Van  Wyck  ».  Mclntosh 
Van  Wycklen  v.  Brooklyn 
Vanzant  v.  Kay 


14  o 

14  p 

361 

28 

5636 

4616 

51  a 

489 

•  a 

501 

573 

469  a 

4616 

543 

4306 

'  305  d 

14  d,  14  o 

6 

429 

44H 

140  a 

358 

46 

444  d 
13  t,  13/ 
256,  343 
305  c 
568  a 
564 
1846 
389 
40,  479 


112,  174, 177,  178, 

1846 

6re 

427 

581 

146 

162  j 

506 

275,  305  c 
284 
173 
275 
305/ 
430  I 
581 
4416 
395 


Varderslice  r.  Philadelphia  140 

Vass's  Case  161  6 

Vasse  v.  Miffln  559 

Vaughan  v.  Fitzgerald  552 

v.  Hann  214 

r.  Martin  438 

v.  McCarthy  305  e 

v.  Parker  305/ 

v.  R.  Co.  14, j,  14  v 
v.  State             14  k,  14  v,  163/,  163  g,  165 

v.  Worral  421 

Vaughan' s  Case  220,  220  6 

Vaughn  v.  Clarkson  461  d 

f.  Perrine  458 

v.  Rhodes  28 

Vaughn's  Trial  14  q 

Vaughton  v.  R.  Co.  2  a,  195 1> 

Vaux  Peerage  Case  497 

Vawter  v.  Hultz  14  6,  328  c 

Veiths  v.  Hagge  74, 120  c 

Velott  y.  Lewis  163  g 

Venafra  v.  Johnson  230 

Yenning  v.  Shuttlewortb  399 


Vent  v.  Pacey  240  a 

Verdin  v.  Wray  14  o 

Vernon  v.  Tucker  461  d,  469  a 

Vernon,  G.,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson  310 

Vernon  Irrig.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles  138  a 

Vernin  v.  Baird  14  v,  439  h 

Verry  v.  Watkins  14  A,  54 

Vica'ry  v.  Moore  303 

Vicary's  Case  174 

Vick  v.  Whitfield  Hd,  Uh 
Vicksburg  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien  162  y,  439  b 

v.  Putnam  81  e,  162 j 

Vietti  v.  Nesbitt  14  u 

Vigus  v.  O'Bannon  78 

Vilas  u.  Downer  14  v 

v.  Reynolds  439  g 

Viles  v.  Moulton  1636 

v.  Waltham  162  c 

Ville  de  Varsovie,  The  373 

Ville  du  Havre,  Steamship  195  6 

Villiers  v.  Villiers  563  q 

Vilmar  v.  Schall  323 
Viual  v.  Burrill  87,  1846,  356 

v.  Gilman  439  6 

Vincent  v.  Cole  88,  304 

v.  Dixon  14  o 

v.  State  369 

Viney  v.  Barss  14  q,  52 

Vining  v.  Baker  34 

Vinton  v.  Peck  581 

Violet  v.  Rose  577 

Violett  v.  Patten  268 

Voce  v.  Lawrence  322 

Vogel  v.  Osborne  186 

Volant  v.  Soyer  241,  469  n 

Von  de  Veld'  v.  Judy  174- 

Von  Mumm  v.  Witteman  5 

Von  Storch  v.  Griffin  14  d 

Vooght  v.  Winch  531 

Voorhies  v.  Hennessy  305  d 

Vosburg  v.  Putney  430 1 

Vosburgh  v.  Thayer  118,  120  o 

Vose  v.  Handy  301 

v.  Morton  523 

Vowles  v.  Miller  60,  62 

r.  Young  114  c,  114  d,  334,  342 

Vreeland  v.  Williams  290 

Vyn  v.  Keppel  189 


W. 

W.  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwee  195  d 

W.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Savison  469  6 

W.  M.  W.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Duncan      14  n,  195  6 

W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kuhn  441  g 

Wachstetter  v.  State  461  a 

Waddingham  v.  Hulett  461  d 

Waddington  ».  Bristow  271 

».  Cousins  578  a,  580 

Wade  r.  De  Witt  162  k 

v.  Ridley  238,  240 

v.  State  165, 166,  219  6,  230,  367 

Wadley  v.  Bayliss  293 

Wadsworth  ».  Dunnam  13  q 

Wafer  v.  Hemken  168 

Wagers  v.  Dickey  165 

Wagner  v.  Aulenbach  184  ft 

Wagner's  Case  6  d 

Wagoner  v.  Richmond  118 

v.  Ruply  581 

v.  Terr.  159  A 


CXXV111 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Wagstaff  v.  Wilson 
Wain  v.  Warlters 

186 
268 

Walston  v.  Com. 
Walter  v.  Bollman 

163/ 
117 

Waite  v.  High 

184  c,  563  e 

v.  Haynes 

40 

v.  Merrill 

427 

Walters  v.  Mace 

64 

Waithman  v.  Miles 

563  I 

v.  People 

Uq 

Wake  v.  Harrop 

284  d 

v.  Rees 

317 

v.  Lock 

396,  421,  426 

v.  Short 

564 

Wakefield  v.  Ross 

364  a,  369 

Walthall  v.  Walthall 

2a 

Wakefield's  Case 

339,  343 

Walton  v.  Coulsou 

21 

Wakely  v.  Hart 

358 

v.  Green 

110,  185,  341 

Walbrfdge  v.  Knipper 

163  ff 

v.  Shelley 

328  6,  384,  389 

Walcott  v.  Allevn 

81  a 

v.  Tomliii 

356 

v.  Hall 

55 

v.  Walton 

260 

Waldele  v.  R.  Co. 

162  g 

Wambaugh  v.  Schenck 

41 

Walden  v.  Canfield 

6  a 

Wandless  v.  Cawthorne 

422,  563  j 

v.  Craig 

73 

Wanner  v.  Landis 

305  c 

v.  Finch 

462 

Wantlan  v.  White 

2a 

v.  Sherburne 

1846 

Waples  v.  Burton 

14  d 

Waldheim  v.  Miller 

305  A; 

Ward  v.  Apprice 

349 

Waldridge  v.  Kennison                                 192 

v.  Dick 

14o 

Waldron  v.  Tuttle 

108,  114  c,  114  e 

v.  Dulaney 

35 

r.  Ward 

243 

v.  Edge 

108 

Walker  ».  Boston 

430/7 

v.  Fuller 

581 

v.  Brantree 

152  d 

v.  Haydon 

357 

v.  Broadstock 

152  c.  189 

v.  Henry 

6a 

».  Countess  of  Beauchamp          11  4  e,  131 
v.  Curtis                                     503  b,  563  h 

v.  Herndon 
f.  Howell 

146 
1846 

v.  Ferrin 

427 

v.  Johnson 

039 

v.  Forbes 

488 

v.  Lewis 

38 

v.  Giles 

409 

r.  Morrison 

66 

v.  Hatry 

1846 

v.  Pomfret 

155 

v.  Kearney 

374 

v.  R.  Co. 

441  d 

v.  Moors 

461  c? 

v.  Salisbury 

441  d 

v.  O'Connell 

162  q 

v.  Saunders 

305  g 

v.  Protection  Ins. 

Co.                             440 

v.  Sharp 

469  'g 

v.   R.  Co. 

44U 

v.  State 

159  a,  461  a.  461  c 

v.  Rogers 

441  I 

v.  Svkes 

103  h 

v.  Sawyer 

425 

v.  Wells 

572 

v.  State          14  b 

14s,  81  c,  1406,  195  a, 

v.  Wilkinson 

398 

220  o,  305  h,  370  c,  439  c,  461  a, 
461  6,  461  d,  469  c 

v.  Young 
Ward's  Estate 

444 
120  c 

v.  Steele 

581 

Warde  v.  Warde 

245 

v.  Stephenson 

54 

Warden  v.  R.  Co. 

14t> 

v.  Walker 

572,  575  b 

Wardell  v.  Eden 

173 

v.  Westfield 

Uv 

v.  Fennor 

572 

v.  Wheatly 

302 

Wardle's  Case 

65 

v.  Wildman 

237,  240 

Ware  v.  Allen 

284 

v.  Wingfield 

114  c,  485  a 

v.  Brookhouse 

140  a 

v.  Witter 

546 

v.  State 

197 

Walker's  Case         13  b,  14  q,  189,  370  e,  450  b 

v.  Ware                 52, 

77,  162  i,  449,  462  a 

Walkup  v.  Com. 

163  g 

Warickshall's  Case 

214,  215,  219,  231 

Wall  v.  McNamara 

531 

Waring  v.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co. 

199 

Wallace  v.  Cook 

484,  493 

v.  Waring 

365 

v.  Grizzard 

4696 

Warlick  v.  Peterson 

461  d 

v.  Harris 

1956 

v.  White 

13  6,  13  c,  14  s 

v.  R.  Co. 

447,  462  a,  466  a 

Warner  v.  Beers 

482 

v.  Rogers 

305 

v.  Com. 

6  6,  461  6,  489 

v.  Small 

192 

v.  Lucas 

469  d 

v.  Twvmaa 

420 

v.  Price 

116,  120 

v.  U.  "S. 

14  it,  328  c 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  6,  14  g,  Uj,  669  a 

r.  Wren 

14  r 

v.  State 

367 

Waller  v.  Cralle 

563  e 

Warren  v.  Anderson 

43  a 

Walling  v.  Com. 

162  c 

v.  Comings 

631,  632 

Wall  inc.  Littetl 

284  a 

v.  Flagjj 

505 

t>.  Mease 

14  o 

v.  Gabriel 

444  a 

r.  Murray 

659 

v.  Greenville 

120,  147,  150 

v.  White 

461  d 

v.  Nichols 

99  a,  163  a 

Walls  v.  Bailey 

292 

v.  Spencer  Water  Co.             252  a,  430  / 

Walser  v.  Ware 

120  c,  186 

v.  State 

232 

Walsh  v.  Dart 

66 

v.  Warren 

40 

v.  People 

13  «,  141,  Urn 

v.  Wheeler 

14  »,  277 

Walsiugham  (Ld.)  v. 

Goodricke       240  a,  244          v.  Wright 

195  d 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 

CXX1X 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

Warren  Hastintrs's  Case                              497 

Weaver  ».  Bromley 

4396 

Warriner  v.  Giles                                           484 

v.  Cone 

328  c 

Warrington  r.  Early 

v.  Leiman 

114  d 

Warwick  v.  Bruce                                          271 

v.  R.  Co. 

Uv 

v.  Foulkes                                         14  o,  53 

v.  Whilden 

581 

Warwick's  Trial                                             377 

Webb  v.  Alexander 

513 

Washburn  v.  Cuddihy            162  i,  162^,  162  k 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v,  440 

v.  R.  Co.                              13.;,  14  v,  162  o 

v.  Page 

310 

v.  Washburn                                           14  b 

v.  Powers 

14  q 

Washington  t>.  Finley                                     6  b 

v.  Richardson 

108 

v.  State                                                 462  b 

v.  Smith 

14  o,  14?,  179,  248 

Washington  C.  &  A.  T.  Co.  v.  Case         14  1, 

v.  State 

14  o,  218,  469  a 

195  d 

v.  St.  Lawrence 

575 

Washington  Ice  Co.  v,  Bradley                466  a 

Webber  v.  Davis 

43  a,  563  g 

v.  Webster                                      75,  162  I 

v.  Hanke 

461  a,  461  c,  461  'd 

Washington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson                  81  d 

v.  Jackson 

4436 

Washington  S.  P.  Co.  v.  Sickles                  532 

v.  R.  Co. 

162  6,  440,  441,  441  e 

Washington  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Tobriner  81,  81/ 

Webster  v.  Golden 

166 

Wass  ».  Stephens                                          81  f 

v.  Hastings 

482 

Waterman  v.  Johnson                          288,  301 

v.  Lee 

532 

v.  Whitney                                   110,  162  e 

v.  Lumber  Co. 

120  c 

Waters  v.  Jones                                            14  d 

v.  Vickers 

385 

v.  State                                                   81  b 

v.  Woodford 

284 

v.  Waters                                                 166 

Webster's  Trial 

Up,  Ur 

Watertown  v.  Cowan                                     175 

Wedgwood's  Case 

43  a,  484,  493 

Watkins  v.  Holman                      479,  480,  482 

Weed  v.  Mut.  L.  Ins. 

Co.                            81  a 

v.  Morgan                                                  73 
v.  Rist                                                   466  a 

v.  People 
Weeks  r.  Hall 

14* 

461  d 

v.  State                                    163  g,  461  d 

v.  Lyndon 

Uv,  101 

v.  Towers                                                  27 

v.  Sparke        128, 

129,  130,  136,  137,  138, 

v.  U.  S.                           163  a,  163  /,  163  h 

138  a,  140  a 

v.  Wallace                                          328  c 

Weeks,  Re 

250 

Watrous  v.  Cunningham                            120  c 

Wehle  v.  Spelman 

182 

Wat  ry  v.  Ferber                14  b,  14  d,  14  g,  14  h 

Wehrkamp  v.  Willet 

4Glc 

Watson  v.  Adams                                            41 

Weidler  v.  Bank 

14 

v.  Baker                                                  286 

Weidman  v.  Kohr 

152  c,  189 

v.  Elaine                                                    26 

Weidner  v.  Phillips 

14  o 

v.  Brewster                                 114  c,  114  g 

v.  Schweigart 

38 

v.  England                                                41 
v.  Gilday                                              163  a 

Weigly  v.  Weir 
Weiler  v.  Munroe  Co. 

26 
5636 

v.  Hay                                                      6  a 

Weir  v.  McGee 

462 

v.  Ins.  Co.                                            444  a 

Weisenberg  v.  Appleton                             14  p 

v.  King                                              41,  ]86 

Welborn's  Case 

158,  161  6 

v.  McLaren                                             430 

Welch  v.  Mandeville 

173 

v.  Miller                                                439  c 

v.  Ricker 

14  n 

v.Moore                    14  d,  14  o,  201,  20  la 

v.  Seaborn 

38 

v.  R.  Co.                                               14  v 

v.  State 

14  p,  462  a 

v.  Simpson                                            162  c 

v.  Stipe 

434,  441/ 

v.  Threlkeld                                      27,  207 

Weld  v.  Nichols 

539 

r.  Wace                                           204,  207 

Weldon  v.  State 

469  c 

r.  Walker                                             439  b 

Welford  v.  Beezely 

268 

Watson's  Trial        2  a,  250,  252,  439  o,  441  A, 
4616 

Welland  Canal  Co.  v.  Hathaway  86,  203,  204 
Weiler  v.  Gov.  Found.  Hosp.              331,  333 

Watts  v.  Fraser                                          14  n 

Wellman,  In  re 

19 

v.  Friend                                                  271 

Wells  v.  Company 

6a 

v.  Howard                                             118 

v.  Compton          195,  301,  485,  527  a,  539 

v.  Kilburn                                             575 

v.  Fisher 

339 

v.  Lawson                                             192 

v.  Fletcher 

207,  339 

v.  Sawver                                4366,  439  c 

v.  Hatch 

120  C 

v.  Thorpe                                                 181 

t>.  Ins.  Co 

163/,  163  h 

Watts'  Trial                                                469  d 

v.  Jesus  College 

138 

Waugh  v.  Bussell                                    69,  567 

v.  Lane 

333 

Wax's  Estate                                       244,  441/ 

v.  Mge.  Co. 

163  a 

Way  v.  Cross                                               120  c 

v.  Porter 

293 

Wavbright  v.  State                                     14  p 

v.  Stevens 

305  g,  510 

Wavland  v.  Ware                                    86,  498 

v.  Tucker 

338 

Wavman  v.  Hilliard                                      192 

v.  Wells 

162  e 

Wavmell  v.  Reed                                           284 

Welsh  ».  Argyle 

81 

Weakly  r.  Bell                                              207 

v.  Barrett 

115,116,  120  a,  1206 

Weall  v.  King                                            58,  64 

v.  State 

152  </ 

W.  a.herhead  v.  Sewell                                 290 

Wendell  v.  George 

385 

Weathers  v.  Barkdale                               461  a 

Wendt  v.  R.  Co. 

445 

VOL.  I. — I 


cxxx 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


Wenning  c.  Temple 
Wentworth  t>.  LlojTd 
Wertz  v.  May. 
Wesley  v.  State 
West  v.  Bank 

v.  Davis 

v.  Duff 

v.  Lj-nch 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Randall 

t?.  Smith 

v.  State          2  a,  14,  43  a, 

v.  Steward 

West  Boylston  v.  Sterling 
West  Cambridge  v.  Lexington 
West  Chic.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Carr 

v.  Kennedy-Cahill 

v.  Kennelly 
West  Pub.  Co.  0.  Lawyers'  Co-op.  Pub. 

Co.  14  q,  " 

Westbury  v.  Aberdein 
Westerfield  v.  Scripps 
Westerman  v.  Westerman 
Western  Ass.  Co.  v.  Mohlman  Co. 
Western  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rogers 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Blance 

v.  Hopkins 
Western  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Bussey 

v.  Calhoun 

v.  Morrison 

v.  Roberson 

v.  Stafford 
Westfield  v.  Warren 
Westfield  Cigar  Co.  ».  Ins.  Co. 
Westmore  v.  Sheffield 
Weston  v.  Barker 

v.  Chamberlin 

v.  Ernes 

v.  Gravlin 

f.  Penniman 
Westover  v.  Ins.  Co. 
Wetherbee  v.  Norris  4 

v.  Wetherbee 
Weyman  v.  People 
Whaley  v.  State 
Whartley  v.  Fearnley 
Whately"  v.  Menheim 
Wheat  v.  State 
W  heater's  Case 
Wheatlev  v.  Baugh 

r.  Williams 
Wheeldon  v.  Wilson 
Wheeler  r.  Alderson 

v.  Campbell  10! 

v.  Ham  bright 

v.  Hatch 

v.  Hill 

v.  Le  Marchant 

v.  R.  Co. 

«.  U.  8. 

Wheeler  &  W.  M.  Co.  v.  Barrett 
Wheeling's  Case 
Wheelock  v.  Doolittle 

v.  Godfrey 
Whelan  v.  Lynch 
Whelp. tale's"  Case 
Whiddeii  t'.  Bank 
Whipple  v.  Foot 

v.  VValpole 
Whitaker  v.  Marsh 

r.  Salisbury 

v.  Smith 


35 

Whitaker  v.  State 

14  p,  Ur 

1956 

Whitamore  v.  Waterhouse 

394,  427 

469  « 

Whitbeck  v.  Whitbeck 

26 

14  c,  14  k 

Whitcher  v.  McLaughlin 

120rt 

1406 

Whitcomb  v.  Whiting 

174,  1846 

563^ 

White  v.  B.  &  F.  G.  Co. 

14  9,  484 

14  h 

v.  Bisbing 

163  a 

4616 

v.  Chase 

532 

14  t' 

v.  Chouteau 

150 

392 

v.  Coatsworth 

532 

192,  286 

v.  Collector 

14* 

I,  577,  581 

v.  Com.                  14  t>, 

370  a,  370  cf,  461  rf 

568  a 

v.  Crew 

260 

323 

v.  Everest 

4695- 

152  c 

v.  Fox 

97  d 

1026 

v.  Foljambe 

46 

14  1 

r.  German  Nat.  Bk. 

187 

1626 

v.  Hale 

174,  184  6 

Pub. 

v.  Hawn 

3646 

14  v,  563  h 

v.  Hermann 

14  y 

441 

v.  Hill 

358 

14  o 

v.  Hinton 

482 

254 

v.  Judd 

310 

198.1 

v.  Lisle 

130,  137,  138,  139 

305  c 

v.  Loring 

46 

563  p 

v.  McQueen 

81/ 

563  p 

t'.  Merrill 

186 

163  1 

v.  Murtland 

14  d,  14  A 

14  r 

v.  Old  Dom.  S.  S.  Co. 

192 

1956 

v.  Parkin 

303 

66 

v  .  Patten 

26 

30  I,  439  y 

v.  Pease 

81/ 

>Ua,  114^ 

v.  Philbrick 

533 

563o 

v.  Proctor 

269 

441  / 

v.  R.  Co. 

14  v,  81  f 

173 

v.  Rosenthal 

Uf 

281 

v.  Saver 

294 

281 

v.  S.'S.  Co. 

192.  484 

81  d 

v.  State    14y,  14  p,  159,  195  6,  219  6,'  232, 

494 

328  c, 

461  a,  461  d,  466  a 

247  a 

v.  Strother 

1146 

0  h,  461  d 

v.  Terr. 

14  k 

130  I,  441  1 

v.  Tolliver 

575  c 

Uq 

v.  Trust.  Brit.  Museum                         272 

Up 

«.  U.  S. 

496 

392 

v.  Wilkinson 

120  rt,  439  b 

531 

V.Wilson                     58,  68,  81,  81  a,  281 

79 

White's  Case 

65,  217,  364  a,  365 

225,  226 

White's  Trial 

App.  Ill 

46 

Whitehead  v.  Scott 

101,  563  c 

245 

v.  Tattersall 

184 

328  c 

Whitehouse  v.  Atkinson 

394,  420 

101,  440 

v.  Bickford 

139 

254,  441  1 

v,  Hemmant 

3 

180 

Whitehouse's  Case 

343 

437 

Whitelaws  v.  Sims 

441  /' 

237 

Whitelock  v.  Baker 

11  4  c,  Hirf.  ill 

247,  247  a 

v.  Musgrove 

430,575,  575  a 

1626 

Whitelv  v.  China 

14  A 

370  d 

v.  King 

14»,162e 

445 

Whitesell  v.  Crane 

163  h,  348,  430  p 

217 

Whiteside  v,  Hoskins 

663  o 

1846 

v.  Loney 

186 

247  a 

Whitfield  v.  Aland 

439  c 

162  / 

v.  Collingwood 

564 

284 

Whitford  v.  Tutin 

87,  563  e 

663  p 

Whiting  v.  Barney 

245 

271 

Whitley  v.  State 

159 

440 

Whitlock  v.  Ramsey 

^69 

163  g 

Whitman  v.  Heneberry 

575  6 

443,  57-2 

v.  Morey 

443,  444 

58 

v.  Shaw 

140  a,  575  b 

TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


cxxxi 


Whitman  ».  State 

14  » 

Wilkerson  P.  State 

156,  254 

Whitmarsh  v.  Angle 

440 

Wilkes  P.  Market  Co. 

441  d 

v.  Walker 

271 

Wilkins  P.  Stidger 

186,  197 

Whitmer  v.  Frye 

568 

Wilkinson  p.  Johnson 

566 

Whitmore  v.  Amsworth 

441  h 

p.  Lutwidge 

196 

v.  Learned 

290 

p.  Moseley 

441  1 

v.  S.  Boston  Iron  Co. 

292 

p.  Pearson 

14  /,  441  c 

v.  Wilks 

847 

v.  Scott 

26,  212,  305 

Whitnash  v.  George 
Whitner  v.  Belknap 

116,  150,  187 
6 

p.  State 
Will  p.  Mendon 

439  g 
14  M,  1626 

Whitnev  v.  Bacon 

140  a 

Willard  v.  Goodenough 

461  c,  461  d 

v.  Bailey 

1956 

v.  Mellor 

162  / 

f.  Bigelow 

152  a 

p.  Pettit 

466  a 

v.  Boardman 

280,  286 

p.  Wickham 

427 

v.  Boston 

461  e 

Willett  P.  Rich 

14  x 

v.  Ferris 

177 

v.  St.  Albans 

14  p 

v.  Fox 

2a 

Willey  v.  Portsmouth 

Up 

v.  Gross 

Ug,Uj 

William  Jones,  The 

2a 

v.  Hevwood 

823 

Williams  p.  Armroyd 

541 

v.  Nicholl 

41 

f  .  Baldwin 

254,  338 

i?.  Shippen 

303 

p.  Bartholomew 

207 

v.  State 

81  c,  563  « 

p.  Brickell 

563  k,  563p 

v.  Thatcher 

430  n 

p.  Bridges 

180,  181 

v.  U.  S. 

6e 

p.  Bryant 

69 

Whiton  v.  Ins.  Co. 

130,  479 

p.  Byrne 

81  e 

Whittaker  v.  Garnett 

26 

p.  Callender 

55 

v.  Wiseley 

19 

p.  Cheney 

171,  186,  195 

Whittemore  v.  Brooks 

572 

v.  Com. 

257  a,  App.  Ill 

Whittier  v.  Franklin 

14  6,  14  h,  140  b 

p.  Conger 

581 

v.  Smith 

207 

v.  E.  India  Co. 

35,  40,  80,  97  d 

v.  Varnev 

14  q 

p.  Eyton 

20 

Whittuck  v.  Waters 

120  a,  493 

p.  Fambro 

146 

Whitwell  v.  Scheer 

73 

p.  Geaves 

115,  151 

v  .  Wyer 

201 

p.  Gilman 

288 

Whyman  v.  Garth 

5696 

p.  Goodwin 

430 

Wiborg  v.  U.  S. 

184  a 

v.  Gorges 

14  i 

Wickes  v.  Caulk 

564 

p.  Harter 

189 

Wicks  v.  Dean 

245 

p.  King.,  &c.  Turnp.  Co.                       78 

v.  Smulbrook 

375 

v.  Hoi  lings  worth 

14  d 

Wicktorwitz  v.  Ins.  Co. 

184  c,  184  rf 

p.  Hulie 

432 

Widdows'  Trusts,  Re 

28 

v.  Innes 

27,  182 

Wiedemann  v.  Walpole 

199 

p.  Ins.  Co. 

4 

Wiehl  v.  Robertson 

184  a 

v.  Johnson 

342 

Wiggin  v.  Chicago 

5 

p.  Miner 

14  o 

v.  Day 

14? 

v.  Mundie 

240 

v.  Goodwin 

303 

v.  Nally 

13/,  162  k 

v.  Lowell 

333 

v.  Ogle 

65 

v.  Plumer  ' 

Hi,  14  1 

p.  People 

14  k,  Uq,  81  c 

Wiggins  v.  Utah 

Uk 

p.  Perkins 

14  c 

Wigglesworth  v.  Dallison 

294 

p.  R.  Co. 

1626 

v.  Steers 

284 

v.  Robbins 

14? 

Wightman  v.  Ins.  Co. 

81  d 

p.  Spencer 

430p 

Wike  v.  Lightner 

461,  461  c,  461  d 

p.  State      14  b,  14  c, 

14  fc,  14  o,  14*,  81  d, 

Wikel  v.  Board 

6e 

163/,  192,  219  a,  219  6,"  230,  254  a, 

WikoS's  Appeal 

564 

370  <f,  370  e, 

461  f,  462,  578  a,  581 

Wilber  v.  Sisson 

34 

p.  Stephens 

392 

Wilbor,  Re 

30 

p.  Taunton 

52 

Wilbur  v.  Flood 

461  b 

p.  Tel.  Co. 

184  c 

v.  Selden 

115,  120  a,  165 

p.  Thomas 

74 

v.  Strickland 

233 

v.  U.  S. 

14s,  370  d,  461  rf 

Wilcocks  v.  Phillips 

430  i,  488 

p.  Wager 

4396 

Wilcox  v    Emerson 

276 

p.  Walbridge 

385 

v.  Farrell 

386 

v.  Walker 

443 

v.  Lucas 

305  c 

p.  Waters 

563o 

v.  Smith 

WUg 

p.  Wilcox 

3 

Wildberger  v.  Cheek 

805  rre 

P.  Wilkes 

502 

Wilde  p.  Arms  by 
Wilder  p.  Welsh 

564 
317 

p.  Williams 
p.  Woods 

45,  200,  441  f 
38 

Wilds  p.  R.  Co. 

14  i' 

v.  Young 

245 

Wiley  v.  Bean 

572 

Williams's  Case 

311 

v.  Moor 

568  a 

Williamson  v.  Allison 

51,  60,  63 

Wilkerson  v.  Eilers 

462  a           v.  Henley 

205 

CXXX11 


Williamson  v.  Nebers 

v.  Peel 

Willingham  v.  Matthews 
Will  ings  r.  Consequa 
Willis  v.  Bernard 

v.  Hulbert 

v.  Jernegan 

v.  State 

v.  West 
Willis's  Case 
Williston  v.  Smith 
Willmering  v.  McGauhey 
Willmett  v.  Harmer 
Willoughby  v.  Willoughby 
Wills  v.  Lance 

v.  McDole 

v.  State 

Willson  v.  Betts 
Wilmer  v.  Israel 
Wilmington  r.  Burlington 
Wilson  i?.  Allen 

v.  Barnett 

v.  Beauchamp 

v.  Boerem 

v.  Bowie 

v.  Brownlee 

v.  Butler 

v.  Calvert 

v.  Coleman 

v.  Conine 

v.  Donaldson 

f.  Gary 

v.  Goodin 

v.  Granby 

v.  Haccker 

v.  Hodges 

v.  Irish 

v.  Kirkland 

v.  McClure 

v.  Melvin 

v.  Niles 

v.  Noonan 

v.  Owens 

v.  Powers 

v.  R.  Co. 

v.  Rastall 

v.  Robinson 

v.  Rogers 

v.  Runyan 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


162  e 

462 

316 

354 

162  d 

284  a 

197 

4506 

243 

217  a,  255 

55 

280 

81  d 

5 

6c 

5636 

465  a 

5756 

118 

114/ 

46 

146 

581 

156 

89,  563 

114  c,  1140 

22 

201 

430  q 

511 

317 

409 

118 

14  v,  162  6 

284 

41,  81 

581 

581 

305  a 

79 

548 

14  d,  14  A,  166 
66 
284 

441  d,  563/j 
237,  239,  243,  247 
14  o 
473 
461  a,  461 c 


v.  State     146,  140, 14  h,  14  Je,  319,  461  c 
App.  Ill 

v.  Stevens  305  m 

v.  Troup  237,  241 

v.  Turner  27 

v.  U.  S.         34,  195  a,  219  6,  220  c,  439  k, 
469d,  App.  Ill 

v.  Van  Leer  162.; 

v.  Wilson  118, 120  c,  166,  276,  305  c 

Wilson,  Expnrte  469/ 

Wilson's  Case  225,  435,  App.  Ill 

Wilson  Sewing  Machine  Co.  r.  Jackson      323 
Wilt  ».  Cutler  489 

Wilton  v.  Girdlestone  521 

t>.  Webster  162  d 

Wiltzie  r.  Adamson  199 

Winans  r.  Dunham  611 

Winch  v.  Keeley  172 

v.  Norman  581 

Wine-hell  v.  Edwards  37,  195  a 

Winchester  v.  Charter  14 1,  14  q 

Winers  v.  Laird  663/ 

Wing  v.  Angrave  30 


Winkley  v.  Kaime  305  m 

Winn  v.  Chamberlin  292 

v.  Patterson  21,  563  q,  563  r,  675  6 

Winnepiseogee  Lake  Co.  v.  Young  5 

Winnisimmett  Co.  v.  Grueby  75 

Winns  v.  State  14  o 

Winona  v.  Burke  Qb 

v.  Huff  563  6.  563  d 

Winship  v.  Bank  of  U.  S  167,  418 

v.  Conner  41 

Winslow  v.  Kimball  341 

Winsmore  v.  Greenbank  341 

Winsor  v.  Dillaway  118 

v.  Pratt  273 

Winston  v.  Moseley  444 

Winter  v.  Wroot  162  d 

Winterton  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.  466  a 

Winters  v.  Winters  243,  247  a 

Wintle,  In  re  493 

Wisdom  v.  Reeves  5756 

Wise  v.  Ackerman  14  v 

v.  State  14  c 

v.  Wakefield  461  e 

v.  Wynn  H4/ 

Wishart  v.  Downey  195  c,  569  a 

Wishaw  v.  Barnes  408 

Witcher  v.  Richmond  14  o 

Withee  v.  Howe  581  a 

Withers  v.  Atkinson  568 

v.  Gillespy  563 

Withnell  v.  Gartham  138,  293 

Witmark's  Case  14  v 

Witmer  v.  Schlatter  539 

Wobb  v.  State  432  6 

Woburn  v.  Henshaw  243 

Woeckner  v.  Motor  Co.  14  g 

Wogan  v.  Small  440 

Wohlford  v.  People  328  c 

Wolcott  v.  Hall  14  d 

v.  Heath  120  c 

Wolf  v.  Foster  90 

v.  Perryman  14  d 

v.  R.  Co.  430.9 

v.  Wveth  165 

Wolfe  v.  Wash  burn  498,  513 

Wolfennan  v.  Bell  564 

Wolff  v.  Smith  14  d 

Wollaston  t>.  Berkeley  30 

Wolley  v.  Brownhill  347 

Wolverton  v.  Van  Syckel  340 

Wolverton  Mortgaged  Estates,  In  re,        290 

Womack  v.  Dearman  479 

v.  Hughes  485  a 

Wood  v.  Braddick  177,  184  6 

v.  Braynard  392 

v.  Brewer  340  a 

v.  Chetwood  254 

r.  Cooper  438 

v.  Cullen  663  e 

v.  Davis  624 

v.  Drury  672 

v.  Finson  14  n 

v.  Fitz  6  a 

v.  Graves 

v.  Hickok  260  a 

v.  Jackson  629,  531 
v.  Knapp 
v.  Le  Baron 

».  Mackinson  446 
v.  Mann                                       461,  461  o 

v.  Matthews  461  d 

».  McGuire  264  a 


TABLE   OF  CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


CXXX111 


Wood  v.  Neale                                             317 

Wright  v.  Barnard                                          5 

v.  Pringle                                                76 

v.  Beckett                                                444 

v.  State                              14  fc,  14  o,  461  a 

v.  Boston                                               108 

v.  Strickland                                         2  a 

v.  Carpenter                                            13; 

v.  Trust  Co.                                          305  y 

v.  Crawfordsville                                   14  i 

v.  U.  S.                                                 14  ? 

v.  Crookes                                      281,  304 

».  Watkinsoa                                          547 

v.  Crumpsty                                         163  a 

•p.  Weld                                           A  pp.  Ill 

«.  Deklyne                                            469  b 

v.  Whiting                                              281 

v.  Express  Co.                                    370  c 

v.  Willard                                  140  ffl,  439  ff 

v.  Foster                                                     74 

Woodard  v.  Bellamy                           14  d,  14  h 

v.  Hawkins                                             66 

Woodbeck  v.  Keller"                              255,  257 

i'.  Hessey                                                 581 

Woodbridge  v.  Spooner                               281 

v.  Hicks                                                   462 

Woodburv  v.  Frink                                         78 

v.  Howard                                                  17 

v.  Ob'ear                                                 441  1 

v.  Littler                                         156,  462 

Woodcock  v.  Johnson                        14  k.  44iy 

v.  Maseras                                               197 

Woodcock's  Case                                158,  163  a 

v.  McKee                                              14  b 

Woodcraft  v.  Kinaston                                 502 

v.  Morse                                                   192 

Woodford  v.  Ashley                                        70 

v.  Netherwood                                        30 

Woodhead  v.  Foulds                                 305  g 

v.  Sarmuda                                                30 

Woodman  v.  Dana                                        581 

v.  Sharp                                                   118 

v.  Lane                                                  301 

v.  State                                                  563  6 

v.  Segar                                              572  a 

v.  Tatham           3,  13  a,  14,  14  c,  14  I,  82, 

Woodnoth  v.  Cobham                                 1206 

99  a,    101,  128,    162  d, 

Woodruff  v.  Westcott                           190,  353 

163,    163  a,    535,   553, 

v.  State                  163/,  163  h,  491,  563  h 

563  n,  569  d 

v.  Whittlesey                                          14  b 

v.  Terr.                                                  81  6 

v.  Woodruff                                          527  a 

v.  Williams'  Est.                                 430/ 

Woods  v.  Banks                                  184  c,  508 

v.  Woodgate                                         14  o 

v.  Gummert                                           14  1 

v.  Wright                            272,  81  a,  439  6 

v.  People                              146,  14  g,  14  s 
v.  Sawin                                                  287 

Wright's  Case                                      App.  Ill 
Wroe  v.  State                    159,  461  6,  461  d,  462 

».  State                                                    230 

Wrye  v.  State                                                 339 

v.  Woods                                        41,  240  a 

Wyatt  v.  Gore                                                251 

Woodides  v.  State                                       163/ 

v.  Hodson                                              174 

Woodward  0.  Buchanan                             14  n 

v.  Lord  Hertford                                   207 

v.  Cotton                                               481 

Wyckoff  v.  Wyckoff                         260  a,  563  b 

v.  Goulstone                                       162  e 

Wver  v.  Dorchester  &c.  Bank                       81 

v.  Heist                                                    106 

Wyland  v.  Griffith                                         245 

v.  Larking                                               211 

Wylde's  Case                                                 288 

v.  Leavitt                             14  f,  14  1,  252  a 

Wyman  v.  R.  Co.                                          14  v 

v.  Newhall                                     197,  356 

Wyndham  v.  Chetwynd                                419 

v.  Pickett                                                268 

v.  Wvcombe                                         1  4  h 

v.  State                                               430  i 

Wynne  v.  State                                     13  e,  14  v 

Woodward,  In  re                                          315 

v.  Tyrwhitt                   150,  154,  570,  575  6 

Wood  worth  v.  Barker                               563  b 

Wvse  v.  Wvse                                           441/ 

v.  Thompson                                186,  441  h 

Wytheville'B.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Teiger              163  6 

Woolam  v.  Hearn                                      '    276 

Woolsev  v.  Bonn                                       120  c 

v.  Roudout                                            563  g 

Y. 

Woolwav  v.  Rowe                                  190,  191 

Woosterv.  Butler      -                       138  a,  287 

Yabsley  v.  Doble                                          180 

v.  Lvons                                                  69 

Yakima  Nat.  Bank  v.  Knipe                       564 

v.  State                                       14  d,  140  b 

Yale  v.  Comstock                               163  a,  166 

Woolen  »>.  Wilkins                                        156 

Yandes  v.  Lefavour                                    1846 

Worcester  v.  Northborough                         484 

Yanke  v.  State                                   1406,  441/ 

Worcester  Bank  v.  Cheney                               5 

Yarborough  v.  Moss                                       201 

Worcester  Co.  Bank    v.   Dorchester  &c. 

Yarbrough  v.  State               441  a,  441  /,  461  d 

Bank                                                              81 

Yardley  v.  Arnold                                         421 

Worden  v.  R.  Co.                              162  i,  162> 

Yates  v.  Carnsew                                          201 

Workingman's  Mut.  Aid  Soc.                      310 

v.  Pym                                                     292 

World  v.  State                                               14  h 

v.  Shaw                                              201  a 

Wormsdorf  v.  R.  Co.                                    14  p 

v.  State                                                    232 

Worrall  v.  Jones                  328  c,  330,  354,  356 

v.  Yates                                         430  d,  581 

Worth  v.  Gilling                                  Uh,  Up 

Yearsley's  Appal                                     120  c 

v.  Grav                                                    39 

Yeates  v.  Reed                                             140  6 

v.  R.  Co.                                               14  /• 

Yeatman  v.  Hart                                        51  a 

Worthington  v.  Hylyer                               300 

Yeaton  v.  Fry                                           5,  514 

v.  Mencer                                            370  c 

Yeats  v.  Pirn"                                                  294 

v.  Scribner                                  250,  469  d 

Yewin's  Case                                             46iy 

Wren  v.  R.  Co.                                               444 

Yock  v.  Ins.  Co.                                          305  c 

Wright  v.  Bales                                            2  a 

Yoev.  People                                            162  * 

CXXX1V 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References  are  to  sections.] 


York  v.  Blott 
v.  Gribble 

399  1  Younge  v.  Honner 
402    Youngs  v.  R.  Co. 

578  & 
14  c,  14  h 

v.  Pease 

74 

v.  Ransom 

5 

York's  Case 

18,  34 

Yount  v.  Howell 

6a 

York,  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Winans 

6a 

Youqua  v.  Nixon 

304 

Yost  v.  Conroy 

4415,  441  # 

Yrissari  v.  Clement 

4 

Yoter  v.  Sanno 

251 

Young  v.  Bank  of  Alexandria 

480,  489,  490 

v.  Bairner 

76,  395 

z. 

v.  Bennett 

14  d,  466  a 

v.  Black 

532 

Zabriskie  v.  State 

14i 

v.  Clapp 

40 

Zalesky  v.  Ins.  Co. 

305  a 

v.  Clark 

14  v 

Zanone  v.  State 

4616 

v.  Com.          14  k,  223,  461  a,  461  c,  461  d 

Zelch  v.  Hirt 

14  o 

v.  Dearborn 

165 

Zell  «.  Com. 

14,4696 

v.  Dougherty 

14  q 

Zellerbach  v.  Allenberg 

563  e 

v.  Johnson 

Us 

Zerbe  v.  Miller 

14  Q 

v.  Makepeace 

13  c,  14  s,  430  c 

Zierenberg  v.  Labouchere 

143 

r.  Miller 

77 

Zimmerman  v.  Brannon 

328  c 

v.  R.  Co. 

81/ 

Zimmerman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Dolph 

305  / 

v.  Raincock 

22 

Zitske  v.  Goldberg 

366 

v.  Richards 

341 

Zitzer  v.  Merkel 

14  A,  461  c 

v.  Smith 

180 

Zollicoffer  v.  Turney 

469,7 

v.  State 

219  a 

Zouch  v.  Clay 

567,  568  a 

v.  Wood 

444  a 

Zuchtmaun  v.  Roberts 

204 

v,  Wright 

27,  186 

Zumwelt  v.  State 

233 

A  TREATISE 


THE  LAW  OF  EVIDENCE. 


VOL.  I.  —  1 


A   TREATISE 


ON 


THE   LAW  OF   EVIDENCE. 


CHAPTER   I. 


PRELIMINARY   OBSERVATIONS. 


1.  Definitions. 

2.  Distinctions. 

2  a.   Scope  of  the  Rules  of  Evidence  ; 


Criminal  Law  and  Equity  ;  Federal  Courts  ; 

Constitutional  Aspects. 

§  3.    Division  of  the  Subject. 


§  1.  Definitions.  The  word  EVIDENCE,  in  legal  acceptation,  in- 
cludes all  the  means  by  which  any  alleged  matter  of  fact,  the  truth 
of  which  is  submitted  to  investigation,  is  established  or  disproved.1 
This  term,  and  the  word  proof,  are  often  used  indifferently,  as  synony- 
mous with  each  other ;  but  the  latter  is  applied  by  the  most  accurate 
logicians  to  the  effect  of  evidence,  and  not  to  the  medium  by  which 
truth  is  established.8  None  but  mathematical  truth  is  susceptible  of 
that  high  degree  of  evidence,  called  demonstration,  which  excludes  all 
possibility  of  error,  and  which,  therefore,  may  reasonably  be  required 
in  support  of  every  mathematical  deduction.  Matters  of  fact  are 
proved  by  moral  evidence  alone ;  by  which  is  meant  not  only  that 
kind  of  evidence  which  is  employed  on  subjects  connected  with  moral 
conduct,  but  all  the  evidence  which  is  not  obtained  either  from  intui- 
tion, or  from  demonstration.  In  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  we  do 
not  require  demonstrative  evidence,  because  it  is  not  consistent  with 
the  nature  of  the  subject,  and  to  insist  upon  it  would  be  unreasonable 
and  absurd.  The  most  that  can  be  affirmed  of  such  things  is,  that 
there  is  no  reasonable  doubt  concerning  them.8  The  true  question, 
therefore,  in  trials  of  fact,  is  not  whether  it  is  possible  that  the  testi- 
mony may  be  false,  but  whether  there  is  sufficient  probability  of  its 

*  See  Wills  on  Circumstantial  Evid.  2  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  10;  1  Phil.  Evid.  1;  £com- 
pare  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  ch.  6.] 
8  Whately's  Logic,  b.  4,  ch.  3,  §  1. 
8  See  Gambler's  Guide  to  the  Study  of  Moral  Evidence,  p.  121. 


4  PKELIMINAKY  OBSEEVATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

truth ;  that  is,  whether  the  facts  are  shown  by  competent  and  satis- 
factory evidence.  Things  established  by  competent  and  satisfactory 
evidence  are  said  to  be  proved. 

§  2.  Distinctions.  By  competent  evidence  is  meant  that  which  the 
very  nature  of  the  thing  to  be  proved  requires,  as  the  fit  and  appro- 
priate proof  in  the  particular  case,  such  as  the  production  of  a  writing, 
where  its  contents  are  the  subject  of  inquiry.  By  satisfactory  evi- 
dence, which  is  sometimes  called  sufficient  evidence,  is  intended  that 
amount  of  proof,  which  ordinarily  satisfies  an  unprejudiced  mind, 
beyond  leasonable  doubt.1  The  circumstances  which  will  amount  to 
this  degree  of  proof  can  never  be  previously  defined ;  the  only  legal 
test,  of  which  they  are  susceptible  is  their  sufficiency  to  satisfy  the 
mind  and  conscience  of  a  common  man;  and  so  to  convince  him,  that 
he  would  venture  to  act  upon  that  conviction,  in  matters  of  the  highest 
concern  and  importance  to  his  own  interest.  Questions  respecting 
the  competency  and  admissibility  of  evidence  are  entirely  distinct 
from  those  which  respect  its  sufficiency  or  effect ; a  the  former  being 
exclusively  within  the  province  of  the  Court;  the  latter  belonging 
exclusively  to  the  jury.8  Cumulative  evidence  is  evidence  of  the 
same  kind,  to  the  same  point.  Thus,  if  a  fact  is  attempted  to  be 
proved  by  the  verbal  admission  of  the  party,  evidence  of  another 
verbal  admission  of  the  same  fact  is  cumulative;  but  evidence  of 
other  circumstances,  tending  to  establish  the  fact,  is  not. 

§  2  a.  Scope  of  the  Rules  of  Evidence ;  Criminal  Law  and  Equity ; 
Federal  Courts;  Constitutional  Aspects.  [(1)  It  may  be  noted,  at 
the  outset,  that,  in  proceedings  at  common  law,  there  is  no  distinction 
to  be  drawn  between  the  rules  of  evidence  in  criminal  and  in  civil 
cases.  It  is  true  that  the  doctrines  about  burden  of  proof  and  pre- 
sumptions differ  decidedly  in  the  two  departments;  and  it  is  also 
true  that  a  few  rules  —  e.  g,  about  confessions  —  do  not  come  into 
play  at  all,  except  in  criminal  cases ;  and  that  many  kinds  of  evidence 
are  commoner  in  criminal  than  in  civil  trials.  But,  so  far  as  the  ad- 
missibility of  evidence  is  concerned,  there  is  no  distinction  between 
criminal  and  civil  cases  as  such ;  in  other  words,  a  rule  that  is  good 
for  the  one  is  good  in  the  same  terms  for  the  other,  so  far  as  appli- 
cable to  the  subject.  This  has  been  many  times  insisted  on  in  judicial 
utterances.1 

1  [These  distinctions  are  in  themselves  of  no  importance  ;  for  certain  purposes,  how- 
ever, some  such  distinctions  are  material ;  see  post,  §  81  d  (measure  of  persuasion  for 
the  jury)  ;  §  14  w  (judge's  control  over  the  jury).] 

2  TFor  this,  see  §  14  (3),  po*t.~\ 
8  [For  this,  see  Chap.  VII.1 

1  £Lord  Melville's  Trial,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  746  (the  best  case,  in  facts,  argument,  and 
opinion,  for  illustrating  the  doctrine)  ;  R.  »'.  Burdett,  4  B.  &  Aid.  95,  122  ;  R.  v.  Mai- 
lory,  15  Cox  Cr.  460  ;  Watson's  Trial,  32  How.  St.  Tr.  492  ;  Stone's  Trial,  25  id.  1314  ; 
Strother  v.  Barry,  5  Bing.  136,  155  ;  Leach  v.  Simpson,  7  Dowl.  Pr.  513  ;  R.  v.  Towey, 
8  Cox  Cr.  331  ;  Anthon,  Law  Student,  176 ;  State  v.  Carter,  1  Houst.  Cr.  402  ;  Brown 
v.  Schock,  77  Pa.  477  ;  Trogdon's  Case,  81  Gratt.  862,  874  ;  Crawford  v.  State,  112 
Ala.  1  ;  State  v.  Hayes,  23  Mo.  314  ;  Stephen,  Hist.  Grim.  Law,  I.  437  ;  Summons  v 


§§  2-2  a.]  SCOPE   OF  EULES  OF  EVIDENCE.  5 

(2)  In  Chancery  practice  it  may  perhaps  be  said  that  the  rules  of 
evidence  are  the  same  as  at  common   law,  so  far  as  they  are  not 
affected   by  the    peculiar   methods   of    pleading   and    procedure   in 
Chancery ; 2  but  this  qualification  is  so  important  and  so  broad  that 
a  correct  apprehension  of  the  precise  extent  of  the  differences  could 
only  be  had  by  a  detailed  examination  of  the  specific  rules.     Particu- 
lar variations  are  noted  from  time  to  time  in  the  ensuing  chapters, 
and  the  whole  subject  of  Chancery  procedure  is  treated  in  a  subse- 
quent volume  of  this  work.8 

(3)  In  the  Federal  Courts,  "  the  laws  of  the  several  States,  except 
where  the  Constitution,  treaties,  or  statutes  of   the   United   States 
otherwise  require  or  provide,  shall  be  regarded  as  rules  of  decision 
in  trials  at  common  law,  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States  in  cases 
where  they  apply;"4  and,  subject  to  certain  rules  of  competency 
expressly  specified,  "  in  all  other  respects  the  laws  of  the  State  in 
which  the  court  is  held  shall  be  the  rules  of  decision  as  to  the  com- 
petency of  witnesses  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States  in  trials  at 
common   law  and  in  equity  and  admiralty." 6      Thus   the   Federal 
Court  adopts  the  rule  of  evidence  that  prevails  in  the  State  where 
it  is  sitting,6  except  where  there   is   by  Federal   statute  a  specific 
Federal  rule  on  the  subject.7     But  the  interpretation  of  the  phrase 
"common  law,"  in  the  above  provision,  is  that  it  does  not  include 
criminal  trials,  and  that  for  such  trials  the  Federal  Court  is  to  apply 
the  rules  in  force  in  the  respective  States  when  the  Judiciary  Act  of 
1789  was  passed,8  —  so  far,  presumably,  as  not  supplanted  by  Federal 
legislation. 

(4)  The  rules  of  evidence  sometimes  involve  constitutional  ques- 
tions,    (a)  So  far  as  a  constitutional  provision  expressly  sanctions 
some  rule  of  evidence,   the  rule  is  given   the   permanent   features 
of  a  constitutional   provision,  and   is  to  be   interpreted   as  a   part 
of  the   Constitution.     The   most   important   instance  of  this   kind 

State,  5  Oh.  St.  325,  352;  West  v.  State,  22  N.  J.  L.  212,  242  ;  compare  Vaughton  ». 
R.  Co.,  12  Cox  Cr.  580,  587-3 

2  ("Henley  v.  Phillips,  2  Atk.  48  ;  Wood  v.  Strickland,  2  Meriv.  461.] 

«   "Vol.  III.  Part  VI.] 

*    "U.  S.  R.  S.  §  721 J 

6    |lb.  §  858.] 

6  "McNeil  v.  Holhrook,  12  Pet.  84  ;  Sims  v.  Hundley,  6  How.  1  ;  Vance  v.  Camp- 
bell, 1  Black  427  ;  Haussknecht  o.  Claypool,  ib.  431  ;  Wright  v.  Bales,  2  id.  535  ; 
Packet  Co.  u.  Clough,  20  Wall.  528  ;  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Trust  Co.,  102  U.  S. 
250.]_ 

'[Pottery.  Bank,  102  U.  S.  163;  Stephens  v.  Bernays,  42  Fed.  488  ;  a  Federal 
court-rule  does  not  prevail  against  the  State  law  :  Ryan  v.  Bindley,  1  Wall.  66.] 

8  £U.  S.  v.  Reid,  12  How.  361;  in  Logan  v.  U.  S.,  144  U.  S.  263,  the  common  law 
of  Texas  at  the  time  of  admission  was  taken.  For  the  interpretation  of  State  statutes, 
as  to  which  different  considerations  may  apply,  see  Burgess  v.  Seligman,  107  U.  S.  20; 
Coulom  v.  Doull,  133  id.  216,  233  ;  Bait.  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149  id.  368  ;  Whitney 
v.  Fox,  166  id.  637  ;  17  Sup.  713  ;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Yates,  U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  584. 
For  Admiralty  rules,  under  St.  1789  (now  R.  S.  §  721,  supra),  see  The  Ship  William 
Jones,  1  Sprague  485 ;  The  Independence,  2  Curt.  C.  C.  350 ;  The  Steamboat 
Neptune,  Olcott  480,  488.] 


6  PRELIMINARY   OBSERVATIONS.  [CH.  L 

is  the  usual  provision  entitling  an  accused  person  to  be  confronted 
by  the  witnesses  against  him  (post,  §  163 /).  (b)  The  constitutional 
provision  against  ex  post  facto  laws  cannot  properly  be  regarded  as 
affecting  a  change  of  a  rule  of  evidence ;  and  an  early  expression  of 
opinion  to  the  contrary  in  the  Federal  Supreme  Court9  has  appar- 
ently been  repudiated.10  Statutes  making  various  kinds  of  evidence 
admissible  or  inadmissible  ex  post  facto  have  often  been  sanctioned.11 
It  would  seem  that  a  change  in  a  rule,  e.  g.  requiring  a  certain  num- 
ber of  witnesses  or  a  certain  kind  of  corroboration,  would  be  equally 
uuforbidden.  (c)  Apart  from  constitutional  prohibitions,  the  rules 
of  evidence  may  be,  and  frequently  are,  changed  by  statute,  and  such 
changes  are  within  the  legislative  power.  But  so  many  things,  not 
rules  of  evidence,  are  frequently  referred  to  in  terms  of  evidence, 
that  it  is  necessary  to  discriminate  changes  which  may  in  effect  con- 
cern rules  of  property  protected  by  constitutional  sanction.  A  statute 
adding  to  the  list  of  those  facts  which  may  be  taken  as  prima  facie 
evidence  of  another  fact,  or  as  creating  a  presumption  of  its  exist- 
ence, is  generally  regarded  as  a  permissible  one ; 12  but  a  statute 
making  a  certain  fact  "  conclusive  evidence "  (post,  §  15)  of  another 
fact  may  in  effect  be  dealing  with  the  substantive  law  and  affecting 
rights  protected  by  constitutional  provisions.18] 

§  3.  Division  of  the  Subject  This  branch  of  the  law  may  be 
considered  under  three  general  heads,  namely:  first,  the  nature 
and  principles  of  evidence;  secondly,  the  object  of  evidence,  and 
the  rules  which  govern  in  the  production  of  testimony ;  and  thirdly, 
the  means  of  proof,  or  the  instruments  by  which  facts  are  estab- 
lished. This  order  will  be  followed  in  further  treating  this  subject.1 
But,  before  we  proceed,  it  will  be  proper  first  to  consider  what  things 
courts  will,  of  themselves,  take  notice  of,  without  proof.3 

9  ECalder  v.  Bull,  3  Dall.  386;  declaring  the  provision  applicable  to  "every  law 
that  alters  the  legal  rules  of  evidence  and  receives  less  or  different  testimony  than  the 
law  required  at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  offence  in  order  to  convict  the 
offender  :  "  said  obiter.  ] 

10  ([Thompson  v.  Missouri,  171  U.  S.  380;  18  Sup.  922;   discrediting  certain  utter- 
ances in  Kring  v.  Missouri,  107  U.  S.  221,  228,  239  ;  Hopt  v.  Utah,  110  id.  574,  587.1 

11  rWalthall  v.  Walthall,  42  Ala.  450  ;  Pittsfield  &  F.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrison,  16  111. 
81  ;   Robinson  v.  State,  84  Ind.  452;  Laughlin  v.  Com.,  13  Bush  261  ;  Patterson  v. 
Hansel,  4  id.  654,  659;    0' Bryan  v.  Allen,  108  Mo.  227,  230;  Messimer  v.  McCrary, 
113  id.  382  ;  State  v.  Thompson,  id.,  42  S.  W.  949  ;  Foster  v.  Gray,  22  Pa.  9,  16.] 

w  [Clarke  v.  Mead,  102  Cal.  516  ;  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  149  111.  361,  382  ; 
State  v.  Beach,  Ind.,  43  N.  E.  949  ;  Com.  v.  Smith,  166  Mass.  370.  Compare  Want- 
Ian  v.  White,  19  Ind.  470.] 

«  TSee  Callanan  v.  Hurley,  93  U.  S.  387  ;  Marx  v.  Hanthorn,  148  id.  172,  182.] 

1  LThis  analysis  cannot  be  regarded  as  either  sound  in  theory  or  helpful  in  remem- 
bering or  tracing  the  specific  rules.     The  first  head  was  used  as  including  the  present 
Chapters  I- VI  ;  the  second,  as  including  Chapters  VII-XXI  ;  the  third,  as  includ- 
ing the  remainder  ;  each  group  of  chapters  having  its  own  numberings.     It  has  seemed 
better  to  abandon  this  arbitrary  grouping,  and  to  number  the  chapters  consecutively 
without  regard  to  it ;  the  same  oraer  of  chapters  being  observed.] 

2  QThe  following  note,  formerly  appended  to  the  end  of  this  volume,  deals  chiefly 
with  matters  of  trial  procedure   not  peculiarly  a  part  of  the   law  of  evidence,   but 
deserves  preservation  because  of  the  weight  of  the  opinion  of  its  author,  presumably 


§§  2  a-3.]  CONSTITUTIONAL  ASFECTS.  7 

Judge  Redfield  Q  Qt  may  be  convenient  here  to  advert  to  six  practical  rules  of  some 
importance,  all  of  which  will  be  found  applicable  to  evidence  of  every  description. 
First,  where  evidence  is  offered  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  an  objection  is  taken 
to  admissibility  for  that  purpose,  if  the  Court  pronounces  ii»  favor  of  its  general 
admissibility  in  the  cause,  a  Court  of  error,  on  exceptions  taken  (a  bill  of  excep- 
tions cannot  be  tendered  on  a  criminal  trial:  R.  v.  Esdaile,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  213,  228,  per 
lid.  Campbell),  will  support  the  decision  of  the  Court  below,  provided  the  evidence  be 
admissible  for  any  purpose  :  The  Irish  Society  v.  Bp.  of  Derry,  12  Cl.  &  Fin.  641,  665. 
The  proper  course  for  the  opposing  counsel  to  take  in  such  a  case  would  seem  to  be,  to 
call  upon  the  judge  to  explain  to  the  jury,  that  the  evidence,  though  generally  admis- 
sible in  the  cause,  furnishes  no  proof  of  the  particular  fact  in  question  ;  and  then, 
should  the  judge  refuse  to  do  so,  his  direction  might  be  the  subject  of  a  distinct  excep- 
tion, or  an  application  might  be  made  to  the  Court  above  for  a  new  trial  on  the  ground 
of  misdirection  :  id.  672-674,  per  Ld.  Brougham.  Secondly,  where  inadmissible  evi- 
dence is  received  at  the  trial  urithout  objection,  the  opposite  party  cannot  afterwards 
object  to  its  having  been  received:  Reed  v.  Lamb,  29  L.  J.  Ex.  452;  s.  c.  6  H.  &N.  75  ; 
or  obtain  a  new  trial  on  the  ground  that  the  jiidge  did  not  expressly  warn  the  jury  to 
place  no  reliance  upon  it :  Goslin  v.  Cony,  7  M.  &  Gr.  342  ;  Doe  v.  Benjamin,  9  A.  & 
E.  644.  Thirdly,  where  evidence  is  objected  to  at  the  trial,  the  nature  of  the  objections 
must  be  distinctly  stated,  whether  a  bill  of  exceptions  be  tendered  or  not ;  and,  on 
either  moving  for  a  new  trial,  on  account  of  its  improper  admission,  or  on  arguing  the 
exceptions,  the  counsel  will  not  be  permitted  to  rely  on  any  other  objections  than  those 
taken  at  Nisi  Prius :  Williams  v.  Wilcox,  8  A.  &  E.  314,  337;  Ferrand  v.  Milligan, 
7  Q.  B.  730;  Bain  w.  Whitehaven  &  Furness  Junct.  Ey.  Co.,  3  H.  of  L.  Cas.  1,  15-17, 
per  Ld.  Brougham.  Fourthly,  where  evidence  is  tendered  at  the  trial  on  an  untenable 
ground,  and  is  consequently  rejected,  the  Court  will  not  grant  a  new  trial  merely  because 
it  has  since  been  discovered  that  the  evidence  was  admissible  on  another  ground  ;  but 
the  party  must  go  much  further,  and  show,  first,  that  he  could  not  by  due  diligence 
have  offered  the  evidence  on  the  proper  ground  at  the  trial,  and,  next,  that  manifest 
injustice  will  ensue  from  its  rejection.  His  position,  at  the  best,  is  that  of  a  party  who 
has  discovered  fresh  evidence  since  the  trial:  Doe  v.  Beviss,  18  L.  J.  C.  P.  128  ;  s.  c. 
7  Com.  B.  456.  Fifthly,  where  evidence  is  rejected  at  the  trial,  the  party  proposing  it 
should  formally  tender  it  to  the  judge,  and  request  him  to  make  a  note  of  the  fact ; 
and,  if  this  request  be  refused,  he  should  then  tender  a  bill  of  exceptions.  If  this 
course  has  not  been  pursued,  and  the  judge  has  no  note  on  the  subject,  the  counsel 
cannot  afterwards  complain  of  the  rejection  of  the  evidence  :  Gibbs  v.  Pike,  9  M.  &  W. 
351,  360,  361 ;  Whitehouse  v.  Hemmaut,  27  L.  J.  Ex.  295 ;  Penn  v.  Bibby,  36  L.  J. 
Ch.  455,  461,  per  Ld.  Chelmsford,  Ch.  Lastly,  where  evidence  has  been  improperly 
admitted  or  rejected  at  Nisi  Prius,  the  Court  will  grant  a  new  trial,  unless  it  be  clear 
beyond  all  doubt  that  the  error  of  the  judge  could  have  had  no  possible  effect  upon  the 
verdict,  in  which  case  they  will  not  enable  the  defeated  party  to  protract  the  litigation 
Wright  v.  Doe  d.  Tatham,  7  A.  &  E.  330 ;  Baron  de  Rut/en  v.  Farr,  4  A.  &  E.  53,  57  , 
Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  919,  933  ;  Doe  v.  Langfield,  16  M.  &  W.  497.  These 
cases  overrule  Doe  v.  Tyler,  6  Bing.  561;  s.  c.  4  M.  &  P.  377;  a  dictum  of  Ld.  Ten- 
terden  in  Tyrwhitt  v.  Wynne,  2  B.  &  Aid.  559  ;  and  one  by  Sir  J.  Mansfield  in  Hor- 
ford  v.  Wilson,  1  Taunt.  14.  See  Mortimer  v.  M'Callan,  6  M.  &  W.  75 ;  Edwards  v. 
Evans,  3  East  451.  It  may  further  be  stated,  that  the  wrongful  reception  of  evidence 
will  not  furnish  less  available  ground  for  a  new  trial,  although  the  jury  accompany 
their  verdict  with  a  distinct  and  positive  statement  that  they  have  arrived  at  it  inde- 
pendently of  the  obnoxious  evidence »  Bailey  v.  Haines,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  73,  78.] 


JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 


[CH.  IL 


CHAPTER  II. 

OP  WHAT  PROPOSITIONS  EVIDENCE  NEED  NOT  BE  OFFERED; 
JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 


§  3  a.  Matters  that  may  be  judicially 
noticed. 

§  4.  Public  Functionaries,  Seals,  Acts 
of  State,  etc. 

§  5.  General  Usages,  Matters  of  Noto- 
riety, etc. 

§  6.   Political  Divisions. 


§  6  a.  Public  Officials,  their  Duties 
and  Acts. 

§  6  6.   Laws. 

§  6  c.   Jury's  Knowledge. 

§  6  d.   Implications  of  the  Doctrine. 

§  6  e.  Other  Senses  of  the  term  Judi- 
cial Notice. 


[Or  the  propositions  involved  in  the  pleadings,  or  relevant  thereto, 
proof  by  evidence  may  be  dispensed  with  in  two  situations :  (1)  where 
the  opponent  by  a  solemn  or  infra-judicial  admission  has  waived  dis- 
pute, and  (2)  where  the  Court  is  justified  by  general  considerations  in 
assuming  the  truth  of  the  proposition  without  requiring  evidence 
from  the  party.  The  former  is  more  conveniently  treated  along  with 
other  kinds  of  Admissions  (post,  §§  186,  205).  The  latter  is  the  pro- 
cess most  commonly  meant  by  the  term  Judicial  Notice.] 

§  3  a.  Matters  that  may  be  judicially  noticed.  [The  various 
senses  in  which  the  term  Judicial  Notice  is  used  will  be  further  ex- 
amined in  §  6  e,  post.  In  the  single  sense  above  noted  —  i.  e.,  of  what 
propositions  in  a  party's  case  he  will  not  be  required  to  offer  evidence 
—  the  general  principle  of  Judicial  Notice  is  simple  and  natural 
enough.  In  general,  it  covers  (1)  matters  which  are  so  notorious  that 
the  production  of  evidence  would  be  unnecessary  ;  (2)  matters  which 
the  judicial  function  supposes  the  judge  to  be  acquainted  with,  either 
actually  or  in  theory ;  (3)  sundry  matters  not  exactly  included  under 
either  of  these  heads.  It  is  hardly  possible,  however,  in  enumerating 
these  matters  to  follow  strictly  this  or  any  other  classification.1] 

§  4.  Public  Functionaries,  Seals,  Acts  of  State,  etc.  All  civilized 
nations,  being  alike  members  of  the  great  family  of  sovereignties, 
may  well  be  supposed  to  recognize  each  other's  existence,  and  general 
public  and  external  relations.  The  usual  and  appropriate  symbols  of 
nationality  and  sovereignty  are  the  national  flag  and  seal.  Every  sov- 
ereign, therefore,  recognizes,  and,  of  course,  the  public  tribunals  and 
functionaries  of  every  nation  take  notice  of,  the  existence  and  titles  of 
all  the  other  sovereign  powers  in  the  civilized  world,  their  respective 
flags,  and  their  seals  of  state.  Public  acts,  decrees,  and  judgments, 
exemplified  under  this  seal,  are  received  as  true  and  genuine,  it  being 

1  fJFor  the  most  acute  and  learned  discussion  of  the  subject,  see  Professor  J.  B. 
Thayer's  "Judicial  Notice,"  in  3  Harv.  Law  Kev.  285,  and  ch.  7  in  hia  "Preliminary 
Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence."  3 


§§  3  a-5.]      GENERAL   USAGES,  MATTERS   OF  NOTORIETY,   ETC.  9 

the  highest  evidence  of  their  character.1  If,  however,  upon  a  civil 
war  in  any  country,  one  part  of  the  nation  shall  separate  itself  from 
the  other,  and  establish  for  itself  an  independent  government,  the 
newly  formed  nation  cannot  without  proof  be  recognized  as  such,  by 
the  judicial  tribunals  of  other  nations,  until  it  has  been  acknowledged 
by  the  sovereign  power  under  which  those  tribunals  are  constituted ; a 
the  first  act  of  recognition  belonging  to  the  executive  function.  But 
though  the  seal  of  the  new  power,  prior  to  such  acknowledgment,  is 
not  permitted  to  prove  itself,  yet  it  inay  be  proved  as  a  fact  by  other 
competent  testimony,'  and  the  existence  of  such  unacknowledged  gov- 
ernment or  State  may,  in  like  manner,  be  proved  ;  the  rule  being,  that 
if  a  body  of  persons  assemble  together  to  protect  themselves,  and  sup- 
port their  own  independence,  make  laws  and  have  courts  of  justice, 
this  is  evidence  of  their  being  a  State.4 

§  5.  General  Usages,  Matters  of  Notoriety,  etc.  In  like  manner, 
the  Law  of  Nations,  and  the  general  customs  and  usages  of  merchants, 
as  well  as  the  public  statutes  and  general  laws  and  customs  of  their 
own  country,  as  well  ecclesiastical  as  civil,  are  recognized,  without 
proof,  by  the  courts  of  all  civilized  nations.1  [No  exact  test  can  be 
phrased  for  distinguishing  usages  which  will  or  will  not  be  noticed ; 
for  example,  notice  has  been  taken  of  a  custom  of  railroads  to  sepa- 
rate freight  and  passenger  trains,2  of  passengers  to  ride  on  the  plat- 

1  Church  v.  Hubbart,  2  Cranch  187,  238  ;  Griswold  v.  Pitcairn,  2  Conn.  85,  90  ; 
U.  S.  v.  Johns,  4  Dall.  416  ;  The  Santissima  Trinidad,  7  Wheat.   283,  335  ;  Anon., 
9  Mod.  66  ;  Lincoln  v.  Battelle,  6  Wend.  475  ;  Coit  v.  Millikin,  1  Denio  376  ;  j Lazier 
D.  Westcott,  26  N.  Y.  146  ;  U.  S.  v.  Wagner,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  App.  585.  ( 

a  City  of  Berne  v.  Bank  of  England,  9  Yes.  347  ;  U.  S.  u.  Palmer,  3  Wheat.  610,  634. 
8  U.  S.  v.  Palmer,  3  Wheat.  610,  634 ;  The  Estrella,  4  Wheat.  298. 

*  Yrissarri  v.  Clement,  2  C.  &  P.  223,  per  Best,  C.  J.     CBu*  the  rule  in  U.  S.  v. 
Palmer,  supra,  seems  limited  to  the  case  of  a  defendant  denying  piratical  intent  by 
pleading  the  authority  of  a  government  having  colorable  existence  and  engaged  in  a 
revolution.     On  the  general  question,  the  correct  rule  seems  to  be  the  contrary  of  the 
statement  in  the  text,  i.  e.  a  Court  will  look  solely  to  the  action  of  the  Executive  where 
the  existence  of  a  foreign  nation  or  government    is  involved  :  U.  S.  ».  Hutchings, 
2  Wheel.  Cr.  C.  543,  per  Marshall,  C.  J.  ;    Rose  v.  Himely,  4  Cranch  241,  272  ;  Gel- 
ston  ».  Hoyt,  3  WTheat.  246,  324  ;  Nueva  Anna,  6  id.  193  ;  Williams  v.  Ins.  Co.,  13 
Pet.  415,  421 ;  Kennett  v.  Chambers,  14  How.  38,  51  ;  Re  Baiz,  135  U.  S.  403,  431; 
Jones  v.  U.  S.,  137  id.  202,  212  ;  Underbill  v.  Hernandez,  168  id.  250  ;  U.  S.  v.  Trum- 
bull,  48  Fed.  99.  104  ;  The  Itata,  56  Fed.  505,  510;  2  Story  Constit.,  §§  1566,  1567; 
Mighell  v.  Sultan  of  Johore,  1894,  1  Q.  B.  149.] 

*  Erskine  v.  Murray.  2  Ld.  Raym.  1542  ;  Heineccius  ad.  Pand.  1.  22,  tit.  3,  §  119 ; 
1  Bl.  Comra.  75,  76,  85  ;    Edie  v.  East  India  Co.,   2  Burr.  1226,  1228;  Chandler  v. 
Grieves,  2  H.  Bl.  606,  n.  ;    R«x  v.  Sutton,  4  M.  &  S.  542  ;  6  Vin.  Abr.  tit.  Court,  D.  ; 
1  Rol.  Abr.  526,  D.  ;  j  Jewell  v.  Center,  25  Ala.  498  ;  Munn  v.  Burch,  25  111.  35  ;  Wig- 
gin  v.  Chicago,  5  Mo.  App.  347  ;(  including  the  usual  practice  and  course  of  con- 
veyancing :  3  Sugd.  Vend.  &  Pur.  28  ;  Willoughby  v.  Willoughby,  1  T.  R.  772,  per  Ld. 
Hardwicke;  Doe  v.  Hilder,  2  B.  &  Aid.  793  ;  Rowe  v.  Greufel,  Ry.  &  M.  398,  per 
Abbott,  C.  J.  ;  and  the  general  lien  of  bankers  on  securities  of  their  customers,  deposited 
with  them  :  Brandao  v.  Barnett,  3  C.  B.  519.     {Merely  local  customs,  however,  will  not 
be  judicially  noticed :  Dutch,  etc.  Co.  o.  Mooney,  12  Cal.  535  ;  Sullivan  v.  Hense,  2  Col. 
Terr.  424  ;  Turner  v.  Fish,  28  Miss.  306 ;   Youngs  v.  Ransom,  31  Barb.  49 ;  Lewis  v. 
McClure,  8  Oreg.  273  ;  nor  customs  which  do  not  form  part  of  the  law  merchant,  e.  g. 
the  rules  of  a  broker's  board :  Goldsmith  v.  Sawyer,  46  Cal.  209. } 

2  CA.  T.  &  S.  F.  R,  Co.  v.  Headland,  18  Colo.  477,  483  ;  see  Clevel.  C.  C.  &S.  L.  R, 
Co.  v.  Jenkins,  111.,  51  N.  E.811J 


10  JUDICIAL  NOTICE.  [CH.   H 

form  of  a  street-car,8  of  Seventh  Day  Baptists  living  in  a  certain 
town  not  to  vote  at  an  election  on  Saturday,4  of  brakemen  to  have 
certain  general  duties,6  of  assessors  to  rate  property  at  a  percentage 
of  the  actual  value,6  of  cattle-owners  to  pasture  on  unsurveyed  public 
lands,7  of  restaurateurs  to  remove  the  label  from  champagne,  in  serv- 
ing it  from  a  cooler,  before  showing  the  bottle  to  the  customer;8 
while  notice  has  been  refused  of  a  custom  to  mark  up  the  price  of 
land  to  be  sold,9  of  a  custom  to  close  lake  navigation  on  April  I,10 
of  the  duties  of  a  railway  superintendent  in  a  certain  town,11  and  of 
the  legal  status  and  powers  of  the  Bornan  Catholic  Church.12]  The 
seal  of  a  notary-public  is  also  judicially  taken  notice  of  by  the  courts, 
he  being  an  officer  recognized  by  the  whole  commercial  world.18  For- 
eign Admiralty  and  Maritime  Courts,  too,  being  the  courts  of  the  civ- 
ilized world,  and  of  co-ordinate  jurisdiction,  are  judicially  recognized 
everywhere  ;  and  their  seals  need  not  be  proved.14  Neither  is  it 
necessary  to  prove  things  which  must  have  happened  according  to  the 
ordinary  course  of  nature ; 15  nor  to  prove  the  course  of  time,  or  of 
the  heavenly  bodies ; 16  nor  the  ordinary  public  fasts  and  festivals ; 
nor  the  coincidence  of  days  of  the  week  with  days  of  the  month ; lr 
^nor  the  succession  of  the  seasons  ; 18}  nor  the  meaning  of  words,19  or 

8  TMetrop.  R-  Co.  v.  Snashall,  3  App.  D.  C.  420,  433.] 
*    "State  v.  South  Kingston,  18  R.  I.  258,  273.] 
6    "Matchett  o.  R.  Co.,  133  Ind.  334. 3 

6  fR.  &  T.  Cos.  v.  Board,  85  Fed.  302,  308.] 

7  TMathews  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  D.,  72  N.  W.  1085.] 

8  [Von  Mumm  v.  Wittemann,  85  Fed.  966.] 

9  QState  v.  Chingren,  la.,  74  N.  W.  946.] 


'Haines  v.  Gibson,  Mich.,  73  N.  W.  12ti.] 
'South.  R.  Co.  v.  Hasan,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  760.] 


12  [^Baxter  v.  McDonnell,  N.  Y.,  49  N.  E.  667.  For  sundry  recent  examples,  see  also 
Fox  v.  Mining  Co.,  Cal.,  41  Pac.  308  ;  Mullen  v.  Sackett,  Wash.,  44  Pac.  136;  Meyer 
v.  Krauter,  56  N.  J.  L.  696  ;  State  v.  Marsh,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  837.] 

M  Anon.,  12  Mod.  345  ;  Wright  v.  Barnard,  2  Esp.  700  ;  Yeaton  v.  Fry,  5  Cranch 
335  ;  Browne  w.  Philadelphia  Bank,  6  S.  &  R.  484  ;  Chanoine  v.  Fowler,  3  Wend. 
173,  178  ;  Bayley  on  Bills,  515  (2d  Am.  ed.  by  Phillips  &  Sewall) ;  Hutcheon  v.  Man- 
nington,  6  Ves.  823;  jDenmead  v.  Maack,  2  McArth.  (D.  C. )  475  ;  Porter  v.  Judson, 
1  Gray  175. } 

14  Croudson  v.  Leonard,  4  Cranch  435  ;  Rose  v.  Hiinely,  ib.  292  ;  Church  ».  Hub- 
bart,  2  Cranch  187  ;  Thompson  v.  Stewart,  3  Conn.  171,  181  ;  Green  v.  Waller,  2  Ld. 
Raym.  891,  893  ;  Anon.,  9  Mod.  66 ;  Story  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  §  643  ;  Hughes 
v.  Cornelius,  as  stated  by  Lord  Holt,  in  2  Ld.  Raym.  893  ;  and  see  T.  Raym.  473  ; 
s.  c.  2  Show.  232. 

16  Rex  v.  Luffe,  8  East  202  ;  Fay  v.  Prentice,  9  Jur.  876. 

16  [_E.  q.  of  moonrise:  People  v.  Mayes,  Cal.,  45  Pac.  860.] 

17  tf  Vi'n.  Abr.  491,  pi.  6,  7,  8  ;  Hoyle  v.  Cornwallis,   1  Str.   387  ;  Page  v.  Faucet, 
Cro.  El.    227  ;  Harvy  v.  Broad,  2  Salk.  626  :    Hanson  v.  Shackelton,    4  Dowl.   48  ; 
Dawkins  v.  Smithwick,  4  Fla.  158  ;  jReed  v.  Wilson,  41  N.  J.  L.  29  ;  Phil.   W.  &  B. 
R.  Co.  v.  Lehman,  56  Md.  226  ;  Mclntosh  v.  Lee,  57  la.   358  ;  QMorgan  v.  Burrow, 
Miss.,   16   So.    432;]    Sprowl  v.   Lawrence,  33  Ala.  674;  Allman  v.   Owen,   31   id. 
167 ;  Sasseer  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  4  Md.  409 ;  Reed  v.  Wilson,  41  N.  J.  L.  29  ;  Holman 
v.  Burrow,  2  Ld.  Raym.  795  ;  including  the  difference  in  time  in  different  longitudes  : 
Curtis  v.  Marsh,  4  Jur.  N.  s.  1112.  (     QFor  the  use  of  almanacs,  see  §  6  e.] 

18  {Ross  v.  Boswell,  60  Ind.  235;  Tomlinson  v.  Greenfield,  3]  Ark.  557;  Floyd  ». 
Ricks,  14  Ark.  286  ;  Hunter  v.  New  York,  0.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y.  622  ;  but 
not.  particular  changes  of  weather  at  special  times  :  Dixon  v.  Niccolls,  89  111.  372.  | 

w  Clement!  v.  Goldiiig,  2  Campb.  25  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Kne  eland,  20  Pick.  239 ; 


§  5.]  GENERAL   USAGES,   MATTERS   OF  NOTORIETY,  ETC.  11 

abbreviations  of  words,30  in  the  vernacular  language ; M  [nor  the  mat- 
ters enumerated  in  the  official  census,  at  least  so  far  as  general  figures 
of  population  are  concerned ; M]  nor  the  legal  weights  and  measures ;  ** 
nor  any  matters  of  public  history,  affecting  the  whole  people ; u  nor  pub- 
lic matters,  affecting  the  government  of  the  country.36  The  current 
coins  of  the  country,  whether  established  by  statute  or  existing  im- 
memorially,  will  be  judicially  recognized;  the  Courts  will  also  take 
notice  of  the  character  of  the  existing  circulating  medium,  and 
of  the  popular  language  in  reference  to  it,28  but  not  of  the  current 
value  at  any  particular  time.27  [Occasionally,  also,  the  Court  will  not 
require  evidence  of  notorious  facts  in  external  nature  and  in  the  sci- 
ences, arts,  and  manufactures ;  for  example,  it  has  been  judicially 
noticed  that  cigars  as  ordinarily  sold  are  not  a  drug  or  medicine,28 
that  cigarettes  are  deleterious,29  that  hair  is  usually  found  along  with 
sheep-fleece,80  that  the  disease  "  peach-yellows  "  is  a  tree-disease  of  a 
baneful  and  contagious  nature,81  and  that  the  business  of  an  undertaker 
in  a  certain  locality  is  offensive ; 82  but  not  that  glanders  is  for  human 
beings  a  contagious  disease.88  Whether  the  fact  that  a  certain  liquor 
is  intoxicating  should  be  noticed  judicially  has  been  the  subject  of 

{Hill  v.  Bacon,  43  111.  477  ;{  £Sinnott  v.  Columbet,  107  Cal.  187  ("kindergarten  ") ; 
Edwards  v.  Publishing  Co.,  99  id.  431,  435  ("sack,"  as  a  corruption-fund).!  Where  a 
libel  was  charged,  in  stating  that  the  plaintiffs  friends,  in  the  advocacy  ofner  claims, 
"  had  realized  the  fable  of  the  Frozen  Snake,"  it  was  held  that  the  Court  might  judi- 
cially take  notice  that  the  knowledge  of  that  fable  of  Phsedrus  generally  prevailed  in 
society:  Hoare  v.  Silverlock,  12  Jur.  695  ;  12  Q.  B.  624.  {Yet  it  was  required  to  prove 
the  meaning  of  "Black  Republicans  :  "  Bait.  v.  State,  15  Md.  376.} 

20  j  It  has  been  held  that  the  Court  knows  judicially  that  "  Adni'r"  means  adminis- 
trator :  Moseley's  Adm'r  v.  Mastin,  37  Ala.  216  ;  but  not  that  "  Mo."  means  Missouri  : 
Ellis  v.  Park,  8  Tex.  205;  nor  that  "La."  means  Louisiana:  Kussell  v.  Martin,  15 
Tex.  238. } 

21  J  But  not  the  proper  mode  of  writing  and  speaking  in  a  foreign  language  :  State 
v.  Johnson,  26  Minn.  316.} 

22  [[People  r.  Williams,  64  Cal.  84,  91  ;  State  v.  Braskamp,  87  la.  588 ;  Bennett  v. 
Marion,  id.,  76  N.  W.  844  ;   Brown  i>.  Lutz,    36  Nebr.  527  ;    Kokes    v.   State,  id., 
76  N.  W.  467  ;    Huntington  v.  Cast,    Ind.,  48  N.  E.    1025  ;  State  v.   Marion   Co. 
Court,  128  Mo.  427.] 

88  Hockin  v.  Cooke,  4  T.  R.  314. 

84  Bank  of  Augusta  v.  Earle,  13  Pet.  519,  590  ;  1  Stark.  Ev.  211  (6th  Am.  ed.) ; 
JAshley  v.  Martin,  50  Ala.  537  ;  Hunter  v.  New  York,  0.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  116  N.Y. 
621  ;  Foscue  v.  Lyon,  55  id.  440  ;  Worcester  Bank  v.  Cheney,  94  111.  430  ;  e.  g.  the 
Civil  War  of  1861-1865  :  Cuyler  v.  Ferrill,  1  Abb.  (U.S.)  169;  Simmons  v.  Trumbo, 
9  W.  Va.  358  ;  The  Peterhoff,  Blatchf.  Prize  Cas.  463  ;  the  suspension  of  the  statute 
of  limitations  during  that  time  :  East,  etc.  Co.  v.  Gaskell,  2  Lea  (Tenn. )  748.  { 

«  Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  221. 

29  Lampton  v.  Haggard,  3  Monr.  149  ;  Jones  v.  Overstreet,  4  Monr.  547  ;  United 
States  v.  Burns,  5  McLean  C.  C.  23  ;  United  States  v.  American  Gold  Coins,  1  Woolw. 
217 ;  of  the  currency  of  the  State  at  a  given  time  :  Buford  r.  Tucker,  44  Ala.  89  ; 
Simmons  v.  Trumbo,"9  W.  Va.  358.  | 

27  Feemster  v.  Ringo,  5  Monr.  336  ;  {Modawell  v.  Holmes,  40  Ala.  391;  cf.  Bryant 
v.  Foot,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  497 ;  37  L.  J.  Q.  B.  217  ;  Hart  v.  State,  55  Ind.  599.} 

23  ["Com.  v.  Marzynski,  149  Mass.  72.] 

29    JAustin  v.  State,  Tenn.,  48  S.  W.  305.] 


Lyon  v.  Marine,  8  U.  S.  App.  409,  412.] 

'State  v.  Main,  69  Conn.  123.] 
"Rowland  v.  Miller,  139  N.  Y.  93.] 
=State  v.  Fox,  79  Md.  514,  528.] 


12  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  [CH.   IL 

much  controversy.  The  doubt  seems  really  to  arise  from  the  multiple 
significance  of  certain  names  of  liquors.  Thus,  it  seems  to  be  proper 
to  hold  that  "  whiskey "  may  be  assumed  to  signify  an  intoxicating 
liquor,84  and  that  a  liquor  termed  "brandy  "  is  intoxicating,85  and  even 
that  "  wine," 86  or  malt  or  hop  liquors,87  are  intoxicating  ;  but  "  beer  " 
is  a  term  applied  to  so  many  non-intoxicating  drinks  that  evidence  of 
its  qualities  in  a  given  instance  may  well  be  required.88  Notorious 
geographical  facts  will  also  frequently  be  noticed ; 89  for  example,  that 
the  distance  between  Dubuque,  la.,  and  Asheville,  N.  C.,  exceeds  one 
hundred  miles,40  or  that  two  towns  in  a  State  are  separated  only  by  a 
river  and  are  accessible  from  each  other  across  the  ice.41] 

§  6.  Political  Divisions.  Courts  also  take  notice  of  the  territorial 
extent  of  the  jurisdiction  and  sovereignty,  exercised  de  facto  by  their 
own  government ;  and  of  the  local  divisions  of  their  country,  as  into 
states,  provinces,  counties,  cities,  towns,  local  parishes,  or  the  like,  so 
far  as  political  government  is  concerned  or  affected ;  and  of  the  rela- 
tive positions  of  such  local  divisions  ;  but  not  of  their  precise  bounda- 
ries, farther  than  they  may  be  described  in  public  statutes.1  (They 
will  notice  whether  a  city  or  town  is  in  the  State ; 2  and  if  so,  in  what 
county,8 }  [and  that  a  town  is  the  county-seat.4  They  may  notice  the 

34  jSchlicht  v.  State,  56  Ind.  173  ;  Eagan  v.  State,  53  id.  162;  Klare  v.  State,  43  id. 
483  ;  Com.  v.  Peckhara,  2  Gray  514.  | 

85  [^Thomas  v.  Com.,  90  Va.  92,  94  (apple-brandy)  ;  State  v.  Tisdale,  54  Minn.  105 
(California  brandy).] 

36  fStarace  v.  Rossi,  69  Vt.  303  (Italian  "sour  wine  ").] 

87  [Contra  :  People  v.  Rice,  103  Mich.  350  ("hop-pop  ")  ;  Shaw  v.  State,  56  Ind.  188 
(malt).] 

w  QKerkow  v.  Bauer,  15  Nebr.  150,  155  ;  State  v.  Beswick,  13  R.  1.211,  220  ;  Hans- 
berg  v.  People,  120  111.  21,  23;  Blatz  v.  Rohrback,  116  N.  Y.  450;  State  v.  Brewing 
Co.,  5  S.  D.  39,  45  ;  State  v.  Church,  6  id.  89  ;  Bell  v.  State,  91  Ga.  227,  231  ;  unless, 
of  course,  the  statute  classifies  beer  as  an  intoxicating  liquor  :  Kerkow  v.  Bauer,  supra."] 
|  That  beer  is  a  malt  liquor  may  be  noticed  :  Adler  v.  State,  55  Ala.  16  ;  State  r. 
Goyette,  11  R.  I.  592.J 

89  {Winnepiseogee  Lake  Co.  v.  Young,  40  N.  H.  420;  Hinckley  v.  Beckwith,  23 
Wis.  328  ;  Morsman  v.  Forrest,  27  Ind.  233  ;  Neaderhouser  v.  State,  28  id.  257;  Cooke 
v.  Wilson,  1  C.  B.  N.  s.  153  ;  Com.  v.  King,  150  Mass.  224.  | 

»  TMut.  Ben.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Robison,  19  U.  S.  App.  266,  279.] 

41  LSiegbert  v.  Stiles,  39  Wis.  533,  536.  See  also  Pettit  v.  State,  135  Ind.  393  ; 
Blumenthal  v.  Meat  Co.,  12  Wash.  331.] 

1  Deybel's  Case,  4  B.  &  Aid.  242 ;  2  Inst.  557  ;  Fazakerley  v.  Wiltshire,  1  Str. 
469  ;  Humphreys  v.  Budd,  9  Dowl.  1000  ;  Ross  v.  Reddick,  1  Scam.  73  ;  Goodwin  v. 
Appleton,  9  Shepl.  453 ;  Vanderwerker  v.  People,  5  Wend.  530  ;  | State  v.  Dunwell, 
3  R.  I.  127;  Boston  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  383 ;  Gooding  v.  Morgan,  70  111.  275  ;  Ham 
v.  Ham,  39  Me.  263  ;  Com.  v.  Desmond,  103  Mass.  445  ;  Beebe  v.  United  States,  11 
N.  W.  Rep.  505  ;|  [State  v.  Snow,  117  N.  C.  774.] 

a  {King  «;.  KentsAdm'r,  29  Ala.  542:  Com.  v.  Desmond,  supra;  Cummings  v. 
Btone,  13  Mich.  70  ;  Solyer  v.  Romanet,  52  Tex.  562  ;  Boston  i>.  State,  supra.\  ^Dis- 
tinguish from  this  certain  cases  refusing  to  notice  that  there  is  only  one  town  of  a 
name  in  a  State  or  in  the  world:  Kearney  v.  King,  2  B.  &  Aid.  301;  Andrews  v. 
Hoxie,  5  Tex.  171 ;  Thayer,  3  Harv.  L.  Rev.  310.] 

8  jSmitha  v.  Flournoy's  Adm'r,  47  Ala.  345  ;  State  ».  Powers,  25  Conn.  48  :  Stein- 
mctz  v.  Versailles  Turnpike  Co.,  57  Ind.  457  ;  Martin  v.  Martin,  51  Me.  866  ;[  [[People 
v.  Etting,  99  Cal.  577  ;  Bauman  v.  Trust  Co.,  66  Minn.  227;  State  v.  Simpson,  91  Me. 
83  ;  Gilbert  ».  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  111.,  52  N.  E.  22;  the  ruling  in  Com.  v.  Wheeler,  162 
Mass.  429,  is  anomalous.] 

4  QHambel  v.  Davis,  89  Tex.  256  ;  Whitner  v.  Belknap,  ib.  273  ;  State  v.  Penning- 
ton,  124  Mo.  388;  People  v.  Faust,  113  Cal.  172.] 


§§  5-6  a.]         POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  J   PUBLIC   OFFICIALS.  13 

boundaries  of  a  city  *  or  a  county,6  but  not  therefore  that  a  boundary 
is  to  be  located  at  a  given  spot.7  The  divisions  of  land  by  public  sur- 
vey are  also  often  noticed ; 8  but  not  therefore  the  location  of  a  certain 
piece  of  land  with  reference  to  such  lines.9] 

§  6  a.  Public  Officials,  their  Duties  and  Acts.  Courts  will  also  judi- 
cially recognize  the  political  constitution  or  frame  of  their  own  gov- 
ernment ;  its  essential  political  agents  or  public  officers,  sharing  in  its 
regular  administration ;  and  its  essential  and  regular  political  opera- 
tions, powers,  and  action.  Thus,  notice  is  taken,  by  all  tribunals,  of 
the  accession  of  the  Chief  Executive  of  the  nation  or  state,  under 
whose  authority  they  act ;  his  powers  and  privileges ; *  the  genuine- 
ness of  his  signature,2  the  heads  of  departments,  and  principal  officers 
of  state,  and  the  public  seals ; 8  the  election  or  resignation  of  a  senator 
of  the  United  States  ;  the  appointment  of  a  cabinet  or  foreign  minis- 
ter ;  *  marshals  and  sheriffs,6  and  the  genuineness  of  their  signatures,9 
but  not  their  deputies ;  courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  their  judges,7 
their  seals,  their  rules,8  and  maxims  in  the  administration  of  justice, 
and  course  of  proceeding ;  *  [including  the  duration  and  dates  of  terms 

6  Q)e  Baker  v.  R.  Co.,  106  Cal.  257  ;  Re  Independence  Boulevard,  Ark.,  30  S.  W. 

773.1 

6 ""Board  v.  State,  147  Ind.  476.] 

7  LBrune  v.  Thompson,  2  Q.  B.  789  ;  Diggins  v.  Hartshorne,  108  Cal.  154.] 

8  Lewis  v.  Harris,  31  Ala.  689  ;  Gardner  v.  Eberhart,  82  111.  316;  Murphy  v.  Hen- 
dricks,  57  Ind.  593  :  Atwater  v.  Schenck,  9  Wis.  156  ;  Quinn  v.  Champagne,  38  Minn. 
323  ;}  [Sever  t>.  Lyon,  170  111.  395  ;  Rogers  v.  Cady,  104  Cal.  288;  McMaster  v.  Morse, 
Utah,  55  Pac.  70.] 

9  rSchwerdtle  v.  Placer  Co.,   108  Cal.  689  ;  Kretzschmar  v,  Meehan,  Minn.,  77 
N.  W741.] 

1  Elderton's  Case,  2  Ld.  Raym.  980,  per  Holt,  C.  J. ;  {Lindsey  v.  Attorney-General, 
33  Miss.  508  ;  "Wells  v.  Company,  47  N.  H.  235  ;  Dewees  r.  Colorado  Co.,  32  Tex.  570. } 

8  Jones  v.  Gale's  Ex'r,  4  Martin  635.  And  see  Rex  v.  Miller,  2  W.  Bl.  797; 
1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  74;  Rex  v.  Gully,  ib.  98;  {Yount  v.  Howell,  14  Cal.  465.} 

8  Rex  v.  Jones,  2  Campb.  131;  Bennett  v.  State  of  Tennessee,  Mart.  &  Yerg.  133, 
Lord  Melville's  Case,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  707;  j  Yount  v.  Howell,  supra.  So,  of  the  head 
of  the  Patent  Office  :  York,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winans,  17  How.  30.{ 

<  Walden  v.  Canfield,  2  Rob.  (La.)  466. 

6  Holman  v.  Burrow,  2  Ld.  Raym.  794. 

8  Alcock  v.  Whatmore,  8  Dowl.  P.  C.615;  {Ingram  v.  State,  27  Ala.  17;  Thielmann 
«.  Burg,  73  111.  293 ;  Major  v.  State,  2  Sneed  11;  Alford  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  545  ; 
Ward  v.  Henry,  19  Wis.  76.} 

*  Watson  v.  Hay,  3  Kerr,  559. 

8  [Though  not  of  rules  of  inferior  courts  :  Cornelieson  v.  Foushee,  Ky.,  40  S.  W.' 
680  ;  Kindel  ».  LeBert,  23  Colo.  385.] 

9  Treganyp.  Fletcher,  1  Ld.  Raym.  154  ;  Lane's  Case,  2  Co.  16  ;  3  Com.  Dig.  357; 
Courts,  Q. ;  Newell  v.  Newton,  10  Pick.  470  ;  Elliott  v.  Edwards,  3  B.  &  P.  183,  184, 
per  Ld.  Alvanley,  C.  J. ;  Maberley  v.  Robins,  5  Taunt.  625  ;  Tooker  v.  Duke  of  Beau- 
fort, Sayer  297.     Whether  superior  Courts  are  bound  to  take  notice  who  are  justices 
of  the  inferior  tribunals  is  not  clearly  settled.      In  Skipp  v.  Hooke,  2  Str.  1080,  it  was 
objected  that  they  were  not ;  but  whether  the  case  was  decided  on  that  or  on  the  other 
exception  taken  does  not  appear:  Andrews  74  reports  the  same  case,  ex  relatione  al- 
terius,  and  equally  doubtful  ;  and  see  Van  Sandau  v.  Turner,  6  Q.  B.   773,  786,  per 
Ld.  Denman.     The  weight  of  American  authorities  seems  rather  on  the  affirmative  side 
of  the  question  :  Hawkes  v.  Kennebeck,  7  Mass.  461 ;  Ripley  v.  Warren,  2  Pick.  592 ; 
Despau  v.  Swindler,  8  Martin  N.  s.  705;  Follain  v.  Lefevre,  3  Rob.  (La.)  13  ;  Jones  t>. 
Gale's  Ex'r,  4  Martin  635;  Wood  ».  Fitz,  10  id.  196  ;  {Kennedy  r.  Com.,  78  Ky.  447; 
Kilpatrick  v.  Com.,  31  Pa.  St.  198  ;  Com.  v.  Jeffts,  14  Gray  19  ;  Ex  parte  Peterson, 


14  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  [CH.   II. 

of  Court,10  the  attorneys  licensed  to  practise,11]  and  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  inferior  Court  whose  judgment  it  re- 
vises, 12  [as  well  as  the  other  proceedings  in  the  same  litigation  before 
the  same  Court; 18]  also,  of  public  proclamations  of  war  and  peace,14 
and  of  days  of  special  public  fasts  and  thanksgivings  ;  stated  days  of 
general  political  elections  ; 16  the  sittings  of  the  Legislature,  and  its 
established  and  usual  course  of  proceeding ;  the  privileges  of  its  mem- 
bers, but  not  the  transactions  on  its  journals.16  The  Courts  of  the 
United  States,  moreover,  take  judicial  notice  of  the  ports  and  waters 
of  the  United  States  in  which  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows ;  of  the  boun- 
daries of  the  several  States  and  judicial  districts.17 

§  6b.  Laws.  [Courts  take  notice]  in  an  especial  manner  of  all 
the  laws  and  jurisprudence  of  the  several  States  in  which  they  exer- 
cise an  original  or  an  appellate  jurisdiction.  [There  are,  however, 
some  limitations  to  be  noted.  (1)  In  the  first  place,  the  doctrine  ap- 
plies in  strictness  to  public  or  general  statutes  of  the  Legislature  only. 
But  the  distinction  between  a  public  or  general  act  and  a  private  or 
special  act  is,  in  this  country  at  least,  not  always  easy  to  make.  It 
may  be  said  that  a  restriction  of  locality  does  not  prevent  an  act  from 
being  public,  provided  the  law  is  general  in  its  application  to  persons  ; 
e.  g.  a  law  regulating  within  certain  districts  the  right  of  fishing,1 
or  the  right  of  navigation,2  or  the  lumber  trade,8  or  the  sale  of 

33  Ala.  74;  [People  v.  MnConnell,  155  111.  192  ;  People  v.  Ebanks,  Cal.,  52  Pac.  1078  ;] 
cf.  Graham  v.  Anderson,  42  111.  514 ;  Davis  v.  McEuaney,  150  Mass.  452 ;}  fjSan  Joa- 
quin  Co.  v.  Budd,  96  Cal.  47,  51J 

10  jKidder  v.  Blaisdell,  45  Me.  461  ;    Fabyan  v.  Russell,  38  N.  H.  84  ;  Eodgers  v. 
State,  50  Ala.  103;  Ross  v.  Anstill,  2  Cal.  183;  Spencer  v.  Curtis,  57  Ind.  221;  Dor- 
man  v.  State,  56  id.  454  ;    Davidson  v.  Peticolas,  34  Tex.  27  ;{    QState  v.  Toland,  36 
S.  C.  515,  523  ;  Thomas  v.  Com.,  90  Va.  92,  94  ;  even  of  inferior  Courts :  Anderson  v. 
Anderson,  141  Ind.  567  ;  Rogers  v.  Venis,  137  id.  221 ;  Donovan  v.  Terr.,  8  Wyo.  91-3 

11  [[Ferris  v.  Bank,  158  111.  237  ;  though  not  inferior  Courts  :  Clark  v.  Morrison,  Ariz., 
52  Pac.  985  ;  cf.  Sutton  v.  R.  Co.,  Wis.,  73  N.  W.  993.] 

12  Chitty  v.  Dendy,  3  Ad.  &  El.  319  ;  j  March  v.  Com.,  12  B.  Mon.  25. } 

18  {Dawson  v.  Dawson,  29  Mo.  App.  523;  State  v.  Bowen,  16  Kan.  475  ;  Pagett  v. 
Curtis,  15  La.  An.  451;  Brucker  v.  State,  19  Wis.  539  ;  Merced  Water  Co.  v.  Cowles, 
31  Cal.  215  ;  Baker  v.  Mygatt,  14  Iowa  131;  Monticello  v.  Bryant,  13  Bush  419; 
Banks  v.  Burnam,  61  Mo.  76  ;}  QState  v.  Electric  Co.,  N.  J.,  38  Atl.  818 ;  Anderson  v. 
Cecil,  86  Md.  490.1 

i*  Dolder  v.  LdT  Huntingfield,  11  Ves.  292;  Rex  v.  De  Berenger,  3  M.  &  S.  67; 
Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213. 

i»  j  Davis  v.  Best,  2  Iowa  96;  State  v.  Minnick,  15  id.  123;  Ellis  v.  Reddin,  12 
Kan.  306  ;|  QTackson  Co.  v.  Arnold,  135  Mo.  207  ;  and,  occasionally,  of  the  result  : 
Thomas  v.  Com.,  90  Va.  92,  95  ;  Kokes  v.  State,  Nebr.,  76  N.  W.  467 ;  or  of  a  ticket 
voted  for  :  State  v.  Downs,  148  Ind.  324.] 

18  rColeman  v.  Dobbins,  8  Ind.  156,  161  ;  Grob  v.  Cushman,  45  111.  119,  125 ;  Burt 
v.  R.  Co.,  31  Minn.  472  ;  Green  v.  Welles,  32  Miss.  650,  686,  711  ;  contra:  State  ». 
Hocker,  36  Fla.  358.  The  question  whether  the  journals  can  avail  to  overthrow  an 
enrolled  act  is  a  very  different  one,  and  is  treated  post,,  §  482.] 

17  Story  on  Eq.  Plead.  §  24,  cites  United  States  v.  La  Vengeance,  3  Dall.  297;  The 
A{K>llon,  9  Wheat.  374  ;  The  Thomas  Jefferson,  10  id.  428  ;  Peyroux  v.  Howard,  7  Pet. 
842 ;  jLathrop  v.  Stewart,  5  McLean  C.  C.  167  ;}  L~C.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Hyatt,  48  Nebr, 
101.1 


Burnham  ».  Webster,  5  Mass.  266. } 
Hammond  v.  Inloes,  4  Md.  139. | 
Pierce  v.  Kimball,  9  GreenL  54.} 


§§  6  o-6  b.]  LAWS.  15 

liquor.4  Acts  incorporating  municipal  corporations,  even  by  special 
charter,  are  usually  regarded  as  public,6  as  also  acts  incorporating  State 
banks,6  aud  acts  incorporating  railways  by  general  provisions,7  but 
not  by  special  charter.8  Moreover,  an  act  declared  by  the  Legislature 
itself  to  be  deemed  a  public  act  will  be  so  treated ; fl  and  of  course  an 
amendment  of  a  private  act  by  a  public  one,10  or  any  amendment  of  a 
public  one,11  will  be  noticed.  Occasionally,  too,  statutes  require  all 
private  acts  to  be  noticed.1'2  (2)  The  ordinances  and  regulations  of 
municipal  and  other  local  boards  and  councils  are  not  noticed.18  The 
regulations  of  executive  departments  or  bureaus  are  sometimes,  but  not 
usually,  noticed.14  (3)  The  laws  of  other  nations  and  states  —  not 
being  laws  of  the  forum  at  all,  except  by  adoption  —  will  not  be 
noticed.  But  here  some  further  discriminations  are  necessary,  (a) 
Relatively  to  each  other,  the  States  of  the  Union  are  independent,  sov- 
ereign, and  for  the  present  purpose  foreign ;  hence  their  laws,  equally 

*  {Levy  v.  State,  6  Ind.  281 ;  State  v.  Cooper,  101  N.  C.  688  ;  cf.  Inglis  v.  State, 
61  Ind.  212.} 

6  {Albrittiu  »>.  Huntsville,  60  Ala.  486  ;  Ferryman  v.  Greenville,  51  id.  510  ;  Smart 
V.  Wetumpka,  24  id.  112  ;  Washington  v.  Finley,  5  Eng.  (Ark.)  423  ;  Payne  v.  Tread- 
well,  16  Cal.  220  ;  Macey  v,  Titcombe,  19  Ind.  136  ;  Johnson  v.  Indianapolis,  16  id. 
227 ;  Stier  v.  Oskaloosa,  41  Iowa,  353  ;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426  ;  Mass.  Pub. 
Stat.  c.  169,  §  68  ;  State  v.  Sherman,  42  Mo.  210  ;  State  v.  Murfreesboro',  11  Humph. 
217  ;  Gallagher  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  469  ;  Briggs  v.  Whipple,  7  Vt.  15  ;  Terry  v. 
Milwaukee.  15  Wis.  490  ;  Alexander  v.  Milwaukee,  16  id.  247  ;  Swain  v,  Comstock, 
18  id.  463.} 

6  j  Jemison  v.  Planters',  etc.  Bank,  17  Ala.  754  ;  Davis  v.  Fulton  Bauk,  81  Ga.  69  ; 
Gordon  v.  Montgomery,   19   Ind.  110;    Bank  of  Newbury  v.  Greenville  R.  R.  Co., 
9  Rich.  L.  495  ;  Shaw  w.  State,  3  Sneed  86  ;  Buell  w.   Warner,   33  Vt.  570  j  Hays  v. 
Northwestern  Bank,  9  Gratt.  127J 

7  (Heaston  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  Ind.  275.} 

8  {A.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackshire,  10  Kau.  477  ;  Perry  v.  New  Orleans,   etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  55  Ala.  413;  Ohio,  etc,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ridge,  5  Blackf.  78;}  contra:  j  Wright 
v.  Hawkins,  28  Tex.  452.  |     For  other  examples  of  the  treatment  of  private  acts  by 
Courts,  see  }  Broad  Street  Hotel  Co.  v.  Weaver's  Adm'rs,  57  Ala.  26  ;  Danville,  etc. 
Plank  Road  Co.  u.  State,  16  Ind.  456;  Perdicarisr.  Trenton,  etc.  Bridge  Co.,  5  Dutch. 
367  ;  Allegheny  t>.  Nelson,  25  Pa.  St.  332  ;J  [[Miller  v.  Matthews,  Md.,  40  Atl.  176  ; 
Jones  v.  Lake  View,  151  111.  668.3 

9  {Cincinnati,   Hamil.  &  Indian.  R,  R.  Co.  v.  Clifford,  113  Ind.  467  ;  Hammett  v. 
Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Ark.  204  ;  Doyle  v.  Bradford,   90  111.  416;  Eel  River, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Topp,  16  Ind.  242  ;  Covington  Drawbridge  Co.  v.  Shepherd,  20  How.  227  ; 
Beaty  v.  Knowler,  4  Pet.  152  ;}  JTM.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Colburu,  90  Tex.  230  ;  Beau- 
mont v.  Mountain,  10  Bing.  404.  J 

»  {Lavalle  v.  People,  6  111.  App.  157.  | 

"  {Belmont  v.  Morrill,  69  Me.  314  ;  State  i>.  O'Conner,  13  La.  An.  486  ;  Parent  v. 
Walmsly's  Adm'rs,  20  Ind.  82. } 

"  {Bixler's  Adm'x  v.  Parker,  3  Bush  166  ;  Halbertr.  Skyles,  1  Marsh.  368  ;  Hart 
v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. ,  6  W.  Va.  336.  | 

M  {Case  t>.  Mobile,  30  Ala.  538  ;  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell,  9  Ind.  897  ; 
Garvin  v.  Wells,  8  Iowa  286 ;  Lucker  v.  Com.,  4  Bush  440  ;  Hassard  v.  Municipality, 
7  La.  An.  495  ;  Winona  v.  Burke,  23  Minn.  254;  Mooney  v.  Kennet,  19  Mo.  551  ; 
Porter  v.  Waring,  69  N.  Y.  250  ;  Palmer  v.  Aldridge,  16  Barb.  131;}  QShanfelter  v. 
Baltimore,  80  Md.  483  ;  Stittgen  ».  Rundle,  Wis.,  74  N.  W.  536.} 

14  QCaha  v.  U.  S.,  152  U.  S.  211,  221  (Interior  Department  regulations  for  land- 
office  suits,  noticed)  ;  Dominici  v,  U.  S.,  72  Fed.  46  (Treasury  Department  regulations, 
etc.,  noticed)  ;  The  Clara,  5  C.  C.  A.  390  (marine  inspectors'  regulations,  not  noticed  ; 
Campbell  v.  Wood,  116  Mo.  196,  202  ( surveyor  general's  instructions  to  deputies, 
noticed)  ;  Com.  v.  Crane,  158  Mass.  218  (internal  revenue  regulations,  not  noticed). ] 


16  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  [CH.   II 

A 

with  the  laws  of  other  nations,  will  not  be  noticed  by  the  Courts  of 
any  one  of  the  United  States.16  Nor  will  the  Federal  Court  of  Ad- 
miralty notice  the  law  of  another  nation.16  (b)  The  Federal  laws  of 
the  United  States  are  equally  the  laws  of  each  State,  and  hence  the 
Courts  of  one  of  the  United  States  notice  them,  whether  ordinary 
public  acts  of  Congress  17  or  treaties ; 18  and  they  are  of  course  noticed 
by  the  Federal  Courts.19  (c)  Since  the  judicial  powers  of  the  Federal 
Courts  extend  to  many  cases  arising  under  the  laws  of  the  various 
States  of  the  Union,  such  State  laws  are  for  the  purpose  in  hand  part 
of  the  law  of  the  Federal  Courts,  and  will  therefore  be  noticed  by 
them 20  (though  the  Federal  Supreme  Court,  on  the  somewhat  scholastic 
theory  that  it  cannot  know  on  appeal  what  the  Court  below  could  not 
know,  declines,  on  writ  of  error  to  a  State  Supreme  Court,  to  notice 
what  the  latter  could  not  notice,  i.  e.  the  law  of  a  sister  State 21).  Ex- 
tending this  principle,  it  has  been  held  by  State  Courts  that  in  cases 
where  appeal  may  be  made  to  the  Federal  Courts  on  questions  of  Fed- 
eral law,  —  e.  g.  the  effect  of  a  judgment  in  another  State  Court,  — 
the  law  of  such  other  State  may  be  noticed.22  (d)  So  far  as.  by  sub- 
division or  amalgamation  the  former  laws  of  another  sovereignty  have 

14  j  Insurance  Co.  v.  Forcheimer,  86  Ala.  541  ;  Continental  Nat.  Bank  v.  McGeoch, 
73  Wis.  332 ;  Millard  v.  Truax,  41  N.  W.  R.  328 ;  St.  Louis  &  San  Fran.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Weaver,  35  Kan.  426  ;  Polk  v.  Butterfield,  9  Col.  326  ;  Mobile,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
ney, 39  Ala.  468  ;  Drake  v.  Glover,  80  id.  382 ;  Cox  v.  Morrow,  14  Ark.  603  ;  Cavender 
v.  Guild,  4  Gal.  250  ;  Simms  v.  Southern  Express  Co.,  38  Ga.  129 ;  Chumasero  v.  Gil- 
bert, 24  111.  293  ;  Syme  r.  Stewart,  17  La.  An.  73 ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Glenn, 
28  Md.  287  ;  Eastman  v.  Crosby,  8  Allen  206 ;  Kline  v.  Baker,  99  Mass.  254  ;  Haines 
v.  Hanrahan,  105  id.  480 ;  Hoyt  ».  McNeil,  13  Minn.  390  ;  Charlotte  v.  Chouteau, 
25  Mo.  465  ;  Condit  v.  Blackwell,  4  Green  (N.  J.)  193  ;  Cutler  v.  Wright,  22  N.  Y. 
472  ;  Hooper  v.  Moore,  5  Jones  L.  130  ;  Anderson  v.  Anderson,  23  Tex.  639  ;  Taylor 
v.  Boardman,  25  Vt.  581;  Ward  v.  Morrison,  ib.  593;  Walsh  v.  Dart,  12  Wis.  635; 
Dainese  v.  Hale,  91  U.  S.  13;  Strother  r.  Lucas,  6  Pet.  763;  Talbotv.  Seaman,  1  Cranch 
38;  Liverpool  S.  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.,  129  U.  S.  444;}  [Tremoult  v.  Dedire,  1  P.  Wms.  429 
(Holland) ;  Warner  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  95;  Hale  v.  S.  N.  Co.,  15  Conn.  539,  549 ;  Sam- 
mis  v.  Wightman,  31  Fla.  10,  30  ;  Chipman  v.  Peabody,  159  Mass.  420,  423.  For  some 
statutory  alterations,  see  Bates  v.  McCully,  27  Miss.  584;  Lockheadp.  W.  &  I.  Co.,  40 
W.  Va.  553 ;  Tenn.  Code  1896,  §  5586.  For  an  exception,  see  par.  (c)  supra. 
The  law  of  the  Chickasaw  Nation  was  refused  notice  in  Wilson  v.  Owens,  U.  S.  App., 
86  Fed.  571-3 

w  {The  Scotland,  105  U.  S.  24,  29;}  Q)ut  compare  Talbot  v.  Seeman,  1  Cr.  1,  37.] 

«  {Morris  v.  Davidson,  49  Ga.  361;  Canal  Co.  v.  E.  B.  Co.,  4  Gill  &  J.  1,  63;  Kes- 
sel  v.  Albetis,  56  Barb.  862;  Mims  ».  Swartz,  37  Tex.  13  ;  Bird  v.  Com.,  21  Gratt.  800; 
Bayly's  Adm'r  v.  Chubb,  16  id.  284;  The  Scotia,  14  Wall.  171.} 

18  j  Montgomery  v.  Deeley,  3  Wis.  709;  Carson  ».  Smith,  5  Minn.  78;  Dole  ».  Wil- 
son, 16  id.  525  ;  United  States  v.  Reynes,  9  How.  127.} 

W  rCallsen  v.  Hope,  75  Fed.  758,  761  (treaty  of  Alaska).] 

20  [Owings  v.  Hull,  9  Pet.  624;  Carpenter  v.  Dexter,  8  Wall.  513;  Merrill  v.  Dawson, 
1  Hemp.  663;  Miller  ».  McQuerry,  5  McLean  C.  C.  469;  Hinde  v.  Vattier,  5  Pet. 
898;  U.  S.  ».  Turner,  11  How.  663;  U.  S.  v.  Philadelphia,  ib.  654;  Jones  v.  Hays, 
4  McLean  C.  C.  521;  Lamar  v.  Micou,  112  U.  S.  452;  s.  c.  114  id.  218  ;j  QMerch. 
Exch.  Bk.  v.  McGraw,  15  U.  S.  App.  832,  341 ;  West.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Roberson,  22 
id.  187,  202.] 

31  {Hanley  v.  Donoghue,  116  U.  8.  1  ;  Renaud  v.  Abbott,  ib.  277,  285.} 

22  |  State  of  Ohio  v.  Hinchman,  27  Pa.  St.  479  ;  Jarvis  v.  Robinson,  21  Wis.  523; 
Butcher  P.  Brownsville,  2  Kan.  70;  Paine  v.  Sohenectady,  11  R.  I.  411;  Shotwell  v. 
Harrison,  22  Mich.  410 ;  Morse  v.  Hewett,  28  Mich.  481  ;  cf.  Fellows  v.  Menasha,  11 
Wis.  558;  Suiter  v.  Applegate,  8  Zabr.  116.} 


§§  66-6c.]  JURY'S  KNOWLEDGE.  17 

to  any  extent  become  a  part  of  the  law  of  the  forum,  such  former  law 
of  the  other  sovereignty  may  properly  be  noticed.  This  principle  has 
been  applied  to  the  laws  of  another  of  the  United  States  from  which 
that  of  the  forum  was  formed  by  subdivision,28  to  the  laws  of  Mex- 
ico,24 to  the  laws  of  the  British  colony  of  Pennsylvania,26  and  to  the 
laws  of  England  before  the  American  Revolution ;  but  is,  of  course, 
not  applicable  to  the  laws  of  England  since  that  time.26] 

§  6  c.  Jury's  Knowledge.  [In  general  the  jury  may  in  modern 
times  act  only  upon  evidence  properly  laid  before  them  in  the  course 
of  the  trial.  But  so  far  as  the  matter  in  question  is  one  upon  which 
men  in  general  have  a  common  fund  of  experience  and  knowledge, 
the  analogy  of  judicial  notice  obtains  to  some  extent,  and  the  jury  are 
allowed  to  resort  to  this  possession  in  making  up  their  minds.  This 
doctrine,  of  course,  has  several  aspects.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
the  jury's  duty  and  function,  it  appears  as  an  exception  to  the  rule 
that  they  must  act  only  upon  what  is  presented  to  them  at  the  trial. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Hearsay  rule,  it  may  also  be  thought 
of  as  a  partial  exception  to  that.1  But  additionally  it  must  be  consid- 
ered from  the  present  point  of  view,  for  it  authorizes  the  party  to  ask 
the  jury  to  refer  to  their  general  knowledge  upon  the  matter  in  ques- 
tion, and  thus  in  effect  and  to  that  extent  makes  it  unnecessary  for 
the  party  to  offer  such  evidence.  But  the  scope  of  this  doctrine  is 
narrow,  and  is  strictly  limited  to  a  few  matters  of  elemental  experi- 
ence in  human  nature,  commercial  affairs,  and  every-day  life.  Thus, 
the  natural  instinct  of  self-preservation  with  reference  to  care  or  neg- 
ligence at  the  time  of  danger  may  be  considered,8  the  dangerousness 
of  smoking  a  pipe  in  a  barn  near  the  straw,8  the  conditions  affecting 
values,4  the  intoxicating  nature  of  a  certain  liquor,6  and  even  (though 
this  illustrates  how  local  conditions  may  affect  the  application)  that  a 
game  played  with  bone-counters  was  played  for  money ; 6  but  such  a 
matter  of  private  and  disputable  belief  as  the  character  of  a  witness 
cannot  be  so  taken  into  consideration  by  the  jury.7  As  a  natural  part 

28  { Arayo  v.  Currel,  1  Mill.  (La.)  528,  540-541 ;  Malpica  v.  McKown,  ib.  254;  Stokes 
v.  Macken,  62 Barb.  145;  Heuthorn  v.  Doe,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  157.  { 

24  rU.  S.  v.  Chaves,  159  U.  S.  452.] 

25  TLoree  v.  Abner,  6  U.  S.  App.  649,  660.] 

"    'Liverpool  S.  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.,  129  U.  S.  444.} 
See  this  aspeet  treated  post,  §  162  o.] 

"Huntress  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  H.,  34  Atl.  154;  Springfield  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoeffher,  111.,  51 
N.  E.  884  ;  Hopkins  v.  Knapp  Co.,  92  la.  328  :  Lamoureux  v.  R.  Co.,  169  Mass.  338  ; 
Chase  v.  R.  Co.,  77  Me.  262  (citing  numerous  cases)  ;  Manning  v.  R.  Co.,  166  Mass. 
230.] 

»  rLillibridge  v.  McCann,  Mich.,  75  N.  W.  288.] 

*  [Houston  v.  State,  13  Ark.  66  ;  Green  v.  Chicago,  97  111.  370,  372  ;  Cummings  v. 
Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  128  ;  Head  v.  Hargrave,  105  U.  S.  45  ;  Parks  v.  Boston,  15  Pick.  198, 
209  ;  Bradford  v.  Cunard  Co.,  147  Mass.  55.  See  Chic.  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  ».  Parsons,  51 
Kan.  408.] 

6  PCom.  v.  Peckham,  2  Gray  514.] 

6  QStevens  v.  State,  3  Ark.  66.] 

i  [Johnson  v.  R.  Co.,  91  Wis.  233 ;  Chat.  R.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Owen,  90  Ga.  26f 

VOL.   I. — 2 


i  r 


18  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  [CH.   II 

of  the  doctrine,  these  matters  may  be  referred  to  by  counsel  in  their 
arguments.8] 

§  6d.  Implications  of  the  Doctrine.  [Certain  subordinate  features 
of  the  doctrine  may  now  be  noted.  (1)  That  a  matter  is  judicially 
noticed  means  merely  that  it  is  taken  as  proved  without  the  offering 
of  evidence  by  the  party  who  should  ordinarily  have  done  so.  It  does 
not  mean  that  the  opponent  is  prevented  from  disputing  the  matter 
by  evidence  if  he  believes  it  disputable.  It  is  true  that  occasionally 
a  Court  is  found  declaring  a  thing  judicially  noticed  and  at  the  same 
time  refusing  to  listen  to  evidence  to  the  contrary  ; 1  but  this  is  in 
truth  laying  down  a  new  rule  of  substantive  law  by  declaring  certain 
facts  immaterial;  whenever  a  Court  forbids  the  production  of  evi- 
dence, it  removes  the  subject  from  the  realm  of  the  law  of  evidence 
properly  so  called.  (2)  The  process  of  taking  judicial  notice  does 
not  necessarily  imply  that  the  judge  at  the  moment  actually  knows 
and  feels  sure  of  the  truth  of  the  matter  suggested.  It  merely  re- 
lieves the  party  from  offering  evidence  because  the  matter  is  one 
which  the  judge  either  knows  or  can  easily  discover.  Hence,  the 
judge  may  often  think  fit  to  inform  himself  further  on  the  subject, 
and  it  is  proper  for  him  to  resort  to  any  source  of  information  which 
he  deems  authentic.2  (3)  The  process  of  taking  judicial  notice  often 
implies  incidentally  a  ruling  as  to  the  respective  functions  of  judge 
and  jury.  It  implies  that  the  settlement  of  the  matter  rests  with  the 
judge  and  not  with  the  jury,  that  the  jury  are  to  accept  the  fact  from 
the  judge,  and  that  so  far  as  any  further  investigation  is  concerned,  it 
is  for  the  judge  alone.8] 

§  6  e.  Other  Senses  of  the  Term  Judicial  Notice.1  [The  term  Judi- 
cial Notice  has  many  other  applications  besides  that  treated  in  the 
foregoing  sections.  Some  of  these  are  traditional  and  therefore  per- 
haps not  to  be  termed  incorrect ;  others  are  merely  loose  ways  of 
naming  some  process  or  rule  already  properly  known  under  another 
name.  The  essential  thing  is  to  distinguish  these  applications  from 

283  ;  Schmidt  v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Gray  529,  535.  Otherwise,  of  that  knowledge  of  human 
nature  which  affects  a  witness'  credibility  in  general :  Jenney  El.  Co.  v.  Brauham,  145 
Ind.  314.  See  for  other  examples  :  B.  v.  Bosser,  6  C.  &  P.  648;  McGarrahan  v.  B.  Co., 
Mass.,  50  N.  E.  610  ;  111.  Cent.  B.  Co.  v.  Greaves,  Miss.,  22  So.  792;  Wills  v.  Lance, 
28  Or.  371.] 

»  TState  v.  Lingle],  128  Mo.  528. 

1  TK.  g.  Coin.  v.  Marzynski,  149  Mass.  72.] 

3  £  Answer  of  Judges  to  House  of  Lords,  22  How.  St.  Tr.  302  (grammars  and  lexi- 
cons) ;  Barranger  v.  Baum,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  524  (foreign  law)  ;  People  v.  Mayes,  113 
Cal.  618;  Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213  (consulting  the  Foreign  Office)  ;  People  v. 
Chee  Kee,  61  Cal.  404  (almanac);]  JU.  S.  v.  Teschmaker,  22  How.  392;  Wagner's 
Case,  61  Me.  178  ;  McKinnon  v.  Bliss,  21  N.  Y.  206  ;  The  Charkieh,  42  L.  J. 
Adm.  17.} 

*  FJHale  v.  S.  N.  Co.,  15  Conn.  539,  549  ;  State  v.  Main,  69  id.  123  :  Thomson  H. 
El.  Co.  «;.  Palmer,  52  Minn.  174,  177  ;  Hooper  v.  Moore,  5  Jones  L.  132.] 

1  QFor  a  careful  discrimination  of  these  various  senses,  see  Professor  Thayer's 
chapter,  already  referred  to,  in  3  Harv.  L.  Bev.  285,  and  in  his  "  Preliminary 
Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence."] 


§§  6d-6e.]      OTHER   SENSES   OF  THE   TERM   JUDICIAL   NOTICE.         19 

the  chief  one  above  described,  i.  e.  the  acceptance  of  a  matter  as 
proved  without  requiring  the  party  to  offer  evidence  of  it. 

(1)  A  usage  extending  far  back  in  our  annals  is  to  apply  the  terra 
where  the  question  is  whether  a  certain  pleading,  or  a  certain  aver- 
ment in  a  pleading,  or  greater  particularity  of  averment,  is  necessary.3 

(2)  Whether  a  Court,  for  the  purposes  of  ordering  a  new  trial  or 
otherwise,  may  give  effect  to  a  matter  capable  of  being  judicially 
noticed  —  i.  e.  assumed  without  evidence  —  but  not  referred  to  in 
the  record,8  or  falsely  alleged  in  the  pleading,4  is  a  question  of  the 
power  and  duty  of  the  Court,  to  which  this  term  has  been  applied. 

(3)  Whether  a  Court  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the  existence  of  a  for- 
eign State 6  is  really  a  question  whether,  as  a  matter  of  substantive 
law  and  judicial  functions,  a  foreign  State  will  in  domestic  Courts 
be  treated  as  existing  only  so   far  as  the  Executive  so  treats  it. 

(4)  Certain  rules  of  evidence,  usually  known  under  other  names,  are 
frequently  referred  to  in  terms  of  judicial  notice.     Thus,  the  admis- 
sibility  of  almanacs  and  mortality-tables  is  mainly  a  question  whether 
an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  can  be  made  in  their  favor ; 6  but  a 
Court  occasionally  makes  this  exception  by  saying  that  the  almanac 
or  the  table  is  to  be  judicially  noticed;  although  the  term  is  properly 
applicable  only  where  the  Court  declares  the  day  of  the  month,  etc., 
not  to  need  evidence,  and  then  consults  the  book  to  inform  itself ; 7 
the  practical  difference  being  that  in  the  former  case  it  goes  to  the 
jury,  but  in  the  latter  not.     Again,  it  has  been  said  that  judicial 
notice  will  be  taken  of  the  correctness  of  the  photographic  process ; 8 
which  is  merely  another  way  of  saying  that  properly  verified  photo- 
graphs are  admissible  evidence.    In  the  same  way,  to  take  notice  that 
"mere  pasturage  upon  these  western  lands  is  very  slight  evidence  of 
possession," 9  is  to  measure  evidence ;  and  it  would  seem  that  the  so- 
called  judicial  notice  of  certain  seals  10  is  merely  a  rule  that  the  pro- 
duction of  something  purporting  to  be  a  seal  shall  be  in  these  cases 
sufficient  evidence  of  genuineness  to  go  to  the  jury  or  shall  suffice  to 
raise  a  presumption  of  genuineness.    Whether  a  Court  will  take  judi- 

2  [3  Harv.  L.  Rev.  289-295;  see  Douglas  v.  R.  Co.,  W.  Va.,  28  S.  E.  705;  Wikel 
».  Board,  120  N.  C.  451 ;  Nichols  v.  Lodge,  Ky.,  48  S.  W.  426.] 

8  £3  Harv.  L.  Rev.  297-299;  compare  Steenerson  v.  R.  Co.,  Minn.,  72  N.  W.  713, 
where  the  Court  declined  to  review  the  technical  matters  covered  by  the  findings 
of  the  Railroad  Commission  as  to  reasonable  rates,  and  "took  judicial  notice  of  all 
such  technical  learning,  knowledge,  and  information. "  as  the  commission  possessed.] 

4  L"Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213,  where  a  pleading  alleged  that  a  certain  govern- 
ment was  recognized  by  H.  M.  government,  and  the  Court  treated  this  as  incorrect  : 
People  v.  Water-Front  Co.,  Cal.,  50  Pac.  305,  where  a  demurrer  was  sustained  to  a 
declaration  alleging  a  title  which  the  Court  knew  not  to  exist.] 

6  [Ante,  §  4.] 

«  [Post,  §  162.;.] 

^  [E.g.  Lincoln  v.  Power,  151  U.  S.  436,  441;  Scheffer  v.  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  521; 
State  v.  Morris,  47  Conn.  179.] 

8  fUdderzook  v.  Com.,  76  Pa.  340.] 

9  [ Whitney  v.  U.S.,  167  U.  S.  529,  546.] 
10  [Ante,  §  4;  post,  §  14  n.] 


20  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  [CH.   II. 

cial  notice  of  the  contents  of  legislative  journals  may  be  properly  a 
question  of  the  present  chapter,  but  the  same  form  of  expression  is 
also  occasionally  used  where  the  real  inquiry  is  whether,  as  evidence 
of  the  statute's  terms,  or  of  its  passage,  the  journals  are  to  be  preferred 
to  the  official  certificate  appended  to  the  enrolled  act.11  (5)  Other 
anomalous  applications  of  the  term,  sometimes  dealing  with  matters 
of  substantive  law,12  sometimes  with  matters  of  procedure,  will  occa. 
sionally  be  found.  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  phrase  should  be  so 
often  loosely  employed.] 

«  [Post,  §  482J 

i*  \_E.g.  South.  E.  Co.  v.  Covenia,  100  Ga.  46,  where  the  Court  "took  judicial 
cognizance  of  the  fact  "  that  a  child  less  than  two  years  old  is  incapable  of  rendering 
such  services  as  could  be  recovered  for.} 


§§6  0-8.]      HUMAN   TESTIMONY ;    THE   SANCTION   OF  INSTINCT.        21 


CHAPTER  III. 

KINDS   OF   EVIDENCE. 


§§  7-9.  Human  Testimony;  the  Sanc- 
tion of  Instinct. 

§  10.  Human  Testimony  ;  the  Sanc- 
tion of  Experience. 

§§  11,12.    Circumstances. 


§  13.  Testimonial  Evidence  and  Cir- 
cumstantial Evidence. 

§13  a.  Real  Evidence;  Profert  ;  In- 
spection ;  View  ;  etc. 


§  7.  Human  Testimony ;  the  Sanction  of  Instinct.  We  proceed 
now  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the  general  nature  and  principles  of 
evidence.  No  inquiry  is  here  proposed  into  the  origin  of  human 
knowledge ;  it  being  assumed,  on  the  authority  of  approved  writers, 
that  all  that  men  know  is  referable,  in  a  philosophical  view,  to  per- 
ception and  reflection.  But,  in  fact,  the  knowledge  acquired  by  an 
individual,  through  his  own  perception  and  reflection,  is  but  a  small 
part  of  what  he  possesses ;  much  of  what  we  are  content  to  regard 
and  act  upon  as  knowledge  having  been  acquired  through  the  percep- 
tion of  others.1  It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  that  the  Supreme  Being, 
whose  wisdom  is  so  conspicuous  in  all  his  works,  constituted  man  to 
believe  only  upon  his  own  personal  experience ;  since  in  that  case 
the  world  could  neither  be  governed  nor  improved ;  and  society  must 
remain  in  the  state  in  which  it  was  left  by  the  first  generation  of 
men.  On  the  contrary,  during  the  period  of  childhood,  we  believe 
implicitly  almost  all  that  is  told  us,  and  thus  are  furnished  with  in- 
formation which  we  could  not  otherwise  obtain,  but  which  is  neces- 
sary, at  the  time,  for  our  present  protection,  or  as  the  means  of 
future  improvement.  This  disposition  to  believe  may  be  termed 
instinctive.  At  an  early  period,  however,  we  begin  to  find  that,  of 
the  things  told  to  us,  some  are  not  true,  and  thus  our  implicit  reliance 
on  the  testimony  of  others  is  weakened :  first,  in  regard  to  particular 
things  in  which  we  have  been  deceived ;  then  in  regard  to  persons 
whose  falsehood  we  have  detected ;  and,  as  these  instances  multiply 
upon  us,  we  gradually  become  more  and  more  distrustful  of  such 
statements,  and  learn  by  experience  the  necessity  of  testing  them  by 
certain  rules.  Thus,  as  our  ability  to  obtain  knowledge  by  other 
means  increases,  our  instinctive  reliance  on  testimony  diminishes,  by 
yielding  to  a  more  rational  belief.2 

§  8.  It  is  true,  that,  in  receiving  the  knowledge  of  facts  from  the 
testimony  of  others,  we  are  much  influenced  by  their  accordance  with 

1  Abercrombie  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  part  2,  §  1,  pp.  45,  46. 

3  Gambier's  Guide,  p.  87  ;  McKinnon's  Philosophy  of  Evidence,  p.  40.  This 
subject  is  treated  more  largely  by  Dr.  Reid  in  his  profound  "  Inquiry  into  the  Human 
Mind,"  ch.  6,  §  24,  pp.  428-434. 


22  KINDS   OF  EVIDENCE.  [CH.    IIL 

facts  previously  known  or  believed;  and  this  constitutes  what  is 
termed  their  probability.  Statements,  thus  probable,  are  received 
upon  evidence  much  less  cogent  than  we  require  for  the  belief  of 
those  which  do  not  accord  with  our  previous  knowledge.  But  while 
these  statements  are  more  readily  received,  and  justly  relied  upon, 
we  should  beware  of  unduly  distrusting  all  others.  While  un- 
bounded credulity  is  the  attribute  of  weak  minds,  which  seldom 
think  or  reason  at  all,  —  "  quo  magis  nesciunt  eo  magis  admirantur," 
—  unlimited  scepticism  belongs  only  to  those  who  make  their  own 
knowledge  and  observation  the  exclusive  standard  of  probability. 
Thus  the  king  of  Siam  rejected  the  testimony  of  the  Dutch  ambas- 
sador, that,  in  his  country,  water  was  sometimes  congealed  into  a 
solid  mass;  for  it  was  utterly  contrary  to  his  own  experience.  Scep- 
tical philosophers,  inconsistently  enough  with  their  own  principles, 
yet  true  to  the  nature  of  man,  continue  to  receive  a  large  portion  of 
their  knowledge  upon  testimony  derived,  not  from  their  own  experi- 
ence, but  from  that  of  other  men ;  and  this,  even  when  it  is  at  vari- 
ance with  much  of  their  own  personal  observation.  Thus,  the 
testimony  of  the  historian  is  received  with  confidence,  in  regard  to 
the  occurrences  of  ancient  times ;  that  of  the  naturalist  and  the 
traveller,  in  regard  to  the  natural  history  and  civil  condition  of  other 
countries;  and  that  of  the  astronomer,  respecting  the  heavenly 
bodies;  facts,  which,  upon  the  narrow  basis  of  his  own  "firm  and 
unalterable  experience,"  upon  which  Mr.  Hume  so  much  relies,  he 
would  be  bound  to  reject  as  wholly  unworthy  of  belief. 

§  9.  The  uniform  habits,  therefore,  as  well  as  the  necessities  of 
mankind,  lead  us  to  consider  the  disposition  to  believe,  upon  the 
evidence  of  extraneous  testimony,  as  a  fundamental  principle  of  our 
moral  nature,  constituting  the  general  basis  upon  which  all  evidence 
may  be  said  to  rest.1 

§  10.  Human  Testimony;  the  Sanction  of  Experience.  Subor- 
dinate to  this  paramount  and  original  principle,  it  may,  in  the 
second  place,  be  observed  that  evidence  rests  upon  our  faith  in 
human  testimony,  as  sanctioned  by  experience;  that  is,  upon  the 
general  experienced  truth  of  the  statements  of  men  of  integrity, 
having  capacity  and  opportunity  for  observation,  and  without  ap- 
parent influence  from  passion  or  interest  to  pervert  the  truth.  This 
belief  is  strengthened  by  our  previous  knowledge  of  the  narrator's 
reputation  for  veracity;  by  the  absence  of  conflicting  testimony; 
and  by  the  presence  of  that  which  is  corroborating  and  cumulative. 

§  11.  Circumstances.  A  third  basis  of  evidence  is  the  known  and 
experienced  connection  subsisting  between  collateral  facts  or  circum- 
stances, satisfactorily  proved,  and  the  fact  in  controversy.  This  is 
merely  the  legal  application,  in  other  terms,  of  a  process,  familiar  in 
natural  philosophy,  showing  the  truth  of  an  hypothesis  by  its  coinci- 
1  Abercrombie,  pt.  2,  §  3. 


§§  8-12.]  CIRCUMSTANCES.  23 

dence  with  existing  phenomena.  The  connections  and  coincidences 
to  which  we  refer  may  be  either  physical  or  moral ;  and  the  knowl- 
edge of  them  is  derived  from  the  known  laws  of  matter  and  motion, 
from  animal  instincts,  and  from  the  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral 
constitution  and  habits  of  men.  Their  force  depends  on  their  suffi- 
ciency to  exclude  every  other  hypothesis  but  the  one  under  consider- 
ation. Thus,  the  possession  of  goods  recently  stolen,  accompanied 
with  personal  proximity  in  point  of  time  and  place,  and  inability  in 
the  party  charged,  to  show  how  he  came  by  them,  would  seem  natu- 
rally, though  not  necessarily,  to  exclude  every  other  hypothesis  but 
that  of  his  guilt.  But  the  possession  of  the  same  goods,  at  a  remoter 
time  and  place,  would  warrant  no  such  conclusion,  as  it  would  leave 
room  for  the  hypothesis  of  their  having  been  lawfully  purchased  in 
the  course  of  trade.  Similar  to  this  in  principle  is  the  rule  of 
noscitur  a  sociis,  according  to  which  the  meaning  of  certain  words,  in 
a  written  instrument,  is  ascertained  by  the  context. 

§  12.  Some  writers  have  mentioned  yet  another  ground  of  the 
credibility  of  evidence,  namely,  the  exercise  of  our  reason  upon  the 
effect  of  coincidences  in  testimony,  which,  if  collusion  be  excluded, 
cannot  be  accounted  for  upon  any  other  hypothesis  than  that  it  is 
true.1  It  has  been  justly  remarked  that  progress  in  knowledge  is 
not  confined,  in  its  results,  to  the  mere  facts  which  we  acquire,  but  it 
has  also  an  extensive  influence  in  enlarging  the  mind  for  the  further 
reception  of  truth,  and  setting  it  free  from  many  of  those  prejudices 
which  influence  men  whose  minds  are  limited  by  a  narrow  field  of 
observation.2  It  is  also  true,  that,  in  the  actual  occurrences  of 
human  life,  nothing  is  inconsistent.  Every  event  which  actually 
transpires  has  its  appropriate  relation  and  place  in  the  vast  compli- 
cation of  circumstances,  of  which  the  affairs  of  men  consist ;  it  owes 
its  origin  to  those  which  have  preceded  it ;  it  is  intimately  connected 
with  all  others  which  occur  at  the  same  time  and  place,  and  often 
with  those  of  remote  regions ;  and,  in  its  turn,  it  gives  birth  to  a 
thousand  others  which  succeed.8  In  all  this,  there  is  perfect  har- 
mony ;  so  that  it  is  hardly  possible  to  invent  a  story  which,  if  closely 
compared  with  all  the  actual  contemporaneous  occurrences,  may  not 
be  shown  to  be  false.  From  these  causes,  minds,  deeply  imbued 
with  science,  or  enlarged  by  long  and  matured  experience,  and  close 
observation  of  the  conduct  and  affairs  of  men,  may,  with  a  rapidity 
and  certainty  approaching  to  intuition,  perceive  the  elements  of 
truth  or  falsehood  in  the  face  itself  of  the  narrative,  without  any 
regard  to  the  narrator.  Thus,  Archimedes  might  have  believed  an 
account  of  the  invention  and  wonderful  powers  of  the  steam-engine, 
which  his  unlearned  countrymen  would  have  rejected  as  incredible ; 

1  1  Stark.  Evid.  471,  note. 

2  Abercrombie  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  part  2,  §  3,  p.  71. 
»  1  Stark.  Evid.  496. 


24  KINDS   OF  EVIDENCE.  [CH.   III. 

and  an  experienced  judge  may  instantly  discover  the  falsehood  of  a 
witness,  whose  story  an  inexperienced  jury  might  be  inclined  to 
believe.  But  though  the  mind,  in  these  cases,  seems  to  have  acquired 
a  new  power,  it  is  properly  to  be  referred  only  to  experience  and 
observation. 

§  13.  Testimonial  Evidence  and  Circumstantial  Evidence.  In  trials 
of  fact,  it  will  generally  be  found  that  the  factum  probandum  is 
either  directly  attested  by  those  who  speak  from  their  own  actual 
and  personal  knowledge  of  its  existence,  or  it  is  to  be  inferred  from 
other  facts,  satisfactorily  proved.  In  the  former  case,  the  truth  rests 
upon  the  second  ground  before  mentioned,  namely,  our  faith  in 
human  veracity,  sanctioned  by  experience.  In  the  latter  case,  it  rests 
on  the  same  ground,  with  the  addition  of  the  experienced  connection 
between  the  collateral  facts  thus  proved  and  the  fact  which  is  in  con- 
troversy ;  constituting  the  third  basis  of  evidence  before  stated.  The 
facts  proved  are,  in  both  cases,  directly  attested.  In  the  former  case, 
the  proof  applies  immediately  to  the  factum  probandum,  without  any 
intervening  process,  and  it  is  therefore  called  direct  or  positive  testi- 
mony. In  the  latter  case,  as  the  proof  applies  immediately  to  collat- 
eral facts,  supposed  to  have  a  connection,  near  or  remote,  with  the 
fact  in  controversy,  it  is  termed  circumstantial;  and  sometimes,  but 
not  with  entire  accuracy,  presumptive.  Thus,  if  a  witness  testifies 
that  he  saw  A  inflict  a  mor-tal  wound  on  B,  of  which  he  instantly 
died  ;  this  is  a  case  of  direct  evidence ;  and,  giving  to  the  witness  the 
credit  to  which  men  are  generally  entitled,  the  crime  is  satisfactorily 
proved.  If  a  witness  testifies  that  a  deceased  person  was  shot  with  a 
pistol,  and  the  wadding  is  found  to  be  part  of  a  letter  addressed  to 
the  prisoner,  the  residue  of  which  is  discovered  in  his  pocket:  here 
the  facts  themselves  are  directly  attested ;  but  the  evidence  they  afford 
is  termed  circumstantial;  and  from  these  facts,  if  unexplained  by 
the  prisoner,  the  jury  may,  or  may  not,  deduce,  or  infer,  or  presume 
his  guilt,  according  as  they  are  satisfied,  or  not,  of  the  natural  con- 
nection between  similar  facts,  and  the  guilt  of  the  person  thus 
connected  with  them.  In  both  cases,  the  veracity  of  the  witness  is 
presumed,  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary ;  but  in  the  latter 
case  there  is  an  additional  presumption  01-  inference,  founded  on  the 
known  usual  connection  between  the  facts  proved,  and  the  guilt  of 
the  party  implicated.  This  operation  of  the  mind,  which  is  more 
complex  and  difficult  in  the  latter  case,  has  caused  the  evidence 
afforded  by  circumstances  to  be  termed  presumptive,  evidence  ;  though, 
in  truth,  the  operation  is  similar  in  both  cases. 

§  13  a.1  Real  Evidence  ;  Profert ;  Inspection  ;  View  ;  etc.  [In 
seeking  evidence  leading  towards  proof  of  the  factum  probandum, 

1  [jThe  original  §  13  a,  a  later  insertion  of  the  anthor'3,  does  not  belong  in  this 
place  ;  and  as  it  could  only  mislead,  and  its  matter  is  fully  covered  in  later  sections,  it 
has  been  placed  hi  the  Appendix.]] 


§§  12-13  a.]  REAL   EVIDENCE.  25 

the  tribunal  has  only  the  two  preceding  sorts  at  its  disposal;  for  all 
evidentiary  facts  or  data  must  be  of  one  of  those  two  sorts.  But  the 
tribunal  has  also  at  its  disposition  a  third  possible  mode,  viz.  self- 
perception  or  self-observation,  or,  describing  it  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  party  attempting  proof,  Autoptic  Preference;*  i.e.  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  object  itself  for  the  personal  observation  of  the  tribunal. 
From  the  metaphysical  point  of  view,  this  may  perhaps  be  regarded 
as  merely  an  additional  kind  of  evidence  i.  e.  the  senses  of  the  tribunal. 
But  the  law  does  not  attempt  and  does  not  need  to  consider  theories 
of  metaphysics  as  to  the  subjectivity  of  knowledge  or  the  mediateness 
of  perception ;  it  assumes  the  objectivity  of  external  nature  ;  and,  for 
the  purposes  of  litigation,  a  matter  found  by  the  tribunal  to  exist 
does  exist.  Thus,  the  immediate  perception  of  its  existence  by  the 
tribunal  itself,  without  resort  to  inference  from  circumstances  or  from 
testimony,  is  in  principle  not  an  employment  of  evidence,  but  a  pro- 
cess of  self-perception  of  the  thing  itself.2  The  term  "  real  evidence" 
has  sometimes  been  applied  to  this  process,  but  not  happily.8 

Dividing,  then,  as  above,  the  sources  of  belief  by  the  tribunal,  we  find 
three  classes :  (1)  Direct,  or  Testimonial,  Evidence;  (2)  Indirect,  or 
Circumstantial,  Evidence ;  (3)  Autoptic  Preference,4  or  Real  Evidence. 
The  first  of  these  involves  in  effect  the  qualifications  of  witnesses, 
treated  post,  Chapter  XXIII ;  the  second  may  be  for  a  moment  post- 
poned, and  is  treated  post,  Chapter  V ;  the  third  may  most  naturally 
be  discussed  first,  and  is  dealt  with  in  the  ensuing  Chapter. 

In  the  use  of  the  above  sources  of  proof,  we  may  assume,  before 
proceeding  to  the  detailed  rules  of  admissibility,  two  fundamental 
principles  or  axioms,  as  applicable  to  all  kinds  of  issues  and  the  whole 
process  of  proof : 6  (a)  No  fact  not  having  probative  value  is  admis- 

2  [^Compare  Garrison,  J.,  in  Gaunt  v.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  490,  495  :  "Inspection  is 
like  an  admission,  in  that  while  not  testimony,  it  is  an  instrument  for  dispensing  with 
testimony;"  Gilbert  on  Evidence,  2:  "When  perceptions  are  thus  distinguished  on 
the  first  view,  it  is  called  self-evidence,  or  intuitive  knowledge.  .  .  .  Now  as  all 
demonstration  is  founded  on  the  view  of  a  man's  own  proper  senses,  by  a  gradation 
of  clear  and  distinct  perceptions,  so  all  probability  is  founded  upon  obscure  and  distinct 
views  or  upon  report  from  the  sight  of  others  ;  .  .  .  and  this  is  the  original  of  trials 
and  all  manner  of  evidence  ; "  Robertson,  C.  J.,  in  Gentry  v.  McGinnis,  3  Dana  (Ky.) 
882,  386  :  "Autopsy,  or  the  evidence  of  one's  own  senses,  furnishes  the  strongest 
probability,  and  indeed  the  only  perfect  and  indubitable  certainty  of  the  existence  of 
any  sensible  fact."] 

8  QFirst,  because  "real  "  is  an  ambiguous  term,  and  not  sufficiently  suggestive  for 
the  purpose  ;  secondly,  because  the  process  is  not  the  employment  of  "evidence"  at 
all  ;  and,  thirdly,  because  the  inventor  of  the  term  (Bentham,  Judicial  Evidence,  III., 
26  ff)  used  the  phrase  in  a  sense  different  from  that  above  and  different  from  that  com- 
monly now  attached  to  it ;  he  meant  by  it  any  fact  about  a  material  or  corporal  object, 
e.  g.  a  book  or  a  human  foot,  whether  produced  in  court  or  not;  it  is  only  by  later 
writers  that  the  production  in  court  is  made  the  essential  feature.] 

*  QThe  word  "  preference  "  is  coined,  in  analogy  to  " reference,"  "inference,"  "  con- 
ference,1' "deference,"  from  the  Latin  pro/erre,  whose  form  profert  is  intimately  asso- 
ciated, in  history  and  in  principle,  with  the  process  of  autoptic  proference.~| 

6  FJThese  were  first  clearly  formulated  and  pointed  out  by  Professor  J.  B.  Thayer  in 


26  KINDS   OF  EVIDENCE.  [CH.   III. 

sible ;  (£)  Every  fact  having  probative  value  is  admissible,  except  so 
far  as  excluded  by  some  specific  rule  of  policy  or  tradition.  The  for- 
mer is  simply  a  presupposition  for  any  system  of  evidence  claiming 
to  be  rational;  it  excludes  all  prejudice,  whim,  and  superstition, 
and  adopts  reason  as  the  guide  of  proof.6  The  latter  expresses  the 
general  principle  that  judicial  proof  is  not  to  vary  without  good  cause 
from  what  is  ordinarily  treated  as  probative.  Courts  have  seldom 
expressly  declared  the  logical  consequence,  i.  e.  that  when  relevancy 
appears  it  is  for  the  opponent  to  point  out  some  specific  exclusionary 
rule,  but  they  have  frequently  indicated  approval  of  the  principle  as 
representing  the  general  and  proper  attitude  of  the  Courts  towards 
evidence.7] 

his  "  Presumptions,"  3  Harv.  L.  Rev.  144,  and  "  Law  and  Fact,"  4  id.  156.  Compare 
Professor  GreenleaPs  untenable  generalizations,  §  50,  post.] 

6  [JNote,  however,  that  it  does  not  exclude  the  subjective  use  of  superstition  as 
indicating  consciousness  of  guilt;  as  e.  g.  in  State  v.  Wisdom,  119  Mo.  539,  where  the 
accused's  refusal  to  touch  the  corpse  of  the  murdered  man  was  treated  as  relevant.] 

7  FjSee  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  in  R.  v.  Birmingham,  1   B.  &  S.  763  ;  Pollock,   C.   B.,  in 
Milne  v.  Leisler,  7  H.  &  N.  796  ;  Coleridge,  C.  J.,  in  Blake  v.  Ass.  Co.,  L.  R.  4  C.  P. 
D.  94  ;  Parke,   B.,  in  Wright  v.  Tatham,  7  A.  &  E.  384;  Hosmer,  C.  J.,  in  State  v. 
Watkins,  9  Conn.  53  ;  Buchanan,  C.  J.,  in  Davis  v.  Calvert,  5  G.  &  J.  304  ;  Lumpkin, 
J.,  in  Johnson  v.  State,  14  Ga.  61  ;  same,  in  Haynes  v.  State,  17  id.  484  ;  Baldwin,  J., 
in  People  v.  Arnold,  15  Cal.  481  ;  Sanderson,  J.,  iu  People  v.  Farrell,  31  id.  584  ;  Ap- 
pleton,  C.-J.,  in  State  v.  Benner,  64  Me.  283.] 


§§13a-135.] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLE. 


27 


CHAPTER  IV. 

REAL   EVIDENCE  (AUTOPTIC   PROFERENCE  1). 


§  13  b.   General  Principle  ;  Instances. 

§  13  c.  Discriminations  ;  Independent 
Principles  not  to  be  confused  :  (1)  Ir- 
relevancy. 

§  13  d.  Same  :  (2)  Privilege  ;  (3)  Sun- 
dry Principles. 

§  13  e.  Limitations  germane  to  the  Pres- 
ent Principle  :  (1)  Prejudice  of  an  Accused 
Person. 


§  13/.  Same:  (2)  Prejudice  of  a  Civil 
Defendant. 

§  13  g.  Same  :  (3)  Immodesty  or  other 
Impropriety. 

§  13  h.   Same  :  (4)  Technical  Matters. 

§  13  i.  Same  :  (5)  Inconvenience^  View 
by  Jury. 

§  13y.  Same:  (6)  Non-transmission  to 
Appellate  Court. 


§  135.  General  Principle;  Instances.  [Since  either  sort  of  evi- 
dence, testimonial  or  circumstantial,  is  one  step  removed  from  the 
thing  itself  to  be  proved,  the  production  of  the  thing  itself  would 
seem  to  be  the  most  natural  and  satisfactory  process  of  proof,  and  to 
be  at  least  equally  as  satisfactory  and  proper  as  offering  evidence 
about  the  thing.  If  the  question  is  whether  a  man  is  of  negro  com- 
plexion, or  whether  a  shoe  is  fastened  by  laces  or  by  buttons,  the  tes- 
timony of  one  who  has  seen  the  man  or  the  shoe,  or  the  circumstance 
that  the  man's  child  is  a  negro  or  that  a  button  has  fallen  from  the 
shoe,  can  at  least  not  be  more  satisfactory  than  the  inspection  of  the 
man  or  the  shoe  in  court.  Accordingly,  it  might  be  said,  a  priori, 
that  where  the  existence  or  the  observable  qualities  of  a  material  ob- 
ject are  in  issue  or  are  relevant  to  the  issue,  the  inspection  of  the  thing 
itself  by  the  tribunal  is  always  proper,  where  no  specific  and  collateral 
reason  to  the  contrary  is  made  to  appear.  Such  ought  to  be,  and 
probably  is,  the  theory  of  the  law.1  In  a  great  variety  of  instances  this 
mode  of  proof  is  frequently  resorted  to.  Among  the  older  precedents 
are  the  writ  de  ventre  inspiciendo?  the  exhibition  of  a  rupture  by  a 
man  charged  with  rape,2  the  coroner's  inquest  over  a  deceased  person, 
the  inspection  of  the  maimed  person  on  a  trial  for  mayhem,8  and  of  the 
features  of  a  child  whose  paternity  is  in  issue,4  and  the  view  of  prem- 
ises.6 In  the  same  way  proof  is  often  made  by  the  production  of  a 
person  of  color,4  of  an  alleged  infant,6  of  weapons,  tools,  and  other 

1  For  the  scope  of  this  term,  see  ante,  §  13  a. 

l  Robertson,  0.  J.,  in  Gentry  v.  McGinnis,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  382,  386  ;  Beck,  J.,  in 
Stock  well  v.  R.  Co.,  43  la.  474  ;  Rodman,  J.,  in  Warlick  v.  White,  76  N.  C.  175,  179  ; 
Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  1954  (declaring  this  general  principle)  ;  Chalmers,  J.,  in  Garvin  v. 
State,  52  Miss.  207,  209  ;  Rules  of  Court  of  1883  (Eng.),  Ord.  50,  r.  3  (declaring  the 
general  principle). 

«  See§  13  g. 

*  Y.  B.  28  Ass.  pi.  5. 

*  See  §  13  c. 

«  See  §§  13  c  (d),  13 1, 13;. 

*  See§  13  c. 


28  HEAL   EVIDENCE.  [CH.   IV. 

instruments  of  crime,7  of  the  clothing,  etc.,  of  a  murdered  person,8 
and  by  the  inspection  of  the  body  of  an  injured  person  in  a  civil  suit 
for  bodily  injury,9  of  an  alleged  insane  person,10  of  an  alleged  incom- 
petent employee,11  or  of  a  drunken  witness.13  A  claimant  to  property 
whose  identity  is  in  dispute  may  exhibit  himself  in  court,18  an 
accused  person's  marks  of  identity  with  the  guilty  person  may  be 
inspected,14  a  sample  of  goods  may  be  shown,15  or  of  the  effects  of 
an  injurious  substance,19  or  of  a  writing; 17  a  suit  of  clothes  may  be 
tried  on  to  show  the  fit,18  and  the  odd  case  of  a  judge's  taking  his 
watch  and  noting  the  length  of  a  minute  for  the  benefit  of  the  jury19 
seems  to  be  an  instance  of  autoptic  perception  of  the  lapse  of  time. 
The  mode  of  inspection  is  usually  by  the  unaided  senses ;  but  the 
tribunal  may  properly  use  such  aids  as  a  microscope  or  magnifying- 
glass.20  The  place  of  inspection  will  of  course  usually  be  the  court- 
room ;  but  the  tribunal  itself  may  sometimes  proceed  elsewhere  to 
inspect  the  object.21] 

§  13  c.  Discriminations ;  Independent  Principles  not  to  be  con- 
fused ;  (1)  Irrelevancy.  [Before  considering  the  proper  limitations 
to  the  above  general  principle,  certain  cases  must  first  be  noted,  in 
which  is  found  the  prohibition  of  autoptic  preference,  not  because  of 
any  objection  to  the  process  itself,  but  because  of  independent  rules 
whose  violation  would  thus  be  involved. 

(1)  Rules  of  Relevancy.  Whether  a  person's  color  is  black  or  white 
is  best  ascertained  by  inspecting  the  person  ;  but  if  his  color  when 
thus  ascertained  would  be  irrelevant,  it  is  obvious  that  inspection  to 
learn  his  color  would  be  unnecessary  and  therefore  improper ;  e.  g.  his 
color  might  be  relevant  to  show  his  race-ancestry,  but  not  to  show  his 
state  of  health,  and  in  the  former  case  inspection  would  be  allowed, 
in  the  latter  case  not ;  the  ruling  in  each  case  depending  on  some  in- 
dependent principle  of  relevancy.  In  a  large  number  of  cases  this  is 
the  real  question,  (a)  Color  has  always  been  regarded  as  evidence  of 
race-ancestry,1  and  accordingly  the  production  of  the  person  to  ascer- 

»  See§  13  «. 

8  See  §  13  e. 

9  See  §  18/. 

10  R.  v.  Goode,  7  A.  &  E.  535  ;  Guiteau's  Trial,  passim. 
"  Keith  v.  N.  H.  &  N.  Co.,  140  Mass.  175,  180. 
2  Walker's  Trial,  23  How.  St.  Tr.  1154. 

u  Annealey  v.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1139,  1182 ;  Tichborne  Trial  (R.  v.  Orton), 
charge  of  C.  J.  Cockburn,  passim. 
"  See  §  13  d. 

16  Thomas  Fruit  Co.  v.  Start,  107  Cal.  206. 

18  Eidt  v.  Cutler,  127  Mass.  522  ;  Kingv.  R.  Co.,  72  N.  Y.  607. 

17  See  §§  576  ff. 

18  Brown  v.  Foster,  113  Mass.  136. 

19  People  v.  Constantino,  153  N.  Y.  24. 

w  Short  v.  State,  63  Ind.  876,  380  ;  Morse  v.  Blancbard,  Mich.,  75  N.  W.  98.    Fol 
such  use  by  a  witness,  see  port,  §  439  A. 
»  See  §  13  i. 
1  See  post,  {14«. 


§§135-13(2.]  DISCRIMINATIONS.  29 

tain  his  color  is  proper ; 2  so,  also,  where  his  foot-formation  is  regarded 
as  relevant.8  (b)  Resemblance  of  features,  as  evidence  of  paternity, 
in  cases  of  bastardy  or  inheritance,  has  been  a  matter  of  much  con- 
troversy ; 4  but  where  the  fact  of  resemblance  is  regarded  by  the  Court 
as  having  probative  value,  the  production  of  the  child  for  the  better 
apprehension  of  the  resemblance  has  been  treated  as  proper.6  (c)  Ap- 
pearance of  a  person,  as  indicating  age  (e.  g.  of  infancy,  of  consent  to 
intercourse),  is  usually  regarded  as  relevant,6  and  if  so,  the  tribunal 
may  properly  observe  the  person  brought  before  them.7  (d)  The  con- 
dition of  premises,  etc.,  long  after  an  event  may  not  be  of  probative 
value  to  show  the  condition  at  the  time  in  issue ; 8  and  upon  this 
ground  a  view  of  the  premises  or  an  inspection  of  the  object  may 
properly  be  refused.9  (e)  Experiments  are  often  excluded  because 
of  the  confusion  of  issues,  etc.,  that  might  be  involved,10  and  this 
exclusion  might  operate  equally  whether  the  experiments  were  to  be 
testified  to  or  to  be  done  in  court.11] 

§  13  d.  Same :  (2)  Privilege.  (3)  Sundry  Principles.  [(2)  Priv- 
ilege. Another  independent  reason  that  may  prohibit  autoptic  pref- 
erence is  the  privilege  of  an  accused  person  not  to  criminate  himself 
against  his  will.  Whether  this  privilege  is  violated  by  compelling 
the  exhibition  of  his  body  or  members  in  court  has  been  a  matter  of 
controversy,  but  depends  wholly  on  the  theory  of  that  privilege.1  A 
similar  privilege  for  a  plaintiff  suing  for  a  bodily  injury  has  been  rec- 
ognized by  a  few  Courts,  and  raises  a  similar  question.2  (3)  Certain 
other  independent  principles  sometimes  resulting  in  the  prohibition 
of  autoptic  preference,  or  prescribing  conditions  for  its  use,  need  to 
be  discriminated.  Specimens  of  handwriting,  as  evidence  of  the  style 

2  Hudgins  v.  Wrights,  1  Hen.  &  M.  134,  141  ;  Hook  v.  Pagee,  2  Munf.  379,  384  ; 
Gentry  v.  McGinnis,  3  Dana  (Ky.)  382,  386  ;  Chancellor  v.  Milly,  9  id.  24;  Garvin  v. 
State,  52  Miss.  207,  209  ;  Warlick  v.  White,  76  N.  C.  175. 

8  Daniel  v.  Guy,  23  Ark.  50,  51. 

4  See  post,  §  14s. 

8  Gaunt  v.  State,  50  N.J.  L.  490,  495  ;  Gilmanton  v.  Ham,  38  N.  H.  108,  112  ; 
Re  Jessup,  81  Cal.  408,  418  ;  Crow  v.  Jordon,  49  Oh.  St.  655  ;  Young  v.  Makepeace, 
103  Mass.  50,  54  ;  Paulk  v.  State,  52  Ala.  427,  429  ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  45  Md.  144, 151, 
semble;  State  v.  Smith,  54  la.  104  ;  Finnegan  v.  Dugan,  14  All.  197  ;  State  v.  Wood- 
ruff, 67  N.  C.  89,  semble.     It  was  forbidden  in  Hanawalt  v.  State,  64  Wis.  84,  87,  on 
the  ground  of  §  13.;',  post.     For  the   cases  in  which  it  was    forbidden  on   the   above 
ground  of  the  irrelevancy  of  resemblance,  see  post,  §  14  s. 

6  See  post,  §141.     Distinguish  the  question  whether  by  the  criminal  law  the  bona 
fide  belief  by  a  liquor-seller  as  to  the  buyer's  age,  based  on  his  appearance,  is  material. 

7  State  v.  Arnold,  13Ired.  184,  192  (criminal  age)  ;  Com.  v.  Hollis,  Mass.,  49  N.  E. 
632  (age  of  consent) ;  Hermann  v.  State,  73  Wis.  248.     In  Indiana,  in  proving  the 

age  of  a  liquor-buyer,  this  mode  of  proof  is  excluded  for  the  reason  of  §  13.;', 
post,  q.  v. 

•  See  post,  §  14«. 

9  Broyles  v.  Prisock,  97  Ga.  643,  25  S.  E.  388  ;  Banning  v.  K.  Co.,  89  la.  74,  80  ; 
State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  148,  157  ;  French  v.  Wilkinson,  93  Mich.  322. 

l°  See  post,  §  14w. 

"  Compare  further  §§  13  e,  13/,  13 1. 

1  See  post,  §  469  e. 

2  See  post.  §  469  m. 


30  REAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  IV. 

of  writing,  are  in  many  jurisdictions  not  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury.8 
The  Hearsay  rule  forbids  a  jury  at  a  view  to  hear  testimony.4  The 
rule  of  Primariness,  i.  e.  that  the  original  of  a  writing  must  be  pre- 
sented autoptically  to  the  tribunal,  unless  it  is  not  available  for  pro- 
duction,6 involves,  of  course,  a  different  question ;  for  there  the  question 
is  whether  the  original  writing  must  be  presented,  while  here  the  only 
question  is  whether  it  may  be,  and  the  answer  to  the  latter  question 
has  never  been  doubted.  The  use  of  photographs,  models,  maps,  and 
the  like,  by  a  witness,  is  merely  one  way  of  giving  testimony,  and 
does  not  concern  us  here.'] 

§  13  e.  Limitations  germane  to  the  Present  Principle ;  (1)  Preju- 
dice of  an  Accused  Person.  [The  autoptic  preference  to  the  tribunal 
of  the  weapons  or  the  tools  or  the  fruits  of  a  crime,  of  the  clothing  or 
the  mutilated  body  of  a  murdered  person,  has  often  been  objected  to 
by  counsel  because  of  the  undue  prejudice  that  might  thus  be  created 
against  the  accused,  in  inflaming  the  passions  of  the  jury  and  causing 
them  to  subordinate  their  reasoning  powers  to  their  feelings  and  to 
omit  to  be  satisfied,  by  evidence  alone,  of  the  accused's  complicity.1 
No  doubt  such  an  effect  may  occasionally  and  in  an  extreme  case  be 
produced ;  and  no  doubt  the  trial  Court  has  a  discretion  to  prevent 
the  abuse  of  the  process  ;  but  in  the  vast  majority  of  instances  where 
such  objection  is  made,  it  is  purely  frivolous  and  there  is  no  ground 
for  apprehension.2  Accordingly,  such  objections  have  almost  invari- 
ably been  repudiated  by  the  Court,  in  allowing  the  production  of 
tools  or  weapons,8  clothing  or  members  of  a  murdered  or  injured  per- 
son's body,4  and  the  fruits  of  the  crime  or  other  material  objects 
connected  with  it,5  —  so  far,  of  course,  as  the  object  is  relevant,  for 
identification  or  otherwise.] 

8  See  post,  §§  576  ff. 

*  See  post,  §  162  o. 

«  See  post,  §§  558  ff. 
6  See  post,  §§  439.7,  A. 

1  The  earliest  instances  of  such  objection  seem  to  be  Picton's  Trial,  30  How.  St. 
Tr.  457,  in  1806,  and  Ing's  Trial,  33  id.  1051,  1088  (Cato-street  conspiracy),  in  1820; 
in  the  latter  trial,   Mr.  Adolphus,  for  the  defence,   put  the  objection  as  clearly  and 
forcibly  as  it  can  be  stated. 

2  See  the  remarks  of  Andrews,  C.  J.,  in  Walsh  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  467. 

«  Wynne  v.  State,  56  Ga.  113,  118;  Crawford  v.  State,  Ala.,  21  So.  214;  Spies 
».  People,  122  111.  1,  236  ;  Anderson  v.  State,  147  Ind.  445  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  59  N.  J. 
L.  535;  State  v.  Jones,  89  la.  182,  188  ;  Taylor  v.  Corn.,  90  Va.  109,  117;  Starch- 
man  v.  State,  62  Ark.  538,  540  ;  State  v.  Gushing,  17  Wash.  544  ;  Mose  v.  State,  36 
Ala.  211,  219,  229  ;  McUonel  v.  State,  90  Ind.  320  ;  Foster  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  619. 

*  R.  v.  Reason,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  42  ;  Dorsey  v.  State,  107  Ala.  157  ;  Burton  v.  State, 
ib.  108  ;  State  v.  Vincent,  24   la.   570,  576   (an  extreme  case  ;  the  severed  head  of 
the  deceased,  preserved  in  alcohol,  exhibited) ;  State  v.  Stair,  87  Mo.  268,  272  ;  People 
».  McCurdy,  68  Cal.  576,  580 ;  Story  v.  State,  99  Ind.  413 ;  State  v.  Murphy,  118  Mo. 
7,  14  ;  State  v.  Duffy,  124  id.  1,  10  ;  State  i>.  Symmes,  40  S.  C.  383,  387  ;  Davidson  v. 
State,  135  Ind.  254,  258  ;  People  o.  Hawes,  98  Cal.  648,  652  ;  Gardiner  v.    People, 
6  Park.  Cr.  C.  201  ;  Kingu.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  277  ;  Hart  t>.  State,  15  id.  202,  228. 

6  State  v.  West,  1  Houst.  Cr.  C.  371,  385  ("museum"  of  an  alleged  insane  person, 
containing  bottled  snakes,  etc.,  exhibited)  ;  Adams  i:  State,  93  Ga.  166  (perjury  as  to 
pantaloons  ;  the  pantaloons  exhibited)  ;  Keating  v.  People,  111.,  43  N.  £.  724 ;  People 


§§  13d-13A.]  LIMITATIONS.  31 

§  13 /.  Same:  (2)  Prejudice  of  a  Civil  Defendant.  [Upon  the 
same  principle,  objection  is  often  made  to  the  exhibition  of  his 
injuries  by  a  civil  plaintiff  suing  for  compensation  ;  the  argument 
being  that  a  sympathy  with  the  sufferings  or  mutilation  thus  made 
vivid  may  induce  the  jury,  especiall}7  as  against  a  corporation,  and 
particularly  a  railway  corporation,  to  render  a  verdict  regardless  of 
the  evidence  of  culpability.  No  doubt,  again,  this  danger  needs  to 
be  guarded  against,  and  it  certainly  is  of  greater  frequency  here  than 
in  the  preceding  class  of  cases  ;  but  such  exhibition  is  generally  and 
rightly  treated  as  a  proper  process  of  proof,  subject  to  occasional 
exclusion  in  cases  of  abuse.1] 

§  13  g.  Same :  (3)  Immodesty  or  other  Impropriety.  [When  the 
exhibition  or  inspection  would  involve  a  repulsive  or  immodest  ex- 
posure of  the  body,  it  may  well  be  forbidden,  at  least  so  far  as  the 
fact  to  be  learned,  or  this  mode  of  learning  it,  is  not  of  serious  im- 
portance. This  general  qualification  is  commonly  mentioned  by 
Courts,  and  occasionally  has  been  applied ; 1  yet  such  exhibitions, 
whenever  it  has  seemed  necessary,  have  been  allowed ; 2  and  the  tra- 
ditional writ  de  venire  inspiciendo  by  a  jury  of  matrons  8  illustrates 
one  expedient  for  avoiding  unnecessary  offence  to  modesty.  In  still 
other  ways  there  may  be  a  deterrent  impropriety  in  autoptic  prefer- 
ence ;  for  example,  in  offering  to  have  the  jury  sample  liquor  alleged 
to  be  intoxicating,4  or  to  kill  dogs  and  rabbits  before  the  jury  to 
illustrate  the  symptoms  of  strychnia-poisoning,6  or  to  go  through  a 
supposed  process  of  suicide  by  hanging.6] 

§  13  7t.  Same  :  (4)  Technical  Matters.  [The  production  of  a  thing 
or  the  performance  of  an  experiment  before  the  jury  may  occasion- 
ally afford  no  help  because  its  features  may  not  be  apprehensible  by 
the  unskilled  jury  by  mere  observation.  In  such  a  case,  an  accom- 

v.  Winthrop,  Cal.,  50  Pac.  390  ;  Com.  v.  Burke,  12  All.  182  ;  Mitchell  v.  State,  Ala., 
22  So.  71  ;  State  v.  Smith,  56  Minn.  78,  84  ;  Powell  v.  State,  61  Miss.  319. 

1  Admitted :  Langworthy  v.  Green,  95  Mich.  93,  96  (citing  many  cases) ;  Graves  v. 
Battle  Creek,  95  Mich.  266,  268  ;  Sherwood  r.  Sioux  Falls,  S.  D.,  73  N.  W.  913  ; 
Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  549  (a  leading  case,  and  citing  many 
precedents)  ;  Osborne  v.  Detroit,  36  Fed.  36,  38  (allowing  the  testing  of  a  paralysis  by 
sticking  pins  into  the  body)  ;  Carrico  v.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  86,  89  ;  Citizens'  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Willoeby,  134  Ind.  563,  570;  Williams  v.  Nally,  Ky.,  46  S.  W.  874  ;  C.  &  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Clausen,  111.,  50  N.  E.  680;  Edwards  v.  Three  Rivers,  96  Mich.  625;  Indiana 
C.  Co.  v.  Parker,  100  Ind.  181,  199  ;  Tudor  Iron  Works  v.  Weber,  129  111.  535; 
Barker  v.  Perry,  67  la.  146.  Excluded:  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  97  Ala.  211  ; 
Carstens  v.  Hanselman,  61  Mich.  426  ;  French  v.  Wilkinson,  93  Mich.  322  (on  the 
ground  of  §  13  c  (d),  ante). 

1  Dacosta  v.  Jones,  Cowp.  729 ;  Knowles  v.  Crompton,  55  Conn.  836  (section  of 
corpse) ;  Brown  v.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  282  (private  parts). 

2  Hale,  PI.  Cr.   I.,  635  (rupture) ;  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Clausen,  111.,  50  N.  E.   680 
(rupture)  ;  see  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Botsford,  141  U.  S.  250,  255. 

8  1  Co.  Litt  189,  Hargreave's  note  ;  Ex  parte  Bellet,  1  Cox  297 ;  Taylor,  Evidence, 
§  544  n.  An  instance  occurred  as  late  as  1879,  noted  in  14  L.  Journ.  439. 

*  Com.  v.  Brelsford,  161  Mass.  61,  63  ;  Wadsworth  v.  Dunnam,  Ala.,  23  So.  699. 
6  R.  v.  Palmer,  Annual  Register,  1856,  pp.  422,  473,  475. 

•  Jumpertz  v.  People,  21  111.  375,  396,  408. 


32  HEAL   EVIDENCE.  [CH.   IV. 

panying  explanation  by  an  expert  will  generally  remove  the  diffi- 
culty, and  Courts  are  seldom  likely  to  see  much  force  in  such  an 
objection.1] 

§  13  i.  Same:  (5)  Inconvenience;  View  by  Jury.  [(&)  It  may 
cause  inconvenience  to  bring  the  desired  object  into  a  court-room  ;  and 
the  Court  may  of  course  on  this  ground  exclude  it ;  *  or  it  may  be 
illegal  to  do  so,  as  in  the  case  of  public  documents  or  court-records 
required  to  be  kept  in  a  certain  place ;  or  it  may  be  impossible,  as 
where  the  condition  of  land  or  fixtures  is  involved,  (b)  In  such 
a  case,  may  the  jury  leave  the  court-room  and  inspect  the  object 
where  it  is  ?  The  taking  of  a  view  by  the  jury  has  always  been 
regarded  as  a  proper  proceeding,  though  its  methods  have  usually 
been  regulated  by  statute.2  The  practice  under  the  English  statutes 
was  usually  confined  to  actions  of  ejectment,  nuisance,  trespass,  and 
the  like  ;  *  and  it  was  said  that  in  criminal  cases  a  view  could  be  had 
only  by  consent  of  the  accused ;  4  in  the  cases  where  it  was  allowable, 
the  Court  granted  it  where  it  seemed  proper  and  necessary.5  The 
matter  is  now  commonly  regulated  by  statute  ;  but,  whether  under 
statute  or  apart  from  it,  the  granting  of  a  view  is  usually  held  to  lie 
in  the  trial  Court's  discretion.6] 

§  13  j.  Same:  (6)  Non-transmission  to  Appellate  Court.  [In  one 
or  two  jurisdictions  the  notion  has  of  late  obtained  a  footing  that 
autoptic  preference  is  to  be  excluded  as  a  method  of  proof  because  it 
is  impossible  to  transmit  to  the  higher  Court  on  appeal  the  source  of 
belief  thus  laid  before  the  jury  below,  and  because  thus  the  losing 
party  cannot  obtain  an  adequate  revision  of  the  proceedings  by  the 

1  E.g.,  in  Stockwell  v.  R.  Co.,  43  la.  470,  473,  the  Court  allowed  the  jury  to  take 
a  view  of  a  train  run  under  special  conditions  to  illustrate  an  alleged  fact.  See  a 
aimilar  instance  in  Taylor  v.  U.  S.,  TJ.  S.  App.,  89  Fed.  954. 

1  In  Thurman  v.  Bertram,  Exch.  D.,  London  Mail,  July  18, 1879,  20  Alb.L.  J.  150, 
the  question  being  whether  an  elephant  was  in  appearance  likely  to  frighten  a  horse, 
the  elephant  was  brought  into  court ;  so  also,  for  a  dog,  to  determine  whether  he  was 
ferocious,  in  Line  v.  Taylor,  3  F.  &  F.  731. 

a  The  English  statutes  are  :  St.  4-5  Anne,  c.  16,  s.  8  ;  8  G.  II,  c.  25,  s.  14  ; 
6  G.  IV,  c.  50,  ss.  23,  24  ;  15-16  Viet.,  c.  76,  s.  114  ;  17-18  Viet.,  c.  125,  s.  53  ;  Kules 
'of  Court,  1883,  Ord.  50,  r.  3. 

8  Redfern  i>.  Smith,  9  Moore  497  ;  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Green,  1  Price  130  ;  Stoves  v. 
Menhem,  2  Exch.  382. 

*  R.  v.  Redman,  I  Kenyon  884;   Com.  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  496,  515  ;  Eastwoods. 
People,  3  Park.  Cr.  25,  53,  semble.    That  it  is  a  criminal  case  is  in  itself  no  objection : 
R.  v.  Whalley,  2  Cox  Cr.  231  ;  R.  ».  Martin,  12  id.  204  ;  Com.  ».  Webster,  5  Cush. 
295, 298  ;  and  other  cases  in  the  ensuing  notes. 

6  Lord  Mansfield,  C.  J.,  in  1  Burr.  252 ;  Davis  w.  Lees,  Willes  344,  348  ;  Anon., 
2  Chitty  422. 

•  See  Campbell  v.  State,  65  Ala.  80  ;  People  v.  White,  116  Cal.  17  ;  Niosi  v.  Laun- 
dry, 117  id.  257  ;  Springer  v.  Chicago,  135  111.  553,  661 ;  Vane  v.  Evanston,  150  id. 
616  ;  Pike  v.  Chicago,  155  id.  656,  40  N.  E.  567  ;  Leidlein  v.  Meyer,  95  Mich.  586 ; 
Milliken  v.  Corunna,  id.,  68  N.  W.  141  ;  Chute  v.  State,  19  Minn.  271;  Brown  v. 
Kohont,  61  id.  113;  Jenkins  ».  R.  Co.,  110  N.  C.  439  ;  State  v.  Perry,  id.,  27  S.  E. 
997  ;  Rudolph  v.  R.  Co.,  Pa.,  40  Atl.  1083  ;  State  v.  Musgravc,  W.  Va",  28  S.  E.  813  ; 
Boardman  v.  Ins.  Co.,  54  Wis.  364  ;  Pick  v.  R.  H.  Co.,  27  id.  433,  446.      For  the  im- 
propriety of  viewing  the  place  in  a  changed  condition,  see  ante,  §  13  c  (d).     For  the 
necessity  of  the  defendant's  presence  at  a  view  in  a  criminal  case,  see  post,  §  162  o. 


§§  13A-13/.]  LIMITATIONS.  33 

higher  Court.1  This  notion  has  been  applied  to  forbid  the  considera- 
tion of  appearance  as  indicating  age,2  and  of  the  features  of  a  child 
as  indicating  paternity,*  and  also  to  forbid  the  resort  to  a  view  by  the 
jury.4  The  doctrine  has  been  repudiated  (after  an  occasional  tem- 
porary favor)  by  all  of  the  Courts  whose  attention  has  been  called  to 
it.6  The  unfortunate  thing  is  that  in  repudiating  it  there  has  been 
an  inclination  t9  evade  the  objection  (i.  e.  that  the  "  evidence  "  can- 
not be  reproduced  or  transmitted  on  appeal)  by  declaring  that  a 
jury-view  does  not  involve  the  obtaining  of  evidence  by  the  jury.6 
There  was  no  necessity  for  invoking  such  an  untenable  doctrine ;  the 
sufficient  answers  to  the  above  objection  are  (1)  that  there  is  no 
precedent  in  the  common  law  for  recognizing  any  doctrine  that  an 
appellate  Court  must  be  able  to  have  every  item  of  evidence  repro- 
duced or  transmitted  to  it;  (2)  that  if  such  a  doctrine  were  sound, 
there  never  could  have  been  jury-views,  or,  in  the  majority  of  cases, 
autoptic  preference  of  any  sort;  (3)  that  if  such  a  doctrine  were 
sound,  all  viva  voce  testimony,  which  depends  so  much  on  the  ap- 
pearance and  demeanor  of  the  witness,  and  all  evidence  whatever 
except  writings  and  other  portable  objects,  should  be  excluded,  —  an 
impossible  result.  To  answer  the  objection  by  declaring  a  jury- 
view  not  to  be  the  obtaining  of  evidence,  in  the  sense  of  an  addi- 
tional source  of  proof,  is  to  adopt  an  untenable  and  unnecessary 
defence.  While,  as  already  pointed  out,7  autoptic  preference  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  evidence,  both  testimonial  and  circumstantial,  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  it  is  at  any  rate  an  additional  source  of 
belief  or  proof,  over  and  above  the  statements  of  witnesses  and  the 
circumstantial  evidence.  Its  significance,  in  this  respect,  has  often 
been  discussed  by  Courts  in  ruling  upon  instructions  as  to  the  nature 
of  jury-views  ;  and  in  spite  of  some  opposing  precedents,8  the  gener- 
ally accepted  and  the  correct  doctrine  is  that  a  view  furnishes  a  dis- 

1  The  theory  is  best  presented  in  the  opinions  in  J.  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen,  40 
Jnd.  548.  So  far  as  the  absence  of  cross-examination  is  objected  to,  see  post,  §  162  0. 

a  Stephenson  v.  State,  28  Ind.  272  ;  Hunger  v.  State,  53  id.  251,  253  :  Robinius  r. 
State,  63  id.  235,  237;  Surgart  v.  State,  64  id.  590;  Bird  v.  State,  104  id.  385,  389. 

8  Hanawalt  t>.  State,  64  Wis.  84,  87. 

*  Smith  v.  State,  42  Tex.  444,  448  (partly  on  this  ground). 

6  Close  v.  Samm,  27  la.  503,  507 ;  J.  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen,  40  Ind.  545,  547 
(overruling  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Cochran,  10  id.  560) ;  Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41  id.  228,  258  ;  Heady 
v.  Turnpike  Co.,  52  id.  117,  124  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Scott,  72  id.  196,  224  ;  Shuler  v. 
State,  105  id.  289  ;  Topeka  v.  Martineau,  42  Kan.  387  ;  State  v.  Stair,  87  Mo.  268, 
272  ;  Foster  v.  State,  70  Miss.  755,  765 ;  Hart  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  202,  228.  The 
Courts  cited  post,  notes  8,  9,  would  apparently  also  reach  the  same  result. 

6  Cole,  J.,  in  Close  v.  Samm,  supra;  J.  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen,  supra;  Wright  v. 
Carpenter,  49  Cal.  607,  610  (repudiated  in  People  v.  Milner,  post)  ;  the  explanation 
usually  is  that  the  view  merely  "illustrates"  the  subject  of  inquiry,  or  "enables  the 
jury  to  apply"  the  testimony. 

T  Ante,  §  13  a. 

8  Vane  v.  Evanston,  150  111.  616,  621  (confining  the  prior  rulings  in  this  Court, 
cited  below,  to  views  under  the  eminent-domain  statute);  Flower  v.  R.  Co.,  132  Pa. 
524  ;  Hoffman  v.  R.  Co.,  143  id.  503,  22  Atl.  823;  Munkwitz  v.R.  Co.,  64  Wis.  403  ; 
Seefeld  v.  R.  Co.,  67  id.  96 ;  Sasse  v.  State,  68  id.  530. 
VOL.    I. — 3 


34  REAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  IV. 

tinctly  additional  source  of  proof,  i.  e.  the  thing  itself  as  autoptically 
observed.9 

It  must  be  added  that  the  question  whether  a  jury-view  involves 
"evidence,"  in  the  sense  that  the  opponent  must  have  an  opportu- 
nity to  be  present,  is  a  different  one ;  it  is  raised  by  the  Hearsay  rule, 
requiring  an  opportunity  of  cross-examination,  and  is  treated  post, 
§  162  o.] 

9  The  best  expositions  of  the  principle  are  found  in  the  opinions  by  Bissell,  J.,  in 
Denv.  T.  &  F.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ditch  Co.,  Colo.  App.,  52  Pac.  225 ;  Johnston,  J.,  in 
Topeka  v.  Martineau,  42  Kan.  387;  White,  P.  J.,  in  Hart  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  202, 
228  ;  Lyon,  J.,  in  Washbum  v.  R.  Co.,  59  Wi§.  364 ;  Woods,  J.,  in  Foster  v.  State,  70 
Miss.  755,  765;  Wright,  J.,  diss.,  in  Close  v.  Sanun,  27  la.  511  ;  Henshaw,  J.,  in  Peo- 
ple v.  Milner,  infra.  Accord:  People  v.  Bush,  68  Cal.  623,  630;  People  v.  Milner,  id., 
54  Pac.  833  ;  Peoria  A.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  71  111.  361;  Mitchell  ».  R.  Co.,  85  id.  566  ; 
Peoria  &  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnum,  107  id.  160 ;  Culbertson  &  B.  Packing  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
111  id.  651  ;  MaywoodCo.  v.  Maywood,  140  id.  216,  223;  Hock  I.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Brew- 
ing  Co.,  id.,  51  N.  E.  572  ;  Kans.  C.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Baird,  41  Kan.  69  ;  C.  K.  &  W.  R; 
Co.  ».  Parsons,  51  id.  408  ;  Shepherd  v.  Camden,  82  Me.  535 ;  Parks  v.  Boston,  15 
Pick.  198,  200,  209  ;  Davis  v.  Jenny,  1  Mete.  222;  Tully  v.  R.  Co.,  134  Mass.  499, 
503  ;  Menard  v.  R.  Co.,  150  id.  386  (undecided);  Neilson  v.  R.  Co.,  58  Wis.  516, 
523 ;  Washburn  v.  R.  Co.,  59  id.  364,  368;  U.  S.  v.  Seufert  B.  Co.,  87  Fed.  35,  38. 


§§  13./-14.]         GENERAL   PRINCIPLES   OF   RELEVANCY. 


35 


CHAPTER  Y. 

RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE. 


§  14.    General  Principles  of  Relevancy. 

§  14  a.  Doctrines  of  Collateral  Incon- 
venience. 

1.    Character  as  Evidence  or  in  Issue. 

§146.  Character  as  Evidence  of  an 
Act  done. 

§  14c.  Character  as  otherwise  eviden- 
tiary. 

§  14  d.   Character  in  Issue. 

2.   Evidence  to  prove  Character. 

§  14  e.   In  general. 

§  14/.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evidence 
of  an  Accused's  Character. 

§  14gr.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evi- 
dence of  other  Persons'  Character  used 
evidentially. 

§  14  h.  'Particular  Conduct  as  Evi- 
dence of  Character  in  issue. 

3.  Other  Human  Qualities  as  Evidence  of 

an  Act. 

§  14  i.  Physical  Capacity,  Skill,  Means, 
etc. 

§  14j.    Habit,  Custom. 

§  14  &.    Design,  Intention,  Plan. 

4.  Evidence  to  prove  Capacity,  Knowledge, 

Plan,    Intent,    Habit,    Custom,    and 
other  Human  Qualities  or  Conditions, 
§  14  I.    Evidence  to  prove  Physical  Ca- 
pacity, Skill,  Age,  Sanity,  etc. 


§  14m.  Evidence  to  prove  Design, 
Plan. 

§  1 4  7i.  Evidence  to  prove  Habit,  Cus- 
tom. 

§140.  Evidence  to  prove  Motive, 
Emotion,  Malice,  etc. 

§  14  p.  Evidence  to  prove  Knowledge, 
Belief,  Notice,  Consciousness  of  Guilt, 
etc. 

§  1 4  q.  Other  Similar  Crimes  or  Mis- 
conduct as  Evidence  of  Knowledge,  Intent, 
Plan,  etc. 

5.  Sundry  Evidence  to  prove  or  disprove  a 

Human  Act. 

§14r.  Alibi,  Commission  by  others, 
etc. 

§  1 4  s.  Traces,  and  other  Evidence  a 
posteriori. 

6.  Evidence  of  the  Condition,  Quality,  Ca~ 

pacity,  of  Inanimate  Objects. 

§  14  t.  Prior  or  Subsequent  Existence 
of  a  Thing,  Place,  Condition,  etc. 

§  14  u.  One  Part  evidencing  another ; 
Samples. 

§  1 4  u.  Similar  Instances  as  Evidence 
of  a  Quality,  Tendency,  Capacity,  etc. 


§  14.1  General  Principles  of  Relevancy.  [The  notion  of  circum- 
stantial evidence,  as  already  explained,8  is  that  of  any  fact,  not  a 
human  assertion,  taken  as  a  basis  of  inference  for  or  against  a  propo- 
sition of  fact  the  subject  of  dispute.  Difficult  as  it  may  be  to  express 
with  precision  in  a  form  of  words  the  scope  of  this  class,  the  distinc- 
tion between  circumstantial  and  testimonial  evidence  runs  deep  in 
the  law.  It  is  sufficient  for  practical  purposes  to  note  that  under  the 
former  head  are  included  not  merely  such  marked  and  suggestive 
circumstances  as  usually  attend  a  crime  and  are  often  thought  of  as 
solely  deserving  the  name,  but  all  evidentiary  facts  whatsoever,  other 
than  human  assertions  used  as  the  basis  of  an  inference  to  the  truth 
of  the  assertion. 

1  The  original  §  14  is  merged  with  §  15,  post,  Chap.  VI. 
8  Ante,  §  13. 


36  RELEVANCY  ;     CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  [CH.  V. 

Certain  preliminary  distinctions  are  necessary.  (1)  It  is  not  the 
law  which  furnishes  the  test  of  relevancy,  but  logic.  Probative  value, 
or  capability  of  supporting  an  inference,  is  a  matter  of  reasoning,  and 
the  modes  of  reasoning  must  be  the  same  in  a  court-room  as  in  a  labor- 
atory ;  it  is  only  the  subject-matter  which  differs.  Whatever  rulings 
upon  relevancy  are  found  in  our  precedents  are  mere  applications  of 
logic  by  the  Court.  Nevertheless  those  notions  of  logic,  in  being  ap- 
plied, become  the  law.  Though  this  legal  logic  may  lead  to  illogical 
law,  still  the  ruling  is  a  legal  precedent.  In  other  words,  there  is  a 
law  of  relevancy,8  consisting  of  those  rulings  which  declare  when 
one  fact  may  be  received  in  a  court  as  the  basis  of  inference  to  another. 
(2)  The  logic  of  the  Courts,  nevertheless,  is  an  instinctive  logic,  rarely 
formulated,  and  loosely  applied.  It  is  usually  rough,  quick,  and  un- 
systematic in  its  tests,  and  is  the  creature  of  its  environment.  There 
is  little  opportunity  for  the  express  application  of  the  recognized 
canons  of  reasoning.  (3)  A  most  important  feature  of  its  use  is  that 
it  aims  merely  to  test  admissibility,  and  does  not  concern  itself  with 
demonstration  or  comparative  weight.  The  historian  or  the  natural- 
ist may  preserve  data  of  the  slightest  helpfulness,  or  may  pass  final 
judgment  at  once  upon  cogent  evidence ;  but  the  legal  tribunal  is 
divided;  the  judge  first  passes  upon  the  offered  evidence,  and  sets 
aside  the  tidbits  for  the  jury;  that  which,  for  one  reason  or  another 
affecting  its  value,  is  not  worth  considering,  never  reaches  the  auxil- 
iary functionaries,  the  jury.  Thus  a  marked  feature  of  our  system 
of  evidence,  distinguishing  it  radically  from  the  Continental  system, 
and  historically  due  to  the  separation  of  function  between  judge  and 
jury,  is  the  distinction  between  admissibility  and  proof.  Our  law  of 
evidence  leaves  it  usually  to  the  jury  to  say  what  constitutes  proof 
or  demonstration ;  and  the  rules  of  relevancy  aim  only  to  determine 
whether  a  given  fact  is  of  sufficient  probative  value  to  be  admissible 
at  all.4  (4)  The  degree  of  strength  to  which  an  evidentiary  fact  must 
rise  in  order  to  be  regarded  as  worth  considering,  i.  e.  the  test  of  pro- 
bative value  for  purposes  of  admissibility,  can  hardly  be  stated  except 
in  terms  so  general  as  to  be  practically  of  little  use.  It  is  usually  said 
that  the  fact  must  be  such  as  indicates  the  desired  factum  probandum 
with  a  fair  or  reasonable  degree  of  probability.6  Only  rarely  can  any- 
thing more  precise  be  attempted  in  the  way  of  a  general  formula;  and 
such  rules  as  exist  are  concerned  almost  entirely  with  particular  con- 

8  Professor  Thayer,  in  3  Harv.  L.  Rev.  143,  145,  seems  to  take  a  contrary  view. 
Yet,  at  any  rate,  the  fact  remains  that  such  decisions  exist,  and  whether  they  be  termed 
logical  or  legal  rulings,  trials  will  be  conducted  according  to  them,  and  the  profession 
must  take  note  of  them.  See  Gushing,  C.  J.,  in  State  v.  Lapagc,  57  N.  H.  288. 

*  For  this  distinction,  see  the  remarks  of  Bosanquet,  J.,  in  Wright  v.  Tatham,  7  A. 
&  E.  375  ;  Marshall,  C.  J.,  in  Col.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  2  Pet.  44  ;  Evans,  Notes  to 
Pothier,  II,  157;  Brickell,  C.  J.,  in  Nelms  v.  Steiner,  Ala.,  22  So.  435. 

•  See  Richardson  v.  Turnpike  Co.,  6  Vt.  503  ;  Stevenson  v.  Stewart,  11  Pa.  308; 
Com.  r.  Jeffries,  7  All.  566  ;  Weidlerv.  Bank,  11  S.  &  R.  140;  Brown  v.  Schock,  77 
Pa.  479  ;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide,  11  Wall.  438,  440  ;  Levison  v.  State,  54  Ala.  528. 


§§  14-14  a.]  COLLATERAL   INCONVENIENCE.  37 

crete  data.  (5)  The  relevancy  of  a  fact  may  not  appear  upon  its  face, 
but  may  depend  upon  some  other  fact  not  yet  proved.  In  such  a  case 
it  is  usual  for  the  trial  Court  in  its  discretion  to  admit  the  former 
upon  the  counsel's  assurance  that  the  latter  will  be  proved  in  due 
time.6  (G)  It  is  occasionally  said  that  an  "inference  upon  an  infer- 
ence "  will  not  be  allowed,  i.  e.  that  the  circumstantial  fact  must  be 
directly  proved  by  testimony.7  There  is  no  such  rule ;  if  there  were, 
hardly  a  single  trial  could  be  adequately  prosecuted.  For  example, 
on  a  charge  of  murder,  the  defendant's  gun  is  found  discharged ;  from 
this  we  argue  that  he  has  discharged  it ;  and  from  this  we  argue  that 
his  bullet  struck  and  killed  the  deceased;  or  the  defendant  is  shown 
to  have  been  sharpening  a  knife ;  from  this  we  argue  that  he  had  a 
design  to  use  it  upon  the  deceased;  and  from  this  we  argue  that  he 
carried  out  his  design ;  in  these  and  innumerable  other  instances  we 
build  up  inference  upon  inference,  and  yet  no  Court  ever  thought  of 
forbidding  it.  All  reasoning,  all  scientific  work,  and  every  day's  life 
proceeds  on  such  data ;  and  the  above  judicial  utterances  must  be 
taken  as  valid  only  for  the  particular  evidence  there  ruled  upon.8] 

§  14  a.  Doctrines  of  Collateral  Inconvenience.  [A  fact  may  have 
probative  value  or  relevancy,  and  still  be  excluded  because  of  collateral 
reasons,  i.  e.  reasons  independent  of  its  probative  value.  The  impor- 
tance of  distinguishing  this  reason  of  exclusion  is  that  it  may  or  may 
not  apply  in  a  given  case,  and  that  the  objection  involved  in  it  may 
be  obviated,  either  in  that  instance  or  upon  the  occasion  of  other  liti- 
gation ;  so  that  the  exclusion  may  not  be  an  absolute  one,  due  to  the 
inherent  probative  deficiency  of  the  fact  itself,  and  may  thus  cease  to 
exist  for  the  same  fact  offered  on  some  other  occasion  for  the  same 
purpose.  These  reasons  are  of  a  great  variety ;  for  example,  they 
are  the  source  of  the  rules  of  Privilege,  treated  post,  Chap.  XIX. 
But,  in  their  application  to  circumstantial  evidence,  they  are  chiefly 
(so  far  as  they  can  be  formulated)  three  in  number;  (a)  the  doctrine 
of  Undue  Prejudice,  ».  e.  that  the  fact,  while  relevant,  may  excite 
passion  or  receive  exaggerated  importance  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead 
the  jury  to  decide  upon  some  other  ground  than  the  evidence ;  this 
reason  finds  its  chief  application  in  excluding  character-evidence 
under  certain  conditions  ;  (&)  the  doctrine  of  Unfair  Surprise,  i.  e. 
that  the  fact  offered  would  find  the  opponent  without  any  means  of 
anticipating  and  meeting  it  by  disproof  or  explanation,  and  would 

«  See  Davis  v.  Calvert,  5  G.  &  J.  304  ;  Weidler  v.  Bank,  11  S.  &  B.  139  ;  Mardis  v. 
Shackleford,  4  Ala.  493.  501  ;  Zell  v.  Com.,  94  Pa.  258,  274  ;  Bischof  v.  Mikels,  147 
Iml.  115  ;  Lane  v.  Soc.,  67  Minn.  65  ;  State  v.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  493,  494  ;  ante,  §  3, 
n.  1. 

7  E.  g.  in  U.  S.  v.  Ross,  92  U.  S.  281  ;  McAleer  v.  Murray,  58  Pa.   126  ;  Globe 
Ace.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gerisch,  163  111.  625. 

8  For  the  weight  of  circumstantial  evidence,  as  compared  with  testimonial  (a  mat- 
ter not  within  the  present  purview),  consult  B.  v.  Exall,  4  F.  &  F.  922,  929  ;  Com.  v. 
Webster,  5  Cush.  295  ;  j  Bowie  v.  Maddox,  29  Ga.  285  ;  Belhaven  and  Stenton  Peerage, 
L.  K.  1  App.  Cas.  278  ;  West  v.  State,  76  Ala.  98;  Lancaster  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  267.| 


38  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  v. 

thus  make  it  possible  to  impose  fictitious  evidence  upon  the  jury; 
this  reason  is  applied  to  "particular"  facts  of  various  sorts;  (c)  the 
reason  of  Confusion  of  Issues,  i.  e.  that  the  fact  would  be  likely  to 
open  up  such  a  complication  of"  rebutting  evidence,  new  witnesses, 
the  impeachment  of  these  witnesses,  and  the  like,  that  much  time 
would  be  spent,  the  jury  confused,  and  the  main  issues  lost  sight  of; 
this  reason  also  has  many  applications,  usually  in  company  with  the 
preceding  one,  and  is  given  greatest  force  in  dealing  with  evidence  of 
minor  probative  value. 

Most  of  the  rules  affecting  circumstantial  evidence,  as  the  resultant 
of  the  above  two  influences,  are  thus  composite  in  their  source.  The 
reasons  leading  to  them  may  concern  either  probative  value  or  col- 
lateral inconvenience,  or  both.  It  is  worth  noting  that  there  is  usually 
a  reason,  however  loosely  thought  out  or  expressed  it  may  sometimes 
be.  But  the  result  is  that,  in  the  practical  handling  of  this  evidence, 
we  have  to  deal  with  a  set  of  rules,  rather  than  with  a  system  of  prin- 
ciples. These  rules,  too,  are  ordinarily  associated  rather  with  certain 
concrete  kinds  of  evidentiary  facts  than  with  general  principles.  It 
is  therefore  scarcely  possible  to  classify  this  material  in  the  law  ex- 
cept according  to  the  kind  of  fact  with  which  the  rule  is  commonly 
associated.  In  the  following  exposition  the  attempt  will  be  merely  to 
take  up  the  chief  sorts  of  evidentiary  facts  about  which  any  contro- 
versy has  arisen,  and  to  explain  the  various  rules  and  distinctions,  so 
far  as  possible,  in  the  light  of  the  reasons  underlying  them.  The 
general  suggestion  may  be  made  at  this  point  that  these  questions 
will  usually  best  be  put  in  the  way  towards  solution  by  recollecting 
that  all  use  of  evidence  presupposes  both  a  factum  probanditm  and  a 
factum  probans,  so  that  the  latter  or  evidentiary  fact  is  always  rela- 
tive to  the  former  or  proposition  to  be  proved ;  and  by  framing  for 
every  evidentiary  problem  in  the  present  region  two  queries,  What  is 
desired  to  be  proved  ?  and,  What  is  offered  as  tending  to  prove  it  ? 
The  solution  is  usually  half  in  sight  when  the  way  has  been  thus 
cleared.] 

1.    Character  as  Evidence  or  in  Issue. 

§  14  b.  Character  aa  Evidence  of  an  Act  done.  [That  a  human 
being  has  a  moral  disposition  or  character  of  a  certain  sort  is  of 
more  or  less  probative  value  in  indicating  the  likelihood  of  his  doing 
or  not  doing  an  act  of  a  related  sort ;  for  example,  a  disposition  as  to 
violence  throws  light  on  the  probability  of  a  violent  killing,  and  a 
disposition  as  to  honesty  on  the  probability  of  committing  a  fraud. 
Nevertheless,  character  is  usually  not  received  as  evidentiary  for 
such  a  purpose,  the  reasons  being  chiefly  the  first  and  the  third  of 
those  mentioned  in  the  preceding  section. 


§§  140-145.]      CHARACTER  AS   EVIDENCE   OF   AN   ACT   DONE.          39 

(1)  Character  of  an  Accused  Person.     The  prosecution  in  a  crim- 
inal case  is  not  allowed  to  resort  to  the  accused's  bad  character  as  a 
basis  of  inference  to  his  guilt ;  the  reason  being  that  such  evidence  is 
too  likely  to  move  the  jury  to  condemnation  irrespective   of  his 
actual  guilt  of  the  offence  charged.1    But  the  accused  himself  may 
always  invoke  his  good  character  as  tending  to  disprove  his  com- 
mission of  the  offence,  no  matter  what  the  grade  of  the  offence,2  and 
no  matter  how  strong  the  evidence  against  him.8     Moreover,  if  the 
accused  has  offered  his  good  character,  the  prosecution  may  in  reply 
introduce  his  bad  character ; 4  not  so  much  by  way  of  exception  to 
the  rule  above  mentioned  as  in  order  to  prevent  the  accused  from 
imposing  upon  the  tribunal  by  false  evidence   of  good  character. 
The  character,  by  whichever  party  offered,  must  be  as  to  the  specific 
trait  —  e.  g.  honesty,  violence,  chastity,  etc. — involved  in  the  act 
charged.6    The  time  and  the  place  of  the  character  are  matters  more 
easily  explained  in  treating  of  Reputation."     When  the  accused 
becomes  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  his  character  as  a  witness  but 
not  as  a  defendant  may  be  put  in  evidence  against  him.7 

(2)  Character  of  Complainant  in  Rape.    The  lack  of  consent  of 
the  woman  being  an  element  in  the  crime  of  rape,  the  woman's  char- 
acter for  chastity  is  universally  conceded  to  be  admissible  as  affect- 
ing the  probability  of  her  consent.8     The  same  rule  should  apply  on 

1  See  R.  v.  Rowton,  Leigh  &  C.  520,  540  ;  State  v.  Lapage,  57  N.  H.  289,  296  ; 
People  v.  Shay,  147  N.  Y.  78.      Citations  are  hardly  necessary  for  this  fundamental 
rule. 

2  State  v.  Henry,  5  Jones  L.  65;  State  v.  Porter,  Or.,  49  Pac.  964  ;  State  v.  North- 
rup,  48  la.  584  ;  State  v.  Rice,  117  N.  C.  782  ;  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  324.    It  was 
formerly  held  that  it  should  be  admitted  in  capital  cases  only :  McNally,  Evidence, 
320  ;  Com.  v.  Hardy,  2  Mass.  317. 

*  Steele  ».  People,  45  111  157  ;  State  r.  Laxton,  76  N.  C.  216  ;  People  v.  Steward, 
28  Cal.  395 ;  People  v.  Van  Dam,  107  Mich.  425  ;  State  v.  King,  78  Mo.  556  ;  State 
v.  Blue,  Utah,  53  Pac.  978.    It  was  formerly  thought  that  it  should  not  be  used  except 
in  doubtful  cases :  Davison's  Trial,  31  How.  St.  Tr.  217.     What  its  weight  with  the 
jury  should  be  is  a  different  question  ;  see  a  good  survey  of  it  in  48  la.  584. 

*  Vin.  Abr.  xii,  48,  tit.  Evidence  ;  R.  v.  Rowton,  Leigh  &  C.  520  ;  Com.  ».  Hardy, 

2  Mass.  317  ;  U.  S.  v.  Holmes,  1  Cliff.  111. 

6  Erskine,  in  Hardy's  Trial,  24  How  St.  Tr.  1076  ;  Morgan  v.  State,  88  Ala.  224  ; 
Captain  Kidd's  Trial,  14  How.  St.  Tr.  146 ;  Turner's  Trial,  32  id.  1007  ;  Kilgore  v. 
State,  74  Ala.  7  ;  Balkum  v.  State,  115  id.  117  ;  Chung  Sing  v.  U.  S.,  Ariz.,  36  Pac. 
205  ;  Kee  v.  State,  28  Ark.  155,  164  ;  People  v.  Josephs,  7  Cal.  129  ;  People  v.  Stewart, 
28  id.  395 ;  People  t>.  Fair,  43  id.  137,  147;  People  v.  Casey,  53  id.  360  ;  People  v. 
Doggett,  62  id.  27,  29  ;  Tedens  v.  Schumers,  112  111.  263,  267;  Fletcher  v.  State,  49 
Ind.  124,  131  ;  State  v.  Bloom,  68  id.  54  ;  Carr  v.  State,  135  id.  1  ;  Gordon  v.  State, 

3  la.  415  ;  State  o.  Kinley,  43  id.  295  ;  State  v.  Curran,  51  id.  112,  117  ;  State  v.  Hea- 
cock,  id.,  76  N.  W.  654  ;  State  v.  Parker,  7  La.  An.  83,  88  ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17 
Mich.  9,  16  ;  State  v.  Dalton,  27  Mo.  15  ;  State  v.  King,  83  id.  556  ;  Basye  v.  State, 
45  Nebr.  261  ;  State  v.  Pearce,  15  Nev.  188,  190  ;  Cathcart  v.  Com.,  37  Pa.  108,  111  ; 
Poyner  v.  State,  Ter.  Cr.,  48  S.  W.  516.    Contra :  Hopps  v.  People,  31  III.  385  ;  State 
v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  157. 

*  Post,  §  461  d. 

7  Post,  §  444  b. 

8  R.  v.  Ryan,  2  Cox  Cr.   115  ;    People  v.  Johnson,  106  Cal.  289  ;   R.  v.  Clarke, 
2  Stark.  243  ;  R.  v.  Tissington,  1  Cox  Cr.  48  ;  R.  v.  Clay,  5  id.  146  ;  Camp  v.  State, 
8  Kelly  417,  420 ;  McQuirk  v.  State,  84  Ala.  435,  438  ;  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624, 


40  RELEVANCY:    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v, 

a  charge  of  enticement  for  prostitution ; 9  but  obviously  not  on  a 
charge  of  rape  of  one  below  the  age  of  consent,10  and  perhaps  not  on 
a  charge  of  assault  with  intent  to  rape.11  Professional  prostitution  is 
here  to  be  assimilated  to  unchaste  character.12 

(3)  Character  of  Deceased  in  a  Jfomicide    Charge.     Where   the 
issue  of  self-defence  is  made,  and  the  question  arises  whether  the 
deceased  was  the  aggressor,  his  character  as  to  violence  may  throw 
light  on  this  question.     Most  of  the  Courts  admitting  it  for  this  pur- 
pose prescribe  as  a  condition  that  there  shall  be  some  independent 
evidence  of  the  deceased's  aggression,  or,  in  the  phrase  of  some,  of 
an  overt  act  of  aggression  by  the  deceased.18     This  use  of  character, 
which  is  of  comparatively  recent  recognition,  must  be  distinguished 
from  that  mentioned  post,  §  14  c;  the  important  difference  being  that 
for  the  present  purpose  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  the  character 
was  known  by  or  communicated  to  the  defendant. 

(4)  Parties  in  Civil  Causes.    Because  of  the  usual  slight  probative 
value  of  a  party's  character,  and  of  its  confusion  of  issues  to  little  pur- 

653  ;  People  v.  Benson,  6  Cal.  221  ;  People  v.  Kuches,  id.,  52  Pac.  1002  :  State  ». 
Shields,  45  Conii.  256,  263 ;  Rise  v.  State,  35  Fla.  236 ;  Shirwin  v.  People,  69  111.  56, 
59  ;  Dimick  v.  Downs,  82  id.  573  ;  Wilson  v.  State,  16  Ind.  393  ;  South  Bend  v. 
Hardy,  98  id.  582 ;  Anderson  v.  State,  104  Jd.  471  ;  Carter  ».  Oavenaugh,  1  Greene, 
171,  175;  Com.  v.  Harris,  131  Mass.  336  ;  Peoples.  McLean,  71  Mich.  310;  Brown 
v.  State,  72  Miss.  997;  State  v.  Duffey,  128  Mo.  549 ;  State  v.  Forschner,  43  N.H.  S9  ; 
O'Blenis  v.  State,  47  N.  J.  L.  279  ;  People  v.  Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  398  ;  People  v.  Abbot, 
19  Wend.  197 ;  Woods  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  515  ;  State  v.  Jefferson,  6  Ired.  305  ;  State 
v.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  32;  State  r.  Hairston,  id.,  28  S.  E.  492  (general  character);  Me- 
Combs  v.  State,  8  Oh.  St.  643,  646  ;  McDermott  v.  State,  13  id.  331,  335  ;  Titus  v. 
State,  7  Baxt.  132,  135;  State  v.  McCune,  Utah,  51  Pac.  818  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  28 
Vt.  512;  State  v.  Reed,  39  id.  417;  Watry  t>.  Forbes,  18  Wis.  500.  Contra:  State  v. 
Morse,  67  Me.  429. 

•  Brown  v.  State,  72  Md.  468,  475,  477. 

15  People  v.  Johnson,  106  Cal.  289  ;  People  v.  Abbott,  97  Mich.  484  ;  State  v.  White- 
sell,  142  Mo.  467. 

11  Accord;  R.  v.  Clarke,  2  Stark.  243.     Contra:  Davenport  v.  Russell,  5  Day  145, 
148. 

12  R.  v.  Barker,  3  C.  &  P.  589  ;  R.  v.'  Holmes,  12  Cox  Cr.  143 ;  R.  v.  Riley,  16  id, 
195  ;  People  v.  Abbot,  19  Wend.  196  ;  Woods  P.  People,  55  N.  Y.  515  ;  State  v.  John- 
son,  28  Vt.  514.    For  the  use  of  particular  acts  of  unchastity,  see  post,  §  14.7. 

18  The  cases  are  contradictory,  and  space  does'  not  suffice  to  indicate  the  decision 
in  each  :  Findlay  v.  Pruitt,  9  Port.  195,  199;  Fields  v.  State,  47  Ala.  603  ;  Eiland  ». 
State,  52  id.  333  ;  Roberts  v.  State,  68  id.  165  ;  Hussey  v.  State,  88  id.  134  ;  Palmore 
v.  State,  29  Ark.  248,  263  ;  People  v.  Murray,  10  Cal.  309  ;  Williams  v.  Fambro,  30 
Ga.  233  ;  Dukes  v.  State,  11  Ind.  557,  565;  Fields  v.  State,  134  id.  46,  56  ;  State  v. 
Spendlove,  44  Kan.  1 ;  Com.  v.  Hoskius,  Ky.,  35  S.  W.  284  ;  State  v.  Burns,  30  La. 
An.  679  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  ib.  921  ;  State  t>.  Garic,  35  id.  970,  971  ;  State  v.  Nash, 
45  id.  1137,  1141  ;  Costley  v.  State,  48  Md.  175  ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9,  15  ; 
State  v.  Dumphey,  4  Minn.  438,  445  ;  Jolly  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  223 ;  Wesley 
v.  State,  37  Miss.  327,  346  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  17  Mo.  544  ;  State  v.  Rider,  90  id.  61 ; 
State  v.  Wells,  1  N.  ,T.  L.  424,  429  ;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  224  ;  People  v.  Druse, 
103  N.  Y.  655;  State  v.  Tackett,  1  Hawks,  210,  216  ;  Piercer.  Myrick,  1  Dev.  345  ; 
State  v.  Tilly,  3  Ired.  424  ;  State  v.  Barfield,  8  id.  344,  349  ;  Bottoms  v.  Kent,  3  Jones 
L.  154  ;  State  v.  Hogue,  6  id.  381,  384  ;  State  v.  Floyd,  ib.  392,  398  ;  State  v.  Turpin, 
77  N.  C.  473,  480  ;  State  v.  Chavis,  80  id.  357  ;  State  v,  IJyrd,  id.,  28  S.  E.  353  ;  Gan. 
dolfo  v.  State,  11  Oh.  St.  114,  118;  Marts  v.  State,  26  id.  162,  168  ;  Com.  v.  Fiim^m, 
44  Pa.  388  ;  Copeland  v.  State,  7  Humph.  479,  495  ;  Williams  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  376, 
396  ;  Henderson  v.  State,  12  Tex.  525,  530. 


§  14  J.]  CHARACTER   AS   EVIDENCE   OF   AN   ACT  DONE.  41 

pose,  and  for  other  reasons  variously  stated  by  different  judges  and 
not  easy  to  disentangle  or  to  define,14  it  has  come  to  be  generally 
accepted  that  the  character  of  a  party  in  a  civil  cause  cannot  be 
looked  to  as  evidence  that  he  did  or  did  not  do  an  act  charged." 
(a)  It  is  sometimes  said  that  there  is  an  exception  where  an  act  of 
negligence  is  in  issue  and  there  were  no  eye  witnesses  of  the  occur- 
rence, and  that  here  the  person's  character  for  negligence  or  pru- 
dence is  admissible;  bnt  this  exception  does  not  generally  prevail.1' 
(£)  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  defamation 
charging  him  with  crime  may,  upon  a  plea  of  truth,  use  his  good 
character  as  evidence  in  disproof  of  the  charge,  on  the  theory  that 
he  is  practically  in  the  position  of  a  defendant  charged  with  crime ; 

M  Consult  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Radloff,  10  Excb.  97  ;  Etting  v.  U.  S.,  11  Wheat.  59,  73    ' 
Smets  v.  Plunket,  1  Strobh.  372,  375  ;  Wright  i;.  McKee,  37  Vt.  163. 

16  Among  the  following  cases  are  a  few  odd  instances  of  admission  :  Ward  v.  Herndon, 
5  Port.  382,  385  ;  Powers  v.  Armstrong,  62  Ark.  267  ;  Woodruff  v.  Whittlesey,  Kirby, 
60,  62  ;  Grandis  v.  Brandeu,  5  Day,  260,  271  ;  Anthony  v.  Grand,  101  Cal.  235  ;  Stow 
v.  Converse,  3  Conn.  345  ;  Humphrey  v.  Humphrey,  7  id.  117  ;  Boatright  v.  Porter, 
32  Ga.  130,  140  ;  Crose  v.  Eutledge,  81  III.  267;  Rogers  v.  Lamb,  3  Blackf.  155  ; 
Walker  v.  State,  6  id.  4  ;  Church  v.  Drummond,  7  id.  19  ;  Cox  v.  Pruitt,  25  Ind.  92, 
94 ;  Gebbart  v.  Burket,  57  id.  379,  385  ;  Houser  v.  State,  93  id.  231  ;  Van  Sickle  v. 
Schenck,  id.,  50  N.  E.  381  ;  Stone  v.  Ins.  Co.,  68  la.  737,  742  ;  Simpson  v.  Westen- 
berger,  28  Kan.  756;  Potter  v.  Webb,  6  Me.  14,  18  ;  Low  v.  Mitchell,  18  id.  372,  374  ; 
Thayer  v.  Boyle,  30  id.  475,  480  ;  Soule  v.  Bruce,  67  id.  584  ;  Heywood  v.  Reed, 
4  Gray,  574,  581  ;  Day  v.  Ross,  154  Mass.  14  ;  Geary  v.  Stevenson,  169  id.  23  ;  Fahey 
v.  Crotty,  63  Mich.  383  ;  Schmidt  v.  Ins.  Co.,  ib.  529,  535  ;  Munroe  v.  Godkin,  111  id. 
183 ;  Kingston  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  70  N.  W.  315  ;  Leinkauf  v.  Brinker,  62  Miss.  255  ;  Me- 
Kern  v.  Calvert,  59  Mo.  242  ;  Dudley  v.  McCluer,  65  id.  241  ;  Vawter  v.  Hultz,  112  id. 
633,  639  ;  Stoppert  v,  Nierle,  45  Nebr.  105 ;  Washburn  v.  Washburn,  5  N.  H.  195  ; 
Matthews  v.  Huntley,  9  id.  146,  148;  Boardman  v.  Woodman,  47  id.  120;  Fowler 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cow.  673;  Gough  v.  St.  John,  16  Wend.  645  (repudiating  Ruan  v. 
Perry,  3  Caines  120,  and  Townsend  «;.  Graves,  3  Paige  Ch.  453,  455) ;  Pratt  v.  An^ 
drews,  4  N.  Y.  496;  Jeffries  v.  Harris,  3  Hawks  105  ;  McRea  v.  Lilly,  1  Ired.  118  ; 
Beal  v.  Robeson,  8  id.  276  ;  Bottoms  v.  Kent,  3  Jones  L.  154  ;  Marcom  v.  Adams, 
N.  C.,  29  S.  E.  333  ;  Hunkers  v.  Ins.  Co.,  30  Or.  211 ;  Nash  v.  Gilkeson,  5  S.  &  R.  352  ; 
Dietrick  v.  Dietrick,  ib.  208  ;  Nusscar  v.  Arnold,  13  id.  323,  328  ;  Anderson  v.  Long, 
10  id.  55,  60 ;  Mertz  v.  Detweiler,  8  W.  &  S.  376,  378  ;  Porter  v.  Seiler,  23  Pa.  424, 
429  ;  Battles  w.  Laudenslager,  84  id.  446,  452;  Amer.  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hazen,  110  id. 
530,  537  ;  Rhodes  v.  Bunch,  3  McC.  66  ;  Smets  v.  Plunket,  1  Strobh.  372  ;  Gable  v. 
Ranch,  50  S.  C.  95  ;  Ketland  v.  Bissett,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  144 ;  Lander  v.  Seaver,  32  Yt. 
114  ;  Wright  v.  McKee,  37  id.  161. 

16  The  authorities  on  both  sides  are  as  follows  :  Brown  v.  R.  Co.,  22  Q.  B.  D.  393  ; 
Towle  v.  P.  I.  Co.,  98  Cal.  342  ;  Morris  v.  East  Haven,  41  Conn.  252  ;  Sanssy  v.  R.  Co., 
22  Fla.  327,  329  ;  Chic.  R.  I.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  108  111.  113  ;  Tol.  S.  L.  &  K.  C.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bailey,  145  111.  159 ;  111.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashline,  171  id.  313  ;  Penn.  F.  W.  & 
C.  R.  Co.  r/Ruby,  38  Ind.  295,  311  ;  Hall  v.  Rankin,  87  la.  261  ;  So.  Kans.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bobbins,  43  Kan.  145,  148  ;  Erb  v.  Popritz,  id.,  52  Pac.  871  ;  Lawrence  v.  Mt.  Vernon, 
35  Me.  100,  104  ;  Dunham  v.  Rackliff,  71  id.  345,  349  ;  Com.  v.  Worcester,  Thacher 
Cr.  C.  100,  102  ;  Adams  v.  Carlisle,  21  Pick.  146  ;  Baldwin  v.  R.  Co.,  4  Gray  333  ; 
Robinson  v.  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  7  id.  92,  95 ;  Tenney  v.  Tuttle,  1  All.  185 ;  Gahagan  v. 
R.  Co.,  ib.  187  ;  McDonald  v.  Savoy,  110  Mass.  49  ;  Fonda  v.  R.  Co.,  Minn.,  74  N.  W. 
166  ;  Culbertson  v.  R.  Co.,  Mo.,  36  S.  W.  834  ;  State  v.  M.  &  L.  Railroad,  52  N.  H. 
549  ;  Warner  v.  K.  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  465,  471  ;  Hays  v.  Millar,  77  Pa.  238  ;  Bait.  &  0. 
R.  Co.  v.  Colvin,  118  id.  230  ;  Misso.  &  K.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  Tex.,  48  S.  W.  568  ; 
Bryant  v.  R.  Co.,  56  Vt.  710,  712  ;  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.  v.  Rtiggles,  33  LT.  S.  App.  567  ; 
Harriman  r.  P.  P.  C.  Co.,  id.,  85  Fed.  353  ;  Carter  v.  Seattle,  Wash.,  53  Pac.  1102. 

For  other  cases  in  which  a  negligent  habit  rather  than  a  negligent  character  ii 
involved,  see  post,  §  14/.     For  negligent  character  iu  issue,  see  post,  §  14  d. 


42  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  v. 

but  this  exception  also  is  generally  repudiated.17  That  the  defendant 
in  the  action  for  defamation  may  not  use  the  plaintiff's  bad  character 
as  evidence  to  prove  a  plea  of  truth  is  conceded.18  (c)  There  are  a 
few  cases  of  admission,  usually  those  in  which  skill  or  the  like  is  in 
issue,  that  stand  as  exceptional  without  formulating  any  general 
principle.19 

(5)  Occasionally  the  character  of  a  third  person,  not  a  party  nor 
the  agent  of  a  party,  is  admitted  exceptionally.20 

(6)  The  disposition  of  an  animal,  as  showing  his  probable  conduct 
on  a  certain  occasion,  is  admissible ; 21  the  various  objections  to  the 
above  sorts  of  evidence  not  being  here  applicable.] 

§  14  c.  Character  as  otherwise  Evidentiary.  [The  character  of  a 
person  may  also  be  evidentiary  otherwise  than  as  tending  to  show  an 
act  done  or  not  done  by  him.  Such  other  uses  commonly  take  as  the 
basis  of  inference  the  reputed,  as  distinguished  from  the  actual 
character ;  i.  e.  the  reputation  is  used  as  indicating  that  some  other 
person  would  probably  have  heard  of  it  and  thus  become  aware  of  the 
character  of  the  person.  The  chief  instances  are  those  in  which 
reputation  is  used  as  indicating  knowledge,  belief,  reasonable  grounds, 
or  the  like,  in  some  other  person.  (1)  The  reputed  character  of  an 
employee  is  of  course  admissible  as  tending  to  show  that  the  employer 
had  knowledge  of  the  employee's  incompetency,  that  incompetency 

17  The  authorities  on  both  sides  are  as  follows :  Starkie,  Evidence,  II,  305,  463 ; 
Sample  v.  Wynn,  Busbee  321  ;  Matthews  v.  Huntly,  9  N.  H.  146 ;  Cornwall  v. 
Richardson,  1  Ry.  &  Mo.  305  ;  Stow  v.  Converse,  3  Conn.  343 ;  Parke  r.  Blackiston, 
3  Harringt.  373,  375  ;  Cox  v.  Strickland,  101  Ga.  482  ;  McCabe  v.  Platter,  6  Blackf. 
405  ;  Byrket  v.  Monohon,  7  id.  84  ;  Miles  v.  Van  Horn,  17  Ind.  249  ;  Harm  v.  Wilson, 
28  id.  301;  Wilson  v.  Barnett,  45  id.  163,  168;  Downey  v.  Dillon,  52  id.  442,  452; 
Gebhart  v.  Burket,  57  id.  381  ;  Hanners  v.  McClelland,  74  la.  319  ;  Harding  v.  Brooks, 
5  Pick.  244;  Finley  v.  Widmer,  Mich.,  70  N.  W.  433 ;  Chesley  v.  Chesley,  10  N.  H. 
327,  330  ;  Severance  v.  Hilton,  24  id.  148  ;  Houghtaling  v.  Kilderhouse,  1  N.  Y.  530; 
Pratt  v.  Andrews,  4  id.  496 ;  Burton  v.  March,  6  Jones  L.  409,  412. 

W  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11  Price  235  ;  Cornwall  v.  Richardson,  1  Ry.  &  Mo.  305  ;  Parke 
v.  Blackiston,  3  Harringt.  373,  375  ;  Com.  v.  Snelling,  15  Pick.  337,  343  ;  Stone  v. 
Varney,  7  Mete.  86,92;  Dewit  v.  Greenfield,  5  Oh.,  Pt.  1,  226.  Contra,  semble: 
Sanford  v.  Rowley,  93  Mich.  119.  Distinguish  the  use  of  bad  reputed  character  in 
mitigation  of  damages,  post,  §  14  d. 

19  Grannis  v.  Branden,  5  Day  260,  271  ;  Jeffries  t>.  Harris,  3  Hawks  105  ;  contra: 
Mertz  v.  Detweiler,  8  W.  &  S.  376,  378. 

80  Pendrell  v.  Pendrell,  2  Str.  925  (to  show  illegitimacy  the  character  of  the  mother 
for  unchastity  was  received);  Blackman  v.  State,  36  Ala.  295  ;  Com.  v.  Gray,  129  Mass. 
476  ;  Fall  v.  Overseers,  3  Munf.  495,  505 ;  Rowt  ».  Kile,  Gilmer  102. 

21  Broderick  v.  Higginson,  Mass.,  48  N.  E.  269  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Knfield,  43  N.  H. 
356  ;  Whittier  t>.  Franklin,  46  id.  23  ;  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Hearn,  87  Tenn.  291 ;  Dover  v. 
Winchester,  Vt.,  41  Atl.  445.  Excluded:  Kelly  v.  Anderson,  R.  I.,  37  Atl.  12; 
Stone  v.  Langworthy,  id.,  40  Atl.  832. 

The  disposition  after  the  time  in  question  may  be  relevant,  under  the  cases  first  cited. 
A  dog's  ancestry  may  be  used  to  show  his  value  :  Citizens'  P.  T.  Co.  v.  Dew,  Tenn., 
45  S.  W.  790. 

For  specific  conduct  of  the  animal,  as  evidence  of  its  disposition,  see  post,  §  140. 
For  tin-  reputation  of  an  animal,  as  evidence  of  the  owner's  knowledge  of  its  vices, 
see  post,  §  1 4  p. 

For  specific  instances  of  its  behavior,  as  showing  a  certain  object  to  be  calculated  to 
frighten  animals,  see  post,  §  14  v  (3). 


§§  14  5-14  <?.]      CHARACTER  AS   OTHERWISE   EVIDENTIARY.  43 

and  the  knowledge  of  it  being  by  the  substantive  law  a  fact  to  be 
proved.1  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  sufficient  in  law  if  the  employer 
had  the  means  to  know  and  ought  to  have  known,  and  in  such  a  case 
the  reputation  is  not  used  evidentially  but  would  suffice  as  a  matter 
of  law  to  charge  the  employer.2  (2)  The  reputed  character  of  the 
deceased  on  a  charge  of  homicide  may  be  evidential  as  indicating  his 
reasonable  apprehension  of  an  attack,  upon  an  issue  of  self-defence  ;  * 
for  iu  a  quarrel  or  other  encounter  the  opponent's  violent  or  turbulent 
character,  as  known  to  the  accused,  may  give  to  his  conduct  a  sig- 
nificance of  hostility  which  would  be  wanting  in  the  case  of  a  man  of 
ordinary  disposition.  It  is  the  essence  of  this  principle,  however,  as 
all  Courts  concede,  that  the  reputed  character  of  the  deceased  should 
have  been  known  to  the  accused ;  and,  furthermore,  most  Courts 
require  (in  order  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  the  doctrine  by  treating  the 
deceased's  bad  character  merely  as  an  excuse  for  the  killing)  that  there 
should  be  some  independent  evidence  of  aggression  by  the  deceased, 
or,  as  it  is  often  phrased,  some  overt  act  of  aggression ;  *  the  prosecu- 

1  Cook  v.  Parham,  24  Ala.  21,  34  ;  C.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  63  111.  293,  297  ; 
P.  F.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruby,  38  Ind.  294,  311  ;  Cherokee  Co.  v.  Dickson,  55  Kan. 
62  ;   Dunham  v.  Rackliff,  69  Me.  345,  349 ;  Norf.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoover,  79  Md. 
253,  263  ;  Gahagan  v.  R.  Co.,  1  All.  187,  190;  Oilman  v.  R.  Co.,  10  id.  233,  235,  239; 
13  id.  433,  444 ;  Monahan  v.  Worcester,  150  Mass.  439 ;  Driscoll  v.  Fall  River,  163 
id.   105  ;   Cox  17.   R.   Co.,   id.,  49  N.  E.  97  ;    Davis  v.  R.  Co.,  20  Mich.  105,  123 ; 
Hilts  v.  R.  Co.,  55  id.  437,  442  ;  State  v.  M.  &  L.  Railroad,  52  N.  H.  539,  549  ;  Youngs 
r.  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  764  ;  Park  v.  R.  Co.,  155  id.  215 ;  Tex.  &  P.  R,  Co.  v.  Johnson, 

89  Tex.  519;  Bait.  &  0.  R,  Co.  v.  Henthorne,  43  U.  S.  App.  113;  Central  Vt.  R.  Co. 
i>.  Ruggles,  33  id.  567. 

2  Davis  r.  R.  Co.,  20  Mich.  105,  123;  Monahan  v.  Worcester,  Oilman  v.  R.  Co., 
Norf.  &  W.  R.  Co.  17.  Hoover,  supra. 

8  Compare  the  other  use,  in  the  preceding  section,  14  &  (3). 

*  Space  does  not  suffice  to  indicate  the  exact  tenor  of  each  decision,  nor  the  solution 
of  the  detailed  questions  that  arise  ;  the  Louisiana  rulings  should  be  avoided  by  other 
Courts,  as  they  are  in  hopeless  confusion  through  frequently  failing  to  take  note  of  the 
preceding  cases,  and  as  their  overt-act  limitation  is  peculiar;  for  the  general  principle, 
consult  the  opinions  of  Lumpkin,  J.,  in  Monroe  w.  State,  5  Ga.  137  ;  Walker,  J.,  in 
Franklin  v.  State,  29  Ala.  17  ;  Fisher,  J.,  in  Cotton  17.  State,  31  Miss.  511  ;  Roberts, 
C.  J. ,  in  Horbach  v.  State,  43  Tex.  250  (best  statement);  the  precedents  are  as  follows 
(briefly  summarizing  them,  the  doctrine  is  recognized  wherever  it  has  been  invoked,  ex- 
cept in  Delaware,  Maine,  and  Massachusetts)  :  Quessenberry  v.  State,  3  Stew.  &  P.  308, 
315 ;  Pritchett  v.  State,  22  Ala.  39 ;  Franklin  v.  State,  29  id.  10,  14  ;  Eiland  ».  State, 
52  id.  333  ;  Roberts  r.  State,  68  id.  165  ;  DeArman  v.  State,  71  id.  360;  Storey  v.  State, 
ib.  329,  341  ;  Williams  v.  State,  74  id.  18,  20 ;  Smith  v.  State,  88  id.  77  ;  Amos  v. 
State,  96  id.  120  ;  Karr«».  State,  100  id.  4;  Rufus  v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  144  ;  Naugher 
v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  26 ;  Palmore  v.  State,  29  Ark.  248,  261,  263  ;  People  17.  Murray, 
10  Cal.  309 ;  People  r.  Lombard,  17  id.  316,  320  ;  People  v.  Edwards,  41  id.  640, 
643  ;  People  v.  Howard,  112  id.  135  ;  Davidson  p.  People,  4  Col.  145,  150  ;  State  v. 
Thawley,  4  Harringt.  562 ;  Bond  17.  State,  21  Fla.  738,  756 ;  Garner  v.  State,  28  id. 
113,  136;  31  id.  170,  174;  Roten  v.  State,  31  id.  514,  523;  Steele  v.  State,  33  id. 
348,  350  ;  Hart  ».  State,  38  id.  39  ;  Allen  «7.  State,  ib.  44  ;  Monroe  v.  State,  5  Ga.  85, 
137 ;  Keener  17.  State,  18  id.  194,  220  ;  Bowie  v.  State,  19  id.  7  ;  Croom  v.  State, 

90  id.  430  ;  Daniel  v.  State,  id.,  29  S.  E.  767  ;  People  v.  Stack,  1  Ida.  218  ;  Davis  17. 
State,  114  111.  86,  95  ;  Dukes  v.  State,  11  Ind.  556,  565  ;  Fahnestock  v.  State,  23  id. 
231,  237  ;  Boyle  ».  State,  97  id.  322,  324  ;  Bowlus  v.  State,  130  id.  227;  Wise  v.  State, 
2  Kan.  419  :  State  17.  Potter,  13  id.  414,  423  ;  State  v.  Riddle,  20  id.  711,  714;  State  v. 
Scott,  24  id.  68,  70 ;  Payne  v.  Corn.,  1  Mete.  Ky.  370,  379  ;   Bohannon  v.  Com., 
8  Bush  481,  488;  Riley  v.  Com.,  94  Ky.  266;  State  v.  Chandler,  5  La.  An.  489} 


44  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

tiou  is,  however,  usually  not  allowed  to  use  in  the  same  way  the 
deceased's  reputation  for  peaceableness,6  except  in  rebuttal,6  though 
principle  would  seem  to  lead  to  the  opposite  conclusion.7 

(3)  The  reputed  character  of  an  arrested  person,  on  a  charge  of 
malicious  prosecution  or  other  issue  in  which  the  reasonable  grounds 
for  arrest  or  prosecution  are  involved,  may  tend  to  show  the  existence 
of  such  grounds,  and  is  generally  admitted.8] 

§  14  d.  Character  in  Issue.  [Character  is  often,  by  the  substan- 
tive law  of  the  case,  a  part  of  the  issue,  and  is  not  used  as  tending  to 
prove  any  other  fact.  In  such  a  case  its  admission  involves  only  a 
question  of  that  substantive  law,  and  no  question  of  evidence.  The 

State  v.  D'Angelo,  9  id.  48  ;  State  v.  Brien,  10  id.  453  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  12  id. 
679;  State  v.  Robertson,  38  id.  340;  State  v.  Burns,  ib.  679;  Stater.  Vance,  32  id. 
1177  ;  State  v.  Ricks,  ib.  1098  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  33  id.  1087  ;  State  v.  McNeely,  34 
id.  1022  ;  State  v.  Claude,  35  id.  71,  74  ;  State  v.  Garic,  ib.  970,  971 ;  State  v.  Watson, 
36  id.  148  ;  State  v.  Birdwell,  ib.  859,  861;  State  v.  Saunders,  37  id.  389  ;  State  v. 
Ford,  ib.  443,  460  ;  State  v.  Janvier,  ib.  644;  State  v.  Kervin,  ib.  782  ;  State  v.  Jack- 
son, ib.  896  ;  State  v.  Williams,  40  id.  16& ;  State  v.  Cosgrove,  42  id.  753  ;  State  v. 
Paterno,  43  id.  514  ;  State  v.  Christian,  44  id.  950,  954  ;  State  v.  Stewart,  45  id.  1164, 
1166  ;  State  v.  Carter,  ib.  1326  ;  State  v.  Nash,  ib.  1137,  1141 ;  State  v.  Williams,  46 
id.  708  ;  State  v.  Beck,  ib.  1419  ;  State  v.  Green,  ib.  1522 ;  State  v.  Vallery,  47  id. 
182  ;  State  v.  Campagnet,  48  id.  1470 ;  State  v.  Field,  14  Me.  244 ;  Com.  v.  York, 
7  Law  Reporter,  Mass.,  497,  507  ;  Com.  v.  Milliard,  2  Gray  294  ;  Com.  v.  Mead,  12 
id.  167  ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9,  15  ;  Brownell  v.  People,  38  id.  732,  735 ; 
State  v.  Dumphey,  4  Minn.  438,  445  ;  Jolly  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  223,  225  ;  Cotton  v. 
State,  31  Miss.  504  ;  Wesley  v.  State,  37  id.  327,  346  ;  Chase  v.  State,  46  id.  683,  703  ; 
Harris  v.  State,  46  id.  319,  325  ;  Spivey  t>.  State,  58  id.  858,  864 ;  King  v.  State, 
65  id.  576,  582  ;  Moriarty  v.  State,  62  id.  654,  661  ;  Smith  v.  State,  id.,  23  So. 
260;  State  v.  Jackson,  17  Mo.  544,  548;  State  v.  Hicks,  27  id.  588,  590  ;  State  v. 
Keene,  50  id.  357,  360  ;  State  v.  Bryant,  55  id.  75,  78  ;  State  v.  Harris,  59  id.  550, 
556  ;  State  v.  Elkins,  63  id.  165  ;  State  v.  Kennade,  121  id.  405,  415  ;  State  v.  Pearce, 
15  Nev.  188,  191 ;  People  v.  Lamb,  41  N.  Y.  360,  366  ;  Abbott  v.  People,  86  id.  461, 
469  ;  State  v.  Turpin,  77  N.  C.  473,  477 ;  State  v.  Chavis,  80  id.  357  ;  State  v.  Rollins, 
113  id.  722,  732;  State  v.  Byrd,  id.,  28  S.  E.  353;  Gandolfo  v.  State,  11  Oh.  St. 
114,  118  ;  Marts  v.  State,  26  id.  162,  168  ;  State  v.  Morey,  25  Or.  241,  255  ;  Pa.  v, 
Robertson,  Add.  246  ;  Com.  v.  Lenox,  3  Brewst.  249,  251  :  Com.  v.  Kerrigan,  44  Pa. 
388  ;  Com.  v.  Straesser,  153  id.  451  ;  State  v.  Smith,  12  Rich.  430,  443  ;  State  v. 
Turner,  29  S.  C.  34,  41 ;  Wright  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  342 ;  Carroll  v.  State,  3  Humph. 
315,  317;  Harmon  v.  State,  3  Head  243  ;  Williams  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  376,  397 ;  Jack- 
son v.  State,  6  Baxt.  452,  465  ;  Henderson  v.  State,  12  Tex.  525,  530  ;  Dorsey  v.  State, 
34  id.  651,  658  ;  Horbach  v.  State,  43  id.  242,  255  ;  Evers  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  318  ; 
Skaggs  v.  State,  ib.  563  ;  Smith  v.  U.  S.,  161  U.  S.  85  ;  Andersen  v.  U.  S.,  170 
id.  481;  State  v.  Lull,  48  Vt.  581 ;  Dock  r.  Com.,  21  Gratt.  909,  911;  State  v. 
McGonigle,  14  Wash.  594 ;  State  v.  Evans,  33  W.  Va.  417,  424 ;  State  v.  Nett,  50 
Wis.  524,  527  ;  Brucker  v.  State,  19  id.  539. 

'  People  P.  Anderson,  39  Cal.  704  ;  People  v.  Powell,  87  id.  348,  362  ;  Pound  v. 
State,  43  Ga.  88,  129  ;  State  v.  Potter,  13  Kan.  414,  423;  State  v.  Vaughan,  22  Nev. 
285  ;  Dock  v.  Com.,  21  Gratt.  909,  912. 

«  Davis  v.  People,  114  111.  86,  95;  Dukes  v.  State,  11  lud.  557,  665;  Fields  v. 
State,  134  id.  45,  56 ;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  218,  224. 

i  Carroll  v.  State,  3  Humph.  315,  317;  see  State  v.  Pettit,  119  Mo.  410. 

8  Fabrigas  v.  Mostyn,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  94;  Rodriguez  v.  Tadmire,  2  Esp.  721; 
Downing  v.  Butcher,  2  M.  &  Rob.  374  ;  Martin  v.  Hardesty,  27  Ala.  458;  Oliver  v. 
Pate,  43  Ind.  132,  138  ;  Gregory  v,  Thomas,  2  Bibb  286  ;  Bacon  v.  Towne,  4  Cush. 
240  ;  Geary  v.  Stevenson,  169  Mass.  23  ;  Dorsey  v.  Clapp,  22  Nebr.  564,  568  ;  Beck  man 
v.  Souther,  N.  H.,  36  Atl.  14.  Contra:  Newsam  v.  Carr,  2  Stark.  69  ;  R.  v.  Turbei- 
field,  Ixiigh  &  C.  495. 

For  the  similar  use  of  particular  acts  of  misconduct  by  the  arrested  or  prosecuted 
person,  tee  post,  §  14  p. 


§§  14<?-14<i]  CHARACTER   IN  ISSUE.  45 

chief  instances  of  this  use  may  here  be  noted,  in  order  to  discriminate 
them  from  the  foregoing  evidentiary  uses. 

(1)  Reputed  Bad  Character  as  Mitigating  Damages  for  Defamation. 
Where  the  question  is  as  to  the  amount  of  compensation  for  defa- 
mation of  character,  it  is  a  plausible  argument  that  the  defendant 
should  be  allowed  to  show  how  little  the  plaintiff  had  to  lose.1  The 
argument  in  reply  is  that  if  such  were  the  rule  a  person  of  poor 
reputation  could  never  recover  but  nominal  or  light  damages  and 
might  thus  be  defamed  with  impunity.8  In  most  jurisdictions  the 
former  argument  has  prevailed,  and  the  defendant  may  show  the 
plaintiff's  bad  reputation  in  mitigation.  Several  distinctions,  how- 
ever, must  be  noted,  (a)  If  the  general  issue  is  pleaded,  the  amount 
of  damages  is  properly  in  issue,  and  the  result  in  almost  all  juris- 
dictions is  as  above ;  (£>)  if  a  justification  of  truth  is  pleaded,  some 
Courts  hold  that  to  allow  the  defendant  to  go  into  the  plaintiff's 
reputation  would  in  effect  merely  allow  him  to  abuse  the  plaintiff's 
character  instead  of  properly  proving  his  plea ;  *  and  (c)  this  is  even 
maintained  by  some  where  the  charge  is  a  general  one  —  e.g.  A  is  a 
fraudulent  rogue —  and  where  the  general  character  is  thus  in  issue 
on  the  plea  of  truth ; 4  (d)  in  the  Courts  admitting  the  plaintiff's  bad 
reputation,  a  further  difference  arises  as  to  whether  (d1)  his  general 
bad  reputation  alone  may  be  used,6  or  (d")  only  his  reputation  for 
the  particular  trait  involved  in  the  defamation,  e.  g.  honesty, 
chastity,  etc.,6  or  (d'")  both  may  be  used.  Speaking  roughly  and 
tentatively,  the  state  of  the  law  seems  to-  be :  (a)  is  now  the  rule 
everywhere  except  perhaps  in  Delaware  and  Vermont;  (b)  is  upheld 
probably  in  Delaware  and  Pennsylvania,  but  repudiated  in  England, 
Illinois,  Indiana,  Massachusetts,  New  York,  Virginia,  and  perhaps 
Wisconsin ;  (c)  is  perhaps  law  to  the  same  extent ;  (d1)  is  no  longer 
the  law  anywhere ;  (d")  is  maintained  in  Kentucky,  Michigan, 
Missouri,  Pennsylvania,  Vermont,  and  perhaps  Wisconsin ;  (d'n)  is 
the  rule  in  England,  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  South  Carolina, 
and  Virginia.7  (e)  It  has  also  been  a  matter  of  great  controversy 

1  See  the  exposition  in  Holt's  N.  P.  308,  arguendo ;  Scott  v.  Sampson,  8  Q.  B.  D. 
491 ;  Foot  v.  Tracy,  1  Johns.  46  ;  Buford  v.   M'Luny,  1   Nott  &  M.  269  ;  Sawyer  v. 
Eifert,  2  id.  515. 

2  See  the  expositions  in  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11  Price  235,  256 ;  Foot  v.  Tracy,  supra  ; 
Buford  v.  M'Luny,  supra. 

8  See  M'Nutt  v.  Young,  8  Leigh  542. 
*  See  J'Anson  v.  Stuart,  1  T.  R.  748. 

6  See  Steinman  v.  Me  Williams,  6  Pa.  175  ;  Conroe  v.  Conroe,  47  id.  202. 
8  See  Wilson  v.  Noonan,  27  Wis.  614. 

7  Space  does  not  suffice  to  analyze  each  ruling  :  Dennis  v.  Pawling,  Vin.  Abr.  XIT, 
159  ;  Hickinbothom  v.  Leach,  10  M.  &  W.  361  ;  Scott  v.  Sampson,  8  Q.   B.    D.   491 
(noting  intervening  rulings);  Zierenberg  v.  Labouchere,  1892,  2  Q.  B.  183;  Powell  v. 
Harper,  5  C.  &  P.  590,  592  ;  Stark.  Evid.,  II,  306  A-,  641  e ;  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11  Price  235, 
273  ;  Myers  v.  Carrie,  22  U.  C.  0.  B.  470  ;  Commons  v.  Walters,  1  Port.  322,  327  ; 
Waters  v.  Jones,  3  id.  442,  450  ;  Bradley  v.  Gibson,  9  Ala.  408  ;  Scott  v.  McKinnish, 
15  id.  665  ;  Brunson  v.  Lynde,   1  Root  354;  Seymour  v.  Merrills,   ib.  459;  Austin  ». 
Hanchet,  2  id.  148  ;  Stow  v.  Converse,  3  Conn.  346;  Treat  v.  Browing,  4  id.  414 1 


46  BELEVANCY;    CIECUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v, 

whether,  in  showing  the  plaintiff's  bad  reputation,  the  defendant 
could  show  less  than  a  real  reputation,  i.  e.  a  prevalent  rumor  or 
common  belief  that  the  plaintiff  had  done  the  act  charged;  the  argu- 
ment being  that  in  that  event  he  could  not  have  been  much  injured 
by  the  charge.8  This  argument  has  been  in  most  jurisdictions 
repudiated.9 

(2)  Reputed  Bad  Character  as  Mitigating  Damages  in  other  Actions. 
On  the  generally  accepted  principle  of  the  preceding  paragraph, 
reputed  character  may  be  considered  in  mitigation  of  damages  in  any 
action  in  which  the  harm  to  reputation  is  recognized  as  an  element  of 

Bennett  ».  Hyde,  6  id.  24  ;  Waples  v.  Burton,  2  Harringt.  446  ;  Parke  v.  Blackiston, 

3  id.  373,  375  ;  Young  v.  Bennett,  5  111.  43,  47 ;  Sheahan  v.  Collins,  20  id.  328 ; 
Henson  v.  Veatch,  1  Blackf.  371  ;  Sanders  v.  Johnson,  6  id.  52;  Burke  v.  Miller,  ib. 
155;  McCabe  v.  Platter,  ib.  405  ;   Bickenstaff  v.    Perrin,    27  Ind.  528  ;  Manners  v. 
McClelland,    74    la.    318,  322;    Eastland  v.  Caldwell,    2  Bibb   21,   23;  Campbell   v. 
Bannister,  79  Ky.  209;  Ratcliff  v.  Courier-Journal,  99  Ky.  416;  Kendrick  v.  Kemp,  6 
Mart.  N.  s.  La.  500;  Smith  v.  Wyman,   16  Me.  14;  Wolcott  v.  Hall,  6  Mass.  518; 
Ross  v.  Lapham,  14  id.  279;  Bodwell  v.  Swan,  3  Pick.  376;  Com.  v.  Siielling,  ]5  id. 
337,  344;  Stone  v.  Varney,  7  Mete.  86  ;  Chapman  v.  Ordway,  5  All.  595  ;  Parkhurst 
v.  Ketchum,  6  id.  406  ;   Peterson  v.  Morgan,  116  Mass.  350;  Clark  v.  Brown,  ib.  509; 
Hastings  v.  Stone,  130  id.  76,  78  ;  Proctor  v.  Houghtaling,  37  Mich.  41,  44  ;  Bathrick 
v.  Post,'  50  id.  641 ;  Thibault  v.  Sessions,  101  id.  279,  290  ;  Finley  v.  Widiier,  id.,  70 
N.   W.   433  ;  Georgia  v.  Bond,  id.,  72  N".  W.  232  ;  Fowler  v.  Fowler,  id.,  71  N.  W. 
1084  ;  Candrian  v.  Miller,  id.,  73  N.  W.  1004  ;  Simmons'^.  Holster,  13  Minn.  249,  257; 
Powers  v.  Presgroves,  38  Miss.  227,  241  ;  Anthony  v.  Stephens,  1  Mo.  254  ;  Lamos  v. 
Snell,  6  N.  H.  413;   Severance  v.  Hilton,  24  id.  148;   Foot  r.  Tracy,  ]  John.  46; 
Paddock  v.  Salisbury,  2  Cow.  811 ;  Douglass  v.  Tousey,  2  Wend.  352 ;  King  v.  Root, 

4  id.  139;   Hamer  "v.   McFarlin,    4   Den.   509;    Vick  v.  Whitfield,    2   Hayw.    222; 
Sample  v.  Wynn,  Busbee  320;  Dewit  v.  Greenfield,  5  Oh.  225;  Fisher  v.  Patterson, 
14  id.  418,  425  ;  Anderson  v.  Long,  10  S.  &  R.  61 ;  Henry  v.  Norwood,  4  Watts  347, 
350;  Smith  v.  Ruckecker,  4  Rawle  295;  Steinman  v.  Me  Williams,  6  Pa.  170,  174; 
Conroe  v.  Conroe,  47  id.  198  ;  Moyer  v.  Moyer,  49  id.  210 ;  Buford  v.  M'Luny,  1  Nott 
&  M.  268  ;  Sawyer  v.  Eifert,  2  id.  511  ;  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  251,  253  ;  Randall  v.  Hol- 
senbake,  3  id.  177  ;  M'Nutt  v.  Young,  8  Leigh  542  ;  Lincoln  v.  Clansman,  10  id.  338, 

342  ;  Adams  ».  Lawson,  17  Gratt.  259 ;  Smith  v.  Shumway,  2  Tyler  74  ;  B v. 

I ,  22  Wls.  372 ;  Wilson  v.  Noonan,  27  id.  599,  612  ;  Maxwell  v.  Kennedy,  50  id. 

645  ;  Haskins  v.  Lumsden,  10  id.  359,  369  ;  Campbell  v.  Campbell,  54  id.  90,  97  ; 
Shroyer  v.  Miller,  3  W.  Va.  158,  161. 

8  See  Bell  v.  Parke,  11  Ir.  C.  L.  413  ;  Scott  v.  Sampson,  8  Q.  B.  D.  491 ;  Long  v. 
Brougher,  5  Watts  440. 

9  See  Leicester  v.  Walter,  2  Camp.  251  ;  Scott  v.  Sampson,  8  Q.  B.  D.  491  (noting 
intervening  cases)  ;  Commons  v.  Walters,  1  Port.  323  ;  Bradley  v.  Gibson,  9  Ala.  406  ; 
Holley  v.  Burgess,  ib.  730  ;  Bailey  v.  Hyde,  3  Conn.  463,  466 ;  Treat  v.  Browning, 
4  id.  408,  414 ;  Cox  v.  Strickland,  101  Ga/482  ;  Sheahan  v.  Collins,  20  111.  328  ;  Henson 
v.  Veatch,  1  Blackf.  371  ;  Sanders  v.  Johnson,  6  id.  54  ;  Kelley  v.  Dillon,  5  Ind.  428 ; 
Bickenstaff  v.  Perrin,  27  id.  528  ;  Hanners  v.  McClelland,  74*  la.  320,  322  ;  Barr  v. 
Hack,  46  id.  310;  Kendrick  v.  Kemp,  6  Mart.  N.  s.  500;  Wolcott  v.  Hall,  6  Mass. 
518  ;  Alderman  v.  French,   1  Pick.  1,  17;  Stone  v.  Varney,  7  Mete.  91;  Watson  v. 
Moore,  2  Gush.  140  ;  Peterson  u.  Morgan,  116  Mass.  350  ;  Proctor  v.  Houghtaling,  37 
Mich.  41,  44;  Wolff  v.  Smith,  id.,  70  N.  W.  1010  ;  Simmons  v.  Holster,  13  Minn. 
249,   257;  Powers  v.   Presgroves,   38  Miss.  227,  241;  Anthony  v.  Stephens,  1   Mo. 
254  ;  Moberly  v.  Preston,  8  id.  462,  466;  Mason  v.  Mason,  4  N.  H.  114  ;  Dame  v. 
Kenney,  25  id.  318  ;  King  v.  Root,  4  Wend.  129,  140;  Kennedy  v.  Gifford,  19  id.  298, 
301  ;  Nelson  t>.  Evans,  1  Dev.  9  ;  Luther  v.  Skeen,  8  Jones  L.  356  ;  Dewit  v.  Green- 
field, 5  Oh.  226 ;  Fisher  v.  Patterson,  14  id.  418,  425  ;  Van  Derveer  v.  Sutphin,  5  Oh. 
St.  293,  298  ;  Smith  v.  Ruckecker,  4  Rawle  295  ;  Long  v.  Brougher,  5  Watts  439  ; 
Freeman  v.  Price,  2  Bail.  115;  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  251,  253  ;  Randall  v.  Holsenbake, 
3  id.  177  ;  Haskins  v.  Lumsden,  10  Wis.  359.     Compare  the  exclusion  of  particular 
acts  as  evidence  of  such  reputed  character  in  mitigation  of  damages,  post,  §  14  A. 


§  14  d.]  CHARACTER  IN  ISSUE.  47 

•recovery  ;  in  particular,  the  daughter's  reputation  for  chastity  in  the 
father's  action  for  seduction;  10  the  wife's  reputation  in  the  husband's 
action  for  criminal  conversation  ;  u  and  the  reputation  of  the  plaintiff 
in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution,1*  breach  of  promise  of  mar- 
riage,1*  or  indecent  assault.  * 

(3)  The  plaintiff's   good  reputed  character  in  the  above  instances 
should  not  be  admitted  until  after  the  defendant  has  offered  to  show 
a  bad  reputation;  because  the  reputation  may  be  assumed  to  be 
good.16 

(4)  Character  otherwise  in  Issue.     In  general,  wherever  by  the  siib- 
stantive  law  of  the  case  a  person's  character  is  a  part  of  the  issue,  it 
may  of  course  be  proved ;  the  chief  remaining  instances  are  (a)  the 
character   of  the  plaintiff  for  chastity,   in  an  action  for  breach  of 
promise  of  marriage,  as  an  excuse  for  the  breach  ; 16  (fr)  the  character 
of  an  employee,  in  actions  by  a  fellow-servant  against  the  employer;  " 
(c)  the  character  of  a  house  or  a  person  on  the  charge  of  keeping  a 
house  of  ill-fame  ;  here  (c')  the  reputation  of  the  house  is  in  issue, 
if  the  crime  consists  in  the  ill-fame  of  the  house  kept  ; 18  (c")  the 
definition  of  such  a  house  usually  implies  a  resort  to  it  by  persons 

1°  Bamfield  v.  Massey,  1  Camp.  460  ;  Dodd  v.  Norris,  3  id.  519  ;  Carpenter  v.  Wall, 
11  A.  &  E.  804  ;  M'Creary  v.  Grundy,  39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  316  ;  Drish  v.  Davenport,  2  Stew. 
266,  270  ;  Davenport  v.  Russell,  5  Day  145,  148  ;  Robinson  v.  Burton,  5  Harringt.  335, 
337  ;  White  v.  Murtland,  71  111.  250,  264  ;  Shattuck  v.  Myers,  13  Ind.  50;  Bell  v. 
Rinker,  29  id.  269  ;  South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  id.  580  ;  Carter  v.  Cavenaugh,  1  Greene 
171,  175;  Boynton  v.  Kellogg,  3  Mass.  189;  McKern  v.  Calvert,  59  Mo.  242;  Akerley 
v.  Haines,  2  Caines  292  ;  Pratt  v.  Andrews,  4  N.  Y.  495;  Hoffman  ».  Kemerer,  44  Pa. 
452 ;  Reed  v.  Williams,  5  Sneed  580,  582  ;  Thompson  v.  Clendening,  1  Head  287,  296  ; 
Watry  v.  Ferber,  18  Wis.  500,  503. 

11  Starkie,  Evidence,  II,  305;  Davenport  «.  Russell,  5  Day  145,  148;  Grose  v.  Rut- 
ledge,  81  111.  266  ;  Pratt  v.  Andrews,  4  N.  Y.  495 ;  Anderson  v.  Long,  10  S.  &  R.  61; 
Ligon  v.  Ford,  5  Munf.  10,  16. 

12  Bacon  v.  Towne,  4  Gush.  240  ;  Wolf  v.  Ferryman,  82  Tex.  112,  120. 

18  McGregor  v.  Mo  Arthur,  5  U.  C.  C.  P.  493 ;  Burnett  v.  Simpkins,  24  111.  267  ; 
Williams  v.  Hollingsworth,  6  Baxt.  12,  16. 

«  Gore  v.  Curtis,  81  Me.  403,  405  ;  Miller  v.  Curtis,  163  Mass.  127, 130;  Mitchell  v. 
Work,  13  R.  I.  645. 

15  Defamation;  accord:  Parke  v.  Blackiston,  3  Harringt.  373,  375;  McCabe  v.  Plat- 
ter, 6  Blackf.  405  ;  Miles  v.  Vauhorn,  17  Ind.  249  ;  Harm  v.  Wilson,  28  id.  301 ; 
Harding  v.  Brooks,  5  Pick.  244  ;  Severance  v.  Hilton,  24  N.  H.  148  ;  Dame  v.  Kenney, 
25  id.  324  ;  Cooper  v.  Phipps,  24  Or.  357,  362 ;  Blakeslee  v.  Hughes,  50  Oh.  St.  490  ; 
contra:  R.  v.  Waring,  5  Esp.  13;  Givens  v.  Bradley,  3  Bibb  192,  195;  Stafford  v. 
Assoc.,  142  N.  Y.  598  ;  Sample  v.  Wynn,  Busbee  322;  Adams  v.  Lawson,  17  Gratt. 
250,  258 ;  Shroyer  v.  Miller,  3  W.  Va.  158,  161. 

Seduction :  See  Bamfield  v.  Massey,  1  Camp.  460  ;  Dodd  v.  N  orris,  3  id.  520  ;  Pratt 
v.  Andrews,  4  N.  Y.  493;  State  v.  Leuihan,  88  la.  670,  673. 

Crim.  con. :  See  R.  v.  Francis,  3  Esp.  116  ;  Pratt  v.  Andrews,  4  N.  Y.  493. 

Malicious  prosecution :  See  Goldsmith  v.  Picard,  27  Ala.  142,  153. 

*6  Foulkes  v.  Sellway,  3  Esp.  236  ;  Woodard  v.  Bellamy,  2  Root  354  ;  Von  Storch 
v.  Griffin,  77  Pa.  504  ;  Smith  v.  Hall,  Conn.,  38  Atl.  386. 

17  This  use  needs  no  citation  of  precedents  ;  for  the  use  of  reputation  as  indicating 
the  employer's  knowledge,  see  the  preceding  section. 

18  Coldwell  v.  State,  17  Conn.  467,  472;  State  v.  Morgan,  40  id.  44  ;  State  v.  Buck- 
ley, ib.  246  ;   State  v.  Thomas,  47  id.  546 ;   State  v.  Brunell,  29  Wis.  435.     If  the 
actual  use  and  character  of  the  house  is  the  criminal  element,  then  the  reputation  is 
merely  hearsay  evidence  of  this  character ;  see  post,  §  140  b. 


48  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  v. 

either  actually  prostitutes  or  reputed  as  such,  and  thus  the  character, 
reputed  or  real,  of  such  frequenters  may  be  shown  ;19  (d)  the  character 
of  the  woman  in  a  statutory  prosecution  for  seduction™] 

2.    Evidence  to  prove  Character. 

§  14  e.  In  general.  [There  are  three  conceivable  ways  of  evidenc- 
ing the  character  of  a  human  being  :  first,  by  the  testimony  of  those 
who  personally  know  him ;  secondly,  by  his  reputation  in  the  com- 
munity ;  thirdly,  by  particular  instances  of  his  conduct  evincing  the 
trait  of  character.  The  first  mode  has  been  a  matter  of  much  contro- 
versy, and  as  it  raises  essentially  the  same  questions  when  offered  to 
prove  a  witness'  character,  it  will  be  considered  in  that  place.1  The 
second  is  receivable  only  by  way  of  excepting  to  the  Hearsay  rule  ; 2 
but  as  its  chief  questions  are  the  same  as  those  arising  in  the  proof 
of  a  witness'  character,  it  is  dealt  with  under  that  head.8  The  third 
method,  here  to  be  considered  in  detail,  is  usually  open  to  one  or 
more  of  the  objections  mentioned  in  §  14  a,  ante,  i.  e.  undue  preju- 
dice, unfair  surprise,  and  confusion  of  issues.  These  objections  are 
in  some  classes  of  cases  allowed  to  prevail,  in  others  not. 

§  14  /'.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evidence  of  an  Accused's  Character. 
Here  such  evidence  is  universally  agreed  to  be  inadmissible  ;  all 
three  of  the  above  reasons,  but  particularly  the  first,  being  regarded 
as  potent.1  It  seems  equally  well  established,  though  with  less  rea- 
son, that  the  accused  himself  cannot  employ  particular  acts  of  good 
conduct  as  evidence  of  his  good  character.2  When  the  accused  be- 
comes a  witness,  however,  he  may  be  treated  as  a  witness  by  cross- 
examination  as  to  past  misconduct  impeaching  his  credibility ; 8  and  on 
the  cross-examination  of  witnesses  to  character,  whether  of  a  defend- 
ant or  a  witness,  the  testimony  may  be  tested  by  asking  whether  the 
witness  has  heard  of  specific  misconduct.4  The  important  bearing  of 

19  Wooster  v.  State,  55  Ala.  221  ;  State  v.  Jerome,  33  Conn.  265,  269  ;  Com.  v.  Kim- 
ball,  9  Gray,  328;  Com.  v.  Gannett,  1  All.  7;  Com.  v.  Cardoze,  119  Mass.  210; 
Shaffer  v.  State,  Md.,  39  Atl.  313  ;  State  v.  Hendrieks,  15  Mont.  194  ;  Clementine  v. 
State,  14  Mo.  113  ;  State  v.  M'Gregor,  41  N.  H.  407  J  State  v.  Hull,  18  E.  I.  207 ; 
State  v.  McDowell,  Dudley  S.  C.  346. 

2D  For  this,  see  post,  §  14  h. 

1  Post,  §  461  c. 

2  See  post,  §  140  6. 
8  Post,  §  461  d. 

1  For  the  reasoning,  see  K.  v.  Oddy,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  264  ;  Dowling  ».  State,  5  Sm.  & 
M.  686  ;  State  v.  Lapage,  57  N.  H.  299  ;  Com.  v.  Jackson,  132  Mass.  20  ;  People  v. 
Dye,  75  Cal.  112.     No  further  citations  are  needed,  as  the  rule  is  never  questioned. 

2  Home  Tooke's  Trial,  25  How.  St.  Tr.  359  ;  Davison's  Trial,  31  id.  187  ;  O'Con- 
nor's Trial,  27  id.  31  ;  R.  v.  Rowton,  Leigh  &  C.  541  ;  Hussey  v.  State,  87  Ala.  133  ; 
Smalls  v.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  153  ;  State  v.  Ferguson,  Conn.,  41  Atl.  769  ;  Whito  v. 
Com.,  80  Ky.  485.     The  older  rule  was  to  the  contrary :  McNally,  Evidence,  322 ; 
Murphy's  Trial,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  725  ;  State  v.  Parker,  7  La.  An.  83,  88  ;  and  it  per- 
•isted  in  English  practice  for  some  time  in  trials  for  treason  :  R.  v.  O'Connor,  4  State 
Tr.  N.  s.  935,  1162  ;  R.  v.  Raukin,  7  id.  711,  747. 

•  Post,  §  444  b. 

*  Post,  §  461  b. 


§§  14^-14^.]        EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   CHARACTER.  49 

the  general  rule  above  is  that  the  prosecution  may  never  use  other 
misconduct  of  the  accused  against  him  merely  as  indicating  him  to 
be  a  bad  man,  and  therefore  likely  to  have  done  the  act  charged  ; 5 
there  must  be  some  definite  evidential  connection  between  the  act 
charged  and  the  other  misconduct,  so  that  the  latter  evidences 
knowledge,  intent,  identity,  etc.6] 

§  14  g.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evidence  of  other  Persons'  Charac- 
ter used  evidentially.  It  has  already  been  seen  that  in  some  other 
instances  (than  that  of  an  accused  person)  character  may  be  used 
evidentially  to  show  the  doing  of  an  act ; 1  in  proving  such  character, 
may  particular  instances  of  conduct  be  used  in  evidence  ?  (1)  Though 
the  character  of  a  person  for  negligence  or  prudence  is  sometimes 
allowed  to  be  shown,2  still  this  sort  of  evidence  of  it  is  generally  ex- 
cluded, for  the  reasons  already  mentioned.8  (2)  Though  the  char- 
acter for  chastity  of  a  complainant  in  rape  is  generally  regarded  as 
relevant,  there  has  been  much  controversy  over  the  use  of  particular 
acts  of  unchastity  as  evidence  of  that  character.  There  are  potent 
reasons  on  each  side ; 4  but  the  better  view  seems  to  admit  them,  at 
least  with  the  limitation  (to  avoid  the  objection  of  surprise)  that 
they  may  only  be  asked  about  on  cross-examination  of  the  complain- 
ant.8 (3)  On  the  analogy  of  the  use  of  the  character  of  the  deceased, 

6  For  the  use  of  a  former  conviction  of  crime  as  affecting  the  measure  of  the  sen- 
tence, see  People  v.  Sickles,  N.  Y.,  51  N.  E.  238,  aud  post,  §  444  b. 
6  For  this  use,  see  post,  §  14  q. 

1  Ante,  §  14  b  (2)  and  (4). 

2  Ante,  §§146,  14  d. 

8  Admitted:  Fulrnore  v.  R.  W.,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  589,  sernble;  Plummer  v.  Ossi- 
pee,  59  N.  H.  59;  Desbrack  v.  State,  38  Oh.  St.  365  ;  Mack  v.  R.  Co.,  S.  C.,  29 
S.  E.  905. 

Excluded:  Little  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrell,  58  Ark.  454,  468  ;  Pacheco  v.  Mfg. 
Co.,  113  Cal.  541 ;  Rowland  v.  R.  Co.,  115  id.  487  ;  Morris  v.  East  Haven,  41  Conn. 
252,  254  ;  Lanfer  v.  Traction  Co.,  68  id.  475  ;  Aug.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Randell,  85  Ga. 
297  ;  Atl.  C.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Bates,  id.,  30  Atl.  41  ;  P.  F.  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  ».  Ruby,  38 
Ind.  295,  311  ;  Rum  pel  v.  R.  Co.,  Idaho,  35  Pac.  700  ;  So.  Kan.  R.  Co.  v.  Robbins, 
43  Kan.  145,  149  ;  Bait.  Elev.  Co.  ».  Neal,  65  Md.  438,  452;  Robinson  v.  F.  &\V.  R. 
Co.,  7  Gray,  92,  95;  Maguire  v.  R.  Co.,  115  Mass.  239  ;  Whitney  v.  Gross,  140  id. 
232  ;  Hatt  p.  Nay,  144  id.  186  ;  Connors  P.  Morton,  160  id.  333  ;  Lewis  v.  Gaslight 
Co.,  165  id.  411  ;  Olsen  v.  Andrews,  168  id.  261  ;  Detr.  &  M.  R.  Co.  r.  Van  Steinburg, 
17  Mich.  Ill ;  M.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  46  id.  176.  179  ;  Warner  v.  R.  Co.,  44  N.  Y. 
465,  471  ;  Baulec  v.  R.  Co.,  59  id.  360 ;  Woeckner  v.  Motor  Co.,  Pa.,  41  Atl.  £S  ; 
Cunningham  p.  R.  Co.,  88  Tex.  534  ;  Sullivan  v.  Salt  Lake,  13  Utah,  122  ;  So.  Hell 
T.  &  T.  Co.  \v.  Watts,  25  U.  S.  App.  214  ;  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruggles,  33  id. 
567  ;  Christensen  v.  U.  T.  Line,  6  Wash.  75,  82. 

See  also  the  use  of  such  evidence  as  showing  character  for  negligence  when  in  issue, 
post,,  §  14  A.  For  evidence  of  other  injuries  at  the  same  place  or  machinery,  see  post, 
§  14  v. 

*  See  People  v.  Abbot,  19  Wend.  194  ;  People  v.  Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  398  ;  Rice  v. 
State,  35  Fla.  236. 

6  The  cases  on  both  sides  are  as  follows  :  R.  v.  Hodgson,  R.  &  R.  211  ;  R.  v.  Clarke, 
2  Stare.  243  ;  R.  ».  Martin,  6  C.  &  P.  562 ;  R.  v.  Tissington,  1  Cox  Cr.  48  ;  R.  v. 
Rohins,  ib.  55  ;  R.  v.  Page,  2  Cox  Cr.  133  ;  R.  v.  Cockcroft,  11  id.  410  ;  R.  P.  Holmes, 
12  id.  137  ;  R.  P.  Riley,  16  Cox  Cr.  191 ;  McQuirk  v.  State,  84  Ala.  435,  438  ;  Pleas- 
ant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624,  643  ;  People  p.  Benson,  6  Cal.  221  ;  Peoples.  Kuches,  id., 
52  Pac.  1002 ;  State  v.  Shields,  45  Conn.  256,  263  ;  Rice  v.  State,  35  Fla.  236  ;  Shir- 
VOL.  I. — 4 


50  BELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

on  a  charge  of  homicide,  as  tending  to  show  the  accused's  reasonable 
apprehensions,6  particular  acts  of  violence  by  the  deceased  ought  to 
be  admissible,7  but  are  rejected  by  most  Courts.8  (4)  In  evidencing 
the  disposition  of  an  animal  (whether  the  disposition  is  an  issue,  or 
is  used  evidentially  as  noted  ante,  §  14  b),  it  would  seem  that  in- 
stances of  the  animal's  behavior  would  be  proper  evidence,  none  of 
the  preceding  objections  (except  perhaps  that  of  surprise)  being  here 
applicable;9  but  such  evidence  is  occasionally  rejected.10] 

§  14  h.  Particular  Conduct  as  Evidence  of  Character  in  Issue. 
[When  character  is  provable  as  a  part  of  the  issue,  the  objections  to 
evidencing  it  by  particular  acts  lose  most  of  their  force;  since  there 
is  no  undue  prejudice  (other  than  is  necessarily  involved),  no  unfair 
surprise  (because  the  issue  warns  of  the  evidence  to  be  anticipated), 
and  no  confusion  of  issues  (because  character  is 'one  of  them),  and 
furthermore  because  other  equally  good  evidence  is  often  not  avail- 
able. It  has  thus  been  said,  as  a  general  principle,  that  character  in 
issue  may  be  evidenced  by  particular  instances  of  conduct ;  *  though 
110  such  general  principle  is  consistently  carried  out.  (1)  Where  the 
issue  is  whether  a  person  is  a  common  offender,  —  e.  g.  gambler,  cheat, 

win  v.  People,  69  111.  56  ;  Dimick  v.  Downs,  82  id.  533  ;  Wilson  v.  State,  16  Ind.  393  ; 
South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  id.  582  ;  Bedgood  v.  State,  115  id.  275,  278  ;  State  v.  McDo- 
nough,  la.,  73  N.  W.  357  ;  State  v.  Brown,  55  Kan.  766  ;  Com.  »•.  Regan,  105  Mass. 
593  ;  Coin.  ».  McDonald,  110  id.  405 ;  Com.  ».  Harris,  131  id.  336 ;  Miller  v.  Curtis, 
163  id.  127,  131  ;  Cargill  v.  Com.,  93  Ky.  578 ;  Brown  v.  Com.,  id.,  43  S.  W.  214  ; 
Strang  v.  People,  24  Mich.  1,  6 ;  People  v.  McLean,  71  id.  309  ;  People  v.  Abbott,  97 
id.  484  ;  Anon.,  37  Miss.  58  ;  Brown  v.  State,  72  id.  997  ;  State  v.  Forschuer,  43 
N.  H.  89  ;  State  v.  Knapp,  45  id.  154 ;  People  v.  Abbot,  19  Wend.  192,  194 ;  People 
v.  Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  398  ;  Woods  ».  People,  55  N.  Y.  517  ;  State  v.  Jefferson,  6 
Ired.  305  ;  State  v.  Heniy,  5  Jones  L.  65,  70 ;  State  v.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  32  ;  McCombs 
v.  State,  8  Oh.  St.  643,  646  ;  McDermott  v.  State,  13  id.  332 ;  State  v.  Fitzsimon,  18 
R.  I.  236 ;  Titus  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  132 ;  State  v.  Johnson,  28  Vt.  512 ;  State  t>.  Reed, 
39  id.  417  ;  State  ».  Hollenbeck,  67  id.  34  ;  Watry  ».  Forbes,  18  Wis.  500,  502. 

For  intercourse  with  the  defendant  as  evidence,  see  post,  §  14  o  (3).  Whether  a 
witness  may  be  asked,  on  cross-examination,  about  discreditable  conduct,  and  whether 
there  is  a  privilege  not  to  answer  questions  involving  disgrace,  are  topics  that  may  also 
come  into  consideration  for  the  above  evidence  ;  for  theso,  see  post,  §§  469,  i,  j,  k,  I. 

6  Ante,  §  14c. 

7  R.  v.  Hopkins,  10  Cox  Cr.  229  ;  People  v.  Henderson,  28  Cal.  465,  469,  *emble; 
Pound  v.  State,   43  Ga.  88,  128,  semble;  Bowie  v.  State,  19  id.  7,  semblc;  Boyle  v. 
State,  97  Ind.  322,  326;  Bowlus  v.  State,  130  id.  227,  230;  People  v.  Harris,  95  Mich. 
87  ;  Skaggs  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  563. 

8  Jones  v.  State,  76  Alu.  15  ;  Davenport  v.  State,  85  id.  336  ;  Campbell  v.  State, 
38  Ark.  498,  508  ;  People  v.  Powell,  87  Cal.  348,  362  ;  State  v.  Woodward,  1  Houst. 
Cr.  C.  455,    458;  Garner  i>.  State,   28   Fla.  113,  138;  31  id.   170,   175;  Croom  v. 
State,  90  Ga.  430  ;  Powell  v.  State,  101  id.  9  ;  State  v.  Fontenot,  50  La.  An.,  23  So. 
634  ;  Moriarty  v.  State,  62  Miss.  654,  661  ;  King  v.  State,  65  id.  576,  582  ;  Eggler  v. 
People,  56  N.  Y.  643  ;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  id.  222 ;  Com.  ».  Straesser,  153  Pa,  451  ; 
State  v.  Dill,  48  S.  C.  249  ;  Andersen  v.  U.  S.,  170  U.  8.  481. 

»  Worth  ».  Gilling,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  3  ;  Whitely  v.  China,  61  Me.  202 ;  Todd  v. 
Rawley,  8  All.  51 ;  Maggi  v.  Cutts,  123  Mass.  535  ;  Broderick  v.  Higginson,  id.,  48  N. 
E.  269  ;  Kennon  ».  Cilmer,  5  Mont.  257,  265  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Enneld,  43  N.  H.  356 ; 
Whittierv.  Franklin,  46  id.  23;  Stone  v.  Langworthy,  R.  I.,  40  All.  832;  Dover  v. 
Winchester,  Vt.,  41  Atl.  445. 

w    East  Kingston  ».  Towle,  48  N.  H.  57,  65. 

1  Chirk  v.  Periam,  2  Atk.  337  ;  Fall  v.  Overseers,  3  Munf.  495,  505  ;  Buller,  Nisi 
Prius,  295.  Contra  :  Miller  v.  Curtis,  158  Mass.  127, 131. 


§§  14 #-14  7i.]          EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   CHARACTER.  51 

drunkard,  —  such  evidence  is  admissible ;  though  in  barratry  notice 
of  the  specific  acts  charged  is  said  to  be  necessary.2  (2)  In  proving 
a  house  to  be  of  ill-fame  or  disorderly,  t.  e.  used  for  purposes  of  pros- 
titution, particular  instances  of  such  use  may  be  given  in  evidence.* 

(3)  In  a  statutory  prosecution  or  action  by  the  woman  for  seduction, 
if  the  *'  chaste  character  "  of  the  statute  means  actual  character,  then 
it  may  well  be  disproved  by  particular  acts  of  unchastity ; 4  but  if 
"good   repute  for  chastity"   is  the  statutory   requirement,   actual 
chastity  and  therefore  particular  acts  are  immaterial ; 5  while  if  the 
statute  is  silent  on  the  subject,  a  requirement  of  chastity  is  usually 
implied  into  it  and    particular  acts  of   unchastity   are  admitted ; ' 
in  any  case,  acts   occurring   since   the   seduction  are  immaterial.7 

(4)  Where  the  woman's  character  for  unchastity  is  set  up  in  de- 
fence to  an  action  for  breach  of  promise  of  marriage,  the  character 
may  be   evidenced   by   particular  acts.8     (5)  Where  a  defamatory 
charge  involves  a  general  trait  of  character  of  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
truth  is  pleaded,  it  may  be  evidenced  by  particular  acts  ;'  but  there 
is  some  authority  for  confining  this   practice   to  cases  where  the 
charge  involves  a  habit  or  course  of  dealings  rather  than  a  trait  of 
moral  character,  and  for  requiring  the  defendant  in  the  latter  case  to 
plead   specifically   such  instances  as   he  relies  on  in  justification.10 
(6)  In  proving  the  incompetency  of  an  employee,  as  a  fact  which  if 
otherwise  shown  to  be  known  to  the  employer  may  make  him  liable,  it 
would  seem  to  be  proper  to  use  particular  acts  of  incompetency,  for 

'  2  Buller,  Nisi  Prius,  296  ;  McNally,  Evidence,  324  ;  R.  v.  Roberts,  1  Camp.  399  ; 
Ingram  v.  State,  39  Ala.  247,  253  ;  Com.  ».  Moore,  2  Dana,  Ky.,  402  ;  Com.  t;.  Hop- 
kins, ib.  419  ;  World  v.  State,  50  Md.  49,  54;  Com.  v.  Whitney,  5  Gray  85;  Com.  v. 
McNamee,  112  Mass.  285  ;  Smith  t;.  State,  55  Ala.  11 ;  McMahon  v.  Harrison,  6  N.  Y. 
443  447. 

•  Caldwell  v.  State,  17  Conn.  467,  473 ;  Egan  ».  Gordan,  65  Minn.  505  ;  State  v. 
M'Gregor,  41  N.  H.  407,  412  ;  Harwood  v.  People,  26  N.  Y.  190 ;  Kenyon  r.  State, 
26  N.  Y.  203,  209  ;  Lanpher  v.  Clark,  149  N.  Y.  472;  State  v.  Patterson^  7  Ired.  70 ; 
though  not,  it  has  been  said,  particular  acts  to  show  the  character  of  persons  so  re- 
sorting :  Com.  v.  Gannett,  1  All.  7. 

*  Andre  v.  State,  5  la.  389  ;  State  v.  Carron,  18  id.  372,  375  ;  State  v.  Shean,  32 
id.  88,  92;  State  r.  Higdoii,  ib.  262;  West  v.  Druff,  55  id.  335,  336  ;  State  v.  Tim- 
mens,   4  Minn.  325,  334  ;  Crozier  v.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  453  ;  Kenyon  v.  State,  26 
N.  Y.  203,  208  ;  State  ».  Blize,  111  Mo.  464,  471 ;  Love  v.  Masoner,  6  Baxt.  24,  33. 

6  State  v.  Bryan,  34  Kan.  63,  69  ;  Zabriskie  v.  State,  43  N.  J.  L.  640,  646  ;  Foley 
v.  State,  59  id.  1 ;  Bowers  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  542,  545. 

6  Wilson  v.  State,  73  Ala.  527,  533  ;  Hussey  v.  State,  86  id.  34  ;  Munkers  v.  State, 
87  id.  94,  97  ;  Bracken  r.  State,  111  id.  68;  Smith  v.  State,  id.,  24  So.  55  ;  Suther  v. 
State,  id.,  24  So.  43  ;  Polk  v.  State,  40  Ark.  482,  486  ;  People  v.  Brewer,  27  Mich. 
133,  135 ;  People  v.  Clark,  33  id.  112,  118  ;  People  v.  Knapp,  42  id.  267,  268  ;  .People 
v.  Squires,  49  id.  487,  488. 

7  Bracken  ».  State,  111  Ala.  68  ;  Polk  v.  State,  40  Ark.  482,  487  ;  People  v.  Clark, 
33  id.  112,  117  ;  Keller*.  State,  Ga.,  31  S.  E.  92. 

8  Foulkes  v.  Sellway,  3  Esp.  236  ;   Woodard  v.  Bellamy,  2  Root  354  ;  Sheahan  v. 
Barry.  27  Mich.  217,  221  ;  Stratton  v.  Dole,  45  Nebr.  472. 

9  R.  v.  Labouchere,  14  Cox  Cr.  419,  428,  430 ;  Ratcliff  v.  Courier-Journal,  99  Ky. 
416  ;  Lampher  «;.  Clark,  149  N.  Y.  472. 

11  See  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11  Price  235  ;  Scott  v.  Sampson,  8  Q.  B.  D.  491  ;  Zierenberg 
r.  Labouchere,  1892,  2  Q.  B.  183  ;  Talmadgcu.  Baker,  22  Wis.  625  ;  compare  the  doc- 
trine ante,  §  14  d  (1),  as  to  using  general  character  in  such  a  case. 


52  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

none  of  the  above-mentioned  objections  apply  with  any  force.11  Two 
other  uses  of  such  facts  must,  however,  be  distinguished :  (a)  former 
acts  of  negligence  by  a  defendant's  employee  as  evidence  of  his  negli- 
gent character,  and  therefore  of  his  probably  having  been  negligent 
at  the  time  in  question ;  here  the  character  is  not  in  issue,  but  is 
evidential  only,  and  particular  acts  are  inadmissible ; ia  (b)  other  acts 
of  incompetency  by  the  employee  as  evidence  of  probable  knowledge 
by  the  employer,  the  incompetency  itself  being  otherwise  proved ; 
the  propriety  of  this  seems  generally  conceded.18  (7)  In  mitigation, 
of  damages,  in  actions  for  defamation,  the  plaintiff's  bad  reputed 
character  is  generally  treated  as  properly  to  be  considered ;  u  but 
particular  instances  of  misconduct  are  universally  regarded  as  inad- 
missible; the  reasons  given  by  the  Courts  are  not  harmonious,15  but 
the  correct  one  seems  to  be  that  the  reputation,  not  the  actual  char- 
acter, is  the  thing  to  be  proved.16  In  an  action  by  the  father  for 
seduction,  the  daughter's  chastity  is  material  as  affecting  the  injury 
to  his  feelings,  and  particular  acts  of  her  unchastity  prior  to  the 
seduction  are  generally  regarded  as  admissible ;  "  on  the  same  prin- 

11  Cunningham  v.  R.  Co.,  88  Tex.  534  ;  Smith  v.  Whtttier,  95  Cal.  279,  292 ;  Mor- 
row v.  R.  Co.,  Minn.,  77  N.  W.  303  ;  State  v.  Swett,  N.  J.,  38  Atl.  969  ;  Youngs  v.  R. 
Co.,  154  N.  Y.  764  ;  Park  v.  R.  Co.,  155  id.  215.     Contra:  Hatt  v.  Nay,  144  Mass. 
186  ;  Connors  v.  Morton,  160  Mass.  333  ;  Kennedy  v.  Spring,  ib.  203  ;  Baltimore  v. 
War,  77  Md.  593,  598. 

12  See  ante,  §  14  </(!). 

»  Accord:  Baulec  v.  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  356,  358  ;  P.  F.  &  W.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruby, 
38  Ind.  294,  311  ;  E.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Tothill,  143  id.  49  ;  Bait.  Kiev.  Co.  v.  Neal, 
65  Md.  438,  452  ;  Norf.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoover,  79  id.  253,  264  ;  Davis  v.  R.  Co., 
20  Mich.  105,  124  ;  M.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  46  id.  176,  179  ;  Chapman  v.  R.  Co.,  55 
N.  Y.  579,  585  ;  Cunningham  v.  R.  Co.,  88  Tex.  534  ;  Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp,  31 
U.  S.  App.  213.  Contra :  Frazier  v.  R.  Co.,  38  Pa.  104 ;  Col.  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chris- 
tian,  97  Ga.  56. 

14  Ante,  §14d,  (1)  and  (2). 

15  See  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11  Price  235,  265  ;  Scott  v.  Sampson,  8  Q.   B.  D.  491 ; 
Randall  v.  Holsenbake,  3  Hill  S.  C.  177. 

16  Dennis  v.  Pawling,  Vin.  Abr.,  Evidence,  I,  b,  16  ;  Smithies  ».  Harrison,  ib.  15; 
Buller,  Nisi  Prius,  9  ;  Knobell  v.  Fuller,   Peake  Add.  Cas.   139  ;  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11 
Price,  235  ;  Moore  v.  Oastler,  2  Stark.  Ev.  641 ;  Bracegirdle  v.  Bailey,  1  F.  &  F .  536  ; 
Scott  v.  Sampson,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  D.  491  ;  Seymour  v.  Merrill,  1  Root  459  ;  Waples  v. 
Burton,  2  Harringt.  446  ;  Sheahan  v.  Collins,  20  111.  329  ;  Campbell  v.  Bannister,  79 
Ky.  208  ;  Smith  v.  Wyman,  16  Me.  14  ;  Bodwell  v.  Swan,  3  Pick.  376  ;  Chapman  v. 
Ordway,  5  All.  595  ;  Parkhurst  v.  Ketchum,  6  id.  406  ;  McLaughlin  v.  Cowley,  131 
Mass.  70,  72  ;    Miller  v.  Curtis,  163  id.  127,  131  ;  Proctor  v.  Houghtaling,  37  Mich. 
41,  44  ;  Vick  v.  Whittield,  2  Hayw.  222  ;  Lamos  v.  Snell,  6  N.  H.  413  ;  Foot  v.  Tracy, 
1  Johns.  46  ;  Root  v.  King,  7  Cow.  635  ;  King  i>.  Root,  4  Wend.  160 ;  Dewit  v.  Green- 
field, 5  Oh.  226  ;  Fisher  v.  Patterson,  14  id.  418,  425  ;  Henry  v.  Norwood,  4  Watts 
347,  34»  ;  Folwell  v.  Journal  Co.,  19  R.  I.  551;  Sawyer  v.  Eifert,  2  Nott  &  M.  511, 
515  ;  Buford  v.  M'Luny,  1  id.  268,  271  ;  Randall  v.  Holsenbake,  3  Hill  S.  C.  177; 
Wilson  v.  Noonan,  27  Wis.  598,  610  ;  Muetze  v.  Tuteur,  77  id.  236,  243. 

17  Batnfield  v.  Massey,  1  Camp.  460  ;  Dodd  v.  Norris.  3  id.  519  ;    Bate  v.  Hill,  1  C. 
&  P.  100;   Andrews  v.   Askey,  8  id.  7 ;  Verry  v.  Watkins,  7  id.  308;  Carpenter  v. 
Wall,  11  A.  &  E.  803  ;  Thompson  v.  Nye,  16  Q.  B.  175  ;  Drish  v.  Davenport,  2  Stew. 
266,  270  ;  Robinson  v.  Burton,  5  Harringt.  335,  338  ;   White  v.  Murtland,  71  111.  250, 
264 ;  Shattuck  v.  Myers,  13  Ind.  50  ;   South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  id.  580  ;   Zitzel  ». 
Mi'ikel,  24  Pa.  408  ;   Reed  v.  Williams,  5  Sneed  580,  582  ;  Thompson  v.  Clendening, 
1  llr;id,  287,  295  ;  Love  v.  Masoner,  6   Baxt.  24,  33,  repudiating  Lea  v.  Henderson, 
1  Coldw.  146,  150.    Contra:  Bell  v.  Riuker,  29  lud.  269  ;  Smith  v.  Yaryan,  69  id.  448  ; 
Hoffman  v.  Kemercr,  44  Pa.  452. 


§§  14  A-14./.]  CAPACITY,   SKILL ;   HABIT,   CUSTOM.  53 

ciple,  particular  acts  of  the  the  father's,  as  showing  a  character  in- 
capable of  such  an  injury  to  the  feelings,  might  well  be  admissible.18 
In  the  husband's  action  for  criminal  conversation,  particular  acts  of 
unchastity  by  the  wife  before  seduction  are  for  the  same  reason  ad- 
missible ; 19  and  the  principle  applies  equally,  in  civil  actions  for 
indecent  assault  M  and  for  breach  of  promise  of  marriage,21  to  prior 
unchaste  acts  of  the  female  plaintiff.] 

3.    Other  Human  Qualities  as  Evidence  of  an  Act. 

§  14  i.  Physical  Capacity,  Skill,  Means,  etc.  [As  indicating  the 
likelihood  of  a  person  doing  or  not  doing  an  act,  it  is  proper  to  con- 
sider his  physical  strength,1  his  condition  as  to  intoxication,2  his 
technical  skill  or  ability,8  his  possession  of  the  appropriate  tools  or 
apparatus ;  *  on  this  principle,  the  lack  of  money  is  evidence  that 
a  debt  was  not  paid  or  money  not  lent,5  though  the  possession  of  it 
is  hardly  evidence  of  the  payment  or  lending.6] 

§  14  y.  Habit,  Custom.  [A  habit  of  doing  a  thing  is  naturally  of 
probative  value  as  indicating  that  on  a  particular  occasion  the  thing 
was  done  as  usual,  and,  if  clearly  shown  as  a  definite  course  of  action, 
is  constantly  admitted  in  evidence.1  Nevertheless,  there  are  some 

18  Robinson  v.  Burton,  5  Harringt.  335,  338.     Contra:  Reed  v.  Williams,  5  Sneed 
580,  582  ;   Thompson  v.  Clendening,  1  Head  287,  296. 

19  Buller,  Nisi  Prius  77 ;  Hodges  v.  Windham,  Peake  39  ;  Elsam  v.  Faucett,  2  Esp. 
563  ;  Thompson  v.  Nye,  16  Q.  B.  175  ;   Torre  v.  Summers,  2  Nott  &  M.  269,  271  ;  or 
Lv  the  husband:  Wyndham  v.  Wycombe,  4  Esp.  16  ;  Bromley  v.  Wallace,  ib.  237. 

"23  Mitchell  v.  Work,  13  R.  I.  645  ;    Watry  v.  Ferber,  18  Wis.  500,  503.     Contra: 
Gore  v.  Curtis,  81  Me.  403,  405.     See  Miller  v.  Curtis,  163  Mass.  127,  130. 
21  Sheahan  v.  Barry,  27  Mich.  217,  221  ;  Stratton  v.  Dole,  45  Nebr.  472. 

1  Goodtitle  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  498  ;  Ellis  v.  Short,  21  Pick.  142  ;   Thiede  v.  Utah, 
159  U.  S.  510. 

2  Alcock  v.  Ass.  Co.,  18  Q.  B.  292  ;  Wright  v.  Crawfordsville,  142  Ind.  636  ;  State 
v.  Home,  9  Kan.  t'28 ;  Com.  v.  Ryan,  134  Mass.  223  ;   Cummings  0.  Nichols,  13  N.  H. 
429  :  Ingalls  v.  State,  48  Wis.  647,  650  ;  Franklin  v.  Franklin,  90  Tenn.  49.     See  also 
post,  under  Habit,  §  14y,  note  2. 

3  Thompson  v.   Mosely,  5  C.  &  P.  501.     Contra:  Dow  v.  Spenny,  29  Mo.   390; 
Mertz  v.  Detweiler,  8  W.  &  S.  378. 

*  R.  v.  Lambe,  Peake  N.  P.  141  ;  R.  v.  Ball,  1  Camp.  324  ;  Griffits  v.  Payne,  11 
A.  &  E.  131;  Thomas  v.  State,  107  Ala.  13  ;  People  v.  Brotherton,  47  Cal.  402  ;  Clark 
v.  Fletcher,  1  All.  53,  56  ;  Com.  v.  Choate,  105  Mass.  451  ;  Rosenthal  v.  Bishop,  98 
Mich.  527  ;  Miller  v.  S.  S.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  199;  Nicholson  v.  Com.,  91  Va.  741. 

5  Bale's  Trial,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  293  ;    Lane  v.  Dighton,  1  Ambl.  409,  413  ;  Mayor 
v.  Homer,   Cowp.   102,    109  ;   Leuch  v.   Lench,   10  Ves.  Jr.  511,  518  ;  Williams"  v. 
Gorges,  1  Camp.  217  ;   Fladong  v.  Winter,  19  Ves.  Jr.  196  ;    Grenfall  o.  Gridlestone, 
2  Y.  &  C.  662,  681  ;  Dowling  v.  Dowling,  10  Ir.  C.  L.  236  ;  Stebbins».  Miller,  12  All. 
591,  597  ;  Winchester  v.  Charter,  97  Mass.  140,  143  ;   Atwood  v.  Scott,  99  id.  177  ; 
Woodward  v.  Leavitt,  107  id.  453,  458  ;   Bliss  v.  Johnson,  162  id.  323;   Demeritt  v. 
Miles,  22  N.  H.  523,  528 ;    Wiggin  v.  Plumer,  31  id.  251,  268  ;  Pontius  v.  People,  82 
N.  Y.  339,  349  ;   Strimpfler  v.  Roberts,  18  Pa.  283,  296  ;   Stauffer  v.  Young,  39  id. 
455,  462  ;   Moore  v.  Palmer,  14  Wash.  134. 

6  Hilton  v.  Scarborough,  5  Gray  422  ;   Atwood  v.  Scott,  99  Mass.  177. 

1  State  v.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  528,  532;  Hall  v.  Brown,  58  id.  93  (switching 
trains) ;  Mathias  v.  O'Neill,  94  Mo.  527  (bookkeeper's  dealing  with  notes)  ;  Fincher  v. 
State,  58  Ala.  221  (keeping  a  gun);  Grantham  v.  State,  95  Ga.  459  (gambling);  Rior. 
dan  v.  Guggerty,  74  la.  693  (destruction  of  telegrams)  ;  People  v.  Burwell,  106  Mich. 


54  KELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

instances  in  which  habit  may  be  thought  to  be  obnoxious  to  the 
character  rule  (ante,  §  14  £),  particularly  a  habit  of  intoxication  or 
intemperance,2  and  a  habit  of  carelessness  or  negligence  j8  and  on 
these  points  there  is  no  uniformity  of  ruling.] 

§  14  k.  Design,  Intention,  Plan.  [The  existence  of  a  design,  plan, 
or  intention  to  do  a  thing  is  of  some  probative  value  to  show  that 
it  was  done,  and  instances  of  its  use  constantly  recur.1  The  inten- 
tion of  an  accused,  as  contained  in  a  threat,  is  perhaps  the  commonest 
instance ; a  the  question  may  arise  whether  the  threat  is  too  indefi- 
nite to  apply  to  the  act  charged ; 8  but  the  fact  that  it  is  conditional 

27;  Schuchardt  v.  Aliens,  1  Wall.  359,  368;  Plumb  ».  Curtis,  66  Conn.  154;  Amer. 
Expr.  Co.  v.  Haggard,  37  111.  465,  472  (delivery  of  packages)  ;  Beakes  ».  Da  Cunha, 
126  N.  Y.  293  (being  at  home) ;  Lucas  v.  Novosilieski,  3  Esp.  296  (mode  of  payment) ; 
Evans  v.  Birch,  3  Camp.  110  (same);  Lee  v.  Pain,  4  Hare  251  (use  of  name) ;  Hine  v. 
Pomeroy,  24  Vt.  211,  219  (process-serving) ;  Ashe  v.  De  Rosset,  8  Jones  L.  240  (giving 
a  receipt) ;  Vaughan  v.  R.  Co.,  63  N.  C.  11  (weighing  and  marking) ;  State  v.  Shaw, 
58  N.  H.  73  (selling  liquor)  ;  Smith  v.  Clark,  12  la.  32  (accepting  in  writing)  ;  Hart 
v.  Alexander,  7  C.  &  P.  746  (sending  circulars);  Meighen  v.  Bank,  25  Pa.  288  (enter- 
ing deposits) ;  Lincoln,  etc.  Co.  v.  Buckner,  39  Nebr.  83,  85  (depositing  ashes) ;  White 
v.  State,  100  Ga.  659  (carrying  pistol).  The  following  cases  concern  a  habit  of  mailing 
a  notice  or  other  letter  :  Hetherington  v.  Kemp,  4  Camp.  193  ;  McKay  v.  Myers,  16S 
Mass.  312  ;  Thellheimer  r.  Brinckerhoff,  6  Cow.  101  ;  Miller  v.  Hackley,  5  Johns. 
375,  384  ;  Coyle  v.  Gozzler,  2  Cr.  C.  C.  625  ;  Union  Bk.  v.  Stone,  50  Me.  595,  601  ; 
Trabue  v.  Sayre,  1  Bush  129 ;  Bell  v.  Bank,  7  Gill  216,  227;  Brailsford  v.  Williams, 
15  Md.  150,  159.  The  following  cases  admit  the  course  of  business  in  the  post-office 
to  be  evidence  that  a  letter  mailed  is  delivered :  U.  S.  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  C.  C.  571  ; 
Sullivan  v.  Kuykendall,  82  Ky.  483  ;  Rosenthal  v.  Walker,  111  U.  S.  193;  Himtley 
v.  Whittier,  105  Mass.  391;  and  so  for  telegrams  also:  Com.  v.  Jeffries,  7  All.  548, 
563  ;  Oregon  S.  Co.  v.  Otis,  100  N.  Y.  446.  For  the  presumption  on  this  subject,  see 
post,  §  40. 

8  See  Heland  v.  Allen,  3  All.  407  ;  McCarty  v.  Leary,  118  Mass.  509  ;  Edwards  v. 
Worcester,  id.,  51  N.  E.  447;  Lane  v.  R.  Co.,  132  Mo.  4 ;  Kingston  v.  R.  Co.,  Mich., 
70  N.  W.  315  ;  Warner  v.  R.  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  465  ;  Cleghorn  v.  R.  Co.,  56  id.  44,  46  ; 
Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Books,  57  Pa.  339,  343 ;  Hunt.  B.  T.  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Decker,  82  id.  119, 
124  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  67  Vt.  443  ;  Thompson  v.  Bowie,  4  Wall.  463,  471  ;  Cosgrove 
v.  Pitman,  103  Cal.  268,  273  ;  Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Pitman,  U.  S.  App.,  73  Fed.  634. 

*  See  State  v.  M.  &  L.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  528,  549  ;  State  v.  B.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  58  id. 
410  ;  Whitney  v.  Gross,  140  Mass.  232  ;  Bronillette  r.  R,  Co.,  162  id.  198,  206  ;  Mul- 
ville  v.  Ins.  Co.,  19  Mont.  95  ;   Baker  v.  Irish,  172  Pa.  528,  532. 

1  State  v.  Smith,  44  Conn.  376,  380  (to  make  an  arrest)  ;  B.  &  0.  R.  Co.  ».  State, 
81  Md.  371  (to  take  a  journey)  ;  Burton  v.  State,  107  Ala.  68  (to  leave  the  State)  ; 
Cluveriusu.  Com.,  81  Va.  813  (to  meet  the  accused)  ;  Invess  v.  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  433 
(to  take  the  cars);  Powell  v.  Olds,  9  Ala.  861  (to  make  a  gift)  ;  Woodcock  v.  Johnson, 
36  Minn.  217  (to  make  a  deed).  Excluded:  Houston  r.Gran,  38  Nebr.  687  (instruc- 
tions to  clerk  not  to  sell  liquor  to  deceased).  In  most  of  the  cases,  the  only  question 
made  is  as  to  the  use  of  the  person's  statements  as  declarations  under  a  hearsay  excep- 
tion ;  for  these  cases,  Bee  post,  §  162  c. 

*  The  principle  is  universally  accepted,  and  no  citations  are  needed  ;  but  there  is  a 
curious  qualification  in  North  Carolina  ;  see  State  v.  Norton,  82  N.  C.  628  ;  State  ». 
Goff,  117  id.  755. 

*  See  R.  ».  Hagan,  12  Cox  Or.  357 ;  Commander  v.  State,  63  Ala.  1,  7  ;  Redd  v. 
State,  68  id.  492,  497  ;  Ford  v.  State,  71  id.  385,  396;  Clarke  v.  State,  78  id.  474,  477  ; 
Prater  v.  State,  107  id.  26;  Drake  v.  State,  110  id.  9;  Linehan  t>.  State,  113  id.  70; 
Burton  v.  State,   115  id.  1  ;    People  v.  Craig,  111  Cal.  460;  Stater.  Hoyt,  47  Conn. 
518,  539  ;  Dixon  v.  State,  13  Fla.  636,  645;  Stafford  v.  State,  55  Ga.  591,  593  ;  Shaw 
v.  State,  60  id.  246,  250;  State  v.  Larkins,   Ida.,  47  Pac.  945;  State  v.  Davis,  id.,  53 
Pac.  678;  Schoolcraft  v.  People,  117  111.  271,  277;  State  v.  Helm,  97  la.  378;  State 
v.  Pierce,  90  id.  506,  512;    Laird  v.  Ass.  Co.,  98  id.  495;   Parker  v.  State,  136  Ind. 
284;  State  v.  Home,  9  Kan.  123,  128;  Brooks  v.  Coin.,  Ky.,  37  S.  W.  1043;  Com,  v. 


§§  14/-14&.]  DESIGN,  INTENTION,   PLAN.  55 

does  not  exclude  it,4  though  it  is  sometimes  said  that  the  condition 
must  be  shown  to  have  happened ;  whether  the  threats  are  too 
remote  in  time  depends  on  the  facts  of  each  case,  and  is  usually  left 
to  the  trial  Court's  discretion.6  Threats  by  the  deceased  are  now 
properly  regarded  by  most  Courts  as  admissible,  on  the  issue  of 
self-defence,  in  a  charge  of  homicide,  as  tending  to  show  the  de- 
ceased to  have  been  the  aggressor ; 8  but  usually  with  the  qualifica- 
tion that  there  must  be  some  independent  evidence  of  his  aggression, 
or,  as  some  phrase  it,  an  overt  act.7  This  use  of  the  deceased's 

Madan,  102  Mass.  1 ;  Com.  v.  Goodwin,  14  Gray  55 ;  Com.  v.  Chase,  147  Mass.  597 ; 
Com.  v.  Quinn,  150  id.  401  ;  Slate  v.  Guy,  69  Mo.  430 ;  State  v.  Dickson,  78  id.  438, 
449  ;  State  v.  Grant,  79  id.  113,  137 ;  Slate  v.  McNally,  87  id.  649  ;  Culbertson  v. 
Hill,  ib.  553,  655;  State  v.  Crawford,  99  id.  74;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  130  id.  407; 
State  v.  Hymer,  15  Nev.  49,  54 ;  State  v.  Walsh,  5  id.  315  ;  People  v.  Kennedy,  32 
N.  Y.  141 ;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  id.  175;  Weed  v.  People,  56  id.  628  ;  People  r.  Suther- 
land, 154  id.  345 ;  Minnus  v.  State,  16  Oh.  St.  221,  230;  Hopkins  v.  Com.,  50  Pa.  9 ; 
Abernethy  v.  Com.,  101  id.  322,  328;  State  v.  Isaacson,  8  S.  D.  69;  Kinchelow  v. 
State,  5  Humph.  9,  12 ;  State  v.  Smalley,  50  Vt.  736,  749 ;  Benedict  v.  State,  14  Wis. 
423;  Massey  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  371 ;  Holley  v.  State,  id.  46  S.  W.  39  ;  Stevenson  v. 
U.  S.,  U.S.  App.,  86  Fed.  106. 

*  Redd  v.  State,  68  Ala.  492,  496  ;  Phillips  v.  State,  62  Ark.  119 ;  Everett  v.  State, 
62  Ga.  65,  70;  Com.  v.  Crowe,   165  Mass.  139;  State  v.  Johnson,   76  Mo.   121,  124; 
State  P.  Adams,  ib.  357;  Carver  v.  Huskey,  79  id.  509;  State  p.  Bradley,  64  Vt.  468, 
470  ;  State  v.  Bradley,  67  id.  465. 

*  See  Redd  t>.  State,  68  Ala.  492,  496 ;  People  v.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  190,  205 ;  People 
v.  Hong  Ah  Duck,  61  id.  387;  McDaniel  v.  State,  100  Ga.  67;  Com.  v.  Goodwin,  14 
Gray  55;  Com.  v.  Holmes,  157  Mass.  233,  239 ;  Com.  v.  Quinn,  150  id.  401  ;  Com.  v. 
Crowe,  165  id.  139;  Hale  v.  Life  Co.,  65  Minn.  548;   Terr,   v,  Roberts,  9  Mont.  12, 
14  ;  State  v.  Adams,  76  Mo.  357 ;  State  v.  Grant,  79  id.  137  ;  Carver  o.  Huskey,  ib.  509; 
State  v.  McNally,  87  id.   650  ;  State  v.   Wright,  141  id.    333 ;    U.  S.  v.   Neverson, 
1  Mackie  152,  169 ;  State  v.  Bradley,  64  Vt.  466,  470 ;  State  v.  Davis,  N.  H.,  41  Atl. 
267. 

6  See  the  reasoning  in  People  v.  Arnold,  15  Cal.  481 ;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N.  Y. 
174. 

7  See  Powell  v.  State,  19  Ala.  577,  581 ;  Carroll  p.  State,  23  id.  37 ;  Burns  v.  State, 
43  id.  374  ;  Roberts  v.  State,  68  id.  163  ;   Green  v.  State,  69  id.  7 ;  Gunter  v.  State, 
111  id.  23;  Atkins  v.  State,  16  Ark.  568,  584;  Coker  v.  State,  20  id.  53,  55  ;  Pitman 
v.  State,  22  id.  353,  356 ;  Harris  v.  State,  34  id.  469,  472 ;  People  v.  Arnold,  15  Cal. 
476,  481 ;    People  v.  Scoggins,  37  id.  676,  684,  696 ;  People  v.  Alivtre,  55  id.  263 ; 
People  v.  Travis,  56  id.  251,  253;  People  P.  Carlton,  57  id.  83;  Davidson  v.  People, 
4  Colo.  145;  Bond  v.  State,  21  Fla.  738,  751 ;  Garner '».  State,  28  id.  113,  133 ;  Wil- 
son v.  State,  30  id.  234,  242  ;  Steele  P.  State,  33  id.  348,  350 ;  Lester  P.  Stat*,  37  id. 
382  ;  Monroe  P.  State,  5  Ga.  85,  138 ;  Haynes  v.  State,  17  id.  465,  482  ;  Reynolds  P. 
State,  1  Kelly  222,  230  ;  Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194,  228 ;  Lingo  v.  State,  29  id.  470, 
483 ;  Hawkins  P.  State,  25  id.  207,  210 ;    Hoye  P.  State,  39  id.  718,  722 ;  Pound  P. 
State,  43  id.  88,  129  ;  Vaughn  v.  State,  88  id.  731  ;  May  P.  State,  90  id.  793 ;  Pitt- 
man  p.  State,  92  id.  480  ;  Peterson  P.  State,  50  id.  142  ;  Campbell  P.  People,  16  111.  1 ; 
Williams  P.  People,  54  id.  422,  426  ;  Siebert  P.  People,  143  id.  571,   590  ;  Holler  v. 
State,  37  Ind.  57,  60  ;    Combs  v.  State,  75  id.  217  ;   Bowlus  P.  State,   130  id.  227  , 
Ellis  P.  State,  id.,  52  N.  E.  82;   State  t'.  Woodson,  41  la.  428;  State  P.   Maloy,  44 
id.  104,  114  ;  State  P.  Elliott,  45  id.  490  ;  State  p.  Brown,  22  Kan.  222  ;  State  v.  Scott, 
24  id.  68,  70  ;  State  P.  Spendlove,  44  id.  1 ;  Cornelius  P.  Com.,  15  B.  Monr.  539,  546  ; 
Sparks  P.  Com.,  89  Ky.  644;  Tudor  p.  Com.,  id.,  43  S.  W.  187;  Young  p.  Com.,  id., 
42  S.  W.  1141;  State  P.  Bradley,  6  La.  An.  554,  560;   State  ».  Gregor,  21  id.  473, 
475;  State  P.  Ryan,  30  id.  1177';    State  p.  Fisher,  33  id.  1344;    State  v.  Williams,  40 
id.  168,  170;  State  P.  Harris,  43  id.  842,  845;  State  p.  Depass,  45  id.  1151;   State  P. 
Walsh,  44  id.  1122;  State  v.  King,  47  id.  28  ;  State  P.  Compagnet,  48  id.  1470;  Tur- 
pin  »,«.  State,  55  Md.  462,  473 ;  People  r.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9,  15 ;  People  P.  Lilly,  38 
id.  277  ;  Brownell  p.  People,  ib.  736  ;  People  p.  Palmer,  96  id.  580  ;  State  p.  Dumphey, 


56  KELEVANCY;  CIKCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

threats  must  be  distinguished  from  another,  earlier  recognized,  viz., 
to  show  the  accused's  reasonable  apprehension  of  violence  from  the 
deceased ;  similar  limitations  are  usually  here  applied,  with  the 
important  addition  that  the  threats  must  be  shown  to  have  been 
communicated  to  the  accused,  since  otherwise  they  could  not  have 
affected  his  apprehensions.8  Where  the  issue  is  whether  a  will  was 

4  Minn.  438,  449  ;  Newcomb  v.  State,  37  Miss.  383,  404 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  54  id.  430; 
Holly  v.  State,  55  id.  424,  428 ;  Kendrick  v.  State,  ib.  436,  450 ;  Moriarty  v.  State, 
62  id.  654,  661 ;  Prine  i>.  State,  73  id.  838  ;  State  v.  Sloan,  47  Mo.  604,  609  ;  McMillen 
v.  State,  13  id.  30 ;  State  v.  Elkins,  63  id.  159,  164  ;  State  v.  Taylor,  64  id.  358,  361  ; 
State  ».  Brown,  ib.  367,  375  ;  State  v.  Alexander,  66  id.  148,  161  ;  State  v.  Guy,  69 
id.  435 ;  State  v.  Eaton,  75  id.  586,  590 ;  State  v.  McNally,  >87  id.  650  ;  State  v.  Rider, 
90  id.  54,  60;  95  id.  476,  484  ;  State  v.  Thomas,  138  id.  168;  State  v.  Hopper,  142 
id.  478  ;  State  v.  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  237;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  174  ;  State  v.' 
Turpin,  77  N.  C.  473,  479;  State  v.  Skidmore,  87  id.  509,  512;  State  v.  Byrd,  id.,  23 
S.  E.  353  ;  Stewart  v.  State,  19  Oh.  302  ;  State  v.  Tarter,  26  Or.  38,  41 ;  Nevling  v: 
Com.,  98  Pa.  322,  337;  State  v.  Bodie,  33  S.  C.  130  ;  State  v.  Faile,  43  S.  C.  52; 
Copeland  v.  State,  7  Humph.  479,  495  ;  Williams  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  376,  396  ;  Wiggins 
v.  Utah,  93  U.  S.  465;  Allison  v.  U.  S.,  160  id.  203;  State  v.  Goodrich,  19  Vt.  116, 
120;  White  v.  Terr.,  3  Wash.  T.  397,  403;  State  v.  Gushing,  Wash.,  45  Pac.  45, 
50  Pac.  512 ;  State  v.  Abbott,  8  W.  Va.  743;  State  v.  Evans,  33  id.  417,  425. 

Compare  the  analogous  use  of  the  deceased's  character  for  violence,  ante,  §  14  6  (3). 

8  Space  does  not  suffice  to  analyze  the  cases  :  Noble's  Trial,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  740  ; 
Powell  v.  State,  19  Ala.  577,  581  ;  Pritchett  v.  State,  22  id.  42  ;  Carroll  v.  State,  23 
id.  28,  36  ;  Dupree  v.  State,  33  id.  380,  386  ;  Hughey  v.  State,  47  id.  97,  103  ;  Powell 
v.  State,  52  id.  1  ;  Payne  y.  State,  60  id.  80,  86 ;  Myers  v.  State,  62  id.  603  ;  Polk  v. 
State,  ib.  239;  Roberts  v.  State,  68  id.  164  ;  Green  v.  State,  69  id.  8,  10  ;  Jones  v. 
State,  id.,  23  So.  135 ;  Atkins  v.  State,  16  Ark.  568,  584  ;  Coker  v.  State,  20  id.  53, 
55  ;  Pitman  v.  State,  22  id.  354,  356;  Palmore  v.  State,  29  id.  248,  263  ;  McPherson 
v.  State,  ib.  225,  228  ;  Harris  v.  State,  34  id.  469,  472  ;  People  v.  Arnold,  15  Cal. 
476,  480;  People  v.  Lombard,  17  id.  316,  320;  People  v.  Scoggins,  37  id.  676,  683  ; 
People  I?.  Taing,  53  id.  602  ;  People  v.  Travis,  56  id.  251,  253  ;  Bond  v.  State,  21  Fla. 
738,  752 ;  Smith  v.  State,  25  id.  517,  521 ;  Garner  v.  State,  28  id.  113,  133;  Steele  v. 
State,  33  id.  348,  350  ;  Reynolds  v.  State,  1  Kelly  222,  230  ;  Hudgins  ».  State,  2  Ga. 
173,  181 ;  Howell  v.  State,  5  id.  48,  54  ;  Monroe  v.  State,  ib.  83,  135  ;  Keener  v.  State, 
18  id.  194,  225  ;  Hawkins  p.  State,  25  id.  209  ;  Lingo  v.  State,  29  id.  470,  483  ;  Cox- 
well  v.  State,  66  id.  309  ;  McDonald  v.  People,  168  IH.  93  ;  D«  Forest  v.  State,  21  Ind. 
23,  26  ;  Wood  v.  State,  92  id.  269,  273 ;  State  v.  Collins,  32  la.  63  ;  State  v.  Woodson, 
41  id.  425,  428 ;  State  v.  Maloy,  44  id.  104,  114  ;  State  v.  Elliott,  45  id.  490 ;  State  v. 
Brown,  22  Kan.  222,  230  ;  State  v.  Scott,  24  id.  68,  70 ;  Cornelius  v.  Com.,  15  B.  Monr. 
539,  546  ;  Young  v.  Com.,  6  Bush  318  ;  Philips  v.  Com.,  2  Duv.  328,  329 ;  Carico  v. 
Com.,  7  Bush  124,  129  ;  Bohannon  v.  Com.,  8  id.  481,  488  ;  Lightfoot  ».  Com.,  80 
Ky.  521  ;  Com.  v.  Hoskins,  id.,  35  S.  W.  284 ;  Grayson  v.  Com.,  id.,  35  S.  W.  1035; 
State  v.  Mullen,  14  La.  An.  577,  579  ;  State  v.  Robertson,  30  id.  340;  State  r.  Ryan, 
ib.  1177;  State  v.  Cooper,  32  id.  1084;  State  v.  Vance,  ib.  1177;  State  v.  Jack- 
son, 33  id.  1087  ;  State  v.  Fisher,  ib.  1344  ;  State  v.  Birdwell,  36  id.  859,  861  ;  State 
v.  Ford,  37  id.  443,  460  ;  State  v.  Labuzan,  ib.  489  ;  State  v.  Janvier,  ib.  644  ; 
State  v.  Spell,  38  id.  20;  State  v.  Brooks,  39  id.  817;  State  v.  Demoreste,  41  id. 
617  ;  State  v.  Cosgrove,  42  id.  753  ;  State  ».  Wilson,  43  id.  840  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  44 
id.  160,  163  ;  State  v.  Harris,  45  id.  842,  845;  State  v.  Green,  46  id.  1522;  State  ». 
Barker,  ib.  798,  802 ;  State  v.  King,  47  id.  28  ;  State  v.  Vickers,  ib.  1574  ;  State  ». 
Compagnet,  48  id.  1470  ;  State  v.  Pruett,  49  id.  283 ;  State  v.  Wiggins,  50  id.,  23  So. 
334  ;  Turpin  v.  State,  55  Md.  462,  473  ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9,  15  ;  Brownell  v. 
People,  38  id.  732,  736  ;  People  v.  Lilly,  ib.  276  ;  State  v.  Dumphey,  4  Minn.  438, 
449  ;  Wesley  v.  State,  37  Miss.  327,  346  ;  Newcomb  v.  State,  ib.  383,  400 ;  Evans  v. 
State,  44  id.  762,  772  ;  Harris  v.  State,  46  id.  319,  323  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  54  id.  430, 
435  ;  Holly  v.  State,  55  id.  424,  428  ;  Kendrick  v.  State,  ib.  436,  450  ;  Morinrty  v. 
State,  62  id.  654,  661  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  17  Mo.  544,  548 ;  State  v.  Hays,  23  id.  287, 
810  ;  State  v.  Sloan,  47  id.  604  ;  State  v.  Keene,  50  id.  357 ;  State  v.  Harris,  59  id. 
550,  556 ;  State  v.  Elkins,  63  id.  159, 163  ;  State  v.  Alexander,  66  id.  148, 162;  State  v. 


§§  14&-14Z.]      EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   CAPACITY,   HABIT,  ETC.  57 

made  or  revoked  or  altered,  the  person's  intention  as  to  making  it, 
etc.,  is  admissible.9  In  the  same  way,  an  intention  to  commit 
suicide  should  be  admissible  to  show  suicide.10] 

4.   Evidence  to  prove  Capacity,  Knowledge,  Plan,  Intent,  Habit,  Cus- 
tom, and  other  Human  Qualities  or  Conditions. 

[In  evidencing  the  various  human  conditions  or  attributes  —  capa- 
city, knowledge,  plan,  intent,  habit,  etc.  —  a  chief  source  is  of  course 
the  person's  conduct;  and  it  thus  happens  that  the  general  objec- 
tions against  the  use  of  particular  acts  in  evidence  (ante,  §§  14  a, 
14  /)  are  frequently  applied  to  exclude  such  evidence.  This  in 
part  explains  the  frequent  lack  of  harmony  in  the  rulings  on  the 
following  subjects.] 

§  14  I.  Evidence  to  prove  Physical  Capacity,  Skill,  Age,  Sanity, 
etc.  [Physical  strength  or  capacity  may  well  be  evidenced  by 
instances  of  the  person's  exhibiting  such  capacity  or  by  his  con- 
duct or  appearance;1  and  the  same  way  of  evidencing  skill  or 
dexterity  is  perhaps  allowable.2  A  person's  appearance  may  be 
evidence  of  his  age,  at  least  within  broad  limits.8  Intoxication 

Guy,  69  id.  435;  State  ».  Harris,  76  id.  364;  State  v.  Reed,  137  id.  125  ;  State  v. 
Albright,  id.,  46  S.  W.  620 ;  Basye  v.  State,  45  Nebr.  261 ;  State  v.  Hall,  9  Nev.  58  ; 
State  v.  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  237  ;  People  v.  Kector,  19  Wend.  589,  614 ;  Stokes  v.  People, 
53  N.  Y.  174  ;  State  v.  Scott,  4  Ired.  415  ;  State  v.  Turpin,  77  N.  C.  473,  476  ;  State  v. 
Byrd,  id.,  28  S.  E.  353  ;  State  v.  Bartmess,  Or.,  54  Pac.  167;  Com.  v.  Lenox,  3  Brewst. 
249,  251  ;  Nevling  v.  Com.,  98  Pa.  322,  336 ;  State  v.  Smith,  12  Rich.  430,  443  ;  State 
v.  Bodie,  33  S.  C.  130  ;  State  v.  Wyse,  ib.  591  ;  Rippy  v.  State,  2  Head  218 ;  Williams 
v.  State,  3  Heisk.  376,  395  ;  Jackson  v.  State,  6  Baxt.  452,  454  ;  Lander  v.  State,  12 
Tex.  462,  484  ;  Grim.  Code,  §  2270  ;  Myers  v.  State,  33  Tex.  525,  542  ;  Dorsey  v. 
State,  34  id.  651,  657 ;  Horbach  v.  State,  43  id.  242,  259  ;  Irwin  v.  State,  ib.  236, 
241;  Mealer  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  102,  107  ;  Allison  v.  U.  S.,  160  U.  S.  203,  16  Sup. 
252;  Wallace  v.  U.  S.,  162  id.  466;  State  v.  Goodrich,  19  Vt.  117,  121;  Whiter. 
Terr.,  3  Wash.  T.  397  ;  State  v.  McGonigle,  14  id.  594;  State  v.  Cushing,  14  id.  527, 
17  id.  544  ;  State  v.  Abbott,  8  W.  Va.  743,  759  ;  State  v.  Evans,  33  id.  417,  425. 

Compare  the  analogous  use  of  the  deceased's  reputed  character  for  violence,  ante, 
§  14  c  (2). 

9  Doe  v.  Palmer,  16  Q.  B.  747  ;  Keen  v.  Keen,  L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  107  ;  Sugden  v. 
St.  Leonards,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  154  ;  Dench  v.  Bench,  L.  R.  2  P.  D.  60,  64  ;  Gould  v. 
Lakes,  L.  R.  6  P.  D.  1  ;  Hoppe  v.  Byers,  60  Md.  393  ;  Converse  v.  Allen,  4  All.  512  ; 
Hope's  Appeal,  48  Mich.  520  ;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  177  Pa.  218  ;  Johnson  v.  Brown, 
51  Tex.  80.  The  design  of  a  devisee  to  prevent  a  will  of  a  certain  tenor  has  also  been 
admitted  :  Gordon  v.  Burns,  141  Mo.  602. 

For  other  questions  as  to  a  testator's  utterances,  see  post,  §  162  e. 

1°  See  post,  §§  14r,  162  c. 

i  State  v.  Wentworth,  37  N.  H.  196,  211;  State  v.  Knapp,  45  id.  148,  154 ;  Keith 
v.  N.  Co.,  140  Mass.  175  ;  Peaslee  v.  R.  Co.,  152  id.  155,  158  ;  Olsen  v.  Andrews,  168 
id.  261;  for  instances  of  exclusion,  see  Ellis  v.  Short,  21  Pick.  142  ;  Billiard  v.  Beattie, 
59  N.  H.  462 ;  People  v.  Corey,  148  N.  Y.  476  ;  State  v.  Cushing,  17  Wash.  544. 

3  See  R.  v.  Williamson,  3  C.  &  P.  635 ;  R.  v.  Whitehead,  3  C.  &  K.  202  ;  Costelo 
v.  Crowell,  139  Mass.  588. 

8  Com.  v.  Hollis,  Mass.,  49  N.  E.  632 ;  Jones  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  108  ;  Eisner  v. 
Supreme  Lodge,  98  Mo.  645  ;  State  v.  Arnold,  13  Ired.  184,  192.  The  contrary  doc- 
trine in  Indiana  is  anomalous  :  L.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  544,  550.  The 
person's  appearance  as  indicating  that  another  person  may  reasonably  have  believed 
him  to  be  over  age  is  a  different  use  of  the  evidence  ;  see  Hermann  v.  State,  73  Wi» 


58  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

may  be  evidenced  by  the  fact  of  his  having  taken  liquor4  or  by 
conduct  significant  of  inebriety.6  Sanity  and  insanity  are  of  course 
evidenced  by  the  person's  conduct ;  in  fact  (in  the  words  of  Mr.  J. 
Patteson),  "Every  act  of  the  party's  life  is  relevant  to  the  issue;"9 
in  particular,  suicide  may  be  evidential  of  insanity,7  and  an  unnatural 
distribution  of  property  by  a  testator.8  Non-payment  of  debts  may 
be  evidence  of  the  pecuniary  capacity  to  lend  or  pay  money.9 

Furthermore,  in  all  cases  where  a  physical  or  mental  condition  is 
in  question,  the  person's  condition  at  a  prior  or  a  subsequent  time 
tends  to  show  what  it  probably  was  at  the  time  in  question;  for 
example,  one's  condition  as  to  facial  appearance,10  physical  condi- 
tion, u  and,  most  frequently,  sanity  or  insanity ;  no  rule  can  be  laid 
down  as  to  the  range  of  time  which  may  be  covered  by  the  evidence; 
in  practice  Courts  usually  employ  great  liberality  and  allow  the  facts 
of  each  case  to  control 12  (though  a  few  Courts  seem  to  require  evi- 
dence of  remote  insanity  to  be  accompanied  by  evidence  of  present 
or  intervening  insanity 18)  ;  and  the  condition  after  as  well  as  before 
the  act  in  question  is  admissible,14  —  in  particular,  of  an  accused 
after  the  act  charged.16  Since  insanity  may  be  inherited,  the  exist- 

248.  For  the  question  whether  the  jury  may  inspect  the  person  in  court,  see  ante, 
§§  13  a,  ff. 

*  Fleming  v.  State,  5  Humph.  564  ;  Tnttle  v.  Russell,  2  Day  202. 

6  Bagley  v.  Mason,  69  Vt.  175  ;  State  v.  Harris,  100  la.  188. 

8  Wright  0.  Tatham,  5  Cl.  &  F.  670,  715,  722  ;  to  a  similar  effect,  U.  S.  v.  Holmes, 
1  Cliff.  109  ;  State  v.  Hays,  22  La.  An.  39,  40.  For  sundry  instances,  see  Rouch  v. 
Zehring,  59  Pa.  78;  Irish  v.  Smith,  8  S.  &  R.  578  ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9, 
16  ;  Hopps  v.  People,  31  III.  385,  388  ;  Bower  v.  Bower,  142  Ind.  194. 

1  Grand  Lodge  v.  Wieting,  168  111.  408  ;  Bachmeyer  v.  Assoc.,  87  Wis.  325,  340 ; 
Hathaway  v.  Ins.  Co.,  48  Vt.  336,  353;  Duffield  v.  Morris,  2  Harringt.  375,  382. 

8  Fountain  v.  Brown,  38  Ala.  74  ;  Sim  v.  Russell,  90  la.  656  ;  Demrning  v.  Butcher, 
91  id.  425;  Manatt  v.  Scott,  id.,  76  N.  W.  717  ;  Burns'  Will,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  519. 

9  Pontius  v.  People,  82  N.  Y.  339,  349  ;  Woods  v.  Gummert,  67  Pa.  136  ;  Wood- 
ward v.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  453,  458  ;  Wiggin  v.  Plainer,  31  N.  H.  251,  270. 

10  Com.  v.  Campbell,  155  Mass.  537;  Com.  v.  Morgan,  159  id.  374  ;  Gilbert  v.  R.  Co., 
160  id.  403  ;  T.  B.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Warner,  Tex.,  32  S.  W.  868 ;  see  also  some  caaea 
under  §  439  h,  post. 

"  Cowley  ».  People,  83  N.  Y.  477. 

12  Beavan  v.  M'Donnell,  10  Exch.  184  ;  Green  v.  State,  59  Ark.  246  ;  Harp  v.  Parr, 
168  111.  459  ;  State  v.  Felter,  25  la.  72,  76  ;  St.  George  v.  Biddeford,  76  Me.  598  ;  Somes 
v.  Skinner,  16  Mass.  348,  359;  Howes  v.  Colburn,  165  Mass.  385;  Laplante  v.  Mills, 
ib.  487;  Haines  v.  Hayden,  95  Mich.   332;  Pinney's  Will,  27  Minn.  282  ;  State  v. 
Hayward,  62  id.  474;  State  v.  Duestrow,  137   Mo.   44  ;  Rhoades  v.  Fuller,    139   id. 
179  ;  State  v.  Lewis,  20  Nev.  342  ;  State  v.  Kelley,  57  N.  H.  549  ;  Norwood  v.  Marrow, 
4  Dev.  &  B.  451;  Irish  v.  Smith,  8  S.  &  R.  576  ;  Wilkinson  v.  Pearson,  23  Pa.  120  ; 
Stauffer  v.  Young,  39  id.  455  ;  Pidcock  v.  Potter,  68  id.  351 ;  First  N.  Bank  v.  Wire- 
back,  106  id.  46 ;  Htndman  v.  Van  Wyck,  153  id.  243,  246  ;  St.  L.  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 
«.  Greenthal,  U.  S.  App.,  77  Fed.  150. 

13  Murtihree  v.  Senn,  107  Ala.  424  ;  Ashcraft  v.  De  Armond,  44  la.  233  ;  Spencer  i>. 
State,  69  Md.  28. 

14  See  cases  in  note  12,  ante. 

16  McLean  v.  State,  16  Ala.  679  ;  Green  i>.  State,  64  Ark.  523  ;  People  v.  Griffin, 
Cal.,  49  Pac.  711;  State  v.  Lewis,  45  la.  20;  State  v.  Newman,  57  Kan.  705  ;  Com.  v. 
Pomeroy,  117  Mass.  148  ;  People  v.  Wood,  126  N.  Y.  249,  272  ;  People  v.  Nino,  149  id. 
817  ;  People  o.  Hoch,  150  id.  291;  French  i>.  State,  93  Wis.  325.  Contra:  State  v. 
Vann,  82  N.  C.  631. 


§§  14?-14w.]      EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   DESIGN,   HABIT,  ETC.  59 

ence  of  insanity  in  an  ancestor,  or  even  in  a  near  collateral  relative, 
is  evidential,  though  the  restriction  is  usually  imposed  that  inde- 
pendent evidence  of  the  person's  insane  conduct  be  also  forthcoming.19 
Moreover,  external  events  may  so  excite  a  weak  mind  that  a  condi- 
tion of  frenzy  ensues;  and  occasionally  such  events  —  e.  g.  a  wife's 
adultery  —  have  been  admitted  as  tending  to  show  the  natural  pro- 
duction of  insanity  in  a  mind  brooding  over  the  disturbing  event, 
provided  independent  evidence  of  insanity  is  also  offered.17] 

§  14  m.  Evidence  to  prove  Design,  Plan.  [In  evidencing  a  de- 
sign or  plan,  as  tending  to  show  the  doing  of  the  act  planned,  the 
person's  conduct1  is  of  course  the  chief  source  of  circumstantial  evi- 
dence. The  kinds  of  conduct  which  may  be  significant  are  of  great 
variety;  the  most  common  being  the  acquisition  or  possession  of  tools 
or  other  means  of  action,3  lying  in  wait,8  making  inquiries  or  experi- 
ments as  to  an  act  of  the  sort  in  question,4  and  often,  also,  throwing 
out  obscure  hints  and  intimations  of  such  a  purpose.8  The  use  of 
similar  offences  or  acts  for  this  purpose  is  discussed  post,  §  14  q.~\ 

§  14  n.  Evidence  to  prove  Habit,  Custom.  [A  habit  or  custom 
is  upually  evidenced  by  direct  testimony  to  its  existence.  But  it  may 
also  be  evidenced  by  distinct  and  repeated  acts ;  the  conditions  being 
that  they  should  be  sufficiently  numerous,  and  should  have  occurred 

16  Earl  Ferrer's  Trial,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  932,  937;   M'Adam  v.  Walker,  1  Dow  148, 
177;  R.  v.  Oxford,  4  State  Tr.  N.  s.  497,  528  ;  R.  v.  Tucket,  1  Cox  Cr.  103;  Green  v. 
State,  64  Ark.  523  ;  State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  540;  Snow  v.  Benton,  28  111.  306  ;  Up- 
stone  v.  People,  109  id.  169;  Bradley  v.  State,  31  Ind.  492,  510  ;  Sawyer  v.  State,  35  id. 
80,  84  ;  State  ».  Felton,  25  la.  75;  Ross  v.  MoQuiston,  45  id.  147;  Sim  v.  Russell, 
90  id.  656  ;  Demming  v .  Butcher,  91  id.  425  ;  State  v.  Van  Tassel,  103  id.  6  ;  St.  George 
»•.  Biddeford,  76  Me.  598  ;  Baxter  v.  Abbott,  7  Gray  71;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich. 
9,  17  (leading  case);  State  v.  Hayward,  62  Minn.  474  ;  State  v.  Spencer,  21  N.  J.  L. 
196,  203  ;  Walsh  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  467;  State  v.  Cunningham,  72  N.  C.  469,  474; 
Laros  v.  Com.,  84  Pa.  200,  209. 

17  See  Sawyer  v.  State,  35  Ind.  80,  84  ;  People  v.  Wood,  126  N.  Y.  147  ;  People  v. 
Strait,  148  id.  566;  State  v.  Jones,  50  N.  H.  369,  382;  Burkhart  v.  Gladish,  123  Ind. 
237;  People  v.  Lane,  101  Cal.  513,  517. 

For  the  use  of  a  testator's  utterances  at  various  times,  as  indicating  his  normal  con- 
dition of  mind  with  reference  to  the  disposition  of  his  property,  see  post,  §  162  e. 

1  For  the  use  of  declarations  of  design  or  plan  under  the  Hearsay  exception,  see  post, 
§162c. 

2  R.  v.  Jarvis,  7  Cox  Cr.  53  ;   French  v.  State,  81  Ala.  41,  49  ;   Spies  v.  People,  122 
111.  1,  141  ;  State  v.  Hinkle,  6  la.  384  ;   State  v.  Adams,  20  Kan.  320  ;  Coin.  r.  Wil- 
liams, 2  Gush.  584  ;   Com.  v.  Choate,  105  Mass.  451  ;    Long  v.  State,  52  Miss.  23,  34  ; 
State  v.  Rider,  95  Mo.  474,   485 ;    People  v.  Scott,  153  N.  Y.  40  ;  U.  S.  v.  Burns, 
7  McLean  23,  26. 

For  similar  conduct  as  evidence  of  capacity,  see  ante,  §§  14  i,  14  /. 

»  Smalls  v.  State,  99  Ga.  25  ;  Prindle  v.  Glover,  4  Conn.  266.     See  R.  v.  Wilson, 

1  Lew.  Cr.  C.  112. 

4  State  v.  Green,  Kirby  89  ;   Jackson  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  38  S.  W.  422  ;  Com.  v.  Hersey, 

2  All.  173,  177  ;  Walsh  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  462,  466.     Excluded:  Costelo  v.  CroweU, 
139  Mass.  588. 

6  See  Blandy's  Trial,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  1122,  1132;  People  v.  Evans,  Cal.,  41  Pac. 
444;  State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518,  522,  538;  State  r.  Smith,  la.,  77  N.  W.  499  ; 
People  v.  Potter,  5  Mich.  1,  5;  State  v.  Gailor,  71  N.  C.  88,  90;  State  v.  Green,  92 
id.  779,  782  ;  Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delpeuch,  82  Pa.  235  ;  Rowt  v.  Kile,  1  Leigh 
217,  223  ;  Nicolas  t-.Com.,  91  Va.  741. 

For  additional  instances,  see  the  next  section,  under  Habit. 


60  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  v. 

under  fairly  similar  circumstances.  There  is  of  course  an  opportu- 
nity for  wide  variation  in  applying  this  notion  to  particular  cases,  and 
precedents  are  seldom  of  much  value;1  in  the  field  of  contracts,  the 
principle  is  applicable  to  proof  of  an  agency  by  other  acts  of  authoriza- 
tion to  the  same  person  about  the  same  matter,2  to  proof  of  a  contract 
by  other  similar  contracts  with  the  same  person,8  and  even  in  some 
instances  to  proof  of  a  contract  by  other  similar  contracts  with  other 
persons;4  but  the  rulings  cannot  be  reconciled,  and  it  can  only  be 
noted  that  such  evidence  is  receivable  so  far  as  it  has  real  probative 
value,  and  does  not  tend  unduly  to  confuse  the  issues.  As  applied 
in  proving  prescriptive  possession,  the  principle  sanctions  the  use  of 
other  acts  of  possession  on  premises  so  connected — i.  e.  as  parts  of 
the  same  manor,  estate,  or  the  like  —  that  acts  done  upon  the  one 
would  be  done  only  as  a  part  of  a  system  or  habit  of  doing  them  upon 
the  rest ; 6  the  bearing  of  a  boundary  may  well  be  evidenced  in  the 
same  way.6  So,  also,  a  custom  in  one  place  or  one  trade  may  be  evi- 
dence of  a  custom  in  another  place,  provided  the  places  or  the  trades 

1  Sundry  instances  are  as  follows:  Com.  v.  Ryan,  134  Mass.  223  (drunkenness)  ; 
Howe  v.  Thayer,  17  Pick.  91,  96  (notice  of  dissolution)  ;  Watts  v.  Fraser,  7  A.  &  E. 
223,  232  (printing  of  newspaper)  ;  Gahagan  v.  R.  Co.,  1  All.  187  (switching  railroad 
cars) ;  State  v.  Shaw,  58  N.  H.  73  (sale  of  liquor)  ;  Davis  v.  Lyon,  91  N.  C.  444  (jus- 
tice's abuse  of  authority) ;  State  v.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  528,  549  (ringing  locomotive  bell)  ; 
Adams  v.  Ins.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  169  (waiver  of  insurance-condition);  L.  E.  &  W.  B.  Co. 
v.  Craig,  47  U.  S.  App.  647  (waiver  of  employer's  rule). 

2  See  Gibson  v.  Hunter,  2  H.  Bl.   283  ;   Barber  v.  Gingell,  3  Esp.  61  ;   Cash  v. 
Taylor,  LI.  &  W.  C.  C.  178;  Llewellyn  ».  Winkworth,  13  M.  &  W.  599;  Morris  v. 
Bethell,  L.  R.  4  C.  P.  765;  Sun  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Barrel  Co.,  114  111.  99  ;  Trull  v. 
True,  33  Me.  367;   Lee  v.  Tinges,  7  Md.  215,  237;   People  ».  McLaughlin,  150  N.  Y. 
365 ;   Stevenson  v.  Roy,  43  Pa.  191,  196. 

»  See  Bourne  r.  Gatltff,  11  Cl.  &  F.  45,  70;  Gardner  v.  Meeker,  169  111.  40;  Eaton 
».  Tel.  Co.,  68  Me.  63,  67  ;  Nickerson  v.  Gould,  82  id.  512;  Wood  ».  Finson,  Me.,  31 
Atl.  1007;  Farnum  v.  Farnum,  13  Gray  508;  Huntsman  v.  Nichols,  116  Mass.  521; 
Schwerin  v.  De  Graff,  21  Minn.  354  ;  Iron  Mountain  Bank  v.  Murdock,  62  Mo.  70,  74  ; 
Swamscot  M.  Co.  v.  Walker,  22  N.  H.  457,  467  ;  Holmes  v.  Goldsmith,  147  U.  S.  150, 
162  ;  Welch  v.  Ricker,  69  Vt.  239  ;  Limerick  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Adams,  id.,  40  Atl.  166. 

4  See  Carter  v.  Pryke,  Peake,  95;  Spenceley  v.  Wilmot,  7  East  108;  Hollingham 
v.  Head,  4  C.  B.  N.  s.  388  ;  Smith  v.  W ilkins,  fl  C.  &  P.  180;  Barden  v.  Keverberg, 
2  M.  &  W.  61 ;  Woodward  v.  Buchanan,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  285 ;  Stolp  v.  Blair,  68  111. 
541  ;  Schmidt  v.  Packard,  132  Ind,  398,  402;  Lexing.  &  E.  R.  Co.  ».  Lyons,  Ky.,  46 
S.  W.  209  ;  Davis  v.  Kneale,  97  Mich.  72,  76 ;  Roles  v.  Mintzer,  27  Minn.  31  ;  Murphy 
v.  Backer,  67  id.  510;  True  v.  Sanborn,  27  N.  H.  383  ;  Jackson  v.  Smith,  7  Cow.  717  ; 
McLoghlin  v.  Bank,  139  N.  Y.  514,  522  ;  Coxe  v.  Deringer,  82  Pa.  236,  258;  Phelps 
v.  Conant,  30  Vt.  277,  282;  Aiken  v.  Kennison,  58  id.  665;  Jones  v.  Ellis,  68  id. 
544  ;  Pictorial  League  v.  Nelson,  69  id.  162 ;  Hartman  v.  Evans,  38  W.  Va.  669,  673  ; 
Kelley  v.  Schupp,  60  Wis.  76  ;  Brumell  v.  H.  S.  M.  Co.,  86  id.  587 ;  Oliver  v.  Morawetz, 
95  id.  1. 

6  Stanley  v.  White,  14  East  332  ;  Barnes  v.  Mawson,  1  M.  &  S.  85  ;  Doe  v.  Kemp, 
7  Bing.  332 ;  Jones  v.  Williams,  2  M.  &  W.  326 ;  Doe  v.  Roberts,  13  id.  520,  530  ,• 
Bristow  v.  Cormican,  L.  R.  3  App.  Gas.  641,  670;  Neill  v.  Devonshire,  L.  R.  8  App. 
Cas.  135,  166;  Bogardus  v.  Trinity  Church,  4  Saiidf.  Co.  633,  746  ;  Abeel  v.  Van 
Gelder,  36  N.  Y.  515. 

Compare  the  somewhat  different  doctrine  as  to  possession  of  part  of  land  under  a 
deed  of  the  whole  being  prima  facie  evidence  of  title  as  against  one  having  no  paper 
title:  Bowman  v.  Weltig,  39  111.  416,  426. 

8  Overton  v.  Davisson,  1  Gratt.  211,  227 ;  Rensens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va.  226 ;  Golds- 
borough  v.  Pidduck,  87  la.  599;  Olsen  v.  Rogers,  Cal.,  62  Pac.  486. 


§§14  71-14(7.]          EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   HABIT,   MOTIVE,   ETC.  61 

are  such  that  a  uniformity  of  practice  may  be  assumed; T  in  the  appli- 
cation of  this  principle  in  England  to  customs  of  descent,  tithes,  and 
the  like,  it  has  been  regarded  as  admitting  in  evidence  the  custom  in 
the  same  manor,8  or  in  the  same  township  or  other  entity,9  and  even 
in  other  manors  where  the  conditions  on  the  matter  in  question  were 
presumably  the  same.10]  » 

§  14  o.  Evidence  to  prove  Motive,  Emotion,  Malice,  etc.  [A  mo- 
tive i; — i.  e.  an  emotion,  passion,  or  feeling,  as  tending  to  produce  an 
act  of  a  given  sort — may  be  evidenced  (1)  either  by  circumstances 
tending  to  excite  such  an  emotion,  (2)  or  by  conduct  exhibiting  it, 
(3)  or  by  the  prior  or  subsequent  existence  of  the  emotion. 

(1)  No  specific  rules  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  kind  of  circum- 
stance that  may  excite  a  certain  emotion  ;  the  range  of  possibilities 
is  infinite ; 2  but  it  is  necessary  that  the  circumstance  should  have  be- 
come known  to  the  person  said  to  have  been  influenced  by  it.8  Of 
the  few  matters  over  which  any  real  controversy  has  arisen,  it  is 
sufficient  to  note  that  domestic  infidelity  in  its  various  shapes, 
or  an  illicit  sexual  connection,  is  treated  as  capable  of  sufficiently 
exciting  the  desire  to  murder;4  as  also  the  opportunity  to  obtain 

7  See  Noble  v.  Kennoway,  2  Dougl.  510 ;  Milward  v.  Hibbert,  3  Q.  B.    120,  139  ; 
Falkner  v.  Earle,  3  B.  &  S.  360 ;  Place  v.  Allcock,  4  F.  &  F.  1074  ;   Fleet  v.  Morton, 
L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  1'26,  41  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  s.  49 ;    M'Fadden  v.  Murdock,  1  Ir.  C.  L.  218  ; 
Barnes  v.  Ingalls,  39  Ala.  201  ;  Denver  &  R.  G.   R.   Co.  v.   Glasscott,  4  Colo.  270  ; 
Toddv.  Keene,  167  Mass.  157  ;   Reynolds  v.  Ins.  Co.,   36  Mich.  131,142;  Walker  v. 
Barrow,  6  Minn.  508  ;   Phceuix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Philip,  13  Wend.  81  ;    Howard  i;.  Ins.  Co., 
4  Den.  507  ;  Tex.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  88  Tex.  439  ;  W.  M.  W.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Dun- 
can, ib.  611;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide,  11  Wall.  438;   Anderson  v.  Mining  Co.,  Utah,  50 
Pac.  815  ;   Hine  v.  Pomeroy,  30  Vt.  103,  106. 

8  Doe  v.  Sisson,  12  East  62. 

9  Blundell  v.  Howard,  1  M.  &  S.  292 ;  Jewison  v.  Dyson,  9  M.  i  W.  540,  556  ; 
Lendruni  v.  Deazley,  4  L.  R.  Ire.  635,  645. 

13  Moulin  v.  Dallison,  Cro.  Car.  484 ;  Champion  v.  Atkinson,  3  Keb.  90  ;  Somerset 
v.  France,  1  Stra.  654 ;  Furneaux  v.  Hutchins,  2  Cowp.  807  ;  Beebee  v  Parker,  5  T.  R. 
26,  31  ;  R.  v.  Ellis,  1  M.  &  S.  652,  661  ;  Rowe  v.  Brenton,  8  B.  &  C.  737,  758  ;  An- 
glesey v.  Hatherton.10  M.  &  W.  218 ;  see  Oilman  v.  Riopelle,  18  Mich.  145,  165. 

1  It  is  of  course  not  essential,  on  a  charge  of  crime,  to  prove  a  motive  :  Pointer  v. 
U.  S.,  151  U.  S.  396,  413  ;  People  v.  Durrant,  116  Cal.  179. 

2  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ala.  627  ;  Lyon  v.  Hancock,  35  Cal.  376  ;  Hendrickson  v. 
People,  10  N.  Y.  13,  31  ;  People  v.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.  128. 

8  Son  v.  Terr.,  Okl.,  49  Pac.  923  ;  Cheek  v.  State,  35  Ind.  492,  494  ;  State  v. 
Shelton,  64  la.  333,  338 ;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  176  ;  People  v.  Fitzgerald,  id., 
50  N.  E.  846. 

*  See  Com.  v.  Ferrigan,  44  Pa.  386  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ala.  625  ;  Edmonds  v. 
State,  34  Ark.  720,  730;  People  v.  Gress,  Cal.,  32  Pac.  752;  State  v.  Watkins, 
9  Conn.  47,  52  ;  State  v.  Green,  35  id.  203  ;  Shaw  v.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  477  ;  Fan  is  v. 
State,  129  111.  521,  526 ;  Simons  v.  People,  150  id.  66,  75  ;  Binns  v.  State,  57  Ind.  46, 
52  ;  Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  id.  334 ;  State  v.  Hinkle,  6  la.  380,  384  ;  State  v.  Kline, 
54  id.  183  ;  State  v.  Reed,  53  Kan.  767,  774  ;  Jackson  v.  Corn.,  Ky.,  38  S.  W.  422  ; 
State  v.  Reed,  50  La.  An.,  24  So.  131  ;  Com.  v.  Madan,  102  Mass.  1,  4  ;  Templetou  v. 
People,  27  Mich.  502;  State  v.  Lawlor,  28  Minn.  216,  219;  Webb  r.  State,  73  Miss. 
456  ;  State  v.  Duestrow,  137  Mo.  44  ;  St.  Louis  v.  State,  8  Nebr.  405,  411  ;  Dixon  v. 
State,  46  id.  298  ;  State  v.  Larkin,  11  Nev.  314,  328  ;  People  v.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.  71, 
128  ;  Pierson  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424,  435  ;  People  v.  Harris,  136  id.  423,  449  ;  Peo- 

Sle  v.  Osmond,  138  id.  80,  86;  People  v.  Buchanan,  145  id.  1  ;  People  v.  Scott,  153 
1.  40;  People  v.  Sutherland,  154  id.  345  ;  Com.  v.  Ferrigan,  44  Pa.  386;  Turner  v. 
Com.,  86  id.  54,  70 ;  State  v.  Chase,  68  Vt.  405 ;  Mack  v.  State,  48  Wis.  271,  276. 


62  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  v. 

money,6  the  expediency  of  preventing  discovery  or  arrest,8  or  the  de- 
ceased's share  in  opposing  or  injuring  the  accused  by  litigation  or 
otherwise.7  Money  or  pecuniary  condition,  as  connected  with  motive, 
has  several  aspects  :  first,  the  possession  of  money  by  A  is  admissible 
as  tending  to  show  a  desire  in  B  to  rob  or  kill  A  to  obtain  it,8  and  the 
lack  of  money  by  A  may  tend  to  show  that  B  would  be  unwilling  to  give 
him  credit,  —  in  particular  by  lending  him  money,9  selling  him  goods,10 
or  selling  them  absolutely,11  or  selling  them  in  good  faith  as  against 
creditors ; 12  secondly,  the  possession  of  money  by  B  is  some  evidence 
that  he  would  not  incline  to  injure  A  to  obtain  money,13  or  would  not 
borrow  money ; 14  and  the  lack  of  money  by  B  is  some  evidence  that 
he  had  a  motive  to  borrow,16  but  is  hardly  evidence  of  a  desire  to 
commit  crime  to  obtain  it16  (except  in  rebuttal17),  because  this  would 
practically  put  a  poor  person  under  comparative  disadvantage  and 
suspicion  in  such  cases ;  thirdly,  where  the  terms  of  a  contract  of 
sale  or  hiring  are  in  question,  the  market  value  of  such  articles  or 
services  is  generally  admitted  as  indicating  that  the  person  charged 
would  not  have  been  willing  to  vary  widely  from  the  market  value, 
and  in  the  same  way,  where  the  identity  of  the  article  delivered  is  in 
issue,  its  relation  in  value  to  the  agreed  price  tends  to  show  whether 
it  was  the  agreed  article.18 

8  See  R.  v.  Flannagan,  15  Cox  Cr.  403,  411 ;  Byers  v.  State,  105  Ala.  31 ;  16  So. 
716  ;  Graves  v.  People,  18  Colo.  170  ;  State  v.  Crowley,  33  La.  An.  782,  785  ;  Hen- 
drickson  v.  People,  10  N.  Y.  13,  31  ;  Kennedy  v.  People,  39  id.  245.  254  ;  Moore  v. 
U.  S.,  150  U.  S.  57,  61. 

6  See  R.  v.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  222 ;  Marler  v.  State,  68  Ala.  580,  584  ;  Dunn   v. 
State,  2  Ark.  229;  State  v.  Seymore,  94  la.  699  ;  State  v.  Mulholland,  16  La.  An.  376; 
State  v.  Fontenot,  48  id.  305  ;  State  v.  Morris,  84  N.  C.  756,  761 ;  Son  v.  Terr.,  Okl., 
49  Pac.  923  ;  State  v.  Pancoast,  5  N.  D.  516. 

7  See  Commander  v.  State,  60  Ala.  1,  7  ;  Com.  v.  Gray,  Ky.,    30  S.  W.  1015; 
Murphy  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  591  ;  Stone  v.  State,  4  Humph.  27,  35. 

8  See  note  5,  supra. 

9  Marcy  v.  Barnes,  16  Gray  161 ;  Cochrane  u.  W.  D.  Co.,  64  Minn.  369. 
1°  Plumb  v.  Curtis,  66  Conn.  154 ;  Lee  v.  Wheeler,  11  Gray  236. 

»  Bus  well  T.  Co.  v.  Case,  144  Mass.  350. 

12  Cook  v.  Mason,  5  All.  212  ;  Sweetser  v.  Bates,  117  Mass.  466. 

"  R.  v.  Grant,  4  F.  &  F.  322.     Contra :  Reynolds  v.  State,  147  Ind.  3. 

14  Stauffer  v.  Young,  39  Pa.  455,  462. 

16  Stevenson  v.  Stewart,  11  Pa.  309;  Covanhovan  v.  Hart,  21  id.  495,  502  ;  Harvey 
r.  Osborn,  55  Ind.  535,  545  ;  Costello  v.  Crowell,  133  Mass.  352  ;  see  Bathrick  v. 
Post,  50  Mich.  633  ;  Com.  v.  Jeffries,  7  All.  548,  556. 

18  Com.  v.  Jeffries,  supra;  Reynolds  v.  State,  147  Ind.  3.  Contra:  Com.  v. 
Yerkes,  Phila.  Com.  Pleas,  29  Leg.  Intell.  60,  12  Cox  Cr.  208,  217,  225  ;  Bridges  v. 
State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  859.  Compare  §  14  s,  post. 

17  Fulmer  v.  Com.,  97  Pa.  503. 

18  The  cases  usually  add  the  qualification  that  the  price,  etc.,  must  be  in  dispute,  or 
the  evidence  conflicting,  or  direct  testimony  be  wanting :  Johnson  v.  Harder,  45  la. 
677,  679  ;  Bradbury  v.  Dwight,  3  Mete.  31  ;  Rennell  v.   Kimball,  5  All.  356,  365  ; 
Parker  v.  Coburn,  10  id.  82,  84  :  Upton  v.  Winchester,  106  Mass.  330  ;  Brewer  r.  R. 
Co.  107  id.  277,  278  ;  Norris  v.  Spofford,  127  id.  85 ;  Campau  v.  Moran,  31  Mich.  281  ; 
Kumler  v.  Ferguson,  7  Minn.   442,  445  ;  Schwerin  v.  De  Graff,  21  id.  354  ;  Miller  v. 
Lamb,  22  id.  43  ;  Saunders  v.  Gallagher,  53  id.  422;  Zelch  v.  Hirt,  59  id.  360,  362  ; 
Blomgren  v.  Anderson,  48  Nebr.  240  ;  Weidner  v.  Phillips.  114  N.  Y.  458,  461  ;  Ru- 
bino  ».  Scott,  118  id.  6<J2;  Short  v.  Yelverton,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  138;  Jefferson  v.  Bur- 


§  14  0.]  EVIDENCE  TO   PROVE   MOTIVE,   EMOTION,    ETC.  63 

(2)  Conduct  as  evidence  of  motive  or  emotion  presents  no  topics 
of  real  controversy.19 

(3)  In  evidencing  motive,  emotion,  passion,  etc.,  by  its  former  or 
subsequent  existence,  the  chief  difficulties  arise  in  fixing  a  limit  of 
time,  and  in  ascertaining  that  the  emotion  relates  to  the  same  object. 
No  precise  rule  can  be  formulated  in  either  respect,     (a)   Hostility, 
as  leading  to  injuries  of  violence  and  the  like,  may  be  evidenced  by 
the  person's  hostile  conduct  at  other  times,  subject  to  indefinite  limi- 
tations on  the  above  points  j20  it  is  sometimes  said21  that  the  details 
of  the  quarrels  or  hostilities  should  not  be  gone  into,  as  too  likely 
to  prejudice  or  to  excuse  the  defendant  unfairly.     The  precedents  in 
cases  of  crimes  of  violence  against  a  wife  or  paramour  may  perhaps  be 
grouped  by  themselves.83     (b)  The  sexual  passion,  as  thus  evidenced, 
raises  a  variety  of  questions.     It  is  conceded  that  such  desire  is  evi- 
dential to  show  the  accomplishment  of  it ; M  and  that  its  existence  at 
the  time  in  question  may  be  evidenced  by  its  existence  for  the  same 
object  at  a  prior  or  subsequent  time;24  the  limits  of  time  must  depend 
on  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  and  should  'be  left  to  the  trial 
Court's  discretion ;  indecent  familiarity,  as  well  as  actual  intercourse, 
is  evidence  of  the  desire ;  and  the  fact  that  the  evidence  involves  an- 
other crime  is  in  itself  no  objection  to  its  reception.26     So  much  is  in 
general  established 26  for  the  various  kinds  of  charges  involving  such 
evidence.     The  cases  of  adultery,  criminal  conversation,  fornication, 

bans,  U.  S.  App.,  85  Fed.  952  ;  Koammen  v.  Mill  Co.,  58  Wis.  399  ;  Valley  L.  Co.  ». 
Smith,  71  id.  304,  306 ;  Bell  v.  Radford,  72  id.  402 ;  Mygatt  v.  Tarbell,  85  id. 
457,  467. 

19  E.  g.  Winns  v.  State,  90  Ala.  623  (calling  a  vile  name,   admitted)  ;  State   v. 
Hiitchinson,  45  la.  566  (making  faces  during  the  trial,  admitted). 

20  See  McManus  v.  State,   36  Ala.  285,  292  ;  Faire  v.  State,  58  id.  74,  79 ;    Com- 
mander  v.  State,  60  id.  1,  7  ;  Hudson  v.  State,  61  id.  333,  337  ;  Gray  v.  State,  63  id. 
66,  73  ;  McAnally  v.  State,  74  id.  17  ;  Atkins  v.  State,  16  Ark.  568,  581  ;  Billings  v. 
State,  52  id.  303,  310 ;  State  v.  Alford,   31  Conn.  40,  43  ;  State  v.  Riggs,  39  id.  498, 
501  ;  Pound  v.  State,  43  Ga.  88,  133  ;  Daniel  v.  State,  id.,  29  S.  E/767  ;  Tracy  v. 
People,  97  111.  104  ;  State  v.  Westfall,  49  la.  328  ;  State  v.  Moelchen,  53  id.  310,  314  ; 
Com.  v.  Gray,   Ky.,  30  S.  W.  1015  ;  Tuttle  v.  Com.,  id.,  33  S.  W.  823;  State  v. 
D'Angelo,  9  La.  An.  46  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  12  id.  679  ;  State  v.  Cooper,  32  id.  1084  ; 
State  v.  McNeely,  34  id.  1022  ;  State  v.  Birdwell,  36  id.  859,  861  ;  Com.  v.  Vaughan, 
9  Cush.  594;  Com.  v.  Holmes,  157  Mass.  240  ;  Josselyn  v.  McAllister,  22  Mich.  300, 
304  ;  Druse  v.  Wheeler,  ib.  439,  444  ;  Tyler  v.  Nelson,  109  id.  37  ;  66  N.  W.  671 ; 
Osmun  v.  Winters,  30  Or.  177  ;  Holley  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  46  S.  W.  39. 

21  In  Alabama,  Massachusetts,  Texas ;  contra,  in  Kentucky,  Louisiana. 

22  See  Baalam  v.  State,  17  Ala.  451,  463  ;  People  v.  Kern,  61  Cal.  244  ;  People  v. 
Barthleman,  Cal.,  52  Pac.  112  ;  Austin  v.  Austin,  10  Conn.   221  ;  State  v.  Green,  85 
id.  203,  208  ;   Shaw  v.  State,  60  Ga.  246,  250  ;  Painter  v.  People,  147  111.  463  ;  Doo- 
little  v.  State,  93  Ind.  272,  274  ;  Kennedy  v.  Hensley,  94  la.  629 ;  Com.  v.  Abbott, 
130  Mass.  472 ;  Com.  v.  Holmes,  157  id.  233,  239 ;  State  v.  Nugent,  71  Mo.  136,  140  ; 
Gardner  v.  Gardner,  23  Nev.  207  ;   State  v.  Langford,  Busbee  436,  442 ;  State  i>.  Rash, 
12  Ired.  382 ;   Sayres  v.  Com.,  88  Pa.  291,  309 ;  Thiede  v.  Utah,  169  U.  S.  610 ;  Bojle 
v.  State,  61  Wis.  440,  444. 

23  See  Thayer  v.  Thayer,  101  Mass.  13;   State  i>.  Markins,  95  Ind.  465. 

24  See  Lawson  v.  Swinney,  20  Ala.  76  ;   Thayer  v.  Thayer,  supra. 
26  See  post,  §145'. 

26  Subject  to  individual  variations  in  some  Courts,  which  space  doea  not  suffice  to 
analyze. 


64  RELEVANCY  ;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  [CH.   V. 

and  incest  present  no  difficulties ;  subject  to  the  above  limitations, 
former  or  subsequent  intercourse  or  improper  familiarities  of  the 
same  persons  is  generally  received.27  In  seduction  and  bastardy 
such  evidence  is  generally  offered  as  indicating  the  probability  of 
intercourse  by  the  man;  but  in  the  statutory  action  or  prosecu- 
tion for  seduction,  it  may  be  offered  to  show  the  probability 
of  consent  by  the  woman  without  a  promise  of  marriage;28  in 
general,  intercourse  or  improper  familiarities  between  the  parties 
at  other  times  is  admitted.29  On  a  charge  of  rape,80  several  discrimi- 
nations are  necessary ;  the  woman's  prior  improper  conduct  with  the 
defendant  is  universally  conceded  to  be  evidence  of  her  probable  con- 
sent ; 81  the  woman's  prior  improper  conduct  with  other  men  is, 
however,  evidential  only  of  her  general  disposition,  and  its  use  is 
disputed ; 82  the  woman's  prior  friendly  feelings  towards  the  defend- 
ant are  evidence  that  he  would  probably  have  attempted  persuasion 
rather  than  force ; M  former  improper  conduct  to  the  same  woman  by 
the  defendant  indicates  a  passion  for  her,84  though  when  this  involves 

27  Duke  of  Norfolk  v.  Germaine,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  943;  Boddy  v.  Roddy,  30  L.  J.  P. 
M.  A.  23  ;  State  v.  Crowley,  13  Ala.  172  ;   Lawson  v.  Swinney,  20  id.  65,  75 ;  Me- 
Leod  v.  State,  35  id.  395,   397  ;  Alsabrooks  v.  State,  52  id.  24  ;   People  v.  Patterson, 
102  Cal.  239,  244  ;    Brevaldo  v.  State,  21  Fla.  789,  795  ;    Bass  v.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E. 
966 ;   Crane  v.  People,  168  111.  395  ;   Lovell  p.  State,  12  Ind.  18  ;   State  v.  Markins, 
95  id.  464  ;   Lefforge  v.  State,  129  id.  551  ;   State  v.  Briggs,  68  la.  416,  423  ;    State  v. 
Kurd,  101  la.  391  ;   State  v.  Witham,  72  Me.  531,  534  ;   Shufeldt  v.  Shufeldt,  86  Md. 
519;   Com.   v.  Merriam,  14   Pick.   518;   Com.   v.    Horton,  2  Gray,   355;   Com.   v. 
Thrasher,  11  id.  450;   Com.  v.  Pierce,  ib.  447;  Com.  v.  Lahey,  14  id.  92;   Com.  v. 
Curtis,  97  Mass.  574  ;   Thayer  v.  Thayer,  101  id.  Ill ;   Com.  v.  Nichols,  114  id.  288  ; 
Brooks  P.  Brooks,  145  id.  574 ;   People  v.  Jenness,  5  Mich.  305,  319  ;   People  v.  Car- 
rier, 46  id.  442,  446 ;   People  v.  Skutt,  96  id.  449,  450 ;    State  v.  Way,  5  Nebr.  283  ; 
State  v.  Wallace,  9  N.  H.  515 ;  State  v.  Marvin,  35  id.  22,  28  ;  Lockyer  v.  Lockyer, 

1  Edm.  Sel.  C.  108  ;  Stephens  v.  People,  19  N.  Y.  549,  571 ;  State  v.  Kemp,  87  N.  C.  538; 
State  v.  Pippin,  88  id.  646  ;  State  v.  Roby,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  490 ;    Gardner  v.  Madeira, 

2  Yeates,  466;   Sherwood  v.  Fitman,  55  Pa.  77,  79  ;   Com.  v.  Bell,  166  id.  405  ;   Colev. 
State,  6  Baxt.  242  ;   Richardson  v.  State,  34  Tex.  142  ;    Burnett  r.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
86  ;  Wood  IT.  State,  ib.  476,  478 ;   Duncan  v.  State,  id.,  45  S.  W.  921  ;  State  v.  Bridg- 
man,  49  Vt.  202,  209  ;  State  v.. Colby,  51  id.  291,  296  ;  State  v.  Potter,  42  id.  33,  40 ; 
Ketchingman  v.  State,  6  Wis.  426  ;"Porath  p.  State,  90  id.  527. 

28  People  v.  Clark,  33  Mich.  112,  116  ;   Bowers  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  542,  546.    The 
opposite  inference  was  suggested  in  Smith  v.  Hall,  69  Conn.  651. 

*>  See  Verdin  v.  Wray,  2  Q.  B.  D.  611  ;  Ramey  v.  State,  127  Ind.  243;  Keller  p. 
Donnelly,  5  Md.  213,  219  ;  People  v.  Clark,  33  Mich.  112,  115;  State  v.  Robertson, 
N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  59 ;  Thayer  p.  Davis,  38  Vt.  163. 

*>  See  R.  v.  Cockcroft,  11  Cox  Cr.  410;  R.  p.  Holmes,  12  id.  141  ;  R.  p.  Riley,  16 
id.  191 ;  McQuirk  v.  State,  84  Ala.  435,  438  ;  Barnes  v.  State,  88  id.  204,  207  ; 
Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624,  643;  People  P.  Ranged,  112  Cal.  669;  Shirwin  v. 
People,  69  111.  56,  59  ;  Eyler  p.  State,  74  Ind.  49,  51  ;  Bedgood  P.  State,  115  id.  275, 
278  ;  Hall  v.  People,  47  Mich.  636  ;  People  v.  McLean,  71  id.  310 ;  People  p.  Abbott, 
97  id.  484,  486  ;  State  P.  Bowser,  Mont.,  53  Pac.  179  ;  State  v.  Forschner,  43  N.  H. 
89  ;  State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  151,  156  ;  People  v.  Abbot,  18  Wend.  194  ;  People  p. 
Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  398  ;  Woods  p.  People,  55  N.  Y.  516  ;  State  p.  Jefferson,  6  Ired. 
305  ;  McCombs  P.  State,  8  Oh.  St.  643,  646  ;  McDermott  v.  State,  13  id.  331  ;  State 
p.  Robinson,  Or.,  48  Pac.  357;  State  v.  Hollenbeck,  67  Vt.  34;  Proper  v.  State,  85 
Wis.  615,  628  ;  these  cases  are  referred  to  in  the  following  four  notes. 

81  See  the  preceding  cases  passim. 

83  See  ante,  §  14  g;  the  distinction  is  illustrated  in  State  P.  Bridgman,  49  Vt  212. 

n  See  cases  in  Michigan,  Montana,  Vermont. 

**  See  cases  in  New  Hampshire,  Oregon,  Wisconsin. 


§  14  O.]  EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   MOTIVE,    EMOTION,   ETC.  65 

another  rape,  it  is  usually  excluded  under  the  principle  of  §  14  q,  post ; 
and  the  rape  of  another  woman  is  not  only  open  to  the  same  objection, 
but  is  also  not  evidential  to  show  a  desire  for  the  woman  in  question, 
(c)  In  actions  for  defamation,  the  use  of  other  utterances  of  the 
defendant  as  evidence  of  malice  is  also  beset  by  special  complications 
which  can  only  be  briefly  noted.  The  inference  is  a  double  one,  i.  e. 
that  the  other  utterance  indicated  malice  then,  and  that  malice  then 
indicates  malice  at  the  time  in  question,  (a)  As  to  the  first  infer- 
ence, expressions  of  hatred  or  ill-will,  though  not  in  themselves  defam- 
atory, are  evidential,  as  all  concede ; 88  furthermore,  any  defamatory 
utterance  may  evidence  malice;86  whether  an  unproved  plea  of  justi- 
fication is  open  to  the  same  inference  has  been  disputed,  but  it  may 
well  be,  if  allowed  to  stand  with  no  attempt  to  prove  it  ;87  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  other  utterance  is  in  England  regarded  as  immaterial, 
but  in  this  country  it  is  usually  said  (in  varying  phrase)  that  it  must 
concern  the  same  subject  as  the  utterance  sued  upon.88  As  to  the 
second  inference,  there  is  no  question  in  general;89  as  to  the  range 
of  time  allowable,  no  limit  at  all  seems  to  be  set  in  England,40  but  in 
this  country  it  has  been  said  that  there  may  well  be  a  limit,  depending 
perhaps  on  the  trial  Court's  discretion."  But  (b)  independently  of 
this  question  of  probative  value  or  relevancy,  certain  considerations  of 
collateral  inconvenience  have  often  been  thought  to  operate ;  in  the 
first  place,  it  has  been  argued  that  if  the  jury  have  such  utterances 
before  them,  they  are  likely  to  give  damages  for  them,  and  thus  the 
defendant  would  pay  for  a  defamation  already  barred  by  statute,  or 
recovered  for,  or  in  future  to  be  sued  for ; 42  in  the  second  place,  it 
has  been  argued  that  the  doctrines  of  surprise  and  confusion  of  issues 
(explained  ante,  §  14  a)  should  exclude  such  evidence.48  Proceeding 
upon  these  reasons,  certain  limitations  have  been  suggested  at  various 
times:  first,  that  all  other  actionable  utterances  be  excluded,44  but 
this  has  long  been  discarded  in  England,45  and,  so  far  as  appears,  in 
this  country ; 48  secondly,  that  other  actionable  utterances  not  already 

86  Wright  v.  Woodgate,  Eng.  ;  for  this  case,  and  those  cited  in  the  following  notes, 
see  infra,  note  56. 

86  Swift  v.  Dickerman,  Conn. 

8?  Simpson  v.  Robinson,  Eng.  ;  accord:  California,  Maine,  Maryland,  Massachusetts, 
New  York  ;  also  Connecticut  and  Oregon  (qualified). 

88  California,  Connecticut,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  New  Hamp- 
shire, New  Jersey,  New  York,  Oregon,  Pennsylvania  (perhaps),  South  Carolina  (quali- 
fied), United  States,  Vermont,  Virginia. 

89  See  the  reasoning  in  Barrett  v.  Long,  Eng.,  Gribble  v.  Press  Co.,  Minn. 
*°  Barrett  v.  Long. 

41  See  cases  in  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  Wisconsin. 

43  See  Bronson,  J.,  in  Root  v.  Lowndes,  N.  Y. ;  the  argument  is  answered  in  Pearson 
».  Lemaitre,  Barrett  v.  Long,  Eng.     The  answer  is  that  the  jury  may  and  should  be 
instructed  not  to  include  these  utterances  in  estimating  damages. 

48  See  Finnerty  v.  Tipper,  Eng.,  Shock  v.  McChesney,  Pa.,  Bronson,  J.,  ubi  aw^?ra. 

44  Cook  v.  Field,  and  others  in  Eugland. 
**  Pearson  v.  Lemaitre,  Barrett  v.  Long. 

48  Alabama,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kentucky,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  North  Caro- 
lina, Ohio,  Pennsylvania ;  and  by  implication  in  others. 

VOL.    I. —  5 


66  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.         [CH.  v. 

recovered  for  be  excluded,47  but  this  has  not  become  law  anywhere; 
thirdly,  that  other  actionable  utterances  already  recovered  for  be 
excluded48  (i.  e.  just  the  contrary  of  the  preceding),  but  this  has  been 
nowhere  accepted ;  fourthly,  that  other  actionable  utterances  not 
barred  by  statutory  limitation  be  excluded,49  but  this  also  has  been 
generally  repudiated;50  fifthly,  it  has  been  suggested  that  just  the 
contrary  rule  be  adopted,  excluding  other  actionable  utterances  barred 
by  limitation,  but  this  also  has  been  rejected  where  proposed;61 
sixthly,  it  has  been  suggested  that  subsequent  utterances  —  i.  e., 
meaning  usually,  after  action  or  trial  —  be  excluded,  but  this  limi- 
tation obtains  in  a  few  jurisdictions  only,62  and  is  generally  repu- 
diated;58 seventhly,  it  has  been  suggested  that  other  actionable 
utterances  be  excluded  entirely  unless  the  utterance  charged  is 
equivocal,  i.  e.  does  not  in  itself  clearly  indicate  malice ; 64  this  dis- 
tinction has  less  frequently  been  put  forward,  but  obtains  in  some 
Courts.66  The  net  result  of  the  arguments  based  on  collateral 
inconvenience  is  that,  except  in  a  few  jurisdictions,  all  the  suggested 
limitations  are  denied ;  though  it  must  be  noted  that  the  foregoing 
statements  as  to  the  rule  in  particular  jurisdictions  are  tentative 
only,  and  that  too  much  reliance  may  often,  be  placed  on  precedents 
and  a  consistent  obedience  to  them. 66] 

47  Symrnons  v.  Blake,  Eng. 

48  Repudiated  in  Connecticut. 
«  New  York. 

60  Alabama,  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  South  Caro- 
lina, Virginia. 

61  England  (Barrett  v.  Long),  Alabama,  Indiana,  Maine,   New  Hampshire,  New 
Jersey,  New  York,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  South  Carolina,  Virginia. 

63  Connecticut,  New  York,  Tennessee. 

68  England  (Rustell  v.  McQuister,  Hemmings  v.  Gasson  —  with  qualifications,  —  and 
intervening  cases),  Alabama,  California,  Georgia,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kentucky,  Maine, 
Massachusetts,  Michigan,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Penn- 
sylvania, South  Carolina,  Vermont,  Virginia,  Wisconsin. 

M  Pearce  v.  Ormsby,  Eng. 

65  Indiana,  New  York  ;  repudiated  in  England  (Barrett  v.  Long),  Ohio. 

66  Space  does  not  suffice  to  analyze  the  cases  :  Buller,  Nisi  Prius,  7  ;  Cook  v.  Field, 
3  Esp.  133  ;  Charlton  v.  Barret,  Peake  N.  P.  22 ;  Mead  v.  Daubigny,  ib.  125  ;  Lee  ». 
Huson,  ib.  166  ;  Plunkett  v.  Cobbett,  5  Esp.  136  ;  Rustell  t>.  Macquister,  1  Camp.  49; 
Scott  v.  Lord  Oxford,  Peake  N.  P.  127,  note  ;    Tate  v.  Humphrey,  1  Camp.  73,  note  ; 
Finnerty  v.  Tipper,  ib.  72  ;  Stuart  v.  Lovell,  2  Stark.  93  ;  Macleod  ».  Wakley,  3  C.  & 
P.  311  ;  Chubb  v.  Westley,  6  id.  436  ;  Defries  v.  Davis,  7  id.  112 ;  Pearce  v.  Ormsby, 
1  Moo.  &  Rob.  477  ;  Wright  v.  Woodgate,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  578  ;  Bond  v.  Douglas,  7  C.  & 
P.  627  ;  Tarpley  v.  Blabey,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  437  ;  Delegall  v.  Highley,  8  C.  &  P.  444, 
449  ;  Webb  v.  Smith,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  379 ;  Barwell  v.  Adkins,  1  M.  &  Gr.  807 ;  Pearson 
v.  Lemaitre,  5  id.  700,  719  j  Simpson  v.  Robinson,  12  Q.  B.  511 ;  Warwick  v.  Foulkes, 
12  M.  &  VV.  507  ;  Wilson  v.  Robinson,  7  Q.  B.  68  ;  Long  v.  Barrett,  7  Ir.  L.  R.  439  ; 
Barrett  v.  Long,  3  H.  L.  C.  395,  414  ;  Camfield  v.  Bird,  3  C.  &  K.  56  ;  Hemmings  v. 
Gasson,  E.  B.  &  E.  346 ;  Teague  v.  Williams,  7  Ala.  844  ;  Scott ».  McKinnist,  15  id.  168, 
170  ;  Stern  v.  Loewenthal,  77  Cal.  340  ;  Westerfield  v.  Scripps,  119  Cul.  607  ;  Hearne 
v.  De  Young,  ib.  670  ;  Holmes  v.  Brown,  Kirby  151 ;  Mix  v.  Woodward,  12  Conn.  262, 
292;  Flint  ».  Clark,  13  id.  361,  366  ;  Williams  v.  Miner,  18  id.  464,  472;  Swift  v. 
Dickerman,  31  id.  285,  290 ;  State  v.  Riggs,  39  id.  498,  501 ;  Ward  v.   Dick,  47  id. 
300,  304  ;  State  v.  Jeandell,  5   Harringt.  475,  479  ;  Craven  v.  Walker,  101  Ga.  845  ; 
Scott  w.  Mortsinger,  2  Blackf.  454,  457  ;  M'Glemery  v.  Keller,  3  id.  489 ;  Throgmor- 
ton  v.  Davis,  4  id.  176  ;  Burke  v.  Miller,  6  id.  155 ;   Mclntire  v.  Young,  ib.  498 ; 


§§  14  0-14 p."]      EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   KNOWLEDGE,  BELIEF,  ETC.      67 

§  14 p.  Evidence  to  prove  Knowledge,  Belief,  Notice,  Conscious- 
ness of  Guilt,  etc.  [The  state  of  mind  of  being  aware  or  conscious, 
having  knowledge  or  belief,  etc.,  may  be  evidenced  either  (1)  by  out- 
ward circumstances  which  would  naturally  have  brought  about  such 
knowledge,  belief,  etc.,  or  (2)  by  conduct  of  the  person  indicating  the 
existence  of  knowledge,  belief,  etc. 

(1)  Several  classes  of  cases  present  controversial  questions  of  this 
sort.  To  show  the  reasonable  apprehensions  of  a  defendant  on  a 
charge  of  homicide  or  assault,  the  deceased  person's  reputed  charac- 
ter,1 or  his  communicated  threats  against  the  defendant,8  though 
probably  not  particular  acts  of  violence,8  may  be  shown,  as  already 
explained.  On  the  same  principle,  to  show  an  employer's  knowledge 
of  an  employee's  incompetency,  the  employee's  reputed  character  for 

Schoonover  v.  Howe,  7  id.  202;  Forbes  v.  Myers,  8  id.  74  ;    Teagle  v.  Deboy,  ib.  136  ; 
Lanter  v.  McEwen,  ib.  496  ;  Burson  v.  Edwards,  1  Ind.  164  ;  Hesler  v.  Degant,  3  id. 

504  ;  Vincent  v.  Dixon,  5  id.  270  ;  Meyer  v.  Bohlfing,  44  id.  239  ;   Downey  v.  Dillon, 
52  id.  442,  450  ;  Beardsley  v.   Bridgman,  17  la.  292  ;   Schrirnper  v.  Heilman,  24  id. 

505  ;  Ellis  v.  Lindley,  38  id.  461  ;    Prime  v.  Eastwood,   45  id.  640,  642 ;  Manners  v. 
McClelland,  74  id.  320  ;  Eccles  v.  Shackelford,  1  Litt.  36 ;   Allensworth  v.  Coleman, 
5  Dana  315  ;  Letton  v.  Young,   2  Mete.  561  ;    Campbell  ».  Bannister,  79  Ky.  208  ; 
Kendrick  v.  Kemp,  6  Mart.  N.  s.  La.  500  ;  Smith  v.  Wyman,  4  Shepl.  13  ;   Harmon 
v.  Harmon,  61  Me.  233  ;  Conant  v.  Leslie,  85  Me.  257 ;  Duvall  v.  Griffith,  2  H.  &  G. 
30  ;  Rigden  v.  Wolcott,  6  G.  &  J.  413,  419  ;  Jackson  v.  Stetson,   15  Mass.  48  ;  Bod- 
well  v.  Swan,  3  Pick.   376  ;   Goodrich  v.  Stone,  11  id.  486,  491;    Watson  v.  Moore, 
2  Gush.  137  ;  Baldwins  Soule,  6  Gray  321;  Markham  v.  Russell,  12  All.  574  ;  Rob- 
bius  v.  Fletcher,  101  Mass.  116;  Clark  v.  Brown,  116  id.  508  ;  Com.  v.  Damow,  136 
id.  449;  Sullivan  v.  O'Leary,  146  id.  322;  Detroit  Post  Co.  z>.  McArthur,  16  Mich. 
446,  454 ;  Proctor  v.  Houghtaling,  37  id.  41,  45  ;    Randall  ».  News  Ass.,  97  id.  136, 
145  ;  Thibault  v.  Sessions,  101  id.  279,  286 ;   Botsford  v.  Chase,  108  id.  432  ;  Reitan 
v.  Goebel,  33  Minn.  151;  Gribble  ».  Press  Co.,  34  id.  342;  Larrabee  v.  Tribune  Co., 
36  id.  141,  142;   Mason  v.  Mason,  4  N.  H.  114;    Chesley  v.  Chesley,   10  id.  337  ; 
Symonds  v.  Carter,  32  id.  458  ;  Bartowr.  Brands,  15  N.  J.  L.248  ;  State  v.  Robinson, 
16  id.  514  ;  Schenck  v.  Schenck,  20  id.  208 ;    Evening  Journal  Ass'n  v.  McDennott, 
44  id.  430 ;  Fahr  v.  Hayes,  50  id.  275,  281 ;  Thomas  v.  Croswell,  7  Johns.  264,  270 ; 
Matson  v.  Buck,  5  Cow.  499;    Root  v.  King,  7  id.  613,  633 ;   King  t>.  Root,  4  Wend. 
140  ;    Inman  ».   Foster,   8  id.  608  ;    Kennedy  v.   Gifford,   19  id.  297,  300  ;  Root  ». 
Lowndes,  6  Hill  518 ;  Keenholts  v.  Becker,  3  Den.  346  ;    Campbell  v.  Butts,  3  N.  Y. 
173  ;  Fero  v.  Roscoe,  4  id.  165 ;  Howard  v.  Sexton,  ib.  157,  161 ;    Fry  ».  Bennett,  28 
id.  324,  327;   Thorn  v.  Knapp,  42  id.  474 ;    Titus  v.  Sumner,  44  id.  266  ;    Bassell  ». 
Elmore,  48  id.  563,  566;  Frazier  v.  McCloskey,  60  id.  337;  Daly  v.  Byrne,  77  id.  187; 
Enos  v.  Enos,  135  id.  609;  Brittaint;.  Allen,  2  Dev.  120,  125;  3  id.  167;  Lucas  v. 
Nichols,  7  Jones  L.  32;  Carter  v.  McDowell,  Wright  100;  Seely  v.  Cole,  ib.  681; 
Flamingham  v.  Boucher,  ib.  746;  Fisher  v.  Patterson,  14  Oh.   418,424;  Stearns  v. 
Cox,  17  id.  590;  Van  Verveer  v.  Sutphin,  5  Oh.  St.  293,  295  ;  Alpiu  v.  Morton,  21  id. 
536,  544 ;  Upton  v.  Hume,  24  Or.  420,  434 ;   Shock  v.  M'Chesney,   2   Yeates   473  ; 
Wallis  v.  Mease,  3  Brim.  546,  550 ;    Kean  v.  M'Laughlin,  2  S.  &  R.  469  ;  M'Almont 
v.  M'Clelland,  14  id.  359,  361  ;  Elliott  v.  Boyles,  31  Pa.  65,  68 ;  Barr  v.  Moore,  87  id. 
385,  394  ;    Com.   v.  Place,  153  id.  314,  318;  Seip  v.  Deshler,  170  id.  334;   Miller  v. 
Kerr,  2  McC.  286  ;  Randall  v.  Holsenbake,  3  Hill  S.  C.  175  ;  Morgan  v.  Livingston, 
2  Rich.  573,  585  ;  Howell   v.  Cheatham,  Cooke  247  ;  Witcher  v.  Richmond,  8  Humph. 
475 ;  Saunders  v.  Baxter,  6  Heisk.  369,  387 ;  U.  S.  v.  Crandell,  4  Cr.  C.  C.  683,  692 ; 
Cavanaugh  v.  Noble,  42  Vt.  576  ;  Knapp  v.  Fuller,  55  id.  311 ;  Lincoln  v.  Chrisman, 
8  Leigh  338,  345  ;  Hansbrough  v.  Stinnett,  25  Gratt.  495  ;  Bradley  v.  Cramer,  66  Wis. 
297,  302  ;  Born  v.  Rosenow,  84  id.  620,  622. 

i  Ante,  §  14  c. 
3  Ante,  §  14  k. 
8  Ante,  §  140. 


68  EELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

competency,4  and  perhaps  also  particular  acts  of  incompetency,5  may 
be  shown  as  already  explained ;  and  in  the  same  way,  against  a 
defendant  whose  knowing  keeping  of  a  dangerous  animal  is  in  issue, 
the  animal's  reputation,6  as  well  as  particular  instances  of  its  vicious 
behavior,  are  admissible.7  So,  also,  in  evidencing  notice  of  the  dan- 
gerous nature  of  premises,  machinery,  and  the  like,  the  previous 
occurrence  of  injuries  or  the  existence  of  other  defects  at  the  same 
place  or  machine  is  some  evidence  of  notice,  on  the  theory  that 
the  prior  occurrence  would  naturally  be  talked  about  or  reported; 
there  is  some  variation  of  ruling  in  determining  how  similar  the  in- 
jury or  the  defect  or  the  place  must  be  in  order  to  be  likely  to  give 
notice ;  but  the  general  principle  is  not  questioned.8  Where  pur- 
chaser's knowledge  or  ignorance  in  good  faith  of  the  transferor's 
insolvency  is  in  issue,  the  transferor's  reputation  as  to  solvency,9  or 
as  to  insolvency,10  if  within  the  same  community,  is  admissible  to  in- 
dicate the  purchaser's  state  of  mind ;  u  the  same  principle  ought  to 
apply  to  one  dealing  with  a  lunatic.12  For  one  dealing  with  a  part- 
nership, a  reputation  of  its  dissolution,18  or  a  publication  in  a  journal 

*  Ante,  §  14  c. 

6  Ante,  §  14  h. 

8  Wormsdorf  v.  R.  Co.,  75  Mich.  472,  475. 

7  Worth  v.  Gilling,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  3  ;  Arnold  v.  Norton,  25  Conn.  92  ;  Graham  v. 
Nowlin,  54  Ind.  391 ;  Kittredge  v.  Elliott,  16  N.  H.  77  ;  Cockerham  v.  Nixon,  11 
Ired.  269  ;  McOaskill  v.  Elliot,  5  Strobh.  196,  197  ;  Keenan  v.  Hayden,  39  Wis.  558. 

8  Malone  v.  Hawley,  46  Cal.  409,  413  ;  Colo.  M.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Rees,  id.,  42  Pac.  42; 
Chicago  v.  Powers,  42  111.  169,  173  ;  Bloomington  v.  Legg,  151  id.  9,  14  ;  Delphi  c. 
Lowery,  74  Ind.  520,  523  ;  Moore  v.  Burlington,  49  la.  136,  137  ;  Armstrong  v.  Ackley, 
71  id.  76,  80  ;  Ruggles  v.  Nevada,  63   la.  185  ;  Faulk  v.  la.  Co.,  103  id.  442  ;  Hinck- 
ley  v.  Somerset,  145  Mass.  326,  337  ;   Noyes  v.  Gardner,   147  id.  505,  508  ;  Dotton  v. 
Albion,  50  Mich.  129,  131;  Smith  v.  Sherwood,  62  id.  159,  165;  Dundas  v.  Lansing, 
75  id.  499,  507  ;  Tice  v.  Bay  City,  78  id.  209  ;  Campbell  v.  Kalamazoo,  80  id.  655,  659  ; 
O'Neil  v.  West  Branch,  81  id.  544,  546  ;  Lombar  v.  East  Tawas,  86  id.  14,  20;  Fuller  v. 
Jackson,  92  id.  191,  205  ;  Corcoran  v.  Detroit,  95  id.  84,  86 ;  Edwards  v.  Three  Rivers, 
102  id.  153;  Strudgeon  v.  Sand  Beach,  107  id.  496  ;  Moore  v.  Kalamazoo,  109  id.  176  ; 
Butts  v.  Eaton  Rapids,  id.,  74  N.  W.  872  ;  Gude  v.  Mankato,  30  Minn.  256,  258  ; 
Burrows  v.   Lake  Crystal,  61  id.  357  ;  Plattsmouth  v.  Mitchell,  20  Nebr.  228,  230 ; 
Willey  v.  Portsmouth,  35  N.  H.  303,  310 ;  Potter  v.  Gas.  Co.,  183  Pa.  575  ;  Smith  v. 
R.  Co.,  10  R.  I.  24,  27  ;  Bridger  v.  R.  Co.,  27  S.  C.  456;  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Keegan, 
U.  S.  App.,  87  Fed.  849 ;  Thomas  v.   Springville,  9  Utah  426  ;  Elster  v.  Seattle,  18 
Wash.    304;   Weisenberg  v.   Appleton,   26   Wis.   56;    Ripon  v.   Bittel,   30  id.    614; 
Sullivan  v.  Oshkosh,  50  id.  508,  513  ;  Spearbracker  v.  Larrabee,  64  id.  573,  575  ;  Shaw 
».  Sun  Prairie,  74  id.  105  ;  Spaulding  v.  Sherman,  75  id.  77,  79  ;  Propsam  v.  Leatham, 
80  id.  608,  611. 

For  the  use  of  the  same  facts  as  evidence  of  the  dangerous,  safe,  etc.,  condition  of 
the  place  or  machine,  see  post,  §  14  u. 

9  See  Merrick,  J.,  in  Hey  wood  v.  Reed,  4  Gray  579. 

l°  See  Stone,  J.,  in  Prico'r.  Mazange,  31  Ala.  701,  707. 

11  Branch  Bank  v.  Parker,  5  Ala.  736  ;  Lawson  v.  Orear,  7  id.  784  ;  Price  v.  Mnznnge, 
31  id.  701,  707  ;  Humes  v.  O'Bryan,  74  M.  81  ;  Kuglar  v.  Garner,  74  Ga.  765,  768 ; 
Brander  v.  Ferriday,  16  La.  296,  299  ;  Denny  v.  Dana,  2  Cush.  169;  Lee  v.  Kilburn, 
3  Gray  594  ;  Cook  v.  Mason,  5  All.  212  ;  Sweetser  v.  Bates,  117  Mass.  468  ;  Bliss  v. 
Johnson,  162  id.  323  ;  Benoist  v.  Darby,  12  Mo.  196,  205  ;  Hinds  v.  Keith,  13  U.  S. 
App.  222,  227. 

Distinguish  the  use  of  reputation  as  evidence  of  the  fact  of  solvency  or  insolvency, 
un.liT  an  exception  to  the  hearsay  rule,  post,  §  140  b. 

18  Contra :  Greenslade  v.  Dare,  20  Beav.  290. 

u  Humes  v.  O'Bryan,  74  Ala  81. 


§  14 p.~\      EVIDENCE   TO   PROVE   KNOWLENGE,   BELIEF,   ETC.  69 

likely  to  come  to  his  hands,14  is  evidence  of  notice  ;  but  the  substan- 
tive law  of  constructive  notice  usually  disposes  of  this  class  of  ques- 
tions. For  one  selling  liquor  to  a  person  of  known  intemperate  habits, 
the  latter's  reputation  would  be  evidence  of  notice.16  Where  the  rea- 
sonable grounds  of  belief  of  a  person  prosecuting  or  arresting  are  in 
issue,  the  reputed  character  of  the  person  sued  or  arrested  is  admis- 
sible ; 16  and,  it  would  seem,  on  principle,  his  particular  acts  of  mis- 
conduct also.17  The  use  of  other  utterings  of  forged  paper,  etc.,  as 
evidence  of  knowledge  has  complications  discussed  post,  §  14  q. 

(2)  Few  controversies  arise  in  evidencing  knowledge,  consciousness, 
etc.,  by  conduct.  The  interpretation  of  the  conduct  is  usually  plain 
enough  and  does  not  admit  of  argument.18  The  most  frequent  field 
for  this  kind  of  evidence  is  conduct  as  indicating  consciousness  of 
guilt.  That  we  may  use  consciousness  of  guilt  as  some  evidence  of 
guilt  is  never  questioned  ;  the  only  question  is  as  to  the  inference  to 
that  consciousness  from  various  kinds  of  conduct.19  Among  the  com- 
moner sorts  of  conduct  thus  evidential  are  a  defendant's  demeanor 
after  the  alleged  act  or  at  the  time  of  arrest m  (though  we  are  repeat- 
edly warned  by  the  Courts  to  remember  the  fallibilit}'  of  such  infer- 
ences 21) ;  demeanor  during  the  trial ; 22  concealment  of  the  fruits  of 
the  crime ;  false  statements  and  fabrication  of  evidence ;  refusal  to 
a  test  appealing  to  superstitious  notions  about  the  super- 
detection  of  guilt;28  flight  or  escape  from  arrest,  a  circum- 
stance originally  sufficient  in  itself  to  bring  about  forfeiture  and 
escheat,24  but  now  treated  merely  as  evidential  of  a  consciousness  of 
guilt ; 25  subject  to  occasional  distinction  on  the  ground  that  the  per- 

14  Godfrey  v.  Macauley,  Peake  155  ;  Leeson  v.  Holt,  1  Stark.  186  ;  Jenkins  v.  Bliz- 
arcl,  ib.  418,  420  ;  Muun  v.  Baker,  2  id.  255. 

15  Stallirigs  v.  State,  33  Ala.  425  ;  Smith  v.  State,  55  id.  12  ;  Tatum  v.  State,  63  id. 
151. 

13  See  ante,  §  14c. 

17  Contra:  Rodriguez  v.  Tadmire,  2  Esp.  721  ;  Dorsey  v.  Clapp,  22  Nebr.  564,  568  ; 
Gregory  o.  Thomas,  2  Bibb  286.    See  State  t;.  Foley,  130*  Mo.  482 ;  State  v,  Healey,  la., 
74  N.  W.  916. 

18  The  following  will  serve  as  instances  of  evidencing  knowledge   by  conduct  : 
Webster's  Trial,  Bends'  Rep.  178  (asking  whether  they  had  found  the  whole  of  Dr. 
Turkman's  body,  thus  indicating  a  knowledge  that  it  had  been  cut  up);  Leslie  v. 
State,  35  Fla.  182  (offer  to  return  stolen  property,  indicating  knowledge  that  it  was 
stolen). 

19  See  the  reasoning  in  Moore  v.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  502;  McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala.  159. 

20  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ala.  623;  Levison  v.  State,  54  id.  519,  527  ;  McAdory  v. 
State,  62  id.  154,  161 ;  Beale  v.  Posey,  72  id.  323  ;  Mcllvain  v.  State,  80  Ind.  71 ; 
State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  10,  11;  Lindsay  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143,  155  ;  Greenfield  v. 
People,  85  id.  75,  85  ;  Moore  v.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  500,  506  ;  Smith  v.  State,  42  Tex. 
444,  447  ;  Holt  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  45  S.  W.  1016  ;  Dean  v.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  912,  924. 

21  Ormond,  J.,  in  9  Ala.  990,  995 ;   Shaw,  C.  J.,  ill  Webster's  Trial,   Bemis'  Rep. 
486  ;  Miller,  J.,  in  Greenfield  v.  State,  85  N.  Y.  86. 

22  Boykin  v.  People,  22  Colo.  496  ;  Graves  v.  U.  S.,  150  U.  S.  118.     There  are  con- 
flicting decisions  in  Illinois :   Rider  v.  People,  110  111.  11,  13 ;  Purdy  v.  People,  140 
id.  46,  49;  Siebert «;.  People,  143  id.  571,  593. 

28  Gassenheimer  v.  State,  52  Ala.  316  ;  State  v.  Wisdom,  119  Mo.  539  ;  State  ».  Guild, 
10  N.  J.  L.  171. 

24  Foxley's  Case,  5  Coke's  Rep.  109  b;  Pollock  &  Maitland,  Hist.  Eng.  Law,  II,  588. 
26  See  the  reasoning  iu  the  charges  of  Parker,  J.  (late  the  Federal  District  Judge  for 


70  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

son  must  have  become  aware  that  he  was  accused  or  that  mere  absence 
is  not  equivalent  to  flight  (neither  of  which  seems  sound),  such  evi- 
dence is  universally  received ; 26  the  defendant  may  of  course  offer  in 
evidence  any  facts  reasonably  tending  to  explain  his  conduct  as  due 
to  other  motives.27  It  would  seem  that  (in  spite  of  the  possibility  of 
feigned  conduct)  an  accused  person's  innocent  bearing  —  in  particular, 
his  voluntary  surrender,  or  his  refusal  to  escape  when  opportunity 
offered  —  should  equally  be  admissible  in  his  favor.28] 

§  14  q.  Other  Similar  Crimes  or  Misconduct  as  Evidence  of  Knowl- 
edge, Intent,  Plan,  etc.  [The  mental  conditions  of  knowledge,  intent, 
and  plan  (or  design)  may  often  be  evidenced  by  conduct  of  the  per- 
son, exhibited  at  other  times,  but  leading,  by  one  process  of  thought 
or  another,  to  an  inference  that  he  has  knowledge,  intent,  or  plan 
with  reference  to  the  act  in  question.  The  process  of  inference,  be- 
ing more  or  less  instinctive  and  obscure,  has  seldom  been  carefully 
phrased  by  Courts  ;  and  this,  with  the  influence  of  the  Character  rule 

Western  Arkansas  and  one  of  the  greatest  American  trial  judges),  in  Starr  v.  U.  S.,  164 
U.  S.  627,  and  Alberty  v.  U.  S.,  162  id.  499. 

•*  Crossfield's  Trial,  26  How.  St.  Tr.  216  ;  R.  v.  Hazy,  2  C.  &  P.  458  ;  Campbell  v. 
State,  23  Ala.  44,  75  ;  Martin  v.  State,  28  id.  71,  81  ;  Murrell  v.  State,  46  id.  89,  91 ; 
Levison  v.  State,  54  id.  519,  527  ;  Bowles  v.  State,  58  id.  335  ;  Sylvester  v.  State,  71 
id.  23,  26  ;  Ross  v.  State,  74  id.  336  ;  Whitaker  v.  State,  106  id.  30;  Jackson  v.  State, 
ib.  12;  White  v.  State,  111  id.  92;  Flanagin  v.  State,  25  Ark.  92,  95;  Burrisv.  State, 
38  id.  221,  225  ;  People  v.  Strong,  46  Cal.  302  ;  People  v.  Stanley,  47  id.  113,  118  ; 
People  v.  Wong  Ah  Ngow,  54  id.  151,  153 ;  People  ».  Winthrop,  118  id.  85  ;  People 
v.  Ashmead,  ib.  508  ;  Whaley  v.  State,  11  Ga.  123,  126  ;  Revel  v.  State,  26  id.  275, 
281  ;  Betts  v.  State,  66  id.  508,  512 ;  Hudson  v.  State,  101  id.  520  ;  People  v.  Ah 
Choy,  1  Ida.  317,  320  ;  Barron  v.  People,  73  111.  256,  260  ;  Porter  v.  State,  2  Ind. 
435,  436  ;  Hittner  v.  State,  19  id.  48,  50  ;  Waybright  v.  State,  56  id.  122,  125  ;  Batten 
v.  State,  80  id.  394,  400;  Anderson  v.  State,  147  id.  445  ;  State  v.  Arthur,  23  la.  430, 
432 ;  State  v.  James,  45  id.  412  ;  State  v.  Fowler,  52  id.  103,  105  ;  State  v.  Van  Win- 
kle, 80  id.  15,  18;  State  v.  Minard,  96  id.  267;  State  v.  Seymore,  94  id.  699  ;  States. 
Thomas,  58  Kan.  805;  Plummer  v.  Com.,  1  Bush  76,  78;  Kennedy  v.  Com.,  14  id. 
345  ;  Clark  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  32  S.  W.  131 ;  State  v.  Beatty,  30  La.  An.  1267  ;  State  v. 
Dufour,  31  id.  804  ;  State  v.  Harris,  38  id.,  20  So.  729  ;  State  v.  Frederic,  69  Me.  400, 
403  ;  Com.  v.  Tolliver,  119  Mass.  315 ;  Com.  v.  Acton,  165  id.  11  ;  People  v.  Pitcher, 
15  Mich.  397,  406;  Probasco  v.  Cook,  39  id.  717,  718;  People  v.  Caldwell,  107  id. 
374  ;  Cicely  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  202,  221  ;  Fanning  v.  State,  14  Mo.  386,  390;  State 
v.  Phillips,  24  id.  475,  484  ;  State  v.  Williams,  54  id.  170  ;  State  v.  Mallon,  75  id.  357  ; 
State  v.  King,  78  id.  557  ;  State  v.  Evans,  138  id.  116  ;  State  v.  Hopper,  142  id.  478  ; 
State  v.  Rand,  33  N.  H.  216,  225  ;  People  v.  Rathbun,  21  Wend.  509,  518  ;  Ryan  v. 
People,  79  N.  Y.  593,  601  ;  State  v.  Paucoast,  5  N.  D.  516 ;  Lanahan  v.  Com.,  84  Pa. 
80,  86 ;  Tyner  t>.  State,  5  Humph.  383. 

27  Chamblee  v.  State,  78  Ala.  466,  468  ;  Golden  v.  State,  25  Ga.  527,  531  ;  Batten  v. 
State,  80  Ind.  394,  400 ;  Welch  v.  State,  104  id.  347,  352 ;  Plummer  v.  Com.,  1  Bush 
76,  78;  Com.  v.  Tolliver,  119  Mass.  314  ;  People  v.  Caldwell,  107  Mich.  374  ;  State  v. 
Hays,  23  Mo.  287,  316  ;  State  v.  Phillips,  24  id.  484  ;  State  v.   Mallon,  75  id.   355  ; 
State  v.  King,  78  id.  557  ;  State  v.  Taylor,  134  id.  109  ;  U.  S.  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  378. 

28  Accord:  Barnard's  Trial,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  833  (a  case  little  known,  but  one  of 
the  most  curious  mysteries  in  legal  annals)  ;   Pinkard  v.  State,  30  Ga.  759  ;  Boston  v. 
State,  94  id.  590  ;  Lewis  v.  State,  4  Kan.  309  ;  State  v.  Vaignenr,  5  Rich.  L.  391,  403. 
Contra:  Cowen,  J.,  in  People  v.  Rathbun,  21  Wend.   509,  519;  Oliver  v.  State,  17 
Ala.  587,  595  ;  Campbell  v.  State,  23  id.   44,  79  ;  Hall  ».  State,   40  id.   698,  706 ; 
Jordan  v.  State,  81  id.  20,  81  ;  State  v.  Henry,  107  id.  22  ;  Dorsey  v.  State,  111  id.  40  ; 
People  v.  Montgomery,  53  Cal.  576 ;  People  v.  Shaw,  111  id.  171  ;  Kennedy  v.  State, 
101  Ga.  559  ;  Com.  v.  Hersey,  2  All.  173,  177  ;  State  v.  Musick,  101  Mo.  260,  274  ; 
State  v.  Smith,  114  id.  406,  424. 


§§  14  J9-14  £.]    OTHER  SIMILAR  CRIMES,  AS  SHOWING  INTENT,  ETC.    71 

(ante,  14/),  has  left  the  precedents  in  an  uncertain  and  inharmonious 
condition.  But  the  apparent  confusion  is  due  more  to  a  difference  in 
the  application  of  principles  in  given  cases  than  to  a  disagreement  as 
to  the  principles  themselves ;  and  the  latter  it  is  possible  to  distin- 
guish and  agree  upoii  without  attempting  to  harmonize  the  various 
rulings. 

Broadly,  three  general  principles,  or  processes  of  inference,  may 
be  involved.  (1)  4-  person's  knowledge,  as  we  have  seen  (ante,  §  14^?), 
may  be  inferred  from  the  occurrence  of  some  circumstance  that  would 
naturally  have  brought  the  matter  in  question  to  his  attention ;  for 
example,  that  A  gave  a  certain  substance  to  his  dog,  and  that  the  dog 
died  shortly  after,  is  some  evidence  that  A  came  to  know  the  sub- 
stance to  be  poisonous,  because  lie  would  probably  learn  of  the  dog's 
death,  and  the  death  probably  excite  his  suspicions  of  the  substance 
given ;  so  also  the  utterance  by  A  of  several  forged  bank-notes  makes 
it  probable  that  in  one  or  another  instance  some  person  would  have  dis- 
covered the  forgery  and  either  refused  to  take  them  or  returned  them 
to  him,  and  thus  that  he  would  have  had  warning  or  suspicion  of  that 
denomination  of  paper.  This  principle  thus  admits,  as  evidence  of 
knowledge,  the  prior  possession  or  use  of  other  specimens  of  a  thing 
charged  as  knowingly  used ;  *  the  most  common  instance  being  the 
knowing  possession  or  utterance  of  forged  or  counterfeit  paper. 
(2)  In  most  crimes  an  element  of  the  crime  is  the  criminal  intent,  i.  e. 
the  state  of  mind,  accompanying  the  act,  in  which  the  very  act  as  for- 
bidden by  the  law  is  distinctly  and  deliberately  pictured  and  willed  ; 
thus,  a  gun  may  be  shot  by  A  under  the  belief  that  he  is  shooting  at 
a  deer  or  that  he  is  shooting  B  ;  the  sum  of  a  column  of  figures  may  be 
incorrectly  added  up  by  A  as  representing  the  correct  sum  or  as  con- 
cealing a  defalcation  ;  a  roll  of  bills  may  be  taken  by  A  as  being  his 
own  or  as  being  another's ;  and  the  differing  mental  states,  innocent  or 
wrongful,  will  represent  a  difference  in  the  criminality  of  the  situation. 
Now,  when  the  act  is  conceded,  and  the  state  of  mind  is  in  issue,  the 
ordinary  doctrine  of  chances  is  apt  to  assist  us  materially  in  coming 
to  a  decision.  For  example,  if  A  while  hunting  in  a  party  with  B 
finds  a  shot  from  B's  gun  whistling  past  his  head,  A  is  willing  to 
accept  a  bad  aim  or  an  accidental  stumble  as  the  explanation ;  but 
the  same  thing  happens  again,  and  if  on  the  third  occasion  A  receives 
B's  bullet  in  his  body,  the  natural  inference  of  probability  is  that  it 
was  done  deliberately.  For  the  basis  of  this  inference  we  have 
merely  the  doctrine  of  chances,  i.  e.  that  the  chances  of  three  suc- 
cessive accidental  and  innocent  shots  of  the  sort  are  very  small,  or 
(to  put  it  in  another  way)  that  inadvertence  or  accident  is  abnormal 
or  occasional,  and  thus  the  recurrence  of  the  same  harmful  result  in- 
dicates a  normal,  i.  e.  deliberate,  origin ;  in  short,  similar  results  do 

1  See  R.  v.  Dossett,  2  C.  &  K.  307  ;  R.  v.  Cooper,  3  Cox  Cr.  547 ;  Com.  v.  Jack- 
son,  132  Mass.  18;  U.  S.  v.  Roudeubush,  1  Baldw.  514. 


72  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

not  usually  recur  through  abnormal  causes.  Such  seems  to  be  the 
principle  upon  which,  when  the«doing  of  a  wrongful  act  is  conceded 
and  the  innocent  intent  is  in  issue,  the  doing  of  the  same  or  a  similar 
act  upon  other  occasions  is  admitted  in  evidence  to  negative  the  in- 
nocence of  intent.2  The  limitations  of  this  use  are  (a)  that  the 
wrongful  act  itself  is  conceded  or  otherwise  proved  to  be  done  and 
the  evidence  is  used  only  to  negative  innocent  intent ;  and  (b)  the 
other  acts  must  be  of  the  same  or  a  closely  similar  sort  and  not  widely 
separated  in  time,  in  order  to  exclude  an  innocent  explanation ;  and 
it  is  this  requirement  of  sameness  or  similarity  which  leaves  so  much 
room  for  difference  of  opinion  and  accounts  largely  for  the  variations 
in  the  rulings.  This  principle  is  occasionally  applied  in  a  peculiar 
shape,  by  receiving  evidence  of  other  similar  anonymous  acts,  i.  e. 
without  showing  the  defendant  to  be  their  author  ;  the  result  is  that 
the  innocent  intent  is  negatived,  no  matter  who  the  doer  may  be,  and 
then  by  other  evidence  the  defendant  may  be  shown  the  doer ;  as, 
if  A  were  to  find  his  house  on  fire  three  nights  in  succession,  the 
repetition  would  serve  to  negative  any  innocent  cause,  no  matter  who 
the  author,  and  after  A  has  connected  B  with  the  last  fire,  the  evi- 
dence of  other  fires  negativing  innocent  intent  is  equally  applicable 
even  though  B  cannot  be  connected  with  the  others.8  (3)  Where  the 
very  doing  of  the  act  charged  is  in  issue  and  is  to  be  evidenced,  one 
of  the  evidential  facts  admissible  (ante,  §  14  7c)  is  the  person's  plan  or 
desiyn  to  do  the  act.  Now  this  plan  or  design  itself  may  be  evi- 
denced by  his  conduct,  and  such  conduct  may  consist  of  other  similar 
acts  so  connected  as  to  indicate  a  common  purpose,  including  in  its 
scope  the  act  charged.  There  is  a  decided  difference  between  this 
use  and  the  preceding  one ;  for  there  the  object  was  merely  to  give  a 
complexion  to  an  act  conceded  or  proved,  i.  e.  to  negative  innocent 
intent,  while  here  the  object  is  to  evidence  a  prior  general  plan, 
scheme,  or  design,  which  in  its  turn  is  to  evidence  the  doing  of  the 
act  so  planned.  Thus,  the  evidence  for  the  present  purpose  needs  to 
be  much  stronger  ;  it  must  be  not  merely  one  or  more  similar  acts 
such  as  would  suffice  to  negative  inadvertence  or  accident,  but  the 
other  acts  must  be  so  connected  by  significant  features  that  a  general 
plan  or  scheme  is  seen  to  have  been  behind  them  as  a  natural 
explanation.4 

In  the  application  of  the  above  principles,  five  sources  of  difficulty 
have  most  commonly  operated  to  cause  confusion  in  the  precedents. 
(1)  The  elements  of  knowledge  and  of  intent  are  both  present  in  some 
crimes, — e.g.  forged  or  counterfeit  utterings,  false  representations 

8  See  R.  v.  Francis,  L.  R.  2  C.  C.  R.  128,  Coleridge,  C.  J. ;  Blake  v.  Asso.  Co., 
L.  R.  4  C.  P.  D.  94,  98,  Grove,  J. ;  Clark,  Att'y-Gen'l,  arguendo,  in  State  v.  Lapage, 
67  N.  H.  245,  261  ;  dishing,  C.  J.,  ib.  294. 

»  See  R.  v.  Bailey,  2  Cox  Cr.  311. 

*  See  Blake  v.  Ass.  Co.,  L.  R.  4  C.  P.  D.  94,  106,  Liiidley,  J.  ;  Com.  v.  Robinson, 
146  Mass.  571,  C.  Allen,  J. 


§  14  J.]      OTHER  SIMILAR   CRIMES,   AS   SHOWING  INTENT,   ETC.          73 

—  and  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  the  respective  applications  of  the 
first  and  second  principles  above ;  (2)  in  applying  the  second  princi- 
ple, there  is  room  for  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  similarity 
to  be  required  in  the  other  acts  before  they  are  properly  admissible ; 
(3)  the  difference  between  the  second  and  third  principles  has  not 
always  been  observed,  and  the  stricter  requirements  of  the  third  are 
often  laid  down  in  cases  where  the  looser  limitations  of  the  second 
were  appropriate ;  as,  for  example,  in  Massachusetts,  where,  in  cases 
of  false  representations  and  fraudulent  transfers,  several  decisions 
require  the  other  acts  to  evidence  a  common  scheme  or  plan,  under 
the  third  principle,  though  the  second  principle  is  usually  the  appro- 
priate and  sufficient  one  in  those  cases  ;  (4)  the  problem  for  each 
sort  of  offence  should  be  solved  according  to  the  particular  nature  of 
that  offence,  for  the  elements  may  differ  decidedly,  and  the  analogies 
of  other  offences  may  not  be  appropriate;  yet  these  analogies  are 
often  invoked  indiscriminately  and  result  in  confusion  ;  (5)  the 
fundamental  rule  that  the  character  of  a  defendant  may  not  be 
attacked  by  evidence  of  his  past  crimes  or  other  misconduct  (ante, 
§  14/),  or,  as  it  is  often  put,  the  prohibition  against  arguing  that,  be- 
cause A  committed  some  other  crime,  therefore  he  committed  the  one 
charged,  is  so  constantly  in  the  minds  of  Courts  that  their  inclination 
invariably  is  to  exclude  evidence  of  past  misdeeds  unless  its  relevancy 
to  show  knowledge,  intent,  or  plan,  is  clear,  and  thus  a  great  deal  is  ex- 
cluded which  has  a  certain  amount  of  probative  value  but  is  distrusted 
and  feared  by  the  Courts  as  being  obnoxious  to  the  above  fundamental 
principle  and  not  sufficiently  evidential  of  intent,  etc.,  to  require 
admission.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  entirely  settled  that  if  such  other 
acts  have  evidential  value  in  showing  knowledge,  intent,  or  plan, 
their  criminality  is  in  itself  no  obstacle  to  their  admission  ; 5  it 
merely  furnishes  a  reason  for  caution  and  for  insisting  on  a  clear  evi- 
dential value;  and  this  ground  of  objection,  though  incessantly  urged 
from  time  to  time,  has  been  as  repeatedly  repudiated  by  the  Courts.6 
The  precedents  for  the  various  crimes  are  so  numerous  that  in  the 
present  stage  of  the  law  it  is  most  useful  to  arrange  them  under  the  heads 
of  the  respective  offences  and  wrongs.  The  foregoing  broad  outline  must 
suffice  as  a  guide  to  the  application  of  the  principles  under  each  head. 
These  questions  have  arisen  in  cases  of  forgery  and  counterfeiting,7 

8  See  clear  expositions  of  the  principle  by  Williams,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Richardson,  2  F. 
&  F.  346  ;  Brackenbrough,  J.,  in  Walker's  case,  1  Leigh  576  ;  Brewer,  J.,  in  State 
v.  Adams,  20  Kan.  319  ;  Allen,  J.,  in  Com.  v.  Robinson,  146  Mass.  274  ;  Heming- 
way, J.,  in  Billings  v.  State,  52  Ark.  309;  Beatty,  C.  J.,  in  People  U.Walters,  98 
Cal.  138. 

6  Painter  v.  People,  147  111.  463  ;  State  v.  Witham,  72  Me.  531  ;  Peoples.  Henssler, 
48  Mich.  49  ;  State  v.  Nugent,  71  Mo.  136  ;   State  v.  Davis,  N.  H.,  41  Atl.267  ;  State 
v.  Robinson,  16  N.  J.  L.  508  ;  People  v.  McLaughlin,  150  N.Y.  386;  State  v.  Pancoast, 
5N.  D.  516  ;  State  v.  Wintzingerode,  9  Or.  153;   Turner  v.  Com.,  86  Pa.  70  ;  Moore 
V.  U.  S.,  150  U.  S.  57  ;  State  v.  Bridgman,  49  Vt.  212. 

7  Graft  v.  Lord  Bertie,  Peake  Evid.  72  ;  Balcetti  v.  Serani,  Peake  142  ;  Gibson  v 


74  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [en.  v. 

of  false  pretences  or  representations  (including  fraudulent  purchase 
with  intent  not  to  pay)  : 8  of  knowing  possession  or  receipt  of  stolen 

Hunter,  2  H.  Bl.  288  ;  Viney  v.  Barss,  1  Esp.  293 ;  R.  v.  Wylie,  1  B.  &  P.  N.  R.  92  ; 
R.  v.  Hough,  R.  &  R.  120 ;  R,  o.  Ball,  ib.  132  ;  R.  v.  Ball,  1  Camp.  324 ;  R.  v.  Taverner, 
Carr.  Suppl.  195  ;  R.  v.  Millard,  R.  &  R.  245  ;  R.  v.  Moore,  2  C.  &  P.  235  ;  R.  v. 
Smith,  ib.  633  ;  R.  v.  Hodgson,  1  Lew.  Cr.  C.  103  ;  R.  v.  Suuderland,  ib.  102  ;  R.  v. 
Phillips,  ib.  105  ;  R.  v.  Kirkwood,  ib.  103  ;  R.  v.  Martin,  ib.  104  ;  R.  v.  Smith,  4  C. 
&  P.  411 ;  R.  v.  Forbes,  7  id.  224  ;  R.  v.  Ball,'  1  Moo.  Cr.  C.  470;  R.  v.  Page,  4  B. 
&  Ad.  122  ;  R.  v.  Forster,  Dears.  Cr.  C.  456  ;  R.  u.  Jarvis,  7  Cox  Cr.  53,  Dears.  Cr.  C. 
552  ;  R.  v.  Weeks,  Leigh  &  C.  18  ;  Roupell  v.  Haws,  2  F.  &  F.  784  ;  R.  v.  Goodwin, 
10  Cox  Cr.  534;  Thorp  v.  State,  15  Ala.  749  ;  People  v.  Frank,  28  Cal.  507,  517  ; 
People  v.  Farrell,  30  id.  316;  People  v.  Sanders,  114  id.  216;  People  v.  Whiteman, 
ib.  338  ;  People  v.  Creegan,  id.,  53  Pac.  1082  ;  State  v.  Smith,  5  Day  175,  178  ; 
Stalker  ».  State,  9  Conn.  341 ;  Hoskins  v.  State,  11  Ga.  92,  95  ;  Steele  v.  People,  45 
111.  152,  157  ;  Blalock  v.  Randall,  76  id.  224,  229;  Lascelles  v.  State,  90  id.  347,  355, 
375;  Fox  v.  People,  95  id.  71,  75;  Anson  v.  People,  148  id.  494,  503;  McCartney  u. 
State,  3  Ind.  354  ;  Bersch  v.  State,  13  id.  435 ;  Harding  v.  State.  54  id.  359,  365  ; 
Robinson  v.  State,  66  id.  331,  334 ;  Thomas  v.  State,  103  id.  432 ;  Card  v.  State,  109 
id.  415,  420 ;  State  v.  Breckenridge,  67  la.  204 ;  State  v.  Saunders,  68  id.  370 ;  Barnes 
».  Com.,  Ky.,  41  S.  W.  772;  State  v.  McAllister,  24  Me.  139,  143;  Dodge  v.  Haskell, 
69  id.  429;  Bishop  v.  State,  55  Md.  138,  144;  Com.  v.  Bigelow,  8  Mete.  235;  Com. 
v.  Stearns,  10  id.  256  ;  Com.  v.  Miller,  3  Gush.  243,  250 ;  Com.  v.  Price,  10  Gray 
473;  Com.  v.  Hall,  4  All.  306;  Com.  v.  Edgerly,  10  id.  184;  Com.  v.  Jackson,  132 
Mass.  18  ;  Com.  v.  White,  145  id.  394  ;  Carver  v.  People,  39  Mich.  786 ;  Pearson  v. 
Hardin,  95  Mich.  360,  366 ;  State  P.  Mix,  15  Mo.  153,  160  ;  State  v.  Wolff,  ib.  173  ; 
State  v.  Minton,  116  id.  605;  State  v.  Hodges,  id.,  45  S.  W.  1093;  State  v.  Van 
Houten,  2  N.  J.  L.  248  ;  State  v.  Robinson,  16  id.  507;  Ryan  ».  State,  id.,  38  Atl. 
672  ;  People  v.  Thorns,  3  Park.  Cr.  256,  270 ;  People  v.  Corbin,  56  N.  Y.  363 ;  People 
v.  Everhardt,  104  id.  591 ;  State  w.  Twitty,  2  Hawks,  248,  258;  State  v.  Hess,  5  Oh. 
9 ;  Reed  v.  State,  15  id.  217  ;  Griffin  v.  State,  14  Oh.  St.  55,  62  ;  Lindsey  v.  State,  38 
id.  507;  Penus.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  153  Pa.  160,  164;  State  v.  Antonio,  2  Constl.  Ct.  776, 
797  ;  State  v.  Houston,  1  Bail.  300 ;  Peck  v.  State,  2  Humph.  78,  86 ;  Fonte  v.  State, 
15  Lea  712,  719  ;  Franklin  v.  Franklin,  90  Tenn.  48 ;  Strang  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  219, 
223  ;  U.  S.  v.  Moses,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  725  ;  U.  S.  v.  Roudenbush,  8  Pet.  288  ;  1  Baldw. 
514  ;  U.  S.  v.  Doebler,  ib.  519,  524  ;  U.  S.  v.  Burns,  5  McLean  23,  26  ;  U.  S. 
v.  Brooks,  3  McArth,  315,  317;  Finn  v.  Com.,  5  Rand.  701,  709  ;  Martin  v.  Com., 
2  Leigh  745  ;  Spencer  v.  Com.,  ib.  751,  756  ;  Hendrick's  Case,  5  id.  769,  776  ;  Keith 
v.  Taylor,  3  Vt.  153  ;  Redding  v.  Redding's  Est.,  69  id.  500 ;  State  v.  Morton, 
8  Wis.  352. 

8  Hathaway's  Trial,  14  How.  St.  Tr.  664  ;  R.  v.  Roberts,  1  Camp.  399 ;  R.  v. 
Whitehead,  1  C.  &  P.  67  ;  Irving  v.  Motly,  7  Bing.  543  ;  R.  v.  Roebuck,  D.  &  B.  24  ; 
R.  v.  Holt,  8  Cox  Cr.  411  ;  R.  v.  Findge,  L.  &  C.  390  ;  R.  v.  Stenson,  12  Cox  Cr.  Ill; 
R.  v.  Francis,  L.  R.  2  C.  C.  R.  128 ;  R.  v.  Saunders,  1  Q.  B.  D.  19  ;  Blake  v.  Ass.  Soc., 
14  Cox  Cr.  246 ;  Martin  v.  Smith,  Ala.,  22  So.  917  ;  Gardner  v.  Preston,  2  Root 
205;  Allin  v.  Millison,  72  111.  201  ;  Strong  ».  State,  86  Ind.  208  ;  Crum  v.  State,  148 
id.  401  ;  State  r.  Rivers,  58  la.  102,  108  ;  State  v.  Jamison,  74  id.  613,  617  ;  State  v. 
Brady,  100  id.  191 ;  Roche  v.  Colernan,  Ky.,  42  S.  W.  739  ;  McKenney  v.  Dingley, 
4  Me.  172  ;  Seaver  v.  Dingley,  ib.  306,  320  ;  Hawes  v.  Dingley,  17  id.  341 ;  Carnell  "v. 
State,  85  Md.  1  ;  Rowley  v.  Bigelow,  12  Pick.  307,  311 ;  Com.  v.  Stone,  4  Mete.  43, 
47  ;  Com.  v.  Eastman,  1  Gush.  189,  195  ;  Wiggin  v.  Day,  9  Gray  97 ;  Jordan  v. 
Osgood,  109  Mass.  457  ;  Haskins  v.  Warren,  115  id.  523,  538;  Com.  v.  Coe,  ib.  481, 
601  ;  Com.  v.  Jackson,  132  id.  16  ;  Com.  t>.  Blood,  141  id.  575  ;  Shipman  v.  Sey- 
mour, 40  Mich.  274,  280 ;  Cook  v.  Perry,  43  id.  623,  626 ;  People  ».  Henssler,  48  id. 
49,  52  ;  People  v.  Wakely,  62  id.  297,  303  ;  Ross  v.  Miner,  67  id.  410  ;  Stubly  v. 
Beachboard,  68  id.  401,  422  ;  State  v.  Wilson,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  715;  State  v.  Jack- 
son, 112  Mo.  585  ;  State  v.  Wilson,  id.,  44  S.  W.  722;  State  v.  Turley,  142  id.  403; 
Davis  v.  Vories,  141  id.  234  ;  Cowan  v.  State,  22  Nebr.  519,  524  ;  Johnson  v.  Gulick, 
46  id.  817;  Morgan  w.  State,  id.,  77  N.  W.  64;  Bradley  P.  Obear,  10  N.  H.  477; 
Augier  v.  Ash,  26  id.  109  ;  State  v.  Call,  48  id.  126,  132  ;  Hovey  v.  Grant,  62  id. 
669  ;  Gary  v.  Hotaling,  1  Johns.  311,  316  ;  Allison  v.  Matthieu,  3  id,  235  ;  Hall  v. 
Naylor,  18  N.  Y.  588  ;  Hennequin  v.  Naylor,  24  id.  139  ;  Hathorne  v.  Hodges,  28  id. 
486,  489;  Bielschofsky  v.  People,  60  id.  616  ;  Weyniau  v.  People,  62  id.  623;  People 


§  14  g-.]      OTHER   SIMILAR  CRIMES,  AS   SHOWING  INTENT,   ETC.          75 

goods ;  *  of  embezzlement ; 10  of  transfers  in  fraud  of  creditors  "  and 
other  fraudulent  transfers ; 12  of  false  claims  of  action,18  fraudulent 
importation  of  goods,14  falsification  of  documents  or  books,15  cheating 
by  false  measures,18  and  fraudulent  insurance ; 17  of  perjury 18  and 

i>.  Shulman,  80  id.  373  ;  Mayer  v.  People,  ib.  364,  372  ;  Shipply  v.  People,  86  id.  376, 
380  ;  People  v.  Dimick,  107  id.  13,  31 ;  People  v.  Peckens,  153  id.  576  ;  State  v. 
Durham,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  26  ;  State  v.  Walton,  114  id.  783  ;  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Wright,  33  Oh.  St.  533  ;  Tarbox  v.  State,  38  id.  581  ;  Simons  v.  Vulcan  Co.,  61  Pa. 
202,  218  ;  White  v.  Rosentlial,  173  id.  175  ;  Schofield  v.  Schiffer,  156  id.  65,  73 ; 
Com.  v.  Yerkes,  29  Phila.  Legal  Intellig.  60  ;  12  Cox  Cr.  208,  215,  225  ;  Defreese  v. 
State,  3  Heisk.  53,  62 ;  Rafferty  v.  State,  91  Te.nn.  655,  663  ;  Castle  v.  Bullard,  23 
How.  172,  186;  Lincoln  w.  Claflin,  7  Wall.  132,  138;  Butler  v.  Watkins,  13  Wall. 
456,  464  ;  U.  S.  v.  Snyder,  4  McCr.  618,  621  ;  Penn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mechanics'  S.  B. 
&  T.  Co.,  37  U.  S.  App.  692 ;  Mudsill  M.  Co.  v.  Watrous,  22  id.  12 ;  Spurr  v.  U.  S., 
id.,  87  Fed.  701  ;  Trogdon's  Case,  31  Gratt.  862,  870  ;  State  v.  Bokien,  14  Wash.  403. 
»  R.  v.  Dunn,  1  Moo.  Cr.  C.  146  ;  R.  v.  Davis,  6  C.  &  P.  177  ;  R.  v.  Hinley,  2  Mo. 
&  Rob.  524,  1  Cox  Cr.  12  ;  R.  v.  Oddy,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  264  ;  R.  v.  Primelt,  1  F.  &  F. 
51  ;  St.  34-35  Viet.  c.  112,  §  19  ;  R.  v.  Carter,  15  Cox  Cr.  448  ;  R.  v.  Drage,  14  id.  85  ; 
R.  v.  Harwood,  11  id.  388;  Gassenheimer  v.  State,  52  Ala.  313,  318;  State  v.  Wood, 
49  Conn.  429,  440;  Goodman  v.  State,  141  Ind.  35;  Lewis  v.  State,  4  Kan.  306; 
Devoto  v.  Com.,  8  Mete.  418;  Stater.  Wolff,  15  Mo.  168,  172;  Stater.  Harrold,  38 
id.  497  ;  State  v.  Flynn,  124  id.  480  ;  People  v.  Rando,  3  Park.  Cr.  335,  339  ;  Cole- 
man  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  81,  90 ;  58  id.  556,  560  ;  Copperman  v.  People,  56  id.  591 ; 
People  ».  Dowling,  84  id.  486 ;  State  v.  Murphy,  84  N.  C.  741  ;  Shriedley  v.  State,  23 
Oh.  St.  130,  142  ;  State  v.  Crawford,  39  S.  C.  343,  350  ;  State  v.  Humason,  5  Wash. 
409,  503. 

10  R.  v.  Richardson,  2  F.  &  F.  343,  8  Cox  Cr.  448  ;  R.  v.  Proud,  L.  &  C.  97,  102 ; 
R.  v.  Reardon,  4  F.  &  F.  79  ;  R.  v.  Stephens,  16  Cox  Cr.  387  ;  People  v.  Gray,  66  Cal. 
271,  274;  People  v.  Bidleinan,   104  id.  609,  613;  Thalheim  v.  State,  38  Fla.  169; 
Kribs  v.  People,  82  III.  425  ;  Shipp  v.  Com.,  Ky.,   41  S.  W.  856  ;   Com.  v.  Tucker- 
man,  10  Gray  173,  197  ;  Com.  v.  Shepard,  1  All.  575,  581  ;  People  v.  Hawkins,  106 
Mich.  479  ;  State  v.  Holmes,  65  Minn.  230  ;  American  Surety  Co.  v.  Pauly,  38  U.  S. 
App.  254 ;  Edelhoff  v.  State,  5  Wyo.  19,  27. 

11  Cummings  v.  McCullough,  5  Ala.  324,  332 ;  Dent  v.  Portwood,  21  id.  589 ;  Ben- 
ning  v.  Nelson.  23  id.  801,  804  ;   Nelms  v.  Steiner,  113  id.  562  ;  White  v.  B.  &  F.  G. 
Co.,  Ark.,  45  S.  W.  1060  ;  Hardy  v.  Moore,  62  la.  65,  70  ;  Lockhartr.  Harrell,  6  La. 
An.  530,  532  ;   Flagg  v.  Willingfon,  6  Greenl.  386  ;  Blake  v.  Howard,  11  Fairf.  202; 
Howe  v.  Reed,  12  id.  515  ;  Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.   99  ;  Long  v.  Lamkin,  9  Cush. 
361 ;  Cook  ».  Moore,  11  Cush.  213,  216  ;  Williams  v.  Robbins,  15  Gray,  590  ;  Taylor 
v.  Robinson,  2  All.  562  ;   Lynde  v.  McGregor,  13  id.  172,  174  ;  Winchester  v.  Charter, 
97  Mass.  143;  Jordan  v.  Osgood,  109  id.  457;  Ganong  v.   Green,  71   Mich.   1,   9; 
Nicolay  v.  Mallery,  62  Minn.  119  ;   Uhler  v.  Adams,  73  Miss.  332  ;  Lovell  v.  Briggs, 
2  N.  H.  223;  Whittier  v.  Varney,  10  N.  H.  291,  294  ;   Augier  v.  Ash,  26  id.   109; 
State,  v.  Johnson,  33  id.  441,  456  ;   Benham  v.  Gary,  11  Wend.  83  ;  Jackson  v.  Tim- 
merman,  12  id.  299  ;  Holmesly  v.  Hogue,  2  Jones  L.  391  ;  State  v.  Jeffries,  117  N.  C. 
727  ;   Zerbe  v.  Miller,  16  Pa.  488,  495  ;   Heath  v.  Page,  63  Pa.  108,  125  ;   M'Elwee  v. 
Sutton,  2  Bail.  128,  130  ;  Lowry  v.  Pinson,  ib.  324,  328 ;  Bottomley  v.  U.  S.,  1  Story 
145  ;  Kellogg  t>.  Clyne,  12  U.  S.  App.  174,  183  ;  Piedmont  Bank  v.  Hatcher,  94  Va. 
229  ;  Kaufer  v.  Walsh,  88  Wis.  63,  68. 

12  Somes  v.  Skinner,   16  Mass.  348,   358  ;  Farrington  v.  Sinclair,  15  Johns.  428  ; 
Lovell  v.  Brings,  2  N.  H.  218,  223  ;  Castle  v.  Bullard,  23  How.  172. 

18  Hood  v.^R.  Co.,  95  la.  331 ;  Bradford  v.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Pick.  161 ;  Miller  r.  Curtis, 
163  Mass.  127,  131  ;  Young  v.  Dougherty,  183  Pa.  179;  Lewis  v.  Barker,  53  Vt.  23  ; 
see  also  under  Extortion,  post,  and  False  Pretences,  ante. 

"  Bottomley  v.  U.  S.,  1  Story  135 ;  Wood  v.  U.  S.,  16  Pet.  342,  360. 

16  Thompson  v.  Mosely,  5  C.  &  P.  501 ;  Gardner  v.  Way,  8  Gray  189 ;  see  also  ante, 
under  Embezzlement. 

W  Dibble  v.  Nash,  47  Mich.  589  ;  Reid  v.  Ladue,  66  id.  22,  25  ;  Bainbridge  v. 
State,  30  Oh.  St.  264,  274  ;  Townsend  v.  Graves,  3  Paige  Ch.  453  ;  see  also  ante,  under 
False  Representations,  and  port,  under  Larceny. 

«  Contin.  Ins.  Co.  ».  Ins.  Co.,'l  U.  S.  App.  201. 

18  State  v.  Raymond,  20  la.  582,  588;  People  v.  Van  Tassel,  N.  Y.,  51  N.  E.  274  ; 
U.  S.  v.  Wood,  14  Pet.  430,  443. 


76  RELEVANCY  ;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  [CH.   V. 

bribery ; 19  of  larceny 20  and  kidnapping ; 21  of  robbery,  piracy,  and 
burglary  22  and  of  extortion ; 23  of  arson ; 24  of  assault  with  intent  to 
rape,25  of  rape,26  and  of  abortion  ; 27  of  homicide  by  violence,28  or  by 

»  Webb  v.  Smith,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  373,  379 ;  State  v.  Durnam,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  127  ; 
State  v.  Williams,  136  Mo.  293  ;  People  v.  Sharp,  107  N.  Y.  427,  456. 

20  R.  v.  Ellis,  6  B.  &  C.  145  ;   R.  v.  May,  1  Cox  Cr.  236 ;  R.  v.  Bleasdale,  2  C.  &  K. 
765  ;  R.  v.  Southwood,  1  F.  &  F.  356 ;  R.  v.  Reardon,  4  id.  79  ;  Dove  v.  State,  37  Ark. 
261,  263;    Endaily  v.  State,  39  id.   278,  280;  State  v.  Wisdom,   8   Port.  511,  516; 
People  v.  Robles,  34  Cal.  591,  593;  People  v.  Lopez,  59  id.  362;  People  v.  Cunning- 
ham, 66  id.   668;   People  v.  Fehreubach,  102  Cal.   394;  Housli  v.   People,  Colo.,  50 
Pac.  1036  ;   Williams  v.  People,  166  111.  132  ;  Bonsall  v.  State,  35  Ind.  461 ;   Shears  v. 
State,  147  id.  51 ;  State  v.  Van  Winkle,  80  la.  15,  18  ;  Lewis  v.  State,  4  Kan.  306  ; 
State  v.  Thurtell,  29  id.  148  ;  State  v.  Bates,  46  La.  An.  849  ;  Pike  v.  Crehore,  40 
Me.  503,  511  ;  People  v.  Schweitzer,  23  Mich.  301 ;  People  v.  Machen,  101  id.  401  ; 
State  v.  Goetz,  34  Mo.  85,  90 ;  State  v.  Reavis,  71  id.  421  ;  Davis  v.  State,  Nebr.,  74 
N.  W.  599  ;  Cheny   v.   State,  7  Oh.,  Pt.  1,  222  ;  Barton  v.  State,  18  id.  221  ;   State 
r.  Harding,  16  Or."  493  ;  Links  v.  State,  9  Lea  701,  712 ;  Gilbraith  v.  State,  41  Tex. 
567;  Nixon  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  205  ;    Uusell  v.  State,  id.,  45  S.  W.  1022 ;  Walker's 
Case,  1  Leigh  574  ;  State  v.  Kelley,  65  Vt.  531 ;  Schaser  v.  State,  36  Wis.  429. 

21  Taylor  v.  Horsey,  5  Harringt.  131  ;  Com.  v.  Turner,  3  Mete.  19  ;  State  v.  Ford, 
3  Strobh.  517  ;  Cole  v.  Com.,  5  Gratt.  696. 

22  Captain  Vaughan's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  499  ;  Captain  Kidd's  Trial,  14  id.  154, 
182  ;  R.  v.  Vandercomb,  2  Leach  (4th  ed.)  708  ;  R.  v.  Briggs,  2  Moo.  &  Rob.  199  ; 
Mason  v.  State,  42  Ala.  532 ;  Ford  v.  State,  34  Ark.  649  ;  People  v.  Dubois,  48  Cal. 
551  ;  People  v.  McGilver,  67  id.  55,  56  ;  Frazer  v.  State,  135  Ind.  38,  41  ;   State  v. 
Desroches,  48  La.  An.  428;  Com.  v.  Williams,  2  Cush.  584 ;  Com.  v.  Scott,  123  Mass. 
225,  234  ;  Lightfoot  v.  People,  16  Mich.  507,  510  ;  McGee  v.  State,  Miss.,  22  So.  890  ; 
State  v.  Greenwade,  72  Mo.  300  ;  State  v.  Cowell,  12  Nev.  337 ;    Leonard  v.  State, 
N.  J.  L.,  41  Atl.  561;  Hope  v.   People,  83  N.  Y.  419,  428;  Coble  v.  State,  31  Oh. 
St.  100  ;  Swan  v.  Com.,  104  Pa.  218  ;   Dawson  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  535,  552;  Long 
v.  State,  id.,  47  S.  W.  363  ;  Neubrandt  v.  State,  53  Wis.  89. 

2*  Barnard's  Trial,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  825.;  R.  v.  Wiukworth,  4  C.  &  P.  444  ;  R.  v. 
Egerton,  R.  &  R.  375  ;  R.  v.  Cooper,  3  Cox  Cr.  547  ;  R.  v.  McDonnell,  5  id.  153  ; 
People  V.  Lambert,  Cal.,  52  Pac.  307  ;  State  v.  Lewis,  96  la.  286  ;  Com.  v.  Sadls- 
bury,  152  Pa.  554  ;  Britt  v.  State,  9  Humph.  31 ;  see  also  ante,  under  False  Claims  of 
Action. 

24  R.  v.  Howell,  3  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1087,  1098  ;  R.  v.  Dosset,  2  Cox  Cr.  243  ;  R.  v. 
Regan,  4  id.  335  ;  R.  v.  Taylor,  5  id.  138;  R.  v.  Gray,  4  F.  &  F.  1102;  R.  v.  Nat- 
trass,  15  Cox  Cr.  73  ;  Brock  v.  State,  26  Ala.  104  ;  Martin  v.  State,  28  id.  71,  82  ; 
Com.  v.  McCarthy,  119  Mass.  355;  Com.  v.  Bradford,  126  id.  42;  State?*.  Raymond, 
53  N.  J.  L.  260,  264  ;  People,  v.  Kennedy,  32  N.  Y.  141  ;  Faucett  v.  Nichols,  64  id. 
377  ;  People  v.  Murphy,  135  id.  450,  456;  People  v.  Fitzgerald,  id.,  50  N.  E.  846; 
State  v.  Freeman,  4  Jones  L.  5  ;  State  v.  Thompson,  97  N.  C.  496  ;  State  v.  Graham, 
id.,  28  S.  E.  409  ;  Kramer  v.  Com.  87  Pa.  299  ;  State  v.  Smalley,  50  Vt.  738,  750  ; 
State  r.  Ward,  61  id.  181 ;  State,  v.  Hallock,  id.,  40  Atl.  51 ;  States.  Miller,  47  Wis.  530. 
26  People  v.  Bowen,  49  Cal.  654  ;  State  v.  Walters,  45  la.  389  ;  State  ?;.  Boyland  ami 
McCurty,  24  Kan.  186  ;  State  v.  Stevens,  Kan.,  44  Pac.  992. 

26  R.  v.  Lloyd,  7  C.  &  P.  318 ;  R.  v.  Chambers,  3  Cox  Cr.  92  ;  R.  v.  Reardon,  4  F. 
&  F.  76  ;  People  v.  Fultz,  109  Cal.  258  ;  Parkinson  v.  People,  135  111.  401  ;  Janzen  v. 
People,  159  id.  440 ;  State  v.  Bonsor,  49  Kan.  758  ;  Conkey  v.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  32, 
35  ;  People  v.  O'SnlUran,  104  N.  Y.  483  ;  State  t>.  Saxton,  76  N.  C.  216  :  Williams  v. 
State,  8  Humph.  585,  594  ;  State  v.  Thompson,  14  Wash.  285  ;  Proper  v.  State,  85  Wis. 
615,  628. 

27  R.  v.  Perry,  2  Cox  Cr.  223  ;  Baker  v.  People,  105  111.  452,  456  ;  Com.  v.  Corkin, 
136  Mass.  429;  Lamb  v.  State,  66  Md.  285  ;  People  v.  Sessions,  58  Mich.  594,  600; 
People  v.  Seaman,  107  id.  348  ;  People  v.  Abbott,  id.,  74  N.  W.  529. 

*  R.  v.  Mobbs,  6  Cox  Cr.  223  ;  R.  v.  Reardon,  4  F.  &  F.  79  ;  R.  v.  Roden,  12  Cox 
Or.  630  ;  R.  v.  Crickmer,  16  id.  701 ;  Makin  t>.  Att'y-Gen'l  of  N.  S.  Wales,  17  id.  704; 
Lawrence  v.  State,  84  Ala.  424 ;  Smith  v.  State,  88  id.  76  ;  Baker  v.  State,  4  Ark.  56, 
61;  Austin  v.  State,  14  id.  555,  558;  Melton  v.  State,  43  id.  367,  371  ;  People  v.  Wal- 
ters, 98  Cal.  138, 141  ;  People  v.  Smith,  106  id.  73, 82  ;  People  v.  Craig,  111  id.  460,  467  ; 
People  v.  Miller,  id.,  58  Pac.  816  ;  Killius  v.  State,  28  Fla.  313,  333 ;  Oliver  v.  State,  38 


§  14  <?.]      OTHER  SIMILAR   CRIMES,   AS   SHOWING   INTENT,    ETC.         77 

poisoning,89  and  of  assault  with  intent  to  do  violence  and  the  like,80 
and  of  riot ; 81  of  keeping  a  disorderly  house ; 8a  of  gambling  or  keep- 
ing a  lottery ; 88  of  committing  a  trespass ; 84  of  casting  a  vote,86  of 
keeping  liquor  for  sale  illegally,86  and  of  infringing  a  copyright.87 
We  here  come  to  the  borders  of  the  principle  in  those  civil  actions 
in  which  no  question  of  intent  or  knowledge  arises,  and  the  only 
principle  applicable  is  the  third  above-mentioned,  i.  e.  the  use  of 

id.  46  ;  Milton  v.  State,  id.,  24  So.  60  ;  Reese  v.  State,  7  Ga.  373  ;  Shaw  v.  State,  60  id. 
246,  250  ;  State  v.  Smith,  102  la.  656  ;  Baylor  v.  Com.,  97  Ky.  184  ;  Green  v.  Com., 
id.,  33  S.  W.  100;  State  v.  Foutenot,  48  La.  An.  305;  State  v.  Pike,  65  Me.  Ill,  113  ; 
Com.  v.  Campbell,  7  All.  541 ;  People  i>.  Knapp,  26  Mich.  112,  116  ;  People  v.  Marble, 
38  id.  117,  123;  Herman  v.  State,  Miss.,  22  So.  872  ;  State  v.  Testermau,  68  Mo.  408, 
415 ;  State  v.  Martin,  74  id.  547  ;  State  v.  Sanders,  76  id.  35,  36 ;  State  v.  Emery,  ib. 
349;  State  v.  Vaughan,  22  Nev.  285;  Roper  v.  Terr.,  7  N.  M.  255,  265  ;  Stephens  v. 
People,  4  Park.  Cr.  396,  511 ;  19  N.  Y.  571 ;  Walters  u.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.  15  ;  People 
v.  Larubia,  140  N.  Y.  87  ;  People  v.  Shea,  147  id.  78;  State  v.  Shuford,  69  N.  C.  486, 
492  ;  .State  v.  Mace,  118  id.  1244  ;  Snyder  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  519,  521  ;  Com.  v.  Mudgett, 
174  id.  211;  Com.  v.  Wilson,  id.,  40  Atl.  283;  Stone  v.  State,  4  Humph.  27,  35; 
People  v.  Coughlin,  13  Utah,  58  ;  Heath  v.  Com.,  1  Rob.  Va.  735,  743;  Poindexter's 
Case,  33  Gratt.  766,  788  ;  Nicholas  v.  Com.,  91  Va.  741  ;  Albricht  v.  State,  6  Wis.  74. 

2»  R.  v.  Mogg,  4  C.  &  P.  335  ;  R.  v.  Calder,  2  Cox  Cr.  348  ;  R.  v.  Bailey,  ib.  312; 
R.  v.  Geering,  18  L.  J.  M.  C.  215  ;  R.  v.  Winslow,  8  Cox  Cr.  397  ;  R.  v.  Garner  and 
wife,  3  F.  &  F.  681,  4  id.  346;  R.  v.  Harris,  4  id.  342;  R.  v.  Cotton,  12  Cox  Cr. 
400;  R.  v.  Heesom,  14  id.  40  ;  R.  v.  Flannagau,  15  id.  403  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ala. 
618,  622;  Com.  v.  Robinson,  146  Mass.  571;  Com.  v.  Kennedy,  id.,  48  N.  E.  770; 
People  v.  Lansing,  21  Mich.  221,  226;  People  v.  Thacker,  108  id.  652  ;  People  v.  Wood, 
3  Park.  Cr.  685;  State  v.  Best,  111  N.  C.  638  ;  Farrer  v.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  54,  67 ;  Brown 
v.  State,  26  id.  176,  180;  Shaft  11  er  v.  Com.,  72  Pa.  60;  Goersen  v.  Com.,  99  id.  388, 
398. 

8°  R,  v.  Yoke,  R.  &  R.  531  ;  Ross  v.  State,  62  Ala.  224;  Horn  v.  State,  102  id.  144, 
151,  279  ;  Gaston  v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  682;  People  v.  Wilson,  117  Cal.  688;  49  Pac. 
1054 ;  State  v.  Merkley,  74  la.  695  ;  State  v.  Patza,  3  La.  An.  512  ;  State  v.  Raper, 
141  Mo.  327  ;  People  u.  Hopson,  1  Den.  574;  Kerrains  v.  People,  60  N.  Y.  228;  Peo- 
ple v.  Gibbs,  93  id.  470  ;  People  v.  Jones,  99  id.  667  ;  Moore  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  234; 
Devine  v.  Rand,  38  Vt.  621,  627. 

81  R.  v.  Hunt,  3  B.  &  Aid.  566,  573  ;  R.  v.  Mailloux,  16  N.  Br.  499,  516  ;  State 
Renton,  15  N.  H.  169,  174. 

82  Roop  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  479  ;  Parks  v.  State,  59  id.  573. 

83  Toll  v.  State,  Fla.,  23  So.  943  ;  Dunn  v.  People,  40  111.  469  ;  Thomas  v.  People, 
69  id.  160,  162;  Miller  v.  Com.,  13  Bush  737  ;  Com.  v.  Ferry,  146  Mass.  209;  Clark 
v.  State,  47  N.  J.  L.  556. 

M  Lou.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  115  Ala.  334  ;  Mayer  v.  R.  Co.,  90  Wis.  522. 
M  People  v.  Shea,  147  N.  Y.  78. 

86  See  Pearce  v.  State,  40  Ala.  720,   724  ;   Chipman  v.  People,  Colo.,  52  Pac.  677; 
State  v.  Arnold,  98  la.  253  ;  State  v.  Plunkett,   64  Me.  534  ;   State  v.  Neagle,  65  id. 
469  ;  Sherman  v.  Wilder,  106  Mass.  537,  540;  Com.  v.  Stochr,   109  id.  365;  Com.  v. 
Berry,  ib.  367  ;  Com.  v.  Dearborn,  ib.  370  ;  Com.  v.  Kohlmeyer,  124  id.  322  ;  Com. 
v.  Levy,  126  id.  240  ;  Com.  v.  Matthews,  129  id.  487;  Com.  v.  Cotton,  138  id.   501  ; 
Com.  v.  McCullow,  140  id.  370  ;  Com.  v.  Neylon,  159  id.  544  ;  Com.   v.  Vincent,  165 
id.  18  ;  People  v.  Haas,  79  Mich.  457,  461  ;  People  v.  Caldwell,  107  Mich.  374  ;  State 
v.  Austin,  Minn.,  77  N.  W.  301  ;    Hans  v.  State,  50  Nebr.   150  ;  State  v.  Shaw,  58 
N.  H.  73  ;  State  v.  Gorman,  ib.  77;  State  v.  White,   Vt.,  39  Atl.  1085  ;    Fosdahl  ». 
State,  89  Wis.  482..    These  rulings  depend  much  on  the  precise  nature  of  the  statutory 
offence  charged. 

87  Spiers  v.  Brown,  31  L.  T.  16  ;  Murray  r.  Bogue,  1  Drewry  858,  360 ;  Longman 
v.  Winchester,  16  Ves.  Jr.  269 ;  Mawman  v.  Tegg,  2  Russ.  385,  394  ;  Webb  v.  Powers, 
2  Woodb.  &  M.  497,  513  ;  Lawrence  v.  Dana,  4  Cliff.  1,  74  ;  Publishing  Co.  v.  Keller, 
30  Fed.  772  ;  Myers  v.  Callaghan,  128  U.  S.  617,  660  ;  Chicago  D.  D.  Co.  P.  Chic. 
D.  Co.,  24  U.  S.  App.  636;  West  Pub.  Co.  v.  Lawyers'  Co-op.  Pub.   Co.,  id.,  79 
Fed.  756. 


78  BELEVANCY;  CIKCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

other  similar  transactions  as  evidence  of  a  general  plan  or  system  of 
doing  such  acts ;  in  such  cases  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  for  practical 
purposes  between  system  and  habit,  the  difference  being  chiefly  a 
verbal  one  ;  and  the  precedents  in  such  cases  have  been  already  con- 
sidered (ante,  §  14  n).] 

5.    Sundry  Evidence  to  prove  or  disprove  a  Human  Act. 

§  14  r.  Alibi,  Commission  by  others,  etc.  [One  way  of  evidencing 
the  non-commission  of  an  act  by  the  person  charged  is  to  show  that 
he  was  elsewhere  at  the  time ; l  this  sort  of  evidence  presents  no 
difficulty  of  principle  ;  it  may  be  noted  that  any  absence  is  relevant 
and  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  total  impossibility  of  presence, 
the  degree  of  possibility  going  only  to  the  weight  of  the  evidence.2 
By  an  analogous  process  of  reasoning,  if  some  one  else  can  be  shown 
to  have  done  the  act  charged,  then  the  accused  could  not  have  done 
it  (apart  from  cases  of  conspiracy  or  joint  commission),  and  it  is 
thus  always  relevant  to  show  some  one  else  than  the  defendant  to 
have  been  the  doer.  This  other  person  may  have  been  the  injured 
person  himself;8  and,  where  the  charge  is  murder,  the  deceased's 
suicide  may  therefore  be  shown,  by  evidence  either  of  his  plan  to 
commit  suicide* or  of  his  motive  to  do  so;6  though  a  few  Courts, 
somewhat  over-cautiously,  reject  such  evidence  unless  combined  with 
other  significant  evidence.8  Or  the  real  doer  may  be  shown  to  be  a 
third  person,  by  evidence  either  of  plan  or  threats 7  or  of  motive  8 

1  Gilbert,  Evidence,  145  ;  Foster,  Crown  Law,  3d  ed.,  368;  Webster's  Trial,  5  Gush. 
295,  318,  Bemis'  Rep.  469. 

2  Stuart  v.  People,  42  Mich.  255,  260  ;  State  v.   Delaney,  92  la.  467  ;  Peyton  v. 
State,  Nebr.,  74  N.  W.  597 ;  Ford  v.  State,  Tenu.,  47  S.  W.  703.     Contra :  Briceland 
«.  Com.,  74  Pa.  463,  469. 

8  State  v.  Lee,  65  Conn.  265,  280  ;  Hitchcock  v.  Burgett,  38  Mich.  504  ;  Lush  v. 
McDaniel,  13  Ired.  487. 

*  Spencer  Cowper's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1166 ;  Jumpertz  v.  People,  21  111.  408  ; 
State  v.  Asbell,  57  Kan.  398  ;  State  v.  Bradley,  6  La.  An.  559  ;  Com.  v.  Trefethen,  157 
Mass.  180  (leading  case);  Smith  v.  Benef.  Soc.,  123  N.  Y.  85  ;  Blackburn  v.  State,  23 
Oh.  St.  146,  165;   Boyd  v.  State,  14  Lea  161,  177;  State  v.  Fournier,  68  Vt.  262 
(undecided). 

Excluded:  (but  some  of  these  proceed  merely  on  the  Hearsay  doctrine  noted  post, 
§  162  c) :  Siebert  v.  People,  143  111.  571,  584;  Hale  v.  Ins.  Co.,  65  Minn.  548  ;  State  v. 
Fitzgerald,  130  Mo.  407  ;  State  v.  Punshon,  124  id.  448,  457.  See  ante,  §  14  k. 

*  Jumpertz  v.  People,  supra;  Blackburn  v.  State,  supra;  Boyd  v.  State,  supra; 
State  o.  Marsh,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  839. 

Excluded;  State  u.  Punshon,  supra. 

0  See  the  excluding  cases  in  the  preceding  notes. 

1  People  v.  Williams,  18  Cal.  193  ;  Morgan  v.  Com.,  14  Bush  106,  112;  Worth  v. 
R.  Co.,  51  Fed.  171  ;  Alexander  v.  U.  S.,  138  U.  S.  853. 

Excluded:  State  v.  Beaudet,  53  Conn.  543  ;  Schoolcraft  v.  People,  117  111.  271,  277; 
Carlton  v.  People,  150  id.  181,  188  ;  State  v.  Crawford,  99  Mo.  74,  80 ;  State  v.  Taylor, 
136  id.  66  ;  State  v.  Fletcher,  24  Or.  295,  800 ;  Crookham  v.  State,  5  W.  Va.  510,  513  ; 
see  also  citations  under  n.  9,  infra. 

8  Crawford  v.  State,  12  Ga.  142,  145;  McElhannon  ».  State,  99  id.  672 ;  State  v. 
Johnson,  80  La.  An.  921. 

Excluded:  State  v.  D'Angelo,  9  La.  An.  46  ;  Com.  v.  Abbott,  130  Mass.  475  (lead* 
ing  case). 


§§14  q-148.]    ALIBI;  COMMISSION  BY  OTHERS;  TRACES.  79 

or  of  other  data;9  but  most  Courts  here  also  impose  the  condi- 
tion that  two  or  more  of  such  evidentiary  facts  must  be  offered,  so 
as  to  make  out  a  plausible  case  against  the  third  person,  and  that 
a  single  fragment  of  evidence  against  him  will  not  be  received.  It 
•would  seem  that  the  conviction  of  another  person  for  the  act  charged 
(supposing  it  to  have  been  feasible  by  one  person  only)  would  be 
significant;  but  technical  difficulties  as  to  the  effect  of  a  judgment 
seem  to  exclude  this.10  For  the  same  reason  it  could  not  be  shown, 
for  the  prosecution,  that  another  person  had  been  acquitted  of  the 
charge  ;  u  but  it  would  be  proper  to  offer  facts  exonerating  another 
person,  who  was  one  of  the  possible  perpetrators.12] 

§  14  s.  Traces,  and  other  Evidence  a  posteriori.  [One  of  the  com- 
monest kinds  of  evidence  of  an  act  is  the  traces  which  it  leaves 
behind.  In  criminal  cases  this  sort  of  evidence  is  particularly  fre- 
quent, in  the  shape  of  marks,  stains,  and  the  like,  found  on  the 
person  of  the  accused  ;  l  but  the  inferences  usually  present  no  diffi- 
culty. The  presumption  arising  from  the  possession  of  stolen 
goods  a  rests  on  a  similar  inference  ;  and  the  possession  of  the  fruits 
of  a  crime  is  in  other  cases  equally  admissible,  —  as,  in  burglary,8 
forgery,4  counterfeiting;8  so  also  the  exit  of  a  person,  drunk  or 
carrying  liquor  in  a  vessel,  from  a  house  is  some  evidence  of  its 
sale  therein;  6  the  possession  of  specific  pieces  of  money  is  of  course 
evidence  of  the  larceny  of  it;  and,  even  though  the  money  is  not 
identified  as  the  same,  the  sudden  acquisition  of  wealth  is  some  evi- 
dence of  acquisition  by  the  dishonest  means  charged.7  The  post- 
office  mark  on  a  letter  is  evidence  that  it  passed  through  the  mails.8 

9  R.  v.  Dytche,  17  Cox  Cr.  39  ;  Phillips  v.  State,  33  Ga.  281,  287  ;  State  v.  Haynes, 
71  N.  C.  79  ;  State  v.  Wallace,  44  S.  C.  357  ;  Rowt  v.  Kile,  Gilmer  Va.  202. 

Excluded  :  Smith  v.  State,  9  Ala.  990,  995  ;  Levison  v.  State,  54  id.  519,  527  ; 
Whitaker  v.  State,  106  id.  30  ;  McPherrin  v.  Jennings,  66  la.  626  ;  State  v.  May, 
4  Dev.  328,  331  ;  State  v.  Duncan,  6  Ired.  236,  239  ;  State  v.  White,  68  N.  C.  158  ; 
State  v.  Bishop,  73  id.  44  ;  State  v.  Davis,  77  id.  483  ;  State  v.  Baxter,  82  id.  602; 
State  v.  Ban-on,  37  Vt.  57,  60;  State  ».  Barker,  53  id.  23  ;  Dover  v.  Winchester,  id., 
41  Atl.  445.  For  the  confession  of  a  third  person,  see  under  the  Hearsay  rule,  post, 


w  State  v.  Smarr,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  549  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Pierson,  U.  S.  App.,  87 
Fed.  420. 

«  People  v.  Mitchell,  100  Oal.  328,  334. 

"  Bram  v.  U.  S.,  1C8  U.  S.  562. 

1  E.  g.,  State  v.  Kingsbury,  58  Me.  238,  243  (arson  ;  kerosene  stains  on  the  defend- 
ant's shirt). 

*  R.  v.  Exall,  4  F.  &  F.  922  ;  see  post,  §  34. 
8  Short  v.  State,  63  Ind.  376,  380. 

*  Com.  v.  Talbot,  2  All.  161  ;  R.  v.  James,  4  Cox  Cr.  90. 
6  R.  v.  Fuller,  R  &  R.  308. 

6  Com.  v.  Taylor,  14  Gray  26  ;  Com.  v.  Maloney,  16  id.  20  ;  Com.  v.  Finnerty, 
148  Mass.  165. 

7  Leonard  v.  State,  115  Ala.   80  ;  State  v.  Grebe,  17  Kan.  458  ;  Com.  ».  Mont- 
gomery, 11  Mete.  534  ;  Bost.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dana,  1  Gray  101  ;  Gates  v.  People,  14 
111.  433  ;  Com.  v.  Mnlrey,  Mass.,  49  N.  E.  91.    The  ruling  in  Williams  v.  U.  S.,  168 
U.  S.  382,  is  unsound. 

8  R.  t».  Johnson,  7  East  65  ;  R.  v.  Plumer,  R.  &  R.  264  ;  N.  Haven  Bank  t;.  Mitchell, 
15  Conn.  206,  225  ;  for  the.  presumption,  see  post,  §  40. 


80  KELEVANCY;  CIKCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.  [CH.  v. 

The  possession  of  an  instrument  of  obligation  usually  surrendered 
on  payment  is  evidence  of  a  discharge ; 9  and  the  presumption  of 
delivery  of  a  deed  from  its  possession  by  the  grantee10  rests  on  a 
similar  inference.  The  presumptions  of  payment n  and  of  death la 
from  lapse  of  time  are  based  on  an  inference  from  the  absence  of 
such  traces  as  would  otherwise  naturally  exist. 

The  significant  traces  may,  however,  also  be  not  merely  mechanical 
but  organic  or  physiological.  Thus,  an  inference  from  the  birth  of  a 
child  during  marriage  to  the  paternity  of  the  mother's  husband  is 
the  basis  of  the  presumption  of  legitimacy ; ls  and  in  the  same  way, 
in  a  bastardy  proceeding,  the  birth  of  a  child  is  evidence  of  some 
one's  intercourse  with  the  mother,  while  other  evidence  may  serve 
to  fix  the  identity  of  the  father.  As  tending  to  disprove  the  hus- 
band's paternity,  the  wife's  adultery  would  be  relevant,  except  so 
far  as  the  historical  peculiarity  of  the  presumption  of  legitimacy 
stands  in  the  way ; 14  but  in  cases  of  bastardy  this  obstacle  does  not 
exist,  and  the  woman's  intercourse  with  others  within  the  appropri- 
ate time  is  generally  admitted  for  the  defence ; 16  mere  improper  con- 
duct, however,  is  excluded.16  In  cases  of  bastardy  and  inheritance, 
the  fact  of  the  resemblance  of  the  child  to  the  alleged  father  is  some 
indication  of  paternity  rests  on  a  physiological  fact  long  and  gener- 
ally accepted,  and  was  in  English  practice  unquestioned ; 17  but  the 
lack  of  definiteness  in  the  features  of  infants  of  the  earliest  age  and 
the  possibility  of  fanciful  notions  of  resemblance  by  partisan  wit- 
nesses have  led  some  Courts  in  this  country  to  exclude  such  evidence 
entirely  or  to  apply  certain  limitations ;  the  five  attitudes  repre- 
sented by  the  decisions  are  :  (a)  the  fact  of  resemblance  is  accepted 
without  any  limitation ;  or  (b)  it  is  accepted  provided  the  child  is 
old  enough  to  have  well-formed  features ;  or  (c)  it  is  accepted  only 

9  Egg  v.  Baruett,  3  Esp.  196  ;  Sluby  v.  Champlin,  4  Johns.  461,  468. 
M  Post,  §  38. 

11  Post,  §  39. 

12  Post,  §  41. 
18  Post,  §  28. 

M  See  pod,  §  28. 

W  Excluded:  State  v.  Bennett,  75  N.  C.  305  ;  State  v.  Parish,  83  id.  613. 

Admitted :  Nugent  v.  State,  18  Ala.  521 ;  Walker  v.  State,  6  Blackf.  1  ;  Hill  v.  State, 
4  Ind.  112;  Townsend  v.  State,  13  id.  357;  Whitman  v.  State,  69  id.  448;  Benhara 
v.  Richardson,  91  id.  82;  State  v.  Wickliff,  95  la.  386  ;  Ginn  v.  Com.,  5  Litt.  Ky. 
300;  Eddy  v.  Gray,  4  All.  435,  439  ;  Force  v.  Martin,  122  Mass.  5;  Anon.,  37  Miss. 
54,  58  ;  Stoppert  v.  Nierle,  45  Nebr.  105 ;  Young  o.  Johnson,  123  N.  Y.  226  ;  State  v. 
Biitt,  78  N.  C.  439,  442  ;  U.  S.  v.  Collins,  1  Cr.  C.  C.  692  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  28  Vt. 
512,  523;  Fall  v.  Overseers,  8  Munf.  495,  502;  Humphrey  v.  State,  78  Wis.  571. 
|  See  Easdale  v.  Reynolds,  143  Mass.  127  ;  Odewaldw.  Woodsum,  142  id.  51 2;  Francis 
v.  Rosa,  151  id.  635;  Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Nebr.  829.  | 

16  Rawles  v.    Ford,  56  Ind.  433  ;  Houser  v.  State,  86  id.   231.     Contra:  State  v. 
Wickliff,  95  la.  886. 

17  Piercy'a  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  1199;  Annesley  v.  Angleaea,  17  id.  1139,  1318, 
1324  ;    Douglas  Peerage  Case,   quoted  2  Hargr.  Collect.  Jurid.  402,  Lord  Mansfield, 
C.  J.  (leading  caae)  ;    Day  v.  Day,  Trial,  3d  ed.,   327,  quoted  in  Nicolas,  Adulterine 
Bastardy,  140,  and  Hubback,  Succession,  884  (the  language  of  Mr.  J.  Heath  in  this 
case  has  sometimes  been  perverted  in  American  judicial  opinions  to  read  against  the 
uso  of  such  evidence) ;  Andrews  v.  Askey,  8  C.  &  P.  7,  9. 


§  14s.]          TRACES,   AND   OTHER   EVIDENCE   A  POSTERIORI.  81 

where  the  child  is  shown  in  court,  and  not  upon  witnesses'  testi- 
mony ;  or  (d)  it  is  accepted  only  from  witnesses,  and  the  showing 
in  court  is  not  allowed ;  or  (e)  it  is  not  accepted  as  relevant  under 
any  conditions.18  On  the  same  principle,  complexion,  hair,  and  other 
features  may  be  evidence  of  negro  or  Indian  race-ancestry,19  and 
even  of  foreign  birth  in  general.20 

There  may  also  be  mental  or  psychological  traces  of  an  act.  The 
use  of  consciousness  of  guilt  in  evidence,21  and  of  a  testator's  belief 
as  to  the  execution  of  a  will,22  rest  on  this  ground;  and  in  investi- 
gating a  person's  identity  with  another,  his  recollection  or  non-recol- 
lection of  events  in  the  latter's  life  may  help  to  indicate  that  he  is 
the  person  to  whom  they  have  happened.28  It  seems  to  be  on  this 
ground  that  the  use  of  a  bloodhound's  discoveries  as  evidence  of  the 
accused's  presence  at  the  place  of  a  crime24  is  to  be  justified  (i.  e. 
the  known  trustworthiness  of  the  animal's  instincts  justifies  us  in 
inferring  from  the  impression  on  his  olfactory  senses  to  the  exist- 
ence of  definite  physical  causes  for  that  impression) ;  and  the  rec- 
ognition by  an  animal  of  its  supposed  owner  or  possessor  may  in  the 
same  way  be  evidence  of  that  person's  familiarity  with  the  animal.] 

6.     Evidence  of  the   Condition,  Quality,  Capacity,  etc.,  of  Inanimate 

Objects. 

[Where  the  matter  in  issue  is  the  existence  of  a  condition,  quality, 
capacity,  tendency,  or  the  like,  of  an  inanimate  object,  —  danger- 

18  The  cases  are  as  follows :    Paulk  v.  State,   52  Ala.  427,  429  ;  Re  Jessup,  81  Cal. 
408,  417;  Risk  v.  State,  19  Ind.  152  ;  Reitz  v.  State,  33  id.  187 ;  Stumm  v.  Hummel, 
39  la.  478,  480;  State  v.  Danforth,  48  id.  43,  47;  State  v.  Smith,  54  id.  104  ;  Shorten 
v.  Judd,  56  Kan.  43  ;  Kenistou  v.  Rowe,  16  Me.  38  ;    Clark  v.  Bradstreet,  80  id.  454  ; 
Jones  v.  Jones,  45  Md.  144,  151  ;  Eddy  v.  Gray,  4  All.  435,  438  ;  Finnegan  i>.  Dugan, 
14  id.  197  ;  Young  v.  Makepeace,  103  Mass.  50,  54  ;    Farrell  v.  Weitz,  160  id.   288  ; 
Gaunt  v.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  490,  495  ;  Gilmanton  v.  Ham,  38  N.  H.  108,  113  ;   State 
v.  Woodruff,  67  N.  C.  89  ;   Crow  v.  Jordon,  49  Oh.  St.  655  ;  State  v.    Britt,  78  id. 
439,  442 ;  U.  S.  v.  Collins,  1  Cr.  C.  C.  592  ;  Hanawalt  v.  State,  64  Wis.  84. 

For  the  propriety  of  offering  the  child  in  court,  to  show  the  resem  blance,  see  ante,  §  1 3  c. 

19  Daniel  v.  Guy,  23  Ark.  50  ;   Bryan  v.  Walton,  20  Ga.  480,  508  ;  Nave's  Adm'r  v. 
Williams,  22  Ind.  370  ;   Gentry  v .  McGinnis,  3  Dana  Ky.   382,  388  ;    Chancellor  v. 
Milly,  9  id.  24  ;  Clark  v.  Bradstreet,  80  Me.    454,  457  ;    Fox  v.   Lambson,  8  N.  J.  L 
275;  Warlick  v.  White,   76  N.   C.   175,   178;  White  v.  Collector,  3  Rich.  L.  138  ; 
Hudgins  v.   Wrights,   1  Hen.  &   M.  134,  137;  Hook  v.  Pagee,  2  Munf.   379,  383; 
Gregory  v.  Baugh,  4  Rand.  611,  613. 

20  Dennis  v.  Brewster,  7  Gray  351. 

21  Ante,  §  14  p. 

23  Sugden  v.  St.  Leonards,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  203,  Hannen,  J.  ;  Steele  r.  Price,  5  B. 
Monr.  69;  Me  Beth  v.  McBeth,  11  Ala.  601;  Collagan  v.  Burns,  57  Me.  458;  Patten 
».  Paulton,  4  Jur.  N.  s.  341  ;  Whiteley  v.  King,  10  id.  1079;  R.  v.  Castro,  charge  of 
C.  J.  Cockburn,  I,  614;  Gould  v.  Lakes,  L.  R.  6  P.  D.  1  ;  He  Johnson's  Will,  40 
Conn.  587;  Re  Page,  118  111.  581  ;  Hoppe  v.  Byers,  60  Md.  393  ;  Foster's  Appeal, 
87  Pa,  75  ;  Smiley  v.  Gambill,  39  Tenn.  165 ;  Bergere  v.  U.  S.,  168  U.  S.  66.  These 
cases,  with  others  involving  the  use  of  post-testamentary  declarations  by  a  testator, 
are  examined  more  fully,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Hearsay  rule,  post,  §  162  e. 

23  Notably  used  in  the  Tichborne  case:  charge  of  C.  J.  Cockburn,  I,  16,  630,  II, 
162,  167,327,  403. 

*  Simpson  v.  State,  111  Ala,  6  ;  Pedigo  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  44  S.  W.  143.    See  also  Stat* 
v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  185  (horse). 
VOL.  I.  —  6 


82  RELEVANCY  ;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  fCH.  V. 

ousness,  safety,  capacity  of  work,  tendency  to  produce  marks,  stains, 
injuries,  etc.,  mode  of  operation,  effect  of  operation,  etc.,  —  there 
are  three  chief  modes  of  evidencing  this  circumstantially.  One  con- 
sists in  showing  the  prior  or  subsequent  existence  of  the  thing,  place, 
condition,  etc.,  and  thence  inferring  its  existence  at  the  time  in 
question.  Another  consists  in  using  the  nature  of  one  part  as 
evidence  of  another  part  united  with  the  former  as  like  parts  of  a 
whole.  Still  another  consists  in  showing  particular  instances  on 
other  occasions  in  which  the  condition,  quality,  tendency,  etc.,  of  the 
thing  in  question  has  been  exhibited,  and  thence  inferring  the  gen- 
eral existence  of  that  quality,  etc.] 

§  14  t.  Prior  or  Subsequent  Existence  of  a  Thing,  Place,  Condi- 
tion, etc.  [The  natural  limitation  of  this  sort  of  evidence  is  that  the 
prior  or  subsequent  time  must  be  so  near  that  nothing  may  be  sup- 
posed to  have  occurred  to  cause  a  change ;  and  the  distance  of  time 
will  depend  entirely  on  the  thing  whose  existence  is  in  question; 
thus,  the  limit  would  vary  according  as  the  thing  in  question  was  a 
soap-bubble  or  Mt.  Everest  or  a  sidewalk.  The  facts  of  each  case 
must  control,1  and  precedents  are  of  little  value.  This  sort  of  evi- 
dence has  been  used  with  reference  to  all  manner  of  objects,  —  a 
highway,2  a  bridge,8  a  railway  track,4  a  stream,6  land  and  buildings,6 
the  condition  of  a  human  body,7  of  animals.8] 

§  14  u.  One  Part  evidencing  another;  Samples.  [Where  by  the 
possession  of  a  uniform  nature  certain  things  form  like  parts  of  a 
whole,  the  nature  of  one  part  will  be  some  evidence  of  the  nature  of 
another  part;  the  requirement,  for  evidential  purposes,  being  that 
the  two  should  be  so  related  as  to  form  fairly  homogeneous  parts  of 
an  entity  including  them  both.  This  principle  receives  frequent 
application  in  evidencing  the  condition  of  one  part  of  a  highway  by 

1  See  Com.  v.  Billings,  97  Mass.  405. 

2  Hunt  v.  Dubuque,  96  la.  314;  Faulk  v.  Iowa  Co.,  103  id.  442;  Barrenberg  t>. 
Boston,  137  Mass.  231  ;  Fuller  v.  Jackson,  92  Mich.  197,  203 ;  Hall  v.  Austin,  Minn., 
75  N.  W.  1121  ;  Link  v.  R.  Co.,  165  Pa.  75  ;  Potter  v.  Natural  Gas  Co.,  183  id.  575  ; 
Beardsley  v.  Columbia  Tp.,  id.,  41  Atl.  618  ;  Roseubaum  v.  Shoffner,  98  Tenn.  624 ; 
Schuenke  v.  Pine  River,  84  Wis.  669,  677. 

*  Jessup  v.  OsceolaCo.,  92  la.  178  ;  Wash.  C.  &  A.  T.  v.  Case,  80  Md.  36. 

«  B.  U.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexander,  93  Ala.  133,  136;  Dyson  v.  R.  Co.,  57  Conn.  24; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Boylan,  104  111.  595,  599  ;  Hipsley  v.  R.  Co.,  88  Mo.  348,  354; 
Stoher  v.  R.  Co.,  91  id.  509,  516  ;  Hampton  v.  R.  Co.,  S.  C.,  27  S.  E.  96. 

*  Lewin  v.  Simpson,   38  Md.  468,  483 ;  Brooke  v.  Winters,  39  id.  509 ;  Dewey  v. 
Williams,  43  N.  H.  384,  387. 

6  Osgood  v.  Chicago,  154  111.  194 ;  Ulrich  v.  People,  39  Mich.  245  ;  Colo.  M.  &  I. 
Co.  v.  Rees,  21  Colo.  435  ;  Sievers  v.  P.  B.  &  L.  Co.,  Ind.,  50  N.  E.  877;  Marston  v. 
Dingley,  88  Me.  546  ;  Com.  t>.  Powers,  123  Mass.  244  ;  Leidlein  v.  Meyer,  95  Mich. 
586,  591. 

7  W.  C.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy-Cabin.   165  111.  496;   Williams  v.  State,  64  Md. 
390  ;   French  v.  Wilkinson,  93  Mich.  322.     Compare  some  of  the  cases  cited  post, 
§  439  h,  under  Photographs,  where  the  same  question  may  arise  ;  it  may  also  arise  in 
connection  with  evidence  of  the  condition  of  a  place  by  its  effects,  post,  §  14  v. 

8  Kansas  S.  Y.  Co.  v.  Couch,   12  Kan.   612,   614 ;   Freynian  v.  Knecht,  78  Pa. 
141,  143. 


§§14«-14v.]       NATURE,   ETC.,   OF   INANIMATE   SUBSTANCES.  83 

the  condition  of  another  part  close  at  hand ; l  or  of  a  railway  track 
or  roadbed a  or  other  artificial  structures,8  or  of  a  natural  growth  or 
formation.*  It  is  also  illustrated  by  the  use  of  samples,  to  show  the 
quality  or  condition  of  the  whole  substance ; 6  where  the  samples  are 
taken  from  a  different  lot  or  series,  and  not  the  very  one  in  question, 
then  the  two  must  of  course  first  be  shown  to  be  identical  in  the 
qualities  in  question.6] 

§  14  v.  Similar  Instances  as  Evidence  of  a  Quality,  Tendency, 
Capacity,  etc.  [In  evidencing  a  quality,  tendency,  capacity,  etc.,  by 
instances  of  its  effects  or  exhibitions  or  operations  on  other  occasions, 
the  natural  and  logical  limitation  is  that  the  evidential  instances 
should  have  occurred  under  substantially  the  same  circumstances  or 
conditions  as  at  the  time  in  question,  because  otherwise  they  might 
well  be  attributed  to  the  influence  of  some  other  element  introduced 
by  the  differing  circumstances.1 

But  in  the  use  of  this  mode  of  evidence,  the  inconveniences  of 
unfair  surprise  and  confusion  of  issues  (ante,  §  14  a)  are  prone  to 
arise  and  often  serve  to  exclude  the  evidence.  The  difficulty  for  the 
opponent  of  anticipating  the  particular  instances  that  may  be  alleged, 
the  length  of  time  that  may  be  spent  on  these  minor  evidential 
matters,  and  the  possible  confusion  of  the  issues  in  the  mind  of  the 
jury,  may  overweigh  the  slight  probative  value  of  the  evidence.2 
The  most  rational  and  practical  solution  of  the  difficulty  would  be  to 
determine  each  case  upon  its  own  circumstances,  and  to  leave  it 
largely  to  the  trial  Court  to  draw  the  line  of  exclusion  whenever  the 
above  objections  in  fact  present  themselves ; 8  for  it  is  obvious  that 

1  Taylor  ».  Monroe,  43  Conn.  42  ;  Hoyt  w.  Des  Moines,  76  la.  430  ;  Eiley  v.  Iowa 
Falls,  83  id.  761  ;   Brooks  v,  Acton,  117  Mass.  204  ;  Campbell  v.  Kalamazoo,  80  Mich. 
655,  660  ;  Edwards  v.  Three  Rivers,  102  id.  153;  Will  v.  Mendon,  108  id.  251 ;  Can- 
field  v.  Jackson,  id.,  70  N.  W.  444  ;  Haynes  v.  Hillsdale,  id.,  71  N.  W.  466  ;  Kelly  v. 
R.  Co.,  28  Minn.  98,  100  ;  Emerson  v.  Lebanon,  N.   H.,  39  Atl.  466  ;  Osborne  v. 
Detroit,  36  Fed.  36,  38. 

2  Cleve.  C.  &  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Newell,  104  Ind.  264,  267 ;  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox, 
11  Bush,  505;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry,  Ky.,  44  S.  W.  428  ;  Turner  v.  R.  Co., 
158  Mass.  261,  266  ;  Grand  R.  &  I.  R.  Co.  ».  Huntley,  38  Mich.  537,  540 ;  Morse  v. 
R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  465  ;  Hipsley  v.  R.  Co.,  88  Mo.  348,  354  ;  Reed  v.  R.  Co.,  45  N.  Y. 
574,  580. 

8  Fort  Wayne  v.  Coombs,  107  Ind.  87 ;  Snyder  v.  Albion,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  475  ; 
Plummer  v.  Ossipee,  59  N.  H.  57  ;  Randall  v.  Tel.  Co.,  54  Wis.  140. 

*  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Ingram,  98  Ala.  395,  397;  Cleland  v.  Thornton,  43  Cal.  437; 
Stambaugh  v.  Smith,  23  Oh.  594. 

5  Epps  v.  State,  102  Ind.  549 ;  Com.  v.  Schaffner,  146  Mass.  512,  514  ;  Com.  v.  Ken- 
drick,  147  id.  444  ;  Vietti  v.  Nesbitt,  22  Nev.  390 ;  Fox  v.  Mining  Co.,  108  Cal.  475  ; 
Brown  v.  Leach,  107  Mass.  367. 

5  Jupitz  v.  People,  34  111.  520  (brass  couplings)  ;  Com.  v.  Goodman,  97  Mass.  117 
(liquor  from  another  barrel). 

1  See  the  phrasing  in  Hunt  v.  Gaslight  Co.,  8  All.  169  ;  C.  S.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Champion,  Ind.,  32  N.  E.  874;  Baxter  v.  Doe,  142  Mass.  558;  State  v.  Justus,  8  Or. 
182. 

2  See  the  reasoning  in  Amoskpag  Co.  v.  Head,  59  N.  H.  332,  337 ;  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Tobin,  32  Oh.  St.  90  ;  Phillips  ».  Willow,  70  Wis.  9. 

8  Darling  v.  Westmoreland,  52  N.  H.  401,  408  (leading  case);  Metrop.  Disk 
Asylum  o.  Hill,  47  L.  T.  R.  x.  s.  29;  Bemis  v.  Temple,  162  Mass.  342,  344. 


84  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

they  do  not  invariably  or  even  usually  exist  for  all  evidence  of  this 
sort.  But  this  course  has  not  been  usual,  and  the  evidence  is  more 
commonly  either  admitted  or  rejected  by  an  inflexible  rule. 

Besides  the  above  two  proper  sorts  of  limitations  (those  depending 
on  relevancy  and  those  depending  on  collateral  inconvenience),  which 
operate  for  frequent  exclusion  and  at  the  same  time  make  the  pre- 
cedents difficult  to  harmonize,  there  are  one  or  two  other  distinctions, 
not  founded  in  reason  or  policy,  but  occasionally  put  forward  by 
Courts  as  justifying  exclusion,  (a)  A  distrust  of  instances  obtained 
by  deliberate  experiment,  as  distinguished  from  casual  observation, 
is  sometimes  shown.  But  the  distinction  has  no  value ;  if  the  con- 
ditions are  shown  to  be  substantially  the  same,  an  experiment  is  as 
significant  as  an  instance  casually  observed,  and  sometimes  more  so ; 
and,  for  some  matters,  an  experiment  is  feasible  where  no  instance 
of  casual  observation  is  possible.4  (b)  It  is  sometimes  thought  that 
a  negative  instance  is  inadmissible,  e.  g.  in  showing  that  a  place  is 
not  dangerous,  the  fact  that  it  has  been  constantly  used  but  with- 
out injurious  effects.5  Such  evidence,  however,  is  in  effect  merely 
the  affirmative  fact  that  the  place  has  shown  itself  safe ;  moreover, 
whatever  its  form  or  its  substance  really  is,  it  has  constant  employ- 
ment in  scientific  research,  and  is  equally  proper  and  probative  with 
evidence  in  form  affirmative.6 

We  may  now  examine  the  various  data  to  which  the  above  prin- 
ciples have  been  applied,  without  attempting  to  note  the  precise 
result  of  the  rulings  in  each  topic,  except  where  special  difficulties 
exist  or  special  development  of  principle  has  occurred.  The  arrange- 
ment of  the  various  precedents  is  a  matter  of  much  difficulty ;  but, 
having  regard  to  the  kind  of  fact  offered  in  evidence  and  the  help- 
fulness of  the  analogies,  it  may  be  best  to  consider  them  according 
as  the  evidential  fact  is  (1)  a  material  effect  (e.  g.  marks  on  a  board 
from  a  pistol-shot,  injuries  to  a  house  by  smoke,  fire  set  by  a  loco- 
motive spark,  work  done  by  machinery,  etc.);  (2)  corporal  effects 
(e.  g.  wounds  produced  by  gunshots,  illness  produced  by  a  poisonous 

4  Some  of  the  rulings  are  as  follows  (all  of  these  being  later  cited  under  their  respec- 
tive subjects)  :  (a)  Admitted  :  Broder  i>.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  D.  692 ;  Brooke  v.  R.  Co.,  81 
la.  511;  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Moffatt,  56  Kan.  667;  Swett  v.  Shumway,  102  Mass.  368  ; 
Stone  v.  Ins.  Co.,  71  Mich.  81  ;  Dillard  v.  State,  58  Miss.  386 ;  Leonard  v.  R.  Co.,  21 
Or.  555  ;  Sullivan  v.  Com.,  93  Pa.  288,  296;  Hoffman  ?>.  R.  Co.,  143  id.  503  ;  Osborne 
v.  Detroit,  32  Fed.  36 ;  State  v.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304,  308,  317  ;  Roskee  v.  Pulp.  Co.,  169 
Mass.  528 ;  Burg  v.  R.  Co.,  90  la.  106,  116  ;  Young  v.  Clark,  Utah,  50  Pac.  832  ;  Bait 
&  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Hellenthal,  U.  S.  App.,  88  Fed.  116  ;  Hayes  v,  R.  Co.,  Utah,  53  Pac. 
1001.  (b)  Excluded  because  the  tests  of  relevancy  were  not  fulfilled :  State  v.  Fletcher, 
24  Or.  295  ;  People  v.  WoonTuck  Wo,  Cal.,  52  Pac.  833  ;  Com.  v.  Piper,  120  Mass. 
190;  Jones  v.  State,  71  Ind.  83;  Ulrich  v.  People,  39  Mich.  245;  Justus  v.  State,  11 
Or.  182.  (c)  Excluded  for  sundry  reasons:  Alab.  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Collier,  Ala.,  14  So. 
327;  State  v.  Lindoen,  87  la.  702;  Jumpertz  v.  People,  21  111.  408;  Wynne  v.  State, 
56  Ga.  113. 

•  Nave  v.  Flack,  90  Ind.  205;  Bauer  v.  Indianapolis,  99  id.  56. 

«  E.  g.,  Doyle  v.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  79;  Crofter  v.  R.  Co.,  L.  11.  1  C.  P.  300  ;  Baird 
».  Daly,  68  N.  Y.  550  ;  Sin  ton  v.  Butler,  40  Oh.  St.  158,  168. 


§  14  V.]  NATURE,   ETC.,   OF  INANIMATE  OBJECTS.  85 

substance,  injury  caused  by  a  defect  in  a  highway,  etc.) ;  and 
(3)  psychological  or  moral  effects,  i.  e.  effects  on  human  conduct  (e.  g. 
efforts  to  escape  danger,  time  required  for  work,  cautions  taken  at  a 
dangerous  place,  etc.).  This  classification  is  for  given  instances  more 
or  less  arbitrary ;  but  so  must  any  be ;  and  this  one  seems  best  to 
group  the  related  and  analogous  evidential  data. 

(1)  Material  Effects.  Under  this  head  may  be  noted  the  use  of 
other  similar  instances  as  evidence  of  the  character  of  a  place,  build- 
ing, factory,  etc.,  alleged  to  be  a  nuisance,7  —  in  particular,  a  rail- 
road;8 of  the  injurious  effects  of  water  by  flowage,  etc.;9  of  the 
injurious  quality  of  gases  on  trees,  paint,  etc.  ;10  of  the  tendency  of 
machines  to  operate  defectively  or  otherwise,  as  shown  by  other 
instances  of  the  action  of  the  same  machine u  or  of  a  similar 
machine ; u  and  of  sundry  other  things.18  The  matter  that  has  given 
rise  to  most  controversy  is  the  use  of  emissions  of  sparks  by  locomo- 
tives as  evidence  of  the  setting  of  a  fire ;  but  here  two  distinct  pur- 
poses must  be  noted ;  for  in  charging  the  owner  of  the  locomotive 
(factory-chimney,  etc.),  the  effort  may  be,  first,  to  show  that  it  has 
the  capacity  or  tendency  to  emit  flaming  sparks  and  thus  may  have 
caused  the  fire,  or,  secondly,  to  show  that  it  is  dangerously  likely  to 
emit  such  sparks,  i.  e.  it  is  negligently  constructed ;  for  the  latter 
purpose  the  evidence  should  be  stronger,  but  there  is  no  difference  of 

7  See  Tennant  v.  Hamilton,  5  Cl.  &  F.  122 ;  R.  v.  Fairie,  8  E.  &  B.  486,  488; 
Broder  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  D.  692 ;  Metrop.  Asylum  Dist.  v.  Hill,  47  L.  T.  R.  N.  s. 
29  ;  Cooper  v.  Randall,  59  111.  320 ;  Lincoln  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  9  All.  181. 

«  See  Metrop.  W.  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  161  111.  22,  24  ;  Concord  R.  Co.  ». 
Greely,  23  N.  H.  237,  243 ;  Doyle  o.  R.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  488,  495;  Hine  v.  R.  Co.,  149 
N.  Y.  154. 

9  See  Folkes  v.  Chadd,  3  Doug.  157  ;  Clark  v.  Water  Power  Co.,  52  Me.  75;  Stan- 
dish  v.  Washburn,  21  Pick.  237  ;  Hawks  v.  Charlemont,  110  Mass.  112  ;  Verran  o. 
Baird,  150  id.  142  ;  Pettibone  v.  Smith,  37  Mich.  580  ;  Dorraan  v.  Ames,  12  Minn. 
451  ;  Reed  v.  Dick,  8  Watts,  480,  481  ;  Haynes  v.  Burlington,  38  Vt.  350,  363. 

l°  See  Ottawa  G.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Graham,  35  111.  348 ;  Eidt  v.  Cutter,  127  Mass.  522  ; 
Evans  v.  Gas.  Co.,  148  N.  Y.  112. 

"  See  Baber  v.  Rickart,  52  Ind.  594,  597 ;  Davis'  Sons  v.  Sweeney,  80  la.  393  ; 
State  v.  Delaney,  92  id.  467  ;  Kramer  v.  Messner,  101  id.  88 ;  Bradford  v.  Ins.  Co.,  11 
Pick.  161  ;  Brierly  v.  Davol  Mills,  128  Mass.  291  ;  Tremblay  v.  Harnden,  162  id.  383  ; 
Flaherty  v.  Powers,  167  id.  61  ;  Roskee  v.  Pulp  Co.,  169  id.  528  ;  Spaulding  v.  Mfg. 
Co.,  id.,  50  N.  E.  543 ;  McCurragher  v.  Rogers,  120  N.  Y.  526  ;  Findlay  Brewing  Co. 
v.  Bauer,  50  Oh.  560  ;  Baker  v.  Hagey,  177  Pa.  128  ;  Taylor  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.  App.,  89 
Fed.  954.  For  evidence  of  defective  condition  by  corporal  injuries  received,  see  post, 
this  section. 

12  See  Blackman  v.  Collier,  65  Ala.  312  ;  Stockton  C.  H.  &  A.  W.  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Cal., 
53  Pac.  565  ;  McCormick  H.  M.  Co.  v.  Gray,  100  Ind.  285,  292  ;  Nat'l  B.  &  L.  Co.  v. 
Dunn,  106  id.  110,  115;  Osborn  v.  Simerson,  73  la.  509,  512;  Gage  ».  Meyers,  59 
Mich.  300,  306  ;  Osborne  v.  Bell,  62  id.  214,  218  ;  Avery  v.  Burrall,  id.,  77  N.  W. 
272  ;  Shute  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  N.  H.,  40  Atl.  391;  Tilton  ».  Miller,  66  Pa.  388;  Carpenter 
».  Corinth,  58  Vt  216. 

"  See  R.  v.  Heseltine,  12  Cox  Cr.  404  ;  People  v.  Brotherton,  47  Cal.  402  ;  People 
».  Hope,  62  id.  291,  295;  People  v.  Durraut,  116  id.  179  ;  48  Pac.  75  ;  State  c.  Smith, 
49  Conn.  381  ;  Tomlinson  v.  Earnshaw,  112  111.  313  ;  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mugg, 
132  Ind.  168  ;  Cine.  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Champion,  id.,  32  N.  E.  874  ;  Swett  ». 
Shumway,  102  Mass.  368;  Com.  r.  Piper,  120  id.  190  ;  Polin  v.  State,  14  Nebr.  540  ; 
Linsday  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143,  156 ;  Otey  v.  Hoyt,  2  Jones  L.  72 ;  Leonard  v.  R.  Co., 
21  Or.  555 ;  Hoffman  v.  R.  Co.,  143  Pa.  503;  State  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  182. 


86  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL   EVIDENCE.  [CH.   V. 

principle  in  its  use.  Moreover,  in  both  cases  the  evidence  may  con- 
ceivably consist  of  other  emissions  either  by  the  same  engine  or  by 
other  engines;  the  latter  sort  of  circumstance  is  equally  relevant 
with  the  former,  provided  the  construction  of  all  the  engines  is  sim- 
ilar. The  result  of  the  precedents  seems  to  be  as  follows  :  (1)  Other 
emissions  of  sparks  are  generally  received  either  (a)  to  show  a  ca- 
pacity to  emit  sparks  and  cause  the  fire,14  or  (b)  to  show  a  negligent 
construction  dangerously  likely  to  emit  sparks  ; 16  the  instances  may 
be  either  before  or  after  the  time  in  question,  but  perhaps,  if  they 
are  not  near  in  time,  it  should  be  shown  that  no  change  of  condition 
had  occurred;  (2)  these  emissions  may  be  not  only  of  the  same 
engine,  but  of  other  engines  of  similar  construction ; 18  it  is  generally 

"  See  Henry  v.  R.  Co.,  50  Gal.  176,  183 ;  Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Tripp,  111.,  51  N.  E. 
833;  Ross  v.  R.  Co.,  6  All.  87 ;  Loring  v.  R.  Co.,  131  Mass.  469;  Hoyt  v.  Jeffers,  30 
Mich.  181,  189  ;  Haseltine  v.  E.  Co.,  64  N.  H.  545;  Hinds  v.  Barton,  25  N.  Y.  544; 
Collins  o.  R.  Co.,  109  id.  243:  249;  Phil.  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hendrickson,  80  Pa.  182, 189; 
Pa.  Co.  v.  Watson,  81  id.  293,  296;  Patteson  v.  R.  Co.,  94  Va.  16 ;  Brusberg  v.  R.  Co., 
55  Wis.  106. 

15  The  cases  are  as  follows  (but  the  Pennsylvania  cases  are  in  great  confusion,  and 
should  not  be  used  as  precedents  elsewhere):  Aldridge  v.  R.  Co.,  3  M.  &  Gr.  515,  522; 
Vaughan  v.  R.  Co.,  3  H.  &  N.  743,  750,  5  id.  679,  688  ;  L.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
109  Ala.  500  ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Malone,  ib.  509 ;  Henry  v.  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  176, 
183  ;  Butchery.  R.  Co.,  67  id.  518;  East  T.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Hesters,  90  Ga.  11  ;  111. 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  McClelland,  42  111.  355;  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Middlecoff,  150  id. 
27,  39  ;  First  N.  B.  of  Hoopeston  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  50  N.  E.  1023  ;  Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41 
lud.  228,  257;  Gandy  v.  R.  Co.,  30  la.  420  ;  Slossen  v.  R.  Co.,  60  id.  215;  Lanning 
v.  R.  Co.,  68  id.  502,  505;  St.  Jos.  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Chase,  11  Kan.  47,  54;  Atch.  T. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  16  id.  200,  204 ;  Atch.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Osborn,  58  id. 
768 ;  Taylor  v.  R.  Co.,  Ky.,  41  S.  W.  551  ;  Annap.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Gautt,  39  Md.  115, 
134  ;  Ireland  v.  R.  Co.,  79  Mich.  163,  165 ;  Davidson  v.  R.  Co.,  34  Minn.  51 ;  Fitch  v. 
R.  Co.,  45  Mo.  322,  327 ;  Longabaugh  v.  R.  Co.,  9  Nev.  271,  289 ;  Field  v.  R.  Co.,  32 
N.  Y.  338,  349  ;  Webb  v.  E.  Co.,  49  id.  420,  424  ;  Collins  v.  E.  Co.,  109  id.  243,  249; 
Fliun  v.  R.  Co.,  142  id.  11,  19;  Koontz  v.  0.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  20  Or.  3 ;  R.  Co.  v.  Yeiser, 
8  Pa.  366,  376 ;  Huyett  v.  E.  Co.,  23  id.  374 ;  Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Decker,  78  id.  293 ;  Pa. 
Co.  v.  Watson,  81*  Pa.  293,  296  ;  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.  o.  McKeen,  90  id.  122,  123,  130; 
Jennings  v.  R.  Co.,  93  id.  337,  340;  Albert  v.  R.  Co.,  98  id.  316,  321 ;  Gowen  v.  Glaser, 
3  Centr.  R.  108  ;  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Page,  21  W.  N.  Pa.  52  ;  Henderson  r.  R.  Co.,  144  Pa.  461, 
476  ;  Thomas  v.  E.  Co.,  182  id.  538;  Grand  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  91  U.  S.  454, 
458,  470 ;  North  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  7  U.  S.  App.  254,  272;  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  76  Va. 
443,  448 ;  N.  York  P.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  92  id.  606 ;  Kimball  v.  Borden,  Va., 
28  S.  E.  207;  Cleavelands  v.  R.  Co.,  42  Vt.  449,  456;  Brusberg  v.  R.  Co.,  55  Wis. 
106  ;  Gibbons  v.  R.  Co.,  58  id.  335 ;  Allard  v.  R.  Co.,  73  id.  165  ;  Menomenie  R.  S.  & 
D.  Co.  v.  E.  Co.,  91  id.  447. 

18  This  seems  to  hold  everywhere  except  in  Arkansas  and  Mississippi.  There  are 
of  course  details  of  development  which  cannot  be  here  considered ;  and  to  the  follow- 
ing cases  should  be  added  most  of  those  in  the  preceding  note,  where  the  evidence 
deals  with  sparks  from  other  engines,  but  no  discrimination  on  that  ground  seems  to 
have  been  attempted  ;  the  limitation  above-mentioned  as  to  identifiable  engines  origi- 
nated in  Pennsylvania,  and  has  been  accepted  in  Michigan,  Missouri,  Wisconsin,  and 
Illinois  (in  the  latter  Court  under  the  erroneous  impression  that  it  represented  the 
weight  of  authority).  The  cases  are  as  follows  :  Piggot  v.  E.  Co.,  3  C.  B.  229 ;  Rail- 
way Co.  v.  Jones,  59  Ark.  105  ;  Butcher  v.  R.  Co.,  67  Cal.  518  ;  Brown  n.  Benson,  101 
Ga.  753  ;  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  McClelland,  42  111.  355  ;  Babcock  v.  R.  Co.,  62  la.  593, 
597  ;  Bell  v.  R.  Co.,  64  id.  321,  325  ;  Thatcher  v.  R.  Co.,  85  Me.  502  ;  Dunning  v. 
R.  Co.,  91  id.  87;  Annap.  E.  R,  Co.  v.  Gautt,  39  Md.  115,  134  ;  Ross  v.  E.  Co.,  6  All. 
87;  Campbell  v.  E.  Co.,  121  Mo.  340,  349  ;  Matthews  v.  E.  Co.,  142  id.  645  ;  Tribette 
v.  R.  Co.,  71  Miss.  212,  233  ;  Longabaugh  v.  E.  Co.,  9  Neb.  271,  288  ;  Boyce  v.  R. 
Co.,  42  N.  H.  97,  100 ;  Smith  o.  E.  Co.,  63  id.  25,  29 ;  Sheldon  «;.  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y. 


§  14  V.]  NATURE,   ETC.,  OF  INANIMATE   OBJECTS.  87 

and  properly  held,  moreover,  that  this  similarity  of  construction  may 
be  assumed  where  the  engines  belong  to  the  same  line,  and  it  need 
not  be  shown  beforehand  by  the  offeror  of  the  evidence  ;  there  is  in 
a  few  jurisdictions  the  further  limitation  that  such  evidence  as  to 
other  engines  is  not  receivable  if  the  particular  engine  setting  the 
fire  in  question  is  identifiable ;  but  this  has  no  support  in  principle 
and  should  not  be  extended. 

(2)  Corporal  Effects.  Under  this  head  may  be  noted  the  use  of 
other  instances  (often  those  obtained  by  experiment)  of  the  ten- 
dency of  a  gunshot  or  pistol-shot  with  reference  to  the  kind  of  wound 
made ; "  of  the  nature  of  a  drug,  gas,  food,  or  other  substance  with 
reference  to  its  corporal  effects  and  symptoms,18  and,  in  particular, 
of  the  intoxicating  nature  of  a  liquor.19  The  use  that  has  come  most 
into  controversy  is  that  of  other  injuries  at  a  highway,  track,  or 
machine,  as  evidence  of  its  dangerous  character.  There  seems  here 
to  be  no  impropriety  in  the  nature  of  an  inference  ;  just  as  the  char- 
acter of  a  white  powder  with  reference  to  producing  illness  may  be 
evidenced  by  its  effects  on  those  taking  it,  so  the  tendency  of  a  ma- 
chine or  a  place  in  the  highway,  with  reference  to  producing  injury 
to  those  who  use  it  or  pass  over  it  may  be  judged  of  by  its  effects  in 
given  instances ;  provided  only  the  conditions  are  substantially  similar 
to  those  in  the  case  at  issue.  Nevertheless,  the  doctrines  of  unfair  sur- 
prise and  confusion  of  issues  (as  explained  above)  have  been  thought 
to  have  an  especial  bearing  here  ;  and  for  some  time  (particularly  in  a 
series  of  cases  in  Massachusetts  beginning  with  Collins  v.  Dorchester, 
but  now  apparently  in  effect  repudiated  in  that  jurisdiction)  much 
distrust  of  this  sort  of  evidence  was  shown.  The  almost  universal 

218,  220 ;  Hinda  v.  Barton,  25  id.  544,  546  ;  Field  ».  R.  Co.,  32  id.  338,  348 ;  Koontz 
v.  0.  R.  &  N.  Co.,  20  Or.  3  ;  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Stranahan,  79  Pa.  405  ;  Henderson  v.  R. 
Co.,  144  id.  461,  487  ;  Smith  v.  R.  Co.,  10  R.  I.  24,  27;  Grand  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Richard- 
son, 91  U.  S.  454,  470  ;  Chic.  S.  P.  M.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  10  U.  S.  App.  375  ; 
Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  a.  Johnson,  ib.  629  ;  Kimball  v.  Borden,  Va.,  28  S.  £.  207  ; 
Hoskison  v.  R.  Co.,  66  Vt.  618  ;  Gibbons  v.  R.  Co.,  58  Wis.  335. 

"  See  Evans  v.  State,  109  Ala.  11  ;  Wynne  v.  State,  56  Ga.  113,  118  ;  State  r.  Cater, 
100  la.  501  ;  State  v.  Asbell,  57  Kan.  398;  Becket  v.  Aid  Assoc.,  67  Minn.  298  ; 
Vaughan  v.  State,  3  S.  M.  &  M.  555  ;  Dillard  v.  State,  58  Miss.  386 ;  State  :•.  Justus, 
11  Or.  182  ;  State  v.  Fletcher,  24  id.  295,  298  ;  Sullivan  v.  Com.,  93  Pa.  288,  296  ; 
Boyd  v.  State,  14  Lea  161,  171 ;  Moore  v.  State,  96  Tenu.  209  ;  Ball  i-.  U.  S.,  163 
U."S.  662. 

«  See  Spencer  Cowper's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1162  ;  R.  v.  Webb,  1  Moo.  &  Rob.  405, 
412  ;  R.  v.  Palmer,  Annual  Register  1856,  pp.  403,  422,  473,  475,  509  ;  Bush  v.  Jack- 
son, 24  Ala.  274 ;  Ala.  G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Collier,  Ala.,  14  So.  327;  Remy  v.  Olds,  Cal., 
34  Pac.  216 ;  Wallace  v.  Wren,  32  111.  150  ;  Epps  v.  State,  102  Ind.  549  ;  State  ». 
Lindoen,  87  la.  702,  704  ;  Champ  v.  Com.,  2  Mete.  Ky.  17,  26  ;  Hunt  v.  Lowell  Gas- 
light Co.,  1  All.  343,  350,  8  id.  169,  171 ;  Baxter  v.  Doe,  142  Mass.  558,  561 ;  Reeve 
v.  Dennett,  145  id.  28  ;  Shea  v.  Glendale  E.  F.  Co.,  162  id.  463  ;  Com.  v.  Kennedy, 
id.,  48  N.  E.  770  ;  Pinney  v.  Cahill,  48  Mich.  586  :  People  r.  Holmes,  111  id.  364  ; 
State  v.  Isaacson,  8  S.  D.  69  ;  Osborne  v.  Detroit,  32  Fed.  36  ;  The  T.  F.  Oakes,  82 
id.  759  ;  U.  S.  v.  Reed,  86  id.  308  ;  Weeks  v.  Lyndon,  54  Vt.  645 ;  Willett  ».  St. 
Albans,  69  id.  330 ;  Bateman  v.  Rutland,  id.,  41  Atl.  500. 

»  See  Knowles  v.  State,  80  Ala.  9  ;  Brantly  v.  State,  91  id.  47  ;  State  v.  Pfefferle,  36 
Kan.  90,  91  ;  State  v.  Adams,  44  id.  135 ;  'Fairly  v.  State,  63  Miss.  333  ;  Com.  v. 
Reyburg,  122  Pa.  299,  305. 


88  RELEVANCY;  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

attitude  of  the  Courts  at  the  present  time,  however20  (apart  from 
minor  peculiarities),  is  to  admit  such  evidence,  subject  to  the  limita- 
tions already  described  at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  The  other 
instances  of  injuries  thus  offered  in  evidence  may  concern  defects 
in  highways,21  or  defects  in  railroad-tracks,  machines,  premises,  and 
the  like.22 

(3)  Effects  on  Human  Conduct.  The  tendency  or  nature  of  a  ma- 
terial object  may  often  be  ascertainable  by  its  psychological  or  moral 
effects  ;  and  it  seems  proper  to  place  here  a  number  of  sorts  of  evi- 
dence, in  which  it  is  perhaps  not  usual  to  perceive  such  a  process  of 
inference.  Nevertheless,  this  analysis  seems  at  once  to  embrace  the 
various  kinds  and  also  to  supply  the  reasons  upon  which  their  admis- 
sion depends.  It  may  be  thought  that  the  Hearsay  rule  is  violated 
by  using  as  evidence  the  conduct  of  persons  not  before  the  Court ; 
but  that  rule  excludes  only  the  assertions  of  such  persons  taken  as 
evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  fact  asserted,  and  though  the  line  be- 
tween conduct  and  assertions  is  not  always  easy  to  draw,  the  distinc- 
tion is  a  real  one  and  leaves  the  Hearsay  rule  not  applicable  to  the 

20  Darling  v.  Westmoreland,  52  N.  H.  401,  opinion  by  Doe,  J.,  is  the  leading  case. 

21  See  Birm.  Un.  R.  Co.  v.  Alexander,  93  Ala.  133  ;  Birmingham  v.  Starr,  112  id.  98  ; 
Bailey  v.  Trumbull,  31  Conn.  581 ;  Calkins  v.  Hartford,  33  id.  57  ;  Taylor  v.  Monroe, 
43  id.  42  ;  Tomlinson  v.  Derby,  43  id.  562  ;   Wilson  v.  Granby,  47  id.  75  ;  Anderson 
v.  Taft,  id.,  39  Atl.  191  ;  Augusta  v.  Hafers,  61  Ga.  48  ;  Gilmer  v.' Atlanta,  77  id.  688  ; 
Aurora  v.  Brown,  12  111.  App.,  131  ;  Bloomington  v.  Legg,  151  111.  9,  13 ;  Delphi  v.  Low- 
ery,  74  Ind.  520,  525  ;  Nave  v.  Flack,  90  id.  205,  214  ;  Bauer  v.  Indianapolis,  99  id.  56, 
60";  L.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  115  id.  378,  393  ;  Salem  S.  &  L.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
139  id.  141  ;  Hudson  v.  R.  Co.,  59  la.  581 ;  Hoyt  v.  Des  Moines,  76  id.  430  ;  Mathews 
».  Cedar  Rapids,  80  id.  459  ;  Hunt  v.  Dubuque,  96  id.  314  ;   Topeka  v.  Sherwood,  39 
Kan.  690  ;  Hubbard  v.  R.  Co.,  39  Me.  506 ;    Branch  v.  Libbey,  78  id.  321  ;  Bait.  & 
Y.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  71  Md.  573,  584 ;   Collins  v.  Dorchester,  6  Cush.  396  ;  Aldrich 
v.  Pelham,  1  Gray,  510 ;  Kidder  v.  Dunstable,  11  id.  342  ;   Schoonmaker  t>.  Wilbra- 
ham,  110  Mass.  134  ;  Marvin  v.  New  Bedford,  158  id.  464,  466  ;  Bumis  v.  Temple, 
162  id.  342,  345 ;  McCool  v.  Grand  Rapida,  58  Mich.  41,  46  ;  Dundas  v.  Lansing,  75 
id.  499,  503  ;  Lombar  v.  East  Tawas,  86  id.  14 ;  Retan  i>.  R.  Co.,  94  Mich.  146  ;  Cor- 
coran  ».  Detroit,  95  id.  84  ;  Phelps  v.  Mankato,  23  Minn.  276,  279  ;    Kelly  v.  R.  Co., 
28  id.  98,  100  ;  Phelps  v.  R.  Co.,  37  id.  487  ;  Burrows  v.  Lake  Crystal,  61  id.  357  ; 
Griffin  v.  Auburn,  58  N.  H.  121 ;  Temperance  Hall  Ass'n  v.  Giles,  33  N.  J.  L.  260; 
Quinlan  v.  Utica,  74  N.  Y.  603;  Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  104  id.  459,  469 ;  Hoyt 
v.  R.  Co.,  118  id.  399  ;  Gillrie  v.  Lockport,  122  id.  403  ;   Mansfield  C.  &  C.  Co.  v. 
McEuery,  91  Pa.  185, 192  ;  Dist.  of  Columbia  v.  Armes,  107  U.  S.  519,  524  ;  Osborne 
v.  Detroit,  32  Fed.  36  ;   Scott  v.  New  Orleans,  U.   S.  App.,  75  Fed.  873;  Lester  v. 
Pittsford,  7  Vt.  158  ;  Kent  o.  Lincoln,  32  id.  591 ;  Walker  v.  Westfield,  39  id.  247  ; 
Elster  v.  Seattle,  18  Wash.  304  ;  Phillips  v.  Willow,  70  Wis.  6 ;  Barrett  v.  Hammond, 
87  Wis.  654,  657. 

M  See  Crofter  ».  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  300  ;  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcraft,  48  Ala.  15,  82; 
Schlaff  v.  R.  Co.,  100  id.  377,  388  ;  Mayer  v.  BuildingCo.,  id.,  22  So.  859  ;  Hodges 
v.  Bearse,  129  111.  89  ;  Libby  ».  Scherman,  146  id.  540;  West  Chic.  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nelly,  170  id.  508  ;  Brooke  v.  R.  Co.,  81  la.  511  ;  Bryce  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  72  N.  W.  780; 
Parker  v.  Publishing  Co.,  69  Me.  173  ;  Bait.  &  Y.  T.'R.  Co.  v.  Leonhardt,  66  Md.  70, 
78 ;  Wise  v.  Ackerman,  76  id.  375,  390  ;  Lewis  v.  Smith,  107  Mass.  834  ;  Peverly  v. 
Boston,  136  id.  366;  Dovle  v.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  79,  82  ;  Hipsley  r.  R.  Co.,  88  Mo. 
848,  354  ;  Graney  v.  R.  Co.,  140  id.  89  ;  Dougan  v.  Champlain  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  7  ;  Baird 
v.  Daly,  68  id.  550;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tobin,  82  Oh.  St.  90;  Sinton  v.  Butler,  40  id.  158, 
168  ;  Bridger  v.  R.  Co.,  27  S.  C.  456  ;  Pearson  v.  Spartanburg  Co.,  51  S.  C.  480; 
Patton  v.  R.  Co.,  U.  S.  App.,  82  Fed.  979  5  Hurd  v.  R.  Co.,  8  Utah  241,  244;  Snow, 
den  v.  Coal  Co.,  id.,  52  Pac.  599. 


£14t>.]  NATURE,   ETC.,   OF  INANIMATE   OBJECTS.  89 

former.  In  the  following  summary  of  the  material,  attention  will  be 
called  merely  to  the  various  instances  that  have  come  before  the 
Courts,  without  attempting  to  note  the  result  of  the  rulings. 

The  simplest  instance  is  the  use  of  other  instances  of  fright  by 
horses  at  a  particular  object  —  a  whistle,  a  pile  of  stones,  a  flag,  a  rail- 
road-car, etc.  —  as  evidence  of  its  tendency  to  cause  fright  in  horses.28 
Closely  analogous  to  this  is  the  use,  on  an  issue  whether  a  person's 
fright  and  jumping  from  a  train,  etc.,  was  natural,  of  the  alarmed  con- 
duct of  other  persons  in  the  same  situation.24  On  the  same  general 
principle  —  i.  e.  the  use  of  mental  impressions  as  indicating  the  nature 
of  a  material  object  —  the  impressions  of  other  persons  (usually  ob- 
tained by  experiment)  as  to  whether  a  thing  could  be  seen,  heard,  or 
identified  under  given  circumstances  of  time,  place,  and  other  sur- 
roundings, has  usually  been  received.26  Whether  a  distance  is  capable 
of  being  traversed  in  a  given  time,  or  a  locomotive  capable  of  being 
stopped  by  the  engineer,  or  any  other  thing  capable  of  being  done  by 
a  human  being,  may  properly  be  evidenced  by  the  experience  of  the 
same  or  other  persons  under  similar  conditions.28  It  seems  to  be  upon 
the  same  principle  that,  upon  an  issue  of  care,  reasonableness,  necessity, 
or  the  like,  the  conduct  of  other  persons,  as  involved  in  their  practice 
or  custom  under  the  same  conditions,  is  to  be  received  as  evidential ; 
e.  g.  if  we  wish  to  learn,  before  leaving  the  house,  whether  it  is 
raining  enough  to  require  the  protection  of  an  umbrella,  we  look  out 
to  see  whether  persons  on  the  street  have  lifted  their  umbrellas  ;  i.  e. 
the  issue  being  the  nature  of  the  rain  with  reference  to  its  requiring 
certain  conduct  on  our  part,  the  conduct  of  others  is  some  evidence 

28  See  Brown  v.  R.  Co.,  22  Q.  B.  D.  391 ;  House  v.  Metcalf,  27  Conn.  631 ;  Knight  v. 
Goodyear  Mfg.  Co.,  38  id.  438,  442  ;  Tomlinson  v.  Derby,  43  id.  662  ;  Cleveland  R. 
Co.  v.  Wynant,  114  Ind.  525  ;  Topeka  Water  Co.  ».  Whitney,  58  Kan.  639;  Hill  v. 
R.  Co.,  55  Me.  438  ;  Crocker  v.  McGregor,  76  id.  282 ;  Bemis  v.  Temple,  162  Mass. 
342 ;  Smith  v.  Sherwood,  62  Mich.  151 ;  Darling  v.  Westmoreland,  52  N.  H.  40  ; 
Gordon  v.  R.  Co.,  58  id.  396  ;  Folsom  v.  R.  Co.,  id..  38  Atl.  209  ;  Valley  ».  R.  Co.,  id., 
38  Atl.  383  ;  Potter  v.  Natural  Gas  Co.,  183  Pa.  575 ;  Thomas  v.  Springville,  9  Utah 
426,  430  ;  Bloor  v.  DeMeld,  59  Wis.  273. 

**  See  Mobile  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcraft,  48  Ala.  31  ;  Mitchell  v.  R.  Co.,  87  Cal.  62 ;  Ga- 
lena &  C.  U.  R.  Co.  v.  Fay,  16  111.  558,  568;  Hohnan  v.  R.  Co.,  Mich.,  72  N.  W. 
202;  Twomley  v.  R.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  161  ;  Hallahan  v.  R.  Co.,  102  id.  199. 

26  See  R.  v.  Robinson,  Annual  Register  1824,  App.  33  ;  Lou.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill, 
115  Ala.  334  ;  People  v.  Woon  Tuck  Wo,  Cal.,  62  Pac.  833  ;  Sealy  v.  State,  1  Kelly 
220;  Jnmpertz  v.  People,  21  111.  408  ;  Painter  v.  People,  147  id.  444,  459;  Jones  w. 
State,  71  Ind.  83,  84  ;  Burg  v.  R.  Co.,  90  la.  106,  116;  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Moffatt,  56 
Kan.  667  ;  White  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  483 ;  Salem  I.  R.  Co.  ».  Adams,  23  Pick.  256,  264  ; 
Com.  v.  Webster,  Bemis'  Rep.  281,  5  Cush.  295,  302 ;  Stone  w.  Ins.  Co.,  71  Mich.  81 ; 
Berckmans  v.  Berckmans,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  127  ;  Smith  v.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  617  ;  Bait.  & 
0.  R.  Co.  v.  Hellenthal,  U.  S.  App.,  88  Fed.  116 ;  Young  v.  Clark,  Utah,  50  Pac.  832. 

48  See  Spencer  Cowper's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1162, 1178  ;  Aug.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Doreey, 
68  Ga.  235  ;  McMnrrm  v.  Rigby,  80  la.  325  ;  Bait.  C.  P.  R.  Co.  r.  Cooney,  Md.,  39 
Atl.  359  ;  People  v.  Morrigan,  29  Mich.  5 ;  Ulrich  v.  People,  39  id.  245 ;  Klanowski  v. 
R.  Co.,  64  id.  279,  286  ;  Davis  v.  State,  Minn.,  70  N.  W.  894  ;  Byers  v.  R.  Co.,  94 
Tenn.  345 ;  West  Pnb.  Co.  v.  Lawyers'  Co-op.  P.  Co.,  U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  756  ;  Hayes 
0.  R.  Co.,  Utah,  53  Pac.  1001;  State  v.  Flint,  60  Vt.  804,  817. 

So  also,  whether  animals  can  do  a  certain  thing :  see  Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  ».  Hart, 
22  111.  App.  209 ;  Carlton  v.  Hescox,  107  Mass.  410 ;  Harwood  v.  R.  Co.,  67  Vt.  664. 


90  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

of  the  nature  of  the  rain  in  that  respect.  This  sort  of  evidence  is 
constantly  resorted  to  in  everyday  life,  and  it  is  of  usefulness  and 
propriety  in  litigation.  The  chief  limitation  is  that  we  should  treat 
the  conduct  of  others  merely  as  some  evidence,  and  should  not  erect 
it  into  an  absolute  legal  standard  or  test  of  liability  or  excuse  ;  and 
it  is  through  fear  that  the  evidence  may  be  thus  abused,  or  through 
inability  to  perceive  any  other  than  this  improper  use  of  it,  that  a 
few  Courts  have  excluded  this  sort  of  evidence.  There  is,  however, 
no  objection  to  its  use,  provided  the  above  distinction  be  observed 
and  the  jury  be  instructed  as  to  the  purely  evidential  use  of  the  con- 
duct of  other  persons.37  The  precedents,  while  in  general  illustrating 
what  has  been  said  above,  cannot  be  reconciled ;  they  cover  a  wide 
variety  of  data,  and  concern  the  conduct,  practice,  or  custom  of 
others,  as  to  whether  certain  treatment  of  animals  28  or  children  29  was 
proper  ;  whether  conduct  with  reference  to  stopping  or  avoiding  fire 
was  proper  ; 80  whether  a  mode  of  switching,  managing,  or  riding  on 
railway-cars  was  proper ; 81  whether  a  mode  of  construction  of  a 
bridge,  track,  machine,  highway,  etc.,  was  proper; 82  whether  an  ap- 
pliance on  a  locomotive  or  other  engine  was  proper ; 88  whether  a 
machine,  place,  etc.,  was  properly  operated  or  protected ; 84  whether 
i 

27  The  distinction  is  well  illustrated  in  the  following  two  leading  cases :  Cass  v.  R. 
Co.,  14  All.  448 ;  Maynard  v.  Buck,  100  Mass.  40. 

28  See  Murphy  v.  Manning,  2  Exch.  D.  307  ;  Brady  w.  McArdle,  15  Cox  Cr.  516  ;  Cal- 
laghan  v.  S.  P.  C.  A.,  16  id.  101 ;  Lewis  v.  Fermor,  L.  K.  18  Q.  B.  D.  532  ;  Ford  t>. 
Wiley,  23  id.  203,  221. 

29  See  Boldron  v.  Widdows,  1  C.  &  P.  65  ;  Lander  v.  Goodenough,  32  Vt.  114,  125  ; 
compare  DeMay  ».  Roberts,  46  Mich.  160. 

80  See  Hatchett  v.  Gibson,  13  Ala.  587,  598  ;  Gibson  v.  Hatchett,  24  id.  201 ; 
Hilder  v.  McCartney,  31  id.  501. 

81  See  Warden  v.  R.  Co.,  94  Ala.  277,  285  ;  Andrews  r.  R.  Co.,  99  id.  439  ;  Kan.  C.  M. 
&  Br.  Co.  v.  Burton,  97  id.  240,  251  ;  Hill  v.  R.  Co.,  100  id.  447 ;  George  v.  R.  Co., 


Hickey  v.  R.  Co.,  14  All.  429  ;  Caswell  u.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass.  194,  200  ;  Glover  v.  Scot- 
ten,  82  Mich.  369  ;  Wilds  v.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  Y.  315,  826  ;  Houston  &  T.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cowser,  57  Tex.  293,  303  ;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton,  75  id.  667  ;  Gulf,  C. 
&  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Harriett,  80  id.  73,  81  ;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  87  id.  348, 
357;  Humphreys  v.  V.  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  135  ;  Andrews  v.  R.  Co.,  96  Wis.  848  ;  Coif  v. 
R.  Co.,  87  id.  273,  276. 

aa  See  Jones  v.  Lumber  Co.,  58  Ark.  125  ;  Burns  v.  Sennett,  99  Cal.  363,  373 ;  Weaver 
v.  R.  Co.,  8  D.  C.  App.  436  ;  Clevel.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Walter,  147  111.  60,  64  ; 
Miller  v.  R.  Co.,  89  la.  567  ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Pedigo,  108  Ind.  481,  484  ; 
Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  115  id.  378,  890;  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Mugg, 
132  id.  168,  175  ;  Hill  Mfg.  Co.  v.  P.  &  N.  Y.  S.  Co.,  125  Mass.  292,  303  j  Marvin  v. 
New  Bedford,  158  id.  464  ;  Kelly  ».  R.  Co.,  28  Minn.  98  ;  Doyle  v.  R.  Co.,  42  id.  79  ; 
Heiaon  v.  R.  Co.,  U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  903  ;  Faerber  v.  Lumber  Co.,  86  Wis.  226. 

3  See  Metzgar  v.  R.  Co.,  76  la.  387  ;  Berberich  v.  Bridge  Co.,  Ky.,  46  S.  W.  691  ;  Hoyt 
v.  Jelters,  30  Mich.  181,  191 ;  Frankford  &  B.  T.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  54  Pa.  346,  351. 

Distinguish  the  question  of  substantive  law  whether  the  owner  of  the  locomotive, 
etc..  is  bound  to  use  the  best  appliances  known. 

84  See  Hartford  Dep.  Co.  v.  Sollitt,  172  111.  222  ;  Mavheww.  Mining  Co.,  76  Me.  100, 

LI  ;  Rooney  v,  S.  &  D.  C.  Co.,  161  Mass.  163,  161  ;  French  v.  Spinning  Co.,  169  id. 

631  ;  Kolsti  v.  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  133  ;  Koona  v.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo.  592,  597;  Helfenstein 

v.  Medart,  136  id.  595  ;  Belleville  Stone  Co.  v.  Comben,  N.  J.  L, ,  89  All.  641 ;  Reese 


§  14  V.]  NATURE,   ETC.,    OF  INANIMATE   OBJECTS.  91 

the  precautions  taken  by  a  bailee  were  adequate  ; **  whether  a  high- 
way was  used  in  a  proper  manner ; M  whether  a  railroad  track  was 
properly  guarded  or  watched  ; 87  whether  a  stock  of  goods  kept  was 
usual  or  proper.88  Upon  the  same  principle  the  patronage  of  an  ar- 
ticle may  furnish  some  evidence  (by  noting  the  difference  between 
patronage  before  and  after  the  use  of  the  alleged  defective  article) 
of  the  quality  of  the  article  ;  w  and  also  (particularly  as  represented 
in  rental  values)  of  the  discomforts  or  annoyances  of  a  place  of  liv- 
ing or  trading.40  Market-value  is  simply  the  potential  patronage  of 
buyers  expressed  in  terms  of  money ;  and,  so  far  as  relevancy  is  con- 
cerned, the  selling-value  of  other  similar  articles  is  some  evidence  of 
value,41  provided  the  conditions  are  substantially  the  same.  But  here 
the  disadvantages  of  surprise  and  confusion  of  issues  (ante,  §  14  a) 
have  by  a  few  Courts  been  thought  to  outweigh  the  slight  utility  of 
such  evidence  and  to  require  its  exclusion.42  The  principle  applies  to 
values  of  every  kind,  —  laud,  personalty,  and  services;  but  consistency 
is  not  always  found  in  the  precedents  of  each  jurisdiction.48] 

v.  Hershey,  163  Pa.  253,  257;  Bridger  v.  R.  Co.,  27  S.  C.  456  ;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  E. 
Co.  v.  Evansich,  61  Tex.  3  ;  Jenkins  v.  Irrig.  Co.,  13  Utah,  100  ;  Congdour.  Scale  Co., 
66  Vt.  255  ;  Richm.  L.  &  M.  W.  v.  Ford,  94  Va.  627. 

Distinguish  the  question  whether  the  defendant's  sufferance  of  a  general  custom  to 
act  in  a  certain  way  implied  a  license  to  the  plaintiff  to  do  the  same.  Note  also 
that  if  the  plaintiff  has  assumed  the  risk  of  a  danger,  the  present  evidence  becomes 
immaterial. 

88  See  Cass  v.  R.  Co.,  14  All.  448  ;  Maynard  v.  Buck,  100  Mass.  40  ;  Hendrick  v.  R. 
Co.,  Mass.,  48  N.  E.  835  ;  Isham  v.  Post,  141  N.  Y.  100,  110. 

*  See  Judd  v.  Fargo,  107  Mass.  264  ;  Bassett  v.  Shares,  63  Conn.  39,  43. 

87  See  Bailey  v.  N.  H.  &  N.  Co.,  107  Mass.  497  ;  Grand  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  91 
U.  S.  454,  458,  469  ;  Bryant  v.  R.  Co.,  56  Vt.  710  ;  Rauney  v.  R.  Co.,  67  id.  594. 
See  note  34,  ante,  for  a  distinction. 

88  See  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide,  11  Wall.  438  ;  Jones  i?.  Ins.  Co.,  36  N.  J.  L.  29,  43. 

89  See  Holcombe  ».  Hewson,  2  Camp.  391  ;  Cunningham  v.  Stein,  109  111.  377. 

«  See  Drucker  v.  R.  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  157, 164  ;  Doyle  v.  R.  Co.,  128  id.  488,  497 ;  Kane 
v.  R.  Co.,  125  id.  164,  187  ;  Cook  v.  R.  Co.,  144  id.  115. 

41  The  questions  whether  price  is  a  test  of  value,  whether  value  at  another  place 
may  be  considered,  etc.,  involve  in  most  instances  a  rule  of  the  law  of  damages  as  to 
the  standard  of  value,  and  are  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  treatment. 

44  See  the  reasoning  in  East  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiester,  40  Pa.  55 ;  Matter  of  Thompson, 
127  N.  Y.  468.  The  true  solution  of  the  difficulty  is,  as  in  Massachusetts  and  New 
Hampshire,  to  leave  the  matter  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court  in  each  instance. 

48  Of  the  following  list  of  cases  it  may  be  said  that  all  but  a  few  jurisdictions 
receive  such  evidence ;  the  distinction  is  occasionally  taken  (as  in  California  and 
Kansas)  that  such  facts  may  be  inquired  about  on  the  cross-examination  of  an  oppo- 
nent's value-witness  for  the  purpose  of  testing  his  consistency  ;  or  (as  in  Illinois  and 
Pennsylvania)  may  be  inquired  about  in  examining  one's  own  witness  as  to  the 
grounds  of  his  qualifications ;  in  Illinois,  and  particularly  in  New  York,  the  prece- 
dents are  in  confusion :  Cent.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  35  Cal.  247,  262  ;  West.  &  A.  R. 
Co.  v.  Calhoun,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  868  ;  White  v.  Hermann,  51  111.  243,  246;  Cook  v. 
Com'rs,  61  id.  115,  124  ;  St.  L.  &  V.  &  T.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Haller,  82  id.  208,  211 ; 
Chic.  &  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Maroney,  95  id.  179,  182  ;  Haish  v.  Payson,  107  id.  365, 
871;  Culb.  &  B.  P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  111  id.  651,  654;  Sherlock  r.  R.  Co.,  130 
id.  403  ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  136  id.  87  ;  Peoria  G.  &  C.  Co.  ».  R. 
Co.,  146  id.  372,  374;  Metrop.  W.  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  161  id.  22,  24;  Metrop. 
R.  Co.  v.  White,  166  id.  375  ;  Nathan  v.  Brand,  167  id.  607;  Boecker  v.  Naperville, 
id.,  48  N.  E.  1058  ;  King  v.  R.  Co.,  34  la.  458,  461  ;  Cherokee  v.  Land  Co.,  52  id. 
279  ;  Cummins  v.  R.  Co.,  63  id.  397,  404  ;  Atch,  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Harper,  19  Kan.  529, 


92  RELEVANCY;    CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE.          [CH.  v. 

534  ;  Kan.  C.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Splitlog,  45  id.  68 ;  Kan.  C.  &  T.  R.  Co.  ».  Vickroy,  46 
id.  248,  250  ;  Chicago,  K.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  47  id.  703,  706  ;  Warren  v.  Wheeler, 
21  Me.  484,  491  ;  Fogg  v.  Hill,  ib.  529,  532  ;  Norton  v.  Willis,  73  id.  580;  Moale  v. 
Baltimore,  5  Md.  314,  324  ;  Wyman  v.  R.  Co.,  13  Mete.  316,  326  ;  Davis  v.  R.  Co., 
11  Gush.  506,  509  ;  Bost.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  0.  C.  &  F.  R.  Co.,  3  All.  142,  146  ;  Paine 
v.  Boston,  4  id.  168  ;  Shattuck  v.  R.  Co.,  6  id.  115,  117  ;  Ham  v.  Salem,  100  Mass. 
350,  352  ;  Benham  v.  Dunbar,  103  id.  365  ;  Presbrey  v.  R.  Co.,  ib.  1,  8  ;  Lavvton  v. 
Chase,  108  id.  238,  241  ;  Green  v.  Fall  River,  113  id.  262,  263  ;  Chandler  v.  Aqueduct, 
122  id.  305;  Gardner  v.  Brookline,  127  id.  358,  363;  Sawyer  v.  Boston,  144  id.  470; 
Patch  v.  Boston,  146  id.  52,  57  ;  Lowell  v.  Com'rs,  146  id.  403  ;  Thompson  v,  Boston, 
148  id.  387 ;  Amory  v.  Melrose,  162  id.  556,  558  ;  Lyman  v.  Boston,  164  id.  99  ; 
Bowditch  v.  Boston,  ib.  107  ;  Pierce  v.  Boston,  ib.  92  ;  Teele  v.  Boston,  165  id.  88  ; 
Buck  v.  Boston,  ib.  509  ;  Beale  v.  Boston,  166  id.  53  ;  Comstock  v.  Smith,  20  Mich. 
338,  346  ;  Eggleston  v.  Boardman,  37  id.  14,  18  ;  Lehinicke  «.  R.  Co.,  19  Minn.  464, 
483  ;  Stinson  v.  R.  Co.,  27  id.  284,  289  ;  Senrer  v.  Horst,  31  id.  479,  480 ;  Lexington 
v.  Long,  31  Mo.  369,  374 ;  Springfield  v.  Schmook,  68  id.  394  ;  St.  Louis  R.  &  N.  W. 
R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  121  id.  169,  185;  Forsyth  Boulevard  v.  Forsyth,  127  id.  417  ;  St. 
Louis  0.  H.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Fowler,  142  id.  670  ;  Kirkendall  v.  Omaha,  39  Nebr.  1,  6  ; 
March  v.  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.,  19  N.  H.  372,  376 ;  Concord  R.  ?;.  Greely,  23  id.  237,  242  ; 
White  v.  Concord  R.,  30  id.  188,  208 ;  Ferguson  v.  Clifford,  37  id.  86,  105  ;  Carr  r. 
Moore,  41  id.  131,  133  ;  Swain  v.  Cheney,  ib.  232,  234  ;  Dewey  v.  Williams,  43  id.  384, 
387  ;  Cross  v.  Wilkins,  ib.  332,  334  ;  French  v.  Piper,  ib.  439  ;  Kingsbury  v.  Moses, 
45  id.  222,  223;  Kelsea  v.  Fletcher,  48  id.  282  ;  Haines  v.  Ins.  Co.,  52  id.  467,  468  ; 
Hoit  v.  Russell,  56  id.  559,  563  ;  Amoskeag  Co.  v.  Head,  59  id.  332,  337  ;  Montclair 
R.  Co.  v.  Benson,  36  N.  J.  L.  557  ;  Laing  v.  R.  &  C.  Co.,  54  id.  576  ;  Gonge  v. 
Roberts,  53  N.  Y.  619  ;  Blanchard  v.  Steamboat  Co.,  59  id.  292,  294,  300  ;  People 
v.  McCarthy,  102  id.  630,  639;  McGean  v.  R.  Co.,  117  id.  219,224;  Huntiugton  v. 
Attrill,  118  id.  365,  378  ;  Matter  of  Thompson,  127  id.  463,  470  ;  Roberts  v.  R.  Co., 
128  id.  455,  473  ;  People  v.  Myers,  133  id.  626,  636  ;  Jamieson  v.  R.  Co.,  147  id.  322, 
825  ;  Witmark's  Case,  149  id.  393;  Searle  v.  R.  Co.,  33  Pa.  57,  63  ;  East  Pa.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hiester,  40  id.  53,  55  ;  Pittsb.  V.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Rose,  74  id.  362,  369 ;  Hays  v. 
Briggs,  ib.  373,  386;  Varderslice  v.  Philadelphia,  103  id.  102,  109  ;  Pittsb.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Patterson,  107  id.  461,  464  ;  Pittsb.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Vance,  115  id.  325,  331  ; 
Curtin  v.  R.  Co.,  135  id.  20,  30 ;  Becker  v.  R.  Co.,  177  id.  252  ;  Daigneault  v.  Woon- 
socket,  18  R.  I.  378 ;  Stanton  v.  Embery,  93  IT.  S.  548,  557  ;  Kerr  v.  Com'rs,  117  id. 
379,  387  ;  Lehigh  V.  C.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  26  Fed.  415,  419  ;  Schradsky  t>.  Stimson,  40 
U.  S.  App.  455  ;  Vilas  v.  Downer,  21  Vt.  419,  424;  Davis  v.  Cotey,  Vt.,  89  Atl.  628  ; 
Seattle  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilchrist,  4  Wash.  509  ;  West  v.  R.  Co.,  56  Wis.  318,  321; 
Watson  v.  R.  Co.,  57  id.  332,  349  ;  Washburn  v.  R.  Co.,  59  id.  364,  377  ;  Atkinson  v. 
R.  Co.,  93  id.  362  ;  Stolze  v.  Term.  Co.,  id.,  75  N.  W.  987. 


§  14v-14t0.]      BURDEN   OF   PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS. 


93 


CHAPTER  VI. 

BURDEN    OF    PROOF,    AND   PRESUMPTIONS. 


1.  General  Theory. 

§  14  w.  Burden  of  Proof;  Presumption; 
In  general. 

§  14ce.  Burden  of  Proof ;  Senses  of  the 
Term  ;  Tests  for  ascertaining  the  Burden  ; 
Shifting  of  the  Burden. 

§  14  y.  Presumptions  of  Law  and  of 
Fact ;  Conclusive  Presumptions  ;  Conflict- 
ing Presumptions;  Prima  facie  Evidence. 

2.    Various  Specific  Presumptions. 

§  15.   Kinds  of  Presumptions. 

§16.    Limitation  of  Claims. 

§  17.    Title  by  Prescription. 

§  18.  Natural  Consequences  of  Acts  ; 
Intent  ;  Murder,  Libel,  etc. 

§19.   Correctness  of  Records. 

§  20.   Observation  of  Legal  Formalities. 

§  21.  Genuineness  of  Ancient  Instru- 
ments. 

§  22.    Estoppels. 

§  23.  Same :  Estoppel  by  Recitals  in 
Deeds. 

§  24.  Same :  Estoppel  by  Deed,  in 
general. 

§  25.  Same :  Estoppel  of  Lessee  as  to 
Lessor. 

§  26.  Same :  Estoppel  by  Deed  Re- 
citals as  to  Consideration. 

§  27.  Same:  Estoppel  by  Statements 
acted  upon. 

§  28.  Incapacity  ;  Legitimacy  ;  Hus- 
band's Coercion. 

§§  29,  30.    Survivorship. 

§  31.    International  Law. 

§  32.  Principle  of  Conclusive  Presump- 
tions. 

§  33.  Disputable  Presumptions  ;  In 
general. 

§  34.  Innocence ;  Ownership  ;  Stolen 
Goods. 


§  35.  Innocence  ;  Life  and  Death  ; 
Conflicting  Presumptions. 

§  36.    Libel. 

§  37.  Spoliation  ;  Fabrication  of  Evi- 
dence. 

§  38.  Course  of  Trade  ;  Payment ;  De- 
livery. 

§  38  a.  Execution  of  Attested  Instru- 
ments ;  Regularity  of  Official  Acts  ;  Ap- 
pointment to  Office. 

§  39.   Payment,  from  Lapse  of  Time. 

§  40.  Course  of  Business  ;  Post-office  ; 
Telegrams  ;  etc. 

§  41.   Continuity  ;  Life  ;  Death. 

§  42.  Continuity  ;  Partnership  ;  In- 
sanity. 

§  43.   Foreign  Law. 

§  43  a.  Identity  of  Name ;  Sundry 
Presumptions. 

§§  44,  45.  Presumptions  of  Fact  ;  In 
general. 

§  45  a.  Lapse  of  Time ;  Grants  from 
the  Sovereign. 

§  46.   Same  :  Grant  from  an  Individual. 

§  47.   Same:  Personalty. 

§  48.  Presumptions  of  Fact ;  In  gen- 
eral. 

3.  Burden  of  Proof  in  Specific  Cases. 

§  74.   In  general. 

§  75.  Damages ;  Right  to  open  and 
close. 

§  76.  Same:  Unliquidated  Damages. 

§  77.    Will  Cases. 

§§  79-81.   Sundry  Instances. 

§  81  a.   Sanity. 

§816.  Criminal  Cases;  Alibi;  Self- 
defence. 

§  81  c.   Measure  of  Persuasion  ;   Proof 
beyond  a  Reasonable  Doubt. 
.      §  81  d.   Same :    Proof   by    Preponder- 
'ance  of  Evidence. 


1.    General  Theory  of  Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof.1 

§  14  w.  Burden  of  Proof ;  Presumption ;  In  general.  [In  every 
attempt  to  explain  the  principles  of  the  law  as  to  burden  of  proof 

1  FJFor  an  acute  and  comprehensive  examination  of  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  see 
chapters  8  and  9  in  Professor  Thayer's  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  the  publi- 
cation of  which  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  epoch-making.] 


94  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   TI. 

and  presumption,  two  things  at  least  present  themselves  for  consid- 
eration,—  the  general  process,  logical  and  legal,  involved  in  deter- 
mining the  parties  by  whom  evidence  is  to  be  produced,  and  the 
significance  and  usage  of  various  terms  employed  and  the  incidental 
problems  of  each  part  of  the  process.  The  difficulties  of  such  an 
attempt,  almost  insuperable,2  exist  not  so  much  from  the  intrinsic 
complication  or  uncertainty  of  the  situation  as  from  the  lamentable 
ambiguity  of  phrase  and  confusion  of  terminology  under  which  our 
law  has  so  long  suffered.  At  the  outset,  then,  it  will  be  more  satis- 
factory to  analyze  the  logical  and  legal  situation  considered  in  itself 
and  independently  of  the  various  usages  and  terms  that  chiefly  cause 
the  confusion. 

(1)  Burden  of  Proof;  Risk  of  Non-persuasion.  Whenever  A  and 
B  are  at  issue  upon  any  subject  of  controversy  (not  necessarily 
legal),  and  M  is  to  take  action  between  them,  and  their  desire  is, 
hence,  respectively  to  persuade  M  as  to  their  contention,  it  is  clear 
that  the  situation  of  the  two,  as  regards  its  advantages  and  risks, 
will  be  very  different.  Suppose  that  A  has  property  in  which  he 
would  like  to  have  M  invest  money,  and  that  B  is  opposed  to  having 
M  invest  money ;  M  will  invest  in  A's  property  if  he  can  learn  that 
it  is  a  profitable  object,  and  not  otherwise.  Here  it  is  seen  that  the 
advantage  is  with  B,  and  the  disadvantage  with  A;  for  unless  A 
succeeds  in  persuading  M  up  to  the  point  of  action,  A  will  fail  and 
B  will  remain  victorious ;  the  burden  of  proof,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  risk  of  non-persuasion,  is  upon  A.  This  does  not  mean  that  B  is 
absolutely  safe  though  he  does  nothing,  for  he  cannot  tell  how  much 
it  will  require  to  persuade  M ;  a  very  little  argument  from  A  might 
suffice ;  or,  if  M  is  of  a  rashly  speculative  tendency,  the  mere  men- 
tion of  the  proposition  by  A  might  without  more  affect  M's  action ; 
so  that  it  may  be  safer  in  any  case  for  B  to  say  what  he  can  on  his 
side  of  the  question ;  and  thus  in  fact  he,  as  well  as  A,  has  more  or 
less  risk,  in  the  sense  that  there  are  always  chances  of  A's  per- 
suading M,  no  matter  how  trifling  his  evidence  and  argument.  But 
nevertheless  the  risk  is  really  upon  A,  in  the  sense  that  if  M,  after 
all  said  and  done,  remains  in  doubt,  and  therefore  fails  to  pass  to 
the  point  of  action,  it  is  A  that  loses  and  B  that  succeeds ;  because 
it  is  A  who  wished  the  action  taken  and  needed  as  a  prerequisite  to 
accomplish  the  persuasion  of  M.  The  risk  of  non-persuasion,  there- 
fore, i.  e.  the  risk  of  M's  non-action  because  of  doubt,  may  properly 
be  said  to  be  upon  A.  This  is  the  situation  common  to  all  cases  of 
attempted  persuasion,  whether  in  the  market,  the  home,  or  the 
forum.  So  far  as  mere  logic  is  concerned,  it  is  perhaps  question- 
able whether  there  is  much  importance  in  the  doctrine  of  burden 

1  ("The  following  remark  will  be  thought  singular,  in  view  of  the  condition  of  the 
precedents  on  this  subject  :  "  Every  student  of  the  law  fully  understands  the  exact 
import  of  the  phrase  '  burden  of  proof  : '  "  State  v.  Thornton,  S.  D.,  73  N.  W.  196.3 


§  14  W.}  GENEEAL   THEOKY.  95 

of  proof  as  affecting  persons  in  controversy.*  The  removal  of  the 
burden  is  not  in  itself  a  matter  of  logical  necessity.  It  is  the  desire 
to  have  action  taken  that  is  important.  In  the  affairs  of  life  there 
is  a  penalty  for  not  sustaining  the  burden  of  proof,  —  i.  e.  not  per- 
suading M  beyond  the  doubting  point, — namely,  that  M  will  not 
take  the  desired  action,  to  which  his  persuasion  is  a  prerequisite. 

Thus,  in  practical  affairs  generally,  the  burden  of  proof  (in  the 
sense  of  risk  of  non-persuasion)  signifies  that  upon  a  person  desir- 
ing action  from  M  will  fall  the  penalty  of  M's  non-action  unless  M 
can  be  persuaded  beyond  the  doubting-point  as  to  the  truth  of  the 
propositions  prerequisite  to  his  action.  What,  then,  is  the  difference, 
if  any,  between  this  risk  of  non-persuasion  in  affairs  at  large  and 
the  same  risk  in  litigation  ?  In  litigation,  the  penalty  is  of  course 
different ;  the  action  which  is  desired  of  M  is  the  verdict  of  the  jury, 
the  decree,  order,  or  finding  of  the  judge,  or  some  other  appropriate 
action  of  the  tribunal ;  but  so  also  the  action  differs  in  other  affairs, 
according  as  M  is  an  investor  with  money  to  lend,  or  an  employer 
with  a  position  to  fill,  or  a  friend  with  a  favor  to  grant.  Is  there  no 
other  and  more  radical  difference  ?  The  radical  difference  in  litiga- 
tion, as  distinguished  from  practical  affairs  at  large,  is  as  to  the  mode 
of  determining  the  propositions  of  persuasion  which  are  a  prerequisite 
to  M's  action.  In  affairs  at  large,  these  are  determined  solely  by  M's 
notion  of  the  proper  grounds  for  his  action,  depending  thus  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  situation  as  judged  by  M.  In  litigation,  these 
prerequisites  are  determined,  first  and  broadly,  by  the  substantive 
law,  which  fixes  the  groups  of  data  that  enter  into  legal  relations 
and  constitute  rights  and  duties,  and,  secondly  and  more  in  detail, 
by  the  laws  of  pleading  and  procedure,  which  further  group  and 
subdivide  these  larger  groups  of  data  and  assign  one  or  another 
sub-group  to  this  or  that  party  as  the  prerequisites  of  the  tribunal's 
action  in  his  favor.  Thus,  if  A  were  endeavoring  to  persuade  M  to 
assist  him  with  money  because  M's  brother  B  had  cruelly  assaulted 
and  beaten  A,  M  might  conceivably  exact  of  A  that  the  latter  first 
prove  to  him — t.  e.  persuade  him  —  not  merely  that  B  had  beaten 
A,  but  further  that  B  had  not  done  this  in  self-defence  or  by  A's 
consent  or  in  ejecting  A  from  B's  premises  or  otherwise  for  some 
reason,  legally  justifiable  or  not.  In  a  legal  tribunal,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  substantive  will  define  and  limit,  in  the  first  place,  the 
reasons  to  be  regarded  as  justifiable,  and  will  thus  narrow  the  total 

8  Q"  In  Logic,  then,  when  we  speak  of  the  burden  of  proof,  we  are  not  speaking  of 
some  merely  artificial  law,  with  artificial  penalties  attached  to  it.  ...  No  penalty 
follows  the  misplacement  of  the  burden  of  proof,  except  the  natural  consequence  that 
the  assertion  remains  untested,  and  the  audience  therefore  (if  inquiring)  unconvinced. 
.  .  .  There  is  no  'obligation'  on  any  one  to  prove  an  assertion, —  other  than  any 
wish  he  may  feel  to  set  an  inquiring  mind  at  rest  or  to  avoid  the  imputation  of  empty 
boasting.  It  is  a  natural  law  alone  with  which  we  are  here  concerned,  —  the  law  that 
an  unsupported  assertion  may,  for  all  that  appears,  be  either  true  or  false : "  Alfred 
Sidgwick,  Fallacies,  163.] 


96  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

of  facts  that  can  in  any  event  be  involved ;  and,  in  the  second  place, 
the  law  of  pleading  will  further  subdivide  and  apportion  these  facts. 
It  will  inform  A  that  he  need  persuade  the  tribunal  of  two  facts 
only,  namely,  that  A  was  beaten  and  it  was  B  who  beat  him ; 4  and 
that,  upon  persuading  the  tribunal  of  these  facts,  its  action  will  be 
taken  in  his  favor,  and  A's  risk  of  the  tribunal's  non-action  will 
thereupon  cease.  It  will  inform  B  that  at  this  point  the  risk  of 
non-action  will  turn  upon  him,  in  the  sense  that  he  needs  the  tri- 
bunal's action  in  order  to  relieve  himself  from  the  consequences  of 
its  previous  action,  and  that  this  action  (by  way  of  reversing  its 
provisional  action  in  A's  favor)  will  depend  upon  his  persuading  the 
tribunal  as  to  certain  specified  facts  by  way  of  excuse  or  justifica- 
tion. Perhaps  the  same  law  of  pleading  may  further  apportion  to 
A  a  third  set  of  facts  to  be  the  subject  of  a  replication,  in  case  B 
succeeds  in  obtaining  action  in  his  favor  on  his  plea.  But  the 
groupings  defined  by  the  substantive  law  and  the  further  subdivi- 
sion by  the  law  of  pleading  does  not  necessarily  end  the  process  of 
apportionment  by  law.  Even  within  a  single  pleading  there  are 
instances  in  which  the  burden  of  proof  (in  the  sense  of  a  risk  of 
non-persuasion)  may  be  taken  from  the  pleader  desiring  action  and 
placed  upon  the  opponent.  In  criminal  cases,  for  example,  though 
there  is  no  affirmative  pleading  for  the  defence,  it  is  put  upon  the 
defendant,  in  some  jurisdictions,  to  prove  the  excuse  of  self-defence ; 
in  many  jurisdictions  in  which  payment  need  not  be  affirmatively 
pleaded  to  a  contract-claim,  the  burden  of  proving  payment  is  never- 
theless put  upon  the  debtor ;  and  so  in  many  other  instances.5  The 
difference  of  effect  between  an  apportionment  under  this  method  and 
an  apportionment  by  requiring  a  pleading  is  merely  that,  in  the 
latter  method,  all  questions  of  burden  of  proof  might  conceivably 8 
be  disposed  of  before  trial  or  the  entering  into  evidence;  while  by 
the  former  method  the  apportionment  is  not  made  until  the  trial 
proper  has  begun.  The  former  method  is  less  simple  in  the  hand- 
ling; but  it  has  come  into  more  vogue  under  the  loose  modes  of 
pleading  current  in  modern  times  in  many  jurisdictions.7 

The  characteristic,  then,  of  the  burden  of  proof  (in  the  sense  of  a 
risk  of  non-persuasion)  in  legal  controversies  is  that  the  law  divides 
the  process  into  stages  and  apportions  definitely  to  each  party  the 

*  ^Assuming,  of  coarse,  that  there  is  no  controversy  as  to  whether  inadvertence  or 
the  liKe  is  a  proper  subject  for  the  general  issue  or  for  an  affirmative  plea.] 

*  fSee  instances  pott,  §§  78  ff.] 

8  LThough  in  practice  not  usually  at  the  present  time ;  see  Langdell,  Discovery 
under  the  Judicature  Acts,  11  Harv.  L.  Rev.  157,  205.] 

T  QThe  result  is  that  what  were  properly  questions  of  pleading  are  often  discussed 
in  terms  of  the  burden  of  proof,  e.  g.  Hopson  v.  Caswell,  Tex.  Civ.  App.,  36  S.  W. 
812,  indexed  under  "  Burden  of  Proof,"  where  it  is  said,  of  a  plea  in  abatement,  "the 
burden  of  sustaining  the  plea  was  upon  the  defendant ;  "  Goodell  v.  Gibbons,  Va.,  22 
8.  E.  504,  where  the  question  of  pleading  affirmatively  the  statute  of  limitations  is  dis- 
cussed indifferently  in  terms  of  pleading  and  of  burden  of  proof. 


§  14  W.]  GENERAL   THEORY.  97 

specific  facts  which  will  in  turn  fall  to  him  as  the  prerequisites  of 
obtaining  action  in  his  favor  by  the  tribunal.  It  is  this  apportion- 
ment which  forms  the  important  element  of  controversy  for  legal 
purposes.  Each  party  wishes  to  know  of  what  facts  he  has  the  risk 
of  non-persuasion.  By  what  considerations,  then,  is  this  apportion- 
ment determined  ?  Is  there  any  single  principle  or  rule  which  will 
solve  all  cases  and  afford  a  general  test  for  ascertaining  the  incidence 
of  this  risk  ?  By  no  means.  It  is  often  said  that  the  burden  is  upon 
the  party  having  the  affirmative  allegation.8  But  this  is  not  an  in- 
variable test,  nor  even  a  significant  circumstance ;  the  burden  is  often 
on  one  who  has  a  negative  assertion  to  prove ;  a  common  instance 
is  that  of  a  promisee  alleging  non-performance  of  a  contract.9  It  is 
sometimes  said  that  it  is  upon  the  party  to  whose  case  the  fact  is 
essential.  This  is  correct  enough,  but  it  merely  advances  the  inquiry 
one  step ;  i.  e.  we  must  ask  whether  there  is  any  general  principle 
which  determines  to  what  party's  case  a  fact  is  essential.  The  truth 
is  that  there  is  not  and  cannot  be  any  one  general  solvent  for  all 
cases.  It  is  merely  a  question  of  policy  and  fairness  based  on  ex- 
perience of  the  different  situations.  Thus,  in  most  actions  of  tort 
there  are  many  possible  justifying  circumstances, — self-defence,  leave 
and  license,  volenti  non  jit  injuria,  and  the  like ;  but  it  would  be 
both  contrary  to  experience  to  assume  that  one  of  them  was  probably 
present  and  unfair  to  require  the  plaintiff  to  disprove  the  existence 
of  each  one  of  them ;  so  that  the  plaintiff  is  put  to  prove  merely  the 
nature  of  his  harm,  and  the  defendant's  share  in  causing  it ;  and  the 
other  circumstances,  which  would  if  they  existed  leave  him  without 
a  claim,  are  put  upon  the  defendant  to  prove.  Nevertheless,  in  mali- 
cious prosecution,  on  the  one  hand,  the  facts  as  to  the  defendant's 
good  faith  and  probable  cause,  which  might  otherwise  have  been  set 
down  for  the  defendant  to  show  in  excuse  (as  the  analogous  facts  in 
an  action  for  defamation  are  reserved  for  a  plea  of  privilege),  are 
here  put  upon  the  plaintiff,  who  is  required  to  prove  their  non-exist- 
ence ;  because  as  a  matter  of  experience  and  fairness  this  seems  to 
be  the  wiser  apportionment.  So,  on  the  other  hand,  in  an  action  for 
defamation  ("false  words,"  in  the  old  nomenclature),  it  might  have 
been  supposed  on  other  analogies  that  to  the  plaintiff  it  would  fall 
to  prove  the  falsity  of  the  defendant's  utterance ;  yet  as  a  matter 
of  fairness,  it  has  in  fact  been  put  upon  the  defendant  to  prove  the 
truth  of  his  utterance.  Thus,  no  one  principle  will  serve  in  torts  as  a 
guiding  rule  for  the  various  cases.  In  criminal  cases,  the  innovation, 
in  some  jurisdictions,  of  putting  upon  the  accused  the  burden  of 
proving  his  insanity  has  apparently  been  based  on  an  experience  as 
to  the  abuses  of  the  contrary  practice.  In  claims  based  on  written 

«  [E.g.,  post,  §§74,  78.] 

9  £#.  g.,  again,   Carmel  N.  G.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Small,   Ind.,  50  N.  E.  476  (action   to 
recover  money  from  an  officer  not  legally  elected).] 
VOL.    I.  —  7 


98  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   YL 

instruments,  experience  has  led  in  most  jurisdictions  to  a  statutory 
provision,  requiring  the  execution  by  the  defendant  to  be  specially 
traversed  or  else  taken  for  admitted,  —  a  step  which  stops  short  of 
changing  the  burden  of  proof,  but  well  illustrates  the  considerations 
affecting  its  incidence.  The  controversy  whether  a  plaintiff  in  tort 
should  be  required  to  prove  his  own  carefulness  or  the  defendant 
should  be  required  to  prove  the  plaintiff's  carelessness  has  depended 
in  part  on  experience  as  to  a  plaintiff  being  commonly  careful  or 
careless,  in  part  on  the  fairness  of  putting  the  burden  on  one  or  the 
other,  and  this  in  part  on  the  consideration  which  of  the  parties  has 
the  means  of  proof  more  available.  This  last  consideration  has  often 
been  advanced  as  a  special  test  for  solving  a  limited  class  of  cases, 
t.  e.  the  burden  of  proving  a  fact  is  said  to  be  put  on  the  one  who 
presumably  has  peculiar  knowledge  enabling  him  to  prove  its  falsity 
if  it  is  false.10  But  this  consideration  furnishes  no  working  rule ;  if 
it  did,  then  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  defamation  charging  him  to 
be  living  in  adultery  should  be  required  to  prove  that  he  is  lawfully 
married.  This  consideration,  after  all,  merely  takes  its  place  among 
other  considerations  of  fairness  and  experience  as  one  to  be  kept  in 
mind  in  apportioning  the  burden  of  proof  in  a  specific  case. 

There  is,  then,  no  one  principle,  or  set  of  harmonious  principles, 
•which  afford  a  sure  test  for  the  solution  of  a  given  case.  The  logic 
of  the  situation  does  not  demand  such  a  test ;  it  would  be  useless  to 
attempt  to  discover  or  to  invent  one ;  and  the  state  of  the  law  does 
not  justify  us  in  saying  that  it  has  accepted  any.  There  are  merely 
specific  rules  for  specific  cases,  resting  for  their  ultimate  reasons  upon 
broad  and  undefined  reasons  of  experience  and  fairness. 

(2)  Burden  of  Proof;  Duty  of  producing  Evidence.  So  far  as 
concerns  the  principles  explained  above,  the  matter  may  have  come 
before  any  kind  of  tribunal.  The  inquiry  peculiarly  concerns  the 
procedure  in  legal  controversies;  but  the  settlement  of  it  is  not 
affected  by  the  nature  of  the  tribunal.  The  tribunal  might  be  a  judge, 
or  a  jury,  or  both,  so  far  as  regards  apportioning  the  risk  of  non- 
persuasion.  Nothing  has  been  said,  or  need  be,  about  a  distinction 
between  judge  and  jury.  But  we  come  now  to  a  peculiar  set  of  rules 
which  have  their  source  in  the  bi-partite  constitution  of  the  common- 
law  tribunal.  Apart  from  the  distinction  of  functions  between  judge 
and  jury,  these  rules  need  have  had  no  existence.  They  owe  their 
existence  to  the  historical  and  unquestioned  control  of  the  judge  over 
the  jury,  and  to  the  partial  and  dependent  position  of  the  jury  as  a 
member  of  the  tribunal  whose  functions  come  into  play  only  within 
certain  limits.11  The  treatment  of  the  situation,  and  the  operation 
of  the  rules,  can  best  be  comprehended  by  keeping  this  consideration 
in  mind,  namely,  that  the  evidential  material  that  may  be  offered  does 

«  TE.  g.,  pott,  §  79.1 

11  [Seepo$t,  Chap.  VI I ;  and  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise,  ch,  5.] 


§  14  tt?.]  GENERAL   THEORY.  99 

not  go  to  the  jury  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  each  party  must  first 
with  his  evidence  pass  the  gauntlet  of  the  judge,  and  that  the  judge, 
as  a  part  of  his  function  in  administering  the  law,  is  to  keep  the  jury 
within  the  bounds  of  reasonable  action ;  and,  in  short,  that  in  order 
to  get  to  the  jury  on  the  issue,  and  bring  into  play  the  burden  of 
proof  (in  the  sense  of  the  risk  of  non-persuasion  of  the  jury),  both 
parties  alike  must  satisfy  the  judge  that  they  have  evidence  fit  to  be 
considered  by  the  jury,  and  to  form  a  reasonable  basis  for  the  verdict. 
This  duty  of  satisfying  the  judge  is  peculiar  in  its  operation,  because 
if  it  is  not  fulfilled,  the  party  in  default  loses  by  order  of  the  judge, 
and  the  jury  is  not  given  an  opportunity  to  debate  and  form  con- 
clusions as  if  the  issue  were  open  to  them.  It  operates  somewhat  as 
follows : 12  — 

(a)  The  party  having  the  risk  of  non-persuasion  (under  the  plead- 
ings or  other  rules)  is  naturally  the  one  upon  whom  first  falls  this 
duty  of  going  forward  with  evidence ;  because,  since  he  wishes  to 
have  the  jury  act  for  him,  and  since  without  any  legal  evidence  at  all 
they  could  properly  take  no  action,  there  is  no  need  for  the  opponent 
to  adduce  evidence ;  and  this  duty  thus  falls  first  upon  the  proponent 
(a  term  convenient  for  designating  the  party  having  the  risk  of  non- 
persuasion).  This  duty,  however,  though  determined  in  the  first 
instance  by  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  sense  of  the  risk  of  non- 
persuasion,  is  a  distinct  one,  for  it  is  a  duty  towards  the  judge,  and  the 
judge  rules  against  the  party  if  it  is  not  satisfied ;  there  is  as  yet  no 
opportunity  to  get  to  the  jury  and  ask  if  they  are  persuaded.  The 
judge,  then,  requires  that  at  least  enough  evidence  be  put  in  to 
be  worth  considering  by  the  jury.  There  was  an  old  phrase  that 
a  "  mere  scintilla  of  evidence  ",was  sufficient ; 18  but  this  seems  to  have 
been  generally  abandoned,14  and  it  is  now  commonly  said  (though  the 
phrasing  differs)  that  it  must  be  "  sufficient  evidence  to  sustain  a 
verdict,"  or  evidence  so  weak  that  a  verdict  for  the  opponent  would 
be  set  aside  as  against  the  evidence,  or  better  still,  "  [The  proposition] 
cannot  be  merely,  Is  there  evidence  ?  .  .  .  The  proposition  seems  to 
me  to  be  this  :  Are  there  facts  in  evidence  which  if  unanswered  would 

12  [See  on  this  part  of  the  subject  a  useful  article  by  the  late  Professor  Austin  Abbott, 
entitled  "Two  Burdens  of  Proof,"  in  6  Harv.  L.  Rev.  125.] 

13  rjFor  the  jurisdictions  in  which  this  rule  still  obtains,  see  Thompson  on  Trials, 
§§  2246  If.;  see  also  Holland  v.  Kindregan,  155  P«.  156 ;  Evans  v.  Chamberlain,  40  S.  C. 
104.] 

»  [Jewell  v.  Parr,  13  C.  B.  909;  Toomey  v.  R.  Co.,  3  C.  B.  N.  s.  146;  Ryder  v. 
Wombwell,  L.  R.  4  Ex.  Ch.  32;  Dublin  R.'Co.  v.  Slattery,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas.  1155, 
1208 ;  Denny  v.  Williams,  5  All.  1 ;  Market  &  F.  N.  B'k  v.  Sargent,  85  Me.  349  ;  Off  utt 
v.  Expos.  Co.,  111.,  51  N.  E.  650 ;  Bartlett  v.  Bank,  119  111.  259  ;  Haines  v.  Trust  Co., 
56  N.  J.  L.  312 ;  Fornes  v.  Wright,  91  la.  392 ;  State  v.  Couper,  Or.,  49  Pac.  959  ; 
Joske  v.  Irvine,  Tex.,  44  S.  W.  1059;  Ewing  v.  Goode,  78  Fed.  442  ;  Com'rs  v.  Clark, 
94  U.  S.  278;  North  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Bank,  123  id.  727;  Elliott  v.  R.  Co.,  150  id.  245  ; 
Monroe  v.  Ins.  Co.,  5  U.  S.  App.  179,  191 ;  Colo.  C.  C.  M.  Co.  v.  Turck,  12  id.  85,  107  ; 
Laclede  P.  B.  M.  Co.  v.  Hartford  Co.,  19  id.  510 ;  and  see  People  v.  Cook,  5  Den.  74, 
and  Mt.  Adams  &  E.  P.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowery,  U.  S.  App.,  74  Fed.  463,  for  good  expo- 
sitions; and  an  article  in  the  Western  Reserve  Law  Journal,  October,  1898.J 


100  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

justify  men  of  ordinary  reason  and  fairness  in  affirming  the  question 
which  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  maintain  ?  "  "  If  the  judge  finds 
this  duty  not  satisfied,  he  "  ought  to  withdraw  the  question  from  the 
jury,  and  direct  a  nonsuit  or  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  if  the  onus  is 
on  the  plaintiff,  or  direct  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  if  the  onus  is  on 
the  defendant,"  16  i.  e.  decide  against  the  proponent  having  the  risk 
of  non-persuasion  on  that  particular  issue,  whether  he  be  plaintiff  or 
defendant.  The  ruling  will  of  course  depend  entirely  on  the  nature 
of  the  evidence  offered  in  the  case  in  hand,  and  it  is  seldom  possible 
that  a  ruling  can  serve  as  a  precedent ;  it  has  been  ruled,  for  instance, 
that  to  show  a  scienter  of  a  horse's  unmanageable  disposition,  a  single 
instance  of  its  having  run  away  is,  though  admissible,  not  sufficient 
evidence  for  the  jury  ; 17  mere  identity  of  name  has  sometimes  been 
thought  insufficient  evidence  of  identity  of  person ; 18  but  even  these 
can  hardly  be  taken  as  fixed  precedents. 

(b)  Suppose,  then,  that  the  proponent  has  satisfied  this  duty 
towards  the  judge,  and  that  the  judge  has  ruled  that  sufficient  evi- 
dence has  been  introduced.  The  duty  has  then  ended.  Up  to  that 
point  the  proponent  was  liable  to  a  ruling  of  law  from  the  judge  which 
would  put  an  end  to  his  case.  After  passing  this  point  he  is  now 
before  the  jury,  bearing  his  risk  of  non -persuasion.  There  is  now  no 
duty  on  either  party,  with  reference  to  any  rule  of  law  in  the  hands 
of  the  judge,  to  produce  evidence.  Either  party  may  introduce  it, 
and  doubtless  both  parties  will  do  so ;  but  there  is  nothing  that 
requires  either  to  do  so  under  penalty  of  a  ruling  of  law  against  him. 
The  proponent,  however,  has  his  burden  of  proof  in  the  sense  of  the 
risk  of  non-persuasion  of  the  jury ;  i.  e.  should  the  jury  be  in  doubt 
after  hearing  the  evidence  of  the  proponent,  either  with  or  without 
evidence  from  the  opponent,  the  proponent  fails  to  obtain  their 
verdict  upon  that  issue,  and  the  opponent  remains  successful.  In 
this  second  stage  of  the  trial,  with  the  evidence  before  the  jury,  the 
only  burden  operating  is  that  which  concerns  the  jury,  —  the  risk  of 
non-persuasion ;  and  not  that  which  concerns  the  judge,  —  the  duty 
of  producing  evidence. 

(e)  Suppose,  however,  that  the  proponent  has  been  able  to  go 
further  and  to  adduce  evidence  which  if  believed  would  make  it 
beyond  reason  to  repudiate  the  proponent's  claim,  —  evidence  such 
that  the  jury,  acting  as  reasonable  men,  must  be  persuaded  and 

15  PBrett,  J.,  in  Bridges  v.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  213  ;  and  see  the  cases  in  the  last 
note.T 

19  LLord  Blackburn,  in  Dublin  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery,  supra.  The  wholly  groundless 
doubt  has  been  sometimes  raised  whether  this  process  is  within  the  judge's  constitu- 
tional power  under  the  provision  for  jury  trial  or  for  making  juries  judges  of  fact  or 
for  prohibiting  a  charge  upon  the  facts  ;  this  doubt  (sanctioned  in  Gannon  r.  Gaslight 
Co.,  Mo.,  46  S.  W.  968  ;  Littlejohn  ».  Fowler,  5  Coldw.  284)  has  rightly  been  repu- 
diated :  Norris  v.  Chinkscales,  47  S.  C.  488  ;  Catlett  v.  R.  Co.,  57  Ark.  461.] 

"  TBenoit  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  48  N.  E.  524.] 

18  [_Post,  §  43  a ;  we  other  possible  instances  post,  §  575  a.] 


5  14  W.~]  GENERAL  THEORY.  101 

render  a  verdict  on  that  issue  for  the  proponent.  Here  the  proponent 
has  now  put  himself  in  the  same  position  that  was  occupied  by  the  op- 
ponent at  the  opening  of  the  trial,  L  e.  unless  the  opponent  now  offers 
evidence  against  the  claim  and  thus  changes  the  situation,  the  jury 
should  not  be  allowed  to  render  a  verdict  against  reason,  —  a  verdict 
which  would  later  have  to  be  set  aside  as  against  evidence.  The 
matter  is  thus  in  the  hands  of  the  judge  again,  as  having  the  super- 
visory control  of  the  proof;  and  now  he  may,  as  applying  a  rule  of 
law,  require  the  opponent  to  produce  evidence,  under  penalty  of 
losing  under  the  direction  of  the  judge.  Thus,  a  duty  of  producing 
evidence,  under  this  penalty  for  default,  has  arisen  for  the  opponent. 
It  arises  for  the  same  reasons,  is  measured  by  the  same  tests,  and  has 
the  same  consequences  as  the  duty  of  production  which  was  formerly 
upon  the  proponent.  There  are,  however,  two  ways  in  which  it  may 
be  invoked  by  the  judge,  differing  widely  in  terms  and  in  appearance, 
but  essentially  the  same  in  principle,  (c')  In  the  ordinary  case,  this 
overwhelming  mass  of  evidence,  bearing  down  for  the  proponent,  will 
be  made  up  of  a  variety  of  complicated  data  differing  in  every  new 
trial  and  not  to  be  tested  by  any  set  formulas.  The  judge's  ruling 
will  be  based  on  a  survey  of  this  mass  of  evidence  as  a  whole ;  and  it 
will  direct  the  jury  to  render  a  verdict  on  that  issue  for  the  propon- 
ent. The  propriety  of  this  has  sometimes  been  doubted  by  Courts 
which  do  not  believe  the  process  to  be  precisely  analogous  to  that  of 
directing  a  nonsuit  for  the  proponent  or  of  enforcing  a  presumption, 
as  shortly  to  be  explained ; "  but  the  better  authority  gives  ample 
recognition  to  this  process.20  (c")  Another  mode  under  which  this 
process  is  carried  out  employs  the  aid  of  a  fixed  rule  of  law  applicable 
to  inferences  from  specific  evidence  to  specific  facts  forming  part  of 
the  issue  rather  than  to  the  general  mass  of  evidence  bearing  on  the 
proposition  in  issue.  If  it  is  a  part  of  the  proponent's  case,  for 
example,  to  prove  that  a  person  is  deceased,  and  he  has  offered  evi- 
dence that  the  person  has  been  absent,  unheard  from,  for  seven  years 
or  more,  and  there  is  no  other  evidence  on  the  subject,  then  the  pro- 
ponent may  ask  that  the  jury  be  directed,  if  they  believe  this  fact  of 
absence,  to  take  as  true  the  proposition  that  the  person  is  deceased  ; 
if  that,  moreover,  were  the  only  proposition  at  issue,  then  the 
direction  would  be  to  find  a  verdict  for  the  proponent  if  this  fact  of 
absence  were  believed.  The  result  is  the  same  as  in  the  preceding 
form  of  the  process  (c'),  L  e.  the  opponent  loses  as  a  matter  of  law,  iu 
default  of  evidence  to  the  contrary  ;  in  other  words,  the  presumption 
creates  for  the  opponent  a  duty  of  producing  evidence,  in  default  of 
which  he  loses  as  a  matter  of  legal  ruling,  the  matter  not  being  open 

»  TSee  Annlston  Bank  r.  Committee,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  134;    Cable  v.  R.  Co.,  id.  29 

S.  E.  377.] 

2)  [See  Delaware  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Converse,  139  U.  S.  469;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
McDonald.  152  id.  262,  284  ;  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  v.  Lucker,  U.  S.  App.,  77  Fed.  243; 
Com.  v.  Magee,  Pa.  1873,  12  Cox  (Jr.  549.] 


102  BUEDEN   OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VL 

for  the  jury,  and  the  risk  of  non-persuasion,  which  applies  only  to 
the  jury's  deliberations,  having  ceased  to  affect  the  proponent.  This 
particular  form  of  the  process,  however  (c"),  happens  to  have  become 
known  as  a  presumption.  The  term  "  presumption  "  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  much  confused  usage.  The  particular  ambiguity  which  we  need 
here  to  guard  against  is  the  confusion  between  the  inference  itself  — 
i.  e.  the  propriety  of  making  the  inference  from  the  evidence  to  the 
factum  probandum  21  —  and  the  effect  of  the  inference  in  the  hands  of 
the  judge.  So  far  as  "  presumption  "  means  anything  for  the  present 
purpose,  it  signifies  a  ruling  as  to  the  duty  of  producing  evidence. 
"  The  essential  character  and  operation  of  presumptions,  so  far  as  the 
law  of  evidence  is  concerned,  is  in  all  cases  the  same,  whether  they 
be  called  by  one  name  or  the  other  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  throw  upon 
the  party  against  whom  they  work  the  duty  of  going  forward  with 
the  evidence ;  and  this  operation  is  all  their  effect,  regarded  merely 
in  their  character  as  presumptions."  22  Keeping  in  mind,  then,  that 
a  presumption  signifies  a  ruling  of  law,  and  that  to  this  extent  the 
matter  is  in  the  judge's  hands  and  not  the  jury's,  what  is  the  effect 
upon  the  legal  situation  of  the  opponent  if  he  does  respond  to  this  duty 
and  comes  forward  with  other  evidence  against  the  fact  presumed  ? 
When  he  has  thus  fulfilled  his  duty  under  the  ruling  of  law,  he  puts 
himself  out  of  the  hands  of  the  judge  and  his  ruling,  and  finds  him- 
self back  again  in  the  hands  of  the  jury.  He  is  precisely  where  the 
proponent  was  in  the  first  place  when  he  fulfilled  the  duty,  then  his, 
of  producing  evidence  and  succeeded  in  getting  from  the  judge  to  the 
jury.  The  case  is  now  open  again  as  to  that  specific  issue,  i.  e.  free 
from  any  liability  to  a  ruling  of  law  against  either  side,  and  is  before 
the  jury,  where  the  proponent  (as  ever,  when  the  issue  is  open  to  the 
jury)  has  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  sense  of  the  risk  of  non- 
persuasion  of  the  jury.  The  important  thing  is  that  there  is  now  no 
longer  in  force  any  ruling  of  law  requiring  the  jury  to  find  according 
to  the  presumption.  "All  is  then  turned  into  an  ordinary  question 
of  evidence,  and  the  two  or  three  general  facts  presupposed  in  the 
rule  of  presumption  take  their  place  with  the  rest,  and  operate,  with 
their  own  natural  force,  as  a  part  of  the  total  mass  of  probative  mat- 
ter. .  .  .  The  main  point  to  observe  is  that  the  rule  of  presumption 
has  vanished ;  "  28  because  its  function  was  as  a  legal  rule  to  settle  the 
matter  only  provisionally,  and  to  cast  upon  the  opponent  the  duty  of 
producing  evidence,  and  this  duty  and  this  legal  rule  he  has  satisfied.24 

21  [This  is  one  of  the  earlier  uses  of  "presumption  ;"  it  is  in  effect  an  equivalent  of 
"inference."    Such  are  Coke's  "presumptions,   whereof  there  be  three  sorts,  viz., 
violent,  probable,  and  light  or  temerary :  "  Co.  Litt.  6,  6.  This  is  what  is  usually 
meant  by  "  presumption  of  fact,"  post,  §§  14  yt  44  ;  see,  in  general,  Thayer,  ubi  supra, 
313.]     ' 

22  TThayer,  ubi-  supra,  339.1 
28  rThayer,  ubi  supra,  346.  J 

24  LThe  following  passage  trom  Professor  Abbott's  article,  already  mentioned,  will 
serve  to  illustrate  the  general  situation  involved  in  the  duty  of  producing  evidence: 


§§  I4tt>-14 X.]      BURDEN  OF  PROOF:  MEANING,   AND  TESTS.  103 

(d)  Are  there  any  further  stages  in  this  possible  shifting  of  the 
duty  of  producing  evidence  ?  It  is  conceivable  that  the  proponent 
may  be  able  to  invoke  other  presumptions,  though  this  is  not 
common.  But  may  not  the  opponent  go  further  than  produce  evi- 
dence sufficient  to  remove  the  presumption  ?  May  he  not  only  get 
the  issue  opened  before  the  jury  again,  but  also  go  further  and  raise 
what  may  be  termed  a  counter-presumption  in  his  favor,  so  that  the 
proponent  will  find  himself  in  his  original  position  at  the  opening  of 
the  trial,  namely,  subject  to  the  duty  of  producing  sufficient  evidence 
to  go  to  the  jury,  under  penalty,  in  case  of  default,  of  suffering  a  ruling 
against  him  by  the  judge  as  a  matter  of  law  ?  This  result  is  possible 
in  principle,  and  there  are  instances  of  it,  though  rare  ;  for  example, 
a  plaintiff,  in  an  action  for  the  burning  of  his  property  by  the  defend- 
ant railway-company's  negligence,  created  a  presumption  of  negligence 
by  showing  the  setting  of  the  fire  by  sparks  from  the  defendant's 
locomotive ;  the  duty  of  producing  evidence  was  thus  put  upon  the 
defendant,  who  not  only  removed  it  by  producing  evidence  sufficient 
to  go  to  the  jury,  but  by  showing  the  proper  construction,  equipment, 
and  inspection  of  the  locomotive  was  held  to  have  raised  a  pre- 
sumption that  it  had  not  been  negligent  and  thus  to  be  entitled  to  a  rul- 
ing by  the  judge  against  the  plaintiff,  taking  the  case  from  the  jury.25 

The  important  practical  distinction  between  these  two  senses  of 
"  burden  of  proof  "  seems  thus  to  be  that  the  risk  of  non-persuasion 
operates  when  the  case  has  come  into  the  hands  of  the  jury,  while  the 
duty  of  producing  evidence  implies  a  liability  to  a  ruling  by  the 
judge  disposing  of  the  issue  without  leaving  the  question  open  to 
the  jury's  deliberations.] 

§  14  x.  Burden  of  Proof ;  Senses  of  the  Term  ;  Tests  for  ascertain- 
ing the  Burden;  Shifting  of  the  Burden.  [(1)  The  term  "  burden  of 
proof"  is  used  commonly  as  applying  equally  to  the  two  preceding 
kinds  of  situations,  and  often  is  applied  in  both  senses  in  the  same 
judicial  opinion.  Apart,  therefore,  from  the  difficulty  of  some  of 
the  problems  of  law  germane  to  each  situation,  peculiar  confusion  is 
added  by  the  unfortunate  ambiguity  of  the  terms  of  discussion. 
There  is  at  this  day  a  fairly  widespread  acceptance  and  understand- 

"  To  use  a  homely  illustration,  a  civil  jury  trial  may  be  compared  to  a  game  of  shuffle- 
board.  The  first  and  nearest  to  the  player  is  the  field  of  mere  scintillas ;  if  the  plain- 
tiff's evidence  halts  there,  he  is  lost.  The  next,  or  middle,  field  is  that  of  balancing 
probabilities  :  if  his  evidence  reaches  and  rests  there,  he  gets  to  the  jury ;  but  they 
alone  can  decide  the  cause,  and  they  may  decide  it  either  way,  or  may  disagree.  The 
third  and  last  field  is  that  of  legal  conclusion  :  if  his  evidence  can  be  pushed  into  that 
division,  he  is  entitled  to  his  victory  at  the  hands  of  the  judge,  and  the  jury  cannot 
draw  it  into  doubt;  but  before  the  judge  can  do  so,  the  defendant  has  a  right  to  give 
evidence,  and  that  evidence  may  bring  the  plaintiff's  evidence  back  into  doubt  again, 
and  leave  the  case  in  the  field  of  balancing  probabilities." 

26  fJMenomenie  E.  S.  &  D.  Co.  v.  R,  Co.,  91  Wis.  447  ;  the  opinion  particularly  dis- 
tinguishes previous  cases  in  which  the  defendant  had  merely  removed  the  presumption 
against  him  by  evidence  sufficient  to  go  to  the  jury,  but  had  not  raised  a  counter-pre- 
sumption requiring  a  ruling  of  the  judge  in  his  favor.] 


104  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND  PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VL 

ing,  in  judicial  utterances,  of  the  distinction  between  the  two  things 
themselves,  the  risk  of  non-persuasion  of  the  jury,  and  the  duty  of 
going  forward  with  evidence  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  ruling  of  the 
judge ;  and  the  law  which  regulates  respectively  this  risk  and  this 
duty  is  in  most  respects  either  generally  settled  or  is  the  subject  of 
local  differences  of  decision  (some  of  the  chief  features  of  which 
have  just  been  noted)  whose  lines  of  dispute  are  not  difficult  to 
discern ;  and  the  main  source  of  difficulty  lies  in  the  interchange- 
able uses  of  the  term  "burden  of  proof,"  which  forces  the  judges 
from  time  to  time  to  distinguish,  explain,  and  even  repudiate  former 
judicial  utterances  employing  analogous  language  but  dealing  with 
distinct  situations;  and  thus  there  is  an  appearance  (and  to  some 
extent,  a  reality)  of  confusion  in  the  precedents  on  the  subject. 

(2)  As  to  the  tests  for  determining  the  burden  of  proof,  it  has 
already  been  pointed  out  that  (a)  for  the  one  burden,  the  risk  of 
non-persuasion,  the  substantive  law  and  the  pleadings,  primarily, 
serve  to  do  this,  and,  subsidiarily,  a  rule  of  practice,  within  the 
stage  of  a  single  pleading,  may  further  apportion  the  burden;  but 
this  apportionment  depends  ultimately  on  broad  considerations  of 
policy,  and,  for  individual  instances,  there  is  nothing  to  do  but 
ascertain  the  rule,  if  any,  that  has  been  judicially  determined  for 
that  particular  class  of  cases,  (b)  For  the  other  burden,  the  duty 
of  going  forward  with  evidence,  there  is  always,  at  the  outset,  such 
a  duty  for  the  party  having  the  first  burden,  or  risk  of  non-persua- 
sion, until  by  some  rule  of  law  (either  by  a  specific  ruling  of  the  judge 
upon  the  particular  evidence,  or  by  the  aid  of  an  appropriate  pre- 
sumption, or  by  matter  judicially  noticed)  this  line  is  passed ;  then 
comes  the  state  in  which  there  is  no  such  duty  of  law  for  either 
party  (although,  if  the  proponent  has  invoked  some  presumption, 
this  stage  is  immediately  passed  over) ;  and  then,  either  by  a  ruling 
on  the  general  mass  of  evidence,  or  by  the  aid  of  some  applicable 
presumption,  the  duty  of  law  arises  anew  for  the  opponent;  and 
finally,  it  may  supposably,  by  similar  modes,  be  later  re-created  for 
the  proponent.  There  is  therefore  no  one  test,  of  any  real  signifi- 
cance, for  determining  the  incidence  of  this  duty ;  at  the  outset  the 
test  is  furnished  by  ascertaining  who  has  the  burden  of  proof,  in  the 
sense  of  the  risk  of  non-persuasion,  under  the  pleadings  or  other  rules 
declaring  what  facta  probanda  are  the  ultimate  facts  of  each  party's 
case ;  a  little  later,  the  test  is  whether  the  proponent  has  by  a  ruling 
of  the  judge  (based  on  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence,  or  a  presump- 
tion, or  a  fact  judicially  noticed)  fulfilled  this  duty ;  later  on,  it  will 
be  whether  the  proponent,  by  a  ruling  of  the  judge  upon  a  presump- 
tion or  the  evidence  as  a  whole,  has  created  a  duty  for  the  propon- 
ent ;  and  still  later,  whether,  for  the  purposes  of  the  judge's  ruling, 
the  proponent  has  satisfied  this  duty.  It  has  been  suggested l  as  a 
1  QBest,  Evidence,  $  268.J 


§  14z.]      BURDEN   OF  PROOF;   TESTS;    SHIFTING   THE   BURDEN.       105 

test  that  "the  test  ought  in  strict  accuracy  to  be  expressed  thus, 
namely :  which  party  would  be  successful  if  no  evidence  at  all,  or 
no  more  evidence  (as  the  case  may  be),  were  given?"  But  it  is 
obvious  that  this  is  not  a  test,  in  any  sense  of  being  a  useful  mode 
for  ascertaining  the  unknown  from  the  known;  it  is  simply  defining 
and  re-stating  in  other  words  the  effect  of  this  duty  of  producing 
evidence;  it  says  "the  burden  of  proof,  in  this  sense,  means  that 
the  party  liable  to  it  will  lose  as  a  matter  of  judicial  ruling  if  no 
evidence  or  no  more  evidence  is  given  by  hir& ; "  and  this  does  not 
solve  the  main  problem  of  determining  which  is  the  party  thus  liable 
to  these  consequences. 

(3)  As  to  the  "shifting"  of  the  burden  of  proof,  (a)  The  first 
burden  above  described  —  the  risk  of  non-persuasion  —  never  shifts, 
since  no  fixed  rule  of  law  can  be  said  to  shift.  The  law  of  plead- 
ing, or,  within  the  stage  of  a  given  pleading,  some  further  rule  of 
practice,  fixes  beforehand  the  facts  respectively  apportioned  to  the 
case  of  each  party ;  and  each  party  may  know  beforehand,  from 
these  rules,  what  facts  will  be  a  part  of  his  case,  so  far  as  concerns 
the  ultimate  risk  of  non-persuasion.  He  will  know  from  these  rules 
that  such  facts,  whenever  the  time  comes,  will  be  his  to  prove, 
and  not  the  other  party's ;  and  that  they  will  not  be  sometimes 
his  and  sometimes  the  other's,  or  possibly  his  and  possibly  the 
other's.  The  other  party  and  himself  will  of  course  have  their 
turns  in  proving  their  respective  facta  probanda  (though  under  a 
strict  system  of  pleading  these  turns  of  proof  will  be  more  clearly 
fixed  before  trial,  and  may  occur  at  different  stages  and  not  the 
same  stage  of  the  cause);  and  the  putting-in  of  evidence  may 
therefore  "shift"  in  the  sense  that  each  will  take  his  turn  in 
proving  the  respective  propositions  apportioned  to  him.  But  the 
burden  does  not  "shift"  in  any  real  sense;  for  each  may  ascertain 
beforehand  from  rules  of  law  the  facta  probanda  apportioned  to 
him,  and  this  apportionment  will  always  remain  as  thus  fixed,  to 
whatever  stage  the  cause  may  progress.  (£)  The  second  kind  of 
burden,  however  —  the  duty  of  producing  evidence,  a  duty  of  satis- 
fying the  judge,  —  does  have  this  characteristic  referred  to  as  a 
"shifting."  It  is  the  same  kind  of  a  duty  for  both  parties,  but  it 
may  be  (within  the  same  stage  of  pleading  and  upon  the  same  issue 
and  during  one  burden  of  the  first  sort)  at  one  time  upon  one  party 
and  at  another  time  upon  the  other,  and,  moreover,  neither  party 
can  ascertain  beforehand  at  what  time  it  will  come  upon  him  a  or 
cease  to  be  upon  him  or  by  what  evidence  it  will  be  removed  or 
created,  —  except  so  far  as  a  presumption  has  by  a  rule  of  law 
been  laid  down  as  determining  the  effect  attached  to  certain  facts. 
Moreover,  in  a  distinctive  sense,  this  kind  of  burden  "  shifts  "  and 

2  [^Except  that  it  comes  first  upon  the  proponent  having  the  burden  of  proof  in  the 
former  sense. 3 


106  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VL 

the  other  does  not,  in  that  during  the  unchanged  prevalence  of  the 
first  kind  of  burden  for  one  party,  the  second  kind  may  be  shared 
in  turn  by  one  and  the  other,  though  the  first  —  the  risk  of  non- 
persuasion  of  the  jury,  should  the  case  be  left  in  their  hands  —  has 
not  come  to  an  end.8 

(4)  Finally,  the  whole  situation  is  complicated,  quite  apart  from 
any  ambiguity  of  terms,  by  the  operation  of  presumptions  upon 
specific  fragments  of  the  issue  under  a  single  pleading,  in  combina- 
tion with  the  established  practice  of  leaving  the  whole  pleading  to 
the  jury  for  a  general  verdict.  For  example,  suppose  that  the  whole 
of  the  plaintiff's  case  and  the  whole  proposition  as  to  which  he  has 
the  burden  of  proof  in  the  first  sense  and  the  whole  of  the  issue 
under  the  pleadings  is  that  A  is  dead  without  heirs ;  suppose  that 
the  plaintiff  has  offered  testimony  that  A  has  been  for  seven  years 
absent  from  home  and  unheard  from,  and  that  there  is  also  testi- 
mony in  contradiction  of  these  facts  from  the  defendant  and  also 
testimony  from  both  sides  as  to  the  existence  of  heirs.  Here  it  is 
obvious  that  the  case  is  not  in  the  hands  of  the  judge  to  order  a 
verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  first,  because  the  death  of  the  plaintiff, 
assuming  the  presumption  from  absence  to  determine  this,  is  not 
the  only  proposition  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  case,  and,  secondly, 
because  he  cannot  pass  upon  the  truth  of  the  plaintiff's  contradicted 
testimony  as  to  absence  and  therefore  it  cannot  then  be  known 
whether  the  fact  exists  on  which  the  presumption  operates;  and 
thus  the  case  is  still  in  appearance  in  the  hands  of  the  jury. 
Nevertheless,  the  matter  is  still  in  the  hands  of  the  judge  (in 
theory  of  law,  at  least)  as  much  as  it  ever  was ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  presumption  or  rule  of  law  still  operates  that  the  fact  of 
absence  for  seven  years  unheard  from  is  to  be  taken,  by  a  rule 
of  law  independent  of  the  jury's  belief,  as  equivalent  to  death, 
in  the  absence  of  any  explanatory  facts  to  the  contrary  from  the 
defendant.  This  rule  of  law  is  still  applied,  notwithstanding  the 
additional  elements  in  the  case ;  for  the  judge  will  instruct  the  jury 
that  if  they  find  the  fact  of  absence  for  seven  years  unheard  from, 
and  find  no  explanatory  facts  to  account  for  it,  then  by  a  rule  of 
law  they  are  to  take  for  true  the  fact  of  death  and  are  to  reckon 

8  ["For  the  language  of  the  Courts  (not  always  clear  or  correct)  on  this  subject,  see 
the  following  citations  collected  by  former  editors  of  this  work  Q  |  Scott  v.  Wood,  81 
Cal.  400 ;  Powers  v.  Russell,  13  Pick.  69  ;  Buraham  v.  Allen,  1  Gray  500  ;  Blanchard 
v.  Young,  11  Gush.  345;  Delano  v.  Bartlett,  6  id.  364;  Jennison  v.  Stafford,  1  id. 
168  ;  Spaulding  v.  Hood,  8  id.  605  ;  Eaton  v.  Alger,  47  N.  Y.  351  ;  Caldwell  v.  New 
Jersey  Steam  Navigation  Co.,  ib.  290  ;  Kitner  v.  Whitlock,  88  111.  513;  Pickup  v. 
Thames  Ins.  Co.,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  Div.  594;  Willett  t».  Rich,  142  Mass.  356  ;  Nichols 
v.  Munsell,  115  id.  567  ;  Simpson  v.  Davis,  119  id.  269  ;  Crowninshield  v.  Crownin- 
shield,  2  Gray  524  ;  Heinemann  v.  Heard,  62  N.  Y.  448  ;  Cass  v.  R.  Co.,  14  All.  448  ; 
Perley  v.  Perley,  141  Mass.  104;  Phipps  v.  Mahon,  141  id.  471  ;  Com.  v.  McKie, 
1  Gray  61 ;  State  ».  Wingo,  66  Mo.  181  ;  Black  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  368  ;  State  v. 
Patterson,  45  Vt.  808.  |  [jBut  the  Massachusetts  cases  are  in  some  respects  peculiar  ; 
see  the  comments  on  them  in  Thayer,  ubi  supra,  pp.  379,  387.] 


§§  14z-14y.]    SHIFTING  OF  BURDEN;  KINDS  OF  PRESUMPTIONS.    107 

upon  it  accordingly  in  making  up  their  verdict  upon  the  whole 
issue.  The  situation  here  is  even  simpler  than  it  is  in  perhaps 
the  majority  of  issues  in  litigation ;  so  that  the  theoretical  effect 
of  presumptions  as  legal  rulings  affecting  the  duty  of  producing 
evidence  tends  to  be  lost  sight  of,  in  that  the  issue  does  go  to  the 
jury  and  the  case  of  the  opponent  of  the  presumption  is  appar- 
ently not  brought  to  an  end  by  a  ruling  of  the  judge.  Neverthe- 
less, in  theory  this  legal  effect  is  merely  postponed,  and  will  have 
due  place  if  the  jury  understands  the  instructions  and  does  its  duty.] 
§  14  y.  Presumptions  of  Law  and  of  Fact ;  Conclusive  Presump- 
tions ;  Conflicting  Presumptions ;  Prima  facie  Evidence.  [(1)  The 
distinction  between  presumptions  "  of  law  "  1  and  presumptions  "  of 
fact " 2  is  in  truth  the  difference  between  things  that  are  in  reality 
presumptions  (in  the  sense  explained  above)  and  things  that  are  not 
presumptions  at  all.  A  presumption,  as  already  explained,  is  in  its 
characteristic  feature  a  rule  of  law  laid  down  by  the  judge  and  attach- 
ing to  one  evidentiary  fact  certain  consequences  as  to  the  production 
of  evidence  by  the  opponent.  They  are  based,  in  their  policy,  upon 
the  probative  strength,  as  a  matter  of  reasoning  and  inference,  of  the 
evidentiary  fact ;  but  the  presumption  is  not  the  fact  itself  nor  the 
inference  itself,  but  the  legal  consequence  attached  to  it.  The  legal 
consequence  removed,  the  inference,  as  a  matter  of  reasoning,  may 
still  remain ;  and  a  presumption  of  fact,  in  the  usual  sense,  is  merely 
an  improper  term  for  the  rational  potency,  or  probative  value,  of  the 
evidentiary  fact,  regarded  as  not  having  this  necessary  legal  con- 
sequence. "  They  are,  in  truth,  but  mere  arguments,"  *  and  "  depend 
upon  their  own  natural  force  and  efficacy  in  generating  belief  or  con- 
viction in  the  mind."  *  They  have  no  significance  so  far  as  affects 
the  duty  of  one  or  the  other  party  to  produce  evidence,  because  there 
is  no  rule  of  law  attached  to  them,  and  the  jury  may  give  to  them 
whatever  force  or  weight  it  thinks  best,  —  just  as  it  may  to  other 
evidence.  There  may  be  a  preliminary  question  whether  the  evi- 
dence is  relevant  and  admissible  as  having  any  probative  value  at 
all ; 4  but,  once  it  is  admitted,  the  probative  strength  of  the  evidence 
is  for  the  jury  to  consider ; 6  and,  so  long  as  the  law  attaches  no 
legal  consequences  in  the  way  of  a  duty  upon  the  opponent  to  coine 
forward  with  contrary  evidence,  there  is  no  propriety  in  applying  the 
term  "  presumption "  to  such  facts,  however  great  their  probative 
significance.  The  employment  here  of  the  term  "presumption"  is 
due  simply  to  historical  usage,  by  which  "  presumption  "  was  origi- 
nally a  term  equivalent,  in  one  sense,  to  "  inference ; "  '  and  the 

'Post,  §  33.' 


'Post,  §  44.1 
"Post,  §  44.1 
See  ante,  Chapter 


OCO     CC/H.O,     */CHb£W;i      •  •  J 

"See  the  author's  concordant  remarks  in  §  48,  post.~^ 

"As  iu  the  passage  from  Coke,  cited  supra  ;  so  Abbott,  C.  J.,  as  late  as  1820,  in 


108  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

distinction  between  presumptions  of  fact  and  of  law  was  a  mere  bor- 
rowing of  misapplied  Continental  terms.7  There  is  in  truth  but  one 
kind  of  a  presumption ;  and  the  term  "  presumption  of  fact "  should 
be  discarded  as  useless  and  confusing.8 

(2)  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  there  be  such  a  thing,  in  strictness, 
as  a  "conclusive  presumption."  9     Wherever  from  one  fact  another  is 
conclusively  presumed,  in  the  sense  that  the  opponent  is  absolutely 
precluded  from  showing  by  any  evidence  that  the  second  fact  does 
not  exist,  the  rule  really  provides  that,  where  the  first  fact  is  shown 
to  exist,  the  second  fact's  existence  is  wholly  immaterial  for  the  pur- 
pose of  the  proponent's  case  ; 10  and  to  provide  this  is  to  make  a  rule 
of  substantive  law,  and  not  a  rule  apportioning  the  burden  of  per- 
suading as  to  certain  propositions  or  varying  the  duty  of  coming 
forward  with  evidence.     The  term  has  no  place  in  the  principles  of 
evidence11  (although  the  history  of  a  "  conclusive  presumption  "  often 
includes  a  genuine  presumption  as  its  earlier  stage  ia),  and  should  be 
discarded. 

(3)  Presumptions  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as  "  conflicting."    But, 
in  the  sense  above  explained,  presumptions  do  not  conflict.     The  evi- 
dentiary facts,  free  from  any  rule  of  law  as  to  the  duty  of  producing 
evidence,  may  tend  to  opposite  inferences,  which  may  be  said  to  con- 
flict.    But  the  rule  of  law  which  prescribes  this  duty  of  production 
either  is  or  is  not  at  a  given  time  upon  a  given  party.     If  it  is,  and 
he  removes  it  by  producing  contrary  evidence,  then  that  presumption, 
as  a  rule  of  law,  is  satisfied  and  disappears  ;  he  may  then  by  his  evi- 
dence succeed  in  creating  another  presumption  which  now  puts  the 
same  duty  upon  the  other  party,  who  may  in  turn  be  able  to  dispose 
of  it  satisfactorily.     But  the  same  duty  cannot  at  the  same  time  exist 
for  both  parties,  and  thus  in  strictness  the  presumptions  raising  the 
duty  cannot  conflict.     There  may  be  successive  shiftings  of  the  duty, 
by  means  of  presumptions  successively  invoked  by  each  ;  but  it  is  not 
the  one  presumption  that  overturns  the  other,  for  the  mere  introduc- 
tion of  sufficient  evidence  would  have  the  same  effect  in  stopping  the 
operation  of  the  presumption  as  a  rule  of  law.     This  shifting  of  the 
duty  of  production  of  evidence,   by  reason  of  the  successive  invoca- 

TL  v.  Burdett,  4  B.  &  Aid.  161 :  "  A  presumption  of  any  fact  is  properly  an  inferring 
of  that  fact  from  other  facts  that  are  known  ;  it  is  an  act  of  reasoning."  Compare 
Professor  Thayer's  account  (p.  317  ff.)  of  the  progress  in  various  instances  from  the 
mere  suggestion  of  such  inferences  to  the  creation  of  rules  of  law  attached  to  them.] 

7  fSee  Thayer,  ubi  supra,  p.  343. ] 

8  Dn  §§  33-48  some  of  the  things  termed  "  presumptions  of  law  "  are  in  truth 
merely  "presumptions  of  fact,"  and  vice  versa.^] 


9  rPost,  §  15."] 
13  r  \— " 


_Willard,  A.  J.,  in  State  v.  Platt,  2  S.  C.  150,  154  :  "  Where  several  independent 
acts  are  required  to  be  performed  in  order  to  accomplish  a  given  result,  to  say  that 
proof  of  the  performance  of  one  of  them  shall  be  admitted  as  conclusive  proof  of  the 
performance  of  the  other,  is  to  say  in  effect  that  one  alone  is  really  requisite. "] 

PFor  a  possible  exception,  see  the  discussion  post,  §  97  rf.l 
u  ("See  instances  in  Thayer,  ubi  tupra,  p.  317  If.,  &nd  post,  §§  17,  46.] 


§  14?/.]     KINDS  OF  PRESUMPTIONS;  PRIMA  FACIE  EVIDENCE.       109 

tion  of  different  presumptions,  may  create  a  complicated  situation 
difficult  to  work  out ;  but  it  can  more  properly  be  spoken  of  as  a 
case  of  successive  presumptions  than  of  conflicting  presumptions ; 
and  the  ultimate  key  to  the  situation  is  very  often  found  by  ascer- 
taining the  incidence  of  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  other  sense,  f.  e. 
the  ultimate  risk  of  non-persuasion.18 

(4)  The  term  "prima  facie  evidence  "  or  "prima  facie  case  "  is 
used  in  two  senses,  and  it  is  often  difficult  to  detect  which  of  these 
is  intended  in  the  passage  in  hand,  (a)  In  discussing  presump- 
tions, the  term  "prima  facie"  is  often  used  as  equivalent  to  the 
notion  of  a  presumption,  even  in  the  strict  sense  of  a  ruling  of  the 
judge  putting  upon  the  opponent  the  duty  of  producing  evidence.14 
In  other  words,  the  terra  is  thus  applied  to  the  stage  of  the  case 
noted  in  a  preceding  section  (§  14  w)  as  (e')  and  (c"),  namely,  where 
the  proponent,  having  the  burden  of  proving  the  issue  (i.  e.  the  risk 
of  non-persuasion  of  the  jury),  has  not  only  removed  by  sufficient 
evidence  the  duty  of  producing  evidence,  to  get  to  the  jury,  but  has 
gone  further,  and,  either  by  means  of  a  presumption  or  by  a  general 
mass  of  strong  evidence,  has  entitled  himself  to  a  ruling  that  the  op- 
ponent should  fail  if  he  does  nothing  more  in  the  way  of  producing 
evidence.  This  usage  for  the  term  is  not  an  objectionable  one,  if 
clearly  signified ;  it  is,  in  fact,  a  useful  one,  for  it  serves  to  subsume 
under  one  name  the  similar  legal  effects,  (c')  and  (c"),  produced  by  a 
presumption  or  by  a  ruling  on  the  evidence  in  the  particular  case. 
(6)  But  it  is  also,  and  clearly  enough,  found  used  in  a  very  differ- 
ent sense,  as  representing  the  stage  noted  in  a  foregoing  section 
(§  14  w)  as  (a),  namely,  where  the  proponent,  having  the  first  duty  of 
producing  some  evidence  in  order  to  pass  the  judge  to  the  jury,  has 
fulfilled  that  duty,  satisfied  the  judge,  and  may  properly  claim  that 
the  jury  be  allowed  to  consider  his  case.  This  sufficiency  of  evidence 
to  go  to  the  jury  (the  significance  of  which  is  that  the  proponent  is 
no  longer  liable  to  a  nonsuit  or  to  a  setting  aside  of  the  verdict  as 
against  evidence)  is  also  often  referred  to  as  a,  prima  facie  case.18  In 

13  [[See  some  good  instances  of  these  situations  worked  out  by  Professor  Thayer,  ubi 
supra,  pp.  343-350  ;   quoted  post,  §  35.J 

14  [_E.  g.,  Bowen,  L.  J.,  in  Abrath  v.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  11  Q.  B.  D.  440,  455,  32  W.  R. 
50,  53  :   "  If  he  [the  plaintiff]  makes  a  prima  facie  case,  and  nothing  is  done  by  the 
other  side  to  answer  it,  the  defendant  fails  ; "   Mansfield,  C.  J.,  in  Banbury  Peerage 
Case,  1  Sim.  &  St.  153  :    "In  every  case  in  which  there  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  any 
right  existing  in  any  person,  the  onus  probandi  is  always  upon  the  person  or  party  call- 
ing such  right  in  question  ;  "  Best,  Evidence,  §  273  :  "The  burden  of  proof  is  shifted 
...  by  every  species  of  evidence  strong  enough  to  establish  a  prima  facie  case  against 
a  party."] 

15  £So,  for  example,  Story,  J.,  in  Crane  v.  Morris,  6  Pet.  598,  621  (referring  to  evi- 
dence of  a  deed):  "Whenever  evidence  is  offered  to  the  jury  which  is  in  its  nature 
prima  facie  proof,  .  .   .  whatever  just  influence  it  may  derive  from  that  character,  the 
jury  have  a  right  to  give  it ;  .  .  .  the  law  has  submitted  it  to  them  to  decide  for  them- 
selves."    In  the  following  Irish  case,  the  obscurity  of  the  legal  phrase  was  brought  out 
by  a  question  from  an  intelligent  juror  :  R.  v.  O'Doherty,  6  State  Tr.  x.  8.  831,  873  ; 
Peimefather,  B.,  charging  the  jury,  in  a  prosecution  for  publishing  an  article  with 


110  BURDEN  OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

this  sense  the  phrase  is  used  to  emphasize  the  distinction  between 
evidence  which  is  merely  admissible,  so  far  as  the  various  rules  of 
evidence  might  have  excluded  it,  and  evidence  which,  being  all  the  evi- 
dence offered  by  the  proponent,  is  still  not  enough  in  quantity  to  be 
worth  submitting  to  the  jury.16  The  difference  between  the  two 
senses  of  the  term  is  practically  of  much  consequence ;  for,  in  the 
latter  sense,  it  means  merely  that  the  proponent  is  safe  in  having  re- 
lieved himself  of  his  duty  of  going  forward,  while  in  the  former 
sense  it  signifies  that  he  has  further  succeeded  in  creating  it  anew 
for  his  opponent.  One  of  the  chief  fields  of  its  use,  and  therefore  of 
an  unfortunate  obscurity  in  the  significance  of  the  rulings,  is  in  the 
proof  of  execution  of  attested  documents,17  or  of  the  identity  of  the 
person  signing  them,18  or  of  the  authentication  of  ancient  writings,19 
where  it  is  often  difficult  to  determine  whether  the  effect  of  the  rul- 
ing is  merely  that  the  document  may  be  read  or  amounts  to  directing 
the  jury  to  take  it  for  genuine.] 

2.    Various  Specific  Presumptions. 

§  15.  Kinds  of  Presumptions.  The  general  head  of  Presumptive 
Evidence1  is  usually  divided  into  two  branches;  namely,  presump- 
tions of  law  and  presumptions  of  fact.  Presumptions  of  Law  con- 
sist of  those  rules  which,  in  certain  cases,  either  forbid  2  or  dispense  2 
with  any  ulterior  inquiry.  They  are  founded,  either  upon  the  first 
principles  of  justice;  or  the  laws  of  nature;  or  the  experienced 
course  of  human  conduct  and  affairs,  and  the  connection  usually 

seditious  intent :  "  The  publishing  them  is  certainly  prima  facie  evidence  against  him, 
as  being  the  registered  proprietor  [of  the  newspaper]  ;"  a  juror:  "There  is  a  differ- 
ence of  opinion  among  the  jurors  ;  some  hold  that,  from  your  lordship  stating  there 
being  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  prisoner's  guilt,  we  should  at  once  go  to  find  him 
guilty;  others  receiving  the  phrase  thus,  that  your  lordship  did  not  mean  to  convey 
that  it  was  sufficient  [to  require  that  finding]  ;  "  Pennefather,  B.  :  "I  did  not  mean, 
gentlemen,  to  direct  you  or  tell  you  that  in  point  of  law,  because  he  was  the  publisher 
and  proprietor  of  the  paper,  he  therefore  necessarily  knew  the  contents.  I  did  not 
mean  to  convey  that.  But  I  told  you  that  it  was  evidence  that  he  did  know  the  con- 
tents,  and  that  you  were  to  form  your  judgment  upon  the  whole  of  the  case,  reading 
the  documents  and  the  evidence."] 

18  fJAs  in  a  case  already  cited  (Benoit  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  48  N.  E.  524),  where  it 
was  ruled,  the  plaintiff  having  to  show  the  defendant's  scientcr  of  a  horse's  unmanage- 
able disposition,  that  a  single  instance  of  its  having  run  away,  though  admissible  evi- 
dence, was  not  sufficient  evidence  to  go  to  the  jury  .J 

"  rPost,  §  575.] 

«    'Post,  §  575  a.~\ 

10       *7V--J       O     tr>~e    t    "H 


[Post,  §  575  b.  J 


1  (^Presumptive  evidence  is  an  older  term  for  inferences  or  circumstantial  evidence  : 
supra,  §  14  y.  It  is  not  "presumptive  evidence"  that  is  here  to  be  classified,  but 
presumptions.  The  procedural  rules  called  presumptions  are  different  things  from 
the  evidential  material  formerly  termed  presumptive  evidence  :  see  ante.,  §  14  w.~\ 

a  [These  two  words  are  not  to  lie  taken  as  interchangeable,  but  represent  radically 
different  principles.  When  A  offers  to  prove  fact  Z  by  evidence  M,  to  "dispense"  A 
from  offering  further  evidence  (i.  e.  to  put  upon  B  the  duty  of  going  forward  with  evi- 
dence to  meet  A's  evidence)  is  one  thing ;  and  to  "  forbid  "  B  to  offer  any  such  evidence 
to  meet  A 'a  is  a  very  different  and  quite  the  opposite  thing.] 


§§  14y-16.]  KINDS   OF  PRESUMPTIONS.  Ill 

found  to  exist  between  certain  things.  The  general  doctrines  of 
presumptive  evidence  are  not  therefore  peculiar  to  municipal  law, 
but  are  shared  by  it  in  common  with  other  departments  of  science. 
Thus,  the  presumption  of  a  malicious  intent  to  kill,  from  the  delib- 
erate use  of  a  deadly  weapon,  and  the  presumption  of  aquatic  habits 
in  an  animal  found  with  webbed  feet,  belong  to  the  same  philosophy ; 
differing  only  in  the  instance,  and  not  in  the  principle,  of  its  appli- 
cation. The  one  fact  being  proved  or  ascertained,  the  other,  its 
uniform  concomitant,  is  universally  and  safely  presumed.  It  is 
this  uniformly  experienced  connection  which  leads  to  its  recogni- 
tion by  the  law  without  other  proof;  the  presumption,  however, 
having  more  or  less  force,  in  proportion  to  the  universality  of  the 
experience.  And  this  has  led  to  the  distribution  of  presumptions 
of  law  into  two  classes;  namely,  conclusive  and  disputable. 

Conclusive,  or,  as  they  are  elsewhere  termed,  imperative,  or  abso- 
lute presumptions  of  law  are  rules  determining  the  quantity  of 
evidence  requisite  for  the  support  of  any  particular  averment  which 
is  not  permitted  to  be  overcome  by  any  proof  that  the  fact  is 
otherwise.  They  consist  chiefly  of  those  cases  in  which  the  long- 
experienced  connection,  before  alluded  to,  has  been  found  so  general 
and  uniform  as  to  render  it  expedient  for  the  common  good  that 
this  connection  should  be  taken  to  be  inseparable  and  universal. 
They  have  been  adopted  by  common  consent,  from  motives  of  public 
policy,  for  the  sake  of  greater  certainty,  and  the  promotion  of 
peace  and  quiet  in  the  community;  and  therefore  it  is  that  all 
corroborating  evidence  is  dispensed  with,  and  all  opposing  evidence 
is  forbidden.* 

§  16.  Limitation  of  Claims.  Sometimes  this  common  consent  is 
expressly  declared,  through  the  medium  of  the  Legislature,  in  stat- 

8  The  presumption  of  the  Roman  law  is  denned  to  be,  —  "  Conjecture,  ducta  ab  eo, 
quod  ut  plurinmra  fit.  Ea  conjecture,  vel  a  lege  inducitur,  vel  a  judice.  Qua  ab 
ipsa  lege  inducitur,  vel  ita  comparata,  ut  probationem  contrarii  haud  admittat  ;  vel  ut 
eadem  possit  elidi.  Priorem  doctores  prtzsumptionem  JURIS  ET  DE  JURE,  posteriorcin 
prcEStimptionem  JURIS,  adpellant.  Quae  a  Judice  indicitur  conjecture,  prcesumptio 
HOMINIS  vocari  solet ;  et  semper  admittit  probationem  contrarii,  quamvis,  si  alicujus 
momenti  sit,  probandi  onere  relevet."  Hein.  ad  Pand.,  pars.  4,  §  124.  Of  the  former, 
answering  to  our  conclusive  presumption,  Mascardus  observes,  —  "  Super  hac  praesump- 
tione  lex  firmum  sancit  jus,  et  earn  pro  veritate,  habet."  De  Probationibus,  vol.  i, 
qusest.  x,  48. 

pt  is  obvious,  however,  that,  so  far  as  all  opposing  evidence  is  forbidden  and  fur- 
ther investigation  into  the  truth  is  stopped,  just  so  far  the  question  ceases  to  be  one  of 
evidence.  To  say  that  the  troth  of  a  fact  is  immaterial  and  will  not  be  investigated 
is  to  say  that  the  fact  itself  is  immaterial  for  the  purposes  of  the  demandant's  right ; 
and  to  say  this  is  to  lay  down  a  proposition  of  substantive  law  as  to  the  facts  essential 
as  elements  of  a  claim  or  defence.  Thus  these  so-called  conclusive  presumptions  are  in 
reality  rules  of  substantive  law  (ante,  §  14  j/).  The  only  doubtful  instances  are  those 
in  which  an  official  makes  a  record  of  something  done  before  him,  and  then  this  record 
is  taken  as  true  and  cannot  be  disputed,  or  can  be  disputed  only  in  case  of  fraud  or  the 
like.  Here  it  seems  not  always  possible  to  say  that  the  record  of  the  official  becomes 
the  final  and  only  material  element  of  the  inquiry  ;  the  act  done  before  him  seems  still 
to  be  the  important  thing,  —  as  in  the  case  of  a  witness'  testimony  before  a  magistrate. 
The  principle  of  this  class  of  instances  ia  discussed  post,  §  97  rf-H 


112  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

utes.  Thus,  by  the  statutes  of  limitation,  where  a  debt  has  been 
created  by  simple  contract,  and  has  not  been  distinctly  recognized, 
within  six  years,  as  a  subsisting  obligation,  no  action  can  be  main- 
tained to  recover  it;  that  is,  it  is  conclusively  presumed  to  have 
been  paid.  A  trespass,  after  the  lapse  of  the  same  period,  is,  in  like 
manner,  conclusively  presumed  to  have  been  satisfied.  \So  the  pos- 
session of  land,  for  the  length  of  time  mentioned  in  the  statutes  of 
limitation,  under  a  claim  of  absolute  title  and  ownership,  constitutes, 
against  all  persons  but  the  sovereign,  a  conclusive  presumption  of  a 
valid  grant.1  j 

§  17.  Title  by  Prescription.  In  other  cases,  the  common  consent, 
by  which  this  class  of  legal  presumptions  is  established,  is  declared 
through  the  medium  of  the  judicial  tribunals,  it  being  the  common 
law  of  the  land ;  both  being  alike  respected,  as  authoritative  declara- 
tions of  an  imperative  rule  of  law,  against  the  operation  of  which  no 
averment  or  evidence  is  received.  Thus,  the  uninterrupted  enjoy- 
ment of  an  incorporeal  hereditament,  for  a  period  beyond  the 
memory  of  man,  is  held  to  furnish  a  conclusive  presumption  of  a 
prior  grant  of  that  which  has  been  so  enjoyed.  This  is  termed  a 
title  by  prescription.1  If  this  enjoyment  has  been  not  only  uninter- 
rupted, but  exclusive  and  adverse  in  its  character,  for  the  period  of 

1  This  period  has  been  limited  differently  at  different  times  ;  but,  for  the  last  fifty 
years,  it  has  been  shortened  at  succeeding  revisions  of  the  law,  both  in  England  and 
the  United  States.  By  Stat.  3  &  4  Wm.  IV,  c.  27,  all  real  actions  are  barred  after 
twenty  years  from  the  time  when  the  right  of  action  accrued.  And  this  period  is 
adopted  in  most  of  the  United  States,  though  in  some  of  the  States  it  is  reduced  to 
seven  years,  while  in  others  it  is  prolonged  to  fifty  :  see  3  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  31,  c.  2, 
the  synopsis  of  Limitations  at  th«  end  of  the  chapter  (Greenleafs  ed.);  see  also  4  Kent 
Comm.  188,  note  (a);  post,  Vol.  II,  §§  537-546.  The  same  period  in  regard  to  the 
title  to  real  property,  or  as  some  construe  it,  only  to  the  profits  of  the  land,  is  adopted 
in  the  Hindu  law  :  see  McNaghten's  Elements  of  Hindu  Law,  vol.  i,  p.  201. 

1  3  Cruise's  Dig.  430,  431  (Greenleafs  ed.).  "  Praescriptio  est  titulus,  ex  usu  et 
tempore  substantiam  capiens,  ad  authoritate  legis."  Co.  Litt.  113  a.  What  length  of 
time  constitutes  this  period  of  legal  memory  has  been  much  discussed  among  lawyers. 
In  this  country,  the  Courts  are  inclined  to  adopt  the  periods  mentioned  in  the  statutes 
of  limitation,  in  all  cases  analogous  in  principle  :  Coolidge  v.  Learned,  8  Pick.  504  ; 
Melvin  v.  Whiting,  10  Pick.  295;  Ricard  v.  Williams,  7  Wheat.  110  ;  {post,  Vol.  II, 
§§  537,  546.  |  In  England,  it  is  settled  by  Stat.  2  &  3  Wm.  IV,  c.  71,  by  which  the 
period  of  legal  memory  has  been  limited  as  follows  :  In  cases  of  rights  of  common  or 
other  benefits  arising  out  of  lands,  except  tithes,  rents,  and  services,  prima  facie  to 
thirty  years ;  and  conclusively  to  sixty  years,  unless  proved  to  have  been  held  by  con- 
sent, expressed  by  deed  or  other  writing ;  in  cases  of  auuatic  rights,  ways,  and  other 
easements,  prima  facie  to  twenty  years  ;  and  conclusively  to  forty  years,  unless  proved 
in  like  manner,  by  written  evidence,  to  have  been  enjoyed  by  consent  of  the  owner  ; 
and,  in  cases  of  lights,  conclusively  to  twenty  years,  unless  proved  in  like  manner,  to 
have  been  enjoyed  by  consent.  In  the  Roman  Law,  prescriptions  were  of  two  kinds,  — 
extinctive  and  acquisitive.  The  former  referred  to  rights  of  action,  which,  for  the  most 
part,  were  barred  by  the  lapse  of  thirty  years.  The  latter  had  regard  to  the  mode  of 
acquiring  property  by  long  and  uninterrupted  possession  ;  and  this,  in  the  case  of  im- 
movable or  real  property,  was  limited,  inter  prccsentes,  to  ten  years,  and,  inter  absentee, 
to  twenty  years.  The  student  will  find  this  doctrine  fully  discussed  in  Mackeldey's 
Compendium  of  Modern  Civil  Law,  vol.  i,  pp.  200-205,  290  et  xeq.  (Amer.  ed.),  with 
the  learned  notes  of  Dr.  Kaufman.  See  also  Novel.  119,  c.  7,  8.  fJ3ee  the  reference 
to  this  presumption  in  Thayer,  ubi  tupra,  317.] 


§§  16-18.]     PEESUMPTIONS  AS  TO  PRESCRIPTION,  INTENT,  LIBEL.     113 

twenty  years,  this  also  has  been  held,  at  common  law,  as  a  conclu- 
sive presumption  of  title.2  There  is  no  difference,  in  principle, 
whether  the  subject  be  a  corporeal  or  an  incorporeal  hereditament; 
a  grant  of  laud  may  as  well  be  presumed  as  a  grant  of  a  fishery,  or 
a  common,  or  a  way.8  But,  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  possession 
alone  for  a  period  of  time,  unaccompanied  by  other  evidence,  as 
affording  a  presumption  of  title,  a  difference  is  introduced,  by  rea- 
son of  the  statute  of  limitations,  between  corporeal  subjects,  such 
as  lands  and  tenements,  and  things  incorporeal;  and  it  has  been 
held,  that  a  grant  of  lands,  conferring  an  entire  title,  cannot  be 
presumed  from  mere  possession  alone,  for  any  length  of  time  short 
of  that  prescribed  by  the  statute  of  limitations.  The  reason  is,  that, 
with  respect  to  corporeal  hereditaments,  the  statute  has  made  all 
the.  provisions  which  the  law  deems  necessary  for  quieting  posses- 
sions; and  has  thereby  taken  these  cases  out  of  the  operation  of 
the  common  law.  The  possession  of  lands,  however,  for  a  shorter 
period,  when  coupled  with  other  circumstances  indicative  of  owner- 
ship, may  justify  a  jury  in  finding  a  grant ;  but  such  cases  do  not 
fall  within  this  class  of  presumptions.4 

§  18.  Natural  Consequences  of  Acts;  Intent;  Murder;  Libel;  etc. 
Thus,  also,  a  sane  man  is  conclusively  presumed  to  contemplate 
the  natural  and  probable  consequences  of  his  own  acts;  and,  there- 
fore, the  intent  to  murder  is  conclusively  inferred  from  the  deliberate 
use  of  a  deadly  weapon.1  So  the  deliberate  publication  of  calumny, 

2  Tyler  v.  Wilkinson,  4  Mason  397,  402;  Ingraham  v.  Hutchinson,  2  Conn.  584; 
Bealey  v.  Shaw,  8  East  208,  215  ;  Wright  v.  Howard,  1  Sim.  &  Stu.  190,  203 ;  Strick- 
ler  v.  Todd,  10  Serg.  &  Rawle  63,  69  ;  Balston  v.  Bensted,  1  Campb.  463,  465  ;  Daniel 
v.  North,  11  East  371  ;  Sherwood  v.  Burr,  4  Day  244  ;  Tinkham  v.  Arnold,  3  Greenl. 
120;  Hill  v.  Crosby,  2  Pick.  466.  See  Best  on  Presumptions,  p.  103,  n.  (m)  ;  Bolivar 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Neponset  Manuf.  Co.,  16  Pick.  241.  See  also  post,  VoL  II,  §§  537-546, 
tit  PRESCRIPTION 

'*  Ricard  v.  Williams,  7  Wheat.  109 ;  Prop'rs  of  Brattle-Street  Church  v.  Bullard, 
2  Met.  363. 

*  Simmer  v.  Child,  2  Conn.  607,  628-632,  per  Gould,  J. ;  Clark  v.  Faunce,  4  Pick. 
245  ;  fjsee  their  treatment  post,  §§  45, 46.] 

1  1  Russ.  on  Crimes,  658-660  ;  R.  v.  Dixon,  3  M.  &  S.  15  ;  1-  Hale  P.  C.  440, 
441  ;  Britton,  50,  §  6.  But  if  death  does  not  ensue  till  a  year  and  a  day  (that  is,  a  full 
year)  after  the  stroke,  it  is  conclusively  presumed  that  the  stroke  was  not  the  sole 
cause  of  the  death,  and  it  is  not  murder  :  4  Bl.  Comm.  197  ;  Glassford  on  Evid.  592. 
The  doctrine  of  presumptive  evidence  was  familiar  to  the  Mosaic  Code,  even  to  the 
letter  of  the  principle  stated  in  the  text.  Thus,  it  is  laid  down  in  regard  to  the 
manslayer,  that  "  if  he  smite  him  with  an  instrument  of  iron,  so  that  he  die  ;  "  or,  "if 
be  smite  him  with  throwing  a  stone  wherewith  he  may  die,  and  he  die ;  or,  "if  he 
smite  him  with  a  hand-weapon-  of  steel  wherewith  he  may  die,  and  he  die,  he  is  a 
murderer."  See  Numb,  xxxv,  16,  17.  Here,  every  instrument  of  iron  is  conclusively 
taken  to  be  a  deadly  weapon  ;  and  the  use  of  any  such  weapon  raises  a  conclusive  pre- 
sumption of  malice.  The  same  presumption  arose  from  lying  in  ambush,  and  thence 
destroying  another.  Id.  v.  20.  But,  in  other  cases,  the  existence  of  malice  was  to 
be  proved,  as  one  of  the  facts  in  the  case  ;  and,  in  the  absence  of  malice,  the  offence 
was  reduced  to  the  degree  of  manslaughter,  as  at  the  common  law.  Id.  v.  22,  23. 
This  very  reasonable  distinction  seems  to  have  been  unknown  to  the  Gentoo  Code, 
which  demands  life  for  life  in  all  cases,  except  where  the  culprit  is  a  Brahmin.  "  If  a 
man  deprives  another  of  life,  the  magistrate  shall  deprive  that  person  of  life."  Hal- 
VOL.  I.  — 8 


114  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND    PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

which  the  publisher  knows  to  be  false,  or  has  no  reason  to  believe 
to  be  true,  raises  a  conclusive  presumption  of  malice.2  So  the 
neglect  of  a  party  to  appear  and  answer  to  process,  legally  com- 
menced in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  he  having  been  duly 
served  therewith  and  summoned,  is  taken  conclusively  against  him 
as  a  confession  of  the  matter  charged.8  [It  is  commonly  said  that 

hed's  Gentoo  Laws,  book  16,  §  1,  p.  233.  Formerly,  if  the  mother  of  an  illegitimate 
child,  recently  born  and  found  dead,  concealed  the  fact  of  its  birth  and  death,  it  was 
conclusively  presumed  that  she  murdered  it.  Stat.  21  Jac.  I,  c.  37,  probably  copied 
from  a  similar  edict  of  Henry  II,  of  France,  cited  by  Dornat.  But  this  unreasonable 
and  barbarous  rule  is  now  rescinded,  both  in  England  and  America. 

The  subject  of  implied  malice,  from  the  unexplained  fact  of  killing  with  a  lethal 
weapon,  was  fully  discussed  in  Com.  v.  York,  9  Met.  103,  upon  a  difference  of  opinion 
among  the  learned  judges,  and  the  rule  there  laid  down,  in  favor  of  the  inference, 
was  reaffirmed  in  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  305. 

jln  Com.  v.  Hawkins,  3  Gray  463,  Chief  Justice  Shaw  said  that  the  doctrine  of 
York's  Case  is  that,  where  the  killing  is  proved  to  have  been  committed  by  the  defend- 
ant, and  nothing  furt/ier  is  shown,  the  presumption  of  law  is  that  it  was  malicious,  and 
an  act  of  murder,  and  that  it  was  inapplicable  to  a  case  when  the  circumstances  attend- 
ing the  homicide  were  fully  shown  by  the  evidence  ;  that,  in  such  a  case,  the  homicide 
being  conceded,  and  no  excuse  being  shown,  it  was  either  murder  or  manslaughter,  and 
that  the  jury,  upon  all  the  circumstances,  must  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that  it  was  done  with  malice,  before  they  could  find  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder. 
This  qualification  of  the  rule  in  York's  Case  limits  the  application  of  the  rule  very 
much,  for  in  very  few  cases  will  the  killing  by  the  defendant  be  the  only  thing  shown. 
The  circumstances  in  every  case  will  tend  to  prove  or  to  disprove  malice,  which  then 
becomes  a  question  of  fact  to  be  decided  by  the  jury.  This  view  of  the  rule  is  in 
accord  with  Hawthorne  v.  State,  58  Miss.  778  ;  State  v.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  308  ;  State  t>. 
McDonnell,  32  id.  491  ;  Brown  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  275  ;  Whart.  Homicide,  §§  669, 
671 ;  State  v.  Smith,  77  N.  C.  488  ;  State  v.  Knight,  43  Me.  12  ;  Stokes  v.  People,  53 
N.  Y.  164 ;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  id.  218.  Cf.  Com.  v.  McKie,  1  Gray,  61 ;  [>ee  People 
v.  Wolf,  95  Mich.  625  ;  State  v.  Whitson,  111  N.  C.  695  ;  Gilbert  v. "State,  90  Ga.  691; 
Terr.  v.  Lucero,  N.  M.,  46  Pac.  18  ;  Herman  v.  State,  Miss.,  22  So.  872.]  In  Ken- 
tucky (Farm  v.  Com.,  14  Bush  362)  and  Louisiana  (State  v.  Swayze,  30  La.  An.  1323 ; 
State  v.  Tribas,  32  id.  1086)  it  is  said  that  there  is  no  such  presumption  as  that 
stated  in  York's  Case.  The  presumption  is  in  any  event  rebuttable,  however,  and  it 
may  be  that  it  will  be  rebutted  by  the  evidence  for  the  prosecution.  If  so,  no  evidence 
need  be  put  in  by  the  defendant  on  this  point.  If  not,  he  must  introduce  evidence  to 
rebut  the  presumption. 

On  indictments  for  malicious  mischief,  wilful  injuries,  and  similar  offences,  where 
malice,  i.  e.  a  spirit  of  wanton  cruelty  or  wicked  revenge,  is  a  necessary  ingredient 
in  the  offence,  this  will  have  to  be  proved,  unless  the  unlawful  act  which  constitutes 
the  crime  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  give  rise  to  a  natural  inference  of  malice,  or  has 
been  judicially  decided  to  be  a  malicious  act ;  evidence  may  be  given  by  the  defendant  to 
rebut  this  proof  of  malice.  R.  v.  Matthews,  14  Cox  Cr.  C.  5;  People  v.  Hunt,  8  Pac. 
C.  L.  J.  590  ;  State  v.  Heaton,  77  N.  C.  505 ;  U.  S.  v.  Imsand,  1  Woods  C.  C.  581 ; 
Seibright  v.  State,  2  W.  Va.  591  ;  State  v.  Hessenkamp,  17  Iowa  25.} 

2  Bodwell  v.  Osgood,  3  Pick.  379  ;  Haire  v.  Wilson,  9  B.  &  C.  643  ;  R.  v.  Shipley, 
4  Doug.  73,  177,  per  Ashhurst,  J.;  {see  post,  Vol.  II,  §  418.} 

3  2  Erskine,  Inst.  780.     Cases  of  this  sort  are  generally  regulated  by  statutes,  or  by 
the  rules  of  practice  established  by  the  Courts  ;  but  the  principle  evidently  belongs  to 
a  general  jurisprudence.     So  is  the  Roman  law :   "Contumacia,  eorutn,  qui,  jus  dicenti 
non  obtemperant,  litis  damno  coercetur  :"  Dig.  lib.  42,  tit.  1,  1.  53  ;  "Si  citatus  ali- 
quis  non  compareat,  habetur  pro  consentiente :  "   Mascard,  de  Prob.  vol.  iii,  p.  253, 
concl.  1159,  n.  26 ;  see  further  on  this  subject,  infra,  §§  204-211.     The  right  of  the 
party  to  have  notice  of  the  proceedings  against  him,  before  his  non-appearance  is  taken 
aa  a  confession  of  the  matter  alleged,  has  been  distinctly  recognized  in  the  Courts  both 
of  England  and  America,  as  a  rule  founded  in  the  first  principles  of  natural  justice, 
and  of  universal  obligation :   Fisher  v.    Lane,  3  Wils.  302,  303,   per  Lee,  C.  J. ;   The 
Mary,  9  Cranch  144,  per  Marshall,  C.  J. ;   Bradstreet  v.  Ncptuue  Ins.  Co.,  3  Sumn. 
607,  per  Story,  J. 


§§  18-20.]     PRESUMPTIONS  AS  TO  RECORDS,  LEGAL  FORMALITIES.    115 

every  man  is  presumed  to  know  the  law ;  but  this  is  merely  another 
way  of  holding  that,  for  the  purpose  of  the  substantive  law  in  haud, 
ignorance  of  it  is  immaterial.4] 

§  19.  Correctness  of  Records.  Conclusive  presumptions  are  also 
made  in  favor  of  judicial  proceedings.  Thus  the  records  of  a  court 
of  justice  are  presumed  to  have  been  correctly  made;1  a  party  to  the 
record  is  presumed  to  have  been  interested  in  the  suit ; a  and  after 
verdict,  it  will  be  presumed  that  those  facts,  without  proof  of  which 
the  verdict  could  not  have  been  found,  were  proved,  though  they  are 
not  expressly  and  distinctly  alleged  in  the  record ;  provided  it  con- 
tains terms  sufficiently  general  to  comprehend  them  in  fair  and  reason- 
able intendment.8  The  presumption  will  also  be  made,  after  twenty 
years,  in  favor  of  every  judicial  tribunal  acting  within  its  jurisdiction, 
that  all  persons  concerned  had  due  notice  of  its  proceedings.4  A  like 
presumption  is  also  sometimes  drawn  from  the  solemnity  of  the  act 
done,  though  not  done  in  court.  Thus  a  bond  or  other  specialty  is 
presumed  to  have  been  made  upon  good  consideration,  as  long  as  the 
instrument  remains  unim  peached.8 

§  20.  Observance  of  Legal  Formalities.  To  this  class  of  legal 
presumptions  may  be  referred  one  of  the  applications  of  the  rule, 
"  Ex  diuturnitate  temporis  omnia  prsesumuntur  rite  et  solenniter  esse 
acta ; "  namely,  that  which  relates  to  transactions,  which  are  not  of 
record,  the  proper  evidence  of  which,  after  the  lapse  of  a  little  time, 
it  is  often  impossible,  or  extremely  difficult  to  produce.  The  rule 
itself  is  nothing  more  than  the  principle  of  the  statutes  of  limitation, 
expressed  in  a  different  form,  and  applied  to  other  subjects.  Thus, 

«  {See  instances  in  U.  S.  v.  Anthony,  11  Blatchf.  C.  C.  200  ;  Com.  v.  Bagley, 
7  Pick.  279;  Brent  ».  State,  43  Ala.  297;  R.  v.  Esop,  7  C.  &  P.  456;  Barronet's 
Case,  1  £.  &  B.  1 ;  R.  v.  Esop,  7  C.  &  P.  456  ;  Finch  v.  Mansfield,  97  Mass.  89,  92. } 

1  Reed  v.  Jackson,  1  East  355 ;  "  Kes  judicata  pro  veritate  accipitur  : "  Dig.  lib.  50, 
tit.  17,  I.  207.     Qt  would  seem,  in  truth,  that  the  records  are  the  judicial  acts  them- 
selves ;  the  law  as  to  what  constitutes  a  judicial  act  and  whether  it  must  be  in  writing 
is  the  law  here  coucerned  :  see  post,  §  86.] 

2  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Pet.  209. 

«  Jackson  v.  Pesked,  1  M.  &  S.  234,  237,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough ;  Stephen  on  PL 
166,  167  (Tyler's  ed.  163,  164)  ;  Spiers  v.  Parker,  1  T.  R.  141  ;  {see  Beale  v.  Com.,  25 
Pa,  St.  11;  Blake  v.  Lyon  Company,  77  N.  Y.  626;  Lathrop  v.  Stuart,  5  McLean 
C.  C.  167;  Sprague  v.  Litherberry,  4  id.  442;  Hardiman  v.  Herbert,  11  Tex.  656; 
Morrison  ».  Woolson,  9  Fost.  N.  H.  510  ;  Com.  v.  Blood,  97  Mass.  538.  | 

*  Brown  v.  Wood,  17  Mass.  68.  A  former  judgment,  still  in  force,  by  a  Court  of 
competent  jurisdiction,  in  a  suit  between  the  same  parties,  is  conclusive  evidence,  u{K>n 
the  matter  directly  in  question  in  such  suit,  in  any  subsequent  action  or  proceeding: 
Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  20  Howell  St.  Tr.  355  ;  Ferrer's  Case,  6  Co.  7.  The  effect 
of  judgments  will  lie  further  considered  hereafter  :  §§  528-543. 

6  Lowe  v.  Peers,  4  Burr.  2225.  j  It  is  sometimes  said  that  there  is  a  conclusive 
presumption  that  legislative  and  judicial  acts  are  in  force  on  every  part  of  ths.  day  speci- 
fied :  Re  Wellman,  20  Vt.  653  ;  but  this  is  only  a  way  of  stating  that  the  policy  of 
that  subject  requires  the  fractions  of  a  day  to  be  ignored  ;  and  for  purposes  of  deter- 
mining private  rights  these  fractions  will  be  inquired  into  where  policy  permits  it :  see 
Ex  parte  D'Obree,  8  Ves.  83  (Sumner's  ed.),  note  (a)  ;  Re  Richardson,  2  Story  571  ; 
Ferris  «.  Ward,  9  111.  499  ;  Lang  t>.  Phillips,  27  Ala.  311;  Whittaker  v.  Wisley,  9  Eng. 
L.&Eq.  45.} 


116  BURDEN   OF   PKOOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.    VL 

where  an  authority  is  given  by  law  to  executors,  administrators,  guar- 
dians, or  other  officers  to  make  sales  of  lands,  upon  being  duly  licensed 
by  the  Courts,  and  they  are  required  to  advertise  the  sales  in  a  partic- 
ular manner,  and  to  observe  other  formalities  in  their  proceedings;  the 
lapse  of  sufficient  time  (which  in  most  cases  is  fixed  at  thirty  years)1 
raises  a  conclusive  presumption  that  all  the  legal  formalities  of  the 
sale  were  observed.2  The  license  to  sell,  as  well  as  the  official  char- 
acter of  the  party,  being  provable  by  record  or  judicial  registration, 
must  in  general  be  so  proved ;  and  the  deed  is  also  to  be  proved  in 
the  usual  manner ;  it  is  only  the  intermediate  proceedings  that  are 
presumed.  "Probatis  extremis,  praesumuntur  media."8  The  reason 
of  this  rule  is  found  in  the  great  probability  that  the  necessary  inter- 
mediate proceedings  were  all  regularly  had,  resulting  from  the  lapse 
of  so  long  a  period  of  time,  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  parties  ad- 
versely interested ;  and  in  the  great  uncertainty  of  titles,  as  well  as 
the  other  public  mischiefs,  which  would  result,  if  strict  proof  were 
required  of  facts  so  transitory  in  their  nature,  and  the  evidence  of 
which  is  so  seldom  preserved  with  care.  Hence  it  does  not  extend 
to  records  and  public  documents,  which  are  supposed  always  to  re- 
main in  the  custody  of  the  officers  charged  with  their  preservation, 
and  which,  therefore,  must  be  proved,  or  their  loss  accounted  for,  and 
supplied  by  secondary  evidence.4  Neither  does  the  rule  apply  to 
cases  of  prescription.6 

§  21.  Genuineness  of  Ancient  Instruments.  The  same  principle 
applies  to  the  proof  of  the  execution  of  ancient  deeds  and  wills. 
Where  these  instruments  are  more  than  thirty  years  old,  and  are 
unblemished  by  any  alterations,  they  are  said  to  prove  themselves ; 
the  bare  production  thereof  is  sufficient :  the  subscribing  witnesses 
being  presumed  to  be  dead.1  This  presumption,  so  far  as  this  rule 

1  See  Pejepscot  Prop'rs  v.  Ransom,  14  Mass.  145;   Blossom  v.  Cannon,  id.  177; 
Colinan  v.  Anderson,  10  Mass.  105.     In  some  cases,  twenty  years  has  been  held  suffi- 
cient, —  as,  in  favor  of  the  acts  of  sheriffs  :  Dronet  ?>.  Rice,  2  Rob.  La.  374.     So,  after 
partition  of  lands  by  an  incorporated  land  company,  and  a  several  possession,  accord- 
ingly, for  twenty  years,  it  was  presumed  that  its  meetings  were  duly  notified  :  Society, 
etc.  v.  Young,  2  N.  H.  310  ;  Williams  v.  Eyton,  4  H.  &  N.  357 ;  s.  c.  5  Jur.  N.  s.  770. 
j  For  instances  of  such  presumptions,  see  King  v.  Little,  1  Gush.  436  ;  Freeman  v. 
Thayer,  33  Me.  76  ;  Cobleigh  v.  Young,  15  N.  H.  493  ;  Freeholders  of  Hudson  Co.  v. 
State,  4  Zabr.  718  ;  State  v.  Lewis,  2  id.  564 ;  Allegheny  v.  Nelson,  25  Pa.  St.  332  ; 
Plank-road  Co.  v.  Bruce,  6  Md.  457 ;  Enimons  v.  Oldham,   12  Tex.  18 ;  Austin  ». 
Austin,  50  Me.  74  ;  Stevens  v.  Taft,  3  Gray  487. } 

2  [Tor  instances  of  this  principle  applied  in  the  shape  of  ordinary,  not  conclusive 
presumptions,  see  post,  §  38  a.] 

8  2  Erskine  Inst.  782  ;  Earl  v.  Baxter,  2  W.  Bl.  1228.  Proof  that  one's  ancestor 
sat  in  the  House  of  Lords,  and  that  no  patent  can  be  discovered,  affords  a  presump- 
tion that  he  sat  by  summons :  The  Braye  Peerage,  6  Cl.  &  Fin.  757.  See  also,  as  to 
presuming  the  authority  of  an  executor,  Piatt  v.  McCullough,  1  McLean,  73. 

4  Brunswick  v.  McKeen,  4  Greenl.  508 ;  Hathaway  v.  Clark,  5  Pick.  490.  fJSee 
also,  in  general,  j>ost,  §  38  «.] 

6  Eldridge  v.  Knott,  Cowp.  215  ;  Mayor  of  Kingston  v.  Horner,  id.  102. 

1  R.  v.  Farringdon,  2  T.  R.  471,  per  Duller,  J.;  Doe  v.  Wolley,  8  B.  &  C.  22 ; 
Bull.  N.  P.  255;  12  Vin.  Abr.  84  ;  Gov.  &c.  of  Chelsea  Waterworks  ».  Cowper,  1  Esp. 
275 ;  R.  i>.  Ryton,  5  T.  R.  259;  R.  v.  Long  Uuckby,  7  East  45 ;  M'Kenire  v.  Fraaei; 


§§20-22.]     PRESUMPTION,  ANCIENT  INSTRUMENTS  ;   ESTOPPELS.      117 

of  evidence  is  concerned,  is  not  affected  by  proof  that  the  wit- 
nesses are  living.  But  it  must  appear  that  the  instrument  comes 
from  such  custody  as  to  afford  a  reasonable  presumption  in  favor  of 
its  genuineness ;  and  that  it  is  otherwise  free  from  just  grounds  of 
suspicion;2  and,  in  the  case  of  a  bond  for  the  payment  of  money, 
there  must  be  some  indorsement  of  interest  or  other  mark  of  genuine- 
ness, within  the  thirty  years,  to  entitle  it  to  be  read.8  Whether,  if 
the  deed  be  a  conveyance  of  real  estate,  the  party  is  bound  first  to 
show  some  acts  of  possession  under  it,  is  a  point  not  perfectly  clear 
upon  the  authorities  ;  but  the  weight  of  opinion  seems  in  the  nega- 
tive, as  will  hereafter  be  more  fully  explained.4  But  after  an  undis- 
turbed possession  for  thirty  years,  of  any  property,  real  or  personal, 
it  is  too  late  to  question  the  authority  of  the  agent,  who  has  under- 
taken to  convey  it,6  unless  his  authority  was  by  matter  of  record. 

§  22.  Estoppels.1  Estoppels  may  be  ranked  in  this  class  of  pre- 
sumptions. A  man  is  said  to  be  estopped,  when  he  has  done  some 
act  which  the  policy  of  the  law  will  not  permit  him  to  gainsay  or 
deny.  The  law  of  estoppel  is  not  so  unjust  or  absurd  as  it  has  been 
too  much  the  custom  to  represent.2  Its  foundation  is  laid  in  the 
obligation  which  every  man  is  under  to  speak  and  act  according  to 
the  truth  of  the  case,  and  in  the  policy  of  the  law,  to  prevent  the 
great  mischiefs  resulting  from  uncertainty,  confusion,  and  want  of 
confidence  in  the  intercourse  of  men,  if  they  were  permitted  to  deny 
that  which  they  have  deliberately  and  solemnly  asserted  and  received 
as  true.  If  it  be  a  recital  of  facts  in  a  deed,  there  is  implied  a  solemn 
engagement  that  the  facts  are  so  as  they  are  recited.  The  doctrine 
of  estoppels  has,  however,  been  guarded  with  great  strictness ;  nob 
because  the  party  enforcing  it  necessarily  wishes  to  exclude  the 
truth,  —  for  it  is  rather  to  be  supposed  that  that  is  true  which  the 
opposite  party  has  already  solemnly  recited,  —  but  because  the  estop- 
pel may  exclude  the  truth.  Hence  estoppels  must  be  certain  to 
every  intent ;  for  no  one  shall  be  denied  setting  up  the  truth,  unless 

9  Yes.  5 ;  Oldnall  v.  Deakin,  3  C.  &  P.  402  ;  Jackson  v.  Blanshan,  3  Johns.  292 ;  Winn 
v.  Patterson,  9  Peters  674,  675 :  Bank  U.  S.  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  70,  71  5 
Henthorn  v.  Doe,  1  Blackf.  157  ;  Bennett  v.  Runyon,  4  Dana  422,  424  ;  Cook  v.  Tot- 
ton,  6  id.  110;  Thruston  v.  Masterson,  9  id.  233;  Hynde  v.  Vattier,  1  McLean  115; 
Walton  v.  Coulson,  ib.  124  ;  Northrup  v.  Wright,  24  Wend.  221.  [This  subject  is 
treated  more  fully  post,  §§  570,  575  a.  But  it  is  not  an  instance  of  a  conclusive  pre- 
sumption, and  probably  not  of  a  presumption  of  any  sort.  The  above  circumstances 
are  merely  sufficient  evidence  to  go  to  the  jury,  under  the  principle  of  §  14  w,  ante.^ 

2  Roe  v.  Rawlings,  7  East  279,  291  ;  12  Vin.  Abr.  84,  Evid.  A,  b.  5;  Swinnerton  v. 
Marquis  of  Stafford,  3  Taunt.  91  ;  Jackson  v.  Davis,  5  Cowen  123  ;  Jackson  v.  Lu- 
quere,  ib.  221 ;  Doe  v.  Beynon,  4  P.  &  D.  193;  Doe  v.  Samples,  3  Nev.  &  P.  254. 

«  Forbes  v.  Wale,  1  W.  Bl.  532;  1  Esp.  278  ;  s.  C.  infra,  §§  121,  122. 


4  Infra,  §  144;  [transferred  post,  as  §  575  a.] 
6  Stockbridge  v.  West  Stockbridge,  14  " 


Mass.  257.  Where  there  had  been  a  posses- 
sion of  thirty-five  years,  under  a  legislative  grant,  it  was  held  conclusive  evidence  of  a 
good  title,  though  the  grant  was  unconstitutional  :  Trustees  of  the  Episcopal  Church 
in  Newbern  v.  Trustees  of  Newbern  Academy,  2  Hawks  233. 

1  [Other  aspects  of  this  subject  are  dealt  with  post,  §§  204,  207-211-] 

2  Per  Taunton,  J.,  2  Ad.  &  El.  291. 


118  BUKDEN   OF  PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS,  [CH.  VL 

it  is  in  plain  and  clear  contradiction  to  his  former  allegations  and 
acts.8 

§  23.  Same:  Estoppel  by  Recitals  in  Deeds.  In  regard  to  recitals 
in  deeds,  the  general  rule  is  that  all  parties  to  a  deed  are  bound  by 
the  recitals  therein,1  which  operates  as  an  estoppel,  working  on  the 
interest  in  the  land,  if  it  be  a  deed  of  conveyance  and  binding  both 
parties  and  privies ;  privies  in  blood,  privies  in  estate,  and  privies  in 
law.  Between  such  parties  and  privies,  the  deed  or  other  matter 
recited  needs  not  at  any  time  be  otherwise  proved,  the  recital  of  it  in 
the  subsequent  deed  being  conclusive.  It  is  not  offered  as  secondary, 
but  as  primary  evidence,  which  cannot  be  averred  against,  and  which 
forms  a  muniment  of  title.  Thus,  the  recital  of  a  lease,  in  a  deed  of 
release,  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  lease  against 
the  parties,  and  all  others  claiming  under  them  in  privity  of  estate.2 

8  Bowman  v.  Taylor,  2  Ad.  &  El.  278,  289,  per  Ld.  C.  J.  Denman;  ib.  291,  per 
Taunton,  J. ;  Lainson  v.  Tremere,  1  Ad.  &  El.  792  ;  Pelletreau  v.  Jackson,  11  Wend. 
117  ;  4  Kent  Comm.  261,  note ;  Carver  v.  Jackson,  4  Peters  83. 

jit  must  also  appear  that  the  party  pleading  the  estoppel  is  or  may  be  prejudiced  by 
the  act  on  which  he  claims  to  estop  :  Nourse  v.  Nourse,  116  Mass.  101  ;  Security  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Fay,  22  Mich.  467  ;  Bank  of  Hindustan  v.  Alison,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  227.  Estop- 
pels, by  matter  of  record  and  by  deed,  will  not  operate  conclusively  unless  they  be 
expressly  pleaded  when  an  opportunity  of  pleading  them  has  been  afforded  :  Bradley 
v.  Beckett,  7  M.  &  G.  994 ;  see  also  2  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  670  et  seq.  If  not  pleaded, 
they  will  be  presumed  to  be  waived  :  Outram  v.  Morewood,  3  East  346  ;  Matthew  v. 
Osborne,  13  C.  B.  919  ;  Wilson  v.  Butler,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  748  ;  Young  ».  Raincock, 
7  C.  B.  310.  If,  however,  no  opportunity  has  been  afforded  to  plead,  they  may  be 
offered  in  evidence  with  the  same  effect  as  if  pleaded:  Adams  v.  Barnes,  17  Alass.  365  ; 
Trevivan  v.  Lawrance,  1  Salk.  276;  Lord  Feversham  v.  Emerson,  11  Exch.  385.  See 
Bigelow  on  Estoppel,  for  the  general  subject.} 

1  But  it  is  not  true,  as  a  general  proposition,  that  one  claiming  land  under  a  deed 
to  which  he  was  not  a  party,  adopts  the  recitals  of  facts  in  an  anterior  deed,  which  go 
to  make  up  his  title.  Therefore,  where,  by  a  deed  made  in  January,  1796,  it  was  re- 
cited that  S  became  bankrupt  in  1781,  and  that,  by  virtue  of  the  proceedings  under 
the  commission,  certain  lands  had  been  conveyed  to  W,  and  thereupon  W  conveyed 
the  same  lands  to  B  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  him  to  make  a  tenant  to  i\\e  praxipe  ; 
to  which  deed  B  was  not  a  party  ;  and  afterwards,  in  February,  1796,  B  by  a  deed, 
not  referring  to  the  deed  last  mentioned,  nor  to  the  bankruptcy,  conveyed  the  premises 
to  a  tenant  to  the  proecipe,  and  declared  the  uses  of  the  recoveiy  to  be  to  his  mother 
for  life,  remainder  to  himself  in  fee  ;  it  was  held  that  B,  in  a  suit  respecting  other  land, 
was  not  estopped  from  disputing  S's  bankruptcy  :  Doe  v.  Shelton,  3  Ad.  &  EL  265, 
283.  If  the  deed  recite  that  the  consideration  was  paid  by  a  husband  and  wife,  parol 
evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  the  money  consisted  of  a  legacy  given  to  the  wife  : 
Doe  v.  Statham,  7  D.  &  Ky.  141. 

a  Shelley  v.  Wright,  Willes  9  ;  Crane  v.  Morris,  6  Peters  611  ;  Carver  v.  Jackson, 
4  id.  1,  83 ;  Cossens  v.  Cossens,  Willes  25.  But  such  recital  does  not  bind  stran- 
gers, or  those  who  claim  by  title  paramount  to  the  deed  ;  Qin  particular,]  it  does 
not  bind  persons  claiming  by  an  adverse  title,  or  persons  claiming  from  the  parties  by  a 
title  anterior  to  the  date  of  the  reciting  deed.  See  Carver  v.  Jackson,  ubi  supra;  in  this 
case,  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  is  very  fully  expounded  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  where,  after 
stating  the  general  principle,  as  in  the  text,  with  the  qualification  just  mentioned,  he 
proceeds  (p.  83)  as  follows  :  "Such  is  the  general  rule.  But  there  are  cases  in  which 
such  a  recital  may  be  used  as  evidence  even  against  strangers.  If,  for  instance,  there  be 
the  recital  of  a  lease  in  a  deed  of  release,  and  in  a  suit  against  a  stranger  the  title  under 
the  release  comes  in  question,  there  the  recital  of  the  lease  in  such  a  release  is  not  prr  se 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  lease.  But  if  the  existence  and  loss  of  the  lease  be 
established  by  other  evidence,  there  the  recital  is  admissible,  as  secondary  proof,  in  the 
absence  of  more  perfect  evidence,  to  establish  the  contents  of  the  lease  ;  and  if  the 


§§  22-24]  ESTOPPEL   BY   DEED.  119 

§  24.  Same :  Estoppel  by  Deed,  in  general.  Thus,  also,  a  grantor 
is,  in  general,  estopped  by  his  deed  from  denying  that  he  had  any 
title  in  the  thing  granted.  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  grantor 
acting  officially,  as  a  public  agent  or  trustee.1  A  covenant  qf  war- 
ranty also  estops  the  grantor  from  setting  up  an  after-acquired  title 
against  the  grantee,  for  it  is  a  perpetually  operating  covenant ; 2  but 
he  is  not  thus  estopped  by  a  covenant,  that  he  is  seised  in  fee  and 
has  good  right  to  convey ; 8  for  any  seisin  in  fact,  though  by  wrong, 
is  sufficient  to  satisfy  this  covenant,  its  import  being  merely  this, 
that  he  has  the  seisin  in  fact,  at  the  time  of  conveyance,  and  thereby 
is  qualified  to  transfer  the  estate  to  the  grantee.4  Nor  is  a  feme 
covert  estopped,  by  her  deed  of  conveyance,  from  claiming  the  land 
by  a  title  subsequently  acquired;  for  she  cannot  bind  herself  person- 
ally by  any  covenant.6  Neither  is  one  who  has  purchased  land  in  his 
own  name,  for  the  benefit  of  another,  which  he  has  afterwards  con- 
veyed by  deed  to  his  employer,  estopped  by  such  deed,  from  claiming 
the  land  by  an  elder  and  after-acquired  title.6  Nor  is  the  heir  es- 
topped from  questioning  the  validity  of  his  ancestor's  deed,  as  a  fraud 
against  an  express  statute.7  The  grantee,  or  lessee,  in  a  deed-poll,  is 

transaction  be  an  ancient  one,  and  the  possession  has  been  long  held  under  such  re- 
lease, and  is  not  otherwise  to  be  accounted  for,  there  the  recital  will  of  itself,  under 
such  circumstances,  materially  fortify  the  presumption,  from  lapse  of  time  and  length 
of  possession,  of  the  original  existence  of  the  lease.  Leases,  like  other  deeds  and 
grants,  may  be  presumed  from  long  possession,  which  cannot  otherwise  be  explained  ; 
and  under  such  circumstances,  a  recital  of  the  fact  of  such  a  lease  in  an  old  deed  is 
certainly  far  stronger  presumptive  proof  in  favor  of  such  possession  under  title,  than 
the  naked  presumption  arising  from  a  mere  unexplained  possession.  Such  is  the  gen- 
eral result  of  the  doctrine  to  be  found  in  the  best  elementary  writers  on  the  subject  of 
evidence.  .  .  .  (~A.fter  examining  the  authorities,]  the  distinction,  then,  which  was 
urged  at  the  bar,  that  an  estoppel  of  this  so*rt  binds  those  claiming  under  the  same 
deed,  but  not  those  claiming  by  a  subsequent  deed  under  the  same  party,  is  not 
well  founded.  All  privies  in  estate  by  a  subsequent  deed  are  bound  in  the  same 
manner  as  privies  in  blood.  .  .  .  The  same  doctrine  was  acted  upon  and  confirmed 
by  the  same  Court,  in  Garwood  v.  Dennis,  4  Binn.  314.  In  that  case,  Qiowever,]  the 
Court  further  held  that  a  recital  in  another  deed  was  evidence  against  strangers, 
where  the  deed  was  ancient  and  the  possession  was  consistent  with  the  deed.  That 
case  also  had  the  peculiarity  belonging  to  the  present,  that  the  possession  was  of  a 
middle  nature  ;  that  is,  it  might  not  have  been  held  solely  in  consequence  of  the  deed, 
for  the  party  had  another  title  :  but  there  never  was  any  possession  against  it.  There 
was  a  double  title,  and  the  question  was,  to  which  the  possession  might  be  attributable. 
The  Court  thought  that,  a  suitable  foundation  of  the  original  existence  and  loss  of  the 
recited  deed  being  laid  in  the  evidence,  the  recital  in  the  deed  was  good  corrobora- 
tive evidence,  even  against  strangers.  And  other  authorities  certainly  warrant  this 
decision." 

1  Fairtitle  v.  Gilbert,  2  T.  R.  171 ;  Co.  Lit.  363  b. 

2  Terrett  v.  Taylor,  9  Cranch  43;   Jackson  v.  Matsdorf,  11  Johns.  97  ;   Jackson  v. 
Wright,  14  id.  193  ;    McWilliams  v.  Nisly,  2  Serg.  &  Kawle  515;    Somes  v.  Skin- 
ner. 3  Pick.  52  ;  {see  Blanchard  v.  Ellis,  1  Gray  195. } 

8  Allen  v.  Sayward,  5  Greenl.  227. 

*  Marston  v.  Hobbs,  2    Mass.  433 ;   Bearce  r.  Jackson,  4  id.  408 ;   Twambly  v. 
Henly,  ib.  441  ;  Chapel  v.  Bull,  17  Mass.  213  ;  {see  ca>tira,  Richardson  v.  Dorr,  5  Vt 
9  ;  Lockwood  v.  Sturdevant,  6  Conn.  373.  [ 

6  Jackson  v.  Vanderhayden,  17  Johns.  167  ;  {Lowell  ».  Daniels,  2  Gray  161.} 

*  Jackson  v.  Mills,  13  Johns.  463 ;  4  Kent  Conirn.  260,  261,  n. 

*  Doe  v.  Lloyd,  8  Scott  93. 


120  BUKDEN   OF   PROOF,    AND  PEESUMPTIONS.  [GIL   V. 

not,  iii  general,  estopped  from  gainsaying  anything  mentioned  in  the 
deed ;  for  it  is  the  deed  of  the  grantor  or  lessor  only ;  yet  if  such 
grantee  or  lessee  claims  title  under  the  deed,  he  is  thereby  estopped 
to  deny  the  title  of  the  grantor.8 

§  25.  Same :  Estoppel  of  Lessee  as  to  Lessor.  It  was  an  early 
rule  of  feudal  policy,  that  the  tenant  should  not  be  permitted  to  deny 
the  title  of  the  lord,  from  whom  he  had  received  investiture,  and  whose 
liegeman  he  had  become ;  but,  as  long  as  that  relation  existed,  the 
title  of  the  lord  was  conclusively  presumed  against  the  tenant,  to  be 
perfect  and  valid.  And  though  the  feudal  reasons  of  the  rule  have 
long  since  ceased,  yet  other  reasons  of  public  policy  have  arisen  in 
their  place,  thereby  preserving  the  rule  in  its  original  vigor.  A 
tenant,  therefore,  by  indenture,  is  not  permitted,  at  this  day,  to  deny 
the  title  of  his  lessor,  while  the  relation  thus  created  subsists.  It  is  of 
the  essence  of  the  contract  under  which  he  claims,  that  the  paramount 
ownership  of  the  lessor  shall  be  acknowledged  during  the  continuance 
of  the  lease,  and  that  possession  shall  be  surrendered  at  its  expiration. 
He  could  not  controvert  this  title  without  breaking  the  faith  which 
he  had  pledged.1  But  this  doctrine  does  not  apply  with  the  same 
force,  and  to  the  same  extent  between  other  parties,  such  as  releasor 
and  releasee,  where  the  latter  has  not  received  possession  from  the 
former.  In  such  cases,  where  the  party  already  in  possession  of  land, 
under  a  claim  of  title  by  deed,  purchases  peace  and  quietness  of  en- 
joyment, by  the  mere  extinction  of  a  hostile  claim  by  a  release,  with- 
out covenants  of  title,  he  is  not  estopped  from  denying  the  validity  of 
the  title,  which  he  has  thus  far  extinguished.2  Neither  is  this  rule 
applied  in  the  case  of  a  lease  already  expired  ;  provided  the  tenant 
has  either  quitted  the  possession,  or  has  submitted  to  the  title  of  a 
new  landlord  ; 8  nor  is  it  applied  to  the  case  of  a  tenant,  who  has  been 
ousted  or  evicted  by  a  title  paramount ;  or  who  has  been  drawn  into 
the  contract  by  the  fraud  or  misrepresentation  of  the  lessor,  and  has, 
in  fact,  derived  no  benefit  from  the  possession  of  the  land.4  Nor  is  a 
defendant  in  ejectment  estopped  from  showing  that  the  party,  under 
whom  the  lessor  claims,  had  no  title  when  he  conveyed  to  the  lessor, 
although  the  defendant  himself  claims  from  the  same  party,  if  it  be 
by  a  subsequent  conveyance.6 

8  Co.  Lit.  363  b ;  Goddard's  Case,  4  Co.  4.  But  he  is  not  always  concluded  by  re- 
citals in  anterior  title-deeds  :  see  supra,  §  23,  n. 

l  Com.  Dig.  Estoppel,  A,  2  ;  Craig.  Jus.  Feud.  lib.  3,  tit.  5,  §§  1,  2;  Blight's  Les- 
see  ».  Rochester,  7  Wheat.  535,  547  ;  )see  Blake  v.  Sanderson,  1  Gray  332  ;{  Qthe 
whole  subject  is  more  fully  treated  post,  §  207.1 

3  Fox  v.  Widgery,  4  Greenl.  214  ;  Blight's  Lessee  v.  Rochester,  7  Wheat.  535,  547  ; 
Ham  t>.  Ham,  2  Shepl.  351.  Thus,  where  a  stranger  set  up  a  title  to  the  premises,  to 
which  the  lessor  submitted,  directing  his  lessee  in  future  to  pay  the  rent  to  the  stranger  ; 
it  was  held  that  the  lessor  was  estopped  from  afterwards  treating  the  lessee  as  his  ten- 
ant ;  and  that  the  tenant,  upon  the  lessor  afterwards  distraining  for  rent,  was  not  es- 
topped to  allege  that  the  right  of  the  latter  had  expired :  Downs  v.  Cooper,  2  Q.  B.  256. 

•  England  v.  Slade,  4  TT  R.  682  ;  Balls  v.  Westwood,  2   Campb.  11. 
«  Hayne  ».  Maltby,  3  T.  B.  438  ;  Hearn  v.  Tomlin,  Peake'a  Cas.  191. 

•  Doe  v.  Payne,  1  Ad.  &  EL  538. 


§§  24-26.]   ESTOPPEL  BY  TENANCY,  BY  DEED  RECITALS.       121 

§  26.  Same  :  Estoppel  by  Deed  Recitals  as  to  Consideration,  etc. 
This  rule  in  regard  to  the  conclusive  effect  of  recitals  in  deeds  is 
restricted  to  the  recital  of  things  in  particular,  as  being  in  existence 
at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  deed  ;  and  does  not  extend  to  the 
mention  of  things  in  general  terms.  Therefore,  if  one  be  bound  in  a 
bond,  conditioned  to  perform  the  covenants  in  a  certain  indenture,  or 
to  pay  the  money  mentioned  in  a  certain  recognizance,  he  shall  not 
be  permitted  to  say  that  there  was  no  such  indenture  or  recognizance. 
But  if  the  bond  be  conditioned,  that  the  obligor  shall  perform  all  the 
agreements  set  down  by  A,  or  carry  away  all  the  marl  in  a  certain 
close,  he  is  not  estopped  by  this  general  condition  from  saying,  that 
no  agreement  was  set  down  by  A,  or  that  there  was  no  marl  in  the 
close.  Neither  does  this  doctrine  apply  to  that  which  is  mere 
description  in  the  deed,  and  not  an  essential  averment :  such  as  the 
quantity  of  land  ;  its  nature,  whether  arable  or  meadow  ;  the  number 
of  tons  in  a  vessel  chartered  by  the  ton ;  or  the  like ;  for  these  are 
but  incidental  and  collateral  to  the  principal  thing,  and  may  be 
supposed  not  to  have  received  the  deliberate  attention  of  the  parties.1 
Whether  the  recital  of  the  payment  of  the  consideration-money,  in 
a  deed  of  conveyance,  falls  within  the  rule,  by  which  the  party  is 
estopped  to  deny  it,  or  belongs  to  the  exceptions,  and  therefore  is 
open  to  opposing  proof,  is  a  point  not  clearly  agreed.  In  England, 
the  recital  is  regarded  as  conclusive  evidence  of  payment,  binding 
the  parties  by  estoppel.2  But  the  American  Courts  have  been  dis- 
posed to  treat  the  recital  of  the  amount  of  the  money  paid,  like  the 
mention  of  the  date  of  the  deed,  the  quantity  of  land,  the  amount  of 
tonnage  of  a  vessel,  and  other  recitals  of  quantity  and  value,  to  which 
the  attention  of  the  parties  is  supposed  to  have  been  but  slightly 
directed,  and  to  which,  therefore,  the  principle  of  estoppels  does  not 
apply.  Hence,  though  the  party  is  estopped  from  denying  the  con- 
veyance, and  that  it  was  for  a  valuable  consideration,  yet  the  weight 
of  American  authority  is  in  favor  of  treating  the  recital  as  only  prima 
facie  evidence  of  the  amount  paid,  in  an  action  of  covenant  by 
the  grantee  to  recover  back  the  consideration,  or  in  an  action  of 
assumpsit  by  the  grantor  to  recover  the  price  which  is  yet  unpaid.8 

1  4  Com.  Dig.  Estoppel,  A,  2  ;  Yelv.  227  (byMetcalf),  note  (1) ;  Doddington's  Case, 
2  Co.  33  ;  Skipworth  v.  Green,  8  Mod.  311 ;  s.  c.  1  Str.  610. 

2  Shelley  v.  Wright,  Willes  9;    Cossens  v.  Cossens,  ib.  25;  Rowntree  v.  Jacob, 
2  Taunt.  141 ;  Lampon  v.  Corke,  5  B.  &  Aid.  606  ;  Baker  v.  Dewey,  1  B.  &  C.  704  ; 
Hill  v.  Manchester  and  Salford  Water  Works,  2  B.  &  Ad.  644;  see  also  Powell  v. 
Monson,  3  Mason  347,  351,  356. 

8  The  principal  cases  are,  in  Massachusetts,  Wilkinson  v.  Scott,  17  Mass.  249 ; 
Clapp  v.  Tirrell,  20  Pick.  247  ;  Livermore  v.  Aldrich,  5  Cush.  431  :  in  Maine,  Scliil- 
linger  v.  McCann,  6  Greenl.  864  ;  Tyler  v.  Carlton,  7  Greenl.  175  ;  Einmons  v.  Little- 
field,  1  Shepl.  233 ;  Bnrbank  v.  Gould,  8  id.  118  :  in  Vermont,  Beach  v.  Packard, 
10  Vt.  96  :  in  New  Hampshire,  Morse  v.  Shattuck,  4  N.  H.  229 ;  Pritchard  v.  Brown, 
id.  397  :  in  Connecticut,  Belden  v.  Seymour,  8  Conn.  804  :  in  New  York,  Shephard 
v.  Little,  14  Johns.  210;  Bowen  v.  Bell,  20  id.  838;  Whitbeck  v.  Whitbeck, 
9  Cowen  266  ;  McCrea  v.  Purmort,  16  Wend.  460  :  in  Pennsylvania,  Weigly  v.  Weir, 


122  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

§  27.  Same  :  Estoppel  by  Statements  acted  upon.  In  addition  to 
estoppels  by  deed,  there  are  two  classes  of  admissions  which  fall 
under  this  head  of  conclusive  presumptions  of  law ;  namely,  solemn 
admissions,  or  admissions  injudicio,  which  have  been  solemnly  made 
in  the  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  either  expressly,  and  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  proof  of  the  fact,  or  tacitly,  by  pleading;  and  unsolemn 
admissions,  extra  judicium,  which  have  been  acted  upon,  or  have 
been  made  to  influence  the  conduct  of  others,  or  to  derive  some 
advantage  to  the  party,  and  which  cannot  afterwards  be  denied 
without  a  breach  of  good  faith.  Of  the  former  class  are  all  agree- 
ments of  counsel,  dispensing  with  legal  proof  of  facts.1  So  if  a 
material  averment,  well  pleaded,  is  passed  over  by  the  adverse 
party,  without  denial,  whether  it  be  by  confession,  or  by  pleading 
some  other  matter,  or  by  demurring  in  law,  it  is  thereby  conclusively 
admitted.8  So  also  the  payment  of  money  into  court,  under  a  rule  for 
that  purpose,  in  satisfaction  of  so  much  of  the  claim  as  the  party  admits 
to  be  due,  is  a  conclusive  admission  of  the  character  in  which  the 
plaintiff  sues,  and  of  his  claim  to  the  amount  paid.3  The  latter  class 
comprehends,  not  only  all  those  declarations,  but  also  that  line  of 
conduct  by  which  the  party  has  induced  others  to  act,  or  has  acquired 
any  advantage  to  himself.*  Thus,  a  woman  cohabited  with,  and 
openly  recognized,  by  a  man,  as  his  wife,  is  conclusively  presumed  to 
be  such,  when  he  is  sued  as  her  husband,  for  goods  furnished  to  her, 
or  for  other  civil  liabilities  growing  out  of  that  relation.6  So  where 
the  sheriff  returns  anything  as  fact,  done  in  the  course  of  his  duty  in 

7  S.  &R.  311 ;  Watson  v,  Elaine,  12  id.  131;  Jack  0.  Dougherty,  3  Watts  151  :  in 
Maryland,  Higdon  v.  Thomas,  1  Har.  &  Gill,  139 ;  Lingan  v.  Henderson,  1  Bland  Ch. 
236,  249:  in  Virginia,  Duval  v.  Bibb,  4  Hen.  &  Munf.  113;  Harvey  v.  Alexander, 
1  Rand.  219:  in  South  Carolina,  Curry  v.  Lyles,  2  Hill  404;  Garrett  v.  Stuart, 
1  McCord  514 :  in  Alabama,  Mead  v.  Steger,  5  Port.  498,  507  :  in  Tennessee,  Jones  v. 
Ward,  10  Yerg.  160,  166  :  in  Kentucky,  Hutchison  v.  Sinclair,  7  Monroe  291,  293 ; 
Gully  v.  Grubbs,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  389.  The  Courts  in  North  Carolina  seem  still  to  hold 
the  recital  of  payment  as  conclusive  :  Brocket  v.  Foscue,  1  Hawks  64 ;  Spiers  v.  Clay, 
4  id.  22  ;  Jones  v.  Sasser,  1  Dev.  &  Batt.  452.  And  in  Louisiana,  it  is  made  so  by  legis- 
lative enactment:  Civil  Code  of  Louisiana,  art.  2234;  Forest  v.  Shores,  11  La.  416; 
see  also  Steele  v.  Worthington,  2  Ohio  350;  {Carpenter  v.  Buller,  8  M.  &  W.  212  ; 
Cruise's  Dig.  (Greenl.  2d  ed.)  tit.  32,  c.  2,  §  38,  n. ;  c.  20,  §  52,  n.  (Greenl.  2d  ed. 
vol.  ii,  pp.  322,  607).  But  the  recital  is  not  even  prima  facie  evidence  of  payment 
when  the  deed  is  attacked  as  fraudulent  by  creditors  ot  the  grantor  :  Bolton  v.  Jacks, 
6  Robt.  N.  Y.  166;  Whittaker  v.  Garnett,  8  Bush  402;  see  Blanchard  v.  Ellis, 
1  Gray  195  ;  Qand  post,  §  190.]  And  the  grantor's  privies  in  estate  are  also  estopped, 
though  the  grantor  had  no  title  when  he  conveyed:  White  v.  Patten,  24  Pick.  324. 
But  such  a  covenant  does  not  estop  the  grantor  from  claiming  a  way  of  necessity  over 
the  land  granted  :  Brigham  v.  Smith,  4  Gray  297. 

1  See  infra,  §§  169,  170,  186,  204,  205  ;  Kohn  v.  Marsh,  3  Rob.  La.  48. 

3  Young  v.  Wright,  1  Camp.  139  ;  Wilson  v.  Turner,  1  Taunt.  398.  But  if  a  deed 
Is  admitted  in  pleading,  there  must  still  be  proof  of  its  identity  :  Johnston  v.  Cotting- 
ham,  1  Armst.  Macartn.  &  Ogle  11. 

8  Cox  v.  Parry,  1  T.  R.  464  ;  Watkins  v.  Towers,  2  T.  B.  275  ;  Griffiths  v.  Williams, 
1  T.  R.  710.  See  infra,  §  205,  Vol.  II,  §  600. 

«  See  infra,  §§  184,  195,  196,  207,  208. 

6  Watson  v.  Threlkeld,  2  Esp.  637 ;  Monro  v.  De  Chemant,  4  Campb.  215  j  Robin- 
son v.  Mali  on,  1  Campb.  245;  post,  $  207. 


§§27-28.]    INCAPACITY;  LEGITIMACY;  HUSBAND'S  COERCION.    123 

the  service  of  a  precept,  it  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  true 
against  him.'  And  if  one  party  refers  the  other  to  a  third  person  for 
information  concerning  a  matter  of  mutual  interest  in  controversy 
between  them,  the  answer  given  is  conclusively  taken  as  true,  against 
the  party  referring.7  This  subject  will  hereafter  be  more  fully  con- 
sidered, under  its  appropriate  title.8 

§  28.  Incapacity  ;  Legitimacy  ;  Husband's  Coercion.  Conclusive 
presumptions  of  law  are  also  made  in  respect  to  infants  and  married 
women.  Thus,  an  infant  under  the  age  of  seven  years  is  conclusively 
presumed  to  be  incapable  of  committing  any  felony,  for  want  of 
discretion  ; *  and,  under  fourteen,  a  male  infant  is  presumed  incapable 
of  committing  a  rape.2  A  female  under  the  age  of  ten  years  is  pre-' 
sumed  incapable  of  consenting  to  sexual  intercourse.8  Where  the 
husband  and  wife  cohabited  together,  as  such,  and  no  impotency  is 
proved,  the  issue  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  legitimate,  though 
the  wife  is  proved  to  have  been  at  the  same  time  guilty  of  infidelity.* 

6  Simmons  v.  Bradford,  15  Mass.  82;  [[see  note  to  §  15,  ante.~\ 

7  Lloyd  v.  Willan,  1  Esp.   178;  Delesline  v.  Greenland,  1  Bay  458 ;  Williams  ». 
Innes,  1  Camp.  364;  Burt  v.  Palmer,  5  Esp.  145. 

8  Sea  infra,  §§'204-212. 

i  4  Bl.  Comm.  23 ;  |>e  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  4.] 

a  1  Hale  P.  C.  630  ;  1  Russell  on  Crimes,  801,  5th  Eng.  ed.  859  ;  R.  v.  Philips, 
8  C.  &  P.  736  ;  R.  v.  Jordan,  9  C.  &  P.  118  ;  {see  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  4,  215.} 

8  1  Russell  on  Crimes,  810,  5th  Eng.  ed.  871;  Qthis  age  has  been  increased  in 
many  jurisdictions. 

There  is,  in  the  law  of  real  property,  a  rule  by  which  for  the  purpose  of  dealing 
with  estates  of  remainder,  etc.,  a  woman  past  some  limit  of  age  is  regarded  as  incapable 
of  bearing  children  ;  it  is  often  spoken  of  as  a  conclusive  presumption  ;  but  no  fixed  age 
is  taken  as  the  standard  :  see  instances  in  Groves  v.  Groves,  9  L.  T.  R.  N.  s.  533  ;  Re 
Widdows'  Trusts,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  408  ;  Re  Millner's  Estate,  L.  R.  14  Eq.  245  ;  Maden  v. 
Taylor,  45  L.  J.  Ch.  569  ;  Re  Taylor's  Trustees,  21  L.  T.  R.  N.  s.  795 ;  Davidson  v. 
Kimpton,  L.  R.  18  Ch.  D.  213  ;  and  a  full  citation  of  cases  in  a  note  to  Apgar's  Estate, 
37  N.  J.  Eq.  502.] 

*  Cope  v.  Cope,  1  Moo.  &  Rob.  269,  276;  Morris  u.  Davies,  3  C.  &  P.  215;  St. 
George  v.  St.  Margaret,  1  Salk.  123;  Banbury  Peerage  Case,  2  Selw.  N.  P.  (by 
Wheaton)  558;  8.  c.  1  Sim.  &  Stu.  153  ;  R.w.  Luffe,  8  East  193;  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§150, 
151.  L~But  it  is  now  fully  understood  that  this  presumption  is  not  a  conclusive  one, 
and  that  the  ordinary  presumption  may  be  rebutted  by  showing  "non-access  or  non- 
generating  access  by  means  of  sucli  legal  evidence  as  is  admissible  in  every  other  case 
in  which  a  legal  fact  has  to  be  proved ; "  see  the  English  authorities  fully  examined, 
and  the  history  of  the  rule  traced  from  the  old  conclusive  presumption  (applied  except 
where  the  husband  had  been  beyond  the  four  seas),  in  the  painstaking  work  of  Nicolas 
on  Adulterine  Bastardy  ;  also  a  large  collection  of  cases  in  Hubhack  on  Succession, 
Pt.  II,  ch.  5 ;  and  see  the  following  more  modern  cases  :  )  Morris  v.  Davies,  5  Cl.  & 
F.  163,  251;  R.  v.  Mansfield,  1  G.  &  Dav.  7;  R.  v.  Maidstone,  12  East  550;  Barony 
of  Saye  &  Sele,  1  H.  L.  C.  507 ;  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  L.  R.  2  App.  Cas.  723  ;  Hawes  v. 
Draeger,  L.  R.  23  Ch.  D.  173;  Legget>.  Edmonds,  25  L.  J.  Eq.  125,  135;  R.  v.  Mans- 
field, 1  Q.  B.  444;  Rideout's  Trusts,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  41 ;  Phillips  v.  Allen,  2  Allen  453  ; 
Sullivan  v.  Kelly,  3  id.  148;  Pittsford  v.  Chittendon,  58  Vt.  51  ;  State  v.  Pettaway, 
3  Hawks  623  ;  Com.  v.  Shepherd,  6  Binn.  283  ;  Tate  v.  Penue,  7  Mart.  La. 
N.  s.  548;  Cross  v.  Cross,  3  Paige,  139;  Com.  v.  Wentz,  1  Ashm.  269;  Vaughn  v. 
Rhodes,  2  McCord,  227  ;  Caujolle  v.  Feme,  26  Barb.  177 ;  Strode  v.  Magowan,  2  Bush 
621;  Van  Aernam  v.  Van  Aernam,  1  Barb.  Ch.  375;  Herring  v.  Goodson,  43  Miss. 
392;  Dean  v.  State,  29  Ind.  483;  Patterson  v.  Gaines,  6  How.  550;}  Bullock  v. 
Knox,  96  Ala.  195;  Rabeke  v.  Baer.  Mich..  73  N.  W.  242;  Randolph  v.  Easton,  23 
Pick.  242;  Matthews'  Estate,  153  N.  Y.  443;  for  the  peculiar  rule  of  the  Louisiana 


124  BURDEN   OF   PBOOF,    AND    PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.    VI. 

And  if  a  wife  act  in  company  with  her  husband  in  the  commission  of 
a  felony,  other  than  treason  or  homicide,  it  is  conclusively  presumed 
that  she  acted  under  his  coercion,  and  consequently  without  any  guilty 
intent.5 

§  29.  Survivorship.  Where  the  succession  to  estates  is  con- 
cerned, the  question,  which  of  two  persons  is  to  be  presumed  the 
survivor,  where  both  perished  in  the  same  calamity,  but  the  cir- 
cumstances of  their  deaths  are  unknown,  has  been  considered  in 
the  Eoman  law,  and  in  several  other  codes ;  but  in  the  common 
law,  no  rule  on  the  subject  has  been  laid  down.  By  the  Eoman 
law,  if  it  were  the  case  of  a  father  and  son,  perishing  together  in 
the  same  shipwreck  or  battle,  and  the  son  was  under  the  age  of 
puberty,  it  was  presumed  that  he  died  first,  but  if  above  that  age, 
that  he  was  the  survivor;  upon  the  principle,  that  in  the  former 
case  the  elder  is  generally  the  more  robust,  and,  iu  the  latter,  the 
younger.1  The  French  Code  has  regard  to  the  ages  of  fifteen  and 
sixty  ;  presuming  that  of  those  under  the  former  age  the  eldest  sur- 
vived ;  and  that  of  those  above  the  latter  age  the  youngest  survived. 
If  the  parties  were  between  those  ages,  but  of  different  sexes,  the 
male  is  presumed  to  have  survived ;  if  they  were  of  the  same  sex, 
the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  the  survivorship  of  the  younger,  as 

Code,  see  McNeely  v.  McNeely,  47  La.  An.  1321.  For  the  exclusion  of  the  testimony 
of  husband  and  wife  on  this  point,  see  post,  §  254  6.] 

6  4  Bl.  Comm.  28,  29  ;  Anon.,  2  East  P.  C.  559.  {But  this  presumption  also  is 
no  longer  regarded  as  conclusive  ;  it  is  no  more  than  an  ordinary  presumption  of  law. 
At  present  the  rule  as  established  by  the  cases  seems  to  be  that  when  it  is  shown  that 
a  crime  has  been  committed  by  a  married  woman  in  the  presence  of  her  husband,  if  it 
is  not  shown  that  she  took  a  willing  and  active  part  in  the  crime,  or  was  the  inciter  of 
it,  a  presumption  of  law  exists  that  she  was  under  his  coercion  ;  but  if  evidence  tending 
to  show  willing  participation  is  put  in,  the  question  is  for  the  jury  upon  the  whole  evi- 
dence, whether  the  woman  took  such  a  part  in  the  crime  as  to  show  that  she  was 
exercising  her  own  free  will,  and  was  not  acting  under  compulsion  by  her  husband : 
R.  v.  John,  13  Cox  Or.  C.  100;  R.  v.  Torpey,  12  id.  45;  R.  v.  Cohen,  11  id. 
99 ;  Goldstein  v.  People,  82  N.  Y.  231 ;  U.  S.  v.  De  Quilfeldt,  2  dim.  L.  Mag. 
211;  Seiler  v.  People,  77  N.  Y.  411;  K.  v.  Hughes,  2  Lewin  C.  C.  229;  R.  v.  Pol- 
lard, 8  C.  &  P.  553;  R.  v.  Stapleton,  1  Jeff.  C.  C.  93;  Com.  v.  Burk,  11  Gray  437  ; 
Com.  v.  Eagan,  103  Mass.  71;  Com.  v.  Butler,  1  Allen,  4;  Com.  v.  Hopkins,  133 
Mass.  381 ;  Com.  v.  Gormley,  ib.  580 ;  Com.  v.  Conrad,  28  Leg.  Int.  310 ;  Com.  v. 
Lindsey,  2  Leg.  Chrou.  232. 

The  presence  of  the  husband  may  be  constructive  as  well  as  actual ;  if  the  woman 
is  so  near  him  as  to  be  under  his  immediate  influence  and  control,  the  presumption 
arises  though  he  maybe  in  another  room  :  Com.  v.  Burk,  supra;  Com.  v.  Munsey, 
112  Mass.  287  ;  Com.  v.  Flaherty,  140  id.  454.  The  presumption  of  coercion  extends 
also  to  torts  committed  by  the  wife;  the  presence  of  the  husband  when  the  tort  was 
committed  raises  a  presumption  that  it  was  done  by  his  direction,  but  this  presumption 
is  not  conclusive  :  Franklin's  Adminis.  Appeal,  115  Pa.  St.  538 ;  Cassin  v.  Delaney, 
88  N.  Y.  178.  This  presumption  is  also  of  force  against  the  husband,  as  well  as  in 
favor  of  the  wife;  for  instance,  in  the  case  where  a  man  was  indicted  for  keeping  and 
maintaining  a  common  nuisance,  to  wit,  a  house  of  ill-fame,  it  was  held  that  the  evi- 
dence  of  acts  done  by  his  wife  in  his  immediate  presence  were  presumed  to  be  done  by 
his  direction  :  Com.  v.  Hill,  145  Mr.st.  305.  | 

1  Dig.  lib.  34,  tit.  5  ;  De  rebus  dubiis,  1.  9,  §§  1,  3  ;  id.  1.  16,  22,  23  ;  Menochius 
de  Presnmpt.  lib.  1,  Qusest.  x.  n.  8, ."  This  rule,  however,  was  subject  to  some  excep- 
tions for  the  benefit  of  mothers,  patrons,  and  beneficiaries. 


§jj  28-30.]  SURVIVORSHIP.  125 

opening  the  succession  in  the  order  of  nature.*  The  same  rules 
were  in  force  in  the  territory  of  Orleans  at  the  time  of  its  cession 
to  the  United  States,  and  have  since  been  incorporated  into  the  Code 
of  Louisiana.8 

§  30.  This  question  first  arose,  in  common-law  courts,  upon  a 
motion  for  a  mandamus,  in  the  case  of  General  Stanwix,  who  per- 
ished, together  with  his  second  wife,  and  his  daughter  by  a  former 
marriage,  on  the  passage  from  Dublin  to  England ;  the  vessel  in 
which  they  sailed  having  never  been  heard  from.  Hereupon  his 
nephew  applied  for  letters  of  administration,  as  next  of  kin  ;  which 
was  resisted  by  the  maternal  uncle  of  the  daughter,  who  claimed 
the  effects  upon  the  presumption  of  the  Roman  law,  that  she  was 
the  survivor.  But  this  point  was  not  decided,  the  Court  decreeing 
for  the  nephew  upon  another  ground;  namely,  that  the  question 
could  properly  be  raised  only  upon  the  statute  of  distributions,  and 
not  upon  an  application  for  administration  by  one  clearly  entitled  to 
administer  by  consanguinity.1  The  point  was  afterwards  raised  in 
chancery,  where  the  case  was,  that  the  father  had  bequeathed  lega- 
cies to  such  of  his  children  as  should  be  living  at  the  time  of  his 
death ;  and  he  having  perished,  together  with  one  of  the  legatees, 
by  the  foundering  of  a  vessel  on  a  voyage  from  India  to  England, 
the  question  was,  whether  the  legacy  was  lapsed  by  the  death  of  the 
son  in  the  lifetime  of  the  father.  The  Master  of  the  Eolls  refused 
to  decide  the  question  by  presumption,  and  directed  an  issue  to  try 
the  fact  by  a  jury.2  But  the  Prerogative  Court  adopts  the  presump- 
tion that  both  perished  together,  and  that  therefore  neither  could 
transmit  rights  to  the  other.8  In  the  absence  of  all  evidence  of  the 
particular  circumstances  of  the  calamity,  probably  this  rule  will 
be  found  the  safest  and  most  convenient;4  but  if  any  circumstances 

8  Code  Civil,  §§  720,  721,  722  ;  Duranton,  Conrs  de  Droit  Francais,  torn.  vi.  pp.  39, 
42,  43,  48,  67,  69  ;  Rogron,  Code  Civil  Expli.  411,  412  ;  Toullier,  Droit  Civil  Fran- 
$ais,  torn.  iv.  pp.  70,  72,  73.  By  the  Mahometan  law  of  India,  when  relatives  thus 
perish  together,  "it  is  to  be  presumed  that  they  all  died  at  the  same  moment,  and  the 
property  of  each  shall  pass  to  his  living  heirs,  without  any  portion  of  it  vesting  in  his 
companions  in  misfortune:"  see  Baillie's  Moohumnnidan  Law  of  Inheritance,  172. 
Such  also  was  the  rule  of  the  ancient  Danish  law  :  "  Filius  in  conimunione  cum  patre 
et  niatre  denatus,  pro  non  nato  hahetur : "  Ancher,  Lex  Cimbrica,  lib.  1,  c.  9,  p.  21. 

•  Civil  Code  of  Louisiana,  art.  930-933 ;  Digest  of  the  Civil  Laws  of  the  Territory 
of  Orleans,  arts.  60-63. 

1  Reg.  v.  Dr.  Hay,  1  "W.  Bl.  640 ;  the  niattiT  was  afterwards  compromised,  upon 
the  recommendation  of  Lord  Mansfield,  who  said  he  knew  of  no  legal  principle  on 
which  he  could  decide  it :  see  2  Phillim.  268,  iu  note;  Fearne's  Posth.  Works,  38. 

2  Mason  ».  Mason,  1  Meriv.  308. 

8  Wright  v.  Netherwood,  2  Salk.  593,  n.  (a)  by  Evans;  more  fully  reported  under 
the  name  of  Wright  v.  Sarmuda,  2  Phillim.  266-277,  n.  (c) ;  Taylor  v.  Diplock,  2 
Phillim.  261,  277,  280;  Selwyn's  Case,  3  Hagg.  Eccl.  748;  In  the  "Goods  of  Murray, 
1  Curt.  596 ;  Satterthwaite  v.  Powell,  1  Curt.  705.  See  also  2  Kent's  Comm.  435, 
436  (4th  ed.),  n.  (b) ;  Colvin  v.  H.  M.  Procurator-Gen.,  1  Hagg.  Eccl.  92;  Moehring 
v.  Mitchell,  1  Barb.  Ch.  264 ;  Sillick  v.  Booth,  1  Y.  &  C.  NewCas.  117  ;  Burge,  Comm. 
on  Colonial  and  Foreign  Laws,  IV,  11-29. 

*  It  was  so  held  iu  Coye  v.  Leach,  8  Mete.  871 J  and  see  Mwhring  v.  Mitchill, 
1  Barb.  Ch.  264. 


126  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

of  the  death  of  either  party  can  be  proved,  there  can  be  no  incon- 
venience in  submitting  the  question  to  a  jury,  to  whose  province  it 
peculiarly  belongs.6 

§  31.  International  Law.  Conclusive  presumptions  of  law  are  not 
unknown  to  the  law  of  nations.  Thus,  if  a  neutral  vessel  be  found 
carrying  despatches  of  the  enemy  between  different  parts  of  the 
enemy's  dominions,  their  effect  is  presumed  to  be  hostile.1  The 
spoliation  of  papers,  by  the  captured  party,  has  been  regarded,  in 
all  the  States  of  Continental  Europe,  as  conclusive  proof  of  guilt ; 
but,  in  England  and  America,  it  is  open  to  explanation,  unless  the 
cause  labors  under  heavy  suspicions,  or  there  is  a  vehement  pre- 
sumption of  bad  faith  or  gross  prevarication.3 

§  32.  Principle  of  Conclusive  Presumptions.  In  these  cases  of 
conclusive  presumption,  the  rule  of  law  merely  attaches  itself  to 
the  circumstances,  when  proved ;  it  is  not  deduced  from  them.  It 
is  not  a  rule  of  inference  from  testimony ;  l  but  a  rule  of  protection, 
as  expedient,  and  for  the  general  good.  It  does  not,  for  example, 
assume  that  all  landlords  have  good  titles;  but  that  it  will  be  a 
public  and  general  inconvenience  to  suffer  tenants  to  dispute  them. 
Neither  does  it  assume  that  all  averments  and  recitals  in  deeds  and 
records  are  true ;  but  that  it  will  be  mischievous,  if  parties  are  per- 
mitted to  deny  them.  It  does  not  assume  that  all  simple  contract 
debts,  of  six  years'  standing,  are  paid,  nor  that  every  man,  quietly 
occupying  land  twenty  years  as  his  own,  has  a  valid  title  by  grant ; 
but  it  deems  it  expedient  that  claims  opposed  by  such  evidence  as 
the  lapse  of  those  periods  affords,  should  not  be  countenanced, 

6  {This  also  is  not  to  be  regarded,  and  apparently  never  was,  as  a  conclusive  pre- 
sumption. The  rule  as  now  established  by  the  English  and  American  cases  is,  that 
where  it  is  proved  that  two  or  more  persons  perished  in  the  same  calamity,  there  is  no 
presumption  of  law  that  one  survived  the  others,  or  that  all  perished  at  the  same  time ; 
the  burden  of  proving  that  one  survived  the  others,  or  that  all  perished  simultaneously, 
is  on  the  person  who  asserts  such  to  be  the  fact.  If  death  by  the  same  calamity  is  all 
that  is  proved,  the  person  who  asserts  the  survivorship  must  fail ;  but  it  seems  if  there 
is  evidence  arising  from  the  age,  sex,  or  physical  condition  of  the  persons  who  perished, 
from  which  a  reasonable  inference  of  survivorship  may  be  drawn,  such  inferential 
proof  may  suffice ;  in  any  case  if  there  is  evidence  arising  from  the  nature  of  the  acci- 
dent, and  the  manner  of  death  of  the  parties,  which  tends  to  show  that  some  one  did 
in  fact  survive  the  others,  the  whole  question  is  one  of  fact,  to  be  decided  in  each  case 
by  the  jury  before  whom  the  cause  is  brought  :  Underwood  v.  Wing,  19  Beav.  459  ; 
4  De  G.  M.  &  G.  633 ;  Wing  v.  Angrave,  8  H.  L.  Cas.  183 ;  Wollaston  v.  Berkeley, 
L.  R.  2  Ch.  Div.  213 ;  Re  Phene's  Trusts,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  139 ;  Re  Murray,  1  Curt.  596  ; 
Taylor  v.  Diplock,  2  Phil.  Ecc.  R.  261 ;  Smith  v.  Croom,  7  Fla.  81  ;  Newell  v.  Nichols, 
12  Hun,  604 ;  8.  c.  75  N.  Y.  78 ;  Pell  v.  Ball,  1  Chev.  Eq.  99  ;  Robinson  v.  Gallier, 

2  Wood  C.  C.  178;   Stinde  v.    Ridgway,  55  How.   Pract.  301;  Stinde  v.  Goodrich, 

3  Redf.  SUIT.  87;  Matter  of  Ridgway,  4  id.  226;  Kansas,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
2  Col.  Terr.  442;   Fuller  v.   Lin  zee,  135  Mass.   468;   Abram  v.  Ehle,  73  Wis.  445; 
Johnson  v.  Merithew,  80  Me.  116  ;|  fSchaub  v.  Griffin,  84  Md.  557;  Re  Wilbor,  R.  I., 
37  Atl.  634.] 

1  The  Atalanta,  6  Rob.  Adm.  440. 

a  The  Pizarro,  2  Wheat.  227,  241,  242,  n.  (e) ;  The  Hunter,  1  Dods.  Adra.  480, 
486;    rseeporf,  §§37,  195r7,T 
1  [See  ante,  $  15,  note.} 


§§30-34]    INNOCENCE;  OWNERSHIP;  STOLEN  GOODS;  ETC.      127 

and  that  society  is  more  benefited  by  a  refusal  to  entertain  such 
claims,  than  by  suffering  them  to  be  made  good  by  proof.  In  fine, 
it  does  not  assume  the  impossibility  of  things  which  are  possible ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  is  founded,  not  only  on  the  possibility  of  their 
existence,  but  on  their  occasional  occurrence ;  and  it  is  against 
the  mischiefs  of  their  occurrence  that  it  interposes  its  protecting 
prohibition.1 

§  33.  Disputable  Presumptions ;  In  general.  The  second  class  of 
presumptions  of  law,  answering  to  the  presumptiones  juris  of  the 
Roman  law,  which  may  always  be  overcome  by  opposing  proof,1 
consists  of  those  termed  disputable  presumptions.  These,  as  well  as 
the  former,  are  the  result  of  the  general  experience  of  a  connection 
between  certain  facts,  or  things,  the  one  being  usually  found  to  be 
the  companion  or  the  effect  of  the  other.  The  connection,  however, 
in  this  class,  is  not  so  intimate,  nor  so  nearly  universal,  as  to  render 
it  expedient  that  it  should  be  absolutely  and  imperatively  presumed 
to  exist  in  every  case,  all  evidence  to  the  contrary  being  rejected; 
but  yet  it  is  so  general,  and  so  nearly  universal,  that  the  law  itself, 
without  the  aid  of  a  jury,  infers  the  one  fact  from  the  proved  exist- 
ence, of  the  other,  in  the  absence  of  all  opposing  evidence.  In  this 
mode,  the  law  defines  the  nature  and  amount  of  the  evidence  which, 
it  deems  sufficient  to  establish  a  prima  facie  case,  and  to  throw  the 
burden  of  proof  on  the  other  party ;  and,  if  no  opposing  evidence  is 
offered,  the  jury  are  bound  to  find  in  favor  of  the  presumption.  A 
contrary  verdict  would  be  liable  to  be  set  aside,  as  being  against 
evidence.8 

§  34.  Innocence ;  Ownership ;  Stolen  Goods ;  etc.  The  rules  in 
this  class  of  presumption,  as  in  the  former,  have  been  adopted  by 
common  consent,  from  motives  of  public  policy,  and  for  the  pro- 
motion of  the  general  good;  yet  not,  as  in  the  former  class,  for- 
bidding all  further  evidence ;  but  only  excusing  or  dispensing  with 
it,  till  some  proof  is  given  on  the  other  side  to  rebut  the  presump- 
tion thus  raised.  Thus,  as  men  do  not  generally  violate  the  penal 
code,  the  law  presumes  every  man  innocent ;  but  some  men  do 
transgress  it,  and  therefore  evidence  is  received  to  repel  this  pre- 
sumption. This  legal  presumption  of  innocence  is  to  be  regarded 
by  the  jury,  in  every  case,  as  matter  of  evidence,  to  the  benefit  of 
which  the  party  is  entitled.1  And  where  a  criminal  charge  is  to  be 

«  See  6  Law  Mag.  348,  355,  356. 

1  Heinnec.  ad  Pand.  pars  iv,  §  124  ;   ("see  the  explanations  ante,  §§  14  w,  14  y.~\ 

3  {See  Crane  v.  Morris,  6  Pet.  598;  Cora.  v.  Hogan,  113  Mass.  7;  U.  S.  v.  Wig- 
gins,  14  Pet.  334.  ( 

1  {See  instances  in  Edwards  v.  State,  21  Ark.  512  ;  Case  v.  Case,  17  Cal.  598  ; 
Goggans  v.  Monroe,  31  Ga.  331 ;  McEwen  v.  Portland,  1  Oreg.  300 ;  Harrington  v. 
State,  19  Ohio  264;}  [People  „.  O'Brien,  106  Cal.  104;  Bryant  v.  State,  Ala.,  23  So. 
40.  This  phrase,  that  "  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  to  be  regarded  by  the  jury 
in  ever\T  case,  as  matter  of  evidence  "  (for  which  no  authority  is  cited),  is  an  unfortunate 
one,  and  has  served  to  create  some  misunderstanding  and  confusion.  The  "  presump- 


128  BUEDEN   OF  PROOF,   AND   PKESUMPTIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

proved  by  circumstantial  evidence,  the  proof  ought  to  be  not  only 
consistent  with  the  prisoner's  guilt,  but  inconsistent  with  any  other 
rational  conclusion.2  On  the  other  hand,  as  men  seldom  do  unlaw- 
ful acts  with  innocent  intentions,  the  law  presumes  every  act,  in 
itself  unlawful,  to  have  been  criminally  intended,  until  the  contrary 
appears  ;  thus,  on  a  charge  of  murder,  malice  is  presumed  from  the 
fact  of  killing,  unaccompanied  with  circumstances  of  extenuation; 
and  the  burden  of  disproving  the  malice  is  thrown  upon  the  accused.8 

tion  of  innocence  "  is  in  truth  merely  another  form  of  expression  for  a  part  of  the 
accepted  rule  for  the  burden  of  proof  in  criminal  cases,  i.  e.  the  rule  that  it  is  for  the 
prosecution  (1)  to  adduce  evidence,  and  (2)  to  produce  persuasion  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.  As  to  this  latter  part,  the  measure  of  persuasion,  the  "  presumption  "  says 
nothing.  As  to  the  former  part,  the  "  presumption  "  implies  what  the  other  rule  says, 
viz.,  that  the  accused  (like  every  other  person  on  whom  the  burden  of  proof  does 
not  lie)  may  remain  inactive  and  secure  until  the  prosecution  has  taken  up  its  burden 
and  produced  evidence  and  effected  persuasion;  i.  e.,  to  say  in  this  case,  as  in  any 
other,  that  the  opponent  of  a  claim  or  charge  is  presumed  not  to  be'  guilty  is  to 
say  in  another  form  that  the  proponent  of  the  claim  or  charge  must  prove  it.  But 
in  a  criminal  case  the  term  does  convey  a  special  hint  over  and  above  the  other  form  of 
the  rule  about  the  burden  of  proof,  in  that  it  cautions  the  jury  to  put  away  from  their 
minds  all  the  suspicion  that  arises  from  the  arrest,  the  indictment,  and  the  arraign- 
ment, and  to  reach  their  conclusion  solely  from  the  legal  evidence  adduced.  In 
other  words,  the  rule  about  burden  of  proof  requires  the  prosecution  by  evidence  to 
convince  the  jury  of  the  accused's  guilt;  while  the  presumption  of  innocence,  too,  re- 
quires this,  but  conveys  for  the  jury  a  special  and  additional  caution  (which  is  perhaps 
only  an  implied  corollary  to  the  other)  to  consider,  in  the  material  for  their  belief, 
nothing  but  the  evidence,  »'.  e.,  no  surmises  based  on  the  present  situation  of  the  accused, 
—  a  caution  particularly  needed  in  criminal  cases.  So  far,  then,  as  the  "  presump- 
tion of  innocence  "  adds  anything,  it  is  a  warning  not  to  treat  certain  things  improp- 
erly as  evidence.  It  cannot  be  said  to  be  itself  a  piece  of  evidence,  • —  "matter  of 
evidence,"  as  the  author  above  terms  it.  No  presumption  can  be  evidence.  It  is  a 
rule  about  evidence  (ante,  §  15).  This  is,  in  itself,  merely  a  matter  of  the  theory  of 
presumptions,  and  to  that  extent  may  be  regarded  as  a  mere  question  of  words,  of  the 
way  of  phrasing  a  rule  upon  the  substance  of  which  there  is  no  dispute.  But  when 
this  erroneous  theory  is  made  the  reason  for  ordering  new  trials  because  of  the  mere 
wording  of  a  judge's  instruction  to  a  jury,  the  erroneous  theory  is  capable  of  causing 
serious  harm  to  the  administration  of  justice.  A  glaring  instance  of  this  fault  is  to  be 
found  in  the  decision  of  Coffin  v.  U.  S.,  156  U.  S.  432,  where  the  opinion  of  the  Court, 
by  Mr.  J.  White,  proceeding  upon  the  above  phrase  of  the  author  as  a  leading  author- 
ity, declares  this  "presumption"  to  be  "evidence  in  favor  of  the  accused."  This 
ruling  received  apparent  sanction  in  the  later  case  of  Allen  v.  U.  S.,  164  id.  492;  and 
was  cited,  though  left  unapproved,  in  Bartley  v.  State,  Nebr.,  75  N.  W.  832.  But  in 
Agnew  v.  U.  S.,  165  U.  S.  36,  the  particularly  objectionable  sentence  declaring  that 
"legal  presumptions  are  treated  as  evidence "  is  referred  to  as  " having  a  tendency  to 
mislead  ;  "  in  this  case  the  trial  Court  had  refused  to  give  an  offered  instruction  copy- 
ing that  sentence,  and  the  refusal  was  held  proper ;  so  that  the  Agnew  decision  may 
perhaps  be  taken  as  a  recantation  to  this  extent  of  the  unfortunate  heresy  put  forward 
in  the  Coffin  case.  (In  People  v.  Ostrander,  110  Mich.  60,  the  view  of  the  Coffin  case 
was  in  effect  repudiated.)  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  opinion  in  the  Agnew  case  (in 
1897)  was  published  subsequently  to  a  notable  lecture  on  the  Presumption  of  Inno- 
cence, apropos  of  the  Coffin  case,  delivered  by  Professor  Thayer  at  the  Yale  University 
Law  School  (in  1896),  in  which  the  history  of  the  presumption  was  carefully  examined, 
its  meaning  acutely  expounded,  and  the  fallacies  of  the  opinion  in  the  Coffin  case  ex- 
posed in  detail.  For  a  fuller  exposition  of  the  whole  subject,  see  the  relevant  portions 
of  this  lecture,  now  printed  as  an  Appendix  to  his  "Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evi- 
dence," p.  551  j 

2  Hodge's  Case,  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  227,  per  Alderson,  B.  ;  [[see  post,  §  81  c.] 

3  Foster's  Crown  Law,  255  ;  Rox  v.  Farrington,  Russ.  &  Ky.  207.     This  point  was 
re-examined  and  discussed,  with  great  ability  and  research,  in  York's  Case,  9  Mete.  93, 


§34]       INNOCENCE;  OWNERSHIP;  STOLEN  GOODS;   ETC.          129 

The  same  presumption  arises  in  civil  actions,  where  the  act  com- 
plained of  was  unlawful.  So,  also,  as  men  generally  own  the  personal 
property  they  possess,  proof  of  possession  is  presumptive  proof  of 
ownership.4  But  possession  of  the  fruits  of  crime  recently  after  its 
commission,  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  guilty  possession ;  and,  if 
unexplained  either  by  direct  evidence,  or  by  the  attending  circum- 
stances, or  by  the  character  and  habits  of  life  of  the  possessor,  or 
otherwise,  it  is  taken  as  conclusive.5  This  rule  of  presumption  is 

in  which  a  majority  of  the  learned  judges  affirmed  the  rule  as  stated  in  the  text  : 
[see  ante,  §  18.J 

*  |  Armory  v.  Delamirie,  1  Stra.  605  ;  Magee  v.  Scott,  9  Cush.  150  ;  Fish  v.  Skut, 
21  Barb.  333 ;  Milky  v.  Butts,  35  Me.  139 ;  Linscott  v.  Trask,  id.  150 ;  Vining  v. 
Baker,  53  id.  544 ;  Succession  of  Alexander,  18  La.  Ann.  337  ;  Stoddard  v.  Burton,  41 
Iowa  582;  Wilber  v.  Sisson,  53  id.  262;  Andrews  v.  Beck,  23  Tex.  455  ;}  ["People  ». 
Oldham,  111  Cal.  648;  Sullivan  v.  Goldman,  19  La.  An.  12;  Com.  v.  Blanchette,  157 
Mass.  486.]  {This  presumption  of  ownership  from  possession  arises  only  when  the 
character  of  the  possession  is  wholly  unexplained,  t.  e.  when  the  possession  and  nothing 
more  appears;  if  the  evidence  of  possession  is  shown  to  be  equally  consistent  with  an 
outstanding  ownership  in  a  third  person,  as  with  a  title  in  the  one  having  the  posses- 
sion, the  presumption  is  rebutted  :  Rawley  v.  Brown,  71  N.  Y.  85;  New  York,  etc. 
R.  K.  Co.  v.  Haws,  f>6  id.  175.  So,  in  general,  possession  by  a  broker,  factor,  or  agent 
of  property  such  as  he  is  in  the  habit  of  having  in  his  possession  in  the  regular  course 
of  his  business,  does  not  raise  the  presumption  of  ownership :  Succession  of  Boisbanc, 
82  La.  Ann.  109.  (  [For  the  presumption  as  applied  to  title  to  negotiable  instruments, 
see  Cobleskill  N.  B'k  v.  Emmitt,  52  Kan.  603;  Jones  v.  Jones,  Ky.,  43  S.  W.  412; 
Saunders  v.  Bates,  Nebr.,  74  N.  W.  578  ;  Halsted  v.  Colvin,  51  N.  J.  Eq.  387,  398.  For 
the  presumption  as  applied  to  real  property,  see  {Smith  v.  Lorillard,  10  Johns.  338 ; 
Jackson  v.  Deun,  5  Cow.  200 ;(  Hewes  v.  Glos,  170  111.  436;  Teass  v.  St.  Albans,  38 
W.  Va.  1,  22.  For  the  presumption  as  applied  to  possession  by  a  wife  or  husband,  see 
JKingsbury  v.  Davidson,  122  Pa.  383  ;[  Farwell  v.  Cramer,  38  Nebr.  61.] 

5  C^y  "conclusive"  is  meant  merely  that,  like  other  presumptions,  it  requires  that 
the  fact  presumed  be  taken  as  true  if  no  evidence  to  the  contrary  is  offered ;  if  such 
evidence  is  offered,  then  the  presumption  as  such  ceases  and  all  the  evidence  goes  to 
the  jury  with  no  rule  of  presumption  to  bind  them,  the  fact  on  which  the  presumption 
is  based  being  then  merely  evidence  along  with  the  other  facts  (ante,  §  14w;).  The 
controversy  referred  to  in  the  cases  below  is  whether  the  possession  of  goods  recently 
stolen  creates  a  presumption  requiring  the  jury  to  find  guilt  in  case  no  evidence 
explaining  honest  possession,  or  the  like,  is  offered  ;  or  whether  no  presumption  (i.  e. 
rule  of  law)  is  created  but  the  fact  is  to  be  regarded  merely  as  strong  evidence.  The  con- 
troversy is  partly  due  to  the  common  phrasing  that  "  recent  possession,  if  unexplained," 
creates  the  presumption  ;  this  should  mean  that  recent  possession  alone  creates  the 
presumption,  and  that  if  no  evidence  at  all  is  offered  by  the  accused  the  verdict  should 
find  him  guilty.  In  this  sense,  there  probably  was  no  such  presumption  in  English 

Practice  (see  the  cases  cited  below),  nut  there  was  apparently  an  attempt  to  say 
MI  the  principle  described  in  §  14  w,  ante)  whether  certain  facts  should  be  suffi- 
cient to  justify  the  jury  in  convicting,  and  the  chief  doubt  was  as  to  what  kind  of 
possession  (how  recent,  etc.)  should  be  sufficient  to  put  the  accused  to  an  explanation, 
t.  e.  to  justify  the  jury  in  finding  him  guilty  if  he  made  no  explanation  ;  hence,  ap- 
parently, the  true  significance  of  the  clause  "  if  unexplained,"  i.  e.  "  he  is  called  upon 
to  account  for  having  it,  and  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  the  jury  may  very  well  infer  "  his 
guilt  (R.  v.  Langmead,  infra,  per  Blackburn,  J.). 

The  precise  significance  of  whatever  rule  exists  is  obscured,  in  recent  times,  by  much 
reference  to  "presumptions  of  law"  and  "presumptions  of  fact,"  with  no  careful 
definition  or  general  agreement  of  the  meaning  of  the  terms  used  ;  and  the  controversy 
often  becomes  a  mere  matter  of  verbal  quibbling.  In  general,  it  may  be  said,  the 
Courts  decline  to  recognize  that  there  is  any  presumption  at  all  in  the  sense  (ante, 
§§  14  w,  14  y)  of  a  rule  of  law  requiring  a  verdict  of  guilty  in  case  no  explanation  is 
offered  ;  but  the  phrasing  in  the  various  jurisdictions,  and  even  in  the  same  Court, 
varies  much.  For  the  general  question,  see  the  following  cases  :  K.  v.  Cockin,  2  Lew. 
Cr.  C.  235 ;  R.  v.  Partridge,  7  (J.  &P.  551 ;  R.  v.  Dredge,  1  Cox  Cr.  235  ;  R.  r.  Burton 
VOL.  I.  — 9 


130  BURDEN  OF   PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [OH.   VI. 

not  confined  to  the  case  of  theft,  but  is  applied  to  all  cases  of  crime, 
even  the  highest  and  most  penal.  Thus,  upon  an  indictment  for 
arson,  proof  that  property,  which  was  in  the  house  at  the  time  it 
was  burnt,  was  soon  afterwards  found  in  the  possession  of  the 
prisoner,  was  held  to  raise  a  probable  presumption  that  he  was 
present,  and  concerned  in  the  offence.6  The  like  presumption  is 
raised  in  the  case  of  murder,  accompanied  by  robbery ; 7  and  in 
•  the  case  of  the  possession  of  an  unusual  quantity  of  counterfeit 
money.8 

§  35.  Innocence;  Life  and  Death;  Conflicting  Presumptions.  This 
presumption  of  innocence  is  so  strong,  that  even  where  the  guilt  can 
be  established  only  by  proving  a  negative,  that  negative  must,  in 
most  cases,  be  proved  by  the  party  alleging  the  guilt;  though  the 
general  rule  of  law  devolves  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  party  hold- 
ing the  affirmative.  Thus,  where  the  plaintiff  complained  that  the 
defendants,  who  had  chartered  his  ship,  had  put  on  board  an  article 
highly  inflammable  and  dangerous,  without  giving  notice  of  its 
nature  to  the  master,  or  others  in  charge  of  the  ship,  whereby  the 
vessel  was  burnt;  he  was  held  bound  to  prove  this  negative  aver- 
ment.1 In  some  cases,  the  presumption  of  innocence  has  been 

Dears.  Or.  C.  282 ;  R.  v.  Exall,  4  F.  &  F.  925  (leading  case) ;  R.  v.  Ham's,  8  Cox 
Cr.  333 ;  R.  v.  Langmead,  Leigh  &  C.  427,  9  Cox  Cr.  464 ;  R.  v.  Hughes,  14  Cox  Cr. 
223  ;  Bryant  v.  State,  Ala.,  23  So.  40;  People  v.  Luchetti,  119  Cal.  501 ;  Brooke  v. 
People,  23  Colo.  375;  {State  v.  Raymond,  46  Conn.  345;}  Leslie  ».  State,  35  Fla. 
171;  Brooks  v.  State,  96  Ga.  353;  {Sahlinger  v.  People,  102  111.241;}  Keating  t;. 
People,  160  id.  480 ;  Doan  v.  State,  26  Ind.  495 ;  Pfan  v.  State,  148  id.  539 ;  Camp- 
bell  v.  State,  id.,  49  N.  E.  905;  Oxier  i>.  U.  S.,  Ind.  T.,  38  S.  W.  331;  {State  v. 
Richart,  57  la.  245  ;}  State  v.  Lagrange,  94  id.  60  ;  State  v.  Hoffman,  53  Kan.  700  ; 
State  v.  Kelley,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  543;  Com.  v.  Bell,  102  Mass.  165  ;  {Com.  v.  Me- 
Gorty,  114  id.  301;}  Com.  v.  Randall,  119  id.  107;  {Stokes  v.  State,  58  Miss.  677;| 
Fort'w.  State,  73  Miss.  734  ;  State  v.  Kelly,  73  Mo.  608  ;  State  v.  Wilson,  137  id.  592  ; 
State  v.  Dodge,  50  N.  H.  510  (leading  case)  ;  {State  v.  Rights,  82  N.  C.  675;}  Johnson 
».  Terr.,  Okl.,  50  Pac.  90;  State  v.  Pomeroy,  30  Or.  16  ;  People  v.  Hart,  10  Utah  204; 
Kibler  v.  Com.,  94  Va.  804;  State  v.  Walters,  7  Wash.  246  ;  {Ingalls  v.  State,  48 
Wis.  647. }  Incidentally,  the  question  arises  how  recent  the  possession  must  be, 
t.  e.  how  near  to  the  time  of  the  stealing  ;  no  specific  rule  can  be  laid  down  ;  see  {R.  v. 
Han-is,  supra  ;  State  v.  Bennet,  2  Mills'  Const.  692 ;  State  v.  Adams,  1  Hayw.  463  ; 
State  v.  Rights,  supra  ;\  State  v.  Foulk,  Kan.,  52  Pac.  864.  The  question  also  arises 
how  far  the  possession  must  appear  to  have  been  exclusively  that  of  the  accused  ;  seo 
Moncrief  v.  State,  99  Ga.  295;  State  v.  Owsley,  111  Mo.  450  ;  {R.  v.  Hughes, 
supra ;  M'Queen  v.  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  569  ;  People  v.  Hurley, 
8  Pac.  C.  L.  J.  1134  ;  3  Crim.  L.  Mag.  440  ;  Gablick  v.  People,  40  Mich.  292.}  For  the 
history  of  the  presumption,  see  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  328.  For 
the  use  of  such  facts  merely  as  circumstantial  evidence,  see  ante,  §  14  «.] 

»  Rickman's  Case,  2  East  P.  C.  1035. 

'  Wills  on  Circumst.  Evid.  72  ;  fjsee  Wilson  v.  U.  S.,  162  U.  S.  613.] 

8  R.  v.  Fuller  et  al,  Russ.  &  Ry.  308  ;  ["State  v.  Hodges,  Mo.,  45  S.  W.  1093.  For 
its  application  to  burglary,  arson,  and  sundry  offences,  see  State  v.  Moore,  117  Mo. 
895,  404  ;  Johnson  r.  Terr.,  Okl.,  60  Pac.  90  ;]  {Stuart  v.  People,  42  Mich.  255  ;  State 
v.  Bishop,  51  Vt.  287;  State  v.  Snell,  46  Wis.  524  ;  Neubrandt  v.  State,  9  N.  W.  Rep. 
824  ;  R.  v.  Hughes,  supra ;  People  v.  Mitchell,  55  Cal.  236 ;  Com.  ».  Talbot,  2  Allen 
161 ;  People  v.  Ah  Sing,  3  Crim.  L.  Mag.  115.} 

1  William  v.  E.  Ind.  Co.,  3  East  192  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  298.  So,  of  allegations  that  a 
party  had  not  taken  the  sacrament :  R.  v.  Hawkins,  10  East  211 ;  had  not  complied 
with  the  act  of  uniformity,  etc. :  Powell  v.  Milburn,  3  Wils.  355,  366 ;  that  goods  were 


§§  34-35.]  INNOCENCE  ;    LIFE   AND   DEATH ;    ETC.  131 

deemed  sufficiently  strong  to  overthrow  the  presumption  of  life. 
Thus,  where  a  woman,  twelve  months  after  her  husband  was  last 
heard  of,  married  a  second  husband,  by  whom  she  had  children ;  it 
was  held  that  the  Sessions,  in  a  question  upon  their  settlement, 
rightly  presumed  that  the  first  husband  was  dead  at  the  time  of 
the  second  marriage.2 

not  legally  imported:  Sissons  v.  Dixon,  5  B.  &  C.  758 ;  that  a  theatre  was  not  duly 
licensed:  Rodwell  o.  Redge,  1  C.&  P.  220. 

3  R.  v.  Twyning,  2  B.  &  Aid.  385.  But  in  another  case,  where,  in  a  question 
upon  the  derivative  settlement  of  the  second  wife,  it  was  proved  that  a  letter  had  been 
written  from  the  first  wife  from  Van  Diemen's  Land,  bearing  date  only  twenty-five 
days  prior  to  the  second  marriage,  it  was  held  that  the  Sessions  did  right  in  presuming 
that  the  first  wife  was  living  at  the  time  of  the  second  marriage :  R.  »  Harborne, 
2  Ad.  &  El.  540.  fJOn  such  cases,  see  ante,  §  14  y,  where  the  notion  of  "conflicting 
presumptions "  is  referred  to ;  and  compare  the  following  comments  of  Professor 
Thayer  on  these  cases  above,  in  his  "Preliminary  Treatise,"  p.  345  :  "The  true 
analysis  of  such  a  case  seems  rather  to  be  this  :  We  observe  that  the  party  seeking 
to  move  the  Court  proved  the  existing  marriage  (contracted  between  five  and  six  years 
ago)  and  children  born  of  it.  On  the  other  side,  the  only  evidence  to  prove  the 
invalidity  of  this  marriage  was  the  fact  of  another  one,  contracted  about  seven  years 
ago,  and  the  disappearance  of  the  first  husband  a  few  months  thereafter  (about  a  year 
earlier  than  the  second  marriage),  on  occasion  of  his  enlisting  and  going  abroad  in  the 
foreign  military  service ;  that  husband  had  never  been  heard  of  since.  These  facts 
might  well  seem  inadequate,  in  evidential  force,  to  impeach  the  validity  of  the  exist- 
ing marriage,  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  children.  For  one  thing,  the  absence,  although 
not  long,  was  upon  a  dangerous  service.  Presumptions  are  displaced  or  made  inap- 
plicable by  such  special  facts.  It  was  not  strange,  therefore,  in  1835,  to  find  the 
matter  handled  in  a  different  way.  (King  v.  Harborne,  2  Ad.  &  El.  540.  Compare 
State  v.  Plym,  43  Minn.  385. )  Here  the  first  spouse  had  been  heard  from  up  to  twenty- 
five  days  before  the  second  marriage  as  having  written  to  her  family  at  that  time,  and 
the  Court  quashed  an  order  which  assumed  the  validity  of  the  second  marriage.  Lord 
Denham,  C.  J.,  said  :  'I  must  take  this  opportunity  of  saying  that  nothing  can  be 
more  absurd  than  the  notion  that  there  is  to  be  any  rigid  presumption  of  law  on  such 
questions  of  fact,  without  reference  to  accompanying  circumstances,  such,  for  instance, 
as  the  age  or  health  of  the  party.  .  .  .  The  only  questions  in  such  cases  are,  what 
evidence  is  admissible  and  what  inference  may  fairly  be  drawn  from  it.'  ...  In  an 
English  case,  in  1881  (R.  v.  Willshire,  6  Q.  B.  D.  366),  the  defendant  was  indicted 
for  bigamy  in  marrying  A  in  1880,  while  his  wife  B,  married  by  him  a  year  before,  in 
3879,  was  living.  When  these  marriages  and  the  present  life  of  B  had  been  proved,  the 
defendant  on  the  other  hand  showed,  by  the  record,  his  own  previous  conviction  upon 
an  indictment  for  bigamy  ;  he  had  married  C  in  1868,  while  his  wife  D,  married  four 
years  before,  was  still  living.  Thus  he  introduced  into  the  case  facts  having  a  ten- 
dency to  show  that  B,  like  several  other  women  in  like  condition,  was  not  his  wife. 
And  so  the  case  was  left.  How  should  these  facts  be  treated  ?  On  some  theory  of 
conflicting  presumptions,  and  their  relative  force  ?  Or  simply  by  having  regard  to  the 
evidential  quality  of  the  facts,  and  to  the  relative  duty  of  the  government  and  the 
accused,  in  establishing  and  defending  the  case?  By  the  latter  method,  the  essential 
inquiry  was  (1)  whether  D,  the  true  and  undivorced  wife,  was  living  when  B  was  mar- 
ried ?  and  (2)  supposing  that  matter  to  be  left  in  doubt,  who  loses  ?  .  .  .  The  govern- 
ment, of  course,  had  to  make  out  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt ;  the  accused  needed 
only  to  create  such  a  doubt.  Guilt  depended  on  whether  D,  living  on  April  22,  1868., 
when  C  was  married,  was  alive  on  Sept.  7,  1879,  when  B  was  married.  The  govern- 
ment, to  succeed,  must  satisfy  the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  a  proposition 
which  included  the  fact  that  D  was  then  dead.  The  accused,  to  be  discharged,  must, 
at  least,  create  a  reasonable  doubt  whether  she  was  then  alive.  In  fact,  the  case  was 


disposed  of  below  by  holding  that,  as  the  evidence  lay,  'the  burden  of  proof  was  on 
the  prisoner ;'  and  he  was  convicted.  But  on  a  question  reserved  'whether  he  was 
properly  convicted,'  the  conviction  was  quashed,  [the  majority  holding  that  there 
was  evidence  both  ways,  which  should  have  been  left  to  the  jury.]  .  .  .  The  case,  then, 
was  rightly  disposed  of  ;  and  the  notion  of  conflicting  presumptions  had  no  real  bear- 
ing upon  it."  For  analogous  instances  involving  the  presumption  of  life  as  affecting  the 


132  BURDEN   OF  FKOOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.  TI. 

§  36.  Libel.  An  exception  to  this  rule,  respecting  the  presump- 
tion of  innocence,  is  admitted  in  the  case  of  a  libel.  For  where  a 
libel  is  sold  in  a  bookseller's  shop,  by  his  servant,  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  his  employment,  this  is  evidence  of  a  guilty  publication  by 
the  master ;  though,  in  general,  an  authority  to  commit  a  breach  of 
the  law  is  not  to  be  presumed.  This  exception  is  founded  upon 
public  policy,  lest  irresponsible  persons  should  be  put  forward,  and 
the  principal  and  real  offender  should  escape.  Whether  such  evi- 
dence is  conclusive  against  the  master,  or  not,  the  books  are  not 
perfectly  agreed;  but  it  seems  conceded,  that  the  want  of  privity 
in  fact  by  the  master  is  not  sufficient  to  excuse  him ;  and  that  the 
presumption  of  his  guilt  is  so  strong  as  to  fall  but  little  short  of 
conclusive  evidence.1  Proof  that  the  libel  was  sold  in  violation  of 
express  orders  from  the  master  would  clearly  take  the  case  out 
of  this  exception,  by  showing  that  it  was  not  sold  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  the  servant's  duty.  The  same  law  is  applied  to  the 
publishers  of  newspapers.2 

§  37.  Spoliation ;  Fabrication  of  Evidence.  The  presumption  of 
innocence  may  be  overthrown,  and  a  presumption  of  guilt  be  raised 
by  the  misconduct  of  the  party,  in  suppressing  or  destroying  evi- 
dence which  he  ought  to  produce,  or  to  which  the  other  party  is 
entitled.1  Thus,  the  spoliation  of  papers,  material  to  show  the 
neutral  character  of  a  vessel,  furnishes  a  strong  presumption,  in 
odium  spoliatoris  against  the  ship's  neutrality.2  A  similar  presump- 
tion is  raised  against  a  party  who  has  obtained  possession  of  papers 
from  a  witness,  after  the  service  of  subpoena  duces  tecum  upon  the 
latter  for  their  production,  which  is  withheld.8  The  general  rule  is, 

validity  of  a  marriage,  see  {Quin  v.  State,  46  Ind.  459  ;  Com.  v.  McGrath,  140  Mass. 
296  ;  Murray  v.  Murray,  6  Oreg.  17;  Spears  v.  Burton,  31  Miss.  547;  Lockhart  v. 
White,  18  Texas  102  ;  Sharp  ».  Johnson,  22  Ark.  75 ;  Klein  ».  Landman,  29  Mo.  259  ;{ 
involving  presumption  of  a  previous  divorce  as  affecting  the  validity  of  a  marriage  : 
Hunter  v.  Huntei-,  111  Cal.  261  ;  Leach  v.  Hall,  95  la.  611  ;  Rash's  Estate,  Mont, 
53  Pac.312;  Schmisseur  v.  Beatrie,  147  111.  210;  Wenning  v.  Temple,  144  Ind.  189  ;] 
j involving  the  presumption  of  legitimacy  :  Dinkinsc  Samuel,  10  Rich.  66  ;  Strode  v. 
McGowan,  2  Bush  621 ;  Harrison  v.  South,  21  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  343 ;  Ward  v.  Dulaney, 
23  Miss.  410  ;  Shuman  v.  Kurd,  79  Wis.  654  ;  Shuman  v.  Shuman,  83  id.  250.  ( 

1  R.  v.  Gutch,  1  M.  &  M.  433  ;  Harding  v.  Greening,  8  Taunt.  42;  R.  v.  Almon, 

5  Burr.  2686;  R.  v.  Walter,  3  Esp.  21 ;  1  Russ.  on  Crimes,  341  (3d  ed.  p.  251);  Ph. 

6  Am.  on  Evid.  466 ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  446. 

2  1  Russ.  on  Crimes,  341  ;    R.  v.  Nutt,  Bull.  N.  P.  6  (3d  ed.  p.  251);   Southwick 
v.  Stevens,  10  Johns.  443  ;  {see  Cooper  v.  Slnde,  6  H.  of  L.  786  ;  R.  v.  Dixon,  3  M. 
&  S.  11 ;  R.  v.  Medley,  6  C.  &  P.  292.     Analogous  to  this  is  the  question  whether 
a  sale  of  liquor  by  an  employee  raises  a  presumption  of  authority;  that  it  does  not,  hut 
merely  furnishes  sufficient  evidence,   see  Com.  v.  Briant,  142  Mass.  463  ;   Com.  v. 
Stevenson,  ib.  466  ;  Com.  v.  Hayes,  145  id.  289.  [ 

1  Qln  these  cases  it  is  seldom  that -a  genuine  presumption  is  enforced  ;    the  oppo- 
nent's act  of  spoliation,  fabrication,  or  non-production  of  evidence  is  treated  merely 
as  a  significant  fact  for  the  jury,  going  to  them  as  an  admission  of  the  thing  which 
the  opponent  desires  to  prove.     For  this  use  of  such  evidence,  see  post,  §§  195  a,  ff.,  and 
the  authorities  there  collected.] 

2  The  Hunter,  1  Dods.  480 ;  The  Pizarro,  2  Wheat.  227 ;  1  Kent  Comm.  157 ; 
$upra,  §  31. 

•  Leeda  v.  Cook,  4  Esp.  256 ;  Rector  v.  Rector,  3  Gilm.  105. 


§§36-38.]    SPOLIATION;  COURSE  OF  TRADE;  PAYMENT;  ETC.    133 

omnia  prcesumuntur  contra  spoliatorem.*  His  conduct  is  attributed 
to  his  supposed  knowledge  that  the  truth  would  have  operated 
against  him.  Thus,  if  some  of  a  series  of  documents  of  title  are 
suppressed  by  the  party  admitting  them  to  be  in  his  possession,  this 
is  evidence  that  the  documents  withheld  afford  inferences  unfavor- 
able to  the  title  of  that  party.5  Thus,  also,  where  the  finder  of  a 
lost  jewel  would  not  produce  it,  it  was  presumed  against  him  that  it 
was  of  the  highest  value  of  its  kind.'  But  if  the  defendant  has  been 
guilty  of  no  fraud,  or  improper  conduct,  and  the  only  evidence 
against  him  is  of  the  delivery  to  him  of  the  plaintiff's  goods,  of  un- 
known quality,  the  presumption  is  that  they  were  goods  of  the 
cheapest  quality.7  The  fabrication  of  evidence,  however,  does  not 
of  itself  furnish  any  presumption  of  law  against  the  innocence  of 
the  party,  but  is  a  matter  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  jury.8  Innocent 
persons,  under  the  influence  of  terror  from  the  danger  of  their  situa- 
tion, have  been  sometimes  led  to  the  simulation  of  exculpatory  facts ; 
of  which  several  instances  are  stated  in  the  books.9  Neither  has  the 
mere  non-production  of  books,  upon  notice,  any  other  legal  effect, 
than  to  admit  the  other  party  to  prove  their  contents  by  parol,  unless 
under  special  circumstances.10 

§  38.  Course  of  Trade  ;  Payment ;  Delivery.  Other  presumptions 
of  this  class  are  founded  upon  the  experience  of  human  conduct  in 
the  course  of  trade;  men  being  usually  vigilant  in  guarding  their 
property ,*  and  prompt  in  asserting  their  rights,  and  orderly  in  con- 
ducting their  affairs,  and  diligent  in  claiming  and  collecting  their 
dues.  Thus,  where  a  bill  of  exchange,  or  an  order  for  the  payment 
of  money  or  delivery  of  goods,  is  found  in  the  hands  of  the  drawee, 
or  a  promissory  note  is  in  the  possession  of  the  maker,  a  legal  pre- 

«  2  Poth.  Obi.  (by  Evans)  292 ;  Dalston  ».  Coatsworth,  1  P.  Wms.  731  ;  Cowper 
v.  Earl  Cowper,  2  P.  Wms.  720,  748-752  ;  R.  v.  Arundel,  Hob.  109,  explained  in  2  P. 
Wins.  748,  749 ;  D.  of  Newcastle  v.  Kinderley,  8  Ves.  363,  375  ;  Aimesley  v.  E.  of 
Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1430.  See  also  Sir  Samuel  Romilly's  argument  in  Lord 
Melville's  Case,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  1194,  1195  ;  Auon.,  1  Ld.  Raym.  731  ;  Broom's 
Legal  Maxims,  p.  485.  In  Barker  v.  Kay,  2  Rnss.  73,  the  Lord  Chancellor  thought 
that  this  rule  had  in  some  cases  been  pressed  a  little  too  far.  See  also  Harwood  v. 
Goodright,  Cowp.  87;  QHay  v.  Peterson,  Wyo.,  45  Pac.  1073;  Fox  v.  Mining  Co., 
108  Cal.  369  (applied  to  a  mode  of  dealing  with  ore).] 

6  James  v.  Biou,  2  Sim.  &  Stu.  600 ;  {see  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Windsor,  24  Beav.  679  ; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323  ;  Jones  v.  Knauss,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  609  ;  Botts  v. 
Wood,  56  Miss.  136  ;  Spring  G.  I.  Co.  ».  Evans,  9  Md.  1 ;  Joannes  v.  Bennett,  5  All. 
169.  | 

6  Armory  v.  Delamirie,  1  Str.  505 ;  Sutton  c.  Devonport,  27  L.  J.  C.  P.  54. 

T  Clunnes  v.  Pezzey,  1  Campb.  8;  {Harris  v.  Rosenberg,  43  Conn.  227;  Tea  v. 
Gates,  10  Ind.  164  ;  Lawton  v.  Sweeney,  8  Jur.  964.  ( 

8  {See  Winchell  v.  Edwards,  57  111.  41 ;  1  Ph.  Ev.  (4th  Am.  ed.)  639  ;  Com.  ».  Web- 
ster, 5  Cush.  (Mass.)  316  ;  Gardiner  v.  People,  6  Parker  C.  C.  155 ;  and  post,  Vol.  Ill, 
§  34.     As  to  alteration  of  documents,  see  post,  §  565,  and  State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H. 
148.  ( 

9  See  3  Inst.  104  ;  Wills  on  Circumst.  Evid.  113. 

»  Cooper  ».  Gibbons,  3  Campb.  363.  j  But  see  Cross  v.  Bell,  34  N.  H.  83  ;  Barber 
».  Lyon,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  622;  Spring  Garden  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Evans,  9  Md.  1 ;{ 
[and  the  authorities  in  §  195  c,  post."} 


134  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,  AND  PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

sumption  is  raised  that  he  has  paid  the  money  due  upon  it,  and 
delivered  the  goods  ordered.1  A  bank-note  will  be  presumed  to  have 
been  signed  before  it  was  issued,  though  the  signature  be  torn  off.8 
So,  if  a  deed  is  found  in  the  hands  of  the  grantee,  having  on  its  face 
the  evidence  of  its  regular  execution,  it  will  be  presumed  to  have 
been  delivered  by  the  grantor.8  {An  instrument  is  presumed  to  have 
been  made  on  the  day  on  which  it  is  dated ;  and  if  several  documents 
are  dated  the  same  day,  it  will  be  presumed  that  they  were  made  in 
the  order  necessary  to  effect  the  object  for  which  they  were  executed, 
unless  some  indications  of  fraud  appear.4 }  So  a  receipt  for  the  last 
year's  or  quarter's  rent  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  payment  of 
all  the  rent  previously  accrued.5  But  the  mere  delivery  of  money 
by  one  to  another,  or  of  a  bank  check,  or  the  transfer  of  stock,  un- 
explained, is  presumptive  evidence  of  the  payment  of  an  antecedent 
debt,  and  not  of  a  loan.6  The  same  presumption  arises  upon  the 
payment  of  an  order  or  draft  for  money ;  namely,  that  it  was 
drawn  upon  funds  of  the  drawer  in  the  hands  of  the  drawee.  But 

1  Gibbon  v.  Featherstonhaugh,  1  Stark.  225;  Egg  v.  Barnett,  3  Esp.  196;  Gar- 
lock  v.  Geortner,  7  Weml.  198  ;  Alvord  v.  Baker,  9  id.  823  ;  Weidner  v.  Schweigart, 
9  Serg.  &  R.  38o  ;  Shepherd  v.  Currie,  1  Stark.  454 ;  Brernbridge  v.  Osborne,  ib.  374. 
QAS  to  this  presumption  of  payment  from  possession  by  the  obligor  of  the  instrument 
of  debt  after  maturity  (which  is  not  always  enforced  by  the  Courts  as  a  genuine  pre- 
sumption), see  Excelsior  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Owens,  58  Ark.  556;  Smith  v.  Gardner,  36  Nebr. 
741  ;  Poston  v.  Jones,  N.  C.,  29  S.  E.  951  ;  Collins  v.  Lynch,  157  Pa.  246,  256  ; 
Seattle  F.  N.  B'k  v.  Harris,  7  Wash.  139  ;  Bates  v.  Cain,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  36.  It  is  said 
not  to  apply  where  the  obligor  was  in  such  a  situation  as  to  have  free  access  to  the 
obligee's  papers  :  Grimes  v.  Hilliary,  150  111.  141,  149 ;  Erhart  v.  Dietrich,  118  Mo. 
418,  428.] 

a  Murdoi.k;v.  Union  Bank  of  La.,  2  Rob.  La.  112  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  15  N.  H.  55. 
The  production,  by  the  plaintiff,  of  an  I  O  U,  signed  by  the  defendant,  is  prima  facie 
evidence  that  it  was  given  by  him  to  the  plaintiff :  Curtis  v.  Rickards,  1  M.  &  G.  46. 

8  Ward  v.  Lewis,  4  Pick.  518  ;  [[Campbell  v.  Carruth,  32  Fla.  264  ;  Rohr  v.  Alex- 
ander, 57  Kan.  381 ;  contra,  for  a  government  grant,  Bergere  v.  U.  S.,  168  TJ.  S.  66. 
The  presumption  was  applied  to  an  insurance  policy  in  Jones  v.  Ins.  Co.,  168  Mass. 
245-3 

*  {New  Haven  v.  Mitchell,  15  Conn.  206  ;  Williams  ».  Woods,  16  Md.  220;  Ander. 
son  r.  Weston,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  302  ;  Houliston  v.  Smith,  2  C.  &  P.  24  ;  Malpas  v.  Clem- 
ents, 19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  435 ;  Potez  v.  Glossop,  2  Exch.  191  ;  Sinclair  v.  Bagalley.  4  M.  & 
W.  318  ;  Trelawuey  v.  Colman,2  Stark.  193  ;  TKendrick  v.  Bellinger,  117  N.  C.  491.] 
When  any  document  purporting  to  be  stamped" as  a  deed  is  properly  signed  and  deliv- 
ered, it  is,  in  most  States,  presumed  to  have  been  sealed,  though  no  trace  of  one  is  left : 
Re  Sandilands,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  411  ;  see  post,  Vol.  II,  §§  296,  297.  |     PBut  distinguish 
from  this  the  question  whether  a  seal  will  be  presumed  to  have  existed  on  the  original 
where  it  is  wanting  on  the  recorded  copy  or  on  a  certified  copy ;  see,  for  example, 
Rensens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va.  226.] 

•  1  Gilb.  Evid.  (by  Lofft)  309  ;  Brewer  0.  Knapp,  1  Pick.  337  ;  jHodgdon  v.  Wight, 
$6  Me.  326.  {     QThat  a  receipt  raises  a  presumption  of  payment,  see  Ramsdell  v.  Clark, 
}0  Mont.  103  ;  contra,  Terryberry  v.  Woods,  69  Vt.  94.] 

jSo,  of  an  unsigned  account  in  the  handwriting  of  the  maker,  in  tho  hands  of  the 
debtor  :  Nichols  v.  Alsop,  10  Conn.  263.  The  possession  by  a  party  of  a  receipt  from 
a  common  carrier  raises  the  presumption  of  a  proper  delivery,  and  of  the  possessor's 
assent  to  its  terms  :  Boorman  o.  Am.  Exp.  Co.,  21  Wis.  152.| 

8  Welch  v.  Seaborn,  1  Stark.  474  ;  Patton  v.  Ash,  7  Serg.  &  R.  116, 125  ;  Breton  v. 
Cope,  Peake's  Cas.  30;  Lloyd  v.  Sandilands,  Gow  13,  16  ;  Cary  v.  Gerrish,  4  fap.  9  ; 
Aubrrt  v.  Walsh,  4  Taunt.  293  ;  Boswell  v.  Smith,  6  C.  &  P.  60;  jGerdiug  v.  Walter, 
29  Mo.  426.) 


§§  38-38  a.]    EXECUTION  OF  ATTESTED  INSTRUMENTS,  ETC.       135 

in  the  case  of  an  order  for  the  delivery  of  goods  it  is  otherwise,  they 
being  presumed  to  have  been  sold  by  the  drawee  to  the  drawer.7 
Thus,  also,  where  the  proprietors  of  adjoining  parcels  of  land  agree 
upon  a  line  of  division,  it  is  presumed  to  be  a  recognition  of  the 
true  original  line  between  their  lots.8 

§  38  a.  Execution  of  Attested  Instruments  ;  Regularity  of  Official 
Acts ;  Appointment  to  Office.  Of  a  similar  character  is  the  pre- 
sumption in  favor  of  the  due  execution  of  solemn  instruments. 
Thus,  if  the  subscribing  witnesses  to  a  will  are  dead,  or  if,  being 
present,  they  are  forgetful  of  all  the  facts,  or  of  any  fact  material  to 
its  due  execution,  the  law  will  in  such  cases  supply  the  defect  of 
proof,  by  presuming  that  the  requisites  of  the  statute  were  duly 
observed.1  The  same  principle,  in  effect,  seems  to  have  been  applied 
in  the  case  of  deeds.3  {On  the  maxim,  "  Omnia  prcBsumuntur  recte 
esse  acta"  that  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  done  which  ought  to 
have  been  done,  as  that  a  bill  in  Chancery  was  sworn  to;8  that  a 
notice  printed,  posted,  and  apparently  signed  by  the  commander  of 
a  military  post,  was  by  his  order ;  *  that  a  church,  long  used,  was  duly 
consecrated ; 6  that  a  parish  certificate,  long  recognized,  was  duly 
executed ; 8  and  generally  when  an  official  act  has  been  done,  which 
can  only  be  lawful  and  valid,  by  the  doing  of  certain  preliminary 
acts,  it  will  be  presumed  that  those  preliminary  acts  have  also  been 
done.7  So  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  designation  of  a  foreign 
official  is  true.8  But  jurisdiction  will  not  be  presumed  in  favor  of 
inferior  courts ;  or  those  established  for  special  purposes.'  So  it  will 
be  presumed  that  lost  instruments  had  all  the  requisites  to  make 
them  valid,  as  that  they  were  stamped ; 10  but  not  if  when  last  seen 
they  were  not  stamped.11}  [A  presumption  of  due  appointment  to 

i  Alvord  v.  Baker,  9  Wend.  323,  324. 
8  Sparhawk  ».  Bullard,  1  Met.  95. 

1  Burgoyne  v.  Showier,  1  Roberts,  Eccl.  10  ;  In  re  Leach,  12  Jur.  381. 

2  Burling  v.  Paterson,  9  0.  &  P.  570  ;  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Met.  349 ;  Quimby  v. 
Buzzell,  4  Shepl.  470 ;  New  Haven  Co.   Bank  v.  Mitchell,   15  Conn.  206  ;  fsee  more 
fully,  post,  §  575.]  But  there  is  no  presumption,  in  the  case  of  a  deed,  that  the  witnesses, 
being  dead,  would,  if  living,  testify  to  the  grantor's  soundness  of  mind  at  ths  time  of 
delivery :  Flanders  v.  Davis,  19  N.  H.  139.     But  one  will  be  presumed  to  understand 
the  contents  of  an  instrument  signed  by  him,  and  whether  dated  or  not :  Androscoggia 
Bank  v.  Kimball,  10  Cush.  373. 


R.  v.  Benson,  2  Campb.  508.  [ 
Brace  v.  Nicolopopulo,  11  Ex.  129.  \ 


v.  Nicolopop 
v.  Kingsmill, 


Rugg  v.  Kingsmill,  L.  R.  1  Ad.  EC.  343  ;  R.  «.  Mainwaring,  26  L.  J.  M.  C.  10.  { 

R.  v.  Upton,  10  B.  &  C.  807;  R.  r.  Stainforth,  11  Q.  B.  66.  { 

R.  v.  Whiston,  4  A.  &  E.  607 ;  R.   ».  Broadhempston,   28  L.  J.  M.   C.   18  ; 


Goeset  v.  Howard,  10  Q.  B.  411.} 


Saltarr.  Applegate,  3  Zabr.  115.{ 
R.  v.  All  Saints,  etc.,  7  B.  &  C.  790  ;  R.  ».  Totness,  11  Q.  B.  80.} 
Hart  v.  Hart,  1  Hare,  1 ;  R.  v.  Long  Buck  by,  7  East  45.  ( 
Arbon  v.  Fussell,  9  Jur.  N.  8.  753.  | 


[Tor  other  instances  see  Aroer.  M.  Co.  ».  Hill,  92  Ga.  297  (regularity  of  verdict)  ; 
State  0.  Lord,  118  Mo.  1  (regularity  of  indictment)  ;  Harkrader  v.  Carroll,  76  Fed. 
474  (proceedings  of  Land  Office)  ;  Goldie  v.  McDonald,  78  111.  605  (service  of  process) ; 
Green  v.  Barker,  47  Nebr.  934  (conveyance  by  municipal  board) ;  Fisher  v.  Kaufman, 


136  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

office  is  raised  by  showing  that  the  person  is  acting  notoriously  as 
such  officer.  This  strictly  involves  two  elements :  first,  the  acting ; 
secondly,  the  notoriety  or  openness  of  such  action,  or,  as  sometimes 
put,  the  repute  of  being  such  officer.  But  often  the  first  element 
alone  is  mentioned  as  essential.12  This  presumption,  however,  must 
be  distinguished  from  the  question  of  substantive  law  whether  for  a 
given  purpose  the  acts  of  a  de  facto  officer  are  valid.] 

§  39.  Payment  from  Lapse  of  Time.  On  the  same  general  prin- 
ciple, where  a  debt  due  by  specialty  has  been  unclaimed,  and  with- 
out recognition,  for  twenty  years,  in  the  absence  of  any  explanatory 
evidence,  it  is  presumed  to  have  been  paid.  The  jury  may  infer  the 
fact  of  payment  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  within  that 
period ;  but  the  presumption  of  law  does  not  attach  till  the  twenty 
years  are  expired.1  This  rule,  with  its  limitation  of  twenty  years, 
was  first  introduced  into  the  courts  of  law  by  Sir  Matthew  Hale,  and 
has  since  been  generally  recognized,  both  in  the  courts  of  law  and  of 
equity.2  It  is  applied  not  only  to  bonds  for  the  payment  of  money, 
but  to  mortgages,  judgments,  warrants  to  confess  judgments,  decrees, 
statutes,  recognizances,  and  other  matters  of  record,  when  not 
affected  by  statutes  ; 8  but  with  respect  to  all  other  claims  not  under 
seal  nor  of  record,  and  not  otherwise  limited,  whether  for  the  pay- 
ment of  money,  or  the  performance  of  specific  duties,  the  general 
analogies  are  followed,  as  to  the  application  of  the  lapse  of  time, 
which  prevail  on  kindred  subjects.4  But  in  all  these  cases,  the  pre- 
sumption of  payment  may  be  repelled  by  any  evidence  of  the  situa- 
tion of  the  parties,  or  other  circumstance  tending  to  satisfy  the  jury 
that  the  debt  is  still  due.6 

170  Pa.  444  (correctness  of  official  survey)  ;  Eyman  v.  People,  6  111.  4  (laying  oat  of  a 
highway) :  Bishop  v.  Cone,  3  N.  H.  513  (proceedings  of  a  town  meeting).  See  also 
ante,  §  20 .1 

12  [_See  this  point  noted  in  Com.  v.  Wright,  158  Mass.  149,  157  ;  the  authorities  on 
the  general  subject  are  collected  in  §§  83,  92,  post ;  §  92  being  now  transferred  post, 
as  §  563  0.3 

1  Oswald  v.  Legh,  1  T.  R.  270  ;  Hillary  ».  Waller,  12  Ves.  264  ;  Colsell  v.  Budd, 
1  Campb.  27  ;  Boltz  v.  Bullman,  1  Yeates  584;  Cottier.  Payne,  3  Day  289.     In  some 
cases,  the  presumption  of  payment  has  been  made  by  the  Court,  after  eighteen  years: 
R.  ».  Stephens,  1  Burr.  434  ;  Clark  v.  Hopkins,  7  Johns.  556  ;  but  these  seem  to  be 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule. 

2  Mathews  on  Presumpt.  Evid.  379 ;  Haworth  ».  Bostock,  4  Y.  &  C.  1  ;  Grenfell  v. 
Girdlestone,  2  Y.  &  C.  662  ;  QSellen  v.  Norman,  4  C.  &  P.  80  ;  Cox  v.  Brower,  114  N. 
C.  422;  Devereux's  Estate,  184  Pa.  429;  King  v.  King,  90  Va.  177.     But  it  is  not 
always  enforced  as  a  genuine  presumption.     For  its  application  to  payments  of  insur- 
ance-dues, see  Niblack,  Benefit  Societies  and  Accident  Insurance,  §  155  ;  Bacon,  Bene- 
fit Societies,  §  114.] 

«  {Jarvis  v.  Albro,  67  Me.  310  ;  Fisher  v.  Mayor,  13  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  64.  j 

*  |  Worth  v.  Gray,  6  Jones  (N.  C.)  Eq.  4  ;  Knight  v.  Macomber,  55  Me.  132.}    This 

presumption  of  the  common  law  is  now  made  absolute  in  the  case  of  debts  due  by 

specialty,  by  Stat.  3-4  Wm.  IV,  c.  42,  §  3.     See  also  Stat.  3-4  Wm.  IV,  c.  27,  and 

7  Wm.  IV.-l  Vic.  c.  28  ;  and  American  statutes. 

6  A  more  extended  consideration  of  this  subject  being  foreign  from  the  plan  of  this 

work,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  treatise  of  Mr.  Mathews  on  Presumptive  Evidence, 

cc.  19,  20;  and  to  Best  on  Presumptions,  part  1,  cc.  2,  3. 


§§  38  a-40.]  PAYMENT;  LETTERS;  ETC.  137 

§  40.  Course  of  Business ;  Post-office ;  Telegrams ;  etc.  Under 
this  head  of  presumptions  from  the  course  of  trade  may  be  ranked 
the  presumptions  frequently  made  from  the  regular  course  of  busi- 
ness in  a  public  office.  Thus  postmarks  on  letters  are  prima  facie 
evidence  that  the  letters  were  in  the  post-office  at  the  time  and  place 
therein  specified.1  If  a  letter  is  sent  by  the  post,  it  is  presumed, 
from  the  known  course  in  that  department  of  the  public  service, 
that  it  reached  its  destination  at  the  regular  time,  and  was  received 
by  the  person  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  if  living  at  the  place,  and 
usually  receiving  letters  there.2  So,  where  a  letter  was  put  into  a 
box  in  an  attorney's  office,  and  the  course  of  business  was  that  a 
bellman  of  the  post-office  invariably  called  to  take  the  letters  from 
the  box ;  this  was  held  sufficient  to  presume  that  it  reached  its 
destination.8  [So  the  delivery  of  a  telegram  may  be  presumed  from 
the  fact  that  it  was  handed  to  the  telegraph  company  correctly 
addressed.4]  So  the  time  of  clearance  of  a  vessel  sailing  under  a 
license,  was  presumed  to  have  been  indorsed  upon  the  license,  which 
was  lost,  upon  its  being  shown  that,  without  such  indorsement,  the 
custom-house  would  not  have  permitted  the  goods  to  be  entered.6 
So,  on  proof  that  goods  which  cannot  be  exported  without  license 
were  entered  at  the  custom-house  for  exportation,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  there  was  a  license  to  export  them.6  The  return  of  a 
sheriff,  also,  which  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  true,  between  the 
parties  to  the  process,  is  taken  prima  facie  as  true,  even  in  his  own 
favor ;  and  the  burden  of  proving  it  false,  in  an  action  against  him 
for  a  false  return,  is  devolved  on  the  plaintiff,  notwithstanding  it 
is  a  negative  allegation.7  In  fine,  it  is  presumed  until  the  contrary 

1  Fletcher  v.  Braddyll,   3  Stark.  64 ;  R,  v.  Johnson,   7  East  65  ;  R.  v.  Watson, 
1  Campb.  215;  R.  v.  Plumer,  Russ.  &  Ry.  264;  New  Haven  Co.  Bank  v.  Mitchell, 
15  Conn.  206 ;  [see  ante,  §  14  5.] 

2  Saunderson  v.  Judge,  2  H.  BL  509  ;  Bussard  v.  Levering,  6  Wheat.  102  ;  Linden- 
berger  v.  Beall,  id.  104  ;  Bayley  on  Bills  (by  Phillips  &  Sewall),  275,  276,  277;  Wal- 
ter v.  Haynes,  Ry.  &  M.   149  ;  Warren  -o.  Warren,    1  Cr.  M.   &  R.   250  ;  Russell  a. 
Buckley,  4  R.  I.   525;    jBriggs  v.  Hervey,  130  Mass.  187  ;  Folsoni  v.  Cook,  115  Pa. 
548  ;  Huntley  v.  Whittier,  105  Mass.  391  ;  First,  etc.  Bank  v.  McManigle,  66  Pa.  156  ; 
Greenfield  Bank  v.  Crafts,  4  Allen  447;  Rosenthal  v.  Walker,  111  U.  S.  185,  193; 
Austin  v.  Holland,   69  N.  Y.   571,  576;  Loud  v.  Merrill,  45  Me.  516;  Freeman  v. 
Morey,  id.  50;  Hedden  v.  Roberts,  134  Mass.  38;  post,  Vol.  II,  §  188 ;(    [Young  v. 
Clapp,  147  111.  176,  190;  Goodwin  c.  Ass.  Soc.,  97  la.  226;  Chase  z;.  Surry,  88  Me. 
468  ;  McDowell  i>.  Ins.  Co.,  164  Mass.  444 ;  Dade  ».  Ins.  Co.,  54  Minn.  336  ;  State 
v.  Howell,  N.  J.   L.,  38  All.  748  ;  Jensen  v.  McCorkell,  154  Pa.  323.     As  usually 
phrased,  the  rule  assumes  it  to  be  shown  that  the  letter  was  properly  stamped  and 
correctly  addressed.     But  the  rule  is  not  always  enforced  as  a  genuine  presumption. 

For  the  presumption  as  to  the  genuineness  of  a  letter  received  in  answer  through  the 
mail,  see  post,  §  575  c.] 

8  Skilbeck  v.  Garbett,  9  Jur.  339  ;  s.  c.  7  Ad.  &  El.  N.  e.  846;  {Spencer  v.  Thomp- 
son, 6  Ir.  C.  L.  537  ;  see  McGregor  v.  Keily,  3  Ex.  794.  j 

*  {Oregon  Steamship  Co.  v.  Otis,  100  N.  Y.  451  ;  Com.  v.  Jeffries,  7  Allen  548; 
U.  S.  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  C.  C.  571;}    fJEppinger  v.  Scott,  112  Cal.  369;  Perry  v. 
Bank,  Nehr.,  73  N.  W.  538  ;  Gray,  Telegrams,  §  136.] 

6  Butler  v.  Allnut,  1  Stark.  222. 

*  Van  Omeron  v.  Dowick,  2  Campb.  44. 

*  Clarke  v.  Lyman,  10  Pick.  47 ;  Boynton  v.  Willard,  ib.  169.     }Iu  Massachusetts, 


138  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.  VL 

is  proved,  that  every  man  obeys  the  mandates  of  the  law,  and  per- 
forms all  his  official  and  social  duties.8  The  like  presumption  is 
also  drawn  from  the  usual  course  of  men's  private  offices  and  busi- 
ness, where  the  primary  evidence  of  the  fact  is  wanting.9 

§  41.  Continuity ;  Life ;  Death.  Other  presumptions  are  founded 
on  the  experienced  continuance  or  permanency  of  longer  and  shorter 
duration,  in  human  affairs.  When,  therefore,  the  existence  of  a 
person,  a  personal  relation,  or  a  state  of  things,  is  once  established 
by  proof,  the  law  presumes  that  the  person,  relation,  or  state  of 
things  continues  to  exist  as  before,  until  the  contrary  is  shown,  or 
until  a  different  presumption  is  raised,  from  the  nature  of  the  subject 
in  question,  [in  this  way,  continuance  of  ownership  of  property1 
may  be  presumed  ;  of  possession  of  property ;  2  of  residence  ; 8  of  an 
agent's  authority  ;  *  and  the  like.5]  Where  the  issue  is  upon  the  life 
or  death  of  a  person,  once  shown  to  have  been  living,  the  burden 
of  proof  lies  upon  the  party  who  asserts  the  death.'  But  after  the 

the  report  of  an  auditor  raises  a  presumption  in  favor  of  the  facts  found  by  him :  see 
the  practice  illustrated  in  Phillips  v.  Cornell,  133  Mass.  546;  Peaslee  v.  Ross,  143 
M.  275  ;  Tobin  v.  Jones,  ib.  448. } 

8  Ld.  Halifax's  Case,  Bull.  N.  P.  298  ;  U.  S.  Bank  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  69, 
70;  Williams  v.   E.  Ind.  Co.,  3  East  192;    Hartwell  v.   Root,   19  Johns.  345;   The 
Mary  Stewart,  2  W.  Rob.  Adm.  244 ;  {Lea  v.  Polk  Co.  C.  Co.,  21  How.  493  ;   Cooper 
v.  Cranberry,  33  Miss.  117;  Curtis  v.  Herrick,  14  Cal.  117;  Isbell  v.  R.  Co.,  25  Conn. 
556.  |     Hence,  children  born  during  the  separation  of  husband  and  wife,  by  a  decree 
of  divorce  a  mensa  et  tkoro,  are  prima  facie  illegitimate  :    St.  George  v.  St.  Margaret, 

I  Salk.  123. 

9  Doe  v.  Turford,  3  B.  &  Ad.  890,  895  ;  Champneys  v.  Peck,  1  Stark.  404  ;  Pritt 
v.  Fairclough,  3  Campb.  305  ;  Dana  v.  Kemble,  19  Pick.  112.    fJFor  these  cases,  which 
seem  here  to  be  misused,  see  post,  §  120  a. ] 

1  { Hanson  v.  Chiatovich,  13  Nev.  395  ;    Flanders  v.  Merritt,  3  Barb.  201  ;   Adams 
v .  Clark,  8  Jones  L.  56  ;   McGee  v.  Scott,  9  Cush.  148  ;}  QBrown  v.  Castellow,  33  Fla. 
204  ;    Lind  v.  Lind,  53  Minn.  48 ;  Chapman  v.  Taylor,  136  N.  Y.  663.] 

2  THollingsworth  v.  Walker,  98  Ala.  543.] 

8  JR.  v.  Tanner,  1  Esp.  304  ;  Kilburn  v.  Bennet,  3  Met.  199  ;  Rixford  v.  Miller, 
49  Vt.  319  ;  Prathe.r  v.  Palmer,  4  Ark.  456;  Nixon  v.  Palmer,  10  Barb.  175,  178  ;| 
TBotna  V.  S.  B'k  v.  Silver  C.  B'k,  87  la.  479  ;  Kipley  v.  Hebron,  60  Me.  379,  393  ; 
Price  v.  Price,  156  Pa.  617,  626.] 

4  THensel  v.  Maas,  94  Mich.  563."] 

6  {Additional  instances  are  as  follows :  Relations  proved  to  exist  between  parties  are 
presumed  to  continue :  Eames  v.  Eames,  41  N.  H.  177  ;  Caujolle  v.  Ferric",  23  N.  Y. 
90 ;  Smith  ».  Smith,  4  Paige  432  ;  Leport  v.  Todd,  32  N.  J.  L.  124 ;  Body  v.  Jensen, 
33  Wis.  402  ;  Cooper  v.  Dedrick,  22  Barb.  516;  a  custom,  to  continue  (Scales  v.  Key, 

II  A.  &  E.  819) ;    coverture  to  continue  (Erskine  v.  Davis,  25  111.  251)  ;  a  judgment 
to  remain  in  force  (Murphy  v.  Orr,  32  111.  489)  ;   a  state  of  mind  to  continue  (Black- 
burn v.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  146).   See  also  Farr  v.  Payne,  40  Vt.  615  ;  Leport  v.  Todd, 
32  N.  J.  L.  124  ;   and  post,  §§  42,  47,  n. } 

Qlt  must  be  understood  that  a  genuine  presumption  of  continuance  is  seldom 
found  ;  the  rulings  usually  declare  merely  that  certain  facts  in  the  case  in  hand  are 
sufficient  evidence.] 

6  Throgmorton  ».  Walton,  2  Roll.  461  ;  Wilson  v.  Hodges,  2  East  313;  Battin  v. 
Bigelow,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  452  ;  Gilleland  v,  Martin,  3  McLean  490  ;  see  Lapsley  v.  Grier- 
SOD,  1  H.  L.  C.  498.  "  Vivere  etiam  usque  ad  centum  annos  quilibet  praesumitur,  nisi 
nrobutur  mortuus :  "  Corpus  Juris  Glossatum,  torn,  ii,  p.  718,  n. (q);  Mascard.  De 
rrob.  vol.  i,  Concl.  103,  n.  5.  j  Life  to  the  common  age  of  man  may  be  presumed  : 
Stevens  v.  McNamara,  36  Me.  176.  And  the  extreme  age  of  a  hundred  years  will  not 
warrant  a  conclusive  presumption  of  death :  Buruey  v.  Ball,  24  Ga.  505  ;  nor  infirm 


§§40-41.]  CONTINUITY;  LIFE;  DEATH.  139 

lapse  of  seven  years,  without  intelligence  concerning  the  person, 
the  presumption  of  life  ceases,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  devolved 
on  the  other  party ;  this  period  was  inserted,  upon  great  deliber- 
ation, in  the  statute  of  bigamy,7  and  the  statute  concerning  leases 
for  lives,8  and  has  since  been  adopted,  from  analogy,  in  other  cases ; 9 
it  is  not  necessary  that  the  party  be  proved  to  be  absent  from  the 
United  States ;  it  is  sufficient,  if  it  appears  that  he  has  been  absent 
for  seven  years  from  the  particular  State  of  his  residence,  without 
having  been  heard  from.10  The  presumption  in  such  cases  is,  that 
the  person  is  dead;  but  not  that  he  died  at  the  end  of  the  seven 
years,  nor  at  any  other  particular  time.11  The  time  of  the  death 
is  to  be  inferred  by  the  jury  from  the  circumstances.13  But  where 
the  presumption  of  life  conflicts  with  that  of  innocence,  the  latter 

health  and  eighty  years :  Matter  of  Hall,  1  Wall.  Jr.  85.  On  the  other  hand,  where 
a  term  was  for  sixty  years,  the  possibility  of  the  term  or  being  alive  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term  was  considered  by  the  Court  :  Beverley  v.  Beverley,  2  Vern.  13] ;  Doe 
j.  Andrews,  15  Q.  B.  756  ;  and  a  deposition,  taken  sixty  years  before  the  trial,  was  re- 
jected, no  search  having  been  made  for  the  deponeut,  and  no  reason  shown  why  he  was 
not  produced :  Benson  v.  Olive,  2  Str.  920.  This  presumption  of  the  continuance  of 
life  is  one  of  fact,  depending  on  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  not  one  of  law  :  Hyde 
Park  v.  Canton,  130  Mass.  505.  f  fjln  other  words,  it  is  not  possible  to  say  that  there 
is  a  genuine  presumption  of  any  definite  sort.  The  state  of  the  pleadings  will  show 
whose  duty  it  is  to  prove  life  at  a  certain  time ;  and  upon  his  showing  life  at  a  pre- 
ceding time,  the  Court  will  usually  leave  it  to  the  jury  to  say  whether  he  has  proved 
his  case,  but  may  sometimes  apply  a  genuine  presumption  shifting  the  duty  of  pro- 
ducing evidence  :  see  Be  Phene'a  Trusts,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  139-3 
»  1  Jac.  I,  c.  11. 

8  19  Car.  II,  c.  6. 

9  Doe  v.  Jesson,  6  East  85 ;   Doe  v.  Deakin,  4  B.  &  Aid.  433 ;  Hopewell  v.  De 
Pinna,  2  Camp.  113;  Watson  ».  England,  14  Sim.  28;  Dowley  v.  Winfield,  ib.  277  ; 
Cuthbert  v.  Purrier,  2  Phill.  199  ;  Loring  v.  Steineman,  1  Mete.  204  ;  Cofer  v.  Tlier- 
inond,  1  Kelly  538;  King  v.  Paddock,  18  Johns.  141  ;    {Flynn  v.  Coffee,  12  All.  133  ; 
Smith  v.  Smi'th,  49  Ala.  156  ;    Prud.  Ass.  Co.  v.  Edmonds,  L.  R.  2  App.   Cas.  487. } 
[For  the  history  of  the  rule,  see  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise,  319.] 

10  Newman  v.  Jenkins,  10  Pick.  515 ;  Innis  v.  Campbell,  1  Rawle  873  ;   Spurr  p. 
Trimble,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  278;  Wambaugh  r.  Schenck,  2  Peuningt.  167;  Woods  v. 
Woods,  2  Bay  476;  {see  other  instances  in  Stevens  v.  McNamara,  36  Me.  176  ;  Stinch- 
field  v.  Emerson,  52  Me.  465 ;  Crawford  v.  Elliott,  1  Houst.  465  ;  McDowell  v.  Simp- 
son, id.  467 ;  Winship  v.  Conner,  42  N.  H.  841 ;  Whitney  T.  Nicholl,  46  111.  230 ; 
Primm  v.  Stewart,  7  Tex.  178  ;  Holmes  v.  Johnson,  42  Pa.  159  ;  Garwood  v.  Hastings, 
38   Cal.  217 ;  Keller  v.  Stuck,  4   Redf.   294 ;    Wambaugh  ».  Schenck,  1  Penn.  N.  J. 
229;    Newman  v.  Jenkins,  10  Pick.  515;    Hyde  Park  v.  Canton,   130  Mass.  505 ;( 
[Watson  v.  Adams,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  573;   Hitz  v.  Algreen,  170  111.  60;  Hoyt  v.  Beach, 
104  la.  257 ;   Bowditch  v.  Jordan,   131  Mass.   321 ;  Claflin  v.  R.  Co.,  157  id.  489  ,• 
Manley  v.  Patterson,  73  Miss.  417;  Francis  i'.  Francis,  180  Pa.  644.] 

11  Doe  v.  Nepean,  5    B.  &  Ad.    86;    Nepean    v.   Knight,  2    M.  &  W.    894;    \Re 
Phene's  Trusts,  L.  R.  5  Ch.  139;    Re  Lewes's  Trusts,  L.   R.  11  Eq.  236,  6  Ch.  356  ; 
£e  Corbishley's  Trusts,  L.  R.   14  Ch.  Div.  846 ;  Hickman   v.  Upsall,  L.  R.  20  Eq. 
136;   Davie  ».  Brings,  97  U.  S.  628;  Johnson  v.   Merithew,  80  Me.   115;  Spencer  v. 
Roper,  13  Ired.  333;  State  v.  Moore,  11  id.   160;   McCartee  v.  Camel,  1  Barb.  Ch. 
455  ;  Hancock  v.  American  L.  Ins,  Co.,  62  Mo.  26  ;{  QSchaub  v.  Griffin,  84  Md.  557  ;] 
\conira,  but  unsound :  Montgomery  v.  Bevans,  1  Sawy.  C.  C.  653 ;   Packett  v.  State, 
1   Sneed  355;   Clarke's   Executors  ».   Canfield,   2  McCart.   119;   Eagle  v.  Eramett, 
4  Bradf.  117  ;  Smith  v.  Knowlton,  11  N.  H.  191.  { 

13  Rust  v.  Baker,  8  Sim.  443;  Smith  v.  Knowlton,  11  N.  H.  191;  Doe  r.  Flan- 
agan, 1  Kelly  543;  Burr  v.  Sim,  4  W  hart.  150;  Bradley  ».  Bradley,  ib.  173;  [see 
note  14,  i 


140  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

is  generally  allowed  to  prevail.18  Upon  an  issue  of  the  life  or  death 
of  a  party,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  like  case  of  the  presumed  pay- 
ment of  a  debt,  the  jury  may  find  the  fact  of  death  from  the  lapse 
of  a  shorter  period  than  seven  years,  if  other  circumstances  concur  ; 
as,  if  the  party  sailed  on  a  voyage  which  should  long  since  have  been 
accomplished,  and  the  vessel  has  not  been  heard  from.14  But  the 
presumption  of  the  common  law,  independent  of  the  finding  of  the 
jury,  does  not  attach  to  the  mere  lapse  of  time,  short  of  seven 
years,15  unless  letters  of  administration  have  been  granted  on  his 
estate  within  that  period,  which,  in  such  case,  are  conclusive  proof 
of  his  death.16 

§  42.  Continuity ;  Partnership ;  Insanity.  On  the  same  ground, 
a  partnership,  or  other  similar  relation,  once  shown  to  exist,  is  pre- 
sumed to  continue,  until  it  is  proved  to  have  been  dissolved.1  And 
a  seisin,  once  proved  or  admitted,  is  presumed  to  continue,  until  a 
disseisin  is  proved.2  The  opinions,  also,  of  individuals,  once  enter- 
tained and  expressed,  and  the  state  of  mind,  once  proved  to  exist,  are 
presumed  to  remain  unchanged,  until  the  contrary  appears.  Thus, 
all  the  members  of  a  Christian  community  being  presumed  to  enter- 
tain the  common  faith,  no  man  is  supposed  to  disbelieve  the  exist- 
ence and  moral  government  of  God,  until  it  is  shown  from  his  own 
declarations.  In  like  manner,  every  man  is  presumed  to  be  of  sane 
mind,  until  the  contrary  is  shown ;  but,  if  derangement  or  imbecility 
be  proved  or  admitted  at  any  particular  period,  it  is  presumed  to 
continue,  until  disproved,  unless  the  derangement  was  accidental, 
being  caused  by  the  violence  of  a  disease.8 

18  R.  v.  Twyning,  2  B.  &  Aid.  386  ;  fjsee  the  comments  ante,  §  35.] 

14  In  the  case  of  a  missing  ship,  bound  from  Manila  to  London,  on  which  the  tinder- 
writers  have  voluntarily  paid  the  amount  insured,  the  death  of  those  on  board  was 
presumed  by  the  Prerogative  Court,  after  an  absence  of  only  two  years,  and  admin- 
istration was  granted  accordingly ;  Re  Hutton,  1  Curt.  595.  See  also  Sillick  v. 
Booth,  1  Y.  &  Col.  N.  C.  117;  CTwemlow  v,  Oswin,  2  Camp.  85;  Watson  r.  King, 
1  Stark.  121 ;  Houstman  v.  Thornton,  Holt  N.  P.  242 ;  Koster  v.  Reed,  6  B.  &  C. 
19  ;3  j  Matter  of  Ackerman,  2  Redf.  521 ;  Hancock  v.  American  L.  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo. 
26  ;  Stouvenal  v.  Stephens,  2  Daly  319 ;  Gibbes  v.  Vincent,  11  Rich.  L.  323;  Sprigg 
v.  Moale,  28  Md.  497  ;  Loring  v.  Steinman,  1  Mete.  204;  and  cases  supra;  Re  Main, 
1  Sw.  &  Tr.  11;  Johnson  v.  Merithew,  80  Me.  115.J  If  the  person  was  unmarried 
when  he  went  abroad  and  was  last  heard  of,  the  presumption  of  his  death  carries  with 
it  the  presumption  that  he  died  without  issue :  Rowe  v.  Hasland,  1  W.  Bl.  404  ;  Doe 
v.  Griffin,  15  East  293 ;  [contra,  Still  v.  Hutto,  48  S.  C.  415.] 

l*  Watson  v.  King,  1  Stark.  121  ;    Green  v.  Brown,  2  id.  1199  ;   Park  on  Ins.  433. 

19  Newman  v.  Jenkins,  10  Pick.  515;   |but  see  Jochumsen  v.    Bank,   3  All.   87; 
Roderigas  v.  Savings  Inst.,  63  N.  Y.  460.}     The  production  of  a  will,  with  proof  of 
payment  of  a  legacy  under  it,  and  of  an  entry  in  the  register  of  burials,  were  held  suf- 
ficient evidence  of  the  party's  death :  Doe  v.  Penfold,  8  C.  &  P.  536. 

1  Alderson  ».  Clay,  1  Stark.  405;  2  Stark.  Evid.  590,  688;  jEames  v.  Eames,  41 
N.  H.  177  ;  Clark  v.  Alexander,  8  Scott  N.  R.  161.J 

8  Brown  v.  King,  5  Mete.  173  ;  FJsee  ante,  §  41,  note  l.J 

8  Attorney-General  t<.  Parnther,  3  Bro.  Ch.  Cas.  443 ;  Peaslee  u.  Robbins,  3  Mete. 
164 ;  Hix  v.  Whittemore,  4  id.  545  ;  1  Collinson  on  Lunnoy,  55  ;  Shelford  on  Luna- 
tics, 275  ;  1  Hal.  P.  C.  30  ;  Swinb.  on  Wills,  Part  II,  §  iii,  6,  7.  ("For  the  burden  of 
proof  as  to  insanity,  see  post,  §§  77,  81  a  ;  that  there  is  a  presumption  (frequently  en- 


§§  41-43.]  CONTINUITY ;    FOREIGN  LAW.  141 

§  43.  Foreign  Law.  A  spirit  of  comity  and  a  disposition  to 
friendly  intercourse  are  also  presumed  to  exist  among  nations,  as 
well  as  among  individuals.  And,  in  the  absence  of  any  positive  rule, 
affirming,  or  denying,  or  restraining  the  operation  of  foreign  laws, 
Courts  of  justice  presume  the  adoption  of  them  by  their  own  gov- 
ernment, unless  they  are  repugnant  to  its  policy,  or  prejudicial  to 
its  interest,1  [ — for  the  purpose,  that  is,  of  giving  legal  effect  to  acts 
done  without  the  local  jurisdiction.  But,  with  reference  to  ascer- 
taining the  terms  of  the  foreign  law,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Court 
does  not  know  it  judicially,2  and  that  it  must  therefore  be  proved 
like  any  factum  probandumf  and  that  in  aid  of  such  proof  a  presump- 
tion may  within  certain  limits  be  resorted  to.  (1)  If  it  is  the  law  of 
a  State  possessing  the  English  common  law  as  the  foundation  of  its 
system,  in  particular,  one  of  the  United  States,  it  will  be  presumed  to 
be  the  same  as  that  of  the  forum  ;*  but  not  if  it  involves  the  existence 
of  a  statutory  enactment  changing  the  common  law.6  (2)  If  the  for- 
eign State  is  not  one  whose  system  is  founded  on  the  common  law 
the  presumption  will  probably  not  be  made,8  unless  the  principle  in- 
volved is  one  of  the  law  merchant  common  to  civilized  countries.7 

forced  in  the  genuine  sense  of  the  term)  that  a  state  of  insanity  arising  from  more  or 
less  permanent  causes  may  be  presumed  to  continue,  see  j  State  v.  Wilner,  40  Win.  304  ; 
Lilly  v.  Waggoner,  27  111.  395  ;  Crouse  v.  Holnmn,  19  Ind.  30;  Cook  v.  Cook,  53  Bnrb. 
180  ;j  ([People  v.  Schmitt,  Cal.,  39  Pac.  204;  Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  170,  204  ; 
Taylor  v.  Pegram,  151  111.  106,  119;  Rodgers  v.  Rodgers,  56  Kan.  483;  Lessee  v. 
Hoge,  1  Pet.  163.  For  evidence  of  insanity,  in  general,  see  ante,  §  14  /.] 

°  Bank  of  Augusta  v.  Earle,  13  Peters  519  ;  Story  on  Confl.  of  Laws,  §§  36,  37. 

2  [Ante,  Chap.  II.] 

8  ^Whether  to  the  Court  or  to  the  jury  is  the  subject  of  a  difference  of  opinion  ;  see 
post,  §  81  g.~} 

«  {Holmes  r.  Broughton,  10  Wend.  75 ;  Savage  v.  O'Neil,  44  N.  Y.  298  ;  Flato  ». 
Mulhall,  72  Mo.  522  ;  Hick  man  v.  Alpaugh,  21  Cal.  225  ;  Hill  v.  Grigsby,  32  Cal.  55  ; 
Atkinson  v.  Atkinson,  15  La.  Ann.  491  ;  Cooper  V.  Reaney,  4  Minn.  528  ;  Green  v. 
Eugely,  23  Tex.  539  ;  Stokes  v.  Macken,  62  Barb.  145  ;  Com.-  v.  Kenney,  120  Mass. 
387;  Clnff  v.  Mutual  B.  Ins.  Co.,  13  Allen  308  ;  Hydrick  v.  Burke,  30  Ark.  124;  Cox 
v  Morrow,  14  id.  603  ;  Bnndy  "•  Hart,  46  Mo.  463  ;  Reese  r.  Harris,  27  Ala.  301  ;( 
TLouisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  113  Ala.  402  ;  Pattillo  v.  Alexander,  96  Ga.  60; 
Goodwin  v.  Ass'n,  97  la.  226  ;  Roehl  v.  Porteous,  47  La.  An.  1582  ;  Scroggin  v. 
McClelland,  37  Nebr.  644;  Fitzgerald  v.  F.  &  M.  C.  Co.,  41  id.  374,  472;  E.  0. 
St.  R  Co.  v.  Oodola,  50  id.  906  :  Musser  r.  Stauffer,  178  Pa.  99  ;  Morris  v.  Hub- 
bard.  S.  D.,  72  N.  W.  894 ;  Tempel  v.  Hunter,  89  Tex.  69  ;  State  v.  Shattuck,  69  Vt. 

6  \E.  g.  statutes  making  contracts  formed  on  Sunday  void  :  Murphy  v.  Collins,  121 
Mass.  6  (contra-,  Brimhall  v.  Van  Canipen,  8  Minn.  13)  ;  statutes  of  usury  :  Cutler 
r.  Wright,  22  N.  Y.  472  ;  Hall  v.  Augustine,  23  Wis.  383  ;  statutes  giving  an  action 
for  damages  resulting  from  death  caused  by  culpable  negligence  :  McDonald  v.  Mallory, 
77  N.  Y.  547;  Leonard  v.  Columbia,  etc.  Company,  84  id.  48  ;  see  Smith  ».  Whitaker, 
23  111.  367  ;{  ^statute  requiring  contracts  to  be  in  writing  :  Miller  v.  Wilson,  146  111. 
523,  531  :  statutes  regulating  jurisdiction  in  divorce  proceedings  :  Kelley  v.  Kelley,  161 
Mass  111.  But  this  limitation  is  not  always  observed  :  see,  for  example,  Cavallaro  v. 
R.  Co.,  110  Cal.  348  :  Burgess  v.  Tel.  Co.,  Tex.,  46  S.  W.  794.] 

6  j  See  Norn's  t>.  Harris.  15  Cal.   226;  Flato  v.  Mulhall.    72  Mo.    522;  Du  Val  v. 
Marshall,  30  Ark.  230;  Savage  v.  O'Neil,  44  N.  Y.  298;  (   [[Brown  v.  Wright,  58  Ark. 
20  (Texas  law).      But  this  proviso  is  not  always  observed,  e.  g.  in   Simms  v.  Express 
Co.,  38  Ga.  129,  132  (Louisiana  law).] 

7  {Dubois  v.  Mason,  127  Mass.  37  ;  Cribbs  v.  Adams,  13  Gray  597.} 


142  BURDEN  OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI 

It  has  been  suggested  that  in  reality  there  is  no  presumption,  and 
that  the  true  process  is  merely  that  of  refusing  to  recognize  a  pre- 
sumption that  the  foreign  'State  has  a  different  law ; 8  and  no  doubt 
this  will  sufficiently  describe  the  situation  in  many  cases ;  but  the 
ordinary  mode  of  stating  the  question  seems  correct  enough  in  most 
instances ;  the  proper  phrasing  depending  upon  the  state  of  the  burden 
of  proof  in  the  case  in  hand.] 

§  43  a.  Identity  of  Name;  Sundry  Presumptions.  [In  regard  to 
the  supposed  presumption  of  identity  of  person  from  identity  of 
name,  three  things  are  to  be  said.  (1)  "A  concordance  in  name  alone 
is  always  some  evidence  of  identity,  and  it  is  not  correct  to  say  with 
the  books  that,  besides  proof  of  the  facts  in  relation  to  the  persons 
named,  their  identity  must  be  shown,  implying  that  the  agreement 
of  name  goes  for  nothing ;  whereas  it  is  always  a  considerable  step 
towards  that  conclusion."1  (2)  Inv  the  greater  number  of  cases  the 
ruling  is  merely  that  identity  of  name,  with  or  without  other  evidence, 
is  or  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  go  to  the  jury  or  sufficient  to  support 
a  verdict,  on  the  principle  of  §  14  w,  ante.  The  oddness  of  the  name, 
the  size  of  the  district  and  length  of  the  time  within  which  the  per- 
sons are  shown  to  have  coexisted,  and  other  circumstances,  affect  this 
result  differently  in  different  cases.  (3)  Often  a  genuine  presump- 
tion is  enforced  by  the  Courts,  in  the  sense  that  the  duty  of  producing 
evidence  to  the  contrary  is  thrown  upon  the  opponent.  But  these  rul- 
ings cannot  be  said  to  attach  a  presumption  to  a  definite  and  constant 
set  of  facts ;  they  apply  the  presumption  upon  the  circumstances  of 
the  particular  case. 

It  is  thus  necessary,  in  ascertaining  the  state  of  the  law  in  a  given 
jurisdiction,  to  examine  the  facts  in  each  case.  There  is,  moreover, 
some  difference  in  the  strictness  with  which  the  evidence  of  identity 
is  treated  for  different  sorts  of  documents  or  persons.  There  is  per- 
haps a  greater  strictness  shown  in  dealing  with  the  identity  of  a 
person  named  as  the  signer  of  an  answer  or  affidavit  in  Chancery,2  or 
as  the  object  of  a  conviction  of  crime,8  or  even  as  a  party  to  a  negoti- 
able instrument;*  but  where  an  identity  of  names  is  found  in  deeds 
or  the  like,  in  tracing  title  from  ancestors  and  grantors,  the  Courts 

.;     »  fCorson,  P.  J.,  in  Metier  t>.  R.  Co.,  S.  D.,  75  N.  W.  823.] 

1  rHubback  on  Succession,  444.] 

a  L^ee  Gilbert,  Evidence,  51  ;  Anon.,  3  Mod.  116;  R.  v.  Morris,  2  Burr.  1189  ; 
Baiter  ».  Turner,  2  Camp.  87;  Dartmouth  v.  Roberts,  16  East  334;  Hodgkinson  v. 
Willis,  3  Camp.  401;  Hennell  v.  Lyon,  1  B.  &  Aid.  185  (standing  for  a  more  liberal 
rule) ;  Studdy  v.  Sanders,  2  Dowl.  &  R.  347;  Garvin  v.  Carroll,  10  Ir.  L.  R.  323,  330.] 

*  FJSee  R.  v.  Tissington,  1  Cox  Cr.  51 ;  R.  v.  Levy,  8  id.  73  ;  People  v.  Rolfe,  61 
Cal.  540 ;  Bayha  v.  Munford,  58  Kan.  445 ;  State  v.  McGuire,  87  Mo.   642 ;  Erfert  v. 
Lytle,  172  Pa".  356.] 

*  ["See  Bulkeley  w.  Butler,  2  B.  &  C.  434  ;  Whitelocke  v.  Mnsgrave,  1  Cr.  &  M. 
622  ;  Warren  v.  Anderson,  8  Scott  384  ;  Greenshields  v.  Crawford,  9  M.  &  W.   374  ; 
Jones  v.  Jones,  9  M.  &  W.  75  ;  Sewall  v.  Evans,  4  Q.  B.  633  ;  Stebbing  v.  Spicer,  8  C. 
B.  827  ;  Aultman  v.  Timm,  93  Ind.  158 ;  Cunningham  v.   Bauk,  21  Wend.  561 ; 
McConeghy  v.  Kirk,  68  Pa.  200.] 


§§  43-43 «.]      IDENTITY  OF   NAME ;    SUNDRY   PRESUMPTIONS.          143 

are  more  frequently  found  enforcing  a  genuine  presumption.5  Be- 
yond this,  no  general  tendencies  seem  traceable." 

It  is  usually  said  that  the  relation  of  parent  and  minor  child  raises 
a  presumption  that  services  rendered  by  the  latter  to  the  former 
were  intended  to  be  gratuitous ; 7  that  a  voluntary  transfer  by  a  father 
to  a  child  is  presumed  to  have  been  intended  as  an  advancement;8 
that  one  obtaining  a  conveyance  from  another  to  whom  he  stands  in 
a  fiduciary  position  is  presumed,  under  certain  circumstances,  to 
have  obtained  it  by  undue  influence  or  fraud.9  These  and  the  pre- 
ceding instances  are  merely  some  of  those  in  most  frequent  applica- 
tion, and  indicate  the  wide  field  of  conduct  and  of  substantive  law 
within  which  presumptions  are  serviceable.] 

The  instances  here  given,  it  is  believed,  will  sufficiently  illustrate 
this  head  of  presumptive  evidence.  Numerous  other  examples  and 
cases  may  be  found  in  the  treatises  already  cited,  to  which  the  reader 
is  referred.10 

8  See  JMcMinn  v.  Whelan,  27  Cal.  300  ;}  [Lee  v.  Murphy,  119  Cal.  364 ;  Scott 
v.  Hyde,  21  D.  C.  531  ;  Brown  v.  Metz,  33  111.  339  ;  Graves  v.  Col  well,  90  id.  612 ; 
}  Ellsworth  v.  Moore,  5  la.  486  ;{  Oilman  v.  Sheets,  78  id.  499;  Cates  v.  Loftus,  3  A. 
K.  Marsh.  202;  j Bennett  v.  Libhart,  27  Mich.  489 ;\  Flournoy  v.  Warden,  17  Mo. 
435  ;  Gitt  v.  Watson,  18  id.  274 ;  Rupert  v.  Penner,  35  Nebr.  587;  Mooers  v.  Bunker, 
29  id.  420,  432  ;  Jackson  v.  Goes,  13  Johns.  518  ;  Jackson  v.  King,  5  Cow.  237  ;  Jack- 
son f.  Cody,  9  id.  140,  148;  Kimball  v.  Davis,  19  Wend.  437;  Brown  v.  Kimball,  25 
id.  259,  272  ;  Sailor  v.  Hertzogg,  2  Pa.  St.  182;  Balbec  v.  Donaldson,  2  Pa.  459;  Bur- 
ford  v.  McCue,  53  Pa.  427  ;  Brotherline  v.  Hammond,  69  id.  128  ;  Sitler  v.  Gehr,  105 
id.  577,  601  ;  Bogue  v.  Bigelow,  29  Vt.  179  ;  Colchester  v.  Culver,  ib.  Ill  ;  Cross  v. 
Martin,  46  id.  14  ;  Pollard  v.  Lively,  4  Gratt.  73  ;  Sweetland  v.  Porter,  43  W.  Va.  189.] 

tt  [For  instances  involving  the  identity  of  a  party  to  a  marriage,  see  Draycott  v. 
Talbot,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  564  ;  Bin  v.  Barlow,  1  Dougl.  175  ;  Hemmings  v.  Smith,  4  id.  33  ; 
Wedgwood's  Case,  8  Greenl.  75  ;  State  v.  Moore,  61  Mo.  276. 

For  instances  involving  the  identity  of  persons  named  in  or  signing  sundry  kinds  of 
documents,  see  Barber  v.  Holmes,  3  Esp.  190  ;  Smith  v.  Fuge,  3  Camp.  456  ;  Middleton 
v.  Sandford,  4  id.  34  ;  Hughes  v.  Wilson,  1  Stark.  179  ;  Sayerr.  Glossop,  2  Exch.  409  ; 
R.  v.  Weaver,  L.  R.  2  C.  C.  R.  85  ;  Heacock  v.  Lubukee,  108  111.  641  ;  Aultman  ». 
Timm,  93  Ind.  158  ;  Mode  v.  Beasley,  143  id.  306  ;  Cobb  v.  Haynes,  8  B.  Monr.  137; 
Webber  v.  Davis,  5  All.  393  ;  Morrissey  v.  Ferry  Co.,  47  Mo.  521 ;  West  v.  State,  22 
N.  J.  L.  212,  238  ;  Jackson  v.  Christmau,  4  Wend.  278  ;  Liscomb  f.  Eldredge,  R.  I.,  38 
Atl.  1052. 

For  instances  involving  the  identity  of  a  person  acting,  speaking,  dying,  etc.,  see 
Corfield  v.  Parsons,  1  Cr.  &  M.  730  ;  Smith  v.  Henderson,  9  M.  &  W.  798  ;  Mullery  v. 
Hamilton,  71  Ga.  720  ;  Nicholas  v.  Lansdale,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  21  ;  Mason  F.  J.  Co.  v. 
Paine,  166  Pa.  352  ;  Kinney  v.  Flynn,  2  R.  I.  319. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  where  there  are  two  persons  of  the  same  name,  it  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  applied  to  the  father:  Stebbing  v.  Spicer,  8  M.  G.  &  S.  827;  Kincaid  v. 
Howe,  10  Mass.  205  ;  State  v.  Vittum,  9  N.  H.  519.] 

7  [Donahue  v.  Donahue,  53  Minn.  560  ;  Kloke  v.  Martin,   Nebr.,  76  N.  W.  168. 
Contra :  Ulrich  v.  Ulrich,  136  N.  Y.  120."] 

8  TCulp  v.  Wilson,  133  Ind.  294  ;  Phillips  v.  Phillips,  90  la.  541;  Find  r.  Garrett, 
102  id.  381.] 

9  [See  Garrett  v.  Berlin,  98  Ala.  615 ;  Little  v.  Knox,  96  id.   179  ;  Hill  v.   Miller, 
50  Kan.  659  ;  Barnard  v.  Gantz,  140  N.  Y.  249,  256  ;  Ten  Kyck  v.  Whit  beck,  id.,  50 
N.  E.  963  ;  Barney's  Will,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  1027; j  JNottidger.  Prince,  2  Giff.  246  ;  1  Story 
Eq.  Jur.  §§  308-324  ;  Baker  v.  Bradley,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  7;  Cooke  v.  Lamotte,  15  Beav. 
234  ;  Gresley  v.  Mousley,  28  L.  J.  Ch.'  620  ;  Lyon  v.  Home,  37  L.  J.  Ch.  674  ;  Dims- 
dale  v.  Dimsdale,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  806  ;  Baker  v.  Monk,  83  Beav.  419  ;  Hargreave  v.  Ever- 
ard,  6  Ir.  Eq.  278,  and  the  additional  cases  cited  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  253  a.  \ 

10  See  Mathews  on  Presumptive  Evid.  c.  11-22 ;  Best  on  Presumptions,  passim. 


144  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

§  44.  Presumptions  of  Pact;  In  general.1  Presumptions  of  fact, 
usually  treated  as  composing  the  second  general  head  of  presumptive 
evidence,  can  hardly  be  said,  with  propriety,  to  belong  to  this  branch 
of  the  law.  They  are,  in  truth,  but  mere  arguments,  of  which  the 
major  premise  is  not  a  rule  of  law ;  they  belong  equally  to  any  and 
every  subject-matter ;  and  are  to  be  judged  by  the  common  and  re- 
ceived tests  of  the  truth  of  propositions  and  the  validity  of  argu- 
ments. They  depend  upon  their  own  natural  force  and  efficacy  in 
generating  belief  or  conviction  in  the  mind,  as  derived  from  those 
connections,  which  are  shown  by  experience,  irrespective  of  any  legal 
relations.  They  differ  from  presumptions  of  law  in  this  essential 
respect,  that  while  those  are  reduced  to  fixed  rules,  and  constitute  a 
branch  of  the  particular  system  of  jurisprudence  to  which  they  be- 
long, these  merely  natural  presumptions  are  derived  wholly  and 
directly  from  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  by  means  of 
the  common  experience  of  mankind,  without  the  aid  or  control  of  any 
rules  of  law  whatever.  Such,  for  example,  is  the  inference  of  guilt, 
drawn  from  the  discovery  of  a  broken  knife  in  the  pocket  of  the 
prisoner,  the  other  part  of  the  blade  being  found  sticking  in  tha 
window  of  a  house,  which,  by  means  of  such  an  instrument,  had  been 
burglariously  entered.  These  presumptions  remain  the  same  in  their 
nature  and  operation,  under  whatever  code  the  legal  effect  or  quality 
of  the  facts,  when  found,  is  to  be  decided.2 

§  45.  There  are,  however,  some  few  general  propositions  in  regard 
to  matters  of  fact,  and  the  weight  of  testimony  by  the  jury,  which 
are  universally  taken  for  granted  in  the  administration  of  justice, 
and  sanctioned  by  the  usage  of  the  bench,  and  which,  therefore,  may 
with  propriety  be  mentioned  under  this  head.  Such,  for  instance,  is 
the  caution,  generally  given  to  juries,  to  place  little  reliance  on  the 
testimony  of  an  accomplice,  unless  it  is  confirmed,  in  some  material 
point,  by  other  evidence.  There  is  no  presumption  of  the  common 
law  against  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice ;  yet  experience  has 
shown,  that  persons  capable  of  being  accomplices  in  crime  are  but 
little  worthy  of  credit ;  and  on  this  experience  the  usage  is  founded.1 
A  similar  caution  is  to  be  used  in  regard  to  mere  verbal  admissions 
of  a  party ;  this  kind  of  evidence  being  subject  to  much  imperfection 
and  mistake.3 

1  FjThe  author's  observations  in  this  section  are  well-founded  (compare  what  is  said 
ante,  §  14  y);  but  so  far  as  the  terra  "presumption  "  is  employed  merely  as  denoting  an 
inference,  more  or  less  strong,  from  circumstances,  and  not  a  rule  of  law  as  to  shifting 
the  duty  of  producing  evidence,  it  is  apt  to  mislead.  Moreover,  in  some  of  the  follow- 
ing sections  the  rules  dealt  with  are  true  presumptions,  and  should  have  been  placed 
ante.  In  other  instances,  the  question  is  merely  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  evidence  to 

E>  to  the  jury,  or  of  an  instruction  on  the  weight  of  evidence  such  as  at  common 
w  judges  may  properly  give  to  the  jury. 3 
3  See  2  Stark.  Evid.  684  ;  6  Law  Mag.  370. 
»  See  infra,  §§  380,  381. 

a  Earle  v.  Picken,  5  C.  &  P.  542,  n. ;  R.  v.  Simons,  60.  &  P.  540  ;  Williams  v. 
Williams,  1  Hagg.  Consist.  304  ;  post,  §  200. 


§§  44r-46.]  LAPSE  OF  TIME  ;    ANCIENT   GRANTS.  145 

§  45  a.  Lapse  of  Time ;  Grants  from  the  Sovereign.  Thus,  also, 
though  lapse  of  time  does  not,  of  itself,  furnish  a  conclusive  legal  bar 
to  the  title  of  the  sovereign,  agreeably  to  the  maxim,  "nullum  tempus 
occurrit  regi ; "  yet,  if  the  adverse  claim  could  have  had  a  legal  coin- 
menceinent,  juries  are  instructed  or  advised  to  presume  such  com- 
mencement, after  many  years  of  uninterrupted  adverse  possession  or 
enjoyment.  Accordingly,  royal  grants  have  been  thus  found  by  the 
jury,  after  an  indefinitely  long-continued  peaceable  enjoyment,  accom- 
panied by  the  usual  acts  of  ownership.1  So,  after  less  than  forty 
years'  possession  of  a  tract  of  land,  and  proof  of  a  prior  order  of  council 
for  the  survey  of  the  lot,  and  of  an  actual  survey  thereof  accordingly, 
it  was  held  that  the  jury  were  properly  instructed  to  presume  that  a 
patent  had  been  duly  issued.2  In  regard,  however,  to  crown  or  publio 
grants,  a  longer  lapse  of  time  has  generally  been  deemed  necessary,  in 
order  to  justify  this  presumption,  than  is  considered  sufficient  to  author- 
ize the  like  presumption  in  the  case  of  grants  from  private  persons. 

§  46.  Same  ;  Grant  from  an  Individual.  Juries  are  also  often  in- 
structed or  advised,  in  more  or  less  forcible  terms,  to  presume  con- 
veyances between  private  individuals,  in  favor  of  the  party  who  has 
proved  a  right  to  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  property,  and  whose 
possession  is  consistent  with  the  existence  of  such  conveyance,  as  is 
to  be  presumed ;  especially  if  the  possession,  without  such  convey- 
ance, would  have  been  unlawful,  or  cannot  be  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained.1 This  is  done  in  order  to  prevent  an  apparently  just  title 
from  being  defeated  by  matter  of  mere  form.  Thus,  Lord  Mansfield 
declared  that  he  and  some  of  the  other  judges  had  resolved  never  to 
suffer  a  plaintiff  in  ejectment  to  be  nonsuited  by  a  term,  outstanding 
in  his  own  trustees,  nor  a  satisfied  term  to  be  set  up  by  a  mortgagor 
against  a  mortgagee ;  but  that  they  would  direct  the  jury  to  presume 

1  R,  v.  Brown,  cited  Cowp.  110  ;   Mayor  of  Kingston  v.  Homer.  Cowp.  102  ;   El- 
dridge  v.  Knott,  Cowp.  215  ;  Mather  v.  Trinity  Church,  3  S.  &  R.  509  ;  Roe  v.  Ire- 
land, 11  East  280  ;  Read  v.  Brookman,  3  T.  R.  159  ;  Goodtitle  v.   Baldwin,    11   East 
488  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  672.    jSee  other  instances  in  Little  v.  Wingfield,  11  Ir.  C.  L.  63  ; 
Doe  v.  Wilson,  10  Moo.  P.  C.  502  ;  O'Neill  v.   Allen,   9  Ir.  C.   L.  132  ;  Att.-Gen.  v. 
Ewelme  Hospital,  17  Beav.  366  :  Mayor  of  Exeter  v.  Warren,  5  Q.   B.  773,  801  ;  Cal- 
niady  v.  Rowe,  6  C.  B.  861  ;  Beaufort  v.  Swan,   3  Ex.   413  ;  Healey  r.  Thome,  4  Ir. 
R.  C.  L.  495  ;  State  v.  Wright,  41  N.  J.  L.  478  ;  Carter  v.  Fishing  Co.,  77  Pa.  310  ;[ 
[see  post,  Vol.  II,  §§  537-546.  j 

2  Jackson  v.  M'Call,  10  Johns.  377.     "  Si  probet  possessionem  excedentem  memo- 
riam  hominum,  habet  vim  tituli  et  privilegii,  etiam  a  Principe.    Et  haec  est  differentia 
inter  possessionem  xxx.  vel.  xl.  annorutn,  et  non  inemorabilis  temporis  ;  quia  per  illam 
acquiritur  non  directum,  sed  utile  dominium ;  per  istam  autem  directum : "    Mascard. 
De  Probat.  vol.  i,  p.  239,  Concl.  199,  n.  11,  12. 

1  The  rule  on  this  subject  was  stated  by  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Doe  v.  Cooke,  6  Bing.  174, 
179  :  "  No  case  can  be  put,"  says  he,  "  in  which  any  presumption  has  been  made,  ex- 
cept where  a  title  has  been  shown,  by  the  party  who  calls  for  the  presumption,  good  in 
substance,  but  wanting  some  collateral  matter,  necessary  to  make  it  complete  in  point 
of  form.  In  such  case,  where  the  possession  is  shown  to  have  been  consistent  with  the 
fact  directed  to  be  presumed,  and  in  snob  cases  only,  has  it  ever  been  allowed;"  and 
he  cites  as  examples,  Lade  v.  Holford,  Bull.  N.  P.  110  ;  England  v.  Slade,  4  T.  R.  682  ; 
Doe  r.  Sybourn,  7  T.  R.  2;  Doe  v.  Hilder.  2  B.  &  Aid.  782 ;  Doe  c.  Wrighte,  ib.  710. 
See  Best  on  Presumptions,  pp.  144-169  ;  fjand  for  a  more  detailed  treatment  of  the  sub- 
ject, Best  on  Evidence,  §§  367-399  ;  and  jwrf,  VoL  II,  §§  537-546-3 
VOL.  I.  — 10 


146  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

it  surrendered.2  Lord  Kenyon  also  said,  that  in  all  cases  where 
trustees  ought  to  convey  to  the  beneficial  owner,  he  would  leave  it  to 
the  jury  to  presume,  where  such  presumption  could  reasonably  be 
made,  that  they  had  conveyed  accordingly.8  After  the  lapse  of  sev- 
enty years,  the  jury  have  been  instructed  to  presume  a  grant  of 
a  snare  in  a  proprietary  of  lands,  from  acts  done  by  the  supposed 
grantee  in  that  capacity,  as  one  of  the  proprietors.4  The  same  pre- 
sumption has  been  advised  in  regard  to  the  reconveyance  of  mort- 
gages, conveyances  from  old  to  new  trustees,  mesne  assignments  of 
leases,  and  any  other  species  of  documentary  evidence,  and  acts  in 
pais,  which  is  necessary  for  the  support  of  a  title  in  all  other  re- 
spects evidently  just.6  It  is  sufficient  that  the  party,  who  asks  for 
the  aid  of  this  presumption,  has  proved  a  title  to  the  beneficial 

a  Lade  v.  Holford,  Bull.  N.  P.  110. 

*  Doe  v.  Sy bourn,  7  T.  R.  2  ;  Doe  v.  Staple,  2  T.  R.  696.    The  subject  of  the  pre- 
sumed surrender  of  terms  is  treated  at  large  in  Mathews  on  Presumpt.  Evid.  ch.  13, 
pp.  226-259,  and  is  ably  expounded  by  Sir  Edw.  Sugden,  in  his  Treatise  on  Vendors 
and  Purchasers,  ch.  15,  §  3,  vol.  iii,  pp.  24-67,  10th  ed.    See  also  Best  on  Presumptions, 
§§  113-122. 

*  Farrar  v.  Merrill,  1  Greenl.  17.     A  by-law  may,  in  like  manner,  be  presumed : 
Bull.  N.  P.  211  ;  The  case  of  Corporations,  4  Co.  78  ;  Cowp.  110. 

6  Emery  v.  Grocock,  6  Madd.  54  ;  Cook  v.  Soltan,  2  Sim.  &  Stu.  154  ;  Wilson  v. 
Allen,  1  Jac.  &  W.  611,  620  ;  Roe  v.  Reade,  8  T.  R.  118,  122  ;  White  v.  Foljambe, 
11  Ves.  350  ;  Keene  v.  Deardon,  8  East  248,  266  ;  Tenny  v.  Jones,  3  M.  &  Scott  472 ; 
Roe  v.  Lowe,  1  H.  Bl.  446,  459;  Van  Dyck  v.  Van  Beuren,  1  Caines  84;  Jackson  v. 
Murray,  7  Johns.  5  ;  4  Kent  Comtn.  90,  91  ;  Gray  v.  Gardiner,  3  Mass.  399  ;  Kuox 
v.  Jenks,  7  Mass.  488  ;  Society,  etc.  ».  Young,  2  N.  H.  310  ;  Colman  v.  Anderson,  10 
Mass.  105  ;  Pejepscot  Proprietors  v.  Ranson,  14  id.  145;  Bergen  v.  Beunet,  1  Caines 
Cas.  1  ;  Blossom  v.  Cannon,  14  Mass.  177  ;  Battles  v.  Holley,  6  Greenl.  145  ;  Lady 
Dartmouth  v.  Roberts,  16  East  334,  339;  Livingston  v.  Livingston,  4  Johns.  Ch.  287  ; 
}so  also  in  favor  of  a  grant  of  fishing  rights:  Little  v.  Wingtield,  11  Ir.  C.  L.  63  ; 
Leconfield  v.  Lonsdale,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  657  ;  Carter  v.  Tinicum  Fishing  Co.,  77  Pa.  St. 
310  ;  see  Mills  v.  Mayor,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  476  ;  and  of  easements  and  incorporeal  heredita- 
ments generally:  Kingston  ».  Leslie,  10  S.  &  R.  383;  Rooker  v.  Perkins,  14  Wis.  79  ; 
Edson  v.  Munsell,  10  Allen  557  ;  Nichols  v.  Boston,  98  Mass.  39  ;  Briggs  v.  Prosser, 
14  Wend.  227;  Munro  v.  Merchant,  26  Barb.  383 ;  Attorney-General  v.  Proprietors, 
etc.,  3  Gray  1,  62-65  ;  St.  Mary's  College  v.  Attorney -General,  3  Jur.  N.  S.  675  ;  Munroe 
v.  Gates,  48  Me.  463  ;  so  also  of  a  deed  of  partition  :  Russell  v.  Marks,  3  Mete.  Ky. 
37  ;  and  of  a  deed  of  manumission :  Lewis  v.  Hart,  33  Mo.  535. } 

Whether  deeds  of  conveyance  can  be  presumed,  in  cases  where  the  law  has  made  pro- 
vision for  their  registration,  has  been  doubted.  The  point  was  argued,  but  not  decided, 
in  Doe  u.  Hirst,  11  Price  475  ;  and  see  24  Pick.  322.  The  better  opinion  seems  to 
be  that  though  the  Court  will  not,  in  such  case,  presume  the  existence  of  a  deed  as  a 
mere  inference  of  law,  yet  the  fact  is  open  for  the  jury  to  find,  as  in  other  cases  ;  see 
R.  v.  Long  Buckby,  7  East  45 ;  Trials  per  Pais,  237;  Finch  400  ;  Valentine  v.  Piper, 
22  Pick.  85,  93,  94  ;  ["Brown  v.  Oldham,  123  Mo.  621,  630  ;  Dunn  v.  Eaton,  92  Tenn. 
743,  753.]  This  rule  nas  been  applied  to  possessions  of  divers  lengths  of  duration  ;  as 
fifty-two  years,  Ryder  v.  Hathaway,  21  Pick.  298  ;  fifty  years,  Melvin  v.  Prop'rs  of 
Locks,  etc.,  16  Pick.  137,  17  Pick.  255,  s.  c.  ;  Qorty-three  years,  Howell  v.  House, 
2  Mill  Const.  80,  85  ;j  thirty-three  years,  White  v.  Loring,  24  Pick.  319  ;  thirty 
years,  McNair  ».  Hunt,  5  Mo.  300 ;  twenty-six  years,  Newman  v.  Studley,  id.  291  ; 
twenty  years,  Brattle-Snuare  Church  v.  Bullard,  2  Met.  363  ;  but  the  latter  period  is 
held  sufficient.  The  rule,  however,  does  not  seem  to  depend  so  much  upon  the  mere 
lapse  of  a  definite  period  of  time  as  upon  nil  the  circumstances,  taken  together ;  the 
question  being  exclusively  for  the  jury.  ["But  on  this  point  there  is  a  difference  of 
opinion,  and  in  modern  cases  the  matter  is  often  made  a  presumption  of  law  :  see 
Bryant  e.  Foot,  L.  It.  2  Q.  B.  161  ;  Best,  Evidence,  §  399  ;  and  post,  Vol.  II,  §§  537- 
646.} 


§§  46-49.]  ANCIENT  GRANTS.  147 

ownership,  and  a  long  possession  not  inconsistent  therewith ;  and 
has  made  it  not  unreasonable  to  believe  that  the  deed  of  conveyance, 
or  other  act  essential  to  the  title,  was  duly  executed.  Where  these 
merits  are  wanting,  the  jury  are  not  advised  to  make  the  presump- 
tion.6 

§  47.  Same ;  Personalty.  The  same  principle  is  applied  to  mat- 
ters belonging  to  the  personalty.  Thus,  where  one  town,  after  being 
set  off  from  another,  had  continued  for  fifty  years  to  contribute  an- 
nually to  the  expense  of  maintaining  a  bridge  in  the  parent  town, 
this  was  held  sufficient  to  justify  the  presumption  of  an  agreement 
to  that  effect.1  And,  in  general,  it  may  be  said  that  long  acquies- 
cence in  any  adverse  claim  of  right  is  good  ground,  on  which  a  jury 
may  presume  that  the  claim  had  a  legal  commencement;  since  it  is 
contrary  to  general  experience  for  one  man  long  to  continue  to  pay 
money  to  another,  or  to  perform  any  onerous  duty,  or  to  submit  to 
any  inconvenient  claim,  unless  in  pursuance  of  some  contract,  or 
other  legal  obligation. 

§  48.  Presumptions  of  Pact ;  Summary.1  In  fine,  this  class  of 
presumptions  embraces  all  the  connections  and  relations  between  the 
facts  proved  and  the  hypothesis  stated  and  defended,  whether  they 
are  mechanical  and  physical,  or  of  a  purely  moral  nature.  It  is  that 
which  prevails  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  namely,  the  process  of 
ascertaining  one  fact  from  the  existence  of  another,  without  the  aid 
of  any  rule  of  law ;  and,  therefore,  it  falls  within  the  exclusive  prov- 
ince of  the  jury,  who  are  bound  to  find  according  to  the  truth,  even 
in  cases  where  the  parties  and  the  Court  would  be  precluded  by  an 
estoppel,  if  the  matter  were  so  pleaded.  They  are  usually  aided  in 
their  labors  by  the  advice  and  instructions  of  the  judge,  more  or  less 
strongly  urged,  at  his  discretion ;  but  the  whole  matter  is  free  before 
them,  unembarrassed  by  any  considerations  of  policy  or  conven- 
ience, and  unlimited  by  any  boundaries  but  those  of  truth,  to  be 
decided  by  themselves,  according  to  the  convictions  of  their  own 
understanding. 

§  49.2 

6  Doe  v.  Cooke,  6  Bing.  174,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  ;  Doe  v.  Reed,  5  B.  &  A.  232;  Livett 
v.  Wilson,  3  Bing.  115  ;  Schauber  v.  Jackson,  2  "Wend.  14,  37  ;  Hepburn  ».  Auld, 
6  Crunch  262  ;  Valentine  ».  Piper,  22  Pick.  85  ;  {where,  for  instance,  the  possession  was 
taken  under  a  title  inconsistent  with  that  claimed  :  Colvin  v.  Warford,  20  Md.  357  ;  or 
where  the  origin  of  the  claim  is  in  fact  shown  not  to  have  been  such  a  deed  :  Nicto 
v.  Carpenter,  21  Cal.  455 ;  QClaflin  v.  R.  Co.,  157  Mass.  489,  499  ;]  see  Grimes  r. 
Bastrop,  26  Tex.  310  ;  or  where  the  possession  did  not  fulfil  the  requisites  of  ad- 
verse possession,  in  that  it  was  continuously  resisted  :  Field  v.  Brown,  24  Gratt. 
74  ;  or  that  it  was  secret :  Chasemore  v.  Richards,  7  H.  L.  C.  349 ;  Roath  v.  Driscoll, 
20  Conn.  533  ;  Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa.  St.  528 ;  Frazier  v.  Brown,  12  Ohio  St. 
294.} 

1  Cambridge  v.  Lexington,  17  Pick.  222.  See  also  Grote  v.  Grote,  10  Johns.  402 ; 
Schauber  v.  Jackson,  2  Wend.  36,  37. 

1  [See  n°te  to  §  44.] 

2  ^Transferred  post,  as  §  81  e,  in  a  separate  chapter  dealing  with  "  Law  and  Fact ; 
Judge  and  Jury.  "3 


148  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,  AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

§   60.8 

§§  51-73.4 

3.  Burden  of  Proof  in  Specific  Cases. 

§  74.  In  general.1  A  third  rule  which  governs  in  the  production 
of  evidence  is,  that  the  obligation  of  proving  any  fact  lies  upon  the 
party  who  substantially  asserts  the  affirmative  of  the  issue.2  This  is 
a  rule  of  convenience,  adopted  not  because  it  is  impossible  to  prove  a 
negative,  but  because  the  negative  does  not  admit  of  the  direct  and 
simple  proof  of  which  the  affirmative  is  capable.8  It  is,  therefore, 
generally  deemed  sufficient,  where  the  allegation  is  affirmative,  to 
oppose  it  with  a  bare  denial,  until  it  is  established  by  evidence. 
Such  is  the  rule  of  the  Roman  law.  "Ei  incumbit  probatioqui  dicit, 
non  qui  negat."  4  As  a  consequence  of  this  rule,  the  party  who  as- 
serts the  affirmative  of  the  issue  is  entitled  to  begin  and  to  reply ; 
and  having  begun,  he  is  not  permitted  to  go  into  half  of  his  case, 
and  reserve  the  remainder ;  but  is  generally  obliged  to  develop  the 
whole.6  Regard  is  had,  in  this  matter,  to  the  substance  and  effect  of 

8  L~This  section  is  as  follows :  "  The  production  of  evidence  to  the  jury  is  governed 
by  certain  principles,  which  may  be  treated  under  four  general  heads  or  rules.  The 
first  of  these  is,  that  the  evidence  must  correspond  with  the  allegations,  and  be  confined 
to  the  point  in  issue.  The  second  is,  that  it  is  sufficient,  if  the  substance  only  of  the 
issue  be  proved.  The  third  is,  that  the  burden  of  proving  a  proposition,  or  issue,  lies 
on  the  party  holding  the  affirmative.  And  the  fourth  is,  that  the  best  evidence  of  which 
the  case,  in  its  nature,  is  susceptible,  must  always  be  produced.  These  we  shall  now 
consider  in  their  order."  This  well-known  classification  of  the  author  cannot  be  de- 
fended from  any  point  of  view  ;  and  since  it  serves  only  to  mislead,  has  no  essential 
connection  with  his  exposition  of  the  various  topics,  and  serves  here  only  to  separate 
the  cognate  subjects  of  Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof,  it  has-been  withdrawn  from 
the  text  to  a  note.] 

4  QThese  sections  have  been  placed  in  Appendix  II.  Sections  51«-55  deal  in  very 
brief  compass  with  a  small  part  of  the  material  now  covered  by  the  editor's  Chapter  V, 
on  Circumstantial  Evidence,  a-nte ;  in  the  view  of  the  author,  this  subject  answered  sub- 
stantially to  the  first  head  in  his  classification  quoted  in  the  preceding  note.  Sections 
56-73  deal  almost  exclusively,  and  in  much  detail,  with  the  subject  of  Variance,  —  a 
matter,  strictly,  of  the  law  of  Pleading,  not  of  Evidence,  and,  moreover,  one  of  little 
consequence  under  modern  legislation  ;  in  the  view  of  the  author  this  subject  answered 
to  the  second  head  in  his  classification  quoted  in  the  preceding  note.  The  third  head 
of  that  classification,  the  Burden  of  Proof,  is  taken  up  in  the  sections  now  following.] 

1  fJThe  principle  of  the  burden  of  proof  has  been  already  examined,  ante,  §§  14  w- 
14  y,  and  the  following  sections  are  to  be  read  in  the  light  of  what  is  there  said.     No 
attempt  is  made  in  these  sections  to  call  attention  to  all  the  specific  inconsistencies 
between  the  author's  statements  and  the  principles  there  explained.] 

2  QSee  note  to  §  78.] 

8  Dranguet  v.  Prudhomme,  8  La.  83,  86 ;  Costigan  v.  Mohawk  &  Hudson  R.  R.  Co., 
3  Demo  609  ;  {Com.  v.  Tuey,  8  Cush.  1  ;  Burnham  v.  Allen,  1  Gray  496  ;  Crownin- 
shield  v.  Crowninshield,  2  id.  524.  | 

*  Dig.  lib.  22,  tit.  3,  1.  2  ;  Mascard.  de  Prob.  Concl.  70,  tot.  ;  Concl.  1128,  n.  10. 
See  also  Tait  on  Evid.  p.  1. 

6  Rees  v.  Smith,  2  Stark.  81  ;  3  Chitty  Gen.  Pract.  872-877;  Swift's  Law  of  Evid. 

?152;  Bull.  N.  P.  298;  Browne  v.  Murray,  Ry.  &  M.  254;  Jones  v.  Kennedy,  11 
ick.  125,  132.  The  true  test  to  determine  which  party  has  the  right  to  begin,  and  of 
course  to  determine  where  is  the  burden  of  proof,  is  to  consider  which  party  would  be 
entitled  to  the  verdict,  if  no  evidence  were  offered  on  either  side ;  for  the  burden  of 
proof  lies  on  the  party  against  whom,  in  such  case,  the  verdict  ought  to  be  given. 
Leete  v.  Gresham  Life  Ins.  Co.,  7  Eng.  Law  &  E<j.  578  ;  15  Jur.  1161  ;  and  sue  Huek- 


§§  50-75.]  EIGHT  TO   OPEN  AND   CLOSE.  149 

the  issue,  rather  than  to  the  form  of  it ;  for  in  many  cases  the  party, 
by  making  a  slight  change  in  his  pleading,  may  give  the  issue  a  neg- 
ative or  an  affirmative  form,  at  his  pleasure.  Therefore  in  an  action 
of  covenant  for  not  repairing,  where  the  breach  assigned  was  that  the 
defendant  did  not  repair,  but  suffered  the  premises  to  be  ruinous, 
and  the  defendant  pleaded  that  he  did  repair,  and  did  not  suffer  the 
premises  to  be  ruinous,  it  was  held  that  on  this  issue  the  plaintiff 
should  begin.6  If  the  record  contains  several  issues,  and  the  plaintiff 
hold  the  affirmative  in  any  one  of  them,  he  is  entitled  to  begin  ;  as,  if 
in  an  action  of  slander  for  charging  the  plaintiff  with  a  crime,  the 
defendant  should  plead  not  guilty,  and  a  justification.  For  wherever 
the  plaintiff  is  obliged  to  produce  any  proof  in  order  to  establish  his 
right  to  recover,  he  is  generally  required  to  go  into  his  whole  case, 
'according  to  the  rule  above  stated,  and  therefore  is  entitled  to  reply. 
How  far  he  shall  proceed  in  his  proof,  in  anticipation  of  the  defence 
on  that  or  the  other  issues,  is  regulated  by  the  discretion  of  the 
judge,  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case  ;  regard  being  gen- 
erally had  to  the  question,  whether  the  whole  defence  is  indicated  by 
the  plea,  with  sufficient  particularity  to  render  the  plaintiff's  evi- 
dence intelligible.7 

§  75.  Damages;  Right  to  open  and  close.  Whether  the  necessity 
of  proving  damages,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  is  such  an  affirm- 
ative as  entitles  him  to  begin  and  reply,  is  not  perfectly  clear  by  the 
authorities.  Where  such  evidence  forms  part  of  the  proof  necessary 
to  sustain  the  action,  it  may  well  be  supposed  to  fall  within  the  gen- 
eral rule ;  as,  in  an  action  of  slander,  for  words  actionable  only  in 
respect  of  the  special  damage  thereby  occasioned ;  or,  in  an  action  on 
the  case,  by  a  master  for  the  beating  of  his  servant  per  quod  servi- 
tium  amisit.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  where  it  appears  by  the 
record,  or  by  the  admission  of  counsel,  that  the  damages  to  be  re- 
covered are  only  nominal,  or  are  mere  matter  of  computation,  and 

man  v.  Fernie,  3  M.  &  W.  510  ;  {Veiths  v.  Hagge,  8  Clarke  163  ;  Kent  v.  "White,  27 
Ind.  390.  Mr.  Taylor  suggests  another  test,  i.  e.  to  examine  what  would  be  the  effect 
of  striking  out  of  the  record  the  allegations  to  be  proved,  for  the  burden  of  proof  rests 
upon  the  party  whose  case  would  be  thereby  destroyed :  1  Taylor  Ev.  §  338  ;  citing 
Amos  v.  Hughes,  1  M.  &  Rob.  464,  per  Alderson,  B. ;  Doe  v.  Rowlands,  9  C.  &  P.  735,  and 
Osborn  v.  Thompson,  2  M.  &  Rob.  256,  as  to  the  first,  and  Mills  v.  Barber,  1  M.  &  W. 
427,  as  to  the  second  ;  |  Qmt  compare  what  has  been  said  on  this  subject  ante,  §  14  #.] 

e  Soward  «;.  Leggatt,  7  C.  &  P.  613. 

7  Rees  v.  Smith,  2  Stark.  31  ;  Jackson  u.  Hesketh,  id.  518  ;  James  v.  Salter, 
1  M.  &  Rob.  501 ;  Rawlins  v.  Desborough,  2  id.  328  ;  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme, 
8  Conn.  261  ;  Curtis  v.  Wheeler,  4  C.  &  P.  196  ;  s.  c.  1  M.  &  M.  493  ;  Williams  v. 
Thomas,  4  C.  &  P.  234  ;  7  Pick.  100,  per  Parker,  C.  J. ;  {York  v.  Pease,  2  Gray  282  ; 
Holbrook  v.  McBride,  4  id.  218 ;  Gushing  v.  Billings,  2  Cush.  158.  |  In  Browne  v. 
Murray,  Ry.  &  M.  254,  Lord  C.  J.  Abbott  gave  the  plaintiff  his  election,  after  proving 
the  general  issue,  either  to  proceed  immediately  with  all  his  proof  to  rebut  the  antici- 


instance,  and  the  residue  after  the  defendant's  case  was  proved. 

is  not  inadmissible  because  it  corroborates  the  evidence  in   chief :  Wright  v.  Foster, 

109  Mass.  5  7.  | 


150  BURDEN   OF  PEOOF,  AND   PKESUMPTIONS.  [<"!H.   VI. 

there  is  no  dispute  about  them,  the  formal  proof  of  them  will  not 
take  away  the  defendant's  right  to  begin  and  reply,  whatever  be  the 
form  of  the  pleadings,  provided  the  residue  of  the  case  is  affirm- 
atively justified  by  the  defendant.1  And  if  the  general  issue  alone 
is  pleaded,  and  the  defendant  will  at  the  trial  admit  the  whole  of  the 
plaintiff's  case,  he  may  still  have  the  advantage  of  the  beginning  and 
reply.2  So  also  in  trespass  quare  clausum  fregit,  where  the  defend- 
ant pleads  not  guilty  as  to  the  force  and  arms  and  whatever  is  against 
the  peace,  and  justifies  as  to  the  residue,  and  the  damages  are  laid 
only  in  the  usual  formula  of  treading  down  the  grass,  and  subverting 
the  soil,  the  defendant  is  permitted  to  begin  and  reply ;  there  being 
no  necessity  for  any  proof  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff.8 

§  76.  Same  ;  Unliquidated  Damages.  The  difficulty  in  determin- 
ing this  point  exists  chiefly  in  those  cases,  where  the  action  is  for' 
unliquidated  damages,  and  the  defendant  has  met  the  whole  case 
with  an  affirmative  plea.  In  these  actions  the  practice  has  been  vari- 
ous in  England  ;  but  it  has  at  length  been  settled  by  a  rule,  by  the 
fifteen  judges,  that  the  plaintiff  shall  begin  in  all  actions  for  personal 
injuries,  libel,  and  slander,  though  the  general  issue  may  not  be 
pleaded,  and  the  affirmative  be  on  the  defendant.1  In  actions  upon 
contract,  it  was,  until  recently,  an  open  question  of  practice  ;  having 
been  sometimes  treated  as  a  matter  of  right  in  the  party,  and  at  other 

1  Fowler  v.  Coster,  1  Moo.  &  M.  243,  per  Lord  Tenterden.  And  see  the  reporter's 
note  on  that  case  in  1  Moo.  &  M.  278-281.  The  dictum  of  the  learned  judge,  in 
Brooks  ».  Barrett,  7  Pick.  100,  is  not  supposed  to  militate  with  this  rule  ;  but  is  con- 
ceived to  apply  to  cases  where  proof  of  the  note  is  required  of  the  plaintiff.  Sanford 
v.  Hunt,  1  C.  &P.  118  ;  Goodtitle  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  497. 

a  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  1  Moo.  &  M.  536  ;  Fowler  v.  Coster,  id.  241  ;  Doe  v.  Barnes, 
1  M.  &  Rob.  386  ;  Doe  v.  Smart,  id.  476  ;  Fish  v.  Travers,  3  C.  &  P.  578  ;  Comstock 
v.  Hadlyme,  8  Conn.  261  ;  Lacon  v.  Higgins,  3  Stark.  178;  Corbett  v.  Corbett, 
3  Campb.  368  ;  Homan  v.  Thompson,  6  C.  &  P.  717  ;  Smart  v.  Rayner,  id.  721  ; 
Mills  v.  Oddy,  id.  728 ;  Scott  v.  Hull,  8  Conn.  296.  But  see  post,  §  76,  n.  4. 

8  Hodges  v.  Holder,  3  Campb.  366 ;  Jackson  v.  Hesketh,  2  Stark.  518  ;  Pearson  v. 
Coles,  1  M.  &  Rob.  206  ;  Davis  v.  Mason,  4  Pick.  156 ;  Leech  v.  Armitage,  2  Dall. 
125.  j  Where  a  defendant  under  a  rule  of  court  filed  an  admission  of  the  plaintiffs 
prima  fade  case,  in  order  to  obtain  the  right  to  open  and  close,  he  was  held  not  to  be 
thereby  estopped  from  setting  up  in  defence  the  statute  of  limitations :  Emmons  v. 
Hay  ward,  11  Cush.  48  ;  nor  from  showing  that  th«  plaintiff  had  no  title  to  the  note 
sued  on  :  Spaulding  v.  Hood,  8  id.  602.  An  auditor's  report  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff 
will  not  give  the  defendant  the  right  to  open  and  close  :  Snow  v.  Batchelder,  ib.  513; 
see  Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Webster,  68  Me.  449.  The  rule,  however,  in  Massachusetts, 
is  to  allow  the  plaintiff  to  open  and  close  in  every  case,  even  when  the  defendant  admits 
the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  files  a  declaration  in  set-off,  or  matter  in  avoidance : 
Hurley  v.  O'Sullivan,  137  Mass.  86  ;  Dorr  v.  Tremont  Nat.  Bank,  128  id.  358  ;  Page  v. 
Osgood,  2  Gray  260;  see  Gaul  v.  Fleming,  10  Ind.  253.  In  probate  trials,  the  executor 
propounding  the  will  begins  and  closes  without  regard  to  the  burden  of  proof:  Dorr  v. 
fremont  Bank,  supra;  Crowninshield  v.  Crowninshield,  2  Gray  524.  In  equity,  the 
same  rule  that  the  plaintiff  is  in  all  cases  entitled  to  open  and  close  prevails  :  Dorr  v. 
Tremont  Bank,  supra.  In  cases  of  land  damages,  the  owner  of  the  land  has  the  right 
to  begin  and  reply,  even  though  the  proceedings  are  formally  begun  by  the  other  party : 
Parks  v.  Boston,  15  Pick.  198,  208  ;  Conn.  River  R,  R.  v.  Clapp,  1  Cush.  559 ;  Win- 
nisimmett  Co.  i>.  Grueby,  111  Mass.  543 ;  Burt  v.  Wigglesworth,  117  id.  302 ;  Dorr  v 
Tremont  Bank,  supra.  \ 

1  Carter  v.  Jones,  6  C.  &  P.  64. 


§§  75-77.]  EIGHT  TO   OPEN  AND   CLOSE.  151 

times  regarded  as  resting  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  under  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.3  But  it  is  now  settled,  in  accordance  with 
the  rule  adopted  in  other  actions.8  In  this  country  it  is  generally 
deemed  a  matter  of  discretion,  to  be  ordered  by  the  judge  at  the  trial, 
as  he  may  think  most  conducive  to  the  administration  of  justice ;  but 
the  weight  of  authority,  as  well  as  the  analogies  of  the  law,  seem  to 
be  in  favor  of  giving  the  opening  and  closing  of  the  cause  to  the 
plaintiff,  wherever  the  damages  are  in  dispute,  unliquidated,  and  to 
be  settled  by  the  jury  upon  such  evidence  as  may  be  adduced,  and 
not  by  computation  alone.4 

§  77.   Will  Cases.     Where  the  proceedings  are  not  according  to  the 

*  Bedell  v.  Russell,  Ry.  &  M.  293  ;  Fowler  v.  Coster,  1  M.  &  M.  241  ;  Revett  v. 
Braham,  4  T.  R.  497  ;  Hare  v.  Munn,  1  M.  &  M.  241,  n. ;  Scott  v.  Hull,  8  Conn.  296  ; 
Burrell  v.  Nicholson,  6  C.  &  P.  202  ;  1  Moo.  &  R,  304,  306  ;  Hoggett  v.  Exley,  9  C.  & 
P.  324.     See  also  3  Chitty  Gen.  Practice,  872-877. 

«  Mercer  v.  Whall,  9  Jur.  576;  5  Q.  B.  447. 

*  Such  was  the  course  in  Young  v.  Bairner,  1  Esp.  103,  which  was  assumpsit  for 
work,  and  a  plea  in  abatement  for  the  non-joinder  of  other  defendants  ;  8.  p.,  Robey  v, 
Howard,  2  Stark.  555;  8.  P.,  Stansfeld  v.  Levy,  3  id.  8  ;  Lacon  v.  Higgins,  ib.  178, 
where,  in  assumpsit  for  goods,  coverture  of  the  defendant  was  the  sole  plea.     Hare 
v.  Munn,  1  M.  &  M.  241,  n.,  which  was  assumpsit  for  money  lent,  with  a  plea  in  abate- 
ment for  the  non-joinder  of  other  defendants;  s.  p.,  Morris  v.  Lotan,  1  Moo.  &  R.  233  ; 
Wood  v.  Pringle,  ib.  217,  which  was  an  action  for  a  libel,  with  several  special  pleas  of 
justification  as  to  part,  but  no  general  issue  ;  and,  as  to  the  parts  not  justified,  judg- 
ment was  suffered  by  default.     See  ace.  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme,  8  Conn.  261 ;  Ayer  v. 
Austin,  6  Pick.  225  ;  Hoggett  v.  Exley,  9  C.  &  P.  324  ;  s.  c.  2  Moo.  &  R.  251.    On  the 
other  hand  are  Cooper  v.  Wakley,  3  C.  &  P.  474  ;  s.  c.  1  M.  &  M.  248,  which  was  a 
case  for  a  libel,  with  pleas  in  justification,  and  no  general  issue ;   but  this  is  plainly 
contradicted  by  the  subsequent  case  of  Wood  v.  Pringle,  and  has  since  been  overruled 
in  Mercer  v.  Whall;  Cotton  v.  James,  1  M.  &  M.  273;  s.  c.,  3  C.  &  P.  505,  which 
was  trespass  for  entering  the  plaintiffs  house,  and  taking  his  goods  with  a  plea  of  jus- 
tification under  a  commission  of  bankruptcy  ;   but  this  also  is  expressly  contradicted 
in  Morris  v.  Lotan  ;  Bedell  v.  Russell,  Ry.  &  M.  293,  which  was  an  action  of  trespass 
for  assault  and  battery,  and  for  shooting  the  plaintiff,  to  which  a  justification  was 
pleaded;  where  Best,  J.,  reluctantly  yielded  to  the  supposed  authority  of  Hodges  v. 
Holder,  3  Campb.  366,  and  Jackson  v.  Hesketh,  2  Stark.  518  ;  in  neither  of  which, 
however,  were  the  damages  controverted  ;  Fish  v.  Travers,  3  C.  &  P.  578,  decided  by 
Best,  J.,  on  the  authority  of  Cooper  v.  Wakley  and  Cotton  v.  James  ;  Burrell  r.  Nich- 
olson, 6  Car.  &  P.  202,  which  was  trespass  for  taking  the  plaintiff's  goods  in  his  house, 
and  detaining  them  one  hour,  which  the  defendant  justified  as  a  distress  for  parish  rates ; 
and  the  only  issue  was,  whether  the  house  was  within  the  parish  or  not.     But  here, 
also,  the  damages  were  not  in  dispute,  and  seem  to  have  been  regarded  as  merely  nom- 
inal.    See  also  Scott  v.  Hull,  8  Conn.  296.     In  Norris  v.  Ins.  Co.  of  North  America, 
3  Yeates  84,  which  was  covenant  on  a  policy  of  insurance,  to  which  performance  was 
pleaded,  the  damages  were  not  then  in  dispute,  the  parties  having  provisionally  agreed 
upon  a  mode  of  liquidation.     But  in  England  the  entire  subject  has  recently  undergone 
a  review,  and  the  rule  has  been  established,  as  applicable  to  all  personal  actions,  that 
the  plaintiff  shall  begin,  wherever  he  goes  for  substantial  damages  not  already  ascer- 
tained :  Mercer  ».  Whall,  9  Jur.  576  ;  5  Q.   B.  447  ;  see  9  Jur.  578 ;  5  Q.  B.  458. 
Ordinarily  speaking,  the  decision  of  the  judge,  at  Nisi  Prius,  on  a  matter  resting  in 
his  discretion,  is  not  subject  to  revision  in  any  other  court.     But  in  Huckman  v.  Fernie, 
5  M.  &  W.  505,  the  Court  observed  that,  though  they  might  not  interfere  in  a  very 
doubtful  case,  yet  if  the  decision  of  the  judge  "were  clearly  and  manifestly  wrong," 
they  would  interfere  to  set  it  right.     In  a  subsequent  case,  however,  it  is  said  that, 
instead  of  "were  clearly  and  manifestly  wrong,"  the  language  actually  used  by  the 
Court  was,  "did  clear  and  manifest  wrong;"  meaning  that  it  was  not  sufficient  to 
show  merely  that  the  wrong  party  had  begun,  but  that  some  injustice  had  been  done 
in  consequence :  see  Edwards  v.  Matthews,  11  Jur.  398  ;  Geach  v.  Ingall,  9  id.   691 ; 
14  M.  &  W.  95. 


152  BUKDEN   OF   PROOF,  AND  PKESUMPTIOXS.  [CH.   VL 

course  of  the  common  law,  and  where,  consequently,  the  onus  pro- 
bandi  is  not  technically  presented,  the  Courts  adopt  the  same  principles 
which  govern  in  proceedings  at  common  law.  Thus,  in  the  probate 
of  a  will,  as  the  real  question  is  whether  there  is  a  valid  will  or  not, 
the  executor  is  considered  as  holding  the  affirmative ;  and  therefore 
lie  opens  and  closes  the  case,  in  whatever  state  or  condition  it  may 
be,  and  whether  the  question  of  sanity  is  or  is  not  raised.1 

[It  seems  to  be  generally  conceded  that  the  burden  of  proof  as  to 
the  testator's  sanity  is  on  the  proponent  of  the  will,  in  the  sense  that, 
when  the  case  goes  to  the  jury,  he  has  the  risk  of  non-persuasion  ;  2 
since  the  testator's  sanity  is  a  fact  essential  to  the  proponent's  claim. 
But  there  is  a  difference  of  practice  as  to  the  duty  of  going  forward  with 
evidence.  According  to  one  view,  the  evidence  of  execution,  introduced 
by  the  proponent,  may  suffice  to  raise  a  presumption  of  sanity,  so  as  to 
require  the  opponent  to  introduce  evidence  of  insanity.  By  another 
view,  the  evidence  of  execution  does  not  raise  this  presumption,  and 
the  proponent  therefore  has  the  duty  of  coming  forward,  as  in  any 
other  case,  with  some  evidence  of  his  factum  probandum,  i.  e.  sanity.8 
As  to  the  burden  of  proof  in  regard  to  undue  influence,  however, 
the  difference  of  opinion  goes  back  to  the  main  burden  of  persuasion  ; 
i.  e.  by  one  opinion,  the  voluntariness  of  the  testator's  act  is  a  part 
of  the  proponent's  case,  and  with  the  jury  he  has  the  risk  of  non- 
persuasion  ;  by  the  other  view,  the  fact  of  undue  influence  is  treated 
as  in  the  nature  of  a  counter-plea  of  the  contestant,  and  therefore  to 
be  proved  as  a  part  of  his  case.4] 

§  78.  Sundry  Instances.  To  this  general  rule,  that  the  burden  of 
proof  is  on  the  party  holding  the  affirmative,1  there  are  some  excep- 

1  Buckminster  v.  Perry,  4  Mass.  593 ;  Brooks  v.  Barrett,  7  Pick.  94  ;  Comstock  v. 
Hadlyme,  8  Conii.  254 ;  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Greenl.  42 ;  Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  6  Mass. 
397. 

2  PNot  in  Indiana ;  see  infra.~\ 

8  [The  Courts  do  not  always  make  their  meaning  clear  ;  the  following  cases  show 
the  practice  in  various  States :  Sutton  v.  Sadler,  3  C.  B.  N.  s.  87 ;  Barber's  Estate,  63 
Conn.  393 ;  Taylor  v.  Pegrara,  151  111.  106,  118  ;  Harp  v.  Parr,  168  111.  459  ;  Blough 
v.  Parry,  144  Ind.  463  ;  Young  v.  Miller,  145  id.  652  ;  Roller  v.  Kling,  id.,  49  N.  E. 
948  ;  Johnson  v.  Stevens,  95  Ky.  128;  Bey's  Succession,  46  La.  An.  773,  787  ;  Crown- 
inshield  v.  Crowninshield,  2  Gray  524 ;  Baxter  v.  Abbott,  7  id.  71 ;  Prentis  ?.'.  Bates, 
93  Mich.  234,  245  (and  note  in  17  L.  R,  A.  494);  Moriarty  v.  Moriarty,  108  id.  249; 
Sheehnn  v.  Kearney,  Miss.,  21  So.  41;  Maddox  v.  Maddox,  114  Mo.  35,  46:  Gordon 
v.  Burris,  141  id.  602  ;  Murry  v.  Hennessey,  48  Nebr.  608  ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  137  N.  Y. 
610  H  jElkinton  v.  Brick,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  158  ;  Mayo  v.  Jones,  78  N.  C.  402.  { 

*  tSee  Barry  v.  Butlin,  2  Moore  P.  C.  480  ;  Bulger  v.  Ross,  98  Ala.  267  ;  King  v. 
King,  Ky.,  42  8.  W.  347  ;  Teegarden  v.  Lewis,  145  Ind.  98  ;  Bush  v.  Delano,  Mich.,  71 
N.W.  628 ;  Sheehan  v.  Kearney,  Miss.,  21  So.  41 ;  Morton  v.  Heidorn,  135  Mo.  608  ; 
McFadin  v.  Catron,  138  id.  197. 

For  the  presumption  of  undue  influence  or  fraud  arising  from  a  beneficiary's  draft- 
ing of  the  will,  see  ante,  §  43  a.] 

1  [This  mode  of  putting  the  principle  is  perhaps  misleading.  The  only  rule  is  that 
the  burden  of  proof  of  a  fact  (in  the  sense  of  the  risk  of  non-persuasion)  is  on  the  party 
for  whom  the  fact  is  an  essential  part  of  his  case  ;  and  this  rule  is  invariable  (ante, 
§  14  z).  But  when  we  come  to  determine  whose  case  the  fact  ought  to  be  essential  to, 
we  then  coine  to  considerations  of  general  policy  which  vary  with  various  situations 


§§  77-78.]  WILL  CASES  :  SUNDRY  INSTANCES.  153 

tions,  in  which  the  proposition,  though  negative  in  its  terms,  must 
be  proved  by  the  party  who  states  it.  One  class  of  these  exceptions 
will  be  found  to  include  those  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff  grounds 
his  right  of  action  upon  a  negative  allegation,  and  where,  of  course, 
the  establishment  of  this  negative  is  an  essential  element  in  his 
case ; a  as,  for  example,  in  an  action  for  having  prosecuted  the 
plaintiff  maliciously  and  without  probable  cause.  Here,  the  want  of 
probable  cause  must  be  made  out  by  the  plaintiff,  by  some  affirmative 
proof,  though  the  proposition  be  negative  in  its  terms.8  So,  in  an 
action  by  husband  and  wife,  on  a  promissory  note  made  to  the  wife 
after  marriage,  if  the  defendant  denies  that  she  is  the  meritorious 
cause  of  action,  the  burden  of  proving  this  negative  is  on  him.4  So, 
in  a  prosecution  for  a  penalty  given  by  statute,  if  the  statute,  in 
describing  the  offence,  contains  negative  matter,  the  count  must  con- 
tain such  negative  allegation,  and  it  must  be  supported  by  prima 
facie  proof.  Such  is  the  case  in  prosecutions  for  penalties  given  by 
statutes,  for  coursing  deer  in  enclosed  grounds,  not  having  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner ; 6  or  for  cutting  trees  on  lands  not  the  party's  own, 
or  taking  other  property,  not  having  the  consent  of  the  owner ; 6  or 
for  selling,  as  a  peddler,  goods  not  of  the  produce  or  manufacture  of 
the  country  ; 7  or  for  neglecting  to  prove  a  will,  without  just  excuse 
made  and  accepted  by  the  Judge  of  Probate  therefor.8  In  these,  and 
the  like  cases,  it  is  obvious,  that  plenary  proof  on  the  part  of  the 
affirmant  can  hardly  be  expected ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  considered 
sufficient  if  he  offer  such  evidence  as,  in  the  absence  of  counter  testi- 
mony, would  afford  ground  for  presuming  that  the  allegation  is  true. 
Thus,  in  an  action  on  an  agreement  to  pay  £100,  if  the  plaintiff 
would  not  send  herrings  for  one  year  to  the  London  market,  and,  in 
particular,  to  the  house  of  J.  &  A.  Millar,  proof  that  he  sent  none  to 
that  house  was  held  sufficient  to  entitle  him  to  recover,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  opposing  testimony.9  And  generally  where  a  party  seeks, 

and  claims.  No  doubt  the  difficulty  of  proving  a  negative  is  one  of  the  most  important 
of  these  considerations  of  policy,  and  helps  to  induce  us,  in  this  or  that  instance,  to 
put  the  fact  over  upon  the  other  party  and  treat  it  as  a  part  of  his  case.  But  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  say  that  this  is  done  by  a  general  rule,  with  its  specific  exceptions ; 
it  is  not  the  case  of  a  definite  rule,  but  of  an  important  underlying  policy  not  capable  of 
being  handled  as  a  rale.  For  the  rule  we  can  look  only  to  specific  kinds  of  actions."] 

2  1  Chitty  on  PI.  206  ;  Spieres  v.  Parker,  1  T.  R.  141 ;  R.  v.  Pratten,  6  T.  R. 
559;  Holmes  v.  Love,  3  B.  &  C.  242  ;  Lane  v.  Crombie,  12  Pick.  177;  Harvey  v. 
Towers,  15  Jur.  544  ;  4  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  Rep.  531. 

8  Purcell  v.  Macnamara,  1  Campb.  199;  s.  c.  9  East  361  ;  tllmer  v.  Leland, 
1  Greenl.  135;  Gibson  v.  Waterhouse,  4  id.  226;  [Nashv.  Hall,  4  Ind.  44.} 

*  Philliskirk  v.  Pluckwell,  2  M.  &  S.  395,  per  Bayley,  J. 

6  R.  v.  Rogers,  2  Campb.  654 ;  R.  v.  Jarvis,  1  East  643,  n. 

6  Little  v.  Thompson,  2  Greenl.  228  ;  R.  v.  Hazy  d  aL,  2  C.  &  P.  458. 

7  Com.  v.  Samuel,  2  Pick.  103. 

8  Smith  v.  Moore,  6  Greenl.  274.     See  other  examples  in  Com.  v.  Maxwell,  2  Pick. 
139  ;  1   East   P.  C.  166,  §   15  ;   Williams   v.  Hingharn  and   Quincy  Turnpike  Co., 
4  Pick.  341  i  R.  v.  Stone,   1  East  639;  R.  v.  Burdett,  4  B.  &  Aid.  95,  140  ;   R.   v. 
Turner,  5  M.  &  S.  206;   Woodbury  v.  Friuk,  14  111.  279. 

9  Calder  v.  Rutherford,  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  302  ;  s.  c.  7  Moore  158  ;  jVigus  v.  O'Ban. 
non,  118  111.  348;  Beardstown  v.  Virginia  cl  al.t  76  id.  34.} 


154  BURDEN  OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.  VL 

from  extrinsic  circumstances,  to  give  effect  to  an  instrument  which, 
on  its  face,  it  would  not  have,  it  is  incumbent  on  him  to  prove  those 
circumstances,  though  involving  the  proof  of  a  negative  ;  for,  in  the 
absence  of  extrinsic  proof,  the  instrument  must  have  its  natural  oper- 
ation and  no  other.  Therefore,  where  real  estate  was  devised  for 
life  with  power  of  appointment  by  will,  and  the  devisee  made  his 
will,  devising  "all  his  lands,"  but  without  mention  of  or  reference  to 
the  power,  it  was  held  no  execution  of  the  power,  unless  it  should 
appear  that  he  had  no  other  lands ;  and  that  the  burden  of  showing 
this  negative  was  upon  the  party  claiming  under  the  will  as  an  ap- 
pointment.10 

§  79.  Sundry  Instances.  But  where  the  subject-matter  of  a  nega- 
tive averment  lies  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of  the  other 
party,  the  averment  is  taken  as  true,  unless  disproved  by  that  party.1 
Such  is  the  case  in  civil  or  criminal  prosecutions  for  a  penalty  for 
doing  an  act  which  the  statutes  do  not  permit  to  be  done  by  any  per- 
sons, except  those  who  are  duly  licensed  therefor ;  as,  for  selling 
liquors,  exercising  a  trade  or  profession,  and  the  like.  Here  the 
party,  if  licensed,  can  immediately  show  it,  without  the  least  incon- 
venience ;  whereas,  if  proof  of  the  negative  were  required,  the  incon- 
venience would  be  very  great.2 

§  80.  Sundry  Instances.  So,  where  the  negative  allegation  in- 
volves a  charge  of  criminal  neglect  of  duty,  whether  official  or  other- 
wise ;  or  fraud ;  or  the  wrongful  violation  of  actual  lawful  possession 
of  property ;  the  party  making  the  allegation  must  prove  it ;  for  in 
these  cases  the  presumption  of  law,  which  is  always  in  favor  of  inno- 
cence and  quiet  possession,  is  in  favor  of  the  party  charged.1  Thus, 
in  an  information  against  Lord  Halifax,  for  refusing  to  deliver  up 
the  rolls  of  the  Auditor  of  the  Exchequer,  in  violation  of  his  duty, 
the  prosecutor  was  required  to  prove  the  negative.  So,  where  one  in 
office  was  charged  with  not  having  taken  the  sacrament  within  a 

1°  Doe  v.  Johnson,  7  Man.  &  Gr.  1047. 

1  p>ee  the  comments  ante,  §14  w."^ 

*  R.  v.  Turner,  5  M.  &  S.  206 ;  Smyth  v.  Jefferies,  9  Price  257 ;  Sheldon  v.  Clark, 
1  Johns.  513;  U.  S.  u.  Hayward,  2  Gall.  485;  Geuing  v.  State,  1  McCord  573; 
Com.  v.  Kimball,  7  Met.  304 ;  Harrison's  Case,  Paley  on  Conv.  45,  n.  ;  Apothe- 
caries' Co.  v.  Bentley,  Ry.  &  M.  159;  Haskill  v.  Com.,  3  B.  Monr.  342;  State  v. 
Morrison,  3  Dev.  299;  State  v.  Crowell,  11  Shepl.  171;  Shearer  v.  State,  7  Blackf. 
99;  {Com.  v.  Curran,  119  Mass.  206:  Corn.  v.  Dean,  110  id.  857;  Com.  v.  Leo, 
ib.  414;  Mass.  P.  S.  c.  214,  §  12;  Lovell  v.  Payne,  30  La.  An.  Pt.  I.  511;  Great 
Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bacon,  30  111.  347;  Wheat  v.  State,  6  Wis.  455 ;[  rjHornberger 
v.  State,  Nebr.,  66  N.  W.  23;  Parker  v.  State,  N.  J.  L.,  39  Atl.  651 ;  State  v.  Shelton, 
Wash.,  48  Pac.  258;  Black,  Intoxicating  Liquors,  §  507;]  \contra:  State  v.  Evans, 
5  Jones  250 ;  see,  further,  Com.  ».  Thurlow,  24  Pick.  874  ;  Com.  v.  Kimball,  7  Mete. 
304;  Cora.  v.  Babcock,  110  Mass.  107;  Com.  v.  Towle,  138  id.  490;  Com.  v.  Lahy, 
8  Gray  459;  Com.  v.  Locke,  114  Mass.  288;  Com.  v.  Welch,  144  id.  356. 

In  civil  cases  it  has  been  held  that,  to  recover  the  price  of  liquor  sold,  the  plaintiff 
most  show  that  he  wan  licensed  to  sell :  Bliss  v.  Brainard,  41  N.  H.  256 ;  Solomon  v. 
Dreschler,  4  Minn.  278  ;  Kane  v.  Johnston,  9  Bosw.  154 ;  contra :  Wilson  v.  Melvin, 
13  Gray  73;  Craig  t.  Proctor,  6  R.  I.  547. | 

1  j  Kline  v.  Baker,  106  Mass.  61  ;   Phelps  v.  Cutler,  4  Gray  139.  { 


§§  78-81.]  SUNDRY   INSTANCES.  155 

year;  and  where  a  seaman  was  charged  with  having  quitted  the  ship, 
without  the  leave  in  writing  required  by  statute ;  and  where  a  shipper 
was  charged  with  having  shipped  goods  dangerously  combustible  on 
board  the  plaintiff's  ship,  without  giving  notice  of  their  nature  to  any 
officer  on  board,  whereby  the  ship  was  burned  and  lost ;  in  each  of 
these  cases,  the  party  alleging  the  negative  was  required  to  prove  it.2 
So,  where  the  defence  to  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance  was,  that 
the  plaintiff  improperly  concealed  from  the  underwriter  certain  facts 
and  information  which  he  then  already  knew  and  had  received,  it 
was  held  that  the  defendant  was  bound  to  give  some  evidence  of  the 
non-communication.8  So,  where  the  goods  of  the  plaintiff  are  seized 
and  taken  out  of  his  possession,  though  for  an  alleged  forfeiture 
under  the  revenue  laws,  the  seizure  is  presumed  unlawful  until  proved 
otherwise.* 

§  81.  Sundry  Instances.  So,  where  infancy  is  alleged ; l  or  where 
one  born  in  lawful  wedlock  is  alleged  to  be  illegitimate,  the  parents 
not  being  separated  by  a  sentence  of  divorce ; 2  or  where  insanity  is 
alleged ; 8  or  a  person  once  living  is  alleged  to  be  dead,  the  presump- 
tion of  life  not  being  yet  worn  out  by  lapse  of  time;4  or  where  non- 
feasance  or  negligence  is  alleged,  in  an  action  on  contract;6  [or  where 
the  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  of  tort,  is 
involved;6]  or  where  the  want  of  a  due  stamp  is  alleged,  there  be- 

2  U.  S.  v.  Hayward,  2  Gall.  498 ;  Hartwell  v.  Root,  19  Johns.  345 ;  Bull.  N.  P. 
[298];  R.  v.  Hawkins,  10  East  211;  Frontine  v.  Frost,  3  B.  &  P.  302;  Williams 
v.  E.  India  Co.,  3  East  192.  See  also  Com.  v.  Stow,  1  Mass.  54;  Evans  v.  Birch, 
3  Campb.  10. 

8  Elkin  v.  Janson,  13  M.  &  W.  655 ;  }so  also  of  the  claim  that  the  policy-holder 
has  burnt  his  own  property  :  Tidmarsh  v.  Wash.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Mason  439  ;  Fiske 
v.  N.  E.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Pick.  310;  Murray  v.  N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  236; 
Heilman  v.  Lazarus,  90  id.  672.} 

*  Aitcheson  v.  Madock,  Peake's  Gas.  162.     An  exception  to  this  rule  is  admitted  in 
Chancery  in  the  case  of  attorney  and  client ;  it  being  a  rule  there,  that  if  the  attorney, 
retaining  the  connection,  contracts  with  his  client,  he  is  subject  to  the  bur'den  of  prov- 
ing that  no  advantage  has  been  taken  of  the  situation  of  the  latter:  1  Story  En.  Jur. 
§  311;  Gibson  v.  Jeyes,  6  Ves.  278;  Cane  v.  Ld.  Allen,  2  Dow  289,  294,  299 ;  [Tor  the 
case  of  this  presumption,  see  ante,  §  43  «.] 

1  Borthwick  v.  Carruthers,  1  T.  R.  648. 

2  Case  of  the  Banbury  Peerage,  2  Selw.  N.  P.  (by  Wheaton)  558  ;  Morris  v.  Daries, 
3  C.  &  P.  215,  427. 

8  Attorney-General ».  Parnther,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  441,  443,  per  Lord  Thurlow  ;  cited  with 
approbation  in  White  v.  Wilson,  13  Ves.  87,  88;  Hoge  v.  Fisher,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  163; 
[see  further  §  81  a.] 

*  Throgmorton  v.  Walton,  2  Roll.  461;  Wilson  r.  Hodges,  2  East  313;  supra,  §  41. 
5  Crowley  v.  Page,  7  C.  &  P.  790 ;  Smith  t».  Davies,  ib.  307  ;  Clarke  v.  Spencc,  10 

Watts  335;  Story  on  Bailm.  §§  454,  457,  n.  (3d  ed.)  ;  Blind  v.  Dale,  8  C.  &  P.  207. 
See  further,  as  to  the  right  to  begin,  and,  of  course,  the  burden  of  proof,  Pontifex  ». 
Jolly,  9  C.  &  P.  202 ;  Harnett  r.  Johnson,  ib.  206 ;  Aston  v.  Perkes,  ib.  231 ;  Osborn 
v.  Thompson,  ib.  337 ;  Bingham  v.  Stanley,  ib.  374 ;  Lambert  v.  Hale,  ib.  506 ;  Lees 
v.  Hoffstadt,  ib.  599  ;  Chapman  v.  Emden,  ib.  712 ;  Doe  v.  Rowlands,  ib.  734 ;  Ridg- 
way  v.  Ewbank,  2  Moo.  &  R.  217  ;  Hudson  v.  Brown,  8  C.  &  P.  774 ;  Soward  v.  Leg- 
gett,  7  id.  613;  Bowles  v.  Neale,  ib.  262;  Richardson  v.  Fell,  4  Dowl.  10;  Silk  t;. 
Humphery,  7  C.  &  P.  14. 

8  ("Contributory  negligence  is  generally  treated  as  in  the  nature  of  an  excuse  to  be 
alleged  and  proved  by  the  defendant :  j  Holt  v.  Whatley,  51  Ala.  569  ;  }  South.  P.  R. 


156  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   ?L 

ing  faint  traces  of  a  stamp  of  some  kind;7  or  where  a  failure  of 
consideration  is  set  up  by  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  to  recover  the 
money  paid ; 8  or  where  the  action  is  founded  on  a  deficiency  in 
the  quantity  of  land  sold,  and  the  defendant  alleges,  in  a  special  plea, 
that  there  was  no  deficiency ; 9  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  party 
making  the  allegation,  notwithstanding  its  negative  character. 

§  81  a.  Sanity.  [(1)  In  proving  the  commission  of  a  crime,  the 
criminal  intent  being  material,  the  accused's  sanity  is,  by  the  ortho- 
dox view,  a  part  of  the  case  of  the  prosecution ;  and  the  burden  of 
proving  it,  in  the  sense  of  the  risk  of  non-persuasion,  is  on  the  prose- 
cution ;  the  measure  of  persuasion  required  being,  as  other  elements 
of  a  crime,  persuasion  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt ;  and,  as  an  incident 
of  this  view,  the  general  presumption  of  sanity  suffices  for  the  prose- 
cution's duty  to  produce  evidence,  and  the  duty  of  producing  evidence 
of  insanity  is  thrown  upon  the  accused.1  A  variation  of  this  view, 
held  by  a  few  Courts,  fixes  a  mere  preponderance  of  evidence  as  the 

Co.  v.  Tomlinson,  Ariz.,  33  Pac.  710 ;  {Sanders  v.  Reister,  1  Dak.  151  ;  }  Augusta  v. 
Hudson,  88  Ga.  599,  606 ;  Bait.  Traction  Co.  r.  Appel,  80  Md.  603  ;  Lillstrom  v.  R. 
Co.,  53  Minn.  464;  Union  S.  Co.  v.  Conoyer,  41  Nebr.  617;  Onverson  v.  Grafton, 
5  N.  D.  281  ;  Baker  v.  Gas  Co.,  157  Pa.  593  ;  Stewart  v.  Nashville,  96  Teim.  50  ;  Gulf 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Schieder,  88  Tex.  152  ;  Tex.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Volk,  151  U.  S.  73  ; 
Wash.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Tobriner,  147  id.  571 ;  {Snyderr.  R.  Co.,  11  W.  Va.  14  ;}  Welsh 
v.  Argyle,  85  Wis.  307. 

Contra,  regarding  it  as  a  part  of  the  plaintiffs  case :  North  Chic.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Louis, 
138  111.  9;  Engrer  v.  R.  Co.,  142  Ind.  618  ;  jBenton  v.  R.  Co.,  42  la.  192  ;  Lane  v. 
Crombie,  12  Pick.  177;  Murphy  v.  Deane,  101  Mass.  455  ;}  The  Charles  L.  Jeffrey, 
5  17.  S.  App.  370  (for  admiralty  cases). 

In  Texas  there  are  two  so-called  exceptions  to  the  rule:  G.  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  ». 
Schieder,  supra.  In  Georgia  the  plaintiff  has  the  burden  of  showing  "  either  that  he 
was  not  to  blame  or  that  the  company  was,"  but  this  doctrine  may  refer  only  to  the 
shifting  of  the  duty  of  producing  evidence  :  R.  Co.  v.  Kenney,  58  Ga.  489  ;  Johnston 
».  R.  Co.,  95  id.  685.] 

7  Doe  v.  Coombs,  3  Q.  B.  687. 

8  Treat  v.  Orono,  13  Shepl.  217. 

»  McCrea  v.  Marshall,  1  La.  An.  29. 

jln  actions  upon  promissory  notes  or  bills  of  exchange,  if  it  be  shown  that  the}'  were 
stolen,  or  otherwise  fraudulently  put  in  circulation,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  holder 
to  show  that  he  took  them  in  good  faith :  Monroe  v.  Cooper,  5  Pick.  412 ;  Worcester 
Co.  Bank  v.  Dorchester,  etc.  Bank,  10  Cush.  488,  491;  Wyerr.  Dorchester,  etc.  Bank, 
11  id.  52;  Bissell  v.  Morgan,  ib.  198;  Fabena  v.  Tirrill,  15  Law  Rep.  44;  Perrin  v. 
Noyes,  39  Me.  384;  Goodman  v.  Harvey,  4  Ad.  &  El.  870  ;  Arbonin  v.  Anderson,  1  Q.  B. 
504.  But  where  the  action  is  by  the  holder  of  a  bank-bill,  and  the  defendant  proves  it 
to  have  been  stolen,  the  plaintiff  is  not  bound  to  show  how  he  came  by  the  bill,  to 
enable  him  to  recover  upon  it,  but  the  defendant,  to  defeat  the  plaintiff's  right  to  re- 
cover upon  it,  must  show  that  he  received  it  under  such  circumstances  as  to  prevent 
the  maintenance  of  this  action  :  Wyer  v.  Dorchester,  etc.  Bank,  supra ;  Solomons  v. 
Bank  of  England,  13  East  135,  n. ;  De  la  Chaumette  v.  Bank  of  England,  2  B.  &  Ad. 
385  ;  see  post,  Vol.  II,  §  172.  When  goods  are  obtained  from  their  owner  by  fraud,  the 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  one  who  claims  under  the  fraudulent  purchaser  to  show  that  he 
is  a  bonajide  purchaser  for  value:  Haskins  v.  Warren,  115  Mass.  514. ( 

1  QJones  v.  People,  23  Colo.  276  ;  State  v.  Lee,  69  Conn.  186  ;  Armstrong  v.  State, 
30  Fla.  170,  196;  {Hoppsu.  People,  31  111.  385  ;(  Hornish  v.  People,  142  id.  620; 
j  State  v.  Crawford,  11  Kan.  32  ;  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9  ;  Cunningham  v.  State, 
56  Miss.  269  ;  Com.  v.  Pomeroy,  117  Mass.  143  ;}  Faulkner  v.  Terr.,  6  N.  M.  464  ; 
jState  v.  Pike,  49  N.  H.  399  ;  State  v.  Jones,  50  id.  370  ;(  Nino  v.  People,  N.  Y.,  43 
N.  E.  853;  Davis  v.  U.  S.,  160  U.  S.  469  ;  State  v.  Wilner,  40  Wis.  304;  see  post, 
VoL  III,  §  5,  and  a  note  in  23  Am.  L.  Reg.  N.  s.  21,  for  other  cases.] 


§§  81-81  b.]    SANITY;  CRIMINAL  CASES;  SELF-DEFENCE.  157 

measure  of  persuasion  required,  instead  of  persuasion  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt.2  But  another  view,  based  on  judicial  experience  in 
dealing  with  the  issue  of  insanity  in  criminal  trials,  and  adopted  by 
an  increasing  number  of  Courts,  is  that  the  accused  has  the  burden 
of  proving  insanity,  in  the  sense  that  he  has  the  risk  of  persuading 
the  jury  to  that  effect  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence,  and  also,  of 
course,  of  producing  evidence.8] 

(2)  {Where  insanity  is  relied  on  as  a  defence  to  an  action  on  a 
contract,  it  is  treated  as  a  plea  in  confession  and  avoidance,  and  the 
burden  of  proof  is  said  to  be  on  the  party  who  alleges  the  insanity ;  * 
and  in  general,  when  the  question  of  sanity  comes  up  in  a  civil  case, 
the  burden  of  proof  as  to  sanity  is  upon  the  party  for  whose  case  the 
allegation  is  regarded  as  necessary  ;  thus,  if  the  guardian  of  an  insane 
person  brings  an  action  to  recover  the  proceeds  of  a  mortgage  and 
note,  which  was  assigned  by  the  insane  person  while  he  was  insane, 
the  guardian  must  allege  such  insanity,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is 
on  him.6} 

(3)  [The  burden  of  proof  as  to  a  testator's  sanity  has  been  already 
referred  to  (ante,  §  77).] 

§  81  b.  Criminal  Cases ;  Alibi ;  Self-defence  ;  etc.  [It  is  gener- 
ally said  that  in  criminal  prosecutions  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the 
prosecution  for  all  the  facts  that  are  material  to  the  crime,  so  that, 
whether  or  not  a  particular  fact  is  one  which  would  in  a  civil  action 
be  of  the  nature  of  an  affirmative  excuse,  it  is  nevertheless  in  a  crim- 
inal prosecution  a  part  of  the  case  to  be  proved  by  the  prosecution.1 
The  absence  of  any  affirmative  pleadings  by  the  accused,  and  the  gen- 
eral policy  of  caution  in  favor  of  accused  persons,  seem  to  have  been 
the  theoretical  and  practical  reasons  for  this  result.  Nevertheless, 
some  inroads  have  of  recent  times  been  made  upon  this  orthodox 
principle,  and  in  many  jurisdictions  it  is  accepted  that  the  burden  of 
proof  may  for  certain  sorts  of  facts  be  upon  the  accused.2  The  ab- 
sence of  affirmative  pleadings  in  defence  is  no  insuperable  objection 

8  rE.  g.  in  New  York.] 

8  [People  v.  Allender,  Cal.,  48  Pac.  1014  ;  Phelps  r.  Com.,  Ky.,  32  S.  W.  470  ;  State 
r.  Scott,  La.  An.,  21  So.  271  ;  Clawson  v.  State,  59  N.  J.  L.  434  ;  Kelch  v.  State,  55  Oh. 
St.  146  ;  Lynch  v.  Com.,  77  Pa.  205  ;  Com.  v.  Berchme,  id.,  32  Atl.  110  ;  King  v.  State, 
91  Tenn.  617,  647.] 

*  j  Brown  v.  Brown,  39  Mich.  792.  But  cf.  Myatt  v.  Walker,  44  111.  485  ;  Weed  v. 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  561 ;  Anderson  v.  Cramer,  11  W.  Va.  562  ;  Jarrett  v. 
Jan-ett,  ib.  584  ;  Titlow  v.  Titlow,  54  Pa.  St.  216  ;  Ripley  v.  Babcock,  13  Wis.  425  ; 
Walcott  v.  Alleyn,  Milw.  EC.  R.  (Ir.)  69  ;  White  v.  Wilson,  13  Yes.  87  ;  Perkins  v. 
Perkins,  39  N.  H.  163  ;}  [so  for  a  deed :  see  Buckey  v.  Buckey,  38  W.  Va.  168  ;  Taylor 
v.  Buttrick,  165  Mass.  547.] 

6  |  Wright  v.  Wright,  139  Mass.  177.] 

1  {People  v.  McCann,  16  N.  Y.  58  ;  Stokes  ».  People,  53  id.  164  ;    Brotherton  v. 
People,  75  id.  159;  O'Connell  v.  People,  87  id.  377;    People  v.  Riordan,  117  id.  73  ; 
People  v.  Downs,  123  id.  564  ;  Turner  v.  Com.,  86  Pa.  54,  74  ;    Tiffany  v.  Com.,  121 
id.  179  ;  Lilienthal  v.  IT.  S.,  97  U.  S.  266  ;}  fJState  v.  Shea,  104  la.  724  :  King  v.  State, 
74  Miss.  576  ;  Gravely  v.  State,  38  Nebr.  871  ;  Davis  v.  State,  id.,  74  N.  W.  599 ;  see 
post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  29,  30.] 

2  £lt  must  be  remembered  that  the  Court's  language  may  perhaps  in  some  instances 
really  mean  only  the  duty  of  producing  evidence.] 


158  BURDEN   OF  PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.   VI. 

to  such  a  result ;  and  the  judicial  experience  with  certain  issues  on 
such  trials  has  seemed  to  these  Courts  to  justify  such  exceptions ; 
and  the  fixing  of  a  particular  fact  on  this  or  that  party  as  a  part  of 
his  case  is  in  general  only  a  question  of  sound  policy  as  based  on 
experience  (ante,  §  14  x). 

(1)  A  few  Courts  seein  in  general  to  place  on  the  accused  the  burden 
of  proving  any  fact  in  the  nature  of  excuse  or  mitigation.*  (2)  A  few 
Courts  seem  to  place  upon  the  accused  the  burden  of  showing  that  he 
acted  in  self-defence.*  (3)  It  is  generally  conceded  that  the  accused 
does  not  have  the  burden  of  proving  an  alibi.6  (4)  The  disposition 
of  the  burden  of  proof  as  to  sanity  has  been  already  referred  to  (ante, 
§  81  a).-] 

§  81  c.  Measure  of  Persuasion  ;  Proof  beyond  a  Reasonable  Doubt. 
[The  logical  notion  involved  in  the  term  "  burden  of  proof  "  signifies 
that  the  tribunal  must  be  persuaded  to  believe  the  affirmation  of  the 
burden-bearer  before  it  can  be  asked  to  act  as  desired.  But  this  per- 
suasion or  conviction  in  the  mind  of  the  tribunal  may  have  more 
than  one  degree  or  quality  of  positiveness ;  and  an  attempt  is  made 
by  the  law  to  define  the  degree  of  positiveness  of  persuasion  which 
must  exist  in  order  to  justify  action  in  the  shape  of  a  verdict  for 
the  burden-bearer.  The  attempt  to  define  these  qualities  of  persuasion 
has  great  difficulties ;  and  many  useless  refinements  and  wordy  quibbles 
have  marked  the  countless  and  more  or  less  unsuccessful  attempts. 

In  criminal  cases  a  rule  has  grown  up  that  the  persuasion  must  be 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  This  distinction  seems  to  have  had  its 
Origin  no  earlier  than  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  to  have 
been  applied  at  first  only  in  capital  cases,  and  by  no  means  in  a 
fixed  phrase,  but  in  various  tentative  forms.  "  A  clear  impression," 
"  upon  clear  grounds,"  "  satisfied,"  are  the  earlier  phrases  ;  and  then 
"  rational  doubt,"  "  rational  and  well-grounded  doubt,"  "  beyond  the 
probability  of  doubt,"  and  "reasonable  doubt"  come  into  use.  Then, 
in  Mr.  Starkie's  classical  treatise,  "  moral  certainty,  to  the  exclusion  of 
all  reasonable  doubt,"  is  given  vogue.1  From  time  to  time,  various  ill- 
judged  efforts  have  been  made  to  define  more  in  detail  this  elusive 

8  [Bee  Appleton  v.  People,  111.,  49  N.  E.  708  (under  R.  S.  c.  38,  §  155);  State  v. 
Byrd,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  353;  Com.  v.  Mika,  171  Pa.  273.  But  see  the  suggestion  in 
the  preceding  note;  also  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  29,  30.] 

*  QSee  Roden  v.  State,  97  Ala.  54 ;  Boulden  «>.  State,  102  id.  78,  83  (hut  compare 
Scheerer  v.  Agee,  113  id.  383)  ;  State  v.  Barringer,  114  N.  C.  840  ;  Meyers  v.  Com., 
90  Va.  705  ;  State  v.  Jones,  20  W.  Va.  764  (but  compare  State?).  Zeigler,  40  id.  593).] 

6  [Pickens  v.  State,  115  Aln.  42;  Schultz  v.  Terr.,  Ariz.,  52  Pac.  352;  McNamara 
v.  People,  Colo.,  48  Pac.  541 ;  State  v.  Ardvin,  49  La.  An.  1145  ;  State  v.  Harvey,  131 
Mo.  339  ;  Peyton  v.  State,  Nehr.,  74  N.  W.  597  ;  Borrego  v.  Terr.,  N.  M.,  46  Pac. 
349 ;  Wright  o.  Terr.,  Okl.,  47  Pac.  1069 ;  State  v.  Thurston,  S.  D.,  73  N.  W.  196  ;] 
jCom.  v.  Choate,  105  Mass.  452  ;  Binns  ».  State,  46  Ind.  311  ;  Kaufman  v.  State,  49 
id.  248  ;  Rudy  v.  Com.,  128  Pa.  507  ;  People  v.  Stone,  117  N.  Y.  484 ;  State  v.  Sut- 
ton,  70  Iowa  268  ;  State  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  192 ;  State  v.  Cameron,  40  id.  555  ;  State  v. 
Kline,  54  Iowa  183  ;  State  v.  Reitz,  83  N.  C.  634  ;  People  v.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  64  CaL 
253  :  State  v.  Reed,  62  Iowa  40  ;  contra,  Waters  v.  State,  39  Oh.  St.  215.  | 

1  £For  the  historical  data  above  summarized,  see  an  article  by  Judge  May  of 
Boston  iu  10  Amer.  Law  Review  642,  656.] 


§§  81  £-81  C.]    MEASURE  OF  PERSUASION;   PROOF  BEYOND  DOUBT.   -159 

and  undefinable  state  of  mind.  One  that  has  received  frequent  sanc- 
tion and  has  been  quoted  innumerable  times  is  that  of  Chief  Justice 
Shaw  of  Massachusetts,  on  the  trial  of  Dr.  Webster  for  the  murder 
of  Mr.  Parkman : 2  "It  is  that  state  of  the  case,  which,  after  the 
entire  comparison  and  consideration  of  all  the  evidence,  leaves  the 
minds  of  jurors  in  that  condition  that  they  cannot  say  they  feel 
an  abiding  conviction,  to  a  moral  certainty,  of  the  truth  of  the 
charge.  .  .  .  The  evidence  must  establish  the  truth  of  the  fact  to  a 
reasonable  and  moral  certainty,  —  a  certainty  that  convinces  and 
directs  the  understanding,  and  satisfies  the  reason  and  judgment.  .  .  . 
This  we  take  to  be  proof  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt." 

Many  others,  in  varying  forms,  convey  the  same  notion  in  more 
or  less  well-chosen  words;  and  each  Court  has  its  stores  of  prece- 
dents of  instructions  approved  and  disapproved.8  Nevertheless, 

2  [Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Gush.  302.]  {Others  are  as  follows :  Gray,  C.  J.,  in  Com. 
v.  Costley,  118  Mass.  1  ;  "  Proof  'beyond  a  reasonable  doubt"  is  not  beyond  all  pos- 
sible or  imaginary  doubt,  but  such  proof  as  precludes  every  reasonable  hypothesis, 
except  that  which  it  tends  to  support.  It  is  proof  to  a  '  moral  certainty,'  as  dis- 
tinguished from  an  absolute  certainty.  As  applied  to  a  judicial  trial  for  crime,  the 
two  phrases  are  synonymous  and  equivalent,  each  has  been  used  by  eminent  judges  to 
explain  the  other,  and  each  signifies  such  proof  as  satisfies  the  judgment  and  con- 
sciences of  the  jury,  as  reasonable  men,  and  applying  their  reason  to  the  evidence 
before  them,  that  the  crime  charged  has  been  committed  by  the  defendant,  and  so 
satisfies  them  as  to  leave  no  other  reasonable  conclusion  possible ; "  Pollock,  C.  B., 
adopting  Lord  Tenterden's  words,  in  K.  v.  Kohl,  London  Times,  Jan.  12,  1865: 
"  Tnere  was  no  doubt  that  it  had  been  said  that  there  ought  to  be  certainty  ;  there 
ought  to  be  the  highest  certainty  that  there  was  in  human  affairs  ;  and  the  rule  that 
Lord  Tenterden  laid  down  was  this,  and  I  pronounce  it  in  his  very  words  :  'The  jury 
should  be  persuaded  of  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  before  they  find  him  guilty  to  the 
same  extent,  and  with  the  same  certainty,  that  they  would  have  in  the  transaction  of 
their  own  most  important  concerns.  They  ought  to  have  the  highest  practicable  degree 
of  certainty  :  demonstration  was  not  required,  nor  was  absolute  certainty  ;  for  that  was 
not  attainable  in  any  case  whatever.  Direct  testimony  might  be  always  got  rid  of  by 
the  suggestion  that  the  witnesses  were  perjured  ;  and  they  never  could  have  absolute, 
positive  certainty.  It  was  idle  to  speculate  as  to  what  might  be  to  one  man  the  most 
important  matter  in  his  life  ;  but  there  were  occasions,  —  with  reference,  for  instance, 
to  the  deepest  interests  of  those  whom  one  loved  most  dearly  ;  there  were  interests 
that  might  be  called  in  question  to  require  the  highest  consideration,  and  all  the  cer- 
tainty that  could  be  attained  in  human  affairs.  He  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  say 
certainty  as  to  this  or  that  particular  matter  ;  but  it  was  the  certainty  men  would  re- 
quire in  their  own  most  important  concerns  in  life :  and  he  thought  that  to  hold  any 
other  doctrine,  or  to  act  on  any  other  view,  would  be  to  paralyze  the  law  entirely  in 
its  criminal  application,  and  to  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  have  a  satisfac- 
tory administration  of  justice.'  "| 

8  A  few  precedents  from  the  various  jurisdictions  are  here  given  :  jMickle  v.  State, 
27  Ala.  20  ;  Tuberville  v.  State,  40  id.  715  ;  McAlpine  r.  State,  47  id.  78  ;  Faulk  v.  State, 
52  id.  515  ;|  [Crawford  „.  State,  id.,  21  So.  214  ;  Walker  v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  149  ; 
Jones  v.  State,  Ark.,  32  S.  W.  81  ;]  {People  v.  Ash,  44  Cal.  288 ;(  [People  „.  Ash- 
mead,  id.,  50  Pac.  681  ;  Boykin  v.  People,  Colo.,  45  Pac.  419 ;  Gantling  v.  State, 
Fla.,  23  So.  857  ;]  jCook  v.  State,  11  Ga.  53  ;  O'Neil  v.  State,  48  Ga.  66  ;|  ["Camp- 
bell v.  State,  id.,  28  S.  E.  71  ;]  {Earll  v.  People,  73  111.  329  :|  [Spalding  v.  People, 
id.,  49  N.  E.  993  ;  Reynolds  t>.  State,  Ind.,  46  N.  E.  31  ;]  | Beavers  v.  State,  58  id. 
530  ;  State  v.  Maxwell,  42  la.  208  ;  State  ».  Porter,  34  id.  131  :(  [State  v.  Marshall, 
id.,  74  N.  W.  763  ;  Stevens  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  45  S.  W.  76  ;  State  v.  Bazile,  58  La.  An., 
23  So.  8  ;]  { People  v.  Finley,  38  Mich.  482  ;|  [Davis  ».  State,  Minn.,  70  N.  W.  894  Q 
jAlghieri  v.  State,  2n  Miss.  584  ;  James  v.  State,  45  id.  572  ;  Browning  v.  State,  33 
id.  47  ;|  [Lipscomb  v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  210  ;  State  v.  Duncan,  Mo.,  44  S.  W.  263  ;j 
{Terr.  v.  Owings,  3  Mont.  137;}  [State  v.  Clancv,  id.,  52  Pac.  267;  Morgan  v.  State, 
Nebr..  71  N.  W.  788;  Whitney  v.  State,  id.,  73  N.  W.  696  :  Terr.  v.  Padilla,  N.  M., 


160  BURDEN   OF   PROOF,   AND   PRESUMPTIONS.  [CH.    VI, 

when  anything  more  than  a  simple  caution  and  a  brief  definition  is 
given,  the  matter  tends  to  become  one  of  mere  words,  and  the  actual 
effect  upon  the  jury,  instead  of  being  enlightenment,  is  rather  confu- 
sion, or,  at  the  least,  unprofitable  incomprehension.  In  practice,  these 
detailed  amplifications  of  the  doctrine  have  usually  degenerated  into 
a  mere  tool  for  counsel  who  desire  to  entrap  an  unwary  judge  into 
forgetfulness  of  some  obscure  precedent,  or  at  least  to  save  a  cause 
for  a  new  trial  by  quibbling  upon  an  appeal  over  the  verbal  impro- 
priety of  a  form  of  words  uttered  by  the  judge  or  the  propriety  of 
a  form  of  words  which  he  declines  to  utter.  "  No  man  can  measure 
with  a  rule  he  does  not  understand ;  neither  can  juries  determine 
by  rules  obscure  in  themselves  and  made  yet  more  obscure  by 
attempted  definition."  4  The  effort  to  perpetuate  and  develop  these 
unserviceable  definitions  is  a  useless  one,  and  serves  to-day  chiefly  to 
aid  the  purposes  of  the  unscrupulous.  It  should  be  wholly  abandoned.] 

§  81  d.  Same :  Proof  by  Preponderance  of  Evidence.  [In  civil 
cases  it  should  be  enough  to  say  that  the  extreme  caution  and  the 
unusual  positiveness  of  persuasion  required  in  criminal  cases  does 
not  obtain.  But  it  is  customary  to  go  further,  and  here  also  to 
attempt  to  define  in  words  the  quality  of  persuasion  necessary.  It 
is  said  to  be  that  state  of  mind  in  which  there  is  seen  to  be  a  "  pre- 
ponderance of  evidence"  in  favor  of  the  demandant's  proposition. 
Here,  too,  moreover,  this  simple  and  suggestive  phrase  has  not  been 
allowed  to  suffice;  and  in  many  precedents  sundry  other  phrases 
—  "  satisfied,"  "  convinced,"  and  the  like  —  have  been  put  forward 
as  equivalents  and  their  propriety  as  a  form  of  words  discussed 
and  sanctioned  or  disapproved.1 

But  the  chief  topic  of  controversy  has  been  whether  in  certain 
civil  cases  the  measure  of  persuasion  for  criminal  cases  should  be 
applied.  Policy  suggests  that  the  latter  test  should  be  strictly  con- 
fined to  its  original  field,  and  that  there  ought  to  be  no  attempt  to 
employ  it  in  any  civil  case.2  Nevertheless,  the  effort  has  been  made 

46  Pac.  346 ;  People  v.  Barker,  N.  Y.,  47  N.  E.  31  Q  {Com.  v.  Carey,  2  Brewst.  404  ; 
Cora.  v.  Harman,  4  Pa.  St.  269  ;{  [State  v.  Aughtry,  S.  C.,  26  S.  E.  619  ;]  JU.  S. 
».  Foulke,  6  McLean  349  ;  Miles  v.  U.  S.,  103  U.  S.  304  ;}  [Isaac  v.  U.  S.,  159 
U.  S.  487;  State  v.  Gushing,  Wash.,  50  Pac.  412  ;  Emery  v.  State,  Wis.,  65  N.  W.848. 

It  is  generally  said  that  the  doctrine  does  not  apply  to  specific  evidentiary  or  sub' 
ordiiiate  facts,  but  only  to  the  general  proposition  of  guilt :  Jamison  v.  People,  145 
III.  357,  380  ;  Williams  v.  People,  id.,  46  N.  E.  749  ;  Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  Ind.  334  ; 
fctate  v.  Glenn,  Mont.,  41  Pac.  998  ;  Morgan  v.  State,  51  Nebr.  672 Q  {but  see  People 
v.  Ah  Chung,  54  Gal.  398  ;  Com.  o.  Doherty,  137  Mass.  245.  | 

{For  the  weight  to  be  given  to  circumstantial  evidence,  see  Stephen,  General  View 
of  the  Criminal  Law,  249  ;  Rea  v.  State,  8  Lea  356  ;  State  v.  Norwood,  74  N.  C.  247  ; 
People  v.  Morrow,  9  Pac.  C.  L.  J.  99  ;  Bowie  v.  Maddox,  29  Ga.  285 ;  Ridley  v. 
Ridley,  1  Coldw.  323  ;  Deland  v.  Bank,  111  111.  327;  Belhaven  &  Stenton  Peerage, 
L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  278  ;  Com.  v.  Read,  Me.,  1  Cent.  L.  J.  219. | 

4  £From  the  article  above  cited  ;  see  its  pages  for  some  just  remarks  upon  the  doc- 
trine in  general.] 

1  [E.  g.  Murphy  v.  Waterhouse,  Cal.,  45  Pac.  866  ;  French  v.  Day,  Me.,  36  Atl. 
908  ;  Moore  v.  Stone,  Tex.  Civ.  App.,  36  S.  W.  909 ;  Sigafus  v.  Porter,  U.  S.  App., 
84  F«-d.  430J 

a  [See  the  article  in  the  American  Law  Review,  above  referred  to.] 


§§81c-81  J.]      PEOOF   BY   PREPONDERANCE   OF   EVIDENCE.  161 

(though  usually  without  success)  to  introduce  it  in  certain  sorts  of 
civil  cases  where  an  analogy  seems  to  obtain.  (1)  It  is  sometimes 
said  that,  in  general,  wherever  in  a  civil  case  a  criminal  act  is 
charged  as  a  part  of  the  cases  the  rule  for  criminal  cases  should 
apply  ; 8  but  this  has  been  generally  repudiated.*  (2)  Nor  is  such  a 
doctrine  better  established  for  individual  kinds  of  cases.  It  does 
not  apply  to  an  action  for  a  statutory  penalty ; 6  nor  to  a  plea  of 
truth  to  an  action  for  a  defamatory  charge  of  crime  ; 6  nor  to  a  plea 
of  arson  by  the  insurer  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  fire  insurance ; 7 
nor  in  an  action  for  support  charging  the  defendant  as  the  father 
of  a  bastard ; 8  nor  in  an  action  for  seduction,9  nor  a  proceeding  for 
divorce  on  the  ground  of  adultery ; 10  nor  in  an  action  involving  a 
charge  of  fraud ; u  nor  in  proceedings  for  contempt.12  But  such  a 
standard,  or  its  equivalent,  is  applied  to  measure  the  proof  of  the 
existence  and  contents  of  a  lost  will,18  and  of  mutual  mistake  as 
ground  for  reformation  of  an  instrument.14] 

8  Q£*.  g.  Illinois  cases  cited  in  Grimes  v.  Hilliary,  150  111.  141,  146  ;]  {see  also  Bar- 
ton v.  Thompson,  46  la.  30  ;  Mott  v.  Dawson,  ib.  533 ;  Polston  v.  See,  54  Mo.  291. } 

*  j  Ellis  v.  Burrell,  60  Me.  209  ;  Weston  v.  Gravliu,  49  Vt.  507;  Munson  v.  Atwood, 
80  Conn.  102  ;  Mead  v.  Husted,  52  id.  56  ;  Jones  v.  Greaves,  26  Oh.  St.  2 ;  Rob- 
inson v.  Randall,  82  111.  521;  Bissell  v.  West,  35  Ind.  54;  Schmidt  v.  New  York, 
etc.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Gray  529  ;  Gordon  v.  Parmelee,  15  id.  413  ;  Burr  v.  Willson,  22  Minn. 
206  ;  New  York  &  B.  F.  Co.  v.  Moore,  102  N.  Y.  667  ;  Sprague  v.  Dodge,  95  Am. 
Dec.  525,  and  note;}  [[Nebraska  N.  B'k  v.  Johnson,  51  Nebr.  546  ;  Brown  v.  Tourte- 
lotte,  Colo.,  50  Pac.  195 ;  see  the  doctrine  criticised  in  10  Amer.  L.  Rev.  642.] 

6  {People  v.  Briggs,  114  N.  Y.64  ;  O'Connell  v.  O'Leary,  145  Mass.  311 ;  Koberge 
v.  Burnham,  124  id.  312  ;{  fjSparta  v.  Lewis,  91  Tenn.  370  ;  contra:  U.  S.  v.  Shap- 
leigh,  54  Fed.  126.] 

6  £Hearne  v.  De  Young,  119  Cal.  670  ;  Atlanta  Journal  o.  Mayson,  92  Ga.  640  ; 
Ellis  f.  Bnrrell,  60  Me.  207  (leading  case)  ;]  {Matthews  v.  Huntley,  9  N.  H.  150  ; 
Folsom  v.  Brown,  25  id.  114 ;  Gordon  v.  Parmelee,  15  Gray  413  ;  Kincade  v.  Brad- 
ehaw,  3  Hawks  63.  ( 

[Contra :  Ellis  v.  Lindley,  38  la.  461 ;  Tucker  v.  Call,  45  Ind.  31  ;  Polston  v.  See,  54 
Mo.  291.  The  supposed  doctrine  contra  is  rested  on  Chalmers  v.  Shackell,  6  C.  &  P. 
475  ;  Willmett  v.  Harmer,  8  id.  695  ;  Neeley  v.  Lock,  ib.  ;  Gants  v.  Viuard,  1  Smith 
Ind.  287 ;  Shortley  v.  Miller,  ib.  395  ;  see  these  criticised  in  10  Amer.  L.  Rev.  642.] 

'  [[Blackburn  v.  Ins.  Co.,  116  N.  C.  821  ;  First  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Assur.  Co.,  Or.,  52 
Pac.  1050  (these  two  citing  some  fifty  cases) ;[]  {Mutual  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Usaw,  112  Pa.  89  ; 
Marshall  v.  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mo.  586  (leading  case)  ;  Schmidt  ».  Ins.  Co.,  1  Gray  529  ; 
Wash.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  7  Wis.  169  ;  Wightman  v.  Ins.  Co.,  8  Rob.  442  ;  Hoff- 
man v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  La.  An.  216 ;  Scott  v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Dill.  C.  C.  105 ;  Howell  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  3  Ins.  L.  J.  653.  f 

£A  supposed  doctrine  contra  is  rested  on  Thurtell  v.  Beaumont,  1  Bing.  339  ;  and 
is  accepted  in  Darling  v.  Banks,  14  111.  46  ;  McConnells  v.  Ins.  Co.,  18  id.  228; 
Shultz  y.  Ins.  Co.,  Fla.,  1  Ins.  L.  J.  495  ;  see  these  criticised  in  10  Amer.  L.  Rev.  642. 

In  some  of  the  cases  in  the  first  list  above,  it  is  sometimes  said  that  the  presump- 
tion of  innocence  applies  ;  as  to  this,  see  ante,  §§  34,  35.] 

8  {Knowles  v.  Scribner,  57  Me.  495  (leading  case) ;  Overlook  v.  Hall,  81  id.  348  ; 
People  v.  Christman,  66  111.  162;  Miller  v.  State,  110  Ala.  69 ;  Williams  v.  State,  113 
id.  58;  State  v.  Bunker,  7  S.  D.  639;  Davison  v.  Cruse,  47  Nebr.  829 ;{    QDukehart 
v.  Caughman,  36  id.  412.]     \Contra:  State  v.  Rogers,  119  N.  C.  793. ( 

9  ["Nelson  v.  Price,  18  R.  I.  539.] 
l°  [Lindley  v.  Lindley,  68  Vt.  421.] 

11  LNelms  v.  Steiner.l  13  Ala.  562;  and  some  of  the  cases  in  note  4,  supra.  Contra:  Kan- 
fias  M.  0.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rammelsberg,  58  Kan.  531 ;  Lalone  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.,  17  Sup.  74.] 
"  TDrakeford  v.  Adams,  98  Ga.  722.] 

»  rShelburne  v.  Jachiquin,  1  Bro.  Ch.  C.  338  ;  Fudge  v.  Payne,  86  Va.  306.] 
"  LDnvis  v.  Sigourney,  8  Met.  487.] 
VOL.    I.  — 11 


162 


LAW   AND   FACT  J    JUDGE   AND   JURY. 


[CH.  VII. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

LAW  AND  FACT  J  JUDGE  AND  JURY.1 


§  81  e.   Admissibility  of  Evidence. 
§  81 /.    Questions   of   Fact   sometimes 
determined  by  the  Judge. 


§  81  g.   Questions  of  Law   sometimes 
determined  by  the  Jury. 


§  81  e  [49].  Admissibility  of  Evidence.  In  trials  of  fact,  without 
the  aid  of  a  jury,  the  question  of  the  admissibility  of  evidence,  strictly 
speaking,  can  seldom  be  raised ;  since,  whatever  be  the  ground  of  ob- 
jection, the  evidence  objected  to  must,  of  necessity,  be  read  or  heard 
by  the  judge,  in  order  to  determine  its  character  and  value.  In  such 
cases,  the  only  question,  in  effect,  is  upon  the  sufficiency  and  weight 
of  the  evidence.  But  in  trials  by  jury,  it  is  the  province  of  the  pre- 
siding judge  to  determine  all  questions  on  the  admissibility  of  evi- 
dence to  the  jury ;  as  well  as  to  instruct  them  in  the  rules  of  law,  by 
which  it  is  to  be  weighed.  Whether  there  be  any  evidence  or  not 
is  a  question  for  the  judge;  whether  it  is  sufficient  evidence  is  a 
question  for  the  jury.2  If  the  decision  of  the  question  of  admissi- 

1  rjOn  the  whole  subject  of  this  chapter,  the  reader  should  consult  the  acute  and 
masterly  historical  and  analytical  survey   by  Professor  Thayer,  in  his   Preliminary 
Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence,  ch.  5,  pp.  183-262;  or  his  "  Law  and  Fact  in  Jury 
Trials,"  4  Harv.  L.  Key.  147.] 

2  Per  Buller,  J.,  in  Carpenter  v.  Hay  ward,  Doug.  360.     fJHere,  however,  four  dis- 
tinct questions  must  be  kept  separate.    (« )  The  admissibility  of  a  given  piece  of  evidence 
is  for  the  judge  to  determine  ;  this  general  principle  is  not  disputed ;  for  its  application 
to  the  various  kinds  of  evidence  —  competency  of  witnesses,  absence  of  a  hearsay  declar- 
ant, voluntariness  of  a  confession,  mental  condition  of  a  dying  declarant,  etc.  —  see 
post,  passim,  under  the  various  heads  of  evidence.     It  follows  (of),  on  the  one  hand, 
that,  so  far  as  the  admissibility  in  law  depends  on  some  incidental  question  of  fact  — 
absence  of  a  deponent  from  the  jurisdiction,   threats  applied  to  obtain  a  confession, 
sanity  of  a  witness,  etc.,  —  this  also  is  for  the  judge  to  determine,  before  he  admits  the 
evidence  to  the  jury:  Bartlett  v.  Smith,  11  M.  &  \V.  483;  Doe  v.  Davies,  10  Q.  B. 
314,  323  ;  Gordon  v.  Hadsell,  9  Cush.  511  ;  Semple  v.  Gallery,  184  Pa.  95;  as  stated  in 
the  ensuing  sentence  of  the  text  above ;  and  («"),  on  the  other  hand,  that  in  certain 
kinds  of  evidence,  where  the  circumstances  do  not  suffice  to  make  the  evidence  inad- 
missible but  do  affect  its  weight  —  as  in  dying  declarations,  confessions,  partly  insane 
witnesses,  etc., —  the  jury  may  still,  after  considering  those  circumstances,  deny  to  the 
admitted  evidence  any  weight  and  in  effect  reject  it ;  here  some  uncertainty  of  judicial 
opinion  sometimes  occurs;  see  post,  under  the  various  kinds  of  evidence,     (b)  The 
weight  or  probative  value  of  admitted  evidence  is  for  the  jury,  in  the  sense  (b')  that 
there  are  no  rules  of  law  to  biiidthem  on  the  subject  (though  Courts  occasionally  attempt 
to  formulate  some ;  see  e.  g.  po.it,  §  162),  and   (&")  that  the  judge's  own  view  of  the 
weight  of  the  evidence  is  not  to  be  stated  to  the  jury  ;  though  this  rule  (which  obtains 
by  Constitution  or  statute  in  almost  every  State,  though  not  in  the  Federal  Courts : 
Vicksburg  R.  Co.  v.  Putnam,  118  U.  S.   545)  is  an  unfortunate  departure  from  the 
orthodox  common-law  rule,  and  has  done  much  to  introduce  fruitless  quibbles  and  to 
impair  the  general  efficacy  of  jury  trial  as  an  instrument  of  justice,     (c)  As  a  part  of  the 
rules  regulating  the  burden  of  proof,  the  party  on  whom  rests  for  tho  time  being  the 
duty  of  coining  forward  with  evidence  may  be  required  not  merely  to  offer  any  evideuc* 


§§  81  e-81/.]     QUESTIONS  OF  FACT  SOMETIMES  FOR  THE  JUDGE.      163 

bility  depends  on  the  decision  of  other  questions  of  fact,  such  as  the 
fact  of  interest,  for  example,  or  of  the  execution  of  a  deed,  these  pre- 
liminary questions  of  fact  are,  in  the  first  instance,  to  be  tried  by 
the  judge;  though  he  may,  at  his  discretion,  take  the  opinion  of  the 
jury  upon  them.  But  where  the  question  is  mixed,  consisting  of  law 
and  fact,  so  intimately  blended  as  not  to  be  easily  susceptible  of  sep- 
arate decision,  it  is  submitted  to  the  jury,  who  are  first  instructed  by 
the  judge  in  the  principles  and  rules  of  law  by  which  they  are  to  be 
governed  in  finding  a  verdict ;  and  these  instructions  they  are  bound 
to  follow.8  If  the  genuineness  of  a  deed  is  the  fact  in  question,  the 
preliminary  proof  of  its  execution,  given  before  the  judge,  does  not 
relieve  the  party  offering  it  from  the  necessity  of  proving  it  to  the 
jury.4  The  judge  only  decides  whether  there  is,  prima  facie,  any 
reason  for  sending  it  at  all  to  the  jury. 

§  81/1  Questions  of  Fact  sometimes  determined  by  the  Judge.  [It 
is  usually  said  that  questions  of  fact  are  for  the  jury;  or  in  the  Latin 
phrase  employed  by  Coke,1^!^  qucestionem  facti  non  respondent  judi- 
ces,  ad  qucBstionem  juris  non  respondent  juratores.  But  this  cannot  be 
taken  as  a  trustworthy  guide  to  the  solution  of  any  particular  contro- 
versy on  the  subject.  "  Courts  pass  upon  a  vast  number  of  questions 
of  fact  that  do  not  get  on  the  record  or  form  any  part  of  the  issue. 
Courts  existed  before  juries;  juries  came  in  to  perform  only  their 
own  special  office ;  and  the  Courts  have  always  continued  to  retain 
a  multitude  of  functions  which  they  exercised  before  ever  juries  were 
heard  of,  in  ascertaining  whether  disputed  things  be  true.  In  other 
words,  there  is  not,  and  never  was,  any  such  thing  in  jury  trials  as  an 
allotment  of  all  questions  of  fact  to  the  jury.  The  jury  simply  decides 
some  questions  of  fact.  .  .  .  The  allotment  to  the  jury  of  matters  of 
fact,  even  in  the  strict  sense  of  fact  which  is  in  issue,  is  not  exact. 
The  judges  have  always  answered  a  multitude  of  questions  of  ulti- 
mate fact,  or  facts  which  form  part  of  the  issue."  a  It  is  therefore 
of  little  service  to  seek  for  guidance  as  to  what  these  questions  are  by 
defining  "  law  "  and  "  fact ; "  8  the  inquiry  is  rather  as  to  the  kinds  of 

whatever  but  a  sufficient  amount  to  be  worth  considering,  before  he  is  regarded  as  satis- 
fying this  rule  ;  in  other  words,  he  cannot  go  to  the  jury  unless  his  evidence  is  sufficient, 
by  this  test ;  and  it  is  the  judge  that  applies  the  test.  In  this  sense,  then,  the  judge 
may  be  called  upon  to  rule  whether  the  evidence  ia  sufficient,  i.  e.  sufficient  to  go  to 
the  jury;  if  it  is,  they  then  solely  determine  whether  it  is  sufficient,  t.  e.  to  convince 
them ;  this  is  treated  ante,  §  14  w.  (d)  The  ruling  of  a  trial  Court  on  preliminary 
questions  of  fact  relating  to  admissibility  is  often  held  to  be  not  subject  to  review,  i.  e. 
the  trial  Court  is  said  to  have  "discretion;"  the  instances  are  mentioned  under  the 
various  heads  of  evidence.] 

8  1  Stark.  Evid.  510,  519-526 ;  Hutchison  v.  Bowker,  5  M.  &  W.  535  ;  Williams  v. 
Byrne,  2  N.  &  P.  139 ;  McDonald  v.  Rooke,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  217;  James  v.  Phelps,  11 
Ad.  &  El.  483  ;  s.  c.  3  P.  &  D.  231  ;  Panton  v.  Williams,  2  Q.  B.  169 :  Townsend  v. 
State,  2  Blackf.  151 ;  Montgomery  v.  Ohio,  11  Oh.  424.  fjSee  §  81  g,  post.] 

*  Ross  v.  Gould,  5  Greenl.  204. 

l  risaack  r.  Clark,  Rolle,  I,  132 ;  2  Bulstr.  314.] 
rThayer,  ubi  supra,  185,  202.] 

8  LFor  further  discriminations  on  this  point,'  see  Thayer,  189  ff.] 


164  LAW  AND  FACT;  JUDGE  AND  JUKY.  [CH.  VH 

questions  of  fact  which  are  to  be  determined  by  the  judge.  Moreover, 
this  inquiry  in  effect  concerns  the  respective  division  of  functions  be- 
tween judge  and  jury,  — a  larger  subject,  and  one  not  so  much  a  part 
of  the  law  of  evidence  as  of  the  law  of  trial-procedure  in  general ;  and 
the  matter  is  thus  complicated  by  other  inquiries  as  to  the  general 
powers  of  the  judge  in  supervising  and  controlling  the  jury,  —  inquiries 
which  must  be  distinguished  from  the  specific  one  whether  the  evi- 
dence on  a  certain  point  is  to  be  addressed  to  the  judge  or  to  the  jury 
as  the  functionary  immediately  concerned  with  its  determination.  It 
is  possible  here  only  to  indicate  the  trend  of  some  of  the  main  subjects 
of  controversy  or  difficulty. 

(1)  When  the  question  is  whether  a  person  has  been  guilty  of  neg- 
ligence, i.  e.  whether  he  has  used  due  care  under  the  circumstances,  or 
has  acted  as  a  prudent  man  would  have  acted,  or  whatever  the  form 
of  phrase  may  be,  the  evidence  is  to  be  addressed  to  the  jury,  and  the 
question  is  for  them  to  determine.  But  from  this  rule  must  be  distin- 
guished three  kinds  of  judicial  utterances,  closely  connected  in  prac- 
tice, and  superficially  though  not  in  truth  involving  an  inconsistency 
with  or  a  limitation  of  this  principle,  (a)  Where  for  the  kind  of  case 
in  hand  a  definite  rule  of  law,  more  precise  and  concrete,  has  been 
framed  for  determining  the  effect  of  the  person's  conduct,  this  rule  of 
law  may,  in  the  hands  of  the  judge,  conclude  the  question,  and  it  may 
cease  to  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  to  the  extent  that  the  rule 
of  law  applies.  Thus,  a  defendant's  conduct  in  carrying  a  loaded  gun 
on  his  shoulder  in  a  city  street  may  be  ruled  by  the  Court  to  be  "neg- 
ligence per  se"  or,  in  a  common  phrase,  he  is  held  to  have  acted  " at 
peril "  of  answering  for  the  harmful  consequences ;  so  that  the  ques- 
tion of  fact  for  the  jury  is  merely  whether  he  carried  the  gun  in  that 
way,  and  the  question  whether  he  acted  with  due  care  ceases  to  be  a 
question  for  them,  because  it  is  covered  by  a  specific  and  concrete  rule 
of  law.  Similar  rules  are  constantly  laid  down  for  various  situations, 
—  leaving  a  horse  unhitched  in  a  street,  running  a  train  at  a  speed  in 
excess  of  a  statutory  limit,  storing  gunpowder  in  a  populous  quarter, 
etc.  So,  also,  a  concrete  rule  of  this  sort  may  be  laid  down  for  a 
plaintiff  whose  contributory  negligence  is  pleaded,  and  it  may  be 
ruled  that  his  conduct  in  thrusting  his  head  out  of  a  railway  car- 
window,  or  in  failing  to  stop,  look,  and  listen  at  a  railway  crossing,  is 
"  negligence  per  se."  Whether  such  a  rule  should  be  laid  down  is  a 
question  of  the  detailed  substantive  law  appropriate  to  the  situation ; 
and,  wherever  such  a  rule  of  law  appears,  the  matter  ceases,  as  of  course, 
to  that  extent,  to  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.4  (a')  In  pursu- 
ance of  the  rules  regarding  the  burden  of  producing  evidence,  and  of 
the  judicial  function  thus  called  into  play  (ante,  §  14  w),  it  is  in  every 
case  for  the  Court  to  say  whether  there  was  sufficient  evidence  to  go 

4  £See  the  nature  of  such  rules  explained  in  Holmes,  Common  Law,  150,  152; 
8  Harv.  L.  Rev.  389.J 


§  SI/.]      QUESTIONS   OF  FACT   SOMETIMES   FOK   THE   JUDGE.  165 

to  the  jury,  and  thus  also  in  a  case  of  negligence.  Thus  the  Court 
has  constantly,  in  revising  the  results  of  a  trial,  to  ask  whether  there 
was  any  evidence  of  negligence  proper  to  be  left  to  a  jury,  and  occa- 
sionally a  more  detailed  test  is  attempted  for  thus  exercising  this 
power  of  revision  and  determining  whether  the  party  has  fulfilled  the 
duty  of  producing  sufficient  evidence.6  (a")  Another  form  of  utter- 
ance, sometimes  and  properly  treated6  as  another  way  of  phrasing 
the  preceding  principle,  but  often  treated  as  if  independent  of  it  and 
as  if  forming  an  exception  to  the  first  general  principle  above  stated, 
is  that  the  question  of  negligence  goes  to  the  jury  unless  the  facts  are 
undisputed  and  fair-minded  or  reasonable  men  could  draw  but  one  in- 
ference from  them.  So  far  as  this  phrase  (almost  universally  used, 
in  one  form  or  another)  is  intended  to  mean  that  the  Court  would,  if 
the  above  condition  were  fulfilled,  either  declare  the  evidence  of  negli- 
gence insufficient  to  go  to  the  jury  (if  that  were  the  Court's  inter- 
pretation of  the  conduct),  or  set  aside,  as  against  the  weight  of  evi- 
dence, a  verdict  finding  no  negligence  and  order  a  new  trial  or  even 
cause  a  new  verdict  to  be  entered  (if  that  were  the  Court's  inter- 
pretation), the  phrase  is  in  effect  only  a  more  detailed  statement  of 
the  test  to  be  adopted  by  the  Court  in  its  supervisory  right,  just  al- 
luded to,  to  say  whether  there  is  or  is  not  sufficient  evidence  for  the 
jury  or  whether  a  verdict  is  or  is  not  against  the  weight  of  evidence 
(ante,  §  14 10).  But  so  far  as  the  phrase  is  intended  to  mean  that,  if 
the  specified  condition  is  fulfilled,  the  Court  will  take  the  question 
into  its  own  hands  and  say,  as  a  matter  to  be  decided  by  the  Court 
itself,  that  there  was  or  was  not  negligence,  upon  facts  undisputed 
and  inferences  alone  conceivable,7  then  the  result  seems  to  be  in  effect 
an  exception  to  the  general  principle  first  above  stated,  i.  e.  it  defines 
an  excepted  case  in  which  the  question  of  negligence  is  to  be  deter- 
mined, for  that  litigation,  by  the  judge  and  not  by  the  jury.  It  is 
often  difficult  to  ascertain  what  is  the  precise  nature  of  the  principle 
involved  in  this  phrasing.8 

6  PSee  the  citations  hi  the  next  notes.] 

IE.  g.  per  Brett,  J.,  in  Bridges  v.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  213.] 

7  LSee,  for  example,  an  opinion  by  Brawley,  J.,  in  Patton  v.  R.  Co.,  U.  S.  App., 
82  Fed.  979.3 

8  QThe  use  of  this  phrase,  and  its  associated  questions,  may  be  seen  in  the  following 
cases:  Bridges  v.   R.  Co.,  supra  ;  j Jackson  v.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  D.  125  ;  Pearson 
v.  Cox,  ib.  369  ;  Davey  ».  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  12  Q.  B.  D.  70  ;  Pearee  v.  Lansdowne,  69  L. 
T.  R.  316  ;  Metrop.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  L.  R.  11  App.  Cas.  152  ;  Metrop.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 3  id.  193  ;  Dublin  R.  Co.  ».  Slattery,  ib.  1155|  ;  Herbert  v.  R.  Co.,  Cal.,  58  Pac. 
651  ;  Stroble  v.  New  Albany,  144  Ind.  695 ;  Young  v.  R.  Co.,  148  id.  54  ;  jHinckley 
V.  R.  Co.,  120  Mass.  257  ;  Teipel  v.   Hilsendegen,   44  Mich.  461 ;    Penns.   R.   Co.  v. 
Righter,  42  N.  J.  L.  180;    Payne  v.  R.  Co.,  83   N.  Y.  572 ;[  Tillett  v.  R.  Co.,   118 
N.  C.  1031  ;  White  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  27  S.   E.   1002;   Gates  v.  R.  Co.,  154  Pa.  566  ; 
Wash.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Tobriner,  147  U.  S.  571 ;    Richm.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Powers,  149 
id.  43  ;  Gardner  v.  R.  Co.,  150  id.  349,  361 ;   Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffiths,  159  id. 
603 ;  North.  P.  R.  Co.   v.  Peterson,  12   U.  S.  App.  254 ;  Pyle  v.   Clark,  id.,  79  Fed. 
744  ;  Hanley  t;.   Huntington,   37  W.  Va.  378 ;  Hart  v.  R.  Co.,  86  Wis.  483,  490  ; 
Morrison  r.  Madison,  96  id.  452.] 


166  LAW  AND  FACT  ;  JUDGE  AND  JUEY.       [CH.  VIL 

(2)  The  question  whether  a  defendant  in  a  case  of  malicious  prose- 
cution  had  "  reasonable  and  probable  cause  "  for  instituting  the  suit, 
although  it  may  be  in  the  broader  sense  a  question  of  fact,  has  never- 
theless been  retained  in  the  hands  of  the  Court  as  a  matter  for  its 
determination.9     The  Court  should  properly  instruct  the  jury  "in  the 
concrete  and  not  in  the  abstract,"  by  instructions  adapted  to  cover 
the  possible  findings  of  fact.10     It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  ques- 
tion is  for  the  judge  if  the  facts  are  undisputed  and  are  open  to  but 
one  inference ; n  but  this  fails  to  recognize  the  right  of  the  judge, 
even  where  the  facts  are  disputed,  to  submit  instructions  appropriate 
to  the  possible  findings. 

(3)  There  are  many  other  situations  in  which  the  issue  of  reason- 
ableness of  conduct  presents  itself;  and  in  general  it  is  recognized  as 
an  issue  of  fact  for  the  jury.12    There  has  been  a  more  or  less  definite 
change  from  an  earlier  attitude  of  the  Courts  when  such  questions 
were  constantly  treated  as  questions  of  law,  in  the  sense  that  the 
judge  determined  whether  the  conduct  under  all  the  circumstances 
was   reasonable  ;   and  instances  of  this  older  treatment  are  to  be 
found  to-day.18    Moreover,  an  intermediate  form  appears,  reserving 
the  question  for  the  judge  where  the  facts  are  undisputed.14    But  from 
these  real  variations  in  the  attitude  toward  the  present  subject  are  to 
be  distinguished  the  instances  of  the  Court's  resort  to  the  two  other 
principles  already  noted  in  speaking  of  the  question  of  negligence ; 
(a)  the  question  may,  by  the  development  of  the  substantive  law, 
have  ceased  to  be  a  mere  broad  question  of  reasonableness  and  have 
become  reduced  to  detailed  and  concrete  rules-of-thumb,  —  as  in  sev- 
eral instances  in  the  law  of  negotiable  instruments ;  here  there  is  a 
rule  of  law,  more  or  less  definite,  and  the  jury  are  to  that  extent  lim- 
ited in  their  inquiry ;  («')  the  Court's  supervisory  right,  upon  the  pres- 
ent issue  as  upon  others,  to  declare  that  there  is  not  evidence  sufficient 
to  go  to  a  jury  or  that  a  verdict  is  against  evidence,  may  be  exercised 
by  ordering  a  nonsuit  or  setting  aside  a  verdict,  without  denying  the 
general  question  to  be  one  of  fact  for  the  jury. 

(4)  The  construction  of  all  written  instruments  belongs  to  the  Court. 
It  may  become  necessary  to  ascertain  the  surrounding  circumstances 
that  fill  out  the  meaning  of  the  words,  as  well  as  any  local  or  commer- 

9  [Tanton  v.  Williams,  2  Q.  B.  169  ;  Lister  v.  Ferryman,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  521  ; 
Schattgen  v.  Holnback,  149  111.  646,  652  ;  White  v.  McQueen,  96  Mich.  249,  254  ; 
Mahaffy  p.  Byers,  151  Pa.  92  ;  Stewart  v.  Sonneborn,  98  U.  S.  187.  So  also  for 
probable  cause  for  nrrest :  Kirk  v.  Garrett,  84  Md.  383  ;  Filer  v.  Smith,  96  Mich.  347. 
For  the  history  of  this,  see  Thayer,  nbi  supra,  n.  221.] 

10  THess  v.  Oregon  Bank,  Or.,  49  Pac.  803.  J 

11  fDiersp.  Mallon,  46  Nebr.  121  ;  Wass  v.  Stephens,  128  N.  Y.  123.] 

12  [Vi.  g.  Gerdes  v.  I.  &  F.  Co.,  124  Mo.   347  (removing  highway  obstructions) ; 
White  v.  Pease,  15  Utah  170  (delivery  of  goods);  Chesterfield  v.  Ratliff,  S.  C.,  30 
S.  E.  593  (discharging  firearms  without  reasonable  excuse).] 

18  \_E.  g.  Joyner  v.  Roberta,   114  N.  C.  389   (reasonable  inquiry  by  one  giving  a 
marriage-license).] 
"  [Comer  o.  Way,  107  Ala.  300 ;  Earnshaw  v.  U.  S.,  146  U.  S.  60,  67.] 


§§  81/-81#.]    QUESTIONS   OF  LAW   SOMETIMES  FOR  THE   JURY.      167 

cial  meanings  attached  to  particular  words  by  usage ;  and  the  ascer- 
tainment of  this  is  for  the  jury.  But,  subject  to  the  amplification  or 
precision  of  the  meaning  thus  ascertained,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury 
to  take  the  construction  of  the  instrument  from  the  Court.16  Where 
a  contract  is  entirely  oral,  or  partly  in  writing  and  partly  oral,  it  is 
usually  said  that  its  terms,  if  disputed,  are  to  be  tried  by  the  jury  as 
a  question  of  fact,16  subject  of  course  to  instructions  as  to  the  legal 
effect  of  the  words. 

(5)  On  such  matters  as  the  Court  notices  judicially  (ante,  Chapter 
II),  it  would  seem  that  the  judge's  ruling  determines  the  matter,  and 
the  jury  must  take  it  from  him  as  a  decided  point,  even  though  it 
concern  something  that  would  otherwise  come  to  them  as  matter  of 
fact. 

(6)  In  the  definition  of  crime,  certain  more  detailed  rules  have  from 
time  to  time  been  laid  down,  as  rules  of  law,  defining  the  nature  of 
malice  and  of  the  other  states  of  mind  which  are  to  be  taken  as  con- 
stituting that  criminal  intent  which  is  one  of  the  elements  of  the 
offence.    So  far  as  limited  by  these  rules,  the  question  of  intent  ceases 
to  be  one  of  fact  and  is  one  of  law.17    The  chief  controversy  which,  in 
the  course  of  this  development,  brought  into  competition  and  collision 
the  respective  functions  of  judge  and  jury  was  the  question  whether, 
in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  libel,  the  malicious  intent  was  an  infer- 
ence of  law  to  be  made  from  the  words  published  and  the  averments 
and  innuendoes,  as  found  by  the  jury  and  spread  upon  the  record,  or 
whether  it  remained  as  an  inference  of  fact  to  be  found  by  the  jury. 
The  practice  of  the  English  judges  in  the  eighteenth  century  had  not 
been  entirely  consistent  in  maintaining  the  former  view,18  and  the 
latter  view  was  finally  after  much  popular  agitation  sanctioned  by 
the  Legislature.19] 

§  81  rj.  Questions  of  Law  sometimes  determined  by  the  Jury.  [[In 
only  a  few  instances  has  it  been  thought  that  a  matter  of  the  sort 
commonly  termed  "law"  should  be  left  with  the  jury  for  determina- 
tion. (1)  It  is  more  generally  held  that  a  foreign  law  is  a  matter  of 

w  [Neilson  v.  Harford,  8  M.  &  W.  806  ;  Graham  v.  Sadlier,  165  111.  95  ;  Ricketts 
v.  Rogers,  Nebr.,  73  N.  W.  946  ;  Spragins  v.  White,  108  N.  C.  449  ;  Meeks  v.  Wil- 
lard,  57  N.  J.  L.  22  ;  Brown  v.  McGran,  14  Pet.  479;  M'Namee  v.  Hunt,  U.  S.  App., 
87  Fed.  298.] 

w  [Eureka  F.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  78  Md.  179,  188  ;  Gassett  v.  Glazier,  165  Mass.  473  ; 
see  Nash  v.  Classon,  163  111.  409.] 

17  [Distinguish  here  such  legal  definitions  of  "malice,"  etc.,   from  ordinary  pre- 
sumptions affecting  the  production  of  evidence  ;  see  ante,  §  18."] 

18  [The  arguments  and  opinions  in  the  great  Trial  of  the  Dean  of  St.  Asaph's,  21 
How.  St.  Tr.  946,  968,  978,  1039  ;  3  T.  R.  428  (in  which  Erskine  was  of  counsel  for 
the  defendant,  and  Lord  Mansfield  delivered  the  opinion),  contain  the  data  on  both 
sides ;  the  answer  of  the  Judges  to  the  Lojds,  in  1789,  22  .How.  St.  Tr.  296,  301, 
finally  dealt  with  the  matter.] 

19  "[1792  ;  St.  32  G.  Ill,  c.  60,  known  as  Fox's  Libel  Act.  For  the  law  in  this 
country,  see  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  2025.  Distinguish  here,  also,  however,  the 
question  whether  in  a  civil  case  there  is  any  evidence  upon  which  a  jury  might  find  a 
libel  :  see  Capital  and  Counties  B'k  v.  Henty,  L.  R.  .7  App.  Gas.  741.] 


168       LAW  AND  FACT;  JUDGE  AND  JURY.     [CH.  vii. 

fact,  i.  e.  its  existence  is  to  be  determined  by  the  jury ; l  but  the  better 
view  is  that  it  should  be  proved  to  the  judge,  who  is  decidedly  the 
more  appropriate  person  to  determine  it.2  (2)  The  doctrine  has  ob- 
tained in  a  few  jurisdictions  that  the  jury,  in  dealing  with  the  sub- 
stantive law  applicable  to  the  case,  have  a  legal  right  to  repudiate  the 
instructions  of  the  judge  and  to  determine  the  law  for  themselves;8 
but  this  ill-judged  doctrine  has  only  a  narrow  acceptance.] 

1  £Kline  v.  Baker,  99  Mass.  253  (except  for  the  construction  and  effect  of  a  written 
law  forming  the  entire  evidence) ;  Gibson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  144  id.  81  (same)  ;  Hancock  N. 
B'k  v.  Ellis,  id.,  51  N.  E.  207  (similar)  ;  Charlotte  v.  Chouteau,  25  Mo.  465,  473 ; 
33  id.  194,  200,  201  (same,  semble)^ 

2  QPickard  v.  Bailey,  26  N.  H.  152,  169  (where  preliminary  to  the  legality  of  a  docu- 
ment) ;  Lycoming  Ins.  Co.  ».  Wright,  60  Vt.  522,  semble;  see  South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins, 
94  U.  S.  260,  277.] 

8  fJFor  the  jurisdictions  in  which  this  view  is  taken,  see  Thompson  on  Trials, 
§§  2132-2148 ;  for  a  vindication  of  its  orthodoxy  and  an  examination  of  the  rule  in 
the  various  jurisdictions,  see  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Gray,  J.,  in  Sparf  v.  U.  S.,  15t> 
TJ.  S.  51  ;  for  an  examination  of  its  probable  origin,  see  Thayer,  ubi  supra,  253  ;  lead- 
ing opinions  are  those  of  Best,  C.  J.,  in  Levi  v.  Mylne,  4  Bing.  195  ;  Story,  J.,  in 
U.  S.  v.  Battiste,  2  Sumn.  243  ;  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Com.  v.  Porter,  10  Mete.  263  ;  Doe, 
J.,  in  State  v.  Hodge,  50  N.  H.  510 ;  and  the  earlier  authorities  are  collected  in  Mr. 
Hargrave's  note  276,  to  Co.  Lit.  155  6-3 


§§  8 1^-81  A.]      HISTORY   AND   SCOPE   OF   THE   PHRASE. 


169 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

BEST   EVIDENCE   PRINCIPLE. 


1.   General  Principle. 

§  81  A.  History  and  Scope  of  the  Phrase. 

§§  82-84.   General  Principle. 

§  85.  Applications  of  the  Principle. 

§  86.  Same:  (1)  Act  required  by  Law 
to  be  in  Writing. 

§87.  Same:  (2)  Same:  Act  reduced  to 
Writing  by  the  Parties. 

§§  88-90.  Same  :  (3)  Contents  of  Writ- 
ing to  be  proved. 


2.  Specific  Rules  included  under  the  Seat 
Evidence  Principle. 

§  97  a.  Eules  covered  by  the  Term 
"Best  Evidence." 

§  97  b.  (1)  Proving  the  Contents  of  a 
Writing. 

§  97  c.  (2)  Testing  a  Witness  by  Oath 
and  Cross-examination. 

§  97  d.  (3)  Classes  of  Witnesses  pre- 
ferred to  others. 


1.    General  Principle. 

§  81  h.  History  and  Scope  of  the  Phrase.  ["  The  rule  that  if  one 
would  prove  the  contents  of  a  writing  he  must  produce  the  writing 
itself,  or  show  a  legally  sufficient  reason  for  not  doing  it,  is  often 
called  the  'best  evidence  rule.'  The  phrase  is  an  old  one.  During 
the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  the  whole  of  the 
eighteenth,  while  rules  of  evidence  were  forming,  the  judges  and 
text  writers  were  in  the  habit  of  laying  down  two  principles,  namely, 
(1)  that  one  must  bring  the  best  evidence  that  he  can,  and  (2)  that  if 
he  does  this  it  is  enough.  These  principles  were  the  beginnings,  in 
the  endeavor  to  give  consistency  to  the  system  of  evidence  before 
juries.  They  were  never  literally  enforced,  —  they  were  principles 
and  not  exact  rules ;  but  for  a  long  time  they  afforded  a  valuable 
test.  As  rules  of  evidence  and  exceptions  to  the  rules  became  more 
definite,  the  field  for  the  application  of  the  general  principle  of  the 
'  best  evidence '  was  narrower.  .  .  .  But  by  this  time  it  was  becoming 
obvious  that  this  'general  rule'  was  misapplied  and  over-empha- 
sized." *  "  An  old  principle  which  had  served  a  xiseful  purpose  for 
the  century  while  rules  of  evidence  had  been  forming  and  were  being 
applied,  to  an  extent  never  before  known,  while  the  practice  of  grant- 
ing new  trials  for  the  jury's  disregard  of  evidence  had  been  develop- 
ing, and  judicial  control  over  evidence  had  been  greatly  extended, — 
this  old  principle,  this  convenient,  rough  test,  had  survived  its  use- 
fulness. A  crop  of  specific  rules  and  exceptions  to  rules  had  been 
sprouting,  and  hardening  into  an  independent  growth.  .  .  .  But  it  is 
accompanied  now  with  so  many  explanations  and  qualifications  as  to 
indicate  the  need  of  some  simpler  and  truer  statement,  which  should 
exclude  any  mention  of  this  as  a  working  rule  of  our  system.  In- 

1  [Thayer,  Cases  on  Evidence,  726,  732.] 


170  BEST   EVIDENCE   PKINCIPLE.  [CH.   VIIL 

deed,  it  would  probably  have  dropped  naturally  out  of  use  long  ago, 
if  it  had  not  coine  to  be  a  convenient,  short  description  of  the  rule  as 
to  proving  the  contents  of  a  writing.  Regarded  as  a  general  rule, 
the  trouble  with  it  is  that  it  is  not  true  to  the  facts,  and  does  not 
hold  out  in  its  application;  and,  in  so  far  as  it  does  apply,  it  is  un- 
necessary and  uninstructive.  It  is  roughly  descriptive  of  two  or  three 
rules  which  have  their  own  reasons,  and  their  own  name  and  place, 
and  are  well  enough  known  without  it."  2  It  is  in  the  light  of  such 
an  explanation  that  one  must  peruse  the  following  sections,  which  rep- 
resent the  general  attitude  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.] 
§  82.  General  Principle.  A  fourth  rule  1  which  governs  in  the 
production  of  evidence  is  that  which  requires  the  best  evidence  of 
which  the  case  in  its  nature  is  susceptible.  This  rule  does  not  demand 
the  greatest  amount  of  evidence  which  can  possibly  be  given  of  any 
fact ;  but  its  design  is  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  any  which,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  supposes  that  better  evidence  is  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  party.  It  is  adopted  for  the  prevention  of  fraud ;  for 
when  it  is  apparent  that  better  evidence  is  withheld,  it  is  fair  to  pre- 
sume that  the  party  had  some  sinister  motive  for  not  producing  it, 
and  that,  if  offered,  his  design  would  be  frustrated.2  The  rule  thus 
becomes  essential  to  the  pure  administration  of  justice.  In  requiring 
the  production  of  the  best  evidence  applicable  to  each  particular  fact, 
it  is  meant  that  no  evidence  shall  be  received  which  is  merely  substi- 
tutionary  in  its  nature,  so  long  as  the  original  evidence  can  be  had. 
The  rule  excludes  only  that  evidence  which  itself  indicates  the  exist- 
ence of  more  original  sources  of  information.8  But  where  there  is  no 
substitution  of  evidence,  but  only  a  selection  of  weaker,  instead  of 
stronger  proofs,  or  an  omission  to  supply  all  the  proofs  capable  of 
being  produced,  the  rule  is  not  infringed.4  Thus,  a  title  by  deed 
must  be  proved  by  the  production  of  the  deed  itself,  if  it  is  within 
the  power  of  the  party ;  for  this  is  the  best  evidence  of  which  the 
case  is  susceptible ;  and  its  non-production  would  raise  a  presumption 
that  it  contained  some  matter  of  apparent  defeasance;  but,  being 
produced,  the  execution  of  the  deed  itself  may  be  proved  by  only  one 

2  (^Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  495,  496.  For  a  luminous  account 
of  the  history  and  scope  of  the  phrase,  see  chap.  11  of  that  work.] 

1  QThis  refers  to  the  authors  classification  at  §50,  ante.~\ 

2  "  Falsi  presumptio  est  contra  emu,  qui  testibns  probare  conatur  id  quod  instru- 
mentis  probare  potest."     Menoch.  Consil.  422,  n.  125. 

8  FJThis  mode  of  stating  the  principle  is  unserviceable  for  any  practical  purpose,  and 
is  impossible  of  consistent  application.  The  "best  evidence  notion  covers  several 
wholly  separate  rules,  as  later  explained,  and  they  cannot  be  subsumed  under  this 
general  phrase.] 

*  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  438  :  1  Phil.  Evid.  418  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  437  ;  Glassford 
on  Evid.  266-278 ;  Tayloe  v.  Riggs,  1  Peters  591,  596  ;  United  States  v.  Reyburn, 
6  id.  352,  367  ;  Minor  v.  Tillotson,  7  id.  100,  101.  QSo  far  as  this  means  that  the 
original  of  a  writing  must  be  produced  if  available,  but  if  unavailable,  there  is  no 
preference  between  different  sorts  of  secondary  evidence,  it  has  a  certain  truth;  see 
pott,  §§  558  ff.  ;  in  any  other  sense,  it  is  of  no  service  as  a  guide.} 


§§81  h-85.]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLE.  171 

of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  though  the  other  also  is  at  hand.1  And 
even  the  previous  examination  of  a  deceased  subscribing  witness,  if 
admissible  on  other  grounds,  may  supersede  the  necessity  of  calling 
the  survivor.6  So,  in  proof  or  disproof  of  handwriting,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  call  the  supposed  writer  himself.7  And  even  where  it  is 
necessary  to  prove  negatively  that  an  act  was  done  without  the  con- 
sent, or  against  the  will  of  another,  it  is  not,  in  general,  necessary  to 
call  the  person  whose  will  or  consent  is  denied.8 

§  83.  All  rules  of  evidence,  however,  are  adopted  for  practical  pur- 
poses in  the  administration  of  justice;  and  must  be  so  applied  as  to 
promote  the  ends  for  which  they  were  designed.  Thus,  the  rule  under 
consideration  is  subject  to  exceptions,  where  the  general  convenience 
requires  it.  Proof,  for  example,  that  an  individual  has  acted  notori- 
ously as  a  public  officer,  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  his  official  char- 
acter, without  producing  his  commission  or  appointment.1 

§  84.  This  rule  naturally  leads  to  the  division  of  evidence  into 
Primary  and  Secondary.  Primary  evidence  is  that  which  we  have 
just  mentioned  as  the  best  evidence,  or  that  kind  of  proof  which, 
under  any  possible  circumstances,  affords  the  greatest  certainty  of  the 
fact  in  question :  and  it  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  a  written  docu- 
ment; the  instrument  itself  being  always  regarded  as  the  primary  or 
best  possible  evidence  of  its  existence  and  contents.  If  the  execution 
of  an  instrument  is  to  be  proved,  the  primary  evidence  is  the  testi- 
mony of  the  subscribing  witness,  if  there  be  one.  Until  it  is  shown 
that  the  production  of  the  primary  evidence  is  out  of  the  party's  power, 
no  other  proof  of  the  fact  is  in  general  admitted.  All  evidence  fall- 
ing short  of  this  in  its  degree  is  termed  secondary.  The  question, 
whether  evidence  is  primary  or  secondary,  has  reference  to  the  nature 
of  the  case  in  the  abstract,  and  not  to  the  peculiar  circumstances 
under  which  the  party  in  the  particular  cause  on  trial  may  be  placed. 
It  is  a  distinction  of  law,  and  not  of  fact :  referring  only  to  the  quality, 
and  not  to  the  strength  of  the  proof.  Evidence  which  carries  on  its 
face  no  indication  that  better  remains  behind  is  not  secondary,  but 
primary.  And  though  all  information  must  be  traced  to  its  source, 
if  possible,  yet  if  there  are  several  distinct  sources  of  information  of 
the  same  fact,  it  is  not  ordinarily  necessary  to  show  that  they  have 
all  been  exhausted,  before  secondary  evidence  can  be  resorted  to.1 

§  85.  Application  of  the  Principle.     The   cases  which  most  fre- 

6  rjThis  illustration  shows  the  fallacy  of  the  above  generalization,  for  the  rule  that  a 
subscribing  witness  must  be  called  is  itself  an  instance  of  the  preference  of  one  kind  of 
witness  as  being  superior  to  another.] 

6  Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  El.  3. 

7  Hughes'  Case,  2  East  P.  C.  1002 ;  McGuire's  Case,  ib.  ;  Rex  v.  Benson,  2  Campb. 
508  ;  fjsee  post,  §  97  rf.] 

8  R.  v.  Hazy  &  Collins,  2  C.  &  P.  458  ;  [see  post,  §  97  d.] 
1  TFor  the  authorities  on  this  point,  see  post,  §  563</.H 

1  L^or  the  original  note  at  this  point,  as  to  whether  there  are  degrees  of  secondary 
evidence  of  the  contents  of  a  document,  see  post,  §  563  q."2 


172  BEST  EVIDENCE   PKINCIPLE.  [CH.  VIIL 

quently  call  for  the  application  of  the  rule  now  under  consideration 
are  those  which  relate  to  the  substitution'  of  oral  for  written  evi- 
dence ; x  and  they  may  be  arranged  into  three  classes :  including  in 
the  first  class  those  instruments  which  the  law  requires  should  be  in 
writing ;  in  the  second,  those  contracts  which  the  parties  have  put 
in  writing ;  and  in  the  third,  all  other  writings,  the  existence  of  which 
is  disputed,  and  which  are  material  to  the  issue.2 

§  86.  Same  :  (1)  Act  required  by  Law  to  be  in  Writing.  In  the  first 
place,  oral  evidence  cannot  be  substituted  for  any  instrument  which 
the  law  requires  to  be  in  writing  ; 1  such  as  records,  public  documents, 
official  examinations,  deeds  of  conveyance  of  lands,  wills  other  than 
nuncupative,  promises  to  pay  the  debt  of  another,  and  other  writings 
mentioned  in  the  statute  of  frauds.  In  all  these  cases,  the  law  hav- 
ing required  that  the  evidence  of  the  transaction  should  be  in  writ- 
ing, no  other  proof  can  be  substituted  for  that,  as  long  as  the  writing 
exists,  and  is  in  the  power  of  the  party.  And  where  oaths  are  re- 
quired to  be  taken  in  open  court,  where  a  record  of  the  oath  is  made, 
or  before  a  particular  officer,  whose  duty  is  to  certify  it ;  or  where  an 
appointment  to  an  additional  office  is  required  to  be  made  and  cer- 
tified on  the  back  of  the  party's  former  commission,  —  the  written 
evidence  must  be  produced.2  Even  the  admission  of  the  fact  by  a 
party,  unless  solemnly  made,  as  a  substitute  for  other  proof,  does  not 
supersede  direct  proof  of  matter  of  record  by  which  it  is  sought  to 
affect  him ; 8  for  the  record,  being  produced,  may  be  found  irregular 
and  void,  and  the  party  might  be  mistaken.4  Where,  however,  the 

1  [This  statement  is  misleading.     When  the  object  is  to  prove  the  contents  of  a 
writing,  the  question  is  not  whether  oral  may  be  substituted  for  written  evidence  ;  but 
whether  any  evidence  whatever  can  be  given  of  the  writing  without  producing  the 
thing  itself.     But  when  the  object  is  to  prove  an  oral  and  not  a  written  transaction, 
the  question  is  not  whether  oral  evidence  can  be  used  for  either,  but  whether  the  oral 
act,  instead  of  the  written  one,  can  be  proved  at  all.     The  above  phrase  confuses  these 
wholly  distinct  questions.] 

2  fJA  perusal  of  §§  305  a-305  g,  post,  will  assist  in  understanding  the  distinctions 
taken  in  the  following  sections.] 

1  [This  principle  is  not  disputed  ;  but  it  is  not  concerned  with  the  present  subject. 
It  is  a  part  of  the  so-called  parol-evidence  rule,  treated  post,  §§  275  IF.     It  amounts  to 
this,  that  if  an  act,  to  receive  legal  effect,  is  required  by  law  to  be  done  in  writing, 
then  an  oral  or  parol  act  cannot  be  proved.     It  is  conceded  that  if  the  writing  is  to  be 
proved  at  all,  the  rule  requiring  its  production  applies  ;  but  the  question  is  whether 
the  thing  to  be  proved  may  be  the  parol  act,  not  the  written  act.     This  question  is  one 
of  the  substantive  law,  not  of  evidence.     The  difficulty  usually  arises  in  distinguishing 
between  a  writing  which  thus  by  law  constitutes  alone  the  legal  act,  and  a  writing 
which  serves  merely  as  an  official  record  or  testimony  of  an  act  which  is  valid  though 
only  in  parol,  i.  e.  of  the  general  sort  treated  in  §§  483  ff.,post.     But  this  equally  is 
still  a  question  whether  the  legal  act  is,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  the  official  writing  or 
the  conduct  recorded  by  it,  —  i.  e.  a  question  of  the  appropriate  substantive  law  ;  see 
the  principle  explained  more  fully  in  §  305  g,  post."] 

2  R.  v.  Hube,  Peake's  Cas.  132  ;  Bassett  v.  Marshall,  9  Mass.  312  ;  Trinp  v.  Garey, 
7  Greenl.  266  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  570,  571;  Dole  v.  Allen,  4  Greenl.  527  ;  {Farnsworth 
Company  v.  Rand,  65  Me.  19 ;  Poorman  v.  Miller,  44  Cal.  269  ;  Bovee  v.  McLean,  24 
Wis.  225;  Terrill  v.  Colebrook,  35  Conn.  188  ;  Steele  v.  Steele,  89  111.  51.} 

8  QThis,  however,  is  usually  a  real  question  of  the  Primariness  rule,  i.  e.  whether 
the  contents  of  a  document  may  be  proved  by  the  opponent's  admission,  without  pro- 
duction ;  see  post,  §  563  k.~\ 

*  Scott  0.  Clare,  3  Campb.  236  ;  Jenner  ».  Joliffe,  6  Johns.  9  ;  Welland  Canal  Co. 


§§  85-87.]      WRITING  REQUIRED  BY  LAW,  OR  BY  THE  PARTIES.          173 

record  or  document  appointed  by  law  is  not  part  of  the  fact  to  be 
proved,8  but  is  merely  a  collateral  or  subsequent  memorial  of  the 
fact,  such  as  the  registry  of  marriages  and  births,  and  the  like,  it  has 
not  this  exclusive  character,  but  any  other  legal  proof  is  admitted.8 

§  87.  Same  :  (2)  Act  reduced  to  "Writing  by  the  Parties.  In  the 
second  place,  oral  proof  cannot  be  substituted  for  the  written  evidence 
of  any  contract  which  the  parties  have  put  in  writing.1  Here,  the  writ- 
ten instrument  may  be  regarded,  in  some  measure,  as  the  ultimate  fact 
to  be  proved,  especially  in  the  cases  of  negotiable  securities  ;  and,  in 
all  cases  of  written  contracts,  the  writing  is  tacitly  agreed  upon,  by 
the  parties  themselves,  as  the  only  repository  and  the  appropriate  evi- 
dence of  their  agreement.  The  written  contract  is  not  collateral,  but 
is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  transaction.2  If  for  example,  an  action 
is  brought  for  use  and  occupation  of  real  estate,  and  it  appears  by  the 
plaintiff's  own  showing  that  there  was  a  written  contract  of  tenancy, 
he  must  produce  it,  or  account  for  its  absence  ;  though,  if  he  were  to 
make  out  a  prima  facie  case,  without  any  appearance  of  a  written 
contract,  the  burden  of  producing  it,  or  at  least  of  proving  its  exist- 
ence, would  be  devolved  on  the  defendant.8  But  if  the  fact  of  the 
occupation  of  land  is  alone  in  issue  without  respect  to  the  terms  of 
the  tenancy,  this  fact  may  be  proved  by  any  competent  oral  testi- 
mony, such  as  payment  of  rent,  or  declarations  of  the  tenant,  not- 

v.  Hathaway,  8  Wend.  480;  1  Leach  Cr.  C.  349;  2  id.  625,  635  ;  {Fleming  v.  Clark, 
12  Allen  191 ;  Michener  v.  Lloyd,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  38.} 

6  QThis  form  of  expression  is  correct,  as  compared  with  the  one  above  used  by  the 
author;  i.e.  it  is  not  a  question  whether  the  " evidence  should  be  in  writing,"  but 
whether  the  act  to  be  proved  by  the  evidence  should  be  in  writing.] 

6  Commonwealth  v.  Norcross,  9  Mass.  492  ;  Ellis  v.  Ellis,  11  Mass.  92  ;  Owings  v. 
Wyant,  3  H.  &  McH.  393  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  571 ;  R,  v.  Allison,  R.  &  R.  109 ;  Reed 
v.  Passer,  Peake's  Cas.  231 ;  {Howser  v.  Com.,  51  Pa.  St.  332  ;  Gillettf.  County  Com- 
missioners, 18  Kan.  410  ;  Brown  v.  County  Commissioners,  63  N.  C.  514;  Wayland 
v.  Ware,  104  Mass.  46.  { 

1  QHere,  again,  we  are  concerned  in  truth  with  a  part  of  the  parol-evidence  rule, 
treated  post,  §§  275  ff . ;  305  e,f.     When  the  parties  have  made  the  writing  the  sole 
memorial  of  their  act,  then  nothing  remains,  as  their  effective  legal  act  on  that  subject, 
but  the  writing ;  the  question,  then,  is  whether  their  parol  acts  have  been  by  their  will 
deprived  of  legal  significance  and  the  writing  alone  given  effect ;   and  this  is  not  a 
question  of  the  law  of  evidence,  but  of  what  constitutes  the  sole  legal  act  in  question. 
If  it  is  held  that  the  writing  does,  then  the  rule  of  Primariness  of  course  applies  to  it.] 

2  QThis  elusiee  word  "collateral  "  serves  here  merely  to  conceal  an  application  of 
two  distinct  principles.     (1)  When  we  ask,  under  the  so-called  parol-evidence  rule 
whether  the  parties  have  covered  the  whole  transaction  in  a  writing,  and  answer  that 
they  have  not  —  as,  perhaps,  where  we  allow  a  tenant  to  prove,  alongside  of  the 
written  lease,  an  oral   promise   by  the  landlord   to  open  a  street,  —  here  it  may  be 
said  that  the  written  transaction  is  "  collateral "  to  the  oral  one,  i.  e.  does  not  super- 
sede it.     This  is  still  a  question  of  the  parol-evidence  rule.     (2)  But  where  we  wish  to 
prove  payment  of  a  note  or  occupancy  of  leased  land,  the  question   arises  whether  we 
are  dealing  with  the  contents  of  a  document  at  all ;  if  we  are,  it  must  be  produced  ; 
but  if  it  can  be  thought  that  the  act  of  payment  or  occupancy  does  not  in  itself  involve 
the  terms  of  the  note  or  the  lease,  then  we  are  not  attempting  to  prove  the  contents 
of  a  writing,  but,  as  it  is  said,  a  "  collateral  "  fact.     This  question  arises  under  the 
Primariness  rule,  and  is  dealt  with  post,  §  563  o.] 

8  Brewer  v.  Palmer,  3  Esp.  213  ;  confirmed  in  Ramsbottom  v.  Tunbridge,  2  M.  &S. 
434  5  R.  v.  Rawden,  8  B.  &  C.  708  ;  Strother  v.  Barr,  5  Bing.  136,  per  Parke,  J. 


174  BEST   EVIDENCE  PEINCIPLE.  [CH.   VIII. 

withstanding  it  appears  that  the  occupancy  was  under  an  agreement 
in  writing ;  for  here  the  writing  is  only  collateral  to  the  fact  in  ques- 
tion.4 The  same  rule  applies  to  every  other  species  of  written  con< 
tract.  Thus,  where,  in  a  suit  for  the  price  of  labor  performed,  it 
appears  that  the  work  was  commenced  under  an  agreement  in  writing, 
the  agreement  must  be  produced  ;  and  even  if  the  claim  be  for  extra 
work,  the  plaintiff  must  still  produce  the  written  agreement ;  for  it 
may  furnish  evidence,  not  only  that  the  work  was  over  and  beyond 
the  original  contract,  but  also  of  the  rate  of  which  it  was  to  be  paid 
for.  So,  in  an  indictment  for  feloniously  setting  fire  to  a  house,  to 
defraud  the  insurers,  the  policy  itself  is  the  appropriate  evidence  of 
the  fact  of  insurance,  and  must  be  produced.6  And  the  recorded  res- 
olution of  a  charitable  society,  under  which  the  plaintiff  earned  the 
salary  sued  for,  was  on  the  same  principle  held  indispensably  necessary 
to  be  produced.6  The  fact  that  in  such  cases  the  writing  is  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  adverse  party  does  not  change  its  character :  it  is  still  the 
primary  evidence  of  the  contract ;  and  its  absence  must  be  accounted 
for  by  notice  to  the  other  party  to  produce  it,  or  in  some  other  legal 
mode,  before  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents  can  be  received.7 

§  88.  Same  :  (3)  Contents  of  Writing  to  be  proved.  In  the  third 
place,  oral  evidence  cannot  be  substituted  for  any  writing,  the  exist- 
ence of  which  is  disputed,  and  which  is  material  either  to  the  issue 
between  the  parties,  or  to  the  credit  of  witnesses,  and  is  not  merely 
the  memorandum  of  some  other  fact.1  For,  by  applying  the  rule  to 
such  cases,  the  Court  acquires  a  knowledge  of  the  whole  contents  of 
the  instrument,  which  may  have  a  different  effect  from  the  state- 
ment of  a  part.  "  I  have  always,"  said  Lord  Tenterden,  "  acted 
most  strictly  on  the  rule,  that  what  is  in  writing  shall  only  be  proved 
by  the  writing  itself.  My  experience  has  taught  me  the  extreme 
danger  of  relying  on  the  recollection  of  witnesses,  however  honest, 
as  to  the  contents  of  written  instruments  ;  they  may  be  so  easily  mis- 
taken, that  I  think  the  purposes  of  justice  require  the  strict  enforce- 
ment of  the  rule."  2  Thus,  it  is  not  allowed,  on  cross-examination,  in 

*  R.  v.  Inhabitants  of  Holy  Trinity,  7  B.  &  C.  611 ;  Doe  v.  Harvey,  8  Bing.  239, 
241  ;   Spiers  ».  Willison,  4  Cranch  398;   Dennett  v.  Crocker,    8   Greenl.  239,   244; 
jRayner  v.  Lee,  20  Mich.  384  ;(  Qsee  the  explanation  in  note  2,  ante."] 

•  R.  v.  Doran,   1   Esp.  127;   K.  v.  Gilson,  Russ.  &  Ry.  138;   (contra:  Com.  v. 
Goodwin,  122  Mass.  19.  | 

«  Whitford  v.  Tutin,  10  Bing.  395  ;  Molton  v.  Harris,  2  Esp.  549. 

i  See  further,  R.  v.  Rawden,  8  B.  &  C.  708  ;  Sebree  v.  Dorr,  9  Wheat.  558  ;  Bui- 
lock  v.  Koon,  9  Cowen,  30;  Mather  v.  Goddard,  7  Conn.  804;  Rank  v.  Shewey, 
4  Watts  218  ;  Northrupa.  Jackson,  13  Wend.  86  ;  Vinal  v.  Burrill,  16  Pick.  401,  407, 
408  ;  Lanauze  v.  Palmer,  1  M.  &  M.  81. 

1  FJThe  author  seems  here  to  be  stating  the  real  rule  of  Primariness,  i.  «.  the  simple 
one  that,  in  proving  the  contents  of  a  writing,  the  writing  must  be  produced  or  accounted 
for.  But  the  clauses,  "the  existence  of  which  is  disputed,"  etc.,  seem  an  improper 
limitation,  and  should  be  omitted.  The  phrase  "  oral  evidence  cannot  be  substituted  " 
is  not  accurate,  as  already  pointed  out ;  oral  evidence  is  not  substituted  for  tlia  writing; 
the  evidence,  whether  oral  or  a  written  copy,  is  offered  to  prove  the  writing's  contents  t 
and  the  rule  calls  for  the  writing  itself,  and  not  evidence  about  it.] 

9  Vincent  v.  Cole,  1  M.  &  M.  258. 


§§  87-90.]         CONTENTS   OF   WRITING  TO   BE   PROVED.  175 

the  statement  of  a  question  to  a  witness  to  represent  the  contents  of  a 
letter,  and  to  ask  the  witness  whether  he  wrote  a  letter  to  any  person 
with  such  contents,  or  contents  to  the  like  effect,  without  having  first 
shown  the  letter  to  the  witness,  and  having  asked  him  whether  he  wrote 
that  letter  ; 8  because,  if  it  were  otherwise,  the  cross-examining  coun- 
sel might  put  the  Court  in  possession  of  only  a  part  of  the  contents  of 
a  paper,  when  a  knowledge  of  the  whole  was  essential,  to  a  right  judg- 
ment in  the  cause.  If  the  witness  acknowledges  the  writing  of  the 
letter,  yet  he  cannot  be  questioned  as  to  its  contents,  but  the  letter 
itself  must  be  read.4  And  if  a  witness  being  examined  in  a  foreign 
country,  upon  interrogatories  sent  out  with  a  commission  for  that 
purpose,  should  in  one  of  his  answers  state  the  contents  of  a  letter 
which  is  not  produced,  that  part  of  the  deposition  will  be  suppressed, 
notwithstanding,  he  being  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  there  may  be  no 
means  of  compelling  him  to  produce  the  letter.6 

§  89.  In  cases,  however,  where  the  written  communication  or  agree- 
ment between  the  parties  is  collateral  to  the  question  in  issue,  it  need 
not  be  produced ;  as,  where  the  writing  is  a  mere  proposal,  which  has 
not  been  acted  upon ; 1  or,  where  a  written  memorandum  was  made 
of  the  terms  of  the  contract,  which  was  read  in  the  presence  of  the 
parties,  but  never  signed,  or  proposed  to  be  signed ; 2  or,  where  dur- 
ing an  employment  under  a  written  contract,  a  separate  verbal  order 
is  given ; 8  or,  where  the  action  is  not  directly  upon  the  agreement, 
for  non-performance  of  it,  but  is  in  tort,  for  the  conversion  or  deten- 
tion of  the  document  itself ;  *  or,  where  the  action  is  for  the  plaintiff's 
share  of  money  had  and  received  by  the  defendant,  under  a  written 
security  for  a  debt  due  to  them  both.6 

§  90.  But  where  the  writing  does  not  fall  within  either  of  the  three 
classes  already  described,  there  is  no  ground  for  its  excluding  oral 
evidence.  As,  for  example,  if  a  written  communication  be  accom- 
panied by  a  verbal  one,  to  the  same  effect,  the  latter  may  be  received 
as  independent  evidence,1  though  not  to  prove  the  contents  of  the 

8  So  held  by  all  the  judges  in  the  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  287  j  [tot  this 
application  of  the  rule,  see  post,  §  463.] 

*  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  287  ;  post,  §  463. 

6  Steinkeller  v.  Newton,  9  C.  &  P.  313 ;  Qfor  the  authorities  on  this  part  of  the  rule, 
see  post,  §  56  ;  e.~] 

1  Ingram  v.  Lea,  2  Campb.  521 ;  Ramsbottora  v.  Tunbridge,  2  M.  &  S.  434 ;  Ste- 
vens v.  Pinney,  8  Taunt.  827 ;  Doe  ».  Cartwright,  8  B.  &  A.  826  ;  Wilson  v.  Bowie, 
1  C.  &  P.  8 ;  Hawkins  v.  Ware,  3  B.  &  C.  690. 

2  Trewhitt  v.  Lambert,  10  Ad.  &  El.  470. 

8  Reid  v.  Battie,  M.  &  M.  413.  QThe  three  preceding  illustrations  involve  the 
principle  of  the  parol-evidence  rule,  as  explained  already,  §  87,  note  2,  (1);  the  sub- 
ject is  treated  more  fully  post,  §§  305  e,  /.] 

*  ["For  tne  authorities  here,  see  post,  §  5630.] 

6  Bayne  v.  Stone,  4  Esp.  13.  See  Tucker  v.  Welsh,  17  Mass.  165  ;  McFadden  v. 
Kingsbury,  11  Wend.  667 ;  Southwick  v.  Stephens,  10  Johns.  448.  [jThe  two  pre- 
ceding illustrations  involve  a  different  question  from  that  of  the  first  three,  i.  e.  the 
one  discussed  as  (2)  in  note  2,  §  87,  ante."} 

1  rjRather,  evidence  of  the  latter  may  be  received,  because  the  thing  proved  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  writing,  and  thus  the  rule  about  proving  the  contents  of  a  writing  doe« 
not  apply  :  see  note  2,  (2),  §  87,  ante.] 


176  BEST   EVIDENCE   PRINCIPLE.  [CH.  VIIL 

writing,  nor  as  a  substitute  for  it.2  Thus,  also,  the  payment  of  money 
may  be  proved  by  oral  testimony,  though  a  receipt  be  taken ; 8  in 
trover,  a  verbal  demand  of  the  goods  is  admissible,  though  a  demand 
in  writing  was  made  at  the  same  time  ; 4  the  admission  of  indebt- 
inent  is  provable  by  oral  testimony,  though  a  written  promise  to  pay 
was  simultaneously  given,  if  the  paper  be  inadmissible  for  want  of  a 
stamp.6  Such,  also,  is  the  case  of  the  examination  and  confession  of 
a  prisoner,  taken  down  in  writing  by  the  magistrate,  but  not  signed 
and  certified  pursuant  to  the  statutes.6  And  any  writing  inadmis- 
sible for  the  want  of  a  stamp,  or  other  irregularity,  may  still  be  used 
by  the  witness  who  wrote  it,  or  was  present  at  the  time,  as  a  memo- 
randum to  refresh  his  own  memory,  from  which  alone  he  is  supposed 
to  testify,  independently  of  the  written  paper.7  In  like  manner,  in 
prosecutions  for  political  offences,  such  as  treason,  conspiracy,  and 
sedition,  the  inscription  on  flags  and  banners  paraded  in  public,  and 
the  contents  of  resolutions  read  at  a  public  meeting,  may  be  proved 
as  of  the  nature  of  speeches,  by  oral  testimony  ; 8  and  in  the  case  of 
printed  papers,  all  the  impressions  are  regarded  as  originals,  and  are 
evidence  against  the  person  who  adopts  the  printing  by  taking  away 
copies.9 

§  91.1 

§  92.a 

§  93.8 

a  {Cramer  v.  Shriner,  18  Md.  140.} 

3  Humbert  v.  Cohen,  4  Esp.  213  ;  Jacob  v.  Lindsay,  1  East  460 ;  Doe  v.  Cart- 
wright,  3  B.  &  A.  326  ;  JKingsbury  v.  Moses,  45  N.  H.  222;  Davis  v.  Hare,  32  Ark. 
386  ;  Wolf  v.  Foster,  13  Kan.  116. }  QHere  the  parol-evidence  rule  does  not  prevent, 
because  the  receipt  is  not  intended  as  the  sole  memorial  of  the  act  (post,  §  305/)  ; 
and  the  primariness  rule  does  not  prevent,  because  proving  the  act  of  payment  is  not 
proving  the  contents  of  the  receipt  (post,  §  563  n).] 

*  Smith  v.  Young,  1  Campb.  439  ;   Qsee  note  1,  swpra.] 

6  Singleton  v.  Barrett,  2  Cr.  &  Jer.  368  ;  (^because  the  attempt  to  reduce  the  trans- 
action to  writing  has  failed,  and  there  is  no  written  act  legally  available.] 

9  Lambe's  Case,  2  Leach  625  ;  R.  v.  Chappel,  1  Moo.  &  R.  395,  896,  n.  ;  2  Phil. 
Evid.  81,  82 ;  Roscoe's  Crim.  Evid.  46,  47  ;  [for  this  principle,  see  post,  §  227.] 

7  Dalison  v.  Stark,  4  Esp.  163  ;  Jacob  ».  Lindsay,  1  East  460  ;   Maugham  v.  Hub- 
bard,  8  B.  &C.  14;  R.  v.  Tarrant,  6  C.  &  P.  182;  R.  a.  Pressly,  id.  183;   Layer's 
Case,  16  Ho  well's  St.  Tr.  223  ;  [[because  he  is  not  testifying  to  the  instrument's  con- 
tents, but  is  merely  using  it  to  aid  recollection."] 

8  R.  r.  Hunt,  3  B.  &  A.  566  ;   Sheridan  &  Kirwan's  Case,  31  Howell's  St.  Tr. 
672.     rjThese  two  results  rest  on  different  considerations ;  the  flag  or  banner  is  not 
produced,  because  the  Primariness  rule  is  said  to  include  only  documents  in  its  scope 
(post,  §  563  n) ;  the  resolutions  are  not  produced,  because  it  is  the  oral  utterances  that 
are  being  proved,  and  not  the  writing's  contents.] 

'  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  129,  [^provided  the  printed  impression,  as  possessed  or 
posted,  is  the  thing  to  be  proved;  nee  post,  §  563;?.] 

1  ^Transferred  post,  as  §  563/.  The  following  seven  sections  deal  with  the  specific 
excuses  for  not  producing  the  writing  itself,  and  as  a  part  of  that  subject  is  also 
treated  by  the  author  post,  in  the  chapter  on  Private  Writings,  it  «eems  best  to  place 
these  sections  there ;  the  whole  subject  loses  by  a  separation  of  the  various  parts  of 
the  rule.] 

["Transferred  post.,  as  §  563  g."l 

8  ^Transferred  post,  as  §  663  h.  J 


§§  90-97  5.]      PROVING  THE  CONTENTS  OF  A  WBITING.  177 

§  94.* 
§  95.» 
§§  96,  97.« 

2.   Specific  Rules  included  under  the  Best  Evidence  Principle. 

§  97 a.  Rules  covered  by  the  Term  "Best  Evidence."  [In  the 
foregoing  sections  the  treatment  of  the  subject  deals  with  certain 
discriminations  involving  in  part  the  parol-evidence  rule,  which  is 
not  here  concerned,  and  in  part  the  specific  rule  requiring  the  pro- 
duction of  writings,  the  application  and  details  of  which  are  more 
fully  treated  in  a  later  chapter  (§§  557  ff.).  In  view  of  the  confusion 
that  may  be  thought  to  result  from  this  mingled  treatment  of  the 
best-evidence  principle  at  large,  together  with  the  parol-evidence 
rule,  and  the  specific  rule  about  producing  writings,  it  seems  best 
here  to  re-state  briefly  the  three  sorts  of  concrete  rules  which  alone 
can  be  regarded  as  the  representatives  in  practice  of  the  "best- 
evidence  "  notion.  That  phrase,  as  already  explained,  is  of  no 
service  as  a  concrete  rule  for  dealing  with  a  given  piece  of  evidence ; 
it  is  used  to  describe  loosely  the  general  policy  underlying  certain 
concrete  rules,  which,  however,  are  entirely  independent  of  each 
other,  in  history1  and  in  theory,  and  must  be  discriminated.  We 
may  here  briefly  notice  the  nature  of  these  rules,  and  the  sense  in 
which  it  may  be  said  of  them  that  they  call  for  the  best  evidence. 
They  are  of  three  general  sorts.] 

§  97  b.  (1)  Proving  the  Contents  of  a  Writing.  [The  chief  and 
most  common  application  of  the  phrase  is  to  the  rule  that  when  the 
contents  of  a  writing  are  to  be  proved,  the  writing  itself  must  be  pro- 
duced, if  it  can  be  (post,  §§  557  ff.).  The  "best"  evidence  is  thought 
of  as  the  writing  itself;  and  it  is  best  in  the  sense  that  the  inspection 
of  the  thing  itself  is  more  trustworthy  than  any  evidence  about  it 
can  be.  Perhaps  in  strictness  the  thing  itself  cannot  be  said  to  be 
evidence  of  itself  at  all ;  in  the  same  way  that  when  we  look  at  the 
sun,  we  are  not  taking  evidence  about  the  sun's  appearance ;  so  that  a 
more  proper  form  of  stating  the  rule  would  be  to  say  that  the  writing 
itself  must  be  produced,  in  preference  to  any  evidence  about  it. 

The  rule  raises  several  distinct  sorts  of  questions.  (1)  Does  the 
class  of  things  to  which  it  applies  include  only  writings,  or  does  it 
include  other  things  ?  If  the  former  only,  then  how  is  the  line  to  be 
drawn  between  writings  and  other  things  ?  (2)  Its  scope  including 
only  writings,  does  the  rule  apply  to  any  reference  to  writings  or  only 
to  their  contents  as  a  thing  to  be  proved  ?  If  the  latter  only,  then  it 
becomes  constantly  necessary  to  determine  whether  in  a  given  case  it 

4  rTransferred  post,  as  §  563  i.~\ 
6  ["Transferred  post^  as  §  563  j.J 
6  rTransferred  post,  as  §§  563  k,  563  Z.] 
i  LSee  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise,  498.] 
VOL.  I. — 12 


178  BEST   EVIDENCE   PKINCIPLE.  [CH.    VIII. 

is  the  contents  of  the  writing  that  are  concerned  or  merely  some 
accompanying  conduct.  Here,  incidentally,  a  question  under  the  parol- 
evidence  rule  may  have  to  be  settled,  i.  e.  even  though  the  offerer  of 
the  evidence  may  explicitly  attempt  to  prove  conduct  or  other  fact 
not  the  writing's  contents,  yet  the  reduction  of  the  transaction  to 
writing  by  the  parties'  intendment  may  have  superseded  the  parol 
transaction  and  prohibit  it  from  becoming  the  object  of  proof. 
(3)  Since  it  is  the  writing  presently  in  issue  which  is  required  by 
the  rule  to  be  produced  or  accounted  for,  it  is  often  necessary  to  con- 
sider what  is  the  precise  writing  desired  to  be  proved  under  the  issue, 
—  as  where  the  state  of  the  issue  must  be  looked  to  for  determining 
whether  a  reporter's  notes  or  a  printed  newspaper  impression  gen- 
erally is  the  objective  document,  or  whether  a  telegraphic  despatch  as 
received  or  as  sent  is  the  objective.  (4)  The  rule  itself  requires  the 
writing  to  be  produced  or  accounted  for  as  non-available;  and  the 
various  situations  must  be  considered  in  which  the  law  regards 
the  original  as  unavailable, — loss,  possession  by  the  opponent,  re- 
tention in  an  official  repository,  physical  impossibility  of  removal, 
and  the  like.  (5)  Supposing  the  writing  to  be  accounted  for,  ques- 
tions will  arise  as  to  the  proper  sort  of  evidence  of  its  contents,  — 
whether  one  kind  of  copy  is  preferred  to  another,  whether  a  copy  of 
a  copy  is  admissible,  whether  one  who  has  heard  the  writing  read 
may  testify  to  the  contents,  and  so  on;  most  of  which  involve  no 
peculiar  corollary  of  the  present  rule,  but  are  applications  of  some 
other  general  principle  of  evidence.  —  Such  are  the  broad  features  of 
the  rule  requiring  a  writing  to  be  produced  or  accounted  for.] 

§  97  c.  (2)  Testing  a  Witness  by  Oath  and  Cross-examination. 
[Less  commonly  nowadays,  but  frequently  up  to  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  phrase  "  best  evidence "  was  applied  to 
include  the  Hearsay  rule,1  i.  e.  the  rule  excluding  assertions  offered 
to  prove  the  fact  asserted,  made  by  persons  not  speaking  on  oath  and 
subject  to  cross-examination  (post,  §99  a).  Their  testimony  on  the 
stand  is  "  best "  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  regarded  as  trustworthy 
until  it  has  been  subjected  to  the  great  tests  of  oath  and  cross- 
examination,  and  particularly  the  latter.  It  is  thus  the  "best  evi- 
dence "  in  a  sense  practically  very  different  from  that  in  which 
the  original  of  a  writing  is  said  to  be.  Here  the  three  chief  classes 
of  questions  are  (1)  whether  the  rule  has  in  a  given  case  been  satisfied 
by  oath  and  adequate  cross-examination,  (2)  whether  in  certain 
classes  of  cases  statements  are  exceptionally  received  without  those 
tests,  and  (3)  where  the  line  is  to  be  drawn  between  utterances  to 
which  the  rule  applies  —  i.  e.  statements  of  fact  used  assertively  as 
testimony  to  the  fact  —  and  utterances  to  which  it  does  not  apply, 
—  i.  e.  utterances  used  in  other  ways  and  irrespective  of  their  truth 
as  assertions.] 

1  [E.  g.,  by  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  Omichund  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  45.] 


§§97  6-97  d.]       HEARSAY;   PREFERRED  WITNESSES.  179 

§  97  d.  (3)  Classes  of  "Witnesses  preferred  to  others.  [In  a  third 
sense,  a  party  may  be  required  to  bring  the  "best  evidence"  by  a 
rule  which  requires  him  to  resort  first  to  a  certain  class  of  witnesses, 
assumed  by  the  law  to  be  superior,  before  he  is  allowed  to  resort 
to  others.1  The  rule  of  this  sort  having  perhaps  the  most  common 
application  was  the  attesting-witness  rule ;  but  it  is  worth  while  to 
note  tlicit  there  are  a  number  of  others  resting  on  the  same  or  an 
analogous  principle,  especially  as  they  are  commonly  treated  under 
various  separate  heads. 

(1)  The  attesting-witness  rule  (post,  §  569)  is  the  particular  one 
of    this  type  to  which  the  "  best-evidence  "  phrase  was  in  one  of 
its  senses  applied.     This   rule  is  that,  in  proving  the  execution  of 
a  document,  the   attesting   witness   must   be  called,    if   he   can  be 
had,   before  any  other  can  be  used.     Thus  the  chief  inquiries  are 
(a)  how  many  must  be  called,  and  whether  they  must  testify  favor- 
ably if  called,  and  the  like ;  (b)  in  what  situations  they  are  to  be 
regarded   as   xinavailable,  —  death,   absence    from   the    jurisdiction, 
illness,  and  the  like;    (c)  if  they   are  unavailable,    what  the  next 
grade  or  step  of  testimony  should  be,  —  the  witness'  handwriting, 
or  the  maker's,  or  both,  and  the  like ;   (d)  whether  there  are  to  be 
exceptions   to  the  rule  where  the  opponent  admits  the  document's 
execution,  or  claims  under  it,  or  where  it  is  an  ancient  document; 
and  the   like ;    (e)  what  is  the  scope   of  the   rule   as   regards  the 
class  of  documents  to  which  it  applies,  —  whether  to   all  attested 
documents,  or  only  to  those  mainly  in  issue,  or  only  to  those  reqiiired 
by  law  to  be  attested,  and  the  like.     Thus,  the  "  best  evidence  "  re- 
quired by  this  rule  is  in  no  sense  the  same  as  that  required  by  the 
rules  of  the  two  preceding  sections. 

(2)  In  modern  times,  in  some  American  jurisdictions,  an  effort  has 
been  made  to  introduce  an  analogous  rule,  binding  the  prosecution 
in  criminal  cases  to  call  all  the  known  and  available  eye-witnesses 
of  the   alleged   crime,  —  in   particular,    of  a  homicide;2    but  this 
attempt,  founded  apparently  on  a  misunderstood  English  practice,8 
has  received  no  wide  acceptance  by  the  Courts.4 

(3)  Occasionally,  in  a  few  other  instances,6  an  attempt,  usually 
futile,  has  been  made  to  treat  as  preferred  witnesses,  certain  persons 
who  would  presumably  know  more  of  the  matter  in  hand  than  other 

1  [This  usage,  as  applied  to  the  attesting-witness  rule,  was  formerly  not  uncommon  : 
e.  g.  Grose,  J.,  in  Stone's  Trial,  25  How.  St.  Tr.  1313.] 

2  [People  v.  Considiue,  Mich.,  63  N.  W.  196 ;  People  v.  Resh,  id.,  65  N.  W.  99  ; 
People  v.  Hughes,  id.,  74  N.  W.  309;   State  v.  Slack,  Vt.,  38  Atl.  311;   State  v. 
Metcalf,  Mont.,  43  Pac.  182.] 

8  TSee  R.  v.  Vincent,  3  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1037,  1064.] 

4  [See  a  good  opinion  in  Reyons  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  1 43  ;  compare  State  v.  Harlan, 
Mo.,  32  S.  W.  997  ;  Siberry  v.  State,  133  Ind.  677,  685  ;  Carlisle  v.  State,  Miss.,  19 
So.  207 ;  State  v.  Payne,  Wash.,  39  Pac.  57.] 

6  [Perhaps  taking  a  cue  from  the  extreme  ruling  of  Lord  Ellenborough  in  Williams 
v.  East  India  Co.,  3  East  192.] 


180  BEST  EVIDENCE   PRINCIPLE.  [CH.   VIIL 

persons, — for  example,  the  alleged  writer  of  a  document,8   or  the 
owner  of  goods  alleged  to  have  been  stolen.7 

(4)  The  rule,  in  some  places  prevailing,  that  in  prosecutions  for 
bigamy,  etc.,  or  actions  for  criminal  conversation,  that  a  "  marriage 
in  fact "    must  be  proved,  i.  e.  the  ceremonial  exchange  of  consent 
instead  of  mere  cohabitation,  seems  to  involve  in  effect  a  rule  of  a 
similar  sort,  viz.,  that  eye-witnesses  of  an  act  of  exchange  of  con- 
sent are  preferred  to  circumstantial  evidence  of  the  exchange  of 
consent.8 

(5)  Certain  official  reports  of  testimony  delivered   are  usually 
thought  to  be  preferred  to  any  other  person's  account  of  the  same 
testimony,  —  in  particular,  the  report  of  a  coroner,  or  of  a  magistrate 
holding  a  preliminary  examination,  of  the  testimony  given   before 
him.     Here  it  might  be  thought  that  the  magistrate's  report  was  in 
effect  adopted  by  the  witness  himself,  in  signing  it,  as  his  testimony, 
and  thus  superseded  his  oral  utterances,  on  the  principle  of  the  parol 
evidence  rule,  but  the  doctrine  seems  to  apply  even  where  the  wit- 
ness does  not  sign  the  report ;  and  since  in  that  case  the  witness* 
oral  utterance   remains   the   object  of  the   proof,  the   magistrate's 
report  appears  to  be  in  effect  a  preferred  testimony  to  the  terms  of 
the  witness'  utterance.9     Moreover,  in  many  Courts  the  preference 
is  carried  further  and  made  absolute,  i.  e.  the  report  is  not  allowed 
to  be  contradicted  by  other  witnesses.     The  application  of  this  rule 
to  the  case  of  an  accused's  examination  is  treated  in  another  chapter 
(post,  Confessions,  §  227),  and   accordingly  the  authorities  dealing 
with  the  same  principle   as  applied  to  other  witnesses  are  there 
referred  to. 

(6)  Certain  other  official  records  or  reports    are  apparently  pre- 
ferred in  the  same  way,   and   sometimes  preferred   absolutely  and 
exclusively,  in  the  above  sense.     For  example,  the  enrolled  statute, 
as  certified  to  by  the  presiding  officers  of  a  legislature,  the  Governor, 
and  the  Secretary  of  State,  is  by  the  better  doctrine  the  exclusive 
evidence  of  the  terms  of  a  statute  and  the  circumstances  of  its  enact- 
ment; I0  so  also,  a  sheriff's  return  is  by  some  Courts  regarded  as  the 
exclusive  evidence,  even  between  strangers  to  the  suit,  of  the  acts 
done  by  him,  and  subject  to  dispute  only  on  the  ground  of  fraud  or 
the  like.     But  in  these  instances  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  they 
are   not  genuine   instances  of  preferred   testimony,  but  are   rather 
instances  of  one  form  of  the  parol-evidence  rule,  i.  e.  the  certificate 

8  £Anfe,  §  82  ;  sec  McCully  o.  Malcotn,  9  Humph.  187 ;  Lefferts  v.  State,  49  N.  J. 
L.  26 ;  also  Foulke's  Case,  2  Hob.  Va.  836.] 

7  [Ante,  §  82  ;  see  Perry  v.  State,  Nebr.,  63  N.  W.  26  ;  Rema  v.  State,  id.,  72  N.  W. 
474  ;  State  v.  Morey,  2  Wis.  494  ;  State  v.  Moon,  41  id.  683  ;  Rapalje,  Larceny,  §  135. 
For  sundry  other  instances,  see  Com.  v.  James,  1  Pick.  375  ;  Koster  v.  Reed,  6  B.  & 
C.  19  ;  Sparks  v.  Rawls,  17  Ala.  211  ;  White  v.  Fox,  1  Bibb  369;  Bowling  v.  Helm, 
ib.  88  ;  Domschke  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  42  N.  E.  804.] 

•  [See  ;*>.«,  Vol.  II,  §§  49,  461  ;  Vol.  Ill,  §  205.] 

9  fSce  this  question  of  theory  further  examined  post,  §  305  0.] 
19  LPost,  §  480  J 


§  97  dJ\         CLASSES   OF  WITNESSES   PEEFEEEED   TO   OTHEES.  181 

or  the  return  is  not  merely  testimony  of  the  act  done,  but  is  the  very 
act  itself;  in  other  words,  that  for  purposes  of  legal. action,  the 
effective  thing  is  the  writing  alone,  and  not  the  conduct  purporting 
to  be  recorded  therein.  In  any  case,  whether  this  be  the  true  view  or 
not,  the  questions  are  so  involved  with  the  rules  of  substantive  law 
applicable  to  the  respective  situations  that  it  is  unprofitable  to  exam- 
ine them  in  a  treatise  upon  evidence.11 

(7)  In  many  other  such  instances,  however,  in  which  the  phrase 
"  best  evidence  "  is  often  employed,  the  question  is  in  truth  one 
of  substantive  law,  and  not  at  all  one  of  preferred  testimony.  It 
is  said,  for  example,  that  the  record  of  a  Court  is  the  best  evidence 
of  its  proceedings,  as  compared  with  other  testimony  to  the  pro- 
ceedings or  with  the  clerk's  minutes  or  docket-entries ;  but  the 
truth  is  that  the  Court's  written  record  is  the  proceeding  itself,  — 
the  only  thing  which  the  law  will  regard  as  the  acta  of  the  Court ; 
and  so  the  frequent  questions  involving  this  subject  are  in  reality 
questions  of  the  substantive  law  as  to  what  constitutes  for  legal 
purposes  a  judicial  act.11  Again,  the  notary's  or  magistrate's  record 
of  a  married  woman's  acknowledgment  of  consent  to  her  deed, 
though  often  spoken  of  as  the  "best  evidence,"  is,  as  generally 
treated,  not  testimony  to  the  act,  but,  the  very  act  itself  and  the 
only  thing  to  which  the  law  will  attach  legal  consequences ; u  though 
in  some  jurisdictions  its  verity  may  be  disputed  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, and  it  then  takes  its  place  with  the  instances  just 
mentioned  in  (6).  Finally,  the  parol-evidence  rule  itself,  though 
sometimes  associated  with  the  phrase  "best  evidence,"  is  in  truth 
not  a  doctrine  about  preferred  testimony,  but  a  doctrine  of  substan- 
tive law  specifying  what  sorts  of  transactions  are  to  be  treated  as 
acts  for  the  purpose  of  giving  them  legal  effect,  i.e.  what  things 
may  be  proved  at  all,  and  not  how  they  may  be  proved.12] 

11  TSee  this  question  of  theory  further  examined  post,  §  305  </.] 
"  [Post,  §  305  a.] 


182 


THE   HEAJRSAY   EULE. 


[CH.   IX. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


THE   HEARSAY   RULE. 


§§  98-99  a.  General  Principle. 
Hearsay  Rule  not  applicable. 

§  100.  Rule  applies  only  to  Testimonial 
Assertions. 

§  101.  Words  used  Evidentially,  though 
not  Testimonially. 


§  108.  Verbal  Acts,  or  Verbal  Parts  of 
an  Act. 

§110.  Same:  Statements  after  the  Act 
ended,  inadmissible. 

§  110  a.  Words  Material  as  a  Part  of 
the  Issue. 


§  98.  General  Principle.  The  first  degree  of  moral  evidence,  and 
that  which  is  most  satisfactory  to  the  mind,  is  afforded  by  our  own 
senses;  this  being  direct  evidence  of  the  highest  nature.  Where 
this  cannot  be  had,  as  is  generally  the  case  in  the  proof  of  facts  by 
oral  testimony,  the  law  requires  the  next  best  evidence;  namely, 
the  testimony  of  those  who  can  speak  from  their  own  personal 
knowledge.  It  is  not  requisite  that  the  witness  should  have  per- 
sonal knowledge  of  the  main  fact  in  controversy,  for  this  may  not 
be  provable  by  direct  testimony,  but  only  by  inference  from  other 
facts  shown  to  exist.  But  it  is  requisite  that,  whatever  facts  the 
witness  may  speak  to,  he  should  be  confined  to  those  lying  in  his 
own  knowledge,  whether  they  be  things  said  or  done,  and  should 
not  testify  from  information  given  by  others,  however  worthy  of 
credit  they  may  be.  For  it  is  found  indispensable,  as  a  test  of 
truth  and  to  the  proper  administration  of  justice,  that  every  living 
witness  should,  if  possible,  be  subjected  to  the  ordeal  of  a  cross- 
examination,  that  it  may  appear  what  were  his  powers  of  per- 
ception, his  opportunities  for  observation,  his  attentiveness  in 
observing,  the  strength  of  his  recollection,  and  his  disposition  to 
speak  the  truth.  But  testimony  from  the  relation  of  third  persons, 
even  where  the  informant  is  known,  cannot  be  subjected  to  this  test; 
nor  is  it  often  possible  to  ascertain  through  whom,  or  how  many 
persons,  the  narrative  has  been  transmitted  from  the  original  wit- 
ness of  the  fact.  It  is  this  which  constitutes  that  sort  of  second- 
hand evidence  termed  "hearsay." 

§  99.  The  term  "  hearsay  "  is  used  with  reference  to  that  which  is 
written,  as  well  as  to  that  which  is  spoken;  and,  in  its  legal  sense, 
it  denotes  that  kind  of  evidence  which  does  not  derive  its  value 
solely  from  the  credit  to  be  given  to  the  witness  himself,  but  rests 


§§  98-99  a.]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLE.  183 

also,  in  part,  on  the  veracity  and  competency  of  some  other  person.1 
Hearsay  evidence,  as  thus  described,  is  uniformly  held  incompetent 
to  establish  any  specific  fact,  which,  in  its  nature,  is  susceptible  of 
being  proved  by  witnesses  who  can  speak  from  their  own  knowledge. 
That  this  species  of  testimony  supposes  something  better,  which 
might  be  adduced  in  the  particular  case,  is  not  the  sole  ground  of  its 
exclusion.  Its  extrinsic  weakness,  its  incompetency  to  satisfy  the 
mind  as  to  the  existence  of  the  fact,  and  the  frauds  which  may  be 
practised  under  its  cover,  combine  to  support  the  rule  that  hearsay 
evidence  is  totally  inadmissible.2 

§  99  a  [124].  Subject  to  these  qualifications  and  seeming  excep- 
tions [to  be  later  examined,]  the  general  rule  of  law  rejects  all  hear- 
say reports  of  transactions,  whether  verbal  or  written,  given  by 
persons  not  produced  as  witnesses.1  The  principle  of  this  rule  is, 
that  such  evidence  requires  credit  to  be  given  to  a  statement  made 
by  a  person  who  is  not  subjected  to  the  ordinary  tests  enjoined  by 
the  law  for  ascertaining  the  correctness  and  completeness  of  his  tes- 
timony; namely,  that  oral  testimony  should  be  delivered  in  the 
presence  of  the  Court  or  a  magistrate,  under  the  moral  and  legal 
sanctions  of  an  oath,  and  where  the  moral  and  intellectual  char- 
acter, the  motives  and  deportment  of  the  witness  can  be  examined, 
and  his  capacity  and  opportunities  for  observation,  and  his  memory, 
can  be  tested  by  a  cross-examination.  Such  evidence,  moreover,  as 
to  oral  declarations,  is  very  liable  to  be  fallacious,  and  its  value  is, 
therefore,  greatly  lessened  by  the  probability  that  the  declaration 
was  imperfectly  heard,  or  was  misunderstood,  or  is  not  accurately 
remembered,  or  has  been  perverted.  It  is  also  to  be  observed,  that 
the  persons  communicating  such  evidence  are  not  exposed  to  the 
danger  of  a  prosecution  for  perjury,  in  which  something  more  than 
the  testimony  of  one  witness  is  necessary,  in  order  to  a  conviction ; 
for  where  the  declaration  or  statement  is  sworn  to  have  been  made 
when  no  third  person  was  present,  or  by  a  person  who  is  since 
dead,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  punish  the  witness,  even  if  his  testi- 
mony is  an  entire  fabrication.3  To  these  reasons  may  be  added 
considerations  of  public  interest  and  convenience  for  rejecting  hear- 
say evidence.  The  greatly  increased  expense  and  the  vexation  which 
the  adverse  party  must  incur  in  order  to  rebut  or  explain  it,  the 
vast  consumption  of  public  time  thereby  occasioned,  the  multipli- 
cation of  collateral  issues  for  decision  by  the  jury,  and  the  danger 

1  Phil.  Evid.  185. 

2  Per  Marshall,  C.  J.,  in  Mima  Queen  w.  Hepburn,  7  Cranch  290,  295,  296 ;  Davis 
v.  Wood,  1  Wheat.  6,  8;  R.  v.  Eriswell,  3  T.  R.  707. 

1  "If,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Buller,  "the  first  speech  were  without  oath,  another  oath, 
that  there  was  such  speech,  makes  it  no  more  than  a  bare  speaking,  and  so  of  no  value 
in  a  court  of  justice  :*'  Bull.  N.  P.  294. 

a  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  217  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  205,  206.  See,  ns  to  the  liability  of 
words  to  misconstruction,  the  remarks  of  Mr.  Justice  Foster,  in  his  discourse  011  High 
Treason,  ch.  1,  §  7- 


184  THE   HEARSAY   KULE.  [CH.    IX. 

of  losing  sight  of  the  main  question  and  of  the  justice  of  the  case 
if  this  sort  of  proof  were  admitted,  are  considerations  of  too  grave  a 
character  to  be  overlooked  by  the  Court  or  the  Legislature,  in  deter- 
mining the  question  of  changing  the  rule.8 

[The  truth  seems  to  be  that,  among  the  preceding  reasons  for 
rejecting  hearsay  assertions,  the  vital  and  determinative  one  is  that 
stated  at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  viz.,  the  desirability  of 
testing  all  testimonial  assertions  by  the  oath  and  by  cross-examina- 
tion. Thus,  a  favorite  passage,  found  in  several  works  in  the  last 
century,  is :  "  It  seems  agreed  that  what  another  has  been  heard  to 
say  is  no  evidence,  because  the  party  was  not  on  oath,  also  because 
the  party  who  is  affected  thereby  had  not  an  opportunity  of  cross- 
examining  ; "  *  and  the  Hearsay  rule  is  constantly  expounded  as  "  the 
general  rule  of  not  receiving  evidence  unless  upon  oath  and  with  the 
opportunity  for  cross-examination;"6  thus,  Swift,  C.  J.,  in  Chap- 
man v.  Chapman : 6  "  It  is  a  general  principle  in  the  law  of  evidence 
that  hearsay  from  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  suit  is  not  admissible ; 
because  such  person  was  not  under  oath  and  the  opposite  party  had 
no  opportunity  to  cross-examine;"  Ewing,  C.  J.,  in  Westfield  v. 
Warren : 7  "  [The  declarations]  were  made  without  oath,  in  no 
judicial  proceeding,  and  in  the  absence  of  the  present  parties.  .  .  . 
They  are  only  the  declarations  of  persons  not  sworn  and  not  cross- 
examined.  .  .  .  The  evidence  then  is  purely  of  the  kind  denom- 
inated hearsay;"  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Warren  v.  Nichols.-*  "The  general 
rule  is  that  one  person  cannot  be  heard  to  testify  as  to  what  an- 
other person  has  declared  in  relation  to  a  fact  within  his  knowledge 
and  bearing  on  the  issue.  It  is  the  familiar  rule  which  excludes 
hearsay.  The  reasons  are  obvious,  and  they  are  two :  first,  because 
the  averment  of  fact  does  not  come  to  the  jury  sanctioned  by  the  oath 
of  the  party  on  whose  knowledge  it  is  supposed  to  rest;  and, 
secondly,  because  the  party  upon  whose  interests  it  is  brought  to 
bear  has  no  opportunity  to  cross-examine  him  on  whose  supposed 
knowledge  and  veracity  the  truth  of  the  fact  depends."*  The 
Hearsay  rule,  then,  is  encountered  whenever  a  testimonial  assertion 
is  offered  in  evidence  without  being  subjected  to  oath  and  cross- 

8  Mima  Queen  v.  Hepburn,  7  Cranch  290,  296,  per  Marshall,  C.  J. 
«  [Bacon's  Abridgm.,  Evidence,  (K);  Hawkins,  PI.  Cr.  II,  596,  B.  II,  c.  46,  s.  44; 
compare  Craig  v.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1160.] 

6  fAbbott,  C.  J.,  in  Doe  ».  Ridgway,  4  B.  &  Aid.  54.] 


'2  Conn.  348.1 
'8  N.  J.  L.  250.3 
6  Mete.  261.T 


*  £See  also  Couman  and  Bosanquet,  JJ.,  in  Wright  v.  Tatharn,  7  A.  &  E.  813 ; 
Richardson,  J.,  in  State  v.  Campbell,  1  Rich.  L.  126  ;  Yerger,  J.,  in  Lampley  v.  Scott, 
24  Miss.  539 ;  Johnson,  C.  J.,  in  Cornelius  v.  State,  12  Ark.  804  ;  Bartlev,  C.  J.,  in 
Simmons  r.  State,  5  Oh.  St.  343  ;  Voorhies,  J.,  in  State  v.  Brunetto,  13  La.  An.  45  ; 
Breese,  C.  J.,  in  Marshall  v.  R.  Co.,  48  111.  476  ;  Kingman,  C.  J.,  in  State  v.  Medli- 
cott,  9  Kan.  287  ;  being  a  few  other  precedents,  out  of  many,  in  which  the  reason,  is 
stated  in  similar  terms. J 


§§  99  0-100.]    RULE  APPLIES  ONLY  TO  TESTIMONIAL  ASSERTIONS.   185 

examination.10  Thus,  three  distinct  groups  of  questions  present 
themselves  in  connection  with  the  Hearsay  rule,  viz. :  A.  Is  the 
Hearsay  rule  applicable  to  the  case  in  hand,  i.  e.  is  the  evidence 
offered  as  a  testimonial  assertion  ?  B.  Is  there  any  exception  to  the 
Hearsay  rule  to  be  made  for  the  evidence  offered  ?  C.  If  the  Hear- 
say rule  is  applicable,  and  if  no  recognized  exception  covers  the  case 
in  hand,  is  the  Hearsay  rule  satisfied,  i.  e.  has  there  been,  in  fact, 
an  oath  and  cross-examination  ?  The  first  of  these  groups  of  ques- 
tions is  treated  in  the  ensuing  sections  100-114  ;  the  second,  in 
sections  114  a  to  162  ;  the  third,  in  sections  163  to  168.] 

Hearsay  Rule  not  Applicable. 

§  100.  Rule  applies  only  to  Testimonial  Assertions.  Before  we 
proceed  any  farther  in  the  discussion  of  this  branch  of  evidence,  it 
will  be  proper  to  distinguish  more  clearly  between  hearsay  evidence 
and  that  which  is  deemed  original.  For  it  does  not  follow,  because 
the  writing  or  words  in  question  are  those  of  a  third  person,  not 
under  oath,  that  therefore  they  are  to  be  considered  as  hearsay. 
On  the  contrary  it  happens,  in  many  cases,  that  the  very  fact  in 
controversy  is  whether  such  things  were  written  or  spoken,  and  not 
whether  they  were  true;  and,  in  other  cases,  such  language  or 
statements,  whether  written  or  spoken,  may  be  the  natural  or  in- 
separable concomitants  of  the  principal  fact  in  controversy.  In 
such  cases  it  is  obvious  that  the  writings  or  words  are  not  within 
the  meaning  of  hearsay,  but  are  original  and  independent  facts,  ad- 
missible in  proof  of  the  issue. 

[The  term  "original,"  however,  as  used  to  distinguish  matter  not 
obnoxious  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  is  not  the  most  fortunate,  because  it 
has  also  and  chiefly  an  association  with  the  rule  requiring  the  produc- 
tion of  the  original  of  a  writing  (ante,  §§  82  ff.),  and  because  it  does 
not  clearly  convey  the  reason  of  the  distinction.  The  essence  of  the 
distinction  is  between  the  use  of  utterances  as  testimonial  assertions 
and  their  use  other  than  as  testimonial  assertions.  Thus  when  the 
assertion  of  A  that  fact  x  exists  is  offered  for  the  purpose  of  induc- 
ing the  tribunal  to  believe  that  fact  x  exists  because  A  says  that  it 
does,  A's  utterance  is  offered  testimonially,  i.  e.  as  if  A  were  a  wit- 
ness  to  fact  #,  and  the  Hearsay  rule  here  requires  that  A's  asser- 
tion, to  be  receivable,  must  be  made  under  oath  and  subject  to 
cross-examination.  But  if  A's  utterance  is  offered,  not  as  evidence 
that  the  fact  asserted  in  it  exists  —  or,  as  is  sometimes  and  less 
accurately  said ,  irrespective  of  the  truth  of  the  assertion,  —  but  in 
some  other  aspect  —  for  example,  as  showing  that  B  heard  what  A 

10  Qt  is  sometimes  said  that  there  must  also  be  Confrontation  ;  but  Confrontation, 
so  far  as  it  is  indispensable,  is  merely  a  mode  of  securing  cross-examination  ;  this  aul* 
ject  is  treated  post,  §  163  ff.J 


186  THE   HEAESAY  EULE ;    SCOPE.  [CH.   IX. 

said,  or  as  being  a  part  of  a  contractual  act,  —  then  it  is  not  obnox- 
ious to  the  Hearsay  rule,  and  stands  or  falls  according  to  such 
other  evidential  rules  as  may  affect  it. 

Those  utterances,  then,  to  which  the  Hearsay  rule  is  not  appli- 
cable, and  which  may  be  received  so  far  at  least  as  that  rule  is  con- 
cerned, may  be  grouped  roughly  into  three  classes.  The  principle 
is  in  each  of  these  simple  and  clear  enough,  though  its  application 
in  given  instances  is  sometimes  difficult.  These  classes  are:  1.  Ut- 
terances (or  words)  used  evidentially,  though  not  as  evidence  of  a 
fact  asserted  in  them ;  2.  Utterances  accompanying  ambiguous  con- 
duct and  serving  to  color  and  complete  it  as  an  act,  —  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  "verbal  acts;"  3.  Utterances  material  to  the  case 
under  some  one  of  the  issues;  this  and  the  preceding  class  are 
usually  denoted  by  the  term  res  gestce  in  one  of  its  uses.  These 
three  may  be  considered  in  the  above  order.] 

§  101.  Words  used  evidentially,  though  not  testimonially. 
[Words  or  utterances,  or  the  fact  of  the  utterance  of  certain  words, 
may  often  be  evidential  indirectly,  — usually  of  the  state  of  mind  of 
a  person  to  whom  they  are  addressed.  In  this  aspect,  the  truth  of 
any  assertion  they  may  contain  is  immaterial.  Thus,  Lord  Abinger 
says:1  "If  a  man  called  another  a  liar,  and  was  knocked  down,  the 
plaintiff"  in  an  action  for  the  battery  "would  not  be  allowed  to 
prove  on  the  trial  of  the  assault  that  the  defendant  was  really  and 
in  point  of  fact  a  liar,  because  evidence  of  provocation  is  admitted 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  feelings  of  the  party  (defend- 
ant) were  excited;"  i.  e.,  the  plaintiff's  utterance  is  evidence  of  the 
defendant's  excited  mental  condition.  Again,  the  issue  being  whether 
an  arrest  was  ordered  under  reasonable  apprehension  by  the  defendant 
of  violence,  and  evidence  being  offered  that  some  one  had  reported  to 
the  defendant  that  the  plaintiff  was  raising  a  mob,  it  was  objected 
that  "Hearsay  is  no  evidence;"  but  Mr.  J.  Gould  answered:2  "We 
do  not  take  it  for  granted  that  it  is  really  so;  only  that  this  gen- 
tleman, hearing  of  this,  tells  the  Governor."  And  in  general,] 
where  the  question  is,  whether  the  party  acted  prudently,  wisely, 
or  in  good  faith,  the  information  on  which  he  acted,  whether  true 
or  false,  is  original  and  material  evidence.  This  is  often  illustrated 
in  actions  for  malicious  prosecution ;  *  and  also  in  cases  of  agency 
and  of  trusts.  So,  also,  letters  and  conversation  addressed  to  a  per- 
son, whose  sanity  is  the  fact  in  question,  being  connected  in  evidence 
with  some  act  done  by  him,  are  original  evidence  to  show  whether 

»  TFraser  v.  Berkeley,  7  C.  &  P.  625.1 

2  PFabrigas  "•  Mostyn,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  137.] 

8  LTaylor  i>.  Willans,  2  B.  &  Ad.  845.  ["For  the  evidential  use  of  such  utterances, 
see  ante,  §  14  p;  see  other  examples  in  Kedford  v.  Bailey,  1  St.  Tr.  N.  8.  1071, 
1174  (information  to  a  magistrate  aa  to  danger  from  a  mob)  ;  Bacon  v.  Towne,  4  Gush. 
240  (malicious  prosecution)  ;  Taylor  v.  Williams,  2  B.  &  Ad.  845,  858  (reason  for 
admitting  to  bail).] 


§§  100-101.]    WORDS  USED  EVIDENTIALLY,  NOT  TESTIMONIALLY.     187 

he  was  insane  or  not.4  The  replies  given  to  inquiries  made  at  the 
residence  of  an  absent  witness,6  or  at  the  dwelling-house  of  a  bank- 
rupt, denying  that  he  was  at  home,  are  also  original  evidence.6  In 
these  and  the  like  cases,  It  is  not  necessary  to  call  the  persons  to 
whom  the  inquiries  were  addressed,  since  their  testimony  could 
add  nothing  to  the  credibility  of  the  fact  of  the  denial,  which  is  the 
only  fact  that  is  material.  This  doctrine  applies  to  all  other  com- 
munications, wherever  the  fact  that  such  communication  was  made, 
and  not  its  truth  or  falsity,  is  the  point  in  controversy.7  Upon  the 
same  principle,  it  is  considered  that  evidence  of  general  reputation, 
reputed  ownership,  public  rumor,  general  notoriety,  and  the  like, 
though  composed  of  the  speech  of  third  persons  not  under  oath,  is 
original  evidence,  and  not  hearsay  (the  subject  of  inquiry  being  the 
concurrence  of  many  voices  to  the  same  fact),  [so  far  as  it  is  offered, 
not  to  prove  the  fact  reputed  to  be  true,  but  merely  the  probability 
that  through  the  reputation,  rumor,  or  other  communication  a  party 
has  become  aware  of  a  certain  fact  if  it  existed ; 8  "  whether  in  fact 
such  information  was  or  was  not  correct  is  immaterial  for  the  pur- 
pose of  determining  its  admissibility ;  and  hence  it  is  no  objection 
to  its  admission  that  it  was  not  given  under  the  sanction  of  an 
oath  or  that  the  opposite  party  had  not  the  opportunity  of  cross- 
examining  the  informant;  .  .  .  such  evidence  is  admitted  merely 
for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the  utterance  of  the  words,  and  not 
their  truth." 9  Again,  the  fact  or  the  time  of  a  conversation  may  be 
evidential  in  identifying  an  occasion,  act,  or  person,  for  the  purposes 
of  the  cause ;  as  where  to  identify  the  time  of  a  sale,  the  fact  that 
A's  testimony  to  it  was  given  at  a  certain  time  before  a  magistrate 
was  admitted;10  or  maybe  evidential  in  explaining  how  an  event 
became  fixed  in  the  memory.11  In  the  same  way,  prior  inconsistent 

*  Wheeler  v.  Alderson,  3  Hagg.  Eccl.  574,  608  ;  Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  El.  3, 
8  ;  8.  c.  7  id.  313  ;  8.  c.  4  Bing.  N.  C.  489  ;  Q>ut  merely  because  all  conduct  of  an 
alleged  insane  person   is   receivable   as   indirectly,   not  testimonially,   showing  the 
workings  of  his  mind  ;  as,  where  he  has  said,   "  I  am  the  Emperor  of  America,"  the 
statement  is  not  received  as  evidence  of  the  fact  asserted,  but  merely  as  circumstantial 
evidence  of  his  irrationality  ;  this  class  of  evidence  is  treated  ante,  §  14  Z.] 

6  fj/.  e.,  as  evidence  of  the  reasonableness  and  diligence  of  the  search  for  him  : 
Spaulding  v.  R.  Co.,  98  la.  205.] 

6  Crosby  v.  Percy,  1  Taunt.  364  ;  Morgan  v.  Morgan,  9  Bing.  359  ;  Sumner  v.  Wil- 
liams, 5  Mass.  444  ;  Pelletreau  v.  Jackson,  11  Wend.  110,  123,  124  ;   Key  v.  Shaw, 
8  Bing.  320 ;  Phelps  v.  Foot,  1  Conn.  387 ;  Qthis  seems  rather  to  belong  in  the  next 
section.] 

7  Whitehead  v.  Scott,  1  Moo.  &  R.  2;  Shott  v.  Streatfield,  ib.  8  ;  1  Ph.  Evid.  188. 

8  Foulkes  v.  Sellway,  3  Esp.  236  ;  Jones  v.  Perry,  2  id.  482 ;  R.  o.  Watson,  2  Stark. 
116  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  296,  297. 

*  [[Harrison,  J.,  in  Smith  v.  Whittier,  92  Cal.  298  ;  for  the  uses  of  this  clasa  of 
evidence,  see  ante,  §  1 4  p.     For  the  use  of  reputation  as  evidence  of  the  fact  reputed, 
under  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  see  post,  §§  128  ff.] 

10  ["Com.  v.  Sullivan,  123  Mass.  221 ;  see  other  instances  in  Barrows  v.  State,  80  Ga. 
194;  Earle  v.  Earle,  11  All.  1;  Weeks  v.  Lyndon,  54  Vt.  640,  647;  People  v.  Mead, 
58  Mich.  229  ;  R.  t».  Richardson,  2  Cox  Cr.  361  ;  Com.  v.  Pi^r,  120  Mass.  187-3 

u  Howser  v.  Com.,  51  Pa.  341  ;  Cole  v.  R.  Co.,  105  Mich.  549.] 


188  THE   HEARSAY  RULE  ;    SCOPE.  [CH.   IX. 

statements  are  used  to  impeach  a  witness  ;  12  the  process  of  impeach- 
ment, indeed,  furnishes  numerous  illustrations  of  the  principle.18] 

§  102.1 

§§  103-106.* 

§  107.» 

§  108.  Verbal  Acts,  or  Verbal  Parts  of  an  Act  There  are  other 
declarations  which  are  admitted  as  original  evidence,  being  distin- 
guished from  hearsay  by  their  connection  with  the  principal  fact 
under  investigation.  The  affairs  of  men  consist  of  a  complication  of 
circumstances  so  intimately  interwoven  as  to  be  hardly  separable 
from  each  other.  Each  owes  its  birth  to  some  preceding  circum- 
stance, and,  in  its  turn,  becomes  the  prolific  parent  of  others  ;  and 
each,  during  its  existence,  has  its  inseparable  attributes,  and  its  kin- 
dred facts,  materially  affecting  its  character,  and  essential  to  be 
known  in  order  to  a  right  understanding  of  its  nature.  These  sur- 
rounding circumstances,  constituting  parts  of  the  res  gestce,  may  al- 
ways be  shown  to  the  jury,  along  with  the  principal  fact  ;  and  their 
admissibility  is  determined  by  the  judge,  according  to  the  degree  of 
their  relation  to  that  fact,  and  in  the  exercise  of  his  sound  discretion  ; 
it  being  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  bring  this  class  of 
cases  within  the  limits  of  a  more  particular  description.1  The  prin- 
cipal points  of  attention  are,  whether  the  circumstances  and  declara- 
tions offered  in  proof  were  contemporaneous  with  the  main  fact  under 
consideration,  and  whether  they  were  so  connected  with  it  as  to  illus- 
trate its  character.8  [The  true  nature  of  this  use  of  words,  however, 
seems  best  understood  by  remembering  that  many  acts,  or  instances  of 
conduct,  have  for  legal  purposes  no  intrinsic  significance,  or  only  an 
ambiguous  one,  until  we  take  into  consideration  the  words  (or  the  in- 
tention expressed  in  the  words)  accompanying  them.  "  Many  acts 
are  in  themselves  of  an  equivocal  nature,  and  the  effect  of  them  de- 
pends upon  the  intention  or  disposition  from  which  they  proceed, 
which  is  in  general  best  determined  by  the  expressions  accompanying 
them.  Wherever,  therefore,  the  demeanor  of  a  person  at  a  given  time 
becomes  the  object  of  inquiry,  his  expressions,  as  constituting  a  part 

w  rSee/xw*,  §461  / 


M  [See  e.  g.,  post,  §§450,  469  J.] 
1  ^ 


Transferred  post,  as  §§  162  a,  162  b  ;  it  deals  with  declarations  of  mental  nnd 
physical  condition,  which  form  in  truth  one  of  the  exceptions  to  the  Hearsay  rule.] 

a  [^Transferred  post,  as  §§  114c-114/;  dealing  with  pedigree-declarations,  which  also 
form  an  exception/] 

•  ["Transferred  post,  as  §  140  c  ;  dealing  with  habit  and  repute  as  evidence  of  mar- 
ria^.'.J 

»  Per  Park,  J.,  in  Rawson  v.  Hatgh,  2  Bing.  104  ;  Ridley  v.  Gyde,  9  id.  349,  352; 
Pool  v.  Bridges,  4  Pick.  379  ;  Allen  v.  Duncan,  11  id.  309. 

*  Declarations,  to  become  part  of  the  res  gcstcs,  "  must  have  been  made  at  the  time 
of  the  act  done,  which  they  are  supposed  to  characterize  ;  and  have  been  well  calculated 
to  unfold  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  facts  they  were  intended  to  explain,  and  so  to 
harmonize  with  them  as  obviously  to  constitute  one  transaction  ;  "  per  Hosmer,  C.  J., 
in  Enos  v.  Tuttle,  8  Conn.  250.    And  see  In  re  Taylor,  9  Paige  611  ;   Carter  v.  Buchan- 
nou,  3  Kelley  513;  Blood  v.  Rideout,  13  Met.  237;  Boyden  v.  Burke,  14  How.  575. 


§§  101-108.]   VERBAL  ACTS,  OB  VERBAL  PARTS  OF  AN  ACT.   189 

of  that  demeanor  and  as  indicating  his  present  intent  and  disposition, 
cannot  properly  be  rejected  in  evidence  as  irrelevant."  *  In  the  old 
form,  for  example,  of  livery  of  seisin,  "  in  taking  in  his  hand  the  deed 
and  the  ring  of  the  doore  (if  it  be  of  an  house)  or  a  turffe  or  twigge 
(if  it  be  of  land),  and  the  feoffee  laying  his  hand  on  it,  the  feoffor  says 
to  the  feoffee,  Here  I  deliver  to  you  seisin  of  this  house  or  of  this 
land;"4  here  the  words  are  complementary  to  the  manual  conduct, 
and  are  as  essential  as  the  conduct  to  the  total  complexion  and  legal 
significance  of  the  act.  Again,  the  legal  act  of  payment  of  money 
may  similarly  depend  on  words  for  its  significance;  "a  man  who  owes 
you  ten  pounds  takes  up  a  handful  of  silver  to  that  amount  and  lays 
it  down  at  a  table  at  which  you  are  sitting  ;  if  then  by  words,  or  ges. 
tures,  or  any  means  whatever,  addressing  himself  to  you,  he  intimates 
it  to  be  his  will  that  you  should  take  up  the  money  and  do  with  it  as 
you  please,  he  is  said  to  have  paid  you ;  but  if  -the  case  was  that  he 
laid  it  down,  not  for  that  purpose  but  for  some  other  —  for  instance, 
to  count  and  examine  it,  meaning  to  take  it  up  again  himself,  or  leave 
it  for  somebody  else,  —  he  has  not  paid  you  ;  yet  the  physical  acts  ex- 
ercised upon  the  pieces  of  money  in  question  are  in  both  cases  the 
same ;  till  he  does  express  a  will  to  that  purpose,"  there  is  no  pay- 
ment.6 Again,  the  occupation  of  land  is,  merely  as  a  physical  act, 
capable  of  various  interpretations,  and  may  need  to  be  completed  by 
words,  in  order  to  have  legal  significance.  "  What  a  man  says,  when 
he  does  a  thing,  shows  the  nature  of  his  act  and  is  a  part  of  the  act ; 
it  determines  its  character  and  effect ;  tenancy  is  a  continuance  of 
acts  in  a  certain  relation  to  another,  and  declarations  during  the  ten- 
ancy by  a  man  that  lie  is  a  tenant  and  of  a  particular  person  may  be 
put  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,"  *  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  learn  the 
significance  of  his  act,  and  assuming  that  his  act  of  possession  is  ma- 
terial. Again,  "the  planting  of  the  hedge  in  from  the  line  of  the 
land  was  an  equivocal  act ;  it  might  be  interpreted  as  a  dedication  to 
the  public  or  as  setting  the  hedge  on  the  true  line ;  the  declarations 
of  E.,  when  he  was  the  owner  and  in  possession  of  the  land,  explana- 
tory of  his  intention  in  leaving  the  strip  of  land  open,  we  think  were 
properly  admitted  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  as  accompanying  the  acts 
of  throwing  the  land  open  and  keeping  it  open."7  Again,  where  "  it 
became  material  to  determine  whether  the  defendant  accepted  the 
lease,  .  .  .  this  act  of  taking  and  reading  the  instrument  was  relied 
on  by  the  plaintiff  in  support  of  her  case ;  what  the  defendant  said 
may  have  given  character  to  the  act,  and  given  it  a  different  meaning 
from  that  claimed  by  the  plaintiff ;  ...  it  was  a  part  of  the  act  of 
taking  and  reading  it." 8 


"Evans,  Notes  to  Pothier,  II,  242-3 
Coke  upon  Litt.  45  6.3 

"Bentham,  Morals  and  Legislation,  c.  18,  par.  85,  note.] 
"Rankin  v.  Tenbrook,  6  Watts  3903 
_Quinn  v.  Eagleston,  108  111.  254.T 
"Stevens  v.  Miles,  142  Mass.  572.  J 


190  THE   HEARSAY  RULE  ;    SCOPE.  [CH.   IX. 

From  these  illustrations,  and  the  judicial  language  accompanying 
them,  it  rnay  be  understood  that  the  doctrine  is  not  as  indefinite 
and  intangible  as  is  sometimes  supposed;  the  typical  case  is  that 
of  conduct  to  which  it  is  desired  to  attach  legal  significance,  but 
in  which  there  is  intrinsically  none,  until  its  whole  tenor  is  other- 
wise made  definite ;  and  it  is  by  words  accompanying  the  conduct 
that  this  tenor  is  more  fully  and  precisely  defined.  The  words  are 
not  used  testimonially ;  for  example,  where  it  is  asked  whether  A's 
possession  is  adverse,  i.  e.  under  claim  of  ownership,  his  utterance, 
"This  land  is  mine  ;  for  I  bought  it  of  B,"  is  not  used  as  evidence 
that  it  is  his  and  that  he  did  buy  it  of  B,  but  merely  as  giving  to 
his  occupation  an  adverse  complexion  and  significance.  The  appli- 
cations of  this  principle  are  numerous.^  Thus,  the  accompanying 
words  may  be  considered  in  determining  whether  an  act  amounted 
to  a  gift  of  personalty ; g  whether  an  act  amounted  to  a  dedication 
of  land  for  a  street ; 10  whether  an  act  was  done  as  agent  or  on  per- 
sonal account ; u  whether  credit  was  given  to  a  buyer  as  agent  or 
otherwise ; 12  whether  a  payment  was  made  or  applied  in  a  certain 
way  or  was  accepted  in  full ;  u  whether  an  act  of  taking  amounted  to 
a  conversion ; 14  whether  an  act  amounted  to  a  revocation  of  an  agent's 
authority.16 '  Perhaps  the  commonest  use  is  that  already  above  re- 
ferred to,  viz.,  of  words  by  one  in  occupation  of  land,  as  characteriz- 
ing his  occupation  so  that  it  may  appear  whether  it  is  adverse  or  not; 
the  utterances  not  being  used  "  to  show  the  quantum  of  his  estate,  but 
only  to  explain  the  nature  of  his  possession ; " 16  it  follows,  as  a  part 
of  the  principle,  that  there  must  be  a  possession  to  be  explained,17  and 
that  if  adverse  possession  is  immaterial  in  the  case,  the  declarations 
are  inadmissible,  so  far  as  the  present  principle  is  concerned.18-!)  It  is 
upon  the  present  principle  that  deeds,  or  recitals  in  deeds,  are  admitted, 
when  they  are  made  to  or  by  one  having  possession,  to  show  the  ex- 
tent of  the  possession  claimed,  because  the  area  of  constructive  occu- 
pation may  thus  appear  from  the  terms  of  the  deed ; 19  and  it  is  no 

9  ([Brooks  v.  Duggan,  149  Mass.  306 ;  Scott  v.  Bank,  140  id.  165  ;  Guinan's  Appeal, 
Conn.,  39  Atl.  482  ;  Parret  v.  Craig,  N.  J.  Eq.,  38  id.  305-3 

1°  [Tait  v.  Hall,  71  Cal.  152 ;  Quinn  v.  Eagleston,  108  111.  254 ;  Pittsb.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  Co.  v.  Noftsger,  148  Ind.  101-3 

11  [Allen  v.  Duncan,  11  Pick.  310;  Jefferds  v.  Alvard,  151  Mass.  94;  Lewis  v. 
Burns,  106  Cal.  381  ;  Elkins  v.  Hamilton,  20  Vt.  630-3 

»  TKastnian  v.  Bennett,  6  Wis.  237-3 

18  Lollard  i>.  Scruggs,  36  Ala.  372;  Hood  v.  French,  37  Fla.  117  ;  Strange  v.  Dono- 
hue,  4  Ind.  328  ;  Brown  v.  Kenyon,  108  id.  283 ;  Rigg  v.  Cook,  9  111.  336  ;  Wheeler 
v.  Campbell,  68  Vt.  98-~J 

14  [Dunbar  v.  McGill,  69  Mich.  297  ;  Frome  v.  Dennis,  45  N.  J.  L.  520  ;  Ross  v. 
White,  60  Vt.  560-3 

16  Russell  »•  Frisbie,  19  Conn.  209-3 

18  LDoe  v.  Pettett,  5  B.  &  Ad.  223;  McBride  v.  Thompson,  8  Ala.  650;  Ogden  v. 
Dodge  Co.,  97  Ga.  461  ;  State  v.  Towle,  62  N.  H.  373  ;  Miller  v.  Feenane,  50  N.  J.  L. 
32  ;  Irwin  v.  Patchin,  164  Pa.  51 ;  Webb  v.  Richardson,  42  Vt.  473-3 

"  TWard  v.  Edge,  Ky.,  39  S.  W.  440 ;  High  v.  Pancake,  42  W.  Va.  602-3 
«  [McCleod  P.  Bishop,  110  Ala.  640.J 

19  LPostal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Brantley,  107  Ala.  683 ;  Dunn  v.  Eaton,  92  Tenn.  743,  751J 


§  108.]          VERBAL   ACTS,   OR   VERBAL   PARTS   OF   AN   ACT.  191 

objection  that  the  deed  is  invalid  to  pass  title,  for  it  none  the  less 
shows  the  extent  of  land  claimed.20  (From  this  use  of  deeds,  how- 
ever, which  may  be  said  to  be  unquestioned,  must  be  distinguished 
the  disputed  question  whether  the  making  of  an  old  deed  or  lease 
may  be  used  as  evidence  o-f  the  possession  itself ;  for  though,  if  pos- 
session is  shown,  the  deed  or  lease  may  be  used  to  color  it  and  show 
its  extent,  yet,  if  no  possession  is  otherwise  shown,  there  is  nothing 
to  be  colored  or  characterized ;  and  the  only  way  of  using  the  docu- 
ment is  to  hold  that  the  mere  act  of  making  it  is  some  slight  evidence 
of  possession,  because  "  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  men  do  not 
make  leases  unless  they  act  on  them  ;  " 21  so  that  the  making  of  the 
deed  or  lease  becomes  evidence  of  possession,  and  then  also  serves  to 
illustrate,  under  the  above  principle,  the  extent  of  that  possession. 
The  doctrine,  at  any  rate,  applies  only  to  ancient  documents,  because 
other  evidence  of  possession  is  then  hard  to  obtain ;  but  whether  it  is 
also  necessary  at  least  to  supply  other  evidence  of  possession  at  a  later 
period  of  time  has  not  been  clearly  settled.22)  Again,  in  trials  for 
sedition,  the  nature  of  the  assembly,  demonstration,  riot,  or  other 
combined  action  in  which  the  defendant  is  charged  to  have  co-ope- 
rated, will  be  determined  by  the  conduct  of  the  persons  thus  acting, 
and,  among  other  things,  by  the  utterances  accompanying  their  con- 
duct ;]  thus,  in  the  trial  of  Lord  George  Gordon  for  treason,  the  cry 
of  the  mob  who  accompanied  the  prisoner  on  his  enterprise  was  re- 
ceived in  evidence  as  forming  part  of  the  res  gestce  and  showing  the 
character  of  the  principal  fact.28  So,  also,  where  a  person  enters 
into  laud  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  a  forfeiture,  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage,  to  defeat  a  disseisin,24  or  the  like;  or  changes  his  actual 
residence,  or  domicile,  [in  which  case  his  declarations  of  intent  of 
residence,  made  at  the  time  of  moving  or  settling,  are  receivable  as 
characterizing  the  act ; 25]  or  is  upon  a  journey,  or  leaves  his  home,  or 
returns  thither,  or  remains  abroad,  or  secretes  himself,  [where  his 

20  rWaldron  v.  Tuttle,  4  N.  H.  371  ;  Bounds  v.  Bounds,  11  Heisk.  318,  324.] 

21  TLord  Blackburn,  in  Bristow  v.  Cornican,  infra.~\ 

22  LSee  Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse,   3   Doug.   189  ;   5  T.   R.  412 ;   Rogers  v.  Allen, 
1  Camp.  309  ;  Doe  v.  Askew,  10  East  520;  Doe  v.  Pulman,  3  Q.  B.  622;  Maloonison 
v.  O'Dea,  10  H.  L.  C.  593 ;  Bristow  v.  Cornican,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas.  653,  668  ;   Boston 
v.  Richardson,  105  Mass.  351  ;  Brown  v.  Kohout,  61  Minn.  113;   Baeder  v.  Jennings, 
40  Fed.  199.     This  doctrine  must  be  distinguished  from  that  about  the  genuineness  of 
ancient  documents,  treated  post,  §  570.     Moreover,  declarations  concerning  land  may 
also  be  affected  by  three  other  principles  which  must  be  carefully  distinguished,  viz.  : 
(1)  declarations  against  interest,  post,  §  152  c ;  (2)  declarations  about  boundaries,  post, 
§  140  a  ;  (3)  admissions  by  a  grantor  in  possession,  post,  §  189  ;  in  the  latter  place  the 
distinctions  between  the  various  principles  are  more  fully  explained.] 

28  21  How.  St.  Tr.  542  ;  [Redford  ».  Bailey,  1  State  Tr.  N.  8.  1071,  1157.] 

24  Co.  Litt.  496,  245  b  Qsee  note  4,  supra~\;  Robison  v.  Swett,  3  Greenl.  316;  3  Bl. 
Comm.  174,  175. 

25  QThorndike  v.   Boston,  1  Mete.  242;   Kilburn  v.  Bennett,  3  id.  199;   Cole  v. 
Cheshire,  1  Gray  444;  Wright  v.  Boston,  126  Mass.  164 ;  Brookfield  v.  Warren,  128  id. 
288  ;  Pickering  v.  Cambridge,  144  id.  248.    But  the  better  view  seems  to  be  that  such 
statements  are  receivable  under  the  exceptions  for  declarations  of  a  mental  state ;  for  later 
Massachusetts  cases  taking  this  view,  and  for  the  general  principle,  see  post,  §  162  c.} 


192  THE   HEARSAY  RULE;    SCOPE.  [CH.   IX. 

conduct  is  said  to  have  amounted  to  an  act  of  bankruptcy,  i.  e.  an  act 
with  intent  to  evade  or  defraud  his  creditors,  in  which  case  his  dec- 
larations accompanying  equivocal  conduct  may  be  considered  ; 28  or 
where  he  does  an  act  which  is  said  to  amount  to  a  revocation  of  a 
will  —  for  example,  burns,  tears,  or  cancels  the  document,  —  his  dec- 
larations at  the  time  may  be  helpful  in  giving  complexion  to  an  other- 
wise equivocal  act  and  determining  its  legal  significance  ;  ^J  or,  in  fine, 
does  any  other  act,  material  to'  be  understood,  [and  of  itself  equivocal 
and  depending  more  or  less  for  its  legal  significance  upon  the  purpose 
with  which  -it  is  done,]  his  declarations,  made  at  the  time  of  the 
transaction,  and  expressive  of  its  character,  motive,  or  object,  are 
regarded  as  "verbal  acts,  indicating  a  present  purpose  and  inten- 
tion," and  are  therefore  admitted  in  proof  like  any  other  material 
facts.38 

§  109.1 

§  110.  Same  :  Statements  after  the  Act  ended,  inadmissible.  It  is 
to  be  observed,  that,  where  declarations  offered  in  evidence  are  merely 
narrative  of  a  past  occurrence,  they  cannot  be  received  as  proof  of  the 
existence  of  such  occurrence.  They  must  be  concomitant  with  the 
principal  act,  and  so  connected  with  it  as  to  be  regarded  as  the  mere 
result  and  consequence  of  the  coexisting  motives,  in  order  to  form  a 
proper  criterion  for  directing  the  judgment  which  is  to  be  formed 
upon  the  whole  conduct.1  [It  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  prin- 
ciple as  above  explained,  that  declarations  made  after  the  equivocal 
act  has  ended  cannot  be  regarded  as  forming  a  part  of  it,  complement- 
ing and  interpreting  the  physical  part  of  the  act,  and  they  therefore 
come  as  ordinary  assertions  of  a  past  fact,  obnoxious  to  the  Hearsay 
rule,  and  not  admissible  under  the  present  principle.  This  limitation 
is  frequently  applied,  —  for  example,  to  exclude  declarations  as  to  the 
purpose  of  money  already  paid,3  declarations  as  to  the  purpose  of  a 

26  plobson  v.  Kemp,  4  Esp.  233 ;  Rawson  v.  Haigh,  9  J.  B.  Moore  217 ;  Ridley  ». 
Gyde,  9  Ring.  349  ;  Smith  v.  Cramer,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  586  ;  Thomas  v.  Connell,  4  M.  & 
W.  267;  Rouch  v.  R.  Co.,  1  Q.  B.  51  ;   Brady  v.  Parker,  67  Ga.  637;  Carter  v.  Gregory, 
8  Pick.  168 ;  but  as  the  conduct  to  be  interpreted  may  extend  over  a  considerable 
period  of  time  —  as  where  the  debtor  absconds  and  stays  abroad  and  then  returns,  — 
declarations  during  the  continuance  of  the  conduct  may  still  be  regarded  as  accom- 
panying it :  Rawson  v.  Haigh,  Ridley  v.  Gyde,  Rouch  i>.  R.  Co.,  supra.~2 

27  [Towell  v,  Powell,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  212;  Dan  v.  Brown,  4  Cow.  490;  Pickens  v. 
Davis,  134  Mass.  257.] 

48  fJThe  original  text  contained  the  following  sentence  :  "  So  upon  an  inqtiiry  as 
to  the  state  of  mind,  sentiments,  or  dispositions  of  a  person  at  any  particular  period, 
his  declarations  and  conversation  are  admissible ;  "  but  such  declarations  are  more  prop- 
erly regarded  as  admissible  under  a  distinct  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  and  are 
treated  post,  §  162  a.  For  other  kinds  of  evidence  to  which  the  term  res  gestce  is  applied, 
see  post,  §  162/and  the  subsequent  sections.] 

*  [Transferred  post,  as  §  152  c;  dealing  with  declarations  against  interest.] 

1  2  Poth.  on  Obi.  by  Evans,  pp.  248,  249,  App.  No.  xvi,  §  11 ;  Ambrose  v.  Clen- 
don,  Cos.  temp.  Hard  w.  254  ;  Doe  v.  Webber,  1  Ad.  &  El.  733.     See  also  Boy  den  v. 
Moore,  11  Pick.  362 ;  Walton  v.  Green,  1  C.  &  P.  621 ;  Reed  v.  Dick,  8  Watts  479 ; 
O'Kelly  ».  O'Kelly,  8  Met.  436  ;  Stiles  v.  Western  Railroad  Corp.,  ib.  44. 

2  rjthistlethwaite  ».  Thistlethwaite,  132  Ind.  355.3 


§§  108-110  a.~]       WORDS    MATERIAL   AS   A    PART   OF    THE    ISSUE.      193 

past  act  of  occupation  of  land,8  and  declarations  as  to  past  acts  of  the 
various  sorts  above  instanced.4- 5 

The  use  of  the  term  res  gestce,  as  defining  or  limiting  the  principle 
of  the  present  subject  and  of  the  next  section,  is  attended  with  more 
or  less  uncertainty  in  its  application  by  the  Courts  ;  and  it  would  be 
a  mistake  to  convey  the  impression  that  the  preceding  principle  is 
always  treated  as  the  doctrine  definitely  represented  by  the  term  res 
gestw.  Not  only  is  this  terra  often  applied  to  that  doctrine  with  a 
looseness  inconsistent  with  the  strict  limits  of  the  principle ;  but  it  is 
also  constantly  applied  to  a  special  class  of  declarations  which  appear 
to  form  a  genuine  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,6  as  well  as  to  the 
class  of  utterances  noted  in  the  next  section,  and  also  in  a  few  other 
senses  more  or  less  superficially  related.  It  is  enough  here  to  describe 
the  general  principle  as  accepted  by  careful  judicial  opinion,  irre- 
spective of  the  nomenclature  that  may  be  employed  for  it  or  of  the 
various  elusive  senses  of  the  term  res  gestce.1  Whatever  the  usage  as  to 
that  phrase  may  be,  and  whether  it  is  appropriate  in  this  place  or  not, 
the  doctrine  described  in  the  two  preceding  sections  exists  in  its  own 
right  as  a  simple  deduction  from  the  nature  of  the  Hearsay  rule.] 

§  110  a.  "Words  Material  as  a  Part  of  the  Issue.  [There  is  still 
another  way  in  which  the  fact  of  the  utterance  of  words,  and  the 
tenor  of  the  utterance,  is  admissible  without  regard  to  the  use  of  the 
utterance  as  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  thing  asserted,  viz.,  where 
the  utterance  is,  under  the  issues  of  substantive  law  in  the  case,  one 
of  the  matters  to  be  proved.  The  simplest  case  is  that  of  slander  or 
libel,  where  the  plaintiff's  main  object  of  proof  is  the  defamatory 
utterance,  —  without  any  desire  on  his  part,  of  course,  to  use  the 
defendant's  utterance,  or  any  other  evidence,  to  show  the  truth  of 
the  charge.  To  such  a  use  of  the  defendant's  words,  the  Hearsay 
rule  is  plainly  not  applicable.  So  also  the  statements,  conversations, 
correspondence,  or  the  like,  which  go  to  make  up  a  contractual  act, 
are  not  excluded  by  the  Hearsay  rule,  because  it  is  not  applicable  to 
them  ; 1  nor  does  it  apply  to  statements  offered  as  constituting  false 

8  FSwerdferger  v.  Hopkins,  67  Vt.  136  ;  Noyes  v.  Ward,  19  Conn.  250.] 

4  L$ee  Carter  v.  Buchanan,  3  Kelly  513  ;  Nourse  v.  Nourse,  116  Mass.  101 ;  Plumer 
v.  French,  22  N.  H.  452 ;  Waterman  v.  Whitney,  11  N.  Y.  157 ;  Sorenson  v.  Dundas, 
42  Wis.  643.] 

6  [[The  original  text  here  added  the  following,  already  dealt  with  in  note  26, 
ante:^  On  this  ground,  it  has  been  holden  that  letters  written  during  absence  from 
home  are  admissible  as  original  evidence,  explanatory  of  the  motive  of  departure  and 
absence,  the  departure  and  absence  being  regarded  as  one  continuing  act :  Rawson  v. 
Haigh,  2  Bing.  99,  104 ;  Marsh  v.  Davis,  24  Vt.  363  ;  New  Milford  v.  Shermaii,  21 
Conn.  101. 

*  [Posf,  §  I62/.] 

7  LThe  various  uses  of  the  term  res  gestce  —  more  properly,  res  ge/tta, — and  the 
different  principles  to  which  it  is  applied,  have  been  fully  and  acutely  examined  by 
Professor  Thayer,  in  his  articles  in  14  Araer.  L.  Rev.  817,  and  15  id.  1,  to  which  the 
reader  is  referred.] 

1  QStoudenmeier  v.  Wilson,  29  Ala.  564;  Nave  v.  Tucker,  70  Ind.  17;  Long-Bell 
L.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  Ind.  Terr.,  40  S.  W.  773  ;  Fredin  v.  Richards,  66  Minn.  46.] 

VOL.    I.  —  13 


194  THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   IX. 

representations ; 2  nor  to  a  statement  required  by  law  to  be  made  as  a 
part  of  the  foundation  of  one's  right,  —  for  example,  a  notice  sent,  or 
a  certificate  or  affidavit  constituting  a  "proof  of  death  "  of  an  insured,8 
or  a  claim  of  invention  of  a  patented  article,4  or  a  statement  of  the 
ground  of  arrest,  made  to  the  arrested  person  in  accordance  with 
statute ; 6  nor  to  a  writing  constituting  the  performance  of  a  con- 
tract ; 6  nor  to  a  reputation  provable  as  a  part  of  a  criminal  offence ; 7 
nor,  in  short,  to  any  remarks,  declarations,  writings,  or  utterances, 
which  are  material  as  a  part  of  the  issue  and  are  not  offered  as  evi- 
dence of  the  truth  of  the  utterance.8  The  declarations  of  co-conspir- 
ators, agents,  partners,  in  short,  of  all  persons  whose  admissions  are 
receivable  against  a  party,  are  also  regarded  as  not  excluded  by  the 
Hearsay  rule. 

The  term  res  gestce  is  also  used,  not  only  in  reference  to  the  pre- 
ceding kinds  of  utterances,  but  also  to  matters  not  consisting  in 
words,  written  or  spoken,  —  as,  where  the  absence  of  street-lamps  at 
a  crossing  was  said  to  be  part  of  the  res  gestce  ; 9  but  in  this  usage 
there  is  of  course,  properly  speaking,  no  reference  to  or  application  of 
the  Hearsay  rule.] 

§§  111-114.1 

2  [Howard  v.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Den.  508  (affidavit  of  an  insured).] 
8  [Railway  P.  &  F.  C.  Assoc.  v.  Robinson,  147  111.  138,  157  ;  Foster  w.  F.  &  C.  Co., 
Wis.,  75  N.  W.  69-3 

4  rPhila.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  14  Pet.  462.] 
8    "Com.  v.  Robinson,  165  Mass.  426.] 

6  |JRoss  v.  Brusie,  70  Cal.  466.] 

7  "See  this  use  of  reputation  treated  ante,  §  14  rf.] 

8  "An  odd  example  is  found  in  Ellis  v.  Thompson,  93  Hun  606,  where  the  de- 
fendant contracted  to  produce  a  play  if  it  had  "reasonable  success;"  the  plaintiff 
was  allowed  to  show  that  the  journals  had  spoken  favorably  of  it  and  that  audiences 
had  applauded  it ;  i.  e.  the  statements  of  the  public  were  a  part  of  its  "  success."] 

9  [Jefferson  v.  Chapman,  127  111.  438.] 

1  [Transferred  post,  as  §§  184a-184rf;  they  deal  with  declarations  of  co-conspira- 
tors, agents,  and  partners,  and  seem  more  properly  to  belong  in  the  chapter  on 
Admissions  ;  their  treatment  is  there  omitted,  but  it  is  under  the  principles  of  that 
chapter  that  they  are  received  in  evidence.  They  seem  to  have  been  placed  here 
merely  because  the  term  res  gestce  is  frequently  used  to  express  the  scope  of  the  agent's 
business  within  which  his  declarations  must  be  made  in  order  to  be  available  against 
his  principal.] 


§§  110  a-114  a.]  PRINCIPLE  OF  EXCEPTIONS  TO  HEARSAY  RULE.    195 


CHAPTER  X. 

EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE:    DECLARATIONS   IN   PEDIGREE 
CASES    (OR,   DECLARATIONS   ABOUT    FAMILY   HISTORY). 


§  114  a.  General  Principle  of  the  Ex- 
ceptions to  the  Hearsay  Rule. 

Declarations  in  Pedigree  Cases. 

§1146.  Necessity  for  this  Evidence; 
Death. 

§  114  c.  Whose  Declarations  are  receiv- 
able. 


§  114  d.   Form  of  the  Declaration. 

§114e.  Post  litem  motam;  No  Interest 
to  deceive. 

§  114/.  Kind  of  Fact  that  may  be  the 
Subject  of  the  Declaration. 

§  114  g.  Kind  of  Litigation  in  which 
such  Declarations  are  receivable. 


§  114  a.    General  Principle  of  the  Exceptions  to  the  Hearsay  Rule. 

[The  essential  principle  of  the  hearsay  rule  (as  explained  ante, 
§§99  a-100)  is  that,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  trustworthiness 
of  testimonial  assertions  and  of  affording  the  opportunity  to  test  the 
credit  of  the  witness,  all  testimonial  assertions  must  be  made  in 
Court  under  oath  and  subject  to  cross-examination.  But,  in  the 
application  of  this  rule,  there  are  a  number  of  recognized  exceptions, 
by  which  testimonial  assertions  are  received  though  not  made  under 
oath  and  subject  to  cross-examination.  Roughly  speaking,  two  gen- 
eral notions  underlie  these  exceptions,  and  'these  two  notions  are 
suggested  by  the  principle  of  the  rule  itself.  The  first  of  these  is 
that  of  necessity  ;  i.  e.  the  situation  in  which  it  is  no  longer  possible 
to  subject  the  person  to  oath  and  cross-examination,  so  that  if  his 
statements  are  to  be  had  at  all,  they  must  be  had  without  applying 
these  securities  for  trustworthiness.1  The  typical  instance  of  the 
sort  is  the  death  of  the  proposed  declarant ;  and  the  question  is 
constantly  presented,  under  several  of  the  exceptions,  whether 
absence  from  the  jurisdiction,  insanity,  or  the  like,  is  to  be  assimi- 
lated to  the  case  of  death,  —  in  other  words,  whether,  as  a  general 
principle,  the  unavailability  of  the  witness  is  a  ground  for  applying 
the  exception  to  the  rule.  In  one  exception  (statements  made  under 
official  duty)  the  public  inconvenience  of  summoning  officials  from 
their  duties  to  repeated  attendance  in  court  is  recognized  as  a 
sufficient  ground  of  exception ;  in  others  (reputation,  in  certain  cases, 
and  declarations  of  a  mental  or  physical  condition),  the  difficulty,  not 
of  having  the  particular  person  in  court,  but  of  getting  better  evi- 
dence in  general,  is  regarded  as  sufficient.  But,  though  there  is  thus 

QTilghraan,  C.  J.,  in  Garwood  v.  Dennis,  4  Binn.  328  :  "  It  is  objected  that,  how- 
ever impressive  the  declaration  of  a  man  of  character  may  be,  yet  the  law  admits  the 
word  of  no  man  in  evidence  without  oath.  The  general  rule  certainly  is  so  ;  but  subject 
to  relaxation  in  cases  of  necessity  or  extreme  inconvenience."] 


196  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEAKSAY  RULE.        [CH.  X. 

no  generally  accepted  and  uniform  principle,  and  no  consistency 
of  principle,  even  within  each  exception,  still  there  is  this  general 
notion  that,  for  the  exception  to  exist  at  all,  there  must  be  some 
kind  of  a  necessity  for  the  reception  of  hearsay-assertions. 

The  second  notion  is  that,  even  though  a  necessity  exists  for  relax- 
ing the  Hearsay  rule,  nevertheless  this  is  not  to  be  done  unless  there 
is,  in  the  particular  class  of  declarations  offered,  some  circumstan- 
tial guarantee  of  trustworthiness  which  shall  — in  some  degree,  at 
least  —  supply  the  tests  of  oath  and  cross-examination  otherwise 
required.2  Thus,  in  the  exception  for  dying  declarations,  it  is  the  im- 
pressive situation  of  the  declarant;  in  the  exception  for  declarations 
against  interest,  it  is  the  improbability  of  making  such  a  statement 
if  it  were  not  believed  true ;  in  the  exception  for  official  state- 
ments, it  is  the  oath  of  office,  and  perhaps  other  things;  in  the  case 
of  reputation,  it  is  the  probability  that  in  certain  matters  the  com- 
munity's means  of  knowledge  and  repeated  discussion  will  sift  out 
something  worth  consideration ;  and  so  on  for  the  other  exceptions. 
Here,  again,  no  general  uniformity  of  principle  must  be  looked  for, 
nor  any  careful  consistency  within  each  exception ;  yet  the  general 
notion  may  be  seen  more  or  less  plainly  throughout  the  exceptions. 

A  third  principle  may  also  be  traced  through  the  various  excep- 
tions, though  there  is  in  it  nothing  peculiar  to  the  Hearsay  rule  ;  it 
is  merely  that  the  person  whose  assertions  are  received  testimonially 
must  not  lack  the  testimonial  qualifications  of  knowledge  and  the 
like  (post,  Chap.  XXIV).  A  person  speaking  extra-judicially  should 
at  least  possess  the  simple  and  fundamental  qualifications  of  a 
person  testifying  infra-judicially.  This  principle,  again,  receives  no 
consistent  application ;  but  it  serves  as  a  natural  explanation  of 
many  details  and  qualifications  of  the  exceptions  which  might  other- 
wise seem  unaccountable. 

At  the  same  time,  it  would  be  improper  to  leave  the  impression 
that  the  general  notions  above  outlined  could  be  taken  as  in  any 
sense  working  rules  or  practical  guides  in  the  solution  of  a  given 
problem  under  the  Hearsay  exceptions.  Those  exceptions  arose  at 
different  times,  were  established  by  different  lines  of  precedents,  and 
were  developed  according  to  considerations  peculiar  to  each  one  ; 
and  it  is  perhaps  under  the  circumstances  a  matter  of  surprise  that 
any  common  notions  at  all  could  be  found  to  underlie  them.  Such 
generalized  suggestions  have  been  repeatedly  made  in  judicial  opin- 
ion ;  *  but  nevertheless,  as  a  matter  of  precedent,  each  exception 
exists  in  and  by  itself,  and  must  be  dealt  with  according  to  its  own 
precedents.  The  generalizations  above  set  forth  have  been  referred 

8  rjLoomis,  J.,  in  Southwest  S.  D.  v.  Williams,  48  Conn.  507  :  "  The  law  does  not 
dispense  with  the  sanction  of  an  oath  and  the  test  of  cross-examination  as  a  prerequisite 
for  the  admission  of  verbal  testimony,  unless  it  discovers  in  the  nature  of  the  case  some 
other  sanction  or  test  deemed  equivalent  for  ascertaining  the  truth."] 

8  [The  two  passages  just  quoted  in  the  preceding  notes  are  merely  taken  from  many 
that  exist.} 


§§  114a-114c.]    FAMILY  HISTORY;  QUALIFIED  DECLARANTS.    197 

to  merely  because  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  excep- 
tions are  maintained  as  purely  arbitrary  creatures  of  tradition,  and 
because  such  general  notions  as  judicial  opinion  has  sanctioned  are 
likely  to  be  of  service  in  employing  and  developing  the  exceptions 
in  cases  not  already  settled  by  precedent.] 

Exception  for  Declarations  in  Pedigree  Cases  (or,  Declarations  about 

family  History'). 

§  114  b.  Necessity  for  this  Evidence  ;  Death.  [As  a  preliminary 
to  the  admission  of  declarations  by  a  member  of  a  family,  or  of 
reputation  in  the  family,  a  necessity  for  resorting  to  such  evidence 
must  first  appear.  As  to  declarations  by  an  individual  member, 
his  death  is  a  sufficient  ground ;  though  there  is  some  authority  for 
the  notion  that  if  other  members  of  the  family  are  living  and  avail- 
able, the  deceased's  statement  is  inadmissible  ; *  but  this  seems  un- 
sound. It  is  usually  intimated  that  death  is  the  only  ground  for 
admission ; 2  and  of  course  where  the  declarant  is  alive  and  available, 
the  declarations  are  inadmissible.  As  to  family  reputation,  it  is  per- 
haps not  necessary  to  show  that  every  member  of  the  immediate 
family  is  deceased;  but  it  is  usual  to  exclude  such  reputation  where 
the  matters  are  of  recent  occurrence  and  some  of  the  family  appear 
to  be  available,8 —  at  any  rate  where  the  reputation  is  in  the  form  of 
a  family  Bible-entry  and  the  entrant  himself  is  still  available.4] 

§  114  c  [103].1  Whose  Declarations  are  receivable.  [A  sound  gen- 
eral principle,  for  determining  whose  declarations  are  receivable, 
was  laid  down  by  Lord  Eldon : *  "  The  tradition  must  be  from  per- 
sons having  such  a  connection  with  the  party  to  whom  it  relates 
that  it  is  natural  and  likely  from  their  domestic  habits  and  con- 
nections that  they  are  speaking  the  truth,  and  that  they  could  not 
be  mistaken."  But  this  principle  has  not  generally  been  carried  out 
to  its  full  extent.]  It  was  long  unsettled,  whether  any  and  what 

1  [Covert  v.  Hertzog,  4  Pa.  St.  146;  White  v.  Strother,  11  Ala.  724. 

Contra  :  Crauford  v.  Blackburn,  17  Md.  54  ;  and  such  is  the  general  implication  run- 
ning through  the  cases.] 

2  rContra,  semble,  Campbell  v.  Wilson,  23  Tex.  252,  for  absence  from  the  jurisdic- 
tion. T 

8  [See  Harland  v.  Eastman,  107  111.  538;  Campbell  v.  Wilson,  supra;  Hurlburt's 

Estate,  68  Vt.  366. 

Contra,  for  one  testifying  to  his  own  age :  Cherry  v.  State,  68  Ala.  30.] 

*  ([People  ?.'.  Mayne,  118  Cal.   516;  Leggctt  v.    Boyd,  3  Wend.  379;  Robinson  v. 

Blakely,  4  Rich.  L.  588.] 

1  FJThe  first  two  sentences  of  this  section,  in  the  original  text,  which  treated  the 
whole  exception  under  res  gesfai,  are  as  follows :  "  To  this  head  may  be  referred  much  of 
the  evidence  sometimes  termed  '  hearsay,1  which  is  admitted  in  cases  of  pedigree.     The 
principal  question,  in  these  cases,  is  that  of  the  parentage  or  descent  of  the  individual  ; 
and,  in  order  to  ascertain  this  fact,  it  is  material  to  know  how  lie  was  acknowledged 
and  treated  by  those  who  were  interested  in  him,  or  sustained  towards  him  any  relations 
of  blood  or  affinity."] 

2  [Whitelocke  u.  Baker,  13  Ves.  514.] 


198  EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.   X. 

kind  of  relation  must  have  subsisted  between  the  person  speaking 
and  the  person  whose  pedigree  was  in  question ;  and  there  are 
reported  cases  in  which  the  declarations  of  servants,  and  even  of 
neighbors  and  friends,  have  been  admitted.  But  it  is  now  settled, 
that  the  law  resorts  to  hearsay  evidence  in  cases  of  pedigree,  upon 
the  ground  of  the  interest  of  the  declarants  in  the  person  from 
whom  the  descent  is  made  out,  and  their  consequent  interest  in 
knowing  the  connections  of  the  family.  The  rule  of  admission  is, 
therefore,  restricted  to  the  declarations  of  deceased  persons  who  were 
related  by  blood  or  marriage  to  the  person,  and,  therefore,  interested 
in  the  succession  in  question ; 8  and  general  repute  in  the  family, 
proved  by  the  testimony  of  a  surviving  member  of  it,  has  been  con- 
sidered as  falling  within  the  rule.4  [As  to  the  scope  of  the  relation- 
ship, it  may  be  said,  first,  that  among  blood  relatives  no  line  seems  to 
be  drawn  because  of  remoteness ;  secondly,  the  declarations  of  a  hus- 
band as  to  his  wife's  family,5  and  of  a  wife  as  to  her  husband's  fam- 
ily,6 are  receivable  ;  and  thirdly,  that  the  declarations  of  any  person 
connected  by  marriage  only  would  probably  be  received,  if  he  appeared 
to  have  had  opportunities  of  information.7  It  is  of  course  necessary 
that  the  declarant's  family  membership  be  first  shown ;  but  it  is 
sometimes  said  that  where,  for  example,  the  question  is  whether  A 
is  B's  heir,  the  declarant  must  appear  to  be  related  to  B,  and  not 
merely  to  A;8  this  seems  erroneous,  however,  since  all  relationship 
is  mutual,  and  the  question  whether  A  is  related  to  B  or  a  member 
of  B's  "family"  is  also  and  just  as  much  a  question  whether  B  is 
related  to  A  or  a  member  of  A's  family,  and  on  this  point  a  person 
shown  to  belong  to  A's  family  is  competent  to  speak ;  the  circum- 
stance that  the  estate  to  be  claimed  is  in  A's  or  in  B's  family  being 
immaterial.9  It  has  been  held  that  declarations  as  to  a  son's  illegiti- 
macy, by  a  member  of  the  father's  family,  are  inadmissible,  because  the 
son  does  not  legally  belong  to  that  family  ; 10  but  it  seems  improper  to 

8  Vowles  v.  Young,  13  Ves.  140,  147;  Goodright  r.  Moss,  Cowp.   591,  594,  as  ex- 
pounded by  Lord  Eldon  in  Whitelocke  v.   Baker,   13  Ves.  514;  Johnson  v.  Lawson, 

2  Bins-  86  ;  Monkton  v.  Attorney-General,  2  Russ.  &  My.  147,  156 ;  Crease  v.  Barrett, 

1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  919,  928  ;  Casey  v.  O'Shaunessy,  7  Jur.  1140 ;  Gregory  v.  Baugh,  4  Rand. 
611  ;  Jewell  v.  Jewell,  1  How.  S.  C.  231  ;  s.  c.  17  Peters,  213 ;  Kay  wood  v.  Barnett, 

3  Dev.  &  Bat.  91  ;  Jackson  v.  Browner,  18  Johns.  37 ;  Chapman  v.  Chapman,  2  Conn. 
347  ;  Waldron  v.  Tuttle,  4  N.  H.  371. 

*  Doe  v.  Griffin,  15  East  293.  There  is  no  valid  objection  to  such  evidence,  because 
it  is  hearsay  upon  hearsay,  provided  all  the  declarations  are  within  the  family ;  thus, 
the  declarations  of  a  deceased  lady,  as  to  what  had  been  stated  to  her  by  her  husband 
in  his  lifetime,  were  admitted  :  Doe  v.  Randall,  2  M.  &  P.  20  ;  Monkton  v.  Att'y-Gen'l, 

2  Russ.  &  My.  165 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  295  ;  Elliott  v.  Piersoll,  1  Pet.  328,  337. 

6  f  Vowles  v.  Young,  supra  ;  Doe  v.  Harvey,  1  Ry.   &  Mo.  297 ;  Jewell  v.  Jewell, 
1  How.  231.] 

«  ["Shrewsbury  Peerage  Case,  7  H.  L.  C.  22;  Doe  v.  Randall,  2  Moo.  &  P.  25.] 

7  Ll)oe  »•  Randall,  supra ;  People  r.  Ins.  Co.,  25  Wend.  209.       Contra :  Turner  v. 
King,  98  Ky.  253.} 

TDunlop  v.  Servaa,  5  U.  C.  Q.  B.  288  ;  Blackburn  i».  Crawfords,  8  Wall.  9.] 

9  LMonkton  v.  Att'y-Gcn'l,  2  HUBS.  &  My.  147;  Sitler  v.  Gehr,  105  Pa.  592;  sea 
Eobh *s  Kstate,  37  S.  C.  19,  22,  33,  30.] 

10  tCrispin  v.  Doglioni,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  44  ;  Flora  v.  Anderson,  75  Fed.  217,  234-3 


§  114  <?]        FAMILY  HISTORY;  QUALIFIED  DECLARANTS.  199 

apply  to  the  present  evidential  principle  a  mere  rule  of  inheritance 
which  has  no  real  bearing ;  and  the  better  view  is  that  such  declara- 
tions are  admissible.11  Testimony  to  one's  own  age  may  be  regarded 
as  admissible  exceptionally  from  a  witness  who  speaks  from  knowl- 
edge not  acquired  by  personal  observation  (post,  §  430  K) ;  but  it  may 
also  be  regarded  as  in  effect  testimony  to  the  family  reputation, 
the  reputation  being  admissible  under  the  present  exception.12  It 
has  been  said  above  that  the  line  has  been  drawn  at  relatives  or 
family-members,  and  that  therefore  declarations  by  other  persons, 
however  intimate  and  well-situated  for  obtaining  accurate  informa- 
tion, are  inadmissible;  and  this  seems  to  be  the  law  in  England;18 
but  this  strictness  is  a  matter  of  fairly  modern  establishment;1* 
and  on  principle  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  for  drawing  an  inflex- 
ible line.  Accordingly,  in  Canada 15  and  in  the  United  States,  declara- 
tions or  reputation  from  intimate  acquaintances  have  by  several 
Courts  been  thought  admissible ; 16  and  reputation  in  the  neigh- 
borhood, or  among  acquaintances  generally,  has  often  been  con- 
sidered admissible  under  local  conditions.17  This  was  apparently 
the  practice  in  England  in  the  last  century ; 18  it  has  always  been 
conceded  to  be  the  law  in  proof  of  marriage ; w  and  it  was  in  the 
times  of  slavery  generally  received  in  proof  of  ancestry,  on  an  issue 
of  freedom  or  slavery;  and  a  liberal  treatment  of  the  principle 
seems  not  improper.20  At  the  same  time,  reputation  or  declarations 
from  persons  not  shown  to  have  opportunities  of  knowing,  or  mere 
rumor,  or  the  like  untrustworthy  report, 21  should  be  excluded.] 

11  FJGoodright  v.  Moss,  2  Cowp.  594  ;  Murray  v.  Milner,  L.  R.  12  Ch.  D.  849  ;  Jackson 
v.  Jackson,  80  Md.  176  ;  Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  98. 

In  Northrop  v.  Hale,  76  Me.  312,  declarations  in  the  mother's  family  were  held 
admissible.] 

12  ("Cherry  v.  State,  68  Ala.  30  ;  Kreitz  v.  Behrensmeyer,  125  111.  141,  185 ;  Com. 
v.  Hollis,  Mass.,  49  N.  E.  632  ;  Houlton  v.  Manteuffel,  51  Minn.  185 ;  State  v.  Mar- 
shall,  137  Mo.  463,  semble;  State  v.  Best,  108  N.  C.  749 ;  Watson  v.  Brewster,  1  Pa. 
St.  383.] 

18  QJohnson  v.  Lawson,  2  Bing.  86  (housekeeper  twenty-four  years  in  the  family)  ; 
Casey  r.  O'Shaughnessy,  7  Jur.  1140  (Catholic  priest) ;  Polini  v.  Gray,  L.  R.  12  Ch.  D. 
426  (intimate  friends).! 

!*  fin  Walker  v.  Wingfield,  18  Ves.  443,  446,  Lord  Eldon  said  it  had  not  yet  been 
decided.] 

16  Q)oe  v.  Auldjo,  5  U.  C.  Q.  B.  175  (body-servant  who  had  gone  abroad  with  his 
master).] 

16  QWilson  v.  Brownlee,  24  Ark.  589  ;  Cuddy  v.  Brown,  78  111.  418  ;  Jackson  v. 
Cooley,  8  Johns.  130.   Contra  :  Flora  v.  Anderson,  75  Fed.  217,  222,  semble;  Hurlburt's 
Estate,  68  Vt.  366.] 

17  [Kelly  v.  McGuire,  15  Ark.  605  ;  Ringhouse  v.  Keener,  49  111.  471  ;  Birney  v. 
Hann,  3  A/K.  Marsh.  326  ;  Jackson  v.  Etz,  5  Cow.  319;  Arents  ».  R.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  50 
N.  E.  422  ;  Ewell  v.  State,  6  Yerg.  372 ;   Flowers  v.   Haralson,  ib.  496  (leading  case) ; 
Carter  v.  Montgomery,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  227.   Contra  :  De  Haven  v.  De  Haven,  77  Ind.  239.] 

»  [Craig  v.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1166,,  1179,  1181  ;  Morewood  v.  Wood,  14 
East  330,  note.] 

w  rSeepost,  §  140  c.] 

20  LThe  pedigree  of  a  dog  has  been  received:  Citizens'  R.  T.  Co.  v.  Dew,  Tenn., 
45  S.  W.  790.] 

21  QWilsou  v.  Brownlee,  24  Ark.  589;  Gould  v.  Smith,  35  Me.  513;  Greenfield  o. 


200  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.   X. 

§  114  d  [104, 105].  Form  of  the  Declaration.1  [The  assertion  may 
come,  as  already  noticed,  either  from  an  individual  member  of  the 
family,  or  from  the  family  in  general,  that  is,  as  the  reputation  or 
accepted  opinion  in  the  family.  The  form  of  the  statement  is  im- 
material ;  and  it  may  of  course  come  in  a  great  variety  of  forms.] 
Thus,  an  entry  by  a  deceased  parent  or  other  relative,  made  in  a 
Bible,  family  missal,  or  any  other  book,  or  in  any  document  or  paper, 
stating  the  fact  and  date  of  the  birth,  marriage,  or  death  of  a  child, 
or  other  relative,  is  regarded  as  a  declaration  of  such  parent  or  rela- 
tive in  a  matter  of  pedigree.2  So,  also,  the  correspondence  of  deceased 
members  of  the  family,  recitals  in  family  deeds,  such  as  marriage  set- 
tlements, descriptions  in  wills,  and  other  solemn  acts,  are  original 
evidence  in  all  cases,  where  the  oral  declarations  of  the  parties  are 
admissible.8  In  regard  to  recitals  of  pedigree  in  bills  and  answers  in 
Chancery,  a  distinction  has  been  taken  between  those  facts  which  are 
not  in  dispute  and  those  which  are  in  controversy  ;  the  former  being 
admitted,  and  the  latter  excluded.4  Recitals  in  deeds,  other  than  fam- 
ily deeds,  are  also  admitted,  when  corroborated  by  long  and  peaceable 
possession  according  to  the  deed.6  Inscriptions  on  tombstones  and 
other  funeral  monuments,  engravings  on  rings,  inscriptions  on  family 
portraits,  charts,  or  pedigrees,  and  the  like,  are  also  admissible,  as 
original  evidence  of  the  same  fact.  Those  which  are  proved  to  have 
been  made  by  or  under  the  direction  of  a  deceased  relative  are  admitted 
as  his  declarations.  But  if  they  have  been  publicly  exhibited  and  were 
well  known  to  the  family,  the  publicity  of  them  supplies  the  defect  of 
proof  in  not  showing  that  they  were  declarations  of  [specified]  deceased 
members  of  the  family;  and  they  are  admitted  on  the  ground  of  tacit 
and  common  assent ;  it  is  presumed,  that  the  relatives  of  the  family 
would  not  permit  an  inscription  without  foundation  to  remain ;  and  that 
a  person  would  not  wear  a  ring  with  an  error  on  it ; 6  [so  that  where 

Camden,  74  id.  61 ;  Jackson  v.  Browner,  18  Johns.  39;  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheuck, 
94  U.  S.  98.] 

1  £The  first  two  sentences  of  this  section  in  the  original  text  deal  with  other  parts 
of  the  subject,  and  apj>ear  at  the  beginning  of  the  later  sections,  114/and  114  17.] 

2  QPerth  Peerage  Case,  2  H.  L.  C.   876   (document  hung  ou  the  wall);  Peoples. 
Slater,  119  Cal.  620  (family  Bible).] 

8  Bull.  N.  P.  233;  Neal  v.  Wilding,  2  Stark.  1151,  per  Wright,  J. ;  Doe  v.  E.  of 
Pembroke,  11  East  504  ;  Whitelocke  v.  Baker,  13  Ves.  514;  Elliott  v.  Piersoll,  1  Pet. 
328  ;  1  Ph.  Evid.  216,  217,  and  peerage  cases  there  cited.  In  two  recent  cases,  the 
recitals  in  the  deeds  were  held  admissible  only  against  the  parties  to  the  deeds  ;  but  in 
neither  of  those  cases  was  the  party  proved  to  have  been  related  to  those  whose  pedigree 
was  recited.  In  Fort  v.  Clarke,  1  Russ.  601,  the  grantors  recited  the  death  of  the  sons 
of  John  Cormick,  tenants  in  tail  male,  and  declared  themselves  heirs  of  the  bodies  of  his 
daughters,  who  were  devisees  in  remainder  ;  and  in  Slaney  v.  Wade,  1  Mylne  &  Craig, 
838,  the  grantor  was  a  mere  trustee  of  the  estate,  not  related  to  the  parties ;  see  also 
Jackson  v.  Cooley,  8  Johns.  128  ;  Jackson  v.  llussell,  4  Wend.  543 ;  Keller  v.  Kutz, 
6  S.  &  R.  251. 

4  Phil,  ft  Am.  on  Evid.  231,  232,  and  the  authorities  there  cited ;  fjsee  the  next 
section  for  this  distinction  of  ante  litem  motow?.] 

*  Stokes  v.  Dawes,  4  Mason,  268  ;  p>ut  this  rests  on  a  peculiar  principle  of  its  own: 
see  fluff,  §  23,  note.] 

'  Per  Lord  Erskine,  in  Vowels  ».   Young,   13  Ves.   144;  Monk  ton  v.  Attorney- 


§§  114^-114e.]    FAMILY  HISTORY;  POST  LITEM  MOTAM.  201 

the  chart,  Bible,  or  other  document  is  put  in  as  representing  the  tacit 
family  opinion  by  reason  of  its  public  exposure  in  the  family,  it  is 
therefore  immaterial  who  wrote  or  printed  it,  nor  need  the  writing  be 
authenticated  other  than  by  the  fact  of  its  exposure  in  the  family ; * 
and  conversely,  where  such  a  document,  for  example,  an  entry  in  a 
family  Bible,  is  put  in  as  the  statement  of  an  individual  member,  by 
proving  the  handwriting,  it  is  unnecessary  to  connect  it  with  the  fam- 
ily as  a  whole  by  showing  a  public  exposure  in  the  family.8]  Mural 
and  other  funeral  inscriptions  are  provable  by  copies,  or  other  second- 
ary evidence,  as  has  been  already  shown.9  Their  value,  as  evidence, 
depends  much  on  the  authority  under  which  they  were  set  up,  and 
the  distance  of  time  between  their  erection  and  the  events  they  com- 
memorate.10 Under  this  head  may  be  mentioned  family  conduct,  such 
as  the  tacit  recognition  of  relationship,  and  the  disposition  and  devo- 
lution of  property,  as  admissible  evidence  from  which  the  opinion 
and  belief  of  the  family  may  be  inferred,  resting  ultimately  on  the 
same  basis  as  evidence  of  family  tradition.  Thus,  it  was  remarked 
by  Mansfield,  C.  J.,  in  the  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  that  "if  the  father 
is  proved  to  have  brought  up  the  party  as  his  legitimate  son,  this 
amounts  to  a  daily  assertion  that  the  son  is  legitimate;  u  and  Mr. 
Justice  Ashhurst,  in  another  case,  remarked  that  the  circumstance  of 
the  son's  taking  the  name  of  the  person  with  whom  his  mother,  at  the 
time  of  his  birth,  lived  in  a  state  of  adultery,  which  name  he  and  his 
descendants  ever  afterwards  retained,  "  was  a  very  strong  family 
recognition  of  his  illegitimacy."  12  So,  the  declarations  of  a  person, 
since  deceased,  that  he  was  going  to  visit  his  relatives  at  such  a  place, 
have  been  held  admissible  to  show  that  the  family  had  relatives 
there ; 18  [and  the  fact  that  a  person's  marriage  had  never  been 
heard  of  in  the  family  is  in  effect  a  family  reputation  that  he  was 
not  married.14] 

§  114  e.  Post  litem  motam  ;  No  Interest  to  deceive.  [Declarations 
made  during  the  course  of  a  legal  controversy  are  to  be  regarded  as 
lacking  in  the  guarantees  of  trustworthiness  ;  it  is  generally  conceded 
that  declarations  made  post  litem  motam  are  inadmissible.1  To  have 

General,  2  Kuss.  &  My.  147;  Kidney  v.  Cockburn,  id.  167;  Camoys  Peerage,  6  Cl. 
&  Fin.  789. 

7  Qlubbard  v.  Lees,  L.  R.  1  Exch.  258;  People  v.  Eatz,  115  Cal.  132  ;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  45  Mil.  160  ;  Weavers.  Leiman,  52  id.  719  ;  North   Brookfield  r.  Warren,   10 
Gray  174;  Eastman  v.  Martin,  19  N.  H.  157  ;  Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pollard,  94  Va.  146. 

Contra,  but  quite  misunderstanding  the  principle  :  Supreme  Council  v.  Conklin, 
N.  J.  L.,  38  Atl.  659  ;  State  v.  Hairstou,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  492.] 

8  [Monkton  v.  Attorney-General,  2  Russ.  &  My.  163.] 

9  8upra,  §  94  ;  Qransferredpos^,  as  §  563  i."} 

10  Some  remarkable  mistakes  of  fact  in  such  inscriptions  are  mentioned  in  1  Phil 
Evid.  222. 

11  4Campb.   416;  [Murray  t>.   Milner,  L.  R.   12  Ch.  D.  845;  Goodright  v.  Mosa, 
Cowper  594.] 

12  Goodright  v.  Saul,  4  T.  R.  356. 

13  Rishton  v.  Nesbitt,  2  Moo.  &  R.  554. 

14  TDoe  v.  Griffin,  15  East  294.] 

1  L  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  4  Camp.  413  ;  Freeman  v.   Phillipps,  4   M.  &  S.  397> 


202  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   X. 

this  effect,  the  dispute  must  have  been  upon  the  very  point  in  contro- 
versy, though  there  is  room  for  much  latitude  in  applying  this  limi- 
tation.2 On  the  other  hand,  it  is  immaterial  whether  litigation  had 
actually  begun,  if  the  controversy  existed.8  Furthermore,  besides 
the  qualification  as  to  declarations  post  litem  motam,  it  is  also  usually 
said  that  the  declarant  must  at  the  time  have  no  interest  to  misrepre- 
sent ; 4  yet  the  mere  possibility  of  a  bias  or  desire  to  misrepresent  is 
not  sufficient,5  and,  in  particular,  the  mere  fact  that  a  statement  or 
entry  is  made  with  a  view  to  perpetuating  evidence  should  not  ex- 
clude it.6] 

§  114  f.  Kind  of  Fact  that  may  be  the  Subject  of  the  Declaration. 
The  term  "  pedigree  "  embraces  not  only  descent  and  relationship,  but 
also  the  facts  of  birth,  marriage,  and  death,  and  the  times  when  these 
events  happened.  [There  was  at  one  time  some  doubt  whether  the 
place  of  such  an  event  was  equally-  included ; 1  but  it  is  now  generally 
and  properly  accepted  that  this  kind  of  fact  also  may  be  the  subject 
of  the  declaration ; 2  as  well  as,  in  general,  any  notable  fact  in  the  life 
of  a  member  of  the  family  or  in  the  family  history  which  might  well 
be  supposed  to  be  known  to  the  members  in  general ; 8  for  the  princi- 
ple applies  equally  well  to  such  facts.] 

Monkton  v.  Att'y-Gen'l,  2  Russ.  &  My.  160 ;  Chapman  v.  Chapman,  2  Conn.  349  ; 
Collins  v.  Grantham,  12  Ind.  444;  People  v.  Ins.  Co.,  25  Wend.  210;  Morgan  ». 
Purnell,  4  Hawks  97  ;  j  Hodges  v.  Hodges,  106  N.  C.  374.  |  Some  judges  have  doubted 
the  need  of  this  restriction  :  Graham,  B.,  in  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  supra;  Boudereau 
v.  Montgomery,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  190.] 

2  [See  Gee  v.  Ward,  7  E.  &  B.  511;  Shedden  v.  Patrick,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  170,  188  ; 
Freeman  v.  Phillipps,  supra  ;  Peoples.  Ins.  Co.,  supra  ;  Elliott  v.  Peirsol,  1  Pet.  337.] 

8  QMonkton  v.  Att'y-Gen'l,  supra,'  Butler  v.  Mountgarret,  6  Ir.  C.  L.  94  ;  6  H.  L. 
C.  641.  It  was  once  suggested  that  the  time  when  the  state  of  facts  began  over  which 
the  controversy  later  arose  should  be  the  time  after  which  declarations  should  be  in- 
competent :  Walker  v.  Beauchamp,  6  C.  &  P.  561  ;  but  this  is  unsound,  and  has  been 
frequently  repudiated :  Reilly  v.  Fitzgerald,  6  Ir.  Eq.  344 ;  Butler  v.  Mountgarret, 
6  Ir.  C.  L.  107,  per  Pigot,  C.  B.  ;  Slaney  v.  Wade,  7  Sim.  615 ;  Shedden  v.  Patrick, 
2  Sw.  &  Tr.  170,  187.J 

4  QThe  phrasing  differs:  see  Monkton  v.  Att'y-Gen'l,  supra;  Reilly  v.  Fitzgerald, 
supra  ;  Plant  v.  Taylor,  7  H.  &  N.  237  ;  Chapman  v.  Chapman,  2  Conn.  349  ;  Waldron 
v.  Tuttle,  4  N.  H.  378 ;  Byers  v.  Wallace,  87  Tex.  503  (declarant  the  sole  heir  of  the 
one  of  whose  relationship  he  spoke).] 

6  rjDoe  v.  Da  vies,  10  Q.  B.  325;  People  v.  Ins.  Co.,  25  Wend.  215  ;  Shields  v. 
Boucher,  2  Russ.  &  M.  147.] 

6  ^Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  4  Camp.  418;  Good  right  v.  Moss,  Cowp.  594,  semble; 
Gee  v.  Ward,  7  E.  &  B.  511 ;  People  o.  Ins.  Co.,  supra,  per  Cowen,  J. ;  contra,  semble, 
Chapman  v.  Chapman,  2  Conn.  349.] 

1  £The  doubt  seems  to  have  been  based  on  R.  v.  Erith,  which  however  was  really 
concerned  with  the  topic  of  the  next  section.] 

2  ^Shields  v.  Boucher,  1  De  G.  &  Sm.  53  (leading  case)  ;  Doe  v.  Griffin,  15  East 
293 ;  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Kohler,  9  H.  L.  C.  686 ;  Rishton  v.  Nesbitt,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  554 ; 
Wise  v.  Wynn,  69  Miss.  592  ;  Jackson  v.  Boucham,  15  Johns.  227 ;   Carter  v.  Mont- 
gomery, 2  Tenn.  Ch.  229  ;  Story  v.  Saunders,  8  Humph.  667,  semble;  Byers  v.  Wallace, 
87  Tex.  503;  contra,  usually  taking  the  supposed  authority  of  R.  v.  Erith:  Wilming- 
ton v.  Burlington,  4  Pick.  175  ;  Independence  v.   Pompton,  4  Halst.   212;  Brooks  ». 
Clay.  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  550;  Tyler  v.  Flanders,  57  N.  H.  624.] 

*  QRishton  v.  Nesbitt,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  554  (existence  of  relatives  in  a  town)  ;  Att'y- 
Gen'l  v.  Kohler,  9  H.  L.  C.  686  (trade,  enlistment  in  the  army,  runningaway  from  home, 
etc.);  Fraxer  v.  Jennison,  42  Mich.  206,  214,  235  (that  two  brothers  immigrated 
together)  ;  Jackson  v.  Boucham,  15  Johns.  227  (death  in  war)  ;  Byers  v.  Wallace,  87 


§§114e-114#.]    FAMILY  HISTORY;  KIND  OF  FACT  AND  ISSUE.    203 

§  114  g.  Kind  of  Litigation  in  which  such  Declarations  are  receiv- 
able. These  facts,  therefore,  may  be  proved  in  the  manner  above 
mentioned,  in  all  cases  where  they  occur  incidentally,  and  in  relation 
to  pedigree,1  [i.  e.,  only  in  litigation  where  the  issue  upon  which  the 
evidence  is  offered  involves  a  question  of  descent,  "  from  what  parents 
the  child  has  derived  its  birth,"2  —  chiefly,  therefore,  in  inheritance 
cases.  This,  at  least,  was  the  original  English  practice,8  since  con- 
firmed and  followed  in  that  country,4  as  well  as  in  some  American 
jurisdictions.6  But,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
this  arbitrary  limitation  can  be  supported.  If  a  statement  of  the 
present  sort  is  to  be  regarded  as  sufficiently  trustworthy,  at  the  time 
of  making  it,  to  be  worth  considering  in  evidence,  it  must  be  equally 
trustworthy  whether,  by  the  turn  of  chance,  the  litigation  in  which  it 
subsequently  becomes  useful  is  an  action  of  ejectment  for  land,  or  a 
plea  of  infancy  to  a  promissory  note,  or  a  suit  for  the  amount  of  a  life- 
insurance  policy,  or  a  prosecution  for  rape  upon  one  under  the  age  of 
consent,  or  any  other  kind  of  proceeding,  civil  or  criminal.  "  If  this 
evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  such  facts  at  all,  it  is  equally  so  in  all 
cases  where  they  become  legitimate  subjects  of  judicial  inquiry  and 
investigation." 6  Accordingly,  such  is  the  view  now  taken  in  the  ma- 
jority of  American  jurisdictions.7] 

Tex.  503  (removal,  enlistment  in  the  army) ;   Du  Pont  v.  Davis,  30  Wis.  178  (death 
by  an  explosion). 

Excluded  :  Crane  v.  Reeder,  21  Mich.  83  (existence  of  heirs)  ;  Jackson  v.  Etz,  5  Cow. 
319  (finding  and  burial  of  body)  ;  People  v.  Koenier,  154  N.  Y.  355  (insanity).]] 

1  QThis  sentence,  in  the  author's  first  edition  of  the  work,  stood  as  follows  :  "  Thesa 
facts,  therefore,  may  be  proved  in  the  manner  above-mentioned  ;  "  but  in  the  second 
edition,  the  above  concluding  clause  was  added ;  but  the   unmodified  statement  is 
responsible,  as  Professor  Thayer  has  pointed  out  (Cases  on   Evidence,  408,  note)  in 
part  for  some  American  rulings  applying  the  doctrine  without  the  limitation  discussed 
m  this  section/] 

2  QR.  v.  Erith,  8  East  539  ;  another  phrasing  is  :  "a  case  in  which  the  controversy 
between  the  parties  was  whether  or  not  a  certain  line  of  genealogy  could  be  estab- 
lished :  "  Haines  v.  Guthrie,  infra7\ 

9  PR.  v.  Erith,  supra.~^ 

4  t^igg  v-  Wedderburue,  11  L.  J.  Q.  B.  46,  semble;  Haines  v.  Guthrie,  L.  R.  13 
Q.  B.  D.  818.] 

6  ^People  v.  Mayne,  118  Cal.  516,  semble;  Union  v.  Plainfield,  39  Conn.  564; 
State  v.  Marshall,  137  Mo.  463;  Westfield  v.  Warren,  8  N.  J.  L.  251;  Eisenlord  v. 
Clum,  126  N.  Y.  552 ;  Conn.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schenck,  94  U.  S.  598.] 

6  fBigelow,  C.  J.,  in  North  Brook  field  v.  Warren,  w/ra.] 

7  LCherry  v.  State,  68  Ala.  30  (selling  liquor  to  a  minor)  ;  Wilson  v.  Brownlee, 
24  Ark.  589  (action  on  a  note;  plea,  deatn   of  a  joint  payee)  ;  South.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Wilkinson,  53  Ga.  547  (insurance  policy)  ;  Collins  v.  Grantham,  12  Ind.  444  (plea  of 
infancy)  ;  Greenleaf  v.  R.  Co.,  30  la.  302  (death  by  negligence)  ;  North  Brookfield  v. 
Warren,  16  Gray  175  (pauper  settlement)  ;  Fraser  v.  Jennison,  42  Mich.  206,  235  (will- 
contest)  ;  Lamoreaux  v.  Att'y-Gen'l,  89  id.  146  (quo  warranto  against  a  sheriff)  ;  Houl- 
ton  v.  Manteuffel,  51  Minn.  185  (plea  of  infancy)  ;  Carskadden  v.  Poorman,  10  Watts 
84  (f>enalty  for  marrying  a  minor)  ;  Watson  v.  Brewster,  1  Pa.  St.  383  (plea  of  infancy); 
Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humphr.  98  (testator's  sanity) ;  Swink  v.  French,  11  Lea  79  (replica- 
tion of  infancy)  ;  Masons  v.   Fuller,  45  Vt.   30  (bastardy  complaint)  ;    Du  Pont  w. 
Davis,  30  Wis.  178  (non-joinder  of  party).] 


204 


EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  KULE. 


[CH.   XL 


CHAPTER  XL 

EXCEPTIONS   TO  THE   HEARSAY   RULE  :    REGULAR  ENTRIES  IN   THE 
COURSE   OP   BUSINESS. 


§  120  a.  Regular  Entries  made  in  the 
Course  of  Business. 

§  120  b.  Parties'  Shopbooks  ;  History  of 
the  Exception. 


§  120  c.  Same:  Rules  for  Use  of  Par- 
ties'  Shopbook  Entries. 


[_ AN  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  exists  for  regular  entries  made 
in  the  course  of  business  ;  but  there  are  two  distinct  branches  to  this 
exception,  one  concerned  with  such  entries  in  general,  and  the  other 
with  entries  by  a  party  in  his  own  shopbooks,  and  it  is  necessary  to 
treat  them  separately.] 

§  115-120. l 

§  120  a.  Regular  Entries  made  in  the  Course  of  Business.  [It  is 
indispensable,  for  the  use  of  these  statements,  that  the  entrant  be 
unavailable  as  a  witness.  Death  is  usually  spoken  of  as  the  condi- 
tion on  which  they  may  be  used;  and  death  is  certainly  sufficient. 
Absence  from  the  jurisdiction  should  equally  suffice.1  On  the  same 
principle,  insanity2  and  illness  hindering  the  presence  of  the  witness8 
should  equally  suffice  ;  and  in  general  "  the  ground  is  the  impossi- 
bility of  obtaining  the  testimony,  and  the  cause  of  such  impossibility 
seems  immaterial."  * 

That  which  gives  trustworthiness  to  such  statements,  and  affords  a 
reason  for  receiving  them  as  an  exception  to  the  rule,  is  the  habit 
and  system  of  making  the  entries  as  a  part  of  the  ordinary  and  regu- 
lar course  of  business,  removing  the  ordinary  motives  for  untruth 

1  Transferred  to  Appendix  II  ;  the  treatment  in  the  original  text  obscures  the 
subject  by  considering  it  under  the  res  gestce  principle,  as  well  as  by  failing  to  distin- 
guish carefully  the  principle  of  the  exception  for  official  statements  (post,  §  162m), 
and  the  exception  for  declarations  against  interest  (post,  §§  147  ff. );  nor  is  the  distinc- 
tion between  parties'  books  and  other  entries  clearly  expounded. 

1  Klliott  v.  Dycke,  78  Ala.  157;  McDonald  v.  Carries,  90  id.  148  ;  Railway  Co. 
v.  Henderson,  57  Ark.  402 ;  Bartholomew  v.  Farwell,  41  Conn.  109  ;  Culver  v.  Marks, 
122  Ind.  565  ;  Karr  v.  Stivers,  34  la.  125  ;  North  Bank  v.  Abbot,  13  Pick.  471  ;  Ster- 
rett  v.  Bull,  1  Binn.   237;  Rigby  v.  Logan,  45  S.  C.  651 ;  Fennerstein's  Champagne, 
3  Wall.  149,  semble.      Contra:  Cooper  v.  Marsden,  1   Esp.  1;  Browning  v.  Flanairin, 
22  N.  J.  L.  567,  672 ;  Wilbur  ».  Selden,  6  Cow.  163 ;  Little  It.  G.  Co.  v.  Dallas  Co., 
80  U.  S.  App.  55. 

2  Union  Hank  v.  Knapp,  3  Pick.  109. 

8  Cmitrn,  srmblc:  Taylor  v.  R.  Co.,  80  la.  135. 
*  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  North  Bank  v.  Abbot,  supra. 


§§  115-1200.]      REGULAR   ENTRIES   IN   COURSE   OF  BUSINESS.       205 

and  adding  certain  safeguards  for  correctness.5  The  entry,  then, 
must  have  been  made  in  the  course  of  business,  i.  e.  as  a  part  of  the 
regular  work  of  one's  livelihood  or  profession  ;  this  permits  the  use 
of  entries  by  one  sending  orders  or  bills,6  by  a  notary  recording  pro- 
tests,7 a  cashier  sending  notice  of  non-payment,8  a  marine  inspector 
certifying  to  a  vessel's  condition,9  an  attorney  keeping  a  book  of 
proceedings,10  an  asylum-officer  keeping  a  weather-record ;  n  records 
of  baptism  or  marriage  by  priests  or  ministers  are  properly  admissi- 
ble 12  (though  not  so  treated  in  England.18)  The  entry  should  also  be 
one  of  a  class  made  more  or  less  regularly  ;  for  example,  a  single 
entry  made  in  a  book  that  had  been  laid  aside  for  ten  years  would  be 
rejected.14  The  entry  must  be  fairly  contemporaneous  with  the  event 
recorded  ; 15  though  no  precise  time  can  be  fixed  as  a  limit.  It  is  com- 
monly said  that  the  entrant  must  have  no  motive  to  misrepresent;19 
though  this  limitation  seems  elusive  in  its  application.  In  this  coun- 
try the  statements  must  be  in  writing  ;  but  in  England  an  oral  regular 
report  is  admissible.17  On  the  other  hand,  in  England,  an  additional 
limitation,  not  existing  in  this  country,  obtains,  in  that  the  declarant 
must  have  been  under  a  duty  to  some  superior  to  make  the  state- 
ment, —  a  duty  to  do  the  thing  recorded,18  to  record  or  otherwise  re- 
port it,19  and  to  report  it  at  the  time.20  The  entry,  in  any  case,  must 
be  produced  in  its  original  form,  if  it  can  be,  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  Primariness,  post,  §  563  a.21  The  entry,  moreover,  must  be 
of  a  fact  within  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  declarant ; 2a  and  on 

6  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Poole  v.  Dicas,  1  Bing.  K  C.  649 ;  Parker,  C.  J.,  in  Welsh  v. 
Barrett,  15  Mass.  380  :  Swayne,  J.,  in  Fennerstein's  Champagne,  3  Wall.  149. 

«  R.  v.  Cope,  7  C.  &  P.  726  ;  Champneys  v.  Peck,  1  Stark.  326. 

7  Halliday  v.  Martinet,  20  Johns.  172. 

8  Nichols  v.  Goldsmith,  7  Wend.  161. 

9  Perkins  v.  Augusta  Co.,  10  Gray  324. 

1°  Leland  v.  Cameron,  31  N.  Y.  121  ;  Fisher  v.  Mayor,  67  id.  77. 
For  log-books,  see  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  428,  431. 

11  De  Armond  v.  Neasmith,  32  Mich.  233. 

12  Hnntly  v.   Comstock,  2   Root  99;   Whitcher  v.  McLanghlin,   115  Mass.   169; 
Kennedy  v~  Doyle,  10  All.  161 ;  Hyain  v.  Edwards,  1  Dall.  2;  Clark  v.  Trinity  Church, 
5  W.  &  S.  268.     Contra:  Royal  S.  G.  F.  v.  McDonald,  N.  J.,  35  Atl.  1061. 

Statutes  often  expressly  provide  for  admission ;  e.  g.  Ala.  Code  1897,  §  1811  ;  Mich. 
How.  St.  §  6222  ;  Penns.  Pep.  &  L.  Dig.  Evidence,  43,  45,  47.  Moreover,  they  are 
often  admissible  as  official  statements  :  post.  §§  162  m,  484. 

W  Whittuck  v.  Waters,  4  C.  &  P.  375 ;  Davis  v.  Lloyd,  1  C.  &  K.  275. 

i*  Kibbe  v.  Bancroft,  77  111.  19. 

15  Champneys  r.  Peck,  1  Stark.  326  ;  Ray  v.  Castle,  79  N.  C.  580. 

18  Poole  v.  Dicas,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  649;  Polini  v.  Gray,  12  Ch.  D.  430;  Lord  v.  Moore, 
87  Me.  220. 

"  Lord  Campbell,  in  Sussex  Peerage  Case,  11  01.  &  F.  113  ;  E.  v.  Buckley,  13  Cox 
Cr.  293. 

!8  Smith  v.  Blakey,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  332  ;  Polini  v.  Gray,  L.  R.  12  Ch.  D.  431 ;  Lyell 
v.  Kennedy,  35  W.  R.  725. 

19  Chambers  v.  Bernasconi,  1  C.  &  J.  451 ;  1  C.  M.  &  R.  347 ;  Smith  v.  Blakey, 
Polini  v.  Gray,  supra;  Trotter  v.  McLean,  L.  R.  13  Ch.  D.  579;  Massey  v.  Allen,  ib. 
558  ;  Lyell  v.  Kennedy,  supra. 

20  Smith  v.  Blakey,  Polini  v.  Gray,  siqira. 

21  Herring  v.  Levy,  4  Mart.  N.  s.  386;  Holmes  v.  Marden,  12  Pick.  171;  Rigby  t>. 
Logan,  45  S.  C.  651 ;  Burton  v.  Driggs,  20  Wall.  135. 

&  Avery  v.  Avery,  49  Ala.  195 ;   McDonald  v.  Carnes,  90  id.  148  ;  New  J.  Z.  &  I. 


206  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEAESAY  RULE.  [CH.   XL 

this  principle  a  record  of  baptism  cannot  be  treated  as  evidence  of  the 
date  of  birth,28  though  it  is  evidence  of  the  person's  being  alive,24 
which  may  sometimes  be  material  under  the  issues.  The  difficult  sit- 
uation arises,  in  the  application  of  this  part  of  the  principle,  where 
two  persons  have  co-operated  in  the  entry,  one  having  personal 
knowledge  and  reporting  to  the  other,  and  the  other  writing  down 
the  transaction  thus  reported  ;  the  tjTpical  cases  being  that  of  a  sales- 
man and  entry-clerk  or  book-keeper  and  that  of  a  workman  and  a 
foreman  recording  the  work  reported.  Where  both  such  persons  are 
brought  to  the  stand,  no  question  of  a  hearsay  exception  arises  ;  and 
it  will  be  seen  later  (post,  §  439  &)  that,  upon  the  principle  of  using  a 
past  recollection,  the  combined  testimony  of  the  two  should  suffice  to 
admit  the  entry.  But  where  one  of  them  —  usually  the  salesman, 
workman,  or  other  person  having  personal  knowledge  —  does  not  ap- 
pear as  a  witness,  the  entry  can  be  received  if  at  all,  only  under  the 
present  exception.  That  it  should  be  so  receivable  seems  proper,  on 
principle,  as  well  as  for  reasons  of  practical  convenience  ;  for  (apart 
from  the  English  doctrine  admitting  oral  reports,  supra)  if  the  sales- 
man, etc.,  has  made  a  regular  report  in  the  course  of  business,  which 
has  not  taken  written  shape,  it  seems  not  to  be  essential  whether  it 
is  he  or  another  who  gives  it  that  written  shape,  and  accordingly  an 
entry,  verified  by  the  person  making  it,  of  a  regular  oral  report  by  a 
person  not  now  available  would  seem  admissible.  The  cases  repre- 
sent various  attitudes  on  the  part  of  the  Courts.  Some  Courts  are 
willing  to  receive  such  entries  where  the  person  making  them  verifies 
their  correctness  on  the  stand  and  the  original  observer  —  salesman, 
etc.  —  is  dead  or  otherwise  unavailable.26  Other  Courts  go  even  fur- 
ther, and  admit  them  without  accounting  for  the  original  observer,  on 
the  sound  consideration  that  it  is  practically  impossible  in  mercantile 
conditions  to  trace  and  procure  every  one  of  the  many  individuals 
who  reported  the  transactions.28  On  the  other  hand,  some  Courts 
refuse  to  receive  such  entries  even  though  the  original  observer  is 
dead  or  otherwise  unavailable  ; 27  while  others  merely  exclude  them 
in  a  given  case  because  he  is  absent  and  not  accounted  for.28  A 

Co.  v.  I,.  Z.  &  I.  Co.,  59  N.  J.  L.  189 ;  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schwenk,  94  U.  S.  598 
(entry  of  age  of  member  by  lodge-secretary,  excluded). 

*»  Doe  v.  Bray,  8  B.  &  C.  815;  R.  ».  N.  Petherton,  5  id.  508.  But  on  peculiar 
grounds  a  register  was  admitted  to  show  illegitimacy  in  Gleinater  v.  Harding,  L.  R. 
29  Ch.  D.  991. 

24  Durfee  v.  Abbott,  61  Mich.  476.  This  use  was  ignored  in  Royal  S.  G.  F.  v.  Mc- 
Donald, N.  J.,  35  Atl.  1061. 

36  Stanley  v.  Wilkerson,  63  Ark.  556  ;  Amer.  S.  Co.  v.  Pauly,  38  U.  S.  App.  254. 

*  Fielder  v.  Collier,  13  Ga.  499  (leading  case);  Schaefer  v.  R.  Co.,  66  Ga.  39  ; 
Chisholm  v.  Machine  Co.,  160  111.  101  ;  Donovan  v.  R.  Co.,  158  Mass.  450  ;  Nelson  v. 
Bank,  82  U.  S.  App.  554  (leading  case) ;  North.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Keyes,  id.,  91  Fed.  47; 
U.  S.  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  379;  Dohrnen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  96  Wia  88. 

87  Stettauer  v.  White,  98  111.  77;  Kent  v.  Garvin,  1  Gray  150;  Chicago  L.  Co.  t>. 
Hewitt,  U.  S.  App.,  64  F«-d.  314. 

»  Swan  v.  Thurman,  Mich.,  70  N.  W.  1023;  Tingley  v.  Land  Co.,  9  Wash.  34,  42; 


§§  120  a-120  6.]    PARTIES'  SHOPBOOKS  ;  HISTORY  OF  EXCEPTION.  207 


similar  question  arises  in  connection  with  parties'  shopbooks 
§  120  &).] 

§  120  b.  Parties'  Shopbooks  ;  History  of  the  Exception.  [In  order 
to  understand  the  present  condition  of  the  law,  it  is  necessary  to  notice 
briefly  the  historical  relation  of  the  two  forms  of  the  exception,  this 
and  the  preceding  one.  First,  we  have  in  England,  as  early  as  the 
1600s,  a  custom  to  receive  the  shopbooks  of  "  divers  men  of  trades 
and  handicraftsmen  "  in  evidence  of  "  the  particulars  and  certainty 
of  the  wares  delivered  ;  "  and  this  whether  the  books  were  kept  by 
the  party  himself  or  by  a  clerk,  and  whether  the  entrant  were  living 
or  dead.  But  there  was  more  or  less  abuse  of  this  evidence  in 
"leaving  the  books  uncrossed  and  any  way  discharged"  and  still 
suing  for  the  claim  ;  moreover,  the  whole  proceeding  was  also  dis- 
paraged as  involving  the  making  of  evidence  for  one's  self,  for  "  the 
rule  is  that  a  man  cannot  make  evidence  for  himself."  In  1609, 
then,  a  statute,1  after  reciting  these  considerations,  forbade  this  use 
of  shopbooks  "  in  any  action  for  any  money  due  for  wares  hereafter 
to  be  delivered  or  for  work  hereafter  to  be  done,"  except  (1)  within 
one  year  after  the  delivery  of  the  wares  or  the  doing  of  the  work, 
(2)  where  a  bill  of  debt  existed,  (3)  "between  merchant  and  mer- 
chant, merchant  and  tradesman,  or  between  tradesman  and  trades- 
man," for  matters  within  the  trade.  The  higher  Courts,  applying 
the  principle  that  a  man  cannot  make  evidence  for  himself,  ulti- 
mately made  the  exclusion  complete,  by  refusing  to  recognize  these 
books  at  all,  after  the  expiration  of  the  year.2  In  the  lower  Courts, 
where  the  jurisdiction  was  limited  to  small  claims,  the  use  of  these 
books  continued  ;  8  and  a  recent  Rule  of  Court  has  re-introduced 
the  use  (to  an  extent  somewhat  indefinite)  in  the  upper  Courts.4 
But,  for  the  purposes  of  the  development  of  the  law,  there  ceased 
to  be  for  two  centuries  any  recognition  in  England  of  this  branch 
of  the  exception.  But,  before  the  end  of  the  century  of  the  above 
statute,  the  entries  of  a  deceased  clerk  (even  a  clerk  of  a  party) 
began  to  be  admitted,  on  considerations  of  necessity,  as  an  exception 
to  the  Hearsay  rule.  It  was  distinctly  understood  that  their  use, 
though  affording  some  concession  to  parties,  was  a  different  thing 
from  the  use  of  books  kept  by  a  living  party  himself.  Price  v. 
Lord  Torrington  is  the  case  most  frequently  taken  as  the  landmark 
of  the  rule,  but  the  usage  is  earlier  than  that  case.6  The  attitude 

White  v.  Wilkinson,  12  La.  An.  360  ;  Clough  v.  Little,  3  Rich.  353  ;  Thomson  v.  Porter, 
4  Strobh.  Eq.  65  ;  The  Norma,  U.  S.  App.,  68  Fed.  509. 

Where  the  absent  person  himself  had  no  personal  knowledge,  the  entry  is  of  course 
inadmissible  :  Penns.  Co.  v.  McCaffrey,  111.,  50  N.  E.  713. 

1  St.  7  Jac.  I,  c.  12  ;  continued  in  3  Car.  I,  c.  4,  §  22  ;  16  Car.  I,  c.  4  ;  Rev.  St.  I,  691. 

2  Crouch  r.  Drury,  1  Keble  27  ;  Smart  v.  Williams,  Comb.  247  ;  Glynn  v.  Bank, 
2  VPS.  38  :  Lefebure  v.  Worden,  ib.  54  ;  Sikes  v.  Marshall,  2  Esp.  705. 

8  Thayer,  Cases  on.  Evidence,  471  ;  see  pp.  471,  506,  516,  for  a  full  collection  of  the 
historical  material. 

4  Rules  of  Court,  1883,  Ord.  33,  n  3;  Ord.  30,  r.  7. 

6  Pitman  i-.  Maddox,  1  Ld.  R,  732  ;  Price  v.  Lord  Torrington,  2  id.  873  ;  Sir  Biby 
Lake's  Case,  Theory  of  Evidence,  93  ;  Glynn  v.  Bank,  Lefebure  v.  Wordeu,  supra. 


208  EXCEPTIOXS   TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.   XI. 

of  the  Courts  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  passage  in  Lefe- 
bure  v.  Worden :  "  So  far  the  Courts  of  justice  have  gone  (and  that 
was  going  a  good  way,  and  perhaps  broke  in  upon  the  original  strict 
rules  of  evidence)  that  where  there  was  such  evidence  [entries]  by 
a  servant  known  in  transacting  the  business,  as  in  a  goldsmith's 
shop  by  a  cashier  or  bookkeeper,  such  entry,  supported  on  the  oath 
of  that  servant  that  he  used  to  make  entries  from  time  to  time  and 
that  he  made  them  truly,  has  been  read.  Further,  where  that  ser- 
vant, agent,  or  bookkeeper  has  been  dead,  if  there  is  proof  that  he 
was  the  servant  or  agent  usually  employed  in  such  business,  was 
intrusted  to  make  such  entries  by  his  master,  [and]  that  it  was  the 
course  of  trade,  —  on  proof  that  he  was  dead  and  that  it  was  his 
handwriting,  such  entry  has  been  read  (which  was  Sir  Biby  Lake's 
case).  And  that  was  going  a  great  way ;  for  there  it  might  be 
objected  that  such  entry  was  the  same  as  if  made  by  the  master  him- 
self ;  yet  by  reason  of  the  difficulty  of  making  proof  in  cases  of  this 
kind,  the  Court  has  gone  so  far."  The  admission  thus  covered  only 
the  books  of  a  clerk  of  a  party.  But  already  there  were  instances 
foreshadowing  a  wider  principle ; 8  and  finally,  in  Doe  v.  Turford,"1 
the  matter  was  placed  on  a  firm  footing ;  and  the  general  scope  of 
the  exception  was  understood  as  covering  all  entries  made  "by  a 
person,  since  deceased,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  his  business,"  — 
whether  a  person  wholly  unconnected  with  the  parties,  or  the  clerk 
of  a  party,  or  a  party  himself ;  and  it  is  this  general  exception  that 
has  been  examined  in  the  preceding  section. 

Meantime,  in  the  United  States,  the  English  statute  of  1609,  or  a 
similar  one,  was  in  force,  to  a  considerable  extent,  in  the  Colonies. 
In  the  Plymouth  Laws,  as  well  as  in  the  later  laws  of  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  and  elsewhere,  the  use  of  parties'  account-books  was 
limited,  but  still  authorized  by  statutes  ;  a  special  action  of  "  book- 
debt  "  was  in  some  places  given.  In  New  York  and  New  Jersey, 
the  use  seems  clearly  traceable  to  Dutch  practice,8  which,  how- 
ever, did  not  vary  in  essentials  from  the  English.  The  usage  in 
the  United  States,  though  accompanied  by  strict  limitations,  con- 
tinued to  survive  in  spite  of  the  repudiation  of  such  evidence  in 
England.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  it  was  put  upon  the  footing  of  a 
Hearsay  exception,  based,  like  so  many  others  (ante,  §114  a),  on 
the  notion  of  necessity,  i.  e.  the  incompetence  of  the  party  as  a 
witness,  and  the  impossibility  in  certain  classes  of  transactions  of 

8  Smart  v.  Williams,  Comb.  247 ;  Woodnoth  ».  Lord  Cobham,  Bunbury  180  ;  But- 
ton v.  Gregory,  Peake  Add.  Gas.  150. 

1  3  B.  &  Ad.  890. 

«  Mr.  J.  Daly,  in  "  History  of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas,"  1  E.  D.  Smith,  xxx. 
This  connection  is  not  mentioned  by  Professor  Thayer,  in  his  notes  on  this  subject  : 
Cases  on  Evidence,  6.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the  original  English  usage,  before  the 
statute  of  James,  was  introduced,  like  so  many  oilier  things  in  the  1500s,  by  the  Dutch 
immigrants  to  England. 


§§  120  5-120  C.J  RULES  FOR  USE  OF  PARTIES'  SHOPBOOK  ENTRIES.   209 

obtaining  any  other  evidence,  and  its  principles  were  developed,  not 
arbitrarily,  but  according  to  the  requirements  of  this  principle. 

At  this  time  no  other  exception  of  the  sort  seems  to  have  been 
recognized  in  the  United  States, — that  is,  there  was  no  using  of 
regular  entries  except  this  limited  use  of  a  party's  shopbooks.  But 
a  knowledge  of  Pi-ice  v.  Lord  Torrington  seems  to  have  been  brought 
about  by  the  English  decisions  of  Pritt  v.  Fairdouyh 9  and  Hagedorn 
v.  Reid  ;10  and  two  well-considered  cases,  following  these,  established 
on  a  firm  footing  the  general  principle  of  admitting  regular  entries 
by  deceased  persons,  —  the  cases  of  Welsh  v.  Barrett n  and  Nicholls 
v.  Webb)1*  in  which  the  general  exception  was  recognized  quite  inde- 
pendently of  the  use  of  parties'  shop-books.  Such  were  the  stages 
by  which  the  two  branches  of  the  exception  reached  their  present 
status  in  England  and  the  United  States.  It  remains  to  examine 
the  rules  attending  the  use  of  parties'  shopbooks, — historically  the 
earlier  branch,  but  now,  as  will  be  seen,  without  any  reason  for 
further  existence.] 

§  120  c.  Same  :  Rules  for  Use  of  Parties'  Shopbook  Entries.  [It 
has  already  been  said  that  the  foundation  of  the  shopbook  excep- 
tion in  the  United  States  was  a  necessity,  resting  in  two  circum- 
stances, —  first,  the  incompetency  of  the  party  to  take  the  stand  as 
a  witness,  and  secondly,  the  conditions  of  early  mercantile  and  in- 
dustrial life,  which  left  the  party  generally  without  other  evidence 
than  his  own  statements  in  the  books.  These  considerations,  often 
judicially  declared,1  lead  to  certain  limitations  in  the  uSe  of  such 
entries.  The  party  must  have  had  no  clerk ;  for  if  he  had,  the  neces- 
sity fails.2  The  entry  must  not  be  for  a  cash  payment  or  loan, 
because  other  evidence  would  usually  exist ;  though  the  reason  is 
sometimes  given  that  a  cash  payment  is  not  usually  a  part  of  the 
regular  business  transactions.8  The  entry  must  not  be  of  goods 

»  1812,  3  Camp.  305. 

10  1813,  ib.  377. 

"  1819,  15  Mass.  380. 

12  1823,  8  Wheat.  326.  There  were  one  or  two  earlier  cases,  such  as  Clarke  v.  Ma- 
gruder,  2  H.  &  J.  77, 1807,  and  Sterrett  v.  Bull,  1  Binn.  237  ;  but  the  above  two  served 
chiefly  as  precedents. 

1  Shippen,  P.,  in  Poultney  v.  Ross,  1  Ball.  238  ;  Parker,  C.  J.,  in  Faxon  v.  Hollis, 
13  Mass.  427  ;  Hitchcock,  J.,  in  Cram  v.  Spear,  8  Hamm.  497  ;  Simpson,  C.  J.,  in 
Bramin  v.  Force,  12  B.  Monr.  508  ;  Devens,  J.,  in  Pratt  v.  White,  132  Mass.  477. 

2  Vosburgh  r.  Thayer,  12  Johns.  461;  Dunn  v.  Whitney,  10  Me.  14;  Haggles  v. 
Gatton,  50  111.  416  ;  Watrous  v.  Cunningham,  71  Cal.  32. 

8  Excluded :  Juniata  Bank  »».  Brown,  5  S.  &  R.  231 ;  Brannin  v.  Force,  12  B.  Monr. 
509  ;  Smith  v.  Rentz,  131  N.  Y.  169  ;  Buggies  v.  Gatton,  50  111.  416  ;  Maine  v.  Har- 
per, 4  All.  115  ;  Richardson  v.  Emery,  23  N.  H.  223 ;  Kotwitz  v.  Wright,  37  Tex.  83  ; 
Snell  r.  Eckerson,  8  la.  284  ;  U.  S.  Bank  v.  Burson,  90  id.  191  ;  Shaffer  v.  McCracken, 
ib.  578  ;  Inslee  v.  Prall,  23  N.  J.  L.  463  (leading  case)  ;  Hauser  v.  Leviness,  id.,  41 
Atl.  72.1.  Admitted :  if  in  fact  a  part  of  the  regular  course  of  business  :  Ganahl  v. 
Shore,  24  Ga.  24  (leading  case)  ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  1  Halst.  99;  Cram  t'.  Spear, 
8  Hamm.  497  ;  Veiths  v.  Hagge,  8  la.  187;  Cargill  v.  Atwood,  18  R.  I.  303;  Peck  v. 
Pierce,  63  Conn.  310 ;  Gleason  v.  Kiuney,  65  Vt.  560. 

In  Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire  the  amount  of  a  cash  entry  must  not  exceed 
405.  ($6.66)  :  Burns  v.  Fay,  14  Pick.  12;  Rich  v.  Eldredge,  42  N.  H.  158. 
VOL.    I.  —  14 


210  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XL 

delivered  to  a  third  person  but  charging  the  defendant  as  guarantor, 
because  the  other  person's  testimony  can  be  had.4  The  entry  is  not 
admissible  to  prove  the  terms  of  a  special  contract,  because  some 
other  writing  would  usually  exist,5  nor  to  prove  an  item  of  goods  so 
large  that  other  evidence  must  have  existed ; e  and  it  has  sometimes 
been  thought  that  the  party's  occupation  was  such  that  other  evidence 
will  always  be  accessible  and  his  books  be  unnecessary.7  At  the 
same  time,  these  limitations  being  reduced  to  fixed  rules,  the  fact 
that  in  a  given  case  other  testimony  happens  to  be  accessible  does 
not  exclude  an  otherwise  admissible  entry,  nor  vice  versa.8 

But,  besides  the  necessity  for  resorting  to  such  entries,  there  are 
limitations  designed  to  secure  their  trustworthiness, —  limitations  not 
dissimilar  in  principle  from  those  of  the  other  branch  of  the  exception, 
but  much  more  rigorous  and  detailed.  The  occupation  of  the  party 
must  be  such  as  involves  the  regular  keeping  of  books;9  thus,  the 
books  of  a  physician,10  and  a  printer,11  have  been  admitted,  but  not  of 
a  pedler. 12  Any  form  of  book  is  sufficient,  provided  it  is  regularly 
kept ; 18  the  fact  that  it  is  in  ledger-form  does  not  exclude  it,14  nor 
does  it  matter  what  the  material  is.16  The  entry  or  item  must  be,  not 
a  casual  one  —  e.  g.  of  an  article  not  usually  dealt  in  or  at  the  end  of 
a  book  already  finished  —  but  one  of  a  regular  series;16  it  must  not 
be  a  condensed  entry  covering  many  transactions,  as,  for  example, 
three  months'  services  in  one  item."  Not  merely  regularity,  but 
contemporaneousness  is  required ;  but  "  the  entry  need  not  be  made 

4  Poultney  v.  Ross,  1  Dall.  238  ;  Juniata  Bank  v.  Brown,  5  S.  &  R.  231 ;  Green  v. 
Pratt,  11  Conn.  205  ;  Kaiser  v.  Alexander,  144  Mass.  78 ;  Black  v.  Fizer,  66  Tenn. 
60. 

6  Loach  v.  Shepard,  5  Vt.  368  ;  Danser  v.  Boyle,  16  N.  J.  L.  395  ;  Nickle  v.  Bald- 
win, 4  W.  &  S.  290  ;  Ward's  Estate,  73  Mich.  225  ;  Ha/er  v.  Streich,  92  Wis.  505. 

«  Corr  v.  Sellers,  100  Pa.  170. 

7  So  of  a  schoolmaster  :  Pelzer  v.  Cranston,  2  McC.  128.     Contra,  for  an  attorney  : 
Codman  v.  Caldwell,  31  Me.  561 ;  Wells  v.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  248,  semble. 

8  Peck  v.  Abbe,   11   Conn.    210  ;    Eastman  v.  Moulton,  3   N.  H.  156  ;    Mathes  v. 
Robinson,  8  Met.  271 ;  Sickles  v.  Mather,  20  Wend.  75.   Contra:  Neville  v.  Northcutt, 
47  Tenn.  296. 

»  Ganahl  v.  Shore,  24  Ga.  17. 
1}  S pence  v.  Sanders,  1  Bay  119. 
«  Thomas  v.  Dyott,  1  Nott  &  McC.  186. 

12  Thayer  v.  Been,  2  Hill  S.  C.  677. 

13  Thus,  a  set  of  separate  books  for  different  enterprises  was  excluded  in  Richardson 
P.  Kinery,  23  N.  H.   223  ;  a  mere  memorandum-book    was  excluded  in  Costello  v. 
Crowell,  139  Mass.  592.    See  other  examples  in  Riley  v.  Boehm,  167  id.  183;  Country- 
man v.  Bunker,  101  Mich.  218  ;    Fulton  s  Estate,  178  Pa.  78  ;   Barley  v.  Byrd,  Va., 
28  8.  E.  329  ;  Hay  v.  Peterson,  Wyo.,  45  Pac.  1073  ;  Diggins'  Estate,  68  Vt.  198. 

14  Coggswell  v.  Dolliver,  2  Mass.  221  ;   Wells  v.  Hatch,  43  N.  H.  248  ;  Hoover  ». 
Gehr,  62  Pa.  136 ;  but  see  note  25,  infra. 

Kendall  t;.  Field,   14  Me.  30  (shingle)  ;  Taylor  v.  Tucker,  1  Kelly  231  (slips  of 


"srfc, 


Beach  v.  Mills,  5  Conn.  496  ;  Davis  v.  Sanford,  9  All.  216  ;  Stuckslager  v.  Neel, 
123  Pa.  60. 

17  Henshaw  v.  Davis,  5  Cash.  146  ;  Bassett  v.  Spoflbrd,  11  N.  II.  267  ;  Carr  v.  Sell- 
era,  100  Pa.  171  ;  Pratt  v.  White,  132  Mass.  477  ;  Baldridge  v.  Penlaud,  68  Tex.  441 ; 
"Woolaey  v.  Bohn,  41  Minn.  238 ;  Cargill  v.  Atwood,  18  11.  I.  303. 


§  12  Oc.]      RULES   FOR   USE   OF   PARTIES'   SHOPBOOK   ENTRIES.          211 

exactly  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence  ;  it  suffices  if  it  be  within  a  rea- 
sonable time;  the  law  fixes  no  precise  instant  when  the  entry  should 
be  made."18  The  entries  must  bear  an  honest  appearance;19  and 
some  testimony  must  be  given  that  the  party  has  the  reputation 
of  keeping  correct  and  honest  books.20  The  entry  must  be  the  ori- 
ginal one,  not  a  copy,  in  accordance  with  the  rule  of  Primariness 
(post,  §  563  a)  ;  but  it  is  often  difficult  to  determine  whether  a  book 
made  up  from  temporary  memoranda  should  be  treated  as  in  effect 
the  original  one  ;  thus,  a  ledger  made  up  from  slate-entries,21  a  book 
made  from  memoranda  chalked  on  a  butcher-cart,22  a  book  from  pen- 
cil-entries on  sheets  of  paper,28  has  been  treated  as  an  original ;  while 
a  journal-book-  copied  from  a  blotter,24  a  ledger  made  up  from  sale- 
slips,25  has  been  excluded  as  not  an  original.  The  entry  may  be  in 
any  kind  of  character  or  mark  capable  of  being  interpreted.26  It  is 
usually  said  that  the  book  cannot  be  used  to  show,  by  the  absence  of 
an  entry,  that  no  such  transaction  occurred,27  though  this  seems  ques- 
tionable. The  entrant  must  have  personal  knowledge  of  the  transac- 
tion entered.28  Where  the  party-entrant  enters  according  to  the  report 
of  another  person,  — salesman,  porter,  etc.,  —  the  entry  is  receivable 
if  the  latter  person  is  called  as  a  witness  to  the  transaction.29  That 
the  latter  person  must  be  called  is  sometimes  maintained ; 80  but  it 
would  seem  (according  to  the  principles  explained  ante,  §  120  a)  that 
if  he  cannot  be  obtained,  either  because  of  his  death  or  because  of 
practical  inconvenience,  the  entry  may  nevertheless  be  received.81 

18  Sergeant,  J.,  in  Jones  v.  Long,  3  Watts  326  ;  Bigelow,  J.,  in  Barker  v.  Haskell, 
9  Gush.  221.  See  instances  of  various  times  in  Liindis  v.  Turner,  14  Cal.  575;  Years- 
ley's  Appeal,  48  Pa.  535 ;  Rumsey  v.  Telephone  Co.,  49  N.  J.  L.  325. 

i»  Cogswell  v.  Dolliver,  2  Mass.  221  ;  Pratt  v.  White,  132  id.  477  ;  Caldwell  ». 
McDermit,  17  Cal.  466  ;  Gutherless  v.  Ripley,  98  la.  290  ;  Levine  v.  Ins.  Co.,  66 
Minn.  138. 

20  Vosburgh  v.   Thayer,  12  Johns.   461  ;  Patrick  v.  Jack,  82  111.  82  ;  Watrous  v. 
Cunningham,  71  Cal.  32  ;  Atkinson  v.  Burt,  Ark.,  46  S.  W.  98t5  ;  Webster  v.  Lumber 
Co.,  101  Cal.  326  ;  Seventh  D.  A.  P.  A.  v.  Fisher,  95  Mich.  274. 

21  Faxon  p.  Hollis,  13  Mass.  427. 
28  Smith  v.  Sanford,  12  Pick.  140. 

23  Plummer  v.  Mercantile  Co.,  23  Colo.  190.  For  additional  instances,  see  Barker 
v.  Haskell,  9  Cush.  218  ;  Kent  v.  Garvin,  1  Gray  148  ;  Miller  v.  Shay,  145  Mass.  162 ; 
Levine  v.  Ins.  Co.,  66  Minn.  138. 

2*  Breinig  v.  Metzler,  23  Pa.  159. 

25  Way  v.  Cross,  95  la.  258.  For  other  examples,  see  Bentley  v.  Ward,  116  Mass. 
337;  Rumsey  v.  Telephone  Co.,  49  N.  J.  L.  325  ;  Woolsey  v.  Bohn,  41  Minn.  239. 

23  Miller  v.  Shay,  145  Mass.  162  ;  Marsh  v.  Case,  30  Wis.  531  ;  Barton  v.  Dundas, 
24  U.  C.  Q.  B.  275. 

27  Alexander  v.  Smoot,  J3  Ired.  462;  Morse  r.  Potter,  4  Gray  292  ;  Rileyr.  Boehm, 
167  Mass.  183  ;  Shaffer  v.  McCracken,  90  la.  578,  semble  ;  Lawhorn  v.  Carter,  11  Bush 
10.    Contra:  Peck  v.  Pierce,  63  Conn.  310,  314. 

28  Union  Electric  Co.  v.  Theatre  Co.,  18  Wash.  213  (based  on  newspaper  reports ; 
excluded). 

29  Harwood  ».   Mulry,  8  Gray  250  ;    Smith  v.  Sanford,    12   Pick.  140  ;    Miller  v. 
Shay,  145  Mass.  163  ;  Hoover  v.  Gehr,  62  Pa.  138  ;  Clough  v.  Little,  2  Rich.  L.  353  ; 
Thomson  v.  Porter,  4  Strobh.  Eq.  65. 

80  Kent  v.  Garvin,  1  Gray  150. 

81  See  the  authorities  cited  ante,  §  120  a,  the  analogy  of  which  would  probably  bo 


212  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEAESAY   RULE.  [CH.   Xl. 

The  suppletory  or  verifying  oath  of  the  party  was  allowed  and  re- 
quired (except  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey 82),  by  which  he  took 
the  stand  to  identify  the  books  and  swear  to  their  correctness.88  This 
oath,  however  (which  could  be  dispensed  with  if  the  party  were  dead 
or  insane 84  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction),  was  not  regarded  as  making  the 
party  a  witness  ;  it  was  merely  a  preliminary  or  cautionary  guarantee, 
and  in  effect  related  back  to  the  time  of  the  entries.85  Moreover, 
the  theory  that  the  party  was  not  testifying  on  the  stand  as  a  witness, 
and  that  the  books  were  merely  hearsay  evidence  and  the  party  still 
incompetent  as  a  witness,  was  further  carried  out  in  connection  with 
the  disqualification  by  interest  of  the  surviving  party  to  a  transaction 
(post,  §  333  b) ;  for  on  the  one  hand,  though  the  survivor  himself  as 
party  be  disqualified,  nevertheless  his  books  may  be  offered  against  the 
deceased  person's  representative ; 86  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  use 
of  the  deceased  person's  books  by  his  representative  is  not  such  a  tes- 
tifying as  amounts  to  a  waiver  of  the  disqualification  and  entitles  the 
survivor  to  take  the  stand  against  the  books.87 

The  basis  of  this  branch  of  the  exception,  as  has  been  seen,  was  the 
supposed  necessity  for  resort  to  such  evidence,  the  party  being  unable 
to  take  the  stand  in  his  own  behalf  as  a  witness.  It  would  follow, 
on  principle,  that  since  the  abolition  of  parties'  incompetency  (post, 
§  328  c)  this  necessity  no  longer  exists,  because  the  party  can  now 
take  the  stand  and  testify,  using  the  books,  if  he  pleases,  as  a  record 
of  past  recollection  (post,  §  439  b).  At  the  present  day,  then,  the 
true  view  is  that  the  special  Hearsay  exception  in  favor  of  parties' 
books  has  disappeared,  and  that  the  party  should  use  them  only  by 
taking  the  stand  and  adopting  them  as  records  of  past  recollection, — 
a  result  preferable  in  practice  as  well  as  principle,  because  the  party 
is  thus  subjected  as  he  should  be  to  cross-examination  on  the  subject 
of  the  entries,  and  because  they  can  thus  be  used  without  the  rigor- 
ous and  detailed  limitations  above  described.  This  view,  however, 
has  as  yet  found  full  acceptance  in  a  few  Courts  only.88  It  must  be 

accepted  by  the  Courts.  In  the  following  cases  of  party's  books  it  was  held  not  neces- 
sary to  produce  the  original  observer :  Morris  v.  Briggs,  3  Gush.  343  ;  Jones  v.  Long, 
8  Watts  326. 

82  Conklin  v.  Stamler,  8  Abb.  Pr.  395. 

83  Roche  v.  Ware,  71  Cal.  379  ;  Neville  v.  Northcutt,  47  Tenn.  296  ;  Marsh  v.  Case, 
30  Wis.  531. 

84  Holbrook  v.  Gay,  6  Cush.  216. 

86  Little  v.  Wyatt,  14  N.  H.  26. 

'  **  Dysart  v.  Furrow,  90  la.  59  ;  Anthony  v.  Stinson,  4  Kan.  220  ;  Cargill  v.  Atwood, 
18  R.  I.  303. 

87  Helton  v.   Hill,  58  Me.  116  ;   Sheehan  v.    Hennessey,  65  N.  H.  101  ;  Roche  v. 
Ware,  71  Cal.  378,  semble.     See  Disnmkes  v.  Tolson,  67  Ala.  386. 

88  Well  expounded  in  Conklin   v.  Stamler,  8  Abb.  Pr.  400  ;  Nichols  ».  Haynes,  78 
Pa.  176;  Stuckslager  v.  Neel,  123  id.  61  ;  Bishnell  v.  Simpson,  119  Cal.  658. 

In  the  following  cases  the  books  are  treated,  more  or  less  explicitly,  from  this  point 
of  view  :  Dismtik«-s  v.  Tolson,  67  Ala.  886  ;  Hancock  v.  Kelly,  81  id.  378  ;  Boiling  v. 
Kalinin,  97  id.  6\9  :  Roche  v.  Ware,  71  Cal.  878  ;  Wolcott  v.  Heath,  78  111.  434  ;  Field 
r.  Thompson,  119  Muss.  151  ;  Montague  »>.  Dongnn,  68  Mich.  2'JO  ;  Culver  v.  Lumber 
Co.,  53  Minn.  360,  365  ;  Anchor  Milling  Co.  v.  Walsh,  108  Mo.  284 ;  Walser  v.  Wear, 


§  120(7.]   RULES  FOR  USE  OF  PARTIES'  SHOPBOOK  ENTRIES.    213 

added  that  in  some  States  statutes  have  been  passed,  apparently  at- 
tempting to  modify  the  present  branch  of  the  exception  by  enlarging 
it  to  include  parties'  books  kept  by  a  clerk ; 89  but  the  phrasing  of 
these  statutes  is  usually  such  that  their  precise  object  and  effect  is 
not  easy  to  ascertain.] 

141  id.  443 ;  Swain  v,  Cheney,  41   N.  H.  237  ;  St.  Paul  F.  &  M.  I.  Co.  v.  Gotthelf, 
35  Nebr.  351,  356 ;    Price  v.  Garland,   3  N.  M.  290  ;  Rurasey  v.  Telephone  Co.,  49 
N.  J.  L.  326  ;  see  Byerts  v.  Robinson,  N.  M.,  54  Pac.  932. 
89  E.  g.  111.  Kev.  St.  c.  51,  §  3. 


214 


EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE.      [CH.  XII. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE:    REPUTATION   ON   MATTERS   OF 
PUBLIC   OR  GENERAL   INTEREST. 


1.  Reputation  as  to  Matters  involving  Prop- 
erty-rights and  the  like. 

§  128.   General  Principle. 

§§  128  a,  129.  Reputation  must  come 
from  a  Competent  Source. 

§  130.  Rights  must  be  ancient,  and 
Declarant  dead. 

§§  131-133.  Reputation  must  be  ante 
litem  motam. 

§§  135,  136.  Interest  as  a  Member  of  the 
Community  does  not  exclude. 

§  137.    Matters  of  Private  Interest. 

§  138.   Particular  Facts. 

§  138  a.  Reputation  as  to  Private  Boun- 
daries ;  American  Doctrine. 


§  139.  Vehicle  of  the  Reputation ;  In- 
dividual Declarations,  Maps,  Leases,  Ver- 
dicts, etc. 

§  140.  Immaterial  whether  for  or  against 
a  Public  Right. 

§  140  a.  American  Doctrine  as  to  Indi- 
vidual Declarations  about  Private  Boun- 
daries. 

2.   Reputation  as  Evidence  of  other  Matters. 

§  140  b.  Character,  Insanity,  Solvency, 
etc. 

§  140  c.  Marriage. 


§§  121, 122.1 

§  123. 2 

§  124.8 

§  125." 

§  126.6 

§  127.  • 

[There  is  a  general  doctrine  about  the  use  of  reputation  as  evi- 
dence of  matters  of  public  or  general  interest,  —  by  which  is  meant 
chiefly  matters  connected  with  property-rights,  franchises,  custom- 
ary privileges,  and  the  like.  There  are  also  sundry  uses  of  reputa- 
tion as  hearsay  evidence,  resting  upon  the  same  general  notion,  but 
dealt  with  in  wholly  separate  lines  of  precedents,  —  reputation  to 
prove  character,  solvency,  etc.] 


1.    Matters  involving  Property-rights  and  the  like. 

§  128.    General   Principle.1     The  terms  "  public  "   and   "  general  " 
are  sometimes  used  as  synonymous,  meaning  merely  that  which  con- 


[Transferred  post,  as  §§  152  a,  152  &.] 
"Transferred  to  Appendix  II J 
^Transferred  ante,  as  §  99  a.T 
^Transferred  to  Appendix  ILJ 

"Transferred  to  Appendix  II ;  the  subject  is  dealt  with  post,  §  462.] 
'Transferred  to  Appendix  II.^j 

.'I'll'-  first  sentence  in  the  original  text  is:  "  And  first,  as  to  matters  of  public  or 
general  interest."] 


§§  121-128  a.]    REPUTATION  ;  MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.    215 

cerns  a  multitude  of  persons.2  But,  in  regard  to  the  admissibility 
of  hearsay  testimony,  a  distinction  has  been  taken  between  them; 
the  term  "public"  being  strictly  applied  to  that  which  concerns  all 
the  citizens,  and  every  member  of  the  State;  and  the  term  "  general  " 
being  referred  to  a  lesser,  though  still  a  large,  portion  of  the  com- 
munity. In  matters  of  public  interest,  all  persons  must  be  presumed 
conversant,  on  the  principle  that  individuals  are  presumed  to  be  con- 
versant in  their  own  affairs;  and,  as  common  rights  are  naturally 
talked  of  in  the  community,  what  is  thus  dropped  in  conversation 
may  be  presumed  to  be  true.8  It  is  the  prevailing  current  of  asser- 
tion that  is  resorted  to  as  evidence,  for  it  is  to  this  that  every  mem- 
ber of  the  community  is  supposed  to  be  privy,  and  to  contribute  his 
share.  Evidence  of  common  reputation  is,  therefore,  received  in 
regard  to  public  facts  (a  claim  of  highway,  or  a  right  of  ferry,  for 
example),  on  ground  somewhat  similar  to  that  on  which  public 
documents,  not  judicial,  are  admitted;  namely,  the  interest  which 
all  have  in  their  truth,  and  the  consequent  probability  that  they 
are  true.4 

§  128  a.  Reputation  must  come  from  a  Competent  Source.  In 
these  matters,  in  which  all  are  concerned,  reputation  from  any  one 
appears  to  be  receivable;  but  of  course  it  is  almost  worthless,  unless 
it  comes  from  persons  who  are  shown  to  have  some  means  of  knowl- 
edge; 1  such  as,  in  the  case  of  a  highway,  by  living  in  the  neighbor- 
hood :  but  the  want  of  such  proof  of  their  connection  with  the  subject 
in  question  affects  the  value  only,  and  not  the  admissibility,  of  the 
evidence.  On  the  contrary,  where  the  fact  in  controversy  is  one  in 
which  all  the  members  of  the  community  have  not  an  interest,  but 
those  only  who  live  in  a  particular  district,  or  adventure  in  a  par- 
ticular enterprise,  or  the  like,  hearsay  from  persons  wholly  uncon- 
nected with  the  place  or  business  would  not  only  be  of  no  value,  but 
altogether  inadmissible.2 

2  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  690,  per  Bayley,  J. 

8  Morewood  v.  Wood,  14  East  329  n.,  per  Ld.  Kenyon ;  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M. 
&  S.  686,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough ;  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  4  Campb.  416,  per  Mans- 
field, C.  J. 

*  fjThe  best  expositions  of  the  principle  are  those  by  Coltman,  J.,  in  Wright  «?. 
Tatham,  7  A.  &  E.  358;  Alderson,  B.,  in  s.  C.  on  appeal,  5  Cl.  &  F.  720;  Lord 
Campbell,  C.  J.,  in  R.  v.  Bedfordshire,  4  E.  &  B.  535  ;  and  Loomis,  J.,  in  Southwest 
School  District  v.  Williams,  48  Conn.  507.  —  especially  the  last  tsvo  opinions.  The 
principle  has  been  applied  to  admit  reputation  to  prove  street  lines  (Ralston  v.  Miller, 
3  Rand.  49),  county  lines  (Cox  v.  State,  41  Tex.  4),  and  road  lines  (State  v.  Vale 
Mills,  63  N.  H.  4)  ;  but  to  exclude  it  as  evidence  of  possession  of  a  house  (Hall  v. 
Mayo,  97  Mass.  417;  Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Hanlon,  132  id.  483),  the  existence 
of  a  schoolhouse  (Southwest  S.  D.  ».  Williams,  supra),  and  a  sheriff's  exemption 
from  executing  criminals  (R.  v.  Antrobus,  2  A.  &  E.  793). J 

1  rjThis  language  is  quoted  from  the  opinion  of  Parke,  B.,  in  Crease  v.  Barrett, 
infra;  but  it  must  be  regarded  as  misleading;  for  in  any  case  it  would  seem  that  the 
reputation  must  come  from  a  region  or  community  having  some  concern  with  the 
right  in  question ;  that  the  right  regards  a  highway,  for  example,  would  not  justify 
the  use  of  a  reputation  in  a  community  remote  from  the  highway,  even  though  in 
theory  all  persons  had  the  right  to  use  the  highway.] 

8  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  929,  per  Parke,  B. 


216  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE.       [CH.  XIT. 

§  129.  Thus,  in  an  action  of  trespass  quare  clausum  fregit,  where 
the  defendant  pleaded  in  bar  a  prescriptive  right  of  common  in  the 
locus  in  quo,  and  the  plaintiff  replied,  prescribing  the  right  of  his 
messuage  to  use  the  same  ground  for  tillage  with  corn  until  the 
harvest  was  ended,  traversing  the  defendant's  prescription;  it  ap- 
pearing that  many  persons  beside  the  defendant  had  a  right  of  com- 
mon there,  evidence  of  reputation,  as  to  the  plaintiff's  right,  was 
held  admissible,  provided  it  were  derived  from  persons  conversant 
with  the  neighborhood.1  But  where  the  question  was,  whether  the 
city  of  Chester  anciently  formed  part  of  the  county  palatine,  an 
ancient  document,  purporting  to  be  a  decree  of  certain  law  officers 
and  dignitaries  of  the  crown,  not  having  authority  as  a  court,  was 
held  inadmissible  evidence  on  the  ground  of  reputation,  they  having, 
from  their  situations,  no  peculiar  knowledge  of  the  fact.2  And,  on 
the  other  hand,  where  the  question  was,  whether  Nottingham  Castle 
was  within  the  hundred  of  Broxtowe,  certain  ancient  orders,  made  by 
the  justices  at  the  quarter-sessions  for  the  county,  in  which  the 
castle  was  described  as  being  within  that  hundred,  were  held  admis- 
sible evidence  of  reputation;  the  justices,  though  not  proved  to  be 
residents  within  the  county  or  hundred,  being  presumed,  from  the 
nature  and  character  of  their  offices  alone,  to  have  sufficient  ac- 
quaintance with  the  subject  to  which  their  declarations  related.8 
Thus  it  appears  that  competent  knowledge  in  the  declarant  is,  in 
all  cases,  an  essential  prerequisite  to  the  admission  of  his  testimony; 
and  that  though  all  the  citizens  are  presumed  to  have  that  knowl- 
edge, in  some  degree,  where  the  matter  is  of  public  concernment, 
yet,  in  other  matters,  of  interest  to  many  persons,  some  particular 
evidence  of  such  knowledge  is  required.4 

§  130.  Rights  must  be  ancient  and  Declarant  dead.  It  is  to  be 
observed,  that  the  exception  we  are  now  considering  is  admitted 
only  in  the  case  of  ancient  rights,  and  in  respect  to  the  declarations 
of  persons  supposed  to  be  dead.1  It  is  required  by  the  nature  of 
the  rights  in  question;  their  origin  being  generally  antecedent  to 
the  time  of  legal  memory,  and  incapable  of  direct  proof  by  living 
witnesses,  both  from  this  fact,  and  also  from  the  undefined  general- 
ity of  their  nature.3  It  has  been  held,  that,  where  the  nature  of  the 

1  "Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  679,  688,  per  Le  Blanc,  J. 

2  Rogers  v.  Wood,  2  Ham.  &  Ad.  245. 

8  Duke  of  Newcastle  v.  Broxtowe,  4  Barn.  &  Ad.  273. 

*  QSee  other  examples  in  Beaufort  v.  Smith,  4  Exch.  467;  Daniel  v.  Wilkin,  7  id. 
437 ;  McKinnon  v.  Bliss,  21  N.  Y.  218.] 

1  Moseley  v.  Daviea,  11  Price  162  ;  K.  v.  Milton,  1  Car.  &  Kir.  58  ;  Davis  0.  Fuller, 
12  Vt.  178. 

a  Q.McKinnon  v.  Bliss,  21  N.  Y.  218  ;  Porter  v.  Warner,  2  Root  23  ;  Smith  v.  Now- 
ells,  2  Litt.  160  ;  Harriman  v.  Brown,  8  Leigh  707.  Therefore,  the  matter  itself  must 
be  an  "ancient"  one:  Daggett  v.  Willey,  6  Fla.  511  ;  Gallagher  v.  R.  Co.,  67  Cal.  15 
(construing  §  1936)  ;  and  the  reputation  must  be  an  "  ancient  "  one  :  Shutte  v.  Thomp- 
son, 15  Wall.  161 ;  nnd  if  a  map  is  the  vehicle  of  reputation,  it  must  be  an  old  one: 
Adams  v.  Stanyau,  24  N.  H.  412;  and  if  the  declaration  of  an  individual  is  the  vehicle, 


§§129-131.]       REPUTATION  J   MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.       217 

case  admits  it,  a  foundation  for  the  reception  of  hearsay  evidence, 
in  matters  of  public  and  general  interest,  should  first  be  laid  by 
proving  acts  of  enjoyment  within  the  period  of  living  memory.8 
But  this  doctrine  has  since  been  overruled;  and  it  is  now  held,  that 
such  proof  is  not  an  essential  condition  of  the  reception  of  evidence 
of  reputation,  but  is  only  material  as  it  affects  its  value  when 
received.4  Where  the  nature  of  the  subject  does  not  admit  of  proof 
of  acts  of  enjoyment,  it  is  obvious  that  proof  of  reputation  alone  is 
sufficient.  So,  where  a  right  or  custom  is  established  by  document- 
ary evidence,  no  proof  is  necessary  of  any  particular  instance  of  its 
exercise;  for,  if  it  were  otherwise,  and  no  instance  were  to  happen 
within  the  memory  of  man,  the  right  or  custom  would  be  totally 
destroyed.6  In  the  case  of  a  private  right,  however,  where  proof  of 
particular  instances  of  its  exercise  has  first  been  given,  evidence  of 
reputation  has  sometimes  been  admitted  in  confirmation  of  the 
actual  enjoyment;  but  it  is  never  allowed  against  it.8 

§  131.  Reputation  must  be  ante  litem  motam.  Another  impor- 
tant qualification  of  the  exception  we  have  been  considering,  by 
which  evidence  of  reputation  or  common  fame  is  admitted,  is,  that 
the  declaration  so  received  must  have  been  made  before  any  contro- 
versy arose  touching  the  matter  to  which  it  relates;  or,  as  it  is 
usually  expressed,  ante  litem  motam.1  The  ground  on  which  such 
evidence  is  admitted  at  all  is,  that  the  declarations  "are  the  natural 
effusions  of  a  party  who  must  know  the  truth,  and  who  speaks  upon 
an  occasion  when  his  mind  stands  in  an  even  position,  without  any 
temptation  to  exceed  or  fall  short  of  the  truth."2  But  no  man  is 
presumed  to  be  thus  indifferent  in  regard  to  matters  in  actual  con- 
troversy: for,  when  the  contest  has  begun,  people  generally  take 

he  must  be  deceased :  R.  v.  Milton,  supra.  The  same  principle  excludes  modern  his- 
tories  or  other  works  offered  as  evidence  of  modem  matters:  Whitou  v.  Ins.  Co.,  109 
Mass.  31  ;  Morris  v.  Lessees,  7  Pet.  558.] 

8  Per  Buller.  J.,  in  Morewood  v.  Wood,  14  East  330,  n.  ;  per  Le  Blanc,  J.,  in 
Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  688,  689. 

4  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  Cromp.  Mees.  &  Rose.  919,  930.  See  also  ace.  Curzon  v. 
Lomax,  5  Esp.  60,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  Steele  v.  Prickett,  2  Stark.  463,  466,  per 
Abbott,  C.  J.  ;  Ratnliffe  v.  Chapman,  4  Leon.  242,  as  explained  by  Grose,  J.,  in  Beebe 
v.  Parker,  5  T.  P,.  32. 

6  Beebe  v.  Parker,  5  T.  R.  26,  32 ;  Doe  v.  Sisson,  12  East  62 ;  Steele  v.  Prickett, 
2  Stark.  463,  466.  A  single  act,  undisturbed,  has  been  held  sufficient  evidence  of  a 
custom,  the  Court  refusing  to  set  aside  a  verdict  finding  a  custom  upon  such  evidence 
alone :  Roe  v.  Jeffery,  2  M.  &  S.  92 ;  Doe  v.  Mason,  3  Wils.  63. 

«  White  v.  Lisle,  4  Mad.  214,  225.  See  Morewood  v.  Wood,  14  East  330,  n.,  per 
Bnller,  J.  ;  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  690,  per  Bayley,  J.  ;  Rogers  v.  Allen,  1  Campb. 
309  ;  Richards  v.  Bassett,  10  B.  &  C.  662,  663,  per  Littledale,  J. 

1  ENicholls  v.  Parker,  14  East  831,  n.  ;  Newcastle  v.  Broxtowe,  4  B.  &  Ad.  279  ; 
Adams  v.  Stanyan,  24  N.  H.  412  ;  Clark  v.  Hills,  67  Tex.  152.  In  the  precedents, 
except  four,  cited  in  the  ensuing  three  sections,  the  Pedigree  exception  was  the  subject 
of  discussion  ;  so  that  the  cases,  as  precedents,  are  hardly  applicable  to  the  present  ex- 
ception ;  for  the  post  litem  motam  limitation,  as  developed  for  the  Pedigree  exception, 
see  ante,  §  114  e.J 

8  Per  Ld.  Eldon,  in  Whitelocke  ».  Baker,  13  Ves.  514  ;  R.  v.  Cotton,  3  Campb.  444, 
446,  per  Dampier,  J. 


218  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE    HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.    XIL 

part  on  the  one  side  or  the  other;  their  minds  are  in  a  ferment; 
and,  if  they  are  disposed  to  speak  the  truth,  facts  are  seen  by 
them  through  a  false  medium.  To  avoid,  therefore,  the  mischiefs 
which  would  otherwise  result,  all  ex  parte  declarations,  even  though 
made  upon  oath,  referring  to  a  date  subsequent  to  the  beginning  of 
the  controversy,  are  rejected.8  This  rule  of  evidence  was  familiar 
in  the  Roman  law;  but  the  term  Us  mota  was  there  applied  strictly 
to  the  commencement  of  the  action,  and  was  not  referred  to  an 
earlier  period  of  the  controversy.4  But  in  our  law  the  term  Us  is 
taken  in  the  classical  and  larger  sense  of  controversy ;  and  by  Us 
mota  is  understood  the  commencement  of  the  controversy,  and  not 
the  commencement  of  the  suit.6  The  commencement  of  the  contro- 
versy has  been  further  defined  by  Mr.  Baron  Alderson,  in  a  case  of 
pedigree,  to  be  "the  arising  of  that  state  of  facts  on  which  the 
claim  is  founded,  without  anything  more."  6 

§  132.  The  Us  mota,  in  the  sense  of  our  law,  carries  with  it  the 
further  idea  of  a  controversy  upon  the  same  particular  subject  in 
issue.  For,  if  the  matter  under  discussion  at  the  time  of  trial  was 
not  in  controversy  at  the  time  to  which  the  declarations  offered  in 
evidence  relate,  they  are  admissible,  notwithstanding  a  controversy 
did  then  exist  upon  some  other  branch  of  the  same  general  subject. 
The  value  of  general  reputation,  as  evidence  of  the  true  state  of 
facts,  depends  upon  its  being  the  concurrent  belief  of  minds  un- 
biassed and  in  a  situation  favorable  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and 
referring  to  a  period  when  this  fountain  of  evidence  was  not  ren- 
dered turbid  by  agitation.  But  the  discussion  of  other  topics,  how- 
ever similar  in  their  general  nature,  at  the  time  referred  to,  does 
not  necessarily  lead  to  the  inference  that  the  particular  point  in 
issue  was  also  controverted,  and,  therefore,  is  not  deemed  sufficient 
to  exclude  the  sort  of  proof  we  are  now  considering.  Thus,  where, 
in  a  suit  between  a  copyholder  and  the  lord  of  the  manor,  the  point 
in  controversy  was,  whether  the  customary  fine,  payable  upon  the 
renewal  of  a  life-lease,  was  to  be  assessed  by  the  jury  of  the  lord's 
court,  or  by  the  reasonable  discretion  of  the  lord  himself;  deposi- 
tions taken  for  the  plaintiff,  in  an  ancient  suit  by  a  copyholder 
against  a  former  lord  of  the  manor,  where  the  controversy  was 
upon  the  copyholder's  right  to  be  admitted  at  all,  and  not  upon  the 

8  The  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  4  Campb.  401,  409,  412,  413;  Monkton  v.  Attorney. 
General,  2  Russ.  &  My.  160,  161  ;  Richards  v.  Bassett,  10  B.  &  C.  657. 

*  "  Lis  est,  ut  primuni  in  jus,  vel  in  judicium  ventum  est ;  antequam  in  judicium 
veniatur,  controversia  est,  non  \is."  Cnjac.  Opera  Posth.  torn,  v,  col.  193,  B,  and  col. 
162,  D.  "  Lis  inchoata  est  ordinata  per  libellum,  et  satisdationem,  licet  non  sit  lis 
contestata."  Corpus  Juris,  Glossatum,  torn,  i,  col.  553,  ad.  Dig.  lib.  iv,  tit.  6,  1.  12. 
"  Lis  mota  censetur,  etiamsi  solus  actor  egerit."  Calv.  Lex.  verb.  Lis  Mota. 

6  Per  Mansfield,  C.  J.,  in  the  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  4  Campb.  417  ;  Monkton  v. 
Attorney-General,  2  Russ.  &  My.  161. 

o  Walker  v.  Countess  of  Beauchamp,  6  C.  &  P.  552,  561.  But  see  Reilly  v.  Fitz- 
ffsnH,  1  Drury  (Ir.)  122.  where  this  is  questioned;  £and  it  has  been  geuerally  repu- 
diated ;  see  ante,  }  114  c.] 


§§131-135.]      REPUTATION  J   MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.        219 

terms  of  admission,  in  which  depositions  the  customary  fine  was 
mentioned  as  to  be  assessed  by  the  lord  or  his  steward,  were  held 
admissible  evidence  of  what  was  then  understood  to  be  the  undis- 
puted custom.1  In  this  case,  it  was  observed  by  one  of  the  learned 
judges  that  "the  distinction  had  been  correctly  taken,  that,  where 
the  Us  mota  was  on  the  very  point,  the  declarations  of  persons  would 
not  be  evidence;  because  you  cannot  be  sure,  that  in  admitting  the 
depositions  of  witnesses,  selected  and  brought  forward  on  a  par- 
ticular side  of  the  question,  who  embark,  to  a  certain  degree,  with 
the  feelings  and  prejudices  belonging  to  that  particular  side,  you 
are  drawing  evidence  from  perfectly  unpolluted  sources.  But 
where  the  point  in  controversy  is  foreign  to  that  which  was  before 
controverted,  there  never  has  been  a  Us  mota,  and  consequently  the 
objection  does  not  apply." 

§  133.  Declarations  made  after  the  controversy  has  originated  are 
excluded,  even  though  proof  is  offered  that  the  existence  of  the 
controversy  was  not  known  to  the  declarant.  The  question  of  his 
ignorance  or  knowledge  of  this  fact  is  one  which  the  Courts  will  not 
try :  partly  because  of  the  danger  of  an  erroneous  decision  of  the 
principal  fact  by  the  jury,  from  the  raising  of  too  many  collateral 
issues,  thereby  introducing  great  confusion  into  the  cause;  and 
partly  from  the  fruitlessness  of  the  inquiry,  it  being  from  its  very 
nature  impossible,  in  most  cases,  to  prove  that  the  existence  of  the 
controversy  was  not  known.  The  declarant,  in  these  cases,  is 
always  absent,  and  generally  dead.  The  light  afforded  by  his  decla- 
rations is  at  best  extremely  feeble,  and  far  from  being  certain ;  and 
if  introduced,  with  the  proof  on  both  sides,  in  regard  to  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  controversy,  it  would  induce  darkness  and  confusion, 
perilling  the  decision  without  the  probability  of  any  compensating 
good  to  the  parties.  It  is  therefore  excluded,  as  more  likely  to 
prove  injurious  than  beneficial.1 

§  134> 

§  135.  Interest  as  a  Member  of  the  Community  does  not  exclude. 
Where  evidence  of  reputation  is  admitted,  in  cases  of  public  or 
general  interest,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  witness  should  be  able 
to  specify  from  whom  he  heard  the  declarations.  For  that,  in  much 
the  greater  number  of  cases,  would  be  impossible ;  as  the  names  of 
persons  long  since  dead,  by  whom  declarations  upon  topics  of  com- 
mon repute  have  at  some  time  or  other  been  made,  are  mostly  for- 
gotten.1 And,  if  the  declarant  is  known,  and  appears  to  have  stood 
in  pari  casu  with  the  party  offering  his  declarations  in  evidence, 

l  Freeman  v.  Phillipps,  4  M.  &  S.  486,  497  ;  Elliott  v.  Peirsol,  1  Peters  328,  337. 

1  Berkeley  Peerage  Case,  4  Campb.  417,  per  Mansfield,  C.  J. 

2  [Transferred  to  Appendix  II.  ;  it  deals  peculiarly  with  the  Pedigree  exception, 
already  treated  ante,  §114  e.] 

1  Moseley  r.  Davies,  11  Price  162,  174,  per  Richards,  C.  B.  ;  Harwood  v.  Sims. 
Wightw.  112. 


220  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEAKSAY  RULE.  [CH.   XII. 

so  that  he  could  not,  if  living,  have  been  personally  examined  as  a 
witness  to  the  fact  of  which  he  speaks,  this  is  no  valid  objection  to 
the  adniissibility  of  his  declarations.  The  reason  is,  the  absence 
of  opportunity  and  motive  to  consult  his  interest,  at  the  time  of 
speaking.  Whatever  secret  wish  or  bias  he  may  have  had  in  the 
matter,  there  was,  at  that  time,  no  excited  interest  called  forth  in 
his  breast,  or,  at  least,  no  means  were  afforded  of  promoting,  nor 
danger  incurred  of  injuring,  any  interest  of  his  own;  nor  could 
any  such  be  the  necessary  result  of  his  declarations;  whereas,  on  a 
trial  in  itself  and  of  necessity  directly  affecting  his  interest,  there  is 
a  double  objection  to  admitting  his  evidence,  in  the  concurrence  both 
of  the  temptation  of  interest  and  the  excitement  of  the  Us  mota.* 

§  136.  Indeed  the  rejection  of  the  evidence  of  reputation,  in 
cases  of  public  or  general  interest,  because  it  may  have  come  from 
persons  in  pari  casu  with  the  party  offering  it,  would  be  inconsistent 
with  the  qualification  of  the  rule  which  has  already  been  mentioned; 
namely,  that  the  statement  thus  admitted  must  appear  to  have  been 
made  by  persons  having  competent  knowledge  of  the  subject.1 
Without  such  knowledge,  the  testimony  is  worthless.  In  matters 
of  public  right,  all  persons  are  presumed  to  possess  that  degree  of 
knowledge  which  serves  to  give  some  weight  to  their  declarations 
respecting  them,  because  all  have  a  common  interest.  But  in  sub- 
jects interesting  to  a  comparatively  small  portion  of  the  community,- 
as  a  city  or  parish,  a  foundation  for  admitting  evidence  of  reputa- 
tion, or  the  declarations  of  ancient  and  deceased  persons,  must  first 
be  laid,  by  showing  that,  from  their  situation,  they  probably  were 
conversant  with  the  matter  of  which  they  were  speaking.2 

§  137.  Matters  of  Private  Interest.  The  probable  want  of  com- 
petent knowledge  in  the  declarant  is  the  reason  generally  assigned 
for  rejecting  evidence  of  reputation  or  common  fame,  in  matters  of 
mere  private  right.  "  Evidence  of  reputation,  upon  general  points, 
is  receivable,"  said  Lord  Kenyon,  "because,  all  mankind  being 
interested  therein,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  they  may  be  con- 
versant with  the  subjects,  and  that  they  should  discourse  together 
about  them,  having  all  the  same  means  of  information.  But  how 
can  this  apply  to  private  titles,  either  with  regard  to  particular 
customs,  or  private  prescriptions  ?  How  is  it  possible  for  strangers 

8  Moselcy  ».  Davies,  11  Price  179,  per  Graham,  B. ;  Deacle  v.  Hancock,  13  id. 
236,  237  ;  Nicholls  o.  Parker,  14  East  331,  n. ;  Harwood  v.  Sims,  Wightw.  112  ;  Free- 
man v.  Phillipps,  4  M.  &  S.  486,  491,  cited  and  approved  by  Lyndhurst,  C.  B  ,  in 
Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  C.  &  J.  593,  594  ;  Monkton  v.  Attorney-General,  2  Rnss.  &  My. 
159,  160,  per  Ld.  Ch.  Brougham;  Reed  u.  Jackson,  1  East  355,  857;  Chapman  ». 
Cowlan,  13  id.  10. 

i  Supra,  §§  128,  129. 

a  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  879,  686,  690 ;  Doed.  Molesworth  v.  Sleeman,  1  New 
Pr.  Cas.  170 ;  More-wood  v.  Wood,  14  East  327,  n.  ;  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  Cr.  M.  &  Ros. 
929  ;  Duke  of  Newcastle  v.  Broxtowe,  4  B.  &  Ad.  273 ;  Rogers  v.  Wood,  2  B.  &  Ad.  245  » 
[see  aide,  §  128  a,  note  1.} 


§§  135-138.]      REPUTATION  J  MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.      221 

to  know  anything  of  what  concerns  only  private  titles  ?  " 1  The  case 
of  prescriptive  rights  has  sometimes  been  mentioned  as  an  excep- 
tion; but  it  is  believed,  that,  where  evidence  of  reputation  has  been 
admitted  in  such  cases,  it  will  be  found  that  the  right  was  one 
in  which  many  persons  were  equally  interested.  The  weight  of 
authority,  as  well  as  the  reason  of  the  rule,  seems  alike  to  forbid 
the  admission  of  this  kind  of  evidence,  except  in  cases  of  a  public 
or  quasi  public  nature.2  [But  it  is  immaterial,  in  proving  bounda- 
ries, that  the  main  issue  is  the  location  of  a  private  boundary,  pro- 
vided the  evidence  deals  with  a  public  boundary,  —  as  where  by 
establishing  the  public  boundary  it  will  thereby  be  possible  to  prove 
the  private  boundary  by  showing  their  coincidence  through  other 
evidence.8] 

§  138.  Particular  Facts.  This  principle  may  serve  to  explain  and 
reconcile  what  is  said  in  the  books  respecting  the  admissibility  of 
reputation,  in  regard  to  particular  facts.  Upon  general  points,  as 
we  have  seen,  such  evidence  is  receivable,  because  of  the  general 
interest  which  the  community  have  in  them;  but  particular  facts  of 
a  private  nature,  not  being  notorious,  may  be  misrepresented  or 
misunderstood,  and  may  have  been  connected  with  other  facts,  by 
which,  if  known,  their  effect  might  be  limited  or  explained.  Repu- 
tation as  to  the  existence  of  such  particular  facts  is,  therefore, 
rejected.1  But,  if  the  particular  fact  is  proved  aliunde,  evidence  of 

1  Morewood  v.  Wood,  14  East  329,  n.,  per  Ld.  Kenyon  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  30,  31  ; 
Clothier  v.  Chapman,  14  East  331,  n.  ;  Reed  v.  Jackson,  1  id.  357  ;  Outram  v.  More- 
wood,  5  T.  R.  121,  123;   Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  679. 

2  Ellicott  v.  Pearl,  10  Peters  412  ;  Richards  v.  Bassett,  10  B.  &  C.  657,  662,  663, 
per  Littledale  .1.  ;  supra,  §  130.     The  following  are  cases  of  a  quasi  public  nature  ; 
though  they  are  usually,  but,  on  the  foregoing  principles,  erroneously,  cited  in  favor  of 
the  admissibility  of  evidence  of  reputation  in  cases  of  mere  private  right :  Bishop  of 
Meath  v.  Lord  Belfield,  Bull.  N.   P.  295,  where  the  question  was,  who  presented  the 
former  incumbent  of  a  parish,  —  a  fact  interesting  to  all  the  parishioners ;    Price  v. 
Littlewood,   3  Campb.  288,  where  an  old  entry  in  the  vestry-book,  by  the  church- 
wardens, showing  by  what  persons  certain  parts  of  the  church  were  repaired,  in  consid- 
eration of  their  occupancy  of  pews,  was  admitted,  to  show  title  to  a  pew  in  one  under 
whom  the  plaintiff  claimed ;  Barnes  v.  Mawson,  1  M.  &  S.  77,  which  was  a  question 
of  boundary  between  two  large  districts  of  a  manor  called  the  Old  and  New  Lands  ; 
Anscomb  v.  Shore,  1  Taunt.  261,  where  the  right  of  common  prescribed  for  was  claimed 
by  all  the  inhabitants  of  Hampton  ;  Blackett  v.  Lowes,  2  M.  &  S.  494, 500,  where  the 
question  was  as  to  the  general  usage  of  all  the  tenants  of  manor,  the  defendant  being 
one,  to  cut  certain  woods ;  Brett  v.  Beales,  1  Mood.  &  Malk.  416,  which  was  a  claim 
of  ancient  tolls  belonging  to  the  corporation  of  Cambridge ;  White  v.  Lisle,  4  Madd. 
Ch.  214,  224,  225,  where  evidence  of  reputation,  in  regard  to  &  parochial  modus,  was 
held  admissible,  because  "  a  class  or  district  of  persons  were  concerned  ;  "  but  denied 
in  regard  to  a  farm  modus,  because  none  but  the  occupant  of  the  farm  was  concerned. 
In  Davies  v.  Lewis,  2  Chitty  535,  the  declarations  offered  in   evidence  were  clearly 
admissible,  as  being  those  of  tenants  in  possession,  stating  under  whom  they  held. 

8  [Thomas  v.  Jenkins,  6  A.  &  E.  525  ;  Abington  v.  N.  Bridgewater,  23  Pick.  174  ; 
Drury  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  127  Mass.  581  ;  Mullaney  v.  Duffy,  145  111.  559,  564.] 

1  QBut  this  form  of  expression,  though  not  uncommon,  is  perhaps  misleading  ;  for 
e.  g.  the  place  of  a  given  boundary  line  may  conceivably  be  termed  a  "particular 
fact."  What  is  meant  is  that  the  reputation  must  be  as  to  the  existence  of  the  custom 
or  right  in  the  abstract,  and  not  as  to  particular  occasions  of  its  exercise;  e.  g.  that  a 
customary  duty  existed  for  the  townspeople  to  pay  a  fee  at  a  certain  toll-gate,  but  not 


222  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   IIEAKSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XII. 

general  reputation  may  be  received  to  qualify  and  explain  it.  Thus, 
in  a  suit  for  tithes  where  a  parochial  modus  of  sixpence  per  acre 
was  set  up,  it  was  conceded  that  evidence  of  reputation  of  the  pay- 
ment of  that  sum  for  one  piece  of  land  would  not  be  admissible;  but 
it  was  held  that  such  evidence  would  be  admissible  to  the  fact  that 
it  had  always  been  customary  to  pay  that  sum  for  all  the  lands  in 
the  parish.2  And  where  the  question  on  the  record  was  whether 
a  turnpike  was  within  the  limits  of  a  certain  town,  evidence  of 
general  reputation  was  admitted  to  show  that  the  bounds  of  the  town 
extended  as  far  as  a  certain  close,  but  not  that  formerly  there  were 
houses,  where  none  then  stood;  the  latter  being  a  particular  fact,  in 
which  the  public  had  no  interest.8  So,  where,  upon  an  information 
against  the  sheriff  of  the  county  of  Chester,  for  not  executing  a 
death-warrant,  the  question  was  whether  the  sheriff  of  the  county 
or  the  sheriffs  of  the  city  were  to  execute  sentence  of  death,  tradi- 
tionary evidence  that  the  sheriffs  of  the  county  had  always  been 
exempted  from  the  performance  of  that  duty  was  rejected,  it  being  a 
private  question  between  two  individuals;  the  public  having  an 
interest  only  that  execution  be  done,  and  not  in  the  person  by  whom 
it  was  performed.*  The  question  of  the  admissibility  of  this  sort 
of  evidence  seems,  therefore,  to  turn  upon  the  nature  of  the  reputed 
fact,  whether  it  was  interesting  to  one  party  only  or  to  many.  If 
it  were  of  a  public  or  general  nature,  it  falls  within  the  exception 
we  are  now  considering,  by  which  hearsay  evidence,  under  the 
restrictions  already  mentioned,  is  admitted.  But  if  it  had  no 
connection  with  the  exercise  of  any  public  right,  nor  the  discharge 
of  any  public  duty,  nor  with  any  other  matter  of  general  interest,  it 
falls  within  the  general  rule  by  which  hearsay  evidence  is  excluded.5 
§  138  a  [145].  Reputation  as  to  Private  Boundaries ;  American 
Doctrine.  Under  this  head  may  be  mentioned  the  case  of  ancient 
boundaries;  in  proof  of  which,  it  has  sometimes  been  said  that 
traditionary  evidence  is  admissible  from  the  nature  and  necessity  of 

that  John  Doe  paid  the  fee  at  a  certain  time.  It  is  thus  correctly  phrased  by  Peake, 
Evidence,  13  :  "A  witness  may  be  permitted  to  state  what  he  has  heard  from  dead 
persons  respecting  the  reputation  of  the  right ;  but  not  to  state  facts  of  the  exercise  of 
it  which  the  dead  persons  said  they  had  seen  ;  "  the  reason  being  that  a  sound  reputa- 
tion may  well  grow  up  about  the  right ;  in  general,  but  not  about  a  single  act  of  its 
exercise.  Add  the  following  cases:  Nicholls  v.  Parker,  14  East  331,  note ;  Ellicott 
v.  Pearl,  10  Pet.  437;  Cherry  v.  Boyd,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  8.J 

2  Harwood  v.  Sims,  Wightw.  122,  more  fully  reported  and  explained  in  Moseley  v. 
Davies,  11  Price  1«2,  169-172  ;  Chatfield  v.  Fryer,  1  id.  253  ;  Wells  v.  Jesus  College, 
7  C.  &  P.  284 ;  Leathes  v.  Newitt,  4  Price  355. 

8  Ireland  v.  Powell,  Salop  Spr.  Ass.  1802,  per  Chambre,  J.  ;  Peake's  Evid.  13, 14 
(Norris's  edit.  p.  27). 

«  R.  ».  Antrobus,  2  Ad.  &  El.  788,  794. 

6  White  v.  Lisle,  4  Madd.  Ch.  214,  224,  225;  Bishop  of  Meath  v.  Lord  Bel  field, 
1  Wils.  215  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  295  ;  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.&  S.  679  ;  Withnell  v.  Gartham, 
1  Esp.  322 ;  Doe  v.  Thomas,  14  East  323  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  258 ;  1  Stark.  Evid. 
84,  35  :  Outrnni  v.  Morewood,  5  T.  R.  121,  123  ;  It.  v.  Eriswell,  3  id.  709,  per 
Grose,  J.  ;  [see  U.  v.  Berger,  1894,  i  Q.  B.  823.} 


§§  138-138  a.]  KEPUTATION  ON  MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.   223 

the  case.  But,  if  the  principles  already  discussed  in  regard  to 
the  admission  of  hearsay  are  sound,  it  will  be  difficult  to  sustain  an 
exception  in  favor  of  such  evidence  merely  as  applying  to  boundary, 
where  the  fact  is  particular,  and  not  of  public  or  general,  interest. 
Accordingly,  though  evidence  of  reputation  is  received,  in  regard  to 
the  boundaries  of  parishes,  manors,  and  the  like,  which  are  of  public 
interest,  and  generally  of  remote  antiquity,  yet,  by  the  weight  of  au- 
thority [in  England]  and  upon  better  reason,  such  evidence  is  held  to 
be  inadmissible  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  boundary  of  a  private 
estate,  when  such  boundary  is  not  identical  with  another  of  a  public 
or  quasi  public  nature.1  [But  the  correctness  of  this  application  of 
the  principle  may  well  be  questioned ;  for  if  such  evidence  may  be 
received  to  show  customs  and  boundaries  of  a  manor,  boundaries  of  a 
parish,  and  tithe-duties,  the  principle  may  well  cover  other  property- 
rights  in  which  a  number  of  persons  are  interested,  whether  the  right 
in  substantive  law  be  called  a  public  or  a  private  one.  In  Weeks  v. 
Sparke  2  the  argument  was  accepted  that  the  (for  this  purpose)  arbi- 
trary distinction  between  "  public  "  and  "  private  "  rights  should  be 
repudiated,  and  a  flexible  test  be  applied  in  each  case.8  This  might 
have  led  ultimately  to  the  admission  of  reputation-evidence  for  pri- 
vate-property matters ;  but  the  case  in  this  aspect  was  practically 
repudiated  by  Baron  Parke  in  1850,*  and  subsequent  English  practice 
checked  further  advances.  But  the  earlier  English  practice6  had 
clearly  been  to  admit  reputation-evidence  of  private  titles,  and  it  is 
therefore  natural  to  find  that  on  questions  of  private  boundaries  rep- 

1  Ph.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  255,  256  ;  supra,  §  137  ;  Thomas  v.  Jenkins,  1  N.  &  P. 
588  ;  Reed  v.  Jackson,  1  East  355,  357,  per  Ld.   Kenyon ;  Doe  v.  Thomas,  14  East 
323;  Morevvood  v.  Wood,  id.  327,  n.  ;  Outram  v.  Morewood,  5  T.  R.   121,   123,  per 
Ld.  Kenyon;  Nichols  v.  Parker,  and  Clothier  v.  Chapman,  in  14  East  331,  n. ;  Weeks 
v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  688,  689;  Dunraven  v.  Llewellyn,  15  Q.  B.  791,  Exch.  Ch. ; 
Cherry  v.  Boyd,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  8,  9;  1  Phil.  Evid.  182  (3d  Lond.  ed.),  cited  and  ap- 
proved by  Tilghman,  C.  J.,  in  Buchanan  v.  Moore,  10  S.  &  R.  281.     In  the  passage 
thus  cited,  the  learned  author  limits  the  admissibility  of  this  kind  of  evidence  to  ques- 
tions of  a  public  or  general  nature  ;  including  a  right  of  common  by  custom  ;  which  he 
observes,  "  is,  strictly  speaking,  a  private  right ;  but  it  is  a  general  right,  and  therefore, 
BO  far  as  regards  the  admissibility  of  this  species  of  evidence,  has  been  considered  as 
public,  because  it  affects  a  large  number  of  occupiers  within  a  district."     Supra,  §§  128, 
137 ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  220,  221.   And  more  recently,  in  England,  it  has  been  decided, 
upon  full  consideration,  that  traditionary  evidence,  respecting  rights  not  of  a  public 
nature,  is  inadmissible  :  Dunraven  v.  Llewellyn,  15  Q.  B.  791  ;  pi.  v.  Bedfordshire, 
4  E.  &  B.  535. 

The  original  text  added  the  following  sentence,  merely  repeating  what  has  been 
said  before:  "Where  the  question  is  of  such  general  nature,  whether  it  be  of  boun- 
dary or  of  right  of  common  by  custom,  or  the  like,  evidence  of  reputation  is  admitted 
only  under  the  qualifications  already  stated,  requiring  competent  knowledge  in  the 
declarants,  or  persons  from  whom  the  information  is  derived,  and  that  they  be  persons 
free  from  particular  and  direct  interest  at  the  time,  and  are  since  deceased."] 

2  p  M.  &  S.  690  ;  1813.] 

8  LBayley,  J-  :  '**  take  it  that  where  the  term  'public  right'  is  used,  it  does  not 
mean  'public'  in  the  literal  sense,  but  is  synonymous  with  'general,'  —  that  is,  what 
concerns  a  multitude  of  persons."] 

TDunraven  v.  Llewellyn,  s«/>r".] 

*  LAs  pointed  out  by  Professor  Thayer:  Cases  on  Evidence,  421,  note.] 


224  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.    XII. 

utation  was  in  the  United  States  freely  admitted  in  the  early  cases.6 
Later,  when  the  English  cases  of  the  1800s  became  known  to  our 
judges,  and  the  question  was  argued  on  its  merits  as  a  matter  of 
principle,  the  decision  was  reached  —  in  harmony  with  the  condi- 
tions of  life  at  the  time  —  that  the  principle  would  under  certain 
circumstances  admit  reputation-evidence  of  the  landmarks  of  private 
title.]  The  admission  of  traditionary  evidence,  in  cases  of  [private] 
boundary,  occurs  more  frequently  in  the  United  States  than  in  Eng- 
land. By  far  the  greatest  portion  of  our  territory  was  originally  sur- 
veyed in  large  masses  or  tracts,  owned  either  by  the  State,  or  by  the 
United  States,  or  by  one,  or  a  company  of  proprietors  ;  under  whose 
authority  these  tracts  were  again  surveyed  and  divided  into  lots  suit- 
able for  single  farms,  by  lines  crossing  the  whole  tract,  and  serving 
as  the  common  boundary  of  very  many  farm-lots  lying  on  each  side 
of  it.  So  that  it  is  hardly  possible,  in  such  cases,  to  prove  the  origi- 
nal boundaries  of  one  farm,  without  affecting  the  common  boundary 
of  many ;  and  thus  in  trials  of  this  sort,  the  question  is  similar,  in 
principle,  to  that  of  the  boundaries  of  a  manor,  and  therefore  tradi- 
tionary evidence  is  freely  admitted.7  [But  it  must  be  noted  that  this 

6  [^Dane's  Abridgment,  III,  397.] 

7  Such  was  the  case  of  Boardmaii  v.  Reed,  6  Peters  328,  where  the  premises  in 
question,  being  a  tract  of  eight  thousand  acres,  were  part  of  a  large  connection  of 
surveys  made  together,  and  containing  between  fifty  and  one  hundred  thousand  acres 
of  land  ;  and  it  is  to  such  tracts,  interesting  to  very  many  persons,  that  the  remarks  of 
Mr.  Justice  M'Lean,  in  that  case  (p.  341),  are  to  be  applied.     In  Conn  v.  Penn,  1  Pet 
C.  C.  496,  the  tract  whose  boundaries  were  in  controversy  was  called  the  manor  of 
Springetsbury,  and  contained  seventy  thousand  acres,  in  which  a  great  number  of  indi- 
viduals had  severally  become  interested.     In  Doe  d.  Taylor  v.  Roe,  4  Hawks  116,  tra- 
ditionary evidence  was  admitted  in  regard  to  Earl  Granville's  line,  which  was  of  many 
miles  in  extent,  and  afterwards  constituted  the  boundary  between  counties,  as  well  as 
private  estates.      In  Ralston  v.  Miller,  3  Randolph  44,  the  question  was  upon  the 
boundaries  of  a  street  in  the  city  of  Richmond ;  concerning  which  kind  of  boundaries 
it  was  said,  that  ancient  reputation  and  possession  were  entitled  to  infinitely  more 
respect,  in  deciding  upon  the  boundaries  of  the  lots,  than  any  experimental  surveys. 
In  several  American  cases,  which  have  sometimes  been  cited  in  favor  of  the  admissi- 
bility  of  traditionary  evidence  of  boundary,  even  though  it  consisted  of  particular  facts, 
and  in  cases  of  merely  private  concern,  the  evidence  was  clearly  admissible  on  other 
grounds,   either  as  part  of  the  original  res  gestce,  or  as  the  declaration  of  a  party  in 
possession,  explanatory  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  his  claim.     In  this  class  may  be 
ranked  the  cases  of  Caufman  v.  Congregation  of  Cedar  Spring,  6  Binn.  59 ;   Sturgeon 
v.  Waugh,  2  Yeates  476  ;  Jackson  d.  McDonald,  v.  McCall,  10  Johns.  377  ;  Hamilton 
v.  Menor,  2  S.  &  R.  70 ;  Higley  v.  Bidwell,  9  Conn.  477;  Hall  v,  Giddings,  2  Harr. 
&  Johns.  112;  Redding  o.  McCubbin,  1  Har.  &  McHen.  368.     In  Wooster  v.  Butler, 
13  Conn.  309,  it  was  said  by  Church,  J.,  that  traditionary  evidence  was  receivable  iu 
Connecticut,  to  prove  the  boundaries  of  land  between  individual  proprietors.     But 
this  dictum  was  not  called  for  in  the  case  ;  for  the  question  was,  whether  there  had 
anciently  been  a  highway  over  a  certain  tract  of  upland  ;  which  being  a  subject  of 
common  and  general  interest,  was  clearly  within  the  rule.     It  has,  however,  subse- 
quently been  settled  as  a  point  of  local  law  in  that  State,  that  such  evidence  is  admis- 
sible to  prove  private  boundaries  :  Kinney  ».  Farnsworth,  17  Conn.  355,  363.     In 
Pennsylvania,  reputation  and  hearsay  are  held  entitled  to  respect,  in  a  question  of 
boundary,  where  from  lapse  of  time  there  is  great  difficulty  in  proving  the  existence  of 
the  original  landmarks :  Nieman  v.  Ward,  1  Watts  &  Serg.   68.     In  Den  d.  Tate  v. 
Southard,  1  Hawks  45,  the  question  was,  whether  the  lines  of  the  surrounding  tracts 
of  land,  if  made  for  those  tracts  alone,  and  not  for  the  tract  in  dispute,  might  bo  shown 
by  reputation  to  be  the  "  known  and  visible  boundaries  "  of  the  latter  tract,  within 


§§  138  a-139.]  REPUTATION  ON  MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.  225 

doctrine  in  practice  is  accepted  as  applying  only  to  evidence  of  boun- 
daries. It  cannot  be  said  that  the  fact  of  title 8  or  of  occupation 9  can 
be  so  evidenced.] 

§  139.  Vehicle  of  the  Reputation  ;  Individual  Declarations,  Maps, 
Leases,  Verdicts,  etc.  [The  exception  we  are  dealing  with  exists 
only  for  reputation,  i.  e.  the  community  opinion;  what  is  offered  must 
be  in  effect  a  reputation,  not  the  mere  assertion  of  an  individual. 
But  reputation  is  made  up  of  and  often  learned  through  the  asser- 
tions of  individuals  ;  and  hence  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between 
assertions  involving  merely  the  assertor's  individual  credit  and  asser- 
tions involving  a  community-reputation.  Though  in  form  the  repu- 
tation may  be  merely  what  deceased  persons  have  been  heard  to  say 
about  a  custom  or  right,  yet  it  ought  to  come  from  them  in  effect  as 
a  statement  of  the  reputation.  The  common  form  of  question  to  the 
witness  was  :  "  What  have  you  heard  old  men,  now  deceased,  say  as 
to  the  reputation  on  this  subject  ?"  And  the  sayings  thus  received 
must  be,  in  effect,  "  I  understand  the  general  acceptance  of  the  cus- 
tom by  the  community  to  be  so-and-so,"  not  "I  know  the  custom  to 
be  so-and-so."  An  individual  declaration  must  thus  appear  to  be 
"  the  result  of  a  received  reputation; "  *  and  the  individual  declarant 
is  thus  merely  the  mouth-piece  of  the  reputation.  Thus,  testimony 
that  R.,  now  deceased,  had  planted  a  willow  in  a  certain  spot  to  show 
a  road-boundary  was  rejected  ;  "he  does  not  assert  that  he  has  heard 
old  men  say  what  was  the  public  road ;  but  he  plants  a  tree  and 
asserts  that  the  boundary  of  the  road  is  at  that  point ;  it  is  the  mere 
allegation  of  a  fact  by  an  individual ;  that  is,  he  knew  it  to  be  so 
from  what  he  had  observed  and  not  from  reputation."  2  Conversely, 
whatever  form  the  evidence  takes,  it  is  receivable  if  it  involves  and 
implies  a  reputation.  For  instance,  the  official  return  of  an  assembly 

the  fair  meaning  of  those  words  in  the  statute  of  North  Carolina,  of  1791,  c.  15. 
[To  these  may  be  added,  admitting  reputation  of  private  boundary  :  Shook  v.  Pate,  50 
Ala.  92;  Taylor  v.  Fomby,  id.,  22  So.  910;  Morton  v.  Folger,  15  Cal.  279;  Da<rgi-tt 
v.  Willey,  6'Fla.  511 ;  Smith  v.  Prewit,2  A.  K.  Marsh.  158;  Smith  v.  Nowells,  2  Litt. 
160  ;  Holbrook  v.  Debo,  99  111.  385  ;  Thoen  v.  Roche,  57  Minn.  135  (here  for  U.  S. 
survey-lines  only) ;  Shepherd  v.  Thompson,  4  N.  H.  215  ;  Curtis  v.  Aaronson,  49  N. 
J.  L/78  ;  McKinnon  v.  Bliss,  21  N.  Y.  218  ;  Taylor  v.  Shufford,  4  Hawks  132;  Shaf- 
fer v.  Gaynor,  117  N.  C.  15  ;  Strand  v.  Springfield,  28  Tex.  166  ;  Clark  v.  Hills,  67 
id.  152,  seinble;  Clement  0.  Packer,  125  U.  S.  321  ;  Harriman  v.  Brown,  8  Leigh 
708.  The  leading  opinions  are  those  in  Harriman  v.  Brown,  Morton  v.  Folger,  McKin- 
non v.  Bliss,  and  Curtis  v.  Aaronson.  The  doctrine  does  not  obtain  in  Maine  and 
Massachusetts  :  Chapman  v.  Twitchell,  37  Me.  62  ;  Hall  v.  Mayo,  97  Mass.  417  ;  Long 
v.  Colton,  116  id.  416.] 

8  FMoore  v.  Jones,  13  Ala.  303  ;  Goodson  v.  Brothers,  111  id.  589.] 

9  [Contra:  Vernon  Irrig.  Co.   v.  Los  Angeles,   106  Cal.  237   (ancient  claim  and 
actual  control  by  a  city)  ;  Jackson  v.  Miller,  6  Wend.  228 ;    Bogardus  v.  Trinity 
Church,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  633,  732  (that  a  lot  of  land  was  commonly  known  as  "  Smith's 
Lot"  or  "The  Duke's  Farm.'').] 

1  nVood,  B.,  in  Moseley  v.  Davies,  11  Price  180.] 

8  PR.  v.  Bliss,  7  A.  &  E.  550.     See  other  instances  in  Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  C.  &  J. 
690;  Drink  water  v.  Porter,  2  C.  &  K.  182  ;  Carnaroon  v.  Villebois,  13  M.  &  W.  332  ; 
Bender  v.  Pitzer,  27  Pa.  335.] 
VOL.  I.  — 15 


226  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEAKSAY  RULE.       [OH.  XII. 

of  the  homage  (or  tenants  of  a  manor),  rehearsing  customs,  fees,  etc., 
might  be  equivalent  to  a  reputation  among  the  tenants.8  The  prin- 
ciple 4]  applies  to  documentary  and  all  other  kinds  of  proof  denomi- 
nated hearsay.  If  the  matter  in  controversy  is  ancient,  and  not 
susceptible  of  better  evidence,  any  proof  in  the  nature  of  traditionary 
declarations  is  receivable,  whether  it  be  oral  or  written;  subject  to  the 
qualifications  we  have  stated.  Thus,  deeds,  leases,  and  other  private 
documents,  have  been  admitted  as  declaratory  of  the  public  matters 
recited  in  them.6  Maps,  also,  showing  the  boundaries  of  towns  and 
parishes,  are  admissible,  if  it  appear  that  they  have  been  made  by 
persons  having  adequate  knowledge;6  [so  also  an  ancient  survey.7 
Where  the  matter  to  be  proved  is  of  the  sort  of  facts  which  we  call 
"  history,"  the  same  mode  of  proof  is  available  in  the  shape  of  histori- 
cal treatises  of  general  acceptance.8  The  history  must  fairly  involve  a 
matter  of  general  interest,9  and  the  matter  must  be  ancient.10]  Ver- 
dicts, also,  are  receivable  evidence  of  reputation,  in  questions  of  pub- 
lic or  general  interest ;  thus,  for  example,  where  a  public  right  of 
way  was  in  question,  the  plaintiff  was  allowed  to  show  a  verdict  ren- 
dered in  his  own  favor,  against  a  defendant  in  another  suit,  in  which 
the  same  right  of  way  was  in  issue  ;  but  Lord  Kenyon  observed,  that 
such  evidence  was,  perhaps,  not  entitled  to  much  weight,  and  certainly 
was  not  conclusive  ;  the  circumstance,  that  the  verdict  was  post  litem 

8  TBeebee  v.  Parker,  5  T.  R.  14.] 

4  QThe  following  sentence  here  began  the  section  in  the  original  text  :  "Hitherto 
we  have  mentioned  oral  declarations,  as  the  medium  of  proving  traditionary  reputa- 
tion in  matters  of  public  and  general  interest.  The  principle,  however,  upon  which 
these  are  admitted." 

6  Curzon  v.  Lomax,  5  Esp.  60  ;  Brett  v.  Beales,  1  M.  &  M.  416  ;  Plaxtan  v.  Dare, 
10  B.  &  C.  17  ;  Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse,  5  T.  R,  412,  n.;  8.  c.  3  Doug.  189  ;  Barnes 
v.  Mawson,  I  M.  &  S.  77,  78  ;  Coombs  v.  Coether,  1  M.  &  M.  398  ;  Beebe  v.  Parker, 
6  T.  R.  26  ;  Freeman  v.  Phillipps,  4  M.  &  S.  486  ;  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  Cr.  Mees.  &  Ros. 
923  ;  Denn  v.  Spray,  1  T.  R.  466  ;  Bullen  t>.  Michel,  4  Dow  298 ;  Taylor  v.  Cook, 
8  Price  650  ;  QWhite  v.  Lisle,  4  Madd.  223  ;  Sasser  v.  Herring,  3  Dev.  L.  342.] 

6  1  Phil.  Evid.  250,  251 ;  Alcock  i>.  Cooke,  2  Moore  &  Payne  625  ;  s.  c.  5  Bing. 
340  ;   Noyes  v.  Ward,   19  Conn.  250  ;  jRoss  v.  Rhoads,  15  Pa.  St.   163  ;   Penny  Pot 
Landing  w.  Philadelphia,  16  id.  79 ;   VVhitehouse  v.  Bickford,  9  Foster  471  ;  Daniel  v. 
Wilkin,  7  Exch.  429  ;  8  id.  156;}   QR.  v.  Milton,  1  C.  &  K.  62  ;  Adams  v.  Stanyan, 
24  N.  H.  411  ;  Drury  v.  R.  Co.,  127  Mass.  581  ;  Taylor  v.  McGonigle,  Cal.,  52  Pac. 
159.     But  it  does  not  seem  that  knowledge  is  necessary  in  the  sense  of  knowledge  of 
the  boundaries,  etc.  ;  for  the  map,  etc.,  is  received  as  representing  the  accepted  belief 
of  the  community  using  it,  and  it  is  therefore  in  strictness  immaterial  not  only  whether 
the  maker  knew  the  facts,  but  even  who  the  maker  was.] 

7  fjBullen  v.  Michel,  supra;  Adams  v.  Stanyan,  supra;  Smith  v.  Brownlow,  L.  R. 
2  Eq.  252.] 

8  QThe  earlier  precedents  are  :  St.  Katherine's  Hospital,  1  Ventr.  151  ;  Brounker  v. 
Atkyns,  Skinner,  14  ;  Steyner  v.  Droitwich,  ib.  623,  1  Salk.  281 ;  Buller,  Nisi  Prius, 
248.']_ 

"LMorris  v.  Lessees,  7  Pet.  558  ;  Bognrdus  v.  Trinity  Church,  4  Sandf.  Ch.  724  ; 
McKinnon  v.  Bliss,  21  N.  Y.  216.  Other  American  precedents  are  :  Hadfield  v.  Jame- 
son, 2  Munf.  53,  71  ;  Com.  v.  Alburgpr,  1  Whart.  469  ;  Baird  v.  Rice,  63  Pa.  489, 
496.  It  has  been  held,  perhaps  ton  narrowly,  that  county-histories  are  not  admissible  : 
Evans  ».  Getting,  6  C.  &  P.  586  ;  MrKinnoii  v.  Bliss,  supra;  Roe  w.  Strong,  107  N.Y. 
856.] 

10 '~t Ante,  §  130.] 


§§  139-140  a.]  REPUTATION  ON  MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.    227 

motam,  does  not  affect  its  admissibility.11  [But  in  truth  this  use  of 
verdicts  has  to-day  no  justification  under  the  Reputation-exception. 
Their  acceptance  up  to  the  early  part  of  this  century  was  merely  "  a 
relic  of  the  time  when  a  jury's  verdict  was  a  conclusion  upon  their 
own  knowledge." 12  A  verdict  did  once  represent  the  reputation  of  the 
neighborhood.18  But  in  the  modern  practice  a  jury's  verdict  cannot 
be  regarded  as  in  any  true  sense  a  vehicle  of  reputation.  The  anom- 
aly began  to  be  perceived  in  the  middle  of  the  century,14  and  we  find 
it  now  treated,  not  as  entering  under  this  exception  for  reputation, 
but  as  a  verbal  act,  i.  e.  as  an  act  of  possession  in  the  course  of  the 
exercise  of  a  prescriptive  right  by  the  people  of  the  neighborhood.16 
It  should  be  added,  that  under  the  older  doctrine,  the  decree  or  order 
of  a  judge  was  sometimes  treated  as  admissible,  as  representing  repu- 
tation in  the  same  way  as  a  verdict.16] 

§  140.  Immaterial  whether  for  or  against  a  Public  Right.  It  is 
further  to  be  observed,  that  reputation  is  evidence  as  well  against 
a  public  right  as  in  its  favor.  Accordingly,  where  the  question  was, 
whether  a  landing-place  was  public  or  private  property,  reputation, 
from  the  declaration  of  ancient  deceased  persons,  that  it  was  the 
private  landing-place  of  the  party  and  his  ancestors,  was  held 
admissible  ;  the  learned  judge  remarking,  that  there  was  no  distinc- 
tion between  the  evidence  of  reputation  to  establish  and  to  disparage 
a  public  right.1 

§  140  a.  American  Doctrine  as  to  Individual  Declarations  about 
Private  Boundaries.  [We  have  already  seen  (§  139)  that  the  spirit 
and  principle  of  the  present  exception,  in  its  orthodox  form,  sanc- 
tions only  the  use  of  reputation,  as  trustworthy  because  representing 
the  net  result  of  general  investigation  and  discussion  by  the  com- 
munity ;  and  that  declarations  of  deceased  individuals  are  receivable 
only  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  effect  the  vehicle  of  such  reputation.  In 
this  country,  however,  a  further  step  has  been  taken  and  virtually  a 
new  and  distinct  exception  created,  by  receiving  also  declarations  of 
deceased  individuals,  quite  irrespective  of  any  bearing  on  reputation, 
and  purely  on  the  individual  credit  of  the  declarant.  This  doctrine, 

»  Reed  v.  Jackson,  1  East  355,  357  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  233  ;  City  of  London  v.  Clerke, 
Garth.  181  ;  Rhodes  v.  Ainsworth,  1  B.  &  Aid.  87,  89,  per  Holroyd,  J. ;  Lancum  v. 
Lovell,  9  Bing.  465,  469;  Cort  v.  Birkbeck,  1  Doug.  218,  222,  per  Lord  Mansfield; 
Case  of  the  Manchester  Mills,  1  Doug.  221,  n.;  Berry  v.  Banner,  Peake  156  ; 
Biddulph  v.  Ath^r,  2  Wils.  23 ;  Brisco  v.  Lomax,  3  N.  &  P.  308  ;  Evans  t-.  Rees,  2  P. 
&  D.  627  ;  s.  c.  10  Ad.  &  El.  151. 

12  rrhayer,  Cases  on  Evidence,  422.] 

18  [Alderson,  B.,  in  Pim  v.  Curell,  6  M.  &  W.  254  :  "  That  was  when  the  jury  was 
summoned  de  vicineto,  and  their  functions  were  less  limited  than  at  present."] 

14  TBrisco  v.  Lomax,  8  A.  &  E.  211  ("a  sort  of  reputation,  if  I  may  so  term  it").] 

15  fNeill  v.  Duke  of  Devonshire,  8  App.  das.  147 ;  see  ante,  §  108.J 

16  LDuke  of  Newcastle  v.  Broxtowe,  4  B.  &  Ad.  279 ;  Laybourn  v.  Crisp,  4  M.  & 
"W.  326;  Duke  of  Devonshire  v.  Neill,  L.  R.  Ir.  2  Exch.  153.     Excluded:  Rogers  v. 
Wood,  2  B.  &  Ad.  256;  Evans  v.  Rees,  10  A.  &  E.  155  (arbitrator).] 

1  Drinkwater  v.  Porter,  7  C.  &  P.  181  ;  R.  v.  Suttou,  3  N.  &  P.  569  ;  [Russell  v. 
Stocking,  8  Conn.  240.] 


228  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE.       [OH.  XII. 

as  commonly  phrased,  admits  "  the  declarations  of  a  person  deceased, 
who  appeared  to  have  had  means  of  knowledge  and  no  interest  in 
making  the  declarations,  upon  a  question  of  boundary,  even  in  a 
case  of  private  right."  1  Historically  this  doctrine  seems  to  have 
three  sources :  (1)  In  some  of  the  Southern  States,  the  reputation- 
exception,  as  stated  in  early  English  and  American  treatises,  was 
misunderstood  or  deliberately  expanded,  and  was  made  to  justify  the 
reception  of  individual  statements  resting  on  the  declarant's  credit ; 
(2)  in  Massachusetts,  the  res  gestce  doctrine  (ante,  §  108 ;  post,  §  162 /) 
was  regarded  as  covering  such  statements;  (3)  in  New  Hampshire, 
and  perhaps  elsewhere,  the  custom  of  periodical  perambulations  of 
town  boundaries  (brought  over  from  England)  was  recognized  as  one 
form  of  reputation  evidence,  and  then  statements  of  individuals,  par- 
ticularly of  surveyors,  were  taken  as  being  of  equal  value  with  these 
perambulations.2  From  these  diverse  origins  arose  a  rule  which 
found  a  vindication  in  the  conditions  of  the  time.8  As  to  its  limita- 
tions :  first,  the  declarant  must  be  deceased  ; 4  though  perhaps  other 

1  [Smith  v.  Powers,  15  1ST.  H.  563.] 

2  LLawrence  v.  Haynes,  5  N.  H.  36,  seems  to  show  this  line  of  development.     On 
the  subject  of  perambulations,  the  original  text  contained  the  following  section,  num- 
bered 146  :  — 

"  In  this  connection  may  be  mentioned  the  subject  of  perambulations.  The  writ 
de  pcrambulatione  facienda,  lies  at  common  law,  when  two  lords  are  in  doubt  as  to  the 
limits  of  their  lordships,  villas,  etc.,  and  by  consent  appear  in  Chancery,  and  agree  that 
a  perambulation  be  made  between  them.  Their  consent  being  enrolled  in  Chancery,  a 
writ  is  directed  to  the  sheriff  to  make  the  perambulation,  by  the  oaths  of  a  jury  of 
twelve  knights,  and  to  set  up  the  bounds  and  limits,  in  certainty,  between  the  parties. 
5  Com.  Dig.  732,  Pleader,  3,  G  ;  F.  N.  B.  [133]  D  ;  1  Story  on  Eq.  Jurisp.  §  611. 
See  also  Stat.  13  Geo.  Ill,  c.  81,  §  14 ;  Stat.  41  Geo.  Ill,  c.  81,  §  14  ;  Stat.  58  Geo. 
Ill,  c.  45,  §  16.  These  proceedings  and  the  return  are  evidence  against  the  parties  and 
all  others  in  privity  with  them,  on  grounds  hereafter  to  be  considered.  But  the  per- 
ambulation  consists  not  only  of  this  higher  written  evidence,  but  also  of  the  acts  of  the 
persons  making  it,  and  their  assistants,  such  as  marking  boundaries,  setting  up  monu- 
ments, and  the  like,  including  their  declarations  respecting  such  acts,  made  during  the 
transactions.  Evidence  of  what  these  persons  were  heard  to  say  upon  such  occasions  is 
always  received  ;  not,  however,  as  hearsay,  and  under  any  supposed  exception  in  favor 
of  questions  of  ancient  boundary,  but  as  part  of  the  res  gestce,  and  explanatory  of  the 
acts  themselves,  done  in  the  course  of  the  ambit.  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M.  &  S.  687,  per 
Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  supra,  §  108  ;  Ellicottv.  Pearl,  1  McLean  211.  Indeed,  in  the  case 
of  such  extensive  domains  as  lordships,  they  being  matters  of  general  interest,  tradi- 
tionary evidence  of  common  fame  seems  also  admissible  on  the  other  grounds  which  have 
been  previously  discussed.  The  writ  de  perambulations  facienda  is  not  known  to  have 
been  adopted  in  practice  in  the  United  States  ;  but  in  several  of  the  States,  remedies 
somewhat  similar  in  principle  have  been  provided  by  statutes.  In  some  of  the  States, 
provision  is  only  made  for  a  periodical  perambulation  of  the  boundaries  of  towns  by  the 
selectmen:  LL.  Maine  Rev.  1840,  c.  5;  LL.  N.  H.  1842,  c.  37  ;  Mass.  Rev.  Stats. 
c.  15  ;  LL.  Conn.  Rev.  1849,  tit.  3,  c.  7  ;  or,  for  a  definite  settlement  of  controversies 
respecting  them,  by  the  public  surveyor,  as  in  New  York,  Rev.  Code,  pt.  i.  c.  8,  tit.  6. 
In  others  the  remedy  is  extended  to  the  boundaries  of  private  estates  :  see  Elmer's 
Digest,  pp.  98,  99,' 315,  316;  New  Jersey,  Rev.  St.  1846,  tit.  22,  c.  12;  Virginia, 
Rav.  Code,  1819,  vol.  i,  pp.  358,  359.  A  very  complete  summary  remedy,  in  all  cases 
of  disputed  boundary,  is  provided  in  the  statutes  of  Delaware,  Revision  of  1829,  pp.  £0, 
81,  tit  Boundaries,  III.  To  perambulations  made  under  any  of  these  statutes,  the 
principles  stated  in  the  text,  it  is  conceived,  will  apply.""] 

*  ("The  policy  is  vindicated  in  Scoggin  u.  Dairymple,  7  Jones  L.  46 ;  Wood  v. 
Willard,  37  Vt.  887.] 

*  £This  is  said  in  almost  every  case.] 


§  140  «.]     REPUTATION  ON  MATTERS  OF  GENERAL  INTEREST.  229 

cases  of  non-availability  would  be  recognized.  Next,  the  declarant 
must  have  had  no  interest  to  misrepresent ;  *  and  for  this  reason 
declarations  by  an  owner  about  his  own  boundaries  are  usually 
excluded.6  The  declarant  must  appear  to  have  had  knowledge,  or 
fair  means  of  knowledge,  of  the  boundary  he  speaks  of ; 7  a  surveyor 
is  the  typical  instance  of  a  qualified  declarant.  Such  are  the  limita- 
tions of  the  rule  as  generally  accepted.8  But  in  a  few  States  (fol- 
lowing a  Massachusetts  peculiarity  of  long  standing9)  the  additional 
limitation  obtains  that  the  declarant  must  have  been  at  the  time 
on  the  land  and  engaged  in  pointing  out  the  boundaries  mentioned.10 
Moreover,  in  the  Massachusetts  variation  of  the  rule,  the  further 
peculiarity  exists  that  the  declarant  must  have  been  in  possession 
as  owner,  e.  g.  a  mere  surveyor's  statement  is  excluded.11 

From  declarations  of  the  above  sort  should  be  distinguished  the 
use,  under  other  principles,  of  declarations  against  proprietary  inter- 
est,12 of  declarations  by  one  in  possession  coloring  an  act  of  prescrip- 
tive occupation,18  and  admissions  by  a  grantor  or  other  predecessor 
while  in  possession.14] 

5  FJSmitli  v.  Forrest,  49  N.  H.  239 ;  Lawrence  ».   Tennant,    64  id.   540  ;    Bethea 
V.  Byrd,  95  N.  C.  310 ;  Spear  v.  Coate,  3  McCord  229  ;  Wood  v.  Willard,  xu-pra ; 
Powers  v.  Silsby,  41  id.  291 ;  Child  v.  Kingsbury,  46  id.  53  ;   Harriman  v.  Brown, 
8  Leigh  713  ;  Hill  v.  Proctor,  10  W.  Va.  84.] 

6  QPorter  v.   Warner,  2  Root  23  ;    Ware  v.  Brookhouse,  7  Gray  454  ;  Morrill  v. 
Titcomb,  8  All.  100;  Shepherd  v.  Thompson,  4  N.  H.  215  ;  Sasser  v.  Herring,  3  Dev. 
L.  342  ;  Halstead  v.  Mullen,  93  N.  C.  252  ;  State  v.  Crocker,  49  S.  C.  242  ;  Tucker 
v.  Smith,  68  Tex.  478  ;  Scaife  v.  Land  Co.,  U.  S.  App.,  90  Fed.  238  ;  Evarts  v.  Young, 
52  Vt.  334.     Contra :  Robinson  v.  Dewhurst,  25  U.  S.  App.  345 ;    High  v.  Pancake, 
W.  Va.,  26  S.  E.  536.] 

7  [Good  statements  are  to  be  found  in  Harriman  v.  Brown,  8  Leigh  713 ;  Clements 
v.  Kyles,  13  Gratt.  478  ;  Bender  v.  Pitzer,  27  Pa.  335  ;  Wood  v.  Willard,  37  Vt.  387 ; 
Smith  v.  Forrest,  49  N.  H.   237.      To  these  add  :    Morton  v.   Folger,   15  Cal.  279  ; 
Tucker  v.  Smith,  68  Tex.  478 ;  Hunnicutt  v.   Peyton,   102  U.  S.  364  ;  Robinson  v. 
Dewhurst,  25  U.  S.  App.  345  ;    Powers  v.  Sibley,  41  Vt.  291  ;    Hadley  v.  Howe,  46  id. 
142  ;  Hill  v.  Proctor,  10  W.  Va.  84.] 

8  £  Additional  cases  adopting  it  are  as  follows :  1  Harr.  &  McH.  84,  230,  368,  531  ; 
4  id.  156  ;  Caufman  ».  Cedar  Spring,  6  Binn.  62  ;  Hamilton  v.  Menor,  2  S.  &  R.  73 ; 
Spear  v.  Coate,  3  McCord  229  ;  Beard  «'.  Talbot,  Cooke  142  ;  Strand  v.  Springfield, 
28  Tex.  666;   Hurt  v.  Evans,  49  id.  316;   Tucker  v.  Smith,  68  id.  478;  Martini;. 
Curtis,  68  Vt.  397.] 

9  [Van  Deusen  v.  Turner,  12  Pick.  532;  Da-rgett  v.  Shaw,  5  Mete.  226;  Bartlett 
v.  Emerson,  7  Gray  175  ;  Ware  v.   Brookhouse,  ib.  454  ;  Flagg  v.   Mason,  8  id.  556  ; 
Whitney  v.  Bacon,  9  id.  206 ;  Morrill  v.  Titcomb,  8  All.  100  ;  Long  v.  Colton,  116 
Mass.  414  ;  Peck  v.  Clark,  142  id.  440.    The  ruling  in  Whitman  v.  Shaw,  166  id.  451, 
seems  to  rest  on  other  grounds.] 

10  [Royal  i;.  Chandler,  81  Me.  119  ;  Curtis  v.  Aaronson,  49  N.  J.  L.  77  ;  Bender  v. 
Pitzer,  27  Pa.  335;  Kennedy  v.  Lubold,  88  id.  255;   Kramer  v.  Goodlander,  98  id.  369. 
By  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Texas  rule,  this  was  also  required  in  Hunnicutt  v.  Pey- 
ton, 102  U.  S.  364  ;  later  Federal  rulings  leave  the  matter  doubtful :  Clement  v.  Packer, 
125  U.  S.  325;  Ayers  ».  Watson,  137  id.  596;  Robinson  v.  Dewhurst,  supra.      This 
limitation,  after  once  prevailing,  has  been  repudiated  in  New  Hampshire  and  Vermont : 
Smith  v.  Forrest,  49  N.  H.  237  ;  Powers  v.  Silsby,  41  Vt.  291.] 

11  Cf)ag«ett  v.  Shaw,  Peck  v.  Clark,  Curtis  i>.  Aaronson,  supra;  Boyal  v.  Chandler, 
83  Me.  152.] 

12  [Post,  §152c.] 

13  [Ante,  §  108.] 

11  L/W,  §  189 ;  where  these  distinctions  and  their  consequences  are  more  fully 
pointed  out.] 


230  EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE    HEAESAY   RULE.  [CH.   XII 

2.   Reputation  as  Evidence  of  other  Matters. 

§  140  b.  Character,  Insanity,  Solvency,  etc.  [Quite  apart,  as  a 
matter  of  precedent,  from  the  preceding  doctrine,  is  a  use  of  reputa- 
tion as  evidence  —  by  way  of  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  —  of 
sundry  matters,  not  connected  in  precedent,  and  not  systematically 
covered  by  any  general  principle,  and  yet  illustrating  the  same  gen- 
eral notion  as  to  the  conditions  under  which  reputation  is  admitted. 
In  these  instances,  reputation,  when  admitted  at  all,  is  received 
because  the  matter  is  of  the  sort  likely  to  be  ascertainable  by  num- 
bers of  people  and  likely  to  be  discussed  by  the  community  in  gen- 
eral, and  because  there  is,  in  one  way  or  another,  a  lack  of  other 
evidence  equally  good  or  better,  and  therefore,  in  some  sense,  a 
necessity  for  resorting  to  reputation.  Such  is  the  broad  but  unfor- 
mulated  notion  which  will  subsume  and  account  for  most  of  these 
unconnected  doctrines  about  the  use  of  reputation.1 

Character  is  a  matter  which  has  long  been  accustomed  to  be  evi- 
denced by  reputation.  The  limitations  applicable  are  more  con- 
veniently discussed  in  another  place  (post,  §  461  d).2  Insanity  is 
generally  held  not  to  be  provable  in  this  way.8  Insolvency,  or  sol- 
vency, is  by  the  better  rule  regarded  as  provable  by  reputation.4  A 
partnership  is  usually  said  not  to  be  provable  by  reputation ;  6  but  the 
question  in  such  cases  is  generally  rather  one  of  substantive  law,  as  to 
the  effect  of  a  holding-out  as  partners.  The  use  of  a  house  for  pur- 
poses of  prostitution  is  allowed  by  many  Courts  to  be  evidenced  by 
the  reputation  of  the  house ; 6  but  here  the  nature  of  the  offence 
may  be  such  that  the  reputation  may  be  admissible  as  a  part  of  the 
issue  (ante,  §  14  d).~] 

1  fJFor  reputation  as  a  part  of  the  issue,  or  as  evidence  of  notice  and  the  like,  see 
ante,  §§  14  c,  14  d,  14/>.] 

2  £For  reputation  as  evidence  of  an  animal's  disposition,  see  Whittier  v.  Franklin, 
46  N.  H.  23 ;  McMillan  v.  Davis,  66  N.  C.  539.] 

8  fJPeople  v.  Pico,  62  Cal.  53;  State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  539  ;  Foster  v.  Brooks, 
6  Ga.  290  (leading  case)  ;  Yeates  v.  Reed,  4  Blackf.  463,  466;  Walker  v.  State,  102 
Ind.  507  ;  Ashcraft  v.  De  Armond,  44  la.  233  ;  Barker  v.  Pope,  91  N.  C.  168  ;  State 
v.  Coley,  114  id.  879 ;  Yauke  v.  State,  51  Wis.  469.1 

*  QLawsou  v.  Orear,  7  Ala.  786  (leading  case)  ;  McNeill  v.  Arnold,  22  Ark.  482, 
terrible ;  Hayes  v.  Wells,  34  Md.  518  ;  West  v.  Bank,  54  Minn.  466  ;  Hahn  v.  Penney, 
60  id.  487  ;  State  v.  Cochran,  2  Dev.  65 ;  Hard  v.  Brown,  18  Vt.  97  ;  Noyesr.  Brown, 
82  id.  430 ;  Bank  v.  Rutland,  33  id.  430. 

Contra :  Branch  Bank  v.  Porter,  5  Ala.  736 :  Price  v.  Mazange,  31  id.  701,  708  ; 
Bliss  v.  Johnson,  162  Mass.  823.  See  Holten  v.  Board,  55  Ind.  199. 

Distinguish  the  use  of  reputation,  not  to  prove  insolvency,  but  to  show  notice  of  it 
by  one  to  whom  the  reputation  would  have  been  known;  ante,  §  14  p.] 

6  QKnard  v.  Hill,  102  Ala.  570;  Sinclair  ».  Wood,  3  Cal.  98;  Grafton  Bank  v. 
Moore,  13  N.  H.  99  ;  Inglebright  v.  Hammond,  19  Oh.  343  ;  Farmers'  Baukv.  Saling, 
Or.,  54  Pac.  190;  Bowen  v.  Rutherford,  60  111.  41.] 

8  £Hogan  v.  State,  76  Ga.  82;  Egan  v.  Gordon,  65  Minn.  505  ;  Stater.  Hendricks, 
15  Mont.  194  (if  corroborated)  ;  State  v.  McDowell,  Dudley  849  (leading  case). 

Contra;  Wooster  v.  State,  55  Ala.  221 ;  State  v.  Hand,  7  la.  411  ;  Shaffer  v.  State, 
Md.,  39  Atl.  313  (until  St.  1892,  c.  522)  ;  Overstreet  ».  State,  8  How.  Miss.  329; 
Handy  v.  State,  63  Miss.  208  ;  State  v.  Folev,  45  N.  H.  466  ;  Nelson  v.  Terr.,  OkL, 
49  Pac.  920;  Barker  v.  Coin.,  90  Va.  8:20;  State  v.  Plaut,  67  Vt.  454.] 


§§  1405-146.]     REPUTATION;  CHARACTER,  SANITY,  ETC.  231 

§  140  c  [107].  Marriage.  It  is  frequently  said,  that  general  repu- 
tation is  admissible  to  prove  the  fact  of  the  marriage  of  the  parties 
alluded  to,  even  in  ordinary  cases,  where  pedigree  is  not  in  question. 
In  one  case,  indeed,  such  evidence  was,  after  verdict,  held  sufficient, 
prima  facie,  to  warrant  the  jury  in  finding  the  fact  of  marriage,  the 
adverse  party  not  having  cross-examined  the  witness,  nor  contro- 
verted the  fact  by  proof.1  But  the  evidence  produced  in  the  other 
cases  cited  in  support  of  this  position  cannot  properly  be  called 
hearsay  evidence,  but  was  strictly  and  truly  original  evidence  of 
facts  from  which. the  marriage  might  well  be  inferred;  such  as  evi- 
dence of  the  parties  being  received  into  society  as  man  and  wife, 
and  being  visited  by  respectable  families  in  the  neighborhood,  and 
of  their  attending  church  and  public  places  together  as  such,  and 
otherwise  demeaning  themselves  in  public,  and  addressing  each  other 
as  persons  actually  married.2  [Such  evidence  is  commonly  spoken 
of  as  "  habite  and  repute,"  and  is  in  principle  of  two  distinct  sorts. 
The  conduct  of  friends  and  neighbors  in  treating  the  couple  as  mar- 
ried persons  is  a  form  of  reputation,  and  is  received,  therefore,  as 
an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  in  evidence  of  the  fact  of  marriage, 
either  of  a  marriage  publicly  solemnized,  as  required  by  the  law  of 
England,  or  of  a  marriage-consent  otherwise  exchanged,  as  sufficient 
by  the  law  of  Scotland  and  most  American  jurisdictions.  The  con- 
duct of  the  couple  themselves  towards  each  other,  in  publicly  treat- 
ing each  other  as  man  and  wife,  is  a  habit  or  conduct  which  enters 
as  circumstantial  evidence  of  a  marriage,  either  by  prior  public 
solemnization  or  by  privately  exchanged  consent.8  In  any  case  it 
cannot  properly  be  said  that  the  "  habite  and  repute  "  are  a  form  of 
marriage  ;  and  in  neither  case  can  it  properly  be  said  that  the  habit 
or  the  repute  is  "original"  evidence,  the  one  being  in  strictness 
circumstantial  evidence  and  the  other  being  hearsay  evidence 
exceptionally  received.] 

§§  141-144.1 

§  145.2 

§  146.« 

i  Evans  v.  Morgan.  2  C.  &  J.  453  ;  post,  Vol.  II,  §  461. 

3  1  Phil.  Evid.  234,  235 ;  Hervey  v.  Hervey,  2  W.  Bl.  877  ;  Birt  v.  Barlow,  Doug. 
171,  174;  Read  v.  Passer,  1  Esp.  213;  Leader  v.  Barry,  id.  853;  Doe  v.  Fleming, 
4  Bing.  266  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  1  Phillim.  294  ;  Hammick  ».  Bronson,  5  Day  290,  293'; 
In  re  Taylor,  9  Paige  611;  {Murray  v.  Milner,  L.  R.  12  Ch.  Div.  845  ;  Lyle  v.  Ell- 
wood,  L.'  R.  19  Eq.  106  ;  Goodman  v.  Goodman,  28  L.  J.  Ch.  745  ;  Hoggan  v. 
Craigie,  1  McL.  &  Rob.  942  ;  Breadalbane  Case,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  Sc.  182  ;  Clayton  v. 
Wardell,  4  N.  Y.  230  ;  (  ^Jackson  v.  Jackson,  80  Md.  176.  For  the  necessity  of 
other  evidence  than  reputation  in  cases  of  bigamy,  adultery,  etc.,  see  VoL  II,  §§  49, 
461,  462  ;  III,  §  205.] 

8  QSee  the  exposition  by  Lord  Cranworth,  in  the  Breadalbane  Case,  L.  R.  1  H.  L. 
Sc.  1<J9.] 

1  ^Transferred  post,  to  §  575  b ;  they  deal  with  the  authentication  of  ancient  docu- 
ments and  with  the  use  of  ancient  documents  as  evidence  of  possession,  and  do  not 
involve  the  Hearsay  rule.] 

PTransferred  ante,  as  §  138  a  ;  dealing  with  reputation  as  to  boundaries.] 

8  ^Transferred  ante,  as  §  140  a,  note  2  ;  dealing  with  perambulations.] 


232 


EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.    XIIL 


CHAPTER  XIIL 

EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE  :   DECLARATIONS   AGAINST 

INTEREST. 


§§  147-149.    General  Principle. 

§  150.  Facts  against  Pecuniary  Inter- 
est ;  In  general. 

§  151.  Same:  Preponderance  of  In- 
terest. 

§152.  Same:  Statement  admissible  for 
all  Facts  contained  in  it. 

§  152  a,  b.  Same  :  Indorsements  of 
Payment  of  Debt  barred  by  Limitation. 


§  152c.  Facts  against  Proprietary  In« 
terest. 

§  152  d.  Facts  against  other  than  a 
Pecuniary  or  Proprietary  Interest. 

§  153.    Competency  of  Declarant. 

§  154.  Authentication  of  Entries  by 
Agents,  Stewards,  etc. 

§  155.   Vicar's  Books. 


§  147.  General  Principle.  [Another  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule 
admits  the  declaration  of  a  deceased  person  stating  a  fact  against 
the  interest  of  the  declarant.1]  This  class  [of  statements]  embraces 
not  only  entries  in  books,  but  all  other  declarations  or  statements 
of  facts,  whether  verbal  or  in  writing,2  and  whether  they  were 
made  at  the  time  of  the  fact  declared  or  at  a  subsequent  day.8 
But,  to  render  them  admissible,  it  must  appear  that  the  declarant 

1  rjThe  beginning  of  this  section  in  the  original  text,  which  in  its  classification  and 
theory  is  unsound  and  misleading,  was  as  follows]  :  "A  third  exception  to  the  rule, 
rejecting  hearsay  evidence,  is  allowed  in  the  case  of  declarations  and  entries  made  by 
persons  since  deceased,  and  against  the  interest  of  the  persons  making  them,  at  the 
time  when  they  were  made.     We  have  already  seen,  that  declarations  of  third  persons, 
admitted  in  evidence,  are  of  two  classes  :  one  of  which  consists  of  written  entries,  made 
in  the  course  of  official  duty  or  of  professional  employment  ;  where  the  entry  is  one  of 
a  number  of  facts  which  are  ordinarily  and  usually  connected  with  each  other,  so  that 
the  proof  of  one  affords  a  presumption  that  the  others  have  taken  place  ;  and,  there- 
fore, a  fair  and  regular  entry,   such  as  usually  accompanies  facts  similar  to  those  of 
which  it  speaks,  and  apparently  contemporaneous  with  them,  is  received  as  original 

E resumptive  evidence  of  those  facts.     And,  the  entry  itself  being  original  evidence,  it 
of  no  importance,  as  regards  its  admissibility,  whether  the  person  making  it  be  yet 
living  or  dt-ad.     But  declarations  of  the  other  class,  of  which  we  are  now  to  speak,  are 
secondary  evidence,  and  are  received  only  in  consequence  of  the  death  of  the  person 
making  them." 

2  Qln  Massachusetts,  peculiarly,  a  statement  against  pecuniary  interest  must  be  in 
•writing,  and  furthermore  must  be  in  the  shape  of  an  account-entry  or  formal  document ; 
Framingham  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Barnard,  2  Pick.  532;    Lawrence  v.  Kimball,  1  Mete.  527  ; 
but  statements  against  proprietary  interest  are  not  thus  limited  :  Marcy  v.  Stone, 
8  Ciish.  9  ;  Stearns  v.  Hendersass,  9  id.  502  ;  Currier  v.  Gale,  14  Gray  504.] 

•  I  vat  v.  Finch,   1  Taunt.  141;  Doe  v.  Jones,   1  Campb.  367;  Davies  t>.  Pierce, 

2  T.  R.  53,  and  Holloway  v.  Raikes,  there  cited  ;  Doe  v.  Williams,  Cowp.  621 ;  Peace- 
able v.  Watson,  4  Taunt.   16;  Stanley  v.   White,  14   East  332,  341,  per  Ld.  Ellen- 
borough  ;  Haddow  v.  Parry,  3  Taunt.  303  ;  Goss  v.  Watlington,  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  132; 
Strode  v.  Winchester,  1  Dick.  397  ;  Barker  v.  Ray,  2  Russ.  63,  76,  and  cases  in  p.  67, 
n.  ;    Warren  v.   Greenville,   2  Str.  1129  ;  8.  c.  2  Burr.  1071,  1072 ;    Doe  v.  Turford, 

3  B.  &  Ad.  898,  per  Parke,  J. ;  Harrison  v.  Blades,  3  Campb.  457  ;  Manning  v.  Lechr 
mere,  1  Atk.  453. 


§§  147-149.]      STATEMENTS  OF   FACTS   AGAINST   INTEREST.  233 

is  deceased ;  *  that  he  possessed  competent  knowledge  of  the  facts,  or 
that  it  was  his  duty  to  know  them ;  and  that  the  declarations  were  at 
variance  with  his  interest.6  When  these  circumstances  concur,  the 
evidence  is  received,  leaving  its  weight  and  value  to  be  determined 
by  other  considerations. 

§  148.  The  ground  upon  which  this  evidence  is  received,  is  the 
extreme  improbability  of  its  falsehood.  The  regard  which  men 
usually  pay  to  their  own  interest  is  deemed  a  sufficient  security, 
both  that  the  declarations  were  not  made  under  any  mistake  of  fact 
or  want  of  information  on  the  part  of  the  declarant,  if  he  had  the 
requisite  means  of  knowledge,  and  that  the  matter  declared  is  true. 
The  apprehension  of  fraud  in  the  statement  is  rendered  still  more 
improbable  from  the  circumstance,  that  it  is  not  receivable  in  evi- 
dence until  after  the  death  of  the  declarant;  and  that  it  is  always 
competent  for  the  party  against  whom  such  declarations  are  adduced 
to  point  out  any  sinister  motive  for  making  them.  It  is  true,  that 
the  ordinary  and  highest  tests  of  the  fidelity,  accuracy,  and  com- 
pleteness of  judicial  evidence  are  here  wanting:  but  their  place  is, 
in  some  measure,  supplied  by  the  circumstances  of  the  declarant; 
and  the  inconveniences  resulting  from  the  exclusion  of  evidence, 
having  such  guarantees  for  its  accuracy  in  fact,  and  for  its  freedom 
from  fraud,  are  deemed  much  greater,  in  general,  than  any  which 
would  probably  be  experienced  from  its  admission.1 

§  149.  In  some  cases,  the  Courts  seem  to  have  admitted  this  evi- 
dence, without  requiring  proof  of  adverse  interest  in  the  declarant; 
while  in  others  stress  is  laid  on  the  fact,  that  such  interest  had 
already  appeared,  aliunde,  in  the  course  of  the  trial.  In  one  case  it 
was  argued,  upon  the  authorities  cited,  that  it  was  not  material  that 
the  declarant  ever  had  any  actual  interest,  contrary  to  his  declara- 
tion; but  this  position  was  not  sustained  by  the  Court.1  In  many 
other  cases,  where  the  evidence  consisted  of  entries  in  books  of 
account  and  the  like,  they  seem  to  have  been  clearly  admissible  as 
entries  made  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  or  duty,  or  parts 

*  [[Other  causes  of  n  on -availability  than  death  might  well  be  recognized,  but  they 
are  usually  not.  Illness  should  suffice  (contra:  Harrison  v.  Blades,  3  Camp.  458),  as 
well  as  insanity  (Mahaska  v,  Ingalls,  16  la.  81,  semble  ;  Jones  v.  Henry,  84  N.  C.  324), 
absence  from  the  jurisdiction  (Shearman  v.  Atkins,  4  Pick.  293;  contra:  Stephen  v. 
Gwenap,  1  Moo.  &  R.  120;  Mahaska  v.  Ingalls,  supra,  semble;  Gerapulo  ».  Wieler,  10 
C.  B.  690,  696  (doubting)),  and  incompetency  through  interest  (Pugh  v.  McKae,  2  Ala. 
394  ;  Dwight  v.  Brown,  9 Conn.  93  ;  Fitch  v.  Chapman,  10 id.  11  :  contra:  Burton  ». 
Scott,  3  Rand.  409).] 

6  Short  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  Walk.  464,  488,  per  Sir  Thomas  Plumer,  M.  R.  ;  Doe  v. 
Rohson,  15  East  32,  34  ;  Higham  v.  Ridgway,  10  id.  109,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ; 
Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317,  327,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  R.  v.  Worth,  4  Q.  B. 
137,  per  Ld.  Denman  ;  2  Smith's  Lead.  Gas.  193,  n.,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Spargo 
r.  Brown,  9  B.  &  C.  935. 

1  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  307,  308  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  293,  294 ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  221. 
£0ood  statements  of  the  reason  will  be  found  in  opinions  by  Fitzgibbon,  L.  J.,  in 
Lalor  v.  Lalor,  4  L.  R,  Ir.  681  ;  Rogers,  J.,  in  Gibblehouse  v.  Strong,  3  Rawle  437. 3 

1  Barker  v.  Ray,  2  Russ.  63,  67,  68,  cases  cited  in  note ;  ih.  p.  76. 


234:  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   EULE.  [CH.    XIII. 

of  the  res  gestce,  and  therefore  as  original  and  not  secondary  evi- 
dence; though  the  fact  that  they  were  made  against  the  interest  of 
the  person  making  them  was  also  adverted  to.  But  in  regard  to 
declarations  in  general,  riot  being  entries  or  acts  of  the  last- 
mentioned  character,  and  which  are  admissible  only  on  the  ground  of 
having  been  made  contrary  to  the  interest  of  the  declarant,  the  weight 
of  authority,  as  well  as  the  principle  of  the  exception  we  are  con- 
sidering, seem  plainly  to  require  that  such  adverse  interest  should 
appear,  either  in  the  nature  of  the  case  or  from  extraneous  proof.2' 8 

§  150.  Facts  against  Pecuniary  Interest;  In  general.  Though  the 
exception  we  are  now  considering  is,  as  we  have  just  seen,  extended 
to  declarations  of  any  kind,  yet  it  is  much  more  frequently  exem- 
plified in  documentary  evidence,  and  particularly  in  entries  in  books 
of  account.  Where  these  are  books  of  collectors  of  taxes,  stewards, 
bailiffs,  or  receivers,  subject  to  the  inspection  of  others,  and  in 
which  the  first  entry  is  generally  of  money  received,  charging  the 
party  making  it,  they  are,  doubtless,  within  the  principle  of  the 
exception.1  But  it  has  been  extended  still  farther,  to  include 
entries  in  private  books  also,  though  retained  within  the  custody  of 
their  owners:  their  liability  to  be  produced  on  notice,  in  trials, 
being  deemed  sufficient  security  against  fraud;  and  the  entry  not 
being  admissible,  unless  it  charges  the  party  making  it  with  the 
receipt  of  money  on  account  of  a  third  person,  or  acknowledges  the 
payment  of  money  due  to  himself;  in  either  of  which  cases  it  would 
be  evidence  against  him,  and  therefore  is  considered  as  sufficiently 
against  his  interest  to  bring  it  within  this  exception.2  The  entry  of 
a  mere  memorandum  of  an  agreement  is  not  sufficient; 3  thus,  where 
the  settlement  of  a  pauper  was  attempted  to  be  proved  by  showing  a 
contract  of  hiring  and  service,  the  books  of  his  deceased  master,  con- 
taining minutes  of  his  contracts  with  his  servants,  entered  at  the 

a  Higham  v.  Ridgway,  10  East  109  ;  Warren  v.  Greenville,  2  Str.  1129,  expounded 
by  Lord  Mansfield,  in  2  Burr.  1071,  1072  ;  Gleadow  v.  Atkin,  3  Tyrwh.  302,  303  ; 

1  C.  &  M.  423,  424  ;  Short  o.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  489  ;  Marks  v.  Lahee,  3  Bing.  N.  C. 
408,  420,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  Barker  v.  Ray,  2  Russ.  63,  76. 

("The  doubt  dealt  with  in  the  above  sentences  no  longer  exists.  At  one  time  the 
distinction  between  the  present  class  of  statements  and  regular  entries  (ante,  §  120  a) 
was  not  definitely  made,  and  there  was  an  occasional  suggestion  of  a  broad  principle 
that  statements  by  a  person  merely  having  "  no  interest  to  falsify  "  (e.  g.  in  Roe  v.  Raw- 
lings,  7  East  290)  were  admissible  ;  but  by  the  third  decade  of  the  1800s  it  was  clearly 
settled  that,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  exception,  the  fact  stated  must  distinctly 
be  against  the  declarant  s  interest.] 

8  ["For  the  last  sentence  of  this  section,  see  post,  §  151,  note/] 
1  Barry  v.  Bebbington,  4  T.  R.  514  ;  Goss  v.  Watlington,  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  132; 
Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317  ;  Stead  v.  Heaton,  4  T.  R.  669  ;  Short  v.  Lee, 

2  Jac.  &  W.  464  ;  Whitnash  v.  George,  8  B.  &  C.  556 ;  Dean,  etc.  of  Ely  v.  Caldecott, 
7  Bing.  433  ;  Marks  v.  Lahee,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  408  ;  Wynne  v.  Tyrwhitt,  4  B.  &  Aid. 
376;  De  Rntzen  v.  Farr,  4  Ad.  &  El.  53;  2  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  193,  note;  Plaxton  v. 
Dare,  10  B.  &  C.  17,  19  ;  Doe  v.  Cartwright,  Ry.  &  M.  62. 

*  Warren  v.  Greenville,  2  Str.  1029  ;  H.  c.  2  Burr.  1071,  1072 ;  Higham  v.  Ridgway, 
10  East  109 ;  Middleton  r.  M.-lton,  10  B.  &  C.  317. 

*  C0r»  rather,  of  a  conditional  obligation  to  puy.] 


§§  149-151.]      STATEMENTS   OF   FACTS   AGAINST   INTEREST.  235 

time  of  contracting  with  them,  and  of  subsequent  payments  of  their 
wages,  were  held  inadmissible;  for  the  entries  were  not  made 
against  the  writer's  interest,  for  he  would  not  be  liable  unless  the 
service  were  performed,  nor  were  they  made  in  the  course  of  his 
duty  or  employment.4  [But  it  would  seem  that  the  existence  of  a 
contract  or  agreement,  even  though  a  conditional  one,  is  a  fact  against 
interest,  for  the  liability  to  pay  is  none  the  less  a  liability,  and 
most  contracts  are  more  or  less  subject  to  contingent  or  conditional 
exonerations.6  In  general,  the  interest  or  burden  involved  in  the 
fact  stated  must  be  a  positive  one  and  of  such  importance  as  would 
naturally  be  present  to  the  mind  of  the  declarant.6  A  given  fact 
may  or  may  not  be  against  interest  according  to  the  attendant  cir- 
cumstances; for  example,  that  one  is  a  partner  may  or  may  not  be 
against  interest  according  to  the  state  of  the  firm's  assets.7] 

§  151.  Same:  Preponderance  of  Interest.  [Where,  along  with  the 
disserving  interest,  there  is  also  a  more  or  less  palpable  interest  to  be 
served  by  the  fact  entered,  the  question  arises  whether  the  interests 
are  to  be  balanced  and  the  entry  admitted  if  the  disserving  interest 
preponderates,  or  whether  the  mere  coexistence  of  the  self-serving 
interest  shall  in  no  case  suffice  to  exclude.  The  former  view  is 
the  one  generally  accepted.1  A  common  instance  of  this  question 
is  the  case  of  a  merchant's  entry  of  payment  (thus  against  interest) 
which  at  the  same  stroke  has  recorded  (in  favor  of  interest)  his 
claim  leading  to  the  payment;  and,  conversely,  an  agent's  debit  and 
credit  account  in  which  the  receipts  creating  liability  are  equalled 
or  exceeded  by  the  credits  in  his  favor;  in  other  words,]  where  the 
entry  is  itself  the  only  evidence  of  the  charge,  of  which  it  shows 
the  subsequent  liquidation ;  its  admission  has  been  strongly  opposed, 
on  the  ground,  that,  taken  together,  it  is  no  longer  a  declaration  of 

*  R.  v.  Worth,  4  Q.  B.  132. 

6  FJThe  following  more  or  less  conditional  obligations  have  been  held  to  be  against 
interest :  White  v.  Chouteau,  10  Barb.  209  (reimbursing  a  surety);  People  v.  Blakeley, 
4  Park.  Cr.  185  (note)  ;  Hosford  v.  Roe,  47  Minn.  247  (ante-nuptial  agreement  as  to 
dower).  Contra :  Moehn  v.  Moehn,  la.,  75  N.  W.  520  (by  an  indorser,  that  the  note  was 
not  paid).  3 

6  [[Examples  :  Smith  v.  Blakey,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  326  (letter  stating  the  arrival  of  goods 
in  declarant's  charge,  excluded) ;  Tate  v.  Tate,  75  Va.  532  (memorandum  of  receipt  of 
goods  as  gratuitous  bailee,  excluded).] 

7  £  See  Raines  v.  Raines,  30  Ala.  428  ;  Humes  v.  O'Bryan,  74  id.  79.] 

1  LShort  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  477,  489  (where  an  entry  of  money  received  by  a  proc- 
tor and  member  of  a  college  of  vicars  involved  his  interest  as  a  member  in  establishing 
the  right  to  collect  dues,  while  his  interest  as  collector  was  to  the  contrary,  the  latter 
being  held  to  preponderate) ;  Clark  v.  Wilmot,  1  Y.  &  C.  54,  2  id.  259,  note  ;  Canton 
v.  Size,  22  U.  0.  Q.  B.  483 ;  Confed.  L.  Ass.  t>.  O'Donnell,  13  Can.  Sup.  225 ;  Free- 
man v.  Brewster,  93  Ga.  648 ;  see  Massey  ».  Allen,  L.  R.  13  Ch.  D.  562. 

Taking  the  other  view  :  Jessel,  M.  R.,  in  Taylor  v.  Witham,  L.  R.  3  Ch.  D.  605  ; 
Raines  r.  Raines,  30  Ala.  428.  The  author's  text  in  §  149  contained  ihe  following,  on 
this  point :]  And  it  seems  not  to  be  sufficient,  that,  in  one  or  nu  re  points  of  view,  a 
declaration  may  be  against  interest,  if  it  appears,  upon  the  whole,  that  the  interest  of 
the  declarant  would  be  rather  promoted  than  impaired  by  the  declaration:  Phil.  &  Am. 
on  Evid.  320  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  305,  306  ;  Short  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  464. 


236  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XIIL 

the  party  against  his  interest,  and  may  be  a  declaration  ultimately 
in  his  own  favor.2  This  point'was  raised  in  the  cases  of  Higham  v. 
Ridgway,*  where  an  entry  was  simply  marked  as  paid  in  the  mar- 
gin; and  of  Howe  v.  Brenton,  which  was  a  debtor  and  creditor 
account,  in  a  toller's  books,  of  the  money  received  for  tolls,  and 
paid  over.  But  in  neither  of  these  cases  was  the  objection  sustained. 
In  the  former,  indeed,  there  was  evidence  aliunde,  that  the  service 
charged  had  been  performed;  but  Lord  Ellenborough,  though  he 
afterwards  adverted  to  this  fact,  as  a  corroborating  circumstance, 
first  laid  down  the  general  doctrine  that  "  the  evidence  was  properly 
admitted,  upon  the  broad  principle  on  which  receivers'  books  have 
been  admitted."  But  in  the  latter  case  there  was  no  such  proof; 
and  Lord  Tenterden  observed,  that  almost  all  the  accounts  which 
were  produced  were  accounts  on  both  sides,  and  that  the  objection 
would  go  to  the  very  root  of  that  sort  of  evidence.  Upon  these 
authorities,  the  admissibility  of  such  entries  may  perhaps  be  con- 
sidered as  established.4  And  it  is  observable,  in  corroboration  of 
their  admissibility,  that  in  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  cases,  they  appear 
to  have  been  made  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  or  of  duty,  and 
therefore  were  parts  of  the  res  gestce.6 

§  152.  Same :  Statement  admissible  for  all  Facts  contained  in  it. 
It  has  also  been  questioned,  whether  the  entry  is  to  be  received  in 
evidence  of  matters  which,  though  forming  part  of  the  declaration, 
were  not  in  themselves  against  the  interest  of  the  declarant.  This 
objection  goes  not  only  to  collateral  and  independent  facts,  but  to 
the  class  of  entries  mentioned  in  the  preceding  section,  and  would 
seem  to  be  overruled  by  those  decisions.  [The  leading  case  is 
Higham  v.  Ridgway^  in  which  an  entry  of  services  rendered  as 
man-midwife,  followed  by  a  note  "pd.  25th  Octr,  1768"  was  admitted 
to  show  the  date  of  the  child's  birth;  Lord  Ellenborough  said:  "It 
is  idle  to  say  that  the  word/>atW  only  shall  be  admitted  in  evidence 
without  the  context,  which  explains  to  what  it  refers.  .  .  .  By 
reference  to  the  ledger,  the  entry  there  was  virtually  incorporated 
with  and  made  a  part  of  the  other  entry,  of  which  it  is  explanatory."] 
But  the  point  was  solemnly  argued  in  a  later  case,  where  it  was 
adjudged  that  though,  if  the  point  were  now  for  the  first  time  to  be 
decided,  it  would  seem  more  reasonable  to  hold  that  the  memorandum 
of  a  receipt  of  payment  was  admissible  only  to  the  extent  of  proving 
that  a  payment  had  been  made,  and  the  account  on  which  it  had  been 
made,  giving  it  the  effect  only  of  verbal  proof  of  the  same  payment; 

2  TDoe  v.  Vowles,  1  Moo.  &  R.  261.] 

8  TBut  this  case  seems  to  involve  rather  the  question  of  the  next  section.] 

4  Rowe  v.  Breiiton,  3  Man.  &  R.  267  ;  2  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  196,  note ;  Williams 
».  Geaves,  8  C.  &  P.  592;  TR,  v.  Worth,  4  Q.  B.  134  ;  Taylor  v.  Withain,  L.  E.  3  Ch.  D. 
605.] 

6TThis  consideration  does  not  affect  the  question."] 

l  [10  East  109.3 


§§  151-152  «.]      STATEMENTS   OF  FACTS   AGAINST   INTEREST.          237 

yet,  that  the  authorities  had  gone  beyond  that  limit,  and  the  entry 
of  a  payment  against  the  interest  of  the  party  making  it  had  been 
held  to  have  the  effect  of  proving  the  truth  of  other  statements  con- 
tained in  the  same  entry,  and  connected  with  it.  Accordingly,  in 
that  case,  where  three  persons  made  a  joint  and  several  promissory 
note,  and  a  partial  payment  was  made  by  one  which  was  indorsed 
upon  the  note  in  these  terms,  "Received  of  W.  D.  the  sum  of  £280, 
on  account  of  the  within  note,  the  £300  "  (which  was  the  amount  of 
the  note)  "having  been  originally  advanced  to  E.  H.,"  for  which 
payment  an  action  was  brought  by  the  party  paying,  as  surety, 
against  E.  H.,  as  the  principal  debtor;  it  was  held,  upon  the  author- 
ity of  Higham  v.  Ridgway,  and  of  Doe  v.  Robson,  that  the  indorse- 
ment, the  creditor  being  dead,  was  admissible  in  evidence  of  the 
whole  statement  contained  in  it;  and,  consequently,  that  it  was 
prima  facie  proof,  not  only  of  the  payment  of  the  money,  but  of 
the  person  who  was  the  principal  debtor,  for  whose  account  it  was 
paid;  leaving  its  effect  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.2  [The  test 
for  determining  what  statements  shall  be  regarded  as  "virtually 
incorporated  with"  or  "knit  up  with  or  involved  in"  the  statement 
against  interest  has  been  variously  phrased  in  these  rulings.  But 
in  any  case  entries  made  at  a  separate  and  subsequent  occasion,  when 
a  former  entry  was  complete,  cannot  be  regarded  as  brought  in  by 
the  former.8] 

§  152  a  [121].  Same:  Indorsements  of  Payment  of  Debt  barred  by 
Limitation.  The  evidence  of  indebtment,  afforded  by  the  indorse- 
ment of  the  payment  of  interest  or  a  partial  payment  of  the  princi- 
pal, on  the  back  of  a  bond  or  other  security,  seems  to  fall  within  the 
principle  we  are  now  considering,  more  naturally  than  any  other; 
though  it  is  generally  classed  with  entries  made  against  the  interest 
of  the  party.1  The  main  fact  to  be  proved  in  the  cases,  where  this 
evidence  has  been  admitted,  was  the  continued  existence  of  the  debt, 
notwithstanding  the  lapse  of  time  since  its  creation  was  such  as 
either  to  raise  the  presumption  of  payment,  or  to  bring  the  case 
within  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  This  fact  was 
sought  to  be  proved  by  the  acknowledgment  of  the  debt  by  the  debtor 
himself;  and  this  acknowledgment  was  proved  by  his  having  actually 
paid  part  of  the  money  due.  It  is  the  usual,  ordinary,  and  well- 
known  course  of  business,  that  partial  payments  are  forthwith  in- 
dorsed on  the  back  of  the  security,  the  indorsement  thus  becoming 
part  of  the  res  gestce.1  Wherever,  therefore,  an  indorsement  is 

2  Davies  v.  Humphreys,  6  M.  &  W.  153,  166  ;  Stead  v.  Heaton,  4  T.  R.  669  ;  Roe 
v.  Bawlings,  7  East  279 ;  Marks  v.  Lahee,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  408  ;  Percival  v.  Nauson, 
7  Exch.  1  ;  QDoe  v.  Cartwright,  Ry.  &  M.  62 ;  R.  v.  Birmingham,  1  B.  &  S.  763  ;  Smith 
v.  Blakey,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  326  ;  R.  v.  Exeter,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  344-3 

8  nSee  examples  in  Doe  v.  Tyler,  4  Moo.  &  P.  381  ;  Knight  v.  Waterford,  4  Y.  &  C. 
294  ;  Doe  v.  Beviss,  7  C.  B.  504.] 

1  QThis  was  said  by  the  author  with  reference  to  the  res  gestce  doctrine,  under  which 
in  these  two  sections  the  present  subject  was  treated  in  the  original  text.  The  resgcsta 
doctrine  is  not  connected  with  the  present  subject.] 


238  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.   XIII. 

shown  to  have  been  made  at  the  time  it  bears  date  (which  will  be 
inferred  from  its  face,  in  the  absence  of  opposing  circumstances), 
the  presumption  naturally  arising  is,  that  the  money  mentioned  in  it 
was  paid  at  that  time.  If  the  date  is  at  a  period  after  the  demand 
became  stale,  or  affected  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  the  interest 
of  the  creditor  to  fabricate  it  would  be  so  strong  as  to  countervail 
the  presumption  of  payment,  and  require  the  aid  of  some  other 
proof;  and  the  case  would  be  the  same  if  the  indorsement  bore  a 
date  within  that  period,  the  instrument  itself  being  otherwise  sub- 
ject to  the  bar  arising  from  lapse  of  time.  Hence  the  inquiry  which 
is  usually  made  in  such  cases,  namely,  whether  the  indorsement, 
when  made,  was  against  the  interest  of  the  party  making  it,  that  is, 
of  the  creditor;  which,  in  other  language,  is  only  inquiring  whether 
it  was  made  while  his  remedy  was  not  yet  impaired  by  lapse  of 
time.2  The  time  when  the  indorsement  was  made  is  a  fact  to  be 
settled  by  the  jury;  and  to  this  end  the  writing  must  be  laid  before 
them.  If  there  is  no  evidence  to  the  contra^,  the  presumption  is 
that  the  indorsement  was  made  at  the  time  it  purports  to  bear  date; 
and  the  burden  of  proving  the  date  to  be  false  lies  on  the  other 
party.8  If  the  indorsement  does  not  purport  to  be  made  contempo- 
raneously with  the  receipt  of  the  money,  it  is  inadmissible  as  part 
of  the  res  gestce. 

§  152  b  [122].  This  doctrine  has  been  very  much  considered  in 
the  discussions  which  have  repeatedly  been  had  upon  the  case  of 
Searle  v.  Barrington.1  In  that  case  the  bond  was  given  in  1697, 
and  was  not  sued  until  after  the  death  of  the  obligee,  upon  whose 
estate  administration  was  granted  in  1723.  The  obligor  died  in 
1710;  the  obligee  probably  survived  him,  but  it  did  not  appear  how 
long.  To  repel  the  presumption  of  payment,  arising  from  the  lapse 

2  Turner  v.  Crisp,  2  Stra.  827  ;  Rose  v.  Bryant,  2  Catnpb.  321  ;  Glynn  v.  Bank  of 
England,  2  Ves.  38,  43 ;  Whitney  v.  Bigelow,  4  Pick.  110  ;  Roseboom  v.  Billington, 
17  Johns.  182;  Gibson  v.  Peebles,  2  McCord  418;  {Clap  v.  Ingersoll,  2  Fairf.  83; 
Coffin  v.  Bucknam,  3  id.  471  ;  Beatty  v.  Clement,  12  La.  An.  82  ;}  [|Addams  v.  Seit- 
zinger,  1  W.  &  S.  243  ;  Allegheny  r.'Nelson,  25  Pa.  334;  Bland  v.  Warren,  65  N.  C. 
373.  The  best  expositions  of  the  principle  are  found  in  Rose  v.  Bryant  and  Addams  v. 
Seitzinger.] 

8  Smith  v.  Battens,  1  Moo.  &  R.  343.  See  also  Hunt  v.  Massey,  5  B.  &  Ad.  902 ; 
Baker  v.  Milburn,  2  M.  &  W.  853 ;  Sinclair  v.  Baggaley,  4  M.  &  W.'  312  ;  Anderson  v. 
Weston,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  296  ;  Nicholls  v.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  326  ;  12  S.  &  R.  49,  87  ;  16 
8.  &  R.  89,  91. 

1  There  were  two  successive  actions  on  the  same  bond  between  these  parties.  The 
first  is  reported  in  8  Stra.  826,  2  Mod.  278,  and  2  Ld.  Raym.  1370  ;  and  was  tried 
before  Pratt,  C.  J. ,  who  refused  to  admit  the  indorsement,  and  nonsuited  the  plaintiff; 
but,  on  a  motion  to  set  the  nonsuit  aside,  the  three  other  judges  were  of  opinion  that 
the  evidence  ought  to  have  been  left  to  the  jury,  the  indorsement  in  such  cases  being 
according  to  the  usual  course  of  business,  and  perhaps  in  this  case  made  with  the  privity 
of  the  obligor  ;  but  on  another  ground  the  motion  was  denied.  Afterwards  another 
action  was  brought,  which  was  tried  before  Lord  Raymond,  C.  J.,  who  admitted  the 
evidence  of  the  indorsement ;  but  to  which  the  defendant  filed  a  bill  of  exceptions. 
This  judgment  was  affirmed  on  error  in  the  Exchequer  Chamber,  and  again  in  the  House 
of  Lords  :  see  2  Stra.  827;  3  Bro.  P.  C.  593.  The  first  case  ia  most  fully  reported  iu 
8  Mod.  278. 


§§  152  a-152  c'.]      STATEMENTS   OF  FACTS   AGAINST   INTEREST.       239 

of  time,  the  plaintiff  offered  in  evidence  two  indorsements,  made 
upon  the  bond  by  the  obligee  himself,  bearing  date  in  1699  and  in 
1707,  and  purporting  that  the  interest  due  at  those  respective  dates 
had  been  then  paid  by  the  obligor.  And  it  appears  that  other  evi- 
dence was  also  offered,  showing  the  time  when  the  indorsements 
were  actually  made.2  The  indorsements  thus  proved  to  have  been 
made  at  the  times  when  they  purported  to  have  been  made,  were, 
upon  solemn  argument,  held  admissible  evidence,  both  by  the  judges 
in  the  Exchequer  Chamber,  and  by  the  House  of  Lords.  The 
grounds  of  these  decisions  are  not  stated  in  any  of  the  reports :  but 
it  may  be  presumed  that  the  reasoning  on  the  side  of  the  prevailing 
party  was  approved,  namely,  that  the  indorsement  being  made  at  the 
time  it  purported  to  bear  date,  and  being  according  to  the  usual  and 
ordinary  course  of  business  in  such  cases,  and  which  it  was  not  for 
the  interest  of  the  obligee  at  that  time  to  make,  was  entitled  to  be 
considered  by  the  jury ;  and  that  from  it,  in  the  absence  of  opposing 
proof,  the  fact  of  actual  payment  of  the  interest  might  be  inferred. 
This  doctrine  has  been  recognized  and  confirmed  by  subsequent  de- 
cisions.8 [But  this  use  of  such  indorsements  has  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions been  forbidden  by  the  Legislature,  — not  by  way  of  repudiating 
the  principle  of  the  present  exception,  but  because  of  the  possibility 
of  the  false  ante-dating  of  the  indorsement,  by  which  it  may  be 
made  to  appear  to  be  against  interest  when  in  truth  it  was  not.4] 

§  152  c  [109],  Facts  against  Proprietary  Interest.  In  regard  to 
the  declarations  of  persons  in  possession  of  land,  explanatory  of  the 
character  of  their  possession,  there  has  been  some  difference  of 
opinion ;  but  it  is  now  well  settled,  that  declarations  in  disparage- 
ment of  the  title  of  the  declarant  are  admissible  as  original  evi- 
dence. Possession  is  prima  .facie  evidence  of  seisin  in  fee-simple ; 

2  This  fact  was  stated  by  Bayley,  B.,  as  the  result  of  his  own  research.  See  1  Cr.  & 
M.  421.  So  it  was  understood  to  be,  and  so  stated,  by  Lord  Hardwicke,  in  2  Ves.  43. 
It  may  have  constituted  the  "other  circumstantial  evidence,"  mentioned  in  Mr.  Brown's 
report,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  594  ;  which  he  literally  transcribed  from  the  case,  as  drawn  up  by 
Messrs.  Lutwyche  and  Fazakerley,  of  counsel  for  the  original  plaintiff,  for  argument  in 
the  House  of  Lords.  See  a  folio  volume  of  original  printed  briefs,  marked  "  Cases  in 
Parliament,  1728  to  1731,"  p.  529,  in  the  Law  Library  of  Harvard  University,  in  which 
this  case  is  stated  more  at  large  than  in  any  book  of  Reports. 

8  Bosworth  v.  Cotchett,  Dom.  Proc.  May  6,  1824  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  348; 
Gleadow  v.  Atkin,  1  Cr.  &  M.  410 ;  Anderson  v.  WVston,  6  Bing.  N.  C.  296 ;  2  Smith's 
Lead.  Cas.  197 ;  Addams  v.  Seitzinger,  1  Watts  &  Serg.  243 ;  Qand  cases  supra,  in 
§  152  a,  notes  2,  3.] 

*  \_E.  g.  Lord  Tenterden's  Act,  9  Geo.  IV,  c.  14,  §  3  ;  Maine,  R.  S.  1883,  c.  81,  §  100 ; 
Mass. ,  P.  S.  c.  197,  §  16 ;  111.  R.  S.  c.  83,  §  16.  These  statutes,  however,  do  not 
usually  do  more  than  forbid  the  use  of  the  indorsement  as  showing  an  acknowledgment 
by  the  debtor  sufficient  to  take  the  debt  out  of  the  statute  of  limitations ;  thus  its  use 
as  showing  a  part-payment  rebutting  the  presumption  of  payment  by  lapse  of  time  may 
still  be  allowable.  Moreover,  some  statutes  apply  only  to  certain  kinds  of  instruments, 
as  bonds. 

The  use  of  an  entry  in  parties'  account-books  for  the  above  purpose  is  sometimes 
repudiated:  Hancock  v.  Cook,  18  Pick.  32  ;3  jOberg  v.  Breen,  50  X.  J.  L.  145;  Lil>by 
v.  Brown,  78  Me.  493.  { 


240  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XIII. 

and  the  declaration  of  the  possessor,  that  he  is  tenant  to  another, 
it  is  said,  makes  most  strongly  against  his  own  interest,  and  there- 
fore is  admissible.1  [A  declaration  by  one  raising  a  loan  under  a 
will  that  his  estate  was  a  life-interest  under  the  will  has  been 
admitted  to  show  the  existence  of  the  will;2  and  a  wife's  declara- 
tion as  to  the  existence  of  a  will  of  her  husband  by  which  she  profited 
less  than  by  his  intestacy ; 8  but  not  a  declaration  by  a  person  that 
he  had  executed  or  revoked  a  will  of  his  own.4*6  But  the  declara- 
tions thus  usable  must  be  distinguished  from  certain  other  kinds 
of  statements,  admissible  on  very  different  principles,  yet  hav- 
ing a  superficial  analogy  in  that  they  are  declarations  about  land. 
(1)  If  the  issue  involves  prescriptive  title  and  adverse  possession, 
declarations  by  the  possessor  may  be  received,  under  the  verbal- 
act  doctrine  (ante,  §  108)  as  coloring  his  possession;  but  here  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  declarant  be  dead.  (2)  The  admissions  of  a 
grantor,  or  other  predecessor  in  title,  as  to  the  nature  of  his  title, 
may  be  used  against  those  claiming  under  him  (post,  §  189) ; 6  but 
here  the  peculiar  limitations  about  admissions  apply.  (3)  Declara- 
tions about  boundaries,  by  deceased  persons  (and,  in  some  States, 
only  by  persons  in  possession)  are  admitted  under  a  variation  of  the 
rule  about  reputation  as  to  boundaries  (ante,  §  140  a).  All  these 

1  Peaceable  v.  Watson,  4  Taunt.  16,  17,  per  Mansfield,  C.  J.  ;  "West  Cambridge  v. 
Lexington,  2  Pick.  536,  per  Putnam,  J.  ;  Little  v.  Libby,  2  Greenl.  242  ;  Doe  v.  Pet- 
tett,  5  B.  &  Aid.  223  ;  Game  v.  Nicoll,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  430  ;  per  Lyndhurst,  0.  B.,  in 
Chambers  v.  Bernasconi,  1  Cromp.  &  Jer.  457  ;  Smith  v.  Martin,  17  Conn.  399 ; 
[Walker  v.  Broadstock,  1  Esp.  458  ;  Doe  v.  Rickarby,  5  id.  4 ;  Baron  De  Bode's  Case, 
8  Q.  B.  243  ;  Doe  v.  Langfield,  16  M.  &  W.  513  ;  R.  v.  Birmingham,  1  B.  &  S.  763  ; 
Smith  v.  Blakey,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  326  ;  Pike  v.  Hayes,  14  N.  H.  20  ;  Rand  v.  Dodge,  17 
id.  359  ;  Perkins  v.  Towle,  59  id.  584  ;  Melvin  u.'Bullard,  82  N.  C.  37  ;  R.  v.  Binning, 
ham  contains  a  good  opinion.] 

a  TSlyv.  Sly,  L.  R.  2  P.  D.  91.] 

»  [Flood  v.  Russell,  29  L.  R.  Ir.  96.] 

*  [Hereford  v.  Rowe,  47  Minn.  247.     For  other  examples  see  Crease  v.  Barrett, 
1  C.  M.  &  R.  931  ;   Allegheny  v.  Nelson,  25  Pa.  334  ;  Turner  v.  Tyson,  49  Ga.  165  ; 
Swerdferger  v.  Hopkins,  67  Vt.  136  ;  Hollis  v.  Sales,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  482.] 

6  [The  original  text  here  contains  the  following  passage  :  "  But  no  reason  is  per- 
ceived why  every  declaration  accompanying  the  act  of  possession,  whether  in  dispar- 
agement of  the  claimant's  title,  or  otherwise  qualifying  his  possession,  if  made  in 
good  faith,  should  not  be  received  as  part  of  the  res  gestce ;  leaving  its  effect  to 
be  governed  by  other  rules  of  evidence  :  Davies  v.  Pierce,  2  T.  R.  53  ;  Doe  v. 
Rickarby,  5  Esp.  4 ;  Doe  v.  Payne,  1  Stark.  86 ;  2  Poth.  on  Obi.  254,  App. 
No.  xvi,  §  11  ;  Rankin  v.  Tenbrook,  6  Watts  388,  390,  per  Huston,  J.  ;  Doe  v. 
Pettett,  6  B.  &  Aid.  223;  Reed  v.  Dickey,  1  Watts  152;  Walker  v.  Broadstock, 

1  Esp.  458  ;  Doe  v.  Austin,  9   Bing.  41  ;   Doe  v.   Jones,   1   Campb.  367  ;   Jackson 
v.   Bard,  4   Johns.  230,   234  ;   Weidman  v.   Kohr,  4   S.  &  R.   174  ;   Gibblehouse   v. 
Stong,   3   Rawle   437  ;   Norton   v.    Pettibone,  7   Conn.  319  ;   Snelgrove   v.    Martin, 

2  McCord  241,  243 ;   Doe  d.  Majoribanks  v.  Green,  1   Gow  227  ;   Came  v.  Nicoll, 
1  Bing.  N.  C.  430 ;  Davis  v.  Campbell,  1  Iredell  482  ;  Crane  v.  Marshall,  4  Shenl.  27  ; 
Adams  v.  French,  2  N.  H.  387  ;   Treat  v.  Strickland,  9  Shepl.  234  ;   Blake  v.  White, 
13  N.  H.  267  ;   Doe  v.  Langfield,  16  M.  &  W.  497  ;   Baron  de  Bode's  Cnse,  8  Q.  B. 
243,  244  ;   Abney  v.  Kingsland,  10  Ala.  355  ;    Daggett  o.  Shaw,  5  Met.  223  ;   Stark  v. 
Boswell,  6  Hill  N.  Y.  405  ;  Pike  v.  Hayes,  14  N.  H.  19  ;  Smith  v.  Powers,   15  id. 
646,  563."     But  the  author  here  seems  to  be  referring  to  a  totally  different  principle, 
or  perhaps  to  two,  as  explained  in  the  ensuing  text  above.] 

•  [See  §  189  for  a  fuller  explanation  of  these  distinctions  and  their  consequences.] 


§§  152  C-152  d.~\      STATEMENTS   OF   FACTS   AGAINST   INTEREST.      241 

rest  on  principles  different  from  that  of  the  present  exception,  though 
occasionally  care  is  not  taken  in  judicial  opinions  to  observe  the 
distinctions.7] 

§  152  d.  Facts  against  other  than  Pecuniary  or  Proprietary  Inter- 
est. [Historically,  two  series  of  precedents  long  existed,  the  one 
admitting  entries  charging  the  declarant  with  the  receipt  of  money, 
—  stewards'  books,  vicars'  tithe-books,  etc.,1  —  the  other  receiving 
declarations  in  disparagement  of  the  declarant's  title.2  In  the  first 
part  of  the  1800s,  a  principle,  derived  from  these  precedents,  began 
to  be  broadly  stated  that  all  statements  of  facts  against  one's  interest 
were  receivable.8  There  was  no  reason  why  this  broad  principle 
should  not  have  been  carried  out  and  applied  to  facts  of  every  sort 
distinctly  against  interest.  But  in  1844,  the  House  of  Lords,  in  a 
case  in  which  the  precedents  were  hardly  considered,4  imposed  an 
arbitrary  limitation  upon  the  exception.  It  was  restricted  to  state- 
ments of  facts  against  either  pecuniary  or  proprietary  interest.5 
The  chief  kind  of  statement  thus  excluded  is  a  statement  of  a  fact 
against  penal  interest ;  e.  g.  a  statement  by  a  clergyman  that  he 
has  performed  a  marriage-ceremony  which  would  subject  him  to  a 
prosecution.8  In  particular,  there  is  thus  excluded  a  confession,  by 
a  deceased  person,  of  the  commission  of  a  crime,  offered  in  favor 
of  the  person  now  charged  with  the  crime.7  Both  principle  and 
policy  seem  to  condemn  any  such  singular  result,  which  must  be 
thought  repellant  to  the  sense  of  justice ;  and  it  is  highly  unfortu- 
nate that  it  has  ever  been  sanctioned. 

7  TSee  §  189  for  a  fuller  explanation  of  these  distinctions  and  their  consequences.] 

1  [E.  g.  Mannings  Lechmere,  1  Atk.  453;  1737-3 

2  [£.  g.  Davies  v.  Pierce,  2  T.  R.  54  ;  1787-3 

8  L.E.  g.  Lord   Ellenborough,  in  Higham  v.  Ridgway,  10  East  109  :  "the  broad 
principle  .   .  .  that  the  entry  made  was  in  prejudice  of  the  party  making  it ;"  Bayley, 
B-,  in  Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317  :  "  It  is  a  general  principle  of  evidence" 
to  receive  statements  "made  against  their  interest.""] 

*  QThe  precise  question  had  been  ruled  the  other  way  in  a  case  not  considered : 
Standen  v.  Standen,  Peake  32.  Powell  v.  Harper,  5  C.  &  P.  590,  is  also  contra.^] 

6  [Sussex  Peerage  Case,  11  Cl.  &  F.  109  ;  followed  in  Davis  v.  Lloyd,  1  C.  &  K.  276  ; 
Papendick  v.  Bridgewater,  5  E.  &  B.  180  ;  and  treated  as  law,  at  least  obiter,  by  most 
American  Courts.^ 

8  TSussex  Peerage  Case,  supra?] 

7  fSmith  v.  State,  9  Ala.  995  ;  Snow  v.  State,  58  id.  375  ;  West  v.  State,  76  id.  99 ; 
Welsh  v.  State,  96  id.  92  ;   People  v.  Hall,  94  Cal.  595  ;   Delk  v.  State,  99  Ga.  667  ; 
Lowry  v.  State,  100  id.  574  ;    Hank  v.  State,  148  Ind.  238  ;   Davis  v.  Com.,  Ky.  App., 
23  S.  W.  585  ;  State  v.  West,  45  La.  An.  928  ;  Pike  v.  Crehore,  40  Me.  503,  511  ;  Com. 
v.  Chabbock,  1  Mass.  144  ;  Com.  v.  Densmore,  12  All  537  ;  People  v.  Stevens,  47  Mich. 
411  ;  Helm  v.  State,  67  Miss.  572  ;  State  w.  Duncan,  116  Mo.  288,  311  ;  State  v.  Hack, 
118  id.  92,  98  ;   State  v.  May,  4  Dev.  L.  332 ;  State  v.  Duncan,  6  Ired.  239  ;   State  v. 
White,  68  N.  C.  158  ;   State  v.  Haynea,  71  id.  79,  84  ;  State  v.  Bishop,  73  id.  44  ;  State 
v.  Fletcher,  24  Or.  295,  300.     Contra,  admitting  the  statement  :  Masons'  F.  A.  A.  i\ 
Riley,  Ark.,  45  S.  W.  684;  Coleman  v.  Frazier,  4  Rich.  L.  152  ;  and  Goldthwaite,  J., 
diss.,  in  Smith  v.  State,  supra.     It  must  be  noted  that  in  a  great  number  of  the  first 
series  of  cases  above,  the  declarant  was  not  shown  to  be  deceased  or  otherwise  una 
vailable,  and  for  this  reason  (as  illustrated  in  R.  v.  Turner,  1  Lew.  Cr.  C.  119)  these 
rulings  may  be  sustained,  and  should  not  operate  as  precedents  in  favor  of  an  arbitrary 
limitation  excluding  confessions  of  a  person  deceased  or  otherwise  unavailable  as  a 
witness.3 

VOL.  I.  — 16 


242  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XIIL 

This  limitation  (to  facts  against  pecuniary  or  proprietary  interest) 
will  operate  also  to  exclude,  here  and  there,  other  statements  of 
facts  against  sundry  kinds  of  interest,  which  might  in  some  instances 
well  be  admitted.8] 

§  153.  Competency  of  Declarant.  In  order  to  render  declarations 
against  interest  admissible,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  declarant 
should  have  been  competent,  if  living,  to  testify  to  the  facts  con- 
tained in  the  declaration  ; *  the  evidence  being  admitted  on  the  broad 
ground,  that  the  declaration  was  against  the  interest  of  the  party 
making  it,  in  the  natiire  of  a  confession,  and,  on  that  account,  so 
probably  true  as  to  justify  its  reception.  For  the  same  reason,  it 
does  not  seem  necessary  that  the  fact  should  have  been  stated  on 
the  personal  knowledge  of  the  declarant.8  Neither  is  it  material 
whether  the  same  fact  is  or  is  not  provable  by  other  witnesses  who 
are  still  living.8  Whether  their  testimony,  if  produced,  might  be 
more  satisfactory,  or  its  non-production,  if  attainable,  might  go  to 
diminish  the  weight  of  the  declarations,  are  considerations  for  the 
jury,  and  do  not  affect  the  rule  of  law. 

§  154.  Authentication  of  Entries  by  Agents,  Stewards,  etc.  But 
where  the  evidence  consists  of  entries  made  by  persons  acting  for 
others,  in  the  capacity  of  agents,  stewards,  or  receivers,  some  proof 
of  such  agency  is  generally  required  previous  to  their  admission. 
The  handwriting,  after  thirty  years,  need  not  be  proved.1  In  re- 
gard to  the  proof  of  official  character,  a  distinction  has  been  taken 
between  public  and  private  offices,  to  the  effect  that,  where  the  office 
is  public  and  must  exist,  it  may  always  be  presumed  that  a  person 
who  acts  in  it  has  been  regularly  appointed;  but  that,  where  it  is 
merely  private,  some  preliminary  evidence  must  be  adduced  of  the 
existence  of  the  office,  and  of  the  appointment  of  the  agent  or  incum- 
bent.2 Where  the  entry,  by  an  agent,  charges  himself  in  the  first 

8  ^Excluded :  Farrell  v.  Weitz,  160  Mass.  288  (statement  of  paternity  by  a  deceased 
person,  not  received  for  the  defendant  on  a  bastardy  charge)  ;  Lucas  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.,  16 
Sup.  1168  (that  the  declarant  did  not  belong  to  the  Choctaw  Nation). 

Admitted:  Ross  v.  McQuiston,  45  la.  147  (testator's  declaration,  when  sane,  that 
he  had  not  been  sane  for  twenty  years) ;  Walker  v.  Brantree,  Kan.,  52  Pac.  80  (by  plain- 
tiff's husband,  a  railway  engineer,  killed  in  an  accident,  that  he  could  have  avoided  it).] 

1  Doe  v.  Robson,  15  East  32 ;  Short  ».  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  464,  489 ;   Gleadow  v.  At- 
kins, 1  Cr.  &  M.  410;  Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317,  326;  Bosworth  v.  Crotchet, 
Ph.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  348,  n.    fJThis  may  be  true  only  so  far  as  it  means  that  the  declar- 
ant may  be  one  who  would  have  been  disqualified  by  interest ;  otherwise,  it  is  unsound ; 
for  it  is  constantly  stated  that  the  declarant  must  be  one  "  having  a  competent  knowl- 
edge or  whose  duty  it  was  to  know  "  (Short  v.  Lee,  supra),  "  having  peculiar  means  of 
knowledge"  (Gleadow  v.  Atkins,  supra),  having  "a  competency  to  know  it"  (Doe  v. 
Robson,  tupra).     Declarations  by  one  not  having  personal  knowledge  were  rejected  in 
Bird  v.  Hueston,  10  Oh.  St.  428;  Arbuckle  v.  Templeton,  65  Vt.  205.] 

2  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  919  ;  Qbut  subject  to  the  qualifications  of  the  pre- 
ceding note.] 

»  Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  327,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  Barry  v.  Bebbington,  4  T.  E. 
514. 

1  Wynne  r.  Tyrwhitt,  4  B.  &  Aid.  376. 
*  Short  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  464.  468. 


§§  152J-155.]     STATEMENTS   OF  FACTS   AGAINST   INTEREST.  243 

instance,  that  fact  has  been  deemed  sufficient  proof  of  his  agency  ;  * 
but  where  it  was  made  by  one  styling  himself  clerk  to  a  steward, 
that  alone  was  considered  not  sufficient  to  prove  the  receipt,  by  either 
of  them,  of  the  money  therein  mentioned.4  Yet,  where  ancient 
books  contain  strong  internal  evidence  of  their  actually  being 
receivers'  or  agents'  books,  they  may,  on  that  ground  alone,  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury.6  Upon  the  general  question,  how  far  mere 
antiquity  in  the  entry  will  avail  as  preliminary  proof  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  declarant  or  party  making  the  entry,  and  how  far  the 
circumstances  which  are  necessary  to  make  a  document  evidence 
must  be  proved  aliunde,  and  cannot  be  gathered  from  the  document 
itself,  the  law  does  not  seem  perfectly  settled.9  But  where  the  trans- 
action is  ancient,  and  the  document  charging  the  party  with  the 
receipt  of  money  is  apparently  genuine  and  fair,  and  comes  from 
the  proper  repository,  it  seems  admissible,  upon  the  general  prin- 
ciples already  discussed  in  treating  of  this  exception.7 

§  155.  Vicars'  Books.  There  is  another  class  of  entries  admissible 
in  evidence  which  sometimes  has  been  regarded  as  anomalous,  and 
at  others  has  been  deemed  to  fall  within  the  principle  of  the  present 
exception  to  the  general  rule ;  namely,  the  private  books  of  a  de- 
ceased rector  or  vicar,  or  of  an  ecclesiastical  corporation  aggregate, 
containing  entries  of  the  receipt  of  ecclesiastical  dues,  when  admit- 
ted in  favor  of  their  successors,  or  of  parties  claiming  the  same 
under  the  interest  as  the  maker  of  the  entries.  Sir  Thomas  Plumer, 
in  a  case  before  him,1  said:  "It  is  admitted,  that  the  entries  of  a 
rector  or  vicar  are  evidence  for  or  against  his  successors.  It  is  too 
late  to  argue  upon  that  rule,  or  upon  what  gave  rise  to  it;  whether 

«  Doe  v.  Stacey,  6  C.  &  P.  139. 

*  De  Rutzen  v.  Fair,  4  Ad.  &  El.  53 ;  and  see  Doe  v.  Wittcomb,  15  Jur.  778. 

8  Doe  i>.  Lord  Geo.  Thynne,  10  East  206,  210.  ^Where  the  body  of  the  book  or 
entry  is  shown  to  be  in  the  purporting  person's  handwriting,  no  signature  need  be  ap- 
pended: Barry  v.  Babbington,  4  T.  R.  514  ;  Dwight  v.  Brown,  9  Conn.  93.] 

6  In  one  case,  where  the  point  at  issue  was  the  existence  of  a  custom  for  the  exclu- 
sion of  foreign  cordwainers  from  a  certain  town,  an  entry  in  the  corporation  books, 
signed  by  one  acknowledging  himself  not  a  freeman,  or  free  of  the  corporation,  and 
promising  to  pay  a  fine  assessed  on  him  for  breach  of  the  custom;  and  another  entry, 
signed  by  two  others,  stating  that  they  had  distrained  and  appraised  nine  pairs  of  shoes 
from  another  person,  for  a  similar  offence,  —  were  severally  held  inadmissible,  without 
previously  offering  some  evidence  to  show  by  whom  the  entries  were  subscribed,  and  in 
what  situation  the  several  parties  actually  stood;  although  the  latest  of  the  entries  was 
more  than  a  hundred  years  old:  Davies  v.  Morgan.  1  Cr.  &  Jer.  587,  590,  593,  per  Ld. 
Lyndhurst,  C.  B.     In  another  case,  which  was  a  bill  for  tithes,  against  which  a  modus 
was  alleged  in  defence,  a  receipt  of  more  than  fifty  years  old  was  offered,  to  prove  a 
money  payment  therein  mentioned  to  have  been  received  for  a  prescription  rent  in  lieu 
of  tithes  ;  but  it  was  held  inadmissible,  without  also  showing  who  the  parties  were,  and 
in  what  character  they  stood:  Manby  v.  Curtis,  1  Price  225,  per  Thompson,  C.*  B., 
Graham,  B.,  and  Richards,  B. ;  Wood,  B.,  dissentientc. 

7  See  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  331,  n.  (2);  1  Phil.  Evid.  316,  n.  (6),  and  cases  there 
cited ;  Fenwick  v.  Read,  6  Madd.  8,  per  Sir  J.  Leach,    Vice-Ch. ;  Bertie  v.  Beaumont, 
2  Price  307;  Bishop  of  Heath  r.  Marquess  of  Winchester,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  183,  203  ; 
\j>ost,  §  575  &.] 

l  Short  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  477,  478. 


244  EXCEPTIONS   TO    THE    HEAKSAY   RULE.  [CH.    XIII. 

it  was  the  cursus  Scaccarii,  the  protection  of  the  clergy,  or  the 
peculiar  nature  of  property  in  tithes.  It  is  now  the  settled  law  of 
the  land.  It  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  a  person,  having  a  tem- 
porary interest  only,  will  insert  a  falsehood  in  his  book  from  which 
he  can  derive  no  advantage.  Lord  Kenyon  has  said,  that  the  rule  is 
an  exception;  and  it  is  so:  for  no  other  proprietor  can  make  evi- 
dence for  those  who  claim  under  him,  or  for  those  who  claim  in  the 
same  right  and  stand  in  the  same  predicament.  But  it  has  been  the 
settled  law,  as  to  tithes,  as  far  back  as  our  research  can  reach.  We 
must,  therefore,  set  out  from  this  as  a  datum  ;  and  we  must  not 
make  comparisons  between  this  and  other  corporations.  No  corpo- 
ration sole,  except  a  rector  or  vicar,  can  make  evidence  for  his 
successor."  But  the  strong  presumption  that  a  person,  having  a 
temporary  interest  only,  will  not  insert  in  his  books  a  falsehood, 
from  which  he  can  derive  no  advantage,  which  evidently  and  justly 
had  so  much  weight  in  the  mind  of  that  learned  judge,  would  seem 
to  bring  these  books  within  the  principle  on  which  entries  made, 
either  in  the  course  of  duty  or  against  interest,  are  admitted.  And 
it  has  been  accordingly  remarked,  by  a  writer  of  the  first  authority 
in  this  branch  of  the  law,  that  after  it  has  been  determined  that 
evidence  may  be  admitted  of  receipts  of  payment,  entered  in  private 
books  by  persons  who  are  neither  obliged  to  keep  such  books  nor 
to  account  to  others  for  the  money  received,  it  does  not  seem  any 
infringement  of  principle  to  admit  these  books  of  rectors  and  vicars. 
For  the  entries  cannot  be  used  by  those  who  made  them ;  and  there 
is  no  legal  privity  between  them  and  their  successors.  The  strong 
leaning,  on  their  part,  in  favor  of  the  church,  is  nothing  more,  iu 
legal  consideration,  than  the  leaning  of  every  declarant  in  favor  of 
his  own  interest,  affecting  the  weight  of  the  evidence,  but  not  its 
admissibility.  General  observations  have  occasionally  been  made 
respecting  these  books,  which  may  seem  to  authorize  the  admission 
of  any  kind  of  statement  contained  in  them.  But  such  books  are 
not  admissible,  except  where  the  entries  contain  receipts  of  money 
or  ecclesiastical  dues,  or  are  otherwise  apparently  prejudicial  to  the 
interests  of  the  makers,  in  the  manner  in  which  entries  are  so  con- 
sidered in  analogous  cases.2  And  proof  will  be  required,  as  in  other 
cases,  that  the  writer  had  authority  to  receive  the  money  stated, 
and  is  actually  dead ;  and  that  the  document  came  out  of  the  proper 
custody.' 

2  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  322,  323,  and  cases  in  notes  (2)  and  (3)  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  308, 
notes  (1),  (2)  ;  Ward  v.  Pomfret,  5  Sim.  475. 

»  Gresley  on  Evid.  223,  224  ;  Carrington  v.  Jonea,  2  Sim.  &  Stu.  135,  140  ;  Perigal 
v.  Nicholson,  1  Wightw.  63. 


§§  155-1560.1 


DYING   DECLARATIONS. 


245 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE:     DYING   DECLARATIONS. 


§  156.    In  general. 

§  156  a.  Limitations  as  to  Kind  of  Is- 
sue, Person  declaring,  and  Subject  of 
Declaration. 

§  157.  Competency  of  Declarant ;  Re- 
ligious Belief. 

§  158.  Consciousness  of  Impending 
Death. 

§  159.  Testimonial  Aspect  of  the  Dec- 
larations. 


§159 a.  Same:  Substance  only  re- 
quired. 

§  1596.   Same:  Declarations  by  Signs. 

§  161.   Same  :  Declarations  in  Writing. 

§  161  a.  Same :  Impeaching  and  cor- 
roborating the  Declarant. 

§1616.  Admissibility  a  Question  for 
the  Court. 

§  161  c.    Sundries. 

§  162.  Weight  of  Declarations. 


§  156.  In  general.  A  fourth  exception  to  the  rule  rejecting  hear- 
say evidence  is  allowed  in  the  case  of  dying  declarations.  The 
general  principle  on  which  this  species  of  evidence  is  admitted  was 
stated  by  Lord  Chief  Baron  Eyre  to  be  this,  —  that  they  are  declara- 
tions made  in  extremity,  when  the  party  is  at  the  point  of  death, 
and  when  every  hope  of  this  world  is  gone;  when  every  motive  to 
falsehood  is  silenced,  and  the  mind  is  induced,  by  the  most  power- 
ful considerations,  to  speak  the  truth.  A  situation  so  solemn  and 
so  awful  is  considered  by  the  law  as  creating  an  obligation  equal  to 
that  which  is  imposed  by  a  positive  oath  in  a  court  of  justice.1 

§  156  a.  Limitations  as  to  Kind  of  Issue,  Person  declaring,  and 
Subject  of  Declaration.  It  was  at  one  time  held,  by  respectable 
authorities,  that  this  general  principle  warranted  the  admission  of 
dying  declarations  in  all  cases,  civil  and  criminal;1  but  it  is  now 

1  R.  v.  Woodcock,  2  Leach's  Cr.  Gas.  256,  567  ;  Drummond's  Case,  1  id. 
378.  The  rule  of  the  Roman  civil  law  was  the  same:  "Morti  proximum,  sive 
nioribundum,  non  praesumendum  est  mentiri,  nee  esse  immemorem  salutis  seternse ; 
licet  non  prsesumatur  semper  dicerc  verum : "  Mascard.  De  Probat.  Concl.  1080.  In 
the  earliest  reported  case  on  this  subject,  the  evidence  was  admitted  without  objection, 
and  apparently  on  this  general  ground  :  R.  v.  Reason,  6  State  Tr.  195,  201  ;  Q6  How. 
St.  Tr.  24.  Lord  Mohun's  Trial,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  967,  975,  987,  in  1696,  is  a  still 
earlier  instance  ;  and  the  principle  had  already  been  referred  to  by  the  great  dramatist 
himself,  in  King  John,  V,  4  :  — 

MELUN  :  "  Have  I  not  hideous  death  within  my  view, 
Retaining  but  a  quantity  of  life, 
Which  bleeds  away  even  as  a  form  of  wax 
Resolveth  from  his  figure  'gainst  the  fire  ? 
What  in  the  world  should  make  me  now  deceive, 
Since  I  must  lose  the  use  of  all  deceit  ? 
Why  should  I  then  be  false,  since  it  is  true 
That  I  must  die  here,  and  live  hence  by  truth  ? " 

Serjeant  Philips  had  used  in  Raleigh's  Trial,  2  How.  St.  Tr.  18,  the  phrase  :  "  Nemo 
moriturus  prsesumitur  mentiri. "J 

1  QThis  was  apparently  the  original  practice;  Lord  Mohun's  Trial,  supra;  Chute, 
arguendo,  in  Omichund  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  38  ;  Douglas  Peerage  Case,  2  Hargr.  ColL 


246  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  ,rCH.   XIV. 

well  settled  that  they  are  admissible,  as  such,  only  in  cases  of  nomi- 
cide,  "  where  the  death  of  the  deceased  is  the  subject  of  the  charge, 
and  the  circumstances  of  the  death  are  the  subject  of  the  dying 
declarations."3  [(1)  As  to  the  issue,  (a)  the  declaration  is  not 
admissible  in  a  civil  case ; 8  (b)  it  is  admissible  in  no  other  crim- 
inal case  than  a  prosecution  for  homicide;4  even  where  death  is 
incidentally  alleged  or  involved,  as  in  the  case  of  a  prosecution  for 
procuring  an  abortion;6  (c)  the  death  which  is  the  subject  of  the 
charge  must  be  the  death  of  the  declarant,0  (2)  The  subject  of  the 
declaration  must  be  the  circumstances  attending  or  leading  up  to 
the  death  for  which  the  prosecution  is  instituted;  for  example,  the 
declaration  of  a  husband,  killed  by  the  wife's  paramour,  that  he  had 
found  them  in  adultery,  has  been  admitted;7  while  the  deceased's 
declarations  as  to  a  prior  threat  by  the  defendant  have  been  ex- 
cluded. 8  (4)  On  the  other  hand,  the  declaration  is  not  excluded  by 

Jurid.  387,  389,  397  ;  Wright  v.  Littler,  3  Burr.  1244  ;  Anon.,  cited  6  East  195,  ap- 
proved in  1  Camp.  210;  McNally,  Evidence,  381,  386  ;  Swift,  Evidence,  125.'  But 
the  distinction  between  civil  and  criminal  cases  was  advanced  by  counsel  as  early  as 
1743,  in  the  Anglesea  case,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1161.  The  real  occasion  for  the  change 
of  view  seems  to  have  been  the  misunderstood  passage  in  Mr.  Serjeant  East's  Pleas  of 
the  Crown,  I,  353,  in  1803.] 

3  R.  v.  Mead,  2  B.  &  C.  605  ;  in  this  case  the  prisoner  had  been  convicted  of  per- 
jury and  moved  for  a  new  trial,  because  convicted  against  the  weight  of  evidence  ;  after 
which  he  shot  the  prosecutor.     Upon  showing  cause  against  the  rule,  the  counsel  for 
the  prosecution  offered  the  dying  declarations  of  the  prosecutor  relative  to  the  fact  of 
perjury  ;  but  the  evidence  was  adjudged  inadmissible. 

'8  rJStobart  v.  Dryden,  1  M.  &  W.  615  ;  Daily  v.  R.  Co.,  32  Coffn.  357;  Wooten 
v.  Wilkius,  39  Ga.  223 ;  E.  T.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Maloy,  77  id.  237  ;  Duling  v.  John- 
son, 32  Ind.  155  ;  Thayer  v.  Lombard,  165  Mass.  174  ;  Brownell  v.  R.  Co.,  47  Mo. 
245  ;  Jackson  v.  Kuiffen,  2  Johns.  36;  Wilson  v.  Boerem,  15  id.  286;  Bartield  v. 
Britt,  2  Jones  L.  43.] 

4  QR.  v.    Hutchinson,    2    B.    &    C.    608,   note   (abortion);  R.    v.  Mead,  ib.  605 
(perjury)  ;  R.   v.  Lloyd,   4  C.   &  P.  233   (robbery)  ;  Johnson  v.   State,   50  Ala.  459 
(rape)  ;  State  v.  Barker,  28  Oh.  St.  583  ;  Hudson  v.  State,  3  Coldw.   359  (robbery) ; 
Crookham  v.  State,  5  W.  Va.  514  (assault  with  intent  to  kill).] 

5  [JR.  v.   Hutchinson,  supra;  R.   v.   Hind,   8  Cox  Cr.  300  :  Com.   v.   Homer,  153 
Mass.  344  ;  People  v.  Davis,  56  N.  Y.  95  ;  State  v.  Harper,   35  Oh.  St.  78  ;  Railing 
v.  Com.,  110  Pa.  103  ;  contra  (but  in  part  because  of  statutory  peculiarities)  :  Mont- 
gomery v.  State,  80  Ind.  345  ;  State  v.  Pearce,  56  Minn.  226,  233 ;  State  v.  Dickinson, 
41  Wis.  308.   Statute  has  in  this  respect  abolished  this  arbitrary  limitation  in  at  least 
two  States  :    Mass.  St.  1889,  c.  100  ;    Thayer  v.  Lombard,  165  Mass.  174 ;  N.  Y.  St. 
1875,  c.  352.] 

•  [Excluded :  Mora  v.  People,  19  Colo.  255  (accomplice)  ;  State  v.  Bohan,  15 
Kan.  418  (murder  of  T.  W.  ;  declarations  of  W.  A.,  shot  at  the  same  time)  ;  Brown  v. 
Com.,  73  Pa.  329  (murder  of  husband;  declarations  of  wife  killed  about  the  same 
time) ;  Poteete  v.  State,  9  Baxt.  270  (declarations  of  another  killed  in  the  same 
affray)  ;  Radford  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  520  (like  Brown  v.  Com.);  contra,  admitting 
them  :  R.  v.  Baker,  2  Moo.  &  R.  53  (declarations  of  another  poisoned  at  the  same 
time)  ;  State  v.  Wilson,  23  La.  An.  559  (declarations  of  another  shot  at  the  same  time)  ; 
State  v.  Terrell,  12  Rich.  L.  329  (like  R.  v.  Baker).  There  is  of  course  no  reason 
whatever  in  this  limitation.] 
,7  rWilkerson  v.  State,  91  Ga.  729,  739.] 

8  LState  v.  Moody,  18  Wash.  165  ;  other  examples  are  as  follows  :  Ben  v.  State,  87 
Ala.  105 ;  Reynolds  v.  State,  68  id.  506  ;  People  v.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  54  Cal.  253  ;  People 
v.  Taylor,  59  id.  648  ;  People  v.  Wong  Chuey,  117  id.  624  ;  Perry  ».  State,  Ga.,  30 
8.  E.  903  :  Leiber  ».  Com.,  9  Bush  13;  Peoples  v.Com.,  87  Ky.  500  ;  State  v.  Petsch, 
48  S.  C.  132.  j 


§§  156-157.]  DYING  DECLARATIONS.  247 

the  circumstance  that  there  are  eye-witnesses  to  the  deed,  or  other 
testimony ;  *  or  that  the  fact  of  the  killing  is  conceded  by  the 
accused.10]  The  reasons  for  thus  restricting  it  may  be,  that  the 
credit  is  not  in  all  cases  due  to  the  declarations  of  a  dying  person: 
for  his  body  may  have  survived  the  powers  of  his  mind;  or  his 
recollection,  if  his  senses  are  not  impaired,  may  not  be  perfect;  or, 
for  the  sake  of  ease,  and  to  be  rid  of  the  importunity  and  annoyance 
of  those  around  him,  he  may  say,  or  seem  to  say,  whatever  they  may 
choose  to  suggest.11  These,  or  the  like  considerations,  have  been 
regarded  as  counterbalancing  the  force  of  the  general  principle  above 
stated;  leaving  this  exception  to  stand  only  upon  the  ground  of  the 
public  necessity  of  preserving  the  lives  of  the  community  by  bring- 
ing manslayers  to  justice.  For  it  often  happens,  that  there  is  no 
third  person  present  to  be  an  eye-witness  to  the  fact;  and  the  usual 
witness  in  other  cases  of  felony,  namely,  the  party  injured,  is  him- 
self destroyed.12  But,  in  thus  restricting  the  evidence  of  dying 
declarations  to  cases  of  trial  for  homicide  of  the  declarant,  it  should 
be  observed  that  this  applies  only  to  declarations  offered  on  the  sole 
ground  that  they  were  made  in  extremis;  for  where  they  constitute 
part  of  the  res  gestce,  or  come  within  the  exception  of  declarations 
against  interest,  or  the  like,  they  are  admissible  as  in  other  cases, 
irrespective  of  the  fact  that  the  declarant  was  under  apprehension 
of  death. 

§  157.  Competency  of  Declarant;  Religious  Belief.  The  persons 
whose  declarations  are  thus  admitted  are  considered  as  standing  in 
the  same  situation  as  if  they  were  sworn ;  the  danger  of  impending 
death  being  equivalent  to  the  sanction  of  an  oath.  It  follows,  there- 
fore, that  where  the  declarant,  if  living,  would  have  been  in- 
competent to  testify,  by  reason  of  infamy,  or  the  like,  his  dying 
declarations  are  inadmissible.1  And,  as  an  oath  derives  the  value  of 
its  sanction  from  the  religious  sense  of  the  party's  accountability  to 
his  Maker,  and  the  deep  impression  that  he  is  soon  to  render  to  Him 
the  final  account,  wherever  it  appears  that  the  declarant  was  inca- 
pable of  this  religious  sense  of  accountability,  whether  from  infidel- 
ity, imbecility  of  mind,  or  tender  age,  the  declarations  are  alike 
inadmissible.2  [But  where  theological  belief  has  by  statute  been 
made  no  longer  an  essential  for  taking  the  oath  (post,  §  370  a),  the 

9  ("Reynolds  v.  State,  68  Ala.  506  ;  Payne  t>.  State,  61  Miss.  163  ;  Donnelly  v.  State, 
26  N.  .1.  L.  627  ;  Cora.  v.  Roddy,  184  Pa.  274.] 

10  TState  v.  Sannders,  14  Or.  305  ;  contra,  Savior  v.  Com.,  97  Ky.  184.] 

11  Jackson  v.  Kniffen,  2  Johns.  31,  35,  per  Livingston,  J. 

12  1  East  P.  C.  353.    (^There  is  no  consistent  ground  oi  policy  to  justify  these  limi- 
tations, and  they  have  often  been  criticised  judicially  :  Taylor,  C.  J.,  in  McFarland  v. 
Shaw,  2  N.  C.  Law  Repos.    105  ;    Davies,  J.,  in  Caujolle  v.  Ferrie,  23  N.  Y.  94  ; 
McCoy,  J.,  in  Wooten  v.  Wilkins,  39  Ga.  223.] 

1  R.  v.  Drummond,   1   Leach's  Cr.  Gas.  878 ;    £State  v.  Baldwin,  Wash.,  45  Pac. 

650-1 

2~R.  v.  Pike,  3  C.  &  P.  598 ;  R.  v.  Perkins,  9  id.  395  ;  2  Mood.  Cr.  C.  135  ;  2  Rus- 
sell on  Crimes.  688. 


248  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XIV, 

declarant's  belief  is  from  that  point  of  view  immaterial.8  However, 
apart  from  the  capacity  to  take  an  oath ,  it  may  be  thought  that  the 
dying  declarations  of  one  who  has  no  belief  in  a  future  state  of  re- 
wards and  punishments  are  lacking  in  their  distinctive  sanction,  and 
should  be  excluded.4  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mere  instinctive 
physical  dread  and  revulsion  of  the  moment  is  the  real  sanction, 
then  the  belief  is  of  no  consequence.6  Again,  profane  cursing  in 
the  last  moments  may  indicate  such  a  reckless  and  revengeful  state 
of  mind  as  is  inconsistent  with  trustworthy  statements.6]  As  the 
testimony  of  an  accomplice  is  admissible  against  his  fellows,  the 
dying  declarations  of  a  particeps  criminis  in  an  act  which  resulted 
in  his  own  death  are  admissible  against  one  indicted  for  the  same 
murder.7 

§  158.  Consciousness  of  Impending  Death.  It  is  essential  to  the 
admissibility  of  these  declarations,  and  is  a  preliminary  fact,  to  be 
proved  by  the  party  offering  them  in  evidence,  that  they  were  made 
under  a  sense  of  impending  death.  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  they 
should  be  stated,  at  the  time,  to  be  so  made ;  it  is  enough,  if  it  sat- 
isfactorily appears,  in  any  mode, 'that  they  were  made  under  that 
sanction;  whether  it  be  directly  proved  by  the  express  language  of 
the  declarant,  or  be  inferred  from  his  evident  danger,  or  the  opinions 
of  the  medical  or  other  attendants,  stated  to  him,  or  from  his  con- 
duct, or  other  circumstances  of  the  case,  all  of  which  are  resorted  to, 
in  order  to  ascertain  the  state  of  the  declarant's  mind.1  The  length 
of  time  which  elapsed  between  the  declaration  and  the  death  of  the 
declarant  furnishes  no  rule  for  the  admission  or  rejection  of  the  evi- 
dence; though,  in  the  absence  of  better  testimony,  it  may  serve  as 
one  of  the  exponents  of  the  deceased's  belief,  that  his  dissolution 
was  or  was  not  impending;  it  is  the  impression  of  almost  immediate 
dissolution,  and  not  the  rapid  succession  of  death  in  point  of  fact, 
that  renders  the  testimony  admissible.2  Therefore,  where  it  appears 

8  [[People  v.  Sanford,  43  Cal.  34  ;  State  v.  Elliott,  45  la.  489 ;  State  v.  Ah  Lee, 
8  Or.  218;  Carver  v.  U.S.,  164  U.  S.  694,  sonble;  see  Hill  v.  State,  694  Miss.  440; 
Goodnll  v.  State,  1  Or.  335.] 

*  [JR.  v.  Pike,  3  C.  &  P.  598  ;  Tracy  v.  People,  97  111.  105 ;  Donnelly  v.  State,  26 
N.  J.  L.  507,  620.  The  preceding  cases  do  not  seem  to  notice  this  consideration.] 

5  TNesbit  v.  State,  43  Ga.  249,  sr,mUe.~\ 

«  [Tracy  v.  People,  97  111.  105  ;  Phillipps.  Evidence,  7th  Eng.  ed.  236.] 

7  Tinckler's  Case,  1  East  PI.  Cr.  354. 

1  R.  v.  Woodcock,  2  Leach's  Cr.  Cas.  567  ;  John's  Case,  1  East  P.  C.  857,  358  ;  R. 
v.  Bonner,  6  C.  &  P.  386  ;  R.  v.  Van  Butchell,  3  id.  631 ;  R.  v.  Mosley,  1  Moody's  Cr. 
Cas.  97  ;  R.  v.  Spilsbury,  7  C.  &  P.  187,  per  Coleridge,  J.  ;  R.  v.  Perkins,  2  Mood. 
Cr.  Cas.  135  ;  Montgomery  v.  State,  11  Oh.  424 ;  Dunn  v.  State,  2  Ark.  229 ;  Com. 
v.  M'Pike,  3  Cush.  181 ;  R.  v.  Mooney,  5  Cox  Cr.  C.  318  ;  ("Lester  v.  State,  37 
Fla.  382  ;  Com.  v.  Matthews,  89  Ky.  292  ;  State  v.  Jones,  47  Lu.  An.  1524  ;  Bell 
v.  State,  72  Miss.  507  ;  State  P.  Evans,  124  Mo.  397  ;  State  v.  Fletcher,  24  Or.  295  ; 
Mattox  v.  U.  8.,  146  U.  S.  140,  151.  This  does  not  seem  ever  to  have  been  denied, 
except  in  R.  r.  Morgan,  14  Cox  Cr.  337,  which  was  hardly  a  distinct  decision.] 

8  In  Woodcock's  Case,  2  Leach's  Cr.  Cas.  563,  the  declarations  were  made  forty- 
eight  hours  before  death  ;  in  Tinckler's  Case,  1  East  P.  C.  854,  Rome  of  them  were  made 
ten  days  before  death ;  and  in  R.  v.  Mosley,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  97,  they  were  made  eleven 


§§  157-159.]  DYING   DECLARATIONS.  249 

that  the  deceased,  at  the  time  of  the  declaration,  had  any  expecta- 
tion or  hope  of  recovery,  however  slight  it  may  have  been,  and 
though  death  actually  ensued  in  an  hour  afterwards,  the  declaration 
is  inadmissible.8  On  the  other  hand,  a  belief  that  he  will  not  re- 
cover is  not  in  itself  sufficient,  unless  there  be  also  the  prospect  of 
" almost  immediate  dissolution."4  [Whether  the  declarant -vvjas,  in 
fact,  in  the  proper  state  of  mind,  as  thus  defined,  ought  to  be  left 
to  the  determination  of  the  trial  Court;  and  this  is  done  in  a  few 
jurisdictions.6 

A  repetition  of  the  statement  at  a  time  when  the  required  condi- 
tion of  mind  has  ceased  to  exist  is  not  admissible; 6  and,  conversely, 
a  statement  made  when  this  condition  does  not  exist  may  become 
admissible  by  being  later  reaffirmed  and  adopted  when  the  condition 
does  exist.7] 

§  159.  Testimonial  Aspect  of  the  Declarations.  The  declarations 
of  the  deceased  are  admissible  only  to  those  things  to  which  he  would 
have  been  competent  to  testify  if  sworn  in  the  cause ;  [i.  e. ,  "  what- 
ever would  disqualify  a  witness  would  make  such  declarations  in- 
competent testimony,"  1  and,  conversely,  "whatever  may  be  stated 
by  a  witness  under  oath  is  admissible  in  evidence  as  dying  declara- 
tions." 2  Thus,  the  declarant  may  not  have  been  in  a  position  to 
have  personal  observation  of  the  facts  stated;  8  or  his  mental  facul- 
ties may  have  been  so  impaired  by  the  injury  that  his  memory  or  his 

days  before  death  ;  and  were  all  received.  See  also  R.  v.  Howell,  1  Denis.  Cr.  Cas.  1 ; 
R.  v.  Bouner,  6  C.  &  P.  386  (three  days  before  death) ;  Smith  v.  State,  9  Humph.  9  ; 
Logan  v.  State,  id.  24  ;  pR.  v.  Reaney,  7  Cox  Cr.  212 ;  Com.  v.  Roberts,  108  Mass. 
301  ;  Jones  v.  State,  71  lud.  74  ;  Bouklen  v.  State,  102  Ala.  78  (two  months'  survival) ; 
State  v.  Craine,  120  N.  C.  601  (five  months'  survival) ;  Moore  v.  State,  96  Tenn.  209.] 

»  So  ruled  in  Welborn's  Case,  1  East  P.  C.  358,  359  ;  R.  v.  Christie,  2  Russ.  ou 
Crimes,  685;  R.  v.  Hayward,  6  C.  &  P.  157,  160  ;  R.  v.  Crockett,  4  id.  544;  R. 
v.  Fagent,  7  id.  238.  £The  test  has  been  variously  phrased  ;  "  no  hope  of  recovery," 
"a  settled  expectation  of  death,"  "an  undoubting  belief  in  death,"  are  among  the 
most  common.  The  cases,  though  numerous,  are  usually  of  no  service  as  precedents, 
for  they  depend  chiefly  on  the  circumstances  of  each  instance  ;  additional  illustrative 
rulings,  phrasing  the  principle,  are  :  People  v.  Sanchez,  24  Cal.  4  ;  Morgan  v.  State, 
31  Ind.  99  ;  Donnelly  v.  State,  26  N.  J.  L.  618  ;  Digby  v.  People,  113  111.  125.  Ask- 
ing for  a  physician  does  not  necessarily  indicate  no  hope  of  recovery  :  R.  v.  Howell, 
1  Den.  Cr.  C.  1  ;  McQueen  v.  State,  103  Ala.  12  ;  State  ».  Evans,  124  Mo.  397  ;  con- 
tra: Matherly  o.  Com.,  Ky.,  19  S.  W.  977-3 

*  Such  was  the  language  of  Hullock,  B.,  in  R.  v.  Van  Butchell,  3  C.  &  P.  629,  631. 
Accord:  Woodcock's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  567,  per  Ld.  C.  B.  Eyre  ;  R.  v.  Bonner, 
6  C.  &  P.  386  ;  Com.  v.  King,  2  Virg.  Cas.  78 ;  Com.  r.  Gibson,  id.  Ill  ;  Com.  v.  Vass, 
3  Leigh  786 ;  State  v.  Poll,  1  Hawks  442  ;  R.  v.  Perkins,  9  C.  &  P.  395  ;  s.  c.  2  Mood. 
Cr.  Cas.  135 ;  R.  v.  Ashton,  2  Lewin's  Cr.  Cas.  147  ;  PR.  v.  Jenkins,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  R. 
193  ;  U.  S.  v.  Schneider,  21  D.  C.  381,  404  ;  State  v.  Welsor,  117  Mo.  570,  579.] 


Com.  v.  Bishop,  165  Mass.  148  ;  Basye  v.  State,  45  Nebr.  261.] 
'Carver  v.  U.  S.,  160  U.  S.  553.] 


"Johnson  v.  State,  104  Ala.  241  ;  State  v.  Evans,  124  Mo.  397.] 
Donnelly  v.  State,  26  K.  J-  L.  620.     For  infamy  and  capacity  to  take  the  oath, 
O,  §  157.] 

2  PWhitley  v.  State,  38  Ga,  70  ;  but  subject,  of  course,  to  the  limitations  of  §  156  a, 
ante.] 

8  LJones  v.  State,  52  Ark.  347  (where  the  declarant  could  not  have  seen  who  shot 
him)  ;  Com.  v.  Roddy,  184  Pa.  274.] 


250  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE    HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.   XIV. 

intelligence  was  too  questionable.4]  They  must,  therefore,  in  gen- 
eral, speak  to  facts  only,  and  not  to  mere  matters  of  opinion ; 5  and 
must  be  confined  to  what  is  relevant  to  the  issue.  It 6  is  not  neces- 
sary, however,  that  the  examination  of  the  deceased  should  be  con- 
ducted after  the  manner  of  interrogating  a  witness  in  the  cause; 
though  any  departure  from  this  mode  may  affect  the  validity  and 
credibility  of  the  declarations;  therefore,  it  is  no  objection  to  their 
admissibility  that  they  were  made  in  answer  to  leading  questions, 
or  obtained  by  pressing  and  earnest  solicitation.7  But  whatever  the 
statement  may  be,  it  must  be  complete  in  itself;  for,  if  the  declara- 
tions appear  to  have  been  intended  by  the  dying  man  to  be  connected 
with  and  qualified  by  other  statements,  which  he  is  prevented  by 
any  cause  from  making,  they  will  not  be  received.8 

§  159  a  [161  a].  Same:  Substance  only  required.  It  has  been 
held  that  the.  substance  of  the  declarations  may  be  given  in  evidence, 
if  the  witness  is  not  able  to  state  the  precise  language  used.1'  a 

§  159  b  [161  b].  Same:  Declarations  by  Signs.  The  testimony 
here  spoken  of  may  be  given  as  well  by  signs  as  by  words;  thus, 
where  one,  being  at  the  point  of  death  and  conscious  of  her  situa- 
tion, but  unable  to  articulate  by  reason  of  the  wounds  she  had  re- 
ceived, was  asked  to  say  whether  the  prisoner  was  the  person  who 
had  inflicted  the  wounds,  and,  if  so,  to  squeeze  the  hand  of  the  in- 
terrogator, and  she  thereupon  squeezed  his  hand,  it  was  held  that 

*  Qlockabee  v.  Com.,  78  Ky.  379:  Brown  r.  State,  32  Miss.   448;  Lipscomb  v. 
State,  id.,  23  So.  210 ;  State  v.  Reed,  137  Mo.  125.] 

6  [This  ill-considered  passage,  invoking  the  much-abused  Opinion  rule  (post,  §  441  b), 
has  led  to  a  number  of  quibbling  rulings  excluding  that  against  which  there  is  no  real 
objection.  "  He  killed  me  for  nothing  "  has  been  excluded  :  Jones  v.  Coin.,  Ky.,  46 
S.  W.  217  ;  Powers  v.  State,  74  Miss.  777  ;  contra:  Sullivan  v.  State,  102  Ala.  135, 
142.  "  He  shot  me  down  like  a  dog  "  or  "a  rabbit  "  has  been  solemnly  declared  ad- 
missible :  White  v.  State,  100  Ga.  659  ;  State  v.  Saunders,  14  Or.  805 ;  State  v.  Kess- 
ler,  15  Utah  142  ;  and  "  he  murdered  me  "  or  "  butchered  me  :  "  State  v.  Mace,  118 
N.  C.  1244  ;  State  v.  Gile,  8  Wash.  12,  22.  Other  examples  will  be  found  in  Berry  v. 
State,  63  Ark.  382  ;  Whitley  v.  State,  38  Ga.  70  ;  Kearney  ».  State,  101  id.  803 ;  Binns 
v.  State,  46  Ind.  311  ;  Lane  v.  State,  id.,  51  N.  E.  1056  ;  State  v.  Nettlebush,  20  la. 
257  ;  Collins  v.  Com.,  12  Bush  272;  Com.  v.  Matthews,  87  Ky.  293  ;  State  v.  Ash- 
worth,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  270;  Payne  v.  State,  61  Miss.  163  ;  Lipscomb  v.  State,  id., 
23  So.  210 ;  People  v.  Shaw,  63  N.  Y.  40  ;  Brotherton  v.  People,  75  id.  159  ;  State  v. 
Williams,  67  N.  C.  15  ;  Wroe  ».  State,  20  Oh.  St.  469  ;  State  v.  Foot  You,  24  Or.  61, 
75  ;  State  v.  Carrington,  15  Utah  480.] 

'  [Tor  the  original  intervening  sentence,  about  either  side  using  the  declaration, 
see  post,  §  161  c.]  ' 

"  R.  v.  Fagent,  7  C.  &  P.  238  ;  Com.  v.  Vass,  8  Leish  786 ;  R.  v.  Reason  et  al.t 
1  Stra.  499  ;  R.  v.  Woodcock,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  563  ;  fJPeople  v.  Sanchez,  24  Cul. 
26  ;  Mattox  «.  U.  S.,  146  U.  S.  152  ;  People  v.  Kuapp,  26  Mich.  116  ;  State  v. 
Ashworth,  60  La.  An.,  23  So.  270.] 

•  Com.  v.  Va«s,  8  Leigh  787  ;  [state  v.  Nettlebush,  20  la.  260  ;  State  v.  Ash- 
worth,  supra;  State  v.  Patterson,  45  Yt.  313  (best  statement)  ;  Jackson  v.  Com.,  19 
Gratt.  668. 

1  Montgomery  v.  State,  11  Oh.  424 ;  Ward  v.  State,  8  Blackf.  101  ;  primes  v. 
State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  505.  If  only  a  part  is  given,  the  opponent  may  call  for  the  re- 
mainder :  Mattox  v.  U.  S.,  146  U.  S.  152.] 

3  [The  original  text  here  repeats  about  leading  questions  what  has  just  been  said.] 


§§  159-161.]  DYING   DECLARATIONS.  251 

this  evidence  was  admissible  and  proper  for  the  consideration  of 
the  jury.1 

§  160. ' 

§  161.  Same :  Declarations  in  Writing.  [Two  or  three  questions, 
involving  different  principles,  here  arise. 

(1)  That  the  declaration  in  writing  was  written  by  another  person 
is  of  itself  no  objection.1     But  the  writing  cannot  be  put  in  as  the 
declarant's  statement  unless  it  has  been  read  over  and  assented  to 
by  him;  2  though  it  can  be  used  by  the  writer   as  a  record  of  his 
recollection  (post,  §  439  b)  of  the  oral  statements  of  the  declarant. 

(2)  Whether  the  written  report  of  the  deceased's  oral  statements 
must  be  put  in  is  a  different  question.]     If  the  statement  of  the  de- 
ceased was  committed  to  writing  and  signed  by  him,  at  the  time  it 
was  made,  it  has  been  held  essential  that  the  writing  should  be  pro- 
duced, if  existing;8  and  that  neither  a  copy,  nor  parcl  evidence  of 
the  declarations,  could  be  admitted  to  supply  the  omission.     [But 
if  the  writing  has  not  been  signed  nor  assented  to  by  the  deceased, 
but  is  merely  a  written  note  by  an  auditor,  there  can  be  no  propriety 
in  requiring  its  production  in  preference  to  other  testimony  of  the 
oral  statements.4    Assuming,  however,  that  in  a  given  case  it  is  the 
written  report  which  it  is  desired  to  use,  the  document  must  be  pro- 
duced or  accounted  for,  according  to  the  general  principle  of  Primari- 
ness  (post,  §  563  a).]    But  where  the  declarations  had  been  repeated  at 
different  times,  at  one  of  which  they  were  made  under  oath,  and  in- 
formally reduced  to  writing  by  a  witness,  and  at  the  others  they  were 
not,  it  was  held  that  the  latter  might  be  proved  by  parol,  if  the 
other  could  not  be  produced.6 

1  Com.  v.  Casey,  11  Gush.  417  ;  s.  c.  6  Monthly  Law  Eep.  p.  203  ;  [^Godfrey  r.  State, 
31  Ala.  323  (nodding  the  head  to  questions;  excluded  on  the  facts);  Mockabee  v.  Com., 
78  Ky.  382;  see  Luby  v.  Cpm.,  12  Bush  6  ;  Wagonerr.  Terr.,  Ariz.,  61  Pac.  145.] 

1  '[Transferred  post,  as  §  161  &.] 

1  £  Perry  v.  State,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  903  ;  nor  need  the  writing  contain  the  exact  spoken 
words  :  State  v.  Baldwin,  15  Wash.  15.] 

a  QState  v.  Fraunburg,  40  la.  557  ;  State  v.  Parham,  48  La.  An.  1309,  aemble.  Hia 
signature,  however,  is  not  essential :  State  v.  Carrington,  15  Utah  480.] 

8  R.  v.  Gay,  7  C.  &  P.  230  ;  Trowter's  Case,  P.  8  Geo.  I,  B.  E.  12  Vin.  Abr.  118, 
119  ;  Leach  ».  Simpson  et  al.,  1  Law  &  Eq.  58  ;  5  M.  &  W.  309  ;  7  Dowl.  P.  C.  513  ; 
s.  c.  3  Jur.  654  ;  (_Anderson  «•  State,  79  Ala.  8  ;  Boulden  v.  State,  102  id.  78,  84 ; 
Collier  v.  State,  20  Ark.  36  ;  State  v.  Sullivan,  51  la.  146  ;  Saylor  v.  Corn.,  97  Ky. 
184  ;  Allison  ».  Com.,  99  Pa.  33  ;  King  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  617,  650.  But  this  seems 
unsound  ;  the  principle  which  prefers  the  written  report  of  an  oral  statement  applies 
only  where  the  reporter  is  an  official  charged  with  the  duty  of  taking  down  testimony 
(ante,  §§  97  d,  227);  and  here  the  oral  declarations  and  the  signed  written  ones  are  two 
distinct  declarations,  and  no  principle  requires  the  preferred  nse  of  the  written  one : 
Com.  t».  Haney,  127  Mass.  458;  State  t>.  Whitson,  111  N.  C.  695  ;  Beets  v.  State, 
Meigs  106,  sembler\ 

*  [Contra:  Epperson  v.  State,  5  Lea  291,  297.] 

6  R.  v.  Reason,  1  Str.  499,  500  ;  Q6  How.  St.  Tr.  33  (leading  case).  The  quali- 
fication of  the  last  clause  is  unsound,  and  is  not  borne  out  by  the  case  cited ;  oral 
statements  made  at  a  separate  time  may  be  proved  without  regard  to  producing  or 
accounting  for  a  separate  written  one  :  Collier  ».  State,  20  Ark.  36,  44  ;  Dunn  v. 
People,  172  111.  582  ;  Lane  v.  State,  Ind.,  51  N.  E.  1056 ;  8  fete  v.  Carrington,  15 
Utah  480.] 


252  EXCEPTIONS    TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.    XIV. 

(3)  If  the  deposition  of  the  deceased  has  been  taken  under  any  of 
the  statutes  on  that  subject,  and  is  inadmissible,  as  such,  for  want  of 
compliance  with  some  of  the  legal  formalities,  it  seems  it  may  still 
be  treated  as  a  dying  declaration,  if  made  in  extremis.6 

§  161  a.  Same :  Impeaching  and  corroborating  the  Declarant.  [The 
declarations  are  offered  as  testimony,  and  it  is  proper  that  the  de- 
clarant should  be  impeachable,  so  far  as  may  be,  like  other  wit- 
nesses, —  for  example,  by  proof  of  bad  character,1  by  conviction  of 
felony,2  or  by  prior  inconsistent  statements.8  So,  also,  he  may  be 
corroborated,  according  to  the  distinctions  applicable  in  the  partic- 
ular jurisdiction  (po*t,  §  469  I},  by  prior  consistent  statements.4] 

§  161  b  [160].  Admissibility  is  a  Question  for  the  Court.  The 
circumstances  under  which  the  declarations  were  made  are  to  be 
shown  to  the  judge ;  it  being  his  province,  and  not  that  of  the  jury, 
to  determine  whether  they  are  admissible.  In  Woodcock's  case, 
the  whole  subject  seems  to  have  been  left  to  the  jury,  under  the 
direction  of  the  Court,  as  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact;  but  sub- 
sequently it  has  always  been  held  a  question  exclusively  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  Court,  being  placed  on  the  same  ground  with  the 
preliminary  proof  of  documents,  and  of  the  competency  of  witnesses, 
which  is  always  addressed  to  the  Court.1  But,  after  the  evidence  is 
admitted,  its  credibility  is  entirely  within  the  province  of  the  jury, 
who,  of  course,  are  at  liberty  to  weigh  all  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  declarations  were  made,  including  those  already  proved  to 
the  judge,  and  to  give  the  testimony  only  such  credit  as,  upon  the 
whole,  they  may  think  it  deserves.2 

6  R.  v.  Woodcock,  2  Leach  Or.  Cas.  663 ;  R.  ».  Callaghan,  McXally's  Evid.  385. 

1  [Lester  v.  State,  37  Fk.  382 ;  Redd  v.  State,  99  Ga.  210 ;  Perry  v.  State,  id.,  30 
S.  E.  903  ;  Carver  v.  U.  S.,  164  U.  S.  694.] 

8  [State  v.  Baldwin,  15  Wash.  15. } 

8  [As  this  question  is  affected  by  the  rule  about  first  asking  the  witness,  the 
authorities  are  collected  post,  §  462.J 

4  [State  v.  Blackburn,  80  N.  C.  4/8  ;  even  before  impeachment:  People  v.  Glenn, 
10  N.  C.  32 ;  State  v.  Craine,  120  id.  601.] 

1  Said,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough,  in  R.  v.  Hucks,  1  Stark.  521,  523,  to  have  been  so 
resolved  by  all  the  judges,  in  a  case  proposed  to  them :  Welborn's  Case,  1  East  P.  C. 
860  ;  John's  Case,  id.  358  ;  R.  v.  Van  Butchell,  3  C.  &  P.  629  ;  R.  v.  Bonner,  6  id. 
386  ;  R.  v.  Spilsbury,  7  id.  187,  190  ;  State  v.  Poll,  1  Hawks  444  ;  Com.  v.  Murray, 
2  Ashm.  41  ;  Com.  v.  Williams,  id.  60  ;  Hill's  Case,  2  Gratt  594  ;  McDaniel  v.  State, 
8  Sm.  &  M.  401;  [State  v.  Sexton,  Mo.,  48  S.  W.  452  ;  Com.  v.  Bishop,  Mass.,  42 
N.  E.  560  ;")   {State  v.  Frazier,  1  Houst.  Cr.  176;  Kehoe  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  127.} 

2  2  Stark.  Evid.  263  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  304  ;  Ross  v.  Gould,  5  Greenl.  204  ; 
Vass's  Case,  8  Leigh  794;  [Com.  v.  Brewer,  Mass.,  42  N.  E.  92.]     See  also  the  re- 
marks of  Mr.  Evans,  2  Poth.  on  Oblig.  256  (294),  App.  No.  16,  who  thinks  that  the 
jury  should  be  directed,  previous  to  considering  the  effect  of  the  evidence,  to  determine  : 
1st,  Whether  the  deceased  waa  really  in  such  circumstances,  or  used  such  expressions, 
from  which  the  apprehension  in  question  was  inferred ;   2d,  Whether  the  inference 
deduced  from  such  circumstances  or  expressions  is  correct ;  3d,  Whether  the  deceased 
did  make  the  declarations  alleged  against  the  accused  ;  and  4th,  Whether  those  declara- 
tions are  to  be  admitted,  as  sincere  and  accurate,     j  But  in  Georgia  the  question  of  a 
consciousness  of  impending  death  .is  left  to  the  jury  :  Jackson  v.  State,  56  Ga.  235  ; 
Dumas  v.  State,  62  Ga.  58.     It  is  considered  good  practice  to  have  the  witnesses  ex- 
amined by  the  Court  out  of  hearing  of  the  jury,  thus  avoiding  any  bias  which  might  be 


§§  161-162.]  DYING  DECLARATIONS.  253 

§  1G1  c.  Sundries.  The  right  to  offer  the  declarations  in  evidence 
is  not  restricted  to  the  side  of  the  prosecutor;  they  are  equally  ad- 
missible in  favor  of  the  party  charged  with  the  death.1  [That  the 
use  of  dying  declarations  is  no  violation  of  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion requiring  the  confrontation  of  the  accused,  in  criminal  cases, 
with  the  witnesses  against  him  is  explained  in  another  place  (post, 
§  163/).] 

§  162.  "Weight  of  Declarations.  Though  these  declarations,  when 
deliberately  made,  under  a  solemn  and  religious  sense  of  impending 
dissolution,  and  concerning  circumstances,  in  respect  of  which  the 
deceased  was  not  likely  to  have  been  mistaken,  are  entitled  to  great 
weight,  if  precisely  identified,  yet  it  is  always  to  be  recollected  that 
the  accused  has  not  the  power  of  cross-examination,  — a  power  quite 
as  essential  to  the  eliciting  of  all  the  truth,  as  the  obligation  of  an 
oath  can  be;  and  that  where  the  witness  has  not  a  deep  and  strong 
sense  of  accountability  to  his  Maker,  and  an  enlightened  conscience, 
the  passion  of  anger  and  feelings  of  revenge  may,  as  they  have  not 
unfrequently  been  found  to  do,  affect  the  truth  and  accuracy  of  his 
statements,  especially  as  the  salutary  and  restraining  fear  of  pun- 
ishment for  perjury  is  in  such  cases  withdrawn.  And  it  is  further 
to  be  considered,  that  the  particulars  of  the  violence  to  which  the 
deceased  has  spoken  were  in  general  likely  to  have  occurred  under 
circumstances  of  confusion  and  surprise,  calculated  to  prevent  their 
being  accurately  observed,  and  leading  both  to  mistakes  as  to  the 
identity  of  persons,  and  to  the  omission  of  facts  essentially  impor- 
tant to  the  completeness  and  truth  of  the  narrative.1 

produced  in  their  minds  by  the  statements,  and  which  might  be  difficult  to  remove. 
This  was  done  in  Swasher  v.  Com.,  26  Gratt.  963  ;  cf.  Bull's  Case,  14  id.  613.  In 
Johnson  v.  State,  47  Ala.  9,  the  evidence  was  heard  by  the  judge  in  the  presence  of 
the  jury,  who  were  cautioned  not  to  regard  it  in  forming  their  verdict.  So  in  People 
v.  Smith,  104  N.  Y.  498,  it  was  held  that  the  necessary  preliminary  examination 
might,  in  the  discretion  of  the  Court,  be  conducted  in  the  presence  of  the  jury  ;  but 
during  the  trial  of  that  preliminary  issue  the  jury  are  merely  in  the  attitude  of  specta- 
tors ;  they  have  no  concern  with  it,  and  should  be  so  instructed  by  the  Court. 
Whether  the  judge  will  hear  evidence  in  rebuttal  is  not  clear.  It  has  been  held  in 
Delaware  that  he  would  not ;  that  the  evidence  was  admissible  when  the  State  has 
made  a  primci  facie  case  :  State  v.  Cornish,  5  Harr.  Del.  502  ;  State  v.  Frazier, 
1  Houst.  Cr.  Cas.  176.  When  it  is  before  the  jury,  however,  no  direction  by  the  judge 
as  to  its  force  is  allowed  :  State  v.  McCanon,  51  Mo.  160.  [ 

1  fMoore  v.  State,  12  Ala.  767  ;  State*.  Saunders,  14  Or.  304;  Mattox  v.  U.  S., 
146  U.  S.  151.  Contra,  semble:  R.  v.  Scaife,  1  Moo.  &  R.  552,  2  Lew.  Cr.  C.  150  ; 
People  v.  McLaughlin,  44  Cal.  435-3 

1  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  805,  306  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  292  ;  2  Johns.  35,  36,  per  Living- 
ston,  J.  ;  see  also  Mr.  Evans's  observations  on  the  great  caution  to  be  observed  in  the 
use  of  this  kind  of  evidence,  in  2  Poth.  Obi.  255  (293)  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  263;  see  also 
R.  v.  Ashtou,  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  147,  per  Alderson,  B.  ;  [People  v.  Kraft,  148  N.  Y. 
631.] 


254 


EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEAKSAY  RULE. 


[CH.  XV. 


CHAPTER  XY. 

EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE'  HEARSAY  RULE  :  DECLARATIONS  OP  A  MENTAL 
OR  PHYSICAL  CONDITION  ;  SPONTANEOUS  DECLARATIONS  ;  LEARNED 
TREATISES  AND  TABLES  |  REGULAR  COMMERCIAL  PUBLICATIONS  ; 
OFFICIAL  STATEMENTS;  SUNDRY  APPLICATIONS  OF  THE  BULE. 


Declarations  of  a  Mental  or  Physical  Con- 
dition. 

§  162  a.    General  Principle. 

§  162  b.  Statements  of  Pain  and  Suf- 
fering. 

§  162c.  Statements  of  Design,  Plan, 
Intent. 

§  1 62  d.  Statements  of  Reason,  Mo- 
tive, Feeling,  Emotion. 

§  162  e.    Statements  by  a  Testator. 

Spontaneous  Declarations  (Res  Gfestce). 

§  162/.    General  Principle. 

§  162  g.    Limits  of  the  Principle. 

§  162  h.  Sundry  Doctrines  ;  Complaint 
of  Rape  ;  Charge  by  Seduced  Woman  ; 
Complaint  after  Robbery. 


Learned  Treatises  and  Statistical  Tables. 

§  162  i.    Exception  generally  denied. 
§  162/.    Partial  Forms  of  Recognition. 
§  162  k.  Application  of  the  Prohibition 

Regular  Commercial  Publications. 

§  1 62  I.  Reports  of  Market  Prices  ; 
Reports  of  Legal  Decisions ;  etc. 

Official  Statements. 

§  162  m.   General  Principle. 

§  162  n.  Application  of  the  Principle. 

Sundry  Applications  of  the  Hearsay  Rule. 

§  162  o.  View  by  Jury ;  Testimony  at 
a  View  ;  Juror's  Private  Knowledge. 

§  162 p.  Interpreter  ;  Counsel  ;  Ex 
parte  Experiments. 


[!N  the  following  remaining  exceptions  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  the 
only  common  circumstance  is  that  the  death  of  the  person,  or  other 
reason  for  unavailability,  need  not  be  shown.] 


Declarations  of  a  Mental  or  Physical  Condition. 

§  162  a  [102].  General  Principle.1  Wherever  the  bodily  or  mental 
feelings  of  an  individual  are  material  to  be  proved,  the  usual  ex- 
pressions of  such  feelings,  made  at  the  time  in  question,  are  also 
original  evidence.  If  they  were  the  natural  language  of  the  affec- 
tion, whether  of  body  or  mind,  they  furnish  satisfactory  evidence, 
and  often  the  only  proof  of  its  existence;  and  whether  they  were 
real  or  feigned  is  for  the  jury  to  determine.  [In  the  words  of  L.  J. 
Hellish: 2  "  Wherever  it  is  material  to  prove  the  state  of  a  person's 
mind,  or  what  was  passing  in  it,  and  what  were  his  intentions,  there 
you  may  prove  what  he  said,  because  that  is  the  only  means  by 
which  you  can  findtout  what  his  intentions  were."  This  use  of  such 
statements  is  often  spoken  of  as  admissible  under  the  res  yeatce 

1  PThe  original  section  has  been  subdivided  into  several.] 
3    S  v.  St.  Leonards,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  154.} 


§§  162  a-1625.]  STATEMENTS  OF  PAIN.  255 

notion,8  or  as  "original"  evidence,  i.e.  not  an  exception  to  the 
Hearsay  rule.  But  this  seems  clearly  unsound.  There  is  one  sort 
of  evidence  of  mental  condition  which  is  in  truth  merely  indirect 
or  circumstantial,  and  therefore  not  subject  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  e.  g. 
where  the  sharpening  of  a  knife  on  the  morning  before  a  homicide  is 
taken  as  evidence  of  a  design  to  kill,  or  where  the  repeated  inflic- 
tion of  blows  indicates  malice,  or  where  running  away  is  taken  as 
indicating  fear.  But  where  a  distinct  assertion,  in  the  form  of 
words,  predicating  a  mental  state,  is  offered,  —  as,  "  I  have  a  pain  in 
my  side,"  or  "I  have  the  intention  of  going  out  of  town,"  or  "'I  do 
this  for  such-and-such  a  reason,"  —  this  language  is  no  less  an  asser- 
tion of  the  existence  of  a  fact  than  is  an  assertion  of  any  other  sort 
of  fact;  in  the  neat  phrase  of  L.  J.  Bowen:4  "The  state  of  a  man's 
mind  is  as  much  a  fact  as  the  state  of  his  digestion;  "  and  therefore 
such  assertions,  being  taken  on  the  credit  of  the  declarant  as  testi- 
monial evidence  of  the  fact  asserted,  are  met  by  the  Hearsay  rule 
(on  the  principle  explained  ante,  §  99  a).  To  admit  them,  then, 
is  to  make  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule. 

The  different  kinds  of  facts  that  may  be  the  subject  of  such  asser- 
tions may  be  roughly  grouped  as  follows :  (1)  Assertions  of  pain, 
or  other  physical  condition;  (2)  assertions  of  plan,  design,  inten- 
tion; (3)  assertions  of  feeling,  emotion,  motive,  reason ;  (4)  sundry 
assertions  by  a  testator.] 

§  162  b.  Statements  of  Pain  and  Suffering.  The  representation  by 
a  sick  person  of  the  nature,  symptoms,  and  effects  of  the  malady 
under  which  he  is  laboring  at  the  time,  are  received  as  original 
evidence ; l  if  made  to  a  medical  attendant,  they  are  of  greater  weight 
as  evidence;  but,  if  made  to  any  other  person,  they  are  not  on  that 
account  rejected.2  [As  to  this,  certain  discriminations  must  be 
made.  (1)  Statements  as  to  the  circumstances  of  an  injury  (as, 
that  the  person  was  knocked  down  by  a  horse),  or  the  nature  of  the 
injury  (as,  that  a  leg  was  broken),  are  not  within  the  exception, 
which  covers  only  statements  of  an  internal  condition.8  On  the 
same  principle,  statements  of  past  sufferings  or  symptoms  are  ex- 

8  £Ante,  §  108  ;  this  was  the  treatment  by  the  author,  and  the  paragraph  was  origi- 
nally placed  in  that  chapter.] 

*  Pin  Edgington  v.  Fitzmaurice,  L.  R.  29  Ch.  D.  459.] 

1  Quotas  "original"  evidence  ;  see  the  explanation  above.] 

2  Aveson  p.  Lord  Kinnaird,  6  East  188;  1  Ph.  Evid.  191  ;  Grey  v.  Young,   Harp. 
38 ;  Gilchrist  v.  Bale,  8  Watts  355.     QThe  principle  is  well  expounded  in  Phillips  v. 
Kelly,  29  Ala.  628  ;  Hyatt  v.  Adams.  16  Mich.  200  ;  State  o.Gedicke,  43  N.  J.  L.  88.] 

8  [[State  v.  Dart,  29  <  'onn.  153 ;  111.  Cent.  B  Co.  v.  Sutton,  42  111.  438 ;  Carthage 
T.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  102  Ind.  144  ;  C.  C.  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Newell,  104  id.  269 ;  Bacon 
v.  Charlton,  7  Cush.  568  ;  Morrissey  v.  Ingham,  111  Mass.  65  ;  Merkle  v.  Bennington, 
58  Mich.  160;  Dundas  v.  Lansing,  75  id.  499;  People  v.  Foglesong,  id.,  74  N.  W. 
730  ;  Rogers  v.  Crain,  30  Tex.  284  ;  Newman  v.  Dodson,  61  id.  95 ;  Earl  v.  Tupper,  42 
Vt.  284  ;  McKeigne  v.  Janesville,  68  Wis.  57.  This  limitation  is  constantly  men- 
tioned. Hawks  v.  Chester,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  727  (  "  I  am  tejribly  hurt")  seems. to  trans- 
gress it.] 


256  EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE   IIEAESAY  RULE.  [CH.   XV. 

eluded;  the  exception  applies  only  to  statements  of  a  present  condi- 
tion.4 (2)  Such  are  the  orthodox  and  correct  limitations  of  the  rule. 
But,  in  consequence  of  the  obscure  and  much  misunderstood  lan- 
guage of  an  often  cited  case,6  a  certain  additional  distinction  as  to 
statements  to  a  physician  has  grown  up  in  some  jurisdictions,  though 
it  is  applied  with  very  different  results.  At  one  extreme  are  a  few 
jurisdictions,  following  the  lead  of  Massachusetts,6  using  this  dis- 
tinction to  enlarge  the  exception,  i.e.  admitting  even  statements  of 
past  suffering  and  symptoms  if  they  were  made  to  a  physician.7 
At  the  other  extreme  are  a  few  jurisdictions  using  the  distinction  to 
limit  the  scope  of  the  exception,  i.  e.  not  admitting  even  assertions 
of  present  pain  unless  made  to  a  physician.  This  narrow  limitation, 
unsound  upon  precedent,  principle,  and  policy,  originated  in  a 
modern  New  York  ruling,8  and  has  since  been  copied  by  other  Courts 
not  appreciating  the  heterodox  nature  of  the  New  York  variation ; 9 
but  it  must  be  noted  that  screams  and  exclamations  of  anguish  are 
discriminated  as  not  excluded  by  this  limitation.10  The  limitation 
has  been  expressly  repudiated  by  several  Courts.11  (3)  As  the 

4  [Rowland  v.  Walker,  18  Ala.  749;  Stone  v.  "Watson,  37  id.  288  ;  Powell  v.  State, 
101  Ga.  9  ;  Atch.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier,  27  Kan.  463  ;  Grand  R.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v. 
Huntley,  38  Mich.  543 ;  Girard  «.  Kalamazoo,  92  id.  610  ;  Towle  v.  Blake,  48  N.  H. 
96  ;  Lush  v.  McDauiel,  13  Ired.  487;  Wheeler  v.  R.  Co.,  Tex.,  43  S.  W.  876;  State  v. 
Fournier.Vt.,  35  Atl.  178.] 

6  [Barber  v.  Merriam,  11  All.  322.] 

8  [Barber  v.  Merriam,  supra,  apparently  meant  to  take  this  view ;  such  is  the  pres- 
ent interpretation  in  that  jurisdiction  :  Roosa  v.  Loan  Co.,  132  Mass.  439.  But,  oddly, 
this  extension  does  not  cover  statements  as  to  the  circumstances  of  the  injury.] 

7  [People  v.  Shattuck,  109  Cal.  673  ;  C.  C.  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Newell,  104  Iiid.  264  ; 
Omberg  v.  Mut.  Assoc.,  Ky.,  40  S.  W.  909  ;  State  v.  Gedicke,  43  N.  J.  L.  88.     This 
extension,  though  in  any  case  not  orthodox,  has  been  expressly  repudiated  by  some 
Courts:  Rowland  v.  R.  Co.,  63  Conn.  415;  Dundas  v.  Lansing,  75  Mich.  503  ;   Web- 
ber v.  R.  Co.,  67  Minn.  155  ;  Williams  v.  R.  Co.,  68  id.  55.] 

8  [No  such  limitation  originally  obtained:    Caldwell  v.  Murphy,  11  N.  Y.  419; 
Teachout  v.  People,  41  id.  13,  and  intervening  cases.     Then,  two  years  later,  it  ap- 
peared in  Reed  v.  R.  Co.,  45  id.  579,  based  partly  on  a  not  unnatural  misunderstand- 
mg  of  Barber  v.  Merriam,  supra,  partly  on  the  unsound  reason  that  the  abolition  of 
parties'  incompetency  rendered  such  statements  unnecessary,  —  a  reason  which  forgets 
that  the  scope  of  the  exception  is  not  confined  to  parties,  and  which  in  any  case  does 
not  justify  a  distinction  as  to  physicians.     The  later  New  York  cases  are  :  Hagen- 
locher  v.  R.  Co.,  99  id.  136  ;  Roche  v.  R.  Co.,  105  id.  294 ;  Davidson  v.  Cornell,  132 
id.  237;  Link  v.  Sheldon,  136  id.  1,  9.] 

•  [Wilson  v.  Granby,  47  Conii.  76 ;  Atl.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker,  93  Ga.  462  ;  Broyles 
v.  Prisock,  97  id.  643,  25  S.  E.  388 ;  S.  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Wainwright,  99  id.  255, 
25  S.  E.  622 ;  Firkins  v.  R.  Co.,  61  Minn.  31 ;  Williams  v.  R.  Co.,  68  id.  55 ;  Quaile 
».  R.  Co.,  48  Wis.  524  ;  Tebo  v.  Augusta,  90  id.  405 ;  Keller  v.  Oilman,  93  id.  9 ; 
Curran  ».  Stange  Co.,  id.,  74  N.  W.  377.  In  Illinois  the  recent  decisions  have  looked 
in  several  directions  :  Globe  A.  I.  Co.  v.  Gerisch,  163  111.625;  West  Chic.  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Carr,  170  id.  478,  48  N.  E.  992;  West  Chic.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennelly,  170  id.  508,  48 
N.  E.  996  (dated  the  same  day  us  the  preceding  one)  ;  Springfield  R.  Co.  v,  Hoeflher, 
id.,  51  N.  E.  884.] 

10  [Cases  in  the  preceding  two  notes  ;  see  the  criticism  of  Canty,  J.,  diss.,  in  Wil- 
liams v.  R.  Co.,  supra."} 

"  [Hancock  Co.  v.  Leggett,  114  Ind.  547;  Chic.  S.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  id. 
880,  392;  Clevel.  C.  C.  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Prewitt,  ib.  557;  Louis  v.  N.  A.  &C.  R.Co.  v. 
Miller,  141  id.  533,  559  ;  North.  P.  It.  Co.  v.  Urlin,  158  U.  S.  273  ;  Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co. 
».  Rambo,  16  U.  S.  App.  277 ;  Bagley  t;.  Mason,  69  Vt.  175;  Brown  v.  Alt.  Holly,  ib. 


§§  162  6-162  cJ]      STATEMENTS   OF   PAIN;   OF  DESIGN.  257 

thought  of  possible  litigation  commonly  suggests  itself  to  an  injured 
person  not  long  after  the  time  of  injury  received,  and  as  it  seems 
impracticable  to  draw  any  real  line  of  distinction  between  the  con- 
templation of  litigation  and  the  beginning  of  process,  it  seems 
hardly  feasible  to  apply  the  distinction  of  post  litem  motam  to  the 
present  exception;  and  such  was  the  view  of  the  earlier  rulings.18 
But  in  several  jurisdictions  the  principle  has  been  introduced  to 
a  certain  extent.  In  some,  it  is  said  that  statements  made  during  a 
consultation,  not  for  medical  assistance,  but  in  preparation  for  the 
trial,  are  to  be  excluded.18  In  others,  it  is  said  that  the  mere  fact 
of  Us  mota  does  not  exclude,  but  that  the  statement  will  be  rejected 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  — a  better  form  of  rule.14] 
§  162  c.  Statements  of  Design,  Plan,  Intent.  [The  existence  of 
a  person's  design  or  plan  to  do  a  thing  is  relevant  circumstantially 
to  show  that  he  ultimately  did  it  (ante,  §  14  &).  The  presence  of  the 
design  or  plan  may  be  evidenced  circumstantially  by  conduct  (ante, 
§§  14  m,  14  q) ;  but  the  person's  assertion  of  a  present  design  or  plan, 
when  made  in  a  natural  way  and  not  under  circumstances  of  suspi- 
cion, is  admissible  under  the  present  exception.  The  res  yestce  notion 
(ante,  §  108)  is  often  put  forward,  but  improperly,  as  the  justifica- 
tion of  this;  for  the  reason  already  explained  (ante,  §  1G2  a)  such 
statements  must  be  regarded  as  admissible  by  virtue  of  the  present 
exception.1  They  are  generally  treated  as  admissible ; 2  though  a  few 
Courts  are  found  to  exclude  them,  usually  through  a  misapplication 

364.  The  above  question  of  the  hearsay  use  of  statements  to  a.  physician  must  be  dis- 
tinguished from  (a)  asking  the  physician's  reasons  for  his  opinion,  (b)  excluding  a  phy- 
sician's testimony  to  the  injury  because  based  entirely  on  information  from  the  patient 
and  not  on  personal  observation  :  post,  §  430  7.] 

12  CClevel.  C.  C.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Newell,  104  Ind.  271  ;  Hatch  v.  Fuller,  131  Mass. 
574 ;  Towle  v.  Blake,  48  N.  H.  96  ;  Norris  v.  Haverhill,  65  id.  89  ;  Mattesou  v.  R. 
Co.,  35  N.  Y.  491  ;  Bagley  v.  Mason,  69  Vt.  175.] 

18  ("Darrigan  v.  R.  Co.,  52  Conn.  291,  309  ;  Lambertson  v.  Traction  Co.,  N.  J.  L., 
38  Atl.  683  (qualified)  ;  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Roalefs,  28  U.  S.  App.  569 ;  Stewart  p. 
Everts,  76  Wis.  42  ;  Abbot  v.  Heath,  84  id.  320  ;  Stone  v.  R.  Co.,  88  id.  98,  105  ; 
Keller  v.  Oilman,  93  id.  9-3 

14  [111.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  42  111.  440 ;  Grand  Rapids  &  I.  R,  Co.  v.  Huntley,  38 
Mich.  544  ;  Kans.  C.  F.  S.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Stoner,  10  U.  S.  App.  209.  The  later  Mich- 
igan cases  look  the  same  way,  but  are  not  uniform  :  Jones  v.  Portland,  88  Mich.  600  ; 
Heddle  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  70  N.  W.  1096  ;  Strudgeon  v.  Sand  Beach,  107  id.  496  ;  Will  v. 
Mendon,  108  id.  251 ;  McKormick  v.  West  Bay  City,  110  id.  265  ;  Butts  v.  Eaton 
Rapids,  id.,  74  N.  W.  872.} 

*  [[See  the  principle  expounded  in  Com.  v.  Trefethen,  157  Mass.  185  ;  Mut.  L.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Hillmon,  145  U.  S.  622  ;  and  particularly  by  Start,  C.  J.,  in  State  v.  Hay  ward, 
62  Minn.  474.} 

2  [Threats  to  commit  a  crime  are  the  commonest  instance,  and  are  always  admitted 
so  far  as  the  present  principle  is  concerned  ;  for  the  relevancy  of  the  design,  see  ante, 
§  14/t.  Threats  to  commit  suicide  are  another  not  uncommon  instance  :  Com.  v.  Tre- 
fethen, supra  ;  Hale  v.  Ins.  Co.,  65  Minn.  548  ;  Rena  v.  Relief  Ass'n,  Wis.,  75  N.  W.  991; 
contra:  Siebert  v.  People,  142  111.  585  ;  State  v.  Punshou,  124  Mo.  448,  457  ;  for  the 
circumstantial  aspect  of  this  evidence,  see  ante,  §  14  r.  Other  examples  are  as  follows  : 
Cowper's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1170  (intention  to  lodge  at  a  place);  R.  v.  Buckley, 
13  Cox  Cr.  294  ;  Denver  &  R.  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  Colo.,  52  Pac.  211  (to  go  to  a 
place) ;  State  v.  Smith,  49  Conn.  380  (to  make  an  arrest) ;  Riggs  v.  Powell,  142  111.  453 
(to  provide  for  a  wife) ;  Timiuona  v.  Titumons,  3  lad.  250  (to  be  absent)  ;  Grimes  v. 
VOL.  I.  —  17 


258  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [OH.   XV. 

of  the  res  gestce  principle.8  Statements  of  intent,  where  the  intent 
becomes  material  in  determining  a  person's  domicile,  are  sometimes 
treated  as  admissible  by  virtue  of  the  res  gestce  or  verbal-act  doctrine ;  * 
but  it  is  perhaps  better  to  regard  them  as  governed  by  the  present 
exception.6  Statements  of  intent  accompanying  an  alleged  crime  are 
usually  admitted  according  to  the  res  gestce  doctrine.6] 

§  162  d.  Statements  of  Reason,  Motive,  Feeling,  Emotion.  [These 
are  equally  included  under  the  general  principle,  and  are  admissible 
so  far  as  they  appear  to  be  natural  and  sincere.  For  example,  where 
the  reason  or  motive  for  the  departure  of  certain  workmen  was  a 
part  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  the  statements  of  the  workmen  to  the 
superintendent,  when  leaving,  as  to  their  reason  for  it,  were  ad- 
mitted ; 1  so  also,  in  an  action  upon  a  false  representation,  the  per- 
son's declaration,  when  sending  goods,  that  he  sent  them  in  reliance 
upon  the  representation  was  admitted.2  So  also  statements  describ- 
ing one's  fear,8  belief,4  cheerful  or  melancholy  feelings  or  the  like,6 
physical  disgust,6  hostility  or  affection,  and  the  like.7  On  this  prin- 

State,  68  id.  193  (to  go  to  a  place)  ;  Walling  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  38  S.  W.  428  (to  spend  the 
night  at  a  place)  ;  Inness  v.  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  433  (to  take  a  train)  ;  Kingv.  McCarthy, 
54  Minn.  190  (to  be  absent) ;  State  v.  Hay  ward,  62  id.  474  (to  meet  the  defendant)  ; 
Carroll  v.  State,  22  Tenn.  321  (to  go  to 'a  place)  ;  Hamby  t;.  State,  36  Tex.  523  (to 
search  for  the  defendant)  ;  State  v.  Howard,  32  Vt.  404  (to  go  to  a  place)  ;  State  v. 
Dickinson,  41  Wis.  307  (same) ;  U.  S.  v.  Craig,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  729  (to  go  and  get  bail); 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hilliuon,  supra  (to  go  to  a  place)  ;  Hunter  v.  State,  40  N.  J.  L.  5 
(to  go  with  the  defendant)  ;  Lake  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Herrick,  49  Oh.  25  (to  go  to  a  place)."] 

8  L~R.  v.  Petcherini,  7  Cox  Or.  82  ;  R.  v.  Wainwright,  13  id.  171  ;  Chic.  &  E.  I.  R. 
Co.  v.  Chancellor,  165  111.  438;  Hank  v.  State,  148  Ind.  238;  Com.  v.  Gray.Ky., 
30  S.  W.  1015  ;  Schultz  r.  Schultz,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  854  ;  State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H. 
494;  Mack  v.  Porter,  25  U.  S.  App.  595  ;  McBride  v.  Com.,  Va.,  30  S.  E.  454.] 

*  fSee  ante,  §  108  ;  post,  §  162/.] 

6  L^iles  v.  Waltham,  157  Mass.  542  (leading  case)  ;  Gorham  v.  Canton,  5  Greenl. 
267  ;  Kreitz  v.  Behrensmayer,  125  111.  141,  196 ;  Etna  v.  Brewer,  78  Me.  377 ;  Watsou 
v.  Simpson,  8  La.  An.  337  ;  Chase  v.  Chase,  66  N.  H.  588  ;  Exp.  Blumer,  27  Tex.  743  ; 
Chambers  v.  Prince,  75  Fed.  176.] 

8  L~R.  v.  Petcherini,  7  Cox  Cr.  81  ;  Carr  v.  State,  33  Ark.  103  ;  Comfort  v.  People, 
54  111.  406  ;  State  v.  Walker,  77  Me.  169  ;  Garber'  v.  State,  44  Tenn.  169  ;  Little  v. 
State,  75  Tex.  322  ;  Mack  v.  State,  48  Wis.  280-3 


1  [Elmer  v.  Fessenden,  151  Mass.  161.1 


2  LFellowes  "•  Williamson,  Moo.  &  M.  307.  For  other  examples,  see  Tilk  v. 
Parsons,  2  C.  &  P.  202  ;  Skinner  v.  Shew,  1894,  2  Ch.  581,  593;  Mobile  R.  Co.  v. 
Ashcraft,  48  Ala.  31  ;  Rives  v.  Lamar,  94  Ga.  186  ;  Steketee  v.  Kimm,  48  Mich.  322  ; 
Hadley  v.  Carter,  8  N.  H.  42;  Hine  v.  R,  Co.,  149  N.  Y.  154;  McCracken  v.  West, 
17  Oh.  16,  24  ;  Acad.  of  M.  Co.  v.  Davidson,  85  Wis.  129,  136.] 

8  QRedford  v.  Birley,  1  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1071,  1238,  1244  (expressions  of  alarm  at  a 
mob);  R.  v.  Vincent,  9  C.  &  P.  275 ;  Com.  v.  Crowley,  165  Mass.  569.] 

*  QHathaway's  Trial,  14  How.  St.  Tr.  653.  J 

»  Cowper's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1165;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  10;  see  other 
instances,  ante,  §  14r.] 

8  TKearney  v.  Farrell,  28  Conn.  320  ;  Gloystine  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  33  S.  W.  824.] 

7  \_E.  g.  in  the  ordinary  case  of  a  witness*  expressions  used  to  discredit  him :  Day  v. 
Stickney,  14  All.  258  ;  see  the  subject  di'scussed  post,  §  450. 

A  good  deal  of  the  evidence  commonly  resorted  to  in  proving  the  above  sorts  of 
mental  conditions  is  of  course  circumstantial  evidence  from  conduct  and  indirect  infer- 
ence from  language,  and  there  is  therefore  no  need  to  invoke  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay 
rule  ;  see,  e.  g.,  DuBost  v.  Beresford,  2  Camp.  511 ;  Chase  v.  Lowell,  151  Mass.  422 ; 
Blake  v.  Damon,  103  id.  209.] 


§§  162  c-162  eJ]      STATEMENTS  OF  MOTIVE,  EMOTION.  259 

ciple,]  in  actions  for  criminal  conversation,  it  being  material  to 
ascertain  upon  what  terms  the  husband  and  wife  lived  together 
before  the  seduction,  [or  in  any  other  case  in  which  the  feelings  of 
either  toward  the  other  is  material,]  their  language  and  deportment 
towards  each  other,  their  correspondence  together,  and  their  conver- 
sations and  correspondence  with  third  persons,  are  original  evidence.8 
[Such  letters  and  other  statements  are  admissible  "  because  credit  is 
given  to  her  for  having  acted  with  sincerity  at  the  time;  and  her 
letters  are  receivable  to  show  the  state  of  her  affections  before  her 
elopement,  being  written  at  a  moment  when  she  had  no  purpose  to 
answer  in  writing  them."9]  But  to  guard  against  the  abuse  of  this 
rule,  it  has  been  held,  that,  before  the  letters  of  the  wife  can  be 
received,  it  must  be  proved  that  they  were  written  prior  to  any 
misconduct  on  her  part,  and  when  there  existed  no  ground  for  im- 
puting collusion.10  If  written  after  an  attempt  of  the  defendant  to 
accomplish  the  crime,  the  letters  are  inadmissible.11  Nor  are  the 
dates  of  the  wife's  letters  to  the  husband  received  as  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  the  time  when  they  were  written,  in  order  to  rebut  a  charge 
of  cruelty  on  his  part;  because  of  the  danger  of  collusion.12 

§  162  e.  Statements  by  a  Testator.  [The  admissibility  of  state- 
ments by  a  testator  is  a  matter  of  much  apparent  confusion  among 
the  precedents,  not  so  much  because  of  numerous  oppositions  of 
policy,  but  because  different  principles,  not  in  themselves  related, 
may  be  brought  to  bear  according  to  the  varying  nature  of  the 
declaration  and  of  the  thing  desired  to  be  evidenced  by  it.  A  con- 
venient division,  for  the  purpose  of  examining  the  different  ques- 
tions, may  be  made  according  as  the  issue  involves  (1)  the  contents, 
or  the  fact  of  execution  or  of  non-execution  or  of  an  act  of  revoca- 

8  Trelawney  v.  Colraan,  2  Stark.  191 ;  s.  c.  1  Barn.  &  Aid.  90  ;  Willis  v.  Bernard, 
8  Bing.  376;  Elsam  v.  Fancett,  2  Esp.  562  ;  Winter  v.  Wroot,  1  Moo.  &  R.  404  ;  Gil- 
christ  v.  Bale,  8  Watts  355  ;  Thompson  v.  Trevanion,  Skin.  402  ;  QJones  v.  Thomp- 
son, 6  C.  &  P.  415  ;  Wilton  v.  Webster,  7  id.  198.    But  they  are  not  always  "  original  " 
evidence.] 

9  [Tollock,  argueTido,  in  Wright  v.  Tatham,  5  Cl.  &  F.  683.     Other  instances  are 
as  follows:  Long  v.  Booe,  106  Ala.  570  ;  Laurence  v.  Laurence,  164  111.  367  ;  Pettit  v. 
State,    135   Ind.   393,  415;  Puth  v.  Zimbleman,  99  la.   641;  Collins  v.  Stephenson, 
8  Gray  440  ;  Jacobs  v.  Whitcomb,  10  Cush.  257  ;  Dalton  v.  Dregge,  99  Mich.  250  ; 
McKenzie  v.  Lautenschlager,  id.,   71  N.   W.  489;  Lockwood  v.  Lockwood,  67  Minn. 
476  ;  Cattisou  v.  Cattison,  22  Pa.  277  ;  Glass  v.  Bennett,  89  Tenn.  482  ;  Gaiuea  v. 
Keif,  12  How.  535;  Rudd  v.  Rounds,  64  Vt.  432,  439;  Beach  v.  Brown,  Wash.,  55 
Pac.  46  ;  Homer  v.  Yance,  93  Wis.  352.] 

10  Edwards  v.  Crock,  4  Esp.  39 ;  Trelawney  v.  Colman,  1  Barn.  &.  Aid.  90  ;  1  Phil. 
Evid.  190. 

11  Wilton  v.  Webster,  7  C.  &  P.  198. 

«  Houliston  v.  Smythe,  2  C.  &  P.  22  ;  Trelawney  v.  Colman,  1  Barn.  &  Aid.  90. 

FJThe  original  text  contains  the  following:  "  In  prosecutions  for  rape,  too,  where 
the  party  injured  is  a  witness,  it  is  material  to  show  that  she  made  complaint  of  the 
injury  while  it  was  yet  recent.  Proof  of  such  complaint,  therefore,  is  original 
evidence  ;  but  the  statement  of  details  and  circumstances  is  excluded,  it  being  no 
legal  proof  of  their  truth."  But  this  subject  is  treated  more  at  length,  post,  §§  162  A, 
469  c.3 


260  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  EULE.       [CH.  XV. 

tion,  (2)  the  intent  to  revoke,  (3)  undue  influence  or  fraud,  (4)  -sun- 
dry other  matters. 

(1)  Ante-testamentary  declarations  (i.  e.  of  an  intention  or  plan  to 
make  a  will,  or  a  will  of  certain  contents,  or  to  alter  one)  involve 
two  principles  :  first,  the  principle  of  relevancy,  i.  e.  that  an  inten- 
tion to  do  an  act  is  some  evidence  that  it  was  done  ; l  secondly,  the 
admissibility,  under  the  present  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  of 
the  testator's  statements  of  intention  as  evidence  of  the  fact  of  the 
intention  (the  principle  of  §  162  c,  ante)  ;  the  propriety  of  thus  using 
them  is  conceded.2  Post-testamentary  statements  (i.  e.  as  to  the  fact 
of  execution  or  non-execution  or  revocation  or  as  to  the  contents) 
may  be  looked  at  in  more  than  one  way.  (a)  If  we  treat  them 
simply  as  assertions  of  a  past  act  of  the  above  sort,  there  is  no 
established  exception  to  admit  them,  and  they  fall  under  the  ban  of 
the  Hearsay  rule,  like  other  extra-judicial  assertions,  and  are  ex- 
cluded.8 But  a  number  of  Courts  have  thought  it  not  impolitic  to 
make  a  special  exception  for  such  statements,  and  to  admit  them 
in  spite  of  the  Hearsay  rule.4  (b)  But  it  is  possible  to  admit  them 
without  breaking  into  the  Hearsay  rule.  It  may  be  said  that  the 
testator's  declarations  are  evidence  of  his  state  of  mind,  i.  e.  his 
belief,  either  as  indirect  evidence  or  as  assertions  admissible  under 
the  present  exception;  and  that  then,  by  a  second  step,  his  belief 
is  circumstantial  evidence,  retrospectively,  of  his  having  done  or  not 
done  the  act  in  question,  e.  g.  his  belief  that  he  destroyed  a  will  is 
evidence  that  he  did  destroy  it.  This  mode  of  treating  the  state- 
ments was  adopted  by  Mr.  J.  Hannen,  in  Keen  v.  Keen6  and 
later  in  Sugden  v.  St.  Leonards;6  and  has  apparently  also  been 

1  ["Treated  ante,  §  14  Jc  ;  such  an  intention  is  here  regarded  as  relevant.] 

2  FThe  cases  are  the  same  as  in  §  14  k,  ante.] 

*  [jStaines  »•  Stewart,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  329  ;  Doe  v.  Palmer,  16  Q.  B.  747 ;  Quick  v. 
Quick,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  442  ;  Hellish,  L.  J.,  dissenting  on  this  point,  in  Sngden  v.  St. 
Leonards,  L.  K.  1  P.  D.  154  (leading  opinion)  ;  Henry  v.  Hall,  106  Ala.  84  ;  Mer- 
cer v.  Mackin,  14  Bush  441,;  Collins  v.  Elliott,  1  H.  &  J.  1  ;  Wells  v.  Wells,  Mo.,  45 
S.  W.  1095;  Boylan  v.  Meeker,  28  N.  J.  L.  276  (leading  opinion)  ;  Gordon's  Will,  50 
N.  J.  Eq.  397,  424 ;  Dan  v.  Brown,  4  Cow.  290  ;  Jackson  v.  Betts,  6  id.  382  ;  Grant 
v.  Grant,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  235.] 

4  QThe  following  cases  proceed  more  or  less  clearly  upon  this  ground  :  Cockburn, 
C.  J.,  and  Jessel,  M.  R.,  in  Sugden  v.  St.  Leonards,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  225,  154  (lead- 
ing  opinions)  ;  Goods  of  Sykes,  L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  27  ;  Harris  v.  Knight,  L.  R.  15 
P.  D.  174  ;  Patterson  v.  Hickey,  32  Ga.  159;  McDonald  ??.  McDonald,  142  Ind.  55  ; 
Scott  v.  Hawk,  la.,  75  N.  W.  368  ;  Lambie's  Estate,  97  Mich.  49,  57  ;  Beadles  v. 
Alexander,  9  Bait.  604 ;  Smiley  v.  Gambill,  39  Tenn.  164  ;  Tyuan  v.  Paschal,  27 
Tex.  300. 

The  recent  cases  in  this  country  usually  purport  to  follow  Sngden  v.  St.  Leon- 
ards. But  whether  that  case  is  law  in  England,  in  the  sense  of  establishing  any 
principle,  has  been  left  open  in  the  House  of  Lords :  Woodward  w.  Goulstone,  L.  R. 
11  App.  Cas.  469  ;  moreover,  its  effect  is  sometimes  misapprehended,  as  explained 
in  note  6,  post.~\ 

6  QL.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  107.] 

8  L'J-  R-  1  P.  D.  203.  It  had  previously  appeared  in  Patten  w.  Poulton,  4  Jnr. 
V.  s.  341  ;  Whitely  v.  King,  10  id.  1079  ;  see  ante,  §  14*,  for  analogies.  It  will  now 
be  understood  why  Sugdeii  v.  St.  Leonards  can  hardly  be  cited  indiscriminately  in 


§162t'.]  STATEMENTS   BY   A   TESTATOR.  261 

the  foundation  of  a  number  of  American  cases  admitting  such 
statements.7 

(2)  Where  the  fact  of  destruction  or  cancellation  is  admitted, 
and  the  accompanying  intent  is  material  to  determine  whether  the 
act  amounted  to  revocation,  the  testator's  state  of  mind  before  and 
after  the  act  is  some  evidence  of  his  state  of  mind  at  the  time  of  it 
(under  the  principle  of  §  14  I,  ante),  and  hence  his   declarations, 
before  and  after,  evidencing  his  state  of  mind  at  the  time  of  making 
them  are  admissible.8 

(3)  Where  undue  influence  or  fraud  is  the  issue,  three  uses  of  the 
evidence  present  themselves,     (a)  The  testator's  utterances,  offered 
as  direct  assertions  that  a  will  made  by  him  was  obtained  by  undue 
influence,  are  obnoxious  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  and  therefore  inadmis- 
sible;9 though  in  a  few  jurisdictions  a  special   exception  for  this 
purpose  (analogous  to  that  suggested  by  some  judges  in   Sugden  v. 
St.  Leonards)  is  recognized.10     (&)    The  utterances  may  be   offered 
either    as   indirect   evidence  of  the  testator's  condition  of   mind  — 
weakness,  susceptibility  to  importunities,  and  the  like  —  or  as  decla- 
rations of  a  state  of  mind  (under  the  present  exception)  — assertions 
of  affection  or  dislike,  etc.,  —  and  are  thus  admissible  ;  his  condition 
of  mind,  intelligence  and  strength  of  purpose,  feelings  towards  this 
or  that  person,  being  all  circumstances  which  bear  on  the  fact  of 
undue  influence  ;  the  propriety  of  this  use  is  universally  recognized.11 

favor  of  the  reception  of  post- testamen tar}7  declarations ;  for  the  opinions  of  Hannen, 
J.,  Jessel,  M.  R.,  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  and  Mellish,  L.  J.,  represent  at  least  three  dis- 
tinct attitudes  towards  such  evidence.  For  this  reason  the  following  cases,  purporting 
merely  to  approve  that  case,  leave  undecided  the  question  of  principle  :  Re  Ball, 

25  L.  R.  Ir.  557  ;  Flood  v.  Russell,  29  id.  97  ;  Behrens  v.  Behrens,  47  Oh.  St.  332.] 

7  QMcBeth  v.  McBeth,   11  Ala.  602    (leading  opinion);    Re   Johnson's    Will,  40 
Conn.  587  ;  Steele  v.  Price,  5  B.   Monr.  63  ;  Callagan  v.  Burns,  57  Me.  458  (lead- 
ing opinion) ;  Re  Page,  118  111.  581 ;  Valentine's  Will,  93  Wis.  45 ;  Steinke's  Will, 
id.,  70  N.  W.  61.      This  doctrine  has  been  expressly  discussed   and   repudiated  in 
Boylan  v.  Meeker,  26  N.  J.  L.  276  ;  but  apparently  not  elsewhere.] 

8  QPickens  v.  Davis,  133  Mass.  257  ;  Lane  v.  Moore,  151  id.  90  ;  Betts  v.  Jack- 
son, 6  Wend.  188  ;  see  Patterson  v.  Hickey,  32  Ga,  159  ;  Lawyer  v.  Smith,  8  Mich. 
860.1 

9TJackson  v.  Kniffen,  2  Johns.  33  (leading  case)  ;  Shailer  v.  Bumstead,  99  Mass. 
122  (leading  case)  ;  Calkins  v.  Calkins,  112  Cal.  296  ;  Kaufman's  Estate,  117  id. 
288  ;  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme,  8  Conn.  263  ;  Mallery  v.  Young,  Ga.,  22  8.  E.  142  ; 
Gwin  v.  Gwin,  Ida.,  48  Pac.  295  ;  Reynolds  v.  Adams,  90  111.  147  ;  Kiikpatrick  v. 
Jenkins,  Ky.,  33  8.  W.  830,  semb/e;  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  24  Mo.  236;  Doherty  v. 
Gilraore,  136  id.  414;  Waterman  v.  Whitney,  11  N.  Y.  157  (leading  case)  ;  Man 
v.  McGlynn,  88  id.  374;  Moritz  v.  Brough,  16  8.  &  R.  403;  Hoshauer  v.  Hoshauer, 

26  Pa.  404;  Kaufman  v.  Caughman,  49  8.  C.  159;    Kennedy  v.  U pshaw,  64  Tex. 
417.] 

*°  fJReel  v.  Reel,  1  Hawks  268  (leading  case) ;  Howell  v.  Barden,  3  Dev.  442 ; 
Beadles  v.  Alexander,  9  Baxt.  604  ;  Linch  v.  Linch,  69  Tenn.  529.] 

11  QQuick  v.  Quick,  3  Sw.  &  Tr.  442;  Dennis  v.  Weeks,  51  Ga.  32;  Bates  v. 
Bates,  27  la.  113;  Hollingsworth's  Will,  58  id.  527;  Stephenson  v.  Stephenson,  62 
id.  165  ;  Parsons  v.  Parsons,  66  id.  757  ;  Muir  ».  Miller,  72  id.  590  ;  Goldthorp's 
Estate,  94  id.  336  ;  Clark  v.  Turner,  69  N.  W.  843  :  Rambler  ».  Tryon,  7  S.  & 
R.  93  ;  Herster  v.  Herster,  122  Pa.  239  ;  Johnson  v.  Brown,  51  Tex.  80 ;  Robinson 
v.  Hutohinson,  26  Vt.  46;  Jaekman's  Will,  26  Wis.  122,  130;  Bryant  v.  Pierce, 
95  id.  331 ;  and  cases  in  the  last  preceding  note  but  one.] 


262  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE    HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.    XV. 

(c)  Again,  the  question  whether  a  will  was  made  under  undue 
influence  is,  in  one  aspect,  a  question  whether  the  testamentary  in- 
tentions and  wishes  represented  in  it  are  the  normal  ones  of  the 
testator,  or  whether,  relatively  to  his  known  usual  and  constant 
state  of  mind,  they  are  abnormal.  It  thus  becomes  important  to 
learn  what  was  the  normal  condition  of  his  affections,  wishes,  and 
testamentary  intentions,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  this  standard 
of  normality.  As  evidence  of  these  affections,  intentions,  etc.  — 
either  by  circumstantial  inference  or  under  the  present  exception 
for  declarations  of  a  state  of  mind,  —  his  utterances  at  various 
times  before  or  after  execution  (including  expressions  of  affection 
or  the  opposite,  previous  wills  or  statements  of  intention,  etc.)  may 
be  resorted  to.  This  use  of  such  evidence  is  also  universally 
accepted.18 

(4)  Where  the  question  is  whether  the  testator  signed  the  will 
understanding  its  contents  (usually  where  fraud  is  charged),  the 
fact  of  his  previous  or  subsequent  understanding  or  ignorance  of  its 
terms,  as  evidenced  by  his  utterances,  is  evidence  as  to  his  under- 
standing or  ignorance  at  the  time.18 

Spontaneous  Declarations. 

§  162  f.  General  Principle.  [The  use  of  utterances  to  which  the 
Hearsay  rule  is  not  applicable,  and  the  employment  of  the  term  res 
gestce  for  some  kinds  of  such  utterances,  has  already  been  explained 
(ante,  §§  100-110  a).  .  It  was  there  noticed  that  the  Hearsay  rule, 
excluding  assertions  used  as  direct  testimonial  evidence  of  the  fact 
asserted,  does  not  apply  to  (1)  words  used  circumstantially  as  evi- 
dence, e.  g.  of  notice  conveyed  to  the  person  addressed,  and  the  like, 
(2)  words  uttered  at  the  time  of  doing  an  equivocal  act  —  e.  g.  the 
occupation  of  land — and  forming  a  part  of  the  total  conduct  which 
determines  the  legal  significance  of  the  act,  (3)  words  the  utterance 
of  which  is  a  fact  forming  part  of  the  issue,  e.  g.  the  words  of  a  con- 
tract or  a  slander.  To  the  last  two  sorts  the  term  res  gestce,  it  was 
noticed,  is  often  applied.  There  is  a  fourth  class  of  statements, 

12  ("Hughes  v.  Hughes,  31  Ala.  524  (leading  case);  Denison's  Appeal,  29  Conn.  402  ; 
Duffield  v.  Morris,  2  Harringt.  375;  Williamson  v.  Nebers,  14  Ga.  311;  Taylor  v. 
Pegram,  151  111.  106,  115  ;  Harp  v.  Parr,  168  id.  459;  Goodbar  v.  Lidikay,  136  Ind. 
1,  8  ;  Dye  v.  Young,  44  la.  435 ;  Mooney  v.  Olsen,  22  Kan.  78  (leading  case);  Griffith 
v.  Diffenderfer,  50  Md.  482  ;  Barlow  v.  Waters,  Ky.,  28  S.  W.  785  ;  Shailer  v.  Bura- 
sted,  99  Mass. '122  (leading  case);  Benaud  v.  Pageot,  102  Mich.  568  ;  Bush  v.  Delano, 
id.,  71  N.  W.  628  ;  Sheehan  v.  Kearney,  Miss.,  21  So.  41 ;  Pancoast  v.  Graham,  15 
N.  J.  Eq.  309  ;  McRae  v.  Malloy,  93  N.  C.  159 ;  Irish  v.  Smith,  8  S.  &  R.  579  ;  Neel 
v.  Potter,  40  Pa.  483  ;  Ferret  ».  Perret,  184  id.  131  ;  Gardner  v.  Frieze,  16  R.  I.  641  ; 
Kaufman  ».  Caughmnn,  49  8.  C.  159  ;  Peery  v.  Peery,  94  Tenn.  328 ;  Kerr  v.  Luns- 
ford,  31  W.  Va.  659.] 

«  THowe  v.  Howe,  99  Mass.  98  (deed);  Nelson's  Will,  141  N.  Y.  152,  157  ;  Patton 
v.  Allison,  7  Humph.  335  ;  Maxwell  v.  Hill,  89  Tenn.  595  ;  Barney's  Will,  Vt,  40 
AtL  1027.]  ' 


§§  162  e-162/.]         SPONTANEOUS   DECLARATIONS.  263 

usually  referred  to  in  connection  with  the  term  res  gestce,  which, 
however,  seem  not  to  be  legitimately  embraced  by  any  variety  of  that 
principle,  but  to  form  by  themselves  a  separate  exception  to  the 
Hearsay  rule.  The  typical  case  is  a  statement  or  exclamation  by  an 
injured  person,  immediately  after  the  injury,  as  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  injury,  or  by  one  present  at  an  affray,  a  collision,  or  any  other 
exciting  occasion,  as  to  the  circumstances  of  it  as  observed  by  him. 
That  these  ordinarily  cannot  be  accounted  for  under  the  first  or  the 
third  of  the  above  classes  of  utterances,  as  utterances  to  which  the 
Hearsay  rule  does  not  in  principle  apply,  seems  clear.  That  they 
cannot  usually  be  placed  in  the  second  of  the  above  classes  seems 
also  true  ;  because  in  that  class  there  is  by  hypothesis  an  equivocal 
act  which  needs  to  be  colored  and  completed  in  legal  significance  by 
the  words  of  the  actor  accompanying  it  —  as,  the  occupation  of  land, 
the  handing  over  of  money,  the  tearing  up  of  a  will,  —  and  this  fun- 
damental requisite  is  in  the  class  of  cases  here  concerned  not  present. 
Moreover,  in  general,  to  say  that  an  utterance  is  not  admissible  be- 
cause the  Hearsay  rule  is  not  applicable — i.  e.  because  the  utterance 
is  used,  not  as  an  assertion  to  prove  the  truth  of  the  fact  asserted, 
but  independently  of  the  truth  of  the  utterance  as  an  assertion  — 
is  to  concede  that  the  Hearsay  rule  does  apply  to  the  present  class 
of  cases,  because  the  assertion  is  used  as  testimonial  evidence  of  the 
fact  asserted,  —  as,  where  the  injured  person  declares  who  assaulted 
him  or  whether  the  locomotive-bell  was  rung,  or  where  the  bystander 
at  an  affray  calls  out  that  the  defendant  shot  first.  Since,  then,  such 
assertions  are  a  genuine  instance  of  using  a  hearsay  assertion  testi- 
inonially,  and  since  it  is  universally  accepted  that  they  are  admissible 
under  certain  limitations,  it  seems  proper  to  treat  them  frankly  as 
the  subject  of  a  real  and  separate  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule. 
The  earlier  cases  were  inclined  to  deal  with  them  as  somehow  con- 
nected with  and  admissible  under  the  second  class  above-mentioned 
—  utterances  accompanying  an  act — and  therefore  as  so-called 
"  original "  evidence,  i.  e.  to  which  the  Hearsay  rule  was  not  appli- 
cable ;  *  and  this  attitude  is  of  course  still  constantly  found.  But  a 
number  of  Courts  recognize,  more  or  less  distinctly,  that  the  conven- 
tional term  res  gestce  affords  no  satisfactory  explanation,  and  that  the 
present  class  of  assertions  may  better  be  treated  as  forming  a  genuine 
exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule ;  the  following  passage  illustrates  this  : 
Barrows,  J.,  in  State  v.  Wagner*  admitting  outcries  naming  an  as- 

1  £E.  g.  Upham,  J.,  in  Hadley  v.  Carter,  8  N.  H.  42  :  "  Where  the  declarations 
of  an  individual  are  so  connected  with  his  acts  as  to  derive  a  degree  of  credit  from  such 
connection,  independently  of  the  declaration,  the  declaration  becomes  part  of  the  trans- 
action ; "  see  other  instances  in  Cornelius  v.   State,  12  Ark.  805  ;  Mitchum  v.  State, 
11  Ga.  621 ;  Hart  v.  Powell,  18  id.  639. 

The  early  English  instances  are  Thompson  v.  Trevanion,  Skinner  402 ;  Aveson  ». 
Kinnaird,  6  East  193  ;  R.  v.  Foster,  6  C.  &  P.  325  ;  but  it  is  hard  to  found  any  general 
principle  upon  their  language.] 

2  F61  Me.  195-3 


264  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  EULE.       [CH.  XV. 

sailant :  "  We  think  that  the  precise  ground  upon  which  their  admis- 
sion should  be  placed  in  a  case  like  this  is  substantially  the  same  as 
that  upon  which  dying  declarations  are  admissible  [t.  e.  necessity  and 
trustworthiness.].  .  .  No  one  can  doubt  that  the  exclamations  of  these 
two  women  embodied  the  truth  as  it  appeared  to  each ;  and  that  the 
cries  of  alarm  and  supplication  uttered  by  any  and  all  human  beings 
under  similar  circumstances  would  express  their  perceptions  of  exist- 
ing facts  as  truly  as  if  backed  by  all  the  oaths  known  in  Christendom. 
.  .  .  We  merely  say  that,  whatever  force  is  given  to  dying  declara- 
tions as  the  utterances  of  those  who  on  account  of  their  peculiar 
situation  may  be  relied  on  to  tell  the  exact  truth  as  it  appears  to 
them,  must  needs  be  accorded  also  to  the  exclamations  of  mortal 
terror  caused  by  a  deadly  assault."  8] 

§  162  g.  Limits  of  the  Principle.  [The  willingness  to  receive  these 
statements,  as  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  rests  on  the  notion 
that  the  circumstances  of  the  occasion  so  excite  and  control  the  mind 
of  the  speaker  that  his  statements  are  natural  and  spontaneous,  and 
therefore  sincere  and  trustworthy ;  thus,  Lacombe,  J.,  says,  charging 
a  jury,  in  U.  S.  v.  King:1  "  The  declarations  of  an  individual,  made 
at  the  moment  of  a  particular  occurrence,  when  the  circumstances 
are  such  that  we  may  assume  that  his  mind  is  controlled  by  the 
event,  may  be  received  in  evidence,  because  they  are  supposed  to  be 
expressions  involuntarily  forced  out  of  him  by  the  particular  event, 
and  thus  have  an  element  of  truthfulness  they  might  otherwise  not 
have.  .  .  .  [But  the  principle  applies  only  to  a  statement]  made  at  a 
time  when  it  was  forced  out  as  the  utterance  of  a  truth,  forced  out 
against  his  will  or  without  his  will,  and  at  a  period  of  time  so 
closely  connected  with  the  transaction  that  there  has  been  no  oppor- 
tunity for  subsequent  reflection  or  determination  as  to  what  it  might 
or  might  not  be  wise  for  him  to  say."  They  must  thus  be  "  spon- 
taneous," a  "  impulsive,"  8  "  instinctive,"  4  "  generated  by  an  excited 
feeling  which  extends  without  break  or  let-down  from  the  moment 
of  the  event  they  illustrate."  5 

It  follows  that  they  must  have  been  made  during  or  shortly  after 
the  time  of  the  occurrence  which  has  inspired  them;  that  is,  only 
"  at  a  time  so  near  as  reasonably  to  preclude  the  idea  of  deliberate 

8  ^Other  leading  cases  phrasing  the  general  doctrine  and  emphasizing  the  use  of 
such  statements  as  assertions  given  trustworthiness  by  the  circumstances  are  as  follows  : 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Mosley,  8  Wall.  397  ;  Browne!!  v.  II.  Co.,  47  Mo.  246  ;  Harrimun  v. 
Stowe,  57  id.  93  ;  McLeod  v.  Gunther,  80  Ky.  405  ;  Augusta  Factory  v.  Barnes,  72  Ga. 
226  ;  L.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Leverett,  48  Ark.  343 ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  li.  Co.  v.  Buck,  116 
Ind.  576.1 

i  P34  Fed.  314.] 

8  LNisbet,  J.,  in  Mitchum  v.  State,  supra;  Somerville,  J.,  in  Dismukes  r.  State, 
83  Ala.  289;  Cooley,  P.  J.,  in  Merkle  v.  Bennington,  58  Mich.  163;  Black,  J.,  in 
Leahey  v.  R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  172.] 

•  rThacher,  J.f  in  Scaggs  ?».  State,  8  Sm.  &  M.  724.] 

*  r.Stinoss,  J-,  >n  State  v.  Murphy,  16  R.  I.  .128.] 

,  J.,  in  Carr  v.  State,  43  Ark.  104.] 


§§  162/-162#.]        SPONTANEOUS   DECLARATIONS.  2G5 

design,"  6  or,  in  the  words  of  Lord  Holt,  in  the  earliest  precedent, 
constantly  quoted,  "immediate  upon  the  hurt  received,  and  before 
that  she  had  time  to  devise  or  contrive  anything  for  her  own  advan- 
tage." 7  It  is  therefore  properly  a  question  to  be  determined  anew 
in  each  case  whether  the  circumstances  were  such  that  the  state- 
ments could  be  regarded  as  of  the  spontaneous  nature  intended  by 
the  above  phrasings ; 8  and  in  the  application  of  the  principle  other 
cases  can  be  of  little  or  no  service  as  precedents.  The  circumstances 
in  each  new  case  may  be  so  different  that  the  period  of  time  which, 
in  the  case  of  other  declarations  admitted  or  excluded,  has  elapsed 
between  the  occurrence  and  the  utterance  can  be  no  guide  for  the 
ruling  in  another  instance.9 

One  or  two  supposed  limitations,  sometimes  put  forward,  are  due 
to  the  association  of  this  exception  with  the  verbal-act  or  res  gestce 
doctrine,  already  referred  to.  (1)  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the 
utterances  of  a  bystander  —  i.  e.  not  the  person  assaulted  in  an  affray 
nor  the  passenger  or  the  engineer  in  a  railway  collision,  but  a  mere 
spectator  not  a  participant  —  are  inadmissible.10  This  would  be  proper 
according  to  the  verbal-act  doctrine,  which  assumes  an  equivocal  act 
and  admits  the  utterances  of  the  actor  as  giving  it  fuller  signifi- 
cance; and  only  the  actor's  utterances  would  thus  be  admissible. 
But  the  limitation  has  no  place  in  the  present  exception;  the  utter- 
ances of  any  person  within  the  influence  of  the  exciting  circum- 
stances should  be  admissible.11  (2)  Declarations  genuinely  coming 

6  Qsisbet,  J.,  in  Mitchum  v.  State,  supra;  the  language  of  the  opinion  in  this  case 
is  perhaps  more  quoted  (olten  without  acknowledgment)  than  any  other  American 
case.] 

7  "^Thompson  v.  Trevanion,  Skinner  402.     Other  useful  phrasings  will  be  found  in 
Hill's  Case,  2  Gratt.  604;  Scaggs  v.  State,  supra;  Waldele  v.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  274  ; 
Galveston  v.  Barbour,  62  Tex.  176;  Merkle  v.  Beunington,  supra;  State  v.  Murphy, 
supra,r\ 

8  pKennedy  v.  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  656  ;  State  v.  Ramsey,  48  La.  An.  1407-3 

9  QA  few  recent  examples  from  the  various  jurisdictions,  in  addition  to  the  fore- 
going leading  cases,  are  given  in  the  following  list:  Burton  v.  State,  Ala.,  23  So. 
729  ;  Appleton  v.  State,  61  Ark.  590  ;  Lissak  v.  Crocker  Est.  Co.,  119  Cal.  442  ;   State 
r.  Bradnack,  69  Conn.  212  ;  Sullivan  v.  State,  101  Ga.  800  ;  Chic.  W.  D.  R.  Co.  v. 
Becker,  128  111.  548  ;  Globe  A.  I.  Co.  v.  Gerisch,  163  id.  625  ;  Parker  v.  State,  136 
Ind.  284,  290  ;  Smith  v.  Dawley,  92  la.  312  ;  Walker  v.  O'Connell,  Kan.,  52  Pac.  894  ; 
Hughes  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  41  S.  W.  294  ;  State  v.  Desroches,  48  La.  An.  428  ;  Eastman  v. 
R.  Co.,  165  Mass.  342  ;  M.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Stinson,  74  Miss.  453  ;  State  v.  Thompson, 
132  Mo.  301  ,  State  v.  Pugh,  16  Mont.  343  ;  Collins  v.  State,  46  Nebr.  37  ;  Trenton 
R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  N.  J.,  37  Atl.  730;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.   Lyons.  129  Pa.  121  ;  State  v. 
Arnold,  47  S.  C.  9  ;  Tex.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  82  Tex.  660  ;  Gowen  t.  Bush,  40 
U.  S.  App.  349;  People  v.  Kessler,  13  Utah  69 ;  State  v.  Badger,  69  Vt.  216  ;  Stein- 
hoferr.  R.  Co.  92  Wis.  123.] 

11  [Flynn  v.  State,  43  Ark.  293;  Stroud  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  19  S.  W.  976  ;  State  ». 
Ramsey,  48  La.  An.  1407  ;  Felska  ».  R.  Co.,  152  N.  Y.  339  ;  Ganaway  v.  Dram.  Ass'n, 
Utah,  53  Pac.  830.] 

11  [See  instances  in  Mobile  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcraft,  48  Ala.  31  ;  Hartnett  v.  McMahan, 
168  Mass.  3  ;  Hitchcock  v.  Burgett,  38  Mich.  505 ;  State  r.  Walker,  78  Mo.  386 ;  State 
V.  Kaiser,  124  id.  651 ;  State  ».  Duncan,  116  id.  288,  292,  310  ;  State  v.  Sexton,  id. 
48  S.  W.  452;  State  v.  Bigcerstaff,  17  Mont.  510  ;  Castner  v.  Sliker,  33  N.  J.  L.  97  ; 
ColL  v.  Transit  Co.,  180  Pa,  618 ;  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.  t>.  Collier,  62  Tex.  320.] 


266  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   KULE.  [CH.   XV. 

under  the  verbal-act  doctrine  must  accompany  it,  i.  e.  must  be  strictly 
contemporaneous  with  it,  because  by  hypothesis  they  form  a  part  of 
the  total  conduct  constituting  the  act.  Some  of  the  earlier  cases  in 
this  country,  frequently  cited,12  seem  to  have  carried  this  requirement 
more  or  less  strictly  into  the  present  exception ;  and  the  English  case 
of  R.  v.  Bedingfield,18  in  which  statements  made  by  one  running  out 
of  a  house  immediately  after  her  throat  was  cut  were  excluded, 
apparently  was  decided  on  this  principle;  "it  was  not  something 
said  while  something  was  being  done,  but  something  said  after 
something  done."  But  after  many  judicial  efforts  to  free  the  use  of 
the  present  sort  of  evidence  from  this  limitation,  it  is  now  generally 
accepted  (as  pointed  out  above)  that,  for  the  present  purpose,  the 
statements  need  not  be  contemporaneous  with  the  occurrence ;  they 
must  merely  be  so  nearly  after  it  that  there  is  no  reasonable  likeli- 
hood that  there  was  time  to  contrive  or  deliberate.  Under  the  gen- 
uine verbal-act  doctrine  (ante,  §  108),  no  such  extension  of  time  is 
allowed.14] 

§  162  h.  Sundry  Doctrines  ;  Complaint  of  Rape ;  Charge  by  Se- 
duced Woman ;  Complaint  after  Robbery.  [It  seems  best  to  note 
here  certain  uses  of  hearsay  statements  which,  though  historically 
having  little  or  no  connection  with  the  precedents  of  the  foregoing 
sections,  seem  to  be  justifiable,  if  at  all,  only  under  the  present 
exception. 

(1)  Complaint  by  the  woman  after  an  alleged  rape.  To  show  that 
the  charge  made  by  the  woman  against  a  defendant  accused  of  rape 
is  not  recently  contrived,  and  to  negative  the  inference  that  might 
be  drawn  from  her  supposed  silence  without  complaint,  the  fact  that 
she  did  complain  freshly  after  the  alleged  act  is  admitted  in  evi- 
dence, and  the  terms  of  her  complaint  are  in  most  jurisdictions  also 
received  as  corroborating  her  present  story.  But  all  this  enters  as 
affecting  her  testimony  as  a  witness,  and  the  limitations  under  which 
it  may  be  done  are  worked  out  from  that  point  of  view,  and  are 
explained  post,  §  469  e.  It  is  a  different  question  whether,  irre- 
spective of  the  bearing  of  such  evidence  in  corroboration  of  a 
witness,  the  terras  of  the  statement  may  be  received,  i.  e.  virtually 
as  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule;  though  the  res  gestce  notion 
is  frequently  referred  to.  The  matter  remained  long  in  contro- 
versy, even  after  Brazier's  Case  ; 1  but  was  finally  settled,  by  a  series 

«  VE.  g.  Com.  v.  McPike,  3  Gush.  184  ;  Com.  v.  Hackett,  2  All.  136.] 

13  [1.4  Cox  Cr.  C.  341.     A  long  controversy  arose  over  this  case,  anil  it  lias  usually 
been  thought  to  be  erroneously  decided ;  see  the  article  "  Bedingfield's  Case,"  by  Pro- 
fessor.1.  B.  Thayer,  in  14  Ame'r.  L.  Rev.  817;  15  id.  1.] 

14  pt  may  also  be  noted  that  statements  by  an  employee  after  an  accident,  raising  the 
question  of  the  use  of  an  agent's  admissions  as  against  his  principal,  are  sometimes 
(lisiMissed  in  terms  of  res  gestce,  without  distinguishing  between  that  question  and  the 
present  one  ;  e.  a.  the  majority's  opinion  in  Vicksburg  R.  Co.  v.  O'Bnen,  119  U.  S.  99. 

For  a  full  ana  acute  exposition  of  the  various  questions  connected  with  res  gcslce, 
see  further  Ihn  article  of  P-nfessor  Thayer  above  referred  to.] 
1  [East  PI.  Cr.  I,  443.] 


§§  162  #-162  i.]      COMPLAINT   OF   RAPE,    SEDUCTION,  ROBBERY.         267 

of  Nisi  Prius  rulings,  against  the  admission  of  such  statements.* 
In  this  country,  a  few  Courts  receive  the  detailed  statement  appar- 
ently as  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  though  with  some  reference 
to  the  res  gestce  phrase.8  But  by  far  the  greater  number  refuse  to 
accept  the  detailed  statement  in  any  way  except  in  corroboration  of 
the  woman  as  a  witness.4 

(2)  It  was  formerly  provided  by  statute  in  some   of  the  older 
States  that  the  mother  of  a  bastard  child  might  be  competent  as  a 
witness,  in  spite  of  her  interest,  in  a  bastardy  proceeding,  provided 
she  had  been  constant  in  her  accusation,  by  having  charged  as  the 
father  of  her  child,  during  the  time  of  travail,  the  same  person  now 
charged.     Such  utterances,  however,  though  resting  in  part  for  their 
support  as  evidence  upon  the  principle  of  the  present  subject,6  are 
now  treated  as  admissible,  if  at  all,  from  the  point  of  view  of  cor- 
roborating a  witness.8 

(3)  Perhaps  upon  the  analogy  of  the  two  preceding  instances,  a 
doctrine  has  grown  up  in  at  least  one  Court  that  the  terms  of  a  com- 
plaint made  by  the  person  robbed,  shortly  after  the  robbery,  are 
admissible;7   but  it  is  elsewhere  usually  repudiated.8] 

Learned  Treatises  and  Statistical  Tables. 

§  162  i.  Exception  generally  denied.  [There  is  much  to  be  said 
for  admitting,  as  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  learned  treatises, 
in  particular,  technical  scientific  works,  as  evidence  of  the  facts  of 
science  therein  stated,  under  proper  safeguards  calculated  to  pre- 
vent the  abuse  of  such  evidence.1  But  ever  since  Collier  v.  Simp- 
son,* it  has  been  commonly  accepted  that  no  such  general  exception 
exists,  either  in  England8  or  in  this  country.4  In  at  least  two 

3  rjR.  v.  Clarke,  2  Stark.  242;  K.  v.  Walker,  2  Moo.  &  R,  212  ;  R.  v.  Megson,  9  C. 
&  P.  420  ;  R.  v.  Alexander,  2  Cr.  &  D.  126  ;  R.  v.  Osborne,  1  Car.  &  M.  622  ;  R.  v. 
Nicholas,  2  C.  &  K.  246  ;  E.  v.  Eyre,  2  F.  &  F.  579  ;  R.  r.  Wood,  14  Cox  Cr.  46  ;  R.  v. 
tallyman,  1896,  2  Q.  B.  167.] 

8  [[State  v.  Kinney,  44  Conn.  156  ;  McMurrin  v.  Rigby,  80  la.  325  ;  People  v. 
Lynch,  29  Mich.  279  ;  People  v.  Brown,  53  id.  531  ;  People  v.  Gage,  62  id.  271 ;  People 
v.  Glover,  71  id.  303  ;  People  v.  Hicks,  98  id.  86;  People  v.  Duncan,  104  id.  460  (the 
last  two  cases  limiting  the  earlier  ones)  ;  State  v.  Fitzsimon,  18  E.  I.  236.] 


6 


'See.  the  authorities  collected  post,  §  469  c.] 

'See  the  language  in  Maxwell  v.  Hardy,  8  Pick.  560.] 

'See  post,  §  469  c.] 


_  People  v.  Morrigan,  29  Mich.  5  ;  Lambert  v.  People,  ib.  71  ;  Driscoll  ».  People, 
47  id.  416  ;  People  t>.  Simpson,  48  id.  479  ;  People  v.  Hicks,  98  id.  86  (restricting  the 
rule).l 

8  [Boiling  »».  State,  98  Ala.  80  ;    People  v.  McCrea,  32  Cal.  98  ;  Brooks  v.  State, 
96  Gii.  353  ;  Shoecraft  v.  State,  137  Ind.  433;  Jones  v.  Com.,.  86  Va.  743.] 

1  L~See  the  reasons  pro  and  con  examined  by  the  present  editor  in  an  article  "Sci- 
entific Books  in  Evidence,"  in  26  Amer.  L.  Rev.  390  ;  but  not  all  the  language  of  the 
article  would  now  be  endorsed  by  him.] 

2  [5  C.  &  P.  73.    The  practice  before  that  time  seems  to  have  been  unsettled  ;  see 
Cowppr's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1163.] 

8  PR.  v.  Crouch,  1  Cox  Cr.  94  ;  R.  v.  Taylor,  13  id.  78."] 

*  [Brown  ».  Sheppard,  13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  179  ;  People  v.  Wheeler,  60  Cal.  584  ;  Gal- 


268  EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   HEARSAY   RULE.  [CH.   XV. 

jurisdictions,  however,  such  a  general  exception  has  been  estab- 
lished.5] 

§  162  j.  Partial  Forms  of  Recognition.  [Nevertheless,  there  are 
several  sorts  of  evidence,  more  or  less  generally  conceded  to  be  ad- 
missible, whose  admission  must  be  regarded  as  a  partial  recognition 
of  the  principle.  (1)  Treatises  on  Anglo-American  law  by  writers 
of  accepted  standing,  whether  English 1  or  American,  may  be  used  as 
evidence  of  the  law.  Treatises  by  reputed  authors  on  foreign  law 
have  also  often  been  employed,2  though  it  has  been  required  in  the 
House  of  Lords  that  they  be  presented  through  and  indorsed  by  an 
expert  witness.8  (2)  Certain  tables  of  mathematical  calculation,  in 
general  acceptance,  have  always  been  regarded  as  admissible,  — 
in  particular,  almanacs,*  and  standard  tables  of  mortality  and  an- 

lagher  v.  R.  Co.,  67  id.  17  ;  Johnston  ».  R.  Co.,  95  Ga.  685  ;  North  C.  E.  M.  Co.  t>. 
Monka,  107  111.  341;  Bloomington  ».  Schrock,  110  id.  221  ;  Epps  v.  State,  102  Ind. 
550  ;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  17  ;  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  57  ;  Ash  worth  v.  Kitt- 
redge,  12  Gush.  195  ;  Washburn  v.  Cuddihy,  8  Gray  431  ;  Com.  v.  Sturtivant,  117 
Muss.  139  ;  Com.  v.  Brown,  121  id.  81  ;  Com.  v.  Marzynski,  149  id.  72 ;  People  v. 
Hull,  48  Mich.  490  ;  People  v.  Millard,  53  id.  75  ;  People  v.  Vanderhopf,  71  id.  179 ; 
Payson  o.  Everett,  12  Minn.  219;  Tucker  v.  McDonald,  60  Miss.  470  ;  Dole  v.  John- 
son, 50  X.  H.  456  ;  New  J.  Z.  &  I.  Co.  v.  L.  Z.  &  I.  Co.,  59  N.  J.  189  ;  Melvin  v. 
Easly,  1  Jones  L.  388 ;  Huffman  w.  Click,  77  N.  C.  57  ;  State  v.  O'Brien,  7  R.  I.  338  ; 
State  o.  Sexton,  S.  D.,  72  N.  W.  84  ;  Fowler  v.  Lewis,  25  Tex.  381  ;  Davis  v.  U.S., 
165  U.  S.  373,  semble;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Yates,  U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  584  ;  Stilling 
v.  Thorp,  54  Wis.  534;  Kreuziger  v.  R.  Co.,  73  id.  160.] 

6  [Yotra:  Bowman  v.  Woods,  1  G.  Gr.  445  ;  Brodhead  v.  Wiltse,  35  la.  429 
(under  the  Code)  ;  Crawford  v.  Williams,  48  id.  249  ;  Worden  v.  R.  Co.,  76  id.  314 ; 
Burg  v.  R.  Co.,  90  id.  106,  114  ;  Nebraska:  Sioux  C.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlayson,  16 
Nebr.  587  (under  Code  §  342)  ;  Alabama :  Stoudenmeier  v.  Williamson,  29  Ala.  567  ; 
Merkle  v.  State,  37  id.  41 ;  Bales  v.  State,  63  id.  38.  But  a  similar  Code  provision  in 
California  is  construed  as  embodying  only  the  exception  (ante,  §  139)  for  reputation 
on  matters  of  general  interest :  People  v.  Wheeler,  60  Cal.  582  ;  Gallagher  v.  R.  Co., 
67  id.  17  ;  and  a  si;nilar  interpretation  lias  recently  been  attempted  for  the  Iowa  and 
Nebraska  Codes :  Bixby  v.  Bridge  Co.,  la.,  75  N.  W.  182  ;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  t>.  Yates, 
U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  584  ;  Van  Skike  v.  Potter,  Nebr.,  73  N.  W.  295.  The  exception 
formerly  existed  in  Wisconsin  :  Luning  v.  State,  1  Chand.  185  ;  Ripon  v.  Bittel,  30 
Wis.  619  ;  see  later  cases  ante,  note  4.] 

1  QThe  Pawashick,  2  Low.  148  ;  the  theory  of  judicial  notice  (ante,  Chap.  II),  and 
of  refreshing  the  judicial  memory,  is  here  sometimes  invoked  in  justification.] 

2  ("Lord  Kllenborough,  C.  J.,  in  Picton's  Trial,  30  How.  St.  Tr.  483,  492,  511,  514  ; 
Lord  Stowell,  in  Dalrymple  v.  Dalrymple,  2  Hagg.  Cois.  81  ;  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  Lacon 
v.  Hig^ins,  3  Stark.  178,  semble  ;  Baron  de  Bode's  Case,  8  Q.  B.  254  ;  Breadalbane  v. 
Chandos,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  727,  741  ;  Nelson  v.  Bridport,  8  Beav.  529  ;  Bremer  v.   Free- 
man, 10  Moore  306;  Rice  v.  Gunn.  4  Ont.  589.    Excluded:  R.  v.  Crouch,  1  Cox  Cr. 
94  ;  Perth  Peerage  Case,  2  H.  L.  C.  874.] 

8  [^Sussex  Peerage  Case,  11  Cl.  &  F.  113.  From  the  above  matters  are  to  be  dis- 
tinguished (1)  the  use  of  official  printed  copies  of  foreign  statutes:  post,  §  489  ;  (2) 
the  use  of  reports  of  judicial  decisions:  post,  §  489  ;  (3)  the  propriety  of  allowing 
counsel  to  read  law-books  to  the  jury :  see  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  130  Mo.  407.] 

•  [[Theory  of  Evidence  (1739),  ch.  5,  pi.  104:  "The  almanack  is  a  sufHcient 
evidence  to  prove  a  day  Sunday  ; "  R.  v.  Dyer,  6  Mod.  41  ;  Brough  ».  Perkins,  ib. 
81;  Tutton  v.  Darke,  5  "H.  &  N.  649;  Allma'n  v.  Owen,  31  Ala.  141  ;  People  v.  Chee 
Kee,  61  Cal.  404;  State  ».  Morris,  47  Conn.  180  ;  Munshower  v.  State,  55  Md.  24  ; 
Wilson  v.  Van  Leer,  127  Pa.  378.  No  requirement  that  the  almanac  shall  be  a 
standard  one  seems  to  be  made.  The  theory  of  judicial  notice  is  sometimes  in- 
voked ;  but  it  is  one  thing  to  notice  the  day  of  the  week  or  the  time  of  moonrise 
without  proof,  and  another  thing  to  resort  to  the  almanac  as  evidence  of  it.  For  an 
interesting  examination  of  the  history  of  the  use  of  the  almanac,  see  Thayer,  Pre- 
liminary Treatise  on  Evidence,  291.] 


§§  162  1-162  &.]   LEAKNED  TREATISES  AND  STATISTICAL  TABLES.     269 

nuities;6  but  sundry  others  have  also  been  admitted,  such  as 
millwrights'  tables,8  tables  of  weights  and  currency,7  engineering 
tabulations  and  statistics.8  (3)  There  is  an  exception  of  undefined 
extent,  allowing  the  resort  to  dictionaries  and  grammars  for  learning 
the  meaning  of  words  and  perhaps  for  other  matters  of  literary 
usage.9  Dictionaries  are  often  cited  in  judicial  opinions;10  and 
Courts  are  frequently  found  supporting  their  views  by  citations  of 
the  very  treatises  of  science  which  they  would  not  have  allowed 
to  be  quoted  from  below  the  bench.11] 

§  162  k.  Application  of  the  Prohibition.  [(1)  The  expert  witness 
is  by  some  Courts  allowed  to  cite  professional  writers,  either  by 
specific  quotation  or  by  reference  to  professional  opinion  as  corrob- 
orating him;1  but  this  is  in  strictness  a  violation  of  principle,8 
though  much  to  be  recommended.  (2)  It  has  been  thought  by  some 
Courts  that  an  expert  witness  may  be  discredited  by  reading  an 
opposite  opinion  from  a  professional  treatise  or  by  being  asked 
whether  opposing  views  have  not  been  laid  down  by  writers  or 
whether  he  agrees  with  certain  opposing  opinions  then  read;8  but 
this  is  in  effect  introducing  the  treatise  in  evidence;  and  it  is  gen- 
erally held  that  it  cannot  be  done,  except  that  where  a  witness  has 
referred  to  a  treatise,  or  to  writers  generally,  as  agreeing  with  him, 
the  treatises  may  be  shown  not  to  agree  with  him,  just  as  any  other 

6  [Rowley  r.  R,  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Exch.  226;  Birm.  M.  R,  Co.  ».  Wilmer,  97  Ala.  165, 
170  ;  A.  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffith,  63  Ark.  491  ;  Townsend  v.  Briggs,  99  Cal.  481  ;  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Richards,  62  Ga.  307  ;  Richm.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Garner,  91  id.  27  ;  Colum- 
bus v.  Sims,  94  id.  483 ;  M.  D.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  99  id.  229  ;  Jolietr.  Blower,  155 
111.  414;  Donaldson  v.  R,  Co.,  18  la.  291  ;  McDonald  v.  R.  Co.,  26  id.  140  ;  Coatesy. 
R.  Co.,  62  id.  491  ;  Worden  v.  R.  Co.,  76  id.  314 ;  Krueger  v.  Sylvester,  100  id.  647  ; 
Lancaster  v.  Lancaster,  78  Ky.  200  ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  id.,  38  S.W.  852 ; 
Nelson  v.  R.  Co.,  104  Mich.  582,  semble  ;  O'Mellia  v.  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  205,  222  ;  Friend 
v.  Ingersoll,  39  Nebr.  717,  724  ;  Camden  v.  Williams,  N.  J.  L.,  40  Atl.  633  ;  Schell  v. 
Plninb,  55  N.  Y.  598  ;  Sauter  v.  R.  Co.,  66  id.  54  ;  People  v.  Ins.  Co.,  78  id.  128  ; 
Campbell  v.  York,  172  Pa.  205  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ayres,  84  Tenn.  729  ;  Vicksburg  R. 
Co.  v.  Putnam,  118  U.  S.  554  ;  Mills  v.  Catlin,  22  Vt.  107  J  McKeigue  v.  Janesville, 
68  Wis.  58. 

Distinguish  those  cases  in  which  life-tables  are  excluded  because  the  results  of  the 
calculations  therein  are  not  material  to  the  issue.] 

6  TGarwood  v.  R.  Co.,  45  Hun  129.] 

1  [Gallagher  »•  R.  Co.,  67  Cal.  16,  semble.^ 

8  LW"st.  Ass.  Co.  v.  Mohlman  Co.,  U.  S.  App.,  83  Fed.  811,  where  Lacombe,  J., 
lays  down  a  broad  principle. 

Other  analogous  instances  are  as  follows  :  Hatcher  v.  Dunn,  la.,  66  N.  W.  905  (ther- 
mometer used  in  gauging  oils,  admitted)  ;  Payson  v.  Everett,  12  Minn.  219  (bank-note 
detectors,  excluded).] 

9  £  Answer  of  the  Judges,  22  How.  St.  Tr.  802  ;  Darby  t>.  Ousley,  1  H.  &  X.  8.] 

10  VE.  g.  Dantzler  v.  D.  C.  &  I.  Co.,  101  Ala.  309,  314,  as  one  instance  from  many.] 

11  £E.  g.  Sinnott  v.  Colombet,  107  Cal.  187  ;  Smith  v.  State,  23  Ga.  806  ;  Wash- 
burn  v.  Cuddihy,  8  Gray  431 ;  Garbutt  v.  People,  17  Mich.  9,  17  J  Steenerson  v.  R. 
Co.,  Minn.,  72  N.  W.  713.] 

1  ["Carter  v.  State,  2  Ind.  619  ;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  17.] 

2  ("People  r.  Millard,  53  Mich.  76  ;  Fox  v.  Peninsular  Works,  84  id.  681.] 

8  £Hess  v.  Lowrey,  122  Ind.  233  ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &€.  R.  Co.  v.  Howefi,  147  id. 
266  ;  Williams  v.  Nally,  Ky.,  46  S.  W.  874 ;  State  v.  Wood,  63  N.  H.  495  ;  Byers  v. 
R.  Co.,  94  Tenn.  345.] 


270  EXCEPTIONS    TO   THE    HEARSAY    RULE.  [CH.    XV. 

assertion  by  a  witness  may  be  disproved.4  (3)  That  counsel  should 
read  a  treatise  to  the  jury  in  argument  would  of  course  be  in  effect  to 
use  the  treatise  in  evidence;  this  is  allowed  in  one  jurisdiction;6 
in  a  few  others  it  is  said  to  be  allowable  only  in  "  illustration  "  of 
the  argument; 6  but  elsewhere  it  is  generally  repudiated.7] 

Regular  Commercial  Publications. 

§  162  I.    Reports  of  Market  Prices ;  Reports  of  Legal  Decisions ;  etc. 

[A  few  instances  are  recognized  in  which  regular  publications  re- 
cording current  transactions  or  proceedings  in  some  commercial  or 
professional  branch,  and  generally  accepted  and  trusted  by  the  trade 
or  profession,  are  admitted  to  show  the  facts  thus  reported.  There 
is  no  general  principle  expressly  recognized  as  uniting  the  instances; 
but  practical  convenience  and  the  accepted  trustworthiness  of  the 
reports  has  been  regarded  as  sufficient  justification.1 

(1)  A  number  of  Courts,  constantly  increasing,  receive  the  reports 
of  market  prices  as  published  in  trade  journals  or  ordinary  news- 
papers commonly  resorted  to  for  such  information,  or  in  price-current 
lists  by  wholesale  dealers  generally  recognized  as  trustworthy.  The 
doctrine  dates  from  the  cases  of  Clicquot's  Champagne2  and  Sisson 
v.  R.  Co.,9  and,  with  more  or  less  variation  of  phrasing,  has  received 
wide  recognition.4 

*  QNelson  v.  Bridport,  8  Beav.  537,  sembfe ;  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  89  111. 
519  ;  Bloomington  v.  Schrock,  110  id.  222  (leading  case) ;  Davis  v.  State,  38  Md.  36  ; 
Pinney  v.  Cahill,  48  Mich.  587  (leading  case) ;  Marshall  v.  Brown,  50  id.  150  ;  People 
v.  Vandcrhoof,  71  id.  179  ;  Hall  v.  Murdoc.k,  id.,  72  N.  W.  150  ;  New  J.  Z.  &  I.  Co. 
v.  L.  Z.  &  I.  Co.,  59  N.  J.  L.  189;  Ripon  v.  Bittel,  30  Wis.  619;  Knoll  v.  State,  55 
id.  256.] 

*  FStiite  v.  Hoyt,  46  Conn.  337.] 

«  £Yoe  »•  People,  49  111.  412,  scmble ;  Cory  v.  Silcox,  6  Ind.  40  ;  Harvey  v.  State, 
40  id.  518  ;  Baldwin  v.  Bricker,  86  id.  223  ;  State  v.  O'Neil,  51  Kan.  651,  674  ;  Legg 
v.  Drake,  1  Oh.  St.  288 ;  Wade  v.  De  Witt,  20  Tex.  400.] 

7  QR.  v.  Crouch,  1  Cox  Cr.  94;  R.  v.  Taylor,  13  id.  77  (yet  it  was  done  by  Serjeant 
Shoe,  in  Palmer's  Trial,  Annual  Register,  1856,  p.  471)  ;  People  v.  Wheeler,  60  Cal.  4  ; 
Ashworth  v.  Kittredge,  12  Gush.  195  ;  Com.  v.  Wilson,  1  Gray  338 ;  Washburn  v.  Cud- 
dihy,  8  id.  431  ;  People  v.  Hall,  48  Mich.  490  :  Marshall  n.  Brown.  50  id.  150  ;  People 
v.  Millard,  53  id.  77  ;  Melvin  w.  Easly,  1  Jones  L.  388  ;  Huffman  v.  Chick,  77  N.  C.  56  ; 
State  v.  Rogers,  112  id.  874;  Byers  v.  R.  Co.,  94  Tenn.  345,  semble  ;  Boyle  v.  State,  57 
Wis.  480.] 

1  CThese  instances  are  to  be  distinguished  from  the  exception  for  regular  entries  in 
the  course  of  business  (ante,  §  120  a),  for  there  the  declarant  must  be  a  specified  per- 
son, while  here  the  reporter  may  be  anonymous,  and  there  he  must  be  deceased  or 
otherwise  unavailable,  while  here  he  need  not  be  accounted  for.] 

2  T3  Wall.  141  ;  1865.] 


_14  Mich.  496  ;  opinion  by  Mr.  J.  Cooley.] 
Ala.  Code  1897,  §  1810  ;  Tyson  v.  Chestnut,  Aln.,  21  So.  73  :  Nash  v.  Classen, 
11.  409,  tembh;  Wash.  Ice  Co.  v.  Webster,  68  MP.  463.  nrrnbfe;  Mnnshower  v. 


8 
4 

163 

State,  55  Md.  24,  stmblt;  Clevel.  &  T.  R.  Co.'  v.  Perkins^  17  Mich.  296  ;  Pen>r  T>! 
Thickstun,  51  Mich.  694  ;  Anils  v.  Young,  fl8  id.  231  ;  Harrison  v.  Glover,  72  N.  Y. 
454,  semble;  Fenneratein'g  Champagne,  3  Wall.  147. 

In  the  following  cases  the  pnn'-inle  was  recognized,  but  the  particular  document 
was  regarded  as  untrustworthy  :  Willnrd  v.  Mellor.  19  Colo.  534  :  Oolsnn  w.  Ehert,  52 
Mo.  260.  270;  Whelan  v.  Lynch,  60  N.  Y.  474  ;  Fairley  v.  Smith,  87  N.  C.  871. 

Distinguish  the  question  whether  a  witness  who  has  merely  read  price-quotations  is 
qualified  to  testify  to  prices  :  post,  §  430  n.] 


§§  162&-162  m.]      REGULAR   COMMERCIAL   PUBLICATIONS.  271 

(2)  The  use  of  printed  reports  of  judicial  decisions,  both  domestic 
and  foreign,  has  usually  been  sanctioned,6  without  the  enunciation 
of  any  distinct  theory;  it  would  seem  that   the  present  principle 
covers  such  cases. 

(3)  In  a  few  other  instances  documents  accepted  in  a  trade  or  pro- 
fession as  trustworthy,  and  compiled  in  the  regular  course  of  busi- 
ness  by  competent  persons  to  be  acted  upon  by  others,  have  been 
received.6] 

Official  Statements. 

§  162  m.  General  Principle.  [An  exception  which  in  practice  is 
by  far  the  commonest  in  its  employment  is  the  exception  admitting 
statements  made  by  officials  in  pursuance  of  official  duty.  The 
necessity  (ante,  §  114  a)  for  the  allowance  of  such  an  exception  is 
found,  not  in  the  death  of  the  declarant,  but  in  the  practically  unen- 
durable inconvenience  of  summoning  public  officers  from  their  posts 
on  the  innumerable  occasions  when  their  official  doings  or  records 
are  to  be  proved  in  litigation.  The  guarantee  of  trustworthiness 
(ante,  §  114  a)  justifying  the  exception  is  usually  said  to  be  the  offi- 
cial oath  of  duty;1  but  an  additional  reason  and  requirement  is  in 
England  said  to  be  the  publicity  of  the  document,  which  ensures  the 
probability  of  the  correction  of  possible  errors  by  the  public  who 
have  access  to  it  and  the  subjective  incentive  on  the  part  of  the  offi- 
cial to  state  correctly  that  which  the  public's  inspection  would  detect 
as  false  if  he  recorded  falsely.8  The  latter  reason,  as  accepted  in 
England,  limits  the  common-law  scope  of  the  principle  in  its  appli- 

6  CStayner  v.  Burgesses,  12  Mod.  86 ;  Gage  v.  Bulkeley,  Ridgw.  t.  Hardw.  276  ; 
Inf;e  o.  Murphy,  10  Ala.  885,  895  ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §§  1902,  1963  ;  Stanford  v.  Priest, 
27  Ga.  243,  247  ;  Kingsley  v.  Kingsley,  20  111.  202  ;  Pen.  &  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Bartlett,  12 
Gray  244  (under  statute);  Cragiu  v.  Lamkin,  7  All.  396;  Ames  v.  McCamber,  124 
Mass.  85  ;  Charlotte  r.  Chouteau,  33  Mo.  201  ;  Kennard  v.  Kennard,  63  N.  H.  308  ; 
State  v.  Moy  Looke,  7  Or.  57  ;  Latimer  v.  Elgin,  4  Dess.  32  ;  So.  Car.  Gen.  St.  c.  86, 
B.  2218  ;  The  Pawashick,  2  Low.  148  ;  Mackay  v.  Easton,  19  Wall.  632.  Contra  : 
Gardner  r.  Lewis,  7  Gill  894  (admitted  by  consent  in  Bait.  &  0.  B.  Co.  v.  Glenn,  28 
Aid.  323);  Barbour  v.  Archer,  2  A.  K.  Alarsh.  9  ;  undecided:  Tcrritt  v.  Woodruff,  19 
Vt.  182  ;  State  v.  Abbey,  29  id.  60,  65. 

Of  course  the  judges  who  refuse  to  accord  an  evidential  standing  to  such  reports  do 
nevertheless,  like  other  judges,  resort  to  them  habitually  for  information  as  to  prece- 
dents in  deciding  their  cases. 

Distinguish  the  use  of  official  printed  copies  of  statutes  and  derisions  (nost,  §  489); 
the  question  above  discussed  arises  only  for  reports  published  unofficially.] 

8  QHart  v.  Walker,  100  Mich.  406,  410  (weather  records  kept  at  an  asylum); 
Slorovich  v.  Ins.  Co.,  108  N.  Y.  62,  semble  (the  American  Lloyd's  and  other  shipping 
registers,  to  show  the  condition,  capacity,  age,  and  value  of  ships);  111.  Rev.  St.  c.  116, 
s.  29  ;  St.  1887,  p.  261  (abstracts  of  title,  made  by  competent  persons  in  the  regular 
course  of  business,  to  show  the  contents  of  records  of  title  destroyed  by  fire  ;  applied 
in  Richley  v.  Farrell,  69  111.  264  ;  Converses  Wood,  142  id.  132;  Chic.  &  A.  R.  Co.  ». 
Keecran,  152  id.  413  ;  similar  statutes  exist  elsewhere);  Pittsb.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sheppard,  56  Oh.  68  (American  Trotting  Association's  annual  reports,  to  show  the 
Bpeed-records  of  a  horse).] 

1  TR,  v.  Aickles,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.  436  (leading  case);  Doe  r.  France,  15  Q.  B.  758J 

s  LMerrick  v.  Wakley,  8  A.  &  E.  170 ;  Sturla  v.  Freccia,  L.  R.  5  App.  Cas.  623.  J 


272  EXCEPTIONS  TO  THE  HEARSAY  RULE.       [CH.  XV. 

cation,8  but  it  has  rarely  been  advanced  in  this  country; 4  and  seems, 
indeed,  to  be  a  modern  innovation  in  England.6] 

§  162  n.  Application  of  the  Principle.  [In  applying  this  principle, 
certain  simple  and  generally  accepted  limitations  prevail.  There 
must  be  an  official  duty  to  make  the  record,  report,  or  entry  in  ques- 
tion. This  duty  may  be  expressly  provided  for  by  statute  or  ordi- 
nance, or  it  may  be  implied  from  the  nature  and  functions  of  the 
office.  One  of  the  questions,  for  example,  that  arose  at  common  law 
was  whether  the  official  custodian  of  a  record  had  an  implied  author- 
ity to  certify  the  correctness  of  copies  of  them  so  as  to  justify  the 
receipt  of  the  certified  copies  in  evidence.  The  statement  must  be 
made  on  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  officer  (or  his  subordinates), 
though  this  limitation  is  liberally  construed. 

The  application  of  this  principle  in  practice  is  constantly  found 
united  with  the  application  of  two  other  principles  ;  viz.  (1)  the 
exemption  from  the  production  in  Court  of  the  original  of  a  public 
document,  involving  the  rule  of  Primariness  (post,  §§  563  a,  ff. 
(2)  the  presumption  of  authenticity  of  certain  official  signatures  and 
seals  appended  to  official  records  and  to  official  statements  used 
under  the  present  exception.  Moreover,  statutes  which  regulate 
the  use  of  public  documents  in  evidence  very  often  apply  two  or 
more  of  these  principles  at  the  same  time,  —  as  where  certified 
copies  of  an  official  register  are  declared  admissible;  «.  e.,  the  orig- 
inal need  not  be  produced,  and  the  hearsay  certificate  of  the  custo- 
dian is  made  admissible.  The  various  questions  arising  under  these 
combined  principles  are  discussed  post,  Chapters  XXVIII,  XXIX  ; 
and  merely  the  general  principle  of  the  present  exception  has  been 
explained  here,  in  order  to  exhibit  its  connection  with  the  other 
exceptions.] 

Sundry  Applications  of  the  Hearsay  Rule. 

[Sundry  instances,  of  not  uncommon  occurrence,  may  now  be  ex- 
amined, in  which  the  question  may  be  raised  whether  the  Hearsay 
rule  applies,  and  if  so,  whether  an  exception  is  to  be  made  to  it.] 

§  162  o.  View  by  Jury ;  Testimony  at  a  View ;  Juror's  Private 
Knowledge.  [The  Hearsay  rule  may  be  here  invoked  in  at  least  five 
aspects.  (1)  The  ancient  custom,  dictated  by  practical  necessity 
and  sanctioned  by  experience,  of  appointing  "showers"  either 
selected  by  the  judge  or  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  to  attend  the 
jury  at  a  view  and  point  out  the  places  and  things  referred  to  in  the 
testimony  at  the  trial,  is  strictly  not  hearsay;  because  each  shower  is 
sworn  to  his  duty,  and  because  either  a  shower  is  appointed  for  each 

•  PCases  in  the  preceding  note.] 

•  Li*  has  been  recognized,  however,  in  Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99  U.  S.  660  ;  Gushing  v, 
E.  Co.,  143  MOOT.  78. J 

6  L~Compare  the  language  of  Parke,  B.,  in  Doe  v.  Arkwright,  2  A.  &  E.  183.  J 


§§  162?w-1620.]  OFFICIAL  STATEMENTS;  SUNDRY  APPLICATIONS.  273. 

side  (in  which  case  he  is  virtually  a  representative  of  the  party)  or 
he  is  an  official  of  the  Court,  — sheriff,  or  the  like  (in  which  case  he 
is  no  more  to  be  regarded  as  testifying  than  is  the  judge  when,  in 
the  orthodox  but  unfortunately  now  with  us  nearly  everywhere 
discarded  practice,  he  sums  up  the  evidence  for  the  jury).  Be  this 
as  it  may,  the  pointing  out  by  the  showers  has  long  been  settled  to 
be  a  proper  proceeding  at  a  view,  and  no  hearsay.1 

(2)  But  at  the  view  no  information  is   to   be  received  by   the 
jury  from   any  other  persons   than  the    showers,    for  this   would 
clearly   be   receiving    hearsay  testimony,  i.  e.    statements   without 
oath  and  cross-examination.2 

(3)  "Where  one  or  more   members  of  the  jury  go  privately  and 
without  authority  from  the  Court  to  the  place  in  controversy  and 
examine  it,  this  is  equally  improper,  even  though  no  person  there 
speaks  to  them  about  the  subject  of  the  trial;  though  this  seems  not 
to  involve  hearsay,  but  to  be  a  violation  of  the  rule  against  unau- 
thorized views  (ante,  §  13  t). 

(4)  Does  the  Hearsay  rule  —  i.  e.  as  involving  the  right  of  cross- 
examination,  and  incidentally  of  confrontation,  of  witnesses  (post, 
§  163  /)  —  require  that  in  criminal  cases  (where  the  Constitution 
secures   the   right  and  therefore  overrides  any  statutes  regulating 
views)  the  defendant  should  be  present  at  a  view  ?     The  requirement 
of  confrontation  (as  explained  post,  §  163  /)  implies  merely  that  the 
party  shall  have  the  opportunity  of  cross-examining  witnesses;  and 
a  view  by  the  jury  (as  explained  ante,  §  13 f)  is  not  the  consultation 
of  witnesses  but  merely  the  inspection  of  the  thing  itself  which  is  the 
subject  of  the  controversy;  so  that  the  constitutional  principle  can- 
not properly  apply  to  render  improper  a  view  at  which  the  accused 
is  not  present.     This  is  the  result  reached   by  the  better  judicial 
opinion;  but  there  are  Courts  which  take  the  contrary  view.8 


ie  lorm  or  me  snowers  oatn  ana  tne  order  appomt- 
.  Whalley,  2  Cox  Cr.  231 .] 
iples  of  its  application  in  Erwin  v.  Bulla,  29  Ind. 
ickwell  w.  R.  Co.,  43  la.  470  ;  Hayward  v.  Knapp, 


1  [This  was  decided  in  Gage  v.  Smith,  Godb.  209  (1614);  Goodtitle  v.  Clark,  Barnes 
457  (1747);  see  the  propriety  recognized  in  Garcia  v.  State,  34  Fla.  811,  332;  People 
v.  Milner,  Cal.,  54  Pac.  833  ;  and  cases  in  the  next  notes.    People  v.  Green,  53  Cal.  60, 
partly  contra,  seems  unsound.     For  the  form  of  the  showers'  oath  and  the  order  appoint- 
ing them,  see  1  Burr.  252,  258;  R.  v.  Whalley,  2  Cox  Cr.  231.f 

2  QThis  is  unquestioned  ;  see  examj " 
95  ;  Conrad  v.  State,  144  id.  290  ;  Stock 

22  Minn.  5  ;  People  v.  Johnson,  110  N.  Y.  134,  143  ;  People  v.  Gallo,  149  id.  106,  li5 ; 
State  v.  Perry,  N.  C.,  27  S.  E.  997  ;  Hays  r.  Terr.,  Okl.,  54  Pac.  300  ;  Sasse  v.  State, 
68  Wis.  530. 

Statutes  sometimes  make  an  exception  for  an  inquest  of  damages  for  land-taking, 
which  becomes  virtually  a  trial  out  of  doors  ;  e.g.  Tenii.  Code  1858,  s.  1337,  Code  1896, 
§  1856J 

s  Q Certain  qualified  and  intermediate  forms  of  opinion  are  found  (for  instance,  that 
the  accused's  absence  is  not  an  objection  if  he  has  waived  attendance),  and  space  does 
not  suffice  to  analyze  each  ruling :  Benton  r.  State,  30  Ark.  328,  345 ;  People  v. 
Bonney,  19  Cal.  426,  445  ;  People  v.  Bush,  68  id.  623 ;  Shular  v.  State,  105  Ind.  289, 
293  (leading  case  pro)-,  State  v.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311,  323  ;  Rutherford  v.  Com.,  78  Ky. 
639  ;  State  v.  Bertin,  24  La.  An.  46  ;  Foster  v.  State,  70  Miss.  755,  765  (leading  case 
cmitrn);  Carroll  v.  State,  5  Nebr.  31 ;  People  v.  Thorn,  N.  Y.,  50  N.  E.  947;  Hays  ». 
Terr.,  Okl.,  54  Pac.  300;  State  v.  Ah  Lee,  8  Or.  214;  Stater.  Moran.  15  id. '262, 
VOL.  I.  —  18 


.274  EXCEPTIONS  TO   THE   HEARSAY  RULE.  [CH.  XV. 

(5)  A  juror  may  not  communicate  to  his  fellows  or  otherwise  use 
his  private  knowledge,  for  this  would  be  in  effect  to  admit  testimony 
not  subjected  to  oath  and  cross-examination.  But  those  general  and 
unquestionable  truths,  which  the  jury  may  assume,  just  as  the  judge 
judicially  notices  certain  notorious  facts  without  evidence  (dnte, 
§  6  c),  do  not  involve  the  use  of  the  juror's  testimony  in  this  sense.*] 

§  162  p.  Interpreter  ;  Counsel ;  Ex  parte  Experiments.  [(1)  The 
interpretation  of  the  words  of  a  witness  testifying  in  a  foreign  lan- 
guage, by  one  who  is  sworn  in  court  and  translates  the  testimony  to 
the  tribunal,  is  not  obnoxious  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  because  both  the 
original  witness  and  the  interpreter  are  under  oath  and  subject  to 
cross-examination.1  Where  a  witness  is  offered  to  testify  to  state- 
ments (e.  g.  admissions)  of  another  person  spoken  in  a  language  not 
understood  by  him  but  translated  for  him  by  an  interpreter,  he  is 
not  qualified,  because  he  does  not  speak  from  personal  knowledge 
(post,  §  430 /);  it  may  be  that  the  person  thus  speaking  may  be  re- 
garded as  having  made  the  interpreter  his  agent  for  the  purpose  of 
speaking  his  words,  in  which  case,  if  the  person  is  a  party,  they  are 
admissible  as  translated.2 

(2)  The  assertion  of  facts  in  argument  by  counsel,  not  as  merely 
stating  the  result  of  the  evidence  given,  but  as  stating  upon  his  own 
credit  a  fact  not  dealt  with  in  the  evidence,  is  in  effect  testimony, 
and  is  obnoxious  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  as  not  being  made  upon  oath 
and  subject  to  cross-examination ; 8  as  also  his  statement  of  what  could 
be  proved  by  a  witness  not  called.4  But  the  line  is  sometimes  hard 
to  draw  between  the  improper  assertion  of  facts  directly  bearing 
on  the  case,  and  the  legitimate  use  in  argument,  or  in  illustration  of 
a  process  of  reasoning,  of  matters  whose  truth  is  not  material  or  is 
generally  conceded,  — as  where  instances  are  cited  of  erroneous  ver- 
dicts on  circumstantial  evidence.6 

276  ;  State  v.  Chee  Gong,  17  id.  635  ;  Com.  v.  Van  Horn,  Pa.,  41  Atl.  469  ;  Sasse  ». 
State,  68  Wis.  530. 

For  other  questions  as  to  views  in  criminal  cases,  see  ante,  §§13  i,  13y.] 

«  fTarks  v.  Boston,'  15  Pick.  198,  209  ;  Washburn  v.  R.  Co.,  59  Wis.  364,  371  ;  see 
other  examples  of  the  distinction  between  the  two,  in  the  chapter  on  Judicial  Notice, 
ante,  §  6  c.  J 

1  FJThat  an  interpreter  of  former  testimony  must  be  called  as  a  witness  or  accounted 
for  in  the  usual  way,  see  Schearer  v.  Harber,  36  Ind.  541  ;  People  i».  Lee  Fat,  54  Cal. 
629 ;  People  v.  Ah  Yute,  56  id.  120  ;  People  v.  Sierp,  116  id.  249.] 

a  rjFabrigas  v.  Mostyn,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  123  ;  Camerlin  v.  Palmer  Co.,  10  All.  541  ; 
Com.  v.  Vose,  157  Mass.  393. 

For  interpretation  as  a  mode  of  rendering  a  witness*  testimony  intelligible,  see  post, 
S  439  «.] 

8  rjDumnore  v.  State,  115  Ala.  69  ;  Bell  v.  State,  100  Ga.  78  ;  Cluck  ».  State,  40 
Ind.  263,  271  ;  Davis  v.  Brown,  Ky.,  86  S.  W.  534;  State  v.  Lingle,  128  Mo.  528; 
Cutler  v.  Skeels,  69  Vt.  154;  State  v.  Bokien,  14  Wnsh.  403.] 

*  ["Sullivan  v.  State,  66  Ala.  51  ;  Mullen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  182  Pa.  150 ;  Pringler.  Miller, 
111  Mich.  663. 

Distinguish  the  use,  by  statute,  of  the  alleged  testimony  of  an  uncoiled  witness, 
where  the  opponent,  to  avoid  postponement  of  the  trial,  has  admitted  that  the  witness 
would  BO  testify.] 

*  [Tor  exam  pies  of  the  judicial  treatment  of  these  things,  see  Sullivan  v.  State,  66  Ala, 


§§  162  0-162  p.~\      RULE   APPLIED   TO   INTERPRETER,  COUNSEL.       275 

(3)  It  has  of  late  been  objected,  in  several  instances,  that  an 
examination  of  a  place  or  person,  or  an  experiment  tried,  or  a  dia- 
gram made,  by  a  witness  ex  parte,  i.  e.  without  notice  to  the  oppo- 
nent, is  improper,  and  renders  testimony  based  upon  it  inadmissible. 
This,  of  course,  is  a  misunderstanding  of  the  Hearsay  rule  and  the 
principle  of  confrontation  (j>ost,  §§  163,  163 /).  The  witness  after- 
wards testifies  in  court,  subject  to  cross-examination,  and  testi- 
mony thus  given  cannot  be  thought  of  as  ex  parte.  The  objection 
has  always  been  repudiated.6] 

51  (leading  opinion) ;  State  v.  O'Neil,  51  Kan.  651,  657,  674  ;  State  v.  Pancoast, 
5  N.  D.  516;  State  v.  Moore,  Or.,  48  Pac.  468  (leading  opinion) ;  Re  McCabe,  Vt.,  40 
Atl.  52  ;  Brown  v.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  281,  291  ;  and  an  article  on  "License  of  Speech 
of  Counsel,"  by  Irving  Browne,  Esq.,  in  "  The  Green  Bag,"  V,  539,  and  preceding 
numbers.] 

6  [Inspection:  State  v.  Leabo,  89  Mo.  247,  253  (leading  opinion) ;  State  v.  Brooks, 
92  id.  542,  579  ;  State  v.  Morris,  84  N.  C.  756,  760  ;  Lipes  v.  State,  15  Lea  125 ; 
Miss.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayres,  16  id.  725 ;  Moore  v.  State,  96  Tenn.  209 ;  Day  v.  U.  S., 
U.  S.  App.,  87  Fed.  125. 

Diagrams  and  models:  Aug.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Daly,  68  Ga.  234  ;  State  ».  Whitacre, 
98  N.  C.  753. 

Experiments:  Burg  v.  R.  Co.,  90  la.  106,  118  (leading  opinion).] 


276 


THE   HEAESAY  RULE   SATISFIED. 


[CH.   XVI. 


CHAPTER  XYI. 

THE     HEARSAY    RULE     SATISFIED  ;    TESTIMONY     BY    DEPOSITION    AND 
TESTIMONY  AT   A    FORMER   TRIAL. 


§  163.  In  general. 

§  163  a.  Opportunity  of  Cross-exami- 
nation :  ( 1 )  Testimony  at  a  Former  Trial. 

§1636.  Same:  (2)  Depositions de bene 
esse. 

§  163  c.  Same:  (3)  Depositions  inper- 
petuam  memoriam. 

§  163  d.  Same  :  (4)  Testimony  at  Pres- 
ent Trial. 

§  163 e.  Same:  Incomplete  Cross-ex- 
amination. 


§  163/.  Confrontation  ;  General  Prin- 
ciple. 

§  163  g.  Same  :  Decease,  Absence,  Ill- 
ness, etc.,  of  Witness  ;  (a)  Testimony  at 
a  Former  Trial. 

§  163 A.    Same:  (b)  Depositions. 

§  163  i.  Same  :  Witness  Present  in 
Court,  or  otherwise  Available. 

§  165.  Proving  the  Substance  of  For- 
mer Testimony. 

§  166.  Mode  of  proving  Former  Testi- 
mony. 


§  163.  In  general.1  The  chief  reasons  for  the  exclusion  of  hear- 
say evidence  are  the  want  of  the  sanction  of  an  oath,  and  of  any 
opportunity  to  cross-examine  the  witness.  But  where  the  testimony 
was  given  under  oath,  in  a  judicial  proceeding,  in  which  the  adverse 
litigant  was  a  party  and  where  he  had  the  power  to  cross-examine, 
and  was  legally  called  upon  so  to  do,  the  great  and  ordinary  test  of 
truth  being  no  longer  wanting,  the  testimony  so  given  is  admitted, 
after  the  decease  of  the  witness,  in  any  subsequent  suit  between  the 
same  parties.2  It  is  also  received,  if  the  witness,  though  not  dead, 
is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  or  cannot  be  found  after  diligent  search, 
or  is  insane,  or  sick,  and  unable  to  testify,  or  has  been  summoned, 
but  appears  to  have  been  kept  away  by  the  adverse  party.8  But 
testimony  thus  offered  is  open  to  all  the  objections  which  might  be 
taken  if  the  witness  were  personally  present.* 

1  [The  first  few  sentences  are  transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 

8  Bull.  N.  P.  239,  242  ;  Mayor  of  Doncaster  v.  Day,  3  Taunt.  262  ;  Glass  v.  Beach, 

5  Vt.  172;  Lightner  v.  Wike,  4  S.  &  R.  203. 

«  Bull.  N.  P.  239,  243 ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  264 ;  12  Vin.  Abr.  107,  A,  b,  31  ;  Godb. 
326;  R.  v.  Eriawell,  3  T.  R.  707,  721,  per  Ld.  Kenyon.  Upon  the  question  whether 
this  kind  of  evidence  is  admissible  in  any  other  contingency  except  the  death  of  the 
witness,  there  is  some  discrepancy  among  the  American  authorities ;  fjsee  the  ensuing 
sections.] 

4  Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  El.  3,  21.  Thus,  where  the  witness  at  the  former 
trial  was  called  by  the  defendant,  but  was  interested  on  the  side  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
the  latter,  at  the  second  trial,  offers  to  prove  his  former  testimony,  tho  defendant  may 
object  to  the  competency  of  the  evidence,  on  the  ground  of  interest :  Crary  v.  Sprague, 
12  Wend.  41.  And  if  the  witness  gave  a  written  deposition  in  the  cause,  but  after- 
wards testified  orally  in  court,  parol  evidence  may  be  given  of  what  he  testified  viva 
twee,  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  the  deposition  :  Todd  v.  E.  of  Winchelsea,  3  C. 

6  P.  387. 


§§  163-163  a.]     DEPOSITIONS  AXD  FORMER  TESTIMONY.  277 

[The  principles  leading  to  the  results  thus  summarized  must  now 
be  examined  more  in  detail.  The  general  principle  for  which  the 
Hearsay  rule  stands  is  (as  already  explained,  ante,  §  99  a)  that  no 
testimonial  assertion  is  receivable,  which  has  not  been  made  in 
court  under  the  fundamental  tests  or  securities  of  oath,  cross- 
examination,  and  confrontation.  The  requirements  of  the  first  are 
examined  in  another  place  (post,  §  364  a) ;  but  its  application  does 
not  affect  our  present  subject,  because  wherever  there  has  been 
cross-examination  there  has  been  an  oath,  and  hence,  if  the  require- 
ment of  cross-examination  has  been  satisfied,  that  of  the  oath  has 
also  been.  It  remains  then  to  inquire  what  sorts  of  testimonial 
assertions  are  receivable,  not  as  exceptions  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  but 
because  they  have  satisfied  the  fundamental  tests  of  truth  which 
the  Hearsay  rule  imposes,  —  cross-examination  and  confrontation.5 
The  two  inquiries  that  thus  arise,  when  we  ask  whether  the  Hearsay 
rule  is  satisfied  by  testimony  offered,  are :  — 

A.  Has  the  opportunity  of  cross-examination  been  had  ?  B.  Has 
there  been  confrontation  ?  We  proceed  now  with  the  former. 

We  may  here  distinguish  four  situations  in  which  the  princi- 
ple may  require  to  be  applied :  (1)  Testimony  at  a  former  trial ; 
(2)  Depositions  de  lene;  (3)  Depositions  in  perpetuam  memoriam  ; 
(4)  Testimony  at  the  present  trial.] 

§  163  a.  Opportunity  of  Cross-examination  :  (1)  Testimony  at  a 
Former  Trial.  [In  the  first  place  the  nature  of  the  tribunal  before 
whom  the  trial  was  had,  and  its  ordinary  mode  of  procedure,  must 
be  such  that  the  test  of  cross-examination  was  available ;  and 
conversely,  if  it  was  available,  then  the  particular  character  or 
name  of  the  tribunal  is  immaterial,  and  the  principle  is  satisfied. 
On  this  principle,  testimony  has  been  excluded  which  was  taken 
before  bankruptcy-commissioners,1  barrack-commissioners,2  or  a 
marine  hull-inspector  ; 8  it  has  been  received  when  taken  before  land- 
commissioners  *  or  a  justice  of  the  peace;6  the  test  being  whether 
the  opponent  had  the  opportunity  of  cross-examination.8  Testimony 
taken  before  arbitrators  may  thus  be  admissible.7  Testimony  at  a 

6  [Mitchell,  J.,  in  Minneap.  Mill  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  51  Minn.  304,  315  :  "  The  admis- 
sion of  the  testimony  of  a  witness  on  a  former  trial  is  frequently  inaccurately  spoken 
of  as  an  exception  to  the  rule  against  the  admission  of  hearsay  evidence.  The  chief 
objections  to  hearsay  evidence  are  the  want  of  the  sanction  of  an  oath  and  of  any 
opportunity  to  cross-examine ;  neither  of  which  applies  to  testimony  given  on  a  for- 
mer trial."  j 

Eade  v.  Lingood,  1  Atk.  203.] 

^Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Davison,  McCl.  &  Y.  167.] 

"Louisville  Ins.  Co.  v.  Monarch,  99  Ky.  578.] 

^Jackson  v.  Bailey,  2  Johns.  20.] 

^Harris  v.  State,  73  Ala.  497.] 

'See  other  examples  in  Cox  v.  Pearce,  7  Johns.  298 ;  Com.  v.  Ricketson,  5  Mete. 
427." 

"Orr  v.  Hadley,  36  N.  H.  580  ;  White  v.  Bisbing,  1  Yeates  400 ;  Bailey  o. 
Woods,  7  N.  H.  372  :  McAdam  v.  Stilwell,  13  Pa.  96.  Contra :  Jessup  v.  Cook. 
1  Halst.  438.] 


6 


278  DEPOSITIONS   AND   FORMER  TESTIMONY.  [CH.   XVL 

coroner's  inquest  does  not  usually  fulfil  this  requirement.8  Testimony 
before  a  committing  magistrate,  or  other  officer  holding  a  prelim- 
inary inquiry  into  crime,  must  satisfy  the  same  test.9 

Furthermore,  there  is  not  an  adequate  opportunity  for  cross- 
examination  unless  on  the  former  occasion  of  litigation  the  issues 
and  the  parties  were  substantially  the  same  as  in  the  present  case.10 
As  to  the  issues,  the  material  inquiry  is  whether  the  present  topic 
was  then  a  subject  of  investigation ;  e.  g.  if  the  then  litigation  con- 
cerned Blackacre  and  the  present  case  concerns  Whiteacre,  but  the 
controversy  in  both  is  whether  John  Doe  is  Eichard  Eoe's  heir,  the 
rule  is  satisfied ;  n  but  if,  though  the  same  act  of  taking  is  involved, 
the  charge  is  in  one  case  larceny  of  a  horse,  and  in  the  other  larceny 
of  a  wagon,  the  rule  might  not  be  regarded  as  satisfied.12  The  appli- 
cation of  the  principle  will  depend  chiefly  on  the  circumstances  of 
each  case.18  As  to  the  parties,  all  that  is  essential  is  that  the  present 
opponent  should  have  had  a  fair  opportunity  of  cross-examination ;  " 
consequently,  a  change  of  parties  which  does  not  effect  such  a  loss 
does  not  prevent  the  use  of  the  testimony,  —  as,  for  example,  a 
change  by  which  one  of  the  opponents  is  omitted  or  by  which  a 
merely  nominal  party  is  added ;  and  the  principle  also  admits  the 
testimony  where  the  parties,  though  not  the  same,  are  so  privy  in 

8  {^Originally  there  seems  to  have  been  a  traditional  exception  for  this  case:  Lord 
Morley's  Case,  Kelyng  55.  But  this  anomaly  was  removed  in  England  by  St.  11  &  12 
Viet.,  c.  42;  and  it  has  not  been  recognized  as  a  part  of  the  common  law  in  this 
country  :  People  v.  Restell,  2  Hill  N.  Y.  297  ;  State  v.  Campbell,  1  Rich.  L.  125  ;  State 
v.  Houser,  26  Mo.  436  ;  McLain  v.  Com.,  99  Pa.  97  ;  State  v.  Campbell,  29  S.  C.  225  ; 
Sylvester  v.  State,  71  Ala.  24;  Meyers  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  204,  216.  Contra:  State 
v.  McNeil,  33  La,  An.  1333.] 

»  L"R.  v.  Paine,  5  Mod.  165;  Woodcock's  Case,  Leach  Cr.  L.,  4th  ed.,  500;  R.  v. 
Eriswell,  3  T.  R.  707  (leading  case) ;  R.  v.  Smith,  Holt  N.  P.  615  ;  R.  &  R.  340  ;  R.  v. 
Forbes,  Holt  N.  P.  599  ;  R.  v.  Arnold,  8  C.  &  P.  621  ;  St.  11-12  Viet.,  c.  42  ;  30-31 
Viet.,  c.  35,  s.  61  ;  R.  v.  Beeston,  6  Cox  Cr.  430 ;  R.  v.  Peltier,  4  Low.  Can.  22  ;  State 
v.  McNamara,  Ark.,  30  S.  W.  762  ;  Robinson  v.  State,  68  Ga.  833 ;  Smith  v.  State, 
72  id.  115  ;  People  v.  Restell,  2  Hill  N.  Y.  300;  Howser  r.  Com.,  51  Pa.  338  ;  State 
v.  Hill,  2  Hill  S.  C.  609  ;  U.  S.  v.  Macomb,  5  McLean  286 ;  Pooler  v.  State,  97  Wis. 
627.j_ 

10  L^or  ordinary  applications  of  the  principle,  giving  the  above  reasons,  see  Lane  ». 
Brainerd,  30  Conn.  579  ;   Warren  v.  Nichols,  6  Mete.  261  (leading  case);  Bailey  t>. 
Woods,  17  N.  H.  372  ;  Bradley  v.  Myrick,  91  N.  Y.  295 ;  State  v.  DeWitt,  2  Jones  L. 
284  ;  Summons  v.  State,  5  Oh.  St.  343  (leading  case).] 

11  TAlderson,  B.,  in  Doe  v.  Foster,  1  A.  &  B.  791,  note."! 

12  rOavis  v.  State,  17  Ala.  357.3 

18  L^ee  other  examples  in  Bath  v.  Bathersen,  5  Mod.  9  ;  Brown  v.  White,  24  Weekly 
Rep.  456  ;  R.  v.  Smith,  R.  &  R.  339  ;  R.  v.  Dilmore,  6  Cox  Cr.  52  ;  R.  v.  Lee,  4  F. 
&  F.  63  ;  R.  v.  Beeston,  6  Cox  Cr.  425  (leading  case);  R.  v.  Williams,  12  id.  101 ;  R 
v.  Castro  (Tichborne  Case),  Charge  of  Chief  Justice,  II,  305  ;  Holman  v.  Bank,  12  Ala 
408;  People  v.  Brennan,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  1098;  Oliver  v.  R.  Co.,  Ky.,  82  S  W  759- 
Mabe  v.  Mabe,  N.  C.,  29  S.  E.  843  ;  Watkins  v.  U.  S.,  Okl.,  50  Pac.  88  ;  Jones  'v. 
WoocL  16  Pa.  43.T 

"  TThe  principle  is  set  forth  in  Goodright  v.  Moss,  Cowper  592  ;  Gilbert  Evidence 
68  ;  Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  A.  &  E.  (leading  case)  :  Orr  ».  Hndlov,  36  N.  H.  580  •  Jack- 
son  w.  Bailey,  2  Johns.  20;  Harper  «;.  Burrow,  6  Ired.  33;  Watson  v.  Gilday,  11  S. 
&  R.  342.  J 


§§  1G3  0-163  b.]         CROSS-EXAMINATION  J   NOTICE.  279 

interest  —  as,   where  one  was  an  executor  or  perhaps   a  grantor  — 
that  the  same  motive  and  need  for  cross-examination  existed.15] 

§  163  b.  Same :  (2)  Depositions  de  bene  esse.  ["  If  the  witness 
be  examined  de  bene  esse,  and  before  the  coming  in  of  the  answer,  the 
defendant  not  being  in  contempt,  the  witness  die,  yet  his  deposition 
shall  not  be  read,  because  the  opposite  party  had  not  the  power  of 
cross-examination;  and  the  rule  of  the  common  law  is  strict  in  this, 
that  no  evidence  shall  be  admitted  but  what  is  or  might  have  been 
under  examination  of  both  parties." *  This  principle  of  the  common 
law  has  almost  invariably  been  carried  out  in  the  statutes  which 
have  in  the  present  century  given  to  the  common-law  Courts  the 
machinery  for  taking  depositions  which  was  formerly  possessed  by 
the  Court  of  Chancery;3  so  that  the  power  of  cross-examination 
(usually  secured  by  a  notice  to  the  opponent  of  the  time  and  place 
of  taking  the  deposition)  is  still  generally  and  properly  recognized.8 
The  express  statutory  provisions  usually  declare  the  means  of  en- 
forcing the  principle;  and  only  a  few  general  problems  need  here 
be  noticed.  Where  two  or  more  depositions  are  appointed  by  one 
party  for  the  same,  there  is  no  opportunity  for  cross-examination  of 
both ;  and  the  better  view  is  that  the  opponent  has  an  election  to 
attend  either,  and  thus  that  the  deposition  which  he  does  not  attend 
should  be  excluded,  but  that  a  failure  to  attend  either  is  a  waiver  of 
objection  to  both,  and  that  if  he,  in  fact,  attends  both,  both  are  ad- 
missible.4 In  general,  the  time  of  notice  required  is  regulated  by 
statute,  but  usually  a  reasonable  time  is  the  requirement.6  The 

16  TThe  circumstances  of  each  precedent  van-  more  or  less  ;  see  Hulin  v.  Powell, 
3  C.  &  K.  323  ;  Llanover  v.  Homfray,  L.  R.  19  Ch.  D.  229  ;  Clealand  v.  Huie,  18  Ala. 
347;  Goodlett  v.  Kelly,  74  id.  219  ;  Wells  v.  Mge.  Co.,  109  id.  430;  Smith  v.  Keyser, 
115  id.  455  ;  Lyons  v.  Marcher,  119  Cal.  382  ;  McDonald  v.  Cutter,  id.,  52  Pac.  120  ; 
Hughes  v.  Clark,  67  Ga.  23  ;  Hatchings  v.  Corgan,  57  111.  71 ;  Ind.  &  St.  L.  B.  Co. 
v.  Stout,  53  Ind.  158  ;  Brown  v.  Zachary,  102  la.  433  ;  State  v.  Smith,  ib.  656;  Krue- 
ger  v.  Sylvester,  100  id.  647  ;  Mitchell  v.  Mitchell,  1  Gill  66,  83  ;  Yale  v.  Comstock, 
112  Mass.  268  ;  Jackson  v.  Lawson,  15  Johns.  544  ;  Jackson  v.  Crissey,  3  Wend.  253  ; 
Wright  v.  Cumpsty,  41  Pa.  Ill ;  Mathews  v.  Colburn,  1  Strobh.  269  ;  Smith  v.  Hawley, 
8  S.  D.  363  ;  Salmer  v.  Lathrop,  id.,  72  N.  W.  570  ;  P.  W.  &  B.  E,  Co.  v.  Howard,  13 
How.  335. 

The  ruling  hi  Seeley  v.  Star  Co.,  71  Fed.  554,  excluding  a  deposition  taken  in  a  suit 
in  a  State  Court  with  the  same  parties  and  issues,  but  offered  in  the  Federal  Court 
where  the  suit  had  been  re-instituted,  seems  unsound.] 

1  CBnller,  Nisi  Prius,  240.] 

2  ^The  present  English  practice,  allowing  some  flexibility,  is  regulated  by  the  Eules 
of  C'lirt,  1883,  Ord.  37,  38.] 

»  [Tor  the  Federal  practice  see  IT.  S.  R.  S.  §§  863,  866  ;  Ex  parte  Fisk,  113  U.  S.  725  ; 
St.  1892,  c.  14;  Gould  &  Tucker's  Notes  to  the  above  sections.  The  State  statutes 
almost  invariablv  make  the  same  requirement.] 

*  pW  Hanldnson  v.  Lombard,  25111.  573:  Evans  v.  Rothschild,  54  Kan.  747  ; 
Cross  v.  Cross,  Kv..  41  S.  W.  272;  Collins  ».  Richart,  14  Rush  625  ;  Cole  v.  Hall, 
131  Mass.  90  (leading  case)  ;  Scammon  v.  Scammon.  33  N.  H.  60  ;  Hays'  Appeal, 
PI  Pa.  268  :  Blair  ».  Bank.  11  Humph.  88  ;  Fantw.  Miller,  17  Gratt.  226  ;  Latham  v. 
Lithnm,  30  id.  340  :  Wytheville  B.  &  I.  Co.  v.  Teiger,  90  Va.  277  ;  Kimpton  v. 
Glover,  41  Vt.  284.] 

B  rSpp.  for  "amide.  Prosdowski  v.  Chosen  Friends,  Mich.,  72  N.  W.  169  ;  Amer. 
E.  N.  B'k  v.  First  N.  B'k,  U.  S.  App.,  82  Fed.  961.] 


DEPOSITIONS   AND   FORMER   TESTIMONY.  [CH.   XVI 

opportunity  to  attend  and  cross-examine  is  all  that  is  necessary,  and 
if  it  is  not  availed  of,  the  principle  has  still  been  satisfied ; 6  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  whole  object  of  the  notice  being  the  oppor- 
tunity to  cross-examine,  the  deposition  is  receivable  if  there  was 
actually  a  cross-examination  or  an  attendance  for  it,  even  though  the 
notice  was  formally  defective.7  "It  is  evident  that,  as  there  can  be 
no  cross-examination,  a  voluntary  affidavit  is  no  evidence  between 
strangers ; " 8  and  this  principle  is  of  frequent  application.9  In 
various  interlocutory  proceedings,  however,  by  which  nothing  is 
decided  by  way  of  adjudication,  it  is  customary  to  receive  affidavits; 
and,  furthermore,  in  a  few  instances,  where  speedy  and  convenient 
means  of  proving  an  incidental  and  not  usually  disputable  matter  — 
as,  the  proof  of  publication  of  a  notice  by  affidavit  of  the  newspaper- 
publisher —  statutory  exceptions  have  been  made.10] 

§  163  c.  Same  :  (3)  Depositions  in  perpetuam  memoriam.  [The 
same  principle  is  applied  in  taking  depositions  for  use  in  future 
possible  litigation,  though  its  application  is  less  effective,  because 
not  all  the  parties  in  interest  may  be  reached  by  notice  at  the  time.1 
Statutes  usually  provide  for  notice  to  be  given  so  far  as  possible.1] 

§  163  d.  Same  :  (4)  Testimony  at  Present  Trial.  [The  same  princi- 
ple applies  to  testimony  given  orally  at  the  trial  in  hand.  Where 
the  witness  refuses  to  be  cross-examined,  his  testimony  in  chief 
should  be  struck  out; 1  so  also  where  in  any  other  way  by  the  fault 
of  the  witness  or  the  party  offering  him  the  opportunity  of  cross- 
examination  is  lost,2  or  if  at  the  instance  of  the  party  offering  him 
there  is  a  postponement  of  the  cross-examination,  and  the  witness 
dies  or  falls  ill  in  the  interval.8  Where  the  death  or  illness  inter- 
venes immediately  after  the  direct  examination,  the  same  result 
should  in  strictness  follow;  but  the  rulings  are  not  harmonious.4 

«  [Moore  0.  Triplett,  Va.,  23  S.  E.  69.] 

7  LTalbott  v.  Bradford,  2  Bibb  316  ;    Ryan  v.  People,  21  Colo.  119.     For  the  case 
of  incomplete  cross-examination,  see  §  163  e,  post.~^ 

8  [Buller,  Nisi  Prius,  241.] 

9  [[Pickering  v.  Townsend,  Ala.,  23  So.  703  ;  Becker  v.  Quigg,  54  111.  390;  Hudson 
v.  Appleton,  87  la.  605  ;  Democrat  P.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  90  id.  304  ;   Patterson  v.  Fagan, 
38  M.>.  70,  82;   Supreme  Lodge  o.   Jaggers,  N.  J.  L.,  40  All.   783;  Allen  v.  U.  S., 
28  Cc.  Cl.  141,  145;  Viles  v.  Moulton,  13  Vt.  510. 

There  is  a  single  traditional  exception  for  foreign  parish -register  copies  in  Penn- 
sylvania :  Kingston  v.  Lesley,  16  S.  &  R.  387."] 

10  [See,  e.  g.,  Ala.  Code  1897,  §  1866  ;  Cul.  C.  C.  P.  §  2010  ;  Va.  Code  1887,  sec. 
2358  ;  Kettering  v.  Jacksonville,  50  111.  39.  When  parties  were  disqualified  to  testify, 
a  party's  affidavit  of  the  loss  of  a  document,  in  order  to  admit  secondary  evidence,  was 
received  in  most  jurisdictions  ;  hut  this  anomaly  is  now  obsolete,  except  where  pre- 
served by  statute  :  see  Becker  v.  Quigg,  54  111.  390.] 

1  [See  U.  S.  R.  S.  5  866  ;  Green  t>.  Oompagnia,  82  Fed.  490,  495 ;  Patterson  v. 
Fagan,  38  Mo.  70,  79.  j 

1  [Smith  v.  Griffith,  3  Hill  N.  Y.  338  ;  State  v.  McNinch,  12  S.  C.  95.] 
^Sce  the  cas^s  in  the  next  notos.] 
_Sperry  v.  Moore,  42  Mich.  361  ;  see  Clements  v.  Benjamin.  12  Johns.  299.] 

4  L»ee  R-  v.  Hagan,  1  Jebb  Cr.  0.  127  (leading  case)  :  R.  t>.  Hyde,  8  Cox  Cr.  90, 
Fuller  v.  Rice,  4  Gray  343  ;  Lewis  v.  Ins.  Co.,  10  id.  511  ;  People  u.  Pope,  108  Mich. 
361  ;  Forrest  »>.  Kiswim.  7  Hill  470  ;  People  v.  Cole,  48  N.  Y.  513;  Sturm  v.  Ins.  Co, 
63  id.  87  ;  Hewlett  v.  Wood,  67  id.  396  ;  Pringle  v.  Pringle,  69  Pa.  290.] 


§§  1636-163/.]      CROSS-EXAMINATION ;  CONFRONTATION.  281 

Where  there  is  no  cross-examination  because  the  opponent  does  not 
choose  to  employ  it,  the  direct  testimony  is  of  course  received,  be- 
cause all  that  the  principle  requires  is  that  there  should  have  been 
an  opportunity  of  cross-examination.6] 

§  163  e.  Same  :  Incomplete  Cross-examination.  [It  would  seem 
that  if  a  witness  falls  ill  or  dies  during  the  cross-examination,  the 
direct  testimony  should  not  be  struck  out  if  there  has  been  cross- 
examination  on  substantially  all  material  points.1  If  he  refuses 
cross-examination  on  certain  points,  the  refusal  might  justify  strik- 
ing out  the  corresponding  portion  or  perhaps  all  of  his  direct  tes- 
timony.2 In  the  case  of  depositions,  the  mere  failure  to  answer  one 
cross-interrogatory  should  not  of  itself  exclude  the  deposition;  but 
the  deliberate  refusal  to  answer  one  or  more  interrogatories  may, 
under  the  circumstances,  justify  the  Court  in  treating  the  deposition 
as  ex  parte  and  inadmissible.8] 

§  163 /.  Confrontation;  General  Principle.  [The  notion  of  con- 
frontation is  that  the  witness  shall  be  now  in  court  at  the  time  of 
testifying  and  in  the  presence  of  the  tribunal  and  the  opponent. 
The  purposes  of  this  are  two,  one  a  chief  and  vital  one,  the  other  a 
minor  and  dispensable  one.  (a)  The  chief  purpose  of  confrontation 
is  to  secure  the  opportunity  for  cross-examination;  this  has  been 
repeatedly  pointed  out  in  judicial  opinion;1  so  that  if  the  oppor- 
tunity of  cross-examination  has  be"en  secured,  the  function  and  test 
of  confrontation  is  also  accomplished;  confrontation  being  merely 
the  dramatic  preliminary  to  cross-examination,  (b)  The  second  and 
minor  purpose  is  that  the  tribunal  may  have  before  it  the  deport- 
ment and  appearance  of  the  witness  while  testifying.2  But  the  latter 
purpose  is  so  much  a  subordinate  and  incidental  one  that  no  vital 
importance  is  attached  to  it;  consequently,  if  it  cannot  be  had,  it  is 
dispensed  with,  provided  the  chief  purpose,  cross-examination,  has 
been  attained.  So  far  as  confrontation  is  concerned,  then,  the  only 
question  is  whether  it  can  be  had  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
case;  if  it  can  be,  it  must  be;  if  not,  it  may  be  dispensed  with. 

6  FCazenove  v.  Vaughan,  1  M.  &  S.  6 ;  Bradley  v.  Myrick,  91  N.  Y.  296.] 

1  [Fuller  v.  Rice,  4  Gray  343.] 
[See  McElhannon  v.  State,  99  Ga.  672  ;  Heath  v.  Waters,  40  Mich.  471.] 

8  [See  McCleskey  i;.  Leadbetter,  1  Ga.  551 ;  Schaefer  v.  R.  Co.,  66  id.  39  ;  Savage 
v.  Blanchard,  20  Pick.  167  (leading  case)  ;  Stratford  v.  Ames,  8  All.  577  ;  McMahon 
v.  Davidson,  12  Minn.  357,  367  ;  Bird  v.  Halsy,  87  Fed.  671 ;  Hadra  v.  Bank,  9  Utah 
412,  414;  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  351. 

The  effect  of  an  amendment  of  pleadings,  or  the  like,  in  rendering  a  deposition  im- 
perfect, depends  on  the  facts  of  each  case ;  see  Anderson  v.  Bank,  6  N.  D.  497  ;  First 
Nat'l  Rank  v.  Wirehach,  106  Pa.  44.J 

1  [Fenwick's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  591 ;  Duke  of  Dorset  v.  Girdler,  Finch's  Prec. 
Ch.  531 ;  Com.  v.  Richards,  18  Pick.  437  ;  Davis  v.  State,  17  Ala.   356;  Summons  v. 
State,  5  Oh.  St.  341  ;  U.  S.  v.  Reynolds,  1  Utah  322  ;  People  v.  Fish,  125  N.  Y.  150 ; 
Woodward,  J.,  in  Howser  t;.  Com.,  51  Pa.  837  :  "Confronting  witnesses  .  .  .  means 
cross-examination  in  the  presence  of  the  accused.] 

2  [Le  Baron  v.  Crombie,  14  Mass.  235 ;  State  v.  O'Blenis,  24  Mo.  421  ;  People  v. 
Sligh,  48  Mich.  56.] 


282  DEPOSITIONS  AND   FORMEE   TESTIMONY.  [CH.   XVL 

But  is  it  true,  under  the  constitutional  sanction  for  confrontation 
in  criminal  cases,  that  confrontation,  if  it  cannot  now  be  had,  may 
be  dispensed  with  ?  The  Federal  Constitution,  and  those  of  most 
States,  provide  that  the  accused  is  entitled  "to  be  confronted  with 
the  witnesses  against  him,"  or  "to  meet  face  to  face  the  witnesses 
against  him."  The  argument  has  often  been  made  that  this  provi- 
sion excludes  all  testimony  not  delivered  viva  voce  at  the  time  of  the 
trial  in  question.  This  argument,  though  wholly  unsound,  has  in  a 
few  instances  been  sanctioned  by  Courts  with  the  effect  of  excluding 
depositions  and  testimony  at  a  former  trial ; 8  but  it  is  usually  and 
properly  repudiated,  not  only  for  depositions  and  testimony  at  a 
former  trial,4  but  also  for  other  testimonial  assertions  receivable  by 
way  of  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  such  as  dying  declarations,5 
reputation,6  official  certificates,7  and  the  like.  But  it  is  desirable  to 
appreciate  the  true  reason  for  repudiating  the  argument.  It  has 
sometimes  been  said,8  in  doing  so,  that  the  witness  who  reports  the 
former  testimony,  etc.,  is,  in  fact,  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
accused,  and  hence  the  rule  is  satisfied.  But  this  is  fallacious; 
the  deceased  deponent  or  former  witness  or  dying  declarant  is 
equally  a  witness,  though  speaking  extra-judicially,  and  as  to  him 
the  accused  is  not  now  confronted.9  The  real  answer  is  a  different 
one.  First,  the  main  object  of  confrontation — to  secure  the  oppor- 
tunity of  cross-examination,  as  above  explained  —  has,  in  fact,  been 
accomplished;  at  the  taking  of  the  deposition  or  the  former  trial  the 
accused  had  the  power  of  cross-examination,  and  that  is  what  the 
Constitution  entitles  him  to;  in  short,  he  has  had  the  promised  con- 
frontation.10 Secondly,  the  constitutional  clause  purported  merely 

8  CFinn  v.  Com.,  5  Rand.  708;  State  v.  Lee,  13  Mont.  248;  Watkins  ».  U.S., 
Okl.,  50  Pac,  88  ;  Cline  v.  U.  S.,  36  Tex.  Cr.  320.] 

•  TVaughan  v.  State,   58  Ark.   853,  370  ;   State  v.  McNamara,  id.,  30  S.  W.  762 
(Woodruff  v.  State,  61  id.  157,  seems  inconsistent);    People  v.  Chin  Hane,  108  Cal. 
597;   People  v.  Sierp,  116  id.  249;    People  v.  Cady,  117  id.  10  ;  Ryan  v.  People,  21 
Colo.  119  ;   State  v.  Oliver,  2  Houst.  589  ;   Williams  v.  State,  19  Ga.  403  ;  Gillespie 
v.  People,  111.,  52  N.  E.  250;  State  v.   Fitzgerald,  63  la.  272  (compare  State  v.  Olds, 
id.,  76  N.  W.  641);  Com.  v.  Richards,   18  Pick.   437  ;   Pt-ople  v.  Sligh,  48  Mich.  54; 
People  w.    Case,    105   id.  92 ;  Woodsides  v.   State,   2  How.  Miss.  665 ;  State  v.  Me- 
O'Blenis,  24  Mo.    416  (leading    case);  State   v.    Byers,  16  Mont.  565  ;  Summons  v. 
State,  5  Oh.  St.  344  (leading  case);   Robbins  v.  State,  8  id.  163;  Brown  v.  Com.,  73 
Pa.  825  ;  Anthony  v.  State,  Meigs  265  ;   Kendrick  v.  State,  10  Humph.  484  ;  Baxter  v. 
State,  15  Lea   660;   U.    S.  v.    Macomb,  5   McLean  286;  Robertson  v.  Baldwin,  165 
U.  S.  275 ;  State  ».  Gushing,  17  Wash.  544.] 

•  ^People  o.  Glenn,  10  Cal.  36  ;  Campbell  v.  State,  11  Ga.  874;  State  v.  Nash,  7  la. 
877  ;   Walston  v.  Com.,   16  B.  Monr.  34  ;  State  v.  Brmietto,  13  La.  An.  45  ;  Com.  v. 
Carey,  12  Cush.  246  ;   Lambeth  v.  State,  23  Miss.  322,  857  (leading  case) ;  People  v. 
Corey,  N.  Y.,  51  N.  E.  1024;  State  v.  Tilghman,  11  Ired.  554  ;  State  v.  Saunders,  14 
Or.  30.1  ;  State  v.  Kindle,  47  Oh.  St.  861  ;  State  v.  Murphy,  16  R.  I.  633 ;  Burrell  v. 
State,  18  Tex.  731  ;  Miller  v.  State,  25  Wis.  386.] 

«  TState  v.  Waldron,  16  R.  I.  194.] 

'  ([State  v.  Behrman,  114  N.  C.  797,  804  ;  Reeves  v.  State,  7  Coldw.  96,  108  ; 
contra,  State  v.  Reidel,  26  la.  430,  436.] 

8  rE.  g.  by  Smith,  J.,  in  Woodside  v.  State,  2  How.  Miss.  665  ;  Lumpkin,  J.,  in 
Campbell  v.  State,  11  Ga.  874.] 

•  TNapton,  J.,  iu  State  v.  Houser,  26  Mo.  437.] 

10  LSnuth,  J.,  in  Woodaides  v.  State,  supra;  Hooker,  J.,  in  People  v.  Case,  105 
Mich.  92.3 


§  163/]  CONFRONTATION.  283 

to  adopt  the  general  principle  of  the  Hearsay  rule,  that  there  must 
be  confrontation,  i.  e.  the  power  of  cross-examination,  for  infra- 
judicial  witnesses;  but  it  did  not  purport  to  enumerate  all  the 
exceptions  and  limitations  to  that  principle.  There  were  then  a 
number  of  well-established  exceptions,  and  there  might  be  others 
in  the  future ;  the  Constitution  indorsed  the  general  principle,  sub- 
ject to  these  exceptions;  merely  naming  and  describing  it  suffi- 
ciently to  indicate  the  principle  intended,  —  just  as  the  brief 
constitutional  sanction  for  trial  by  jury  did  not  attempt  to  enumerate 
the  classes  of  cases  to  which  that  form  of  trial  was  appropriate  nor 
the  precise  procedure  involved  in  it,  and  has  always  been  construed 
as  not  absolute  and  universal  in  effect,  but  as  subject  to  the  limita- 
tions and  unessential  variations  understood  to  accompany  that  insti- 
tution.11 Thirdly  (perhaps  only  as  another  aspect  of  the  preceding 
reason),  the  constitutional  requirement  is  limited  to  the  mode  of 
taking  testimony  at  the  trial;  it  does  not  prescribe  what  kinds  of 
testimony  shall  be  given  infra-judicially,  but  only  what  mode  of  pro- 
cedure —  i.  e.  not  a  secret  or  ex  parte  examination  —  shall  be  fol- 
lowed for  such  testimony  as  by  the  ordinary  and  existing  law  of 
evidence  is  required  to  be  given  infra-judicially.12  —  Such  is  the 
better  reasoning  accepted  by  most  Courts  as  here  applicable.  It 
follows  that  the  constitutional  requirement  of  confrontation  is  not 
violated  by  dispensing  with  the  actual  presence  of  the  witness  at  the 
trial,  if  he  has  already  been  subject  to  cross-examination,  or  if  his 
assertions  are  received  under  some  recognized  exception  to  the 
Hearsay  rule. 

The  general  principle,  therefore,  should  be  that  in  all  cases  where 
the  party  has  without  his  own  fault  or  concurrence  irrecoverably 
lost  the  power  of  producing  the  witness  again,18  he  should  be  dis- 
pensed from  doing  so,  if  there  is  at  hand  his  testimony  already  sub- 
jected to  cross-examination;  and  this  general  notion  underlies  all 
the  cases  of  dispensation.  But  it  is  not  rationally  and  consistently 
applied.  As  a  matter  of  precedent,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to 
examine  the  specific  ways  in  which  a  witness'  presence  may  become 
impossible;  and,  furthermore,  the  precedents  often  dift'or  (though 
they  should  not)  according  as  the  cross-examined  testimony  is 
offered  in  the  shape  of  testimony  at  a  former  trial  (including  in- 

11  pumpkin,  J.,  in  Campbell  v.   State,  11  Ga.  374;  Leonard,  J.,  in  State  v.  Mo 
O'Blenis,  24  Mo.  416  ;  Brown,  J.,  in  Robertson  v.  Baldwin,  U.  S.,  17  Sup.  826.] 

12  [Putnam,  J.,  in  Com.  v.  Richards,  18  Pick.  437;  Simpson,  J.,  in  "Walston  v, 
Com.,  16  B.  Monr.  35  ;  Bartley,  C.  J.,  in  Summons  r.  State,  5  Oh.  St.  341.] 

18  [TThis  phrase  is  reproduced  from  §  168,  post.  Compare  the  following  passage. 
Green,  J.,  in  Wells  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Pa.,  40  Atl.  802:  "The  cause  of  the  subsequently 
accruing  incompetency  is  not  material.  It  may  arise  from  absence,  from  sickness,  from 
interest,  from  death,  or  from  a  newly-created  statutory  incompetency  ;  but  the  principle 
controlling  them  all  is  that,  if  at  the  time  the  deposition  or  testimony  was  taken,  the 
witness  was  competent,  it  may  be  given  in  evidence  after  the  incompetency  had  arisen. 
Such  is  the  sense  of  all  the  modern  decisions,  and  we  think  the  conclusion  reasonable 
and  just."] 


284  DEPOSITIONS   AND   FOKMER   TESTIMONY.  [CH.    XVL 

quests   and   preliminary   examinations)    or   of  a   deposition.      The 
matter  is  regulated  by  statute  in  some  jurisdictions. 1 

§  163  y.  Same:  Decease,  Absence,  Illness,  etc.,  of  Witness; 
(1)  Testimony  at  a  Former  Trial.  [The  death  of  the  witness  has 
always,  and  as  of  course,  been  considered  as  sufficient  to  allow  the 
use  of  his  former  testimony.1  The  absence  of  the  witness  from  the 
jurisdiction,  out  of  reach  of  the  Court's  process,  ought  also  to  be 
sufficient,  and  is  so  treated  by  the  great  majority  of  Courts  ;2  mere 
absence,  however,  may  not  be  sufficient,  and  it  is  usually  said  that 
a  residence  or  an  absence  for  a  prolonged  or  uncertain  time  is  neces- 
sary.8 A  few  Courts  do  not  recognize  at  all  this  cause  for  non- 
production;*  a  few  others  deny  it  for  criminal  cases;8  neither 
position  is  sound.  Inability  to  find  the  witness  is  an  equally  suffi- 
cient reason  for  non-production,  by  the  better  opinion,6  though  there 
are  contrary  precedents  ; T  the  sufficiency  of  the  search  is  usually  and 
properly  left  to  the  trial  Court's  discretion.  Absence  through  the 
opponent's  procurement  should  of  course  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  non- 

1  L~This  is  mentioned  in  almost  all  of  the  cases  in  the  ensuing  notes  ;  see  also  Gil- 
bert, Evidence,  60 ;  Lord  Morley's  Case,  Kelyng  55  ;  Fry  v.  Wood,  1  Atk.  444  ;  R.  v. 
Castro  (Tichborne  Case),  Charge  of  Chief  Justice,  JI,  305  ;  St.  Louis  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co. 
v.  Sweet,  60  Ark.  550 ;  People  v.  Douglass,  100  Cal.  1,  5  ;  Lewis  v.  Kowlo,  93  Mich. 
475  ;  State  v.  George,  60  Minn.  503  ;  Carrico  v.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  86. 

A  few  modern  Courts,  misunderstanding  the  constitutional  bearings  of  the  question, 
have  refused  to  acknowledge  this  or  any  other  cause  for  non-production :  Watkins  v, 
State,  Okl.,  50  Pac.  83 ;  State  v.  Lee,  13  Mont.  248  ;  Cline  v.  State,  36  Tex.  Cr.  320  ; 
Finn  v.  Com.,  5  Rand.  708.] 

2  [Try  v.  Wood,  1  Atk.  445  ;  Roe  v.  Jones,  3  Low.  Can.  58 ;  Sutor  «.  McLean,  18 
U.  C.  Q.  B.  492  ;  Minis  v.  Sturtevant,  36  Ala.  64 ;  Marler  v.  State,  67  id.  64  ;  Thomp- 
son v.  State,  106  id.  67  ;  Lowery  v.  State,  98  id.  45,  50  ;  Mitchell  v.  State,  114  id.  1  ; 
McMunn  v.  State,  113  id.  86,  semble;  Dennis  v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  1002  ;  Hurley  v.  State, 
29  Ark.  23 ;  Dolan  v.  State,  40  id.   61 ;  Vaughan  v.  State,  58  id.  353,  370 ;  State  v. 
McNamara,  id.,  30  S.  W.  762  ;  People  v.  Devine,  46  Cal.  48  ;  Benson  v.  Shotwell,  103 
id.  163  ;  People  v.  Cady,  117  id.  10  ;  Cassady  v.  Trustees,  105  111.  567,  semble;  Spaul- 
ding  v.  R.  Co.,  98  la.  205  ;  Reynolds  v.  Powers,  96  Ky.  481 ;  Louisville  Water  Co.  ». 
Upton,  id.,  36  S.  W.  520  ;  State  v.  Madison,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  622  ;  Rogers  v.  Raborg, 
2  G.  &  J.  60 ;  Howard  v.  Patrick,  88  Mich.  799 ;  Minneap.  M.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  51  Minn. 
304,  314  ;  King  v.  McCarthy,  54  id.  190,  195;  Hill  v,  Winston,  id.,  75  N.  W.  1030; 
Omaha  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Elkins,  39  Nebr.  480  ;  Lowe  v.  Vaughn,  48  id.  651 ;  Ord  v.  Nash, 
id.,  69  N.  W,  964 ;  Magill  ».  Kauffman,  4  S.  &  R.   317  ;  Forney  v.  Hallagher,  11  id. 
203;  Giberson  v.  Mills  Co.,  Pa.,  41  Atl.  525  ;  Chic.  S.  P.  M.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Myers,  U.  S. 
App.,  80  Fed.  361.  J 

*  QSee  the  preceding  cases.    It  is  not  necessary  to  try  and  take  the  witness"  deposi- 
tion or  secure  hia  voluntary  personal  attendance:  Minn.  M.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  51  Minn. 
804,  315;  contra:  Shisser  w.  Burlington,  47  la.   302  ;  Chic.  S.  P.  M.  &  0.  R.  Co. 
v.  Myers,  supra.'] 

*  FBerney  v.  Mitchell,  34  N.  J.  L.  841  ;  Crary  v.  Sprague,  12  Wend.  45.] 

8  LPittiman  v.  State,  92  Ga.  480  ;  State  v.  Hauser,  26  Mo.  439  ;  People  u.  New- 
man, 5  Hill  296  ;  Finn  v.  Com.,  5  Rand.  708.] 

«  ("Gates'  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  1285  ;  Godbolt  236  ;  Gilbert,  Evidence,  60 ;  Buller, 
Nisi  Prius,  239  ;  Thompson  v.  State,  106  Ala.  67  ;  Mitchell  v.  State,  114  id.  1  ;  Shack- 
elford  v.  State,  83  Ark.  539  ;  Sneed  v.  State,  47  id.  186  ;  Vaughan  v.  State,  58  id. 
853,  370;  Harwood  v.  State,  63  id.  130;  A.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Randall,  85  Ga.  302,  314  ; 
State  v.  White,  46  La.  An.  1273 ;  State  v.  Timberlake,  50  id.,  23  So.  276 ;  Seitz  v. 
Seitz,  170  Pa.  71,  acmblc  ] 

7  fLord  Morley's  Case,  Kelyng  R5 ;  R.  v.  TIagan,  8  C.  &  P.  169  :  R.  v.  Scaife, 
8  Q.  B.  243 ;  Crary  v.  Sprague,  12  Weud.  45.] 


§§  163/-163  A.]  DECEASE,  ETC.,   OF  WITNESS.  235 

production.8  Illness,  by  causing  inability  to  attend,  has  the  same 
effect.9  The  phrase  usually  employed  as  a  test  is  "so  ill  as  to  be 
unable  to  travel ;  "  the  application  of  the  principle  should  be  left  to 
the  trial  Court's  discretion ; 10  but  the  phrasing  differs  in  different 
statutes  and  decisions.11  Insanity  equally  renders  the  witness  un- 
available ; 12  as  well  as  loss  of  memory  by  disease  or  old  age,18  or  by 
mere  lapse  of  time.14  Blindness  may  render  a  witness  unavailable 
for  certain  kinds  of  testimony.15  Disqualification,  since  the  former 
trial,  by  reason  of  interest,  infamy,  or  other  disqualification,  should 
be  sufficient.16] 

§  163  h.  Same :  (2)  Depositions.  [The  same  general  principle 
applies  here  as  in  the  preceding  sort  of  testimony ;  a  deposition 
taken  subject  to  cross-examination  should  be  receivable  if  the  depon- 
ent is  at  the  time  of  trial  not  available  as  a  witness.  But  the  gen- 
eral necessity  of  empowering  Courts  of  common  law,  by  statute,  to 
authorize  the  taking  of  depositions,  has  led  customarily  to  the 
express  statutory  declaration  of  the  cases  in  which  the  deposition 
may  be  admitted ; 1  and  reference  must  thus  be  had  chiefly  to  the 
terms  of  the  local  statutes.2  The  following  brief  summary  deals  only 
with  the  judicial  decisions. 

The  death  of  the  witness  is  the  typical  and  recognized  instance  of 
unavailability,  and  admits  the  deposition.8  Absence  from  the  juris- 

8  [Harrison's  Trial,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  851  ;  U.  S.  v.  Reynolds,  1  Utah  322,  98  U.  S. 
158.     Contra,  for  an  accused  person,  Bergen  «.  People,  17  111.  427.] 

9  [Lord  Morley's  Case,  Kelyng  55  ;  Try  v.  Wood,  1  Atk.  445 ;  R.  v.  Savage,  5  C. 
&  P.  143  ;  Rogers  v.  Roborg,  2  G.  &  J.  60  ;  Howard  v.  Patrick,  38  Mich.   799  ;  Emig 
v.  Diehl,  76  Pa.  373;   McLain  v.  Com.,  99  id.  97  (not  decided  as  to  criminal  cases); 
Perrin  v.  Wells,  155  id.  300.     Contra:  Doe  v.  Evans,  3  C.  &  P.  221  ;  Com.  v.  Mc- 
Kenna,  158  Mass.  207  (for  criminal  cases).] 

1°  ["Thornton  v.  Britton,  144  Pa.  130.] 

"  [See  R.  v.  Farrell,  12  Cox  Cr.  606  ;  R.  v.  Thompson,  13  id.  182 ;  R.  v.  Heesom, 
14  id.  42  ;  R.  v.  Wellings,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  D.  428  ;  Miller  v.  Russell,  7  Mart.  N.  s.  268 ; 
Berney  v.  Mitchell,  34  N.  J.  L.  341.] 

"  [R.  v.  Eriswell,  3  T.  R.  707  ;  Morler  v.  State,  67  Ala.  62 ;  Thompson  v.  State, 
106  id.  67;  17  So.  512;  Cook  v.  Stout,  47  111.  531;  Walkup  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  20  S.  W. 
221 ;  Whitaker  v.  Marsh,  62  N.  H.  478.] 

18  [Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  97  Ga.  326 ;  Emig  v.  Diehl,  76  Pa.  373  ;  Rothrock  v. 
Gallagher,  91  id.  112  ;  Drayton  v.  Wells,  1  Nott  &  M.  247.] 

u  [Jack  v.  Woods,  26  Pa.  S7S,semble.  Contra:  Robinson  v.  Oilman,  34  N.  H.  297; 
Yelott  v.  Lewis,  102  Pa.  326 ;  Drayton  v.  Wells,  supra.] 

W  [Houston  v.  Blythe,  60  Tex.  509.] 

M  [Gosse  v.  Traoy,  2  Vern.  699  ;  Haws  v.  Hand,  2  Atk.  615  ;  Redd  v.  State,  Ark., 
47  S.  W.  119  ;  Evans  v.  Reed,  78  Pa.  415,  84  id.  254  ;  Pratt  v.  Patterson,  81  id.  114  ; 
Wai  bridge  v.  Knipj>er,  96  id.  50  ;  Galbraith  v.  Zimmerman,    100  id.  374.     Contra: 
Baker  v.  Fairfax,  1  Str.  101  ;  LeBaron  v.  Crombie,  14  Mass.  235. 
For  imprisonment  as  a  convict,  see  State  v.  Conway,  56  Kan.  682.] 

1  [The  conditions  of  granting  permission  to  take  a  deposition  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  conditions  on  which  it  will  be  received  ;  the  latter  (the  present  subject) 
will  usually  be  somewhat  different  from  the  former  ;    but  the  latter  is  not  always 
regulated  by  the  statute.] 

2  [The  English  statutes  have  been  numerous.     Those  of  present  importance  are 
St.  30-31  Viet.,  c.  35,  §  6;  Rules  of  Court,  1883,  Ord.  37,  r.  18  ;  construed  in  Burton 
».  Railway.  35  W.  R.  536 ;    Nadin  v.   Bassett,  L.   R.   25  Ch.    D.   21.     The   Federal 
Statute  is  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  866 ;  for  its  construction,  see  Gould  &  Tucker's  Notes  on  the 
Revised  Statutes;  also  St.  1892.  c.  14;  Mulcahey  w.  R.  Co.,  69  Fed.  172.] 

8  [Gilbert,  Evidence,  64;  Ward  r.  Sykes,  Ridgw.  193;    Price  v.  Bridgman,  Dick. 


286  DEPOSITIONS   AND   FOKMER   TESTIMONY.  [CH.   XVL 

diction  is  also  a  recognized  ground  for  admission ; 4  but  statutes  often 
prescribe  a  smaller  district,  —  as,  without  the  county,6  or  more  than 
one  hundred  miles  distant.6  A  residence  without  the  district  at  the 
time  of  taking  the  deposition  is  usually  presumed  to  continue  at  the 
time  of  offering  it.7  Inability  to  find  the  witness  may  also  be  sufficient 
for  admission.8  Illness,  or  other  physical  cause  preventing  attendance, 
will  suffice  ; 9  the  phrasing  of  this  ground  for  non-attendance  vary- 
ing much  in  precedents  and  statutes.  Insanity  also  suffices,10  as 
well  as  disqualification  by  interest  or  the  like.11] 

§  163  i.  Same :  Witness  present  in  Court  or  otherwise  available. 
[The  whole  notion  of  taking  depositions  is  that  they  are  a  provision 
in  advance  for  obtaining  testimony  from  one  who  will  not  be  available 
at  the  time  of  the  trial,  i.  e,,  in  the  traditional  phrase,  they  are  taken 
de  bene  esse,  conditionally.  If  the  witness  is  in  fact  available  at  the 
time  of  the  trial,  the  principle  of  confrontation  requires  that  he 
should  be  examined  viva  voce  on  the  stand.  This  principle  is  con- 
stantly vindicated; l  nevertheless,  a  few  Courts,  forgetting  the  essen- 
tially conditional  nature  of  a  deposition,  admit  it  even  though  the 
witness  is  present  in  court  or  otherwise  available.2  There  are,  how- 
ever, two  classes  of  statutes  which  expressly  or  impliedly  sanction 
this,  viz.,  the  Federal  statute  authorizing  depositions  by  dedimus 

144.  This  ground  is  mentioned  in  most  of  the  cases  in  the  ensuing  notes.  A  few 
modern  Courts,  misunderstanding  the  constitutional  question  (ante,  §  163/),  do  not 
admit  a  deposition,  against  the  accused  or  in  a  criminal  case,  under  any  circumstances  : 
Woodruff  v.  State,  61  Ark.  157,  semble  ;  Watkins  v.  U.  S.,  Okl.,  50  Pac.  88.] 

*  fjAltham  v.  Anglesea,  11  Mod.  212  ;  Ward  v.  Sykes,  Ridgw.  193  ;  Birt  v.  White, 
Dick.  473;  Falconer  v.  Hanson,  1  Camp.  172  ;  Robinson  v.  Markis,  2  Moo.  &  R.  376 ; 
Cunningham  ».  Cunningham,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  525  ;  Carpenter  v.  Groff,  5  S.  &  R.  165  ; 
Johnson  v.  Sargent,   42  Vt.   195  ;  Hoopes  v.  De  Vaughn,  43  W.  Va.   447.     Contra, 
for  criminal  cases :    State  v.  Tomblin,    57  Kan.   841  ;   State  v.  Humason,  5   Wash. 
499.1 

6TSee,  e.g.,  Gardner  v.  Meeker,  169  111.  40.] 

8  L^ee  the  Federal  statute,  cited  supra."2 

T  Patapsco  Ins.  Co.  v.  Southgate,  5  Pet.  604,  616 ;  Pettibone  v.  Derringer,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  215 ;  ([Kaufman  p.  Caughman,  49  S.  C.  159;  Hennessy  v.  Ins.  Co.,  8  Wash.  91. 

But  the  magistrate's  certificate  appended  to  the  deposition  is  not  always  made  evi- 
dence of  the  necessary  facts  :  see  Atkinson  v.  Nash,  56  Minii.  472  ;  Littlehale  v.  Dix, 
11  Cush.  365.] 

PPettibone  v.  Derringer,  supra ;  Burton  v.  State,  107  Ala.  68.] 

•  Lilly's  Pract.  Reg.  II,  703  ;  Altham  v.  Anglesea,  11  Mod.  212  ;  Palmers.  Ayles- 
bury,  15  Ves.  Jr.  176  ;  Avery  p.  Woodruff,  1  Root  76  ;  Hanley  v.  Banks,  Okl.,  51  Pac. 
662';  Whitesell  p.  Crave,  8  W.  &  S.  372 ;  Johnson  v.  Sargent,  42  Vt.  195.] 

TR.  v.  Marshall,  Car.  &  M.  147.] 

11  pjrown  v.  Greenly,  Dick.  504  ;  Sabine  v.  Strong,  6  Mete.  277  ;  Wells  v.  Ins.  Co., 
Pa.,  40  Atl.  802.  Contra:  Irwin  v.  Reed,  4  Yeates  512;  Chess  v.  Chess,  17  S.  &  R. 
412.] 

1QMobile  Life  Ins.  Co.  p.  Walker,  58  Ala.  290  ;  Humes  P.  O'Bryan,  78  id.  77 ; 
Neilson  v.  R.  Co.,  67  Conn.  466;  Dunn  p.  Dunn,  11  Mich.  292  (leading  case)  ;  Schmitz 
P.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  256,  271  ;  Benjamin  p.  R.  Co.,  133  id.  274  j  Barber  Co.  p.  Ullman, 
137  id.  543;  Gerhauser  p.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Nev.  189. 

So  also  tor  A  party  offering  his  own  deposition  :  State  v.  Oliver,  55  Kan.  711  ;  Moore 
f.  Palmer,  14  Wash.  134.] 

a  Qwest.  &  A.  R.  Co.  P.  Bnssey,  95  Oa.  584  (leading  case)  ;  Bradley  P.  Geiselman, 
17  111.  .171;  Frink  P.  Potter,  ib.  408  ;  Edmonson  v.  R.  Co.,  Ky.,  46  S.  W.  681;  Phenix 
v.  Baldwin,  14  Wend.  62,  sembU."} 


§§  163A-165.]  WITNESS   PRESENT  IN   COURT.  287 

potestatem,*  and  some  State  statutes,  usually  dealing  with  the  depo- 
sition of  an  opposing  party.4  Moreover,  the  principle  of  course 
does  not  apply  where  the  deposition  is  offered  to  contradict  the 
deponent  himself  on  the  stand.6] 

§  164.1 

§  165.  Proving  the  Substance  of  Former  Testimony.  It  was  for- 
merly held,  that  the  person  called  to  prove  what  a  deceased  witness 
testified  on  a  former  trial  must  be  required  to  repeat  his  precise  words, 
and  that  testimony  merely  to  the  effect  of  them  was  inadmissible.1 
But  this  strictness  is  not  now  insisted  upon,  in  proof  of  the  crime 
of  perjury ; 2  and  it  has  been  well  remarked,  that  to  insist  upon  it 
in  other  cases  goes  in  effect  to  exclude  this  sort  of  evidence  alto- 
gether, or  to  admit  it  only  where,  in  most  cases,  the  particularity 
and  minuteness  of  the  witness'  narrative,  and  the  exactness  with 
which  he  undertakes  to  repeat  every  word  of  the  deceased's  testi- 
mony, ought  to  excite  just  doubts  of  his  own  honesty,  and  of  the 
truth  of  his  evidence.  It  seems,  therefore,  to  be  generally  consid- 
ered sufficient,  if  the  witness  is  able  to  state  the  substance  of  what 
was  sworn  on  the  former  trial.8  But  he  must  state,  in  substance, 
the  whole  of  what  was  said  on  the  particular  subject  which  he  is 
called  to  prove;  if  he  can  state  only  what  was  said  on  that  subject 
by  the  deceased,  on  his  examination  in  chief,  without  also  giving 
the  substance  of  what  he  said  upon  it  in  his  cross-examination,  it  is 
inadmissible.4 

8  [Tatapsco  Ins.  Co.  v.  Southgate,  5  Pet.  616  ;  Sergeant  v.  Biddle,  4  Wheat.  511  ; 
Jones  v.  R.  Co.,  3  Sawyer,  527.] 

4  [E.g.  Adams  v.  Weaver,  117  Cal.  42.] 
6  fPeople  v.  Hawley,  111  Cal.  78.] 
1  [^Transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 

1  4  T.  R.  290  ;  said,  per  Ld.  Kenyon,  to  have  been  so  "  agreed  on  all  hands,"  upon 
an  offer  to  prove  what  Ld.  Palmerstou  had  testified.     So  held,  also,  by  Washington,  J., 
in  U.  S.  v.  Wood,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  440  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  200  (215),  3d  ed. ;  Foster  v.  Shaw, 
7  Serg.  &  R.  163.  per  Duncan,  J.;  Wilbur  v.  Selden,  6  Coweu  165  ;  Ephraims  v.  Mur- 
doch, 7  Blackf.  10. 

2  R.  v.  Rowley,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  111. 

8  See  Cornell  v.  Green,  10  Serg.  &  R.  14,  16,  where  this  point  is  briefly  but  power- 
fully discussed  by  Mr.  Justice  Gibson.  See  also  Miles  v.  O'Hara,  4  Binn.  108  ;  Caton 
v.  Lenox,  5  Randolph  31,  36;  R.  v.  Rowley,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C.  Ill;  Chess  v.  Chess, 
17  Serg.  &  R.  409,  411,  412  ;  Jackson  v.  Bailey,  2  Johns.  17 ;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  638 
[683],  (3d  Am.  ed.)  ;  Sloan  v.  Somers,  1  Spencer  66  ;  Garrott  v.  Johnson,  11  G.  &  J. 
173  ;  Canney's  Case,  9  Law  Rep.  408  ;  State  v.  Hooker,  17  Vt.  658  ;  Gildersleeve  v. 
Caraway,  10  Ala.  260;  Gould  v.  Crawford,  2  Barr  89;  Wagers  v.  Dickey,  17  Ohio 
439. 

4  Wolf  v.  Wyeth,  11  Serg.  &  R.  149  ;  Gildersleeve  v.  Caraway,  10  Ala.  260.  [The 
last  two  sentences  seem  to  represent  the  law  everywhere  to-day,  except  in  Massachu- 
setts, where  the  early  adoption  of  the  rule  requiring  the  precise  words  still  hampers 
the  Court ;  the  following  list  includes  only  late  citations  from  the  various  jurisdictions  : 
Thompson  v.  State,  Ala.,  17  So.  685  ;  Vanghan  v.  State,  58  Ark.  353,  378  ;  People  v. 
Murphy,  45  Cal.  137,  145  ;  Mitchell  c.  State,  71  Ga.  128  ;  Mineral  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Keep, 
22  111.  20  ;  Bass  v.  State,  136  Ind.  165  ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  63  la.  271;  Solomon  R. 
Co.  u.Jones,  34  Kan.  461;  Bush  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  247;  Lime  Rock  Bank  v.  Hewett, 
52  Me.  531 ;  Black  v.  Woodrow,  39  Md.  194,  220  ;  Costigan  v.  Lunt,  127  Mass.  354  ; 
Fisher  v.  Kyle,  27  Mich.  455  ;  Scoville  r.  R.  Co.,  94  Mo.  87;  Twohig  v.  Learner, 


288  FORMER   TESTIMONY.  [CH.   XVI. 

§  166.  Mode  of  proving  Former  Testimony.  What  the  deceased 
witness  testified  may  be  proved  by  any  person  who  will  swear  from 
his  own  memory;  or  by  notes  taken  by  any  person  who  will  swear  to 
their  accuracy.1  [When  notes  are  used,  the  principles  of  §§  439  b, 
439  c,  post,  are  applicable;  i.  e.,  either  the  witness  by  referring  to 
the  notes  revives  an  actual  recollection,  or  else  he  has  no  present 
recollection,  but  adopts  the  notes  as  a  record  of  past  recollection 
made  at  or  about  the  time.  The  use  of  stenographic  notes  usually 
involves  the  latter  principle.3  But  the  offer  of  the  mere  notes  them- 
selves, whether  purporting  to  be  by  a  stenographer 8  or  only  by  an 
attorney  or  clerk, 4  is  the  offer  of  a  hearsay  report  of  the  testimony, 
and  is  improper;  even  the  notes  of  a  court  stenographer  stand  on  no 
better  footing;6  unless  they  can  be  brought  within  the  exception 
(ante,  §  162  m)  for  official  statements,  as  by  a  statute  or  a  rule  of 
Court  expressly  declaring  the  notes  of  the  official  stenographer  to 
be  receivable  under  the  principle  of  that  exception.6  The  testimony 
may  also  be  proved,]  perhaps,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  by  the 
judge's  own  notes,  where  both  actions  are  tried  before  the  same 
judge;  for,  in  such  case,  it  seems  the  judge,  from  his  position,  as 
well  as  from  other  considerations,  cannot  be  a  witness.7  But,  ex- 
cept in  this  case  of  necessity,  if  it  be  admitted  as  such,  the  better 
opinion  is,  that  the  judge's  notes  are  not  legal  evidence  of  what  a 
witness  testified  before  him;  for  they  are  no  part  of  the  record,  nor 
is  it  his  official  duty  to  take  them,  nor  have  they  the  sanction  of  his 
oath  to  their  accuracy  or  completeness.8  But  in  Chancery,  when  a 

48  Nebr.  247  ;  Young  v.  Dearborn,  22  N.  H.  372  ;  Sloan  r.  Somers,  20  N.  J.  L.  66 ; 

Trimmer  v.  Trimmer,  90  N.  Y.  676  ;  Balleiiger  v.   Barnes,  3  Dev.  460,  465  ;  Bine  v. 

Carver,  73  N.  C.  264  ;  Summons  v.  State,  5  Oh.  St.  325,  352  ;  Hepler  v.  Bank,  97  Pa. 

420  ;    State  v.  Jones,   29  S.  C.  229  ;  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  80  ;    Parks  v.  Caudle, 

58  Tex.  220  ;  Bennett  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  216  ;  Ruch  v.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S.  693  ; 

Earl  v.  Tupper,  45  Vt.  284  ;  Caton  v.  Lenox,  5  Rand.  31,  39  ;  Emery  v.  State,  92  Wis. 

146.] 

1  Mayor  of  Doncaster  v.  Day,  3  Taunt.  262;  Chess  v.  Chess,  17  Serg.  &  R.  409  ; 

{Hatchings  v.  Corgan,  59  111.   70  (juror)  ;  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  80  (magistrate)  ; 

Ruch  v.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S.  693  ;  People  v.  Murphy,  45  Cal.  137;  Yale  v.  Comstock, 

112  Mass.  267.  (     - 

3  £#.  g.  in  State  v.  Bartmess,  Or.,  54  Pac.  167.] 

8  rMorris  v.  Hammerle,  40  Mo.  489  ;  Bedford  v.  R.  Co.,  Wash.,  46  Pac.  650.] 
1  TJenkins  v.  State,  Ala.,  17  So.  182  ;  Waters  v.  Waters,  35  Md.  639.] 
6  LHardeman  v.  English,  79  Ga.  387,  390  ;  Herrick  v.  Swomley,  56  Md.  4  ;  Toohey 

v.  Plummer,  69  Mich.  345 ;  Jackson  v.  State,  81  Wis.  127.] 

6  fGrieve  v.  R.  Co.,  104  la.  659  ;  Susque.  M.  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Mardorf,  152  Pa.  22  ; 
Woodward  v.  Heist,  180  Pa.  161.] 

7  Glassford  on  Evid.   602 ;  Tait  on   Evid.  432  ;    R.  v.  Gazard,  8  C.   &  P.  595  ; 
infra,  §  249. 

8  Miles  v.  O'Hara,  4  Binn.  108;  Foster  v.  Shaw,  7  Serg.  &  R.  156  ;  Ex  pnrte  Lear- 
mouth,  6  Madd.  113;  R.  v.  Plummer,  8  Jur.  922,  perGurney,  B. ;  Livingston  v.  Cox, 
8  Watts  &  Serg.  61  ;  Courts  expressly  disclaim  any  power  to  compel  the  production  of 
a  judge's  notes :  Scougull  v.  Campbell,  1  Chitty  283  ;  Graham  v.  Bowham,  ib.  284,  n.  ; 
and  if  an  application  is  made  to  amend  a  verdict  by  the  judge's  notes,  it  can  be  made 
only  to  the  judge  himself  before  whom  the  trial  was  had  :   ib.,   2  Tidd's  Pr.  770, 
933.     Whore  a  party,  on  a  new  trial  being  granted,  procured,  at  great  expense,  copies 
of  a  shorthand  writer's  notes  of  the  evidence  given  at  the  former  trial,  for  the  amount 


§§  166-168.]  MODE   OF   PROVING.  289 

new  trial  is  ordered  of  an  issue  sent  out  of  Chancery  to  a  Court  of 
common  law,  and  it  is  suggested  that  some  of  the  witnesses  in  the 
former  trial  are  of  advanced  age,  an  order  may  be  made,  that,  in  the 
event  of  their  death  or  inability  to  attend,  their  testimony  may  be 
read  from  the  judge's  notes.9  [The  use  of  a  bill  of  exceptions, 
embodying  testimony  at  the  trial,  has  usually  been  repudiated, 
chiefly,  perhaps,  because  only  selected  fragments  are  thus  embodied, 
and  not  the  whole;  for  apart  from  this  consideration,  it  would  seem 
that  the  signing  of  the  bill  by  the  parties  would  suffice  as  an  admis- 
sion of  the  terms  of  the  testimony.10  The  reduction  to  writing  by 
the  magistrate  at  a  preliminary  hearing,  or  by  the  coroner,  of  testi- 
mony given  before  him  by  the  accused  or  other  witnesses  is  usually 
expressly  declared  admissible  by  statute  as  an  official  report  of  the 
testimony.11] 
§§  167,  168. l 

of  which  he  claimed  allowance  in  the  final  taxation  of  costs  ;  the  claim  was  disallowed, 
except  for  so  much  as  would  have  been  -the  expense  of  waiting  on  the  judge,  or  his 
clerk,  for  a  copy  of  his  notes  ;  on  the  ground  that  the  latter  would  have  sufficed  :  Crease 
v.  Barrett,  1  Tyrw.  &  Grang.  112.  But  this  decision  is  not  conceived  to  affect  the 
question,  whether  the  judge's  notes  would  have  been  admissible  before  another 
judge,  if  objected  to.  In  R.  v.  Bird,  5  Cox  C.  C.  11,  2  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  444,  the 
notes  of  the  judge,  before  whom  a  former  indictment  had  been  tried,  were  admitted 
without  objection,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what  beatings  were  proved  at  that  trial, 
in  order  to  support  the  plea  of  mrirefms  acquit.  In  New  Brunswick,  a  judge's  notes 
have  been  held  admissible,  though  objected  to,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  taken 
under  the  sanction  of  an  oath,  and  th.it  such  has  been  the  practice :  Doe  v.  Murray, 
1  Allen  N.  B.  216.  But  in  a  recent  case  in  England,  on  a  trial  for  perjury,  the  notes 
of  the  judge,  before  whom  the  false  evidence  was  given,  being  offered  in  proof  of  that 
part  of  the  case,  Talfourd,  J.,  refused  to  admit  them  ;  observing,  that  "  a  judge's  notes 
stood  in  no  other  position  than  anybody  else's  notes.  They  could  only  be  used  to  re- 
fresh the  memory  of  the  party  taking  them.  It  was  no  doubt  unusual  to  produce 
the  judge  as  a  witness,  and  would  be  highly  inconvenient  to  do  so  ;  but  that  did  not 
make  his  notes  evidence:"  R.  v.  Child,  5  Cox  C.  C.  197,  203.  [The  more  modern 
rulings  are  clear  that  a  judge's  notes  are  not  receivable,  since  it  is  not  a  part  of  his 
duty  to  make  such  a  report :  Leach  i>.  Simpson,  5  M.  &  W.  311 ;  Schafer  v.  Schafer,  93 
Ind.  588;  Webster  v.  Colden,  55  Me.  171  ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  38  Wis.  228  ;  Zitske  v. 
Goldberg,  38  id.  229.  Contra:  Ex  pnrte  Gillebrand,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  App.  52,  semble; 
Doe  d.  Lonchester  v.  Murray,  siipra.~\ 

9  Hargrave  v.  Hargnive,  10  Jur.  957. 

1°  [Excluded :  St.  Louis  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweet,  60  Ark.  550  ;  Roth  v.  Smith, 
64  111.  432 ;  111.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashline,  171  id.  313 ;  Boyd  v.  Bank,  25  la.  257  (leading 
case);  Breitenwischer  v.  dough,  Mich.,  74  N.  W.  507.  Admitted:  Bank  v.  Lacy, 
1  T.  B.  Monr.  7  ;  Boner  v.  Com.,  Kv.,  40  S.  W.  700  (but  not  in  criminal  cases);] 
jCoughlin  v.  Haenssler,  50  Mo.  126  ;|  ^Wilson  v.  Noonan,  35  Wis.  343.] 

11  QFor  the  necessity  of  producing  this  report  of  the  magistrate,  in  preference  to  any 
other  witness  to  the  testimony,  see  ante,  §  97  d,  post,  §  227.J 

1  ^Transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 


VOL.   I.  —  19 


290 


ADMISSIONS. 


[CH.   XVII. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

ADMISSIONS. 


1.  In  General, 

§  169.   General  Principle. 

§  170.  Admissions  and  Confessions 
distinguished. 

§  170  a.  Party  need  not  be  asked  be- 
fore proving  an  Admission. 

2.    Persons  whose  Statements  are  receivable 
as  Admissions. 

§  171.   Parties  to  the  Record. 

§§  172,  173.     Same  :  Nominal  Parties. 

§  174.  Same :  Joint  Promisors  ;  Par- 
ties in  a  Testamentary  Cause ;  etc. 

§  175.  Same  :  Town  Corporators. 

§176.  Same:  Mere  Community  of  In- 
terest not  enough. 

§  177.  Same :  Interest  must  first  be 
shown. 

§  178.  Same  :  Answers  of  Parties  in 
Chancery. 

§  179.  Same :  Interest  must  exist  at 
Time  of  Admission  made. 

§§  180,  181.  Persons  not  Parties  to  the 
Record  ;  In  general. 

§§  182-184.  Same:  Referees  ;  Appoint- 
ees ;  Interpreters. 

§  184 a.   Same:  Conspirators. 

§  184  b.    Same  :  Partners. 

§§184c,  184  d.    Same:  Agents. 

§  185.   Same:  Husband  and  Wife. 

§  186.  Same :  Attorneys  of  Record  ; 
Pleadings. 

§§  187,  188.  Same  :  Principal  and 
Surety. 

§  189.  Same:  Privity  of  Estate  ;  An- 
cestor or  Grantor  during  Ownership. 

§  190.  Same :  Vendor  or  Assignor  of 
Personalty. 

§  191.  Party  or  Privy  need  not  bo 
called. 

8.  What  Kinds  of  Conduct  or  Utterances 
amount  to  an  Admission. 

§  192.    Offers  of  Compromise. 

§  193.  Statements  made  under  Con- 
straint. 


§  194.  Statements  made  incidentally 
or  in  unrelated  Transactions. 

§  195.    Assuming  a  Character. 

§  195  a.  Conduct :  (1)  Falsehood  and 
Fraud ;  Manufacturing  and  destroying 
Evidence. 

§  195  b.  Same  :  (2)  Failure  to  produce 
Evidence. 

§  195 c.  Same:  (3)  Failure  to  produce 
Documents. 

§  195  d.  Same:  (4)  Repairs  and  Pre- 
cautions after  an  Injury. 

§  196.  Same :  (5)  Sundry  Kinds  of 
Conduct. 

§§  197,  198.  Same:  (6)  Failure  to  repu- 
diate another's  Assertion  ;  Statements 
made  in  a  Party's  Presence. 

§  199.  Same:  (7)  Possession  of  Docu- 
ments ;  Unanswered  Letters  ;  Books  of  a 
Society  or  Corporation. 

4.   Sundry  Limitations. 

§  200.  Weight  and  Value  of  Admis- 
sions. 

§  201.  Explanations  ;  Putting  in  the 
whole  of  a  Conversation,  Document,  or 
Correspondence. 

§  201  a.   Same  :  Other  Modes. 

§  202.    Admissions  based  on  Hearsay. 

§  203.  Parol  Admissions  of  Title  or  of 
Contents  of  Documents. 

5.   Conclusive  Admissions  (Estoppel;  Ju- 
dicial  Waiver). 

§  204.  Admissions  as  Estoppels  between 
Parties. 

§  205.   Judicial  Admissions. 

§  206.    Same  :  Admissions  by  Mistake. 

§§  207-210.  Admissions  acted  upon,  as 
giving  rise  to  Estoppels. 

§211.    Admissions  in  Deeds. 

§  212.  Non-judicial  Admissions,  not 
conclusive. 


1.    In  General. 

§  169.    General  Principle.     Under  the  head  of  exception  to  the  rule 
rejecting  hearsay  evidence,  it  has  been  usual  to  treat  of  admissions 


§  169.]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLE.  291 

and  confessions  by  the  party,  considering  them  as  declarations 
against  his  interest,  and  therefore  probably  true.  But  in  regard  to 
many  admissions,  and  especially  those  implied  from  conduct  and 
assumed  character,  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  the  party,  at  the  time 
of  the  principal  declaration  or  act  done,  believed  himself  to  be 
speaking  or  acting  against  his  own  interest;  but  often  the  contrary.1 
Such  evidence  seems,  therefore,  more  properly  admissible  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  ordinary  and  legal  proof,  either  in  virtue  of  the  direct 
consent  and  waiver  of  the  party,  as  ill  the  case  of  explicit  and  solemn 
admissions;  or  on  grounds  of  public  policy  and  convenience, 'as  in 
the  case  of  those  implied  from  assumed  character,  acquiescence,  or 
conduct.2  It  is  in  this  light  that  confessions  and  admissions  are 
regarded  by  the  Roman  law,  as  is  stated  by  Mascardus.  "Illud 
igitur  in  primis,  ut  hinc  potissimum  exordiar,  lion  est  ignorandum, 
quod  etsi  confessioni  inter  probationum  species  locum  in  praesentia 
tribuerimus;  cuncti  tamen  fere  Dd.  unanimes  sunt  arbitrati,  ipsam 
potius  esse  ab  onere  probandi  relevationem  quam  proprie  proba- 
tionem."8  [But  the  theory  that  an  admission  is  something  that  is 
substituted  for  and  serves  in  place  of  evidence  is  open  to  the  objec- 
tion that  it  is  not  founded  on  the  facts  of  the  law;  for  the  party's 
extra-judicial  admissions  simply  go  to  the  jury  with  other  evidence, 
and  do  not  by  any  means  relieve  the  other  party  from  producing 
evidence  or  allow  him  to  take  for  granted  the  fact  referred  to  in  the 
admission.  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  under  the  term  "admission" 
are  included  two  things,  wholly  distinct  in  evidential  theory  and 
effect.  (1)  A  deliberate  and  formal  waiver,  made  usually  in  court 
or  by  writing  preparatory  to  trial,  by  the  party  or  his  attorney,  by 
conceding  for  the  purposes  of  the  trial  the  truth  of  some  alleged 
fact,  has  the  effect  of  a  confessory  pleading,  in  that  the  fact  is 
thereafter  to  be  taken  for  granted  and  the  other  party  need  offer  no 
evidence  to  prove  it.  This  is  what  is  commonly  termed  a  solemn 
—  i.  e.  ceremonial  or  formal  —  or  judicial  admission,  and  is  in  truth, 
as  above  suggested,  a  substitute  for  evidence,  in  that  it  does  away 
with  the  need  for  evidence.  These  are  later  referred  to  in  §§  186, 
192,  and  205.  (2)  Statements  by  a  party,  other  than  these,  are  also 
termed  admissions;  but  there  is  nothing  in  their  nature  which  enti- 
tles us  to  say  that  they  are  explainable  only  as  made  against  the 
person's  interest.  The  simple  and  broad  rule  for  receiving  them  is, 
in  the  language  of  Chief  Baron  Pollock,  that  "  if  a  party  has  chosen 

1  FJThis  notion  that  an  admission  is  something  said  against  the  interest  of  the  party 
(analogous  to  the  principle  of  the  Hearsay  exception,  ante,  Chap.  XIII)  lias  been  very 
common  ;  e.  g.  the  language  of  Eyre,  G.  J.,  in  Hardy's  Trial,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  1093  ; 
Evans,  J.,  in  Robinson  v.  Blakely,  4  Rich.  588.     But,   as  the  author  suggests,  the 
theory  fails  for  the  simple  reason  that  an  admission  is  receivable  even  though  the  party 
spoke,  not  against  his  interest,  but  in  favor  of  it,  as  is  generally  conceded.] 

2  See  supra,  §  27. 

8  Mascard.  De  Probat.  vol.  i,  Qusest.  7,  n.  1,  10,  11 ;  Menochius,  De  Prsesump.  lib. 
1,  Quaes.  62,  n.  6  ;  Alciatus,  De  Praesump.  pars  2,  n.  4. 


292  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

to  talk  about  a  particular  matter,  his  statement  is  evidence  against 
himself; "  4  and  the  theory  of  their  use  seems  to  be  that  they  are  to 
a  party  what  prior  inconsistent  statements  are  to  a  witness  (post, 
§  444),  viz.,  a  means  of  discrediting  his  present  claim  by  showing 
that  he  has  at  other  times  made  a  smaller  or  otherwise  different 
claim.  If  a  witness  says  on  the  stand  that  he  saw  the  plaintiff 
give  the  defendant  one  hundred  dollars,  a  prior  statement  of  his  that 
he  saw  fifty  dollars  given  discredits  his  present  testimony,  in  that 
both  statements  cannot  be  true,  and  at  one  time  or  the  other  the 
witness  has  apparently  erred.  In  a  similar  way,  a  plaintiff's  state- 
ment at  a  prior  time  that  he  lent  the  defendant  fifty  dollars  throws 
discredit  on  his  present  claim  in  the  pleadings  that  he  lent  one  hun- 
dred dollars.  The  evidential  weight  of  the  inconsistency  may  be 
greater  if  his  prior  statement  was  against  his  interest  —  as,  if  he 
declared  that  he  never  lent  any  money  at  all,  —  but  that  is  not  essen- 
tial to  its  admissibility ;  so  that,  in  the  end,  the  purpose  and  effect 
of  using  admissions  of  this  sort  is  simply  to  set  a  prior  statement  of 
the  party  against  the  statement  now  advanced  by  him  in  pleadings 
or  through  his  witnesses,  and  thus  discredit  the  present  claim  by  its 
inconsistency  with  the  former  one. 

Admissions  are  often  spoken  of  as  "binding,"  and  admissions 
rejected  are  likewise  referred  to  as  "not  binding."  This  term,  how- 
ever, has  no  application  whatever  to  the  second  sort  above  men- 
tioned; these  go  to  the  jury  like  the  inconsistent  statements  of  a 
witness,  and  the  party  is  not  prevented  from  continuing  to  dispute 
their  truth  in  any  way  he  may.6  They  never  "bind"  in  the  sense 
that  he  is  held  as  a  matter  of  law  to  the  fact  thus  stated.  That 
term  does  apply,  however,  to  solemn  admissions  (the  first  sort  above 
named),  which  the  party  cannot  retract  or  dispute;  and  it  applies  to 
the  estoppels,  miscalled  admissions,  which  are  treated  in  the  later 
sections  of  this  chapter,  but  are,  after  all,  like  contracts,  acts  carry- 
ing legal  consequences  in  the  substantive  law,  and  not  evidential 
data.]  Many  admissions,  however,  being  made  by  third  persons,8 
are  receivable  on  mixed  grounds;  partly  as  belonging  to  the  res 
gestce,  partly  as  made  against  the  interest  of  the  person  making 
them,  and  partly  because  of  some  privity  with  him  against  whom 
they  are  offered  in  evidence.  The  whole  subject,  therefore,  prop- 
erly falls  under  consideration  in  this  connection. 

§  170.  Admissions  and  Confessions  distinguished.  In  our  law, 
the  term  "  admission  "  is  usually  applied  to  civil  transactions,  and  to 
those  matters  of  fact,  in  criminal  cases,  which  do  not  involve  crim- 
inal intent;  the  term  "confession"  being  generally  restricted  to  ac- 

"Darby  v.  Ouselev,  1  H.  ft  N.  1.] 

"See  §  212,  post."} 

^There  are,  properly  speaking,  no  admissions  by  third  persons  ;  inconsistent 
statements  by  others  than  the  party  or  a  witness  are  received  as  admissions  only  because 
the  other  person  is  regarded  as  representing  or  identified  with  the  party .J 


*  P 

6  h 
•B 


§§  169-170  a.  j  NATURE  OF  ADMISSIONS.  293 

knowledgments  of  guilt.1  We  shall  therefore  treat  them  separately, 
beginning  with  admissions.  The  rules  of  evidence  are  in  both  cases 
the  same.2  Thus,  in  the  trial  of  Lord  Melville,  charged,  among 
other  things,  with  criminal  misapplication  of  moneys,  received  from 
the  Exchequer,  the  admission  of  his  agent  and  authorized  receiver 
was  held  sufficient  proof  of  the  fact  of  his  receiving  the  public 
money;  but  not  admissible  to  establish  the  charge  of  any  criminal 
misapplication  of  it.  The  law  was  thus  stated  by  Lord  Chancellor 
Erskine:  "This  first  step  in  the  proof"  (namely,  the  receipt  of  the 
money)  "  must  advance  by  evidence  applicable  alike  to  civil  as  to 
criminal  cases;  for  a  fact  must  be  established  by  the  same  evidence, 
whether  it  is  to  be  followed  by  a  criminal  or  civil  consequence; 
but  it  is  a  totally  different  question,  in  the  consideration  of 'criminal 
as  distinguished  from  civil  justice,  how  the  noble  person  now  on  trial 
may  be  affected  by  the  fact  when  so  established.  The  receipt  by 
the  paymaster  would  in  itself  involve  him  civilly,  but  could  by  no 
possibility  convict  him  of  a  crime."  8 

§  170  a.  Party  need  not  be  asked  before  proving  an  Admission. 
[The  resemblance  between  an  admission,  as  used  against  a  party,  and 
a  prior  inconsistent  statement,  as  used  against  a  witness,  has  fre- 
quently been  availed  of  by  counsel  to  justify  a  demand  that  the  rule 
applicable  to  this  mode  of  discrediting  a  witness l  be  applied  also  in 
the  case  of  a  party,  at  least  when  he  is  also  a  witness,  viz.,  the  rule 
that,  for  fairness'  sake,  the  person  to  be  discredited  must  first  be 
asked  whether  he  made  such  a  statement.  There  are  two  reasons 
why  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  party;  in  the  first  place,  parties 
became  competent  and  compellable  to  testify  only  within  the  last 
half -century,  and  until  that  time  it  was  impossible  to  put  such  a 
question  to  a  party;  so  that  the  use  of  admissions  was  long  and 
firmly  established  without  any  such  preliminary  condition  (which, 
indeed,  even  for  witnesses  is  no  older  than  1820) ;  in  the  second 
place,  the  party  is  presumably  in  attendance  throughout  the  trial, 
while  the  witness  frequently  or  usually  departs  after  giving  his 
testimony,  so  that  for  the  witness  it  is  a  matter  of  fairness  to  put 
the  inquiry  before  it  is  too  late  to  obtain  an  explanation  from  him, 
while  for  the  party  there  is  no  such  palpable  need.  That  the  inquiry 
need  not  be  made  of  a  party  is  generally  accepted.2] 

1  [The  accused  in  a  criminal  case  may  make  admissions,  just  as  a  party  in  a  civil 
case,  f.  c.  by  saying  things  inconsistent  with  the  present  points  of  his  proof.     Admis- 
sions, in  the  sense  of  inconsistencies,  arc  not  peculiar  to  civil  cases.     But  a  direct  asser- 
tion by  an  accused  of  the  truth  of  the  charge  against  him  is  specifically  termed  a 
confession  ;  and  for  the  use  of  this,  certain  special  limitations  obtain,  as  treated  in  the 
next  chapter.] 

2  [Tor  admissions,  but  not  for  confessions  ;  see  the  preceding  note.] 
8  29  How.  St.  Tr.  764. 

1  [Post,  §  461 /.] 

2  L Andrews  v.  Askey,  8  C.  &  P.  7  ;  Day,  Common  Law  Procedure  Acts,  4th  ed., 
277  ;  Collins  v.  Mack,  31  Ark.  694  ;  Rose  v.  Otis,  18  Colo.  59  ;  State  v.  Brown,  Houst. 
Del,  40  Atl.  938;  Belt  v.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  451 ;  Coffin  v.  Bradbury,  Ida.,  35  Pac. 


294  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 


2.    Persons  whose  Statements  are  receivable  as  Admissions* 

§  171.  Parties  to  the  Record.  We  shall  first  consider  the  person 
whose  admissions  may  be  received.  And  here  the  general  doctrine 
is,  that  the  declarations  of  a  party  to  the  record,  or  of  one  identified 
in  interest  with  him,  are,  as  against  such  party,  admissible  in  evi- 
dence.1 If  they  proceed  from  a  stranger,  and  cannot  be  brought 
home  to  the  party,  they  are  inadmissible,  unless  upon  some  of  the 
other  grounds  already  considered.  Thus,  the  admissions  of  a  payee 
of  a  negotiable  promissory  note,  not  overdue  when  negotiated,  can- 
not be  received  in  an  action  by  the  indorsee  against  the  maker,  to 
impeach  the  consideration,  there  being  no  identity  of  interest  be- 
tween him  and  the  plaintiff.2 

§  172.  Same  :  Nominal  Parties.  This  general  rule,  admitting  the 
declarations  of  a  party  to  the  record  in  evidence,  applies  to  all  cases 
where  the  party  has  any  interest  in  the  suit,  whether  others  are  joint 
parties  on  the  same  side  with  him  or  not,  and  howsoever  the  interest 
may  appear,  and  whatever  may  be  its  relative  amount.1  But  where 
the  party  sues  alone,  and  has  no  interest  in  the  matter,  his  name 
being  used,  of  necessity,  by  one  to  whom  he  has  assigned  all  his 
interest  in  the  subject  of  the  suit,  though  it  is  agreed  that  he  cannot 
be  permitted,  by  his  acts  or  admissions,  to  disparage  the  title  of  his 
innocent  assignee  or  vendee,  yet  the  books  are  not  so  clearly  agreed 
in  the  mode  of  restraining  him.  That  Chancery  will  always  protect 

715,  722;  Buck  v.  Haddock,  167  111.  219;  Eddings  v.  Brown,  Ind.  Ter.,  38  S.  W. 
1110  ;  State  v.  Forsythe,  99  la.  1 ;  South  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Painter,  53  Kan.  414  ;  Kirk  v. 
Garrett,  84  Md.  383  ;  Brubaker  v.  Taylor,  76  Pac.  87  ;  State  v.  Freeman,  43  S.  C.  105  ; 
Hart  v.  Pratt,  Wash.,  53  Pac.  711.] 

1  Spargo  v.  Brown,  9  B.  &  C.  935,  per  Bayley,  J.     In  the  Court  of  Chancery,  in 
England,  evidence  is  not  received  of  admissions  or  declarations  of  the  parties,  which  are 
not  put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings,  and  which  there  was  not,  therefore,  any  opportunity 
of  explaining  or  disproving :  Copland  v.  Toulmin,  7  Cl.  &  Fin.  350,  373  ;    Austin  v. 
Chamber,  6  id.  1  ;  Attwood  v.  Small,  ib.  234.     But  in  the  United  States  this  rule  has 
not  been  adopted ;  and  it  is  deemed  sufficient  if  the  proposition  to  be  established  is 
stated  in  the  bill,  without  stating  the  particular  kind  of  evidence  by  which  it  is  to  be 
proved:  see  Smith  v.   Burnham,  2  Sumn.  612;  Brandon  v.  Cabiness,  10  Ala.  156; 
Story,  Equity  Plead.  265  «,  and  n.  (1),  where  this  subject  is  fully  discussed.      And  in 
England,  the  rule  has  recently  been  qualified,  so  far  as  to  admit  a  written  admission  by 
the  defendant  of  his  liability  to  the  plaintiff,  in  the  matter  of  the  pending  suit :  Mal- 
colm v.  Scott,  3  Hare  63  ;  McMahon  v.  Burchell,  1  Coop.  Gas.  temp.  Cottenham  475 ; 
7  Law  Rev.  209  ;  see  the  cases  collected  by  Mr.  Cooper  in  his  note  appended  to  that  case. 

2  Barough  v.  White,  4  B.  &  C.  325  ;  Bristol  v.  Dann,  12  Wend  142.     QA11  these 
questions,  dealt  with  in  the  immediately  following  sections,  as  to  the  classes  of  per- 
sons whose  statements  can  be  used  ns  if  the  party  himself  were  responsible  for  them, 
are  hardly  questions  of  the  law  of  evidence  ;  their  solution,  at  any  rate,  depends  chiefly 
on  the  substantive  law  determining  the  legal  relations  of  such  persons  to  the  party.] 

1  Bauerman  v.  Radenius,  7  T.  R.  663  ;  8.  c.  2  Esp.  653.  In  this  case  the  consign- 
ees brought  an  action  in  the  name  of  the  consignor  against  the  ship-master,  for  a 
damage  to  the  goods,  occasioned  by  his  negligence;  and  without  supposing  some 
interest  to  remain  in  the  consignor,  the  action  could  not  be  maintained.  It  was  on 
this  ground  that  Lawrence,  J.,  placed  the  decision  ;  see  also  Nonlen  v.  Williamson, 
1  Taunt.  878 ;  Mandeville  v.  Welch,  5  Wheat.  283,  286  ;  Dan  et  al.  v.  Brown,  4  Cowen, 
483,  492. 


§§  171-173.]         WHOSE   ADMISSIONS   ARE   RECEIVABLE.  295 

the  assignee,  either  by  injunction  or  otherwise,  is  very  certain ;  and 
formerly  this  was  the  course  uniformly  pursued;  the  admissions  of 
a  party  to  the  record,  at  common  law,  being  received  against  him  in 
all  cases.  But,  in  later  times,  the  interests  of  an  assignee,  suing  in 
the  name  of  his  assignor,  have  also,  to  a  considerable  extent,  been 
protected,  in  the  courts  of  common  law,  against  the  effect  of  any 
acts  or  admissions  of  the  latter  to  his  prejudice.  A  familiar  example 
of  this  sort  is  that  of  a  receipt  in  full,  given  by  the  assignor,  being 
nominal  plaintiff,  to  the  debtor,  after  the  assignment;  which  the 
assignee  is  permitted  to  impeach  and  avoid,  in  a  suit  at  law,  by 
showing  the  previous  assignment.* 

§  173.  But  a  distinction  has  been  taken  between  such  admissions 
as  these  which  are  given  in  evidence  to  the  jury  under  the  general 
issue,  and  are  therefore  open  to  explanation  and  controlling  proof, 
and  those  in  more  solemn  form,  such  as  releases  which  are  specially 
pleaded  and  operate  by  way  of  estoppel ;  in  which  latter  cases  it  has 
been  held,  that,  if  the  release  of  the  nominal  plaintiff  is  pleaded  in 
bar,  the  Courts  of  law,  sitting  in  bank,  will  administer  equitable 
relief,  by  setting  aside  the  plea  on  motion ;  but  that,  if  issue  is  taken 
on  the  matter  pleaded,  such  act  or  admission  of  the  nominal  plain- 
tiff must  be  allowed  its  effect  at  law  to  the  same  extent  as  if  he  were 
the  real  plaintiff  in  the  suit.1  The  American  Courts,  however,  do 
not  recognize  this  distinction;  but,  where  a  release  from  the  nominal 
plaintiff  is  pleaded  in  bar,  a  prior  assignment  of  the  cause  of  action, 
with  notice  thereof  to  the  defendant,  and  an  averment  that  the  suit 
is  prosecuted  by  the  assignee  for  his  own  benefit,  is  held  a  good 
replication.2  Nor  is  the  nominal  plaintiff  permitted  by  the  entry  of 
a  retraxit,  or  in  any  other  manner,  injuriously  to  affect  the  rights 
of  his  assignee  in  a  suit  at  law.* 

2  Henderson  et  al.  v.  Wild,  2  Campb.  561.  Lord  Ellenborough,  in  a  previous  case 
of  the  same  kind,  thought  himself  not  at  liberty,  sitting  at  Nisi  Prius,  to  overrule 
the  defence :  Alner  v.  George,  1  Campb.  392 ;  Frear  v.  Evertson,  20  Johns.  142  ;  see 
also  Payne  v.  Rogers,  Doug.  407;  Winch  v.  Keeley,  1  T.  R.  619;  Cockshot  v.  Ben- 
nett, 2  "id.  763  ;  Lane  v.  Chandler,  3  Smith  77,  83 ;  Skaife  v.  Jackson,  3  B.  & 
C.  421 ;  Appleton  v.  Boyd,  7  Mass.  ]  31 ;  Tiermen  v.  Jackson,  5  Peters  580 ;  Sar- 
geant  v.  Sargeant,  3  Washb.  371  ;  Head  v.  Shaver,  9  Ala.  791. 

1  Alner  v.  George,  1  Campb.  395,  per  Ld.  Ellen  borough;  Gibson  v.  Winter,  5  B.  & 
Ad.  96;  Craib  u.  D'Aeth,  7  T.  R.  670,  n.  (l>);  Legh  v.  Legh,  1  B.  &  P.  447;  Anon., 
1  Salk.  260  ;  Payne  v.   Rogers,  Doug.  407;  Skaife  v.  Jackson,  3  B.  &  C.  421. 

2  Mandeville  v.  Welch,  5  Wheat.  277,  283  ;  Andrews  v.  Beecker,  1  Johns.  Gas.  411; 
Raymond  v.  Squire,    11  Johns.    47 ;    Littlefield   v.    Storey,    3   id.   425 ;    Dawson   v. 
Coles,  16  id.  51;  Kimball  v.  Huntington,  10  Wend.  675;  Owinga  v.  Low,  5  Gill  & 
Johns.  134. 

8  Welch  v.  Mandeville,  1  Wheat.  233 :  "  By  the  common  law,  cJwses  in  action 
were  not  assignable  except  to  the  crown.  The  civil  law  considers  them  as,  strictly 
speaking,  not  assignable  ;  but,  by  the  invention  of  a  fiction,  the  Roman  jurisconsults 
contrived  to  attain  this  object.  The  creditor  who  wished  to  transfer  his  right  of  action 
to  another  person,  constituted  him  his  attorney,  or  procurator  in  rem  suam  as  it  was 
called,  and  it  was  stipulated  that  the  action  should  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the 
assignor,  but  for  the  benefit  and  at  the  expense  of  the  assignee.  Pothier  de  Vente, 
No.  550.  After  notice  to  the  debtor,  this  assignment  operated  a  complete  cession  of 
the  debt,  and  invalidated  a  payment  to  any  other  person  than  the  assignee,  or  a  release 


296  ADMISSIONS.  [CK.    XVII. 

§  174.  Same  :  Joint  Promisors  :  Parties  in  a  Testamentary  Cause  ; 
etc.  Though  the  admissions  of  a  party  to  the  record  are  generally 
receivable  in  evidence  against  him,  yet,  where  there  are  several 
parties  on  the  same  side,  the  admissions  of  one  are  not  admitted  to 
affect  the  others,  who  may  happen  to  be  joined  with  him,  unless 
there  is  some  joint  interest  of  privity  in  design  between  them ; l  al- 
though the  admissions  may,  in  proper  cases,  be  received  against  the 
person  who  made  them.  Thus,  in  an  action  against  joint  makers  of 
a  note,  if  one  suffers  judgment  by  default,  his  signature  must  still 
be  proved  against  the  other.2  And  even  where  there  is  a  joint  in- 
terest, a  release,  executed  by  one  of  several  plaintiffs,  will,  in  a 
clear  case  of  fraud,  be  set  aside  in  a  court  of  law.8  But  in  the 
absence  of  fraud,  if  the  parties  have  a  joint  interest  in  the  matter 
in  suit,  whether  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  an  admission  made  by 
one  is,  in  general,  evidence  against  all.*  They  stand  to  each  other, 

from  any  other  person  than  him  :  ib.  110,  554  ;  Code  Napoleon,  liv.  3,  tit.  6  ;  De  la 
Vente,  c.  8,  §  1690.  The  Court  of  Chancery,  imitating,  in  its  usual  spirit,  the  civil  law 
in  this  particular,  disregarded  the  rigid  strictness  of  the  common  law,  and  protected 
the  rights  of  the  assignee  of  chases  in  action.  "This  liberality  was  at  last  adopted  by  the 
Courts  of  common  law,  who  now  consider  an  assignment  of  a  chose  in  action  as  substan- 
tially valid,  only  preserving,  in  certain  cases,  the  form  of  an  action  commenced  in  the 
name  of  the  assignor,  the  beneficial  interest  and  control  of  the  suit  being,  however,  con- 
sidered as  completely  vested  in  the  assignee,  as  procurator  in  rcm  suam.  See  Master 
Miller,  4  T.  R.  340;  Andrews  v.  Beecker,  1  Johns.  Cas.  411;  Bates  v.  New  York 
Insurance  Company,  3  id.  242;  Wardell  v.  Eden,  1  Johns.  532,  in  notis ;  Carver  v. 
Tracy,  3  id.  427;  Raymond  v.  Squire,  11  id.  47;  Van  Vechten  v.  Graves,  4  id.  406; 
VVeston  v.  Barker,  12  id.  276  ; "  see  the  reporter's  note  to  1  Wheat.  237.  But 
where  the  nominal  plaintiff  was  constituted,  by  the  party  in  interest,  his  agent  for 
negotiating  the  contract,  and  it  is  expressly  made  with  him  alone,  he  is  treated,  in  an 
action  upon  such  contract,  in  all  respects  as  a  party  to  the  cause;  and  any  defence 
against  him  is  a  defence,  in  that  action,  against  the  cestui  que  trust,  suing  in  his  name. 
Tnerefoiv,  where  a  broker,  in  whose  name  a  policy  of  insurance  under  seal  was  effected, 
brought  an  action  of  covenant  thereon,  to  which  payment  was  pleaded;  it  was  held 
that  payment  of  the  amount  of  loss  to  the  broker,  by  allowing  him  credit  in  account 
for  that  sum,  against  a  balance  for  premiums  due  from  him  to  the  defendants,  was  a 
good  payment,  as  between  the  plaintiff  on  the  record  and  the  defendants,  and,  there- 
fore, an  answer  to  the  action  :  Gibson  v.  Winter  et  al.,  5  B.  &  Ad.  96.  This  case,  how- 
ever, may,  with  equal  and  perhaps  greater  propriety,  be  referred  to  the  law  of  agency; 
see  Richardson  v.  Anderson,  1  Campb.  43,  n.  ;  Story  on  Agency,  §§  413,  429-434. 

1  Dan  v.  Brown,  4    Cowen  483,  492  ;  R.  v.  Hardwick,  11  East  678,  689,  per  Le 
Blanc,  J.  ;  Whitcomb  v.  Whiting,  2  Doug.  652. 

2  Gray  t;.  Palmer,  1  Esp.  135;  see  also  Shirreff  v.  Wilks,  1  East  48. 

8  Jones  t>.  Herbert,  7  Taunt.  421  :  Loring  v.  Brackett,  3  Pick.  403  ;  Skaife  v.  Jack- 
son,  3  B.  &  C.  421  ;  Henderson  v.  Wild,  2  Compb.  561. 

4  Such  was  the  doctrine  laid  down  by  Ld.  Mansfield  in  Whitcomb  v.  Whiting, 
2  Doug.  652.  Its  propriety,  and  the  extent  of  its  application,  have  been  much  dis- 
cussed .Hid  sometimes  questioned  ;  but  it  seems  now  to  be  clearly  established  :  see 
Pt-rham  v.  Raynal,  2  Bing.  306  ;  Burleigh  v.  Stott,  8  R  &  C.  36 ;  Wyatt  v.  Hodson, 
8  Bing.  309;  Brandrarn  v.  Whurton,  1  B.  &  Aid.  467;  Holme  v.  Green,  1  Stark. 
488.  See  also,  accordingly,  White  «».  Hale,  3  Pick.  291  ;  Martin  v.  Root,  17  Mass. 
22  ;  Hunt  ».  Bridgham,  2  Pick.  581  ;  Frye  v.  Barker,  4  id.  382  ;  Beitz  v.  Fuller, 
1  McCord  541;  Johnson  v.  Boardslee,  15  Johns.  3;  Bound  v.  Lathrop,  4  Conn. 
336;  Coit  v.  Tracy.  8  id.  268.  276,  277;  Getchell  ».  Heald,  7  Gi-penl.  26;  Owings 
v.  Low,  5  Gill  &  Johns.  144;  Patterson  v.  Clmatc,  7  Wend.  441;  Mclntire  v. 
Oliver,  2  Hawks  209  ;  Cady  v.  Shepherd,  11  Pick.  400  ;  Van  Reimsdyk  v.  Kane, 
1  Gall.  635,  636  ;  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Peters  351  ;  j  Barrick  v.  Austin,  21  Barb. 
241  ;  Camp  v.  Dill,  27  Ala.  563;  Derby  v.  Rounds,  53  Cal.  659.}  But  the  admia- 


§§  174-175.]         WHOSE   ADMISSIONS   AEE   EECEIVABLE.  297 

in  this  respect,  in  a  relation  similar  to  that  of  existing  copartners. 
Thus,  also,  the  act  of  making  a  partial  payment  within  six  years, 
by  one  of  several  joint  makers  of  a  promissory  note,  takes  it  out  of 
the  statute  of  limitations.8  And  where  several  were  both  legatees 
and  executors  in  a  will,  and  also  appellees  in  a  question  upon  the 
probate  of  the  will,  the  admission  of  one  of  them,  as  to  facts  which 
took  place  at  the  time  of  making  the  will,  showing  that  the  testa- 
trix was  imposed  upon,  was  held  receivable  in  evidence  against  the 
validity  of  the  will.6  And  where  two  were  bound  in  a  single  bill, 
the  admission  of  one  was  held  good  against  both  defendants.7 

§  175.    Same  :  Town  Corporators.    In  settlement  cases,  it  has  long 

sion  must  be  distinctly  made  by  a  party  still  liable  upon  the  note ;  otherwise  it 
will  not  be  binding  against  the  others  ;  therefore,  a  payment  appropriated,  by  the 
election  of  the  creditor  only,  to  the  debt  in  question,  is  not  a  sufficient  admission 
of  that  debt,  for  this  purpose  :  Holme  v.  Green,  ubi  sup.  Neither  is  a  payment 
received  under  a  dividend  of  the  effects  of  a  bankrupt  promisor  :  Brandram  v. 
Wharton,  ubi  sup.  In  this  last  case,  the  opposing  decision  in  Jackson  v.  Fairbank, 

2  H.  Bl.  340,  was   considered  and   strongly  disapproved  ;  but   it   was  afterwards 
cited   by  Holroyd,  J.,  as   a   valid   decision,  in    Burleigh  v.    Stott,  8  B.  &    C.  36. 
{More  recent  cases,  both  in  this  countiy  and  in    England,  have  denied   that,  from 
the  mere  fact  of  part  payment,  the  jury  are  authorized   to   infer  a   promise  to  pay 
the    rest :    Davies    v.    Edwards,    6    Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  550  ;  s.  C.  15  Jur.   1014,    where 
Jackson  v.  Fairbank   aud  Brandram    v.  Wharton    are  said    not    to   have    been  well 
considered  ;  see  now  St.  19  &  20  Viet.,  c.  97  ;  Jackson  v.  Woolley,  8  E.  &  B.  784  ; 
Smith  v.  Westmoreland,  12    S.  &    M.  663  ;    Davidson   r.  Harrisson,  33  Miss.  41  ; 
Roscoe  v.  Hale,  7  Gray  274  ;  Stoddard  v.  Doane,  id.  387  ;  and   note   to   Bradtield 
v.  Tapper,  7  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  541;  see  Shoemaker  v.  Benedict,  1  Ker.  (N.  Y.)  176; 
Coleman  i>.  Fobes,  22  Pa.  156  ;  Bush  v.  St.owell,   71  Pa.  St.  208 ;  Angell  on  Lim- 
itations, 6th  ed.,  §§  240,  260,  where  the  subject,  both  as  to  payments  and  admis- 
sions, is  fully  treated,  and   the   authorities   are    collected.}     The   admission    where 
one  of  the  promisors  is  dead,  to   take   the   case    out   of  the   statute  of  limitations 
against  him,  must  have  been  made  in  his  lifetime:  Burleigh  v.  Stott,  supra;  Slat- 
ter  v.  Lawson,  1  B.  &  Ad.  396  ;  and  by  a  party  originally  liable,  Atkins  u.  Tred- 
gold,   2  B.  &  C.  23.     This  effect  of  the  admission  of  indebtment,  by  one  of  several 
joint  promisors,  as  to  cases  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  when  it  is  merely 
a  verbal  admission,  without  part    payment,  is    now    restricted    in    England,  to  the 
party  making  the  admission,  by  Stat.  9  George  IV,  c.  14  (Lord  Tenterd en's  Act). 
So  in  Massachusetts,  by  Gen  Stat.,  c.  155,  §§  14,  16  ;  and  in  Vermont,  Rev.  Stat., 
c-  58,  §§  23,  27.     The  application  of   this  doctrine    to    partners,  after  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  partnership,  has  already  been  considered:  §  112,  n.  (d),  ^transferred  post, 
as  §  184  b.~^     Whether  a  written  acknowledgment,  made  by  one  of  several  partners, 
stands  upon  different  ground  from    that  of  a   similar   admission  by  one  of  several 
joint  contractors,  is   an   open    question  :  Clark   v.  Alexander,  8  Jnr.  496,  498 ;  see 
post,  Vol.   II,  §§  441,  444  ;  Pierce  v.  Wood,   3  Foster  520. 

6  Burleigh  v.  Stott,  8  B.  &  C.  36  ;  Munderson  v.  Reeve,  2  Stark.  Evid.  484  ; 
Wyatt  v.  Hodson,  8  Bing.  309 ;  Chippendale  v.  Thurston,  4  C.  &  P.  98 ;  s.  c. 
1  M.  &  M.  411  ;  Pease  v.  Hirst,  10  B.  &  C.  122.  But  it  must  be  distinctly  shown 
to  be  a  payment  on  account  of  the  particular  debt  :  Holme  v.  Green,  1  Stark.  488. 

6  Atkins  v.  Sanger,  1  Pick.  192  ;  see  also  Jackson  v.  Vail,  7  Wend.  125  ;  Osgood 
v.    Manhattan   Co.,  3   Cowen  612;     j  Milton   v.    Hunter,    13   Bush  163;    Robinson 
v.    Hutchinson,    31   Vt.    443 ;  contra,   unless  there    is  a    joint  interest :    Hayes    v. 
Burkam,  51    Ind.  130  ;    Forney  ».   Ferrell,  4  W.  Va.   730  ;  La  Bau  v.  Vanderbilt, 

3  Redf.   384  ;  Clark  v.  Morrison,  25  Pa.  St.  453  ;    Shailer   v.  Bumstead,  99  Mass. 
112  ;  Osgood  c.  Manhattan  Co.,  3  Cow.  612  ;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  13  Ohio  St. 
358;    and  post,    §  176,  n.  7 ;    (   [^Roller  v.  Kling,  Ind.,  49  N.  E.  948;  undecided: 
Von  de  Veld  v.  Judy,  Mo.,  44  S.  W.  111".] 

7  Lowe  v.  Boteler,  4  Har.  &  McHen.  346  ;  Vicary's  Case,  1  Gilbert,  Evid.,  by  Lofft, 
p.  59,  n. 


298  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

been  held  that  declarations  by  rated  parishioners  are  evidence  against 
the  parish;  for  they  are  parties  to  the  cause,  though  the  nominal 
parties  to  the  appeal  be  church-wardens  and  overseers  of  the  poor  of 
the  parish.1  The  same  principle  is  now  applied  in  England  to  all 
other  prosecutions  against  towns  and  parishes,  in  respect  to  the 
declarations  of  ratable  inhabitants,  they  beiug  substantially  parties 
to  the  record.2  Nor  is  it  necessary  first  to  call  the  inhabitant,  and 
show  that  he  refuses  to  be  examined,  in  order  to  admit  his  declara- 
tions.8 And  the  same  principle  would  seem  to  apply  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  towns,  counties,  or  other  territorial  political  divisions  of 
this  country,  who  sue  and  are  prosecuted  as  inhabitants,  eo  nomine, 
and  are  termed  quasi  corporations.  Being  parties  personally  liable, 
their  declarations  are  admissible,  though  the  value  of  the  evidence 
may,  from  circumstances,  be  exceedingly  light.4 

§  176.  Same  :  Mere  Community  of  Interest  not  enough.  It  is  a 
joint  interest,  and  not  a  mere  community  of  interest,  that  renders 
such  admissions  receivable.  Therefore  the  admissions  of  one  execu- 
tor are  not  received,  to  take  a  case  out  of  the  statute  of  limitations 
as  against  his  co-executor.1  Nor  is  an  acknowledgment  of  indebt- 
ment  by  one  executor  admissible  against  his  co-executor,  to  establish 
the  original  demand.2  The  admission  of  the  receipt  of  money,  by 
one  of  several  trustees,  is  not  received  to  charge  the  other  trustees.8 
Nor  is  there  such  joint  interest  between  a  surviving  promisor,  and 

*  R.  v.  Inhabitants  of  Hardwick,  11  East  579. 

a  R.  v.  Adderbury,  5  Q.  B.  187. 

8  R.  ».  Inhabitants  of  Whitley  Lower,  1  M.  &  S.  637  ;  R.  v.  Inhabitants  of  Woburn, 
10  East  395. 

4  11  East  586,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  580.  The  statutes  rendering 
quasi  corporators  competent  witnesses  (see  54  Geo.  Ill,  c.  170  ;  3  &  4  ViH.,  c.  25)  are 
not  understood  as  interfering  with  the  rule  of  evidence  respecting  admissions  :  Phil.  & 
Am.  on  Evid.  395  and  n.  (2)  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  375,  n.  (2).  [Tor  interest  as  disqualify- 
ing a  corporator,  and  its  abolition,  see  post,  §  331,  and  the  preceding  sections/]  {Note 
by  Judge  Redfield:  "  We  believe  the  practice  is  not  general,  in  the  American  States, 
to  admit  the  declarations  of  the  members  of  a  corporation,  as  evidence  against  the  cor- 
poration itself.  And  it  seems  to  us,  that  upon  principle  they  are  clearly  inadmissible. 
There  is  no  rule  of  law  better  settled  than  that  the  admission  of  a  shareholder  will  not 
bind  the  corporation.  Nor  will  the  admission  of  a  director  or  agent  of  a  private  corpo- 
ration bind  the  company,  except  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce.  And  it  will  make  no  differ- 
ence that  the  action  is  in  the  corporate  name  of  the  president  and  directors  ;  that  does 
not  make  them  parties  in  person.  And  we  see  no  more  reason  why  the  admission  of 
the  inhabitants  of  a  town  or  parish  should  bind  the  municipality,  because  the  action 
happens  to  be  in  form  in  the  name  of  such  inhabitants,  than  that  all  the  admissions  or 
declarations  of  the  people  at  large  should  be  evidence  against  the  public  prosecutor  in 
criminal  proceedings,  when  they  are  instituted  in  the  name  of  The  People,  which  we 
believe  would  be  regarded  as  an  absurdity  by  every  one.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that 
in  no  such  case  can  the  admission  or  declaration  of  a  corporator  be  fairly  regarded  as 
evidence  against  the  corporation.  Watertown  v.  Cowen,  4  Paige  510  ;  Burlington  v. 
Calais.  1  Vt.  385;  Low  v.  Perkins,  10  id.  532."} 

1  Tullock  v.  Dunn,  R.  &  M.  416.      Quatre,  and  see  Hammon  v.  Huntley,  4  Cowen, 
493.     But  the  declarations  of  an  executor  or  administrator  are  admissible  against  him, 
in  any  suit  by  or  against  him  in  that  character:  Faunce  v.  Gray,  21  Pick.  243. 

2  Hammon  v.  Huntley,  4  Cowen  493 ;  James  v.  Hackley,  16  Johns.  277  ;  Forsyth 
v.  Gannon,  5  Wend.  558. 

8  Davies  v.  Ridge,  3  Eap.  101. 


§§  175-177.]  PERSONS  MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  299 

the  executor  of  his  co-promisor,  as  to  make  the  act  or  admission  of 
the  one  sufficient  to  bind  the  other.4  Neither  will  the  admission  of 
one  who  was  joint  promisor  with  a  feme  sole  be  received  to  charge 
her  husband,  after  the  marriage,  in  an  action  against  them  all,  upon 
a  plea  of  the  statute  of  limitations.6  For  the  same  reason,  namely, 
the  absence  of  a  joint  interest,  the  admissions  of  one  tenant  in  com- 
mon are  not  receivable  against  his  co-tenant,  though  both  are  parties 
on  the  same  side  in  the  suit.8  Nor  are  the  admissions  of  one  of 
several  devisees  or  legatees  admissible  to  impeach  the  validity  of 
the  will  where  they  may  affect  others  not  in  privity  with  him.T 
Neither  are  the  admissions  of  one  defendant  evidence  against  the 
other,  in  an  action  on  the  case  for  the  mere  negligence  of  both.8 

§  177.  Same  :  Interest  must  first  be  shown.  It  is  obvious  that  an 
apparent  joint  interest  is  not  sufficient  to  render  the  admissions  of 
one  party  receivable  against  his  companions  where  the  reality  of  that 
interest  is  the  point  in  controversy.  A  foundation  must  first  be  laid, 
by  showing,  prima  facie,  that  a  joint  interest  exists.  Therefore, 
in  an  action  against  several  joint  makers  of  a  promissory  note,  the 
execution  of  which  was  the  point  in  issue,  the  admission  of  his  sig- 
nature only  by  one  defendant  was  held  not  sufficient  to  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  recover  against  him  and  the  others,  though  theirs  had 
been  proved;  the  point  to  be  proved  against  all  being  a  joint  promise 
by  all.1  And  where  it  is  sought  to  charge  several  as  partners,  an 
admission  of  the  fact  of  partnership  by  one  is  not  receivable  in  evi- 
dence against  any  of  the  others,  to  prove  the  partnership.  It  is  only 
after  the  partnership  is  shown  to  exist,  by  proof  satisfactory  to 
the  judge,  that  the  admission  of  one  of  the  parties  is  received,  in 
order  to  affect  the  others.2  If  they  sue  upon  a  promise  to  them  as 

«  Atkins  v.  Tredgold,  2  B.  &  C.  23 ;  Slater  v.  Lawson,  1  B.  &  Ad.  396  ;  Slaymaker 
».  Gundacker's  Ex'r,  10  Serg.  &  R.  75 ;  Hathaway  v.  Haskell,  9  Pick.  42. 

6  Pittara  v.  Foster,  1  B.  &  C.  248. 

'  Dan  v.  Brown,  4  Cowen  483,  492  ;  and  see  Smith  v.  Vincent,  15  Conn.  1  ;  [jcontra, 
on  the  facts,  St.  Louis,  0.  H.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Fowler,  142  Mo.  670-3 

7  Hauberger  v.  Root,  6  Watts  &  Serg.  431  ;  [see  ante,  §  174.~| 

8  Daniels  v.  Potter,  1  M.  &  M.  501  ;  supra,  f  111.      Neither  is  there  such  privity 
among  the  members  of  a  board  of  public  officers,  as  to  make  the  admissions  of  one  bind- 
ing on  all :  Lockwood  v.  Smith,  5  Day  309.     Nor  among  several  iudorsers  of  a  promis- 
sory note :  Slaymaker  v.  Gundacker's  Ex'r,  10  Serg.  &  R.  75.     Nor  between  executors 
and  heirs  or  devisors:   Osgood  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  3  Cowen  612;  jnor  between  infant 
and  guardian  ad  lit,em:  Chipman  v.  R.  Co.,  12  Utah  68.  [ 

1  Gray  v.  Palmer,  1  Esp.  135. 

8  Nicholls  v.  Dowding,  1  Stark.  81  ;  Grant  f.  Jackson,  Peake's  Cas.  204  ;  Burgess 
v.  Lane,  3  Greenl.  165 ;  Grafton  Bank  t1.  Moore,  13  N.  H.  99 ;  see  Latham  v.  Kennis- 
ton,  ib.  203  ;  Whitney  v.  Ferris,  10  Johns.  66  ;  Wood  v.  Braddick,  1  Taunt.  104 ; 
Sangster  v.  Mazzarredo,  1  Stark.  161  ;  Van  Reimsdyk  v.  Kane,  1  Gall.  635  ;  Harris 
v.  Wilson,  7  Wend.  57;  Bucknam  v.  Barnum,  15  Conn.  68;  {Allcott  v.  Strong, 
9  Gush.  323  ;  Dutton  c.  Woodman,  ib.  255 ;  Rich  v.  Flanders,  39  N.  H.  304  ;  Camp- 
bell v.  Hastings,  29  Ark.  512 ;  Cowan  v.  Kinney,  33  Ohio  St.  422  ;  ante,  §  112,  n.  (a) 
[transferred  as  §  184  b,  post]  ;  see  Vol.  II,  §  484,  post;  but  when  A  and  B  are  sued  as 
partners,  if  A  admits  that  he  is  a  partner  with  B,  and  B  admits  that  he  is  a  partner 
with  A,  it  is  evidence  of  partnership  as  to  both ;  and  it  makes  no  difference  which 
declaration  is  offered  first :  Edwards  v.  Tracy,  62  Pa.  St.  874.  [Tor  the  case  of  an 
agent,  as  affected  by  this  principle,  see  post,  §  184  c-3 


300  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

partners,  the  admission  of  one  is  evidence  against  all,  even  though  it 
goes  to  a  denial  of  the  joint  right  of  action,  the  partnership  being 
conclusively  admitted  by  the  form  of  action.8 

§  178.  Same  :  Answers  of  Parties  in  Chancery.  In  general,  the 
answer  of  one  defendant  in  Chancery  cannot  be  read  in  evidence 
against  his  co-defendant;  the  reason  being,  that,  as  there  is  no  issue 
between  them,  there  can  have  been  no  opportunity  for  cross-exami- 
nation.1 But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  cases  where  the  other  defend- 
ant claims  through  him  whose  answer  is  offered  in  evidence ;  nor  to 
cases  where  they  have  a  joint  interest,  either  as  partners  or  other- 
wise, in  the  transaction.2  Wherever  the  confession  of  any  party 
would  be  good  evidence  against  another,  in  such  case  his  answer,  a 
fortiori,  may  be  read  against  the  latter.8 

§  179.  Same  :  Interest  must  exist  at  Time  of  Admission  made. 
The  admissions  which  are  thus  receivable  in  evidence  must,  as  we 
have  seen,  be  those  of  a  person  having  at  the  time  some  interest  in 
the  matter  afterwards  in  controversy  in  the  suit  to  which  he  is  a 
party.  The  admissions,  therefore,  of  a  guardian,  or  of  an  executor 
or  administrator,  made  before  he  was  completely  clothed  with  that 
trust,  or  of  uprochein  amy,  made  before  the  commencement  of  the 
suit,  cannot  be  received,  either  against  the  ward  or  infant  in  the  one 
case,  or  against  himself,  as  the  representative  of  heirs,  devisees, 
and  creditors,  in  the  other ; l  though  it  may  bind  the  person  himself, 
when  he  is  afterwards  a  party,  suo  jure,  in  another  action.  A  solemn 
admission,  however,  made  in  good  faith,  in  a  pending  suit,  for  the 
purpose  of  that  trial  only,  is  governed  by  other  considerations. 
Thus,  the  plea  of  nolo  contendere,  in  a  criminal  case,  is  an  admis- 
sion for  that  trial  only.  One  object  of  it  is  to  prevent  the  pro- 
ceedings being  used  in  any  other  place;  and  therefore  it  is  held 

«  Lucas  v.  De  La  Cour,  1  M.  &  S.  249. 

1  Jones  v.  Turberville,  2  Ves.  Jr.  11  ;  Morse  v.  Royal,  12  Ves.  355,  360  ;  Leeds  v. 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  of  Alexandria,  2  Wheat.  380 ;  Gresley  on  E(j.  Evid.  24  ;  Field  v.  Hol- 
land,  6  Cranch    8 ;    Clark's  Ex'rs    v.    Van    Riemsdyk,  9   id.  153 ;   Van   Riemsdyk 
v.  Kane,  1  Gall.  630  ;  Parker  v.  Morrell,  12  Jur.  253  ;  2  C.  &  K.  599  ;  Morris  v.  Nixon, 
1  How.  S. C.  118  ;  j  McElroy  v.  Ludlum,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  828 ;  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  274-277.( 

2  Field  v.  Holland,  6  Cranch  8,  24  ;  Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Van  Riemsdyk,  9  id.  153, 
156  ;  Osborn  v.  United  States  Bank,  9  Wheat.  738,  832  ;  Christie  v.  Bishop,  1   Barb. 
Ch.  105,  116. 

•  Van  Riemsdyk  ».  Kane,  1  Gall.  630,  635. 

1  Webb  v.  Smith,  K.  &  M.  106  ;  Fraser  w.  Marsh,  2  Stark.  41  ;  Cowling  ».  Ely,  it). 
866 ;  Plant  v.  McEwen,  4  Conn.  544.  So,  the  admissions  of  one,  before  he  became 
assignee  of  a  bankrupt,  are  not  receivable  against  him,  where  suing  as  assignee:  Fen- 
wick  v.  Thornton,  1  M.  &  M.  51  ;  jLegge  v.  Edmonds,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  125;  Metiers  v. 
Brown,  32  L.  J.  Ex.  140  ;  the  ruling  to  the  contrary  by  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Smith  v. 
Morgan,  2  M.  &  Rob.  259,  seems  to  DC  regarded  as  unsound  in  England.}  Nor  is  the 
statement  of  one  partner  admissible  against  the  others,  in  regard  to  matters  which  were 
transacted  before  ne  became  a  partner  in  the  house,  and  in  which  he  had  no  interest 
prior  to  that  time  :  Catt  v.  Howard,  3  Stark.  3.  In  trover  by  nn  infant  suing  by  his 
guardian,  the  statements  of  the  guardian,  tending  to  show  that  the  property  was  in  fact 
his  own,  are  admissible  against  th«  plaintiff,  as  l>eing  the  declarations  of  a  party  to  the 
record.  Tenney  v.  Evans,  14  N.  II.  343  ;  post,  §  180,  n.  ;  fjbut  not  if  mudo  after  guar- 
dianship ended  :  Freeman  v.  Brewstcr,  93  Ga.  648.3 


§§  177-180.]  PERSONS  MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  301 

inadmissible  in  a  civil  action  against  the  same  party.*  So,  the 
answer  of  the  guardian  of  an  infant  defendant  in  Chancery  can 
never  be  read  against  the  infant  in  another  suit;  for  its  office  was 
only  to  bring  the  infant  into  court  and  make  him  a  party.8  But  it 
may  be  used  against  the  guardian,  when  he  afterwards  is  a  party  in 
his  private  capacity;  for  it  is  his  own  admission  upon  oath.4 
Neither  can  the  admission  of  a  married  woman,  answering  jointly 
with  her  husband,  be  afterwards  read  against  her,  it  being  considered 
as  the  answer  of  the  husband  alone.6 

§  180.  Persona  not  Parties  to  the  Record :  In  general.  We  are 
next  to  consider  the  admissions  of  persons  who  are  not  parties  to  the 
record,  but  yet  are  interested  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.  The 
law,  in  regard  to  this  source  of  evidence,  looks  chiefly  to  the  real 
parties  in  interest,  and  gives  to  their  admissions  the  same  weight 
as  though  they  were  parties  to  the  record.  Thus  the  admissions  of 
the  cestui  gue  trust  of  a  bond;1  those  of  the  persons  interested  in  a 
policy  effected  in  another's  name,  for  their  benefit;3  those  of  the 
ship-owners,  in  an  action  by  the  master  for  freight ; '  those  of  the 
indemnifying  creditor,  in  an  action  against  the  sheriff;4  those  of 
the  deputy-sheriff,  in  an  action  against  the  high-sheriff  for  the  mis- 
conduct of  the  deputy ; 6  are  all  receivable  against  the  party  mak- 

2  Guild  r.  Lee,  3  Law  Beporter,  p.  433.     So,  an  admission  in  one  plea  cannot  be 
called  in  aid  of  the  issue  in  another:  Stracy  v.  Blake,  3  M.  &  W.  168  ;  Jones  v.  Flint, 
2  P.  &  D.  .594  ;  Gould  on  Pleading,  432,  433  ;  Mr.  Rand's  note  to  Jackson  v.  Stetson, 
15  Mass.  58. 

3  Eggleston  v.  Speke,  alias  Petit,  3  Mod.  258,  259  ;  Hawkins  v.  Luscotnbe,  2  Swanst. 
392,  cases  cited  in  note  (a) ;  Story  on  Eq.   PI.  668  ;  Gresley  on  Eq.  Evid.  24,  323  ; 
Mills  v.  Dennis,  3  Johns.  C.  367. 

4  Beasley  v.  Magrath,  2  Sch.  &  Lefr.  34  ;  Gresley  on  Eq.  Evid.  323. 
6  Hodgson  v.  Merest,  9  Price  563 ;  Elston  v.  Wood,  2  My.  &  K.  678. 

1  Hanson  v.  Parker,  1  Wils.  257  ;  see  also  Harrison  v.  Vallance,  1  Bing.  45.  But 
the  declarations  of  the  cestui  que  trust  are  admissible,  only  so  far  as  his  interest  and 
that  of  th«  trustee  are  identical :  Doe  o.  "Wainwright,  3  Nev.  &  P.  598.  And  the  nature 
of  his  interest  must  be  shown,  even  though-it  be  admitted  that  he  is  a  cestui  que  trust  : 
May  v.  Taylor,  6  M.  &  Gr.  261. 

*  Bell  v.  Ansley,  16  East  141,  143  ;  Qor  of  the  insured,  as  against  the  beneficiary  : 
Thomas  v.  Grand  Lodge,  Cal.,  41  Pac.  882  ;  F.  M.  L.  Ass'n  v.  Winn,  96  Tenn.   224  ; 
see  Bicknell,  Mutual  Benefit  Societies,  §  325.] 

8  Smith  v.  Lyon,  8  Campb.  465. 

*  Dowden  t>.  Fowle,  4  Campb.  38  ;  Dyke  v.  Aldridge,  cited  7  T.  R.  665;  11  East 
684  ;  Young  v.  Smith,  6  Esp.  121 ;  Harwood  ».  Keys,   1  M.  &  Rob.  204 ;  Proctor  v. 
Lainson,  7  C.  &  P.  629. 

6  The  admissions  of  an  tinder-sheriff  are  not  receivable  in  evidence  against  the 
sheriff,  unless  they  tend  to  charge  himself,  he  being  the  real  party  in  the  cause  ;  he  is 
not  regarded  as  the  general  officer  of  the  sheriff,  to  all  intents:  Snowball  v.  Goodricke, 
4  B.  &  Ad.  541  ;  though  the  admissibility  of  his  declarations  has  sometimes  been  placed 
on  that  ground  :  Drake  v.  Sykes,  7  T.  R.  113.  At  other  times  they  have  been  received 
on  the  ground,  that,  being  liable  over  to  the  sheriff,  he  is  the  real  party  to  the  suit: 
Yabsley  v.  Doble,  1  Ld.  Raym.  190.  And  where  the  sheriff  has  taken  a  general  bond 
of  indemnity  from  the  under-officer,  and  has  given  him  notice  of  the  pendency  of  the 
suit,  and  required  him  to  defend  it,  the  latter  is  in  fact  the  real  party  in  interest, 
whenever  the  sheriff  is  sued  for  his  default ;  and  his  admissions  are  clearly  receivable, 
on  principle,  when  made  against  himself.  It  has  elsewhere  been  said,  that  the  declara- 
tions of  an  under-sheriff  are  evidence  to  charge  the  sheriff,  only  where  his  acts  might 
be  given  iu  evidence  to  charge  him ;  and  then,  rather  aa  acts  than  aa  declarations,  the 


302  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

ing  them.  And,  in  general,  the  admissions  of  any  party  represented 
by  another  are  receivable  in  evidence  against  his  representatives.6 
But  here,  also,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  declarations  or  admis- 
sions must  have  been  made  while  the  party  making  them  had  some 
interest  in  the  matter;  and  they  are  receivable  in  evidence  only  so 
far  as  his  own  interests  are  concerned.  Thus,  the  declaration  of  a 
bankrupt,  made  before  his  bankruptcy,  is  good  evidence  to  charge 
his  estate  with  a  debt;  but  not  so  if  it  was  made  afterwards.7  While 
the  declarant  is  the  only  party  in  interest,  no  harm  can  possibly 
result  from  giving  full  effect  to  his  admissions.  He  may  be  sup- 
posed best  to  know  the  extent  of  his  own  rights,  and  to  be  least  of 
all  disposed  to  concede  away  any  that  actually  belonged  to  him. 
But  an  admission,  made  after  other  persons  have  acquired  separate 
rights  in  the  same  subject-matter,  cannot  be  received  to  disparage 
their  title,  however  it  may  affect  that  of  the  declarant  himself. 
This  most  just  and  equitable  doctrine  will  be  found  to  apply  not 
only  to  admissions  made  by  bankrupts  and  insolvents,  but  to  the  case 
of  vendor  and  vendee,  payee  and  indorsee,  grantor  and  grantee,  and, 
generally,  to  be  the  pervading  doctrine  in  all  cases  of  rights  acquired 
in  good  faith,  previous  to  the  time  of  making  the  admissions  in 
question.8 

§  181.  In  some  cases,  the  admissions  of  third  persons,  strangers 
to  the  suit,  are  receivable.  This  arises  when  the  issue  is  substan- 
tially upon  the  mutual  rights  of  such  persons  at  a  particular  time; 
in  which  case  the  practice  is  to  let  in  such  evidence  in  general  as 
would  be  legally  admissible  in  an  action  between  the  parties  them- 
selves. Thus,  in  an  action  against  the  sheriff  for  an  escape,  the 
debtor's  acknowledgment  of  the  debt,  being  sufficient  to  charge  him 

declarations  being  considered  as  part  of  the  res  gestce  :  Wheeler  v.  Hambright,  9  Serg. 
&  K.  396,  397  ;  see  Scott  v.  Marshall,  2  Cr.  &  Jer.  238  ;  Jacobs  v.  Humphrey,  2  Cr.  &  M. 
413  ;  8.  c.  4  Tyrw.  272.  But  whenever  a  person  is  bound  by  the  record,  he  is,  for  all 
purposes  of  evidence,  the  party  in  interest,  and,  as  such,  his  admissions  are  receivable 
against  him,  both  of  the  facts  it  recites,  and  of  the  amount  of  damages,  in  all  cases 
where,  being  liable  over  to  the  nominal  defendant,  he  has  been  notified  of  the  suit,  and 
required  to  defend  it :  Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Carrington,  7  Cranch  322  ;  Hamilton  v.  Cutts, 
4  Mass.  349  ;  Tyler  v.  Ulmer,  12  id.  166  ;  Duffield  v.  Scott,  8  T.  R.  374 ;  Kip  v. 
Brigham,  6  Jones  158 ;  7  Johns.  168  ;  Bender  r.  Fromberger,  4  Ball.  436  ;  see  also 
Carlisle  v.  Garland,  7  Bing.  298  ;  North  v.  Miles,  1  Campb.  389  ;  Bowsher  t>.  Galley, 
ib.  391,  n.;  Underbill  v.  Wilson,  6  Bing.  697  ;  Bond  v.  Ward,  1  Nott  &  McCord 
201;  Carmack  v.  Com.,  5  Binn.  184;  Sloman  v.  Herne,  2  Esp.  695;  Williams  ». 
Bridges,  2  Stark.  42 ;  Savage  o.  Balch,  8  Greenl.  27. 

•  Stark.  Evid.  26 ;  North  v.  Miles,  1  Campb.  390  ;  £for  the  case  of  the  deceased's 
admissions,  in  an  action  by  the  representative  for  his  death,  see  Baird  v.  Baird,  145 
N.  Y.  659 ;  40  N.  E.  222 ;  Camden  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  N.  J.  L.,  40  Atl.  634 ; 
|  Stern  v.  R.  Co.,  Phila.,  7  Leg.  GHZ.  223  ;  }  the  deceased's  admissions  are  of  course  not 
admissible  in  a  prosecution  for  murder:  Shields  v.  State,  Ind.,  49  N.  E.  851.] 

7  Batemnn  v.  Bailey,  6  T.  R.  513  ;  Smith  v.  Simmes,  1  Esp.  330 ;  Deady  v.  Har. 
rison,  1  Stark.  60. 

8  Bartlet  v.   Delprat,  4  Mass.  702,  708;  Clarke  v.  Waite,  12  id.  439;  Biidge  v. 
Eggleston,   14  id.   245,  250,  251;   Phoenix  v.   Ingraham,   5  Johns.   412;  Packer  v. 
Gonsalus,  1  Serg.  &  K.  526  ;  Patton  v.  Goldaborough,  9  id.  47  ;  Babb  v.  Clemsou,  12 
id.  328  ;  [>o  post,  §§  189,  190.  J 


§§  180-183.]  PERSONS   MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  303 

in  the  original  action,  is  sufficient,  as  against  the  sheriff,  to  support 
the  averment  in  the  declaration  that  the  party  escaping  was  so  in- 
debted.1 So,  an  admission  of  joint  liability  by  a  third  person  has 
been  held  sufficient  evidence,  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  to  sup- 
port a  plea  in  abatement  for  the  non-joinder  of  such  person  as  de- 
fendant in  the  suit;  it  being  admissible  in  an  action  against  him  for 
the  same  cause.2  And  the  admissions  of  a  bankrupt,  made  before 
the  act  of  bankruptcy,  are  receivable  in  proof  of  the  petitioning 
creditor's  debt.  His  declarations,  made  after  the  act  of  bankruptcy, 
though  admissible  against  himself,  form  an  exception  to  this  rule, 
because  of  the  intervening  rights  of  creditors,  and  the  danger  of 
fraud.8 

§  182.  Same  :  Referees  ;  Appointees  ;  Interpreters.  The  admis- 
sions of  a  third  person  are  also  receivable  in  evidence,  against  the 
party  who  has  expressly  referred  another  to  him  for  information,  in 
regard  to  an  uncertain  or  disputed  matter.  In  such  cases,  the  party 
is  bound  by  the  declarations  of  the  persons  referred  to,  in  the  same 
manner,  and  to  the  same  extent,  as  if  they  were  made  by  himself.1 
Thus,  upon  a  plea  of  plene  administravit,  where  the  executors  wrote 
to  the  plaintiff,  that,  if  she  wished  for  further  information  in  re- 
gard to  the  assets,  she  should  apply  to  a  certain  merchant  in  the 
city,  they  were  held  bound  by  the  replies  of  the  merchant  to  her  in- 
quiries upon  that  subject.2  So,  in  assumpsit  for  goods  sold,  where 
the  fact  of  the  delivery  of  them  by  the  carman  was  disputed,  and  the 
defendant  said:  "If  he  will  say  that  he  did  deliver  the  goods,  I  will 
pay  for  them,"  he  was  held  bound  by  the  affirmative  reply  of  the 
carman.8 

§  183.  This  principle  extends  to  the  case  of  an  interpreter  whose 
statements  of  what  the  party  says  are  treated  as  identical  with  those 
of  the  party  himself;  and  therefore  may  be  proved  by  any  person 
who  heard  them,  without  calling  the  interpreter.1 

1  Sloman  v.  Herne,  2  Esp.  695  ;  Williams  v.  Bridges,  2  Stark.  42 ;  Kempland  v. 
Macauley,  Peake's  Gas.  65. 

2  Clay  v.  Langslow,  1  M.  &  M.  45  ;  sed  qucere,  and  see  infra,  §  395. 

*  Hoare  v.  Coryton,  4  Taunt.  560;  2  Rose  158;  Robson  v.  Kemp,  4  Esp.  234; 
Watts  v.  Thorpe,  1  Campb.  376 ;  Smallcombe  v.  Bruges,  McClel.  45  ;  s.  c.  13  Price 
136  ;  Taylor  v.  Kinloch,  1  Stark.  175  ;  2  id.  594 ;  Jarrett  v.  Leonard,  2  M.  &  S. 
265.  The  dictum  of  Lord  Kenyon,  in  Dowton  v.  Cross,  1  Esp.  168,  that  the  admissions 
of  a  bankrupt,  made  after  the  act  of  bankruptcy,  but  before  the  commission  issued,  are 
receivable,  is  contradicted  in  13  Price  153,  154,  and  overruled  by  that  and  the  other 
cases  above  cited  ;  see  also  Bernasconi  i>.  Farebrother,  3  B.  &  Ad.  372  ;  QMilburn  v. 
Phillips,  136  Ind.  680,  695.1 

1  jWehler.  Spelman,  1  Hun  634;  Turner  v.  Yates,  16  How.  14;  Allen  v.  Killin- 
ger,  8  Wall.  480 ;  Chapman  v.  Twitchell,  37  Me.  59 ;  Chadsey  v.  Greene,  24  Conn. 
562;}  |~R.  v.  Mallory,  15  Cox  Cr.  456.] 

2  Williams  v.  Innes,  1  Campb.  864. 

8  Daniel  v.  Pitt,  1  Campb.  866,  n. ;  s.  c.  6  Esp.  74  ;  Brock  v.  Kent,  ib.;  Burt  v. 
Palmer,  5  id.  145;  Hood  v.  Reeve,  8  C.  &  P.  532  ;  jbut  if  a  third  person  ia  referred 
to  simply  to  furnish  information  as  to  certain  facts,  his  statements  as  to  other  facts  or 
his  opinions  are  inadmissible:  Lambert  v.  People,  6  Abb.  (N.  Y. )  X.  Cas.  181.} 

1  Fabrigas  v.  Mostyn,  11  St.  Tr.  171;  Qee  for  other  authorities,  ante,  §  162  p; 


304  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.    XVIL 

§  184.  Whether  the  answer  of  a  person  thus  referred  to  is  conclu- 
sive against  the  party  does  not  seem  to  have  been  settled.  Where 
the  plaintiff  had  offered  to  rest  his  claim  upon  the  defendant's  affi- 
davit, which  was  accordingly  taken,  Lord  Kenyon  held,  that  he  was 
conclusively  bound,  even  though  the  affidavit  had  been  false;  and 
he  added,  that  to  make  such  a  proposition  and  afterwards  to  recede 
from  it  was  mala  fides  ;  but  that,  besides  that,  it  might  be  turned  to 
very  improper  purposes,  such  as  to  entrap  the  witness,  or  to  find  out 
how  far  the  party's  evidence  would  go  in  support  of  his  case.1  But 
in  a  later  case,  where  the  question  was  upon  the  identity  of  a  horse, 
in  the  defendant's  possession,  with  one  lost  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
plaintiff  had  said,  that,  if  the  defendant  would  take  his  oath  that  the 
horse  was  his,  he  should  keep  him,  and  he  made  oath  accordingly, 
Lord  Tenterden  observed,  that,  considering  the  loose  manner  in 
which  the  evidence  had  been  given  he  would  not  receive  it  as  con- 
clusive; but  that  it  was  a  circumstance  on  which  he  should  not  fail 
to  remark  to  the  jury.8  And  certainly  the  opinion  of  Lord  Tenter- 
den,  indicated  by  what  fell  from  him  in  this  case,  more  perfectly 
harmonizes  with  other  parts  of  the  law,  especially  as  it  is  opposed  to 
any  further  extension  of  the  doctrine  of  estoppels,  which  sometimes 
precludes  the  investigation  of  truth.  The  purposes  of  justice  and 
policy  are  sufficiently  answered,  by  throwing  the  burden  of  proof  on 
the  opposing  party,  as  in  a  case  of  an  award,  and  holding  him  bound, 
unless  he  impeaches  the  test  referred  to  by  clear  proof  of  fraud  or 
mistake.* 

§  184  a  [HI].  Same :  Conspirators.  The  same  principles  apply 
to  the  acts  and  declarations  of  one  of  a  company  of  conspirators, 
in  regard  to  the  common  design  as  affecting  his  fellows.1  Here 
a  foundation  must  first  be  laid  by  proof  sufficient  in  the  opinion 
of  the  judge  to  establish  prima  facie  the  fact  of  conspiracy  between 

post,  §  439  e.]  The  cases  of  the  reference  of  a  disputed  liability  to  the  opinion  of  legal 
counsel,  and  of  a  disputed  fact  regarding  a  mine  to  a  miner's  jury,  have  been  treated  as 
falling  under  this  head  ;  the  decisions  being  held  binding  as  to  the  answers  of  persons 
referred  to.  How  far  the  circumstance,  that  if  treated  as  awards,  being  in  writing,  they 
would  have  been  void  for  want  of  a  stamp,  may  have  led  the  learned  judges  to  con- 
sider them  in  another  light,  does  not  appear :  Sybray  r.  White,  1  M.  &  W.  485 ; 
{Price  v.  Hollis,  1  M.  &  S.  105  ;  Downs  v.  Cooper,  2  Q.  B.  256.}  But  in  this  coun- 
try, where  no  stamp  is  required,  they  would  more  naturally  be  regarded  as  awards  upon 
parol  submissions,  and  therefore  conclusive,  unless  impeached  for  causes  recognized  in 
the  law  of  awards. 

i  Stevens  v.  Thacker,  Peake's  Gas.  187  ;  Lloyd  v.  Willan,  1  Esp.  178  ;  Delesline  v. 
Greenland,  1  Bay  458,  ace.,  where  the  oath  of  a  third  person  was  referred  to.  See  Reg. 
v.  Moreau,  36  Leg.  Obs.  69  ;  11  Ad.  &  El.  1028,  as  to  the  admissibility  of  an  award 
as  an  admission  of  the  party. 

a  Garnet  v.  Ball,  8  Stark.  160. 

•  Whitehead  v.  Tattersall,  1  Ad.  &  El.  491. 

1  £This  section  was  orginally  placed  by  the  author  in  the  chapter  ante,  under  the 
res  gestat  principle.  —  The  principle  involved  is  fundamentally  one  of  the  substantive 
criminal  and  civil  law,  — under  what  circumstances  a  defendant  is  to  be  held  respon- 
sible for  the  acts  of  a  co-actor.  Incidentally,  the  same  principle  determines  what 
statements  of  a  co-actor  may  be  offered  as  admissions  against  the  defendant. J 


§§  184-184  a.]       PERSONS  MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  305 

the  parties,  or  proper  to  be  laid  before  the  jury  as  tending  to  estab- 
lish such  fact. 

The  connection  of  the  individuals  in  the  unlawful  enterprise 
being  thus  shown,  every  act  and  declaration  of  each  member  of  the 
confederacy,  in  pursuance  of  the  original  concerted  plan,  and  with 
reference  to  the  common  object,  is,  in  contemplation  of  law,  the  act 
and  declaration  of  them  all;  and  is  therefore  original  evidence  against 
each  of  them.  It  makes  no  difference  at  what  time  any  one  entered 
into  the  conspiracy.  Every  one  who  does  enter  into  a  common  pur- 
pose or  design  is  generally  deemed,  in  law,  a  party  to  every  act 
which  had  before  been  done  by  the  others  and  a  party  to  every  act 
which  may  afterwards  be  done  by  any  of  the  others  in  furtherance 
of  such  common  design.2  Sometimes,  for  the  sake  of  convenience, 
the  acts  or  declarations  of  one  are  admitted  in  evidence  before  suffi- 
cient proof  is  given  of  the  conspiracy;  the  prosecutor  undertaking  to 
furnish  such  proof  in  a  subsequent  stage  of  the  cause.  But  this 
rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  and  is  not  permitted,  except 
under  particular  and  urgent  circumstances;  lest  the  jury  should 
be  misled  to  infer  the  fact  itself  of  the  conspiracy  from  the  declara- 
tions of  strangers.8  And  here,  also,  care  must  be  taken  that  the 
acts  and  declarations,  thus  admitted,  be  those  only  which  were  made 
and  done  during  the  pendency  of  the  criminal  enterprise,  and  in 

2  [This  general  principle  is  not  disputed ;  and  the  controversies  usually  arise 
merely  upon  its  application  to  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  There  are  two  chief 
things  to  be  considered  in  thus  applying  it  to  the  facts,  (1)  whether  a  common  pur- 
pose and  co-operation  between  the  persons  has  been  sufficiently  shown  on  the  circum- 
stances, and  (2)  whether  the  acts  and  admissions  in  question  were  made  during  the 
continuance  of  that  purpose  and  co-operation.  This  is  often  a  difficult  question  to 
determine,  but  it  depends  almost  wholly  on  the  facts  of  each  case,  and  one  ruling  is 
usually  of  little  service  as  a  precedent  in  another  case.  The  following  leading  English 
cases  will  illustrate  the  orthodox  phrasing  of  the  test,  and  cases  from  various  American 
jurisdictions  are  added  :  QR.  v.  Stone,  25  How.  St.  Tr.  1271;  R.  r.  Watson,  32  id.  7,  359  ; 
R.  v.  Brandreth.ib.  852  ;]  R.  v.  Hardy,  24  id.  451;  Nicholls  v.  Dowding,  1  Stark.  81  ; 
R.  ?'.  Hunt,  3  B.  &  Aid.  5,  66  ;  Daniels" t?.  Potter,  1  M.  &  M.  501  ;  [The  Queen's  Case, 
2  B.  &B.  303;  R.  v.  O'Connell,  5  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1,  244,  262,  276,  678,  699,  710  ; 
Hunter  v.  State,  112  Ala.  77  ;  Everage  v.  State,  113  id.  102  ;  People  v.  Oldham,  111 
Cal.  648 ;  State  v.  Thompson,  69  Conn.  720 ;  Spies  v.  People  (anarchist  case), 
122  111.  1  ;]  { Reid  v.  Louisiana  State  Lottery,  29  La.  An.  388  ;  Smith  v.  Tarbox,  70 
Me.  127;}  Com.  i>.  L'rowninshield,  10  Pick.  497;  []Com.  v.  Hunton,  168  Mass.  130; 
Nicolay  v.  Mallery,  62  Minn.  119  ;]  jStreet  v.  State,  43  Miss.  1;  Garrard  v.  State, 
50  id.  147;|  [Hart  *>•  Hicks,  129  Mo.  99;]  {Jacobs  v.  Shorey,  48  N.  H.  100  ;( 
tCoburn  v.  Storer,  id.,  36  Atl.  607  ;  Borrego  v.  Terr.,  N.  M.,  46  Pac.  349  ;]  jOrmsby 
v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  472  ;|  ([People  v.  Peckens,  153  id.  576  ;  State  v.  Turner, 
119  N.  C.  841  ;  State  v.  Tice,  30  Or.  457;  State  v.  Rice,  49  S.  C.  418  ;  Wiehl  v. 
Robertson,  97  Tenn.  458  ;  McKenzie  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  568,  577  ;]  American 
Fur  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  2  Pet.  363,  365  ;  1U.  S.  v.  McKee,  3  Dill.  546  ;i  QClune  v.  U.  S..  159 
U.  S.  590  ;  Wiborg  v.  U.  S.,  163  id.  632  ;  State  v.  Cram,  67  Vt.  650  ;  State  v.  McCann, 
16  Wash.  249  ;]  j Ellis  v.  Dempsey,  4  W.  Va.  126;  (  [>ee  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  92. 

That  the  acts  offered  may  have  been  done,  as  above  said,  before  the  defendant 
joined  the  conspiracy,  if  he  adopted  their  conduct  by  joining,  see  illustrations  in  R.  v. 
Frost,  4  State  Tr.  N.  8.  85,  229,  244 ;  R.  v.  Cuffey/7  id.  467,  476.] 

8  QSee  instances  of  this  question  arising  in  People  v.  Van  Horn,  119  Cal.  323  ; 
State  v.  Thompson,  69  Conn.  720;]  )  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  195  ;  j  [State  v. 
May,  142  Mo.  135  ;  State  o.  Moore,  Or.,  48  Pac.  468.] 

VOL.  i.— 20 


306  ADMISSIONS.  £CH.   XVII. 

furtherance  of  its  objects.  If  they  took  place  at  a  subsequent  period, 
and  are,  therefore,  merely  narrative  of  past  occurrences,  they  are, 
as  we  have  just  seen,  to  be  rejected.4  The  term  "acts"  includes 
written  correspondence,  and  other  papers  relative  to  the  main  de- 
sign; but  whether  it  includes  unpublished  writings  upon  abstract 
questions,  though  of  a  kindred  nature,  has  been  doubted.6  Where 
conversations  are  proved,  the  effect  of  the  evidence  will  depend  on 
other  circumstances,  such  as  the  fact  and  degree  of  the  prisoner's 
attention  to  it,  and  his  assent  or  disapproval.6  [Where  the  declar- 
ant is  also  a  joint-defendant,  but  no  common  purpose  can  be  shown, 
his  admissions  are  receivable  as  against  himself  only,  the  jury  being 
cautioned  not  to  use  them  against  the  others.7' 8] 

§  184  b  [112].  Same  :  Partners.  This  doctrine  extends  to  all 
cases  of  partnership.  Wherever  any  number  of  persons  associate 
themselves  in  the  joint  prosecution  of  a  common  enterprise  or  design, 
conferring  on  the  collective  body  the  attribute  of  individuality  by 
mutual  compact,  as  in  commercial  partnerships  and  similar  cases, 
the  act  or  declaration  of  each  member,  in  furtherance  of  the  common 
object  of  the  association,  is  the  act  of  all.  By  the  very  act  of  asso- 
ciation, each  one  is  constituted  the  agent  of  all.1  While  the  being 
thus  created  exists,  it  speaks  and  acts  only  by  the  several  members ; 
and,  of  course,  when  that  existence  ceases  by  the  dissolution  of  the 
firm,  the  act  of  an  individual  member  ceases  to  have  that  effect; 
binding  himself  alone,  except  so  far  as  by  the  articles  of  association 

4  E.  v.  Hardy,  supra;  {People  v.  English,  52  Cal.  212  ;  State  v.  Ah  Tom,  8  Nev. 
213;  U.  S.  v.  Hartwell,  3  Cliff.  C.  C.  221  ;  State  v.  Larkin,  49  N.  H.  39  ;  Card 
v.  State,  109  I  ml.  418;  People  v.  McQuade,  110  N.  Y.  284;  State  v.  Jackson,  29 
La.  An.  354  ;  Reid  v.  Louisiana  State  Lottery,  ib.  388  ;  State  v.  Duncan,  64  Mo.  262  ; 
Phillips  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  364;  [[State  v.  Rogers,  54  Kan.  683  ;  Twyman  v.  Com., 
Ky.,  33  S.  W.  409;  State  v.  Magone,  Or.,  51  Pac.  452;  Wagner  v.  Aulenbach,  170  Pa. 
495;  Logan  v.  U.  S.,  144  U.  S.  263,  309;  Brown  v.  U.  S.,  150  id.  93,  98.]  The  acts 
and  declarations  of  conspirators  in  their  endeavors  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  their 
crime,  i.  e.  detection,  pursuit,  and  arrest,  are  considered  as  part  of  the  original  criminal 
design:  Kelley  o.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565;  contra,  People  v.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113.  ( 
("That  the  declarant  has  been  acquitted  is  immaterial :  Holt  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  46 
8.  W.  829.] 

6  Foster,  Discourse,  198;  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  116,  141-147. 

6  R.  v.  Hardy,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  703,  per  Eyre,  C.  J.  ;  JR.  v.  Blake,  6  Q.  B.  126. | 

7  EState  v.  Thibodeaux,  48  La.  An.  600;  Com.  v.  Bishop,  165  Mass.  148;  State  v. 
Collins,  N.  C.,  128  S.  E.  520;  Ball  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.,  16  Sup.  1192.] 

8  QFor  the  use  of  co-defendant's  confessions,  see  post,  §  233.] 

1  Sandilands  v.  Marsh,  2  B.  &  Aid.  673,  678,  679 ;  Wood  v.  Braddick,  1  Taunt. 
104,  and  Petherkk  v.  Turner  et  al.,  there  cited;  R.  v.  Hardwick,  11  East  578,  589  ; 
V.ui  Rcimsdyk  v.  Kane,  1  Gall.  630,  635 ;  Nichols  v.  Dowding,  1  Stark.  81  ;  Hodempyl 
v.  Vingerhoed,  Chitty  on  Bills,  618,  n.  (2)  ;  Coit  v.  Tracy,  8  Conn.  268  ;  [>ee  Smith  i>. 
I/micr,  101  Ga,  137;  Hester  v.  Smith,  5  Wyo.  291  ;]  j  Scull's  Appeal,  115  Pa.  141  ; 
1'i'Tce  v.  Roberts,  57  Conn.  40.  The  admissions  of  a  deceased  partner  are  receivable  in 
an  action  against,  his  representative:  Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Van  Reimsdyk,'  9  Cranch  153  ; 
McElroy  v.  Ludlum,  32  N.  J.  Kq.  828.  The  partnership  must,  in  any  case  first  be 
proved,  like  the  authority  of  an  ngent,  otherwise  than  by  the  alleged  admissions  : 
Cownn  v.  Kinncy,  33  Oh.  St.  422;  Abbott  v.  Pearson,  130  Mass.  191;  Dntton  v. 
Woodman,  8  Cash.  255;  Alcott  v.  Strong,  id.  323  ;  Henry  v.  Willard,  73  N.  C.  36  ;J 
CV.'alkcr  v.  Hatry,  152  Pa,  1,  10.] 


§§  184a-lS45.]    PERSONS  MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  307 

or  of  dissolution  it  may  have  been  otherwise  agreed.2  An  admis- 
sion, however,  by  one  partner,  made  after  the  dissolution,  in  regard 
to  business  of  the  firm,  previously  transacted,  has  been  held  to  be 
binding  on  the  firm.8 

2  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Peters  371 ;  Burton  v.  Issitt,  5  B.  &  Aid.  267. 

8  This  doctrine  was  extended  by  Lord  Brougham,  to  the  admission  of  payment  to 
the  partner  after  the  dissolution  :  Pritchard  v.  Draper,  1  Russ.  &  M.  191,  199,  200.  See 
Wood  v.  Braddick,  1  Taunt.  104  ;  Whitcoinb  v.  Whiting,  2  Doug.  652 ;  approved  in 
Mclntire  v.  Oliver,  2  Hawks  209 ;  Beitz  v.  Fuller,  1  McCord  541  ;  Cady  v.  Shepherd, 
11  Pick.  400  ;  Van  Keimsdyk  v.  Kane,  1  Gall.  635,  636.  See  also  Parker  v.  Merrill, 

6  Greenl.  41 ;  Martin  v.  Root,  17  Mass.  223,  227 ;   Vinal  v.  Burrill,    16  Pick.  401  ; 
Lefavour  v.  Yandes,  2  Blackf.  240 ;  Bridge  v.  Gray,  14  Pick.  55 ;  Gay  v.  Bowen,  8  Met 
100  ;  Mann  v.  Locke,  11  N.  H.  246,  to  the  same  point.     In  New  York,  a  different 
doctrine  is  established:    Walden  v.  Sherburne,    15  Johns.  409;    Hopkins  i'.  Banks, 

7  Cowen  650;  Clark  v.  Gleason,  9  id.  57;  Baker  v.  Stackpole,  ib.  420  ;  {Van  Keuren 
v.  Parmelee,  2  Comst.  523  ;[  so  in  Louisiana:    Lambeth  v.  Vawter,  6  Rob.  La.  127. 
See  also,  in  support  of  the  text,  Lacy  v.  M'Neile,  4  Dowl.  &  Ry.  7.     {Compare  Da  vies 
v.  Edwards,  2  Russ.  153 ;  Gilligan  v.  Tebbetts,  33  Me.  360  ;  Drumright  v.  Philpot,  16 
Ga.  424  ;  Loomis  v.  Loomis,  26  Vt.  198.  |     Whether  the  acknowledgment  of  a  debt  by 
a  partner,  alter  dissolution  of  the  partnership,  will  be  sufficient  to  take  the  case  out  of 
the  statute  of  limitations,  and  revive  the  remedy  against  the  others,  has  been  very 
much  controverted  in  this  country ;  and  the  authorities  to  the  point  are  conflicting. 
In  England,  it  is  now  settled  by  Lord  Tenterden's  Act  (9  Geo.  IV,  c.  14)  that  such 
acknowledgment,  or  new  promise,  independent  of  the  fact  of  part  payment,  shall  not 
have  such  effect,  except  against  the  party  making  it.     This  provision  has  been  adopted 
in  the  laws  of  some  of  the  United  States.     And  it  has  since  been  holden  in  England, 
where  a  debt  was  originally  contracted  with  a  partnership,  and  more  than  six  years 
afterwards,  but  within  six  years  before  action  brought,  the  partnership  having  been  dis- 
solved, one  partner  made  a  partial  payment  in  respect  of  the  debt,  —  that  this  barred 
the  operation  of  the  statute  of  limitations  ;  although  the  jury  found  that  he  made  the 

Eayment  by  concert  with  the  plaintiffs,  in  the  jaws  of  bankruptcy,  and  in  fraud  of  his 
ite  partners :  Goddard  v.  Ingram,  3  Q.  B.  839.  The  American  cases  seem  to  have 
turned  mainly  on  the  question,  whether  the  admission  of  the  existing  indebtrnent 
amounted  to  the  making  of  a  new  contract,  or  not.  The  Courts  which  have  viewed  it 
as  virtually  a  new  contract  have  held  that  the  acknowledgment  of  the  debt  by  one 
partner  after  the  dissolution  of  partnership  was  not  admissible  against  his  copartner. 
This  side  of  the  question  was  argued  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  with  his  accustomed  ability, 
in  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  Court  in  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Peters  367  et  seq. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  that  in  this  opinion  the  Court  were  not  unanimous  ;  and  that 
the  learned  judge  declares  that  the  majority  were  "  principally,  though  not  exclusively, 
influenced  by  the  course  of  decisions  in  Kentucky,"  where  the  action  arose.  A  similar 
view  of  the  question  has  been  taken  by  the  Courts  of  Pennsylvania,  both  before  and 
since  the  decision  of  Bell  v.  Morrison;  Levy  v.  Cadet,  17  Serg.  &  R.  127;  Searight 
v.  Craighead,  1  Pa.  135  ;  and  it  has  been  followed  by  the  Courts  of  Indiana :  Yandes 
v.  Lefavour,  2  Blackf.  371.  Other  judges  have  viewed  such  admissions  not  as  going  to 
create  a  new  contract,  but  as  mere  acknowledgments  of  the  continued  existence  of  a 
debt  previously  created,  thereby  repelling  the  presumption  of  payment,  resulting  from 
lapse  of  time,  and  thus  taking  the  case  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions ;  to  this  effect  are  White  r.  Hale,  3  Pick.  291 ;  Martin  v.  Root,  17  Mass.  222,  227  ; 
Cady  o.  Shepherd,  11  Pick.  400  ;  Vinal  v.  Burrill,  16  id.  401  ;  Bridge  v.  Gray,  14  id. 
61 ;  Patterson  v.  Choate,  7  Wend.  441  ;  Hopkins  v.  Banks,  7  Cowen  650  ;  Austin  ». 
Bostwick,  9  Conn.  496  ;  Greenleaf  v.  Quincy,  3  Fairf.  11 ;  Mclntire  v.  Oliver,  2  Hawks 
209  ;  Wardw.  Howell,  5  Har.  &  Johns.  60;  Fisher  v.  Tucker,  1  McCord  Ch.  175  ; 
Wheelock  v.  Doolittle,  18  Vt.  440.  In  some  of  the  cases  a  distinction  is  strongly 
taken  between  admissions  which  go  to  establish  the  original  existence  of  the  debt,  and 
those  which  only  show  that  it  has  never  been  paid,  but  still  remains  in  its  original 
force  ;  and  it  is  held,  that  before  the  admission  of  a  partner,  made  after  the  dissolution, 
can  bo  received,  the  debt  must  first  be  proved  aliundc:  see  Owings  v.  Low,  5  Gill  & 
Johns.  134,  144;  Smith  v.  Ludlow,  6  Johns.  267  ;  Patterson  v.  Choate,  7  Wend.  441, 
445  ;  Ward  v.  Howell,  Fisher  v.  Tucker,  Hopkins  v.  Banks,  Vinal  v.  Burrill,  ubi  supra  ; 
Shelton  v.  Cocke,  3  Munf.  197.  In  Austin  v.  Bostwick,  the  partner  making  the  admis- 
sion had  become  insolvent ;  but  this  was  held  to  make  no  difference,  as  to  the  ad- 


308  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

§  184  c  [113].  Same  :  Agents.  A  kindred  principle  governs  in 
regard  to  the  declarations  of  agents.  The  principal  constitutes  the 
agent  his  representative,  in  the  transaction  of  certain  business; 
whatever,  therefore,  the  agent  does,  in  the  lawful  prosecution  of 
that  business,  is  the  act  of  the  principal  whom  he  represents.  And, 
"where  the  acts  of  the  agent  will  bind  the  principal,  there  his 
representations,  declarations,  and  admissions,  respecting  the  sub- 
ject-matter, will  also  bind  him,  if  made  at  the  same  time,  and  con- 
stituting part  of  the  res  gestce." l  They  are  of  the  nature  of  original 
evidence,  and  not  of  hearsay ;  the  representation  or  statement  of  the 
agent,  in  such  cases,  being  the  ultimate  fact  to  be  proved,  and  not  an 
admission  of  some  other  fact.2  But,  it  must  be  remembered,  that 
the  admission  of  the  agent  cannot  always  be  assimilated  to  the  ad- 
mission of  the  principal.  The  party's  own  admission,  whenever 
made,  may  be  given  in  evidence  against  him ;  but  the  admission  or 
declaration  of  his  agent  binds  him  only  when  it  is  made  during  the 
continuance  of  the  agency  in  regard  to  a  transaction  then  depend- 
ing et  dum  fervet  opus.  It  is  because  it  is  a  verbal  act,  and  part  of 
the  res  gestce,*  that  it  is  admissible  at  all ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  call  the  agent  himself  to  prove  it; 4  but,  wherever  what 
he  did  is  admissible  in  evidence,  there  it  is  competent  to  prove  what 
he  said  about  the  act  while  he  was  doing  it;6  and  it  follows,  that, 

missibility  of  his  declaration.  A  distinction  has  always  been  taken  between  admissions 
by  a  partner  after  the  dissolution,  but  before  the  statute  of  limitations  has  attached  to 
the  debt,  and  those  made  aiterwards  ;  the  former  being  held  receivable,  and  the  latter 
not :  Fisher  v.  Tucker,  1  McCord  Ch.  175  ;  and  see  Scales  v.  Jacob,  3  Bing.  638  ; 
Gardner  v.  M'Mahon,  3  Q.  B.  566.  See  further  on  the  general  doctrine,  ante,  §  174  n. 
In  all  cases  where  the  admission,  whether  of  a  partner  or  other  joint  contractor,  is 
received  against  his  companions,  it  must  have  been  made  in  good  faith  :  Coit  v.  Tracy, 
8  Conn.  268 ;  see  also  Chardon  v.  Oliphant,  2  Mills  Const.  685 ;  cited  in  Collyer  on 
Partn.  236,  n.  (2d  Am.  ed.).  It  may  not  be  useless  to  observe  that  Bell  v.  Morrison 
was  cited  and  distinguished,  partly  as  founded  on  the  local  law  of  Kentucky,  in  Parker 
v.  Merrill,  6  Greenl.  47,  48  ;  and  in  Greenleaf  v.  Quincy,  3  Fairf.  11 ;  and  that  it  was 
not  cited  in  the  cases  of  Patterson  v.  Choate,  Austin  v.  Bostwick,  Cady  v.  Shepherd, 
Viual  v.  Burrill,  and  Yaudes  v.  Lefavour,  though  these  were  decided  subsequent  to  its 
publication. 

1  Story  on  Agency,  §§  134-137. 

2  1  Phil.  Evid.  381 .     QThis  is  so  if  the  statement  by  the  agent  is  to  be  used  contract- 
ually ;  but  if  it  is  offered  as  a  mere  admission,  then  like  other  admissions  it  is  mere 
evidence.] 

8  Qln  the  sense  that  it  is  done  during  the  continuance  of  the  authority ;  it  is  admis- 
sible because  the  agent  represents  the  principal  ;  it  is  not  hearsay,  because  no  admis- 
sions are  hearsay  in  the  strict  sense  (ante,  §  169);  for  the  discriminations  as  to  the  term 
resgestce,  see  ante,  §§  100-1 10 a;  162/.] 

*  Doe  v.  Hawkins,  2  Q.  B.  212  ;  Sauniere  v.  Wode,  3  Harrison  299. 

6  Garth  v.  Howard,  8  Bing.  451  ;  Fairlie  ».  Hastings,  10  Ves.  123, 127;  Mechanics' 
Bank  of  Alexandria  v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  5  Wheat.  336,  337  ;  Langhorn  v.  Allnutt, 
4  Taunt.  519,  per  Gibbs,  J.  ;  Hannay  v.  Stewart,  6  Watts  487,  489  ;  Stockton  v.  De- 
muth,  7  id.  39;  Story  on  Agency,  126,  129,  n.  (2)  ;  Woods  v.  Banks,  14  N.  H. 
101  ;  Cooley  v.  Norton,  4  Gush.  93.  In  a  case  of  libel  for  damages,  occasioned  by  col- 
lision of  ships,  it  was  held  that  the  admission  of  the  master  of  the  ship  proceeded  against 
might  well  be  articulated  in  the  libel  :  The  Manchester,  1  W.  Rob.  62  ;  but  it  does 
not  appear,  in  the  report,  whether  the  admission  was  made  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence 
or  not.  The  question  has  been  discussed,  whether  there  is  any  substantial  distinction 


§  184  C.]  PERSONS   MAKING   ADMISSIONS.  309 

where  his  right  to  act  in  the  particular  matter  in  question  has  ceased, 
the  principal  can  no  longer  be  affected  by  his  declarations,  they 
being  mere  hearsay.6  [The  question  depends,  in  effect,  upon  the 
authority  to  be  attributed  to  the  agent  in  the  specific  case,  and  this 
will  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  business  with  reference  to  the 
degree  of  responsibility  and  authority  attributable  to  the  particular 
person.7] 

between  a  written  entry  and  an  oral  declaration  by  an  agent  of  the  fact  of  his  having 
received  a  particular  rent  for  his  employer.  The  case  was  one  of  a  sub-agent,  employed 
by  a  steward  to  collect  rents,  and  the  declaration  offered  in  evidence  was,  "  M.  N.  paid 
me  the  halt-year's  rent,  and  here  it  is."  Its  admissibility  was  argued,  both  as  a  decla- 
ration against  interest,  and  also,  as  made  in  the  course  of  discharging  a  duty  ;  and  the 
Court  inclined  to  admit  it,  but  took  time  for  advisement :  Fursdom  v.  Clogg,  10  M.  & 
W.  572  ;  see  also  R.  v.  Hall,  8  C.  &  P.  358  ;  Allen  v.  Denstone,  ib.  760  ;  Lawrence 
v.  Thatcher,  6  id.  669  ;  Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Field,  2  Hill  445  ;  Doe  v.  Hawkins, 
2  Q.  B.  212.  Whether  the  declaration  or  admission  of  the  agent  made  in  regard  to  a 
transaction  already  past,  but  while  his  agency  for  similar  objects  still  continues,  will  bind 
the  principal,  does  not  appear  to  have  been  expressly  decided  ;  but  the  weight  of  author- 
ity is  in  the  negative;  see  the  observations  of  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Garth  v.  Howard,  supra ; 
see  also  Mortimer  ».  M'Callan,  6  M.  &  W.  58,  69,  73  ;  Haven  v.  Brown,  7  Greenl.  421, 
424  ;  Thallhimer  v.  Brinckerhoff,  4  Wend.  394  ;  City  Bank  of  Baltimore  v.  Bateman, 
7  Har.  &  Johns.  104  ;  Stewartson  v.  Watts,  8  Watts  392  ;  Betham  v.  Benson,  Gow  45, 
48,  n.;  Baring  v.  Clark,  19  Pick.  220  ;  Parker  v.  Green,  8  Met.  142,  143 ;  Plumer  v. 
Briscoe,  12  Jur.  351  ;  11  Q.  B.  46.  Where  the  fraudulent  representations  of  the  ven- 
dor are  set  up  in  defence  of  an  action  for  the  price  of  land,  the  defence  may  be  main- 
tained by  proof  of  such  representations  by  the  vendor's  agent  who  effected  the  sale ;  but 
it  is  not  competent  to  inquire  as  to  his  motives  or  inducements  for  making  them : 
Hammatt  v.  Emerson,  14  Shepl.  308. 

6  Reynolds  v.  Rowley,  3  Rob.  La.  201 ;  Stiles  v.  Western  Railroad  Co.,  8  Met.  44. 

7  FFor  admissions  as  to  negligent  conduct  and  the  like,  see  the  following  cases  : 
{Durkee  v.  R.  Co.,  69  Cal.  534';   Griffin  v.  R.  Co.,  26  Ga.  Ill  ;(   South.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kinchen,  id.,  29  S.  E.  816  ;  Penns.  R.  Co.  v.  Bridge  Co.,  170  111.  645  ;  Atch.  T.  &  S. 
F.  R,  Co.  v.  Osborn,  58  Kan.  768 ;  Atch.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Cattle  Co.,  id.,  52  Pac. 
71  ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R,  Co.  v.  Ellis,  97  Ky.  330  ;  Graddy  »;.  R.  Co.,  id.,  43  S.  W.  468  ; 
C.  &  0.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  id.,  39  S.  W.  832  :  East  T.  T.  Co.  v.  Simms,  99  id.  404 ; 
| Morse  v.  R.  Co.,  6  Gray  450  ;  Robinson  v.  R.  Co.,  7  id.  92  ;}   Gilmore  v.  Paper  Co., 
169  Mass.  471;   Ablard  v.  R,  Co.,  104  Mich.  147;    jLuby  v.  R.  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  131  ;| 
Williams  v.  Tel.  Co.,  116  N.  C.  558  ;  Giberson  v.  Mills  Co.,  174  Pa.  369  ;  {Oil  C.  F.  S. 
Co.  v.  Boundy,  122  id.  460  ;   Erie  &  W.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  125  id.  264  ;  Charleston 
R.  Co.  v.  Blake,  12  Rich.  L.  634  ;{  Houston  E.  &  W.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  Tex.,  45 
S.  W.  2  ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  9  U.  S.  App.  564  ;  Linderberg  v.  Min.  Co., 
9  Utah  163  ;  Rensch  v.  Cold  Storage  Co.,  91  Va.  534. 

For  admissions  in  insurance  claims,  see  Schoep  v.  Ins.  Co.,  104  la.  354  ;  {Ins.  Co. 
v.  Woodruff,  2  Dutch.  541  ;(  Albert  v.  Ins.  Co.,  N.  C.,  30  S.  E.  327  ;  Wicktorwitz  v. 
Ins.  Co.,  Or.,  51  Pac.  75. 

For  recent  instances  in  sundry  classes  of  agencies,  see  the  following  :  Postal  C.  C. 
Co.  v.  LeNoir,  107  Ala.  640 ;  Postal  C.  C.  Co.  v.  Brantley,  ib.  683  ;  Georgia  H.  I.  Co. 
v.  Warten,  113  id.  479  ;  Ames  Ironworks  v.  Pulley  Co.,  63  Ark.  87  ;  Hewes  v.  Fruit 
Co.,  106  Cal.  441  ;  Mutter  v.  Lime  Co.,  id.,  42  Pac.  1068  ;  McGowan  v.  McDonald, 
111  id.  57;  Hearne  v.  De Young,  119  id.  670;  Builders'  Co.  v.  Cox,  68  Conn.  380; 
{Newton  Mfg.  Co.  w.  White,  53  Ga.  395  ;  Mich.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Carrow,  73  111.  348  ;( 
Treager  r.  Mining  Co.,  142  Ind.  164  ;  Waite  v.  High,  96  la.  742;  Irlbeck  v.  Bii-rl, 
101  id.  240  ;  Metrop.  N.  B'k  v.  Com.  St.  B'k,  104  id.  682  ;  {Sivenson  v.  Aultman, 
14  Kan.  273  ;{  Cherokee  Co.  v.  Dickson,  55  id.  62 ;  First  N.  B'k  v.  Marshall,  56  id. 
441  ;  {Burnham  v.  Ellis,  39  Me.  319  ;  Dome  v.  S.  M.  Co.,  11  Cush.  205  ;(  Geary  v. 
Stevenson,  169  Mass.  23  ;  Andrews  v.  Mining  Co.,  Mich.,  72  N.  W.  242 ;  Nostrum  v. 
Halliday,  39  Nebr.  828  ;  N.  P.  Lumber  Co.  p.  W.  S.  M.  L.  &  M.  Co.,  29  Or.  219  ;  First 
N.  B'k  o.  Linn  Co.  B'k,  30  id.  296 ;  Hunt  R.  Co.  v.  Decker,  82  Pa.  119  ;  School  F. 
Co.  t».  Warsaw,  S.  D.,  122  id.  500  ;  Estey  v.  Birmbaum,  9  S.  D.  174  ;  Nelson  v.  Bank, 
32  U.  S.  App.  554;  Moyle  v.  Congr.  Soc.,  Utah,  50  Pac.  806  Q  jStiles  ».  Danville,  42 
Vt.  282.  { 


310  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

§  184  d  [114].  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  rule  admitting  the 
declarations  of  the  agent  is  founded  upon  the  legal  identity  of  the 
agent  and  the  principal;  and  therefore  they  bind  only  so  far  as  there 
is  authority  to  make  them;  [and  this  authority,  therefore,  must  be 
shown  other  than  by  the  extra-judicial  statements  of  the  supposed 
agent,  which  are  receivable  as  admissions  only  on  the  assumption 
that  the  declarant's  agency  is  independently  proved.1]  Where  this 
authority  is  derived  by  implication  from  authority  to  do  a  certain  act, 
the  declarations  of  the  agent,  to  be  admissible,  must  be  ])art  of  the 
res  gestce.2  An  authority  to  make  an  admission  is  not  necessarily  to 
be  implied  from  an  authority  previously  given  in  respect  to  the  thing 
to  which  the  admission  relates.8  Thus  it  has  been  held,4  that  the 
declarations  of  the  bailee  of  a  bond,  intrusted  to  him  by  the  defend- 
ant, were  not  admissible  in  proof  of  the  execution  of  the  bond  by  the 
bailor,  nor  of  any  other  agreements  between  the  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant respecting  the  subject.  The  res  gestce  consisted  in  the  fact  of  the 
bailment,  and  its  nature ;  and  on  these  points  only  were  the  declara- 
tions of  the  agent  identified  with  those  of  the  principal.  As  to  any 
other  facts  in  the  knowledge  of  the  agent,  he  must  be  called  to 
testify,  like  any  other  witness.6 

§  185.  Same :  Husband  and  "Wife.  The  admissions  of  the  wife  will 
bind  the  husband,  only  where  she  has  authority  to  make  them.1 
This  authority  does  not  result,  by  mere  operation  of  law,  from  the 
relation  of  husband  and  wife ;  but  is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  found 
by  the  jury,  as  in  other  cases  of  agency ;  for  though  this  relation  is 

1  {Cent.   Penn.  Teleph.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  112  Pa.  St.  131 ;  Francis  v.  Edwards,  77 
N.  C.  271  ;  Galbreath  v.  Cole,  61  Ala.  139  ;  Central  Branch  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  But- 
man,  22  Kan.  639  ;  Mussey  v.  Beecher,  3  Gush.  517;  Brigham  v.  Peters,  1  Gray  145  ; 
Trustees,  etc.  v.  Bledsoe,   5  Ind.   133  ;   Corbin  v.  Adams,   6  Gush.  93 ;  Printup  v. 
Mitchell,  17  Ga.  558  ;  Covington,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingles,  15  B.  Mon.  637  ;  Tattle 
v.  Brown,  4  Gray  457,  460  ;|   QAbel  v.  Jarratt,  100  Ga.  732  ;  Amer.  Expr.  Co.  v.  Land- 
ford,  Ind.  Terr.,  46  S.  W.  182  ;  Nowell  v.  Chipman,  Mass.,  49  N.  E.  631 ;  Wicktorwitz 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  Or.,  51  Pac.  75  ;  Union  G.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  420. 
The  alleged  agent  may  of  course  be  a  witness  on  the  stand  to  prove  his  authority,  be- 
cause it  is  immaterial  by  whom  the  preliminary  fact  of  agency  is  proved:  Amer.  Exp. 
Co.  v.  Lankford,  Wicktorwitz  v.  Ins.  Co.,  supra.     Moreover,  the  declarations  are  also 
admissible,  without  such  preliminary  proof,  as  showing  at  least  that  the  person  pur- 
ported to  act  as  agent,  the  agency  being  proved  later:  Nowell  v.  Chipman,  supra. J 

2  [^Translate  this  :  "act  authorized  to  be  done."] 

8  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  402.  As  to  the  evidence  of  authority  inferred  from  circum- 
stances, see  Story  on  Agency,  §§  87-106, 259,  260. 

*  Fairlie  v.  Hastings,  10  Ves.  123. 

6  Maesters  v.  Abraham,  1  Esp.  375  (Day's  ed.),  and  note  (1);  Stoiy  on  Agency, 
§§  135-143 ;  Johnson  v.  Ward,  6  Esp.  47. 

1  Emerson  v.  Bloniden,  1  Esp.  142  ;  Anderson  v  Sanderson,  2  Stark.  204;  Cnreyr. 
Adkins,  4  Campb.  92  ;  {State  v.  Jaeger,  66  Mo.  173 ;  Goodrich  v.  Tracy,  43  Vt.  814  ; 
Hunt  v.  Strew,  33  Mich.  85  ;  Butler  v.  Price,  115  Mass.  578  ;  Deck  v.  Johnson,  1  Abb. 
(N.  Y. )  App.  Dec.  497  ;j  rjBroderick  v.  Hipginson,  169  Mass.  482  ;  People  r.  Knapp, 
42  Mich.  269.]  In  Walton  v.  Green,  1  C.  &  P.  621,  which  was  an  action  for  neces- 
saries furnished  to  the  wife,  the  defence  being  that  she  was  turned  out  of  doors  for 
adultery,  the  husband  was  permitted  to  prove  her  confessions  of  the  fact,  just  previous 
to  his  turning  her  away  ;  but  this  was  contemporary  with  the  transaction  of  which  it 
formed  a  part. 


§  §184(2-186.]          PERSONS  MAKING   ADMISSIONS.  311 

peculiar  in  its  circumstances,  from  its  close  intimacy  and  its  very 
nature,  yet  it  is  not  peculiar  in  its  principles.  As  the  wife  is  seldom 
expressly  constituted  the  agent  of  the  husband,  the  cases  on  this 
subject  are  almost  universally  those  of  implied  authority,  turning 
upon  the  degree  in  which  the  husband  permitted  the  wife  to  partici- 
pate, either  in  the  transaction  of  his  affairs  in  general,  or  in  the 
particular  matter  in  question.  Where  he  sues  for  her  wages,  the 
fact  that  she  earned  them  does  not  authorize  her  to  bind  him  by  her 
admissions  of  payment;2  nor  can  her  declarations  affect  him,  where 
he  sues  with  her  in  her  right;  for  in  these,  and  similar  cases,  the 
right  is  his  own,  though  acquired  through  her  instrumentality.8 
But  in  regard  to  the  inference  of  her  agency  from  circumstances, 
the  question  has  been  left  to  the  jury  with  great  latitude,  both  as  to 
the  fact  of  agency  and  the  time  of  the  admissions.  Thus,  it  has  been 
held  competent  for  them  to  infer  authority  in  her  to  accept  a  notice 
and  direction,  in  regard  to  a  particular  transaction  in  her  husband's 
trade,  from  the  circumstance  of  her  being  seen  twice  in  his  counting- 
room,  appearing  to  conduct  his  business  relating  to  that  transaction, 
and  once  giving  orders  to  the  foreman.4  And  in  an  action  against 
the  husband,  for  goods  furnished  to  the  wife,  while  in  the  country, 
where  she  was  occasionally  visited  by  him,  her  letter  to  the  plain- 
tiff, admitting  the  debt,  and  apologizing  for  the  non-payment,  though 
written  several  years  after  the  transaction,  was  held  by  Lord  Ellen- 
borough  sufficient  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute  of  limitations.6 
[On  the  same  principle,  an  actual  agency  must  be  shown  to  render 
the  statements  of  a  husband  admissible  against  the  wife.6] 

§  186.  Same  :  Attorneys  of  Record  ;  Pleadings.  (1)  (a)  The  admis- 
sions of  attorneys  of  record  bind  their  clients,  in  all  matters  relating 
to  the  progress  and  trial  of  the  cause;  but,  to  this  end,  they  must  be 
distinct  and  formal,  or  such  as  are  termed  solemn  admissions,1  made 
for  the  express  purpose  of  alleviating  the  stringency  of  some  rule 
of  practice,  or  of  dispensing  with  the  formal  proof  of  some  fact  at 

2  Hall  v.  Hill,  2  Str.  1094.  An  authority  to  the  wife  to  conduct  the  ordinary 
business  of  the  shop  in  her  husband's  absence  does  not  authorize  her  to  bind  him  by 
an  admission,  in  regard  to  the  tenancy  or  the  rent  of  the  shop  :  Meredith  v.  Footner, 
11  M.  &  W.  202. 

8  Alhan  v.  Pritchett,  6  T.  R.  680  ;  Kelly  v.  Small,  2  Esp.  716  ;  Denn  v.  White, 
7  T.  R.  112,  as  to  her  admission  of  a  trespass  ;  Hodgkinson  v.  Fletcher,  4  Campb.  70. 
Neither  are  his  admissions,  as  to  facts  respecting  her  property,  which  happened  before 
the  marriage,  receivable  after  his  death,  to  affect  the  rights  of  the  surviving  wife  : 
Smith  v.  Scudder,  11  Serg.  &  R.  325. 

*  Plimmer  v.  Sells,  3  Nev.  &  M.  422  ;  and  see  Riley  v.  Suydam,  4  Barb.  222. 

6  Gregory  v.  Parker,  1  Campb.  394  ;  Palethorp  v.  Furnish,  2  Esp.  511,  n.  See  also 
Clifford  v.  Burton,  1  Bing.  199  ;  s.  c.  8  Moore  16 ;  Petty  v.  Anderson,  3  Bing.  170  ; 
Cotes  v.  Davis,  1  Campb.  485. 

8  jDec.k  v.  Johnson,  1  Abb.  App.  Dec.  497  ;[  QBroderick  v.  Higginson,  169  Mass. 
482  ;  LeMaster  v.  Dickson,  Tex.,  45  S.  W.  1 ;  see  Hughes  v.  Canal  Co.,  176  Pa.  254. 
For  admissions  by  a  husband  in  possession  of  goods  said  to  be  his  wife's,  see  Coldwater 
N.  B'k  v.  Buggie,  Mich.,  75  N.  W.  1057  ;  Lehmann  v.  Chapel,  Minn.,  73  N.  W. 
402  ;  Boynton  v.  Miller,  Mo.,  46  S.  W.  754.1 

1  [Post,  §  205.3 


312  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

the  trial;  in  such  cases,  they  are  in  general  conclusive;  and  may  be 
given  in  evidence;  even  upon  a  new  trial.2  (V)  But  other  admis- 
sions, which  are  mere  matters  of  conversation  with  an  attorney, 
though  they  relate  to  the  facts  in  controversy,  cannot  be  received  in 
evidence  against  his  client;  the  reason  of  the  distinction  is  found 
in  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  authority  given;  the  attorney  being 
constituted  for  the  management  of  the  cause  in  court,  and  for  noth- 
ing more.8  If  the  admission  is  made  before  suit,  it  is  equally  bind- 
ing, provided  it  appear  that  the  attorney  was  already  retained  to 
appear  in  the  cause.4  But  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  of  retainer 
at  that  time  in  the  cause,  there  must  be  some  other  proof  of  authority 
to  make  the  admission.6  Where  the  attorney  is  already  ^constituted 
in  the  cause,  admissions  made  by  his  managing  clerk  or  his  agent 
are  received  as  his  own.6 

(2)  It  seems  that  pleadings,  whether  in  equity  or  at  common  law, 
are  not  to  be  treated  as  positive  allegations  of  the  truth  of  the  facts 
therein  stated,  for  all  purposes;  but  only  as  statements  of  the  case 
of  the  party,  to  be  admitted  or  denied  by  the  opposite  side,  and,  if 
denied,  to  be  proved,  and  ultimately  to  be  submitted  to  judicial 
decision.7  {This  is  sometimes  enacted  by  statute 8  and  sometimes  is 
arrived  at  by  decisions  of  Court,  pleadings  being  regarded,  so  far  as 
the  suits  in  which  they  are  filed  are  concerned,  as  mere  formulas 
for  the  solution  of  the  case,  and  to  limit  and  make  definite  the  issues 
to  be  tried  by  the  jury.  Any  attempt,  therefore,  to  comment  upon 

2  Doe  v.  Bird,  7  C.  &  P.  6  ;  Langley  v.  Lord  Oxford,  1  M.  &  W.  508  ;  {Colledge  v. 
Horn,  3  Bing.  119;}  QLuther  v.  Clay,  100  Ga.  236,  sembfe ;  Central  B.  Co.  v. 
Lowell,  15  Gray  106,  128  ;  Prestwood  v.  Watsou,  Ala,,  20  So.  600.  Contra:  {Perry 
v.  Mfg.  Co.,  40  Conn.  313  ;|  Luther  v.  Clay,  Ga.,  28  S.  E.  46 ;  King  v.  Shepard,  id., 
30  S.  E.  634 ;  Pearl  v.  Allen,  1  Tyl.  4.  It  is  usually  a  question  of  implied  intention 
in  each  case.  But  it  is  only  as  to  their  binding  effect  that  the  difference  of  opinion 
exists  ;  it  is  generally  conceded  that  they  may  be  used  as  ordinary  admissions.  But  in 
any  case  they  do  not  prevent  the  opposite  party  from  putting  in  his  evidence  if  he 
chooses,  in  spite  of  this  waiver  of  proof:  Com.  i>.  Miller,  3  Gush.  243,  250  ;  Com.  v. 
Costello,  120  Mass.  358,  369  ;  Stetson's  Will,  id.,  44  N.  E.  1085  ;  Whiteside  v.  Loney, 
id.,  50  N.  E.  930  (in  Court's  discretion);  Dunning  v.  R.  Co.,  Me.,  39  Atl.  352.  As  to 
the  kind  of  statement  that  amounts  to  such  a  binding  waiver,  see  Rosenbaum  v.  State, 
33  Ala.  361;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323  ;  Lake  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Rooker, 
Ind.  App.,  41  N.  E.  470;  Mahoney  v.  Hardware  Co.,  Mont.,  48  Pac.  545;  Smith  v. 
Olsen,  Tex.,  46  S.  W.  631.  It  need  not  be  signed  :  Prestwood  v.  Watsou,  supra.  For 
the  Court's  discretion  to  relieve  for  mistake,  see  post,  §  206.] 

8  Young  v.  Wright,  1  Campb.  139,  141  ;  Parkins  v.  Hawkshaw,  2  Stark.  239  ;  Elton 
v.  Larkins,  1  M.  &  Rob.  196  ;  Doe  v.  Bird,  7  C.  &  P.  6  ;  Doe  v.  Richards,  2  C.  &  K. 
216 ;  Watson  v.  Kins,',  3  C.  B.  608. 

«  Marshall  v.  Cliff,  4  Campb.  133. 

«  Wagstaff  v.  Wilson,  4  B.  &  Ad.  339;  {Lord  w.  Bigelow,  124  Mass.  185.} 

8  Taylor  v.  Willans,  2  B.  &  Ad.  845,  856  ;  Standage  v.  Creighton,  5  C.  &  P.  4^6  ; 
Taylor  v.  Foster,  2  id.  195;  Griffiths  v.  Williams,  1  T.  R.  710;  Truslove  v.  Burton, 
9  Moore  64.  As  to  the  extent  of  certain  admissions,  see  Holt  v.  Squire,  Ry.  &  M.  282  ; 
Marshall  v.  Cliff,  4  Campb.  133.  The  admission  of  the  due  execution  of  a  deed  does 
not  preclude  the  party  from  taking  advantage  of  a  variance :  Goldie  v.  Shuttlewortn, 
1  Campb.  70. 

7  Boileau  r.  Rutlin,  2  Exch.  665. 

8  \E.  g.  Mass.  Pub.  St.  c.  167,  §  75.| 


§  186.]  PERSONS   MAKING   ADMISSIONS;   ATTOKNEYS.  313 

them  in  argument,  as  for  instance,  to  compare  an  original  declara- 
tion, or  answer,  with  an  amended  form  of  the  same,  so  as  to  draw  an 
inference  to  the  discredit  of  the  party  filing  them,  is  inadmissible.}9 
(3)  (The  question  how  far  statements  made  by  a  party  to  a  suit 
in  pleadings  filed  by  him  or  his  attorney  in  previous  cases  are  admis- 
sible in  evidence  against  him  is  not  one  free  from  doubt.  The  test 
which  seems  most  satisfactory  to  apply  is  the  inquiry  whether,  under 
the  circumstances,  the  party  against  whom  the  admissions  are  offered 
can  fairly  be  supposed  to  have  had  personal  knowledge  of  making  of 
the  admissions  in  the  pleadings  at  the  time  the  pleadings  were  drawn 
or  filed.  If  the  pleadings  are  signed  and  filed  by  the  attorney,  with- 
out apparently  being  brought  to  the  party's  attention,  it  is  generally 
held  that  such  pleadings  are  not  evidence  in  another  case  against 
the  party.10  And  pleadings  which  are  general  and  formal  in  their 
nature,  not  containing  specific  allegations  of  fact,  and  which  are 
signed  by  the  attorney  and  are  not  shown  to  have  been  specially 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  party  in  whose  behalf  they  were 
made,  are  not  receivable  in  other  cases  as  admissions  of  the  party  for 
whom  they  are  filed;  u  the  presumption  being  that  the  pleading  is  not 
known  to  the  party  in  whose  behalf  it  was  filed.  But  if  the  plead- 
ings are  shown  to  have  been  drawn  by  the  express  direction  of  the 
party  in  whose  behalf  they  are  filed,  and  any  statements  of  fact 
therein  contained  to  have  been  inserted  by  his  direction  or  with  his 
assent,  the  pleadings  are  admissions  of  the  facts  therein  contained  as 
against  such  a  party  in  subsequent  cases.12  There  are  dicta  in  several 
States  that  a  pleading,  even  though  signed  by  the  attorney,  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  known  to  the  party  in  whose  behalf  it  is  made,  and  is  to 
be  regarded  as  an  admission  of  the  facts  therein  stated.18  But  this 
is  not  the  better  rule.  The  true  rule  is  that  formal  allegations  are 
presumed  to  be  made  by  the  attorney  on  general  instructions  and 

9  [>mes  v.  Woodward,  115  Cal.  308  ;]  jPhillips  v.  Smith,  110  Mass.  61;  Taft  v. 
Fiske,  140  id.  250;  Blackiiigton  v.  Johnson,  126  id.  21;  Lyons  v.  Ward,  124  id.  365.} 
[^Contra,  allowing  their  use  as  evidence:  O'Connor's  Estate,  118  Cal.  69  ;  Leach  v. 
Hill,  97  la.  81;  Ludwig  v.  Blackshere.  102  id.  366;  j  Anderson  v.  McPike,  86  Mo. 
801 ;{  Walser  v.  Wear,  141  id.  443;  Woodworth  v.  Thompson,  44  Nebr.  311;  Lee  ». 
Heath,  N.  J.,  39  Atl.  729  ;  Kilpatrick  Co.  v.  Box,  13  Utah  494  ;  Lindner  v.  Ins.  Co., 
93  Wis.  526  ;  see  State  v.  Bowe,  61  Me.  176.] 

w  j  Marianski  v.  Cairns,  1  Macq.  Sc.  212 ;  Dennie  v.  Williams,  135  Mass.  28  ;  Wil- 
kins  v.  Stidger,  22  Cal.  239  ;  Harrison  v.  Baker,  5  Litt.  250  ;  Elting  v.  Scott,  2  Johns. 
157  ;  Meade  v.  Black,  22  Wis.  232  ;  Tabb  v.  Cabell,  17  Gratt.  160  ;  Hobson  v.  Ogden, 
16  Kau.  388  ;f  TSolari  v.  Snow,  101  Cal.  387  ;  Rockland  v.  Farnsworth,  89  Me.  481 ; 
Farr  v.  Rouillard,  Mass.,  52  N.  E.  443.] 

11  {Delaware  County  v.  Diebold  Safe  Co.,  133  U.  S.  487  ;  Combs  v.  Hodge,  21  How. 
307  ;  Pope  ».  Allis,  115  U.  S.  363  ;  Dennie  v.  Williams,  supra.\ 

12  j  Birchard  v.  Booth,  4  Wis.  67  ;  Wilkins  v.  Stidger,  22  Cal.  239  ;  Brown  v.  Jewett, 
120  Mass.  215  ;  Nichols  v.  Jones,  32  Mo.  App.  664  ;  Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type  Foundry, 
29  id.  545  ;  and  see  cases  supra.  \ 

18  jCoward  v.  Clauton,  79  Cal.  29;  Rich  v.  Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  84  ;  Vogel  ». 
Oshorne,  32  id.  167:  Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type  Foundry,  supra;  Bailey  v.  O'Baunon, 
28  Mo.  App.  46;}  [>ee  Gardner  v.  Meeker,  169  111.  40  ;  Jones  v.  Howard,  3  All.  24; 
O'Hiley  v.  Clampet,  53  Minn.  539  ;  Lee  v.  R.  Co.,  Wis.,  77  N.  W.  714 ;  and  see  a  few 
other  cases,  post,  §  195.] 


314  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII 

without  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  client;  but  particular  and 
specific  allegations  of  matters  of  action  or  defence,  which  cannot 
be  presumed  to  have  been  made  under  the  general  authority  of  the 
attorney,  but  under  specific  instructions  to  him  from  the  client,  are 
competent  evidence  against  the  client.14  If  the  pleadings  in  question 
were  sworn  to  by  the  party  in  whose  behalf  they  were  filed,  this  fact 
is  evidence  that  they  were  drawn  with  his  knowledge  of  the  facts 
therein  stated  and  consequently  admissible  against  him  in  other 
cases.15  Similarly,  an  answer  of  the  trustee  in  a  trustee  suit  may  be 
admissible  against  the  trustee  filing  it  in  a  subsequent  suit.18  So, 
answers  of  a  party  to  interrogatories  filed  in  the  ordinary  mode  of 
practice  are  competent  evidence  against  the  party  making  the  answers 
in  a  subsequent  suit.17  The  fact  that  the  pleadings  offered  in  evi- 
dence were  made  in  a  suit  in  another  State  does  not  affect  their  ad- 
missibility.18  Admissions  of  fact  made  in  a  law  brief  for  the  purposes 
of  arguing  the  case  before  the  law  court,  are  not  under  ordinary 
circumstances  admissions  of  those  facts  which  bind  the  attorney  or 
party  making  them,  though  if  the  statements  therein  appear  to  be 
made  from  directions  of  the  client  and  from  his  personal  knowledge 
they  may  have  the  effect  of  admissions.19}  [Subsequent  conduct 
of  the  party,  by  abandoning  the  proceedings  or  otherwise  recognizing 
the  justice  of  the  opponent's  case,  may  amount  to  an  admission.20] 

§  187.  Same :  Principal  and  Surety.  We  are  next  to  consider  the 
admissions  of  a  principal,  as  evidence  in  an  action  against  the  surety, 
upon  his  collateral  undertaking.  In  the  cases  on  this  subject  the 
main  inquiry  has  been,  whether  the  declarations  of  the  principal 
were  made  during  the  transaction  of  the  business  for  which  the 
surety  was  bound,  so  as  to  become  part  of  the  res  gestce.  If  so,  they 
have  been  held  admissible;  otherwise  not.  The  surety  is  considered 
as  bound  only  for  the  actual  conduct  of  the  party,  and  not  for  what- 
ever he  might  say  he  had  done;  and  therefore  is  entitled  to  proof 
of  his  conduct  by  original  evidence,  where  it  can  be  had;  excluding 
all  declarations  of  the  principal,  made  subsequent  to  the  act  to 
which  they  relate,  and  out  of  the  course  of  his  official  duty.1  Thus, 
where  one  guaranteed  the  payment  for  such  goods  as  the  plaintiffs 


Dennie  v.  Williams,  supra ;  Johnson  v.  Russell,  144  Mass.  409.  { 
Cook  v.  Barr,  44  N.  Y.  166 ;  Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type  Foundry,  supra. } 
Eaton  v.  Teleg.  Co. ,  68  Me.  63.  { 

Williams  v.  Cheney,  8  Gray  215  ;  Judd  v.  Gibbs,  ib.  589.     See  also  Church  v. 
Sholton,  2  Curtis  C.  C.  271  ;  State  v.  Littlefield,  8  R.  I.  124.  j 
18  jBuzard  v.  McAnulty,  77  Tex.  445.  f 
w  [Wood  v.  Graves,  144  Mass.  865. 

81  rMalcolmson  v.  O'Dea,  10  H.  L.  C.  593  Q  White  v.  Merrill,  82  Cal.  14.  f 
1  jLee  v.  Brown,  21  Kan.  458  ;  Pollard  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  7  Bush  597  ; 
White  v.  German  Nat'l  Bank,  9  Heisk.  475 ;  Hatch  v.  Elkins,  65  N.  Y.  489 ;  Tenth 
Nat'l  Bank  v.  Darragh,  8  Thomp.  &  C.  188  ;  Chelmsford  Company  v.  Demarest, 
7  Gray  1 ;  see  Union  Savings  Association  v.  Edwards,  47  Mo.  445  ;|  £Singer  Mfg.  Co. 
v.  Reynolds,  168  Mass.  588.J  jThe  admission  of  the  surety,  however,  is  good  against 
both;  Chapel  v.  Waahburn,  11  Ind.  893. J 


§§  186-189.]  PEKSONS   MAKING   ADMISSIONS.  315 

should  send  to  another,  in  the  way  of  their  trade,  it  was  held,  that 
the  admissions  of  the  principal  debtor,  that  he  had  received  goods, 
made  after  the  time  of  their  supposed  delivery,  were  not  receivable 
in  evidence  against  the  surety.2  So,  if  one  becomes  surety  in  a 
bond,  conditioned  for  the  faithful  conduct  of  another  as  clerk,  or 
collector,  it  is  held,  that,  in  an  action  on  the  bond  against  the  surety, 
confessions  of  embezzlement  made  by  the  principal  after  his  dis- 
missal, are  not  admissible,  in  evidence;8  though,  with  regard  to 
entries  made  in  the  course  of  his  duty,  it  is  otherwise.4  A  judg* 
ment,  also,  rendered  against  the  principal,  may  be  admitted  as  evi- 
dence, of  that  fact,  in  an  action  against  the  surety.6  On  the  other 
hand,  upon  the  same  general  ground,  it  has  been  held,  that,  where 
the  surety  confides  to  the  principal  the  power  of  making  a  contract, 
he  confides  to  him  the  power  of  furnishing  evidence  of  the  contract; 
and  that,  if  the  contract  is  made  by  parol,  subsequent  declarations 
of  the  principal  are  admissible  in  evidence,  though  not  conclusive. 
Thus,  where  a  husband  and  wife  agreed,  by  articles,  to  live  separate, 
and  C,  as  trustee  and  surety  for  the  wife,  covenanted  to  pay  the 
husband  a  sum  of  money,  upon  his  delivering  to  the  wife  a  carriage 
and  horses  for  her  separate  use,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  by  the 
husband  for  the  money,  that  the  wife's  admissions  of  the  receipt  by 
her  of  the  carriage  and  horses,  were  admissible.6  So,  where  A  guar- 
anteed the  performance  of  any  contract  that  B  might  make  with  C, 
the  admissions  and  declarations  of  B  were  held  admissible  against 
A,  to  prove  the  contract.7 

§  188.  But  where  the  surety,  being  sued  for  the  default  of  the 
principal,  gives  him  notice  of  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  and  requests 
him  to  defend  it;  if  judgment  goes  against  the  surety,  the  record  is 
conclusive  evidence  for  him,  in  a  subsequent  action  against  the  prin- 
cipal for  indemnity;  for  the  principal  has  thus  virtually  become 
party  to  it.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in  such  case  the  declara- 
tions of  the  principal,  as  we  have  heretofore  seen,  become  admis- 
sible, even  though  they  operate  against  the  surety.1 

§  189.  Same  :  Privity  of  Estate  ;  Ancestor  or  Grantor  during  Own- 
ership.  The  admissions  of  one  person  are  also  evidence  against 
another,  in  respect  of  privity  between  them.  The  term  "  privity " 

2  Evans  i».  Beattie,  5  Esp.  26 ;  Bacon  ».  Chesney,  1  Stark.  192 ;  Longenecker  ». 
Hyde,  6  Binn.  1. 

8  Smith  v.  Whittingham,  6  C.  &  P.  78 ;  see  also  Goss  v.  Watlington,  8  Brod.  &  Bing. 
132  ;  Cutler  v.  Newlin,  Manning's  Digest,  N.  P.  137,  per  Holroyd,  J.,  in  1819  ;  Davres 
v.  Sbedd,  15  Mass.  6,  9;  Foxcroft  v.  Nevins,  4  Greenl.  72;  Hayes  v.  Seaver,  7  id. 
237;  Respublica  v.  Davis,  3  Yeates  128  ;  Hotchkiss  v.  Lyon,  2  Blackf.  222  ;  Shelby  v. 
Governor,  etc.,  id.  289 ;  Beall  v.  Beck,  3  Ear.  &  McHen.  242. 

*  Whitnash  v.  George,  8  B.  &  C.  556 ;  Middleton  t>.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317;  Mo 
Gahey  v.  Alston,  2  M.  &  W.  213,  214. 

6  Drummond  r.  Prestman,  12  Wheat.  515. 

6  Fenner  v.  Lewis,  10  Johns.  38. 

7  Meade  v.  McDowell,  5  Binn.  195. 

1  See  supra,  §  180,  n.  8,  and  cases  there  cited. 


316  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII 

denotes  mutual  or  successive  relationship  to  the  same  rights  of  prop- 
erty; and  privies  are  distributed  into  several  classes,  according  to 
the  manner  of  this  relationship.  Thus,  there  are  privies  in  estate, 
as  donor  and  donee,  lessor  and  lessee,  and  joint-tenants;  privies  in 
blood,  as  heir  and  ancestor,  and  co-parceners ;  privies  in  representa- 
tion, as  executors  and  testator,  administrators  and  intestate ;  privies 
in  law,  where  the  law,  without  privity  of  blood  or  estate,  casts  the 
land  upon  another,  as  by  escheat.  All  these  are  more  generally 
classed  into  privies  in  estate,  privies  in  blood,  and  privies  in  law.1 
The  ground  upon  which  admissions  bind  those  in  privity  with  the 
party  making  them  is,  that  they  are  identified  in  interest;  and,  of 
course,  the  rule  extends  no  farther  than  this  identity.  The  cases  of 
co-parceners  and  joint-tenants  are  assimilated  to  those  of  joint- 
promisors,  partners  and  others  having  a  joint  interest,  which  have 
already  been  considered.2  In  other  cases,  where  the  party,  by  his 
admissions,  has  qualified  his  own  right,  and  another  claims  to  suc- 
ceed him  as  heir,  executor,  or  the  like,  he  succeeds  only  to  the 
right,  as  thus  qualified,  at  the  time  when  his  title  commenced ;  and 
the  admissions  are  receivable  in  evidence  against  the  representative 
in  the  same  manner  as  they  would  have  been  against  the  party  repre- 
sented.8 Thus,  the  declarations  of  the  ancestor,  that  he  held  the 
land  as  the  tenant  of  a  third  person,  are  admissible  to  show  the  seisin 
of  that  person,  in  an  action  brought  by  him  against  the  heir  for  the 
land.4  Thus  also,  where  the  defendant  in  a  real  action  relied  on  a 
long  possession,  he  has  baen  permitted,  in  proof  of  the  adverse 
character  of  the  possession,  to  give  in  evidence  the  declarations  of 
one  under  whom  the  plaintiff  claimed,  that  he  had  sold  the  land  to 
the  person  under  whom  the  defendant  claimed.6  And  the  declara- 
tions of  an  intestate  are  admissible  against  his  administrator,  or  any 
other  claiming  in  his  right.8 

1  Co.  Tat.  271  a;  Carver  v.  Jackson,  4  Peters  1,  83 ;  Wood's  Inst.  L.  L.  En£.  236  ; 
Tomliu's  Law  Diet.  s.  v.  Privies.  But  the  admissions  of  executors  and  administrators 
are  not  receivable  against  their  co-executors  or  co-administrators  :  Elwood  v.  Deifen- 
dorf,  5  Barb.  S.  C.  498.  Other  divisions  have  been  recognized  ;  namely,  privity  in 
tenure  between  landlord  and  tenant;  privity  in  contract  alone,  or  the  relation  between 
lessor  and  lessee,  or  heir  and  tenant  in  dower,  or  by  the  curtesy,  by  the  covenants  of 
the  latter,  after  he  has  assigned  his  term  to  a  stranger ;  privity  in  estate  alone,  be- 
tween the  lessee  and  the  grantee  of  the  reversion ;  and  privity  in  both  estate  and  con- 
tract, as  between  lessor  and  lessee,  etc.,  but  these  are  foreign  from  our  present  purpose ; 
see  Walker's  Case,  8  Co.  23;  Beverley's  Case,  4  Co.  123,  124;  supra,  §§  II),  20,  23,  24. 

3  Supra,  §§174,  180. 

*  {Alexander  v.  Caldwell,  55  Ala.  517;  Pickering  v.  Reynolds,  119  Mass.  Ill ; 
Haydcnw.  Stone,  121  id.  413;  Rawson  v.  Plaisted,  151  id.  73  ;  Anderson  v.  Kent,  14 
Kaii.  207;  Roelke  v.  Andrews,  2(5  Wis.  811;  Dodge  r.  Freedrnan's  Saving,  etc.  Com- 
pany, 93  U.  8.  879 ;(  ([Williams  v.  Harter,  Cal.,  63  Pac.  405  ;  McCurtain  v.  Grady, 
Ind.  Terr.,  38  S.  W.  6f> ;  Levi  v.  Gardner,  S.  C.,  80  S.  E.  617;  Henderson  v.  Wana- 
maker,  U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  736  ;  Rensens  v.  Lawson,  91  Va,  226.] 

«  Doe  v.  Pettet,  5  B.  &  Aid.  223  ;  2  Poth.  on  Obi.  by  Evans,  p.  254. 

6  Brattle  Street  Church  v.  Billiard,  2  Met.  363;  and  see  Padgett  v.  Lawrence,  10 
Pai^r,  170;  Dorsey  v.  Dorsey,  8  H.  &  J.  410  ;  Clary  v.  Grimes,  12  G.  &  J.  31. 

«  Smith  v.  Smith,  8  Bing.  N.  C.  29 ;  Ivatw.  Finch,  1  Taunt.  141 ;    {McFadden  v. 


§  189.]  PERSONS   MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  317 

{The  admissions  must  be  made  while  the  title  to  the  property  in 
question  is  in  the  declarant;  they  therefore  cannot  affect  a  title 
subsequently  acquired,7  nor  are  they  admissible  if  made  after  the 
declarant  has  parted  with  his  interest  in  the  property; 8  unless  there 
is  proof  of  some  fraudulent  scheme  between  the  grantor  and  grantee, 
e.  g.  to  defraud  creditors.9}  [It  follows  that  the  declarant,  if  at  the 
time  owner  or  claimant,  need  not  have  been  in  possession;10  and, 
conversely,  that  his  being  in  possession  after  the  title  conveyed  does 
not  make  his  declaration  competent  as  an  admission.11]  The  declara- 
tions, also,  of  the  former  occupant  of  a  messuage,  in  respect  of  which 
the  present  occupant  claimed  a  right  of  common,  because  of  vicinage, 
are  admissible  evidence  in  disparagement  of  the  right,  they  being 
made  during  his  occupancy;  and  on  the  same  principle,  other  con- 
temporaneous declarations  of  occupiers  have  been  admitted,  as  evi- 
dence of  the  nature  and  extent  of  their  title,  against  those  claiming 
in  privity  of  estate.12  Any  admission  by  a  landlord  in  a  prior  lease, 

Ellmaker,  52  Cal.  348  ;  Foote  v.  Beecher,  78  N.  Y.  155;  Lewis  v.  Adams,  61  Ga.  559  ; 
Eokert  v.  Triplett,  48  Ind.  174  ;  Mueller  v.  Rebhan,  94  111.  142  ;  Plainer  v.  Platner, 
78  N.  Y.  90;  Fellows  v.  Smith,  130  Mass.  378  ;(  [[compare  the  notes  to  §§  174,  176, 
179,  ante.^\ 

7  |Stockwell  v.  Blarney,  129  Mass.  312  ;    Noyes  v.  Merrill,  108  id.  396  ;  Hutchins 
v.  Hutchins,  98  N.  Y.  64  ;  Houston  v.  McCluny,  8  W.  Va.  135. } 

8  jPringle  v.  Priugle,  59  Pa.  St.  281 ;    Chadwick  v.  Fonner,  69  N.  Y.  404  ;  Rand- 
eggerr.  Ehrhardt,  51  111.  101;  Bentley  v.  O'Bryan,  111  id.  53  ;  Hills  v.  Ludwig,  46 
Oh.  St.  373  ;    Carpenter  v.   Carpenter,  8  Bush  283 ;   Taylor  v.  Webb,  54  Miss.  36 ; 
Howell  v.  Howcll,  47  Ga.  492  ;|   [Old  v.  Ord,  99  Cal.  523  ;  Bowden  v.  Achor,   95  Ga. 
243  ;  Miller  r.  Miller,  155  111.  284  ;  Shea  v.  Murphy,  164  id.  614  ;  Bobbins  v.  Spencer, 
140  Ind.  483  ;  Neuffer  v.  Moehn,  96  la.  731  ;  Vyn  v.  Keppel,  108  Mich.  244  ;  Kurtz 
».  R.  Co.,  61   Minn.  18  ;   Consol.  T.  L.  Co.  v.  Pien,  44  Nebr.  887  ;  Jones  v.  Jones, 
137  N.  Y.  610,  614 ;  Arnegaard  v.  Arnegaard,  N.  D.,  75  N.  W.  797  ;  Josephi  v.  Fur- 
nish, 27  Or.  260  ;  Matteson  v.  Hartman,  91  Wis.  485.] 

9  j  Hartman  v.  Diller,  62  Pa.  St.  37 ;  Boyd  v.  Jones,  60  Mo.  454  ;    Pier  v.  Duff,  63 
Pa.  St.  59  ;  Hutchings  v.  Castle,  48  Cal.  152  ;  Cuyler  v.  McCartney,   33  Barb.  165  ; 
Holbrook  v.  Holbrook,   113  Mass.  75  ;{  [[Biggins  v.  Spahr,  145  Ind.  167  ;  Toms  v. 
Whitmore,  Wyo.,  44  Pac.  56.] 

1°  ("Fry  v.  Stowers,  92  Va.  13.] 

»  [|Emmons  v.  Barton,  109  Cal.  662;  Hart  v.  Randolph,  142  111.  521,  525.] 
12  Walker  v.  Broadstock,  1  Esp.  458;  Doe  v.  Austin,  9  Bing.  41 ;  Davies  v.  Pierce, 
2  T.  R.  53 ;  Doe  v.  Rickarby,  5  Esp.  4 ;  Doe  v.  Jones,  1  Campb.  367.  QAs  to  this,  see 
the  discriminations  pointed  out  post,  in  the  text.]  Ancient  maps,  books  of  survey, 
etc.,  though  mere  private  documents,  are  frequently  admissible  on  this  ground,  where 
there  is  a  privity  in  estate  between  the  former  proprietor,  under  whose  direction  they 
were  made,  and  the  present  claimant,  against  whom  they  are  offered  :  Bull.  N.  P.  283 ; 
Bridgman  v.  Jennings,  1  Ld.  Raym.  734.  So,  as  to  receipts  for  rent,  by  a  former 
grantor,  under  whom  both  parties  claimed  :  Doe  v.  Seaton,  2  Ad.  &  El.  171.  See  also 
Doe  v.  Cole,  6  C.  &  P.  359,  that  a  letter  written  by  a  former  vicar,  respecting  the 
property  of  the  vicarage,  is  evidence  against  his  successor,  in  an  ejectment  for  the  same 
property,  in  right  of  his  vicarage.  The  receipts,  also,  of  a  vicar's  lessee,  it  seems,  are 
admissible  against  the  vicar,  in  proof  of  a  modus,  by  reason  of  the  privity  between  them : 
Jones  v.  ( 'arrington,  1  C.  &  P.  329,  330,  n. ;  Maddisou  ».  Nuttal,  6  Bing.  226.  So,  the 
answer  of  a  former  rector :  De  Whelpdale  v.  Milburn,  5  Price,  485.  An  answer  in 
Chancery  is  also  admissible  in  evidence  against  any  person  actually  claiming  under  the 
party  who  put  it  in  ;  and  it  has  been  held  prima  facie  evidence  against  persons  gen- 
erally reputed  to  claim  under  him,  at  least  so  far  as  to  call  npon  them  to  show  another 
title  from  a  stranger:  Earl  of  Sussex  o.  Temple,  1  Ld.  Raym.  310;  Countess  of  Dart- 
mouth v,  Roberts,  16  East  334,  339,  340.  So,  of  other  declarations  of  the  former  party 


318  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

•which  is  relative  to  the  matter  in  issue,  and  concerns  the  estate,  has 
also  been  held  admissible  in  evidence  against  a  lessee  who  claims  by 
a  subsequent  title.18 

[The  truth  seems  to  be  that  several  distinct  principles,  dealing 
with  declarations  about  land,  are  apt  to  be  confused  and  their  respec- 
tive limitations  interchanged  and  misused.  (1)  As  regards  admis- 
sions, the  statements  of  a  prior  person  under  whom  title  is  claimed 
to  be  derived  are  receivable  against  the  successor  so  claiming,,  on 
the  theory  that  there  is  sufficient  identity  of  interest  to  render  the 
statements  of  the  former  equally  receivable  with  the  admissions  of 
the  latter  himself.  Consequently,  it  is  only  statements  made  during 
the  existence  of  that  interest  that  can  be  received ;  and'  the  prede- 
cessor's declarations  before  title  acquired  (or  claimed  to  be  acquired) 
or  after  title  parted  with,  are  not  receivable.  That  the  statements 
are  against  interest,  or  in  the  common  phrase,  "  in  disparagement  of 
title,"  is  not  essential,  for  these  or  for  other  admissions  (ante,  §  169). 
Moreover,  that  the  declarant  was  or  was  not  in  actual  possession  of 
the  land  is  immaterial.  The  usual  limitations  of  admissions  apply, 
that  they  can  be  employed  only  against  the  successor  in  claim. 
(2)  To  be  distinguished  from  this  is  that  kind  of  admission  which  is 
given  the  force  of  a  contractual  estoppel,  i.e.,  the  question  whether 
a  recital  in  a  deed  by  a  predecessor  concludes  the  successor  and  is 
not  to  be  disputed  by  him.  This  involves  the  distinct  principle  of 
substantive  law  as  to  estoppel  by  deed  (ante,  §  23).  (3)  Still  con- 
cerning the  same  kind  of  statement,  but  raising  a  wholly  different 
question,  is  the  use  of  recitals  in  old  deeds  as  hearsay  evidence  of 
the  contents  of  former  lost  deeds.  If  these  are  admissible,  they 
may  be  used  by  any  one,  irrespective  of  whether  they  are  offered 
against  a  successor  in  title;  they  may  even  be  used  by  that  succes- 
sor himself.14  (4)  Under  the  Hearsay  exception  for  declarations 
against  proprietary  interest  (ante,  §  152  c),  statements  in  disparage- 
ment of  title  may  be  received.  The  marked  differences  between  this 
principle  and  that  of  admissions  are  that  it  is  broader,  in  that  the 
statements  may  be  offered  in  evidence  by  or  against  any  one,  and 
that  it  is  narrower,  in  that  the  declarant  must  be  deceased  and  he 
must  have  been  speaking  distinctly  against  his  interest.  (5)  Still 
dealing  with  Hearsay  exceptions,  we  have  two  American  varia- 
tions admitting  declarations  as  to  boundaries  (treated  ante,  §  140  a) ; 
by  one  of  these,  obtaining  generally,  the  declarant  must  not  have 
been  an  interested  party  (as,  an  owner),  and  he  need  not  have  been 

in  possession,  which  would  have  been  good  against  himself,  and  were  made  while  he 
was  in  possession  :  Jackson  v.  Hard,  4  Johns.  230,  234 ;  Norton  v.  Pettibone,  7  Conn. 
319;  Weidtnan  v.  Kohr,  4  Serg.  &  R.  174  ;  j  Adams  v.  Davidson,  10  N.  Y.  App.  309  ; 
Downs  v.  Beldcn,  46  Vt.  674;  Gedney  t>.  Logan,  79  N.  C.  21 4.  { 

«  C'n-ase  v.  Barrett,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  919,  932. 

14  TThe  opinion  of  Story,  J.,  in  Carver  v.  Jackson,  ante,  §  23,  lucidly  explains 
thisj 


§§  189-190.]  PERSONS   MAKING  ADMISSIONS.  319 

in  possession ;  by  the  other,  in  vogue  in  a  few  Atlantic  jurisdictions, 
he  must  have  been  on  the  land  and  he  must  have  been  an  owner. 
(6)  Further,  and  not  with  any  reference  either  to  admissions  or  to 
a  Hearsay  exception,  the  declarations  of  a  person  in  occupation  of 
land  are  receivable  as  coloring  the  act  of  his  occupation  and  giving 
it  or  not  the  character  of  an  adverse  possession.  Such  declarations, 
because  verbal  parts  of  acts,  are  not  obnoxious  to  the  Hearsay  rule 
(ante,  §  108).  But,  obviously  the  strict  limitation  to  the  use  of  such 
evidence  is  that  it  is  available  only  in  an  action  where  the  offerer  of 
the  evidence  is  claiming  title  by  prescription  and  wishes  to  prove 
that  his  predecessor's  occupation  was  adverse.  Moreover,  here  he 
may  use  in  his  own  favor  the  utterances  of  his  own  predecessor; 
while  statements  offered  as  admissions  can  be  offered  only  as  against 
one  claiming  under  the  declarant.  (7)  On  the  same  principle,  a 
deed  or  lease  made  by  a  predecessor  in  possession  is  an  act  which 
helps  to  color  the  possession  as  adverse,  inasmuch  as  the  grantor  is 
seen  to  be  claiming  ownership.  In  this,  and  the  preceding  class  of 
evidence,  moreover,  possession  by  the  declarant  is  absolutely  essen- 
tial. (8)  The  question  may  then  arise  whether  the  mere  act  of 
making  a  deed  or  lease  is  not  some  evidence  of  possession,  since 
persons  out  of  possession  do  not  usually  make  them  (ante,  §  108) ; 
this  is  a  question  of  circumstantial  evidence,  and  is  not  in  principle 
connected  with,  though  often  in  fact  incidental  to,  the  preceding 
sort  of  evidence.  — All  these  principles  are  simple  enough  in  them- 
selves, and  distinct  enough  from  each  other  as  general  principles; 
but  it  is  easy  to  see  how  it  has  happened  that  Courts,  in  applying 
them  to  the  various  superficially  related  sorts  of  declarations  about 
land,  have  not  always  enforced  the  appropriate  limitations  and  have 
in  many  instances  interchanged  and  misapplied  limitations  in  such 
a  way  as  to  make  the  precedents  difficult  to  disentangle.] 

§  100.  Same :  Vendor  or  Assignor  of  Personalty.  The  same 
principle  holds  in  regard  to  admissions  made  by  the  assignor  of  a 
personal  contract  or  chattel,  previous  to  the  assignment,  while  he 
remained  the  sole  proprietor,  and  where  the  assignee  must  recover 
through  the  title  of  the  assignor,  and  succeeds  only  to  that  title  as 
it  stood  at  the  time  of  its  transfer ;  in  such  case,  he  is  bound  1  by 
the  previous  admissions  of  the  assignor,  in  disparagement  of  his  own 
apparent  title.2  But  this  is  true  only  where  there  is  an  identity  of 

1  £Not  "bound,"  unless  a  case  of  estoppel  is  presented  ;  the  assignor's  statements 
are  merely  receivable  as  evidence.] 

2  |  Downs  v.  Belden,  46  Vt.  674  ;  Keystone  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Johnson,  50  Iowa 
142 ;  Benson  v.  Lundy,  52  id.  265  ;  Many  v.  Jagger,  1  Blatchf.  C.  C.  372,  376  ;  Camp- 
bell v.  Coon,  51  Ind.  76 ;  Magee  v,  Raiguel,  64  Pa,  St.  110  ;  Alger  v.  Andrews,  47  Vt. 
238  ;{  FJOgden  v.  Dodge  Co.,  97  Ga.   461  ;    Milling  v.  Hillenbrand,  156  111.   310; 
Muncey  v.  Ins.  Office,  109  Mich.  542  ;  Burl.  N.  B'k  v.  Beard,  55  Kan.  773  ;  Frick  v. 
Reynolds,  Okl.,  52  Pac.  391 ;  Anderson  v.  White,  18  Wash.  658.     Where  the  fraudu- 
lent intent  of  a  conveyance  is  in  issue,  the  grantor  or  mortgagor  being  deemed  to  have 
the  same  interest  as  the  grantee,  his  statements  as  to  his  own  intent  to  defraud  should 


320  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

interest  between  the  assignor  and  assignee;  and  such  identity  is 
deemed  to  exist  not  only  where  the  latter  is  expressly  the  mere 
agent  and  representative  of  the  former,  but  also  where  the  assignee 
has  acquired  a  title  with  actual  notice  of  the  true  state  of  that  of  the 
assignor,  as  qualified  by  the  admissions  in  question,  or  where  he  has 
purchased  a  demand  already  stale,  or  otherwise  infected  with  cir- 
cumstances of  suspicion.8  Thus,  the  declarations  of  a  former  holder 
of  a  promissory  note,  negotiated  before  it  was  overdue,  showing  that 
it  was  given  without  consideration,  though  made  while  he  held  the 
note,  are  not  admissible  against  the  indorsee;  for,  as  was  subse- 
quently observed  by  Parke,  J.,  "the  right  of  a  person,  holding  by  a 
good  title,  is  not  to  be  cut  down  by  the  acknowledgment  of  a  former 
holder  that  he  had  no  title."4  But,  in  an  action  by  the  indorsee  of 
a  bill  or  note  dishonored  before  it  was  negotiated,  the  declarations  of 
the  indorser,  made  while  the  interest  was  in  him,  are  admissible  in 
evidence  for  the  defendant,8  ^but  not  when  made  before  or  after  his 
interest  existed,  except  where  the  transfer  is  conditioned  to  be  void 
on  the  payment  of  a  less  sum  than  the  note's  face.6j 

§  191.  Party  or  Privy  need  not  be  called.  These  admissions  by 
third  persons,  as  they  derive  their  value  and  legal  force  from  the 
relation  of  the  party  making  them  to  the  property  in  question,  and 
are  taken  as  parts  of  the  res  gestce,  may  be  proved  by  any  competent 
witness  who  heard  them,  without  calling  the  party  by  whom  they 
were  made.  The  question  is,  whether  he  made  the  admission,  and 
not  merely  whether  the  fact  is  as  he  admitted  it  to  be.  Its  truth, 

be  admissible,  though  not  as  to  the  grantee's  intent,  but  sometimes  this  distinction  is 
lost  sight  of,  and  the  former's  statements  are  wholly  excluded  ;  for  cases  on  both  sides, 
see  Banning  v.  Marleau,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  692  ;  Claflin  v.  Ballance,  91  Ga.  411,  418  ; 
Thomas  v.  McDonald,  102  la.  564  ;  McDonald  v.  Bowman,  40  Nebr.  269  ;  Grimes  D.  G. 
Co.  v.  Malcolm,  19  U.  S.  App.  229.  It  would  seem  to  follow,  on  the  above  theory,  that 
the  vendor's  admissions,  e.  g.  as  to  receipt  of  full  consideration,  would  not  be  receiv- 
able against  the  assignee  in  bankruptcy:  Bicknell  v.  Mellett,  160  Mass.  328  ;  see  ante, 
§26.1 

1  Harrison    v.  Vallance,  1  Bing.   45 ;    Bayley   on    Bills,  by    Phillips  &   Sewall, 

ex  502,  503,  and  notes  (2d  Am.  ed. )  ;  Gibblehouse  v.  Stong,  3  Rawle  437  ;  Hatch  v. 
ennis,  1  Fairf.  244  ;  Snelgrove  o.  Martin,  2  McCord  241,  243. 

*  Barough  v.  White,  4  B.  &  C.  325,  explained  in  Woolway  v.  Rowe,  1  Ad.  &  El. 
114,  116 ;  Shaw  v.  Broom,  4  D.  &  R.  730  ;  Smith  v.  De  Wruitz,  Ry.  &  M.  212  ;  Beau- 
champ  v.  Parry,  1  B.  &  Ad.  89  ;  Hackett  v.  Martin,  8  Greenl.  77 ;  Parker  v.  Grout, 
11  Mass.  157,  n.  ;  Jones  v.  Witter,  13  id.  304  ;  Dunn  v.  Snell,  15  id.  481  ;  Paige  ». 
Cagwin,  7  Hill  N .  Y.  361.  In  Connecticut,  it  seems  to  have  been  held  otherwise : 
Johnson  v.  Blackman,  11  Conn.  342;  Woodruff  v.  Westcott,  12  id.  134.  So  in  Ver- 
mont :  Sargeant  v.  Sargeant,  18  Vt.  371. 

6  Bayley  on  Bills,  502,  503,  and  notes  (2d  Am.  ed.  by  Phillips  &  Sewnll) ;  Pocock 
v.  Billings,  Ry.  &  M.  127.  See  also  Story  on  Bills,  §  220  ;  Chitty  on  Bills,  650  (8th 
ed. ) ;  Hatch  v.  Dennis,  1  Fairf.  249  ;  Shirley  v.  Todd,  9  Greenl.  83. 

6  {Bond  v.  Fitzpatrick,  4  Gray  89,  92 ;  Sylvester  v.  Crapo,  15  Pick.  92  ;  Fisher  v. 
True,  38  Me.  534  ;  McLanathan  v.  Patten,  39  id.  142 ;  Scammon  v.  Scammon,  33 
N.  H.  52,  58  ;  Griddle  v.  Criddle,  21  Mo.  522  ;  see  Jermain  o.  Denniston,  6  N.  Y.  Ct 
App.  276;  Boot  v.  Sweczey,  8  id.  276  ;  Tousley  v.  Barry,  16  id.  497;  and  compare  Car- 
penter i>.  Hollisfo-r,  13  Vt.  552  ;  Miller  v.  Bingham,  29  id.  82;  Alger  v.  Andrews,  47  id. 
238  (pledge)  ;  Harrison  v.  Vallace,  1  Bing.  45;  Shaw  v.  Broom,  4  Dow.  &  Ry.  730; 
Pocock  v.  Billing,  2  Bing.  269.  | 


§§  190-192.]  PERSONS   MAKING   ADMISSIONS.  321 

where  the  admission  is  not  conclusive  (and  it  seldom  is  so),  may  be 
controverted  by  other  testimony ;  even  by  calling  the  party  himself, 
when  competent;  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  produce  him,  his  declara- 
tions, when  admissible  at  all,  being  admissible  as  original  evidence, 
and  not  as  hearsay.1 

3.    What  Kinds  of  Conduct  or  Utterances  amount  to  an  Admission. 

§  192.  Offers  of  Compromise.  We  are  next  to  consider  the  time 
and  circumstances  of  the  admission.  And  here  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  confidential  overtures  of  pacification,  and  any  other  offers  or 
propositions  between  litigating  parties,  expressly  stated  to  be  made 
without  prejudice,  are  excluded  on  grounds  of  public  policy.1  For, 
without  this  protective  rule,  it  would  often  be  difficult  to  take  any 
step  towards  an  amicable  compromise  or  adjustment.  A  distinction 
is  taken  between  the  admission  of  particular  facts  and  an  offer  of  a 
sum  of  money  to  buy  peace.  For,  as  Lord  Mansfield  observed,  it  must 
be  permitted  to  men  to  buy  their  peace  without  prejudice  to  them, 
if  the  offer  should  not  succeed;  and  such  offers  are  made  to  stop  liti- 
gation, without  regard  to  the  question  whether  anything  is  due  or 
not.  If,  therefore,  the  defendant,  being  sued  for  £100,  should  offer 
the  plaintiff  £20,  this  is  not  admissible  in  evidence,  for  it  is  irrele- 
vant to  the  issue;  it  neither  admits  nor  ascertains  any  debt;  and  is 
no  more  than  saying,  he  would  give  £20  to  be  rid  of  the  action ; 2 
[so  that  the  true  reason  for  excluding  an  offer  of  compromise  seems 
to  be,  not  any  consideration  of  public  policy,  nor  any  respect  accorded 
to  a  confidential  communication,  but  the  impossibility  of  attribut- 
ing to  such  an  offer  the  real  quality  of  an  admission ;  in  other  words, 
"it  is  money  paid  to  buy  peace  and  stop  a  complaint;  "  8  "the  offer 
which  a  man  makes  under  such  circumstances  does  not  represent  his 
judgment  of  what  he  ought  to  receive  at  the  end  of  litigation,  but 

1  Supra,  §§  101,  113.  114,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Clark  v.  Hougham,  2  B.  &  C. 
149  ;  Mountstephen  v.  Brooke,  3  B.  &  Aid.  141  ;  Woolway  v.  Rowe,  1  Ad.  &  El.  114  ; 
Payson  v.  Good,  3  Kerr  272  ;  )  Miller  v.  Wood,  44  Vt.  378  ;|  [Tor  the  theory  of  ad- 
missions, and  the  reason  why  the  party  need  not  be  called  as  required  by  the  Hearsay 
rule,  see  ante,  §  169.] 

i  Cory  v.  Bretton,  4  C.  &  P.  462  ;  Healey  v.  Thatcher,  8  id.  388  ;  Jardine  v. 
Sheridan,  2  C.  &  K.  24  ;  {Jones  v.  Foxall,  15  Beav.  338 ;  Williams  v.  State,  52  Ala. 
411  ;  Barker  v.  Busbnell,  75  111.  220  ;  Payne  v.  42d  St.  R.  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 
8;  Durgiii  v.  Somers,  117  Mass.  56  ;  Draper  v.  Hatfield,  124  id.  53  ;  Gay  r.  Bates, 
99  id.  263  ;  Daniels  v.  Woonsocket,  11  R.  I.  4  ;  Strong  v.  Stewart,  9  Heisk.  137  ;( 
[Feibelman  v.  Assur.  Co.,  108  Ala.  180  ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  115  Ind. 
378,  390 ;  Kassing  v.  Walter,  la.,  65  N.  W.  832  ;  Houdeck  v.  Ins.  Co.,  102  id.  303  ; 
State  v,  Wright,  48  La.  An.  1525  ;  Pelton  v.  Schmidt,  104  Mich.  345  ;  Callen  v.  Rose, 
47  Nebr.  638  ;  Wright  v.  Morse,  id.,  73  N.  W.  21]  ;  Hanover  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Stoddard, 
id.,  73  N.  W.  291  ;  Tennant  v.  Dudley,  144  N.  Y.  504  ;  State  v.  Jefferson,  6  Ired.  307."] 

a  Bull.  N.  P.  236  ;  Gregory  v.  Howard,  3  Esp.  113,  Ld.  Kenvon  ;  Marsh  v.  Gold, 
2  Pick.  290  ;  Gerrish  r.  Sweet'zer,  4  id.  374,  377  ;  Wayman  v.  Billiard,  7  Bing.  101  ; 
dimming  v.  French,  2  Campb.  106,  n.  ;  Glassford  on  Evid.  p.  336  ;  see  Molyneaux 
v.  Collier,  13  Ga.  406. 

8  CL.  C.  Cottenham,  in  Tenuant  v.  Hamilton,  5  Cl.  &  F.  133.J 
VOL.  I. — 21 


322  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

what  he  is  willing  to  take  and  avoid  it." 4]  But,  in  order  to  exclude 
distinct  admissions  of  facts,  it  must  appear  either  that  they  were 
expressly  made  without  prejudice,  or,  at  least,  that  they  were  made 
under  the  faith  of  a  pending  treaty,  and  into  which  the  party  might 
have  been  led  by  the  confidence  of  a  compromise  taking  place.6 
But,  if  the  admission  be  of  a  collateral  or  indifferent  fact,  such  as 
the  handwriting  of  the  party,  capable  of  easy  proof  by  other  means, 
and  not  connected  with  the  merits  of  the  cause,  it  is  receivable, 
though  made  under  a  pending  treaty.6  It  is  the  condition,  tacit  or 
express,  that  no  advantage  shall  be  taken  of  the  admission,  it  being 
made  with  a  view  to,  and  in  furtherance  of,  an  amicable  adjustment, 
that  operates  to  exclude  it.  But,  if  it  is  an  independent  admission 
of  a  fact,  merely  because  it  is  a  fact,  it  will  be  received; 7  and  even 
an  offer  of  a  sum,  by  way  of  compromise  of  a  claim  tacitly  admitted, 
is  receivable,  unless  accompanied  with  a  caution  that  the  offer  is 
confidential.8 

§  193.  Statements  made  under  Constraint.  In  regard  to  admis- 
sions made  under  circumstances  of  constraint,  a  distinction  is  taken 
between  civil  and  criminal  cases ;  and  it  has  been  considered,  that, 
on  the  trial  of  civil  actions,  admissions  are  receivable  in  evidence, 
provided  the  compulsion  under  which  they  are  given  is  legal,  and 
the  party  was  not  imposed  upon  or  under  duress.  Thus,  in  the  trial 
of  Collett  v.  Lord  Keith,  for  taking  the  plaintiff's  ship,  the  testimony 

*  [Start,  J.,  in  Neal  v.  Thornton,  67  Vt.  221. ] 

5  jCampan  v.  Dubois,  39  Mich.  274  ;  White  v.  S.  S.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  662  ;  contra  : 
West  v.  Smith,  101  U.  S.  263  ;  Lofts  v.  Hudson,  2  M.  &  R.  481-484.} 

6  Waklridge  v.  Kennison,  1  Esp.  143,  per  Lord  Kenyon.    The  American  Courts  have 
gone  farther,  and  held,  that  evidence  of  the  admission  of  any  independent  fact  is  re- 
ceivable, though  made  during  a  treaty  of  compromise.     See  Mount  v.  Bogert,  Anthon's 
Rep.  259,  per  Thompson,  C.  J.  ;  Murray  v.  Coster,  4  Cowen  635  ;  Fuller  v.  Hampton, 
6  Conn.  416,  426  ;  Sanborn  v.  Neilson,  4  N.  H.  501,  508,  509  ;  Delogny  v.  Rentoul, 
2  Martin  175;   Marvin  v.  Richmond,  3  Den.  58;  Cole  v.  Cole,  33  Me.  542.     Lord 
Kenyon  afterwards  relaxed  his  own  rule,  saying  that  in  future  he  should  receive  evi- 
dence of  all  admissions,  such  as  the  party  would  be  obliged  to  make  in  answer  to  a  bill 
in  equity  ;  rejecting  none  but  such  as  are  merely  concessions  for  the  sake  of  making 
peace  and  getting  rid  of  a  suit.    Slack  v.  Buchanan,  Peake's  Cas.  5,  6  ;  Tait  on  Evid. 
p.  293.     A  letter  written  by  the  adverse  party,  "without  prejudice,"  is  inadmissible: 
Healey  v.  Tliacher,  8  C.  &  P.  3?8  ;  [Paddock  v.  Forrester,  3  Scott  N.  s.  715,  732  ;  Home 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Wareh.  Co.,  93  U.  S.  527,  548.] 

?  {Central  Branch  U.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Butman,  22  Kan.  639 ;  Louisville,  New  Alb. 
&  Chic.  R.  R.  Co.  u.  Wright,  115  Ind.  390;  Binfonl  v.  Young,  115  Ind.  176;  Doonv. 
Rarey,  49  Vt.  293;  Plummer  v.  Currier,  52  N.  H.  282;  Bartlett  v.  Tarbox,  1  Abb. 
A  pp.  Dec.  120;  Snow  v.  Batchelder,  8  Cush.  513  ;\  [Kutcher  v.  Love,  19  Colo.  542; 
Rose  v.  Rose,  109  Cul.  544.] 

8  Wallace  v.  Small,  1  M.  &  M.  446  ;  Watts  v.  Lnwson,  id.  447,  n. ;  Dickinson  v. 
Dickinson,  9  Met.  471  ;  Thomson  r.  Austen,  2  t)o\vl.  &  Ry.  358  (in  this  case  Bayley,  J., 
remarked  that  the  essence  of  an  otter  to  compromise  was,  that  the  party  making  it  was 
willing  to  submit  to  a  sacrifice,  and  to  make  a  concession) ;  Hartford  Bridge  Co. 
v.  Granger,  4  Conn.  148;  Gerrish  v.  Sweetser,  4  Pic.k.  374,  377;  Murray  v.  Coster, 
4  Cowen  617,  635;  JBrice  v.  Bauer,  108  N.  Y.  433. |  Admissions  made  before  an  arbi- 
trator are  receivable  in  a  subsequent  trial  of  the  cause,  the  reference  having  proved 
ineffectual :  Slack  v.  Buchanan,  reake's  Cas.  1.  See  also  Gregory  v.  Howard,  3  Esp. 
113;  Collier  v.  Nokes,  2  C.  &  K.  1012  (offer  received  simply  as  one  step  in  proof  of 
actual  compromise). 


§§  192-195.]        WHAT   AMOUNTS   TO   AN   ADMISSION.         '  323 

of  the  defendant,  given  as  a  witness  in  an  action  between  other 
parties,  in  which  he  admitted  the  taking  of  the  ship,  was  allowed  to 
be  proved  against  him ;  though  it  appeared  that,  in  giving  his  evi- 
dence, when  he  was  proceeding  to  state  his  reasons  for  taking  the 
ship,  Lord  Kenyon  had  stopped  him  by  saying  it  was  unnecessary 
for  him  to  vindicate  his  conduct.1  The  rule  extends  also  to  answers 
voluntarily  given  to  questions  improperly  asked,  and  to  which  the 
witness  might  successfully  have  objected.  So,  the  voluntary  an- 
swers of  a  bankrupt  before  the  commissioners  are  evidence  in  a 
subsequent  action  against  the  party  himself,  though  he  might  have 
demurred  to  the  questions,  or  the  whole  examination  was  irregular,2 
unless  it  was  obtained  by  imposition  or  duress.8 

§  194.  Statements  made  incidentally  or  in  unrelated  Transactions. 
There  is  no  difference,  in  regard  to  the  admissibility  of  this  sort  of 
evidence,  between  direct  admissions  and  those  which  are  incidental 
or  made  in  some  other  connection  or  involved  in  the  admission  of 
some  other  fact.  Thus,  where,  in  an  action  against  the  acceptor  of 
a  bill,  his  attorney  gave  notice  to  the  plaintiff  to  produce  at  the 
trial  all  papers,  etc.,  which  had  been  received  by^him  relating  to  a 
certain  bill  of  exchange  (describing  it),  which  "  was  accepted  by  the 
said  defendant;"  this  was  held  prima  facie  evidence,  by  admission 
that  he  accepted  the  bill.1  So,  in  an  action  by  the  assignees  of  a 
bankrupt,  against  an  auctioneer,  to  recover  the  proceeds  of  sales  of 
a  bankrupt's  goods,  the  defendant's  advertisement  of  the  sale,  in 
which  he  described  the  goods  as  "the  property  of  D.,  a  bankrupt," 
was  held  a  conclusive  admission  of  the  fact  of  bankruptcy,  and  that 
the  defendant  was  acting  under  his  assignees.2  So,  also,  an  under- 
taking by  an  attorney,  "  to  appear  for  T.  and  R.  joint  owners  of  the 
sloop  '  Arundel, ' "  was  held  sufficient  prima  facie  evidence  of 
ownership.8 

§  195.    Assuming  a  Character.     Other  admissions  are  implied  from 

1  Collett  v.  Lord  Keith,  4  Esp.  212,  per  Le  Blanc,  J.,  who  remarked,  that  the  fnan- 
ner  in  which  the  evidence  had  been  obtained  might  be  matter  of  observation  to  the 
jury  ;  but  that,  if  what  was  said  bore  in  any  way  on  the  issue,  he  was  bound  to  receive 
it  as  evidence  of  the  fact  itself:  jNewhall  v.  Jenkins,  2  Gray  562 ;(  QMcGahan  v. 
Crawford,  47  S.  C.  566,  semble.^  See  also  Mil  ward  v.  Forbes,  4  Esp.  171. 

8  Stockfleth  v.  De  Tastet,  4  Campb.  10  ;  Smith  v.  Beadnell,  1  id.  30.  If  the  com- 
mission has  been  perverted  to  improi>er  purposes,  the  remedy  is  by  an  application  to 
have  the  examination  taken  from  the  fiJes  and  cancelled:  4  Campb.  11,  per  Ld. 
Ellenborough  ;  Milward  v.  Forbes,  4  Esp.  171  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  22. 

•  Robson  v.  Alexander,  1  Moore  &  P.  448;  Tucker  v.  Barrow,  7  B.  &  C.  623  ;  Qor 
this  subject,  see  under  Confessions,  post,  §  224,  and  more  fully  in  Appendix  III.] 

1  Holt  v.  Squire,  Ry.  &  M.  282. 

2  Maltby  v.  Christie,  1  Esp.  342,  as  expounded  by  Lord  Ellenborough,  in  Kankin 
v.  Horner,  16  East  193. 

»  Marshall  v.  Cliff,  4  Campb.  1 33,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough.  QSo,  also,  the  defendant's 
authority  to  L.  being  in  issue,  a  claim  made  by  the  defendant  as  L.'s  principal  against 
a  third  person  is  admissible  :  Beattyville  Coal  Co.  v.  Hoskins,  Ky.,  44  S.  W.  363.  A 
party's  own  account-book  may  be  used  as  admissions  by  him  :  German  N.  B'k  v. 
Leonard,  40  Nebr.  676  (though  not  in  an  action  on  an  account  stated  :  Sterling  L.  Co. 
v.  Stinson,  41  id.  368).j  {Compare  Lloyd  ».  Lynch,  28  Pa,  419;  Baker  v.  Mfg.  Co., 
122  id.  363 ;  Foster  v.  Beals,  21  N.  Y.  Ct.  App.  247.} 


324  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

assumed  character,  language,  and  conduct,  which,  though  hereto- 
fore adverted  to,1  may  deserve  further  consideration  in  this  place. 
Where  the  existence  of  any  domestic,  social,  or  official  relation  is  in 
issue,  it  is  quite  clear  that  any  recognition,  in  fact,  of  that  relation, 
is  prima  facie  evidence  against  the  person  making  such  recognition, 
that  the  relation  exists.2  This  general  rule  is  more  frequently  ap- 
plied against  a  person  who  has  thus  recognized  the  character  or  office 
of  another;  but  it  is  conceived  to  embrace,  in  its  principle,  any 
representations  or  language  in  regard  to  himself.  Thus,  where  one 
has  assumed  to  act  in  an  official  character,  this  is  an  admission  of 
his  appointment  or  title  to  the  office,  so  far  as  to  render  him  liable, 
even  criminally,  for  misconduct  or  neglect  in  such  'office.8  So, 
where  one  has  recognized  the  official  character  of  another  by  treat- 
ing with  him  in  such  character,  or  otherwise,  this  is  at  least  prima 
facie  evidence  of  his  title,  against  the  party  thus  recognizing  it.4 
So,  the  allegations  in  the  declaration  or  pleadings  in  a  suit  at  law 
have  been  held  receivable  in  evidence  against  the  party,  in  a  subse- 
quent suit  between  him  and  a  stranger,  as  his  solemn  admission  of 
the  truth  of  the  facts  recited,  or  of  his  understanding  of  the  meaning 
of  an  instrument;  though  the  judgment  could  not  be  made  available 
as  an  estoppel,  unless  between  the  same  parties,  or  others  in  privity 
with  them.6 

1  Supra,  §  27. 

2  Dickinson  v.  Coward,  1  B.  &  Aid.  677,  679,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough ;  Radford  q.  t. 
v.  Mclntosh,  3  T.  R.  632. 

8  Bevan  v.  Williams,  3  T.  R.  635,  per  Ld.  Mansfield,  in  an  action  against  a  clergy- 
man, for  non-residence ;  R.  v.  Gardner,  2  Campb.  513,  against  a  military  officer,  for 
returning  false  musters;  R.  v.  Kerne,  2  St.  Tr.  957,  960  ;  R.  v.  Brommick,  id.  961, 
962  ;  R.  v.  Atkins,  id.  964,  which  were  indictments  for  high  treason,  being  popish 
priests,  and  remaining  forty  days  within  the  kingdom  ;  R.  v.  Borrett,  6  C.  &  P.  124} 
an  indictment  against  a  letter-carrier,  for  embezzlement ;  Trowbridge  v.  Baker,  1  Cowen 
251,  against  a  toll-gatherer,  for  penalties ;  Lister  v.  Priestly,  Wightw.  67,  against  a 
collector,  for  penalties.  See  also  Cross  v.  Kaye,  6  T.  R.  663;  Lipscombe  v.  Holmes, 

2  Campb.  441  ;  Radford  v.  Mclntosh,  3  T.  R  632. 

4  Peacock  v.  Harris,  10  East  104,  by  a  renter  of  turnpike  tolls,  for  arrearages  of 
tolls' due;  Radford  v.  Mclntosh,  3  T.  R.  632,  by  a  farmer-general  of  the  post-horse 
duties,  against  a  letter  of  horses,  for  certain  statute  penalties ;  Prit chard  v.  Walker, 

3  C.  &  P.  212,  by  the  clerk  of  the  trustees  of  a  turnpike  road,  against  one  of  the  trus- 
tees ;  Dickinson  v.  Coward,  1  B.  &  A.  677,  by  the  assignee  of  a  bankrupt,  against  a 
debtor,  who  had  made  the  assignee  a  partial  payment.     In  Berryman  v.  Wise,  4  T.  R. 
366,  which  was  an  action  by  an  attorney  for  slander,  in  charging  him  with  swindling, 
and  threatening  to  have  him  struck  off  the  roll  of  attorneys,  the  Court  held  that  this 
threat  imported  an  admission  that  the  plaintiff  was  an  attorney:  Cummin  v.  Smith, 
2  Serg.  &R.  440.     But  see  Smith  v.  Taylor,  1  New  R,  196,  in  which  the  learned  judges 
were  equally  divided  upon  a  point  somewhat  similar,  in  the  case  of  a  physician  ;  but,  in 
the  former  case,  the  rou  of  attorneys  was  expressly  mentioned,  while  in  the  latter,  the 
plaintiff  was  merely  spoken  of  as  "  Doctor  S.,"  and  the  defendant  had  been  employed 
as  his  apothecary.     If,  however,  the  slander  relates  to  the  want  of  qualification,  it  was 
held  by  Mansfield,  C.  J.,  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  it ;  hut  not  where  it  was  con- 
fined to  mere  misconduct  :  1  New  R.  207.   See  to  this  point,  Moises  v.  Thornton,  8  T.  R. 
303  ;  Collins  v.  Carnegie,  1  Ad.  &  El.  695,  703,  per  Ld.  Denman,  C.  J.     See  further, 
Divoll  v.  Leadbetter,  4   Pick.  220 ;  Crofton  v.  Poole,  1  B.  &  Ad.  568 ;  R.  v.  Barnes, 
1  Stark.  243;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  369,  370,  371  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  851,  352. 

6  Tiley  v.  Cowling,  1  Ld.  Raym.  744  ;  8.  c.  Bull.  N.  P.  243  ;  see  Robison  v.  Swett, 
8  Greenl.  316  ;  Wells  v.  Compton,  3  Rob.  La.  171 ;  Parsons  v.  Copeland,  33  Me.  370; 


§§  195-195  a.]         CONDUCT  AS  AN  ADMISSION.  325 

§  195  a.  Conduct ;  (l)  Falsehood  and  Fraud  ;  Manufacturing  and 
Destroying  Evidence.  [In  general,  a  party's  conduct,  so  far  as  it 
indicates  his  own  belief  in  the  weakness  of  his  cause,  may  be  used 
against  him  as  an  admission;  subject,  of  course,  to  any  explana- 
tions he  may  be  able  to  make  removing  that  significance  from  his 
conduct.  In  particular,  "  falsehood  is  a  badge  of  fraud,  and  a  case 
which  is  sought  to  be  supported  by  meaiie  of  deception  may  prim.a 
facie,  until  the  contrary  be  shown,  be  taken  to  be  a  bad  and  dis- 
honest case ; " 1  and  this  applies  equally  to  civil  and  to  criminal 
cases.2  So  also  the  attempt  to  manufacture  evidence,  as  by  the  subor- 
nation of  witnesses,  "  is  in  the  nature  of  and  implies  an  admission 
that  he  has  no  right  to  recover  if  the  case  was  tried  on  the  evidence 
as  it  exists."8  So  also  the  attempt  to  suppress  evidence,  by  intimi- 
dating or  removing  witnesses,  is  admissible  as  having  "a  tendency  to 
show  consciousness  in  him  of  title  in  the  opponent."4  Concealing 
or  destroying  evidential  material  is  likewise  admissible;6  in  partic- 
ular, the  destruction  (spoliation)  of  documents,  as  evidence  of  an 
admission  that  their  contents  are  as  alleged  by  the  opponent.6  That 
the  fraudulent  conduct  was  in  connection  with  other  litigation  does 
not  necessarily  exclude  it;7  and  that  it  was  that  of  a  third  person 
does  not  exclude  it  if  the  party  can  be  shown  to  have  authorized  or 
connived  at  it;  although  the  doctrines  of  implied  agency  are  some- 
times here  invoked,  and  no  test  is  uniformly  accepted.8  The  party 

\  Williams  w.  Cheney,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  215;  Judd  v.  Gibbs,  id.  539;  see  Church  ». 
Shelton,  2  Curt.  C.  0.  271;  State  v.  Littlefield,  3  R.  I.  124  ;f  [the  subject  is  treated 
more  fully  ante,  §  186.  For  judicial  admissions  as  conclusive,  see  post,  §  205.] 

1  [Charge  of  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  iu  R.  r.  Castro  (Tichborne  Trial),  I,  813-3 

2  [Jones  „.  state,  59  Ark.  417;  Walker  v.  State,  49  Ala.  398;  Levison  v.  State, 
54  id.  519,  527;  State  v.  Seinhart,   Cal.,  38   Pac.  825;    Hinsbaw  v.  State,  147  Ind. 
334  ;  State  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  145 ;  People  v.  Arnold,  43  Mich.  303 ;  Coleman  v.  People, 
58  N.  Y.  556;  U.  S.  v.  Randall,  Deady  524,  542  ;  Wilson  v.  U.  S.,  162  U.  S.  613  ; 
Dickerson  v.  State,  48  Wis.  288,293.] 

8  [('hie.  C.  R.  Co.  ».  McMahon,  1 03  111.  485  ;  see  good  statements  in  Moriarty  v. 
R.  Co.,  L.  R  5  Q.  B.  319  ;  Egan  v.  Bowker,  5  All.  452;  other  instances  in  Hastings 
v.  Stetson,  130  Mass.  76  ;  Lynch  v.  Coffin,  131  id.  311;  Com.  v.  Wallace,  123  id.  400; 
People  v.  Mason,  29  Mich.  31,  39  ;  State  v.  Brown,  76  N.  C.  222  ;  Allen  t;.  U.  S.,  164 
U.  S.  492.] 

*  [Mounteney,  B.,  in  Annesley  v.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1217,  the  most  cele- 
brated and  interesting  case  of  its  sort  in  our  annals  ;  see  also  good  statements  in  Com. 
v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  295,  316  ;  Green  v.  Woodbury,  48  Vt.  6  ;  other  instances  in  Liles 
v.  State,  30  Ala.  24  ;  Levison  r.  State,  54  id.  519,  528  ;  People  v.  Chin  Hane,  108  Cal. 
597;  State  v.  Hogan,  67  Conn.  581 ;  State  v.  Hudson,  50  la.  157  ;  State  v.  Barren,  37 
Vt.  57 ;  Snell  v.  Bray,  56  Wis.  156.] 

6  [State  o.  Bruce,  74  Me.  72;  Com.  v.  Hall,  4  All.  306;  Com.  r.  Wallace,  123 
Mass.  400 ;  Com.  v.  Daily,  133  id.  577;  Com.  v.  Sullivan,  156  id.  487;  Com.  v.  Welch, 
163  id.  372  ;  State  v.  Dickson,  78  Mo.  438,  448.] 

6  [Barker  v.  Ray,  2  Russ.  63,  73  ;  Jessel,  M.  R.,  in  Lacey  v.  Hill,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  D.  543; 
Downing  v.  Plate,  90  111.  268,  272  ;  Lambie's  Estate,  97  Mich.  49,  55;  Botts  v.  Wood, 
56  Miss.  136  ;  Little  v.  Marsh,  2  Ired.  Eq.  18,  27;  Lucas  v.  Brooks,  23  La.  An.  117; 
State  v.  Chamberlain,  89  Mo.   129 ;  McReynolds  v.  McCord,  6  Watts  288.     For  the 
presumptive  effect  of  spoliation,  see  ante,  §  37.] 

7  [£.  g.  Ga.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Lybrend,  99  Ga.  421;  Com.  v.  Sacket,  22  Pick.  394; 
State  v.  Staples,  47  N.  H.  113.] 

8  [See  Evans,  Notes  to  Pothier,  II,  225  ;  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  302  ;  Martin 


326  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.    XVIL 

may,  of  course,  explain  away  the  apparent  significance  of  his 
conduct.9] 

§  195  b.  Same  ;  (2)  Failure  to  produce  Evidence.  ["  If  the  opposite 
party  has  it  in  his  power  to  rebut  it  by  evidence,  and  yet  offers  none, 
then  we  have  something  like  an  admission  that  the  presumption  is 
just." 1  There  are  several  ways  in  which  this  failure  to  produce  evi- 
dence may  be  suggested  as  amounting  to  an  admission  that  no  evi- 
dence of  the  supposed  sort  can  be  had.  (1)  In  the  first  place,  the 
failure  to  produce  a  particular  witness  may  under  certain  circum- 
stances allow  the  inference  that  his  testimony  would  be  unfavorable. 
The  witness  must  be  one  whose  testimony  would  presumably  be  valu- 
able or  superior  to  those  already  called;2  he  must  not  be  one  who 
would  clearly  be  prejudiced ; 8  he  must  be  within  the  knowledge  and 
power  of  the  party  to  produce ;  *  he  must  not  be  one  equally  available 
for  production  by  the  opposite  party  (for  since  the  opponent  wishes 
to  argue  that  the  testimony  would  be  unfavorable  if  produced,  it  is 
then  a  simple  matter  to  put  the  witness  on  the  stand;  otherwise,  the 
argument  tells  just  as  much  against  the  opponent),5  and  a  witness  in 
court  is  of  course  equally  so  available;6  and  the  party  must  have 
knowledge  that  the  witness  would  be  needed.7  Subject  to  these  limi- 
tations, the  doctrine  is  universally  conceded  that  the  failure  to  call 
such  a  witness  may  be  an  admission  that  his  testimony  would  be 
unfavorable.8  This  doctrine  has  been  applied  to  the  failure  to  call 

v.  State,  28  Ala.  71 ;  Winchell  v.  Edwards,  57  111.  41,  48 ;  Chic.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
McMahon,  103  id.  485  ;  Cora.  v.  Locke,  145  Mass.  401  ;  Com.  v.  McHugh,  147  id. 
401  ;  Com.  v.  Downey,  148  id.  14 ;  Com.  v.  Gillon,  ib.  15 ;  Matthews  v.  Lumber  Co., 
Mich.,  67  N.  W.  1008  ;  Green  v.  Wood  bury,  48  Vt.  5.  As  to  fraudulent  action  by  a 
prosecuting  officer,  see  Com.  v.  Ryan,  134  Mass.  223.] 

9  QLynch  v.  Coffin,  131  Mass.  311  ;  Homer  v.  Everett,  91  N.  Y.  641,  646;  see 
Com.  »».  Goodwin,  14  Gray  55.] 

1  QBest,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Burdett,  4  B.  &  Ad.  122.     The  leading  historical  utterances 
are  found  in  Armory  v.  Delamirie,   1  Stra.  505  (chimney-sweeper's  jewel)  ;   Roe  v. 
Harvey,  4  Burr.  2484,  2489.] 

2  [Stone,  C.  J.,  in  Carter  v.  Chambers,  79  Ala.  223,  241 ;  Haynes  v.  McRae,  101  id. 
318  ;  People  v.  Dole,  Gal.,  51  Pae.  945.] 

8  QState  v.  Cousins,  58  la.  250  ;   Com.  v.  McCabe,  163  Mass.  98  ;  Robinson  v. 

Woodford,  37  W.  Va.  377,  391.] 

*  [People  v.  Sharp,  107  N.  Y.  427,  463  ;  State  v.  Fitzgerald,  68  Vt.  125.] 

6  LNelms  v.  Steiner,  113  Ala.  562  ;   Scovill  v.  Baldwin,  27  Conn.  316  ;  State  v. 

Rosier,  55  la.  517  ;  State  v.  Cousins,  58  id.  250.     This  was  disregarded  in  Fonda  v. 

R.  Co.,  Minn.,  74  N.  W.  166.] 

6  ["Crawford  v.  State,  112  Ala.  1,  23  ;  Bates  ».  Morris.  101  id.  282  ;  Arbuckle  v. 
Templeton,  65  Vt.  205,  211  ;  disregarded  in  West.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Morrison,  Ga.,  29 
S.  E.  104.] 

7  TGraves  v.  U.  S.,  150  IT.  S.  118.1 

8  [^Canning's  Trial,   19  How.  St.  Tr.  312  ;  Bond's  Trial,  27  id.  605  ;  R.  v.  Labou- 
chere,  14  Cox  Cr.  419,  432 ;  Vanghton  v.  R.  Co.,  12  id.  580,  588  ;  Tracy  Peerage  Case, 
10  Cl.  k  F.  154,  180,  189  ;  Throckmorton  v.  Chapman,  65  Conn.  441,"  454  ;  Leslie  v. 
State,  85  Fla.   171  ;    Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  Ind.  334  ;  Union  Bank  r.  Stone,  50  Me. 
595  (leading  opinion    by  Appleton,  J.) ;  Com.  v.  Clark,   14  Gray  367  ;  Whitney  v. 
Bailey,  4  All.  173,  175  ;   jLothrop  v.  Adams,  133  id.  477  ;  Lym-h  v.  Peabody,  137  id. 
93;  Com.  v.  Haskell,  140  id.  128  ;|   Com.  v.  McCabe,  163  id.  102  ;  Wallace  v.  Harris, 
32  Mich.  380,  394  ;   People  v.  Gordon,  40  id.  716  ;  Ruppe  v.  Steinbach,  48  id.  465  ; 
State  v.  Degonia,  69  Mo.  485 ;   People  v.  Doyle,  21  N.  Y.  578  ;  Fowler  v.  Sergeant, 


§§  195  a-195  £.]      CONDUCT  AS  AN  ADMISSION.  327 

a  consulted  expert,9  to  the  failure  to  use10  and  even  the  failure  to 
try  and  take  u  a  deposition ;  but  it  can  hardly  be  applied  to  a  failure 
to  call  a  privileged  witness.13  (2)  The  party's  own  failure  to  testify 
may  equally  be  given  this  significance.  It  is  proper  to  do  so  in  a 
civil  case,  the  party  not  being  privileged; 18  and  this  applies  equally 
to  the  party's  refusal  to  submit  to  a  medical  examination.14  In  a 
criminal  prosecution,  however,  the  accused  is  privileged,  and,  as  a 
part  of  that  privilege,  no  inference  is  to  be  drawn  from  his  availing 
himself  of  it.16  But  from  this  must  be  distinguished  his  failure  by 
other  evidence  to  rebut  the  evidence  on  a  given  point  where  it  is 
apparently  in  his  power  to  produce  such  evidence  without  waiving 
his  privilege;  this  of  course  tells  against  him.16  This,  again,  both 
in  civil  and  in  criminal  cases,  must  be  distinguished  from  that  inac- 
tion which  consists  in  merely  requiring  the  opponent  to  sustain  his 
burden  of  proof;  this  should  raise  no  such  inference.17  Further- 
more, the  accused's  good  character  is  presumed;  hence  his  failure  to 
offer  evidence  of  it  raises  no  inference  that  it  is  bad.18  Again,  an 
unsuccessful  attempt  to  prove  an  alibi  is  in  itself  no  ground  of 
inference  as  to  the  alibi's  falseness;  it  is  the  fabrication  of  alibi- 
evidence  that  alone  has  such  significance.19  (3)  Finally,  the  infer- 
ence suggested  by  the  conduct  of  the  party  may  always  be  explained 
away  by  him,  if  possible,  — as  by  showing  that  the  witness  is  ill  or 
has  fled  the  country,  or  the  like.20] 

1  Pa.  355  ;  Rice  v.  Com.,  102  id.  408  ;  Steamship  Ville  du  Havre,  7  Ben.  328  ;  U.  S. 
v.  Schindler,  18  Blatch.  227  ;  The  Fred  M.  Laurence,  15  Fed.  635 ;  Kirby  v.  Tallmadge, 
160  U.  S.  379 ;  The  Joseph  B.  Thomas,  81  Fed.  578.3 
»  TMcKim  v.  Foley,  Mass.,  49  N.  E.  625-3 
1°  TLearned  v.  Hall,  133  id.  417-3 

11  LL-eslie  v.  State,  35  Fla.  171 ;   but  not  to  a  failure  to  test  a  machine's  alleged 
defects  :  U.  S.  Sugar  R.  v.  Allis  Co.,  9  U.  S.  App.  550-3 

12  [See  Wentworth  v.   Lloyd,   10  H.  L.  C.  589  ;  People  v.  Hovey,  92  N.  Y.  554  ; 
State  v.  Hatcher,  Or.,  44  Pac.  584;  Knowles  v.  People,  15  Mich.  408-3 

18  [Taylor  «.  Willans,  2  B.  &  Ad.  856  ;  Tufts  v.  Hatheway,  4  Allen  N.  B.  62  ; 
Throckmorton  v.  Chapman,  65  Conn.  441;  McDonough  r.  O'Neil,  113  Mass.  92; 
Brown  v.  Schock,  77  Pa.  471,  478 ;  Kirby  v.  Tallmadge,  160  U.  S.  379 ;  Hefflebower  v. 
Dietrick,  7  W.  Va.  16,  23-3 

14  fJDurgin  v.  Danville,  47  Vt.  95,  105  ;  and  cases  cited  post,  §  469  m,  where  the 
question  of  a  civil  party's  privilege  thus  to  refuse  is  treated-3 

16  PSee  the  authorities  post,  §  469  e,  where  this  privilege  is  discussed. 3 

16  L"Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Gush.  295,  316;   State  p.  Hinkle,  6  la.  385  ;3   jCom.  v. 
Brownell,  145  Mass.  319.  (     [Contra:  People  v.  Streuber,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  918-3 

17  rstate  v.  Carr,  25  La.  An.  407  ;  Brill  v.  Car  Co.,  80  Fed.  909-3 

18  LFletcher  v.  State,  49  Ind.  134  ;  State  v.  Northrup,  48  la.  584  ;  State  v.  Upham, 
38  Me.  261  (overruling  a  prior  case ;  but  see  State  v.  Tozier,  49  id.  404) ;  Olive  v. 
State,  11  Nebr.  1,  29 ;  People  v.  White,  24  Wend.  524,  546,  554,  560,  573,  584  (over- 
ruling  People  v.  Vane,  12  id.  82)  ;  People  v.  Bodine,  1  Dnn.  281,  314  ;  State  v.  O'Neal, 
7  Ired.  251  ;  State  v.  Sanders,  84  N.  C.  729;  Com.  v.  Weber,  167  Pa.  153;  State  v. 
Ford,  3  Strobh.  522,  semble.J 

19  fJToler  v.  State,  16  Oh.  St.  585  (leading  opinion)  ;  Porter  v.  State,  55  Ala.  107  ; 
Kilgore  v.  State,  74  id.  8 ;  People  v.  Malaspina,  57  Cal.  628  ;  White  v.  State,  31  Ind. 
262  ;  Turner  v.  Com.,  86  Pa.  54,  72.     But  distinguish  this  from  failing  to  account  for 
his  whereabouts,  and  from  producing  alibi-evidence  as  an  afterthought ;  e.  g.  Gordon  v. 
People,  33  N.  Y.  501  ;  Dean's  Case,  32  Gratt.  912.  925-3 

*>  [Com.  v.  Costello,  119  Mass.  214  ;  Learned  v.  Hall,  123  id.  417  ;  Com.  v. 


328  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

§  195  c.  Same :  (3)  Failure  to  produce  Documents.  [A  common 
application  of  the  foregoing  principle  is  to  a  party's  failure  to  pro- 
duce a  document  asked  for  by  the  opponent.  The  inference  from 
such  a  failure  is  to  an  admission  by  the  party  that  its  contents  are 
in  fact  as  alleged  by  the  opponent.1  In  a  few  jurisdictions  it  has 
been  said  that  the  inference  cannot  arise  from  the  mere  non-produc- 
tion on  demand,  but  that  it  may  be  used  to  help  out  such  slight 
evidence  as  the  opponent  may  offer.2] 

§  195  d.  Same  :  (4)  Repairs  and  Precautions  after  an  Injury.  [It 
has  often  been  urged  by  counsel  that,  after  an  injury  has  occurred,  the 
making  of  repairs  or  the  taking  of  other  precautions  or  the  discharge 
of  the  employee  concerned  is  to  be  taken  as  an  admission  by  the 
party  so  doing  that  there  was  negligence  or  other  culpable  conduct. 
The  answers  to  this  suggestion  are  two:  first,  that  such  conduct  is 
equally  open  to  the  interpretation  that  the  party,  though  he  does 
not  believe  the  place  or  thing  culpably  defective  or  dangerous,  still 
wishes,  in  the  light  of  what  has  occurred,  to  make  it  safe  even 
beyond  what  the  law  requires  of  him,  or,  put  in  another  way,  in  the 
notable  epigram  of  Baron  Bramwell,  "it  would  be  to  hold  that 
because  the  world  gets  wiser  as  it  gets  older,  therefore  it  was  foolish 
before ; "  secondly,  to  admit  such  evidence  would  be  to  discourage 
all  endeavor  to  improve  existing  conditions,  or,  in  the  words  of  Mr. 
J.  Elliott,  to  put  a  penalty  upon  conscientious  persons.1  The  use 
of  such  evidence  is  now  generally  repudiated,  and  a  few  earlier 
cases  favoring  it  have  been  in  some  jurisdictions  overruled.2  For 

163  id.  98;  Rumrill  v.  Ash,  169  id.  341  ;  Hall  v.  Austin,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  1121; 
Pease  v.  Smith,  61  N.  Y.  477,  482 ;  Hoard  v.  State,  15  Lea  321  ;  W.  M.  W.  &  N.  R. 
Co.  v.  Duncan,  88  Tex.  611  ;  Durgin  v.  Danville,  47  Vt.  95,  105.] 

1  fJRoe  v.  Harvey,  4  Burr.  2484,  2489  ;  E.  v.  Smith,  3  id.  1475  ;  James  v.  Biou, 
2  Sim.  &  St.  600,  606 ;  Curlewis  v.  Corfield,  1  Q.  B.  814;  Sutton  v.  Davenport,  27  L.  J. 
C.  P.  54;  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Dean.  24  Beav.  679,  706 ;  Leese  v.  Clark,  29  Cal.  664  ;  Cres- 
cent C.  I.  Co.  v.  Erraann,  36  La.  An.  841 ;  Emerson  v.  Fisk,  6  Greenl.  200 ;  Tobin  v. 
Shaw,  45  Me.  331,  349;  Davie  v.  Jones,  68  id.  393  ;  Thayer  v.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Pick.  326; 
j  Eldridge  v.  Hawley,  116  Mass.  410  ;}  Page  v.  Stevens,  23  Mich.  357  ;  State  v.  Simons, 
17  N.  H.  83;  Cross  v.  Bell,  34  id.  82;  Jackson  v.  M'Vey,  18  Johns.  331  ;  Life  &  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Wend.  31  ;  Connell  v.  McLaughlin,  28  Or.  230  ;  Schreyer  v. 
Mills  Co.,  id.,  43  Pac.  719;  Wishart  v.  Downey,  15  S.  &  R.  77 ;  Frick  v.  Barbour, 
64  Pa.  120  ;  Hanson  v.  Eustace,  2  How.  653  ;  Clifton  v.  U.  S.,  4  id.  242;  U.  S.  ». 
Flemming,  18  Fed.  907,  916;  Ruukle  v.  Burnham,  153  U.  S.  216,  225;  Mclntyre  v. 
Min.  Co.,  Utah,  53  Pac.  1124. 

For  the  effect  of  non-production  as  creating  a  presumption,  see  ante,  §  37.] 
TSee  cases  supra  in  7  Wend.,  34  N.  H.,  2  How.] 

1  LSee  excellent  explanations  by  Bramwell,  B.,  in  Hart  v.  R.  Co.,  Coleridge,  C.  J., 
in  Beeverw.  Hanson  ;  Mitchell,  J.,  in  Morse  v.  R.  Co.  ;  Loomis.  J.,  in  Nailey  r.  Carpet 
Co. ;  Coleman,  J.,  in  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Malone ;  Elliott,  J.,  in  Terre  H.  &  I.  R. 
Co.  v.  Clem.] 

pThe  overruled  cases  in  Indiana,  Minnesota,  and  New  Hampshire  are  not  given 
in  this  list:  Excluded;  Hart  v.  R.  Co.,  21  L.  T.  R.  N.  s.  261  ;  Beever  v.  Hanson, 
cited  in  73  N.  V.  473,  note,  as  from  25  L.  J.,  but  not  there  to  be  found  ;  Louisv.  & 
N.  R.  Co.  v.  Malone,  109  Ala.  509  ;  Sapponfield  v.  R.  Co.,  91  Cal.  48,  61  ;  Turner  r. 
II.  arst.  115  id.  894  ;  Anson  v.  Evans,  19  Colo.  274  (but  see  Kans.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
2  id.  442,  468);  Nailey  v.  Carpet  Co.,  51  Conn.  524  ;  Warren  v.  Wright,  103  111.  298  ; 
Hodges  v.  Percival,  132  id.  63;  Bloomington  t>.  Legg,  151  id.  9, 15  ;  Lafayette  v.  Weaver, 


§§  195  C-196.]  CONDUCT  AS   AN   ADMISSION.  329 

the  same  reason,  the  fact  that  the  party  is  insured  against  accidents 
is  not  receivable  for  this  purpose.8  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that 
acts  of  repair  or  any  other  acts  of  dominion  over  the  place  or  thing 
are  receivable  as  an  admission  that  the  person  has  or  claims  control 
over  it.4] 

§  19G.  Same  :  (5)  Sundry  Kinds  of  Conduct.  Admissions  implied 
from  the  conduct  of  the  party  are  governed  by  the  same  principles. 
Thus  the  suppression  of  documents  is  an  admission  that  their  con- 
tents are  deemed  unfavorable  to  the  party  suppressing  them.1  The 
entry  of  a  charge  to  a  particular  person,  in  a  tradesman's  book,  or 
the  making  out  of  a  bill  of  parcels  in  his  name,  is  an  admission  that 
they  were  furnished  on  his  credit.2  The  omission  of  a  claim  by  an 
insolvent,  in  a  schedule  of  the  debts  due  to  him,  is  an  admission 
that  it  is  not  due.8  Payment  of  money  is  an  admission  against  the 
payer  that  the  receiver  is  the  proper  person  to  receive  it,  but  not 
against  the  receiver  that  the  payer  was  the  person  who  was  bound  to 
pay  it;  for  the  party  receiving  payment  of  a  just  demand  may  well 
assume,  without  inquiry,  that  the  person  tendering  the  money  was 
the  person  legally  bound  to  pay  it.4  Acting  as  a  bankrupt,  under  a 
commission  of  bankruptcy,  is  an  admission  that  it  was  duly  issued.6 
Asking  time  for  the  payment  of  a  note  or  bill  is  an  admission  of  the 

92  Ind.  477  ;  Terre  H.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Clem,  123  id.  15  ;  Sievers  v.  P.  B.  &  L.  Co.,  id., 
50  N.  E.  877 ;  Taylor  v.  R.  Co.,  Ky.,  41  S.  W.  551 ;  Wash.  C.  &  A.  T.  Co.  v.  Case, 
80  Md.  36  ;  Menard  v.  R.  Co.,  150  Mass.  386  ;  Shiimers  v.  Locks,  154  id.  168 ;  Downey 
v.  Sawyer,  157  id.  418 ;  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  161  id.  51  ;  Chalmers  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  164  id. 
532  ;  Dacey  v.  R.  Co.,  168  id.  479  ;  Fulton  Works  v.  Kimball,  52  Mich.  146;  Lombar 
v.  East  Tawas,  86  id.  14  ;  Noble  v.  R.  Co.,  98  id.  249  ;  Morse  v.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn. 
465  ;  Day  v.  Lumber  Co.,  54  id.  523 ;  Hammargren  v.  St.  Paul,  67  id.  6  ;  Ely  v.  R.  Co., 
77  Mo.  34  ;  Aldrich  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  H.,  29  Atl.  408 ;  Reed  v.  R,  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  575 ; 
Dougan  v.  Champlain  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  1,  8  ;  Baird  v.  Daly,  68  id.  547  ;  Dale  v.  R,  Co., 
73  id.  468  ;  Sewell  v.  Cohoes,  75  id.  45,  54 ;  Corcoran  v.  Peekskill,  108  id.  151 ;  Gulf 
C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  McGowan,  73  Tex.  355 ;  Miss  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Hennessey,  75  id.  155  ; 
Columbia  R.  Co.  v.  Hawthorne,  144  U.  S.  202  (in  effect  discrediting  Osborne  v.  Detroit, 
36  Fed.  36)  ;  Richardson  v.  W.  &  R.  T.  Co.,  6  Vt.  496,  504  ;  Christensen  v.  U.  T.  Line, 
6  Wash.  75,  83  ;  Bell  v.  W.  C.  S.  Co.,  8  id.  27  ;  Green  v.  Water  Co.,  Wis.,  77  N.  W.  722. 

Admitted:  Hemmi  v.  R.  Co.,  102  la.  25  (compare  Cramer  v.  Burlington,  45  id.  627 ; 
Hudson  v.  R.  Co.,  59  id.  581  ;  Coates  ?>.  R.  Co.,  62  id.  491) ;  St.  J.  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Chase,  11  Kan.  47,  56  ;  Atch.  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Retford,  18  id.  245  ;  Einporia  v. 
Schmidling,  33  id.  485  (for  limited  purpose)  ;  St.  L.  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver,  35  id. 
412,  432  :  Pa.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  51  Pa.  315  ;  W.  f.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwee,  67  id. 
311 ;  McKee  v.  Bidwell,  74  id.  218  :  Lederman  c.  R.  Co.,  165  id.  118  (for  limited  pur- 
pose) ;  Jenkins  v.  Irrig.  Co.,  13  Utah  100. 

Undecided:  Farley  v.  C.  B.  &  V.  Co.,  51  S.  C.  222.] 

8  [Anderson  v.  Duckworth,  162  Mass.  251  ;  Sawyer  v.  Shoe  Co.,  Vt.,  38  Atl.  311. 
For  the  use  of  tins  fact  as  showing  bias,  etc.,  see  post,  §  450.] 

*  [Lafayette  v.  Weaver,  92  Ind.  477  ;  Manderschid  v.  Dubuque,  29  la.  73  ;  Readman 
v.  Conway,  126  Mass.  374;  Sewell  v.  Oohoes,  75  N.  Y.  45,  54.] 

1  James  v.  Biou,  2  Sim.  &  Stu.  600,  606  ;  Owen  v.  Flack,  id.  606.  [This  subject  has 
just  been  fully  treated  in  §§  195  a  and  195  c.] 

a  Storr  v.  Scott.  6  C.  &  P.  241  ;  Thomson  r.  Davenport,  9  B.  &  C.  78,  86,  90,  91 ; 
[see  note  to  §194.] 

8  Nicholls  r.  Downes,  1  M.  &  Rob.  13  ;  Hart  v.  Newman,  3  Campb.  13.  See  also 
Tilghman  u.  Fisher,  9  Watts  441. 

4  James  v.  Biou,  2  Sim.  &  Stu.  600,  606  ;  Chapman  v.  Beard,  3  Anstr.  942. 

6  Like  v.  Howe,  6  Esp.  20 ;  Clarke  v.  Clarke,  ib.  61. 


330  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

holder's  title,  and  of  the  signature  of  the  party  requesting  the  favor ; 
and  the  indorsement  or  acceptance  of  a  note  or  bill  is  an  admission 
of  the  truth  of  all  the  facts  which  are  recited  in  it.6 

§  197.  Same  :  (6)  Failure  to  repudiate  another's  Assertion ;  State- 
ments made  in  Party's  Presence.  Admissions  may  also  be  implied 
from  the  acquiescence  of  the  party.  But  acquiescence,  to  have  the 
effect  of  an  admission,  must  exhibit  some  act  of  the  mind,  and 
amount  to  voluntary  demeanor  or  conduct  of  the  party.1  And 
whether  it  is  acquiescence  in  the  conduct  or  in  the  language  of 
others,  it  must  plainly  appear  that  such  conduct  was  fully  known, 
or  the  language  fully  understood  by  the  party,  before  any  inference 
can  be  drawn  from  his  passiveness  or  silence.  The  circumstances, 
too,  must  be  not  only  such  as  afforded  him  an  opportunity  to  act  or 
to  speak,  but  such  also  as  would  properly  and  naturally  call  for  some 
action  or  reply,  from  men  similarly  situated.2  To  affect  a  party 
with  the  statements  of  others,  on  the  ground  of  his  implied  admis- 
sion of  their  truth  by  silent  acquiescence,  it  is  not  enough  that  they 
were  made  in  his  presence;  for,  if  they  were  given  in  evidence  in  a 
judicial  proceeding,  he  is  not  at  liberty  to  interpose  when  and  how  he 
pleases,  though  a  party.8  [Yet,  in  civil  cases,  where  the  party 
could  take  the  stand  in  denial,  his  failure  to  do  so  (not  his  mere 
failure  to  interrupt  during  others'  testimony)  might  be  construed 
against  him.4  That  the  accused  is  in  custody  when  the  statements 
are  made  to  him  does  not  of  itself  render  it  unnatural  for  him  to 
deny  what  he  considers  false.8]  •  Where  a  landlord  quietly  suffers  a 

8  Helmsley  v.  Loader,  2  Campb.  450  ;  Critchlow  v.  Parry,  ib.  182  ;  Wilkinson  v. 
Lutwidge,  1  Stra.  648 ;  Robinson  v.  Yarrow,  7  Taunt.  455  ;  Taylor  v.  Croker,  4  Esp.  187 ; 
Bass  v.  Clive,  4  M.  &  S.  13.  See  further,  Bayley  on  Bills,  by  Phillips  &  Sewall,  pp.  496- 
606  ;  Phil.  &Ani.  on  Evid.  383,  n.  (2);  1  Phil.  Evid.  364,  n.  (1),  and  cases  there 
cited.  [Failure  to  sue  in  one's  own  State  may  be  commented  on :  Merritt  v.  R.  Co., 
162  Mass.  326.1 

i  Allen  v.  McKeen,  1  Sumn.  314  ;  Carter  v.  Bennett,  4  Fla.  340. 

*  [Thus,  no  inference  could  be  drawn  where  he  was  not  within  hearing  (Josephi  v. 
Furnish,  27  Or.  260),  or  unconscious  from  an  injury  (Dean  v.  State,  105  Ala.  21 ;  People 
v.  Koerner,  154  N.  Y.  355  ;  Gowen  v.  Bush,  40  U.  S.  App.  349),  or  unacquainted  with 
the  language  used  :  ]  j  Wright  v.  Maseras,  56  Barb.  521.] 

QSee  sundry  instances  of  the  principle  applied  in  the  following  cases  :  {People  v. 
Driscoll,  107  N.  Y.  424  ;  Com.  v.  Harvey,  1  Gray  487,  489  ;  Boston  &  W.  R.  H.  Corp. 
v.  Dana,  ib.  83,  104  ;  Corn.  v.  Kenney,  12  Met.  235  ;  Brainard  v.  Buck,  25  Vt.  573  ; 
Corser  v.  Paul,  41  N.  H.  24  ;  Wilkins  •».  Stidger,  22  Cal.  231 ;  Abercrombie  v.  Allen, 
29  Ala.  281  ;  Rolfe  v.  Rolfe,  10  Ga.  143;  Mattocks  v.  Lyman,  16  Vt.  113;  Vail  v. 
Strong,  10  id.  457  ;  Gale  v.  Lincoln,  11  id.  152  ;  Higgins  v.  Bellinger,  22  Mo.  397  ; 
Drury  t>.  Hervey,  126  Mass.  619  ;  Hackett  v.  Callender,  32  Vt.  97  ;  (  Bob  v.  State, 
32  Ala.  565  ;  Peck  v.  Ryan,  110  id.  336  ;  People  v.  McCrea,  32  Cal.  98  ;  People  v.  Ah 
Yute,  53  id.  613 ;  People  v.  Young,  108  id.  8  ;  Ware  v.  State,  96  Ga.  349 ;  Springer 
v.  Byram,  137  Ind.  15,  25;  Com.  v.  McCabe,  163  Mass.  98  ;  People  v.  Fowler,  104 
Mich.  449  ;  State  ».  Hill,  134  Mo.  663  ;  M'Kee  v.  People,  36  N.  Y.  113  ;  State  v.  Kemp, 
87  N.  C.  540  ;  State  v.  Magoon,  68  Vt  289 ;  Fry  v.  Stowers,  92  Va.  13.] 

*  Melen  v.  Andrews,  1  M.  &  M.  336  ;  [Bell  v.  State,  93  Ga.  557  ;  Collier  v.  Dick, 
La.  An.,  18  So.  622.1    See  also  Allen  v.  McKeen,  1  Sumn.   313,  314,  317;  Jones  v. 
Morrell,  1  Car.   &  Kir.  266;  Neile  v.  Jakle,   2  id.  709;  Peele  v.  Merch.  Ins.  Co., 
3  Mason  81  ;  Hudson  /•.  Harrison,  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  97. 

«  [See  Simpson  v.  Robinson,  12  Q.  B.  612 ;  Connell  v.  MrNett,  109  Mich.  329.1 

*  [See  instances  on  both  sides  in  JR.  v.  Bartlett,  7  C.  &  P.  832 ;  R.  v.  Appleby, 


§§  196-198.]  CONDUCT   AS   AN   ADMISSION.  331 

tenant  to  expend  money  in  making  alterations  and  improvements  on 
the  premises,  it  is  evidence  of  his  consent  to  the  alterations.8  If 
the  tenant  personally  receives  notice  to  quit  at  a  particular  day, 
without  objection,  it  is  an  admission  that  his  tenancy  expires  on 
that  day.7  Thus,  also  among  merchants,  it  is  regarded  as  the  allow- 
ance of  an  account  rendered,  if  it  is  not  objected  to,  without  un- 
necessary delay.8  A  trader  being  inquired  for,  and  hearing  himself 
denied,  may  thereby  commit  an  act  of  bankruptcy.9  And,  generally, 
where  one  knowingly  avails  himself  of  another's  acts,  done  for  his 
benefit,  this  will  be  held  an  admission  of  his  obligation  to  pay  a 
reasonable  compensation.10 

§  198  [199]. l  But,  in  regard  to  admissions  inferred  from  acquies- 
cence in  the  verbal  statements  of  others,  the  maxim,  Qui  tacet 
consentire  videtur,  is  to  be  applied  with  careful  discrimination. 
"Nothing,"  it  is  said,  "can  be  more  dangerous  than  this  kind  of 
evidence.  It  should  always  be  received  with  caution;  and  never 
ought  to  be  received  at  all,  unless  the  evidence  is  of  direct  declara- 
tions of  that  kind  which  naturally  calls  for  contradiction;  some 
assertion  made  to  the  party  with  respect  to  his  right,  which,  by  his 
silence,  he  acquiesces  in."2  A  distinction  has  accordingly  been 
taken  between  declarations  made  by  a  party  interested  and  a  stran- 
ger; and  it  has  been  held  that,  while  what  one  party  declares  to 
the  other,  without  contradiction,  is  admissible  evidence,  what  is 
said  by  a  third  person  may  not  be  so.  It  may  be  impertinent,  and 
best  rebuked  by  silence;  but  if  it  receives  a  reply,  the  reply  is  evi- 
dence. Therefore,  what  the  magistrate,  before  whom  the  assault 
and  battery  was  investigated,  said  to  the  parties,  was  held  inadmis- 
sible, in  a  subsequent  civil  action  for  the  same  assault.8  If  the 

3  Stark.  33  ;  Com.  v.  Walker,  13  All.  570 ;  Com.  v.  Kenney,  12  Mete.  235 ;  Noonan 
v.  State,  9  Miss.  562  ;  Kelly  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565  ;  {  State  v.  Murray,  126  Mo.  611  ; 
State  v.  Foley,  id.,  46  S.  W.  733 ;  Green  u.  State,  97  Tenu.  50  ;  People  v.  Kessler,  13 
Utah  69  ;  State  v.  McCullum,  18  Wash.  394-3 

e  Doe  v.  Allen,  3  Taunt.  78,  80  ;  Doe  v.  Pye,  1  Esp.  366  ;  Neale  v.  Parkin,  ib. 
229  ;  see  also  Stanley  v.  White,  14  East  332. 

7  Doe  v.  Biggs,  2  Taunt.  109  ;  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  2  Campb.  647 ;  Doe  v.  Forster, 
13  East  405  ;  Oakapple  v.  Copous,  4  T.  R.  361  ;  Doe  v.  Woombwell,  2  Campb.  559. 

8  Sherman  v.  Sherman,  2  Vern.  276.     Hutchins,  Ld.  Com.,  mentioned  "a  second 
or  third  post,"  as  the  ultimate  period  of  objection.     But  Lord  Hardwicke  said,  that  if 
the  person  to  whom  it  was  sent  kept  the  account  "for  any  length  of  time,  without 
making  any  objection,"  it  became  a  stated  account  :  Willis  v.  Jernegan,  2  Atk.  252. 
See  also  Freeland  v.  Heron,  7  Cranch  147,  151  ;  Murray  v.  Toland,  3  Johns.  Ch.  575  ; 
Tickel  v.  Short,  2  Ves.  239  ;  fPeck  v.  Ryan,  110  Ala.  336  ;  Pabst  B.  Co.  v.  Lueders, 
107  Mich.  41;  see  §  212,  post.^ 

9  Key  v.  Shaw,  8  Bing.  320. 

10  Morris  v.  Burdett,  1  Campb.  218,  where  a  candidate  made  use  of  the  hustings 
erected  for  an  election  ;  Abbot  v.  Inhabitants  of  Hermon,  7  Greenl.  118,  where  a  school- 
house  was  used  by  the  school  district ;  Hayden  v.  Inhabitants  of  Madison,  ib.  76,  a 
case  of  partial  payment  for  making  a  road. 

1  [[Interchanged  with  the  next  section.] 

*  14  Serg.  &  R.  393,  per  Duncan,  C.  J. ;  2  C.&  P.  193,  per  Best,  C.  J.     And  see  Me- 
Clenkan  v.  McMillan,  6  Barr  366,  where  this  maxim  is  expounded  and  applied.     See 
also  Com.  v.  Call,  21  Pick.  515. 

*  Child  v.  Grace,  2  C.  &  P.  193  ;  Qsee  the  preceding  section.  3 


332  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XTIL 

declarations  are  those  of  third  persons,  the  circumstances  must  be 
such  as  called  on  the  party  to  interfere,  or  at  least  such  as  would  not 
render  it  impertinent  in  him  to  do  so.  Therefore,  where,  in  a  real 
action  upon  a  view  of  the  premises  by  a  jury,  one  of  the  chain- 
bearers  was  the  owner  of  a  neighboring  close,  respecting  the  bounds 
of  which  the  litigating  parties  had  much  altercation,  their  declara- 
tions in  his  presence  were  held  not  to  be  admissible  against  him,  in 
a  subsequent  action  respecting  his  own  close.4  But  the  silence  of 
the  party,  even  where  the  declarations  are  addressed  to  himself,  is 
worth  very  little  as  evidence,  where  he  has  no  means  of  knowing  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  the  statement.6 

§199  [198]. l  Same:  (7)  Possession  of  Documents;  Unanswered 
Letters  ;  Books  of  a  Society  or  Corporation.  The  possession  of  docu- 
ments, also,  or  the  fact  of  constant  access  to  them,  sometimes  affords 
ground  for  affecting  parties  with  an  implied  admission  of  the  state- 
ments contained  in  them.  Thus,  the  rules  of  a  club,  contained  in 
a  book  kept  by  the  proper  officer,  and  accessible  to  the  members ; l 
charges  against  a  club,  entered  by  the  servants  of  the  house,  in  a 
book  kept  for  that  purpose,  open  in  the  club-room;2  the  possession 
of  letters,3  and  the  like,  — are  circumstances  from  which  admissions 

*  Moore  v.  Smith,  14  Serg.  &  R.  388;  {see  Larry  v.  Sherburne,  2  Allen  35  ;  Hil- 
dreth  v.  Martin,  3  id.  371 ;  Fenno  v.  Weston,  31  Vt.  345. }  Where  A  and  B  were  charged 
with  a  joint  felony,  what  A  stated  before  the  examining  magistrate,  respecting  B's  par- 
ticipation in  the  crime,  is  not  admissible  evidence  against  B  :  R.  v.  Appleby,  3  Stark. 
33.  Nor  is  a  deposition,  given  in  the  person's  presence  in  a  cause  to  which  he  was  not 
a  party,  admissible  against  him :  Melen  v.  Andrews,  1  M.  &  M.  336 ;  [see  the  preced- 
ing section.]  See  also  Fairlie  v.  Denton,  3  C.  &  P.  103,  per  Lord  Tenterden  ;  Tait  on 
Evidence,  p.  293.  So  in  the  Roman  law,  "  Confessio  facta  sea  praesumpta  ex  taciturni- 
tate  in  aliquo  judicio,  non  nocebit  in  alio:  "  Mascardus  De  Probat.  vol.  i,  coucl.  348, 
n.  31. 

6  Hayslep  v.  Gymer,  1  Ad.  &  El.  162,  165,  per  Parke,  J.  See  further  on  the  sub- 
ject of  tacit  admissions,  State  v.  Rawls,  2  Nott  &  McCord  331  ;  Batturs  v.  Sellers, 
6Harr.  &  J.  117,  1.19. 

1  Raggett  v.  Musgrave,  2  C.  &  P.  556. 

3  Alderson  v.  Clay,  1  Stark.  405  ;  Wiltzie  v.  Adamson,  1  Phil.  Evid.  357.  Daily 
entries  in  a  book,  constantly  open  to  the  party's  inspection,  are  admissions  against  him 
of  the  matters  therein  stated  :  Alderson  v.  Clay,  1  Stark.  405  ;  Wiltzie  v.  Adamson, 
1  Phil.  Evid.  357 ;  see  further,  Coe  v.  Button,  1  Serg.  &  11.  398  ;  McBride  v.  Watts, 
1  McCord,  384  ;  Corps  v.  Robinson,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  338 ;  [it  may  depend  upon  circum- 
stances: see  Cheney  v.  Cheney,  162  Mass.  591.]  So,  the  members  of  a  company  are 
chargeable  with  knowledge  of  the  entries  in  their  books,  made  by  their  agent  in  the 
course  of  his  business,  and  with  their  true  meaning,  as  understood  by  the  agent :  Allen. 
v.  Coit,  6  Hill  N.  Y.  818 ;  [Anderson  v.  Life  Ass'n,  171  111.  40  ;  see  San  Pedro  L. 
Co.  v.  Reynolds,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  410.] 

»  Hewitt  o.  Piggott,  5  C.  &  P.  75 ;  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  140 ;  Home  Tooke's 
Case,  25  How.  St.  Tr.  120.  But  the  possession  of  unanswered  letters  seems  not  to  be 
of  itself  evidence  of  acquiescence  in  their  contents  :  Fairlee  t>.  Denton,  3  C.  &  P.  103  ; 
R.  v.  Plumer,  R.  &  R.  264.  [There  i^  however,  some  difference  of  opinion  on  this 
point,  and  it  should  perhaps  o!epend  chiefly  on  the  circumstances  of  eacii  case  whether 
a  reply  in  denial  would  have  been  natural  had  the  party  thought  the  contents  false  ; 
see  jCorn.  v.  Jeffries,  7  All.  548;  Com.  v.  Eustman,  1  Cash.  189;  Fenno  v,  Weston, 
81  Vt.  845  ;  Leonard  v.  Tillotson,  97  N.  Y.  8  (leading  case)  ;  Talcott  t>.  Harris,  93  id. 
667  ;  Waring  v.  U.  8.  Tel.  Co.,  44  How.  N.  Y.  69  ;  s.  c.  4  Daly  233  ;  Fairlie  v. 
Denton,  3  C.  &  P.  103  ;  Richards  v.  Fnvnkum,  9  id.  221;}  Hulett's  Estate,  66  Minn. 
827  ;  State  v.  Howell,  N.  J.  L.,  38  All.  748 ;  Razor  v.  Razor,  149  111.  621  ;  Wiedeinann 


§§  198-200.]  CONDUCT  AS   AN  ADMISSION.  333 

by  acquiescence  may  be  inferred.  Upon  the  same  ground,  the  ship- 
ping list  at  Lloyd's,  stating  the  time  of  a  vessel's  sailing,  is  held 
to  be  prima  facie  evidence  against  an  underwriter,  as  to  what  it 
contains.4 

4.    Sundry  Limitations. 

§  200.  "Weight  and  Value  of  Admissions.  With  respect  to  all 
verbal  admissions,  it  may  be  observed  that  they  ought  to  be  received 
with  great  caution.  The  evidence,  consisting  as  it  does  in  the  mere 
repetition  of  oral  statements,  is  subject  to  much  imperfection  and 
mistake;  the  party  himself  either  being  misinformed,  or  not  having 
clearly  expressed  his  own  meaning,  or  the  witness  having  misunder- 
stood him.  It  frequently  happens,  also,  that  the  witness,  by  unin- 
tentionally altering  a  few  of  the  expressions  really  used,  gives  an 
effect  to  the  statement  completely  at  variance  with  what  the  party 
actually  did  say.1  But  where  the  admission  is  deliberately  made 

v.  Walpole,  1891,  2  Q.  B.  534.]  j  But  .if  the  person  receiving  a  letter  does  reply  to  it, 
and  in  his  reply  refers  to  the  letter  he  has  received,  he  makes  the  original  letter  evi- 
dence against  him  as  to  the  facts  referred  to,  so  far  as  is  necessary  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  reply :  Trischet  v.  Hamilton  Ins.  Co.,  14  Gray  456 ;  Dutton  r.  Woodman, 
9  Cush.  262  ;  Fearing  v.  Kiruball,  4  Allen  125;  Gaskill  v.  Skene,  14  Q.  B.  664 ;{  [>ee 
post,  §  201,  note  14.] 

fJFor  the  wholly  different  question,  whether  possession  of  a  document  shows  knowl- 
edge of  its  contents,  see  ante,  §  14/>.] 

*  Mackintosh  r.  Marshall,  11  M.  &  "W.  116. 

1  Earle  v.  Picken,  5  C.  &  P.  542,  n.,  per  Parke,  J. ;  Rex  v.  Simons,  6  id. 
640,  per  Alderson,  B.;  Williams  v.  Williams,  1  Hagg.  Consist.  304,  per  Sir  William 
Scott;  Hope  v.  Evans,  1  Sm.  &  M.  Ch.  195.  Alciatus  expresses  the  sense  of  the  civil- 
ians to  the  same  effect,  where,  after  speaking  of  the  weight  of  judicial  admissions, 
"  propter  majorem  certitudinem,  <juam  in  se  habet,"  he  adds  :  "  Qua  ratio  non  habet 
locum,  quaudo  ista  coufessio  probaretur  per  testes  ;  imo  est  minus  certa  cceteris  proba- 
tionibus,"  etc.  Alciat.  de  Prcesump.  Pars  Secund.  Col.  682,  n.  6.  See  supra,  §§  96,  97  ; 
2  Poth.  on  Obi.  by  Evans,  App.  No.  16,  §  13 ;  Malin  v.  Malin.  1  Wend.  625,  652 ; 
Lench  v.  Lench,  10  Ves.  517,  518,  cited  with  approbation  in  6  Jonns.  Ch.  412,  and  in 
Smith  v.  Burnham,  3  Sumn.  438  ;  Stone  v.  Ramsey,  4  Monroe  236,  239  ;  Myers  v.  Baker, 
Hardin  544,  549 ;  Perry  v.  Gerbeau,  5  Martin  N.  8.  18,  19  ;  Law  v.  Merrills,  6  Wend. 
268,  277  ;  {Saveland  v.  Green,  40  Wis.  431 ;  Mauro  v.  Platt,  62  111.  450.  "  In  a  some- 
what extended  experience  of  jury  trials,  we  have  been  compelled  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  most  unreliable  of  all  evidence  is  that  of  the  oral  admissions  of  the  party,  and 
especially  where  they  purport  to  have  been  made  during  the  pendency  of  the  action,  or 
after  the  parties  were  in  a  state  of  controversy.  It  is  not  uncommon  for  different  wit- 
nesses of  the  same  conversation  to  give  precisely  opposite  accounts  of  it  ;  and  in  some 
instances  it  will  appear  that  the  witness  deposes  to  the  statements  of  one  party  as  com- 
ing from  the  other,  and  it  is  not  very  uncommon  to  find  witnesses  of  the  best  inten- 
tions repeating  the  declarations  of  the  party  in  his  own  favor  as  the  fullest  admissions 
of  the  utter  falsity  of  his  claim.  When  we  reflect  upon  the  inaccuracy  of  many  wit- 
nesses, in  their  original  comprehension  of  a  conversation,  their  extreme  liability  to 
mingle  subsequent  facts  and  occurrences  with  the  original  transactions,  and  the  im- 
possibility of  recollecting  the  precise  terms  used  by  the  party,  or  of  translating  them 
by  exact  equivalents,  we  must  conclude  there  is  no  substantial  reliance  upon  this  class 
of  testimony.  The  fact,  too,  that  in  the  final  trial  of  open  questions  of  fact,  both  sides 
are  largely  supported  by  evidence  of  this  character,  in  the  majority  of  instances,  must 
lead  all  cautious  triers  of  fact  greatly  to  distrust  its  reliability  : "  Judge  Redfield's 
addendum  to  this  section  in  the  twelfth  edition.  But  the  value  of  the  confession  is 
wholly  a  matter  for  the  jury  :  Com.  v.  Galligan,  113  Mass.  202.  |  See  also  Smith  v. 
Burnham,  3  Sumn.  435,  438,  439  ;  Clea viand  v.  Burton,  11  Vt.  138 ;  Stephens  » 
Vromau,  18  Barb.  250  ;  Priutup  v.  Mitchell,  17  Ga.  558. 


334  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

and  precisely  identified,  the  evidence  it  affords  is  often  of  the  most 
satisfactory  nature.2 

§  201.  Explanations  ;  Putting  in  the  whole  of  a  Conversation,  Doc- 
ument, or  Correspondence.  We  are  next  to  consider  the  effect  of 
admissions,  when  proved.  And  here  it  is  first  to  be  observed,  that 
the  whole  admission  is  to  be  taken  together;  for  though  some  part 
of  it  may  contain  matter  favorable  to  the  party,  and  the  object  is 
only  to  ascertain  that  which  he  has  conceded  against  himself,  for  it 
is  to  this  only  that  the  reason  for  admitting  his  own  declarations 
applies,  namely,  the  great  probability  that  they  are  true;  yet,  unless 
the  whole  is  received  and  considered,  the  true  meaning  and  import 
of  the  part  which  is  good  evidence  against  him  cannot  be  ascer- 
tained.1 [This  general  principle,  however,  raises  two  sorts  of  ques- 
tions: first,  whether  the  party  offering  the  admission  must,  as  a 
preliminary  condition,  put  in  the  whole,  or  other  parts,  of  the  con- 
versation, document,  etc. ;  secondly,  whether  the  party  whose  state- 
ment it  is  may  afterwards,  by  way  of  explanation,  put  in  the 
remainder,  or  other  parts,  or  other  statements,  (a)  It  does  not 
seem  to  be  generally  required  that  the  party  offering  the  admission 
must  put  in  at  the  same  time  any  more  than  that  which  he  desires  to 
use,  — whether  a  speech  or  conversation,2  or  a  writing; 8  and  so  far 
as  the  portion  of  it  allowed  to  be  given  is  concerned,  the  substance  is 
sufficient,  without  the  precise  words,  whether  of  an  oral  statement  * 
or  a  lost  writing.8  A.S  to  a  letter  forming  part  of  a  correspondence, 
it  does  not  seem  usual  to  require  the  preceding  letters  to  be  put  in, 
unless  they  are  expressly  referred  to  in  the  one  offered.6  For  an 
answer  in  Chancery  or  a  deposition,  it  used  to  be  said  that  the  whole 

2  Rigg  v.  Curgenven,  2  Wils.  395,  399  ;  Glassford  on  Evid.  326  ;  Com.  v.  Knapp, 
9  Pick.  507,  508,  per  Putnam,  J. 

1  fJFor  general  statements  of  this  principle,  see  Erskine's  celebrated  argument  in 
Stockdale's  Trial,  22  How.  St.  Tr.  257  (where  he  employs  Algernon  Sidney's  famous 
illustration  of  the  charge  of  libel  against  a  publisher  of  the  Bible  for  printing  "[The 
fool  hath  said  in  his  heart,]  There  is  ho  God");  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  the  Queen's  Case, 
2  B.  &  B.  287  ;  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  Thomson  v.  Austen,  2  Dowl.  &  R.  361 ;  Wilson,  J.,  in 
Johnson  v.  Powers,  40  Vt.  611.] 

2  [Eaton's  Trial,  23  How.  St.  Tr.  1030  ;  R.  v.  O'Connell,  5  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1,  196  ; 
People  v.  Daniels,  Cal.,  38  Pac.  720 ;  People  v.  Dice,  id.,  62  Pac.  477 ;  State  v.  Vallery, 
La.  An.,  16  So.  745;  State  v.  Daniel,  49  id.,  22  So.  415  ;  State  v.  Cowan,  7  Ired.  239. 
The  rulings  are  not  uniform.] 

8  [Cornish's  Trial,  11  How.  St.  Tr.  423 ;  Sizer  v.  Burt,  4  Den.  426.  But  it  will 
depend  much  upon  the  facts,  whether  sufficient  has  been  given  :  see  Coxe  v.  England, 
65  Pa.  212,  223  ;  Bank  v.  Brown,  Dudley  62.] 

•  [[R.  v.  Edmonds,  1  State  Tr.  N.  s.  785,  820  ;  Teague  v.  Williams,  7  Aln.  844  ; 
Hewitt  v.  Clark,  91  111.  608  ;  Kittredge  v.  Russell,  114  Mass.  68 ;  Chambers  v.  Hill, 
34  Mich.  524  ;  Maxwell  v.  Warner,  11  N.  H.  569  (leading  case);  Eaton  v.  Rice,  8  id. 
880  ;  Kingsbury  v.  Moses,  45  id.  222;  Norton  v.  Parsons,  Vt.,  32  Atl.  481  ;  Fertig  v. 
State,  Wis.,  75  N.  W.  960.     Distinguish  the  effect  of  the  Opinion  rule,  post,  §  441  6.] 

•  [Hardy's  Trinl»  24  How-  St-  '?*•  681  >  Edwards  v.  Rives,  Fla.,  17  So.  416  ;  Clark 
t>.  Honghton,  12  Gray  44  ;  Bell  v.  Young,  3  Grant  175  ;  Maxted  v.  Fowler,  94  Mich. 
Ill;  Taylo«».  Riggs,  1  Pet.  599.] 

•  [See  Watson  v.  Moore,  1  C.  &  K.  626 ;  Barnes  v.  Trust  Co.,  111.,  48  N.  E.  31  ; 
Stone  v.  Sanborn,  104  Mass.  319;  Coats  v.  Gregory,  10  Ind.  845;  Hayward  R.  Co.  v. 
Duncklee,  30  Vt.  29,  89.] 


§§  200-201.]  EXPLANATIONS.  335 

must  be  put  in,7  and  perhaps  this  would  still  be  required.8  (&)  For 
the  party  against  whom  the  admission  is  offered,  it  used  to  be  said 
that  he  may,  by  way  of  explanation,  put  in  the  whole  of  the  speci- 
fied conversation  or  other  oral  statement,9  or  writing,10  or  answer  in 
Chancery,11  provided  only  that  it  dealt  with  the  same  subject.  But 
this  broad  allowance  has  been  repudiated  in  England  and  in  some 
other  jurisdictions,  and  it  is  now  better  said  that  the  party  wishing 
to  explain  may  put  in  only  so  much  as  is  necessary  for  his  purpose, 
i.  e.  to  qualify  or  explain  the  portion  put  in  against  him.12  Where 
a  series  of  letters  in  a  correspondence,  or  of  entries  in  an  account- 
book,  are  involved,  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between 
those  which  are  in  effect  a  part  of  the  same  statement  and  those 
which  are  not ; 18  but  it  seems  that  so  far  as  the  letter  or  oral  state- 
ment put  in  as  an  admission  was  written  or  made  in  reply,  or  con- 
tains within  it  a  reference  to  a  remark  or  letter  from  the  party 
offering  it,  the  anterior  statement  may  be  put  in  evidence.14]  But 
though  the  whole  of  what  he  said  at  the  same  time,  and  relating  to 
the  same  subject,  must  be  given  in  evidence,18  yet  it  does  not  follow 
that  all  the  parts  of  the  statement  are  to  be  regarded  as  equally 
worthy  of  credit;  but  it  is  for  the  jury  to  consider,  under  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, how  much  of  the  whole  statement  they  deem  worthy  of 
belief,  including  as  well  the  facts  asserted  by  the  party  in  his  own 
favor,  as  those  making  against  him.16 

7  [Gilbert,  Evidence,  50.] 

8  [See  Perkins  v.  Adams,  5  Mete.  46;  Hamilton  u.  People,  29  Mich.  197  ;  South. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hubbard,  Ala.,  22  So.  541 ;  and  the  practice  in  cross-examining  witnesses  as 
to  their  written  statements,  post,  §  463.] 

»  [The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  297 ;  R.  v.  O'Connell,  5  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1,  239  j 
Frazier  v.  State,  42  Ark.  72 ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  1854  ;  Thalheim  r.  State,  Fla.,  20  So. 
938  ;  Gough  v.  St.  John,  16  Wend.  646 ;  see  Drake  v.  State,  Ala.,  20  So.  450  ;  State 
v.  Cowan,  7  Ired.  241  ;  Pinney's  Trial,  3  State  Tr.  N.  s.  11,  464 ;  R.  v.  Martin,  6  id. 
925,  928.  For  the  corresponding  rule  as  to  a  witness'  inconsistent  statements,  see  post, 
§4626.] 

10  [Grattan  v.  Ins.  Co.,  92  N.  Y.  284  ;  see  Robinson  v.  Cutter,  163  Mass.  377.] 

11  [  Bath  v.   Battersea,  5  Mod.  9  ;   Roe  v.  Ferrars,  2  B.  &  P.  542  ;  see  Roberts  v. 
Tennell,   3  T.  B.  Monr.    247;    Duncan  v.  Gibbs,  1  Yerg.   256;]    JGildersleeve  ». 
Mahoney,  5  Duer  883.} 

13  [Prince  v.  Samo,  7  A.  &  E.  627  ;  Hathaway  v.  Tinkham,  148  Mass.  85,  semble  ; 
Silberry  v.  State,  Ind.,  39  N.  E.  937  ;  Re  Chamberlain,  140  N.  Y.  390;]   {see  Moore 
v.  Wright,  90  111.  470  ;  Darby  v.  Ouseley,  1  H.  &  N.  1. } 

18  [See  Catt  v.  Howard,  3'  Stark.  6 ;  Sturge  v.  Buchanan,  10  A.  &  E.  598 ;]  Roe  v. 
Dav,  7  C.  &  P.  705. 

14  [See«?ite,  §  199,  note  3;  Hartman  Steel  Co.  v.  Hoag,  104  la.  269  ;  Trischet  v. 
Ins.  Co.,  14  Gray  457;]  Watsou  v.  Moore,  1  C.  &  K.  626;  jPeunell  v.  Meyer,  2  M.  & 
Rob.  98.  j 

16  [Not  "must"  be  but  "may"  be  ;  the  author  is  apparently  dealing  with  the 
second  sort  of  question  above.] 

18  Smith  v.  Blandy,  Ry.  &  M.  257,  per  Best,  J.  ;  Cray  v.  Halls,  ib.  cit.  per  Abbott, 
C.  J.  ;  Bermon  v.  Woodbridge,  2  Doug.  788  ;  R.  v.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221,  per  Little- 
dale,  J. ;  McClenkan  v.  McMillan,  6  Barr  866 ;  Mattocks  v.  Lyman,  18  Vt.  98  ;  Wil- 
son P.  Calvert,  8  Ala.  757 ;  Yarborough  v.  Moss,  9  Ala.  382  ;  Dorlon  v.  Douglass, 
6  Barb.  S.  C.  451  ;  jEnders  v.  Stern bergh,  2  Abb.  App.  Dec.  81.}  A  similar  rule 
prevails  in  Chancery :  Gresley  on  Evid.  13.  See  also  the  Queeu'a  Case,  2  Brod.  & 


336  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

§  201  a.  Same  :  Other  Modes.  [The  party  against  whom  the  ad- 
mission is  offered  may  also  explain  it  away,  so  far  as  possible,  in 
any  other  way,1  —  as,  by  showing  that  it  was  said  with  a  different 
intent  or  meaning,  or  without  personal  knowledge,  or  the  like.2  But 
he  will  not  be  allowed  to  show  that  he  at  other  times  said  the 
contrary.8] 

§  202.  Admissions  based  on  Hearsay.  Where  the  admission, 
whether  oral  or  in  writing,  contains  matters  stated  as  mere  hearsay, 
it  has  been  made  a  question  whether  such  matters  of  hearsay  are  to 
be  received  in  evidence.  Mr.  Justice  Chambre,  in  the  case  of  an 
answer  in  Chancery,  read  against  the  party  in  a  subsequent  suit  at 
law,  thought  that  portion  of  it  not  admissible;  "for,"  he  added,  "it 
appears  to  me,  that,  where  one  party  reads  a  part  of  the  answer  of 
the  other  party  in  evidence,  he  makes  the  whole  admissible  only  so 
far  as  to  waive  any  objection  to  the  competency  of  the  testimony  of 
the  party  making  the  answer,  and  that  he  does  not  thereby  admit  as 
evidence  all  the  facts  which  may  happen  to  have  been  stated  by  way 
of  hearsay  only  in  the  course  of  the  answer  to  a  bill  filed  for  a  dis- 
covery." *  But  where  the  answer  is  offered  as  the  admission  of  the 
party  against  whom  it  is  read,  it  seems  reasonable  that  the  whole 
admission  should  be  read  to  the  jury,  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
under  what  impressions  that  admission  was  made,  though  some  parts 
of  it  be  only  stated  from  hearsay  and  belief.  And  what  may  or  may 
not  be  read,  as  the  context  of  the  admission,  depends  not  upon  the 
grammatical  structure,  but  upon  the  sense  and  connection  in  fact. 
But  whether  the  party,  against  whom  the  answer  is  read,  is  entitled 
to  have  such  parts  of  it  as  are  not  expressly  sworn  to  left  to  the 
jury  as  evidence,  however  slight,  of  any  fact,  does  not  yet  appear 
to  have  been  expressly  decided.2 

§  203.  Parol  Admissions  of  Title  or  of  Contents  of  Documents.  It 
is  further  to  be  observed  on  this  head,  that  the  parol  admission  of 
a  party,  made  en  pais,  is  competent  evidence  only  of  those  facts 

Bing.  298,  per  Abbott,  C.  J.  ;  Randle  v.  Blackburn,  6  Taunt.  245  ;  Thomson  v.  Aus- 
ten, 2  D.  &  R.  358  ;  Fletcher  v.  Froggatt,  2  C.  &  P.  569  ;  Yates  v.  Carnsew,  3  C.  &  P. 
99,  per  Lord  Tenterden  ;  Cooper  v.  Smith,  15  East  103,  107  ;  Whitwell  v.  Wyer,  11 
Mass.  6,  10  ;  Garey  v.  Nicholson,  24  Wend.  350  ;  Kelsey  v.  Bush,  2  Hill  440. 

*  See  Watson  v.  Moore,  1  C.  &  K.  626;  jPennell  v.  Meyer,  2  M.  &  Rob.  98;} 
[TYischtr.  Ins.  Co.,  14  Gray  457  ;   Hartman  Steel  Co.  v.  Hoag,  104  la.  269.1 

8  See  Reav  v.  Richardson,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  422 ;  ("Reid  v.  Warner,  17  Low.  Can.  487 
Smith  v.  Giffard,  83  Ala.  172;  Yates  v.  Shaw,  24  111.  369;  Smith  v.  Mayfield,  163  id. 
447 ;  Janvrin  v.  Fogg,  49  N.  H.  846  ;  Kolmes  v.  W.  R.  E.  Co.,  R.  I.,  88  Atl.  946.   But 
see  Sutter  v.  Rose,  169  111.  66.] 

»  {Baxter  v.  Knowles,  12  All.  114;  Pickering  v.  Reynolds,  1]9  id.  Ill;  Royal  v. 
Chandler,  79  Me.  265  ;  post,  §  209,  note  4.}  £Yet  there  is  some  reason  for  using 
such  statements  under  some  circumstances,  as  pointed  out  by  Brackenridge,  J.,  in 
Garwood  v.  Dennis,  4  Binn.  814,  333,  339.  Compare  the  principle  for  similar  state- 
ments by  a  witness,  post,  §  4696] 

1  Roe  v.  Ferrers,  2  B.  &  P.  548 ;  jsee  Stephens  v.  Vrooman,  16  N.  Y.  801 ;  Shad- 
dock v.  Clifton,  22  Wis.  115;  Chapman  v.  R.  Co.,  26  id  296.} 

•  2  Bos.  &  Pul.  548,  n.  ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  13. 


§§  201  rt-204.]  SUNDRY   LIMITATIONS.  337 

which  may  lawfully  be  established  by  parol  evidence ;  it  cannot  be 
received  either  to  contradict  documentary  proof,  or  to  supply  the 
place  of  existing  evidence  by  matter  of  record.  Thus,  a  written 
receipt  of  money  from  one  as  the  agent  of  a  corporation,  or  even  an 
express  admission  of  indebtment  to  the  corporation  itself,  is  not 
competent  proof  of  the  legal  authority  and  capacity  of  the  corpora- 
tion to  act  as  such.1  Nor  is  a  parol  admission  of  having  been  dis- 
charged under  an  insolvent  act  sufficient  proof  of  that  fact,  without 
the  production  of  the  record.2  The  reasons  on  which  this  rule  is 
founded  having  been  already  stated,  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider 
them  further  in  this  place.8  The  rule,  however,  does  not  go  to  the 
utter  exclusion  of  parol  admissions  of  this  nature,  but  only  to  their 
effect;  for  in  general,  as  was  observed  by  Mr.  Justice  Parke,4  what  a 
party  says  is  evidence  against  himself,  whether  it  relate  to  the  con- 
tents of  a  written  instrument,  or  anything  else.  Therefore,  in  re- 
plevin of  goods  distrained,  the  admissions  of  the  plaintiff  have  been 
received,  to  show  the  terms  upon  which  he  held  the  premises,  though 
he  held  under  an  agreement  in  writing,  which  was  not  produced.8 
Nor  does  the  rule  affect  the  admissibility  of  such  evidence  as  second- 
ary proof,  after  showing  the  loss  of  the  instrument  in  question. 

5.    Conclusive  Admissions  (Estoppel;  Judicial  Waiver). 

§  204.  Admissions  as  Estoppels  between  Parties.  With  regard, 
then,  to  the  conclusiveness  of  admissions,  it  is  first  to  be  considered, 
that  the  genius  and  policy  of  the  law  favor  the  investigation  of 
truth  by  all  expedient  and  convenient  methods;  and  that  the  doctrine 
of  estoppels,  by  which  further  investigation  is  precluded,  being  an 
exception  to  the  general  rule,  founded  on  convenience,  and  for  the 
prevention  of  fraud,  is  not  to  be  extended  beyond  the  reasons  on 
which  it  is  founded.1  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  estoppels  bind 
only  parties  and  privies,  and  not  strangers.  Ktence  it  follows,  that 
though  a  stranger  may  often  show  matters  in  evidence,  which  parties 
or  privies  might  have  specially  pleaded  by  way  of  estoppel,  yet,  in 
his  case,  it  is  only  matter  of  evidence  to  be  considered  by  the  jury.2 

1  Welland  Canal  Co.  v.  Hathaway,  8  Wend.  480  ;  National  Bank  of  St.  Charles  v. 
De  Bernales,  1  C.  &  P.  569;  Jenner  v.  Joliffe,  6  Johns.  9. 

2  Scott  v.  Clare,  3  Campb.  236  ;  Summarsett  v.  Adamson,  1  Bing.  73,  per  Parke,  J. 
8  See  siipra,  §§  96,  97  ;  [[transferred  post,  as  §§  563  i,  j.^ 

*  In  Earle  v.  Pick  -n,  5  C.  &  P.  542  ;  Newhall  v.  Holt,  6  M.  &  W.  662  ;  Slatterie  v. 
Pooley,  ib.  664  ;  Pritchard  v.  Bagshawe,  11  Common  Bench  459. 
5  Howard  v.  Smith,  3  Scott  N.  R.  574. 

1  See  supra,  §§  22-26  ;  Qhe  whole  subject  of  estoppels  is  one  of  substantive  law, 
not  of  evidence.] 

2  This  subject  was  very  clearly  illustrated  by  Mr.  Justice  Bayley,  in  delivering 
the  judgment  of  the  Court,  in  Heane  v.  Rogers,  9  B.  &  C.  577,  586.     It  was  an  action 
of  trover,  brought  by  a  person  against  whom  a  commission  of  bankruptcy  had  issued, 
against  his  assignees,  to  recover  the  value  of  goods,  which,  as  assignees,  they  had  sold  ; 
and  it  appeared  that  he  had  assisted  the  assignees,  by  giving  directions  as  to  the  sale 

VOL.  i. —22 


338  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

It  is,  however,  in  such  cases,  material  to  consider  whether  the  ad- 
mission is  made  independently,  and  because  it  is  true,  or  is  merely 
conventional,  entered  into  between  the  parties  from  other  causes 
than  a  conviction  of  its  truth  and  only  as  a  convenient  assumption 
for  the  particular  purpose  in  hand.  For  in  the  latter  case  it  may  be 
doubtful  whether  a  stranger  can  give  it  in  evidence  at  all.8  Verbal 
admissions,  as  such,  do  not  seem  capable,  in  general,  of  being 
pleaded  as  estoppels,  even  between  parties  or  privies;  but  if,  being 
unexplained  or  avoided  in  evidence,  the  jury  should  wholly  disre- 
gard them,  the  remedy  would  be  by  setting  aside  the  verdict.  And 
when  they  are  held  conclusive,  they  are  rendered  effectually  so  by 
not  permitting  the  party  to  give  any  evidence  against  them.  Parol 
or  verbal  admissions,  which  have  been  held  conclusive  against  the 
party,  seem  for  the  most  part  to  be  those  on  the  faith  of  which  a 
court  of  justice  has  been  led  to  adopt  a  particular  course  of  proceed- 
ing, or  on  which  another  person  has  been  induced  to  alter  his  con- 
dition.4 To  these  may  be  added  a  few  cases  of  fraud  and  crime, 
and  some  admissions  on  oath,  which  will  be  considered  hereafter, 
where  the  party  is  estopped  on  other  grounds. 

of  the  goods  ;  and  that,  after  the  issuing  of  the  commission,  he  gave  notice  to  the  les- 
sors of  a  farm  which  he  held  that  he  had  become  bankrupt,  and  was  willing  to  give  up 
the  lease,  which  the  lessors  thereupon  accepted,  and  took  possession  of  the  premises. 
And  the  question  was,  whether  he  was  precluded,  by  this  surrender,  from  disputing 
the  commission  in  the  present  suit.  On  this  point  the  language  of  the  learned  judge 
was  as  follows  :  "  There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  express  admissions  of  a  party  to  the 
suit,  or  admissions  implied  from  his  conduct,  are  evidence,  and  strong  evidence,  against 
him  ;  but  we  think  that  he  is  at  liberty  to  prove  that  such  omissions  were  mistaken, 
or  were  untrue,  and  is  not  estopped  or  concluded  by  them,  unless  another  person  has 
been  induced  bjr  them  to  alter  his  condition ;  in  such  a  case,  the  party  is  estopped  from 
disputing  their  truth  with  respect  to  that  person  (and  those  claiming  under  him),  and 
that  transaction  ;  but  as  to  third  persons,  he  is  not  bound.''  The  earlier  cases  fall 
within  the  principle  above  laid  down.  In  Clarke  v.  Clarke,  6  Esp.  61,  the  bankrupt 
was  not  permitted  to  call  that  sale  a  conversion,  which  he  himself  had  procured  and 
sanctioned  ;  in  Like  v.  Howe,  6  Esp.  20,  he  was  precluded  from  contesting  the  title  of 
persons  to  be  assignees,  wfiom  he  by  his  conduct  had  procured  to  become  so  ;  and  the 
last  case  on  this  subject,  Watson  v.  Wace,  5  B.  &  C.  153,  is  distinguishable  from  the 
present,  because  Wace,  one  of  the  defendants,  was  the  person  from  whose  unit  the  plain- 
tiff had  been  discharged,  and  therefore,  perhaps,  he  might  be  estopped  with  respect  to 
that  person  by  his  conduct  towards  him.  See  also  Welland  Canal  Co.  v.  Hathaway, 
8  Wend.  483  ;  Jennings  v.  Whittaker,  4  Monroe  50  ;  Grant  v.  Jackson,  Peake's  Cas. 
203  ;  Ashmore  v.  Hardy,  7  C.  &  P.  501  ;  Carter  ».  Bennett,  4  Fla.  343. 

«  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  388  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  368.  In  Slaney  v.  Wade,  1  Myl.  &  Cr. 
338,  and  Fort  v.  Clarke,  1  liuss.  601,  604,  the  recitals  in  certain  deeds  were  held  inad- 
missible, in  favor  of  strangers,  as  evidence  of  pedigree.  But  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
the  parties  to  those  deeds  were  strangers  to  the  persons  whose  pedigree  they  undertook 
to  recite. 

4  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  378  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  360.  The  general  doctrine  of  estoppels 
is  thus  stated  by  Lord  Dcnman  :  "  Where  one  by  his  words  or  conduct  wilfully  causes 
another  to  believe  the  existence  of  a  certain  state  of  things,  and  induces  him  to  act  on 
that  belief,  so  as  to  alter  his  own  previous  position,  the  former  is  concluded  from  aver- 
ring against  the  latter  a  different  state  of  things  as  existing  at  the  same  time : "  Pickard 
v.  Scars,  6  Ad.  &  EL  469,  474.  The  whole  doctrine  is  ably  discussed  by  Mr.  Smith, 
and  by  Messrs.  Hare  and  Wallace  in  their  notes  to  the  case  of  Trevivan  v.  Lawrence. 
See  2  Smith's  Leading  Cases,  pp.  430-479  (Am.  ed.);  jsee  1  Curtis  C.  C.  136,  144  i 
Zuchtmanu  v.  Roberts,  109  Mass.  54.  { 


§§  204-205.]  CONCLUSIVE  ADMISSIONS.  339 

§  205.  Judicial  Admissions.  Judicial  admissions,  or  those  made  in 
court  by  the  party's  attorney,  generally  appear  either  of  record,  as  in 
pleading,1  or  in  the  solemn  admission  of  the  attorney,  made  for  the 
purpose  of  being  used  as  a  substitute  for  the  regular  legal  evidence 
of  the  fact  at  the  trial, l  or  in  a  case  stated  for  the  opinion  of  the 
Court.  Both  these  have  been  already  considered  in  the  preceding 
pages.  There  is  still  another  class  of  judicial  admissions,  made  by 
the  payment  of  money  into  court,  upon  a  rule  granted  for  that  pur- 
pose. Here,  it  is  obvious,  the  defendant  conclusively  admits  that 
he  owes  the  amount  thus  tendered  in  payment ; 2  that  it  is  due  for 
the  cause  mentioned  in  the  declaration;  8  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  claim  it  in  the  character  in  which  he  sues;4  tjhat  the  Court  has 
jurisdiction  of  the  matter; 6  that  the  contract  described  is  rightly  set 
forth,  and  was  duly  executed;  6  that  it  has  been  broken  in  the  manner 
and  to  the  extent  declared;7  and  if  it  was  a  case  of  goods  sold  by 
sample,  that  they  agreed  with  the  sample.8  In  other  words,  the 
payment  of  money  into  court  admits  conclusively  every  fact  which 
the  plaintiff  would  be  obliged  to  prove  in  order  to  recover  that 
money.9  But  it  admits  nothing  beyond  that.  If,  therefore,  the 
contract  is  illegal,  or  invalid,  the  payment  of  money  into  court  gives 
it  no  validity;  and  if  the  payment  is  general,  and  there  are  several 
counts,  or  contracts,  some  of  which  are  legal  and  others  not,  the 
Court  will  apply  it  to  the  former.10  So,  if  there  are  two  inconsistent 
counts,  on  the  latter  of  which  the  money  is  paid  into  court,  which 
is  taken  out  by  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  is  not  entitled  to  show 
this  to  the  jury,  in  order  to  negative  any  allegation  in  the  first 
count.11  The  service  of  a  summons  to  show  cause  why  the  party 
should  not  be  permitted  to  pay  a  certain  sum  into  court,  and  a  for- 
tiori, the  entry  of  a  rule  or  order  for  that  purpose,  is  also  an  admis- 
sion that  so  much  is  due.12 

1  See  ante,  §  186. 

2  Blackburn  v,  Scholes,  2  Campb.  341  ;  Rucker  v.  Palsgrave,  1  id.  558  ;  s.  c.  1  Taunt. 
419  ;  Boyden  v.  Moore,  5  Mass.  365,  369. 

»  Seaton  v.  Benedict,  5  Bing.  28,  32  ;  Bennett  v.  Francis,  2  B.  &  P.  550 ;  Jones  v. 
Hoar,  5  Pick.  285 ;  Huntington  v.  American  Bank,  6  Pick.  340. 
4  Lipscombe  v.  Holmes,  2  Campb.  441. 
6  Miller  r.  Williams,  5  Esp.  19,  21. 

6  Gutteridge  v.  Smith,  2  H.  Bl.  374  ;  Israel  v.  Benjamin,  3  Campb.  40;  Middleton 
v.  Brewer,   Peake's  Gas.  15;  Randall  v.  Lynch,  2  Campb.  352,357;  Cox  v.  Brain, 
3  Taunt.  95. 

7  Dyer  v.  Ashton,  1  B.  &  C.  3. 

8  Leggett  v.  Cooper,  2  Stark.  103. 

9  Dyer  v.  Ashton,  1  B.  &  C.  3  ;  Stapleton  v.  Nowell,  6  M.  &  W.  9  ;  Archer  v.  Eng- 
lish,  2  Scott  N.  s.  156  ;  Archer  v.  Walker,  9  Dowl.  2L    And  see  Story  v.  Finnis,  3  Eng. 
L.  &  Eq.  548,  6  Exch.   123;   Schreger  P.  Carden,  16  Jur.  568  ;  j  Bacon  v.  Charlton, 
7  Cush.  581  ;  Hubbard  P.  Knous,  7  Cush.  556,  559  ;  Kingham  v.  Robins,  5  M.  &  W. 
94  ;  Archer  v.  English,  1  M.  &  G.  873.} 

10  Ribbans  v.  Crickett,  1  B.  &  P.  264  ;  Hitchcock  P.  Tyson,  2  Esp.  481,  n. 

11  Gould  v.  Oliver,  2  M.  &  Gr.  208,  233,  234  ;  Montgomery  v.  Richardson,  5  C.  &  P. 
247. 

12  Williamson  u.  Henley,  6  Bing.  299. 


340       ,  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVIL 

§  206.  Same :  Admissions  by  Mistake.  It  is  only  necessary  here 
to  add,  that  where  judicial  admissions  have  been  made  improvi- 
dently,  and  by  mistake,  the  Court  will,  in  its  discretion,  relieve  the 
party  from  the  consequences  of  his  error,  by  ordering  a  repleader,  or 
by  discharging  the  case  stated,  or  the  rule,  or  agreement,  if  made  in 
court.1  Agreements  made  out  of  court,  between  attorneys,  concern- 
ing the  course  of  proceedings  in  court,  are  equally  under  its  control, 
in  effect,  by  means  of  its  coercive  power  over  the  attorney  in  all 
matters  relating  to  professional  character  and  conduct.  But,  in  all 
these  admissions,  unless  a  clear  case  of  mistake  is  made  out,  entitling 
the  party  to  relief,  he  is  held  to  the  admission ;  which  the  Court  will 
proceed  to  act  upon,  not  as  truth  in  the  abstract,  but  as  a  formula 
for  the  solution  of  the  particular  problem  before  it,  namely,  the 
case  in  judgment,  without  injury  to  the  general  •  administration  of 
justice.2 

§  207.  Admissions  acted  upon,  as  giving  rise  to  Estoppels.  Ad- 
missions, whether  of  law  or  of  fact,  which  have  been  acted  upon  by 
others,  are  conclusive  against  the  party  making  them,  in  all  cases 
between  him  and  the  person  whose  conduct  he  has  thus  influenced.1 
It  is  of  no  importance  whether  they  were  made  in  express  language 
to  the  person  himself,  or  implied  from  the  open  and  general  conduct 
of  the  party.  For,  in  the  latter  case,  the  implied  declaration  may 
be  considered  as  addressed  to  every  one  in  particular,  who  may  have 
occasion  to  act  upon  it.  In  such  cases  the  party  is  estopped,  on 
grounds  of  public  policy  and  good  faith,  from  repudiating  his  own 
representations.2  This  rule  is  familiarly  illustrated  by  the  case  of  a 
man  cohabiting  with  a  woman,  and  treating  her  in  the  face  of  the 
world  as  his  wife,  to  whom  in  fact  he  is  not  married.  Here,  though 
he  thereby  acquires  no  rights  against  others,  yet  they  may  against 

1  "Non  fatetur,  qui  errat,  nisi  jus  ignoravit."  Dig.  lib.  42,  tit.  2,  1.  2.  "Si  veto 
per  errorem  fuerit  facta  ipsa  confessio  (soil,  ab  advocato),  clienti  concessum  est,  errore 
probato,  usque  ad  sententiam  revocare."  Mascard.  De  Probat.  vol.  i,  Quaest.  7,  n.  63  ; 
id.  n.  19-22  ;  id.  vol.  i,  Concl.  348,  per  tot.  See  Kohn  v.  Marsh,  3  Rob.  La.  48. 
The  principle  on  which  a  party  is  relieved  against  judicial  admissions  made  improvi- 
dently  and  by  mistake,  is  equally  applicable  to  admissions  en  pais.  Accordingly,  where 
a  legal  liability  was  thus  admitted,  it  was  held  that  the  jury  were  at  liberty  to  consider 
all  the  circumstances,  and  the  mistaken  view  under  which  it  was  made  ;  that  the  party 
might  show  that  the  admission  made  by  him  arose  from  a  mistake  as  to  the  law ;  and 
that  he  was  not  estopped  by  such  admission,  unless  the  other  party  had  been  induced 
by  it  to  alter  his  condition  :  Newton  v.  Belcher,  13  Jur.  253;  18  Law  J.  Q.  B.  63  ;  12 
Q.  B.  921 ;  Newton  v.  Liddiard,  ib.  925  ;  Solomon  v.  Solomon,  2  Kelly  18. 


2,  1.  4  ;  id.  1.  6.  See  also  Van  Leeuwen's  Comm.  b.  5,  ch.  21 ;  Everhardi  Condi.  155, 
n.  3 ;  "  Confessus  pro  judicato  est :"  Dig.  ubi  snip.  \.  1. 

1  See  supra,  §  27  ;  Commercial  Bank  of  Natchez  ».  King,  3  Rob.  Ln.  243 ;  Kin- 
ney  v.  Farnsworth,  17  Conn.  355;  Newton  v.  Belcher,  13  Jur.  253;  12  Q.  B.  921  : 
Newton  v.  Liddiard,  ib.  925;  {but  see  Hackett  r.  Calender,  32  Vt.  99.} 

a  See  supra,  §§  195,  196  ;  Quick  v.  Staines,  1  B.  &  P.  293 ;  Graves  v.  Key,  3  B.  & 
Ad.  318  ;  Straton  v.  Rastall,  2  T.  R.  36C;  Wyatt  v.  Lord  Hertford,  3  East  147. 


§§  206-207.]  ESTOPPELS.  341 

him;  and,  therefore,  if  she  is  supplied  with  goods  during  such  cohab- 
itation, and  the  reputed  husband  is  sued  for  them,  he  will  not  be 
permitted  to  disprove  or  deny  the  marriage.8  So,  if  the  lands  of 
such  woman  are  taken  in  execution  for  the  reputed  husband's  debt, 
d3  his  own  freehold  in  her  right,  he  is  estopped,  by  the  relation  de 
facto  of  husband  and  wife,  from  saying  that  he  held  them  as  her  ser- 
vant.4 So,  if  a  party  has  taken  advantage  of,  or  voluntarily  acted 
under,  the  bankrupt  or  insolvent  laws,  he  shall  not  be  permitted,  as 
against  persons,  parties  to  the  same  proceedings,  to  deny  their  regu- 
larity.6 So,  also,  where  one  knowingly  permits  his  name  to  be  used 
as  one  of  the  parties  in  a  trading  firm,  under  such  circumstances  of 
publicity  as  to  satisfy  a  jury  that  a  stranger  knew  it,  and  believed 
him  to  be  a  partner,  he  is  liable  to  such  stranger  in  all  transactions 
in  which  the  latter  engaged,  and  gave  credit  upon  the  faith  of  his 
being  such  partner.6  On  the  same  principle  it  is,  that,  where  one 
has  assumed  to  act  in  an  official  or  professional  character,  it  is  con- 
clusive evidence  against  him  that  he  possesses  that  character,  even 
to  the  rendering  him  subject  to  the  penalties  attached  to  it.7  So, 
also,  a  tenant  who  has  paid  rent,  and  acted  as  such,  is  not  permitted 
to  set  up  a  superior  title  of  a  third  person  against  his  lessor,  in  bar 
of  an  ejectment  brought  by  him;  for  he  derived  the  possession  from 
him  as  his  tenant,  and  shall  not  be  received  to  repudiate  that  rela- 
tion.8 But  this  rule  does  not  preclude  the  tenant,  who  did  not  re- 
ceive the  possession  from  the  adverse  party,  but  has  only  attorned 
or  paid  rent  to  him,  from  showing  that  this  was  done  by  mistake.9 
This  doctrine  is  also  applied  to  the  relation  of  bailor  and  bailee,  the 
cases  being  in  principle  the  same;10  and  also  to  that  of  principal 

8  Watson  v.  Threlkeld,  2  Esp.  637 ;  Robinson  v.  Nahorr,  1  Canipb.  245  ;  Mnnro  v. 
De  Chemant,  4  id.  216;  Ryan  v.  Sams,  12  Q.  B.  460;  supra,  §  27.  But  where 
such  representation  has  not  been  acted  upon,  namely,  in  other  transactions  of  the  sup- 
posed husband  or  wife,  they  are  competent  witnesses  for  each  other  :  Batthews  v. 
Galindo,  4  Bing.  610 ;  Wells  v.  Fletcher,  5  C.  &  P.  12 ;  Tufts  v.  Hayes,  5  N.  H.  452. 

*  Divoll  v.  Leadbetter,  4  Pick.  220. 

6  Like  v.  Howe,  6  Esp.  20  :  Clarke  v.  Clarke,  ib.  61 ;  Goldie  v.  Gunston,  4  Campb. 
381 ;  Watson  v.  Wace,  5  B.  &  C.  153,  explained  in  Heane  v.  Rogers,  9  B.  &  C.  587  ; 
Mercer  v.  Wise,  3  Esp.  219 ;  Harmar  v.  Davis,  7  Taunt.  577 ;  Flower  v.  Herbert,  2  Ves. 
326. 

8  Per  Parke,  J.,  in  Dickinson  v.  Valpy,  10  B.  &  C.  128,  140,  141  ;  Fox  v.  Clifton, 
6  Bing.  779,  794,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  See  also  Kell  v.  Nainby,  10  B.  &  C.  20 ;  Guidon 
v.  Robson,  2  Campb.  302. 

7  See  supra,  §  195,  and  cases  cited  in  note. 

8  Doe  v.  Pegge,  1  T.  R.  759,  n.,  per  Lord  Mansfield;  Cooke  v.  Loxley,  5  id.  4  ; 
Hodson  v.  Sharpe,  10  East  350,  352,  353,  per  Lord  Ellenborough  ;  Phipps  v.  Seulthorpe, 
1  B.  &  Aid.  50,  53  ;  Cornish  v.  Searell,  8  B.  &  C.  471,  per  Bay  ley,  J. ;  Doe  v.  Smythe, 
4  M.  &  S.  347  ;  Doe  v.  Austin,  9  Bing.  41  ;  Fleming  v.  Gooding,  10  id.  549 ;  Jackson 
v.  Reynolds,  1  Caines  444 ;  Jackson  v.  Scissam,  3  Johns.  499,  504;  Jackson  v.  Dobbin, 
ib.  223  ;  Jackson  v.  Smith,  7  Cowen  717 ;  Jackson  v.  Spear,  7  Wend.  401.     See  1  Phil, 
on  Evid.  107;  {Dolby  v.  lies,  11  A.  &  E.  335.|     QSee  other  authorities,  ante,  §  25.] 

»  Williams  v.  Bartholomew,  1  B.  &  P.  326 ;  Rogers  v.  Pitcher,  6  Taunt.  202,  208. 
10  Gosling  v.  Birnie,  7  Bing.  339 ;  Phillips  v.  Hall,  8  Wend.  610 ;  Drown  v.  Smith, 
3  N.  H.  299 ;   Eastman  v.  Tuttle,  1  Cowen  248  ;   McNeil  v.  Philip,  1  McCord  392  ; 
Hawes  o.  Watson,  2  B.  &  C.  540;  Stonard  v.  Dunkin,  2  Campb.  344;  Chapman  v. 


342  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

and  agent.11  Thus,  where  goods  in  the  possession  of  a  debtor  were 
attached  as  his  goods,  whereas  they  were  the  goods  of  another  per- 
son, who  received  them  of  the  sheriff,  in  bailment  for  safe  custody, 
as  the  goods  of  the  debtor,  without  giving  any  notice  of  his  own 
title,  the  debtor  then  possessing  other  goods,  which  might  have  been 
attached,  it  was  held  that  the  bailee  was  estopped  to  set  up  his  own 
title  in  bar  of  an  action  by  the  sheriff  for  the  goods.12  The  accept- 
ance of  a  bill  of  exchange  is  also  deemed  a  conclusive  admission, 
against  the  acceptor,  of  the  genuineness  of  the  signature  of  the 
drawer,  though  not  of  the  indorsers,  and  of  the  authority  of  the 
agent,  where  it  was  drawn  by  procuration,  as  well  as  of  the  legal 
capacity  of  the  preceding  parties  to  make  the  contract.  The  indorse- 
ment, also,  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  or  promissory  note,  is  a  conclusive 
admission  of  the  genuineness  of  the  preceding  signatures,  as  well  as 
of  the  authority  of  the  agent,  in  cases  of  procuration,  and  of  the 
capacity  of  the  parties.  So,  the  assignment  of  a  replevin  bond  by 
the  sheriff  is  an  admission  of  its  due  execution  and  validity  as  a 
bond.18  So,  where  land  has  been  dedicated  to  public  use,  and 
enjoyed  as  such,  and  private  rights  have  been  acquired  with  refer- 
ence to  it,  the  original  owner  is  precluded  from  revoking  it.14  And 
these  admissions  may  be  pleaded  by  way  of  estoppel  enpais.16 

§  208.  It  makes  no  difference  in  the  operation  of  this  rule, 
whether  the  thing  admitted  was  true  or  false :  it  being  the  fact  that 
it  has  been  acted  upon  that  renders  it  conclusive.  Thus,  where  two 
brokers,  instructed  to  effect  insurance,  wrote  in  reply  that  they  had 
got  two  policies  effected,  which  was  false:  in  an  action  of  trover 

Searle,  3  Pick.  38,  44;  Dixon  v.  Hamond,  2  B.  &  Aid.  310 ;  Jewett  v.  Torrey,  11  Mass. 
219  ;  Lyraan  v.  Lymati,  id.  317  ;  Story  on  Bailments,  §  102  ;  Kieran  t>.  Sandars,  6  Ad. 
&  El.  515.  But  where  the  bailor  was  but  a  trustee,  and  is  no  longer  liable  over  to  the 
cestui  que  trust,  a  delivery  to  the  latter  is  a  good  defence  for  the  bailee  against  the  bailor. 
This  principle  is  familiarly  applied  to  the  case  of  goods  attached  by  the  sheriff,  and  de- 
livered for  safe  keeping  to  a  person  who  delivers  them  over  to  the  debtor.  After  the 
lieu  of  -the  sheriff  is  dissolved,  he  can  have  no  action  against  his  bailee  :  Whittier  v. 
Smith,  11  Mass.  211  ;  Cooper  v.  Mowry,  16  Mass.  8 ;  Jenney  v.  Rodman,  ib.  464.  So, 
if  the  goods  did  not  belong  to  the  debtor,  and  the  bailee  has  delivered  them  to  the  true 
owner:  Learned  v.  Bryant,  13  Mass.  224;  Fisher  v.  Bartleft,  8  Greenl.  122.  Ogle  v. 
Atkinson,  5  Taunt.  759,  which  seems  to  contradict  the  text,  has  been  overruled,  as  to 
this  point,  by  Gosling  v.  Birnie,  supra.  See  also  Story  on  Agency,  §  217,  n. 

u  Story  on  Agency,  §  217,  and  cases  there  cited.  The  agent,  however,  is  not 
estopped  to  set  up  the  jus  tertii  in  any  case  where  the  title  of  the  principal  was  ac- 
quired by  fraud  ;  and  the  same  principle  seems  to  apply  to  other  cases  of  bailment : 
Hardman  v.  Willcock,  9  Bing.  382,  n. 

13  Dewey  v.  Field,  4  Met.  381.  See  also  Pitt  v.  Chappelow,  8  M.  &  W.  616 ;  San- 
derson  v.  (Jollraan,  4  Scott  N.  R.  638  ;  Heane  v.  Rogers,  9  B.  &  C.  577  ;  Dezell  v. 
Odell,  8  Hill  215. 

18  Scott  v.  Waithman,  3  Stark.  168  ;  Barnes  v.  Lucas,  Ry.  &  M.  234  ;  Plumer  v. 
Briscoe,  12  Jur.  351. 

14  Cincinnati  v.  White,  6  Pet.  439  ;  Hobbs  v.  Lowell,  19  Pick.  405. 

18  Story  on  Bills  of  Exchange,  §§  262,  263  ;  Sanderson  v.  Collman,  4  Scott  N.  R. 
838 ;  Pitt  v.  Chappelow,  8  M.  &  W.  616  ;  Taylor  v.  Croker,  4  Esp.  187  ;  Drayton  v. 
Dale,  2  B.  &  C.  293  ;  Haley  v.  Lane,  2  Atk.  181 ;  Bass  v.  Clive,  4  M.  &  S.  13  ;  supra, 
55  195,  196,  197 ;  Weakly  v.  Bell,  9  Watts  273. 


§§  207-210.]  ESTOPPELS.  343 

against  them  by  the  assured  for  the  two  policies,  Lord  Mansfield 
held  them  estopped  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  policies,  and  said  he 
should  consider  them  as  the  actual  insurers.1  This  principle  has 
also  been  applied  to  the  case  of  a  sheriff,  who  falsely  returned  that 
he  had  taken  bail.2 

§  209.  On  the  other  hand,  verbal  admissions  which  have  not 
been  acted  upon,  and  which  the  party  may  controvert,  without  any 
breach  of  good  faith  or  evasion  of  public  justice,  though  admissible 
in  evidence,  are  not  held  conclusive  against  him.  Of  this  sort  is  the 
admission  that  his  trade  was  a  nuisance,  by  one  indicted  for  setting 
it  up  in  another  place; a  the  admission  by  the  defendant,  in  an  action 
for  criminal  conversation,  that  the  female  in  question  was  the 
wife  of  the  plaintiff; 2  the  omission  by  an  insolvent,  in  his  schedule 
of  debts,  of  a  particular  claim,  which  he  afterwards  sought  to  enforce 
by  suit.8  In  these,  and  the  like  cases,  no  wrong  is  done  to  the  other 
party  by  receiving  any  legal  evidence  showing  that  the  admission 
was  erroneous,  and  leaving  the  whole  evidence,  including  the  ad- 
mission, to  be  weighed  by  the  jury.4 

§  210.  In  some  other  cases,  connected  with  the  administration  of 
public  justice  and  of  government,  the  admission  is  held  conclusive, 
on  grounds  of  public  policy.  Thus,  in  an  action  on  the  statute 
against  bribery,  it  was  held  that  a  man  who  had  given  money  to 
another  for  his  vote  should  not  be  admitted  to  say  that  such  other 
person  had  no  right  to  vote.1  So,  one  who  has  officiously  inter- 
meddled with  the  goods  of  another,  recently  deceased,  is,  in  favor 
of  creditors,  estopped  to  deny  that  he  is  executor.2  Thus,  also, 
where  a  ship-owner,  whose  ship  had  been  seized  as  forfeited  for 
breach  of  the  revenue  laws,  applied  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
for  a  remission  of  forfeiture,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  incurred  by 

1  Harding  v.  Carter,  Park  on  Ins.  p.  4.     See  also  Salem  v.  Williams,  8  Wend.  483  ; 
8.  C.  9  id.  147 ;   Chapman  v.  Searle,  3  Pick.  38,  44 ;  Hall  v.  White,  3  C.  &  P.  136  ; 
Den  v.  Oliver,  3  Hawks  479  ;    Doe  v.  Lambly,  2  Esp.  635  ;  1  B.  &  A.  650,  per  Lord 
Ellenborough  ;   Pi-ice  v.  Harwood,  3  Campb.  108     Stables  v.  Eley,  1  C.  &  P.  614  ; 
Howard  v.  Tucker,  1  B.  &  Ad.  712.     If  it  is  a  case  of  innocent  mistake,  still,  if  it  has 
been  acted  upon  by  another,  it  is  conclusive  in  his  favor ;  as,  where  the  supposed  maker 
of  a  forged  note  innocently  paid  it  to  a  bonafide  holder,  he  shall  be  estopped  to  recover 
back  the  money  :  Salem  Bank  v.  Gloucester  Bank,  17  Mass.  1,  27. 

2  Simmons  v.  Bradford,  15  Mass.  82;  Eaton  v.  Ogier,  2  Greenl.  46. 

1  R.  v.  Neville,  Peake's  Cas.  91. 

2  Morris  v.  Miller,  4  Burr.  2057,  further  explained  in  2  Wils.  399,  1  Doug.  174, 
and  Bull.  N.  P.  28. 

*  Nicholls  f.  Downes,  1  Mood.  &  R.  13  ;  Hart  v.  Newman,  3  Campb.  13. 

4  j  But  the  effect  of  an  admission  cannot  be  rebutted  by  evidence  that  different 
statements  were  made  at  other  times  :  Clark  v.  Huffaker,  26  Mo.  264  ;  Jones  v.  State, 
13  Tex.  168 ;  Hunt  v.  Roylance,  11  Cush.  117;  ante,  §  201  a,  note  3.} 

1  Combe  v.  Pitt,  3  Rurr.  1586,  1590  ;  Rigg  v.  Curgenven,  2  Wils.  395. 

2  Reade's  Case,  5  Co.   33,  34 ;    Toller's  Law  of  Ex'rs,  37-41  ;   see  also  Quick  v. 
Staines,  1  B.  &  P.  293.     Where  the  owners  of  a  stage-coach  took  up  more  passen- 
gers than  were  allowed  by  statute,  and  an  injury  was  laid  to  have  arisen  from  over- 
loading, the  excess  beyond  the  statute  number  was  held  by  Lord  Ellenborough  to  be 
conclusive  evidence  that  the  accident  arose  from  thatcau&e  :  Israel  v.  Clark,  4  Esp.  259. 


344  ADMISSIONS.  [CH.   XVII. 

the  master  ignorantly,  and  without  fraud,  and,  upon  making  oath  to 
the  application,  in  the  usual  course,  the  ship  was  given  up,  he  was 
not  permitted  afterwards  to  gainsay  it,  and  prove  the  misconduct 
of  the  master,  in  an  action  by  the  latter  against  the  owner,  for  his 
wages,  on  the  same  voyage,  even  by  showing  that  the  fraud  had 
subsequently  come  to  his  knowledge.8  The  mere  fact  that  an  ad- 
mission was  made  under  oath  does  not  seem  alone  to  render  it  con- 
clusive against  the  party,  but  it  adds  vastly  to  the  weight  of  the 
testimony,  throwing  upon  him  the  burden  of  showing  that  it  was  a 
case  of  clear  and  innocent  mistake.  Thus,  in  a  prosecution  under 
the  game  laws,  proof  of  the  defendant's  oath,  taken  under  the  in- 
come act,  that  the  yearly  value  of  his  estates  was  less  than  £100, 
was  held  not  quite  conclusive  against  him,  though  very  strong  evi- 
dence of  the  fact.4  And  even  the  defendant's  belief  of  a  fact,  sworn 
to  in  an  answer  in  Chancery,  is  admissible  at  law,  as  evidence  against 
him  of  the  fact,  though  not  conclusive.6 

§  211.  Admissions  in  Deeds.  Admissions  in  deeds  have  already 
been  considered,  in  regard  to  parties  and  privies,1  between  whom 
they  are  generally  conclusive ;  and  when  not  technically  so,  they  are 
entitled  to  great  weight  from  the  solemnity  of  their  nature.  But 
when  offered  in  evidence  by  a  stranger,  or,  as  it  seems,  even  by  a 
party  against  a  stranger,  the  adverse  party  is  not  estopped,  but  may 
repel  their  effect  in  the  same  manner  as  though  they  were  only  parol 
admissions.8 

§  212.  Non-judicial  Admissions,  not  conclusive.  Other  admis- 
sions, though  in  writing,  not  having  been  acted  upon  by  another  to 
his  prejudice,  nor  falling  within  the  reasons  before  mentioned  for 
estopping  the  party  to  gainsay  them,  are  not  conclusive  against  him, 
but  are  left  at  large,  to  be  weighed  with  other  evidence  by  the  jury. 

8  Freeman  v.  Walker,  6  Greenl.  68.  But  a  sworn  entry  at  the  custom-house  or 
certain  premises,  as  being  rented  by  A,  B,  and  C,  as  partners,  for  the  sale  of  beer, 
though  conclusive  in  favor  of  the  crown,  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of  the  partner- 
ship, in  a  civil  suit,  in  favor  of  a  stranger:  Ellis  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  453.  The 
difference  between  this  case  and  that  in  the  text  may  be,  that  in  the  latter  the  party 
gained  an  advantage  to  himself,  which  was  not  the  case  in  the  entry  of  partnership  :  it 
being  only  incidental  to  the  principal  object ;  namely,  the  designation  of  a  place  where 
an  excisable  commodity  was  sold. 

*  R.  v.  Clarke,  8  T.  R.  220.  It  is  observable  that  the  matter  sworn  to  was  rather  a 
matter  of  judgment  than  of  certainty  in  fact.  But  in  Thornes  v.  White,  1  Tyrwh.  & 
Grang.  110,  the  party  had  sworn  positively  to  matter  of  fact  in  his  own  knowledge  ;  but 
it  was  held  not  conclusive  in  law  against  him,  though  deserving  of  much  weight  with 
the  jury  ;  and  see  Carter  v.  Bennett,  4  Fla.  343. 

6  Doe  v.  Steel,  3  Campb.  115.  Answers  in  Chancery  are  always  admissible  at  law 
against  the  party,  but  do  not  seem  to  be  held  strictly  conclusive,  merely  because  they 
are  sworn  to.  See  Bull.  N.  P.  236,  237  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  284  ;  Cameron  v.  Li^htfoot, 
2  W.  Bl.  1190  ;  Grant  v.  Jackson,  Peake's  Cas.  203 ;  Studdy  «'.  Sanders,  2  D.  &  II.  347 ; 
De  Whelpdale  v.  Milburn,  5  Price  485. 

1  Supra,  §§  22-24,  189,  204.  But  if  the  deed  hns  not  been  delivered,  that  party  is 
not  conclusively  bound :  Robinson  v.  Cushman,  2  Denio  149  ;  j  Bulley  v.  Bulley,  L.  R. 
9  Ch.  739.} 

a  Bowman  v.  Rostron,  2  Ad.  &  El.  295,  n. :  Woodward  v.  Larking,  3  Esp.  286  j 
Mayor  of  Carlisle  v.  Blaiuire,  8  East  487,  492,  493. 


§§  210-212.]  ESTOPPELS.  345 

Of  this  sort  are  receipts,  or  mere  acknowledgments,  given  for  goods 
or  money  whether  on  separate  papers,  or  indorsed  on  deeds  or  on 
negotiable  securities;1  adjustment  of  a  loss,  on  a  policy  of  insur- 
ance, made  without  full  knowledge  of  all  the  circumstances,  or 
under  a  mistake  of  fact,  or  under  any  other  invalidating  circum- 
stances;2 and  accounts  rendered,  such  as  an  attorney's  bill,8  and 
the  like.  So,  of  a  bill  in  Chancery,  which  is  evidence  against  the 
plaintiff  of  the  admissions  it  contains,  though  very  feeble  evidence, 
so  far  as  it  may  be  taken  as  the  suggestion  of  counsel.4 

1  Skaife  v.  Jackson,  3  B.  &  C.  421  ;  Graves  v.  Key,  3  B.  &  Ad.  313  ;  Straton  v. 
Rastall,  2  T.  R.  366  ;  Fairmaner  v.  Budd,  7  Bing.  574  ;  Lampon  v.  Corke,  5  B.  &  Aid. 
606,  611,  per  Holroyd,  J.;  Harden  v.  Gordon,  2  Mason  541,  561  ;  Fuller  v.  Crittenden, 
9  Conn.  401;  Ensign  v.  Webster,  1  Johns.  Cas.  145  ;  Putnam  v.  Lewis,  8  Johns.  389  ; 
Stackpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  27;  Tucker  v.  Maxwell,  ib.  143  ;  "Wilkinson  v.  Scott, 
17  id.  249;  [post,  §  305  e.] 

2  Reyner  v.  Hall,  4  Taunt.  725 ;  Shepherd  v.  Chewter,  1  Campb.  274,  276,  note  by 
the  reporter  ;  Adams  v.  Sanders,  1  M.  &  M.  373 ;  Christian  v.  Coombe,  2  Esp.  489  ; 
Bilbie  ».  Lumley,  2  East  4C9  ;  Elting  v.  Scott,  2  Johns.  157. 

8  Lovebridge  v.  Botham,  1  B.  &  P.  49. 

4  Bull.  N.  P.  235;  Doe  v.  Sybourn,  7  T.  E.  3.    See  [ante,  §  186;]  post,  vol.  iil, 
§276. 


346 


CONFESSIONS. 


[CH.   XVIIL 


CHAPTER  XVIIL 


CONFESSIONS. 


1.  In  general. 

§  213.    What  is  a  Confession. 
§§  214,  215.    Weight  of  Confessions. 

2.   Confessions  as  Sufficient  Evidence  for 
Conviction. 

§  216.  Judicial  Confessions  ;  Plea  of 
Guilty. 

§  217.  Proof  of  Corpus  Delicti  as  Cor- 
roboration. 

§  217  a.    Confessions  of  Treason. 

3.  Construction  of  Confessions. 
§  218.   Confession    to    be  taken  as  a 
Whole. 

4.  Admissibility  of  Confessions. 
§  219.    General  Principle. 
§  219  a.    Tests  in  applying  the   Prin- 
ciple. 


§  219  b.  Judge  and  Jury. 

§§  220,  220  a.  Various  Specific  Induce- 
ments. 

§  220  b.  Confessions  induced  by  Spirit- 
ual Exhortations,  by  Trick, "etc. 

§  220  c.  Confessions  while  under  Ar- 
rest. 

§  221.  Removing  the  Improper  Induce- 
ment. 

§§  222,  223.    Persons  in  Authority. 

§§  224-226.  Confessions  at  an  Exami- 
nation before  a  Magistrate. 

§§  227,  228.  Magistrate's  Keport  of 
Examination  conclusive. 

§§  231,  232.  Corroborative  Discoveries, 
as  curing  a  Defective  Confession. 

§  233.  Confessions  of  other  Persons  ; 
Conspirators. 

§  234.  Same  :  Agents. 


1.    In  general. 

§  213.  What  is  a  Confession.  The  only  remaining  topic,  under 
the  general  head  of  admissions,  is  that  of  confessions  of  guilt  in 
criminal  prosecutions,  which  we  now  propose  to  consider.  It  has 
already  been  observed  that  the  rules  of  evidence,  in  regard  to  the 
voluntary  admissions  of  the  party,  are  the  same  in  criminal  as  in 
civil  cases.  But,  as  this  applies  only  to  admissions  brought  home  to 
the  party,  it  is  obvious  that  the  whole  subject  of  admissions  made 
by  agents  and  third  persons,  together  with  a  portion  of  that  of  im- 
plied admissions,  can  of  course  have  very  little  direct  application  to 
confessions  of  crime  or  of  guilty  intention.  In  treating  this  subject, 
however,  we  shall  follow  the  convenient  course  pursued  by  other 
writers,  distributing  this  branch  of  evidence  into  two  classes; 
namely,  first,  the  direct  confessions  of  guilt;  and,  secondly,  the 
indirect  confessions,1  or  those  which,  in  civil  cases,  are  usually 
termed  "implied  admissions."  [The  term  "confession,"  as  indicat- 
ing a  statement  subjected  to  peculiar  rules  for  its  use  in  criminal 
cases,  seems  in  strictness  to  include  only  what  in  common  usage  the 

1  QBy  this  term  the  author  seems  to  describe  that  conduct  (flight,  fabrication  of  evi. 
denw,  etc.)  which  indicates  consciousness  of  guilt  (treated  ante,  §  14;?),  and  that 
conduct  (silence,  etc.)  which  is  equivalent  to  an  admission  or  assertion  of  some  inci- 
dental fact  (treated  ante,  §§  195o-198).] 


§§  213-214]  NATURE   OF   CONFESSIONS.  347 

term  implies,  namely,  a  direct  assertion  by  the  accused  person  of  the 
doing  of  the  act  charged  as  a  crime.  It  is  for  this  sort  of  a  state- 
ment that  the  particular  ensuing  rules  of  caution  and  limitation  are 
intended, — the  rule  requiring  some  sort  of  corroboration,  the  rule 
requiring  freedom  from  the  inducement  of  hope  or  fear,  and  the  like. 
It  would  seem  to  follow  that  these  limiting  rules  about  confessions 
do  not  apply  to  conduct  or  statements  of  the  accused,  when  offered 
against  him,  other  than  those  of  the  above  sort.  In  particular  they 
do  not  apply  (1)  to  assertions  of  innocence,  assertions  of  an  alibi,  or 
other  exculpatory  assertions  about  incidental  facts,  when  offered  in 
court  in  contradiction  of  the  accused's  testimony  (on  the  principle 
of  §  461  /,  post)  or  as  indicating  by  their  falsity  a  fabrication  signifi- 
cant of  consciousness  of  guilt  (on  the  principle  of  §  14  £>,  ante) ; 2  nor 
do  they  apply  to  admissions  of  incidental  or  evidential  circumstances 
which  may  be  used  against  the  accused  just  as  the  statements  of  any 
party,  inconsistent  with  his  present  contention,  may  be  used  against 
him  (ante,  §  169). 8  Nevertheless,  statements  of  these  two  sorts, 
though  apparently  never  deliberately  asserted  by  any  Court  to  come 
within  the  rules  of  confessions,  are  by  some  Courts  not  uncom- 
monly treated  as  though  the  limiting  rules  about  confessions 
were  applicable.4] 

§  214.  Weight  of  Confessions.  But  here,  also,  as  we  have  before 
remarked  in  regard  to  admissions,1  the  evidence  of  verbal  confes- 
sions of  guilt  is  to  be  received  with  great  caution.  For,  besides  the 
danger  of  mistake,  from  the  misapprehension  of  witnesses,  the  mis- 
use of  words,  the  failure  of  the  party  to  express  his  own  meaning, 
and  the  infirmity  of  memory,  it  should  be  recollected  that  the  mind 
of  the  prisoner  himself  is  oppressed  by  the  calamity  of  his  situation, 
and  that  he  is  often  influenced  by  motives  of  hope  or  fear  to  make  an 

2  QThis  discrimination  is  noticed  in  Swift,  Evidence  (1810),  133  ;  Pentecost  v.  State, 
107  Ala.  81  ;  People  v.  Strong,  30  Cal.  157  ;  People  v.  Parton,  49  id.  637  ;  People  v. 
Reinhart,  id.,  38  Pac.  825  (useful  opinion) ;  People  v.  Hickman,  113  id.  80  ;  People  v. 
Ashmead,  118  id.  508  ;  People  v.  Ammermann,  ib.  23  ;  Mora  v.  People,  19  Colo.  255  ; 
Lee  v.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  264 ;  Powell  v.  State,  101  id.  9  ;  State  v.  Oilman,  51  Me. 
225  ;  State  v.  Cadotte,  17  Mont.  315  ;  Taylor  v.  State,  37  Nebr.  788  ;  State  v.  Porter, 
Or.,  49  Pac.   964  (useful  opinion);    State  v.  Broughton,  7  Ired.  96,  101;  State  ». 
Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  L.  402,  semble;  State  v.  Munson,  7  Wash.  239,  sembte.    The  Texas 
rulings  seem  to  vacillate  ;  see  jHaynie  v.  State,  2 Tex.  App.  168  ;  Taylor  v.  State,  Sid. 
387  ;  Marshall  v.  State,  5  id.  273  ;}   Ferguson  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  93  j  Bailey  v.  State, 
id.,  49  S.  W.  100.] 

3  rjCrossfi eld's  Trial,  26  How.  St.  Tr.  215  (leading  case)  ;  People  v.  Miller,  Cal.,  54 
Pac.  523  ;  Shaww.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  477  ;  Ballew  ».  U.  S.,  160  U.  S.  187  ;]  |  State 
v.  Knowles,  48  la.  590. } 

*  FJA  signal  instance  of  this  error  is  found  in  Bram  ».  U.  S.,  168  U.  S.  532,  where 
the  accused's  exculpatory  assertion  that  B.  could  not  have  seen  the  accused,  and  that 
he  thought  B.  committed  the  crime,  was  treated  as  a  confession. 

The  author  of  this  volume,  in  another  section,  had  added  the  following  note  :  "  The 
rule  excludes  not  only  direct  confessions,  but  any  other  declaration  tending  to  impli- 
cate the  prisoner  in  the  crime  charged,  even  though,  in  terms,  it  is  an  accusation  of 
another,  or  a  refusal  to  confess:  R.  v.  Tyler,  1  C.  &  P.  129  j  R.  v.  Enoch,  5  id.  539."! 

l  Supra,  §  200. 


348  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIIL 

untrue  confession.2  The  zeal,  too,  which  so  generally  prevails,  to 
detect  offenders,  especially  in  cases  of  aggravated  guilt,  and  the 
strong  disposition,  in  the  persons  engaged  in  pursuit  of  evidence,  to 
rely  on  slight  grounds  of  suspicion,  wnich  are  exaggerated  into 
sufficient  proof,  together  with  the  character  of  the  persons  necessa- 
rily called  as  witnesses,  in  cases  of  secret  and  atrocious  crime,  all 
tend  to  impair  the  value  of  this  kind  of  evidence,  and  sometimes 
lead  to  its  rejection,  where,  in  civil  actions,  it  would  have  been  re- 
ceived.8 The  weighty  observation  of  Mr.  Justice  Foster  is  also  to  be 
kept  in  mind,  that  "this  evidence  is  not,  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
things,  to  be  disproved  by  that  sort  of  negative  evidence,  by  which 
the  proof  of  plain  facts  may  be,  and  often  is,  confronted/' 

§  215.  Subject  to  these  cautions  in  receiving  and  weighing  them  it 
is  generally  agreed  that  deliberate  confessions  of  guilt  are  among 
the  most  effectual  proofs  in  the  law.1  Their  value  depends  on  the 
supposition  that  they  are  deliberate  and  voluntary,  and  on  the  pre- 

2  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  3,  n.  (2) ;  McNally's  Evid.  42,  43,  44  ;  Vaughan  v. 
Hann,  6  B.  Monr.  341.  Of  this  character  was  the  remarkable  case  of  the  two  Booms, 
convicted  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont,  in  Benniugton  County,  in  September  term, 
1819,  of  the  murder  of  Russell  Colvin,  May  10,  1812  ;  this  case,  of  which  there  is  a  re- 
port in  the  Law  Library  of  Harvard  University,  is  critically  examined  in  a  learned  and 
elaborate  article  in  the  North  American  Review,  vol.  x,  pp.  418-429.  For  other  cases 
of  false  confessions,  see  Wills  on  Circumstantial  Evidence,  p.  88  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid. 
419  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  397,  n.  ;  Warickshall's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  299,  n. ;  1  Chitty's 
Crirn.  Law,  p.  85  ;  1  Dickins,  Just.  629,  n.;  Joy  on  Confessions,  etc.,  pp.  100-109. 

The  civilians  placed  little  reliance  on  naked  confessions  of  guilt,  not  corroborated  by 
other  testimony.  Carpzovius,  after  citing  the  opinions  of  Severus  to  that  effect,  and 
enumerating  the  various  kinds  of  misery  which  tempt  its  wretched  victims  to  this  mode 
of  suicide,  adds :  "  Quorum  omnium  ex  his  font.ibus  contra  se  emissa  pronunciatio,  non 
tarn  delicti  confessione  tirmati  quam  vox  doloris,  vel  insanientis  oratio  est."  B.  Carpzov. 
Pract.  Rerum  Criminal.  Pars  III,  Qusest.  114,  p.  160.  The  just  value  of  these  instances 
of  false  confessions  of  crime  has  been  happily  stated  by  one  of  the  most  accomplished  of 
modern  jurists,  and  is  best  expressed  in  his  own  language  :  "  Whilst  such  anomalous 
cases  ought  to  render  Courts  and  juries,  at  all  times,  extremely  watchful  of  every  fact  at- 
tendant on  confessions  of  guilt,  the  cases  should  never  be  invoked,  or  so  urged  by  the 
accused's  counsel,  as  to  invalidate  indiscriminately  all  confessions  put  to  the  jury,  thus 
repudiating  those  salutary  distinctions  which  the  Court,  in  the  judicious  exercise  of  its 
duty,  shall  be  enabled  to  make.  Such  a  use  of  these  anomalies,  which  should  be  re- 
garded as  mere  exceptions,  and  which  should  speak  only  in  the  voice  of  warning,  is  no 
less  unprofessional  than  impolitic  ;  and  should  be  regarded  as  offensive  to  the  intelli- 
gence both  of  the  Court  and  jury.  .  .  .  Confessions  and  circumstantial  evidence  are 
entitled  to  a  known  and  fixed  standing  in  the  law  ;  and  while  it  behooves  students  and 
lawyers  to  examine  and  carefully  weigh  their  just  force,  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  to 
define  their  proper  limits,  the  advocate  should  never  be  induced,  by  professional  zeal  or 
a  less  worthy  motive,  to  argue  against  their  existence,  be  they  respectively  invoked, 
either  in  favor  of  or  against  the  accused  : "  Hoffman's  Course  of  Legal  Study,  vol.  i,  pp. 
'  367,  368;  see  also  The  (London)  Law  Magazine,  N.  8.  vol.  iv,  p.  317.  PFor  the  real 
reasons  why  confessions  are  often  to  be  regarded  as  untrustworthy,  ana  why,  on  the 
contrary,  they  are  often  spoken  of  as  the  highest  evidence,  see  an  article  by  the  present 
editor,  on  Confessions,  in  the  American  Law  Review,  May-June,  1899.1 

'  Foster's  Disc.  p.  243.  See  also  Lench  v.  Lench,  10  Ves.  518  ;  Smith  v.  Burnham, 
8  Sunm.  438. 

1  Dig.  lib.  42,  tit.  2,  De  Confess. ;  Van  Leenwen's  Comm.  b.  5,  c.  21,  §  1 ;  2  Poth. 
on  Obi.  (by  Evans),  App.  Num.  xvi,  §  13;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  LofTt,  216  ;  Hawk.  P.  C. 
b.  2,  c.  46,  §  3,  n.  (1 ) ;  Mortimer  v.  Mortimer,  2  Hagg.  Conn.  815  ;  Harris  v.  Harris, 
2  linger.  Eccl.  409;  {see  further  State  v.  Brown,  48  la.  882:  Com.  v.  Sanborn,  116 
Mass.  61.  | 


§§  214-216.]  SUFFICIENCY   FOR   CONVICTION.  349 

sumption  that  a  rational  being  will  not  make  admissions  prejudicial 
to  his  interest  and  safety,  unless  when  urged  by  the  promptings  of 
truth  and  conscience.2  Such  confessions,  so  made  by  a  prisoner,  to 
any  person,  at  any  moment  of  time,  and  at  any  place,  subsequent  to 
the  perpetration  of  the  crime ,  and  previous  to  his  examination  before 
the  magistrate,  are  at  common  law  received  in  evidence  as  among 
proofs  of  guilt.8  Confessions,  too,  like  admissions,  may  be  inferred 
from  the  conduct  of  the  prisoner,  and  from  his  silent  acquiescence  in 
the  statements  of  others,  respecting  himself,  and  made  in  his  pres- 
ence; provided  they  were  not  made  under  circumstances  which  pre- 
vented him  from  replying  to  them.4  The  degree  of  credit  due  to 
them  is  to  be  estimated  by  the  jury  under  the  circumstances  of 
each  case.5  Confessions  made  before  the  examining  magistrate,  or 
during  imprisonment,  are  affected  by  additional  considerations. 


Confessions  as  Sufficient  Evidence  for  Conviction. 

§  216.  Judicial  Confessions;  Plea  of  Guilty.  Confessions  are 
divided  into  two  classes,  [with  reference  to  their  sufficiency  in  evi- 
dence for  a  conviction,]  namely,  judicial  and  extrajudicial.  Judi- 
cial confessions  are  those  which  are  made  before  the  magistrate,  or 
in  court,  in  the  due  course  of  legal  proceedings ;  and  it  is  essential 
that  they  be  made  of  the  free  will  of  the  party,  and  with  full  and 
perfect  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  consequences  of  the  confession. 
Of  this  kind  are  the  preliminary  examinations,  taken  in  writing  by 
the  magistrate,  pursuant  to  statutes ;  and  the  plea  of  "  guilty  "  made 
in  open  court  to  an  indictment.  Either  of  these  is  sufficient  to 
found  a  conviction,  even  if  to  be  followed  by  sentence  of  death,  they 
being  deliberately  made,  under  the  deepest  solemnities,  with  the 
advice  of  counsel,  and  the  protecting  caution  and  oversight  of  the 
judge.1  Such  was  the  rule  of  the  Koman  law:  "Confesses  in  jure, 
pro  judicatis  haberi  placet; "  and  it  may  be  deemed  a  rule  of  univer- 

2  [Tor  an  examination  of  these  apparently  inconsistent  views  as  to  the  weight  of 
confessions,  see  the  article  by  the  present  editor  in  the  American  Law  Review,  above 
referred  to.] 

8  Lanibe  s  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  625,  629,  per  Grose,  J. ;  Warickshall's  Case, 
1  id.  298  ;  McNally's  Evid.  42,  47. 

4  Supra,  §  197  ;  R.  v.  Bartlett,  7  C.  &  P.  832  ;  R.  v.  Smithies,  5  id.  332;  R.  v. 
Appleby,  3  Stark.  33;  Joy  on  Confessions,  etc.,  77-80;  Jones  v.  Morrell,  1  Car.  &  Kir. 
266;  {State  v.  Smith,  30  La.  An.  Pt.  I,  457  ;  Campbell  v.  State,  55  Ala.  80  ;  Kelley 
v.  State,  55  N.  Y.  565;  supra,  §  197;  see  Drumright  v.  State,  29  Ga.  430 ;  People  v. 
McCrea,  32  Gal.  98 ;  Lawson  v.  State,  20  Ala.  65 ;  State  v.  Flanagin,  25  Ark.  92.  | 
[But  note  the  distinctions  already  mentioned  in  §  213.] 

6  Coon  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  246 ;  McCann  v.  State,  ib.  471 ;  Qfor  the  jury's  use  of 
the  confession,  see  post,  §  219  6.] 

i  [jStaundford  PI.  Cr.  b.  2,  c.  51 ;  Hale  PI.  Cr.,  Emlyn's  ed.  225 ;  Hawkins  PI.  Cr. 
b.  2,  c.  31,  sects.  1-3;  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Mico,  Hardres  139  ;  such  a  confession  must  not 
"  proceed  from  fear,  menace,  or  duress."]  J  It  is  of  course  also  admissible  in  evidence : 
Com.  v.  Brown,  150  Mass.  330.} 


350  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII. 

sal  jurisprudence.3  Extra  judicial  confessions  are  those  which  are 
made  by  the  party  elsewhere  than  [in  pleading]  before  a  magistrate, 
or  in  court;  this  term  embracing  not  only  explicit  and  express  con- 
fessions  of  crime,  but  all  those  admissions  of  the  accused  from  which 
guilt  may  be  implied.  All  confessions  of  this  kind  are  receivable 
in  evidence,  being  proved  like  other  facts,  to  be  weighed  by  the 
jury. 

§  217.  Extra  judicial  Confessions ;  Proof  of  Corpus  Delicti  as  Cor- 
roboration.  Whether  extrajudicial  confessions  uncorroborated  by 
any  other  proof  of  the  corpus  delicti  are  of  themselves  sufficient  to 
found  a  conviction  of  the  prisoner,  has  been  gravely  doubted.  In 
the  Roman  law,  such  naked  confessions  amounted  only  to  a  semiplena 
probatio,  upon  which  alone  no  judgment  could  be  founded;  and  at 
most  the  party  could  only  in  proper  cases  be  put  to  the  torture. 
But  if  voluntarily  made,  in  the  presence  of  the  injured  party,  or  if 
reiterated  at  different  times  in  his  absence,  and  persisted  in,  they 
were  received  as  plenary  proof.1  In  each  of  the  English  cases 
usually  cited  in  favor  of  the  sufficiency  of  this  evidence,  there  was 
some  corroborating  circumstance.2  In  the  United  States,  the  pris- 
oner's confession,  when  the  corpus  delicti  is  not  otherwise  proved,  has 
been  held  insufficient  for  his  conviction;  and  this  opinion  certainly 
best  accords  with  the  humanity  of  the  criminal  code,  and  with  the 
great  degree  of  caution  applied  in  receiving  and  weighing  the  evi- 

2  Cod.  Lib.  7,  tit.  59;  1  Poth.  on  Obi.  part  4,  c.  3,  §  1,  n.  798  ;  Van  Leeuwen's 
Coram.  b.  5,  c.  21,  §  2;  Mascard.  De  Probat.  vol.  i,  Concl.  344  ;  supra,  §  179. 

1  N.   Everhard.  Concil.  xix,  8,  Ixxii,  5,  cxxxi,  1,  clxv,  1,  2,  3,  clxxxvi,  2,  3,  11; 
Mascard.  De  Probat.  vol.  1,  Concl.  347,  349  ;  Van  Leeuwen's  Comm.  b.  5,  c.  21,  §§  4,  5  ; 
B.  Carpzov.  Practic.  Rerum  Criminal.  Pars  II,  Quaest.  n.  8. 

2  Wheeling's  Case,  1  Leach  Or.  Cas.  349,  n.,  seems  to  be  an  exception;  but  it  is 
too  briefly  reported  to  be  relied  on  ;  it  is  in  these  words :  "  But  in  the  case  of  John 
Wheeling,  tried  before  Lord  Kenyon,  at  the  Summer  Assizes  at  Salisbury,  1789,  it  was 
determined  that  a  prisoner  may  be  convicted  on  his  own  confession,  when  proved  by 
legal  testimony,  though  it  is  totally  uncorroborated  by  any  other  evidence.  '     But  in 
Eldridge's  Case,  Russ.  &  Ry.  440,  who  was  indicted  for  the  larceny  of  a  horse,  the  beast 
was  found  in  his  possession,  and  he  had  sold  it  for  £12,  after  asking  £35,  which  last 
was  its  fair  value.     In  the  case  of  Falkner  and  Bond,  ib.  481,  the  person  robbed  was 
called  upon  his  recognizance,  and  it  was  proved  that  one  of  the  prisoners  had  endeav- 
ored to  send  a  message  to  him  to  keep  him  from  appearing.     In  White's  Case,  ib.  508, 
there  was  strong  circumstantial  evidence,  both  of  the  larceny  of  the  oats  from  the  pros- 
ecutor's stable,  and  of  the  prisoner's  guilt ;  part  of  which  evidence  was  also  given  in 
Tippet's  Case,  ib.  509,  who  was  indicted  for  the  same  larceny  ;  and  there  was  the  addi- 
tional proof,  that  he  was  an  under-hostler  in  the  same  stable.     And  in  all  these  cases, 
except  that  of  Falkner  and  Bond,  the  confessions  were  solemnly  made  before  the  exam- 
ining magistrate,  and  taken  down  in  due  form  of  law.     In  the  case  of  Falkner  and  Bond, 
the  confessions  were  repeated,  once  to  the  officer  who  apprehended  thorn,  and  afterwards 
on  hearing  the  depositions  read  over,  which  contained  the  charge.     In  Stone's  Case, 
Dyer,  215,  pi.  50,  which  U  a  brief  note,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  corpus  delicti  was  not 
otherwise  proved  ;  on  the  contrary,  the  natural  inference  from  thereport  is,  that  it  was. 
In  Francia's  Case,  6  State  Tr.  58,  [15  How.  St.  Tr.  920,]  there  was  much  corroborative 
evidence ;  but  the  prisoner  was  acquitted  ;  and  the  opinion  of  the  judges  went  only  to 
the  sufficiency  of  the  confession  solemnly  made,  upon  the  arraignment  of  the  party  for 
high  treason,  and  thin  only  upon  the  particular  language  of  the  statutes  of  Edw.  VI. 
See  Foster,  Disc.  pp.  240-242.     Qln  R.  v.  Unkles,  Ir.  R.  8  C.  L.  50,  and  R.  v.  Sullivan, 
16  Cox  Cr.  347,  380,  the  doctrine  of  R.  v.  Wheeling,  supra,  is  approved.] 


§§  216-218.]  SUFFICIENCY  FOR  CONVICTION.  351 

deuce  of  confessions  in  other  cases,  and  it  seems  countenanced  by 
approved  writers  on  this  branch  of  the  law.8 

§  217  a  [235].  Confessions  of  Treason.  It  was  formerly  doubted 
whether  the  confession  of  the  prisoner,  indicted  for  high  treason, 
could  be  received  in  evidence,  unless  it  were  made  upon  his  arraign- 
ment, in  open  court,  and  in  answer  to  the  indictment;  the  statutes 
on  this  subject  requiring  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  some 
overt  act  of  treason.1  But  it  was  afterwards  settled,  and  it  is  now 
agreed,  that  though,  by  those  statutes,  no  confession  could  operate 
conclusively,  and  without  other  proof,  to  convict  the  party  of  trea- 
son, unless  it  were  judicially  made  in  open  court  upon  the  arraign- 
ment, yet  that,  in  all  cases,  the  confession  of  a  criminal  might  be 
given' in  evidence  against  him;  and  that  in  cases  of  treason,  if  such 
confession  be  proved  by  two  witnesses,  it  is  proper  evidence  to  be 
left  to  a  jury.2  And,  in  regard  to  collateral  facts  which  do  not  con- 
duce to  the  proof  of  any  overt  acts  of  treason,  they  may  be  proved  as 
at  common  law  by  any  evidence  competent  in  other  criminal  cases.8 


3.    Construction  of  Confessions. 

§  218.  Confession  to  be  taken  as  a  "Whole.  In  the  proof  of  con- 
fessions, as  in  the  case  of  admissions  in  civil  cases,  the  whole  of 
what  the  prisoner  said  on  the  subject,  at  the  time  of  making  the 
confession,  should  be  taken  together.1  This  rule  is  the  dictate  of 

»  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  163,  185 ;  Long's  Case,  1  Hayw.  524  (455) ;  Hawk.  P.  C. 
b.  2,  c.  46,  §  18;  jCom.  v.  Tarr,  4  Allen  315;  People  v.  Porter,  2  Parker  C.  R.  14; 
People  v.  Hennessey,  15  Wend.  147 ;  Ruloff  v.  People,  18  N.  Y.  179  ;  Bergen  v.  People, 
17  111.  426;  Brown  v.  State,  32  Miss.  433;  State  v.  German,  54  Mo.  526  ;  State  v. 
Keeler,  28  Iowa  553  ;  State  v.  Feltes,  51  id.  495 ;  Priest  v.  State,  10  Neb.  393  ;  John- 
son v.  State,  59  Ala.  37;  Cunningham  v.  Com.,  9  Bush  149  (by  statute);}  fJPeople  v. 
Jones,  Cal.,  55  Pac.  698;  Dugan  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  43  S.  W.  418;  Davis  v.  State,  Ga.,  32 
S.  E.  158.  It  seems  that  the  general  notion  is  merely  that  of  securing  some  corrobora- 
tion  before  convicting,  and  that,  on  the  one  hand,  other  evidence  merely  of  the  corpus 
delicti  will  suffice,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  other  evidence  not  necessarily  directed 
towards  the  corpus  delicti  will  equally  suffice ;  see  Bergen  v.  People,  17  111.  426,  and 
the  other  cases  supra;  Bartley  v.  People,  156  111.  234.] 

1  Foster's  Disc.  1,  §  8,  pp.  232-244;   1  East's  P.  C.  131-133.      Tinder  the  Stat. 
1  Ed.  VI,  c.  12,  and  5  Ed.  VI,  c.  11,  requiring  two  witnesses  to  convict  of  treason,  it 
has  been  held  sufficient  if  one  witness  prove  one  overt  act,  and  another  prove  another, 
if  both  acts  conduce  to  the  perpetration  of  the  same  species  of  treason  charged  upon 
the  prisoner :  Lord  Stafford's  Case,  T.  Raym.  407 ;  3  St.  Tr.  204,  205  ;  1  East's  P.  C. 
129 ;  1  Burr's  Trial  196. 

2  Francia's  Trial,   1   East's  P.  C.  133-135.      QBut  this  seems  not  to  have  been 
the  effect  of  Francia's  Trial,  which  looked  rather  in  the  opposite  direction.     In  Willis' 
Trial,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  623,  however,  the  above  view  was  taken ;   yet  the  question 
(which  turned  on  the  interpretation  of  St.  7  Wm.  Ill,  c.  3),  remained  unsettled  in 
Foster's  time:   Discourse,  supra,  241,  and  in  East's  time  :  East,  PI.  Cr.  I,  132.     The 
controversy  is  more  fully  explained  in  an  article  by  the  present  editor  on  Confessions, 
in  the  American  Law  Review,  May-June,  1899.] 

1  Smith's  Case,  Fost.  Disc.  p.  242;  East's  PL  Cr.  I,  130.     See  post,  §§  254,  255. 

1  The  evidence  must  be  confined  to  his  confessions  in  regard  to  the  particular  offence 
of  which  he  is  indicted  ;  if  it  relates  to  another  and  distinct  crime,  it  is  inadmissible  : 
R.  v.  Butler,  2  Car.  &  Kir.  221. 


352  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII. 

reason,  as  well  as  of  humanity.  The  prisoner  is  supposed  to  have 
stated  a  proposition  respecting  his  own  connection  with  the  crime; 
but  it  is  not  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  entire  proposition,  with 
all  its  limitations,  was  contained  in  one  sentence,  or  in  any  particu- 
lar number  of  sentences,  excluding  all  other  parts  of  the  conversa- 
tion. As  in  other  cases  the  meaning  and  intent  of  the  parties  are 
collected  from  the  whole  writing  taken  together,  and  all  the  instru- 
ments, executed  at  one  time  by  the  parties,  and  relating  to  the  same 
matter,  are  equally  resorted  to  for  that  purpose,  so  here.  [This 
principle,  in  its  application,  has  several  detailed  consequences. 
(1)  The  prosecution  must  put  in  the  whole  of  the  accused's  state- 
ment, including  the  portions  favorable  to  himself  as  well  as  those 
unfavorable.2  But  this  does  not  prevent  the  use  of  statements 
which  are  separate  in  themselves  though  not  forming  all  the  ac- 
cused's utterances,3  nor  of  such  fragments  of  a  connected  statement 
as  were  alone  heard  or  remembered  by  the  witness.4  Moreover,  the 
witness  need  not  be  able  to  give  the  exact  words,  provided  he  can 
give  the  substance.6]  (2)  If  one  part  of  a  conversation  is  relied  on, 
as  proof  of  a  confession  of  the  crime,  the  prisoner  has  a  right  to  lay 
before  the  Court  the  whole  of  what  was  said  in  that  conversation ; 
not  being  confined  to  so  much  only  as  is  explanatory  of  the  part 
already  proved  against  him,  but  being  permitted  to  give  evidence  of 
all  that  was  said  upon  that  occasion,  relative  to  the  subject-matter 
in  issue ;  6  for,  as  has  been  already  observed  respecting  admissions  ,7 
unless  the  whole  is  received  and  considered,  the  true  meaning  and 
import  of  the  part  which  is  good  evidence  against  him  cannot  be 
ascertained.  (3)  But  if,  after  the  whole  statement  of  the  prisoner 
is  given  in  evidence,  the  prosecutor  can  contradict  any  part  of  it,  he 
is  at  liberty  to  do  so ;  and  then  the  whole  testimony  is  left  to  the 
jury  for  their  consideration,  precisely  as  in  other  cases,  where  one 
part  of  the  evidence  is  contradictory  to  another ; 8  for  it  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  all  the  parts  of  a  confession  are  entitled  to  equal 

2  [^Hawkins,  PI.  Cr.  II,  c.  46,  s.  36 ;  R.  v.  Jones,  2  C.  &  P.  629 ;  R.  v.  Bowen, 
3  id.  603  ;  R.  v.  Higgins,  ib.  603;  R.  v.  Steptoe,  4  id.  397  ;  R.  r.  Clewes,  ib.  221  ; 
Chambers  v.  State,  26  Ala.  63  ;  Corbett  v.  State,  31  id.  341 ;  Eiland  v.  State,  52  id. 
835  (but  see  Webb  v.  State.  100  id.  47)  ;  Coon  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  249  ;  McCann 
p.  State,  ib.  498  ;  Bower  v.  State,  5  Mo.  382  ;  State  v.  Carlisle,  57  id.  106  ;  {State 
v.  Worthington,  64  N.  C.  594 ;  State  v.  Mahon,  32  Vt.  244 ;(  Brown's  Case,  9  Leigh 
633  ;  Griswold  v.  State,  24  Wis.  148.] 

8  FState  v.  Cowan,  7  Ired.  239  ;  Com.  v.  Pitsinger,  110  Mass.  101.H 
4  LState  ».  Madison,   47   La.  An.   30;    State  v.  Covington,  2  Bail.  569;  State  ». 
Gossett,  9  Rich.  428  ;  Shifflet's  Case,  HGratt.  652  ;]   jLevison  v.  State,  54  Ala.  520; 
but  compare  Berry  v.  Com.,  10  Bush  15  ;  People  v.  Gelabert,  39  Cal.  663.} 

•  (^Blister  v.  State,  26  Ala.  107,  127  ;  State  v.  Desroches,  48  La.  An.  428  ;   Berry 
v.  Com.,  10  Bush  17.  j 

8  Per  Lord  C.  J.  Abbott,  in  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  297,  298  ;  R.  v. 
Paine,  5  Mod.  165 ;  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  5  ;  R,  v.  Jones,  2  C.  &  P.  629  ;  R.  v. 
Higgins,  8  id.  603 ;  R.  v.  Hearne,  4  id.  215  ;  R.  v.  Clewes,  ib.  221  ;  R.  v.  Steptoe, 
ib.  397;  Brown's  Case,  9  Leigh  633  ;  ("State  v.  Jones,  47  La.  An.  1524.} 

7  Supra,  §  201,  and  cases  there  citi-d. 

•  R.  v.  Jones,  2  C.  &  P.  629. 


§§  218-219.]  CONFESSION   TAKEN  AS   A  WHOLE.  353 

credit.  The  jury  may  believe  that  part  which  charges  the  prisoner, 
and  reject  that  which  is  in  his  favor,  if  they  see  sufficient  grounds 
for  so  doing.9  If  what  he  said  in  his  own  favor  is  not  contradicted 
by  evidence  offered  by  the  prosecutor,  nor  improbable  in  itself,  it 
will  naturally  be  believed  by  the  jury;  but  they  are  not  bound  to  give 
weight  to  it  on  that  account,  but  are  at  liberty  to  judge  of  it  like 
other  evidence,  by  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  (4)  And  if  the 
confession  implicates  other  persons  by  name,  yet  it  must  be  proved 
as  it  was  made,  not  omitting  the  names ; 10  but  the  judge  will  instruct 
tne  jury,  that  it  is  not  evidence  against  any  but  the  prisoner  who 
made  it.11 

4.    Admissibility  of  Confessions. 

§  219.  General  Principle.  Before  any  confession  can  be  received 
in  evidence  in  a  criminal  case,  it  must  be  shown  that  it  was  volun- 
tary.1 "A  free  and  voluntary  confession,"  said  Eyre,  C.  B.,2  "is 
deserving  of  the  highest  credit,  because  it  is  presumed  to  flow  from 
the  strongest  sense  of  guilt,  and  therefore  it  is  admitted  as  proof  of 
the  crime  to  which  it  refers;  but  a  confession  forced  from  the  mind 
by  the  flattery  of  hope,  or  by  the  torture  of  fear,  comes  in  so  ques- 
tionable a  shape,  when  it  is  to  be  considered  as  the  evidence  of 
guilt,  that  no  credit  ought  to  be  given  to  it;  and  therefore  it  is 
rejected."8 

8  B.  v.  Higgins,  3  C.  &  P.  603  ;  R.  v.  Steptoe,  4  id.  397  ;  R.  v.  Clewes,  ib.  221  ; 
Respublica  v.  McCarty,  2  Dall.  86,  88  ;  Bower  v.  State,  5  Mo.  364  ;  supra,  §  201  ; 
j State  v.  West,  1  Houst.  Cr.  C.  371 ;  Eiland  v.  State,  52  Ala.  322  ;  Griswold  v.  State, 
24  Wis.  144 ;  State  v.  Malion,  32  Vt.  241  ;|  [[compare  Myers  v.  State,  97  Ga.  76.] 

10  R.  v.  Hearne,  4  C.  &  P.  215  ;  R.  v.  Clewes,  ib.  221  (per  Littledale,  J.,  who  said 
he  had  considered  this  point  very  much,  and  was  of  opinion  that  the  names  ought  not 
to  be  left  out ;  it  may  be  added,  that  the  credit  to  be  given  to  the  confession  may  de- 
pend much  on  the  probability  that  the  persona  named  were  likely  to  engage  in  such  a 
transaction) ;  see  also  R.  •?'.  Fletcher,  ib.  250.  The  point  was  decided  in  the  same  way 
in  R.  v.  Walkley,  6  id.  175,  by  Gurney,  B.,  who  said  it  had  been  much  considered 
by  the  judges  ;  Mr.  Justice  Parke  thought  otherwise  :  Barstow's  Case,  Lewin  Cr.  Cns. 
110.  [[Agreeing  with  R.  v.  Clewes  are  State  v.  Donelon,  45  La.  An.  744;  States. 
Foamier,  Vt.,  85  Atl.  178.] 
u  fOn  the  principle  of  §  233,  pos<.] 

1  L^t  this  point  the  author  inserted  the  following  sentence,  apparently  out  of 
place  :  "  The  course  of  practice  is,  to  inquire  of  the  witness  whether  the  prisoner  had 
been  told  that  it  would  be  better  for  him  to  confess,  or  worse  for  him  if  he  did  not 
confess,  or  whether  language  to  that  effect  had  been  addressed  to  him  :  1  Phil,  on  Evid. 
401  ;  2  East  PI.  Cr.  659."  No  cases  are  cited  ;  and  it  seems  incorrect  to  say  that  the 
"  course  of  practice"  involved  this  usual  inquiry.  Whether  such  a  communicatinn  to 
the  accused  makes  the  confession  inadmissible  is  another  question,  treated  post,  §  220.] 

3  Warickshall's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  299  ;  McNally's  Evid.  47;  Knapp's  Case, 
10  Pick.  489,  490  ;  Chabbock's  Case,  1  Mass.  144. 

8  In  Scotland,  this  distinction  between  voluntary  confessions  and  those  which  have 
boen  extorted  by  fear  or  elicited  by  promises  is  not  recognized,  but  all  confessions,  ob- 
tained in  either  mode,  are  admissible  at  the  discretion  of  the  judge.  In  strong  cases 
of  undue  influence,  the  course  is  to  reject  them  ;  otherwise,  the  credibility  of  the  evi- 
dence ia  left  to  the  jury  ;  see  Alison's  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  pp.  581,  582. 

L~For  the  history  of  this  limitation  as  to  voluntary  confessions,  see  the  article  in 
the  American  Law  Review,  already  referred  to.] 
VOL.  i.  — 23 


354  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII 

§  219  a.  Testa  in  applying  the  Principle.  The  material  inquiry, 
therefore,  is,  whether  the  confession  has  been  obtained  by  the  influ- 
ence of  hope  or  fear,  applied  by  a  third  person  to  the  prisoner's 
mind.  [But  this,  after  all,  is  merely  one  of  several  tests  or  rules 
which  have  been  employed  as  representing  a  general  principle  under- 
lying these  differently  phrased  tests.  "  The  foundation  of  all  rules 
upon  this  subject  rests  upon  an  anxiety  to  exclude  confessions  that 
are  probably  not  true ;  and  therefore  to  exclude  those  that  are  not 
voluntary  because  such  are  probably  untrue." *  "The  ground,"  said 
Chief  Justice  Shaw,2  "  on  which  confessions  made  by  a  party  accused, 
under  promises  of  favor  or  threats  of  injury,  are  excluded  as  incom- 
petent is  not  because  any  wrong  is  done  to  the  accused  in  using 
them,  but  because  he  may  be  induced,  by  the  pressure  of  hope  or 
fear,  to  admit  facts  unfavorable  to  him,  without  regard  to  their  truth, 
in  order  to  obtain  the  promised  relief  or  avoid  the  threatened  danger; 
and  therefore  admissions  so  obtained  have  no  just  and  legitimate 
tendency  to  prove  the  facts  admitted."  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.,  says : 8 
"  It  is  a  trite  maxim  that  the  confession  of  a  crime,  to  be  admissible 
against  the  party  confessing,  must  be  voluntary ;  but  this  only  means 
that  it  shall  not  be  induced  by  improper  threats  or  promises,  because 
under  such  circumstances  the  party  may  have  been  influenced  to  say 
that  which  is  not  true,  and  the  supposed  confession  cannot  be  safely 
acted  on."  4  This  being  the  general  underlying  principle  —  the  risk 
of  a  false  confession  of  guilt,  under  the  inducement  of  powerful 
considerations,  — various  tests  or  rules  of  thumb  have  obtained  more 
or  less  currency  in  the  application  of  the  principle  to  the  different 
kinds  of  influences  that  have  operated  to  induce  the  confession. 

(1)  The  only  sound  and  satisfactory  test,  judged  by  the  above 
principle,  is  one  which  has  unfortunately  found  only  infrequent 
use.  "The  only  proper  question  is,  whether  the  inducement  held 
out  to  the  prisoner  was  calculated  to  make  his  confession  an  untrue 
one."6  "The  controlling  inquiry6  is  whether  there  had  been  any 
threat  of  such  a  nature  that  from  fear  of  it  the  prisoner  was  likely 
to  have  told  an  untruth.  If  so,  the  confession  should  not  be  ad- 
mitted. Its  exclusion  rests  on  the  connection  with  the  inducement; 
they  stand  to  each  other  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  If  it  is 
apparent  that  no  such  connection  exists,  there  is  no  reason  for  the 
exclusion  of  the  evidence." 7 

1  [Withers,  J.,  in  State  v.  Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  L.  400;  see,  in  accord,  the  first  sen- 
tence of  §  231,  vost.1 

2  rCom.  v.  Morey,  1  Gray  462.] 

«  rSoott'l  Case,  1  Dears.  '&  B.  68.] 

4  L$°  also  Cooler,  J.,  in  People  v.  Wolcott,  61  Mich.  615  ;  Bleckley,  C.  J.,  in  Corn- 
wall v.  State,  113  N.  C.  277,  283  ;  and  many  other  judges.} 

6  ("Coleridge,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Thomas,  7  C.  &  P.  846 ;  so  also  R.  ».  Holmes,  1  C.  &  K. 
248 ;  R.  v.  Hornbrook,  1  Cox  Cr.  64  ;  R.  v.  Garner,  1  Den.  Cr.  C.  331,  Erie,  J.  ;  R.  v. 
Reason,  12  Cox  Cr.  229;  Joy,  Confessions,  13.] 

PHaralson,  J.,  in  Beckham  o.  State,  100  Ala.  15,  17.] 

7  L-""J  also  Williams  v.  State,  63  Ark.  527  ("whether  there  haa  been  any  threat  or 


§§  219  a-219  5.]  TESTS  OF  ADMISSIBILITT.  355 

(2)  It  is  much  more  common  to  state  the  test  without  any  ref- 
erence to  the  probability  of  the   inducement's   causing  an  untrue 
confession  of  guilt,  i.  e.  to  state  that  a  confession  is  inadmissible  if 
madfe  under  the  influence  of  a  promise  or  a  threat,  or  (taking  the 
subjective  point  of  view  to  express  a  similar  notion)  if  it  is  made 
through  fear  (of  harm  threatened)  or  through  hope  (of  benefit  prom- 
ised) ;  and  this  has  been  distinctly  taken  by  many  Courts  to  include 
any  sort  of  threat  or  promise  whatever.8 

(3)  Another  test,  quite  as  early,  historically,  and  quite  as  com- 
mon as  the  preceding  one,  is  whether  the  confession  was  "volun- 
tary."    But  this  phrase  is  so  indefinite  that  it  is  of  little  service  in 
itself,  and  is  usually  found  in  combination  with  the  preceding  one, 
called  in  aa  a  subordinate  test.9     It  is  the  least   satisfactory  one, 
not  only  for  this  reason,  but  also  because  it  is  inaccurate  (since  inad- 
missible confessions   made   under  the  hope  of  reward  are  still  in 
strictness  voluntary),  and,  further,  because  it  tends  misleadingly  to 
suggest  some  connection  between  the  present  doctrine  and  the  privi- 
lege against  self -crimination  (post,  §  469  cT).10 

Such  being  the  three  chief  forms  of  test  for  confessions,  it  remains 
to  notice  the  application  of  them  to  various  specific  inducements 
under  which  confessions  have  been  made.  The  spirit  of  extreme 
caution  and  liberality  towards  accused  persons  has  resulted  in  many 
rulings  not  to  be  defended  upon  principle;  but  the  tendency  in  most 
courts  to-day  is  towards  repudiating  the  most  extreme  of  these  rul- 
ings of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  to  approximate 
toward  the  use  of  the  first  above-mentioned  and  only  correct  test. 

But  first  as  to  the  respective  functions  of  judge  and  jury  in  apply- 
ing the  test.] 

§  219  b.  Judge  and  Jury.  The  evidence  to  this  point,  being  in  its 
nature  preliminary,  is  addressed  to  the  judge,  who  admits  the  proof 
of  the  confession  to  the  jury,  or  rejects  it,  as  he  may  or  may  not  find 
it  to  have  been  drawn  from  the  prisoner,  by  the  application  of  those 
motives.1  [It  is  sometimes  said  that  even  when  the  confession  is 

promise  of  such  a  nature  that  the  prisoner  would  be  likely  to  tell  an  untruth  from  the 
fear  of  the  threat  or  hope  of  profit  from  the  promise") ;  Fife  ».  Com.,  29  Pa.  437;  U.  S. 
v.  Stone,  8  Fed.  232,  241,  256  ;  Young  v.  State,  68  Ala.  575.] 

8  QR.  v.  Moore,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  525  ;  State  v.  Long,  Haywood  455  ;  Bonner  v.  State, 
55  Ala.  245."] 

9  CE.  g.  Thompson's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  C.  (4th  ed.)  293  ;  R.  v.  Fennell,  7  Q.  B.  D. 
150  ;  R.  «.  Thompson,  1893,  2  Q.  B.  17;  State  v.  Jones,  54  Mo.  479.1 

10  rjThe  express  statement,  in  Bram  v.  U.  S.,  168  U.  S.  532,  that  the  constitutional 
amendment  embodying  that  privilege  "was  but  a  crystallization  of  the  doctrine  as  to 
confessions"  is  simply  without  any  foundation  whatever,  either  in  history,  policy,  or 
principle.  If  proof  were  needed,  it  is  found  in  the  circumstances,  (1)  that  the  lines  of 
precedents  are  wholly  distinct,  (2)  that  the  privilege  applies  to  witnesses  as  such,  while 
confessions  are  concerned  only  with  the  party-defendant,  (3)  that  a  statement  may  be 
not  privileged  and  yet  inadmissible  as  a  confession,  and  vice  versa,  (4)  that  a  statement 
obtained  by  violating  the  privilege  may  still  be  used  against  a  person  other  than  the 
privileged  one.  The  fallacy  was  long  ago  exploded  by  Mr.  J.  Seldon,  in  Hendrickson 
».  People,  ION.  Y.  33,  and  People  v.  McMahon,  15  id.  386  ;  see  also  the  exposition 
post,  in  Appendix  III. 

1  Boyd  v.  State,  2  Humphreys  39  ;  R.  v.  Martin,  1  Annstr.  Macartn.  &  Ogle  197 ; 


356  CONFESSIONS.  '  [CH.   XVIII. 

admitted,  the  jury  may  still  reject  it  if  it  appears  not  voluntary;3 
but  this  seems  erroneous;  for  the  jury  have  nothing  to  do  with  this 
preliminary  question  of  admissibility;  and  if  the  confession  is  once 
left  to  them,  they  may  reject  it  because  they  do  not  believe  it,  but 
not  because  it  is  not  voluntary.8]  This  matter  resting  wholly  in 
the  discretion  of  the  judge,  upon  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,4 
it  is  difficult  to  lay  down  particular  rules  a  priori,  for  the  govern- 
ment of  that  discretion.  The  rule  of  law,  applicable  to  all  cases, 
only  demands  that  the  confession  shall  have  been  made  voluntarily, 
without  the  appliances  of  hope  or  fear  by  any  other  person;  and 
whether  it  was  so  made  or  not  is  for  him  to  determine,  upon  consid- 
eration of  the  age,  situation,  and  character  of  the  prisoner,  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  was  made.5  Language  addressed  by 
others,  and  sufficient  to  overcome  the  mind  of  one,  may  have  no  effect 
upon  that  of  another;  a  consideration  which  may  serve  to  recon- 
cile some,  contradictory  decisions,  where  the  principal  facts  appear 
similar  in  the  reports,  but  the  lesser  circumstances,  though  often 
very  material  in  such  preliminary  inquiries,  are  omitted.  But  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  this  rule  has  been  sometimes  extended  quite 
too  far,  and  been  applied  to  cases  where  there  could  be  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  inducement  had  any  influence  upon  the  mind  of  the 
prisoner.8 

State  v.  Grant,  9  Shepl.  171  ;  U.  S.  v.  Nott,  1  McLean  499  ;  State  v.  Harman, 
3  Harringt.  567;  ]  Brown  v.  State,  91  111.  506  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  59  Ala.  37  ;  Wade 
v.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  80  ;  Chabbock's  Case,  1  Mass.  144  ;  Com.  v.  Taylor,  5  Cush. 
606  ;  Com.  v.  Moray,  1  Gray  461  (but  compare  Com.  v.  Piper,  120  Mass.  185  ;  Com. 
v.  Smith,  119  id.  305;  Com.  v.  Cullen,  111  id.  436;  Com.  v.  Cuffee,  108  id.  285)  ; 
Com.  »>.  Culver,  126  id.  464  ;{  [Redd  v.  State,  69  Ala.  260  ;  State  v.  Duncan,  64  Mo. 
2G5  ;  Rufer  v.  State,  25  Oh.  St.  469 ;  Fife  v.  Com.,  29  Pa.  437  ;  State  v.  Gossett, 
9  Rich.  435  ;  Cain  v.  State,  18  Tex.  390;  Smith's  Case,  10  Gratt.  737;  Dugan  v. 
Com.,  Ky.,  43  S.  W.  418  ;  U.  S.  v.  Stone,  8  Fed.  256  (leading  case).] 

2  Qiarrard  v.  State,  50  Miss.  152;  Hamlin  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  47  S.  W.  656;  Com. 
v.  Bond,  170  Mass.  41  ;  Wilson  v.  U.  S.,  162  U.  S.  613  ;]  {People  v.  Howes,  81  Mich. 
396  ;  People  v.  Swetland,  77  id.  53  ;  People  v.  Barker,  60  id.  277;  Thomas  v.  State, 
84  Ga.  618  ;  Carr  v.  State,  ib.  250. } 

8  [Burton  v.  State,  107  Ala.  108  (leading  case)  ;  Holland  v.  State,  39  Fla.  178. 
But  it  would  seem  that  if  the  existence  of  the  improper  inducement  is  doubtful  as  a 
question  of  fact,  the  confession  may  be  left  to  the  jury  to  determine  this  preliminary 
question :  Com.  v.  Preece,  140  Mass.  276  ;  Com.  v.  Burroughs,  1C2  id.  513  ;  Burdge  v. 
State,  53  Oh.  612.] 

*  [No  Court  goes  so  far  as  this  ;  but  a  few  Courts  declare  the  finding  of  the  facts 
of  the  inducement  to  be  detenninable  by  the  trial  Court :  Holland  v.  State,  39  Fla. 
178  ;  State  v.  Vann,  82  N.  C.  632  ;  while  a  few  Courts  use  certain  general  terms, 
hardly  significant  iu  practice,  about  the  trial  Court's  discretion  :  see  Williams  r.  State, 
63  Ark.   527  ;  State  v.  Willis,  Conn.,  41  Atl.  820 ;   Bartley  v.  People,  156  111.  234  ; 
Roesel  v.  State,  N.  J.  L.,  41  Atl.  408 ;  State  v.  Cannon,  49  S.  C.  550.] 

6  McNally's  Evid.  43  ;  Nute's  Case,  6  Petersdorfs  Abr.  82;  Knapp's  Case,  10  Pick. 
496  ;  U.  S.  P.  Nott,  1  McLean  499  ;  supra,  §  49  ;  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  ]75,  180  ; 
Drew's  Case,  8  C.  &  P.  140;  R.  v.  Thomas,  7  id.  345  ;  R.  v.  Court,  ib.  486. 

•  Parke,  B.t  in  R.  v.  Baldry,  16  Jur.  599,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  441.     "  By  the  law  of  Eng- 
land, in  order  to  render  a  confession  admissible  in  evidence,  it  must  be  perfectly  volun- 
tary; and  there  is  no  doubt  that  any  inducement,  in  the  nature  of  a  promise  or  of  a 
thniat,  held  out  by  a  pel-son  in  authority,  vitiates  a  confession.     The  decisions  to  th:it 
effect  have  gone  a  long  way.     Whether  it  would  not  have  been  better  to  have  left  the 


§§  219  5-220.]      KINDS   OF  IMPROPER   INDUCEMENTS.  357 

[As  to  where  the  burden  of  proof  lies,  the  orthodox  rule  prescribes 
that  the  prosecution  shall  show  the  confession  not  to  have  been 
improperly  obtained  by  the  person  receiving  it,7  and  it  has  even 
been  held  that  an  improper  inducement  from  any  other  person  must 
be  negatived.8  But  in  England  the  modern  doctrine  seems  to  be 
that  improper  inducements  need  to  be  negatived  only  where  a  doubt 
has  been  raised  as  to  their  existence ; 9  and  the  best  rule,  obtaining  in 
ouly  a  few  jurisdictions,  is  that  the  defendant  must  show  that  an 
improper  inducement  was  applied  to  obtain  the  confession.10] 

§  220.  Various  Specific  Inducements.  The  rule  under  considera- 
tion has  been  illustrated  in  a  variety  of  cases.  Thus,  where  the 
prosecutor  said  to  the  prisoner,  "Unless  you  give  me  a  more  satis- 
factory account,  I  will  take  you  before  a  magistrate,"  evidence  of 
the  confession  thereupon  made  was  rejected.1  It  was  also  rejected, 
where  the  language  used  by  the  prosecutor  was,  "  If  you  will  tell 
me  where  my  goods  are,  I  will  be  favorable  to  you ; "  a  where  the 
constable  who  arrested  the  prisoner  said,  "It  is  of  no  use  for  you  to 
deny  it,  for  there  are  the  man  and  boy  who  will  swear  they  saw  you 
do  it;"8  where  the  prosecutor  said,  "He  only  wanted  his  money, 
and  if  the  prisoner  gave  him  that  he  might  go  to  the  devil,  if  he 
pleased;  "  *  and  where  he  said  he  should  be  obliged  to  the  prisoner, 
if  he  would  tell  all  he  knew  about  it,  adding,  "  If  you  will  not,  of 
course  we  can  do  nothing,"  meaning  nothing  for  the  prisoner.5  So 
where  the  prisoner's  superior  officer  in  the  police  said  to  him,  "  Now 
be  cautious  in  the  answers  you  give  me  to  the  questions  I  am  going 
to  put  to  you  about  this  watch;"  the  confession  was  held  inadmis- 
sible.6 There  is  more  difficulty  in  ascertaining  what  is  such  a 

whole  to  go  to  the  jury,  it  is  now  too  late  to  inquire ;  but  I  think  there  has  been  too 
much  tenderness  towards  prisoners  in  this  matter.  I  confess  that  I  cannot  look  at  the 
decisions  without  some  shame,  when  I  consider  what  objections  have  prevailed  to  pre- 
vent the  reception  of  confessions  in  evidence ;  and  I  agree  with  the  observation,  that 
the  rule  has  been  extended  quite  too  far,  and  that  justice  and  common  sense  have  too 
frequently  been  sacrificed  at  the  shrine  of  mercy ;  "  jsee  State  v.  Grant,  22  Me.  171  ; 
Com.  v.  Morey,  1  Gray  461 ;  Fife  v.  Com.,  29  Pa.  St.  429  ;  Spears  r.  Ohio,  2  Oh.  St 
683.  { 

*  [Thompson's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  C.  3d  ed.  328,  semble  ;  R,  v.  Warringham,  2  Den. 
Cr.  C.  447  ;  Bonner  v.  State,  55  Ala.  245;  Hopt  v.  Utah,  110  U.  S.  587  ;J  { Nicholson 
».  State,  38  Md.  140;  People  v.  Soto,  49  Cal.  69;  Thompson's  Case,  20  Gratt.  724; 
Johnson  v.  State,  30  La,  An.  881 ;  State  t>.  Garvey,  28  id.  925 ;  Barnes  v.  State,  36 
Tex.  356.  | 

8  ["State  v.  Garvey,  28  La.  An.  925.] 

9  LR-  «•  Thompson,  1893,  2  Q.  B.  12,  18-3 

10  [Com.  v.  Culver,  126  Mass.  464  ;  Rufer  v.  State,  25  Oh.  St.  469  ;]  see  R.  ». 
Garner,  2  C.  &  K.  920.  QWhere  a  written  confession  denies  the  existence  of  any 
improper  inducement,  the  same  result  would  follow:  Hauk  v.  State,  148  lud.  238. 

1  Thompson's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  325.     See  also  Com.  v.  Harman,  5  Barr  269 ; 
State  v.  Cowan,  7  I  red.  239. 

2  Cass's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  328,  n.  ;  Boyd  v.  State,  2  Humph.  39. 
8  R.  v.  Mills,  6C.  &  P.  146. 

*  R.  v.  Jones,  Russ.  &  Ry.  152.     See  also  Griffin's  Case,  ib.  151. 

6  R.  v.  Partridge,  7  C.  &  P.  551.     See  also  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  163. 

6  R.  v.  Fleming,  1  Armst.  Macartn.  &  Ogle  330.     But  where  the  examining  magis- 


358  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII. 

threat,  as  will  exclude  a  confession ;  though  the  principle  is  equally 
clear,  that  a  confession  induced  by  threats  is  not  voluntary,  and 
therefore  cannot  be  received.7  [On  principle,  the  advice  by  any 
person,  "You  had  better  tell  the  truth,"  or  its  equivalent,  cannot 
possibly  vitiate  the  confession,  since  it  does  not  tend  to  produce  a 
false  statement;  and  to  this  effect  is  the  modern  weight  of  authority.8 
But  advice  that  "  You  had  better  confess,"  i.  e.  irrespective  of  actual 
guilt,  has  generally  been  held  an  improper  inducement.9  Confes- 
sions made  under  threats  of  physical  violence  —  as  where  the  accused 
is  in  the  hands  of  a  mob  —  are  inadmissible;10  so  also  a  confession 
obtained  by  promise  of  pardon.11  Indefinite  promises  of  favorable 
legal  action  stopping  short  of  complete  immunity  are  usually  treated 
as  affording  an  improper  inducement;12  as  also  a  promise  not  to 
arrest.1*  A  statement  that  "what  you  say  will  be  used  for  you"  is 
no  longer  regarded  as  vitiating  the  confession.14] 

§  220  a.  It  is  extremely  difficult  to  reconcile  these  and  similar 
cases  with  the  spirit  of  the  rule,  as  expounded  by  Chief  Baron  Eyre, 
whose  language  is  quoted  in  a  preceding  section.  The  difference  is 
between  confessions  made  voluntarily,  and  those  "forced  from  the 

trate  said  to  the  prisoner,  "  Be  sure  you  say  nothing  but  the  truth,  or  it  will  be  taken 
against  you,  and  maybe  given  in  evidence  against  you  at  your  trial,"  the  statement 
thereupon  made  was  held  admissible  :  R.  v.  Holmes,  1  C.  &  K.  248  ;  s.  p.  R.  v.  Att- 
wood,  5  Cox  C.  C.  322. 

7  Thornton's  Case,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  27 ;  Long's  Case,  6  C.  &  P.  179  ;  Roscoe's 
Crim.  Evid.  34  ;   Dillon's  Case,  4  Dall.  116.     Where  the  prisoner's  superior  in  the 
post-office  said  to  the  prisoner's  wife,  while  her  husband  was  in  custody  for  opening 
and  detaining  a  letter,  ' '  Do  not  be  frightened  ;  I  hope  nothing  will  happen  to  your 
husband  beyond  the  loss  of  his  situation  ;  "  the  prisoner's  subsequent  confession  was 
rejected,  it  appearing  that  the  wife  might  have  communicated  this  to  the  prisoner : 
R.  v.  Harding,  1  Armst.  Macartn.  &  Ogle  340. 

8  Ql.  v.  Court,  7  C.  &  P.  486  (leading  case)  ;  E.  v.  Hewett,  Carr.  &  M.  534 ;  R.  v. 
Moore,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  523,  Erie,  J.  ;  R.  v.  Jarvis,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  R.  96 ;  R.  v.  Reeve,  ib. 
362 ;  Aaron  v.  State,  37  Ala.  106 ;  King  v.  State,  40  id.  321  (leading  case)  ;  State  v. 
Potter,  18  Conn.  178,  semble. ;  Rafe  v.  State,  20  Ga.  62 ;  Valentine  v.  State,  77  id. 
472  ;  Nicholson  v.  State,  38  Md.  153 ;  Com.  v.  Tuckerman,  10  Gray  191  ;  Com.  v. 
Mitchell,  117  Mass.  432;  Com.  v.  Smith,  119  id.  307;  States.  Staley,  14  Minn.  Ill; 
State   ».    Anderson,  96  Mo.   249;  State  v.  Gossett,  9  Rich.  428;   State  v.   Kirby, 

I  Strobh.  155;  State  v.  Carr,  37  Vt.  192. 

Contra  :  R.  v.  Enoch,  5  C.  &  P.  539 ;  R.  v.  Garner,  1  Den.  Cr.  C.  329 ;  R,  v.  Bate, 

II  Cox  Cr.  686 ;  R.  v.  Dogherty,  13  id.  23 ;  R.  v.  Fennell,  7  Q.  B.  D.  147  ;  People  v. 
Thompson,  84  Cal.  605;  State  v.  York,  37  N.  H.  175  ;  State  v.  Whitfield,  70  N.  C. 
856 ;  Com.  v.  Harman,  4  Pa.  St.  269.] 

»  CR.  v.  Kingston,  4  C.  &  P.  387  ;  R.  v.  Shepherd,  7  id.  579 ;  R.  v.  Thomas,  6  id. 
853  ;  R.  v.  Warringham,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  447 ;  R.  v .  Coley,  10  Cox  Cr.  536  ;  Banks  v. 
State,  84  Ala.  430;  Green  v.  State,  88  Ga.  616  ;  Com.  v.  Nott,  135  Mass.  269  ;  State 
v.  Brockman,  46  Mo.  569  ;  Vaughan's  Case,  17  Gratt.  580.] 

w  TMiller  v.  People,  39  111.  457  ;  Barnes  w.  State,  36  Tex.  356.] 

11  LK-  »•  Gillis,  11  Cox  Cr.  69 ;  Com.  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  499  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  80 
La.  An.  881.] 

18  R.  v.  Cooper,  5  C.  &  P.  535  ;  R.  ».  Mansfield,  14  Cox  Cr.  639  ;  Porter  v.  State,  55 
Ala.  101 ;  Austine  v.  People,  61  111.  238  ;  People  v.  Wolcott,  51  Mich.  614  ;  Boyd  v. 
State,  2  Humph.  40.] 

HI.  v.  Luckhurst,  6  Cox  Cr.  243  ;  Beery  v.  U.  S.,  2  Colo.  189,  203.] 

14  LH.  v-  Baldry,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  430,  repudiating  earlier  rulings ;  Roesel  v.  State, 
N.  J.  L.,  41  Atl.  408.] 


|§  220-220  5.]     KINDS  OF  IMPROPER  INDUCEMENTS.  359 

mind  by  the  flattery  of  hope,  or  by  the  torture  of  fear."  If  the 
party  has  made  his  own  calculation  of  the  advantages  to  be  derived 
from  confessing,  and  thereupon  has  confessed  the  crime,  there  is  no 
reason  to  say  that  it  is  not  a  voluntary  confession.  It  seems  that, 
in  order  to  exclude  a  confession,  the  motive  of  hope  or  fear  must  be 
directly  applied  by  a  third  person,  and  must  be  sufficient,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  Court,  so  far  to  overcome  the  mind  of  the  prisoner 
as  to  render  the  confession  unworthy  of  credit.1 

§  220  b.  Confessions  induced  by  Spiritual  Exhortations,  by  Trick, 
etc.  Though  it  is  necessary  to  the  admissibility  of  a  confession  that 
it  should  have  been  voluntarily  made,  that  is,  that  it  should  have 
been  made,  as  before  shown,  without  the  appliances  of  hope  or  fear 
from  persons  having  authority,  yet  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should 
have  been  the  prisoner's  own  spontaneous  act.  It  will  be  received, 
though  it  were  induced  by  spiritual  exhortations,  whether  of  a 
clergyman,1  or  of  any  other  person; 2  by  a  solemn  promise  of  secrecy, 
even  confirmed  by  an  oath;8  or  by  reason  of  the  prisoner's  having 
been  made  drunken ;  *  or  by  a  promise  of  some  collateral  benefit  or 
boon,  no  hope  or  favor  being  held  out  in  respect  to  the  criminal 
charge  against  him ; 6  or  by  any  deception  practised  en  the  prisoner, 
or  false  representation  made  to  him  for  that  purpose,  provided  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  inducement  held  out  was  calculated 
to  produce  any  untrue  confession,  which  is  the  main  point  to  be 
considered.6  So,  a  confession  is  admissible,  though  it  is  elicited  by 

1  See  R.  v.  Baldry,  16  Jur.  599,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  430,  where  this  subject  was  very  fully 
discussed,  and  the  true  principle  recognized,  as  above  quoted  from  C'h.  Baron  Eyre. 

1  R.  v.  Gilham,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Gas.  186,  more  fully  reported  in  Joy  on  Confessions, 
52-56;  Cora.  v.  Drake,  15  Mass.  161;  [see  R.  v.  Radford,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C.  197.]     In 
the  Roman  law  it  is  otherwise  ;  penitential  confessions  to  the  priest  being  encouraged, 
for  the  relief  of  the  conscience,  and  the  priest  being  bound  to  secrecy  by  the  peril  of 
punishment.     "  Confessio  coraui  sacerdote,  in  pcenitentia  facta,  non  probat  in  judicio  ; 
quia  censetur  facta  coram  Deo;  imo,  si  sacerdos  earn  enunciat,  incidit  in  pcenam  : " 
Mascardus,  De  Probat.  vol.  i,  Concl.  377.     It  was  lawful,  however,  for  the  priest  to 
testify  in  such  cases  to  the  fact  that  the  party  had  made  a  penitential  confession  to 
him,  as  the  Church  requires,  and  that  he  had  enjoined  penance  upon  him  ;  and,  with 
the  express  consent  of  the  penitent,  he  might  lawfully  testify  to  the  substance  of  the 
confession  itself  :  Ib.     See  post,  §  247,  as  to  the  privilege  in  such  a  case. 

2  R.  v.  Wild,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  452 ;  R.  v.  Court,  7  C.  &  P.  486  ;  Joy  on  Confessions, 
49,  51  ;  [JR.   v.  Gibney,  Jebb  Cr.  C.  15;  R.  v.  Hodgson,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C.  203;  R.  v. 
Sleeman,  6  Cox  Cr.  245.] 

8  R.  v.  Shaw,  6  C.  &  P.  372;  Com.  ».  Knapp,  9  Pick.  496,  500-510;  [State  v. 
Darnell,  1  Houst.  Cr.  C.  322.]  So,  if  it  was  overheard,  whether  said  to  himself  or  to 
another  :'  R.  v.  Simons,  6  C.  &  P.  540  ;  [Com.  v.  Goodwin,  186  Pa.  218.] 

4  R.  v.  Spilsbury,  7  C.  &  P.  187;  {Eskridge  v.  State,  25  Ala.  30  ;  Com.  v.  Howe, 
9  Gray  110  ;  State  v.  Feltes,  51  Iowa  495  ;  Jeffords  v.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  R.  547;  Lester 
v.  State,  32  Ark.  727  ;|  [Vaughan's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  507;  State  v.  Berry,  La. 
An.  24  So.  329;  State  v.  Cannon,  S.  C..  30  S.  E.  589  (morphine);  Leach  v.  State,  99 
Tenn.  584  ;  White  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  625.]  jBut  a  confession  made  during  sleep  is 
inadmissible:  People  v.  Robinson,  19  Cal.  40. ( 

6  R.  v.  Green,  6  C.  &  P.  655  ;  R.  v.  Lloyd,  ib.  393  ;  j  State  v.  Wentworth,  37  N.  H. 
196 ;  e.  g.,  that  he  shall  see  his  wife,  or  have  some  spirits,  or  have  his  handcuffs  re- 
moved (R.  v.  Green  ;  R.  v.  Lloyd),  or  be  released  from  solitary  confinement,  and  be 
allowed  to  associate  with  other  prisoners  :  State  v.  Tatro,  50  Vt.  483.  { 

6  R.  v.  Derrington,  2  C.  &  P.  418  ;  Burley'a  Case,  2  Stark.  Evid.  12,  n.;  jCom.  ». 


360  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII. 

questions,  whether  put  to  the  prisoner  by  a  magistrate,  officer,  or 
private  person;  and  the  form  of  the  question  is  immaterial  to  the 
admissibility,  even  though  it  assumes  the  prisoner's  guilt.7  In  all 
these  cases  the  evidence  may  be  laid  before  the  jury,  however  little 
it  may  weigh,  under  the  circumstances,  and  however  reprehensible 
may  be  the  mode  in  which,  in  some  of  them,  it  was  obtained.  All 
persons,  except  counsellors  and  attorneys,  are  compellable  at  com- 
mon law  to  reveal  what  they  may  have  heard;  and  counsellors  and 
attorneys  are  excepted  only  because  it  is  absolutely  necessary,  for 
the  sake  of  their  clients,  and  of  remedial  justice,  that  communica- 
tions to  them  should  be  protected.8  Neither  is  it  necessary  to  the 
admissibility  of  any  confession,  to  whomsoever  it  may  have  been 
made,  that  it  should  appear  that  the  prisoner  was  warned  that  what 
he  said  would  be  used  against  him.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  con- 
fession was  voluntary,  it  is  sufficient,  though  it  should  appear  that 
he  was  not  so  warned.9 

§  220  c.  Confessions  while  under  Arrest  It  has  been  thought 
that  illegal  imprisonment  exerted  such  influence  upon  the  mind  of 
the  prisoner  as  to  justify  the  inference  that  his  confessions,  made 
during  its  continuance,  were  not  voluntary ;  and  therefore  they  have 
been  rejected.1  But  this  doctrine  cannot  yet  be  considered  as  satis- 
factorily established.2  [That  the  mere  fact  of  the  accused  person's 
being  under  arrest  at  the  time  of  making  the  confession  does  not 
exclude  it  seems  generally  conceded.8] 

§  221.  Removing  the  Improper  Inducement.  But  though  promises 
or  threats  have  been  used,  yet  if  it  appears  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
judge  that  their  influence  was  totally  done  away  before  the  confes- 

Hanlon,  3  Brewst.  Pa.  461  ;}  [\Stone  v.  State,  105  Ala.  60;  Burton  v.  State,  107  id. 
108 ;  Cornwall  t>.  State,  91  Ga.  277  ;  State  v.  Brooks,  92  Mo.  542,  576.] 

7  R.  v.  Wild,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  452;  K.  v.  Thornton,  ib.  27  ;  Gibney's  Case,  Jebb's 
Cr.  Cas.  15  ;  Kerr's  Case,  8  C.  &  P.  179.    See  Joy  on  Confessions,  34-40,  42-44  ;  Arnold's 
Case,  8  C.  &  P.  622;  JR.  v.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  60  ;  R.  v.  Berriman,  6  Cox  Cr.  C. 
388  ;  R.  v.  Cheverton,  2  F.  &  F.  833.  ( 

8  Per  Patteson,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Shaw,  6  C.  &  P.  372 ;  infra,  §§  247,  248  and  notes. 

9  Gibney's  Case,  Jebb's  Cr.  Cas.  15  ;  R.  v.  Magill,  cited  in  McNally's  Evid.  33;  R. 
v.  Arnold,  8  C.  &  P.  622 ;  Joy  on  Confessions,  45-48. 

1  Per  Holroyd,  J.,  in  Ackroyd  and  Warburton's  Case,  1  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  49. 

2  R.  v.  Thornton,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  27 ;  Qt  was  repudiated  in  Balbo  v.  People,  80 
N.  Y.  499  ;  for  the  general  doctrine  that  illegality  in  the  mode  of  obtaining  evidence 
does  not  exclude  it,  see  post,  §  254  «.] 

8  R.  v.  Wild,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C.  452 ;  R.  r.  Gibney,  Jebb  Cr.  C.  15  ;  R.  ».  Johnston, 
15  Ir.  C.  L.  60  ;  Burton  v.  State.  107  Aln.  108  ;  People  v.  Ramirez,  56  Cal.  5G6  ;  State 
v.  Trusty,  Del.,  40  Atl.  766 ;  Green  i'.  State,  Fla.,  23  So.  851  ;  Nobles  v.  State,  98  Ga. 
73  ;  State  v.  Davis,  Ida.,  53  Pac.  678  :  Walker  v.  State,  136  Ind.  663  ;  State  v.  Fortner, 
43  la.  495  ;  State  v.  Jones,  47  La.  An.  1524  ;  Com.  ».  Cnffee,  108  Mass.  287  ;  Com.  v. 
Bond,  170  id.  41  ;  People  v.  Warner,  104  Mich.  337  ;  State  v.  McClain,  137  Mo.  307  ; 
Faulkner  v.  Terr.,  6  N.  M.  464  ;  People  v.  MoGlnin,  91  N.  Y.  242  ;  Tom.  t>.  Moslnr 
4  Pa.  St.  264  ;  State  v.  Cook,  15  Rich.  L.  20 ;  Wilson  ».  U.  S.,  162  U.  S.  613  ;  State 
v.  Bradley,  67  Vt.  465  ;  State  v.  Mmison,  7  Wash.  239  ;  Connors  v.  State,  95  Wis.  77. 

In  Texas  a  statute  seems  to  affect  the  doctrine  peculiarly  :  j  Marshall  v.  State,  5  Tex. 
App.  273;  Angell  v.  State,  id.  451;  Davis  v.  State,  ib.  510;}  Barth  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr., 
46  S.  W.  228-3 


§§2205-221.]      REMOVING  AN  IMPROPER   INDUCEMENT.  361 

sion  was  made,  the  evidence  will  be  received.  Thus,  where  a  magis- 
trate, who  was  also  a  clergyman,  told  the  prisoner  that  if  he  was  not 
the  man  who  struck  the  fatal  blow,  and  would  disclose  all  he  knew 
respecting  the  murder,  he  would  use  all  his  endeavors  and  influence 
to  prevent  any  ill  consequences  from  falling  on  him ;  and  he  accord- 
ingly wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  received  an  answer,  that 
mercy  could  not  be  extended  to  the  prisoner;  which  answer  he  com- 
municated to  the  prisoner,  who  afterwards  made  a  confession  to  the 
coroner ;  it  was  held  that  the  confession  was  clearly  voluntary,  and 
as  such  it  was  admitted.1  So,  where  the  prisoner  had  been  induced, 
by  promises  of  favor,  to  make  a  confession,  which  was  for  that  cause 
excluded,  but  about  five  months  afterwards,  and  after  having  been 
solemnly  warned  by  two  magistrates  that  he  must  expect  death  and 
prepare  to  meet  it,  he  again  made  a  full  confession,  this  latter  con- 
fession was  admitted  in  evidence.8  In  this  case,  upon  much  con- 
sideration, the  rule  was  stated  to  be,  that,  although  an  original 
confession  may  have  been  obtained  by  improper  means,  yet  subse- 
quent confessions  of  the  same  or  of  like  facts  may  be  admitted,  if 
the  Court  believes,  from  the  length  of  time  intervening,  or  from 
proper  warning  of  the  consequences  of  confession,  or  from  other 
circumstances,  that  the  delusive  hopes  or  fears,  under  the  influence 
of  which  the  original  confession  was  obtained,  were  entirely  dis- 
pelled.3 In  the  absence  of  any  such  circumstances,  the  influence  of 
the  motives  proved  to  have  been  offered  will  be  presumed  to  con- 
tinue, and  to  have  produced  the  confession,  unless  the  contrary  is 
shown  by  clear  evidence;  and  the  confession  will  therefore  be  re- 
jected.4 Accordingly,  where  an  inducement  has  been  held  out  by  an 
officer,  or  a  prosecutor,  but  the  prisoner  is  subsequently  warned  by 
the  magistrate,  that  what  he  may  say  will  be  evidence  against  him- 
self, or  that  a  confession  will  be  of  no  benefit  to  him,  or  he  is  simply 
cautioned  by  the  magistrate  not  to  say  anything  against  himself, 
his  confession,  afterwards  made,  will  be  received  as  a  voluntary 
confession.6 

1  R.  v.  Owes,  4  C.  &  P.  221. 

2  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  163,  168. 

8  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  180.  But  otherwise  the  evidence  of  a  subsequent  confes- 
sion, made  on  the  basis  of  a  prior  one  unduly  obtained,  will  be  rejected :  Com.  v.  Har- 
man,  4  Barr  269  ;  State  v.  Roberts,  1  Dev.  259. 

«  Roberts'  Case,  1  Dev.  259,  264 ;  Meynell's  Case,  2  Lewin's  Cr.  Cas.  122  ;  Sherring- 
ton's  Case,  id.  123  ;  R.  v.  Cooper,  5  C.  &  P.  535. 

6  R.  v.  Howes,  6  C.  &  P.  404 ;  R.  v.  Richards,  5  id.  318 ;  Nute's  Case,  2  Russ. 
on  Crimes,  648  ;  Joy  on  Confessions,  27,  28,  69-75  ;  R.  v.  Bryan,  Jebb'sCr.  Cas.  157. 
If  the  inducement  was  held  out  by  a  person  of  superior  authority,  and  the  confession 
was  afterwards  made  to  one  of  inferior  authority,  as  a  turnkey,  it  seems  inadmissible, 
unless  the  prisoner  was  first  cautioned  by  the  latter :  R.  v.  Cooper,  5  C.  &  P.  535.  [Tlie 
rulings  depend  much  on  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  and,  in  England,  upon  a  mod- 
ern statute  requiring  express  warning  to  be  given  ;  see  further  R.  v.  Hornbrook,  1  Cox 
Cr.  54  ;  R.  v.  Horner,  ib.  364  ;  R.  v.  Collier,  3  id.  57  ;  R.  v.  Sansome,  4  id.  206  ;  R. 
v.  Bond,  ib.  235;  R.  v.  Bate,  11  id.  686  ;  Porter  v.  State,  55  Ala.  101;  jMcAdory  v. 
State,  62  id.  154  ;  People  v.  Johnson,  41  CaL  452  ;{  Beery  v.  U.  S.,  2  Colo.  203;  State 


362  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII, 

§  222.  Persona  in  Authority.  In  regard  to  the  person  by  whom 
the  inducements  were  offered,  it  is  very  clear,  that  if  they  were 
offered  by  the  prosecutor,1  or  by  his  wife,  the  prisoner  being  his 
servant,2  or  by  an  officer  having  the  prisoner  in  custody,8  or  by  a 
magistrate,4  or,  indeed,  by  any  one  having  authority  over  him,  or 
over  the  prosecution  itself,6  or  by  a  private  person  in  the  presence 
of  one  in  authority,6  —  the  confession  will  not  be  deemed  voluntary, 
and  will  be  rejected.  The  authority,  known  to  be  possessed  by  those 
persons,  may  well  be  supposed  both  to  animate  the  prisoner's  hopes 
of  favor,  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  to  inspire  him  with  awe, 
and  in  some  degree  to  overcome  the  powers  of  his  mind.  It  has 
been  argued,  that  a  confession  made  upon  the  promises  or  threats 
of  a  person,  erroneously  believed  by  the  prisoner  to  possess  such 
authority,  the  person  assuming  to  act  in  the  capacity  of  an  officer  or 
magistrate,  ought,  upon  the  same  principle,  to  be  excluded.  The 
principle  itself  would  seem  to  require  such  exclusion;  but  the  point 
is  not  known  to  have  received  any  judicial  consideration. 

§  223.  But  whether  a  confession,  made  to  a  person  who  has  no 
authority,  upon  an  inducement  held  out  by  that  person,  is  receivable, 
is  a  question  upon  which  learned  judges  are  known  to  entertain 
opposite  opinions.1  In  one  case,  it  was  laid  down  as  a  settled  rule, 
that  any  person  telling  a  prisoner  that  it  would  be  better  for  him 
to  confess  will  always  exclude  any  confession  made  to  that  per. 

».  Willis,  Conn.,  41  Atl.  820  ;  {State  v.  Chambers,  39  la.  179  ;}  Dunne  v.  Park  Com'rs, 
159  111.  60  ;  Laughlin  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  37  S.  W.  590  ;  Com.  v.  Cullen,  111  Mass.  437  ; 
Com.  v.  Myers,  160  id.  530  ;  Peter  v.  State,  4  Sm.  &  M.  36 ;  State  v.  Jones,  54  Mo. 
479  ;  State  v.  Guild,  10  N.  J.  L.  163,  179  ;  State  v.  Lowhorne,  66  N.  C.  638 ;  State  v. 
Drake,  113  id.  624  ;  State  v.  Frazier,  6  Baxt.  540  ;  Barnes  v.  State,  36  Tex.  356;  Early's 
Case,  86  Va.  927 ;  State  v.  Carr,  37  Vt.  191.] 

1  Thompson's  Case,  1  Leach's  Cr.  Cas.  325  ;  Cass's  Case,  id.  328,  n.;  R.  v.  Jones, 
Russ.  &  R.  152;  R.  v.  Griffin,  ib.  151  ;  Chabbock's  Case,  1  Mass.  144;  R.  v.  Gibbons, 
1  C.  &  P.  97,  n.  (a) ;  R.  v.  Partridge,  7  id.  551  ;  Roberta's  Case,  1  Dev.  259 ;  R.  v. 
Jenkins,  Russ.  &  Ry.  492  ;  R.  v.  Hearn,  1  Car.  &  Marsh.  109.  See  also  Phil.  &  Am. 
on  Evid.  430,  «31. 

a  R.  v.  Upchurch,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  465  ;  R.  v.  Hewett,  1  Car.  &  Marsh.  534;  R.  ». 
Taylor,  8  C.  &  P.  733.  In  R.  v.  Simpson,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  410,  the  inducements 
were  held  out  by  the  mother-in-law  of  the  prosecutor,  in  his  house,  and  in  the  presence 
of  his  wife,  who  was  very  deaf ;  and  the  confessions  thus  obtained  were  held  inadmis- 
sible. See  Joy  on  Confessions,  5-10. 

»  R.  v.  Swatkins,  4  C.  &  P.  548 ;  R.  v.  Mills,  6  id.  146  ;  R.  v.  Sextons,  6  Petersd.  Abr. 
84 ;  R.  v.  Shepherd,  7  C.  &  P.  579.  See  also  R.  v.  Thornton,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  27.  But 
see  Com.  v,  Mosler,  4  Barr  264. 

«  Rudd's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  135;  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  163. 

*  R.  v.  Parratt,  4  C.  &  P.  570,  which  was  a  confession  by  a  sailor  to  his  captain, 
who  threatened  him  with  prison,  on  a  charge  of  stealing  a  watch.  R.  v.  Enoch,  5  C.  & 
P.  539,  was  a  confession  made  to  a  woman,  in  whose  custody  the  prisoner,  who  was  a 
female,  had  been  left  by  the  officer.  The  official  character  of  the  person  to  whom  the 
confession  is  made  does  not  affect  its  admissibility,  provided  no  inducements  were  em- 
ployed: Joy  on  Confessions,  59-61  ;  R.  v.  Gibbons,  1  C.  &  P.  97,  n.  (a)',  Knapp's 
Case,  10  Pick.  477  ;  Mosler's  Case,  6  Pa.  Law  Journ.  90  ;  4  Barr  264. 

8  Roberta's  Case,  1  Dev.  259 ;  R.  v.  Pountney.  7  C.  &  P.  302 ;  R.  v.  Laugher,  2  C. 
&  K.  22'.. 

1  So  stated  by  Parke,  B.,  in  R.  v.  Spencer,  7  C.  &  P.  776.  See  also  R.  v.  Pountney, 
ib.  302,  per  Alderson,  B. ;  R.  v.  Row,  Russ.  &  Ry.  153,  per  Chambre,  J. 


§§  222-223.]  PERSONS  IN  AUTHORITY.  363 

son.2  And  this  rule  has  been  applied  in  a  variety  of  cases,  both  early 
and  more  recent.'  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held,  that  a  prom- 
ise made  by  an  indifferent  person,  who  interfered  officiously,  without 
any  kind  of  authority,  and  promised,  without  the  means  of  per- 
formance, can  scarcely  be  deemed  sufficient  to  produce  any  effect 
even  on  the  weakest  mind,  as  an  inducement  to  confess;  and,  accord- 
ingly, confessions  made  under  such  circumstances  have  been  admitted 
in  evidence.4  The  difficulty  experienced  in  this  matter  seems  to  have 
arisen  from  the  endeavor  to  define  and  settle,  as  a  rule  of  law,  the 
facts  and  circumstances  which  shall  be  deemed,  in  all  cases,  to  have 
influenced  the  mind  of  the  prisoner  in  making  the  confession.  In 
regard  to  persons  in  authority,  there  is  not  much  room  to  doubt. 
Public  policy,  also,  requires  the  exclusion  of  confessions,  obtained  by 
means  of  inducements  held  out  by  such  persons.  Yet  even  here  the 
age,  experience,  intelligence,  and  constitution,  both  physical  and 
mental,  of  prisoners,  are  so  various,  and  the  power  of  performance 
so  different,  in  the  different  persons  promising,  and  under  different 
circumstances  of  the  prosecution,  that  the  rule  will  necessarily 
sometimes  fail  of  meeting  the  truth  of  the  case.  But  as  it  is  thought 
to  succeed  in  a  large  majority  of  instances,  it  is  wisely  adopted  as  a 
rule  of  law  applicable  to  them  all.  Promises  and  threats  by  private 
persons,  however,  not  being  found  so  uniform  in  their  operation, 
perhaps  may,  with  more  propriety,  be  treated  as  mixed  questions  of 
law  and  fact;  the  principle  of  law,  that  the  confession  must  be 
voluntary,  being  strictly  adhered  to,  and  the  question,  whether  the 
promises  or  threats  of  the  private  individuals  who  employed  them, 
were  sufficient  to  overcome  the  mind  of  the  prisoner,  being  left  to 
the  discretion  of  the  judge,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.6 

a  R.  v.  Dunn,  4  C.  &  P.  543,  per  Bosanquet,  J.;  R.  v.  Slaughter,  ib.  544. 

8  See,  accordingly,  R.  v.  Kingston,  4  C.  &  P.  387 ;  R.  w.  Clewes,  ib.  221  ;  R.  v. 
Walkley,  6  id.  175 ;  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  163;  Knapp's  Case,  9  Pick.  496,  500-510; 
R.  v.  Thomas,  6  C.  &  P.  353. 

«  R.  v.  Hardwick,  6  Petered.  Abr.  84,  per  Wood,  B. ;  R.  v.  Taylor,  8  C.  &  P.  734. 
See,  accordingly,  R.  v.  Gibbons,  1  id.  97 ;  R.  v.  Tyler,  ib.  129 ;  R.  v.  Litigate, 
6  Petered.  84;  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  125,  n. 

6  In  Scotland,  it  is  left  to  the  jury ;  see  Alison's  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  pp.  581, 
582.  Mr.  Joy  maintains  the  unqualified  proposition,  that  "  a  confession  is  admissible 
in  evidence,  although  an  inducement  is  held  out,  if  such  inducement  proceeds  from  a 
person  not  in  authority  over  the  prisoner ; "  and  it  is  strongly  supported  by  the  authori- 
ties he  cites,  which  are  also  cited  in  the  notes  to  this  section  ;  see  Joy  on  Confessions, 
ss.  2,  23-33.  His  work  has  been  published  since  the  first  edition  of  this  book ;  but, 
upon  a  deliberate  revision  of  the"  point,  I  have  concluded  to  leave  it  where  the  learned 
judges  have  stated  it  to  stand,  as  one  on  which  they  were  divided  in  opinion.  fJThe 
question  has  since  been  settled  in  England  so  that  the  existence  of  a  legal  interest 
in  the  prosecution  has  been  taken  as  the  test  whether  the  person  is  one  whose  induce- 
ments make  the  confession  inadmissible  :  R.  v.  Moore,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  522 ;  see  later 
rulings  in  R.  v.  Luckhurst,  6  Cox  Cr.  243;  R.  v.  Sleeman,  ib.  245 ;  R.  v.  Vernon,  12 
id.  153 ;  a  police  officer  is  of  course  also  a  person  in  authority :  R.  v.  Moore,  supra. 
In  the  United  States,  this  distinction  has  not  been  sharply  drawn,  owing  in  part  to 
the  circumstance  that  the  injured  person  does  not,  as  usually  in  England,  have  the  in- 
stitution and  management  of  the  criminal  prosecution.  Occasionally  it  is  said  that 
only  inducements  by  those  having  official  authority  are  improper  :  U.  S.  v.  Stone, 


364  CONFESSIONS.  [CH-   XVIII. 

§  224.  Confessions  at  an  Examination  before  a  Magistrate.1  The 
same  rule,  that  the  confession  must  be  voluntary,  is  applied  in  cases 
where  the  prisoner  has  been  examined  before  a  magistrate,  in  the 
course  of  which  examination  the  confession  is  made.  The  practice 
of  examining  the  accused  was  familiar  in  the  Eoman  jurisprudence, 
and  is  still  continued  in  Continental  Europe; 2  but  the  maxim  of  the 
common  law  was,  Nemo  tenetur  prodere  seipsum;  and  therefore 
no  examination  of  the  prisoner  himself  was  permitted  in  England, 
until  the  passage  of  the  statutes  of  Philip  and  Mary.8  By  these 
statutes,  the  main  features  of  which  have  been  adopted  in  several  of 
the  United  States,  the  justices,  before  whom  any  person  shall  be 
brought,  charged  with  any  of  the  crimes  therein  mentibned,  shall 
take  the  examination  of  the  prisoner,  as  well  as  that  of  the  witnesses, 
in  writing,  which  the  magistrate  shall  subscribe,  and  deliver  to  the 
proper  officer  of  the  court  where  the  trial  is  to  be  had.  The  signa- 
ture of  the  prisoner,  when  not  specially  required  by  statute,  is  not 
necessary;  though  it  is  expedient,  and  therefore  is  usually  obtained.4 
The  certificate  of  the  magistrate,  as  will  be  hereafter  shown  in  its 
proper  place,6  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
examination  was  conducted;  and,  therefore,  where  he  had  certified 
that  the  prisoner  was  examined  under  oath,  parol  evidence  to  show 

8  Fed.  260 ;  but  usually  the  question  is  made  to  depend  upon  the  actual  relation  of 
power  in  the  case  in  hand  by  the  person  offering  the  inducement;  see  Murphv  v.  State, 
63  Ala.  3  ;  Com.  v.  Morey,  1  Gray  463 ;  State  v.  Carrick,  16  Nev.  128;  Shifflet's  Case, 
14  Gratt.  657 ;  State  v.  Caldwell,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  869  ;]  j  Beggarly  v.  State,  8  Baxt. 
520  ;  McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala.  154  ;  Young  v.  Com.,  8  Bush  366  ;  Johnson  v.  State, 
61  Ga.  305 ;  Com.  v.  Howe,  2  Allen  153 ;  Com.  v.  Sego,  125  Mass.  210 ;  State  v.  Dar- 
nell, 1  Houst.  0.  C.  321 ;  Ulrich  v.  People,  39  Mich.  245  ;  Flagg  v.  People,  40  id.  706  ;{ 
State  «>.  Kirby,  1  Strobh.  155. 

1  £The  important  subject  of  the  next  three  sections  is  so  complicated  by  necessary 
distinctions,  conflicting  rulings,  and  historical  variations  of  practice,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  review  the  state  of  the  law  in  this  place  ;  and  accordingly  a  full  statement  of 
the  differing  theories  and  distinctions  and  the  precedents  in  each  jurisdiction  has  been 
placed  post  as  Appendix  III,  to  which  the  reader  is  referred.] 

2  The  course  of  proceeding,  in  such  cases,  is  fully  detailed  in  B.  Carpzov.  Practice 
Rerum  Criminal.  Pars  III,  Quaest.  113,  per  tot. 

8  1-2  Phil.  &  M.  o.  13  ;  2-3  Phil.  &  M.  c.  10 ;  7  Geo.  IV,  c.  64  ;  4  Bl.  Comm. 
295.  QHow  incorrect  historically  the  above  statement  is  may  be  seen  by  a  perusal  of 
Stephen's  History  of  the  Criminal  Law,  vol.  i,  passim;  the  maxim  nemo  tenetur,  etc., 
was  not  recognized  in  the  common  law  until  long  after  the  time  of  the  above  statutes; 
see  an  article  by  the  editor  in  5  Harv.  L.  Rev.  71.]  The  object  of  these  statutes, 
it  is  said,  is  to  enable  the  judge  to  see  whether  the  offence  is  bailable,  and  that  both 
the  judge  and  jury  may  s-e  whether  the  witnesses  are  consistent  or  contradictory,  in 
their  accounts  of  the  transaction.  The  prisoner  should  only  be  asked,  whether  he 
wishes  to  say  anything  in  answer  to  the  charge,  when  he  had  heard  all  that  the  wit- 
nesses in  support  of  it  had  to  say  against  him:  Joy  on  Confessions,  etc.,  pp.  92-94 ; 
R.  v.  Saunders,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  652 ;  R.  v.  Fagg,  4  C.  &  P.  567.  But  if  he  is  called 
upon  to  make  his  answer  to  the  charge,  before  he  is  put  in  possession  of  all  the  evi- 
dence against  him,  this  irregularity  is  not  sufficient  to  exclude  the  evidence  of  his 
confession  :  R.  v.  Bell,  5  C.  &  P.  163.  His  statement  is  not  an  answer  to  the  depo- 
sitions, but  to  the  charge.  He  is  not  entitled  to  have  the  depositions  first  read,  as  a 
matter  of  right.  But  if  his  examination  refers  to  any  particular  depositions,  he  is 
entitled  to  have  them  read  at  the  trial,  by  way  of  explanation  :  Dennis's  Case,  2  Lew. 
Cr.  Cas.  261  ;  see  further,  Rowland  v.  Ashby,  Ry.  &  M.  231,  per  Best,  C.  J. ;  R.  v. 
Simons,  6  C.  &  P.  540  ;  R.  v.  Arnold,  8  id.  621. 

4  1  Chitty's  Grim.  Law  87  ;  Lambe's  Case.  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  625. 

•  Infra,  $  227. 


§§  224-225.]         EXAMINATION   BEFORE   MAGISTRATE.  365 

that  in  fact  no  oath  had  been  administered  to  the  prisoner  was  held 
inadmissible.8  But  the  examination  cannot  be  given  in  evidence 
until  its  identity  is  proved.7  If  the  prisoner  has  signed  it  with  his 
name,  this  implies  that  he  can  read,  and  it  is  admitted  on  proof  of 
his  signature ;  but  if  he  has  signed  it  with  his  mark  only,  or  has  not 
signed  it  at  all,  the  magistrate  or  his  clerk  must  be  called  to  identify 
the  writing,  and  prove  that  it  was  truly  read  to  the  prisoner,  who 
assented  to  its  correctness.8 

§  225.  The  manner  of  examination  is,  therefore,  particularly  re- 
garded; and  if  it  appears  that  the  prisoner  had  not  been  left  wholly 
free,  and  did  not  consider  himself  to  be  so,  in  what  he  was  called 
upon  to  say,  or  did  not  feel  himself  at  liberty  wholly  to  decline  any 
explanation  or  declaration  whatever,  the  examination  is  not  held  to 
have  been  voluntary.  In  such  cases,  not  only  is  the  written  evi- 
dence rejected,  but  oral  evidence  will  not  be  received  of  what  the 
prisoner  said  on  that  occasion.1  The  prisoner,  therefore,  must  not 
be  sworn.3  But  where,  being  mistaken  for  a  witness,  he  was  sworn, 
and  afterwards,  the  mistake  being  discovered,  the  deposition  was 
destroyed;  and  the  prisoner,  after  having  been  cautioned  by  the 
magistrate,  subsequently  made  a  statement;  this  latter  statement 
was  held  admissible.8  It  may,  at  first  view,  appear  unreasonable 
to  refuse  evidence  of  confession,  merely  because  it  was  made  under 
oath,  thus  having  in  favor  of  its  truth  one  of  the  highest  sanctions 
known  in  the  law.  But  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  none  but  voluntary 
confessions  are  admissible;  and  that  if  to  the  perplexities  and  em- 
barrassments of  the  prisoner's  situation  are  added  the  danger  of 
perjury,  and  the  dread  of  additional  penalties,  the  confession  can 
scarcely  be  regarded  as  voluntary ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  seems  to 
be  made  under  the  very  influences  which  the  law  is  particularly 
solicitous  to  avoid.  But  where  the  prisoner,  having  been  examined 
as  a  witness,  in  a  prosecution  against  another  person,  answered 
questions  to  which  he  might  have  demurred,  as  tending  to  criminate 
himself,  and  which,  therefore,  he  was  not  bound  to  answer,  his 
answers  are  deemed  voluntary,  and,  as  such,  may  be  subsequently 

«  R.  v.  Smith  &  Homage,  1  Stark.  242 ;  R.  v.  Rivers,  7  C.  &  P.  177 ;  R.  ».  Pikesley, 
9  id.  124. 

7  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  3,  n.  (1). 

8  R.  v.  Chappel,  1  M.  &  Rob.  395. 

1  R.  v.  Rivers,  7  C.  &  P.  177  ;  R.  ».  Smith,  1  Stark.  242  ;  Barman's  Case,  6  Pa, 
Law  Journ.  120.     But  an  examination,  by  way  of  question  and  answer,  is  now  held 
good,  if  it  appears  free  from  any  other  objection  :  R.  v.  Ellis,  Ry.  &  M.  432  ;  2  Stark. 
Evid.  29,  n.  (g)  ;  though  formerly  it  was 'held  otherwise,  in  Wilson's  Case,  Holt  597. 
See  ace.  Jones's  Case,  2  Russ.  658,  n. ;  Roscoe's  Crirn.  Evid.  44.     So,  if  the  questions 
were  put  by  a  police-officer  (R.  v.  Thornton,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  27),  or  by  a  fellow- 
prisoner  (R."  v.  Shaw,  6  C.  &  P.  372),  they  are  not,  on  that  account,  objectionable. 

2  Bull.  N.  P.  242 ;  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  3 ;  £R.  r.  Scott,  1  D.  &  B.  47.] 

8  R.  v.  Webb,  4  C.  &  P.  564.  fJThe  above  statute  has  been  superseded  in  England 
by  St.  11-12  Viet.,  c.  42,  s.  18  (for  Ireland,  St.  12-13  Viet.,  c.  69,  s.  18;  14-15  Viet., 
c.  93,  s.  14),  which  has  been  construed  in  R.  v.  Pettit,  4  Cox  Cr.  164 ;  R.  v.  Sansome, 
ib.  207  ;  R.  t>.  Stripp,  7  id.  97  ;  R.  v.  Berriman,  6  id.  888  ;  R.  v.  Mick,  8  F.  &  F.  822  ; 
B.  r.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  82.  See  the  whole  subject  discussed  pott,  Appendix  III.] 


366  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIIL 

used  against  himself,  for  all  purposes;4  though  where  his  answers 
are  compulsory,  and  under  the  peril  of  punishment  for  contempt, 
they  are  not  received.6 

§  226.  Thus,  also,  where  several  persons,  among  whom  was  the 
prisoner,  were  summoned  before  a  committing  magistrate  upon  an 
investigation  touching  a  felony,  there  being  at  that  time  no  specific 
charge  against  any  person ;  and  the  prisoner,  being  sworn  with  the 
others,  made  a  statement,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  examination 
he  was  committed  for  trial ;  it  was  held,  that  the  statement  so  made 
was  not  admissible  in  evidence  against  the  prisoner.1  This  case  may 
seem,  at  the  first  view,  to  be  at  variance  with  what  hag  been  just 
stated  as  the  general  principle,  in  regard  to  testimony  given  in  an- 
other case;  but  the  difference  lies  in  the  different  natures  of  the  two 
proceedings.  In  the  former  case,  the  mind  of  the  witness  is  not 
disturbed  by  a  criminal  charge,  and,  moreover,  he  is  generally  aided 
and  protected  by  the  presence  of  the  counsel  in  the  cause ;  but  in 
the  latter  case,  being  a  prisoner,  subjected  to  an  inquisitorial  exam- 
ination, and  himself  at  least  in  danger  of  an  accusation,  his  mind  is 
brought  under  the  full  influence  of  those  disturbing  forces  against 
which  it  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  protect  him.2 

§  227.  Magistrate's  Report  of  Examination  conclusive.  (1)  As 
the  statutes  require  that  the  magistrate  shall  reduce  to  writing  the 
whole  examination,  or  so  much  thereof  as  shall  be  material,  the  law 
conclusively  presumes,  that,  if  anything  was  taken  down  in  writing, 
the  magistrate  performed  all  his  duty  by  taking  down  all  that  was 
material.1  In  such  case,  no  parol  evidence  of  what  the  prisoner  may 
have  said  on  that  occasion  can  be  received.2  (2)  But  if  it  is  shown 

*  2  Stark.  Evid.  28 ;  Wheater's  Case,  2  Lew.  Cr.  Gas.  157 ;  s.  c.  2  Mood.  Cr.  Gas. 
45  ;  Joy  on  Confessions,  62-66  ;  Hawarth's  Case,  Roscoe's  Grim.  Evid.  45  ;  R.  v.  Tubby, 
6  C.  &  P.  530,  cited  and  agreed  in  R.  v.  Lewis,  6  id.  161 ;  R.  r.  Walker,  cited  by  Gurney, 
B.,  in  the  same  case.  But  see  R.  v.  Davis,  6  C.  &  P.  177,  contra. 

'  R.  v.  Garbett,  2  C.  &  K.  474.  But  where  one  was  examined  before  the  grand  jury 
as  a  witness,  on  a  complaint  against  another  person,  and  was  afterwards  himself  in- 
dicted for  that  same  offence,  it  was  held  that  his  testimony  before  the  grand  jury  was 
admissible  in  evidence  against  him  :  State  v.  Broughton,  7  Ired.  96.  FJFor  all  this,  see 
Appendix  III.] 

1  R.  v.  Lewis,  6  C.  &  P.  161,  per  Gurney,  B. ;  R.  v.  Wheeley,  8  id.  250  ;  R.  v.  Owen, 
9  id.  238.     ("For  this,  see  Appendix  III.] 

2  It  has  been  thought,  on  the  authority  of  Britton's  Case,  1  M.  &  Rob.  297,  that 
the  balance-sheet  of  a  bankrupt,  rendered  in  his  examination  under  the  commission, 
was  not  admissible  in  evidence  against  him  on  a  subsequent  criminal  charge  because 
it  was  rendered  upon  compulsion.     But  the  ground  of  this  decision  was  afterwards 
declared  by  the  learned  judge  who  pronounced  it,  to  be  only  this,  that  there  was  no 
previous  evidence  of  the.  issuing  of  the  commission  ;  and,  therefore,  no  foundation  had 
been  laid  for  introducing  the  balance-sheet  at  all ;  see  Wheater's  Case,  2  Mood.  Cr. 
Gas.  45,  51. 

1  Whatever  the  prisoner  voluntarily  said,  respecting  the  particular  felony  under 
examination,  should  be  taken  down,  but  not  that  which  relates  to  another  matter  : 
R.  0.  Weller,  2  C.  &  K.  228:  and  see  K.  v.  Butler,  ib.  221. 

2  R.  v.  Weller,  supra.     Mr.  Joy,  in  his  Treatise  on  Confessions,  89-92,  237,  dissent* 
from  this  proposition,  so  far  as  regards  the  conclusive  character  of  the  presumption  ; 
which,  he  thinks,  La  neither  "  supported  by  the  authorities,"  nor  "reconcilable  with  the 


§§  225-228.]         EXAMINATION   BEFORE   MAGISTRATE.  367 

that  the  examination  was  not  reduced  to  writing;  or  if  the  written 
examination  is  wholly  inadmissible,  by  reason  of  irregularity;  parol 
evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  what  he  voluntarily  disclosed.8  And 
if  it  remains  uncertain  whether  it  was  reduced  to  writing  by  the 
magistrate  or  not,  it  will  not  be  presumed  that  he  did  his  duty,  and 
oral  evidence  will  be  rejected.4  (3)  A  written  examination,  how- 
ever, will  not  exclude  parol  evidence  of  a  confession  previously  and 
extrajudicially  made;6  nor  of  something  incidentally  said  by  the 
prisoner  during  his  examination,  but  not  taken  down  by  the  magis- 
trate, provided  it  formed  no  part  of  the  judicial  inquiry,  so  as  to 
make  it  the  duty  of  the  magistrate  to  take  it  down.6  So  where  the 
prisoner  was  charged  with  several  larcenies,  and  the  magistrate  took 
his  confession  in  regard  to  the  property  of  A,  but  omitted  to  write 
down  what  he  confessed  as  to  the  goods  of  B,  not  remembering  to 
have  heard  anything  said  respecting  them,  it  was  held  that  parol 
evidence  of  the  latter  confession,  being  precise  and  distinct,  was 
properly  admitted.7 

§  228.  It  has  already  been  stated,  that  the  signature  of  the  pris- 
oner is  not  necessary  to  the  admissibility  of  his  examination,  though 

object  with  which  examinations  are  taken  ; "  see  supra,  §  224,  n.  But  upon  a  careful 
review  of  the  authorities,  and  with  deference  to  the  opinion  of  that  learned  writer,  I 
am  constrained  to  leave  the  text  unaltered  ;  see  infra,  §§  275-277.  If  the  magistrate 
returns,  that  the  prisoner  "declined  to  say  anything,"  parol  evidence  of  statements 
made  by  him  in  the  magistrate's  presence,  at  the  time  of  the  examination,  is  not  ad- 
missible :  R.  v.  Walter,  7  C.  &  P.  267 ;  see  also  R.  v.  Rivers,  ib.  177  ;  R.  v.  Morse 
et  al.t  8  id.  605  ;  Leach  i».  Simpson,  7  Dowl.  513. 

£The  learned  author  seems  to  have  been  correct,  in  his  difference  of  opinion  with 
Mr.  Joy :  R.  r.  Reason,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  35  ;  R.  v.  Smith,  1  Stark.  242 ;  R.  Bentley, 
6  C.  &  P.  148  ;  R.  v.  Walter,  7  id.  267;  R.  v.  Pikealey,  9  id.  124;  R.  v.  Martin, 
6  State  Tr.  N.  8.  925,  989;  but  see  R.  v.  Erdheim,  1896,  2  Q.  B.  260.  But  it  was 
always  conceded  that  the  magistrate's  report  must  first  be  produced,  as  preferred 
testimony  to  what  was  said.  Being  so  produced,  it  could  not  be  shown  that  it  was 
incorrect.  In  the  American  cases  it  does  not  always  appear  clearly  whether  the  magis- 
trate's report  is  treated  merely  as  a  preferred  source,  to  be  first  used  or  accounted  for,  or 
whether  it  is  furthermore  conclusive ;  see  Leggett  v.  State,  97  Ga.  426  ;  Powell  v.  State, 
Miss.,  23  So.  266  ;  State  v.  Steeves,  29  Or.  85 ;  State  v.  Branham,  13  S.  C.  389  ; 
Alfred  v.  Anthony,  2  Swan  581.] 

8  Jeans  v.  Wheedon,  2  M.  &  Rob.  486  ;  R.  r.  Fearshire,  1  Leach  Cr.  Gas.  240 ;  R.  v. 
Jacobs,  ib.  347;  Irwin's  Case,  1  Hayw.  112;  R.  v.  Bell,  5  C.  &  P.  162;  R.  v.  Reed, 
1  M.  &  M.  403  ;  Phillips  v.  Wimburn,  4  C.  &  P.  273  ;  QR.  v.  Hayman,  1  M.  &  M.  403  ;j 
{State  v.  Vincent,  1  Houst.  C.  C.  11  ;  State  t>.  Parish,  Busb.  Law,  239.  ( 

4  Hinxman's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  349,  n. 

6  R.  t\  Carty,  MoNally's  Evid.  p.  45. 

9  Moore's  Case,  Roscoe's  Crim.  Evid.  45,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  R.  v.  Spilsbury,  7  C.  &  P. 
188  ;   Maloney's  Case,  ib.  (otherwise  Mulvey's  Case,  Joy  on  Confessions,  238),  per 
Littledale,  J.     In  Rowland  v.  Ashby,  Ry.  &  M.  231,  Mr.  Justice  Best  was  of  opinion 
that,  "upon  clear  and  satisfactory  evidence,  it  would  be  admissible  to  prove  something 
said  by  a  prisoner,  beyond  what  was  taken  down  by  the  committing  magistrate. 
TSee  R.  v.  Coveney,  6  C.  &  P.  667  ;  R.  v.  Thomas,  ib.  817  ;  R.  v.  Morse,  8  id.  605  ; 
R.  v.  Wilkinson,  9  id.  662  ;  R.  v.  Weller,  2  C.  &  K.  223;  R.  v.  Christopher,  ib.  994; 
Griffith  v.  State,  37  Ark.  332.] 

7  Harris's  Case,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  338.     See  2  Phil.  Evid.  84,  n.,  where  the  learned 
author  bas  reviewed  this  case,  and  limited  its  application  to  confessions  of  other  offences 
than  the  one  for  which  the  prisoner  was  on  trial ;  but  the  case  is  more  fully  stated, 
and  the  view  of  Mr.  Phillips  dissented  from,  in  2  Russell  on  Crimes,  876-878,  n.  by 
Mr.  Greaves ;  see  also  Joy  on  Confessions,  pp.  89-93. 


368  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII. 

it  is  usually  obtained.  But  where  it  has  been  requested  agreeably 
to  the  usage,  and  is  absolutely  refused  by  the  prisoner,  the  examina- 
tion has  been  held  inadmissible,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  to  be  con- 
sidered as  incomplete,  and  not  a  deliberate  and  distinct  confession.1 
Yet  where,  in  a  similar  case,  the  prisoner,  on  being  required  to 
sign  the  document,  said,  "  It  is  all  true  enough ;  but  he  would  rather 
decline  signing  it,"  the  examination  was  held  complete,  and  was 
accordingly  admitted.2  And  in  the  former  case,  which,  however,  is 
not  easily  reconcilable  with  those  statutes  which  require  nothing 
more  than  the  act  of  the  magistrate,  though  the  examination  is  ex- 
cluded, yet  parol  evidence  of  what  the  prisoner  voluntarily  said  is 
admissible.  For  though,  as  we  have  previously  observed,3  in  certain 
cases  where  the  examination  is  rejected,  parol  evidence  of  what  was 
said  on  the  same  occasion  is  not  received,  yet  the  reason  is,  that  in 
those  cases  the  confession  was  not  voluntary ;  whereas,  in  the  case 
now  stated,  the  confession  is  deemed  voluntary,  but  the  examination 
only  is  incomplete.4  And  wherever  the  examination  is  rejected  as 
documentary  evidence,  for  informality,  it  may  still  be  used  as  a 
writing,  to  refresh  the  memory  of  the  witness  who  wrote  it,  when 
testifying  to  what  the  prisoner  voluntarily  confessed  upon  that 
occasion.8 
§§  229,  230. x 

1  R.  v.  Telicote,  2  Stark.  483 ;  Rennet's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  627,  n. ;  R.  v.  Foster, 
1  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  46 ;  R.  v.  Hirst,  ib.  46. 

2  Lambe's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  625. 
8  Supra,  §  225. 

*  Thomas's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  727 ;  De\vhurst's  Case,  1  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  47 ;  R.  v. 
Swatkins,  4  C.  &  P.  548  ;  R.  v.  Reed,  1  M.  &  M.  403. 

6  Layer's  Case,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  215  ;  R.  v.  Swatkins,  4  C.  &  P.  548,  and  n.  (a) ; 
R.  v.  Tarrant,  6  id.  182;  R.  v.  Pressly,  ib.  183  ;  £R.  v.  Telicote,  supra;  Dewhurst's 
Case,  supra;  R.  v.  Bell,  5  C.  &  P.  162 ;  R.  v.  Watson,  3  C.  &  K.  Ill  ;  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  §  439  b,  post.~} 

1  [^Transferred  ante,  as  §§  220  b,  220  c.  Questions  analogous  to  those  treated  in 
§§  227-2*28  arise  also  in  connection  with  the  magistrate's  report  of  the  testimony  of  the 
witnesses  at  the  examination.  The  statute  usually  requires  him  to  reduce  these  to  writ- 
ing as  well  as  the  accused's  statement,  but  the  questions  that  arise,  though  similar,  are 
not  always  solved  in  the  same  way  as  for  the  accused's  statement.  (1)  The  first  ques- 
tion is  whether  the  magistrate's  report  is  a  preferred  source  of  testimony  to  what  the 
witness  said  ;  i.  e.,  whether  it  is  the  "  best  evidence,"  in  the  sense  of  §  97  d,  ante. 
There  is  much  difference  of  opinion  on  this  point.  That  the  witness  (as  by  some  statutes) 
Is  required  to  sign  it,  after  it  is  read  over  to  him,  seems  to  be  generally  regarded  as 
making  it  preferred ;  though  this  does  not  necessarily  follow,  for  the  original  oral  state- 
ment of  the,  witness  and  the  subsequent  report  signed  and  adopted  by  him  may  still  be 
regarded  as  distinct  statements.  Nevertheless,  it  is  better  to  regard  the  magistrate's 
report,  tnken  as  required  by  law,  as  preferred  testimony,  i.  e.  to  be  first  used  or  accounted 
for,  even  though  the  witness  is  not  required  to  sign  it  or  fails  to  sign  it.  (2)  The  next 
question  is  whether  the  magistrate's  report  is  conclusive,  when  produced,  i.  e.  whether 
it  can  be  shown  that  it  is  an  incorrect  report,  or  that  the  witness  said  things  not  con- 
tained in  the  report.  Here  also  there  is  difference  of  opinion.  The  better  opinion  is 
that  its  incorrectneHS  may  be  shown  and  omissions  supplied,  even  where  the  witness 
hn»  by  signing  adopted  it  as  correct.  Cases  on  both  sides  of  the  above  questions  are  as 
follows  :  Annesley's  Trial,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1121  ;  Rowland  v.  Ashby,  Ry.  &  Mo.  231  ; 
R.  f.  Harris,  Mood.  Cr.  C.  338  ;  Venafra  v.  Johnson,  1  Moo.  &  Rob.  816;  Resolutions 
of  Judge*,  7  C.  &  P.  676 ;  Leach  v.  Simpson,  7  DowL  Tr.  513 ;  5  M.  &  W.  309  ;  R. 


§§  228-232.]  CORROBORATION.  369 

§  231.    Corroborating  Discoveries,  as  curing  a  Defective  Confession. 

The  object  of  all  the  care  which,  as  we  have  now  seen,  is  taken  to 
exclude  confessions  which  were  not  voluntary,  is  to  exclude  testi- 
mony not  probably  true.  But  where,  in  consequence  of  the  infor- 
mation obtained  from  the  prisoner,  the  property  stolen,  or  the 
instrument  of  the  crime,  or  the  bloody  clothes  of  the  person  mur- 
dered, or  any  other  material  fact,  is  discovered,  it  is  competent  to 
show  that  such  discovery  was  made  conformably  to  the  information 
given  by  the  prisoner.  The  statement  as  to  his  knowledge  of  the 
place  where  the  property  or  other  evidence  was  to  be  found,  being 
thus  confirmed  by  the  fact,  is  proved  to  be  true,  and  not  to  have  been 
fabricated  in  consequence  of  any  inducement.  It  is  competent, 
therefore,  to  inquire  whether  the  prisoner  stated  that  the  thing 
would  be  found  by  searching  a  particular  place,  and  to  prove  that  it 
was  accordingly  so  found;  but  it  would  not  be  competent  to  inquire 
whether  he  confessed  that  he  had  concealed  it  there.1  This  limi- 
tation of  the  rule  was  distinctly  laid  down  by  Lord  Eldon,  who  said 
that  where  the  knowledge  of  any  fact  was  obtained  from  a  pris- 
oner, under  such  a  promise  as  excluded  the  confession  itself  from 
being  given  in  evidence,  he  should  direct  an  acquittal,  unless  the  fact 
itself  proved  would  have  been  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction 
without  any  confession  leading  to  it.2 

§  232.  If  the  prisoner  himself  produces  the  goods  stolen,  and  de- 
livers them  up  to  the  prosecutor,  notwithstanding  it  may  appear  that 
this  was  done  upon  inducements  to  confess,  held  out  by  the  latter, 
there  seems  no  reason  to  reject  the  declarations  of  the  prisoner,  con- 
temporaneous with  the  act  of  delivery,  and  explanatory  of  its  char- 

v.  Taylor,  8  C.  &  P.  726 ;  Reporter's  note  to  2  Moo.  &  Rob.  487,  approved  in  1  Den. 
Cr.  C.  542  ;  R.  v.  Taylor,  13  Cox  Or.  77  ;  R.  v.  Dillon,  14  id.  4  ;  Dunn  v.  State,  2  Ark. 
229,  248  ;  Atkins  v.  State,  16  id.  568,  588  ;  Talbot  v.  Wilkins,  31  id.  411  ;  Nelson  v. 
State,  32  id.  192;  State  v.  Kirkpatrick,  ib.  117  ;  Shackelford  v.  State,  33  id.  539; 
Cole  v.  State,  59  id.  50 ;  People  v.  Robles,  29  Cal.  421  ;  Hobbs  v.  Duff,  43  id.  485  ; 
People  v.  Devine,  44  id.  452  ;  People  v.  Gordon,  99  id.  227  ;  Cicero  v.  State,  54  Ga.  156 ; 
Williams  r.  State,  69  id.  11,  30;  Broyles  v.  State,  47  Ind.  251  ;  Woods  v.  State,  63 
id.  353  ;  Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  id.  334  ;  Pearce  v.  Furr,  2  Sm.  &  M.  58;  State  v. 
Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  220,  236 ;  State  v.  Jones,  29  S.  C.  227  ;  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  80  ; 
Titus  v.  State,  ib.  132  ;  Carrico  o.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va.  86.  But  the  principle  on  which 
this  report,  if  made  conclusive,  is  so  treated,  must  not  be  regarded  as  necessarily  being 
the  principle  of  Integration,  post,  §  305  g.  The  magistrate's  report  can  hardly  be 
regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  the  witness'  statement  (except,  perhaps,  where  the  wit- 
ness by  signing  has  adopted  it),  but  remains  merely  testimony  to  what  the  witness 
said  ;  and  hence  it  seems  better  to  regard  it  as  preferred  testimony,  and,  when  not 
allowed  to  be  contradicted,  as  a  case  of  absolute  and  conclusive  preference,  —  as  sug- 
gested ante,  §  97  d.  (3)  As  in  the  case  of  an  accused's  statement,  so  here  also,  if  the 
magistrate's  report  is  inadmissible  because  taken  irregularly,  or  if  the  magistrate  did 
cot  reduce  the  statement  to  writing,  then  certainly  it  may  be  proved  by  other  witnesses : 
Brown  v.  State,  71  Ind.  470  ;  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  80  ;  Alston  v.  State,  41  Tex.  40. 
(4)  For  these  questions  in  connection  with  testimony  at  a  former  trial,  see  ante,  §  166.] 

1  1  Phil.  Evid.  411  ;  Warickshall's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.   298 ;  Mosey's  Case,  ib. 
301,  n.  ;  Com.  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  496,  511  ;  R.  ».  Gould,  9  C.  &  P.  364  ;  R.  v.  Harris, 
1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  338. 

2  2  East  P.  C.  657  ;  Harvey's  Case,  ib.  658 ;  Lockhart's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  430. 
VOL.  i.  — 24 


370  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVTII 

acter  and  design,  though  they  may  amount  to  a  confession  of  guilt; l 
but  whatever  he  may  have  said  at  the  same  time,  not  qualifying  or 
explaining  the  act  of  delivery,  is  to  be  rejected.  And  if,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  confession  of  the  prisoner,  thus  improperly  induced, 
and  of  the  information  by  him  given,  the  search  for  the  property  or 
person  in  question  proves  wholly  ineffectual,  no  proof  of  either  will 
be  received.  The  confession  is  excluded,  because,  being  made 
under  the  influence  of  a  promise,  it  cannot  be  relied  upon ;  and  the 
acts  and  information  of  the  prisoner,  under  the  same  influence,  not 
being  confirmed  by  the  finding  of  the  property  or  person,  are  open 
to  the  same  objection.  The  influence  which  may  produce  a  ground- 
less confession  may  also  produce  groundless  conduct.2 

§  233.  Confessions  of  other  Persons ;  Conspirators.  As  to  the 
prisoner's  liability  to  be  affected  by  the  confessions  of  others,  it  may 
be  remarked,  in  general,  that  the  principle  of  the  law  in  civil  and 
criminal  cases  is  the  same.  In  civil  cases,  as  we  have  already  seen 1 
when  once  the  fact  of  agency  or  partnership  is  established,  every  act 
and  declaration  of  one,  in  furtherance  of  the  common  business,  and 
until  its  completion,  is  deemed  the  act  of  all.  And  so,  in  cases  of 
conspiracy,  riot,  or  other  crime,  perpetrated  by  several  persons, 
when  once  the  conspiracy  or  combination  is  established,  the  act  or 
declaration  of  one  conspirator  or  accomplice,  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  enterprise,  is  considered  the  act  of  all,  and  is  evidence  against 
all.8  Each  is  deemed  to  assent  to,  or  command,  what  is  done  by  any 

1  R.  v.  Griffin,  Rnss.  &  Ry.  151  ;  R.  v.  Jones,  ib.  152. 

2  R.  v.  Jenkins,  Russ.  &  Ry.  492;  R.  v.  Hearn,  1  Car.  &  Marsh.  109.      £As  to  the 
subject  of  the  above  two  sections,  the  following  may  be  said:  (1)  On  principle,  the 
discovery  by  search  of  facts  corroborating  the  confession  removes  the  reasons  for  distrust 
created  by  the  improper  inducement,  and  should  render  the  confession  admissible  as  a 
whole  ;  yet  no  Court  seems  clearly  to  go  this  far  ;  see  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Wells,  J., 
in  Beery  v.  U.  S.,  2  Colo.  211,  for  a  good  exposition  of  the  reasoning;  and  Brister  v. 
State,  26  Ala.  128  ;  Warren  v.  State,  29  Tex.  369.      (2)   A  number  of  Courts  properly 
go  so  far  as  to  admit  that  part  of  the  confession  confirmed  by  the  discovery,  and  this 
doctrine  is  gaining  ground  :  Lowe  v.  State,  88  Ala.  8;  Pressley  v.  State,  111  id.  34; 
Yates  v.  State,  47  Ark.  174;  Hinkle  v.  State,  94  Ga.  595;  State  v.  Drake,  82  N.  C. 
596;  Stater.  Winston,  116  id.  990;  Laros  v.  Com.,  84  Pa.  209;  Strait  t>.  State,  43 
Tex.  488  ;  State  v.  Jenkins,  5  Vt.  379 ;  Fredrick  v.  State,  8  W.  Va.   697.      (3)  The 
practice  in  England,  and  in  some  American  jurisdictions,  is  not  to  admit  any  part  of 
the  confession  directly,  but  merely  to  admit  the  fact  that  the  discoveries  had  been 
made  in  consequence  of  a  statement  made  or  information  given  by  the  accused  :  R.  v. 
Mosey,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.  3d  ed.  301,  note;  R.  v.  Jenkins,  R.  &  R.  492  ;  R.  v.  Cain,  1  Cr. 
&  D/37  ;  U.  »'.  Gould,  9  C.  &  P.  364  ;  R.  v.  Berriman,  6  Cox  Cr.  388  ;  R.  v.  Doyle,  12 
Ont.  350,  semble;  Garrard  v.  State,  50  Miss.  151 ;  State  v.  Motley,   7  Rich.   L.  337  ; 
Deathridge  v.  State,  1  Sneed  80;  White  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  341.      (4)    The  facts  them- 
selves, as  discovered,  are  always  admissible  :  R.  v.  Warickshall,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.  3d  ed. 
298 ;  R.  v.  Mosey,  ib.  301,  note  ;  R.  v.  Lockhart,  ib.  430  ;  U.  S.  v.  Nott,  1  McL.  502  ; 
Duffy  v.  People,  26  N.  Y.  590.1 

»  fiupra,  §§  184  b,  c,  d. 

2  Qor  the  subject  of  this  section,  see  a  fuller  treatment  ante,  §  184  a.]  So  is  the 
Roman  law.  "Confessio  unius  non  probat  in  pnEJudieium  altcrius  ;  quia  aliag  esset 
in  manu  confitentiH  dicere  quod  vellct,  et  sic  jus  alteri  quaesitum  auferre,  quaiulo 
omnino  jure  prohibent;  —  etiamsi  talis  confitens  esset  omui  exceptione  major.  Sed 
limitnbis,  qiumdo  inter  paries  convcnit  parcre  coiifcssiuni  et  dicto  uniua  alterius." 
Mascard.  de  Probat.  Concl.  486,  vol.  i,  p.  409. 


§§  232-234]        CONFESSIONS  OF  OTHER  PERSONS.  371 

other,  in  furtherance  of  the  common  object.8  Thus,  in  an  indictment 
against  the  owner  of  a  ship,  for  violation  of  the  statutes  against  the 
slave-trade,  testimony  of  the  declarations  of  the  master,  being  part  of 
the  res  gestce,  connected  with  acts  in  furtherance  of  the  voyage,  and 
within  the  scope  of  his  authority,  as  an  agent  of  the  owner,  in  the 
conduct  of  the  guilty  enterprise,  is  admissible  against  the  owner.4 
But  after  the  common  enterprise  is  at  an  end,  whether  by  accom- 
plishment or  abandonment  is  not  material,  no  one  is  permitted,  by 
any  subsequent  act  or  declaration  of  his  own,  to  affect  the  others. 
His  confession,  therefore,  subsequently  made,  even  though  by  the 
plea  of  guilty,  is  not  admissible  in  evidence,  as  such,  against  any 
but  himself.5  If  it  were  made  in  the  presence  of  another,  and  ad- 
dressed to  him,  it  might,  in  certain  circumstances,  be  receivable,  on 
the  ground  of  assent  or  implied  admission.6  In  fine,  the  declarations 
of  a  conspirator  or  accomplice  are  receivable  against  his  fellows  only 
when  they  are  either  in  themselves  acts,  or  accompany  and  explain 
acts,  for  which  the  others  are  responsible;  but  not  when  they  are  in 
the  nature  of  narratives,  descriptions,  or  subsequent  confessions.7 

§  234.  Same :  Agents.  The  same  principle  prevails  in  cases  of 
agency.  In  general,  no  person  is  answerable  criminally  for  the  acts 
of  his  servants  or  agents,  whether  he  be  the  prosecutor  or  the 
accused,  unless  a  criminal  design  is  brought  home  to  him.  The  act 
of  the  agent  or  servant  may  be  shown  in  evidence  as  proof  that  such 
an  act  was  so  done ;  for  a  fact  must  be  established  by  the  same  evi- 
dence, whether  it  is  to  be  followed  by  a  criminal  or  civil  conse- 
quence; but  it  is  a  totally  different  question,  in  the  consideration  of 
criminal  as  distinguished  from  civil  justice,  how  the  principal  may 

8  Per  Story,  J.,  in  U.  S.  v.  Gooding,  12  "Wheat.  469.  And  see  supra,  §  111,  fjnow 
§  184  a,]  and  cases  there  cited;  American  Fur  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  2  Peters  358;  Com.  v. 
Eberle,  3  S.  &  R.  9 ;  Wilbur  v.  Strickland,  1  Rawle  458 ;  Reitenbach  v.  Reitenbach,  ib. 
362 ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  232-237 ;  State  v.  Soper,  4  Shepl.  293. 

4  U.  S.  v.  Gooding,  12  Wheat.  460. 

6  R.  v.  Turner,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  347 ;  R.  r.  Appleby,  3  Stark.  33 ;  and  see  Helen 
v.  Andrews,  1  M.  &  M.  336,  per  Parke,  J. ;  R.  v.  Hinks,  1  Den.  Cr.  Cas.  84 ;  1  Phil. 
Evid.  199  (9th  ed.);  R.  v.  Blake,  6  Q.  B.  126;  {State  ».  Weasel,  30  La.  An.  919  ; 
Spencer  v.  State,  31  Tex.  64;  Com.  v.  Thompson,  99  Mass.  444;  Ake  v.  State,  30 
Tex.  466.  | 

6  { Where  statements  are  made  by  one  of  two  jointly  charged  with  an  offence,  the 
silence  of  the  other  and  his  failure  to  make  any  explanation  is  not  to  be  used  against  him : 
Com.  v.  McDermott,  123  Mass.  441  ;  Com.  v.  Walker,  13  Allen,  570.  But  if  a  con- 
fession has  been  made,  and,  in  accordance  with  it,  property  stolen  has  been  found,  it 
seems  to  be  the  rule  that  this  fact  of  the  finding  and  so  much  of  the  confession  as  relates 
to  it  may  be  given  in  evidence  against  all  the  participes  criminis :  Zumwalt  v.  State, 
5  Tex.  Ap.  521.} 

*  1  Phil,  on  Evid.  414;  4  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  34;  Tong's  Case,  Sir  J. 
Kelyng's  R.  18,  5th  Res. ;  {Priest  v.  State,  10  Neb.  393 ;  Gove  v.  State,  58  Ala.  391 ; 
State,  v.  Thibeau,  30  Vt.  100.  {  £For  the  use  of  another  person's  confession  that  he 
committed  the  crime  now  charged  against  the  defendant,  see  ante,  §  152rf.]  In  a  case 
of  piracy,  where  the  persons  who  made  the  confessions  were  not  identified,  but  the 
evidence  was  only  that  some  did  confess,  it  was  held  that,  though  such  confessions 
could  not  be  applied  to  any  one  of  the  prisoners  as  proof  of  his  personal  guilt,  yet  the 
jury  might  consider  them,  so  far  as  they  went,  to  identify  the  piratical  vessel:  United 
States  v.  Gibert,  2  Sumn.  19 ;  State  i>.  Thibeau,  30  Vt.  100. 


372  CONFESSIONS.  [CH.   XVIII. 

be  affected  by  the  fact,  when  so  established.1  Where  it  was  proposed 
to  show  that  an  agent  of  the  prosecutor,  not  called  as  a  witness, 
offered  a  bribe  to  a  witness,  who  also  was  not  called,  the  evidence 
was  held  inadmissible ;  though  the  general  doctrine,  as  above  stated, 
was  recognized.2 
§  235.1 

1  Lord  Melville's  Case,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  764;  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing. 
306,  307 ;  supra,  §§  184  c,  d. 

2  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  302,  306-309.     To  the  rule,  thus  generally 
laid  down,  there  is  an  apparent  exception,  in  the  case  of  the  proprietor  of  a  newspaper, 
who  is,  prima  facie,  criminally  responsible  for  any  libel  it  contains,  though  inserted 
by  his  agent  or  servant  without  his  knowledge.     But  Lord  Tenterden  considered  this 
case  as  falling  strictly  within  the  principle  of  the  rule  ;  for  "surely,"  said  he,  "a  per- 
son who  derives  profit  from,  and  who  furnishes  means  for  carrying  on,  the  concern, 
and  entrusts  the  conduct  of  the  publication  to  one  whom  he  selects,  and  in  whom  he 
confides,  may  be  said  to  cause  to  be  published  what  actually  appears,  and  ought  to  be 
answerable,  though  you  cannot  show  that  he  was  individually  concerned  in  the  par- 
ticular publication  : "    R.  v.  Gutch,  1  M.  &  M.  433,  437.     See  also  Story  on  Agency, 
§§  452,  453,  455  ;  R.  v.  Almon,  5  Burr.  2686 ;  R.  v.  Walter,  3  Esp.  21;  Southwick  v. 
Stevens,  10  Johns.  443. 

1  [^Transferred  ante,  as  §  217  a.] 


234-237.] 


ATTORNEY  AND   CLIENT. 


373 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


EXCLUSIONS  BASED  ON  PUBLIC   POLICY;    PRIVILEGE. 


§  236.  In  general. 

1.  Attorney  and  Client. 

§  237.   General  Principle. 

§  238.   Reason  for  the  Privilege. 

§  239.   Who  is  a  Legal  Adviser. 

§  240.  Purpose  and  Nature  of  the  Com- 
munication. 

§  240  a.   Same  :  Opinion  of  Counsel. 

§  241.  Same  :  Consultation  as  Convey- 
ancer ;  Title-deeds  and  other  Documents. 

§  242.  Same  :  Attorney  as  a  Party. 

§  242  a.  Same :  Consultation  for  Un- 
lawful Purpose. 

§  243.   Death  ;  and  Waiver. 

§  244.  Communications  not  within  the 
Principle. 

§  245.   Same:  Illustrations. 


2.    Other  Confidential  Relations. 

§  247.   Priest  and  Penitent. 
§  247  «.    Physician  and  Patient. 
§  248.  Ordinary  Private  Relations. 
§  250.   Government  and  Informer. 
§  251.   Confidential  Official  Business. 
§  252.    Proceedings  of  Grand  Jurors. 
§  252  a.  Proceedings  of  Traverse  Jurors. 
§  254.   Communications  between  Hus- 
band and  Wife. 

3.   Other  Exclusions  based  on  Public  Policy. 

§  254  a.   Evidence  procured  by  Illegal 
Means. 

§  254  b.    Indecent  Evidence. 

§  254  c.    Judge ;  Arbitrator  ;  Attorney. 


§  236.  In  general.  There  are  some  kinds  of  evidence  which  the 
law  excludes,  or  dispenses  with,  on  grounds  of  public  policy,  be- 
cause greater  mischiefs  would  probably  result  from  requiring  or  per- 
mitting its  admission,  than  from  wholly  rejecting  it.  The  principle 
of  this  rule  of  the  law  has  respect,  in  some  cases,  to  the  person  tes- 
tifying, and  in  others  to  the  matters  concerning  which  he  is  interro- 
gated, thus  including  the  case  of  the  party  himself,  and  that  of  the 
husband  or  wife  of  the  party  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other, 
the  subject  of  professional  communications,  awards,  secrets  of  State, 
and  some  others.  The  two  former  of  these  belong  more  properly  to 
the  head  of  the  competency  of  witnesses,  under  which  they  will 
accordingly  be  hereafter  treated.1  The  latter  we  shall  now  proceed 
briefly  to  consider. 

1.   Attorney  and  Client. 

§  237.  General  Principle.  And,  in  the  first  place,  in  regard  to 
professional  communications,  the  reason  of  public  policy,  which 
excludes  them,  applies  solely,  as  we  shall  presently  show,  to  those 
between  a  client  and  his  legal  adviser;  and  the  rule  is  clear  and  well 
settled,  that  the  confidential  counsellor,  solicitor,  or  attorney  of  the 
party  cannot  be  compelled  to  disclose  papers  delivered,  or  communi- 


§§  326-429. 


374  EXCLUSIONS  BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

cations  made  to  him,  or  letters  or  entries  made  by  him,  in  that 
capacity.1  "This  protection,"  said  Lord  Chancellor  Brougham,  "is 
not  qualified  by  any  reference  to  proceedings  pending,  or  in  con- 
templation. If,  touching  matters  that  come  within  the  ordinary 
scope  of  professional  employment,  they  receive  a  communication  in 
their  professional  capacity,  either  from  a  client,  or  on  his  account 
and  for  his  benefit,  in  the  transaction  of  his  business,  or,  which 
amounts  to  the  same  thing,  if  they  commit  to  paper  iu  the  course 
of  their  employment  on  his  behalf  matters  which  they  know  only 
through  their  professional  relation  to  the  client,  they  are  not  only 
justified  in  withholding  such  matters,  but  bound  to  withhold  them, 
and  will  not  be  compelled  to  disclose  the  information,  or  produce  the 
papers,  in  any  court  of  law  or  equity,  either  as  party  or  as  witness."  a 
§238.  Reason  for  the  Privilege.  " The  foundation  of  this  rule," 
he  adds,  "is  not  on  account  of  any  particular  importance  which  the 
law  attributes  to  the  business  of  legal  professors,  or  any  particular 
disposition  to  afford  them  protection.  But  it  is  out  of  regard  to  the 
interests  of  justice,  which  cannot  be  upholden,  and  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  which  cannot  go  on,  without  the  aid  of  men 
skilled  in  jurisprudence,  in  the  practice  of  the  courts,  and  in  those 
matters  affecting  rights  and  obligations,  which  form  the  subject  of 
all  judicial  proceedings."  If  such  communications  were  not  pro- 
tected, no  man,  as  the  same  learned  judge  remarked  in  another  case, 
would  dare  to  consult  a  professional  adviser,  with  a  view  to  his  de- 
fence, or  to  the  enforcement  of  his  rights;  and  no  man  could  safely 
come  into  a  court,  either  to  obtain  redress,  or  to  defend  himself.1 
\ "It  is  to  be  remembered,  whenever  a  question  of  this  kind  arises, 
that  communications  to  attorneys  and  counsel  are  not  protected  from, 
disclosure  in  court  for  the  reason  that  they  are  made  confidentially ; 
for  no  such  protection  is  given  to  confidential  communications  made 
to  members  of  other  professions.  '  The  principle  of  the  rule  which 
applies  to  attorneys  and  counsel,'  says  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  in  Hatton 
v.  Robinson,2  '  is  that  so  numerous  and  complex  are  the  laws  by  which 

1  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  My.  &  K.  ]  01 ;  in  this  decision,  the  Lord  Chancellor  was 
assisted  by  consultation  with  Lord  Lyndhurst,  Tiudal,  C.  J.,  and  Parke,  J.,  4  B.  & 
Ad.  876  ;  and  it  is  mentioned,  as  one  in  which  all  the  authorities  have  been  reviewed, 
in  2  M.  &  W.  100,  per  Lord  Abinger,  and  is  cited  in  Russell  v.  Jackson,  15  Jur.  1117, 
as  settling  the  law  on  this  subject.  See  also  16  id.  30,  41-43,  where  the  cases  on 
this  subject  are  reviewed.  The  earliest  reported  case  on  this  subject  is  that  of  Herd  v. 
Lovelace,  19  Eliz.,  in  Chancery,  Gary's  R.  88.  See  also  Austen  v.  Vesey,  id.  89  ;  Kel- 
way  v.  Kelway,  id.  127  ;  Dennis  v.  Codrington,  id.  143 ;  all  of  which  are  stated  at 
large  by  Mr.  Metcalf,  in  his  notes  to  2  Stark.  Evid.  395  (1st  Am.  ed.).  See  also  12 
Vin.  Abr.  Evid.  B,  a  ;  Wilson  v.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753;  R.  v.  Withers,  2  Catnpb.  578  ; 
Wilson  v.  Troup,  7  Johns.  Ch.  25  ;  2  Cowen  195 ;  Mills  v.  Oddy,  6  C.  &  P.  728 ; 
Anon.,  8  Mass.  370;  Walker  v.  Wildman,  6  Madd.  47;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  458-461; 
Jackson  w.  Burtis,  14  Johns.  391  ;  Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89  ;  Chirac  v.  Reinicker, 
11  Wheat  295 ;  R.  v.  Shaw,  6  C.  &  P.  372  ;  Granger  v.  Warrington,  3  Gilm,  299  ; 
Wheeler  v.  Hill,  4  Shepl.  329. 

3  Greenough  v.  Gaslcell,  supra. 

1  Bolton  v.  Corporation  of  Liverpool,  1  My.  &  K.  94,  95. 

»  14  Pick.  22. 


§'§  237-239.J      PRIVILEGE  ;  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT.  375 

the  rights  and  duties  of  citizens  are  governed,  so  important  is  it  they 
should  be  permitted  to  avail  themselves  of  the  superior  skill  and 
learning  of  those  who  are  sanctioned  by  the  law  as  its  ministers  and 
expounders,  both  in  ascertaining  their,  rights  in  the  country  and 
maintaining  them  most  safely  in  courts,  without  publishing  those 
facts  which  they  have  a  right  to  keep  secret,  but  which  must  be  dis- 
closed to  a  legal  adviser  and  advocate  to  enable  him  successfully  to 
perform  the  duties  of  his  office,  that  the  law  has  considered  it  the 
wisest  policy  to  encourage  and  sustain  this  confidence  by  requir- 
ing that  on  such  facts  the  mouth  of  the  attorney  shall  be  forever 
sealed.' " 8 } 

§  239.  "Who  is  a  Legal  Adviser.  In  regard  to  the  persons  to  whom 
the  communications  must  have  been  made  in  order  to  be  thus  pro- 
tected, they  must  have  been  made  to  the  counsel,  attorney,  or  solici- 
tor, acting,  for  the  time  being,  in  the  character  of  legal  adviser.1 
For  the  reason  of  the  rule,  having  respect  solely  to  the  free  and 
unembarrassed  administration  of  justice,  and  to  security  in  the 
enjoyment  of  civil  rights,  does  not  extend  to  things  confidentially 
communicated  to  other  persons,  nor  even  to  those  which  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  counsel,  when  not  standing  in  that  relation  to  the 
party.  Whether  he  be  called  as  a  witness,  or  be  made  defendant, 
and  a  discovery  sought  from  him,  as  such,  by  bill  in  Chancery,  what- 
ever he  has  learned,  as  counsel,  solicitor,  or  attorney,  he  is  not 
obliged  nor  permitted  to  disclose.2  And  this  protection  extends 
also  to  all  the  necessary  organs  of  communication  between  the  attor- 
ney and  his  client;  an  interpreter8  and  an  agent*  being  considered 
as  standing  in  precisely  the  same  situation  as  the  attorney  him- 
self, and  under  the  same  obligation  of  secrecy.  It  extends  also  to 
a  case  submitted  to  counsel  in  a  foreign  country  and  his  opinion 
thereon.6  It  was  formerly  thought  that  an  attorney's  or  a  barris- 
ter's clerk  was  not  within  the  reason  and  exigency  of  the  rule; 
but  it  is  now  considered  otherwise,  from  the  necessity  they  are  under 
to  employ  clerks,  being  unable  to  transact  all  their  business  in  per- 
son; and  accordingly  clerks  are  not  compellable  to  disclose  facts, 
coming  to  their  knowledge  in  the  course  of  their  employment  in  that 

*  Metcalf,  J.,  in  Barnes  v.  Harris,  7  Cush.  576,  578.     £See  other  good  expositions  in 
the  leading  case  of  Craig  v.  Auglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1225  ;  and  by  Emery,  J.,  in 
Wade  v.  Ridley,  87  Me.  368.1 

1  Turquand  v.  Knight,  2  M.  &  W.  101.  If  the  party  has  been  requested  to  act  as 
solicitor,  and  the  communication  is  made  under  the  impression  that  the  request  has 
been  acceded  to,  it  is  privileged  :  Smith  v.  Fell,  2  Curt.  667  ;  Sargent  v.  Hampden, 
88  Me.  581  ;  McLellan  ».  Longfellow,  82  id.  494. 

a  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  My.  &  K.  98 ;  Wilson  v.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753. 

8  Du  Barr6  v.  Livette,  Peake's  Cas.  77,  explained  in  4  T.  R.  756 ;  Jackson  v.  French, 
8  Wend.  337  ;  Andrews  v.  Solomon,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  356  ;  Parker  v.  Carter,  4  Munf.  273. 

*  Parkins  v.  Hawkshaw,  2  Stark.  239  ;  Tait  on  Evid.  385 ;  Bunbury  v.  Bunbury, 
2  Beav.  173  ;  Steele  r.  Stewart,  1  PhiL  Ch.  471  ;  Carpmael  v.  Powis,  1  Phil.  Ch.  687; 
8.  C.  9  Beav.  16. 

*  Bunbury  v.  Bunbury,  2  Beav.  173. 


376  EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

capacity,  to  which  the  attorney  or  barrister  himself  could  not  be  in- 
terrogated.6 [But  here  it  is  as  a  necessary  assistant  of  the  legal 
adviser  that  the  clerk  comes  within  the  privilege;  hence,  a  person 
acting  independently  of  such  employment  is  not  a  professional  legal 
adviser  merely  because  he  is  a  student  or  apprentice  of  law,7  or  be- 
cause he  is  conducting  a  case  before  a  petty  Court, 8  or  because  as 
conveyancer,  scrivener,  or  land-broker,  he  has  to  do  with  legal  docu- 
ments.9 On  the  other  hand,  the  person  must  be  at  the  time  acting  as 
legal  adviser; 10  hence  a  communication  with  an  attorney  merely  as 
with  a  lender  of  money,11  a  friend,12  or  a  scrivener13  is  not  privileged. 
Having  in  view  the  object  of  the  rule,  viz.,  subjectively  to  encourage 
free  communication  between  client  and  adviser,  it  would  seem  that  the 
protection  should  extend  to  communications  to  a  person  supposed  to 
be,  but  in  fact  not,  a  lawyer.14]  And  as  the  privilege  is  not  personal 
to  the  attorney,  but  is  a  rule  of  law,  for  the  protection  of  the  client, 
the  executor  of  the  attorney  seems  to  be  within  the  rule,  in  regard 
to  papers  coming  to  his  hands,  as  the  personal  representative  of  the 
attorney.15 

§  240.  Purpose  and  Nature  of  the  Communication.  This  protection 
extends  to  every  communication  which  the  client  makes  to  his  legal 
adviser,  for  the  purpose  of  professional  advice  or  aid,  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  his  rights  and  liabilities.  [It  is  not  material  that  no  fee  has 
yet  been  paid  or  is  to  be  paid ; 1  and  it  does  not  matter  that  the  dis- 
closures were  not  necessary  for  the  purpose,  provided  they  were 
thought  necessary  by  the  client.2]  Nor  is  it  necessary  that  any  judi- 

6  Taylor  v.  Forster,  2  C.  P.  195,  per  Best,  J.,  cited  and  approved  in  12  Pick.  93  ; 
R.  v.  Upper  Boddington,  8  Dow.  &  lly.  726,  per  Bailey,  J.  ;  Foote  v.  Hayne,  1  0.  & 
P.  545,  per  Abbott,  C.  J.  ;  s.  c.  R.  &  M.  163;  Jackson  v.  French,  3  Wend.  337;  Power 
v.  Kent,  1  Cohen  211  ;  Bowman  v.  Norton,  5  C.  &  P.  177  ;  Shore  v.  Bedford,  5  M.  & 
Gr.  271 ;   Jardine  v.  Sheridan,  2  C.  &  K.  24  ;  jSibley  v.  Waffle,  16  N.  Y.  App.  180; 
Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  68 ;  Landsberger  v.  Gorham,  5  Cal.  450  ;  see  Fenner  v.  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  67.  j     [Under  certain  conditions  an  expert  witness  assisting  in  preparing 
the  case  may  be  treated  as   an  assistant  of  counsel  :  Lalance  &  G.  M.  Co.  v.  Haber- 
mari   M.  Co.,  87  Fed.  563.     A  New  York  statute  includes  stenographers  and  other 
employees  of  counsel  :  §  835,  C.  C.  P.] 

7  rSchnblugal  v.  Dierstein,  131  Pa.  54;]  {Barnes  v.  Harris,  7  Gush.  576.} 
j.McLaughlin  v.  Gilmore,  1  111.  App.  5t!3 ;  Hoi  man  v.  Kimball,  22  Vt.  555.  | 

8  Matthew's   Estate,   5  Pa.  L.  J.  R.  149;  4  Arner.  Law  J.  N.  S.  356.     [See  post, 
9  241,  for  communications  to  an  attorney  about  conveyances."] 

»'  Foster  »>.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89  ;  see  Bean  v.  Quimby,  5  N.  H.  94. 

11  R.  v.  Farley,  1  Den.  Cr.  C.  197  ;  see  R.  t>.  Jones,  ib.  160. 

"  [Patten  v.  Glover,  1  D.  C.  App.  466,  476  ;  McDonald  v.  McDonald,  142  Ind.  55; 
O'Brien  v.  Spalding,  Ga.,  31  S.  E.  100  ;  Basye  v.  State,  45  Nebr.  261;  State  v.  Swaf- 
ford,  98  la.  362;  or  as  public  prosecutor:  Cole  v.  Andrews,  Minn.,  76  N.  W.  962.] 

"  jD.-Wolf  v.  Strader,  26  111.  225  ;  Borum  v.  Fonts,  15  Ind.  50  ;  Coon  v.  Swau,  30 
Vt.  6  :|  [Sparks  v.  Sparks,  51  Kan.  195,  201.] 

14  [People  v.  Barker,  60  Mich.  308  ;  State  v.  Russell,  83  Wis.  830  ;  contra:  Foun- 
tain v.  Young,  6  Esp.  113  ;]  {Sample  v.  Frost,  10  la.  266.  | 

u  Fen  wick  v.  Heed,  1  Meriv.  114,  120.  arg. 

1  {Sargent  v.  Hampden,  38  Me.  581  ;|  [Davis  v.  Morgan,  19  Mont.  141.  See  Wade 
v.  Ridley,  87  M*.  868.} 

8  ("Mounteney,  B.,  m  Craig  v.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1241 Q  Cleave  v.  Jones, 
7  Exch.  421  ;  see  Aikeu  v.  Kilburne,  14  Shepl.  252. 


§§  230-240  a.]    PRIVILEGE  :  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT.  377 

cial  proceedings  in  particular  should  have  been  commenced  or  con- 
templated; it' is  enough  if  the  matter  in  hand,  like  every  other  human 
transaction,  may,  by  possibility,  become  the  subject  of  judicial  in. 
quiry.  "If,"  said  Lord  Chancellor  Brougham,  "the  privilege  were 
confined  to  communications  connected  with  suits  begun,  or  intended 
or  expected,  or  apprehended,  no  one  could  safely  adopt  such  precau- 
tions, as  might  eventually  render  any  proceedings  successful,  or  all 
proceedings  superfluous."8  Whether  the  party  himself  can  be  com- 
pelled, by  a'bill  in  chancery,  to  produce  a  case  which  he  has  laid  be- 
fore counsel,  with  the  opinion  given  thereon,  is  not  perfectly  clear. 
At  one  time  it  was  held  by  the  House  of  Lords  that  he  might  be 
compelled  to  produce  the  case  which  he  had  sent,  but  not  the  opinion 
which  he  had  received.4  This  decision,  however,  was  not  satisfac- 
tory; and  though  it  was  silently  followed  in  one  case,6  and  reluc- 
tantly submitted  to  in  another,6  yet  its  principle  has  since  been  ably 
controverted  and  refuted.7  The  great  object  of  the  rule  seems  plainly 
to  require  that  the  entire  professional  intercourse  between  client  arid 
attorney,  whatever  it  may  have  consisted  in,  should  be  protected  by 
profound  secrecy. 

§  240  a.  Same:  Opinion  of  Counsel.  In  regard  to  the  obligation 
of  the  party  to  discover  and  produce  the  opinion  of  counsel,  various 

8  1  M.  &  K.  102,  103  :  Carpmael  v.  Powis,  9  Beav.  16  ;  1  Phillips,  687  ;  Penrud- 
dock  v.  Hammond,  11  Beav.  59;  jMinet  v.  Morgan,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  361 ;{  see  also  the 
observations  of  the  learned  judges,  in  Cromack  v.  Heathcote,  2  Brod.  &  B.  4,  to  the 
same  effect ;  Gresley's  Evid.  32,  33  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  600;  Moore  v.  Terrell,  4  B.  & 
Ad.  870  ;  Beltzhoover  v.  Blackstock,  3  Watts  20 ;  Taylor  v.  Blacklow,  3  Bing.  N.  C. 
235  ;  Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89,  92,  99,  where  the  English  decisions  on  this  subject 
are  fully  reviewed  by  the  learned  Chief  Justice ;  Doe  v.  Harris,  5  C.  &  P.  592  ;  Walker 
v.  Wildman,  6  Madd.  47  ;  [Liggett  v.  Glenn,  4  U.  S.  App.  438,  474  ;  Denver  T.  Co. 
v.  Owens,  20  Colo.  107,  125.]  {But  a  conversation  while  seeking  to  retain  the  adviser 
may  not  be  :  see  Heaton  v.  Findlay,  12  Pa.  St.  304.}  There  are  some  decisions  which 
require  that  a  suit  be  either  pending  or  anticipated  :  see  Williams  v.  Mundie,  Ry.  &M. 
34  ;  Broad  v.  Pitt,  3  C.  &  P.  518  ;  Duffin  v.  Smith,  Peake's  Cas.  108  ;  but  these  are 
now  overruled  ;  see  Pearse  v.  Pearse,  11  Jur.  52 ;  s.  c.  1  De  Gex  &  Smale,  12.  The 
law  of  Scotland  is  the  same  in  this  matter  as  that  of  England  :  Tait  on  Evid.  384. 

*  Radcliffe  v.  Fursman,  2  Bro.  P.  C.  514. 

«  Preston  v.  Carr,  1  Y.  &  Jer.  175. 

8  Newton  v.  Beersford,  1  You.  376. 

7  Iu  Bolton  v.  Corp.  of  Liverpool,  1  My.  &  K.  88,  per  Lord  Chancellor  Brougham, 
and  in  Pearse  v.  Pearse,  11  Jur.  52,  by  Knight  Bruce,  V.  C. ;  see  11  Jur.  pp.  54,  55  ; 
1  De  Gex  &  Smale,  25-29  ;  see  also  Gresley  on  Evid.  32,  33  ;  Bishop  of  Meath  v. 
Marquis  of  Winchester,  10  Bing.  330,  375,  454,  455  ;  Nias  v.  Northern,  etc.  Railway 
Co.,  3  My.  &  C.  356,  357  ;  Buubury  v.  Bunbury,  2  Beav.  173  ;  Herring  v.  Clobery, 
1  Phil.  91  ;  Jones  v.  Pugh,  id.  96  ;  Law  Mag.  (London)  vol.  xvii,  pp.  51-74,  and  vol. 
xxx,  pp.  107-123  ;  Holmes  v.  Baddeley,  1  Phil.  Ch.  476  ;  Jin  Minet  v.  Morgan,  L.  R. 
8  Ch.  361,  Pearse  v.  Pearse,  16  L.  J.  Ch.  153,  and  Lawrence  v.  Campbell,  4  Drew.  485, 
were  approved,  and  all  the  former  decisions  reviewed.}  Lord  Langdale  has  held 
that  the  privilege  of  a  client,  as  to  discovery,  was  not  coextensive  with  that  of  his 
solicitor ;  and  therefore  he  compelled  the  son  and  heir  to  discover  a  case  which  had 
been  submitted  to  counsel  by  his  father,  and  had  come,  with  the  estate,  to  his  hands: 
Greenlaw  v.  King,  1  Beavan  137.  But  his  opinion  on  the  general  question,  whether 
the  party  is  bound  to  discover  a  case  submitted  to  his  counsel,  is  known  to  be  opposed 
to  that  of  a  majority  of  the  English  judges,  though  still  retained  by  himself  :  see 
Crisp  v.  Platel,  8  Beav.  62  ;  Reece  v.  Trye,  9  id.  316,  318,  819 ;  Peile  v.  Stoddaid, 
13  Jur.  373. 


378  EXCLUSIONS   BASED    ON   PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

distinctions  have  been  attempted  to  be  set  up,  in  favor  of  a  discovery 
of  communications  made  before  litigation,  though  in  contemplation 
of,  and  with  reference  to,  such  litigation,  which  afterwards  took 
place;  and  again,  in  respect  to  communications  which,  though  in 
fact  made  after  the  dispute  between  the  parties,  which  was  followed 
by  litigation,  were  yet  made  neither  in  contemplation  of,  nor  with 
reference  to,  such  litigation ;  and  again,  in  regard  to  communications 
of  cases  or  statements  of  fact,  made  on  behalf  of  a  party  by  or  for 
his  solicitor  or  legal  adviser,  on  the  subject-matter  in  question,  after 
litigation  commenced,  or  in  contemplation  of  litigation  on  the  same 
subject  with  other  persons,  with  the  view  of  asserting  the  same 
right;  but  all  these  distinctions  have  been  overruled,  and  the  com- 
munications held  to  be  within  the  privilege.1 

§  241*  Same  :  Consultation  as  Conveyancer  ;  Title-deeds  and  other 
Documents.  Upon  the  foregoing  principles  it  has  been  held  that 
the  attorney  is  not  bound  to  produce  title-deeds,  or  other  documents, 
left  with  him  by  his  client  for  professional  advice ;  though  he  may 
be  examined  to  the  fact  of  their  existence,  in  order  to  let  in  second- 
ary evidence  of  their  contents,  which  must  be  from  some  other 
source  than  himself.1  But  whether  the  object  of  leaving  the  docu- 
ments with  the  attorney  .was  for  professional  advice  or  for  another 
purpose,  may  be  determined  by  the  judge.3  If  he  was  consulted 

1  Lord  Walsingham  v.  Goodricke,  3  Hare  122,  125  ;  Hughes  v.  Biddulph,  4  Russ. 
190  ;  Vent  v.  Pacey,  id.  193  ;  Clagett  v.  Phillips,  2  Y.  &  (J.  82 ;  Combe  v.  Corp.  of 
Lond.  ,1  id.  631  ;  Holmes  v.  Baddeley,  1  Phil.  Ch.  476.  Where  a  ccstui  qne  trust 
filed  a  bill  against  his  trustee,  to  set  aside  a  purchase  by  the  latter  of  the  trust  prop- 
erty, made  thirty  years  back  ;  and  the  trustee  filed  his  cross-bill,  alleging  that  the 
eestui  que  trust  had  long  known  his  situation  in  respect  to  the  property,  and  had 
acquiesced  in  the  purchase,  and  in  proof  thereof  that  he  had,  fifteen  years  before,  taken 
the  opinion  of  counsel  thereon,  of  which  he  prayed  a  discovery  and  production,  —  it 
was  held  that  the  opinion,  as  it  was  taken  after  the  dispute  had  arisen  which  was  the 
subject  of  the  original  and  cross  bill  and  for  the  guidance  of  one  of  the  parties  in  respect 
of  that  very  dispute,  was  privileged  at  the  time  it  was  taken  ;  and  as  the  same  dispute 
was  still  the  subject  of  the  litigation,  the  eommunicatiou  still  retained  its  privilege : 
Woods  v.  Woods,  9  Jur.  615,  per  Sir  J.  Wigram,  V.  C.  But  where  a  bill  for  the 
specific  performance  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  an  estate  was  brought  by  the  assignees 
of  a  bankrupt  who  has  sold  it  under  their  commission,  and  a  cross-bill  was  filed  against 
them  for  discovery,  in  aid  of  the  defence  it  was  held  that  the  privilege  of  protection 
did  not  extend  to  professional  and  confidential  communications  between  the  defendants 
and  their  counsel,  respecting  the  property  and  before  the  sale,  but  only  to  such  as  had 
passed  after  the  sale  ;  and  that  it  did  not  extend  to  communications  between  them  in 
the  relation  of  principal  and  agent ;  nor  to  those  had  by  the  defendants  or  their  counsel 
with  the  insolvent,  or  his  creditors,  or  the  provisional  assignee,  or  on  behalf  of  the  wife 
of  the  insolvent :  Robinson  v.  Flight,  8  Jur.  888,  per  Ld.  Langdale. 

1  Brard  v.  Ackerman,  5  Esp.  119;  Doe  v.  Harris,  5  C.  &  P.  692  ;  Jackson  v.  flfcr- 
tis,  14  Johns.  391  ;  Dale  ».  Livingston,  4  Wend.  653  ;  Brandt  v.  Klein,  17  Johns.  8C5  ; 
Jarkson  v.  McVey,  18  id.  330 ;  Bevan  v.  Waters,  1  M.  &  M.  235  ;  Eicke  v.  Nokes, 
id.  803  ;  Mills  v.  Oddy,  6  C.  &  P.  728  ;  Marston  v.  Downes,  id.  881 ;  s.  c.  1  Ad.  &  El. 
81,  explained  in  Hibbert  v.  Knight,  12  Jur.  162  ;  Bate  v.  Kinsey,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  88  j 
Doe  v.  Ross,  7  M.  A  W.  102  ;  Nixon  v.  Mayoh,  1  M.  &  Rob.  76  ;  Davies  v.  Waters, 
9  M.  &  W.  608  ;  Coates  v.  Birch,  1  0.  &  D.  474  ;  1  Dowl.  P.  C.  540 ;  Doe  v.  Langdon, 
12  Q.  B.  711  ;  QDwyer  »•  Collins,  7  Exch.  639;  Davis  v.  R.  Co.,  Minn.,  72  N.  W. 
8J:J;1  jStokoe  i>.  St.  Paul,  Minn.  &  Manit.  Ry.  Co.,  40  Minn.  546;  Brandt  v.  Klein, 
17  .lohm.  83.')  ;  Volant  t>.  Sawyer,  130.  B.  231.} 

8  R.  v,  Joues,  1  Denis,  Cr.  Cua.  166. 


§§240a-243.]    PRIVILEGE:  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT.  379 

merely  as  a  conveyancer,  to  draw  deeds  of  conveyance,  the  communi- 
cations made  to  him  in  that  capacity  are  within  the  rule  of  protec- 
tion,8 even  though  he  was  employed  as  the  mutual  adviser  and 
counsel  of  both  parties ;  for  it  would  be  most  mischievous,  said  the 
learned  judges  in  the  Common  Pleas,  if  it  could  be  doubted  whether 
or  not  an  attorney,  consulted  upon  a  man's  title  to  an  estate,  were 
at  liberty  to  divulge  a  flaw.4 

§  242.  Same :  Attorney  as  a  Party.  This  rule  is  limited  to  cases 
where  the  witness  (or  the  defendant  in  a  bill  in  chancery  treated  as 
such,  and  so  called  to  discover)  learned  the  matter  in  question  only 
as  counsel,  solicitor,  or  attorney,  and  in  no  other  way.  If,  there- 
fore, he  were  a  party  to  the  transaction,  and  especially  if  he  were 
party  to  the  fraud  (as,  for  example,  if  he  turned  informer,  after 
being  engaged  in  a  conspiracy),  or,  in  other  words,  if  he  were  acting 
for  himself,  though  he  might  also  be  employed  for  another,  he  would 
not  be  protected  from  disclosing;  for  in  such  a  case  his  knowledge 
would  not  be  acquired  solely  by  his  being  employed  professionally.1 

§  242  a.  Same  Consultation  for  Unlawful  Purpose.  [It  is  not 
within  the  duty  of  a  legal  adviser  to  assist  in  the  planning  of  crime 
or  fraud ;  and  a  consultation  with  a  view  to  such  an  unlawful  pur- 
pose would  not  be  privileged; l  but  the  extent  of  this  limitation  has 
not  been  fully  defined.] 

§  243.  Death  ;  and  "Waiver.  The  protection  given  by  the  law  to 
such  communications  does  not  cease  with  the  termination  of  the  suit, 
or  other  litigation  or  business,  in  which  they  were  made ;  nor  is  it 
affected  by  the  party's  ceasing  to  employ  the  attorney  and  retaining 

8  Cromack  v.  Heathcote,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  4  ;  Parker  v.  Carter,  4  Munf.  273  ;  [Tester 
«.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89  ;]  see  also  Wilson  v.  Troup,  7  Johns.  Ch.  25  ;  j  Crane  v.  Barkdoll, 
59  Md.  534  ;  Getzlaff  v.  Seliger,  43  Wis.  297.}  ^Distinguish  from  this  the  case  of  con- 
sulting a  non-professional  person  for  conveyancing  purposes,  ante,  §  239.] 

*  Cromack  v.  Heathcote,  supra;  Doe  r.  Seaton,  2  Ad.  &  El.  171  ;  Clay  v. 
Williams,  2  Munf.  105,  122;  Doe  v.  Watkins,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  421.  [>s  to  an  attorney 
acting  for  both  parties,  see  post,  §  244.")  Neither  does  the  rule  require  any  regular 
retainer,  as  counsel,  nor  any  particular  form  of  application  or  engagement,  nor  the 
payment  of  fees ;  it  is  enough  that  he  was  applied  to  for  advice  or  aid  in  his  pro- 
fessional character.  But  this  character  must  have  been  known  to  the  applicant ; 
for  if  a  person  should  be  consulted  confidentially,  on  the  supposition  that  he  was 
an  attorney,  when  in  fact  he  was  not  one,  he  will  be  compelled  to  disclose  the 
matters  communicated.  [X)n  these  two  points,  see  ante,  §  239.] 

1  Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  1  My.  &  K.  103,  104  ;  Desborough  v.  Rawlins,  8  Myl. 
&  Cr.  515,  521-523  ;  Story  on  Eq.  PI.  §§  601,  602.  In  Duffin  v.  Smith,  Peake's 
Cas.  108,  Lord  Kenyon  recognized  this  principle,  though  he  applied  it  to  the  case 
of  an  attorney  preparing  title-deeds,  treating  him  as  thereby  becoming  a  party  to 
the  transaction  ;  but  such  are  now  held  to  be  professional  communications. 

1  CCraig  v.  Earl  of  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.Tr.  1229  (the  claimant  to  the  defendant's 
estate,  purporting  to  be  the  elder  brother's  son,  kidnapped  by  the  defendant,  came  back 
to  England  after  many  adventures,  and,  while  preparing  to  claim  his  inheritance,  killed 
a  person,  accidentally,  it  was  said  ;  the  defendant,  wishing  to  employ  G.  to  conduct  the 
prosecution  for  this  killing,  remarked  that  he  would  give  ten  thousand  pounds  to  see 
the  claimant  hanged;  held,  not  privileged;  see  the  opinion  of  Mounteney,  B.);  Gart- 
side  v.  Outram,  26  L.  J.  Ch.  113;  R.  v.  Cox,  L.  R.  14  Q.  B.  D.  153  g  jFollettr. 
Jeffereyes,  1  Sim.  N.  s.  3 ;  Bank  v.  Mersereau,  8  Barb.  Ch.  528 ;  People  v.  Sheriff, 
29  id.  627  ;  jBigbee  v.  Dresser,  103  Mass.  523;}  Russell  v.  Jackson,  15  Jur.  1117. 


380  EXCLUSIONS  BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

another;  nor  by  any  other  change  of  relations  between  them;  nor  by 
the  death  of  the  client.1  The  seal  of  the  law,  once  fixed  upon  them, 
remains  forever;  unless  removed  by  the  party  himself,  in  whose 
'favor  it  was  there  placed.2  It  is  not  removed  without  the  client's 
consent,  even  though  the  interests  of  criminal  justice  may  seem  to 
require  the  production  of  the  evidence.8  The  client  does  not  waive 
this  privilege  merely  by  calling  the  attorney  as  a  witness,  unless  he 
also  examines  him  in  chief  to  the  matter  privileged;  4  ^nor  by  taking 
the  stand  himself  on  his  own  behalf.6}  [The  privilege  is  that  of 
the  client,  being  intended  to  promote  freedom  of  consultation  for 
those  needing  legal  advice;  hence,  the  client  is  equally  protected 
from  disclosing  the  communication; 8  and  the  attorney's  willingness 
to  disclose  is  immaterial.7] 

§  244.  Communications  not  within  the  Principle.  This  rule  is 
further  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  cases,  in  which  the  attorney 
may  be  examined,  and  which  are  therefore  sometimes  mentioned  as 
exceptions  to  the  rule.  These  apparent  exceptions  are,  where  the 
communication  was  made  before  the  attorney  was  employed  as  such, 
or  after  his  employment  had  ceased ; l  or  where,  though  consulted  by 
a  friend,  because  he  was  an  attorney,  yet  he  refused  to  act  as  such, 
and  was  therefore  only  applied  to  as  a  friend ; 2  or  where  there  could 
not  be  said,  in  any  correctness  of  speech,  to  be  a  communication  at 
all,  as  where,  for  instance,  a  fact,  something  that  was  done,  became 
known  to  him,  from  his  having  been  brought  to  a  certain  place  by 
the  circumstance  of  his  being  the  attorney,  but  of  which  fact  any 
other  man,  if  there,  would  have  been  equally  couusant  (and  even 
this  has  been  held  privileged  in  some  of  the  cases) ; 8  or  where  the 
matter  communicated  was  not  in  its  nature  private,  and  could  in  no 

1  }  As  between  heirs  and  devisees,  however,  neither  can  be  said  to  represent  the  client 
rather  than  the  other,  and  the  privilege  may  not  apply :  see  Morris  v.  Morris,  119  Ind. 
343;  Layman's  Will,  40  Minn.  372  ;  Russell  p.  Jackson,  15  Jur.  1117;  Blackburn  v. 
Crawfords,  3  Wall.  175 ;  }  [Winters  v.  Winters,  102  la.  53 ;  Glover  v.  Patten,  U.  S., 
17  Sup.  411  ;  see  the  somewhat  analogous  discussion  in  regard  to  the  privilege  of  phy- 
sician and  patient,  post,  §  247  a.] 

2  Wilson  v.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  759,  per  Buller,  J.  ;  Petrie's  Case,  cited  arg.  4  T.  R. 
756  ;  Parker  v.  Yates,  12  Moore  520  ;  Merle  v.  More,  R.  &  M.  390. 

8  R.  v.  Smith,  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  182  ;  R.  v.  Dixon,  3  Burr.  1687  ;  Anon.,  8  Mass. 
870 ;  Petrie's  Case,  supra. 

*  Vaillantr.  Dodemead,  2  Atk.  524  ;  Waldron  v.  Ward,  Styles  449  ;  {Montgomery 
v.  Pickering,  116  Mass.  227.} 

6  jHemenway  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  701 ;  Barker  v.  Kuhn,  38  Iowa  895 ;  State  v.  White, 
19  Kan.  445  ;  Duttenhofer  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  91  ;  Bigler  v.  Reyher,  43  Ind.  112. 
But  see  Woburn  v.  Henshaw,  101  Mass.  193 ;  People  v.  Gallagher,  75  Mich.  515 ;  State 
v.  Tall,  43  Minn.  276  ;  |  QLonisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  115  Ala.  334.] 

•  {Hughes  v.  Biddulph,  4  Russ.  190;  Holmes  i>.  Baddeley,  1  Phil.  476;  Hemenway 
v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  701.} 

7  CCraig  "•  Anglesen,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1225;]  {Stephen,  Digest  of  Evidence,  art. 
115  ;  contra:  WilHs  w.  West,  60  Ga.  613.} 

1  QHarless  t>.  Harless,  144  Ind.  196;  Jennings  »>.  Sturderant,  140  id.  641 ;  Brady  v. 
State,  39  Nehr.  629 ;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Berg,  46  id.  600;  Farley  «.  Peebles,  50  id.  723; 
Turner's  Estate,  167  Pa.  609.] 

1  TSee  ante,  §  289.] 

8  LSee  the  next  section.] 


§§  243-245.]     PRIVILEGE  :  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT.  381 

sense  be  termed  the  subject  of  a  confidential  disclosure ;  *  or  where 
the  thing  had  no  reference  to  the  professional  employment,  though 
disclosed  while  the  relation  of  attorney  and  client  subsisted;  or 
where  the  attorney,  having  made  himself  a  subscribing  witness,  and 
thereby  assumed  another  character  for  the  occasion,  adopted  the 
duties  which  it  imposes,  and  became  bound  to  give  evidence  of  all 
that  a  subscribing  witness  can  be  required  to  prove.8  In  all  such 
cases,  it  is  plain  that  the  attorney  is  not  called  upon  to  disclose 
matters  which  he  can  be  said  to  have  learned  by  communication  with 
his  client,  or  on  his  client's  behalf,  matters  which  were  so  com- 
mitted to  him,  in  his  capacity  of  attorney,  and  matters  which  in  that 
capacity  alone  he  had  come  to  know.6 

§  245.  Same  :  Illustrations.  'Thus,  the  attorney  may  be  compelled 
to  disclose  the  name  of  the  person  by  whom  he  was  retained,  in 
order  to  let  in  the  confessions  of  the  real  party  in  interest ; l  the 
character  in  which  his  client  employed  him,  whether  that  of  ex- 
ecutor or  trustee,  or  on  his  private  account;2  the  time  when  an 
instrument  was  put  into  his  hands,  but  not  its  condition  and  appear- 
ance at  that  time,  as,  whether  it  was  stamped  or  indorsed,  or  not;8 
the  fact  of  his  paying  over  to  his  client  moneys  collected  for  him;4 
the  execution  of  a  deed  by  his  client,  which  he  attested;6  a  state- 
ment made  by  him  to  the  adverse  party;6  {the  fact  of  having  re- 

4  FSee  the  next  section.] 

6  jMcKinney  v.  G.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.352  ;  Coleman's  Will,  111  id.  226  ;{  QN.  Y.  St. 
1893,  c.  295;  O'Brien  v.  Spalding,  Ga.,  31  S.  E.  100;  Taylor  v.  Pegram,  151  111.  106; 
Pence  v.  Waugh,  135  Ind.  143,  153  ;  Denning  v.  Butcher,  91  la.  425,  434  ;  Pitt's 
Estate,  85  Wis.  162,  167  ;  Mullin's  Estate,  110  Cal.  252  ;  Wax's  Estate,  106  id.  343; 
so  also  where  he  was  merely  the  draughtsman  of  the  will:  Fayerweather  v.  Ritch,  90 
Fed.  13.] 

6  Per  Ld.  Brougham,  in  Greenongh  v.  Gaskell,  1  My.  &  K.  104.  See  also  Desborough 
v.  Rawlins,  3  My].  &  Cr.  521,  522 ;  Lord  Walsingham  v.  Goodricke,  3  Hare  122  ;  Story's 
Eq.  PI.  §§  601,  602;  Bolton  v.  Corporation  of  Liverpool,  1  My.  &  K.  88  ;  Annesley  v.  E. 
of  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1239-1 244  ;  Gillard  v.  Bates,  6  M.  &  W.  547  ;  R.  v.  Brewer, 
6  C.  &  P.  363 ;  Levers  v.  Van  Buskirk,  4  Ban-,  309. 

1  Levy  v.  Pope,  1  M.  &  M.  410  ;  Brown  v.  Payson,  6  N.  H.  443  ;  Chirac  v.  Reinicker, 
11  Wheat.  280 ;  Gowerv.  Emery,  6  Shepl.  79  ;  fParke,  B.,  in  Jones  v.  Jones,  9  M.  &  W. 
75-1 

2  Beckwith  v.  Benner,  6  C.  &  P.  681.      But  see  Chirac  v.  Reinicker,  11  Wheat.  280, 
295,  where  it  was  held  that  counsel  could  not  disclose  whether  they  were  employed  to 
conduct  an  ejectment  for  their  client  as  landlord  of  the  premises. 

8  Wheatley  v.  Williams,  1  M.  &  W.  533  ;  Brown  v.  Payson,  6  N.  H.  443  ;  [>ee  Tur- 
ner v.  Warren,  160  Pa.  336  ;  Arbuckle  v.  Templeton,  65  Vt.  205.]  But  if  the  question 
•were  about  a  rasure  in  a  deed  or  will,  he  might  be  examined  to  the  question,  whether  he 
had  ever  seen  it  in  any  other  plight :  Bull.  N.  P.  284.  So,  as  to  a  confession  of  the  rasure 
by  his  client,  if  it  were  confessed  before  his  retainer:  Cuts  v.  Pickering,  1  Ventr.  197. 
See  also  Baker  v.  Arnold,  1  Cai.  258,  per  Thompson  and  Livingston,  JJ. 

4  QSee  Freeman  u.  Brewster,  93  Ga.  648  ;  Caldwell  v.  Melvedt,  93  la.  730.      For  th* 
privilege  as  applied  to  matters  in  bankruptcy,  see  an  article  in  33  Law  Journal  489 
(1898).] 

5  Doe  v.  Andrews.  Cowp.  845 ;  Robson  r.  Kemp,  4  Esp.  235 ;  s.  c.  5  id.  53 ;  Sand- 
ford  v.  Remington,  2  Ves.  Jr.  189  ;  fjand  whether  he  attested  it  or  not :  Duchess  of  King- 
ston's Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  613  ;  Stanhilberv.  Graves,  97  Wis.  515,  semble ;]   jRundle 
v.  Foster,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  658.  \ 

8  Ripon  v.  Da  vies,  2  Nev.  &  M.  310  ;  Shore  i».  Bedford,  5  M.  &  Gr.  271  ;  Griffith  v. 
Davits,  5  B.  &  Ad.  502,  overruling  Gainsford  c.  Grammar,  2  Campb.  9,  contra. 


382  EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON  PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

ceived  money  from  his  client  and  deposited  it.7}  He  may  also  be 
called  to  prove  the  identity  of  his  client;8  the  fact  of  his  having 
sworn  to  his  answer  in  Chancery,  if  he  were  then  present ; 9  usury  in 
a  loan  made  by  him  as  broker,  as  well  as  attorney  to  the  lender;10 
the  fact  that  he  or  his  client  is  in  possession  of  a  certain  document 
of  his  client's  for  the  purpose  of  letting  in  secondary  evidence  of  its 
contents;11  and  his  client's  handwriting,12  [or  mental  condition.18] 
[The  presence  of  a  third  person  will  usually  be  treated  as  indicating 
that  the  communication  was  not  confidential ; 14  moreover,  a  third 
person  who  overhears  the  communication  is  not  within  the  confidence 
and  may  disclose  what  he  hears.15  Where  the  same  attorney  is  act- 
ing for  both  parties,  it  is  perhaps  difficult  to  say  whether  the  com- 
munications should  be  treated  as  joint  confidences  and  therefore 
privileged  in  litigation  between  the  same  parties,  or  whether,  on  the 
contrary,  they  should  be  considered  as  confidential  against  all  other 
persons,  but  not  as  between  the  parties  themselves;  the  latter  view 
seems  usually  preferable.16]  But  in  all  cases  of  this  sort,  the  privi- 
lege of  secrecy  is  carefully  extended  to  all  the  matters  profession- 
ally disclosed,  and  which  he  would  not  have  known  but  from  his 
being  consulted  professionally  by  his  client.  [Communications  by 
a  witness,  when  consulted  by  the  attorney,  are  not  privileged, 

^  (Jeanes  v.  Friden burgh,  5  Pa.  L.  J.  R.  199  ;  Williams  v.  Young,  46  la.  140. } 
8  Cowp.  846  ;  Beckwith  v.  Benner,  6  C.  &  P.  681 ;  Hurd  v.  Moring,  1  id.  372 ;  R. 
v.  Watkinson,  2  Str.  1122  and  note. 

»  Bull.  N.  P.  284;  Cowp.  846;  [Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr. 
613.] 

1°  Duffin  v.  Smith,  Peake's  Cas.  108. 

11  Revan  v.  Waters,  1  II.  &  M.  235  ;  Eicke  v.  Nokes,  ib.  303 ;  Jackson  v.  McVey,  18 
Johns.  330 ;  Brandt  v.  Klein,  17  id.  335 ;  Doe  v.  Ross,  7  M.  &  W.  102 ;  Robson  v. 
Kemp.  5  Esp.  53 ;  Coates  v.  Birch,  2  Q.  B.  252 ;  Coveney  v.  TannahilF,  1  Hill  33  ;  Dwyer 
v.  Collins,  16  Jur.  569;  7  Exch.  639;  {see  Allen  v.  Root,  39  Tex.  589.} 

»  Hurd  w.  Moring,  1  C.  &  P.  372  ;  Johnson  v.  Daverne,  19  Johns.  134 ;  4  Hawk.  P.  C. 
b.  2,  ch.  36,  §  89  ;  [Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  613.] 

w  j Daniel  v.  Daniel,  39  Pa.  191 ;{  T Wicks  v.  Dean,  Ky.,  44  S.  W.  397 ;  State  v.  Fitz- 
gerald, 68  Vt.  125  ;  contra  :  Gurleyv.  Park,  135  Ind.  440'.] 

14  jGoddard  v.  Gardner,  28  Conn.  172  ;|  [People  v.  Buchanan,  145  N.  Y.  1 ;  Hnmmel 
v.  Kistner,  182  Pa.  216  ;  particularly  if  the  third  person  is  an  opposing  partv :  Wyland  v. 
Griffith,  96  la.  24 ;  Frank  v.  Morley,  106  Mich.  635  ;  David  Adlerfc  S.  C.  Co.  w.  Hellman, 
Nebr..  75  N.  W.  877.J 

18  [See  Denver  T.  Co.  v.  Owens,  20  Colo.  107, 125  ;  Perry  v.  State,  Ida.,  38  Pac.  658  ; 
Basyo  v.  State,  45  Nebr.  261  ;]  {Hoy  v.  Morris,  13  Gray  519  ;  Whiting  v.  Barney,  30 
N.  Y.  330. }  [^Contra,  for  a  lost  writing,  Liggett  v.  Glenn,  4  U.  S.  App.  438,  472 ";  but 
compare  Calcraft  v.  Guest,  1898,  1  Q.  B.  759.] 

10  [The  cases  are  not  harmonious  ;  see]  R.  v.  A  very,  6  C.  &  P.  f>96  ;  Shore  v.  Bed- 
ford, 5  M.  &  Gr.  271;  Bank  v.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528  ;  Pritchard  v.  Foulkes, 

I  Coop.  14  ;  Warde  r.  Warde,  15  Jur.  759  ;   {Doe  v.  Watkins,  8  Bing.  N.  C.  421  ; 
Doe  v.  Seaton,  2  A.  &  E.  171;  Reynell  v.  Sprye,  10  Beav.  51  ;  Gulick  v.  Gulick, 
89  N.  J.  Eq.  516  ;  Michael  v.  Foil,  100  N.  C.  189  ;  Cady  v.  Walker,  62  Mich.  157  ; 
Tyler  v.  Tyler,  126  111.  541  ;  Lynn  t>.  Lyerle,  113  111.  134;  Re  Bauer,  79  Cal.  312; 
Coolt  r.  McConnell,  116  Ind.  256;  Goodwin  Company's  Appeal,  117  Pa.   St.  537; 

II  in  I  on  v.  Doherty,  109  Ind.  37  ;  Rice  v.  Rice,  14  B.  Mon.  417  ;j  ^Murphy  v.  Water- 
li'Hisn,  113  Cal.  467;  Sparks  v.  Sparks,  51  Kan.  195,  201  ;  Livingston  v.  Wagner, 
23  Nev.  63 ;  Roper  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  420 ;  Levers  v.  Van  Buskirk,  Pa.,  40  AtL 
1008.] 


§§  245-247.]    PRIVILEGE  :  ATTORNEY  AND  CLIENT.  383 

for  the  witness  is  in  principle  not  a  partisan  or  agent  of  either 
party."] 
§  246. l 

2.    Other  Confidential  Relations. 

§  247.  Priest  and  Penitent.  There  is  one  other  situation  in  which 
the  exclusion  of  evidence  has  been  strongly  contended  for,  on  the 
ground  of  confidence  and  the  general  good,  namely,  that  of  a  clergy- 
man ;  and  this  chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  in  reference  to  criminal  con- 
duct and  proceedings;  that  the  guilty  conscience  may  with  safety 
disburden  itself  by  penitential  confessions,  and  by  spiritual  advice, 
instruction,  and  discipline,  seek  pardon  and  relief.  The  law  of 
Papal  Rome  has  adopted  this  principle  in  its  fullest  extent ;  not  only 
excepting  such  confessions  from  the  general  rules  of  evidence,  as  we 
have  already  intimated,1  but  punishing  the  priest  who  reveals  them. 
It  even  has  gone  farther;  for  Mascardus,  after  observing  that,  in 
general,  persons  coining  to  the  knowledge  of  facts,  under  an  oath  of 
secrecy,  are  compellable  to  disclose  them  as  witnesses,  proceeds  to 
state  the  case  of  confessions  to  a  priest  as  not  within  the  operation 
of  the  rule,  on  the  ground  that  the  confession  is  made  not  so  much 
to  the  priest  as  to  the  Deity,  whom  he  represents;  and  that  there, 
fore  the  priest,  when  appearing  as  a  witness  in  his  private  character, 
may  lawfully  swear  that  he  knows  nothing  of  the  subject.  "  Hoc 
tamen  restringe,  non  posse  procedere  in  sacerdote  producto  in  testem 
contra  reum  crirninis,  quando  in  confessione  sacramentali  fuit  aliquid 
sibi  dictum,  quia  potest  dicere,  se  nihil  scire  ex  eo;  quod  illud,  quod 
scit,  scit  ut  Deus,  et  ut  Deus  non  producitur  in  testem,  sed  ut  homo, 
et  tanquain  homo  ignorat  illud  super  quo  producitur."2  In  Scot- 
land, where  a  prisoner  in  custody  and  preparing  for  his  trial  has 
confessed  his  crimes  to  a  clergyman,  in  order  to  obtain  spiritual 
advice  and  comfort,  the  clergyman  is  not  required  to  give  evidence 
of  such  confession.  But  even  in  criminal  cases  this  exception  is 
not  carried  so  far  as  to  include  communications  made  confidentially 

17  fJDuchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  613 ;]  Mackenzie  v.  Yen,  2  Curt. 
866.  [Contra :  State  ».  Houseworth,  91  la.  740.  For  the  client's  communications  to 
an  expert  witness,  see  ante,  §  239.  As  to  consultation  by  a  party's  wife,  see  E.  v. 
Farley,  2  C.  &  K.  313.] 

1  ("Transferred  post,  as  §  469  n.] 

1  Supra,  §  229,  n.  By  the  Capitularies  of  the  French  kings  and  some  other  conti- 
nental codes  of  the  Middle  Ages,  the  clergy  were  not  only  excused,  but  in  some  cases 
were  utterly  prohibited  from  attending  as  witnesses  in  auy  cause.  Clerici  de  judicii 
sui  cognitione  non  cogantur  in  publicum  dicere  testimonium  :  Capit.  Reg.  Francorum, 
lib.  7,  §  118  (A.  D.  827).  Ut  uulla  ad  testimonia  dicendum,  ecclesiastici  cujuslibet 

Eulsetur  persona :  Id.  §  91.  See  Leges  Barbar.  Antiq.  vol.  iii,  pp.  313,  316;  Leges 
angobardicae,  in  the  same  collection,  vol.  i,  pp.  184,  209,  237.  But  from  the  consti- 
tutions of  King  Ethelred,  which  provide  for  the  punishment  of  priests  guilty  of  per- 
jury,—  "Si  presbyter,  alicubi  inveniatur  in  falso  testimonio,  vel  in  perjurio," —  it 
would  seem  that  the  English  law  of  that  day  did  not  recognize  any  distinction  between 
them  and  the  laity,  in  regard  to  the  obligation  to  testify  as  witnesses :  see  Leges 
Barbaror.  Antiq.  vol.  iv,  p.  294 ;  Ancient  Laws  and  Inst.  of  England,  vol  i,  p.  347, 
§27. 

2  Mascard.  De  Probat.  vol.  i,  Qusest.  5,  n.  61 ;  id.  Concl.  377.  Vid.  et  P.  Farinac, 
Opera,  tit.  8,  Qusest.  78,  n.  73. 


384     EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC  POLICY  J     PEIVILEGE.    [CH.  XIX. 

to  clergymen  in  the  ordinary  course  of  their  duty.8  Though  the 
law  of  England  encourages  the  penitent  to  confess  his  sins,  "for  the 
unburthening  of  his  conscience,  and  to  receive  spiritual  consolation 
and  ease  of  mind,"  yet  the  minister  to  whom  the  confession  is  made 
is  merely  excused  from  presenting  the  offender  to  the  civil  magis- 
tracy, and  enjoined  not  to  reveal  the  matter  confessed,  "  under  pain 
of  irregularity."  4  In  all  other  respects,  he  is  left  to  the  full  opera- 
tion of  the  rules  of  the  common  law,  by  which  he  is  bound  to  testify 
in  such  cases  as  any  other  person  when  duly  summoned.  In  the 
common  law  of  evidence  there  is  no  distinction  between  clergymen 
and  laymen ;  but  all  confessions,  and  other  matters  not  confided  to 
legal  counsel,  must  be  disclosed  when  required  for  the  purposes  of 
justice.  Neither  penitential  confessions,  made  to  the  minister  or  to 
members  of  the  party's  own  church,  nor  secrets  confided  to  a  Roman 
Catholic  priest  in  the  course  of  confession,  are  regarded  as  privi- 
leged communications.5  [By  statute  in  a  few  jurisdictions  such  a 
privilege  has  been  created;6  but,  while  little  harm  to  the  interests 
of  justice  can  be  done  thereby,  it  is  questionable  whether  any  addi- 
tion to  the  existing  privileges  is  desirable.] 

§  247  a.  Physician  and  Patient  Neither  is  this  protection  ex- 
tended to  medical  persons,  in  regard  to  information  which  they  have 
acquired  confidentially,  by  attending  in  their  professional  charac- 
ters ;  *  [but  by  statute,  two  generations  ago,  the  privilege  was  created 
in  a  few  jurisdictions,  and  this  policy  has  found  favor  of  recent 
years  in  a  large  number  of  other  jurisdictions.  The  privilege  thus 
established  is  usually  made  to  apply  to  such  communications  only  as 
are  necessary  for  obtaining  the  medical  advice.8  Whether  it  in- 
cludes all  facts  learned  by  observation  or  otherwise,  or  merely  the 

*  Tait  on  Evidence,  pp.  386,  387 ;  Alison's  Practice,  p.  586. 

*  Const.  &  Canon,  1  Jac.  I,  Can.  cxiii ;  Gibson's  Codex,  p.  963. 

6  Wilson  v.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  753  ;  Butler  v.  Moore,  McNally's  Evid.  253-255  ; 
Anon.,  Skin.  404,  per  Holt,  C.  J. ;  Du  Barre  v.  Livette,  Peake's  Cas.  77;  Com. 
v.  Drake,  15  Mass.  161  ;  QJessel,  M.  R.,  in  Wheeler  v.  LeMarchant,  L.  R.  17  Ch.  10, 
675  ;  Normanshaw  v.  Normanshaw,  69  L.  T.  Rep.  468.]  The  contrary  was  held  by 
De  Witt  Clinton,  Mayor,  in  the  Court  of  General  Sessions  in  New  York,  June,  1813, 
in  People  v.  Phillips,  1  Southwest.  Law  Journ.  p.  90.  See  also  Broad  v.  Pitt,  3  C. 
&  P.  518,  in  which  case  Best,  C.  J.,  said,  that  he  for  one  would  never  compel  a  clergy- 
man to  disclose  communications  made  to  him  by  a  prisoner ;  but  that,  if  he  chose  to 
disclose  them,  he  would  receive  them  in  evidence  :  Joy  on  Confessions,  etc.,  pp.  49-58; 
Best's  Principles  of  Evidence,  §§  417-419  ;  fin  the  Tichborne  Case,  R.  v.  Castro,  Charge 
of  the  Chief  Justice,  I,  648,  a  priest  refused  to  disclose  and  was  not  compelled  ;  see  an 
historical  article  by  Mr.  Hopwood,  in  3  Jurid.  Soc.  Pap.  29.] 

*  fSee  the  Iowa  statute  applied  in  State  v.  Brown,  95  la.  381.] 

1  Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  11  Hargr.  St.  Tr.  243  ;  20  How.  St.  Tr.  643  ;  R.  v. 
Gibbons,  1  C.  &  P.  97;  Broad  v.  Pitt,  3  id.  518,  per  Best,  C.  J.;  CJessel,  M.  It.,  in 
Wheeler  v.  LeMarchant,  *j<;>ra.] 

1  ^Statements  by  the  mother  of  a  bastard,  naming  its  father  ;  statements  by  an 
injured  person  as  to  the  occasion  of  the  injury,  —  these  illustrate  the  sort  of  question 
that  arises  ;  see  Collins  v.  Mack,  31  Ark.  693  ;  Redfield's  Estate,  116  Cal.  637  ;  Penns. 
Co.  v.  Marion,  123  Ind.  415  ;  Bower  v.  Bower,  142  id.  194  ;  Kans.  C.  F.  S.  &  M.  R. 
Co.  v.  Murray,  55  Kan.  336  ;  Campan  v.  North,  39  Mich.  606 ;  People  v.  Colo,  id.,  71 
N.  W.  455  ;  Edington  v.  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  185,  194;  Feeney  v.  R.  Co.,  116  id.  380  ; 
Grattau  v.  Ins.  Co.,  80  id.  281,  297;  Redmond  v.  Ben.  Ass'u,  150  id.  167.] 


§  247  a.]  PRIEST  ;  PHYSICIAN.  385 

verbal  communications  of  the  patient,  is  generally  not  left  doubtful  by 
the  statute,  the  former  and  broader  rule  being  the  usual  one.8  It  is 
properly  held  that  an  implied  qualification  exists,  similar  to  that  in 
the  case  of  attorneys,  not  exempting  communications  made  while 
preparing  or  committing  a  crime  or  fraud.*  The  communication  will 
not  be  privileged  if  made  under  circumstances  negativing  its  confi- 
dentiality; 6  as  where  the  physician  has  been  asked  to  attest  a  will,6 
or  has  been  sent  by  the  opponent  to  examine  the  person's  condition,7 
or  after  the  relation  of  medical  adviser  has  ended.8  The  patient 
may  of  course  waive  the  privilege,  either  by  express  act  beforehand,* 
or  by  calling  the  physician  to  testify  to  his  knowledge  of  the  for- 
mer's condition.10  Whether  after  the  patient's  death  the  privilege 
may  in  his  interest  be  waived  by  his  representative,  and,  in  partic- 
ular, whether  in  a  contest  between  heirs  and  devisees  the  one  or  the 
other  can  be  said  for  this  purpose  to  be  the  deceased's  representa- 
tive, there  is  no  general  agreement,  the  statutory  phrasing  often 
being  peculiar  and  controlling.11  The  person  consulted  may  be  an 
assistant  or  partner  of  the  physician ; 12  but  a  dentist 18  or  a  drug- 
clerk14  or  a  mere  bystander16  would  not  be  a  person  as  to  whom  the 
communication  would  be  privileged.18 

As  to  the  policy  of  the  privilege,  and  of  extending  it,  there  can 
only  be  condemnation.  The  chief  classes  of  litigation  in  which  it 

8  L~See  Gurley  v.  Park,  135  Ind.  440  ;  Bower  »  Bower,  142  id.  194;  Prader  v.  Accid. 
Ass'n,  95  la.  149  ;  Brown  v.  Ins.  Co.,  65  Mich.  306  ;  Lammiman  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  71  N.  W. 
153  ;  Nelson  v.  Oneida,  N.  Y.,  50  N.  E.  802;]  {People  v.  Kemmler,  119  id.  585  ; 
Grattan  v.  Ins.  Co.,  80  id.  297.} 

•  QSee  Hank  v.  State,  148  Ind.  238  ;  State  v.  Kidd,  89  la.  56;  State  v.  Smith,  99 
id.  26 ;  Hewitt  v.  Prime,  21  Wend.  79  ;  People  o.  Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423,  437,  448.] 

6  TBut  compare  Reuihan  v.  Dennin,  103  N.  Y.  577.] 

•  [Mullin's  Estate,  110  Cal.  252.] 

7  LFreel  v.  R.  Co.,  97  Cal.  40,  semble;  Nesbit  v.  People,  19  Colo.  441,  461  ;  People 
v.  Sliney,  137  N.  Y.  570  ;  People  v.  Hoch,  150  id.  291  ;  compare  Renihau  v.  Dennin, 
103  id.  577.] 

8  [People  v.  Koerner,  154  N.  Y.  355.] 

•  rFoley  v.  Royal  Arcanum,  151  N.  Y.  196.] 

1°  L\Vheelock  v.  Godfrey,  100  Cal.  587;  Lissak  v.  Croker  Est.  Co.,  119  id.  442  ;T 
{see  McKiriney  v.  R.  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  355.  |  [JFor  waiver  by  calling  one  of  several 
physicians  who  examined,  see  Baxter  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  103  la.  599  ;  Morris  v.  R.  Co., 
148  N.  Y.  88.] 

"  £See  Flint's  Estate,  100  Cal.  391  ;  Harrison  v.  R.  Co.,  116  id.  156 ;  Morris  v. 
Morris,  ]19  Ind.  341  ;  Heuston  v.  Simpson,  115  id.  62;  Winters  r.  Winters,  102  la. 
53;  Denning  v.  Butcher,  91  id.  425,  436  ;  Eraser  v.  Jennison,  42  Mich.  206;  Groll  v. 
Tower,  85  Mo.  249  ;  Thompson  c.  Ish,  99  id.  160  ;  Edington  v.  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  185  ; 
Westover  ».  Ins.  Co.,  99  id.  56  ;  Renihan  v.  Dennin,  103  id.  573;  Loder  v.  Whelpley, 
111  id.  239;  Hoyt  v.  Hoyt,  112  id.  513.] 

12  LEtna  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Denning,  123  Ind.  384.  | 

13  PPeople  v.  De  France,  104  Mich.  563.] 

14  L"Brown  v.  R.  Co.,  66  Mo.  597  ;  or  a  veterinary  surgeon:  Hendershott  v. Tel.  Co., 
la.,  76  N.  W.  828 J 

34  TSpringer  v.  Byram,  137  Ind.  15,  23.] 

19  fin  California,  the  statute  does  not  apply  to  criminal  cases:  People  v.  Lane,  101 
Cal.  513;  People  v.  West,  106  id.  89.]     {In  New  York  it  has  been  said  that  the  ac- 
cused cannot  invoke  it  for  communications  by  the  deceased  on  whom  the  crime  was 
committed:  Pierson  v.  People,  18  Hun  239,  79  N.  Y.  424.  j 
VOL.  i.  — 25 


386      iEXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY  ;    PRIVILEGE.     [CH.  XIX 

is  invoked  are  actions  on  policies  of  life  insurance,  where  the  de- 
ceased's misrepresentations  as  to  health  are  involved;  actions  for 
corporal  injuries,  where  the  plaintiff's  bodily  condition  is  to  be 
ascertained;  and  testamentary  actions,  where  the  testator's  mental 
condition  is  in  issue.  In  all  of  these  cases  the  medical  testimony  is 
"the  most  vital  and  reliable,"  "the  most  important  and  decisive,"  " 
and  is  absolutely  needed  for  purposes  of  learning  the  truth.  In  none 
of  them  is  there  any  reason  for  the  party  to  conceal  the  facts  except 
to  perpetrate  a  fraud  upon  the  opposing  party,  and  in  the  first  two 
of  these  classes  the  advancement  of  fraudulent  claims  is  notoriously 
common.  In  none  of  these  cases  need  there  be  any  fear  that  the 
absence  of  the  privilege  will  subjectively  hinder  people  'from  consult- 
ing physicians  freely  (which  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  true  reason  for 
maintaining  the  privilege  for  clients  of  attorneys);  the  injured 
person  would  still  seek  medical  aid,  the  insured  person  would  still 
submit  to  a  medical  examination,  and  the  dying  testator  would  still 
summon  physicians  to  his  cure.  In  litigation  about  wills,  policies, 
and  personal  injuries,  the  privilege,  where  it  exists,  is  known  in 
practice  to  be  a  serious  obstacle  to  the  ascertainment  of  truth  and  a 
useful  weapon  for  those  interested  in  suppressing  it.  Any  extension 
of  it  to  other  jurisdictions  is  to  be  earnestly  deprecated.] 

§  248.  Ordinary  Private  Relations.  Neither  is  this  protection  ex- 
tended to  confidential  friends,1  clerks,3  bankers,8  or  stewards 4  (except 
as  to  matters  which  the  employer  himself  would  not  be  obliged  to 
disclose,  such  as  his  title-deeds  and  private  papers,  in  a  case  in 
which  he  is  not  a  party).  [The  purpose  of  trials  could  never  be 
accomplished,  if  every  disclosure  made  in  confidence  were  to  be 
sealed  with  perpetual  secrecy.  In  the  language  of  Lord  Camden,6 
"it  is  not  befitting  the  dignity  of  this  high  Court  of  justice  to  be 
debating  the  etiquette  of  honor  at  the  same  time  when  we  are  trying 
lives  and  liberties."  The  protection  accorded  to  the  relations  treated 
in  the  preceding  and  ensuing  paragraphs  is  not  based  on  a  respect 
for  the  confidentiality  of  the  communication,  but  on  the  policy  of 
fostering  the  greatest  freedom  within  that  relation  and,  as  a  means 
thereto,  of  assuring  beforehand  to  persons  in  s\ach  relations  the  feel- 
ing of  security  and  liberty.  There  is,  thus,  no  privilege  for  a  confi- 
dential communication  merely  as  such.6] 

17  Pty  the  Court,  criticising  the  privilege,  in  Renihan  v.  Dennin,  103  N.  Y.  577.] 
1  4  T.  R.  758,  per  Ld.  Kenyon  ;  Hoffman  v.  Smith,  1  Caines  157,  159 ;  [Duchess 

of  Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  586  ;  Hill's  Trial,  ib.  1362 ;  R.  v.  Shaw,  6  C.  &  P. 

873  ;  R.  v.  Thomas,  7  id.  346  ;  Cox  v.  Montague,  78  Fed.  845;  nor  to  a  fellow-member 

of  a  fraternal  order  :  Owens  v.  Frank,  Wyo.,  53  Pac.  282.] 

»  Lee  v.  Birrell,  3  Campb.  337 ;  Webb  v.  Smith,  1  C.  &  P.  837. 

•  Lovd  v.  Freshfield,  2  C.  &  P.  325. 

«  Vaillant  v.  Dodemead,  2  Atk.  524  ;  4  T.  R.  756,  per  Buller,  J. ;  E.  of  Falmouth 
v.  Moss,  11  Price  455;  ["and  of  course  not  to  a  newspaper  reporter :  People  v.  Durrant, 
116  Cal.  179;  Ex  parte  Lawrence,  ib.  298.] 

6  rin  Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  «wpm.] 

*  Lit  has  thus  been  repudiated  for  a  commercial  agency  :  Shnner  v.  Alterton,  151 
U.  3.  607,  617  ;]  {and  for  a  telegraph  company  :  State  v.  Litchfield,  58  Me.  267  ;  Nat'l 


§§247 a-250.]     PHYSICIAN;  FRIEND;  GOVERNMENT.  387 

§  249.  » 

§  250.  Government  and  Informer.  We  now  proceed  to  the  third 
class  of  cases,  in  which  evidence  is  excluded  from  motives  of  public 
policy,  namely,  secrets  of  State,  or  things  the  disclosure  of  which 
would  be  prejudicial  to  the  public  interest.  These  matters  are 
either  those  which  concern  the  administration  of  penal  justice,  or 
those  which  concern  the  administration  of  government;  but  the 
principle  of  public  safety  is  in  both  cases  the  same,  and  the  rule  of 
exclusion  is  applied  no  further  than  the  attainment  of  that  object 
requires. 

Thus,  in  criminal  trials,  the  names  of  persons  employed  in  the 
discovery  of  the  crime  are  not  permitted  to  be  disclosed,1  any  farther 
than  is  essential  to  a  fair  trial  of  the  question  of  the  prisoner's  inno- 
cence or  guilt.2  "It  is  perfectly  right,"  said  Lord  Chief  Justice 
Eyre, 1  "  that  all  opportunities  should  be  given  to  discuss  the  truth 
of  the  evidence  given  against  a  prisoner;  but  there  is  a  rule  which 
has  universally  obtained,  on  account  of  its  importance  to  the  public 
for  the  detection  of  crimes,  that  those  persons  who  are  the  channel 
by  means  of  which  that  detection  is  made  should  not  be  unnecessa- 
rily disclosed."  Accordingly,  where  a  witness,  possessed  of  such 
knowledge,  testified  that  he  related  it  to  a  friend,  not  in  office,  who 
advised  him  to  communicate  it  to  another  quarter,  a  majority  of  the 
learned  judges  held  that  the  witness  was  not  to  be  asked  the  name  of 
that  friend;  and  they  all  were  of  opinion  that  all  those  questions 
which  tend  to  the  discovery  of  the  channels  by  which  the  disclosure 
was  made  to  the  officers  of  justice,  were,  upon  the  general  principle 
of  the  convenience  of  public  justice,  to  be  suppressed;  that  all  per- 
sons in  that  situation  were  protected  from  the  discovery;  and  that, 
if  it  was  objected  to,  it  was  no  more  competent  for  the  defendant  to 
ask  the  witness  who  the  person  was  that  advised  him  to  make  a 
disclosure,  than  to  ask  who  the  person  was  to  whom  he  made  the 
disclosure  in  consequence  of  that  advice,  or  to  ask  any  other  question 
respecting  the  channel  of  communication,  or  all  that  was  done  under 
it.8  Hence  it  appears  that  a  witness,  who  has  been  employed  to 
collect  information  for  the  use  of  government,  or  for  the  purposes 
of  the  police,  will  not  be  permitted  to  disclose  the  name  of  his  em- 
ployer, or  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  them,  or  the  name  of 
any  person  who  was  the  channel  of  communication  with  the  govern- 
ment or  its  officers,  nor  whether  the  information  has  actually  reached 

Bank  v.  Rank,  7  W.  Va.  544 ;{   {JEx  parte  Brown,  72  Mo.  83,  91  ;  and  see  the  article 
by  Mr.  Hitchcock,  in  5  So.  L.  Rev.  N.  s.  473.] 
1  [Transferred  post,  as  §  254  c.] 

1  LHardy's  Trial,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  8  (leading  case) ;  Watson's  Trial,  32  id.  102  ; 
R.  0.  O'Counell,  5  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1,  208 ;  R.  v.  O'Brien,  7  id.  1,  123  0  Att'y-Gen'l 
v.  Briant,  15  L.  J.  N.  8.  Exch.  265. 

2  PAs  to  this  last  clause,  see  post,  at  the  end  of  the  section.] 
•  R.  v.  Hardy,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  808-815,  per  Ld.  C.  J.  Eyre. 


388     EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY;    PBIVILEGE.     [CH.  XIX. 

the  government.     But  he  may  be  asked  whether  the  person  to  whom 
the  information  was  communicated  was  a  magistrate  or  not.4 

§  251.  Confidential  Official  Business.  On  a  like  principle  of  public 
policy,  the  official  transactions  between  the  heads  of  the  departments 
of  State  and  their  subordinate  officers  are  in  general  treated  as  privi- 
leged communications.  Thus,  communications  between  a  provincial 
governor  and  his  attorney-general  on  the  state  of  the  colony,  or  the 
conduct  of  its  officers ; 1  or  between  such  governor  and  a  military 
officer  under  his  authority;2  the  report  of  a  military  commission 
of  inquiry  made  to  the  commander-in-chief;  8  and  the  correspond- 
ence between  an  agent  of  the  government  and  a  Secretary  of  State,4 
are  confidential  and  privileged  matters,  which  the  interests  of  the 
State  will  not  permit  to  be  disclosed.  The  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  governors  of  the  several  States,  are  not  bound  to  pro- 
duce papers  or  disclose  information  communicated  to  them,  when, 
in  their  own  judgment,  the  disclosure  would,  on  public  considera- 
tions, be  inexpedient.5  And  where  the  law  is  restrained  by  public 
policy  from  enforcing  the  production  of  papers,  the  like  necessity  re- 
strains it  from  doing  what  would  be  the  same  thing  in  effect ;  namely, 
receiving  secondary  evidence  of  their  contents.8  But  communica- 
tions, though  made  to  official  persons,  are  not  privileged  where  they 
are  not  made  in  the  discharge  of  any  public  duty ;  such,  for  exam- 
ple, as  a  letter  by  a  private  individual  to  the  chief  secretary  of  the 

*  1  Phil.  Evid.  180,  181 ;  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  136;  32  How.  St.  Tr.  101 ;  U.  S. 
v.  Moses,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  726  ;  Home  v.  Lord  F.  C.  Bentinck,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  130, 
162,  per  Dallas,  C.  J. ;  ^Humphrey  v.  Archibald,  20  Ont.  App.  267  ;  Worthington  v. 
Scribner,  109  Mass.  487.     Whether  the  exclusion  is  absolute,  or  whether  the  Court 
may,  in  discretion  and  in  fairness  to  a  defendant  or  where  otherwise  the  disclosure 
would  be  desirable,  require  it  to  be  made,  is  not  clearly  settled:  see  j Oliver  v.  Pate, 
43  Ind.  132  ;  Stephen,  Dig.  of  Evidence,  art.  113;}  and  the  opinions  in  the  last  two 
cases  above  cited.     The  rule  does  not  apply  to  an  application  for  a  liquor-license :  Re 
Hirsch,  74  Fed.  928  ;  contra,  on  peculiar  grounds :  Re  Weeks,  82  Fed.  729.] 

1  Wyatt  v.  Gore,  Holt's  N.  P.  Gas.  299;  {or  between  a  district-attorney  and  the 
Attorney-General:  U.  S.  v.  Six  Lots  of  Ground,  1  Woods  C.  C.  234. | 

*  Cooke  v.  Maxwell,  2  Stark.  183. 

8  Home  v.  Lord  F.  C.  Bentinck,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  130. 

4  Anderson  v.  Hamilton,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  156,  u. ;,  2  Stark.  185,  per  Lord  Ellen- 
borough,  cited  by  the  Attorney-General ;  Marbury  v.  Madison,  1  Cranch  144  ;  see  also 
post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  498. 

•  1  Burr's  Trial,  186,  187,  per  Marshall,  C.  J.  ;  Gray  v.  Pentland,  2  S.  &  R.  23. 

•  Gray  v.  Pentland,  2  S.  &  R.  23,  31,  32,  per  Tilghman,  C.  J.,  cited  and  approved 
in  Yoter  v.  Sanno,  6  Watts  166,  per  Gibson,  C.  J.     In  Law  v.  Scott,  5  Har.  &  J.  438, 
it  seems  to  have  been  held  that  a  senator  of  the  United  States  may  be  examim-d  as  to 
what  transpired  in  a  secret  executive  session,  if  the  Senate  has  refused,  on  the  party's 
application,  to  remove  the  injunction  of  secrecy.     Sed  quaere,  for  if  so,  the  object  of  the 
rule,  in  the  preservation  of  State  secrets,  may  generally  be  defeated.     And  see  Plunkett 
v.  Cobbett,  29  Howell's  St.  Tr.  71,  72  ;  s.  c.  5  Esp.   136,   where  Lord  Ellen  borough 
held  that  though  one  member  of  Parliament  may  be  asked  as  to  the  fact  that  another 
member  took  part  in  a  debate,  yet  he  was  not  bound  to  relate  anything  which  had 
been  delivered  by  such  a  speaker  as  a  member  of  Parliament.     But  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  this  was  placed  by  Ixml  Ellenborough  on  the  ground  of  personal  privilege  in  the 
member;  whereas  the  transactions  of  a  session,  after  strangers  are  excluded,  are  placed 
under  an  injunction  of  secrecy  for  reasons  of  State:  Isee  Chubb  v.  Salomons,  3  C.  & 
K.75.J 


§§  250-252.]  OFFICIAL  BUSINESS;  GRAND  JURY.  389 

Postmaster-General,  complaining  of  the  conduct  of  the  guard  of  the 
mail  towards  a  passenger.7 

§  252.  Proceedings  of  Grand  Jurors.  Eor  the  same  reason  of  public 
policy,  in  the  furtherance  of  justice,  the  proceedings  of  grand  jurors 
are  regarded  as  privileged  communications.  It  is  the  policy  of  the 
law,  that  the  preliminary  inquiry,  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
a  party  accused,  should  be  secretly  conducted;  and  in  furtherance  of 
this  object  every  grand  juror  is  sworn  to  secrecy.  One  reason  may 
be,  to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  party  should  he  know  that  proceed- 
ings were  in  train  against  him;  another  may  be,  to  secure  freedom 
of  deliberation  and  opinion  among  the  grand  jurors,  which  would 
be  impaired  if  the  part  taken  by  each  might  be  made  known  to  the 
accused.  A  third  reason  may  be,  to  prevent  the  testimony  produced 
before  them  from  being  contradicted  at  the  trial  of  the  indictment, 
by  subornation  of  perjury  on  the  part  of  the  accused.  The  rule  in- 
cludes not  only  the  grand  jurors  themselves,  but  their  clerk,1  if  they 
have  one,  and  the  prosecuting  officer,  if  he  is  present  at  their  delib- 
erations;a  all  these  being  equally  concerned  in  the  administration  of 
the  same  portion  of  penal  law.  They  are  not  permitted  to  disclose 
who  agreed  to  find  the  bill  of  indictment,  or  who  did  not  agree ;  nor 
to  detail  the  evidence  on  which  the  accusation  was  founded.8  But 
they  may  be  compelled  to  state  whether  a  particular  person  testified 
as  a  witness  before  the  grand  jury ; 4  though  it  seems  they  cannot  be 
asked  if  his  testimony  there  agreed  with  what  he  testified  upon  the 
trial  of  the  indictment.6  Grand  jurors  may  also  be  asked,  whether 

7  Blake  v.  Pilfold,  1  M.  &  Rob.  198. 

QThere  seems  also  to  be  a  privilege,  not  well  defined,  against  the  disclosure,  not 
merely  of  communications  from  other  officials,  but  also  of  facts  coming  to  the  witness* 
knowledge  through  an  official  position,  where  the  disclosure  of  the  facts  would  injure 
State  policy:  see  Bishop  Atterbury's  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  494,  495,  543,587,  629, 
672  (cipher  used  by  official  detectives,  etc.)  ;  Nundocomar's  Trial,  20  id.  1057  ;  {Beat- 
son  v.  Skene,  5  H.  &  N.  838  ;|  Hartranf't's  Appeal,  85  Pa.  433.  Distinguish  from  all 
the  above  questions  (1)  that  of  the  amenability  of  a  public  official  to  legal  process  for 
official  acts,  and  (2)  the  exemption  of  an  executive  officer  of  State  from  responding  to 
a  subpoena  as  witness :  see  Hartranft's  Appeal,  supra.  Letters  in  the  public  post  are 
not  privileged  apart  from  statute  :  Tomline  v.  Tyler,  44  L.  T.  N.  B.  187  ;  Re  Smith, 
L.  R.  Ir.  7  Ch.  D.  286;  but  the  constitutional  provision  protecting  against  unlawful 
search  has  been  spoken  of  as  applying  to  the  mail :  Ex  parte  Jackson,  96  U.  S.  727.] 

1  12  Vin.  Abr.  38,  tit.  Evid.  B,  a,  pi.  5  ;  Trials  per  Pais,  315. 

2  Com.  v.   Tilden,   cited  in  2   Stark.  Evid.  232,   n.   (1),    by   Metcalf ;  McLellan 
v.  Richardson,  1  Shepl.  82  ;  QJenkins  v.  State,  Fla.,  18  So.  182-3     But  on  the  trial 
of    an    indictment   for  perjury,    committed   in   giving    evidence    before    the    grand 
jury,  it  has  been  held  that  another  person,   who  was  present  as  a   witness  in   the 
same   matter,  at   the   same  time,  is  competent  to  testify  to  what  the  prisoner  said 
before  the  grand  jury  ;    and  that  a  police-officer  in  waiting  was  competent   for   the 
same  purpose  ;   neither  of  these  being  sworn  to   secrecy :   R.   v.   Hughes,   1  Car.  & 
Kir.  519. 

»  Sykes  v.  Dunbar,  2  Selw.  N.  P.  815  (1059)  ;  Huidekoper  v.  Cotton,  3  Watts  56  ; 
McLellan  v.  Richardson,  1  Shepl.  82  ;  Low's  Case,  4  Greenl.  439,  446,  453  ;  Burr's 
Trial  (Anon.),  Evidence  for  Deft.  p.  2 ;  [>ee  Owen  v.  Owen,  Md.,  132  Atl.  247.] 

*  Sykes  v.  Dunbar,  2  Selw.  N.  P.  815  (1059)  ;  Huidekoper  v.  Cotton,  1  Watts  56  ; 
Frepnian  v.  Arkell,  1  C.  &  P.  135,  137,  n.  (c)  ;  £or  the  date  of  the  witness'  attendance  : 
Watson's  Trial,  32  How.  St.  Tr.  107.1 

6  12  Vin.  Abr.  20,  tit.  Evidence,  H ;  Imlay  v.  Rogers,  2  Halst.  347.     The  rule  in 


390     EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY;    PRIVILEGE.     [ciI.  XIX. 

twelve  of  their  number  actually  concurred  in  the  finding  of  a  bill,  the 
certificate  of  the  foreman  not  being  conclusive  evidence  of  that  fact.' 
§  252  a.  Proceedings  of  Traverse  Jurors.  On  similar  grounds  of 
public  policy,  and  for  the  protection  of  parties  against  fraud,  the  law 
excludes  the  testimony  of  traverse  jurors,  when  offered  to  prove 
misbehavior  in  the  jury  in  regard  to  the  verdict.  Formerly,  indeed, 
the  affidavits  of  jurors  have  been  admitted  in  support  of  motions  to 
set  aside  verdicts  by  reason  of  misconduct;  but  that  practice  was 
broken  in  upon  by  Lord  Mansfield,  and  the  settled  course  now  is  to 
reject  them,  because  of  the  mischiefs  which  may  result  if  the  ver- 
dict is  thus  placed  in  the  power  of  a  single  juryman.1  >  [But  while 
it  may  be  conceded  that  the  communications  between  jurors  are  in 
general  accorded  the  protection  of  privacy,  the  true  question  in  most 
of  such  cases  seems  to  be  one  of  jury-law  or  of  the  law  of  new  trials, 
i.  e.  whether  certain  kinds  of  misconduct  will  be  considered  as  suffi- 
cient ground  for  disturbing  the  verdict,  and  whether  it  is  wiser  to 
attempt  to  investigate  the  truth  about  such  occurrences  or  to  let  the 
verdict  make  an  end  of  controversy,  — much  on  the  same  principle 
that,  after  a  judicial  record  has  been  made  up  or  a  contract  reduced 
to  a  final  written  memorial,  the  prior  parol  proceedings  or  negotia- 
tions will  not  be  investigated  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  the 
record  or  instrument.  In  other  words,  it  is  then  not  so  much  a  ques- 
tion of  whether  the  things  said  or  done  in  the  jury  room  shall  be 
kept  secret  as  of  whether  certain  things  said  or  done  should  be  given 
any  legal  effect  in  overturning  or  supporting  a  verdict.  Some  things 
—  such  as  tossing  coins  to  determine  the  verdict  —  might  well  be 

the  text  is  applicable  only  to  civil  actions.  In  the  case  last  cited,  which  was  trespass, 
the  question  arose  on  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  for  the  rejection  of  the  grand  juror,  who 
was  offered  in  order  to  discredit  a  witness;  and  the  Court  being  equally  divided,  the 
motion  did  not  prevail.  Probably  such  also  was  the  nature  of  the  case  in  Clayt.  84, 
pi.  140,  cited  by  Viner.  [^Moreover,  whatever  the  rule  may  now  be  in  England  (see 
Stephen,  Digest  of  Evidence,  art.  114),  the  general  view  in  this  country  is  that  where 
a  witness  testifies  on  a  trial,  the  reasons  for  preserving  privacy  as  to  his  former  state- 
ments before  the  grand  jury  do  not  forbid  the  resort  to  that  testimony  for  the  purpose 
of  exposing  the  inconsistency  of  his  story:  see  (Com.  v.  Mead,  12  Gray  166;  Jones  v. 
Turpin,  6  Heisk.  181  ;  State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H.  484  ;  Shattuck  v.  State,  11  Ind.  473  ; 
Burdick  v.  Hunt,  43  id.  381 ;  New  Hamp.  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Healey,  151  Mass.  538;!  Jenkins 
v.  State,  35  Fla.  737 ;  Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  Ind.  334  ;  State  v.  Benner,  64  Me.  282  • 
People  v.  O'Neill,  107  Mich.  556;  Kirk  v.  Garrett,  84  Md.  383;  State  v.  Rrown,  28 
Or.  147  ;  statutes  often  regulate  the  subject;  as,  e.  g.,  in  State  v.  Thomas,  99  Mo.  235, 
'9  D  Where  a  witness  before  the  grand  jury  has  committed  perjury  in  his  testimony, 
either  before  them  or  at  the  trial,  the  reasons  mentioned  in  the  text  for  excluding  the 
testimony  of  grand  jurors  do  not  prevent  them  from  being  called  as  witnesses  after  the 
first  indictment  has  been  tried,  in  order  to  establish  the  guilt  of  the  perjured  partv: 
see  4  Bl.  Comm.  126,  n.  5,  by  Christian  ;  1  Chittv's  Grim.  Law.  p.  817 ;  Sir  J.  Fen  wick's 
Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  610,  6J1 ;  fi  St.  Tr.  72;  FJPcopIn  v.  O'Neill,  107  Mich.  556  j 

6  4  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  25,  §  15;  McLellan  v  Richardson,  1  Shepl.  82;  Low's 
Case,  4  Greenl.  439;  Com.  v.  Smith,  9  Mass.  107  :  [contra:  Bayard's  Trial,  14  How. 
St.  Tr.  478. j 

1  Vaise  v.  Delaval,  1  T.  R.  11  ;  Jackson  »-.  Williamson,  2  T.  R.  281  ;  Owen  v.  War- 
burton,  1  N.  R.  326  ;   Little  u.  Larrabpe,  2  Ornenl.  37.  41,  n.,  where  the  cases  are  col- 
Slate  „.  Freeman,  5  Conn.  348;  Meade  v.  Smith,  16  Conn.  346;  Straker  v. 
Graham,  4  M.  &  W.  721. 


§§  252-254.]      TRAVERSE  JURY;  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.  391 

investigated  and  given  effect;  others  —  such  as  misunderstanding 
the  instructions  —  might  well  be  thought  so  elusive  and  so  fruitful 
of  unending  controversy  as  to  forbid  consideration  for  the  purpose  of 
affecting  the  verdict.  Judicial  opinion  naturally  differs  much  as  to 
the  kinds  of  conduct  which  may  thus  be  investigated.2] 

§  253.  * 

§  254.  Communications  between  Husband  and  Wife.  Communica- 
tions between  husband  and  wife  belong  also  to  the  class  of  privileged 
communications,  and  are  therefore  protected  independently  of  the 
ground  of  interest  and  identity,  which  precludes  the  parties  from 
testifying  for  or  against  each  other.  The  happiness  of  the  married 
state  requires  that  there  should  be  the  most  unlimited  confidence  be- 
tween husband  and  wife;  and  this  confidence  the  law  secures  by 
providing  that  it  shall  be  kept  forever  inviolable;  that  nothing  shall 
be  extracted  from  the  bosom  of  the  wife  which  was  confided  there  by 
the  husband.  [The  common-law  privilege  has  usually  been  dealt 
with  by  the  statutes  abolishing  disqualification  by  reason  of  interest. 
Most  of  these  statutes *  have  abolished  the  common-law  disqualifica- 
tion of  one  spouse  to  testify  for  the  other,  and  a  few  of  them  have 
also  abolished  the  privilege  of  one  spouse  not  to  have  the  other 
testify  in  opposition  (post,  §§  333  c-346) ;  but  all  of  these  have 
preserved,  or  intended  to  preserve,  the  present  privilege  (for  confi- 
dential communications)  undiminished.  The  practical  differences 
between  these  three  principles  —  wholly  distinct  in  policy  and  effect, 
but  not  always  carefully  distinguished  —  is  explained  in  another  place 
(post,  §  333  c).  In  several  of  these  statutes,  however,  the  three 
matters  have  been  dealt  with  so  confusedly  that  the  original  features 
of  the  present  common-law  privilege  have  been  more  or  less  altered, 
usually  by  the  interpolation  of  some  of  the  incidents  of  the  other 
two  principles  above  mentioned,  but  occasionally  by  the  direct  ex- 
pansion of  the  scope  of  the  present  privilege.  In  many  jurisdic- 
tions, therefore,  the  limits  of  the  privilege  will  depend  wholly  on  the 
wording  of  the  local  statute.  In  this  place  it  will  be  possible  to 
note  only  a  few  of  the  more  general  questions  that  arise. 

At  common  law  the  privilege  seems  clearly  to  have  included  only 
such  communications  as  are  private  or  confidential;  but  by  some  of 

2  ^Leading  opinions  are  those  by  Brewer,  J.,  in  Perry  v.  Bailey,  12  Kan.  539 ;  Gray,  J., 
in  Woodward  v.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  453  ;  Fuller,  C.  J.,  in  Ma'ttox  v.  U,  S.,  146  U.  S. 
140;  see  also  {Tucker  v.  South  Kingston,  5  R.  I.  558;  Bridgewater  r.  Plymouth, 
97  Mass.  382;  Boston,  etc.  R.  R.  Cor]),  v.  Dana,  1  Gray  83,  105;  Folsom  'v.  Man- 
chester, 11  Cush.  334,  337  ;  Rowe  v.  Canney,  139  Mass.  41 ;  Warren  v.  Water  Co., 
143  id.  155;  Com.  v.  White,  147  id.  76;  Heffron  v.  Gallupe,  55  Me.  563;  Dana  v. 
Tucker,  4  Johns.  487;  Tenney  v.  Evans,  13  N.  H.  462;  State  v.  Aver,  23  id.  301 ;[ 
Kelly  v.  State,  39  Fla.  122  ;  Bolden  v.  G.  R.  &  B.  Co.,  Ga.,  27  S.  E.  664  ;  Christ  v. 
Webster  City,  la.,  74  N.  W.  743  ;  State  v.  McCormick,  57  KHII.  440  ;  Harrington  v. 
R.  Co.,  157  Mass.  579  ;  Rush  v.  R.  Co.,  Minn.,  72  N.  W.  733  ;  Hamburg  B.  F.  I.  Co.  v. 
Mfg.  <'o.,  U.  S.  App.,  76  Fed.  479:  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  2618.] 

1  ^Transferred  post,  as  §  254  A.] 

1  LSee  these  statutes  set  out  in  Appendix  I/J 


392     EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY ;    PEIVILEGE.      [CH.  XIX, 

the  statutes  it  includes  all  communications  between  husband  and 
wife.2  In  construing  the  privilege  in  its  original  and  proper  form, 
it  is  usually  held  that  a  conversation  in  the  presence  of  third  per- 
sons is  not  confidential ; 8  various  other  situations  present  the  same 
question,  but  much  must  depend  on  the  circumstances  of  each  case.4 
But  a  conversation  with  a  third  person  is  not  excluded  because  the 
other  spouse  was  also  present;6  and  one  who  surreptitiously  over- 
hears the  communication  may  testify  to  it,  presumably  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  person  making  the  communication  might,  by  taking 
more  pains,  have  secured  that  privacy  which  the  law  would  have  re- 
spected.6 The  common-law  privilege  protects  only  conversations  or 
communications;  and  the  question  may  thus  arise  whether  certain 
conduct  by  one  spouse  in  the  presence  of  the  other  —  such  as  the 
payment  of  money  or  the  signing  of  a  note  —  is  to  be  treated  as  a 
communication;  but  under  certain  statutes  which  enlarge  the  privi- 
lege to  "  transactions  "  these  questions  arise  less  frequently.7  Pre- 
cisely whose  the  privilege  is  —  i.  e.,  in  particular,  whether  the 
objection  of  the  other  spouse  would  still  be  effectual,  supposing  that 
the  spouse  against  whom  it  is  offered  has  waived  it  —  does  not  seem 
to  be  clearly  settled;  but  it  seems  certain,  on  the  one  hand,  that  as 
against  the  one  who  has  waived  it  —  e.  g.  by  voluntarily  disclosing 
it  to  a  third  person  —  the  protection  of  the  privilege  ceases,8  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  voluntary  disclosure  by  one  spouse  to  a 
third  person  does  not  make  the  communication  admissible  as  against 
the  other;9  moreover,  the  privilege  seems  to  belong  equally  to  the 

2  QSee  the  statutes  in  Appendix  I ;]   {also  Campbell  v.  Chare,  12  E.  I.  333  ;  Estate 
of  Low,  Myrick's  Probate  143;    Bird  v.   Hueston,    10  Ohio  St.  418;   Westemian  v. 
Westerman,  25  id.  500.  { 

3  QThe  circumstances  of  each  case  may  affect  the  decision :  see  Reynolds  v.  State, 
147  Ind.  3  ;  Jacobs  v.  Hesler,  113  Mass.  159 ;   Fay  v.   Guynon,   131   id.  31  ;   Lyon  v. 
Prouty,  154  id.  489  ;  Toole  v.  Toole,  111  N.  C.  152  ;  Dumbach  v.  Bishop,  183  Pa.  602; 
Wheeler  v.  Campbell,  68  Vt.  98J 

<  {See  Dexter  v.  Booth,  2  All.  559;  Raynes  v.  Bennett,  114  Mass.  425;  Com.  v. 
Jardine,  143  id.  567  ;  Com.  v.  Hayes,  145  id.  293 ;  Wood  v.  Chetwood,  27  K  J.  Eq. 
311  ;(  QHagerman  v.  Wigent,  108  Mich.  192;  Newstrom  v.  R.  Co.,  61  Minn.  78;  Seitz 
».  Seitz,  170  Pa.  71;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shoemaker,  95  Tenn.  72;  Southwick  v. 
Southwick,  49  N.  Y.  510. 1 

6  rAllbri^ht  v.  Hannah,  103  la.  98;]  {Griffin  v.  Smith,  45  Ind.  366;  Higbee  v. 
McMUlen,  18  Kan.  133. ( 

«  QR.  v.  Simons,  6  C.  &  P.  541 ;  Com.  v.  Griffin,  110  Mass.  181 ;]  {State  v.  Carter, 
35  Vt.  378.  | 

QOn  this  principle,  if  a  written  communication  is  obtained  by  a  third  person  (sup- 
posably  without  collusion),  the  latter  may  put  it  in:  see  State  v.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  540; 
]State  v.  Buffington,  20  Kan.  599;}  contra,  Mercer  v.  State,  Fla.,  24  So.  154.  Dis- 
tinguish this  from  a  voluntary  disclosure  by  one  of  the  spouses  to  a  third  person,  po.it.~2 

'  QSee  examples  under  both  forms  of  the  privilege  in  Poulson  v.  Stanley,  Gal.,  55  Pnc. 
605;  Griffith  v.  Griffith,  162  111.  368;  Poison  v.  State,  137  Ind.  519,  524;  Beyerline 
v.  State,  147  id.  125;  McKenzie  v.  Lautenschlager,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  489;  Shanklin  v. 
McCracken,  140  Mo.  348;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shoemaker,  95  Tenn.  72;  French  v.- 
Ware,  65  Vt.  338,  344;  Homer  v.  Yancc,  93  Wis.  352;  Lanctot  r.  State,  id.,  73  N.  W. 
675.T 

8  "[[See  People  v.  Hayes,  140  N.  Y.  484,  495;  Kelley  v.  Andrews,  102  la.  ]19;"1 
j Brown  v.  Wood,  121  Mass.l37.| 

•  fJ3ee  Scott  ».  Com.,  94  Ky.  511 ;  Wilkerson  v.  State,  91  Ga.  729,  738.] 


§§254-254  a.]  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.  393 

spouse  making  and  the  spouse  receiving  the  communication.  The  ob- 
ject of  the  privilege  being  to  give  to  the  spouses  such  an  assurance 
of  privacy  as  will  subjectively  induce  between  them  complete  free- 
dom of  communication,]  therefore,  after  the  parties  are  separated, 
whether  it  be  by  divorce 10  or  by  the  death  n  of  the  husband,  the  wife 
is  still  precluded  from  disclosing  any  conversations  with  him, 
though  she  may  be  admitted  to  testify  to  facts  which  came  to  her 
knowledge  by  means  equally  accessible  to  any  person  not  standing 
in  that  relation.12  Their  general  incompetency  to  testify  for  or 
against  each  other  will  be  considered  hereafter  in  its  more  appropri- 
ate place. 


3.    Other  Exclusions  based  on  Public  Policy. 

§  254  a.  Evidence  procured  by  Illegal  Means.  It  may  be  men- 
tioned in  this  place,  that  though  papers  and  other  subjects  of  evi- 
dence may  have  been  illegally  taken  from  the  possession  of  the 
party  against  whom  they  are  offered,  or  otherwise  unlawfully  ob- 
tained, this  is  no  valid  objection  to  their  admissibility  if  they  are 
pertinent  to  the  issue.  The  Court  will  not  take  notice  how  they 
were  obtained,  whether  lawfully  or  unlawfully,  nor  will  it  form  an 
issue  to  determine  that  question.1  [This  principle  is  regularly  ap- 
plied to  incriminating  materials  —  tools,  liquor,  documents,  etc. — 
obtained  by  unlawful  search  of  premises,2  or  by  unlawful  search  of 
the  person,"  or  by  other  unauthorized  means.4  On  the  same  princi- 
ple a  letter  or  other  document  obtained  by  fraud  or  other  dishonor- 

11  [Griffith  v.  Griffith,  162  111.  368.] 

11  LXewstrom  v.  R.  Co.,  61  Minn.  78;  Buckingham  v.  Roar,  45  Nebr.  244;  South- 
wick  v.  Southwick,  49  N.  Y.  510 ;  Geer  v.  Goudy,  111.,  51  N.  E.  623-3 

12  Monroe  v.  Twistleton,   Peake's  Evid.  App.  Ixxxii,  as  explained  by  Lord  Ellen- 
borough,  in  Aveson  v.  Lord  Kinnaird,  6  East  192,  193;  Doker  v.  Hasler,  Ry.  &  M. 

198 ;  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Peters  209,  223  ;  Coffin  v.  Jones,  13  Pick.  441,  445  ;  Edgell 
v.  Bennett,  7  Vt.  536;  Williams  v.  Baldwin,  id.  503,  506,  per  Royce,  J.;  jBigelow  v. 
Sickles,  75  Wis.  428.  j  In  Beveridge  v.  Minter,  1  C.  &  P.  364,  where  the  widow 
•was  permitted  by  Abbott,  C.  J.,  to  testify  to  certain  admissions  of  her  deceased  hus- 
band, relative  to  the  money  in  question,  this  point  was  not  considered,  the  objection 
being  placed  wholly  on  the  ground  of  her  interest  in  the  estate.  See  also  2  Kent 
Comm.  180;  2  Stark.  Evid.  399;  Robin  v.  King,  2  Leigh  142,  144. 

J.  Com.  '-v.  Dana,  2  Met.  329,  337  ;  Legatt  v.  Tollervey,  14  East  302  ;  Jordan  v. 
Lewis,  id.  306,  n. ;  [Terry  v.  State,  Ida.,  38  Pac.  658.  Good  expositions  of  the 
principle  will  be  found  in  opinions  by  Wilde,  J.,  in  Com.  t;.  Dana,  supra  ;  Lumpkin, 
P.  J.,  in  Williams  v.  State,  infra7\ 

2  FJBishop  Atterbury's  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  495,  629;  R.  v.  Granatelli,  7  State 
Tr.  N.  s.  979,  987  ;  Starchma7i  v.  State,  62  Ark.  538  ;  State  v.  Griswold,  67  Conn.  290  ; 
Wood  v.  McGuire,  21  Ga.  576  ;  Williams  v.  State,  100  id.  511  ;  Trask  v.  People,  151 
111.  523  ;  Com.  v.  Tibbetts,  157  Mass.  519  ;  Com.  v.  Hurley,  158  id.  159  ;  Com.  v. 
Acton,  165  id.  11  ;  Com.  v.  Smith,  166  id.  370  ;  State  v.  Atkinson,  40  S.  C.  363,  371.] 

8  [Shields  v.  State,  104  Ala.  35;  Scott  v.  State,  113  id.  64;  Com.  ».  Welch,  163 
Mass.  372  ;  State  v.  Cross,  W.  Va.,  29  S.  E.  527.  See  State  v.  Van  Tassel,  103  la.  6.] 

*  FJPeople  v.  Alden,  113  Cil.  264;  Stevison  v.  Earnest,  80  111.  513  (leading  case)  ; 
State  v.  Sawtelle,  66  N.  H.  488,  semble;^  State  v.  Graham,  74  N.  C.  646. 


394  EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON   PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

able  means  is  not  excluded.5  The  illegality  of  obtaining  evidence 
by  violating  the  privilege  against  self -crimination  does  not  exclude 
it;  but  the  privilege  itself  nevertheless  operates  to  exclude  it.6] 

§  254  b  [253].  Indecent  Evidence.  There  is  a  fourth  species  of 
evidence  which  is  excluded,  namely,  that  which  is  indecent,  or 
offensive  to  public  morals,  or  injurious  to  the  feelings  or  interests 
of  third  persons,  the  parties  themselves  having  no  interest  in  the 
matter,  except  what  they  have  impertinently  and  voluntarily  created. 
The  mere  indecency  of  disclosures  does  not/  in  general,  suffice  to  ex- 
clude them  where  the  evidence  is  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  civil 
or  criminal  justice;  as,  in  an  indictment  for  a  rape;  or  in  a  ques- 
tion upon  the  sex  of  one  claiming  an  estate  entailed,  as  heir  male  or 
female;  or  upon  the  legitimacy  of  one  claiming  as  lawful  heir;  or 
in  an  action  by  the  husband  for  criminal  conversation  with  the  wife. 
In  these  and  similar  cases  the  evidence  is  necessary,  either  for  the 
proof  and  punishment  of  crime  or  for  the  vindication  of  rights  ex- 
isting before,  or  independent  of,  the  fact  sought  to  be  disclosed.1 
But  where  the  parties  have  voluntarily  and  impertinently  interested 
themselves  in  a  question  tending  to  violate  the  peace  of  society  by 
exhibiting  an  innocent  third  person  to  the  world  in  a  ridiculous  or 
contemptible  light,  or  to  disturb  his  own  peace  and  comfort,  or  to 
offend  public  decency  by  the  disclosures  which  its  decision  may  re- 
quire, the  evidence  will  not  be  received.  Of  this  sort  are  wagers  or 
contracts  respecting  the  sex  of  a  third  person,2  or  upon  the  question 
whether  an  unmarried  woman  has  had  a  child.8  In  this  place  may 
also  be  mentioned  the  declarations  of  the  husband  or  wife  that  they 
have  had  no  connection,  though  living  together,  and  that  therefore 
the  offspring  is  spurious;  which,  on  the  same  general  ground  of 
decency,  morality,  and  policy,  are  uniformly  excluded.4 

§  254  c  [249].  Judge  ;  Juror  ;  Arbitrator  ;  Attorney.  In  regard  *  to 
judges  of  courts  of  record,  it  is  considered  dangerous  to  allow  them 
to  be  called  upon  to  state  what  occurred  before  them  in  court ;  and, 
on  this  ground,  the  grand  jury  were  advised  not  to  examine  the 
chairman  of  the  Quarter  Sessions  as  to  what  a  person  testified  in  a 

«  [Legatt  r.  Tollervy,  14  East  306  ;  Stockfleth  v.  DeTastet,  4  Camp.  11;  R.  v. 
Derrington,  2  C.  &  P.  419;  State  v.  Kenard,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  894. 

For  this  principle  as  illustrated  in  the  use  of  confessions,  see  ante,  §  229.] 
«  TSee  pout,  §  469  d.~\ 
rCompare  the  principle  as  to  indecent  exhibition  of  the  person,  etc.,  ante,  §  13  #.] 

*  Da  Costa  v.  Jones,  Cowp.  729. 

8  Ditchburn  v.  Goldsmith,  4  Campb.  152.  If  the  subject  of  the  action  is  frivolous, 
or  the  question  impertinent,  and  this  is  apparent  on  the  record,  the  Court  will  not  pro- 
ceed at  all  in  the  trial  :  Brown  v.  Leeson,  2  H.  131.  43  ;  Henkin  v.  Gerss,  2  Campb.  408. 

*  Goodright  v.  Moss,  Cowp.  594,  said,  per  Lord  Mansfield,  to  have   been  solemnly 
decided  at  the  Delegates  ;  Cope  v.  Cope,   1  M.  &  Rob.  269,  per  Alderson,  J. ;  R.  v. 
Rook,  1  Wils.  340  ;  R.  v.  Luffe,  8  East  193,  202,  203  ;  R.  v.  Kea,  11  id.  132  ;  Com.  ». 
Shepherd,  6  Binn.  283;   [Simon   v.   State,   81   Tex.  Cr.  186,  199;   Rabeke  V.  Baer, 
Mii-h.,  73  N.  W.  242  ;  see  ante,  §  28.  under  the  presumption  of  legitimacy.] 

1  [This  section  began  in  the  original  text  as  follows  f]  The  case  of  judges  and  arbi- 
trators may  be  mentioned,  as  the  second  class  of  privileged  communications. 


§§  254a-254c-.]     INDECENCIES;  JUDGE,  JUROR,  ARBITRATOR.     395 

trial  in  that  court.8  It  may  be  *  proper  to  take  notice  of  the  case, 
where  the  facts  are  personally  known  by  the  judge,  before  whom  the 
cause  is  tried;  and  whatever  difference  of  opinion  may  once  have 
existed  on  this  point,  it  seems  now  to  be  agreed,  that  the  same 
person  cannot  be  both  witness  and  judge,  in  a  cause,  which  is  on 
trial  before  him.  If  he  is  the  sole  judge,  he  cannot  be  sworn;  and 
if  he  sits  with  others,  he  still  can  hardly  be  deemed  capable  of  im- 
partially deciding  on  the  admissibility  of  his  own  testimony,  or  of 
weighing  it  against  that  of  another.4  Whether  his  knowledge  of  com- 
mon notoriety  is  admissible  proof  of  that  fact,  is  not  so  clearly  agreed.6 
This  principle  [of  exclusion]  has  not  been  extended  to  jurors.6 
Though  the  jury  may  use  their  general  knowledge  on  the  subject  of 
any  question  before  them;  yet,  if  any  juror  has  a  particular  knowl- 
edge, as  to  which  he  can  testify,  he  must  be  sworn  as  a  witness.7  On 
grounds  of  public  interest  and  convenience,  a  judge  cannot  be  called 
as  a  witness  to  testify  to  what  took  place  before  him  in  the  trial  of 
another  cause ; 8  though  he  may  testify  to  foreign  and  collateral  mat- 
ters, which  happened  in  his  presence  while  the  trial  was  pending  or 
after  it  was  ended.9  The  case  of  arbitrators  is  governed  by  the  same 
general  policy;10  and  neither  the  courts  of  law  nor  of  equity  will 
disturb  decisions  deliberately  made  by  arbitrators,  by  requiring  them 
to  disclose  the  grounds  of  their  award,  unless  under  very  cogent  cir- 
cumstances, such  as  upon  an  allegation  of  fraud;  for,  "Interest 
reipublicse  ut  sit  finis  litium."  n  On  grounds 12  of  public  policy,  and 

2  R.  v.  Gazard,  8  C.  &  P.  595,  per  Patteson,  J. ;  People  r.  Miller,  2  Parker  C.  R. 
197.  j  But  this  seems  not  to  be  the  law  :  R.  v.  Gazard,  8  C.  &  P.  595  ;  State  v.  Duff}', 
57  Conn.  525;  Huff  v.  Bennett,  4  Sandf.  120;  Schall  v.  Miller,  5  Whart.  156.f 
^Magistrates  and  judges  are  frequently  called  upon  to  state  testimony  given  before  them ; 
and  though  they  might  perhaps  plead  public  duty  in  refusal  to  attend  (Re  Lester,  77  Ga. 
143),  there  seems  to  be  no  objection  to  their  testimony  if  they  are  willing.]] 

8  [The  next  five  sentences  are  transferred  from  §  364.] 

*  Ross  v.  Buhler,  2  Martin's  R.  N.  s.  313;  FJEstes  v.  Bridgforth,  114  Ala.  221  ; 
Rogers  v.  State,  60  Ark.  76  ;  Shockley  v.  Morgan,  Gu.,  29  S.  E.  694 ;  Baker  i>.  Thomp- 
son, 89  id.  486  (on  special  grounds) ;  Maitland  v.  Zanga,  14  Wash.  92.  But  this  seems 
not  to  have  been  the  orthodox  rule  :  Cornish's  Trial,  11  How.  St.  Tr.  459  ;  Feuwick's 
Trial,  13  id.  663,  667.]  So  is  the  law  of  Spain,  Partid.  3,  tit.  16, 1.  19  ;  1  Moreau  & 
Cnrleton's  Tr.  p.  200;  —  and  of  Scotland,  Glassford  on  Evid.  p.  602;  Tait  on  Evid. 
432 ;  Stair's  Inst.  Book  iv,  tit.  45,  4  ;  Erskine's  Inst.  Book  iv,  tit.  2,  33. 

5  Lord  Stair  and  Mr.  Erskine  seem  to  have  been  of  opinion  that  it  was,   "unless  it 
be  overruled  by  pregnant  contrary  evidence;"  but  Mr.  Glassford  and  Mr.  Tait  are  of 
the  contrary  opinion.      fJOn  this  point,  see  ante,  Chap.  II.] 

6  QSav.  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ono,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  607;   People  v.  Thiede,  11  Vt.  241 ; 
Thiede  v.  Utah,  159  U.  S.  510.] 

7  R.   v.   Rosser,  7  C.  &  P.  648 ;  Stones  v.  Byron,  4  Dowl.  &  L.  393  ;  Fjsee  anie^ 
§§  6c,  162  o.] 

8  R.  v.  Gazard,  8  C.  &  P.  595,  per  Patteson,  J. ;  Qsee  the  beginning  of  this  section, 
supra.~] 

9  R.  v.  Earl  of  Thanet,  27  How.  St.  Tr.  847,  848. 

10  fJThe  policy  is  in  truth  a  different  one,  i.  e.  that  the  grounds  of  the  award  are  in 
the  nature  of  the  case  immaterial ;  on  any  material  facts,  the  arbitrator  as  a  witness  is 
not  excluded:  Whiteley  &  Roberts'  Arbitr.,  1891,  1  Ch.  558.] 

u  Story  E(|.  PI.  458,  n.  (1);  Anon.,  3  Atk.  644;  2  Story  Eq.  Jurisp.  680  ;  Johnson 
».  Durant,  4  C.  &  P.  327  ;  Ellis  v.  Saltau,  ib.  n.  (a) ;  Habershou  t'.  Troby,  3  Esp.  38. 

18  jT"his  sentence  is  transferred  from  §  386.] 


896  EXCLUSIONS   BASED   ON    PUBLIC   POLICY.  [CH.  XIX. 

for  the  purer  administration  of  justice,  the  relation  of  lawyer  and 
client  is  so  far  regarded  by  the  rules  of  practice  in  some  courts,  as 
that  the  lawyer  is  not  permitted  to  be  both  advocate  and  witness  for 
his  client  in  the  same  cause.18 

[The  privileges  against  self-crimination,  against  the  production  of 
documents  by  one  not  a  party,  and  against  inspection  of  the  person 
of  a  civil  plaintiff,  are  treated  post,  §§  469  cZ-469  w.] 

13  Stones  v.  Byron,  4  Dowl.  &  Lowndes  393  ;  Dunn  v.  Packwood,  11  Jur.  242  ;  Reg. 
Gen.  Sup.  Court,  N.  Hamp.  Reg.  23 ;  6  N.  Hamp.  R.  580  ;  Mishler  v.  Baumgardner, 
1  Am.  Law  Jour.  304,  N.  s.  Contra :  Little  v.  Keon,  1  N.  Y.  Code  Rep.  4 ;  1  Sandf. 
607  ;  Potter  v.  Ware,  1  Cush.  518,  524,  and  cases  cited  by  Metcalf,  J.  £In  §  364,  the 
author  states  the  above  rule  as  obtaining  in  England,  but  adds,  citing  no  authority  : 
"  But  in  the  United  States  no  case  has  been  found  to  proceed  to  that  extent;  and  the 
fact  is  hardly  ever  known  to  occur.5'  Modern  practice  does  not  exclude  the  advocate 
as  witness. 


§§  254  c-255.] 


TREASON. 


397 


CHAPTER  XX. 

QUANTITY   OP    EVIDENCE  ;    NUMBER    OP    WITNESSES ;    CORROBORATION. 


§  255.  Treason. 

§  256.  Same :  Overt  Act  and  Evidence 
of  it. 

§  257.  Perjury. 

§  257  a.   Same :  Several  Assignments. 

§  258.  Same :  Corroborating  Circum- 
stances. 


§  259.  Same  :  Inconsistent  Statements 
as  Proof. 

§  260.   Answers  in  Chancery. 

§  260  a.  Usage  ;  Wills  and  Deeds. 

§  260  b.  Accomplice  ;  Complainant  in 
Rape  or  Seduction. 


§  255.  Treason.  Under  this  head  it  is  not  proposed  to  go  into  an 
extended  consideration  of  the  statutes  of  treason,  or  of  frauds,  but 
only  to  mention  briefly  some  instances  in  which  those  statutes,  and 
some  other  rules  of  law>  have  regulated  particular  cases,  taking  them 
out  of  the  operation  of  the  general  principles  by  which  they  would 
otherwise  be  governed.  Thus  in  regard  to  treasons,  though  by  the 
common  law  the  crime  was  sufficiently  proved  by  one  credible  wit- 
ness,1 yet,  considering  the  great  weight  of  the  oath  or  duty  of  alle- 
giance against  the  probability  of  the  fact  of  treason,2  it  has  been 
deemed  expedient  to  provide'  that  no  person  shall  be  indicted  or 
convicted  of  high  treason  but  upon  the  oaths  and  testimony  of  two 
witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  to  separate  overt  acts  of  the  same 
treason,  unless  upon  his  voluntary  confession  in  open  court.  We 
have  already  seen  that  a  voluntary  confession  out  of  court,  if  proved 

i  Foster's  Disc.  p.  233  ;  Woodbeck  v.  Keller,  6  Cowen  120  ;  McNally's  Evid.  31. 

8  This  is  conceived  to  be  the  true  foundation  on  which  the  rule  has,  in  modern 
times,  been  enacted.  The  manner  of  its  first  introduction  into  the  statutes  wan  thus 
stated  by  the  Lord  Chancellor,  in  Lord  Stafford's  Case,  T.  Raym.  408:  "Upon  this 
occasion,  my  Lord  Chancellor,  in  the  Lords'  House,  was  pleased  to  communicate  a 
notion  concerning  the  reason  of  two  witnesses  in  treason,  which  he  said  was  not  very 
familiar,  he  believed ;  and  it  was  this :  anciently  all  or  most  of  the  judges  were  church- 
men and  ecclesiastical  persons,  and  by  the  canon  law  now,  and  then,  in  use  all  over  the 
Christian  world,  none  can  be  condemned  of  heresy  but  by  two  lawful  ind  credible  wit- 
nesses ;  and  bare  words  may  make  a  heretic,  but  not  a  traitor,  and  anciently  heresy  was 
treason  ;  and  from  thence  the  Parliament  thought  fit  to  appoint  that  two  witnesses 
ought  to  be  for  proof  of  high  treason." 

8  This  was  done  by  Stat.  7  W.  Ill,  c.  3,  §  2.  Two  witnesses  were  required  by  the 
earlier  statutes  of  1  Ed.  IV,  c.  12,  and  5-6  Ed.  VI,  c.  11;  in  the  construction  of 
which  statutes,  the  rule  afterwards  declared  in  Stat.  7  \V.  Ill  was  adopted;  see  R. 
v.  Lord  Stafford,  T.  Raym.  407.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides  that 
"No  person  hhall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to 
the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession  in  open  court."  Art.  8,  §  3.  This  provision  has 
been  adopted,  in  terms,  in  many  of  the  State  constitutions.  But  as  in  many  other 
States  there  is  no  express  law  requiring  that  the  testimony  of  both  witnesses  should 
be  to  the  same  overt  act,  the  rule  stated  in  the  text  is  conceived  to  be  that  which  would 
govern  in  trials  for  treason  against  those  States  ;  though  in  trials  in  the  other  States, 
and  for  treason  against  the  United  States,  the  constitutional  provision  would  confine 
the  evidence  to  the  same  overt  act. 


398  NUMBER   OF  WITNESSES;    CORROBORATION.  [CH.   XX. 

by  two  witnesses,  is  sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction ;  and  that  in 
England  the  crime  is  well  proved  if  there  be  one  witness  to  one 
overt  act,  and  another  witness  to  another  overt  act,  of  the  same 
species  of  treason.4  It  is  also  settled  that  when  the  prisoner's  con- 
fession is  offered,  as  corroborative  of  the  testimony  of  such  witnesses, 
it  is  admissible,  though  it  be  proved  by  only  one  witness ;  the  law 
not  having  excluded  confessions,  proved  in  that  manner,  from  the 
consideration  of  the  jury,  but  only  provided  that  they  alone  shall 
not  be  sufficient  to  convict  the  prisoner.6  And  as  to  all  matters 
merely  collateral,  and  not  conducing  to  the  proof  of  the  overt  acts,  it 
may  be  safely  laid  down  as  a  general  rule,  that  whatever  was  evi- 
dence at  common  law  is  still  good  evidence  under  the  express  consti- 
tutional and  statutory  provision  above  mentioned.6 

§  256.  Same  :  Overt  Act  and  Evidence  of  it.  It  may  be  proper  in 
this  place  to  observe  that  in  treason  the  rule  is  that  no  evidence  can 
be  given  of  any  overt  act  which  is  not  expressly  laid  in  the  indict- 
ment. But  the  meaning  of  the  rule  is,  not  that  the  whole  detail  of 
facts  should  be  set  forth,  but  that  no  overt  act,  amounting  to  a 
distinct  independent  charge,  though  falling  under  the  same  head  of 
treason,  shall  be  given  in  evidence  unless  it  be  expressly  laid  in  the 
indictment.  If,  however,  it  will  conduce  to  the  proof  of  any  of  the 
overt  acts  which  are  laid,  it  may  be  admitted  as  evidence  of  such 
overt  acts.1  This  rule  is  not  peculiar  to  prosecutions  for  treason; 
though,  in  consequence  of  the  oppressive  character  of  some  former 
State  prosecutions  for  that  crime,  it  has  been  deemed  expedient  ex- 
pressly to  enact  it  in  the  later  statutes  of  treason.  It  is  nothing 
more  than  a  particular  application  of  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  the 
law  of  remedy  and  of  evidence;  namely,  that  the  proof  must  corre- 
spond with  the  allegations,  and  be  confined  to  the  point  in  issue.2 
This  issue,  in  treason,  is  whether  the  prisoner  committed  that  crime 
by  doing  the  treasonable  act  stated  in  the  indictment;  as,  in  slander, 
the  question  is,  whether  the  defendant  injured  the  plaintiff  by 
maliciously  uttering  the  falsehoods  laid  in  the  declaration ;  and  evi- 
dence of  collateral  facts  is  admitted  or  rejected  on  the  like  principle 
in  either  case,  accordingly  as  it  does  or  does  not  tend  to  establish  the 
specific  charge.  Therefore  the  declarations  of  the  prisoner,  and 
seditious  language  used  by  him,  are  admissible  in  evidence  as  ex- 
planatory of  his  conduct,  and  of  the  nature  and  object  of  the  con- 
spiracy in  which  he  was  engaged.8  And  after  proof  of  the  overt  act 

•  Supra,  §  235,  n. ;  Lord  Stafford's  Case,  7  How.  St.  Tr.  1527 ;  Foster's  Disc.  237  ; 
1  Burr's  Trial  196. 

•  Willis's  Case,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  623-625  ;  Grossfield's  Case,  26  id.  55-57 ;  Foster's 
Disc.  241. 

8  Supra,  §  235;  Foster's  Disc.  2-IO,  242;  1  East  P.  C.  130. 

1  Foster's  Disc.  p.  245  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  471 ;  Deacon's  Case,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  366  ; 
B.  c.  Foster  9;  Regicide's  Case,  J.  Kely.  8,  9;  1  Eaat  P.  C.  121-123;  2  Stark.  Evid. 
800,  801. 

»  Supra,  §§  51-53. 

•  R.  t».  Watson,  2  Stark.  118,  134;  JU.  8.  v.  Hanway,  2  Wall.  Jr.  139.1 


§§  255-257.]  TREASON;  PERJURY.  399 

of  treason,  in  the  county  mentioned  in  the  indictment,  other  acts  of 
treason  tending  to  prove  the  overt  acts  laid,  though  done  in  a  foreign 
country,  may  be  given  in  evidence.4 

§  257.  Perjury.  In  proof  of  the  crime  of  perjury,  also,  it  was  for- 
merly held  that  two  witnesses  were  necessary,  because  otherwise 
there  would  be  nothing  more  than  the  oath  of  one  man  against 
another,  upon  which  the  jury  could  not  safely  convict.1  But  this 
strictness  has  long  since  been  relaxed ;  the  true  principle  of  the  rule 
being  merely  this,  that  the  evidence  must  be  something  more  than 
sufficient  to  counterbalance  the  oath  of  the  prisoner,  and  the  legal 
presumption  of  his  innocence.2  The  oath  of  the  opposing  witness, 
therefore,  will  not  avail,  unless  it  be  corroborated  by  other  inde- 
pendent circumstances.8  But  it  is  not  precisely  accurate  to  say,  that 
these  additional  circumstances  must  be  tantamount  to  another  wit- 
ness. The  same  effect  being  given  to  the  oath  of  the  prisoner,  as 
though  it  were  the  oath  of  a  credible  witness,  the  scale  of  evidence 
is  exactly  balanced,  and  the  equilibrium  must  be  destroyed,  by 
material  and  independent  circumstances,  before  the  party  can  be 
convicted.  The  additional  evidence  need  not  be  such  as,  standing 
by  itself,  would  justify  a  conviction  in  a  case  where  the  testimony 
of  a  single  witness  would  suffice  for  that  purpose.  But  it  must  be 
at  least  strongly  corroborative  of  the  testimony  of  the  accusing  wit- 
ness; *  or,  in  the  quaint  but  energetic  language  of  Parker,  C.  J.,  "a 

4  Deacon's  Case,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  367  ;  s.  c.  Foster  9  ;  Sir  Henry  Vane's  Case,  4th 
res.,  6  id.  123,  129,  n.;  1  East  P.  C.  125,  126  ;  {see  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  246-248.} 

1  1  Stark.  Evid.  443 ;  4  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  10  ;  4  Bl.  Comm.  358  ;  2  Russ. 
on  Crimes,  1791. 

2  The  history  of  this  relaxation  of  the  sternness  of  the  old  rule  is  thus  stated  by  Mr. 
Justice  Wayne,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Court  in  U.  S.  v.  Wood,  14  Pet.  440, 
441 :    "At  first,  two  witnesses  were  required  to  convict  in  a  case  of  perjury  ;   both 
swearing  directly  adversely  from  the  defendant's  oath.     Contemporaneously  with  this 
requisition,  the  larger  number  of  witnesses  on  one  side  or  the  other  prevailed.     Then  a 
single  witness,  corroborated   by  other  witnesses,  swearing  to  circumstances   bearing 
directly  upon  the  imputed  corpus  delicti  of  a  defendant,  was  deemed  sufficient.     Next, 
as  in  the  case  of  R.  v.  Knill,  5  B.  &  Aid.  929,  n.,  with  a  long  interval  between  it  and 
the  preceding,  a  witness  who  gave  proof  only  of  the  contradictory  oaths  of  the  defendant 
on  two  occasions,  one  being  an  examination  before  the  House  of  Lords,  and  the  other 
an  examination  before  the  House  of  Commons,  was  held  to  be  sufficient ;  though  this 
principle  had  been  acted  on  as  enrly  as  1764,  by  Justice  Yates,  as  may  be  seen  in  the 
note  to  the  case  of  The  King  v  Harris,  5  B.  &  Aid.  937,  and  was  acquiesced  in  by  Lord 
Mansfield,  and  Justices  Wilmont  and  Aston.     We  are  aware  that,  in  a  note  to  R.  v. 
Mayhew,  6  C.  &  P.  315,  a  doubt  is  implied  concerning  the  case  decided  by  Justice 
Yates  :  but  it  has  the  stamp  of  authenticity,  from  its  having  been  referred  to  in  a  case 
happening  ten  years  afterwards  before  Justice  Chambre,  as  will  appear  by  the  note 
in  5  B.  &  Aid.  937.     Afterwards,  a  single  witness,  with  the  defendant's  bill  of  costs 
(not  sworn  to)  in  lieu  of  a  second  witness,  delivered  by  the  defendant  to  the  prose- 
cutor, was  held  sufficient  to  contradict  his  oath  ;  and  in  that  case  Lord  Denman  says, 
'  A  letter  written  by  the  defendant,  contradicting  his  statement  on  oath,  would  be 
sufficient  to  make  it  unnecessary  to  have  a  second  witness.'     6  C.  &  P.  315.     We  thus 
see  that  this  rule,  in  its  proper  application,  has  been  expanded  beyond  its  literal  terms, 
as  cases  have  occurred  in  which  proofs  have  been  offered  equivalent  to  the  eud  intended 
to  be  accomplished  by  the  rule." 

•  TSee  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  198,  and  Terr.  ».  Williams,  Ariz.,  54  Pac.  232J 

4  Woodbeck  v.  Keller,  6  Cowen  118,  121,  per  Sutherland,  J.;  Champney's  Case, 


400  NUMBER    OF   WITNESSES;   CORROBORATION.  [CH.    XX. 

strong  and  clear  evidence,  and  more  numerous  than  the  evidence 
given  for  the  defendant."  * 

§  257  a.  Same :  Several  Assignments.  When  there  are  several 
assignments  of  perjury  in  the  same  indictment,  it  does  not  seem  to 
be  clearly  settled,  whether,  in  addition  to  the  testimony  of  a  single 
witness  there  must  be  corroborative  proof  with  respect  to  each ;  but 
the  better  opinion  is,  that  such  proof  is  necessary;  and  that,  too, 
although  all  the  perjuries  assigned  were  committed  at  one  time  and 
place.1  For  instance,  if  a  person,  on  putting  in  his  schedule  in  the 
insolvent  debtors'  court,  or  on  other  the  like  occasion,  has  sworn  that 
he  has  paid  certain  creditors,  and  is  then  indicted  for  perjury  on 
several  assignments,  each  specifying  a  particular  creditor  who  has 
not  been  paid,  a  single  witness  with  respect  to  each  debt  will  not,  it 
seems,  suffice,  though  it  may  be  very  difficult  to  obtain  any  fuller 
evidence.2 

§  258.  Same  :  Corroborating  Circumstances  as  Equivalent  of  "Wit- 
ness. The  principle  that  one  witness  with  corroborating  circum- 
stances is  sufficient  to  establish  the  charge  of  perjury,  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  circumstances,  without  any  witness,  when  they  exist 
in  documentary  or  written  testimony,  may  combine  to  the  same 
effect ;  as  they  may  combine  altogether  unaided  by  oral  proof,  except 
the  evidence  of  their  authenticity,  to  prove  any  other  fact,  connected 
with  the  declarations  of  persons  or  the  business  of  human  life.  The 
principle  is,  that  circumstances  necessarily  make  a  part  of  the  proofs 
of  human  transactions ;  that  such  as  have  been  reduced  to  writing, 
in  unequivocal  terms,  when  the  writing  has  been  proved  to  be  au- 
thentic, cannot  be  made  more  certain  by  evidence  aliunde;  and  that 
such  as  have  not  been  reduced  to  writing,  whether  they  relate  to  the 
declarations  or  conduct  of  men,  can  only  be  proved  by  oral  testi- 

2  Lew.  Cr.  C.  258  ;  {R.  v.  Braithwaite,  8  Cox  Cr.  254;  R.  v.  Shaw,  10  id.  66;  R.  v. 
Boulter,  16  Jur.  135  ;  State  v.  Buie,  43  Tex.  532  ;  State  v.  Heed,  57  Mo.  252.  The 
fact  of  swearing  and  testifying  as  alleged,  independently  of  the  falsity,  may  be  proved 
by  one  witness  :  Com.  v.  Pollard,  12  Mete.  225.  f 

6  The  Queen  v.  Mascot,  10  Mod.  194  ;  see  also  State  v.  Molier,  1  Dev.  263,  265  ; 
State  v.  Hay  ward,  1  Nott  &  McCord  547 ;  R.  v.  Mayhew,  6  C.  &  P.  315  ;  R.  v.  Boulter, 
16  Jur.  135;  Roscoe  on  Crim.  Evid.  686,  687;  Clark's  Executors  v.  Van  Riemsdyk, 
9  Cranch  160.  It  must  corroborate  him  in  something  more  than  some  slight  particu- 
lars :  R.  v.  Yates,  1  Car.  &  Marsh.  139.  More  recently,  corroborative  evidence,  in 
cases  where  more  than  one  witness  is  required  by  law,  has  been  denned  by  Dr.  Lushing- 
ton  to  be  not  merely  evidence  showing  that  the  account  is  probable,  but  evidence 
proving  facts  tjusdcm  generis,  and  tending  to  produce  the  same  results  :  Simmons  v. 
Simmons,  11  Jur.  830.  See  further  to  this  point,  R.  v.  Parker,  C.  &  Marsh.  646  ; 
R.  v.  Champney,  2  Lewin  258  ;  R.  v.  Gardiner,  8  C.  &  P.  737 ;  R.  v.  Roberts,  2  Car. 
&  Kir.  614. 

1  R.  v.  Virrier,  12  A.  &  E.  317,  324,  per  Ld.  Denman;  }R.  v.  Parker,  Russell  on 
Crimes,  5th  ed.,  Ill,  80;  Williams  v.  Com.,  91  Pa.  493.     But  not  where  the  assign- 
ment is  of  a  continuous  nature  :  R.  v.  Hare,  13  Cox  Cr.  174.J 

2  R.  v.  Parker,  C.  &  Marsh.  639,  645-647,  per  Tindnl,  C.  J.     In  R.  v.  Mudie,  1  M.  & 
Rob.  128,  129,  Lord  Tenterden,  under  similar  circumstances,  refused  to  stop  tlie  onse, 
saying  that,  if  the  defendant  was  convicted,  he  might  move  for  a  new  trial.     He  was, 
however,  acquitted:  see  the  (London)  Law  Review,  etc.,  May,  1846,  p.  128. 


§§  257-259.]  PERJURY.  401 

mony.  Accordingly,  it  is  now  held  that  a  living  witness  of  the 
corpus  delicti  may  be  dispensed  with,  and  documentary  or  written 
evidence  be  relied  upon  to  convict  of  perjury, — first,  where  the 
falsehood  of  the  matter  sworn  by  the  prisoner  is  directly  proved  by 
documentary  or  written  evidence  springing  from  himself,  with  cir- 
cumstances showing  the  corrupt  intent;  secondly,  in  cases  where  the 
matter  so  sworn  is  contradicted  by  a  public  record,  proved  to  have 
been  well  known  by  the  prisoner  when  he  took  the  oath,  the  oath  only 
being  proved  to  have  been  taken ;  and,  thirdly,  in  cases  where  the 
party  is  charged  with  taking  an  oath,  contrary  to  what  he  must  nec- 
essarily have  known  to  be  true;  the  falsehood  being  shown  by  his  own 
letters  relating  to  the  fact  sworn  to,  or  by  any  other  written  testi- 
mony existing  and  being  found  in  his  possession,  and  which  has  been 
treated  by  him  as  containing  the  evidence  Af  the  fact  recited  in  it.1 

§  259.  Same  :  Inconsistent  Statements  as  Proof.  If  the  evidence 
adduced  in  proof  of  the  crime  of  perjury  consists  of  two  opposing 
statements  of  the  prisoner,  and  nothing  more,  he  cannot  be  convicted. 
For  if  one  only  was  delivered  under  oath,  it  must  be  presumed,  from 
the  solemnity  of  the  sanction,  that  that  declaration  was  the  truth, 
and  the  other  an  error  or  a  falsehood;  though  the  latter,  being  incon- 
sistent with  what  he  has  sworn,  may  form  important  evidence,  with 
other  circumstances,  against  him.  And  if  both  the  contradictory 
statements  were  delivered  under  oath,  there  is  still  nothing  to  show 
which  of  them  is  false,  where  no  other  evidence  of  the  falsity  is 
given.1  If,  indeed,  it  can  be  shown  that,  before  giving  the  testi- 
mony on  which  perjury  is  assigned,  the  accused  had  been  tampered 
with,2  or  if  there  be  other  circumstances  in  the  case,  tending  to  prove 
that  the  statement  offered  in  evidence  against  the  accused  was  in 
fact  true,  a  legal  conviction  may  be  obtained.8  And  "although  the 
jury  may  believe  that  on  the  one  or  the  other  occasion  the  prisoner 
swore  to  what  was  not  true,  yet  it  is  not  a  necessary  consequence 
that  he  committed  perjury.  For  there  are  cases  in  which  a  person 
might  very  honestly  and  conscientiously  swear  to  a  particular  fact, 
from  the  best  of  his  recollection  and  belief,  and  from  other  circum- 
stances subsequently  be  convinced  that  he  was  wrong,  and  swear  to 
the  reverse,  without  meaning  to  swear  falsely  either  time."  4 

1  U.  S.  v.  Wood,  14  Peters  440,  441 ;  in  this  case,  under  the  latter  head  of  the  rule 
here  stated,  it  was  held  that,  if  the  jury  were  satisfied  of  the  corrupt  intent,  the 

?'isoner  might  well  be  convicted  of  perjury,  in  taking,  at  the  custom-house  in  New 
ork,  the  "owner's  oath  in  cases  where  goods,  wares,  or  merchandise  have  been 
actually  purchased,"  upon  the  evidence  of  the  invoice-book  of  his  father,  John  Wood, 
of  Saddleworth,  England,  and  of  thirty-five  letters  from  the  prisoner  to  his  father,  dis- 
closing a  combination  between  them  to  defraud  the  United  States,  by  invoicing  and 
entering  the  goods  shipped  at  less  than  their  actual  cost. 

1  See  Alison's  Principles  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  p.  481  ;  R.  v.  Hughes, 
1  C.  &  K.  519  ;  R.  v.  Wheatland,  8  C.  &  P.  238  ;  R.  v.  Champney,  2  Lew.  258. 
1  Anon.,  5  B.  &  Aid.  939,  940,  n. ;  and  see  2  Russ.  Cr.  &  AI.  653,  n. 
»  R.  v.  Knill,  5  B.  &  Aid.  929,  930,  n. 

4  Per  Holroyd,  J.,  in  Jackson's  Case,  1  Lewin's  Cr.  Cas.  270.     This  very  reasonable 
VOL.  i.  —  26 


402  NUMBEE   OF   WITNESSES  J   CORROBORATION.  [CH.    XX. 

§  260.  Answers  in  Chancery.  The  principles  above  stated,  in 
regard  to  the  proof  of  perjury,  apply  with  equal  force  to  the  case  of 
an  answer  in  Chancery.  Formerly,  when  a  material  fact  was  directly 
put  in  issue  by  the  answer,  the  Courts  of  equity  followed  the  maxim 
of  the  Roman  law,  responsio  unius  non  omnino  audiatur,  and  re- 
quired  the  evidence  of  two  witnesses,  as  the  foundation  of  a  decree. 
But  of  late  years  the  rule  has  been  referred  more  strictly  to  the 
equitable  principle  on  which  it  is  founded;  namely,  the  right  to 
credit  which  the  defendant  may  claim,  equal  to  that  of  any  other 
witness  in  all  cases  where  his  answer  is  "positively,  clearly,  and 
precisely"  responsive  to  any  matter  stated  in  the  bill.  For  the 
plaintiff,  by  calling  on  the  defendant  to  answer  an  allegation  which 
he  makes,  thereby  admits  the  answer  to  be  evidence.1  In  such  case, 
if  the  defendant  in  expfess  terms  negatives  the  allegations  in  the 
bill,  and  the  bill  is  supported  by  the  evidence  of  only  a  single  witness, 
affirming  what  has  been  so  denied,  the  Court  will  neither  make  a 
decree,  nor  send  the  case  to  be  tried  at  law;  but  will  simply  dismiss 
the  bill.2  But  the  corroborating  testimony  of  an  additional  witness, 
or  of  circumstances,  may  give  a  turn  either  way  to  the  balance. 
And  even  the  evidence  arising  from  circumstances  alone,  may  be 
stronger  than  the  testimony  of  any  single  witness.8 

§  260  a.  Usage ;  Wills  and  Deeds.  It  has  also  been  held  that  the 
testimony  of  one  witness  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  establish  any  usage 
of  trade,  of  which  all  dealers  in  that  particular  line  are  bound  to 
take  notice,  and  are  presumed  to  be  informed.1  [The  requirement 

doctrine  is  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  rule  of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  as  laid 
down  by  Mr.  Alison  in  his  lucid  and  elegant  treatise  on  that  subject,  in  the  following 
terms :  "  When  contradictory  and  inconsistent  oaths  have  been  emitted,  the  mere  con- 
tradiction is  not  decisive  evidence  of  the  existence  of  perjury  in  one  or  other  of  them  ; 
but  the  prosecutor  must  establish  which  was  the  true  one,  and  libel  on  the  other  as 
containing  the  falsehood.  Where  depositions  contradictory  to  each  other  have  been 
emitted  by  the  same  person  on  the  same  matter,  it  may  with  certainty  be  concluded 
that  one  or  other  of  them  is  false.  But  it  is  not  relevant  to  infer  perjury  in  so  loose 
a  manner ;  but  the  prosecutor  must  go  a  step  farther,  and  specify  distinctly  which  of 
the  two  contains  the  falsehood,  and  peril  his  case  upon  the  means  he  possesses  of 
proving  perjury  in  that  deposition.  To  admit  the  opposite  course,  and  allow  the 
prosecutor  to  libel  on  both  depositions,  and  make  out  his  charge  by  comparing  them 
together,  without  distinguishing  which  contains  the  truth  and  which  the  falsehood, 
would  be  directly  contrary  to  the  precision  justly  required  in  criminal  proceedings. 
In  the  older  practice  this  distinction  does  not  seem  to  have  been  distinctly  recognized  ; 
but  it  is  now  justly  considered  indispensable,  that  the  perjury  should  be  specified 
existing  in  one,  and  the  other  deposition  referred  to  in  modum  probationis,  to  make 
out,  along  with  other  circumstances,  where  the  truth  really  lay  :  "  Alison's  Crim.  Law 
of  Scotland,  475. 

1  Gresley  on  Evid.  p.  4. 

2  Cooth  v.  Jackson,  6  Ves.  40,  per  Lei.  Eldon. 

•  Pember  v.  Mnthers,  1  Bro.  Ch.  52  ;  2  Story  on  Eq.  Jur.  §  1528  ;  Gresley  on  Evid. 
p.  4  ;  Clark  v.  Van  Riemsdyk,  9  Cranch  160  ;  Keys  v.  Williams,  3  Y.  &  C.  55  ;  Daw- 
Bon  v.  Massey,  1  Ball  &  Beat.  234;  Maddox  v.  Sullivan,  2  Rich.  Kq.  4  ;  jHinkle  v. 
Wanzer,  17  How.  353  ;  Lawton  v.  Kittredge,  30  N.  H.  500  ;  Ingt>.  Brown,  3  Md.  Ch. 
Dec.  521;  Glenn  v.  Grover,  3  Md.  212  ;  Jordan  v.  Fenno.  13  Ark.  593;  Johnson  v. 
McGruder,  15  Mo.  365  ;  Walton  v.  Walton,  17  id.  376  :  White  v.  Crew,  16  Ga.  416  ; 
Calkin  v.  Evans,  6  Ind.  441  ;  see  further,  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  289.  ( 

1  Wood  v.   Hickok,  2  Wend.  501;   1'arrott  o.  Thachur,  9  Pick.  426;  Thomas  v. 


§§260-274]  USAGE  ;   WILLS  ;   ACCOMPLICES.  403 

that  a  will  or  a  deed  must  be  subscribed  by  one  or  more  attesting 
witnesses  is  a  rule  of  substantive  law  affecting  the  validity  of  the  in- 
strument, and  not  a  rule  of  evidence.  But  the  question  whether  all 
such  attesting  witnesses  must  be  called,  in  preference  to  other  wit- 
nesses to  the  document's  execution,  is  a  rule  of  evidence,  and  is 
treated  in  another  place  (post,  §  569).  In  one  or  two  jurisdictions 
a  will  is  required  to  be  proved  by  two  witnesses,  or  the  equivalent, 
even  though  no  attestation  of  the  document  is  required  as  an  element 
in  its  validity.2] 

§  260  b.  Accomplice  ;  Complainant  in  Rape  or  Seduction.  [It  is 
in  some  jurisdictions  required  that  an  accomplice's  testimony  shall 
not  suffice  for  a  conviction  without  corroboration ;  the  doctrine  on 
that  subject  is  examined  post,  §  380.  In  a  few  jurisdictions,  usually 
by  statute,  a  similar  rule  exists  for  the  testimony  of  a  complainant 
in  rape1  and  a  complainant  in  the  statutory  criminal  charge  of 
seduction.2] 

§§  261-274. l 

Graves,  1  Mills  Const.  Rep.  150  [308];  {Boardman  v.  Spooner,  13  All.  353,  359; 
\contra:  Jones  v.  Hoey,  128  Mass.  585  ;  Vail  v.  Rice,  1  Seld.  155  ;  Robinson  v.  U.  S., 
13  Wall.  363.  | 

2  [~£  g.f  in  Pennsylvania:  Derr  y.  Green  wait,  76  Pa.  239,  253.  A  similar  statutory 
provision  exists  in  most  States  for  nuncupative  wills,  and  sometimes  also  for  wills  of 
personalty  or  for  the  revocation  of  a  will.  Apart  from  such  statutes,  even  a  lost  will 
may  be  proved  by  one  witness :  Johnson's  Will,  40  Conn.  587;  Re  Page,  118  111.  576  ; 
Baker  v.  Dobyns,  4  Dana  Ky.  220;  Dickey  v.  Malechi,  6  Mo.  177;  Wyckoff  v. 
Wyckoff,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  401.] 

1  fjState  v.  Bailor,  104  la.  1  ;  Hammond  v.  State,  39  Nebr.  252 ;  Sowers  v.  Terr., 
Okl.,  50  Pac.  257;  O'Boyle  v.  State,  Wis.,  75  N.  W.  989;   contra:  Curby  v.  Terr., 
Ariz.,  42  Pac.  953  ;  Doyle  v.  State,  39  Fla.  155  ;  State  v.  Connelly,  57  Minn.   482; 
State  v.  Marcks,  140  Mo.  656;  Thompson  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  472  ;  Tway  v.  State, 
Wyo.,  50  Pac.  188.] 

2  FJSuther  v.  State,  Ala.,  24  So.  43  ;  State  v.  Bauerkemper,  95  la.  562;  Ferguson 
v.  State,  71  Miss.  805,  815  ;  State  v.  Davis,  141  Mo.   522  ;  State  v.   King,  9  S.  D. 
628;  Mills  v.  Com.,  93  Va.  815;   contra:  People  v.  Wade,  118  Cal.  672  ;   State  ». 
Marshall,  137  Mo.  463  ;  Ferguson  v.  Moore,  98  Tenn.  342.] 

1  QThese  sections,  dealing  with  the  necessity  of  a  writing  for  deeds,  for  sales  of 
personalty  (Statute  of  Frauds),  and  for  wills  and  their  revocation,  have  been  trans- 
ferred to  Appendix  II,  since  they  are  not  in  *  strictness  concerned  with  rules  of  evi- 
dence and  since  they  can  only  be  adequately  treated  in  special  works  on  the  subject ; 
see  a  discussion  of  the  theory  of  such  rules  as  to  writings,  post,  §  305  y.] 


404 


THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  KULE. 


[CH.  XXL 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  RULE. 


1.    The  Parol  Evidence  Rule. 

§§  275,  276.    General  Principle. 

§  277.    Interpretation. 

§  278.  Same  :  Words  taken  in  their 
Ordinary  Sense. 

§  279.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  applicable 
to  Parties  only. 

§  280.    Local  Usage. 

§§  281,  282.    Collateral  Agreements. 

§  283.  Agreement  in  more  than  one 
Writing. 

§  284.  Instrument  may  be  shown  Void 
or  Voidable. 

§  284  a.  Transaction  partially  reduced 
to  Writing. 

§  285.    Contradicting  a  Recital. 

§§  286-288.  Interpretation  of  Terms  of 
the  Instrument. 

§§  289-291.  Interpretation  of  Wills  ; 
Declarations  of  Intention. 

§  292.   Interpretation  by  Special  Usage. 

§  293.  Usage,  applied  to  Statutes,  Char- 
ters, and  Deeds. 

§  294.  Usage,  applied  to  annex  Inci- 
dents. 

§§  295,  295  a.  Standard  of  Usage  as  aid- 
ing Interpretation. 

§  296.  Will  Cases  ;  Rebutting  an 
Equity. 

§  296  a.  Mutual  Mistake ;  Deed  Abso- 
lute as  Security. 

§§  297-300.  Interpretation  of  Ambigui- 
ties. 

§  301.  Interpretation  of  False  Descrip- 
tions. 


§  302.   Showing  a  Discharge. 
§§  303,  304.    Showing  an  Additional  or 
Substituted  Agreement. 

§  305.   Contradicting  Receipts. 

2.    Another   View   of  the    Parol   Evidence 
Rule-;   Integration  and  Interpretation. 

§  305  a.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  not  a 
Rule  of  Evidence. 

§  305  b.  Constitution  and  Interpreta- 
tion of  Legal  Acts  ;  Parol  Evidence  Rule. 

§  305  c.  (I)  Constitution  of  Legal  Acts  ; 
(1)  Whether  an  Act  has  been  consummated 
at  all. 

§  305  d.  Same:  (2)  Whether  a  Defence  or 
Excuse  exists,  rendering  the  Act  voidable. 

§  305  e.  Integration  of  Legal  Acts  by 
Intent  of  Parties ;  (1)  Whether.the  Act  has 
been  integrated  at  all . 

§305/.  Same:  (2)  Whether  the  Part 
of  the  Act  in  question  has  been  integrated. 

§  305  g.  Integration  by  Requirement  of 
Law. 

§  305  h.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  applica- 
ble only  between  the  Parties. 

§  305  i.  (II)  Interpretation  of  Legal 
Acts. 

§  305  j.  Same :  General  Principle  of 
Interpretation. 

§  305  k.  Same  :  ( 1 )  Rule  against  using 
Declarations  of  Intention. 

§  305  I.  Same :  (2)  Rule  against  dis- 
turbing a  Clear  Meaning. 

§  305  m.  Same :  (3)  Rule  against  cor- 
recting a  False  Description. 


1.   The  Parol  Evidence  Rule.1 

§  275.  General  Principle.  By  written  evidence,2  in  this  place,  is 
meant  not  everything  which  is  in  writing,  but  that  only  which  is  of  a 

1  QSo  many  questions  of  general  principle  arise  in  this  Chapter,  and  they  are  so 
intimately  connected  with  each  other,  that  their  treatment  in  a  series  of  scattered  notes 
has  not  seemed  feasible  ;  and  accordingly  a  general  and  connected  view  of  the  subject 
has  been  given  post,  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter,  in  a  group  of  sections  (305  a-305  n) 
entitled  "Another  View  of  the  Parol  Evidence  Rule."  Illustrative  citations  from  re- 
cent rulings  will  there  be  found,  together  with  a  number  of  the  classical  precedents. 
Cross-references  to  that  exposition  and  to  the  recent  citations  will  be  given  at  the 
proper  places  in  the  ensuing  sections  275-305.  J 

^  [The  parol -evidence  rule  is  in  truth  110  rula  of  evidence,  but  of  substantive  law  ; 
see  post,  §  305  a.] 


§§  275-276.]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLE.  405 

documentary  and  more  solemn  nature,  containing  the  terms  of  a  con- 
tract between  the  parties,  and  designed  to  be  the  repository  and  evi- 
dence of  their  final  intentions.  "Fiunt  enim  de  his  [contractibus] 
scripturse,  ut,  quod  actum  est,  per  eas  facilius  probari  poterit." 8 
When  parties  have  deliberately. put  their  engagements  into  writing, 
in  such  terms  as  import  a  legal  obligation,  without  any  uncertainty  as 
to  the  object  or  extent  of  such  engagement,  it  is  conclusively  pre- 
sumed that  the  whole  engagement  of  the  parties,  and  the  extent  and 
manner  of  their  undertaking,  was  reduced  to  writing ;  and  all  oral  tes- 
timony of  a  previous  colloquium  between  the  parties,  or  of  conversa- 
tion or  declarations  at  the  time  when  it  was  completed,  or  afterwards, 
as  it  would  tend  in  many  instances  to  substitute  a  new  and  different 
contract  for  the  one  which  was  really  agreed  upon,  to  the  prejudice, 
possibly,  of  one  of  the  parties,  is  rejected.4  In  other  words,  as  the 
rule  is  now  more  briefly  expressed,  "  parol  contemporaneous  evidence 
is  inadmissible  to  contradict  or  vary  the  terms  of  a  valid  written 
instrument." 6 

§  276.  This  rule  "  was  introduced  in  early  times,  when  the  most 
frequent  mode  of  ascertaining  a  party  to  a  contract  was  by  his  seal 
affixed  to  the  instrument ;  *  and  it  has  been  continued  in  force,  since 
the  vast  multiplication  of  written  contracts,  in  consequence  of  the 

8  Dig.  lib.  20,  tit.  1,  1.  4 ;  Id.  lib.  22,  tit.  4,  1.  4. 

4  Stackpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  30,  31,  per  Parker,  J. ;  Preston  v.  Merceau,  2  W. 
Bl.  1249  ;  Coker  v.  Guy,  2  B.  &  P.  565,  569  ;  Bogert  v.  Cauman,  Anthon  97 ;  Bayard 
v.  Malcolm,  1  Johns.  467,  per  Kent,  C.  J. ;  Rich  v.  Jackson,  4  Bro.  Ch.  519,  per  Ld. 
Thurlow  ;  Sinclair  v.  Stevenson,  1  C.  &  P.  582,  per  Best,  C.  J.  ;  McLellan  v.  Cum- 
berland Bank,  11  Shepl.  566.  QSee  post,  §  305  b.J  The  general  rule  of  the  Scotch 
law  is  to  the  same  effect,  namely,  that  "  writing  cannot  be  cut  down  or  taken  away,  by 
the  testimony  of  witnesses  :  "  Tait  on  Evid.  pp.  326,  327.  And  this,  in  other  lan- 
guage, is  the  rule  of  the  Roman  civil  law  :  Contra  scriptum  testimonium,  non  scrip- 
turn  testimoniurn  non  fertur :  Cod.  lib.  4,  tit.  20,  1.  1. 

6  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  753 ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  350  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  544,  548 ;  Adams 
v.  Wordley,  1  M.  &  W.  379,  380,  per  Parke,  B. ;  Boorman  v.  Johnston,  12  Wend.  573  ; 
jBast  v.  Bank,  101  U.  S.  93;  Slocum  i;.  Swift,  2  Low.  212;  Muhlig  v.  Fiske,  131 
Muss.  310;  Keller  v.  Webb,  126  id.  393;  Fay  v.  Gray,  124  id.  500;  Schwass  v. 
Hershey,  125  111.  653  ;  Sanders  v.  Cooper,  115  N.  Y.  279  ;  Van  Vechten  v.  Smith,  59 
Iowa  173  ;  Seckler  v.  Fox,  51  Mich.  92 ;  Best  v.  Sinz,  73  Wis.  243  ;  Hostetter  v. 
Auman,  119  Ind.  7  ;  The  Gazelle,  128  U.  S.  484  ;  Coots  v.  Farnsworth,  61  Mich.  502  ; 
Gordon  v.  Niemann,  118  N.  Y.  152  ;  Smith  v.  Burton,  59  Vt.  408  ;  Diven  v.  Johnson, 
117  Ind.  512;  Lafayette  C.  M.  Co.  v.  Magoon,  73  Wis.  627;  Avery  v.  Miller,  86  Ala. 
495  ;  Carlton  v.  Vineland  Wine  Co.,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  466  ;  Fengar  v.  Brown,  57  Conn. 
60;  Hennershotz  v.  Gallagher,  124  Pa.  St.  9;  Ames  v.  Brooks,  143  Mass.  347  ;  Hunt 
v.  Gray,  76  Iowa  270  ;  De  Witt  v.  Berry,  134  U.  S.  315  ;  Corse  i?.  Peck,  102  N.  Y. 
517 ;  Fordice  v.  Scribner,  108  Ind.  88  ;  Frost  v.  Brigham,  139  Mass.  43  ;  Express  Pub. 
Co.  v.  Aldine  Press,  126  Pa.  St.  347  ;  Paddock  v.  Bartlett,  68  Iowa  16;  Miller  v.  But- 
terfield,  79  Cal.  62  ;  Patterson  v.  Wilson,  101  N.  C.  564  ;  Munde  v.  Lambie,  122  id. 
336 ;  Stevens  v.  Haskell,  70  Me.  202  ;  Van  Syckel  v.  Dalrymple,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  233  ; 
Etheridge  v.  Paliu,  72  N.  C.  213  ;  Monroe  v.  Berens,  67  Pa.  St.  459  ;  Farrow  v.  Hayes, 
51  Md.  498  ;  Daggett  v.  Johnson,  49  Vt..345.  The  rule  in  Pennsylvania  is  peculiar  ; 
see  Thomas  v.  Loose,  115  Pa.  45  ;  Cullmans  v.  Lindsay,  id.  170  ;  Cake  r.  Pottsville 
Bank,  116  id.  270  ;  Greenawalt  v.  Kohne,  85  id.  369 ;  Barclay  v.  Wainwright,  86 
id.  191.} 

1  rjFor  the  history  of  the  rule,  see  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  the  Law  of 
Evidence,  401,  ff.] 


406  THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  RULE.          [CH.  XXL 

increased  business  and  commerce  of  the  world.  It  is  not  because  a 
seal  is  put  to  the  contract,  that  it  shall  not  be  explained  away,  varied, 
or  rendered  ineffectual ;  but  because  the  contract  itself  is  plainly  and 
intelligibly  stated,  in  the  language  of  the  parties,  and  is  the  best  pos- 
sible evidence  of  the  intent  and  meaning  of  those  who  are  bound  by 
the  contract,  and  of  those  who  are  to  receive  the  benefit  of  it."  "  The 
rule  of  excluding  oral  testimony  has  heretofore  been  applied  gener- 
ally, if  not  universally,  to  simple  contracts  in  writing,  to  the  same 
extent  and  with  the  same  exceptions  as  to  specialties  or  contracts 
under  seal.2 

§  277.  Interpretation.  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  the*  rule  is  di- 
rected only  against  the  admission  of  any  other  evidence  of  the  lan- 
guage employed  by  the  parties  in  making  the  contract,  than  that 
which  is  furnished  by  the  writing  itself.  The  writing,  it  is  true,  may 
be  read  by  the  light  of  surrounding  circumstances,  in  order  more  per- 
fectly to  understand  the  intent  and  meaning  of  the  parties  ;  but,  as 
they  have  constituted  the'  writing  to  be  the  only  outward  and  visible 
expression  of  their  meaning,  no  other  words  are  to  be  added  to  it,  or 
substituted  in  its  stead.  The  duty  of  the  Court  in  such  cases  is  to 
ascertain,  not  what  the  parties  may  have  secretly  intended,  as  contra- 
distinguished from  what  their  words  express,  but  what  is  the  mean- 
ing of  words  they  have  used.1  It  is  merely  a  duty  of  interpretation ; 
that  is,  to  find  out  the  true  sense  of  the  written  words,  as  the  parties 
used  them ;  and  of  construction,  that  is,  when  the  true  sense  is  ascer- 
tained, to  subject  the  instrument,  in  its  operation,  to  the  established 
rules  of  law.2  And  where  the  language  of  an  instrument  has  a  settled 
legal  construction,  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  contradict  that 
construction.  Thus,  where  no  time  is  expressly  limited  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  money  mentioned  in  a  special  contract  in  writing,  the 
legal  construction  is,  that  it  is  payable  presently  ;  and  parol  evidence 
of  a  contemporaneous  verbal  agreement,  for  the  payment  at  a  future 
day,  is  not  admissible.8 

2  Per  Parker,  J.,  in  Staokpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  31.  See  also  Woollam  v.  Hearn, 
7  Ves.  218,  per  Sir  William  Grant ;  Hunt  v.  Adams,  7  Mass.  522,  per  Sewall,  J.  {The 
rule  applies  also  to  all  records  of  judgments  or  official  proceedings  :  Mayhew  v.  Gay 
Head,  13  Allen  129  ;  Hiinneman  v.  Fire  District,  37  Vt.  46  ;  Eddy  v.  Wilson,  43  id. 
362;  Quinn  v.  Com.,  20  Gratt.  138  ;  Brooks  r.  Claiborne  Co.,  8  Baxt.  43  ;  Koberts  v. 
Johnson,  48  Tex.  133;  Wilson  w.  Wilson,  45  Cal.  399  ;  Com.  v.  Slocura,  14  Gray  395  ; 
so  that  an  official  entry  on  a  record,  void  for  uncertainty,  cannot  be  explained  by  ex- 
trinsic evidence  :  Porter  v.  Byrne,  10  Ind.  146  ;  see  McMicken  v.  Com.,  58  Pa.  St.  213; 
Wilcox  v.  Emerson,  10  R.  I.  270;  Gregorys.  Sherman,  44  Conn.  466-473,  note; 
Kendig's  Appeal,  82  Pa.  St.  68  ;  McDermott  v.  Hoffman,  70  id.  31.  |  [Tor  a  further 
explanation  of  the  application  of  the  principle  to  records,  see  post,  §  305  g.~] 

1  Doe  v.  Gwillim,  5  B.  &  Ad.  122,  129,  per  Parke,  J.  ;   Doe  v.  Martin,  4  id.  77F, 
786,  per  Parke,  J.  ;    Beaumont  v.  Field,  2  Chitty  275,  per  Abbott,  C.  J. 

2  fSee  post,  §§  305  t-305  n,  on  the  subject  of  Interpretation.] 

*  Warren  v.  Wheeler,  8  Met.  97.  Nor  is  parol  evidence  admissible  to  prove  how  a 
written  contract  waa  understood  by  either  of  the  parties,  in  an  action  upon  it  at  law, 
in  the  absence  of  any  fraud  :  Bigelow  v.  Collamore.  5  Cush.  226  ;  Harper  »>.  Gilbert, 
ib.  41?  ;  jTaft  v.  Dickinson,  6  Allen  553  ;  Davis  Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Stone,  131 
Mass.  384  ;  |  Qiee  further,  post,  §  305  ;'.] 


§§  276-280.]  INTERPRETATION  ;   USAGE.  407 

§  278.  Same  :  "Words  taken  in  their  Ordinary  Sense.  The  terms  of 
every  written  instrument  are  to  be  understood  in  their  plain,  ordinary, 
and  popular  sense,  unless  they  have  generally,  in  respect  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter, as  by  the  known  usage  of  trade,  or  the  like,  acquired  a 
peculiar  sense,  distinct  from  the  popular  sense  of  the  same  words ; 
or  unless  the  context  evidently  points  out  that,  in  the  particular  in- 
stance, and  in  order  to  effectuate  the  immediate  intention  of  the  par- 
ties, it  should  be  understood  in  some  other  and  peculiar  sense.1  But 
where  the  instrument  consists  partly  of  a  printed  formula,  and  partly 
of  written  words,  if  there  is  any  reasonable  doubt  of  the  meaning 
of  the  whole,  the  written  words  are  entitled  to  have  greater  effect 
in  the  interpretation  than  those  which  are  printed;  they  being  the 
immediate  language  and  terms  selected  by  the  parties  themselves 
for  the  expression  of  their  meaning,  while  the  printed  formula 
is  more  general  in  its  nature,  applying  equally  to  their  case  and 
to  that  of  all  other  contracting  parties,  on  similar  subjects  and 
occasions.2 

§  279.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  applicable  to  Parties  only.  The  rule 
under  consideration  is  applied  only  (in  suits)  between  the  parties  to 
the  instrument ;  as  they  alone  are  to  blame  if  the  writing  contains 
what  was  not  intended,  or  omits  that  which  it  should  have  contained. 
It  cannot  affect  third  persons,  who,  if  it  were  otherwise,  might  be 
prejudiced  by  things  recited  in  the  writings,  contrary  to  the  truth, 
through  the  ignorance,  carelessness,  or  fraud  of  the  parties  ;  and  who, 
therefore,  ought  not  to  be  precluded  from  proving  the  truth,  however 
contradictory  to  the  written  statements  of  others.1 

§  280.  Local  Usage.  It  is  almost  superfluous  to  add  that  the  rule 
does  not  exclude  the  testimony  of  experts,  to  aid  the  Court  in  reading 
the  instrument.  If  the  characters  are  difficult  to  be  deciphered,  or 
the  language,  whether  technical,  or  local  and  provincial,  or  altogether 
foreign,  is  not  understood  by  the  Court,  the  evidence  of  persons  skilled 
in  deciphering  writings,  or  who  understood  the  language  in  which  the 
instrument  is  written,  or  the  technical  or  local  meaning  of  the  terms 
employed,  is  admissible  to  declare  what  are  the  characters,  or  to 
translate  the  instrument,  or  to  testify  to  the  proper  meaning  of  the 

1  jHolt  v.  Collyer,  L.  R.  16  Ch.  D.  718;  Chemical  E.  L.  Co.  v.  Howard,  150  Haas. 
496;}   [see  post,  §  305  /.] 

2  Per  Ld.  Ellenborough,  in  Robertson  v.  French,  4  East  135,  136.     See  also  Boor- 
man  ».  Johnston,  12  Wend.  573  ;    Taylor  v.  Briges,  2  C.  &  P.  525  ;   Alsager  v.  St. 
Kntherine's  Dock  Co.,  14  M.  &  W.  799,  per  Parke,  B.  ;  jSmith  v.  Flanders,  129  Mass. 
322  ;  Holt  v.  Pie,  120  Pa.  439.  | 

1  1  Poth.  OH.  by  Evans,  part  4,  c.  2,  art.  3,  n.  (766) ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  575  ;  Krider 
v.  Latferty,  1  Whart.  303,  314,  per  Kennedy,  J.  ;  Reynolds  v.  Magness,  2  Iredell  26  ; 
j^unningham  v.  Milner,  56  Ala.  522  ;  Kellogg  v.  Tompson,  142  Mass.  76  ;  Talbot  u. 
Wilkins,  31  Ark.  411  ;  Hnssman  v.  Wilke,  50  Cal.  250  ;  McMaster  v.  Insurance  Co.  of 
N.  America,  55  N.  Y.  222;  Brown  v.  Thurber,  77  id.  613  ;  s.  c.  58  How.  Pr.  95  ;  Bell 
v.  Woodman,  60  Me.  465  ;  Tobey  e.  Leonard,  2  Cliff.  40 ;  Edgerly  v.  Emerson,  23 
N.  H.  555.  See  Langdon  v.  Lang'don,  4  Gray  186;  Arthur  v.  Roberts,  60  Barb.  680  ;| 
Qaud  cases  cited  post,  §  305  A.] 


403  THE  PAEOL  EVIDENCE  RULE.          [CH.  XXL 

particular  words.1  Thus  the  words  "inhabitant,"2  "level,"  8  "thou- 
sands," 4  "fur," 6  "freight,"  6  and  many  others,  have  been  interpreted, 
and  their  peculiar  meaning,  when  used  in  connection  with  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  transaction,  has  been  fixed,  by  parol  evidence  of  the 
sense  in  which  they  are  usually  received,  when  employed  in  cases 
similar  to  the  case  at  bar.  And  so  of  the  meaning  of  the  phrase, 
"  duly  honored," 7  when  applied  to  a  bill  of  exchange  ;  and  of  the  ex- 
pression "  in  the  month  of  October/' 8  when  applied  to  the  time  when 
a  vessel  was  to  sail ;  and  many  others  of  the  like  kind.9  If  the  ques- 
tion arises  from  the  obscurity  of  the  writing  itself,  it  is  determined  by 
the  Court  alone ; 10  but  questions  of  custom,  usage,  and  actual  intention 
and  meaning  derived  therefrom,  are  for  the  jury.11  But  where  the 

1  Wigram  on  the  luterpretation  of  Wills,  p.  48 ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  565,  566  ;  Birch 
v.  Depeyster,  1  Stark.  210,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Sheldon  v.  Beiiham,  4  Hill  N.  Y. 
129  ;  {Com.  v.  Morgan,  107  Mass.  200. { 

2  R.  v.  Mashiter,  6  Ad.  &  El.  153. 

8  Clayton  v.  Gregson,  5  Ad.  &  El.  302  ;  s.  c.  4  N.  &  M.  602. 

*  Smith  o.  Wilson,   3  B.  &  Ad.   728.     The  doctrine  of  the  text  was  more  fully 
expounded  by  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Brown  v.  Brown,  8  Met.  576,  577,  as  follows  :     "  The 
meaning  of  words,  and  the  grammatical  construction  of  the  English  language,  so  far  as 
they  are  established  by  the  rules  and  usages  of  the  language,  are,  prinia  facie,  matter 
of  law,  to  be  construed  aud  passed  upon  by  the  Court.     But  language  maybe  ambigu- 
ous, and  used  in  different  senses  ;  or  general  words,  in  particular  trades  and  branc.iies 
of  business,  — as  among  merchants,  for  instance,  — ma}*  be  used  in  a  new,  peculiar,  or 
technical  sense;   and,  therefore,  in  a  few  instances,  evidence  may  be  received,  from 
those  who  are  conversant  with  such  branches  of  business,  and  such  technical  or  peculiar 
use  of  language,  to  explain  and  illustrate  it.     One  of  the  strongest  of  these,  perhaps, 
among  the  recent  cases,  is  the  case  of  Smith  v.  Wilson,  3  B.  &  Ad.  728,  where  it  was 
held  that,  in  an  action  on  a  lease  of  an  estate  including  a  rabbit-warren,  evidence  of 
usage  was  admissible  to  show  that  the  words,  '  thousand  of  rabbits,'  were  understood 
to  mean  one  hundred  dozen,  that  is,  twelve  hundred.     But  the  decision  was  placed 
on  the  ground  that  the  words  'hundred,'  'thousand,'  and  the  like,   were  not  under- 
stood, when  applied  to  particular  subjects,  to  mean  that  number  of  units ;  that  the 
definition  was  not  fixed  by  law,  and  therefore  was  open  to  such  proof  of  usage.     Though 
it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  draw  the  precise  line  of  distinction,  yet  it  is  manifest  that 
such  evidence  can  be  admitted  only  in  a  few  cases  like  the  above.     Were  it  otherwise, 
written  instruments,  instead  of  importing  certainty  and  verity,  as  being  the  sole  repos- 
itory of  the  will,  intent,  and  purposes  of  the  parties,  to  be  construed  by  the  rules  of 
law,  might  be  made  to  speak  a  very  different  language  by  the  aid  of  parol  evidence." 

*  Astor  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  7  Cowen  202. 
8  Peisch  v.  Dickson,  1  Mason  11,  12. 

7  Lucas  v.  Groning,  7  Taunt.  164. 

8  Cliaurand  v.  Angerstein,  Peake  43.    See  also  Peisch  v.  Dickson,  1  Mason  12  ;  Doe 
v.  Benson,  4  B.  &  Aid.  588  ;  U.  S.  v.  Breed,  1  Sumn.  159 ;  Taylor  v.  Briggs,  2  C.  & 
P.  525. 

*  {So,  to  explain  8nch  an  expression  as  "  regular  turns  of  loading,"  in  an  action  on 
a  contract  for  loading  coals  at  Newcastle  (Leideman  v.  Schultz,  24  Erig.  Law  &  EII. 
305  ;  14  C.  B.  38):  "payable  in  trade''  (Dudley  v.  Vose,  114  Mass.  34)  ;  "dollars,  ' 
"  current  funds  "  (Thorington  v.  Smith,  8  Wall.  1,  12  ;  Bryan  v.  Harrison,  76  N.  C. 
360  ;  Davis  v.  Glenn,  ib.  427)  ;  "spitting  of  blood,"  in  an  insurance  policy  (Singleton 
v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  66  Mo.  63)  ;  "crop  of  flax  "  (Goodrich  v.  Stevens,  5  Lans. 
230);    "horn  chains "  (Swett  v.    Shumway,  102  Mass.   365);     "barrel"   (Miller  r. 
Stevens,  100  id.  518)  ;  "all  faults"  (Whitney  v.  Boardman,118  id.  242)  ;  "  best  oil" 
(Lucas  «.  Bristow,  E.  B.  &  E.  907)  ;  "f.  o.  b."  (Silberman  v.  Clark,  96  N.  Y.   524  ; 
see  also  Herrick  v.  Noble,  27  Vt.  1  ;  Taylor  v.  Sayre,  4  Zabr.  647).  j 

10  Remon  v,  Hayward,  2  Ad.  &  El.  666  ;  Crofts  v.  Marshall,  7  C.  &  P.  697  ;  infra, 
}  300.     But  see  Sheldon  v.  Benham,  4  Hill  N.  Y.  129. 

11  Lucas  v.  Groning,  7  Taunt.  164,  167,   168  ;  Birch  v.  Depeyster,   1  Stark.  210  ; 
Paley  on  Agency  (by  Lloyd),  p.  198  ;  Hutchison  v.  Bowker,  5  M.  &  W.  535. 


§§230-281.]       USAGE;  COLLATERAL  AGREEMENTS.  409 

words  have  a  known  legal  meaning,  such,  for  example,  as  measures  of 
quantity  fixed  by  statute,  parol  evidence,  that  the  parties  intended  to 
use  them  in  a  sense  different  from  the  legal  meaning,  though  it  were 
still  the  customary  and  popular  sense,  is  not  admissible.12 

§  281.  Collateral  Agreements.  The  reason  and  policy  of  the  rule 
will  be  further  seen,  by  adverting  to  some  of  the  cases  in  which  parol 
evidence  has  been  rejected.1  Thus,  where  a  policy  of  insurance  was 
effected  on  goods,  "in  ship  or  ships  from  Surinam  to  London,"  parol 
evidence  was  held  inadmissible  to  show  that  a  particular  ship  in  the 
fleet,  which  was  lost,  was  verbally  excepted  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
tract.2 So,  where  a  policy  described  the  two  termini  of  the  voyage, 
parol  evidence  was  held  inadmissible  to  prove  that  the  risk  was  not 
to  commence  until  the  vessel  reached  an  intermediate  place.8  So, 
where  the  instrument  purported  to  be  an  absolute  engagement 'to  pay 
at  a  specified  day,  parol  evidence  of  an  oral  agreement  at  the  same 
time  that  the  payment  should  be  prolonged,4  or  depend  upon  a 
contingency,6  or  be  made  out  of  a  particular  fund,  has  been  rejected.9 
Where  a  written  agreement  of  partnership  was  unlimited  as  to  the  time 
of  commencement,  parol  evidence  that  it  was  at  the  same  time  verbally 
agreed  that  the  partnership  should  not  commence  until  a  future  day, 
was  held  inadmissible.7  So,  where,  in  assumpsit  for  use  and  occupa- 
tion, upon  a  written  memorandum  of  lease,  at  a  certain  rent,  parol 
evidence  was  offered  by  the  plaintiff  of  an  agreement  at  the  same 

12  Smith  v.  Wilson,  3  B.  &  Ad.  728,  per  Ld.  Tenterden ;  Hockin  v.  Cooke,  4  T.  R. 
314  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Cast  Plate  Glass  Co.,  1  Anst.  39  ;  Sleght  v.  Rhinelantler, 
1  Johns.  192  ;  Frith  v.  Barker,  2  id.  335 ;  Stoever  v.  Whitman,  6  Binn.  417  ;  Henry  v. 
Risk,  1  Dall.  265  ;  Doe  v.  Lea,  11  East  312 ;  Caine  v.  Horsefall,  2  C.  &  K.  349  ;  |  Insur- 
ance Company  v.  Throop,  22  Mich.  146  ;  Wilhnering  v.  McGaughey,  30  Iowa  205  ; 
Arthur  v.  Roberts,  60  Barb.  580  ;  Butler  v.  Gale,  27  Vt.  739.  {  £See  on  this  point, 
§  305  /,  post.^  Conversations  between  the  parties  at  the  time  of  making  a  contract 
are  competent  evidence,  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  to  show  the  sense  which  they 
attached  to  a  particular  term  used  in  the  contract:  Gray  v.  Harper,  1  Story  574. 
Where  a  sold  note  run  thus  :  "  18  pockets  of  hops,  at  100s.,"  parol  evidence  was  held 
admissible  to  show  that  100s.  meant  the  price  per  hundredweight  :  Spicer  v.  Cooper, 
1  G.  &  D.  52. 

1  [The  illustrations  in  this  section  concern  mainly  the  principle  of  §§  305  c-305/, 
post,  not  that  of  Interpretation,  §§  305  i,  305  /.] 

2  Weston  v.  Ernes,  1  Taunt.  115. 

8  Kaine.s  v.  Knightly,  Skin.  54  ;  Leslie  v.  De  la  Torre,  cited  12  East  583  ;  {see 
Barrett  v.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Cush.  175,  180  ;  Lee  v.  Howard,  etc.  Co.,  3  Gray  583,  592  ; 
Union  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilkinson,  13  Wall.  222  ;  Sayward  v.  Stevens,  8  Gray  97,  102.  ( 

4  Hoare  v.   Graham,   3  Campb.  57;   Hanson  v.  Stetson,  6  Pick.   506  ;  Spring  v. 
Lovett,  11  id.  417  ;  fjind  citations  post,  §  305  c.] 

5  Rawson  v.  Walker,  1  Stark.  361  ;  Foster  v.  Jolly,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  703  ;   Hunt  v. 
Adams,  7  Mass.  518  ;  Free  v.  Hawkins,  8  Taunt.  92  ;  Thompson  v.  Ketcham,  8  Johns. 
189  ;  Woodbridge  v.  Spooner,  3  B.  &  Aid.  233  ;  Moseley  v.  Hauford,  10  B.  &  C.  729  ; 
Erwin  v.  Saunders,  1  Cowen  249,  fjand  citations  post,  §  305  c.] 

6  Campbell  v.  Hodgson,  1  Gow  74  ;  j  Allen  v.  Furbish,  4  Gray  504  ;  Hollenbeck  v. 
Shntts,  1  id.  431;  Billings  v.  Billings,  10  Cush.  178,  182;  Southwick  v.  Hapgood, 
ib.  119,  121  ;  Ridgway  v.  Bowman,  7  Cash.  268,  271;  City  Bank  v.  Adams,  45  Me. 
455 ;|  Quid  post,  §  305  c;]  {for  other  instances,  see  Langdon  v.  Langdon,  4  Gray 
186,  188 ;  Furbush  v.  Goodwin,  25  N.  H.  425  ;  Wood  v.  Whiting,  21  Barb.  190,  197; 
Alexander  p.  Moore,  19  Mo.  143;  Button  v.  Kettell,  1  Sprague  309.} 

1  Dix  t;.  Otis,  5  Pick.  38. 


410  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.    XXL 

time  to  pay  a  further  sum,  being  the  ground  rent  of  the  premises,  to 
the  ground  landlord,  it  was  rejected.8  So,  where,  in  a  written  con- 
tract of  sale  of  a  ship,  the  ship  was  particularly  described,  it  was 
held  that  parol  evidence  of  a  further  descriptive  representation,  made 
prior  to  the  time  of  sale,  was  not  admissible  to  charge  the  vendor, 
without  proof  of  actual  fraud  ;  all  previous  conversation  being  merged 
in  the  written  contract.9  So,  where  a  contract  was  for  the  sale  and 
delivery  of  "ware  potatoes,"  of  which  there  were  several  kinds  or 
qualities,  parol  evidence  was  held  not  admissible  to  show  that  the  con- 
tract was  in  fact  for  the  best  of  those  kinds.10  Where  one  signed  a 
premium  note  in  his  own  name,  parol  evidence  was  held  inadmissible 
to  show  that  he  signed  it  as  the  agent  of  the  defendant,  on  whose 
property  he  had  caused  insurance  to  be  effected  by  the  plaintiff,  at  the 
defendant's  request,  and  who  was  sued  as  the  promisor  in  the  note, 
made  by  his  agent.11  So,  where  an  agent  let  a  ship  on  hire,  describing 
himself  in  the  charter-party  as  "owner,"  it  was  held,  in  an  action 
upon  the  charter-party,  brought  by  the  true  owner,  that  parol  evi- 
dence was  not  admissible  to  show  that  the  plaintiff,  and  not  the  agent, 
was  the  real  owner  of  the  ship.12  Even  the  subsequent  confession  of 

8  Preston  v.  Merceau,  2  W.  Bl.  1249.     A  similar  decision  was  made  in  The  Isa- 
bella, 2  Rob.  Adm.  241,  and  in  White  v.  Wilson,  2  B.  &  P.  116,  where  seamen's  wages 
were  claimed  in  addition  to  the  sum  named  in  the  shipping  articles.     The  English  stat- 
utes not  only  require  such  contracts  to  be  in  writing,  but  declare  that  the  articles  shall 
be  conclusive  upon  the  parties.     The  statute  of  the  United  States  is  equally  imperative 
as  to  the  writing,  but  omits  the  latter  provision  as  to  its  conclusiveness.     But  the 
decisions  in  both  the  cases  just  cited  rest  upon  the  general  rule  stated  in  the  text,  which 
is  a  doctrine  of  general  jurisprudence,  and  not  upon  the  mere  positive  enactments  of  the 
statutes;  see  2  Rob.  Adm.  243  ;  Bogert  r.  Cauman,  Anthon  97.   The  American  Courts 
adopt  the  same  doctrine,  both  on  general  principles  and  as  agreeable  to  the  intent  of  the 
act  of  Congress  regulating  the  merchant  service.     See  Abbott  on  Shipping  (by  Story), 
p.  434,  n. ;  Bartlett  v.  Wyman,  14  Johns.  260  ;  Johnson  v.  Dalton,  1  Cowen  543.    The 
same  rule  is  applied  in  regard  to  the  Statute  of  Frauds  ;  see  11  Mass.  31.    See  further, 
Rich  v.  Jackson,  4  Bro.  Ch.  514;  Brigham  v.  Kogers,  17  Mass.  571;  Flinn  v.  Calow, 

1  M.  &  G.  589.     {For  agreements  collateral  to  deeds,  see  Howe  v.  Walker,  4  Gray  318  ; 
Goodrich  v.  Longley,  ib.  379,  383  ;  Raymonds.  Raymond,  10  Cush.  134,  141  ;  Button 
v.  Gerrish,  9  id.  89.      For  mining  leases,  see  Lyon  v.  Miller,  24  Pa.  St.  392 ;   Ken- 
nedy v.  Erie,  etc.  Plank  Road  Co.,  25  id.  224  ;  Chase  v.  Jewett,  37  Me.  351.  (     [For 
receipts,  bills  of  lading,  and  the  like,  see  post,  §§  305,  305  /.] 

9  Pickering  v.  Dowson,  4  Taunt.  779.     See  also  Powell  v.  Edmunds,  12  East  6  ; 
Fender  v.  Fobes,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  250  ;  Wright  v.  Crookes,  1  Scott  N.  R.  685. 

10  Smith  v.  Jeffryes,  15  M.  &  W.  561. 

11  Stackpole  r.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  27.    See  also  Hunt  v.  Adams,  7  Mass.  518  ;  Shank- 
land  v.  Corp.  of  Washington,  5  Peters  394  ;  jMyrick  v.  Dame,  9  Cush.  248;  Arnold 
v.  Cessna,  25  Pa.  34.  |     But  parol  evidence  in  admissible  to  show  that  one  of  several 
promisors  signed  as  the  surety  of  another  :  Carpenter  v.  King,  9  Met.  511  ;  McGee  v. 
Prouty,  ib.  547;  {as  to  agreements  for  suretyship,  see  Weaton  v.  Chamberlin,  7  Cush. 
404;  Riley  v.  Gerrish,  9  ib.  104;  Barry  v.  Ransom,  2  Kernan  462;  Norton  v.  Coons. 

2  Selden  83  ;  Dickinson  v.  Commissioner,  6  Ind.   123  ;  Riley  ».  Gregg,  16  Wis.  666  ;| 
Qand  post,  §  305  c.] 

13  Humble  v.  Hunter,  12  Q.  B.  310.  And  see  Lucas  v.  De  la  Cour,  1  M.  &  S.  249  ; 
Robson  e.  Drummond,  2  B.  &  Ad.  303.  Where  a  special  agreement  was  mn<le  in  writ- 
ing for  the  sale  of  goods  from  A  to  B,  the  latter  being  in  part  the  agent  of  C,  whose 
name  did  not  appear  in  the  transaction,  it  was  held  that  C  might  maintain  an  action 
in  his  own  name  against  A  for  the  breach  of  this  contract,  and  that  parol  evidence  wns 
admissible  to  prove  that  B  acted  merely  as  the  agent  of  C,  and  for  his  exclusive 
benefit  :  Hubbert  v.  Borden,  6  Wharton  79  ;  Qsee  post,  §  305  c.] 


§§  281-283.]  COLLATERAL  AGREEMENTS.  411 

the  party,  as  to  the  true  intent  and  construction  of  the  title-deed, 
under  which  he  claims,  will  be  rejected.18  The  books  abound  in  cases 
of  the  application  of  this  rule  ;  but  these  are  deemed  sufficient  to 
illustrate  its  spirit  and  meaning,  which  is  the  extent  of  our  present 
design. 

§  282.  From  the  examples  given  in  the  two  preceding  sections,  it  is 
thus  apparent  that  the  rule  excludes  only  parol  evidence  of  the  lan- 
guage of  the  parties,  contradicting,  varying,  or  adding  to  that  which  is 
contained  in  the  written  instrument;  and  this  because  they  have  them- 
selves committed* to  writing  all  which  they  deemed  necessary  to  give 
full  expression  to  their  meaning,  and  because  of  the  mischiefs  which 
would  result,  if  verbal  testimony  were  in  such  cases  received.  But 
where  the  agreement  in  writing  is  expressed  in  short  and  incomplete 
terms,  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  explain  that  which  is  per  se 
unintelligible,  such  explanation  not  being  inconsistent  with  the  writ- 
ten terms.1  It  is  also  to  be  kept  in  mind,  that  though  the  first  ques- 
tion in  all  cases  of  contract  is  one  of  interpretation  and  intention,  yet 
the  question,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  is  not  what  the  parties 
may  have  secretly  and  in  fact  intended,  but  what  meaning  did  they 
intend  to  convey,  by  the  words  they  employed  in  the  written  instru- 
ment. To  ascertain  the  meaning  of  these  words,  it  is  obvious  that 
parol  evidence  of  extraneous  facts  and  circumstances  may  in  some 
cases  be  admitted  to  a  very  great  extent,  without  in  any  wise  in- 
fringing the  spirit  of  the  rule  under  consideration.  These  cases, 
which  in  truth  are  not  exceptions  to  the  rule,  but  on  the  contrary  are 
out  of  the  range  of  its  operation,  we  shall  now  proceed  to  consider. 

§  283.  Agreement  in  more  than  one  "Writing.  It  is  in  the  first  place 
to  be  observed  that  the  rule  does  not  restrict  the  Court  to  the  perusal 
of  a  single  instrument  or  paper ;  for,  while  the  controversy  is  between 
the  original  parties,  or  their  representatives,  all  their  contempora- 
neous writings,  relating  to  the  same  subject-matter,  are  admissible  in 
evidence.1 

13  Paine  o.  Mclntier,  1  Mass.  69,  as  explained  in  10  id.  461.  See  also  Townsend  v. 
Weld,  8  id.  146. 

1  Sweet  v.  Lee,  3  M.  &  G.  452  ;  {so,  where  the  writing  was,  "  Rec'd  of  P.  $500,  due 
on  demand,"  it  was  held  that  parol  evidence  was  admissible  of  the  consideration  of  tlie 
promise  and  the  circumstances  of  the  transaction  :  De  Lavallette  v.  Wendt,  75  N.  Y. 
579  ;  so,  when  the  writing  was,  "  I.  0.  U.  the  sum  of  $160,  which  I  shall  pay  on  de- 
mand to  you,"  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  identify  "you:"  Kinney  v.  Flynn, 
2  R.  I.  319  ;  see  Collender  v.  Dunsmore,  55  N.  Y.  200.  Certain  contracts,  however, 
though  very  concise  in  their  language,  have  a  definite  meaning  in  the  commercial 
world  and  may  not  be  contradicted  by  parol  evidence :  such  are  in  some  instances 
acceptances  and  indorsements  of  commercial  paper :  Hauer  v.  Patterson,  84  Pa.  St. 
274 ;  Koss  v.  Espy,  66  id.  481 ;  Jones  ».  Albee,  70  111.  34. } 

1  Leeds  v.  Lancashire,  2  Campb.  205  ;  Hartley  v.  Wilkinson,  4  id.  127  ;  Stone  v, 
Metcalf,  1  Stark.  53  ;  Bowerbank  v.  Monteiro,  4  Taunt.  846,  per  Gibbs,  J.  ;  Hunt 
v.  Livermore,  5  Pick.  395;  Davlin  v.  Hill,  2  Fairf.  4«4;  Couch  v.  Meeker,  2  Conn. 
302  ;  Lee  v.  Dick,  10  Pet.  482  ;  Bell  v.  Bruen,  17  id.  161  ;  s.  c.  1  Howard  1C9,  183  ; 
[Tjut  this  must  be  confined  to  writings  forming  separate  parts  of  a  single  entire  con- 
tract ;  except  so  far  as  the  other  writings  may  be  admissible  as  indicating  usage  for 
the  purpose  of  interpretation.] 


412  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [oil.   XXL 

§  284.  Instrument  may  be  shown  Void  or  Voidable.  It  is  in  the 
next  place  to  be  noted  that  the  rule  is  not  infringed  by  the  admission 
of  parol  evidence,  showing  that  the  instrument  is  altogether  void,  or 
that  it  never  had  any  legal  existence  or  binding  force;1  either  by 
reason  of  fraud,  or  for  want  of  due  execution  and  delivery,  or  for  the 
illegality  of  the  subject-matter;  this  qualification  applies  to  all  con- 
tracts, whether  under  seal  or  not.  The  want  of  consideration  may 
also  be  proved  to  show  that  the  agreement  is  not  binding ; 2  unless  it 
is  either  under  seal,  which  is  conclusive  evidence  of  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration,8 or  is  a  negotiable  instrument  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent 
indorsee.4  Fraud,  practised  by  the  party  seeking  the  remedy,  upon 
him  against  whom  it  is  sought,  and  in  that  which  is  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  action  or  claim,  is  universally  held  fatal  to  his  title. 
"The  covin,"  says  Lord  Coke,  "doth  suffocate  the  right."  The 
foundation  of  the  claim,  whether  it  be  a  record,  or  a  deed,  or  a  writing 
without  seal,  is  of  no  importance ;  they  being  alike  void,  if  obtained 
by  fraud.6  Parol  evidence  may  also  be  offered  to  show  that  the 
contract  was  made  for  the  furtherance  of  objects  forbidden  by  law,6 

1  jO'Donnell  v.  Clinton,  145  Mass.  461  ;    Faunce  ».  Ins.  Co.,  101  id.  279;    Sher- 
man v.   Wilder,   106  id.  537  ;    Wilson  v.  Haecker,  85  111.  349  ;  Heeter  v.  Glasgow, 
79  Pa.  St.  79  ;  Beers  v.  Beers,  22  Mich.  42  ;  Martin  v.  Clarke,  8  R.  I.  389  ;    Grierson 
v.  Mason,  60  N.  Y.  394 ;  Ware  v.  Allen,  128  U.  S.  590 ;    Kalamazoo  Nov.   Man.  Co. 
v.  McAlister,  40  Mich.  84;  Hill  v.  Miller,  76  N.  Y.  32;   Reynolds  v.   Kobinson,   110 
id.  654  ;  Wilson  v.  Powers,   131   Mass.  539 ;    Com.  v.  Welch,  144  id.  356 ;  Adams  v. 
Morgan,  150  id.  148  ;  Lindley  v.  Lacey,  17  C.  B.  N.  s.  578  ;  Murray  v.  Stair,  2  B.  & 
C.  82  ;  Wilson  v.  Powers,  131  Mass.  539  ;   Earle  v.  Rice,  111  id.  17  ;   Greenawalt  v. 
Kohne,   85  Pa.  St.  369;    Black  v.   Lamb,  1  Beasl.  N.  J.  108;}    [see  further,  post, 
§  305  c."] 

2  j  \feyer  v.  Casey,  57  Miss.  615  ;   Howell  v.  Moores,  127  111.  86  ;   Illinois  Land  & 
Loan  Co.  v.  Bouner,  91  id.  120  ;  Bruce  v.  Slemp,  82  Va.  357  ;   Green  v.  Batson,  71 
Wis.  57  ;   compare  Simanovich  v.  Wood,  145  Mass.  180  ;{    fjand  see  further,  post, 
§§  304,  305/.3 

8  j  Gardners.  Lightfoot,  71  Iowa  577 ;  Feeney  ».  Howard,  79  Cal.  525;  Salisbury 
v.  Clark,  61  Vt  453.  { 

4  j  For  an  agreement  to  treat  a  deed  absolute  as  a  security  only,  see  Campbell  v. 
Dearborn,  109  Mass.  130  ;  Brick  v.  Brick,  98  II.  S.  514 ;  Matthews  v.  Sheehan, 
69  N.  Y.  585  ;  Odenbaugh  v.  Bradford,  67  Pa.  St.  96 ;  Plumer  v.  Guthrie,  76  id.  441 ; 
Lindauer  v.  Cummings,  57  111.  195  ;  Hassam  v.  Barrett,  115  Mass.  256 ;  Bonham  v. 
Craig,  80  N.  C.  224  ;  McClane  v.  White,  5  Minn.  178;  Tillson  v.  Moulton,  23  111. 
648  ;  People  v.  Irwin,  14  Cal.  428  ;  Marsh  r.  McNair,  99  N.  Y.  178;  Newton  v.  Fay, 
10  Allen  505;  Butman  v.  Howell,  144  Mass.  66;  Reeve  v.  Dennett,  137  id.  815; 
Grant  r.  Frost,  80  Me.  204;  Philbrook  v.  Eaton,  134  Mass.  400;  Pennock  i>. 
McCormick,  120  id.  275  ;{  Quid  post,  §  305/.~J  JFor  the  propriety  of  showing  the 
actual  date  of  an  instrument,  see  Reffell  v.  Reffetl,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  139  ;  Shaughnessey 
v.  Lewis,  130  Mass.  355;  Cole  v.  Howe,  50  Vt.  35  ;  Gately  ».  Irvine,  51  Cal.  172; 
Finnev's  Appeal,  59  Pa.  St.  398 ;  Joseph  v.  Bigelow,  4  Cush.  82 ;  Stockham  v. 
Stockham,  32  Md.  196; I  fand  pout,  §  305//] 

6  2  Stark.  Evid.  340  ;  Tail  on  Evid.  327,  328  ;  Chitty  on  Contr.  527 a;  Buckler  v. 
Millerd,  2  Ventr.  107  ;  Filmer  v.  Gott,  4  Bro.  P.  C.  230  ;  Taylor  v.  Weld,  5  Mass. 
116,  per  Sedgwick,  J. ;  Franchot  v.  Leach,  5  Cowen  508  ;  Dorr  r.  Munsell,  13  Johns. 
431  ;  Morton  v.  Chandler,  8  Greenl.  9  ;  Com.  v.  Bullard,  9  Mass.  270 :  Scott  v.  Bur- 
ton,  2  Ashm.  312;  j  Allen  v.  Furbish,  4  Gray  504;  Prescott  v.  Wright,  id.  461  ; 
Cushing  v.  Rice,  46  Me.  803  ;  Thompson  v.  Bell,  37  Ala.  438  ;  Plant  v.  Condit,  22  Ark. 
454  ;  Selden  o.  Myers,  20  How.  506  ;j  fjand  post,  §  305  d.~] 

•  Collins  v.  Blantern,  2  Wik  347  ;  1  Smith's  Leading  Cas.  154,  168,  note,  and  cases 
there  cited.  If  the  contract  is  by  deed,  the  illegality  must  be  specially  pleaded: 


§§284-284  a.]      VOID  OR  VOIDABLE  IXSTRUMETS.  413 

whether  it  be  by  statute  or  by  an  express  rule  of  the  common  law, 
or  by  the  general  policy  of  the  law ;  or  that  the  writing  was  obtained 
by  felony,7  or  by  duress ; 8  or  that  the  party  was  incapable  of  binding 
himself,  either  by  reason  of  some  legal  impediment,  such  as  infancy 
or  coverture,9  or  from  actual  imbecility  or  want  of  reason,10  whether 
it  be  by  means  of  permanent  idiocy  or  insanity,  or  from  a  temporary 
cause,  such  as  drunkenness ;  u  or  that  the  instrument  came  into  the 
hands  of  the  plaintiff  without  any  absolute  and  final  delivery,12  by 
the  obligor  or  party  charged. 

§  284  a.  Transaction  partially  reduced  to  Writing.  Nor  does  the 
rule  apply  in  cases  where  the  original  contract  was  verbal  and  entire, 
and  a  part  only  of  it  was  reduced  to  writing.  Thus,  where,  upon 
an  adjustment  of  accounts,  the  debtor  conveyed  certain  real  estate  to 
the  creditor  at  an  assumed  value,  which  was  greater  than  the  amount 
due,  and  took  the  creditor's  promissory  note  for  the  balance ;  it  being 
verbally  agreed  that  the  real  estate  should  be  sold,  and  the  proceeds 
accounted  for  by  the  grantee,  and  that  the  deficiency,  if  any,  below 
the  estimated  value,  should  be  made  good  by  the  grantor ;  which 
agreement  the  grantor  afterwards  acknowledged  in  writing,  —  it  was 
held,  in  an  action  brought  by  the  latter  to  recover  the  contents  of 
the  note,  that  the  whole  agreement  was  admissible  in  evidence  on  the 
part  of  the  defendant ;  and  that,  upon  the  proof  that  the  sale  of  the 
land  produced  less  than  the  estimated  value,  the  deficiency  should  be 
deducted  from  the  amount  due  upon  the  note.1 

Whelpdale's  Case,  5  Co.  119  ;  Mestayer  v.  Biggs,  4  Tyrw.  471.  But  the  rule  in  the 
text  applies  to  such  cases  as  well  as  to  those  arising  under  the  general  issue.  See  also 
Biggs  v.  Lawrence,  3  T.  R.  454  ;  Waymell  v.  Reed,  5  id.  600  ;  Doe  v.  Ford,  3  Ad.  & 
El.  649;  Catlin  v.  Bell,  4  Campb.  183  ;  Com.  v.  Pease,  16  Mass.  91;  Norman  v.  Cole, 
3  Esp.  253  ;  Sinclair  v.  Stevenson,  1  C.  &  P.  582  ;  Chitty  on  Contr.  519-527. 
"  2  B.  &  P.  471,  per  Heath,  J. 

8  2  Inst.  482,  483  ;  5  Com.  Dig.  Pleader,  2  W.  18-23  ;  Stouffer  v.  Latshaw,  2  Watts 
165  ;  Thompson  v.  Lockwood,  15  Johns.  256  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  274. 

9  2  Stark.  Evid.  274  ;  Anon.,  12  Mod.  609  ;  Van  Valkenbnrgh  v.  Rouk,  12  Johns. 
338  ;  2  Inst.  482,  483  ;  5  Dig.  ubi  sup. 

13  2  Kent  Comm.  450-453,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Webster  v.  Woodford,  3  Day  90  ; 
Mitchell  v.  Kingman,  5  Pick.  431  ;  Rice  v.  Peet,  15  Johns.  503. 

11  See  Barrett  v.  Buxton,  2  Aik.  167,  where  this  point  is  ably  examined  by  Prentiss, 
J. ;  Seymour  v.  Delancy,  3  Cowen  518  ;  1  Story's  Eq.  Jur.   §  231,  n.  (2)  ;  Wiggles- 
worth  v.  Steers,  1  Hen.  &  Munf.  70 ;  Prentice  v.  Achorn,  2  Paige  31.    ]For  execution 
by  an  illiterate  person,  see  Trambly  v.  Ricard,  130  Mass.  259  ;  Foye  v.  Patch,  132  id. 
106;  |   [and  port,  §305c.H 

12  Clark  v.  Gifford,  10  Wend.  310;  United  States  v.  Leffler,  11  Pet.  86  ;  Jackson  d. 
Titus  v.  Myers,  11  Wend.  533,  536  ;  Couch  v.  Meeker,  2  Conn.  302. 

1  Lewis  v.  Gray,  1  Mass.  297  ;  Lapham  v.  Whipple,  8  Met.  59;  {see  other  instances 
in  Morgan  v.  Griffith,  L.  R.  6  Ex.  70  ;  Chapin  v.  Dobson,  78  N.  Y.  74;  Callan  v. 
Lukens,  89  Pa.  St.  134  ;  Barclay  v.  Wainwright,  86  id.  191  ;  Caley  v.  Phila ,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  80  id.  363  ;  Barclay  v.  Hopkins,  59  Ga.  562  ;  Willis  v.  Hulbert,  117  Mass.  151  ; 
Bissenger  v.  Guiteman,  6  Heisk.  277  ;  Rohan  v.  Hanson,  11  Cush.  44  ;  Paige  ». 
Monks,  5  Gray  492 ;  Snow  v.  Alley,  151  Mass.  15  ;  Bonney  v.  Morrill,  57  Me.  368  ; 
Basshor  v.  Forbes,  36  Md.  1 54 ;  Sheffield  v.  Page,  Sprague  285  ;  Harris  v.  Forman, 
5  C.  B.  N.  8.  1  ;  Wallis  v.  Littell,  11  id.  368;  8  Jur.  N.  s.  745;  Wake  v.  Harrop, 
10  W.  R.  626  ;  s.  c.  7  Law  T.  N.  8.  96  ;  Crane  v.  Elizabeth,  etc.,  29  N.  J.  L.  802; 
Beach  v.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  457 ;  Page  v.  Sheffield,  2  Curt.  C.  C.  377  ;  Cilley  v.  Tenny, 


414  THE   PAEOL  EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXL 

§  285.  Contradicting  a  Recital.  Neither  is  this  rule  infringed  by 
the  introduction  of  parol  evidence,  contradicting  or  explaining  the 
instrument  in  some  of  its  recitals  of  facts,  where  such  recitals  do 
not,  on  other  principles,  estop  the  party  to  deny  them ;  and  accord- 
ingly in  some  cases  such  evidence  is  received.1  Thus,  in  a  settle- 
ment case,  where  the  value  of  an  estate,  upon  which  the  settlement 
was  gained,  was  in  question,  evidence  of  a  greater  sum  paid  than 
was  recited  in  the  deed  was  held  admissible.2  So,  to  show  that  the 
lands  described  in  the  deed  as  in  one  parish,  were  in  fact  situated 
in  another.8  So,  to  show  that  at  the  time  of  entering  into  a  con- 
tract of  service  in  a  particular  employment,  there  was  a  further 
agreement  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  as  a  premium,  for  teaching  the 
party  the  trade,  whereby  an  apprenticeship  was  intended;  and  that 
the  whole  was  therefore  void  for  want  of  a  stamp,  and  so  no  settle- 
ment was  gained.4  So,  to  contradict  the  recital  of  the  date  of  a 
deed;  as,  for  example,  by  proving  that  a  charter-party,  dated  Feb- 
ruary 6th,  conditioned  to  sail  on  or  before  February  12th,  was  not 
executed  till  after  the  latter  day,  and  that  therefore  the  condition 
was  dispensed  with.6  So,  to  show  that  the  reference  in  a  codicil  to 
a  will  of  1833  was  a  mistake,  that  will  being  supposed  to  be  de- 
stroyed; and  that  the  will  of  1837  was  intended.6  And,  on  the  other 
hand,  where  a  written  guaranty  was  expressed  to  be  "  in  considera- 
tion of  your  having  discounted  V.'s  note,"  and  it  was  objected  that 
it  was  for  a  past  consideration,  and  therefore  void,  explanatory  parol 
evidence  was  held  admissible  to  show  that  the  discount  was  con- 
temporaneous with  the  guaranty.7  So,  where  the  guaranty  was  "in 
consideration  of  your  having  this  day  advanced  to  V.  LX,"  similar 
evidence  was  held  admissible.8  It  is  also  admissible  to  show  when 
a  written  promise,  without  date,  was  in  fact  made.9  Evidence  may 
also  be  given  of  a  consideration,  not  mentioned  in  a  deed,  provided 
it  be  not  inconsistent  with  the  consideration  expressed  in  it.10 

31  Vt.  401 ;  E«al  Estate  T.  Co.'s  Appeal,  125  Pa.  St.  560  ;  TKomas  v.  Loose,  114  id. 
35;  Dodge  v.  Ziminer,  110  N.  Y.  49  ;[  [a.u&  post,  §  305/.J 

1  2  Poth.  on  Obi.,  by  Evans,  181,  182  ;  j  Ingersoll  v.  Truebody,  40  Cal.  603  ;  Harris 
v.  Rickett,  4  H.  &  N.  1  ;  Chapman  v.  Callis,  2  F.  &  F.  161  ;{  [for  receipts,  bills  of 
kding,  and  the  like,  see  post,  §§  305,  305/.] 

a  R.  v.  Scammonden,  3  T.  R.  474.     See  also  Doe  v.  Ford,  3  Ad.  &  El.  649. 

«  R.  v.  Wiekham,  2  Ad.  &  El.  517. 

«  R.  v.  Laindon,  8  T.  R.  379. 

*  Hall  v.  Cazenove,  4  East  477 ;  [ante,  §  284.]     See  further,  Tait  on  Evid.  pp. 
832,  333-336  ;  infra,  §  304. 

*  Quincey  v.  Quincey,  11  Jur.  111. 

"*  Exparte  Flight,  35  Leg.  Obs.  240.  And  see  Haigh  v.  Brooks,  10  Ad.  &  El.  309  ; 
Butcher  ».  Steuart,  11  M.  &  W.  857. 

•  Goldshede  v.  Swan,  35  Leg.  Obs.  203  ;  1  Exch.  154.     This  case  has  been  the  sub- 
ject of  some  animated  discussion  in  England.     See  12  Jur.  22,  94,  102. 

•  Lobb  v.  Stanley,  5  Q.  B.  574. 

10  Clifford  v.  Turrill,  9  Jur.  633  ;  [see  ante,  §  284.  At  this  point  the  author  seems  to 
have  broken  off  his  treatment  of  that  portion  of  the  parol-evidence  rule  which  has  been 
herciiiiiftiT  (§  305  b)  termed  the  Intonation  rule;  tlie  remainder  of  his  treatment  of 
that  part  of  the  subject  will  be  found  post,  §§  302-305.] 


§§  285-287.]  RECITALS  ;  INTERPRETATION.  415 

§  286.  Interpretation  of  Terms  of  the  Instrument.  As  it  is  a  lead- 
ing rule,  in  regard  to  written  instruments,  that  they  are  to  be  inter- 
preted according  to  their  subject-matter,  it  is  obvious  that  parol  or 
verbal  testimony  must  be  resorted  to,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  nature 
and  qualities  of  the  subject,1  to  which  the  instrument  refers.  Evi- 
dence which  is  calculated  to  explain  the  subject  of  an  instrument  is 
essentially  different  in  its  character  from  evidence  of  verbal  commu- 
nications respecting  it.  Whatever,  therefore,  indicates  the  nature 
of  the  subject,  is  a  just  medium  of  interpretation  of  the  language  and 
meaning  of  the  parties  in  relation  to  it,  and  is  also  a  just  foundation 
for  giving  the  instrument  an  interpretation,  when  considered  rela- 
tively different  from  that  which  it  would  receive  if  considered  in 
the  abstract.  Thus,  where  certain  premises  were  leased,  including 
a  yard,  described  by  metes  and  bounds,  and  the  question  was,  whether 
a  cellar  under  the  yard  was  or  was  not  included  in  the  lease ;  verbal 
evidence  was  held  admissible  to  show  that,  at  the  time  of  the  lease, 
the  cellar  was  in  the  occupancy  of  another  tenant,  and,  therefore, 
that  it  could  not  have  been  intended  by  the  parties  that  it  should 
pass  by  the  lease.2  So,  where  a  house,  or  a  mill,  or  a  factory  is 
conveyed,  eo  nomine,  and  the  question  is  as  to  what  was  part  and 
parcel  thereof,  and  so  passed  by  the  deed,  parol  evidence  to  this 
point  is  admitted.8 

§  287.  Indeed,  there  is  no  material  difference  of  principle  in  the 
rules  of  interpretation  between  wills  and  contracts,  except  what 
naturally  arises  from  the  different  circumstances  of  the  parties.  The 
object,  in  both  cases,  is  the  same,  namely,  to  discover  the  intention. 
And,  to  do  this,  the  Court  may,  in  either  case,  put  themselves  in  the 
place  of  the  party,  and  then  see  how  the  terms  of  the  instrument 
affect  the  property  or  subject-matter.1  With  this  view,  evidence 

1  In  the  term  "  subject,"  in  this  connection,  text-writers  include  everything  to 
which  the  instrument  relates,  as  well  as  the  person  who  is  the  other  contracting  party, 
or  who  is  the  object  of  the  provision,  whether  it  be  by  will  or  deed  :  Phil.  &  Am.  on 
Evid.  732,  n.  (1). 

2  2  Poth.  on  Obi.,  by  Evans,  p.  185  ;  Doe  d.  Freeland  v.  Bint,  1  T.  R.  701  ;  Elfe 
v.  Gadsden,  2  Rich.  373 ;  Brown  v.  Slater,  16  Conn.  192 ;  Milboum  v.  Ewart,  5  T.  R. 
381,  385. 

8  Ropps  v.  Barker,  4  Pick.  239  ;  Farrar  v.  Stackpole,  6  Greenl.  154.  But  where 
the  language  of  the  deed  was  broad  enough  plainly  to  include  a  garden,  together  with 
the  house,  it  was  held  that  the  written  paper  of  conditions  of  sale,  excepting  the  gar- 
den, was  inadmissible  to  contradict  the  deed  :  Doe  v.  Webster,  4  P.  &  D.  273  ;  {see  other 
instances  in  McKenzie  v.  Wimberly,  86  Ala.  195  ;  Moffitt  v.  Maness,  102  N.  C.  457  ; 
Brady  v.  Cassidy,  104  N.  Y.  155;  Cleverly  v.  Cleverly,  124  Mass.  314  ;  Thornell  v. 
Brockton,  141  id.  151  ;  Thayer  v.  Finton,  108  N.  Y.  397  ;  Sweet  ».  Shumway,  102 
Mass.  365  ;  Whitney  v.  Boardman,  118  id.  242;  Habenicht  v.  Lissak,  77  Cal.  139; 
West  v.  Smith,  101  U.  S.  263 ;  Knick  v.  Knick,  75  Va.  19 ;  Watson  v.  Baker,  71 
Tex.  739  ;  Bulkley  o.  Devine,  127  111.  407  ;  Brown  v.  Fales,  139  Mass.  21 ;  Parsons  v. 
Thornton,  82  Ala.  308  ;|  [and  post,  §§  305  7,  305  »».] 

1  Doe  v.  Martin,  1  N.  &  M.  524;  s.  c.  4  B.  &  Ad.  771,  785,  per  Park,  J. ;  Moisten 
v.  Jumpson,  4  Esp.  189  ;  Brown  v.  Thorndike,  15  Pick.  400;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid. 
736 ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  277  ;  Guy  ».  Sharp,  1  M.  &  K.  602.  n°Q  this  subject,  see  §§  305  i, 
305  j, 


416  THE   PAROL  EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

must  be  admissible  of  all  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  author 
of  the  instrument.2  In  the  simplest  case  that  can  be  put,  namely, 
that  of  an  instrument  appearing  on  the  face  of  it  to  be  perfectly  in- 
telligible, inquiry  must  be  made  for  a  subject-matter  to  satisfy  the 
description.  If,  in  the  conveyance  of  an  estate,  it  is  designated  as 
Blackacre,  parol  evidence  must  be  admitted  to  show  what  field  is 
known  by  that  name.  Upon  the  same  principle,  where  there  is  a 
devise  of  an  estate  purchased  of  A,  or  of  a  farm  in  the  occupation  of 
B,  it  must  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence  what  estate  it  was  that 
was  purchased  of  A,  or  what  farm  was  in  the  occupation  of  B,  be- 
fore it  can  be  known  what  is  devised.8  So,  if  a  contract  in  writing 
is  made,  for  extending  the  time  of  payment  of  "certain  notes,"  held 
by  one  party  against  the  other,  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show 
what  notes  were  so  held  and  intended.4 

§  288.  It  is  only  in  this  mode  that  parol  evidence  is  admissible 
(as  is  sometimes,  but  not  very  accurately,  said)  to  explain  written 
instruments;  namely,  by  showing  the  situation  of  the  party  in  all 
his  relations  to  persons  and  things  around  him,  or,  as  elsewhere  ex- 
pressed, by  proof  of  the  surrounding  circumstances.  Thus,  if  the 
language  of  the  instrument  is  applicable  to  several  persons,  to 
several  parcels  of  land,  to  several  species  of  goods,  to  several  monu- 
ments or  boundaries,  to  several  writings;  1  or  the  terms  be  vague  and 
general,  or  have  divers  meanings,  as  "household  furniture,"  "stock," 
"freight,"  "factory  prices,"  and  the  like;2  or  in  a  will,  the  words 

2  The  propriety  of  admitting  such  evidence  in  order  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of 
doubtful  words  or  expressions  in  a  will,  is  expressly  conceded  by  Marshall,  C.  J.,  in 
Smith  v.  Bell,  6  Peters  75.  See  also  Wooster  v.  Butler,  13  Conn.  317  ;  Baldwin  v. 
Carter,  17  id.  201  ;  Brown  v.  Slater,  16  id.  192  ;  Marshall's  Appeal,  2  Barr  388  ;  Stoner's 
Appeal,  ib.  428  ;  Great  Northern  Railw.  Co.  v.  Harrison,  16  Jur.  565  ;  14  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 
195,  per  Parke,  B. 

8  Sandford  v.  Raikes,  1  Mer.  646,  653,  per  Sir  W.  Grant  ;  Doe  d.  Preedy  v.  Holtom, 

4  Ad.  &  El.  76,  81,  per  Coleridge,  J.;  Doe  v.  Martin,  4  B.  &  Ad.  771,  per  Parke,  J. 
"  Whether  parcel,  or  not,  of  the  thing  demised,  is  always  matter  of  evidence  :  "  per 
Buller,  J.,  in  Doe  o.  Burt,  1  T.  R.  704  ;   Doe  v.  E.  of  Jersey,  3  B.  &  C.  870  ;  Doe  v. 
Chichester,  4  Dow  65  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  558-561. 

*  Bell  v.  Martin,  3  Harrison  167  ;  jsee  other  instances  in  Keller  v.  Webb,  125  Mass. 
88  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Durant,  95  U.  S.  576,  Dunham  v.  Gannett,  124  Mass.  151  ;  Woods 
v.  Sawin,  4  Gray  322  ;  Raymond  v.  Coffey,  5  Or.  132  ;  Russel  v.  Werntz,  24  Pa.  337  ; 
Gerrish  v.  Towne,  3  Gray  82  ;  Altschul  v.  Assoc.,  43  Cal.  171  ;  Field  v.  Munson,  47 
N.  Y.  221  ;  Suffern  v.  Butler,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  410  ;  Foster  w.  McGraw,  64  Pa.  St.  464  ; 
Tuxbury  v.  French,  41  Mich.  7  ;  Cleverly  v.  Cleverly,  124  Mass.  314  ;  Blnck  v.  Hill, 
32  Oh.  St.  313  ;  Maguire  v.  Baker,  57  Ga.  109  ;  Bancroft  v.  Grover,  23  Wis.  463  ; 
Kimball  v.  Myers,  21  Mich.  276  ;  Thorington  v.  Smith,  8  Wall.  1  ;  McDonald  v.  Long- 
bottom,  1  E.  &  E.  977  ;  Mumford  v.  Gething,  7  C.  B.  N.  s.  305  ;  Almgren  v.  Dutilh, 

5  N.  Y.  28  ;  Barrett  v.  Stow,  15  111.  423  ;  Stoops  v.  Smith,  100  Mass.  63  ;  Hart  v. 
Hammett,  18  Vt.  127  ;  Sargent  v.  Adams,  3  Gray  72  ;|   fjmd  compare  §§  305  I,  305  m, 

~ 


1  Miller  v.  Travers,  8  Bing.  244;  Storer  v.  Freeman,  6  Mass.  435;  Waterman  r. 
Johnson,  13  Pick.  261  ;  Hodges  t».  Horsfall,  1  Rus.  &  My.  116;  Dillon  v.  Harris,  4  Bli<;h 
X.  8.  343,  356  ;  Parks  r.  Gen.  Int.  Assur.  Co.,  5  Pick.  84  ;  Coit  v.  Starkweather,  8  Conn. 
289  ;  Blake  v.  Doherty,  5  Wheston  359  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  558-561. 

3  Peisch  v.  Dickson,  1  Mason  10-12,  per  Story,  J.  ;  Pratt  v.  Jackson,  1  Bro.  P.  C. 
222  ;  Kelly  o.  Powlet,  Ambl.  610  ;  Bunn  v.  Winthrop,  1  Johns.  Ch.  329  ;  Le  Farraut 


§§  287-289.]  INTERPRETATION.  417 

"child,"  "children,"  "grandchildren,"  "son,"  "family,"  or  "nearest 
relations,"  are  employed;8  in  all  these  and  the  like  cases,  parol 
evidence  is  admissible  of  any  extrinsic  circumstances,  tending  to 
show  what  person  or  persons,  or  what  things,  were  intended  by  the 
party,  or  to  ascertain  his  meaning  in  any  other  respect;4  and  this, 
without  any  infringement  of  the  rule,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  only 
excludes  parol  evidence  of  other  language,  declaring  his  meaning, 
than  that  which  is  contained  in  the  instrument  itself. 

§  289.  Interpretation  of  "Wills ;  Declarations  of  Intention.  In 
regard  to  wills,  much  greater  latitude  was  formerly  allowed,  in  the 
admission  of  evidence  of  intention,  than  is  warranted  by  the  later 
cases.1  The  modern  doctrine  on  this  subject  is  nearly  or  quite 
identical  with  that  which  governs  in  the  interpretation  of  other 
instruments ; 2  and  is  best  stated  in  the  language  of  Lord  Abinger's 
own  lucid  exposition,  in  a  case  in  the  Exchequer.8  "  The  object,"  he 

v.  Spencer,  1  Ves.  97  ;  Colpoys  v.  Colpoys,  Jacob  451 ;  "Wigram  on  Wills,  p.  64  ;  Gob- 
let v.  Beechey,  3  Sim.  24  ;  Barrett  v.  Allen,  10  Ohio  426  ;  A  very  v.  Stewart,  2  Corai. 
69;  Williams  v.  Oilman,  3  Greenl.  276. 

8  Black  well  v.  Bull,  1  Keen  176  ;  Wylde's  Case,  6  Co.  16  ;  Brown  v.  Thorndike, 
15  Pick.  400  ;  Richardson  v.  Watson,  4  B.  &  Ad.  787.  See  also  Wigram  on  Wills,-p.  58; 
Doe  v.  Joinville,  3  East  172  ;  Green  v.  Howard,  1  Bro.  Ch.  32  ;  Leigh  v.  Leigh,  ]5  Ves. 
92  ;  Beachcroft  v.  Beachcroft,  1  Madd.  430;  [post,  §§  290,  305  Z.T 

*  Goodinge  v.  Goodinge,  1  Ves.  231 ;  Jeacock  v.  Falkener,  1  Bro.  Ch.  295 ;  Fon- 
nereau  v.  Poyntz,  ib.  473  ;  Mackell  ».  Winter,  3  Ves.  Jr.  540,  541  ;  Lane  v.  Lord  Stan- 
hope, 6  T.  R.  345  ;  Doe  v.  Huthwaite,  3  B.  &  Aid.  632 ;  Goodright  v.  Downshire,  2  B. 
&  P.  608,  per  Lord  Alvanley  ;  Lansdowne  v.  Lansdowne,  2  Bligh  60  ;  Clementson  v. 
Gandy,  1  Keen  309  ;  King  v.  Badeley,  3  My.  &  K.  417;  [post,  §§  305;,  305  7/1.3  So 
parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  what  debt  was  referred  to,  in  a  letter  of  collateral 
guaranty  :  Drummond  v.  Prestman,  12  Wheat.  515.  So,  to  show  that  advances,  which 
had  been  made,  were  in  fact  made  upon  the  credit  of  a  particular  letter  of  guaranty  : 
Douglass  v.  Reynolds,  7  Pet.  113.  So,  to  identify  a  note,  which  is  provided  for  in  an 
assignment  of  the  debtor's  property  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  but  which  is  misde- 
scribrd  in  the  schedule  annexed  to  the  assignment  :  Pierce  v.  Parker,  4  Met.  80.  So, 
to  show  that  the  indorsement  of  a  note  was  made  merely  for  collateral  security  :  Dwight 
v.  Linton,  3  Rob.  La.  57.  See  also  Bell  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co.,  ib.  423,  428,  where 
parol  evidence  was  admitted  of  an  agreement  to  sell,  prior  to  the  deed  or  act  of  sale. 
So,  to  show  what  flats  were  occupied  by  the  riparian  proprietor,  as  appurtenant  to  his 
upland  and  wharf,  and  passed  with  them  by  the  deed  :  Treat  v.  Strickland,  10  Shepl. 
234.  jSee  other  instances  in  Storer  v.  Ins.  Co.,  45  Me.  175;  Reamer  v.  Nesmith,  34 
Cal.  624  ;  Garwood  v.  Garwood,  29  id.  514  ;  Holding  v.  Elliott,  5  H.  &  N.  117  ;  Her- 
ring v.  Iron  Co.,  1  Gray  134;  Hopkins  v.  School  District,  27  Vt.  281 ;  Rev  v.  Simp- 
son, 22  How.  341  ;  Sargent  v.  Adams,  3  Gray  72 ;  Bainbridge  v.  Wade,  20  L.  J.  N.  8. 
Q.  B.  7  :  Blossom  v.  Griffin.  13  N.  Y.  569  ;  Griffiths  v.  Harden bergh,  41  id.  468  ;  Biad- 
ley  v.  Wash.,  etc.  Co.,  13  Pet.  89;  George  v.  Joy,  19  N.  H.  544  ;  Linsley  v.  Lovely, 
26  Vt.  123.  | 

1  QThe  development  seems  in  fact  to  have  been  just  the  opposite  ;  see  Thayer,  Pre- 
liminary Treatise,  414  ff.] 

2  L~Compare  the  discriminations  in  §  305;',  post."^ 

8  Doe  d.  Hiscocks  v.  Hixcocks,  5  M.  &  W.  363,  367.  This  was  an  action  of  ejectment, 
brought  on  the  demise  of  Simon  Hiscocks  against  John  Hiscocks.  The  question  turned 
on  the  words  of  a  devise  in  the  will  of  Simon  Hiscocks,  the  grandfather  of  the  lessor  of 
the  plaintiff  and  of  the  defendant.  By  his  will  Simon  Hiscocks,  after  devising  estates 
to  his  son  Simon  for  life,  and  from  and  after  his  death,  to  his  grandson,  Henry  His- 
cocks, in  tail  male,  and  making,  as  to  certain  other  estates  an  exactly  similar  provision 
in  favor  of  his  son  John  for  life  ;  then,  after  his  death,  the  testator  devised  those 
estates  to  "  my  grandson,  John  Hiscocks,  eldest  son  of  the  said  John  Hiscocks."  It  was 
on  this  devise  that  the  question  wholly  turned.  In  fact,  John  Hiscocks,  the  father, 
VOL.  i.  —  27 


418  THE   PAEOL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

remarked,  "in  all  cases,  is  to  discover  the  intention  of  the 
testator.  The  first  and  most  obvious  mode  of  doing  this  is  to 
read  his  will  as  he  has  written  it,  and  collect  his  intention  from 
his  words.  But  as  his  words  refer  to  facts  and  circumstances, 
respecting  his  property  and  his  family,  and  others  whom  he 
names  or  describes  in  his  will,  it  is  evident  that  the  meaning  and 
application  of  his  words  cannot  be  ascertained,  without  evi- 
dence of  all  those  facts  and  circumstances.4  To  understand  the 
meaning  of  any  writer,  we  must  first  be  apprised  of  the  persons 
and  circumstances  that  are  the  subjects  of  his  allusions  or  state- 
ments; and  if  these  are  not  fully  disclosed  in  his  work,  we  must 
look  for  illustration  to  the  history  of  the  times  in  which  he  wrote, 
and  to  the  works  of  contemporaneous  authors.  All  the  facts  and 
circumstances,  therefore,  respecting  persons  or  property,  to  which 
the  will  relates,  are  undoubtedly  legitimate,  and  often  necessary 
evidence,  to  enable  us  to  understand  the  meaning  and  application  of 
his  words.  Again,  the  testator  may  have  habitually  called  certain 
persons  or  things  by  peculiar  names,  by  which  they  were  not  com- 
monly known.  If  these  names  should  occur  in  his  will,  they  could 
only  be  explained  and  construed  by  the  aid  of  evidence,  to  show  the 
sense  in  which  he  used  them,  in  like  manner  as  if  his  will  were 
written  in' cipher,  or  in  a  foreign  language.  The  habits  of  the  tes- 
tator, in  these  particulars,  must  be  receivable  as  evidence,  to  explain 
the  meaning  of  his  will.  But  there  is  another  mode  of  obtaining 
the  intention  of  the  testator,  which  is  by  evidence  of  his  declara- 
tions, of  the  instructions  given  for  his  will,  and  other  circumstances 
of  the  like  nature,  which  are  not  adduced  for  explaining  the  words 
or  meaning  of  the  will,  but  either  to  supply  some  deficiency,  or 
remove  some  obscurity,  or  to  give  some  effect  to  expressions  that  are 
unmeaning  or  ambiguous.  Now,  there  is  but  one  case  in  which  it 
appears  to  us  that  this  sort  of  evidence  of  intention  can  properly  be 
admitted,  and  that  is,  where  the  meaning  of  the  testator's  words  is 
neither  ambiguous  nor  obscure,  and  where  the  devise  is,  on  the 
face  of  it,  perfect  and  intelligible,  but  from  some  of  the  circum- 
stances admitted  in  proof,  an  ambiguity  arises  as  to  which  of  the  two 
or  more  things,  or  which  of  the  two  or  more  persons  (each  answering 
the  words  in  the  will),  the  testator  intended  to  express.  Thus,  if  a 
testator  devise  his  manor  of  S.  to  A.  B.,  and  has  two  manors  of  North 
S.  and  South  S.,  it  being  clear  he  means  to  devise  one  only,  whereas 
both  are  equally  denoted  by  the  words  he  has  used,  in  that  case 
there  is  what  Lord  Bacon  calls  '  an  equivocation,'  that  is,  the  words 

had  been  twice  married  ;  by  his  first  wife  he  had  Simon,  the  lessor  of  the  plaintiff,  his 
eldest  son  ;  the  eldest  son  of  the  second  marriage  was  John  Hiscocks,  the  defendant. 
The  devise,  therefore,  did  not,  both  by  name  ana  description,  apply  to  either  the  lessor 
of  the  plaintiff,  who  was  the  eldest  son,  but  whoso  name  was  Simon,  nor  to  the  defend- 
ant, who,  though  his  name  was  John,  was  not  the  eldest  son. 

*  See  Crocker  v.  Crocker,  11  Pick.  2.17  ;  Lamb  v.  Lamb,  ib.  375,  per  Shaw,  C.  J.  ; 
Bainbridge  v.  Wade,  20  Law  J.  N.  s.  Q.  B.  7  ;  1  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  236. 


§§  289-291.]  INTERPRETATION;  WILLS.  419 

equally  apply  to  either  manor,  and  evidence  of  previous  intention 
may  be  received  to  solve  this  latent  ambiguity,  for  the  intention 
shows  what  he  meant  to  do;  and  when  you  know  that,  you  immedi- 
ately perceive  that  he  has  done  it,  by  the  general  words  he  has  used, 
which,  in  their  ordinary  sense,  may  properly  bear  that  construction. 
It  appears  to  us  that,  in  all  other  cases,  parol  evidence  of  what  was 
the  testator's  intention  ought  to  be  excluded,  upon  this  plain  ground, 
that  his  will  ought  to  be  made  in  writing;  and  if  his  intention  can- 
not be  made  to  appear  by  the  writing,  explained  by  circumstances, 
there  is  no  will." 

§  290.  From  the  above  case,  and  two  other  leading  modern  deci- 
sions,1 it  has  been  collected,2  (1)  that  where  the  description  in  the 
will,  of  the  person  or  thing  intended,  is  applicable  with  legal  cer- 
tainty to  each  of  several  subjects,  extrinsic  evidence  is  admissible 
to  prove  which  of  such  subjects  was  intended  by  the  testator.  But 
(2)  if  the  description  of  the  person  or  thing  be  wholly  inapplicable 
to  the  subject  intended,  or  said  to  be  intended  by  it,  evidence  is  not 
admissible  to  prove  whom  or  what  the  testator  really  intended  to  de- 
scribe;8 his  declarations  of  intention,  whether  made  before  or  after 
the  making  of  the  will,  are  alike  inadmissible.4  Those  made  at  the 
time  of  making  the  will,  when  admitted  at  all,  are  admitted  under 
the  general  rules  of  evidence  applicable  alike  to  all  written  instru- 
ments. 

§  291.  But  declarations  of  the  testator,  proving  or  tending  to 
prove  a  material  fact  collateral  to  the  question  of  intention,  where 
such  fact  would  go  in  aid  of  the  interpretation  of  the  testator's  words, 
are,  on  the  principles  already  stated,  admissible.  These  cases,  how- 
ever, will  be  found  to  be  those  only  in  which  the  description  in  the 
will  is  unambiguous  l  in  its  application  to  any  one  of  several  sub- 
jects.8 Thus,  where  lands  were  devised  to  John  Cluer  of  Calcot,  and 

1  Miller  v.  Travers,  8  Bing.  244  :  f_see  this  case  discussed  in  Thayer,  Preliminary 
Treatise,  474  ;  and  post,  §  305  k  ;]  Doe  d.  Gord  v.  Needs,  2  M.  &  W.  129  ;  Atkinson  r. 
Cummins,  9  How.  479.    The  same  rule  is  applied  to  the  monuments  in  a  deed,  in  Clough 
v.  Bowman,  15  N.  H.  504. 

2  By  Vice-Chancellor  Wigram,  in  his  Treatise  on  the  Interpretation  of  Wills,  pi. 
184,  188.     See  also  Gresley  on  Evid.  203. 

8  ["For  these  supposed  rules,  see  further  §§  805/-305  I,  post.^ 

*  Wigram  on  Wills,  pi.  104,  187  ;  Brown  v.  Saltonstall,  3  Met.  423,  426  ;  Trustees, 
etc.  v.  Peaslee,  15  N.  H.  317,  330  ;  jsee  other  instances  in  Castle  v.  Fox,  L.  R.  11  Eq. 
542  ;  Ellis  v.  Houston,  L.  R.  10  Oh.  Div.  236  ;  Weatherhead  v.  Sewell,  9  Humph.  272  ; 
Brower  v.  Bowers,  1  Abb.  App.  Dec.  214  ;  Re  Cahn,  3  Redf.  31  ;  Benham  v.  Hendrick- 
son,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  441 ;  Sherratt  v.  Monntford,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  928 ;  Re  Wolverton  Mort- 
gaged Estates,  L.  R.  7  Ch.  Div.  197  ;  Moseley  v.  Martin,  37  Ala.  216  ;  Morse  v.  Stearns, 
131  Mass.  389;  Lovejoy  v.  Lovett,  124  id.  270  ;  Hoar  v.  Goulding,  116  id.  132  ;  Ches- 
ter Emery  Co.  v.  Lncas,  112  id.  424;  Putnam  v.  Bond,  100  id.  58  ;  Hall  v.  Davis,  36 
N.  H.  569  ;  Morgan  v.  Burrows,  45  Wis.  211  ;  Ganson  o.  Madigan,  15  id.  144;  Clark 
V.  Clark,  2  Lea  723;  Vreeland  v.  Williams,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  734;  Homer  v.  Stillwell, 
85  N.  J.  L.  307.  For  instances  in  deeds,  see  Ringsford  v.  Hood,  105  Mass.  495  ;  Simp- 
son v.  Dix,  131  id.  179  ;  Whitmore  v.  Learned,  70  Me.  276.  | 

1  ["Possibly  this  word  should  be  "ambiguous;  "  see  post,  §  305  fr.] 

8  Wigram  on  Wills,  pi.  5,  96,  104,  194,  195,  211-215;   Doe  v.  Martin,  1  N.  &  M, 


420  THE    PAROL   EVIDENCE    EULE.  [CH.    XXL 

there  were  father  and  son  of  that  name,  parol  evidence  of  the  testa- 
tor's declarations,  that  he  intended  to  leave  them  to  the  son,  was 
held  admissible.8  So,  where  a  legacy  was  given  to  "  the  four  chil- 
dren of  A,"  who  had  six  children,  two  by  a  first,  and  four  by  a  second, 
marriage,  parol  evidence  of  declarations  by  the  testatrix,  that  she 
meant  the  latter  four,  was  held  admissible.4  So,  where  the  devise 
was,  "to  my  granddaughter,  Mary  Thomas  of  Llechloyd  in  Merthyr 
parish,"  and  the  testator  had  a  granddaughter  named  Elinor  Evans  in 
that  parish,  and  a  great-granddaughter,  Mary  Thomas,  in  the  parish 
of  Llangain;  parol  evidence  of  the  testator's  declarations  at  the  time 
of  making  the  will  was  received  to  show  which  was  intended.6  So, 
where  a  legacy  was  given  to  Catherine  Earnley,  and  there  was  no 
person  of  that  name,  but  the  legacy  was  claimed  by  Gertrude  Yard- 
ley;  parol  proof  was  received  that  the  testator's  voice,  when  the 
scrivener  wrote  the  will,  was  very  low,  that  he  usually  called  the 
legatee  Gatty,  and  had  declared  that  he  would  do  well  by  her  in  his 
will ;  and  thereupon  the  legacy  was  awarded  to  her.8  So,  also,  where 

524,  per  Parke,  J. ;  s.  c.  4  B.  &  Ad.  771  ;  Guy  v.  Sharp,  1  M.  &  K.  602,  per  Ld. 
Broughman,  0.  See  also  Boys  v.  Williams,  2  Russ.  &  My.  689,  where  parol  evidence 
of  the  testator's  property  and  situation  was  held  admissible  to  determine  whether  a 
bequest  of  stock  was  intended  as  a  specific  or  a  pecuniary  legacy.  These  rules  apply 
with  equal  force  to  the  interpretation  of  every  other  private  instrument. 

8  Jones  v.  Newman,  1  W.  Bl.  60.  See  also  Doe  v.  Beynon,  4  P.  &  D.  193  ;  Doe 
v.  Allen,  ib.  220.  But  where  the  testator  devised  to  his  "grandson  Rufus,"  and 
there  were  two  of  that  name,  the  one  legitimate,  who  lived  in  a  foreign  land,  and 
whom  he  had  seen  only  once  and  when  a  child,  and  the  other  illegitimate,  living  with 
him,  and  whom  he  had  brought  up  and  educated;  it  was  held,  that  the  words  were 
legally  applicable  only  to  the  legitimate  grandson,  and  that  parol  evidence  to  the 
contrary  was  not  admissible:  Doe  v.  Taylor,  1  Allen  144  (N.  Bruns.),  Street,  J., 
dissentiente. 

*  Hampshire  v.  Pierce,  2  Ves.  216. 

*  Thomas  v.  Thomas,  6  T.  R.  671. 

6  Beaumont  v.  Fell,  2  P.  Wins.  141.  The  propriety  of  receiving  evidence  of  the 
testator's  declarations,  in  either  of  the  two  last-cited  cases,  was,  as  we  have  just  seen 
supra,  §  239,  note),  strongly  questioned  by  Lord  Abinger  (in  Hiscocks  v.  Hiscocks, 
5  M.  &  W.  371),  who  thought  them  at  variance,  in  this  particular,  with  the  decision  in 
Miller  ».  Travers,  8  Bing.  244,  which,  he  observed,  was  a  decision  entitled  to  great 
weight.  But  upon  the  case  of  Beaumont  v.  Fell,  it  has  been  correctly  remarked,  that 
"  the  evidence,  which  is  confessedly  admissible,  would,  in  conjunction  with  the  will 
itself,  show  that  there  was  a  devise  to  Catherine  Earnley,  and  that  no  such  person  ex- 
isted, but  that  there  was  a  claimant  named  Gertrude  Yardley,  whom  the  testator  usually 
called  Gatty.  In  this  state  of  the  case,  the  question  would  be,  whether,  upon  the 
principle  of  falsa  demonstratio  non  nocet,  the  surname  of  Earnley  being  rejected,  the 
Christian  name,  if  correct,  would  itself  be  a  sufficient  indication  of  the  devisee  ;  and  if 
so,  whether  Gatty  satisfied  that  indication.  Both  these  questions  leave  untouched  the 
general  question  of  the  admissibility  of  evidence,  to  show  the  process  by  which  Gatty 
passed  into  Katty,  and  from  Katty  to  Catherine."  See  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  729, 
note  (2).  It  is  not  easy,  however,  to  perceive  why  extrinsic  evidence  of  the  testator's 
declared  intentions  of  beneficence  towards  an  individual  is  not  as  admissible,  as  evi- 
dence is  that  he  used  to  speak  of  him  or  address  him  as  his  son,  or  godson,  or  adopted 
child  ;  when  the  object  in  both  cases  is  to  ascertain  which  of  several  demonstrations  is 
to  be  retained  as  true,  and  which  rejected  as  false.  Now  the  evidence  of  such  declara- 
tions, in  Beaumont  v.  Fell,  went  to  show  that  "Earnley"  was  to  be  rejected  as  falsa, 
demonitratio  ;  and  the  other  evidence  went  to  designate  the  individual  intended  by  the 
word  "Catherine;"  not  by  adding  words  to  the  will,  but  by  showing  what  the  word 
used  meant.  See  infra,  §  301 ;  Wigram  oil  the  Interpretation  of  Wills,  pp.  128,  129, 


§§  291-292.]  INTERPRETATION;  WILLS.  421 

a  devise  was  to  "  the  second  son  of  Charles  Weld,  of  Lulworth,  Esq.," 
and  there  was  no  person  of  that  name,  but  the  testator  had  two  rela- 
tives there,  bearing  the  names  of  Joseph  Weld  and  Edward-Joseph 
Weld,  it  was  held,  upon  the  context  of  the  will,  and  upon  extrinsic 
evidence,  that  the  second  son  of  Joseph  Weld  was  the  person 
intended.  So,  where  a  bequest  was  to  John  Newbolt,  second  son 
of  William-Strangways  Newbolt,  Vicar  of  Somerton ;  and  it  ap- 
peared aliunde  that  the  name  of  the  vicar  was  William-Robert  New- 
bolt,  that  his  second  son  was  Henry-Robert,  and  that  his  third  son 
was  John-Pryce  ;  it  was  held  that  John-Pryce  was  entitled  to  the 
legacy.7  So,  where  the  testatrix  gave  legacies  to  Mrs.  and  Miss  B. 
of  H.,  widow  and  daughter  of  the  Rev.  Mr.  B. ;  upon  the  legacies  be- 
ing claimed  by  Mrs.  and  Miss  W.,  widow  and  daughter  of  the  late 
Rev.  Mr.  W.  of  H.,  it  was  held  that  they  were  entitled ;  it  appear- 
ing aliunde  that  there  were  no  persons  literally  answering  the  de- 
scription in  the  will,  at  its  date;  but  that  the  claimants  were  a 
daughter  and  granddaughter  of  the  late  Rev.  Mr.  B.,  with  all  of 
whom  the  testatrix  had  been  intimately  acquainted,  and  that  she  was 
accustomed  to  call  the  claimant  by  the  maiden  name  of  Mrs.  W.8 
The  general  principle  in  all  these  cases  is  this,  that  if  there  be  a 
mistake  in  the  name  of  the  devisee,  but  a  right  description  of  him, 
the  Court  may  act  upon  such  right  description ; 9  and  that  if  two  per- 
sons equally  answer  the  same  name  or  description,  the  Court  may  de- 
termine, from  the  rest  of  the  will  and  the  surrounding  circumstances, 
to  which  of  them  the  will  applies.10 

§  292.  Interpretation  by  Special  Usage.  It  is  further  to  be  observed, 
that  the  rule  under  consideration,  which  forbids  the  admission  of  parol 
evidence  to  contradict  or  vary  a  written  contract,  is  not  infringed  by 
any  evidence  of  known  and  established 1  usage  respecting  the  subject 
to  which  the  contract  relates.  To  such  usage,  as  well  as  to  the  lex 
loci,  the  parties  may  be  supposed  to  refer,  just  as  they  are  presumed 

pi.  166  ;  £post,  §  305  k.~]  See  also  Baylis  v.  Attorney-General,  2  Atk.  239  ;  Abbot  ». 
Massie,  3  Ves.  148;  Doe  d.  Oxenden  v.  Chichester,  4  Dow  65,  93;  Duke  of  Dorset  ». 
Lord  Hawarden,  3  Curt.  80  ;  Trustees  ».  Peaslee,  15  N.  H.  317 ;  Doe  v.  Hubbard,  15 
Q.  B.  248,  per  Ld.  Campbell ;  {Charter  v.  Charter,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  364 ;  He  Kilverts' 
Trusts,  L.  R.  12  Eq.  183  ;  Leonard  ».  Davenport,  58  How.  N.  Y.  Pr.  384  ;  Dunham  ». 
Averill,  45  Conn.  61  ;  Colette's  Estate,  Myrick's  Prob.  Cal.  116.  | 
^  Newbolt  v.  Price,  14  Sim.  354. 

8  Lee  v.  Pain,  4  Hare  251  ;  9  Jur.  247. 

9  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  name  is  right,  but  the  description  is  wrong,  the  name 
will  be  regarded  as  the  best  evidence  of  tlie  testator's  intention  ;  thus,  where  the  tes- 
tator had  married  two  wives,  Mary  and  Caroline,  successively,  both  of  whom  survived 
him,  and  he  devised  an  estate  to  his  "  dear  wife  Caroline,"  the  latter  was  held  entitled 
to  take,  though  she  was  not  the  true  wife  :   Doe  v.  Roast,  12  Jur.  99;  {Andrews  v. 
Dyer,  81  Me.  105.} 

1°  Hlundell  v.  Gladstone,  1  Phil.  Ch.  279,  288,  per  Patteson,  J. 
1  The  usage  must  be  general  in  the  whole  city  or  place,  or  among  all  persons  in  the 
trade,  and  not  the  usage  of  a  particular  class  only,  or  the  course  of  practice  in  a  par- 
ticular office  or  bank,  to  whom  or  which  the  party  is  a  stranger  :  Gabay  v.  Lloyd,  3  B. 
&  C.  793  ;  {Byrne  v.  Packing  Co.,  137  Mass.  313 ;  Mooney  p.  Ins.  Co".,  138  id.  375  ;| 
Ipost,  §305/3 


422  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   EULE.  [CH.   XXL 

to  employ  words  in  their  usual  and  ordinary  signification ;  and 
accordingly  the  rule  is  in  both  cases  the  same.  Proof  of  usage  is 
admitted,  either  to  interpret  the  meaning  of  the  language  of  the  con- 
tract, or  to  ascertain  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  contract,  in  the 
absence  of  express  stipulations,  and  where  the  meaning  is  equivocal 
and  obscure.2  Thus,  upon  a  contract  for  a  year's  service,  as  it  does 
not  in  terms  bind  the  party  for  every  day  in  the  year,  parol  evidence 
is  admissible  to  show  a  usage  for  servants  to  have  certain  holidays 
for  themselves.8  So,  where  the  contract  was  for  performance  as  an 
actor  in  a  theatre,  for  three  years,  at  a  certain  sum  per  week,  parol 
evidence  was  held  admissible  to  show  that,  according1  to  uniform 
theatrical  usage,  the  actor  was  to  be  paid  only  during  the  theatrical 
season ;  namely,  during  the  time  while  the  theatre  was  open  for  per- 
formance, in  each  of  those  years.4  So,  where  a  ship  is  warranted  "  to 
depart  with  convoy,"  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  at  what 
place  convoy  for  such  a  voyage  is  usually  taken ;  and  to  that  place 
the  parties  are  presumed  to  refer.6  So,  where  one  of  the  subjects  of 
a  charter-party  was  "  cotton  in  bales,"  parol  evidence  of  the  mercan- 
tile use  and  meaning  of  this  term  was  held  admissible.8  So,  where  a 
promissory  note  or  bill  is  payable  with  grace,  parol  evidence  of  the 
known  and  established  usage  of  the  bank  at  which  it  is  payable  is 
admissible  to  show  on  what  day  the  grace  expired.7  But  though 
usage  may  be  admissible  to  explain  what  is  doubtful,  it  is  not  admis- 
sible to  contradict  what  is  plain.8  Thus,  where  a  policy  was  made  in 
the  usual  form,  upon  the  ship,  her  tackle,  apparel,  boats,  etc.,  evidence 
of  usage,  that  the  underwriters  never  pay  for  the  loss  of  boats  slung 

2  2  Poth.  on  Obi.  by  Evans,  App.  No.  xvi,  p.  187 ;  2  Sumn.  569,  per  Story,  J.,  ;  11 
Sim.  626,  per  Parke,  B. ;  4  East  135,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  Cutter  v.  Powell  6  T.  R. 
320  ;  Vallance  v.  Dewar,  1  Campb.  503  ;  Noble  v.  Kennoway,  2  Doug.  510 ;  Bottom- 
ley  w.  Forbes,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  121  ;  6  Scott  866  ;  Ellis  v.  Thompson,  3  M.  &  W.  445  ; 
post,  Vol.  II,  §§  251,  252,  and  notes.  [JBut  the  principles  and  the  difficulties  concerned 
in  its  admission  are  of  three  distinct  sorts  :  (1)  Under  the  parol-evidence  rule  proper, 
the  question  arises  whether,  when  parties  have  reduced  thqr  contract  to  a  writing, 
the  terms  of  an  unwritten  usage  may  be  treated  as  part  of  the  contract ;  post,  §  305 /; 
(2)  in  the  interpretation  of  a  contract,  the  standard  of  interpretation  must  be  a  mutual 
one  ;  hence,  the  question  arises  whether  the  usage  offered  in  interpretation  was  com- 
mon to  both  parties  ;  post,  §  305  i;  (3)  the  rule  against  disturbing  a  clear  meaning 
may  operate  to  exclude  a  usage  offered  by  way  of  interpretation  ;  post,  §  305  /.J 

8  K.  v.  Stoke  upon  Trent,  5  Q.  B.  303. 

«  Grant  v.  Maddox,  15  M.  &  W.  737. 

6  Lethulier's  Case,  2  Salk.  443. 

«  Taylor  v.  Briggs,  2  C.  &  P.  525. 

7  Renner  v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  9  Wheat.   681,  where  the  decisions  to  this  point 
are  reviewed  by  Mr.  Justice  Thompson  ;  {see  other  instances  in  Fleet  v.  Murton,  L.  R. 
7  Q.  B.  126  ;  Hutchinson  v.  Tatham,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  482  ;  Harris  v.  Rathbun,  2  Abb. 
App.  326  ;  Swett  v.  Shumwny,  102  Mass.  365  ;  Robinson  v.  U.  S.,  13  Wall.  863  ;  New- 
hall  v.  Appleton,  114  N.  Y.  143;  Walls  v.  Bailey,  49  id.  464  ;  Gorrissen  v.  Perrin,  27 
L.  J.  C.  P.  29  ;  Russian  S.  W.  Co.  v.  Silva,  13  C\  B.   N.  8.  610  :  Florence  Mach.  Co. 
v.  Daggett,  135  Mass.  582;  Mooney  v.  Ins.  Co.,  138  id.  875;    Newhall  v.  Appleton, 
114  N.  Y.  143  ;  Dana  v.  Fiedler,  2  Kenian  40  ;  Brown  v.   Brooks,  25  Pa.   St.   210; 
Allan  v.  Comstock,  17  Ga.  554  ;  Brown  v.  Byrne,  26  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  247;  3  El.  & 
Bl.  703;  |   ratulpo*,  §305  ft 

1  2  (Jr.  &  J.  249,  per  Lord  Lyndhurst. 


§§  292-293.]  INTERPRETATION  J   USAGE.  423 

upon  the  quarter,  outside  of  the  ship,  was  held  inadmissible.9  So, 
also,  in  a  libel  in  re-m  upon  a  bill  of  lading,  containing  the  usual 
clause  "the  dangers  of  the  seas  only  excepted,"  where  it  was  articu- 
lated in  the  answer  that  there  was  an  established  usage,  in  the  trade 
in  question,  that  the  ship-owners  should  see  the  merchandise  properly 
secured  and  stowed,  and  that  this  being  done  they  should  not  be  liable 
for  any  damages  not  occasioned  by  their  own  neglect ;  it  was  held 
that  this  article  was  incompetent,  in  point  of  law,  to  be  admitted  to 
proof.10 

§  293.  Usage  applied  to  Statutes,  Charters,  and  Deeds.  The  rea- 
sons which  warrant  the  admission  of  evidence  of  usage  in  any  case, 
apply  equally,  whether  it  be  required  to  aid  the  interpretation  of  a 
statute,  a  public  charter,  or  a  private  deed ;  and  whether  the  usage 
be  still  existing  or  not,  if  it  were  contemporaneous  with  the  instru- 
ment.1 And  where  the  language  of  a  deed  is  doubtful  in  the  de- 
scription of  the  land  conveyed,  parol  evidence  of  the  practical 
interpretation,  by  the  acts  of  the  parties,  is  admissible  to  remove 
the  doubt.2  So,  evidence  of  former  transactions  between  the  same 
parties  has  been  held  admissible  to  explain  the  meaning  of  terms  in 
a  written  contract  respecting  subsequent  transactions  of  the  same 
character.* 

9  Blackett  v.  Ass.  Co.,  2  Cr.  &  J.  244. 

10  Schooner  Reeside,  2  Sumn.  567  ;  so,  where  the  written  contract  was  for  "  prime 
singed  bacon,"  and  evidence  was  offered  to  prove  that  by  the  usage  of  the  trade,  a 
certain  latitude  of  deterioration,  called  average  taint,  was  allowed  to  subsist,  before 
the  bacon  ceases  to  answer  the  description  of  prime  bacon,  it  was  held  inadmissible  : 
Yates  v.  Pym,  6  Taunt.  446.  So,  also,  parol  evidence  has  been  held  inadmissible  to 
prove,  that  by  the  words  "glassware  in  casks,"  in  the  memorandum  of  excepted 
articles  in  a  fire  policy,  according  to  the  common  understanding  and  usage  of  in- 
surers and  insured,  were  meant  such  ware  in  open  casks  only.  Bend  v.  Ins.  Co., 
1  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  12 ;  see  Taylor  v.  Briggs,  2  C.  &  P.  525  ;  Smith  v.  Wilson,  3  B.  & 
Ad.  728  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  565  j'Park  on  Ins.  c.  2,  pp.  30-fiO;  post,  Vol.  II,  §  251  ;  Hone 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Sandf.  137;  jDe  Witt  v.  Berry,  134  U.  S.  312  ;  Bigelow  v.  Legg,  102 
N.  Y.  654  ;  Emery  v.  Ins.  Co.,  138  Mass.  398  ;  Lichtenheim  v.  R.  Co.,  11  Cush.  70; 
Hedden  t;.  Roberts,  134  Mass.  38  ;  Brown  v.  Foster,  113  id.  136;  Hearne  v.  N.  E. 
Marine  Ins.  Co.,  3  Cliff.  318;  Schenck  v.  Griffin,  38  N.  J.  L.  462;  Spears  v.  Ward, 
48  Ind.  541;  Martin  ».  Union  P.  R.  Co.,  1  Wy.  143;  Winn  v.  Chamberlin,  32  Vt. 
318  ;  Symonds  t;.  Lloyd,  6  C.  B.  N.  s.  691  ;  Beacon  L.  &  F.  Ass.  Co.  v.  Gibb,  1  Moo. 
P.  C.  N.  a.  73  ;  9  Jur.  N.  s.  185  ;  Whitmore  v.  The  South  Boston  Iron  Co.,  2  Allen 
52.}  fJMost  of  these  precedents  are  concerned  with  the  principle  of  §  305  f,  post; 
but  some  involve  the  principle  of  §  305  /.] 

1  Withnell  v.  Gartham,  6  T.  R.  388  ;  Stammers  v.  Dixon,  7  East  200  ;  Wadley  v. 
Bayliss,  5  Taunt.  752  ;  2  Inst.  282  ;  Stradling  v.  Morgan,  Plowd.  205,  ad.  calc. ;  Hey- 
doii's  Case,  3  Co.  7  ;  Wells  v.  Porter,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  729,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  ;  Duke  of 
Devonshire  v.  Lodge,  7  B.  &  C.  36,  39,  40 ;  Chad  v.  Tilsed,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  403  ; 
Attorney-General  v.  Boston,  9  Jur.  838 ;  s.  c.  2  Eq.  Rep.  107  ;  Farrar  v.  Stackpole, 
6  Greenl.  154  ;  Meriam  v.  Harsen,  2  Barb.  Ch.  232. 

2  Stone  v.  Clark,  1  Mete.  378  ;  Livingston  v.  Tenbroeck,  16  Johns.  14,  22,  23  ; 
Cooke  v.  Booth,  Cowp.  819.     This  last  case  has  been  repeatedly  disapproved  of,  and 
may  be  considered  as  overruled  ;  not,  however,  in  the  principle  it  asserts,  but  in  the 
application  of  the  principle  to  that  ease.     See  Phil.  &   Am.   on  Evid.   747,  n.  (1)  ; 
1  Sugd.  Vend.  (6th  ed.)  210  (255)  ;  Cambridge  v.  Lexington,  17  Pick.  222;  Choate  r. 
Bnrnham.  7  id.  274  ;  Allen  v.  Kingshury,  16  id.  239  ;  4  Cruise's  Dig.   tit.  32,  c.  20, 
§  23,  n.  (Greenleafs  ed.),  2d  ed.  1857,  vol.  ii,  p.  598,  and  note. 

»  Bourne  v.  Gatliff,  11  Cl.  &  Fin.  45,  69,  70. 


424  THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  EULE.          [CH.  XXL 

§  294.  Usage  applied  to  annex  Incidents.  Upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple, parol  evidence  of  usage  or  custom  is  admissible  "to  annex 
incidents,"  as  it  is  termed ;  that  is,  to  show  what  things  are  custom- 
arily treated  as  incidental  and  accessorial  to  the  principal  thing, 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  contract,  or  to  which  the  instrument  re- 
lates. Thus,  it  may  be  shown  by  parol  that  a  heriot  is  due  by  cus- 
tom, on  the  death  of  a  tenant  for  life,  though  it  is  not  expressed  in 
the  lease.1  So,  a  lessee  by  a  deed  may  show  that,  by  the  custom  of 
the  country,  he  is  entitled  to  an  away-going  crop,  though  no  such 
right  is  reserved  in  the  deed.2  So,  in  an  action  for  the  price  of 
tobacco  sold,  evidence  was  held  admissible  to  show  that,  by  the  usage 
of  the  trade,  all  sales  were  by  sample,  though  not  so  expressed  in  the 
bought  and  sold  notes.8  This  evidence  is  admitted  on  the  principle, 
that  the  parties  did  not  intend  to  express  in  writing  the  whole  of  the 
contract  by  which  they  were  to  be  bound,  but  only  to  make  their 
contract  with  reference  to  the  known  and  established  usages  and 
customs  relating  to  the  subject-matter.  But,  in  all  cases  of  this  sort, 
the  rule  for  admitting  the  evidence  of  usage  or  custom  must  be  taken 
with  this  qualification,  that  the  evidence  be  not  repugnant  to,  or  in- 
consistent with,  the  contract ;  for  otherwise  it  would  not  go  to  inter- 
pret and  explain,  but  to  contradict,  that  which  is  written.4  This  rule 
does  not  add  new  terms  to  the  contract,  which,  as  has  already  been 
shown,6  cannot  be  done ;  but  it  shows  the  full  extent  and  meaning 
of  those  which  are  contained  in  the  instrument. 

§  295.  Standard  of  Usage  as  Aiding  Interpretation.  But,  in  resort- 
ing to  usage  for  the  meaning  of  particular  words  in  a  contract,  a 
distinction  is  to  be  observed  between  local  and  technical  words,  and 
other  words.  In  regard  to  words  which  are  purely  technical,  or 
local,  that  is,  words  which  are  not  of  universal  use,  but  are  familiarly 
known  and  employed,  either  in  a  particular  district,  or  in  a  particu- 
lar science  or  trade,  parol  evidence  is  always  receivable,  to  define 
and  explain  their  meaning  among  those  who  use  them.  And  the 
principle  and  practice  are  the  same  in  regard  to  words  which  have 
two  meanings,  the  one  common  and  universal,  and  the  other  tech- 
nical, peculiar,  or  local ;  parol  evidence  being  admissible  of  facts 
tending  to  show  that  the  words  were  used  in  the  latter  sense,  and  to 
ascertain  their  technical  or  local  meaning.1  The  same  principle  is 
also  applied  in  regard  to  words  and  phrases  used  in  a  peculiar  sense 

1  White  v.  Saver,  Palm.  211. 

2  Wiggles worth  v.  Dallison,  1  Doug.  201  ;  1  Smith's  Lead.  Gas.  300;  1  Bligh  287  ; 
Senior  v.  Armytage,  Holt's  N.  P.  Cas.  197  ;  Button  t>.  Warren,  1  M.  &  W.  466 ;  )so, 
also,  upon  a  conveyance,  that  growing  crops  were  orally  reserved  :  Merrill  v.  Blodg^tt, 
84  Vt  480  ;  Backenstoss  v.  Stahler,  33  Pa.  St.  251  ;  Harbold  v.  Kuster,  44  id.  392.} 

8  Syers  v.  Jonas,  2  Exch.  111. 

4  Yeats  v.  Pirn,  Holt's  N.  P.  95 ;  Holding  v.  Pigott,  7  Bing.  465,  474  ;  Blackett 
v.  Ass.  Co.,  2  C.  4  J.  244;  Caine  v.  Horsefall,  2  C.  &  K.  349. 
k  Ante,  §  281. 
1  QSee  post,  J  305.;',  upon  this  subject.] 


§§  294-296.]  INTERPRETATION  J  USAGE.  425 

by  members  of  a  particular  religious  sect.2  But  beyond  this  the 
principle  does  not  extend.  If,  therefore,  a  contract  is  made  in  or- 
dinary and  popular  language,  to  which  no  local  or  technical  and 
peculiar  meaning  is  attached,  parol  evidence,  it  seems,  is  not  admis- 
sible to  show  that,  in  that  particular  case,  the  words  were  used  in 
any  other  than  their  ordinary  and  popular  sense.8 

§  295  a.  It  is  thus  apparent,  as  was  remarked  at  the  outset,  that 
in  all  the  cases  in  which  parol  evidence  has  been  admitted  in  expo- 
sition of  that  which  is  written,  the  principle  of  admission  is,  that  the 
Court  may  be  placed,  in  regard  to  the  surrounding  circumstances, 
as  nearly  as  possible  in  the  situation  of  the  party  whose  written 
language  is  to  be  interpreted;  the  question  being,  What  did  the 
person,  thus  circumstanced,  mean  by  the  language  he  has  employed  ? 

§  296.  Will  Cases ;  Rebutting  an  Equity.  There  is  another  class 
of  cases,  in  which  parol  evidence  is  allowed  by  courts  of  equity  to 
affect  the  operation  of  a  writing,  though  the  writing  on  its  face  is 
free  from  ambiguity,  which  is  yet  considered  as  no  infringement  of 
the  general  rule ;  namely,  where  the  evidence  is  offered  to  rebut  an 
equity.  The  meaning  of  this  is,  that  where  a  certain  presumption 
would,  in  general,  be  deduced  from  the  nature  of  an  act,  such  pre- 
sumption may  be  repelled  by  extrinsic  evidence,  showing  the  inten- 
tion to  be  otherwise.1  The  simplest  instance  of  this  occurs,  when 
two  legacies,  of  which  the  sums  and  the  expressed  motives  exactly 
coincide,  are  presumed  not  to  have  been  intended  as  cumulative. 
In  such  case,  to  rebut  the  presumption  which  makes  one  of  these 
legacies  inoperative,  parol  evidence  will  be  received ;  its  effect  being 
not  to  show  that  the  testator  did  not  mean  what  he  said,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  to  prove  that  he  did  mean  what  he  had  expressed.2  In  like 
manner,  parol  evidence  is  received  to  repel  the  presumption  against 
an  executor's  title  to  the  residue,  from  the  fact  that  a  legacy  has 
been  given  to  him.  So,  also,  to  repel  the  presumption  that  a  portion 
is  satisfied  by  a  legacy ; 8  and  in  some  cases,  that  the  portionment  of 
a  legatee  was  intended  as  an  ademption  of  the  legacy.4 

8  The  doctrine  on  this  subject  has  recently  been  very  fully  reviewed,  in  the  case  of 
Lady  Hewley's  charities:  Attorney-General  v.  Shore,  11  Sim.  592;  7  id.  309;  see 
Attorney-General  v.  Pearson,  3  Meriv.  353 ;  7  id.  290  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Drunimond, 
1  Dr.  &  W.  353  ;  2  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  15 ;  14  Jur.  137;  Attorney-General  v.  Glasgow  Col- 
lege, 10  Jur.  676  ;  |Hinckley  v.  Thatcher,  139  Mass.  477.  ( 

8  2  Stark.  Evid.  566  ;  supra,  §§  277,  280 ;  but  see  Gray  v.  Harper,  1  Story  574, 
where  two  booksellers  having  contracted  for  the  sale  and  purchase  of  a  certain  work  at 
"  cost,"  parol  evidence  of  conversations  between  them  at  the  time  of  making  the  con- 
tract was  held  admissible  to  show  what  sense  they  attached  to  that  term  ;  see  also 
Selden  v.  Williams,  9  Watts  9  ;  Kemble  v.  Lull,  3  McLean  272  ;  fjsee  also  the  criti* 
cisms  post,  §  305  /.] 

1  2  Poth.  on  Obi.  by  Evans,  App.  No.  xvi,  p.  184  ;  Coote  v.  Boyd,  2  Bro.  Ch.  522  ; 
Bull.  N.  P.  297,  298  ;  Mann  v.  Mann,  1  Johns.  Ch.  231  ;   jKing  r/Ruckman,  21  N.  J. 
E<I.  599  ;  j   Qsee  the  explanation  post,  §  305  n.] 

2  Gresley  on  Evid.  210  ;  Hurst  v.  Beach,  5  Madd.  360,  per  Sir  J.  Leach,  V.  C. 

8  5  Madd.  360  ;  2  Poth.  on  OM.  by  Evans,  App.  No.  xvi,  p.  184  ;  Ellison  v.  Cook- 
son,  1  Ves.  Jr.  100  ;  Clinton  v.  Hooper,  ib.  173.  So,  to  rebut  an  implied  trust:  Liver- 
more  v.  Aldrich,  5  Cush.  431 . 

*  Kirk  v.  Eddowes,  8  Jur.  530.     As  the  further  pursuit  of  this  point,  as  well  as  the 


426  THE   PAEOL   EVIDENCE   KULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

§  296  a.  Mutual  Mistake ;  Deed  Absolute  as  Security.  Courts  of 
equity  also  admit  parol  evidence  to  contradict  or  vary  a  writing, 
where  it  is  founded  in  a  mistake  of  material  facts,  and  it  would  be 
unconscientious  or  unjust  to  enforce  it  against  either  party,  accord- 
ing to  its  expressed  terms.  Thus,  if  the  plaintiff  seeks  a  specific 
performance  of  the  agreement,  the  defendant  may  show  that  such 
a  decree  would  be  against  equity  and  justice,  by  parol  evidence  of 
the  circumstances,  even  though  they  contradict  the  writing.  So,  if 
the  agreement  speaks,  by  mistake,  a  different  language  from  what  the 
parties  intended,  this  may  be  shown  in  a  bill  to  reform  the  writing 
and  correct  the  mistake.1  In  short,  wherever  the  active, agency  of  a 
court  of  equity  is  invoked,  specifically  to  enforce  an  agreement,  it 
admits  parol  evidence  to  show  that  the  claim  is  unjust,  although 
such  evidence  contradicts  that  which  is  written.  Whether  courts 
of  equity  will  sustain  a  claim  to  reform  a  writing,  or  to  establish  a 
mistake  in  it,  by  parol  evidence,  and  for  specific  performance  of  it 
when  corrected,  in  one  and  the  same  bill,  is  still  an  open  question. 
The  English  authorities  are  against  it;  but  in  America  their  sound- 
ness is  strongly  questioned.3  So,  also,  if  a  grantee  fraudulently 
attempts  to  convert  into  an  absolute  sale  that  which  was  originally 
meant  to  be  a  security  for  a  loan,  the  original  design  of  the  convey- 
ance, though  contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  writing,  may  be  shown  by 
parol.8 

§  297.  Interpretation  of  Ambiguities.  Having  thus  explained  the 
nature  of  the  rule  under  consideration,  and  shown  that  it  only  ex- 
cludes evidence  of  the  language  of  the  party,  and  not  of  the  circum- 
stances in  which  he  was  placed,  or  of  collateral  facts,  it  may  be 
proper  to  consider  the  case  of  ambiguities,  both  latent  and  patent. 
The  leading  rule  on  this  subject  is  thus  given  by  Lord  Bacon:  "  Am- 
biguitas  verborum  latens  verificatione  suppletur;  nam  quod  ex  facto 
oritur  ambiguum,  verificatione  facti  tollitur."  l  Upon  which  he  re- 
marks, that,  "  there  be  two  sorts  of  ambiguities  of  words ;  the  one  is 
amliguitas patens  and  the  other  latens.  Patens  is  that  which  appears 
to  be  ambiguous  upon  the  deed  or  instrument;  latens  is  that  which 

consideration  of  the  presumed  revocation  of  a  will  by  a  subsequent  marriage  and  the 
birth  of  issue,  does  not  consist  with  the  plan  of  this  treatise,  the  reader  is  referred  to 
1  Roper  on  Legacies,  by  White,  pp.  317-353  ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  pp.  209-218;  6  Cruise's 
Di^'.  tit.  38,  c.  6,  §§  45-57,  and  notes  by  Greenleat',  J2d  ed.  1857,  vol.  iii,  p.  104,  and 
notes  ;J  1  Jarra.  on  Wills,  c.  7,  and  notes  by  Perkins.  See  also  post,  Vol.  II,  §§  684, 
685. 

1  j  Fisher  v.  Diebert,  54  Pa.  St.  460  ;  Cunningham  v.  Wrenn,  23  111.  64  ;  Mussey  v. 
Curtis,  60  Vt.  272  ;  Davis  v.  Road  Co.,  84  Ind.  39  ;  Lazear  v.  Bank,  62  Md.  119  ; 
Potter  r.  Sewall,  54  Me.  142  ;(  [see  post,  §§  305  c,  305  rf.] 

2  1  Story  Eq.  Jurisp.  §§  152-161  ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  205-209. 

•  Morris  v.  Nixon,  17  Pet.  109.  See  Jenkins  v.  Eldredge,  3  Story  181,  284-287  ; 
[[and  ante,  §  284,  post,  §  305  d.] 

1  Bacon's  Maxims,  Reg.  23[25];  [[as  to  this  "unprofitable  subtlety,"  its  history 
and  significance,  see  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  422,  471.  For  an- 
other treatment  of  the  topics  covered  by  the  next  four  sections,  see  post,  §§  305.;'- 
305  m-3 


§§  296  a-299.]       INTERPRETATION  ;  AMBIGUITIES.  427 

seemeth  certain  and  without  ambiguity,  for  anything  that  appeareth 
upon  the  deed  or  instrument;  but  there  is  some  collateral  matter  out 
of  the  deed  that  breedeth  the  ambiguity.  Amliguitas  patens  is 
never  holpen  by  averment;  and  the  reason  is,  because  the  law  will 
not  couple  and  mingle  matter  of  specialty,  which  is  of  the  higher 
account,  with  matter  of  averment,  which  is  of  inferior  account  in 
law;  for  that  were  to  make  all  deeds  hollow  and  subject  to  aver- 
ments, and  so,  in  effect,  that  to  pass  without  deed  which  the  law 
appointeth  shall  not  pass  but  by  deed.  Therefore,  if  a  man  give  land 
to  J.  D.  and  J.  S.  et  hceredibus,  and  do  not  limit  to  whether  of  their 
heirs,  it  shall  not  be  supplied  by  averment  to  whether  of  them  the 
intention  was  (that)  the  inheritance  should  be  limited."  "But  if  it 
be  ambiguitas  latens,  then  otherwise  it  is;  as  if  I  grant  my  manor 
of  S.  to  J.  F.  and  his  heirs,  here  appeareth  no  ambiguity  at  all. 
But  if  the  truth  be,  that  I  have  the  manors  both  of  South  S.  and 
North  S.,  this  ambiguity  is  matter  in  fact;  and  therefore  it  shall  be 
holpen  by  averment,  whether  of  them  it  was  that  the  party  intended 
should  pass."2 

§  298.  But  here  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  words  cannot  be  said  to 
be  ambiguous  because  they  are  unintelligible  to  a  man  who  cannot 
read;  nor  is  a  written  instrument  ambiguous  or  uncertain  merely 
because  an  ignorant  or  uninformed  person  may  be  unable  to  inter- 
pret it.  It  is  ambiguous  only,  when  found  to  be  of  uncertain  mean- 
ing by  persons  of  competent  skill  and  information.  Neither  is  a 
judge  at  liberty  to  declare  an  instrument  ambiguous,  because  he  is 
ignorant  of  a  particular  fact,  art,  or  science,  which  was  familiar  to 
the  person  who  used  the  words,  and  a  knowledge  of  which  is  there- 
fore necessary  to  a  right  understanding  of  the  words  he  has  ubed. 
If  this  were  not  so,  then  the  question,  whether  a  will  or  other  in- 
strument were  ambiguous  or  uncertain,  might  depend  not  upon  the 
propriety  of  the  language  the  party  has  used,  but  upon  the  degree  of 
knowledge,  general  or  local,  which  a  particular  judge  might  happen 
to  possess;  nay,  the  technical  accuracy  and  precision  of  a  scientific 
man  might  occasion  his  intestacy,  or  defeat  his  contract.  Hence  it 
follows  that  no  judge  is  at  liberty  to  pronounce  an  instrument 
ambiguous  or  uncertain,  until  he  has  brought  to  his  aid,  in  its  inter- 
pretation, all  the  lights  afforded  by  the  collateral  facts  and  circum- 
stances, which,  as  we  have  shown,  may  be  proved  by  parol.1 

§  299.  A  distinction  is  further  to  be  observed,  between  the  ambi- 
guity of  language  and  its  inaccuracy.  "Language,"  Vice-Chancellor 

a  See  Bacon's  Law  Tracts,  pp.  99,  100.  And  see  Miller  v.  Travers,  8  Bing.  244  ; 
supra,  §  290  ;  Reed  v.  Prop'rs  of  Locks,  etc.,  8  How.  274.  Where  a  bill  was  drawn 
expressing  £200  in  the  body  in  words,  but  £245  in  figures  in  the  margin,  it  was  held 
that  the  words  in  the  body  must  be  taken  to  be  the  true  amount  to  be  paid;  and  that 
the  ambiguity  created  by  the  figures  in  the  margin  was  patent,  and  could  not  be  ex- 
plained by  parol :  Saunderson  v.  Piper,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  425. 

1  See  Wigram  on  the  Interpretation  of  Wills,  p.  174,  pi.  200,  201. 


428  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   EULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

Wigram  remarks,  "may  be  inaccurate  without  being  ambiguous, 
and  it  may  be  ambiguous  although  perfectly  accurate.  If,  for  in- 
stance, a  testator,  having  one  leasehold  house  in  a  given  place  and 
no  other  house,  were  to  devise  his  freehold  house  there  to  A.  B., 
the  description,  though  inaccurate,  would  occasion  no  ambiguity. 
If,  however,  a  testator  were  to  devise  an  estate  to  John  Baker,  of 
Dale,  the  son  of  Thomas,  and  there  were  two  persons  to  whom  the 
entire  description  accurately  applied,  this  description,  though  accu- 
rate, would  be  ambiguous.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  whole 
of  that  class  of  cases  in  which  an  accurate  description  is  found  to  be 
sufficient  merely  by  the  rejection  of  words  of  surplusage  -are  cases  in 
which  no  ambiguity  really  exists.  The  meaning  is  certain,  not- 
withstanding the  inaccuracy  of  the  testator's  language.  A  judge,  in 
such  cases,  may  hesitate  long  before  he  comes  to  a  conclusion;  but  if 
he  is  able  to  come  to  a  conclusion  at  last,  with  no  other  assistance 
than  the  light  derived  from  a  knowledge  of  those  circumstances,  to 
which  the  words  of  the  will  expressly  or  tacitly  refer,  he  does  in 
effect  declare  that  the  words  have  legal  certainty,  —  a  declaration 
which,  of  course,  excludes  the  existence  of  any  ambiguity.  The 
language  may  be  inaccurate;  but  if  the  Court  can  determine  the 
meaning  of  this  inaccurate  language,  without  any  other  guide  than  a 
knowledge  of  the  simple  facts,  upon  which  —  from  the  very  nature 
of  language  in  general  —  its  meaning  depends,  the  language,  though 
inaccurate,  cannot  be  ambiguous.  The  circumstance,  that  the  inac- 
curacy is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  instrument,  cannot,  in  prin- 
ciple, alter  the  case." 1  Thus,  in  the  will  of  Nollekens,  the  sculptor, 
it  was  provided,  that,  upon  his  decease,  "  all  the  marble  in  the  yard, 
the  tools  in  the  shop,  bankers,  mod,  tools  for  carving,"  etc.,  should 
be  the  property  of  Alex.  Goblet.  The  controversy  was  upon  the 
word  "mod,"  which  was  a  case  of  patent  inaccuracy;  but  the  Court, 
with  no  guide  to  the  testator's  intention  but  his  words,  and  the 
knowledge  common  to  every  working  sculptor,  decided  that  the  word 
in  question  sufficiently  described  the  testator's  "  models ;  "  thus 
negativing  the  existence  of  any  ambiguity  whatever.3 

§  300.  The  patent  ambiguity,  therefore,  of  which  Lord  Bacon 
speaks,  must  be  understood  to  be  that  which  remains  uncertain  to 
the  Court,  after  all  the  evidence  of  surrounding  circumstances  and 
collateral  facts,  which  is  admissible  under  the  rules  already  stated, 
is  exhausted.  His  illustrations  of  this  part  of  the  rule  are  not  cases 
of  misdescription,  either  of  the  person  or  of  the  thing  to  which  the 
instrument  relates;  but  are  cases  in  which  the  persons  and  things 
being  sufficiently  described,  the  intention  of  the  party  in  relation 
to  them  is  ambiguously  expressed.1  Where  this  is  the  case,  no 

»  WSgram,  pp.  175,  176,  pi.  203,  204. 

3  Goblet  v.  Bee«.-hey,  3  Sim.  24  ;   Wigrnm,  p.  179. 

1  Wigram,  p.  179  ;  Fish  v.  Hubbard,  21  Wend.  651. 


§§299-301.]     INTERPRETATION;  FALSE  DESCRIPTION.  429 

parol  evidence  of  expressed  intention  can  be  admitted.  In  other 
words,  and  more  generally  speaking,  if  the  Court,  placing  itself  in 
the  situation  in  which  the  testator  or  contracting  party  stood  at  the 
time  of  executing  the  instrument,  and  with  full  understanding  of  the 
force  and  import  of  the  words,  cannot  ascertain  his  meaning  and 
intention  from  the  language  of  the  instrument  thus  illustrated,  it  is 
a  case  of  incurable  and  hopeless  uncertainty,  and  the  instrument, 
therefore,  is  so  far  inoperative  and  void.3 

§  301.  Interpretation  of  False  Descriptions.  There  is  another  class 
of  cases,  so  nearly  allied  to  these  as  to  require  mention  in  this  place; 
namely,  those  in  which,  upon  applying  the  instrument  to  its  subject- 
matter,  it  appears  that  in  relation  to  the  subject,  whether  person  or 
thing,  the  description  in  it  is  true  in  part,  but  not  true  in  every  par- 
ticular.1 The  rule,  in  such  cases,  is  derived  from  the  maxim,  "Falsa 
demonstratio  non  nocet,  cum  de  corpore  constat."8  Here  so  much 
of  the  description  as  is  false  is  rejected;  and  the  instrument  will 
take  effect,  if  a  sufficient  description  remains  to  ascertain  its  appli- 
cation. It  is  essential,  that  enough  remains  to  show  plainly  the  in- 
tent.8 "The  rule,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Parke,4  "is  clearly  settled, 
that  when  there  is  a  sufficient  description  set  forth  of  premises,  by 
giving  the  particular  name  of  a  close,  or  otherwise,  we  may  reject  a 
false  demonstration;  but  that  if  the  premises  be  described  in  general 
terms,  and  a  particular  description  be  added,  the  latter  controls  the 
former."  It  is  not,  however,  because  one  part  of  the  description 
is  placed  first  and  the  other  last  in  the  sentence;  but  because,  taking 
the  whole  together,  that  intention  is  manifest.  For,  indeed,  "  it  is 
vain  to  imagine  one  part  before  another ;  for  though  words  can  neither 
be  spoken  nor  written  at  once,  yet  the  mind  of  the  author  compre- 
hends them  at  once,  which  gives  vitam  et  modum  to  the  sentence."* 
Therefore,  under  a  lease  of  "all  that  part  of  Blenheim  Park,  situate 
in  the  county  of  Oxford,  now  in  the  occupation  of  one  S.,  lying" 
within  certain  specified  abuttals,  "  with  all  the  houses  thereto  be- 
longing, which  are  in  the  occupation  of  said  S. ,"  it  was  held  that  a 

3  Per  Parsons,  C.  J.,  in  "Worthington  v.  Hylyer,  4  Mass.  205  ;  U.  S.  v.  Cantril, 
4  Cranch  167;  1  Jarman  on  Wills,  315  ;  1  Powell  on  Devises  (by  Januan),  p.  348  ; 
4  Cmise's  Dig.  255,  tit.  32,  c.  20,  §  60  (Greenleafs  2d  ed.,  vol.  ii,  p.  609).  Patent 
ambiguities  are  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  Court  alone.  But  where  the  meaning  of  an 
instrument  becomes  ambiguous,  by  reason  of  extrinsic  evidence,  it  is  for  the  jury  to 
determine  it:  Smith  v.  Thompson,  18  Law  J.  C.  P.  314;  Doe  v.  Beviss,  ib.  128.  See 
supra,  §  280. 

1  QFor  the  subject  of  this  section,   and  additional   citations,  see   further,  post, 
§§  305  k,  305  m  ;  and  the  author's  note,  ante,  §  291.] 

2  6  T.  R.  676  ;  Broom's  Maxims,  p.  269;  Bac.  Max.  Reg.  25.     And  see  Just.  Ins. 
lib.  2,  tit.  20,  §  29  :  "  Sinuidem  in  nomine,  cognomine,  pranoraine,  agnomine  legatarii, 
testator  erraverit,  cum  de  persona  constat,  nihilominns  valet  legatum  ;    idemque  in 
hseredihus  servatur  ;  et  recte :  nomina  enim  signifioandorum  hominum  gratia  reperta 
aunt  ;  qui  si  alio  quolibet  modo  intellignntur,  nihil  interest." 

8  Doe  v.  Hubbard,  15  Q.  B.  240,  241,  245. 

*  Doe  d.  Smith  v.  Galloway,  5  B.  &  Ad.  43,  51. 

&  Stukeley  v.  Butler,  Hob.  171. 


430  THE  PAEOL  EVIDENCE  RULE.  [CH.  XXI. 

house  lying  within  the  abuttals,  though  not  in  the  occupation  oi  S., 
would  pass.6  So,  by  a  devise  of  "the  farm  called  Trogue's  Farm, 
now  in  the  occupation  of  C.,"  it  was  held  that  the  whole  i'arm  passed, 
though  it  was  not  all  in  C.'s  occupation.7  Thus,  also,  where  one 
devised  all  his  freehold  and  real  estate  "  in  the  county  of  Limerick 
and  in  the  city  of  Limerick;  "  and  the  testator  had  no  real  estates  in 
the  county  of  Limerick,  but  his  real  estates  consisted  of  estates 
in  the  county  of  Clare,  which  was  not  mentioned  in  the  will,  and  a 
small  estate  in  the  city  of  Limerick,  inadequate  to  meet  the  charges 
in  the  will;  it  was  held  that  the  devisee  could  not  be  allowed  to 
show,  by  parol  evidence,  that  the  estates  in  the  county  of  Clare  were 
inserted  in  the  devise  to  him,  in  the  first  draft  of  the  will,  which 
was  sent  to  a  conveyancer,  to  make  certain  alterations,  not  affecting 
those  estates;  that,  by  mistake,  he  erased  the  words  "county  of 
Clare ; "  and  that  the  testator,  after  keeping  the  will  by  him  for 
some  time,  executed  it,  without  adverting  to  the  alteration  as  to  that 
county.8  And  so,  where  land  was  described  in  a  patent  as  lying  in 
the  county  of  M.,  and  further  described  by  reference  to  natural 
monuments ;  and  it  appeared  that  the  land  described  by  the  monu- 
ments was  in  the  county  of  H.,  and  not  of  M. ;  that  part  of  the 
description  which  related  to  the  county  was  rejected.  The  entire  de- 
scription in  the  patent,  said  the  learned  judge,  who  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  Court,  must  be  taken,  and  the  identity  of  the  land 
ascertained  by  a  reasonable  construction  of  the  language  used.  If 
there  be  a  repugnant  call,  which,  by  the  other  calls  in  the  patent, 
clearly  appears  to  have  been  made  through  mistake,  that  does  not 
make  void  the  patent.  But  if  the  land  granted  be  so  inaccurately 
described  as  to  render  its  identity  wholly  uncertain,  it  is  admitted 
that  the  grant  is  void.9  So,  if  lands  are  described  by  the  number  or 
name  of  the  lot  or  parcel,  and  also  by  metes  and  bounds,  and  the 
grantor  owns  lands  answering  to  the  one  description  and  not  to  the 
other,  the  description  of  the  lands  which  he  owned  will  be  taken  to 
be  the  true  one,  and  the  other  rejected  as  falsa  demonstration  So, 
where  one  devised  "  all  that  freehold  farm  called  the  Wick  Farm, 
containing  two  hundred  acres  or  thereabouts,  occupied  by  W.  E.  as 
tenant  to  me,  with  the  appurtenances,"  to  uses  applicable  to  free- 
hold property  alone;  and  at  the  date  of  the  will,  and  at  the  death  of 
the  testator,  W.  E.  held,  under  a  lease  from  him,  two  hundred  and 
two  acres  of  land,  which  were  described  in  the  lease  as  the  Wick 

«  Doe  d.  Smith  v.  Galloway,  5  B.  &  Ad.  43. 

7  Goodtitle  v.  Southern,  1  M.  &  S.  299. 

8  Miller  v.  Trovers,  8  Bing.  244;  Doe  v.  Chichester,  4  Dow  65;  Doe  v.  Lyford, 
4  M.  &  S.  550  ;  Qor  comments  on  the  effect  of  Miller  v.  Travers,  see  post,  §  305  k ;  and 
Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise,  474.1 

9  Boardman  t>.  need  and  FordVLessees,  6  Pet.  828,  845,  per  McLean,  J. 

10  Loomis  v.  Jackson,  19  Johns.  449 ;  Lush  v.  Druse,  4  Wend.  313  ;  Jackson  v. 
Marsh,  6  Cowen  281  ;  Worthintfton  „.  Hylyer,  4  Mass.  196  ;  Blague  v.  Gold,  Cro. 
Car.  44"  ;  Swift  v.  Eyres,  id.  648. 


§  301.]  INTERPRETATION;  FALSE  DESCRIPTION.  431 

Farm,  but  of  which  twelve  acres  were  not  freehold,  but  were  lease- 
hold only;  it  was  held  that  these  twelve  acres  did  not  pass  by  the 
devise.11  The  object  in  cases  of  this  kind  is,  to  interpret  the  instru- 
ment, that  is,  to  ascertain  the  intent  of  the  parties ;  the  rule  to  find 
the  intent  is,  to  give  most  effect  to  those  things  about  which  men  are 
least  liable  to  mistake.12  On  this  principle,  the  things  usually  called 
for  in  a  grant,  that  is,  the  things  by  which  the  land  granted  is 
described,  have  been  thus  marshalled :  first,  the  highest  regard  is  had 
to  natural  boundaries;  secondly,  to  lines  actually  run,  and  corners 
actually  marked,  at  the  time  of  the  grant;  thirdly,  if  the  lines  and 
courses  of  an  adjoining  tract  are  called  for,  the  lines  will  be  extended 
to  them,  if  they  are  sufficiently  established,  and  no  other  departure 
from  the  deed  is  thereby  required;  marked  lines  prevailing  over 
those  which  are  not  marked;  fourthly,  to  courses  and  distances; 
giving  preference  to  the  one  or  the  other,  according  to  circum- 
stances.18 And  in  determining  the  lines  of  old  surveys,  in  the 
absence  of  any  monuments  to  be  found,  the  variation  of  the  needle 
from  the  true  meridian,  at  the  date  of  the  original  survey,  should  be 
ascertained;  and  this  is  to  be  found  by  the  jury,  it  being  a  question 
of  fact,  and  not  of  law.14  Monuments  mentioned  in  the  deed,  and 
not  then  existing,  but  which  are  forthwith  erected  by  the  parties  in 
order  to  conform  to  the  deed,  will  be  regarded  as  the  monuments 
referred  to,  and  will  control  the  distances  given  in  the  deed.15  And 
if  no  monuments  are  mentioned,  evidence  of  long-continued  occupa- 
tion, though  beyond  the  given  distances,  is  admissible.18  If  the 
description  is  ambiguous  or  doubtful,  parol  evidence  of  the  practical 
construction  given  by  the  parties,  by  acts  of  occupancy,  recognition 
of  monuments  or  boundaries,  or  otherwise,  is  admissible  in  aid  of 
the  interpretation.17  Words  necessary  to  ascertain  the  premises 
must  be  retained ;  but  words  not  necessary  for  that  purpose  may  be 
rejected,  if  inconsistent  with  the  others.18  The  expression  of  quan- 

u  Hall  v.  Fisher,  1  Collyer  47. 

12  Davis  v.  Rainsford,  17  Mass.  210  ;  Mclver  v.  Walker,  9  Cranch  178. 

is  See  Cherry  v.  Slade,  3  Murphy  82  ;  Dogan  v.  Seekright,  4  Hen.fc  Munf.  125,  130  ; 
Preston  v.  Bowniar,  6  Wheat.  582  ;  Loring  v.  Norton,  8  Greenl.  61  ;  2  Flintoff  on 
Real  Property,  537,  538  ;  Nelson  v.  Hall,  1  McLean  518  ;  Wells  v.  Compton,  3  Rob. 
La.  171  ;  j  Kellogg  v.  Smith,  7  Cush.  375,  379-384;  Newhill  v.  Ireson,  8  id.  595; 
Haynes  v.  Young,  36  Me.  557.  | 

"  Burgin  v.  Chenault,  9  B.  Monr.  285  ;  2  Am.  Law  Journ.  N.  8.  470. 

15  Makepeace  v.  Bancroft,  12  Mass.  469  ;  Davis  v.  Rainsford,  17  id.  207  ;  Lernerd 
r.  Morrill,  2  N.  H.  197  ;  jBlaney  v.  Rice,  20  Pick.  62  ;  Cleaveland  v.  Flagg,  4  Cush. 
76,  81.  | 

18  Owen  v.  Bartholomew,  9  Pick.  520. 

17  Stone  v.  Clark,  1  Met.  378  ;  j  Kellogg  v.  Smith,  7  Cush.  375,  883  ;  Waterman  p. 
Johnson,  13  Pick.  261  ;  Frost  v.  Spaulding,  19  id.  445  ;  Clark  v.  Munyan,  22  id.  410; 
Crafts  v.  Hibbard,  4  Met.  438  ;  Civil  Code  of  Louisiana,  art.  1951  ;  Wells  ».  Compton, 
3  Rob.  La.  171.} 

!8  Worthington  v.  Hylyer,  4  Mass.  205  :  Jackson  v.  Sprague,  1  Paine  494 ;  Vose  v. 
Handy,  2  Greenl.  322.  QFor  other  citations  illustrating  the  general  principle,  see 
post,  §  305  m.3 


432  THE   PAEOL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.    XXI. 

tity  is  descriptive,  and  may  well  aid  in  finding  the  intent,  where  the 
boundaries  are  doubtful.19 

§  302.  Showing  a  Discharge.  Returning  now  to  the  consideration 
of  the  general  rule,  that  extrinsic  verbal  evidence  is  not  admissible 
to  contradict  or  alter  a  written  instrument,  it  is  further  to  be  ob- 
served, that  this  rule  does  not  exclude  such  evidence,  when  it  is  ad- 
duced to  prove  that  the  written  agreement  is  totally  discharged.1 
If  the  agreement  be  by  deed,  it  cannot,  in  general,  be  dissolved  by 
any  executory  agreement  of  an  inferior  nature;  but  any  obligation 
by  writing  not  under  seal  may  be  totally  dissolved,  before  breach,  by 
an  oral  agreement.2  And  there  seems  little  room  to  doubt,  that  this 
rule  will  apply,  even  to  those  cases  where  a  writing  is  by  the  Statute 
of  Frauds  made  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  agreement.8  But 
where  there  is  an  entire  agreement  in  writing,  consisting  of  divers 
particulars,  partly  requisite  to  be  in  writing  by  the  Statute  of 
Frauds,  and  partly  not  within  the  statute,  it  is  not  competent  to 
prove  an  agreed  variation  of  the  latter  part,  by  oral  evidence,  though 
that  part  might,  of  itself,  have  been  good  without  writing.4 

§  303.  Showing  an  Additional  or  Substituted  Agreement.  Neither 
is  the  rule  infringed  by  the  admission  of  oral  evidence  to  prove  a 
new  and  distinct  agreement,  upon  a  new  consideration,  whether  it  be 
as  a  substitute  for  the  old,  or  in  addition  to  and  beyond  it.1  And  if 
subsequent,  and  involving  the  same  subject-matter,  it  is  immaterial 
whether  the  new  agreement  be  entirely  oral,  or  whether  it  refers  to 
and  partially  or  totally  adopts  the  provisions  of  the  former  contract 
in  writing,  provided  the  old  agreement  be  recsinded  and  abandoned.3 

«  Mann  v.  Pearson,  2  Johns.  37,  41 ;  Perkins  v.  Webster,  2  N.  H.  287  ;  Thorndike 
y.  Richards,  1  Shepl.  437  ;  Allen  v.  Allen,  2  id.  387 ;  Woodman  v.  Lane,  7  N.  H.  241  ; 
Pernam  v.  Wead,  6  Mass.  131  ;  Reddick  v.  Leggat,  3  Murphy  539,  544  ;  supra,  §  290. 
See  also  4  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  32,  c.  21,  §  31,  n.,  2  Greenleafs  ed.  (1856)  vol.  ii,  pp. 
623-641,  and  notes,  where  this  subject  is  more  fully  considered. 

1  fOn  this  subject,  see  post,  §  305  d.~} 

2  Hull.  N.  P.  152;  Milward  v.  Ingram,  1  Mod.  206  ;  8.  C.   2  id.  43  ;  Edwards  v. 
Weeks,  1  id.  262  ;  8.  c.  2  id.  259  ;  8.  c.    1  Freern.   230  ;    Lord  Milton  v.  Edgworth, 
5  Bro.  P.  C.  318  ;  4  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  32,  c.  3,  §  51  ;  Clement  v.  Dnrgin,  5  Greenl.  9  ; 
Cottrill  v.  Myrick,  3  Fairf.  222  ;  Ratcliff  v.  Pemberton,  1  Esp.  85  ;  Fleming  v.  Gilbert, 
3  Johns.  531.     But  if  the  obligation  be  by  deed,  and  there  be  a  parol  agreement  in 
discharge  of  such  obligation,  if  the  parol  agreement  be  executed,  it  is  a  good  discharge  : 
Dearborn  v.  Cross,  7  Cowen  48.     See  also  Littler  v.  Holland,  5  T.  R.  390  ;  Peytoe's 
Case,  9  Co.  77  ;  Kayew.  Waghorn,  1  Taunt.  428  ;  Le  Fevre  v.  Le  Fevre,  4  8.  &  R.  241 ; 
Suydam  v.  Jones,   10  Wend.    180;  Barnard  v.  Darling,  11  id.  27,  30.     In  equity,  a 
parol  rescission  of  a  written  contract,  after  breach,  may  be  set  up  in  bar  of  a  bill  for 
specific  performance  :  Walker  v.  Wheatly,  2  Humphreys  119.     By  the  law  of  Scot- 
land, no  written  obligation  whatever  can  be  extinguished  or  renounced,  without  either 
the  creditor's  oath,  or  a  writing  signed  by  him  :  Tait  on  Evid.  p.  325. 

•  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  776  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  363  ;  Goss  v.  Lord  Nugent,  5  B.  &  Ad. 
58,  65,  66,  per  Ld.  Denman,  C.  J.  ;  Stowell  v.  Robinson,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  928  ;  Cum- 
mings  v.  Arnold,  3  Met.  486  ;  Stearns  v.  Hall,  9  Cush.  81,  84  ;  fsee  cases  cited  post, 
9  305  d.] 

«  Harvey  v.  Grabham,  5  Ad.  &  El.  61,  74 ;  Marshall  v.  Lynn,  6  M.  &  W.  109. 

1  fOn  this  subject,  see  further,  pout,  §  306  d.^ 

8  Burn  v.  Miller,  4  Taunt.  745  ;  Foster  v.  Allatison,  2  T.  R.  479 ;  Scltack  v.  An- 
thony, 1  M.  &  S.  573,  575 ;  Sturdy  v.  Arnaud,  8  T.  K.  699 ;  Brigham  v.  Rogers,  17 


§§301-304]     DISCHARGE;  SUBSEQUENT  AGREEMENT.  433 

Thus,  where  one  by  an  instrument  under  seal  agreed  to  erect  a  build- 
ing for  a  fixed  price,  which  was  not  an  adequate  compensation,  and, 
having  performed  part  of  the  work,  refused  to  proceed,  and  the 
obligee  thereupon  promised  that,  if  he  would  proceed,  he  should  be 
paid  for  his  labor  and  materials,  and  should  not  suffer,  and  he  did 
so ;  it  was  held  that  he  might  recover  in  assumpsit  upon  this  verbal 
agreement.*  So,  where  the  abandonment  of  the  old  contract  was 
expressly  mutual.*  So,  where  a  ship  was  hired  by  a  charter-party 
under  seal,  for  eight  months,  commencing  from  the  day  of  her  sail- 
ing from  Gravesend,  and  to  be  loaded  at  any  British  port  in  the 
English  Channel;  and  it  was  afterwards  agreed  by  parol  that  she 
should  be  laden  in  the  Thames,  and  that  the  freight  should  com- 
mence from  her  entry  outwards  at  the  custom-house;  it  was  held 
that  an  action  would  lie  upon  the  latter  agreement.5 

§  304.  It  is  also  well  settled  that,  in  a  case  of  a  simple  contract  in 
writing,  oral  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that,  by  a  subsequent 
agreement,  the  time  of  performance  was  enlarged,  or  the  place  of 
performance  changed,  the  contract  having  been  performed  according 
to  the  enlarged  time,  or  at  the  substituted  place,  or  the  perform- 
ance having  been  prevented  by  the  act  of  the  other  party;  or  that 
the  damages  for  non-performance  were  waived  and  remitted;1  or 
that  it  was  founded  upon  an  insufficient  or  an  unlawful  considera- 
tion, or  was  without  consideration  ;a  or  that  the  agreement  itself  was 
waived  and  abandoned.8  So,  it  has  been  held  competent  to  prove 
an  additional  and  suppletory  agreement,  by  parol ;  as,  for  example, 
where  a  contract  for  the  hire  of  a  horse  was  in  writing,  and  it  was 
further  agreed  by  parol  that  accidents,  occasioned  by  his  shying, 

Mass.  573,  per  Putnam,  J.  ;  Heard  v.  Wadham,  1  East  630,  per  Lawrence,  J.  ;  1  f'hitty 
on  PI.  93  ;  Richardson  v.  Hooper,  13  Pick.  446 ;  Brewster  v.  Countryman,  12  Wend. 
446;  Delacroix  v.  Bulkley,  13  id.  71;  Vicary  v.  Moore,  2  Watts  456,  457,  per 
Gibson,  C.  J.  ;  Brock  v.  Sturdivant,  3  Fairf.  81  ;  Marshall  v.  Baker,  1  Appleton  402 ; 
Chitty  on  Contracts,  p.  88  ;  j  Russell  v.  Barry,  115  Mass.  300;  Whitney  v.  Shippen, 
89  Pa.  St.  22 ;  Wiggin  v.  Goodwin,  63  Me.  389  ;  Davidson  v.  Bodley,  27  La.  An.  149  ; 
Sharkey  v.  Miller,  69  111.  560  ;  Hastings  v.  Lovejoy,  140  Mass.  261  ;  Emery  t;.  Boston 
Marine  Ins.  Co.,  138  id.  398  ;  Cummings  v.  Arnold,  3  Met.  486,  489.  ( 

8  Munroe  v.  Perkins,  9  Pick.  298.     See  also  Rand  v.  Mather,  11  Cush.  1. 

*  Lattimore  v.  Harsen,  14  Johns.  330. 

6  White  v.  Parkin,  12  East  578. 

1  Jones  v.  Barkley,  2  Dong.  684,  694  ;  Hotham  v.  East  Ind.  Co.,  1  T.  R.  638 ;  Cum- 
mings v.  Arnold,  3  Met.   486 ;  f'lement  v.  Durgin,  5  Greenl.  9  ;  Keating  v.   Price, 
1  Johns.  Cas.  22  ;  Fleming  v.  Gilbert,  3  Johns.  530,  531,  per  Thompson,  J. ;  Envin  v. 
Saumlers,  1  Cowen  249 ;  Frost  v.  Everett,  5  id.  497  ;  Dearborn  v.  Cross,  7  id.  50  ;  Neil 
v.  Cheves,  1  Bailey  537,  538,  n.  (a)  ;   Cuff  v.  Penn,  1  M.  &  S.  21 ;  Robinson  v.  Bach- 
elder,  4  N.  H.  40  ;  Medomak  Bank  v.  Curtis,  11  Shepl.  36  ;  Blood  v.  Goodrich,  9  Wend. 
68;  Youqua  v.  Nixon,  1  Peters  C.  C.  221;  {Stearns  v.  Hall,   9  Cush.  31  ;j    but  see 
Marshall  v.  Lynn,  6  M.  &  W.  109. 

2  See  ffnfc,'§  26,  [jmd  §  284  ;]  Mills  v.  Wyman,  3  Pick.  207  :  Erwin  v.  Saunders, 
1  Cowen  249  ;  Hill  v.  Buckminster,  5  Pick.   391  ;  Rawson   v.   Walker,  1  Stark.  361  ; 
Foster  v.  Jolly,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  707,  708,  per  Parke,  B.  ;  Stackpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass. 
27,  32  ;  Folsom  v.  Mussey,  8  Greenl.  400. 

8  Ballard  v.  Walker,  3  Johns.  Cas.   60;  Poth.  on  Obi.  pt.  3,  c.  6,  art.  2,  No.  636l 
Marshall  v.  Baker,  1  Appleton  402 ;  Eden  v.  Blake,  13  M.  &  W.  614. 
VOL.  i.  —  28 


434  THE    PAROL    EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXL 

should  be  at  the  risk  of  the  hirer.4  A  further  consideration  may 
also  be  proved  by  parol,  if  it  is  not  of  a  different  nature  from  that 
which  is  expressed  in  the  deed.6  And  if  the  deed  appears  to  be 
a  voluntary  conveyance,  a  valuable  consideration  may  be  proved  by 
parol.6 

§  305.  Contradicting  Receipts.  In  regard  to  receipts,  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  they  may  be  either  mere  acknowledgments  of  payment  or 
delivery,  or  they  may  also  contain  a  contract  to  do  something  in 
relation  to  the  thing  delivered.  In  the  former  case,  and  so  far  as  the 
receipt  goes  only  to  acknowledge  payment  or  delivery,  it  is  merely 
prima  facie  evidence  of  the  fact,  and  not  conclusive;  and  therefore 
the  fact  which  it  recites  may  be  contradicted  by  oral  testimony.  But 
in  so  far  as  it  is  evidence  of  a  contract  between  the  parties,  it  stands 
on  the  footing  of  all  other  contracts  in  writing,  and  cannot  be  contra- 
dicted or  varied  by  parol.1  Thus,  for  example,  a  bill  of  lading, 
which  partakes  of  both  these  characters,  may  be  contradicted  and  ex- 
plained in  its  recital,  that  the  goods  were  in  good  order  and  well 
conditioned,  by  showing  that  their  internal  order  and  condition  was 
bad;  and,  in  like  manner  in  any  other  fact  which  it  erroneously 
recites;  but  in  other  respects  it  is  to  be  treated  like  other  written 
contracts.2 

2.   Another  View  of  the  Parol  Evidence  Rule. 

§  305  a.  Parol  Evidence  Rule,  not  a  Rule  of  Evidence.  [An  un- 
fortunate employment  of  a  terminology  in  which  the  subject  cannot 

*  Jeffery  v.  Walton,  1  Stark.  267  ;  in  a  suit  for  breach  of  a  written  agreement  to 
manufacture  and  deliver  weekly  to  the  plaintiff  a  certain  quantity  of  cloth,  at  a  certain 
price  |>er  yard,  on  eight  months'  credit,  it  was  held  that  the  defendant  might  give  in, 
evidence,  as  a  good  defence,  a  subsequent  parol  agreement  between  him  and  the  plain- 
tiff, made  on  sufficient  consideration,  by  which  the  mode  of  payment  was  varied,  and 
that  £he  plaintiff  had  refused  to  perform  the  parol  agreement :  Cummings  v.  Arnold, 
3  Met.  486.  See  further,  Wright  v.  Crookes,  1  Scott  N.  s.  685. 

5  Clifford  v.  Turrill,  9  Jur.   633;   {Miller  v.  Goodwin,  8  Gray  542;  Pierce  v.  Wey- 
moutli,  45  Me.  481  ;  Lewis  v.  Brewster,  57  Pa.  St.  410 ;  Cowan  v.  Cooper,  41  Ala.  187  ; 
Hendrick  v.  Crowley,  31  Cal.  471 ;  Sewell  v.  Baxter,  2  Md.  Ch.  447 ;  Rhine  v.  Ellen, 
36  Cal.  362.  | 

6  Pott  v.  Todhunter,  2  Collyer  Ch.  Cas.  76,  84. 

1  Straton  v.  Rastall,  2  T.  R.  366  ;  Alner  v.  George,  1  Campb.  392;  supra,  §  26,  n. ; 
Staekpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  27,  32;  Tucker  v.  Maxwell,  ib.  143 ;  Johnson  v.  John- 
son, ib.  359,  363,   per  Parker,   C.   J.  ;  Wilkinson  v.  Scott,   17  id.  257;  R.  v.  Scam- 
monden,  3  T.  R.  474  ;  Rollins  v.  Dver,  4  Shepl.  475  ;  Brooks  v.  White,  2  Met.  283; 
Niles  v.  Culver,  4  Law  Rep.  N.  s.  72;  Fuller  v.  Crittenden,  9  Conn.  406 ;  {Hildreth  v. 
O'Brien.  10  Allen  104  :  Stacy  v.  Kemp,  97  Mass.  166;   Kinsman  v.  Kershaw,  119  id. 
140 ;  Alexander  v.  Thompson,  42  Minn.  499  ;  Squires  v.  Amherst,  145  id.  192  :   Hill 
v.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  Y.  351  ;  Leonard  v.  Dnnton.  51  111.  482  :  Harris  v,  Johnston.  3  Cranch 
311 ;  Wallace  v.  Rogers,  2  N.  H.  506  ;  Bradford  v.  Mauley,  13  Mass.  139;  Fletcher  v. 
Willard,  14  Pick.    464;    Hazard  v.  Loring,  10  Cusli.  267,  268  ;|  fjand  see  additional 
citations  in  §  305  f,  post,  and  the  author's  brief  reference  to  the  subject,  ante,  §  285.] 

2  Barrett  v.  Rogers,   7  Mass.  297;  Gardner  v.  Chane,  2  R.  1/112;  The  Tuskar, 
1  Sprague  71  ;  Benjamin  v.  8in<-lair.  1  Bailey  174  ;  Smith  v.  Brown,  3  Hawks  580  ;  May 
n.  Babcock,  4  Ohio  834,  346  ;  jClnrkc  v.  Ba'rnwfll,  12  How.  272  ;  O'Brien  r  Gilchrist, 
31  M.-.  554  ;  Ellis  v.  Willard,  5  Seldcn  529  ;  Fitzhngh  v.  Wiman,  ib.  559,  566 ;  McTyer 
?•.  St.-.-lc,  26  Aln.  487;  Burke  w.   Rav,   40   Minn.  35  ;  Adams  v.   Davis,  100   Ind.  21; 
Havcrly  v.  Railroad  Company,  125  Pa.  St.  122;  Thompson  v.  Maxwell,  74  Iowa  415;} 
[>«e  post,  §  305/.] 


§§  304-305  a.]  ANOTHER  VIEW.  435 

possibly  be  discussed  with  accuracy  and  lucidity,  a  lack  of  systematic 
treatment  in  its  proper  department  and  surroundings,  and  an  inher- 
ent necessity  for  certain  distinctions  which  are  simple  in  themselves 
but  are  in  application  to  individual  cases  often  unavoidably  inde- 
cisive and  difficult  to  trace,  —  these  considerations  alone  would  suf- 
fice to  account  for  the  confusion,  the  apparent  inconsistency,  and  the 
discouraging  difficulties  that  attend  the  so-called  parol-evidence  rule 
and  make  it  perhaps  the  most  troublesome  in  the  whole  field  of  evi- 
dence. No  one  can  approach  the  subject,  in  any  attempt  to  re-state 
its  limitations,  except  with  a  sense  of  temerity ;  and  the  following 
brief  arrangement  of  the  leading  topics  of  the  rule  is  offered  merely 
in  the  belief  that  no  new  way  of  stating  them  can  be  more  confusing 
than  some  of  those  now  to  be  found,  while  a  mode  of  statement  dis- 
carding the  evidential  terminology,  and  emphasizing  certain  related 
doctrines  of  substantive  law,  may  make  it  easier,  if  not  to  solve  the 
various  problems,  at  least  to  appreciate  what  is  the  nature  of  the 
problem  to  be  solved.1 

(1)  It  is  first  to  be  noticed  that  the  rule  or  rules  concerned  are  not 
rules  of  evidence.     They  do  not  exclude  certain  data  because  those 
data  for  one  reason  or  another  are  untrustworthy  or  undesirable 
means  of  evidencing  something  to  be  proved.     They  do  not  declare 
that  something  here  is  admissible  evidence  while  something  there  is 
not.     What  the  rule  does  is  to  forbid  a  certain  thing  to  be  proved  at 
all,  and  this,  of  course,  is  in  effect  to  declare  that  the  thing  is  legally 
immaterial  for  some  reason  of  substantive  law.     When  a  thing  is  not 
to  be  proved  at  all,  the  rule  of  prohibition  is  not  a  rule  of  evidence, 
even  though  the  words  "proof"  or   "evidence"  are  employed  in 
stating  the  prohibition ;  just  as,  on  a  plea  of  self-defence  to  an  action 
for  battery,  if  we  say  that  no  evidence  of  the  plaintiff's  insulting 
words  will  be  admitted,  we  mean  that  his  words  are  no  excuse  for 
the  battery.     If,  then,  we  dismiss  once  for  all  any  notion  that  the 
parol-evidence   rule   is   concerned  with   any  doubts  or   precautions 
or   limitations   based   on  the  nature  of  certain  evidentiary  matter, 
or  indeed  with  any  regulation  about  evidence,  we  shall  have  taken 
the   first  step  to   a   clearer   understanding   of   the  working  of  the 
rule. 

(2)  It  is  next  to  be  noted  that  the  thing  that  is  to  be  excluded  as 
immaterial  by  the  rule  is  not  particularly  anything  that  can  clearly 
be  described  as  "parol."     Without  attempting  to  discriminate  the 
various  possible  senses  of  this  word^  it  will  be  enough  to  note  that, 
so  far  as  it  conveys  the  impression  that  what  is  excluded  is  excluded 
because  it  is  oral  —  because  somebody  spoke  or  did  something  not 
in  writing,  or  is  now  offering  to  testify  orally,  —  this  impression  is 
not  the  correct  one.     Where  the  rule  is  applicable,  what  is  excluded 

1  QFor  an  acute  analysis  and  historical  examination  of  the  whole  subject,  see  eh.  10 
in  Professor  Thayer's  "  Preliminary  Treatise  oil  the  Law  of  Evidence."] 


436  THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  RULE.          [CH.  XXL 

may  be  written  material  as  well  as  conversations,  circumstances,  and 
oral  matter  in  general ;  and  where  the  rule  is  applicable  so  as  to 
exclude  certain  written  material,  nevertheless  certain  oral  material 
may  properly  be  considered.  So  that  the  term  "parol"  affords  no 
necessary  clue  to  the  kind  of  material  excluded  ;  and  it  conduces  to 
the  intelligent  use  of  the  rule  to  dismiss  any  notion  that  oral  or 
parol  matters  are  inherently  the  object  of  its  prohibition. 

(3)  Again,  within  the  scope  of  the  rule  are  usually  treated  two 
distinct  bodies  of  doctrine,  which  do  not  properly  touch  each  other, 
except  in  certain  relations  at  certain  points.  One  of  these  concerns 
the  constitution  of  legal  acts,  the  other  concerns  their  interpretation ; 
and  the  difficulties  of  principle  and  lines  of  precedents  for  these  two 
subjects  are  as  a  whole  entirely  distinct,  and  cannot  properly  be  sub- 
sumed under  any  single  generalization  or  rule. 

In  short,  then,  the  " parol-evidence  rule"  does  not  concern  doc- 
trines of  evidence  j  nor  is  it  to  be  tested  by  the  oral  nature  of  the 
fact  to  be  proved ;  nor  is  there  any  one  rule  on  the  subject.] 

§  305  b.  Constitution  and  Interpretation  of  Legal  Acts ;  Parol 
Evidence  Rule.  [A  person's  conduct  is  one  of  the  chief  sources  of 
any  changes  that  occur  in  his  legal  relations.  The  creation,  transfer, 
and  extinction  of  a  right  and  of  an  obligation  are  made  in  great  part 
to  depend  upon  specified  kinds  of  conduct  on  his  part.  This  con- 
duct, regarded  as  having  legal  consequences  of  the  above  sort,  may 
be  spoken  of,  in  individual  instances,  as  a  legal  act.1  The  terms  or 
nature  of  the  act  vary,  of  course,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  right 
or  the  obligation  aimed  at,  —  a  contract,  a  sale,  a  will,  a  notice,  and 
so  on  ;  the  substantive  law  specifies  these  terms  appropriately  in  the 
various  instances ;  and  the  various  branches  of  the  substantive  law- 
are  to  be  sought  for  these  essential  terms  of  the  conduct  required  to 
constitute  an  effective  act. 

Isow  the  conduct  which  may  go  to  make  up  the  terms  of  a  legal 
act  may  normally  be  spread  over  various  times  and  contained  in 
various  materials,  — as  where  a  contract  to  sell  goods  may  have  to  be 
gathered  from  conversations,  letters,  telegrams,  price-lists,  and  other 
data.  If  there  were  no  such  rule  as  the  "  parol-evidence  "  rule,  such 
would  always  be  the  various  data  in  which  would  be  sought  the  terms 
of  the  act.  Conceivably,  and  frequently,  they  would  not  be  found  in 
a  single  utterance  or  a  single  writing,  nor  in  writings  nor  utterances 
made  at  one  time.  But  there  is  a  doctrine,  founded  on  sound  policy 
and  experience,  which  imposes  restrictions  upon  the  sort  of  data 
that  are  to  be  considered  as  effectively  supplying  the  terms  of  a  legal 
act.  The  restrictions  thus  imposed  affect  both  time  and  material; 

1  £The  true  point  of  view  lias  thus  been  obscured  by  our  traditional  handling  of  the 
subject  in  terms  of  evidence.  The  German  discussions  of  the  general  subject,  while  of 
no  service  in  elucidating  our  sjwoial  problems,  take  a  better  standpoint  for  discussion  ; 
a  profitable  work  is  "  Der  Irrtlnuu  boi  niehtigeu  Vertragou,"  by  Dr.  Rudolph  Leou- 
hard  (Dummies,  Berlin,  1882)/] 


§§  305  a-305  &.]  ANOTHER  VIEW.  437 

i.  e.,  they  may  require  the  terms  of  the  act  to  be  sought  in  the  utter- 
ances or  conduct  of  one  occasion  (forbidding  a  range  over  preceding 
occasions  of  the  same  negotiation) ;  and  they  may  require  the  terms 
to  be  contained  in  a  special  mode  of  expression,  i.  e.  writing  or  its 
equivalent  (excluding  the  use  of  oral  utterances2).  Usually  the 
two  sorts  of  restriction  are  combined,  i.  e.  the  terms  of  the  act  are 
to  be  sought  in  a  single  writing  made  at  one  time. 

When  do  such  restrictions  become  applicable,  so  as  to  have  this 
effect  of  giving  legal  standing  and  validity  to  a  single  writing  only, 
and  of  forbidding  the  consideration  of  all  other  conduct  as  supply- 
ing the  terms  of  the  legal  act  ?  The  restrictions  may  become  appli- 
cable in  two  kinds  of  situations:  (1)  where  a  specific  rule  of  law 
provides  that  the  act,  to  be  effective  legally,  must  be  contained  in  a 
single  writing;  as  where  a  will  or  a  deed  is  required  to  be  in  writing; 
(2)  where  the  parties  to  the  act  have  by  intention  made  a  single 
writing  the  sole  memorial  and  repository  of  its  terms,  —  as  where 
the  parties  to  a  contract  finally,  after  sundry  negotiations,  embody 
in  a  single  writing  the  terms  agreed  upon.  This  process  of  reducing 
the  act's  terms  to  a  single  memorial,  whether  by  requirement  of  law 
or  by  intention  of  the  parties,  may  be,  for  convenience  of  discussion, 
termed  Integration,  i.  e.  the  constitution  of  the  whole  in  a  single 
memorial. 

This  principle  is  well  established  and  unquestioned  in  the  law. 
The  difficulties  that  arise  are  concerned  with  the  scope  of  its  appli- 
cation. The  effect  of  the  principle  is  an  exclusionary  one,  i.  e.  to 
reject  from  consideration,  as  having  no  legal  standing  and  effect, 
data  of  conduct  other  than  the  sole  written  memorial.  The  matter 
thus  excluded  has  come  to  be  termed  "  parol  evidence ; "  although, 
as  already  pointed  out,  it  is  not  evidence  and  not  necessarily  in 
parol.  As  the  question  usually  comes  up  in  Court,  a  writing  is  re- 
ceived from  one  party;  and  then  matter  other  than  this  writing, 
and  tending  to  overturn  its  legal  effect,  is  offered  by  the  other  party 
and  is  objected  to  by  the  first  party  by  virtue  of  the  present  princi- 
ple. The  inquiry  is  thus  presented  whether  the  data  thus  offered  in 
opposition  are  obnoxious  to  this  rule  of  Integration ;  in  other  words, 
Granting  that  there  is  a  writing  by  the  party  or  parties,  is  this 
sufficient  to  exclude  the  opposing  data  ?  Does  the  mere  fact  of  the 
writing  have  that  effect  ?  Are  there  not  many  cases  in  which  such 
data,  although  affecting  the  writing  in  the  interest  of  the  opponent, 
are  nevertheless  receivable  without  being  obnoxious  to  the  Integra- 
tion rule  ?  Unquestionably  there  are  such  cases ;  but  the  difficulty 
is  to  draw  the  line  consistently  and  to  expound  the  reasons  soundly 

2  Qt  may  be  noted  that,  as  Mr.  J.  Blackburn  has  acutely  pointed  out  (when  argu- 
ing as  counsel  in  Brown  v.  Byrne,  3  E.  &  B.  703),  the  parol-evidence  rule  might  con- 
ceivably apply  even  to  an  oral  utterance  constituting  the  final  fixing  of  the  terms,  thus 
excluding  other  oral  utterances  ;  so  also  Gilbert  v.  McGinnis,  114  111.  28  ;  but  practi- 
cally this  possibility  need  uot  be  considered.] 


438  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

and  systematically.  The  great  mass  of  the  rulings  upon  the  parol- 
evidence  rule  are  concerned  with  the  attempt  to  draw  this  line  and 
define  these  situations.  The  various  cases  in  which  such  data  are 
receivable  seem  to  fall  under  the  following  heads :  — 

(1)  (1)    It  may  always  be  shown  that  no  legal  act  at  all  has  ever 
been  consummated  or  that  some  defence  or  excuse  exists  which  over- 
turns or  sets  aside  an  act  conceded  to  have  been  done,     (a)  Under 
the  first  of  these  heads,  there  are  certain  constantly  recurring  situa- 
tions, depending   somewhat   for  their  solution  upon  the  particular 
department  of  law  (contracts,  wills,  etc.),  yet  capable  of  being  dis- 
cussed in  general  terms  applicable  to  all  legal  acts.     They  concern 
the  will  or  conscious  volition  of  the  person  in  setting  his  hand  to 
the  act;  and  the  question  is  whether  he  has  after  all  consummated 
any  legal  act  at  all  or  an  act  of  the  alleged  tenor,  i.  e.  whether  it  is 
to  be  treated  as  his  act  (that  is,  an  act  having  the  supposed  legal  con- 
sequences) if  he  has  merely  drafted  its  terms  but  not  finally  willed 
to  execute  it,  or  if  he  has  done  it  with  the  understanding  that  it  is 
to  be  only  morally  binding,  or  if  he  has  done  it  subject  to  another's 
approval,  or  if  he  has  signed  a  writing  without  reading  it  over,  and 
the  like.     (&)  The  second  of  these  heads  deals  with  the  effect  of  some 
accompanying  circumstance  as  making  the  act,  though  consummated 
and  intrinsically  effective,  potentially  avoidable,  e.  g.  subject  to  some 
defence  or  excuse  which  will  enable  the  actor  to  repudiate  it  or  set 
it  aside   or  successfully   defend    against    the    consequences,    e.  g. 
whether  fraud,  or  an  agreement  to  hold  in  trust  or  for  security,  will 
avail  for  this  purpose.     Thus,  these  two  kinds  of  situations  allow  a 
consideration  of  all  data  by  which  it  appears,  as  a  rule  of  substantive 
law  (a)  that  no  legal  act  has  been  consummated  at  all,  or  (&)  that 
the  act,  though  consummated,  is  subject  to  avoidance  upon  grounds 
justifying  such  a  defence. 

(2)  Independently  of  the  preceding,  it  is  further  true  that  the 
Integration  rule,  excluding  other  data,  does  not  apply  unless  there 
has  been  integration.     Consequently,  such  extrinsic  data  may  always 
be  considered  (a)  where  there   has  not   been,  by   intention  of  the 
parties,  any  integration  at  all,  or  (a')  only  a  partial  integration,  not 
extending  to  the  matters  in  question;  and  (b)  where  the  law  does  not 
specifically  require  an  integration  in  writing. 

(II)  Furthermore,  a  legal  act  existing,  it  has  constantly  to  be 
interpreted  in  order  to  be  made  effective;  for,  since  its  terms  will 
be  found  chiefly  in  words,  and  since  words  are  merely  symbols  indi- 
cating external  objects  as  to  which  the  right  or  duty  is  predicated, 
the  connection  between  these  symbols  and  all  possible  objects  must 
be  ascertained  in  order  to  carry  the  terms  into  effects  corresponding 
with  their  significance  as  predetermined  by  the  party  or  parties  to 
the  act.  In  this  process  of  Interpretation,  various  data  have  to  be 
considered;  and  there  may  be  rules  of  guidance  for  choosing  or 
ascertaining  the  proper  meaning;  a  new  series  of  questions  arise, 


§§  305  6-305  c.]  NO  ACT  CONSUMMATED.  439 

peculiar  to  this  subject;  but  the  general  process  of  using  the  inter- 
preting data  is  not  obnoxious  to  the  Integration  rule. 

These  several  subjects  may  now  be  examined  in  more  detail.] 
§  305  c.  (I)  Constitution  of  Legal  Acts  ;  (l)  Whether  an  Act  has 
been  consummated  at  all.  [Only  a  small  part  of  conduct  is  legal 
conduct,  i.  e.  conduct  intended  to  have  legal  effectiveness.  The 
same  conduct  may  under  varying  circumstances  be  intended  to  have 
other  sorts  of  consequences  than  a  legal  one  or  the  particular  legal 
one,  —  as  where  a  person  hands  a  parcel  to  another,  or  writes  a 
letter;  and  the  distinction  will  often  turn  entirely  on  the  accom- 
panying intent.  In  other  words,  whether  an  act  of  an  alleged  tenor 
has  been  consummated  will  often  depend  chiefly  on  whether  an 
intention  to  do  an  act  of  that  tenor  accompanied  the  conduct  in  ques- 
tion. At  the  same  time,  since  for  reasons  of  policy  designed  to  pro- 
tect others  in  their  dealings  against  undisclosed  and  undiscoverable 
defects  in  their  rights,  there  may  be  cases  in  which  the  doing  of  the 
conduct  itself,  irrespective  of  the  intention,  must  be  taken  as  finally 
consummating  the  act.  Thus  the  problem  is  to  define  these  situ- 
ations in  which  the  effectiveness  or  validity  of  the  act  is  to  depend 
merely  on  its  doing  and  apart  from  its  intention.  Put  in  the  shape 
of  a  rule  of  exclusion,  the  question  becomes :  When  may  it  not  be 
shown  that  the  intention  of  the  actor  was  not  to  do  an  act  of  the 
sort  apparently  done  ?  Observing  that  this  is  distinctly  a  question 
of  substantive  law  determining  the  existence  of  rights  and  duties, 
and  that  the  solution  may  well  be  different  in  different  parts  of  the 
law,  we  may  notice  briefly  the  various  types  of  situation.  The 
alleged  incompleteness  of  the  act  may  be  attributed  to  the  circum- 
stance (a)  that  the  act  was  intended  to  have  no  legal  significance 
at  all,  but  only  a  moral  or  social  one;  or  (&)  that  the  act  was  provi- 
sional or  preparatory  only,  and  never  finally  willed  as  a  consum- 
mated act;  or  (c)  that  though  a  legal  act  of  some  sort  was  intended, 
yet  it  was  not  this  legal  act,  but  an  act  of  some  other  tenor,  either 
wholly  or  in  part. 

(a)  This  variety  of  situation,  while  common  enough,  seldom 
gives  rise  to  legal  controversy.  An  invitation  to  dine,  extended 
to  a  friend,  illustrates  it,  and  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  promise  of 
a  restaurateur  to  furnish  a  meal.  An  instance  of  a  different  sort  is 
found  in  Earle  v.  Rice,1  where  it  was  allowed  to  be  shown  that  an 
agreement,  signed  by  husband  and  wife,  as  to  the  sale  of  her  lands 
and  the  disposition  of  the  proceeds  for  the  benefit  of  the  children, 
was  understood  between  them  to  be  only  morally  binding.  In  this 
aspect,  the  " parol-evidence  rule"  may  be  stated  somewhat  thus, 
namely,  that  conduct  apparently  having  the  form  of  a  legal  act  may 
always  be  shown  to  have  been  done  with  the  intent  to  assume  only 
moral  or  social  consequences.8 

1  nil  Mass.  17.1 

8  QSee  Gnnz  v.  Giegling,  108  Mich.  295;  Church  v.  Case,  110  id.  621;  Grand 
Isle  v.  Kinney,  Vt.,  41  AtL  130J 


440  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

(J)  This  variety  of  situation  gives  rise  to  constant  legal  contro- 
versy, chiefly  because  it  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  practically 
between  such  a  total  absence  of  effective  intent  as  to  leave  the  act 
merely  inchoate  and  such  a  partial  modification  of  the  effect  of  a 
consummated  act  as  concedes  the  consummation  but  violates  the 
principle  of  Integration  by  improperly  setting  up  a  competing  agree- 
ment to  modify  the  integrated  act.  An  instance  of  the  less  difficult 
sort  is  the  writing  of  a  draft  promissory  note  for  possible  use,  where 
the  lack  of  intent  to  consummate  a  note  leaves  the  writing  with- 
out final  legal  significance.  Again,  in  Nicholls  v.  Nicholls,6  it  was 
allowed  to  be  shown  that  a  paper  purporting  to  be  a  will  was  written 
during  a  friendly  conversation,  in  the  course  of  which  the  writer  put 
certain  words  on  a  paper,  and  said  "  That  is  as  good  a  will  as  I  shall 
probably  ever  make; "  these  words  indicating  possibly  that  the  writ- 
ing was  intended  merely  as  an  experiment  or  suggestion.  Instances 
of  the  more  difficult  sort  are  cases  of  contract-writings  drawn  up  in 
complete  detail  and  signed,  but  agreed  not  to  be  regarded  as  binding 
and  consummated  until  the  happening  of  some  condition  precedent. 
Thus,  it  may  be  shown  that  an  agreement,  though  signed,  was  un- 
derstood not  to  be  a  binding  act  until  the  signature  of  another  party 
was  obtained,4  or  until  the  approval  or  consent  of  a  third  person 
should  be  obtained,8  or  that  some  other  act  should  be  done  by  a  party 
or  a  third  person.6  On  the  other  hand,  an  understanding  which  con- 
cedes that  an  effective  legal  act  has  been  consummated  but  purports 
to  affect  the  terms  of  the  obligation,  by  limiting  the  conditions  of 
default  or  specifying  events  on  which  it  shall  by  condition  subsequent 
cease  to  be  binding,  does  not  come  within  the  above  notion,  and  is 
excluded  because  it  comes  in  competition  with  the  terms  of  the 
written  act,  under  the  principle  of  §  305  e,  post;  thus,  an  understand- 
ing that  a  note  is  to  be  payable  out  of  certain  funds  only,7  or  that  its 
payment  will  not  be  enforced  at  all,8  or  only  upon  certain  conditions,9 
would  not  be  considered.10  Under  the  present  head  seems  also  to 

*  ["Prerog.  Ct.,  Ann.  Keg.  1814,  p.  278.] 

*  LPattle  v.  Hornbrook,  1897,  1  Ch.  25  ;   State  ».  Wallis,  57  Ark.  64  ;    Robertson 
v.  Rowell,  158  Mass.  94  ;  Kelly  y.  Oliver,  113  N.  C.  442  ;  Mfrs.  Furn.  Co.  v.  Kremer, 
7  S.  D.  463;   McCormiek  Co.  v.  Faulkner,  ib.   363;   Oilman  v.  Gross,  97  Wis.  224  ; 
see  Beard  v.  Boylan,  59  Conn.  181.] 

"  ["Cleveland  Ref.  Co.  v.  Dunning,  Mich.,  73  N.  W.  339  ;  Tup  R.  C.  &  S.  Co.  v. 
BrigeT,  U.  S.  App.,  86  Fed.  818;  Pym  v.  Campbell,  6  E.  &  B.  370.] 

«  TBlewitt  v.  Boorum,  142  N.  Y.  357  ;  Curry  v.  Colburn,  Wis.,  74  N.  W.  778.] 

''  QStein  v.  Fogarty,  Ida.,  43  Pac.  681 ;  Mumford  v.  Tolman,  157  111.  2.'>8 ;  Gorrell 
v  Ins.  Co.,  24  U.  S.  App.  188  •  contra:  Clinch  Co.  v.  Willing,  180  Pa.  165.] 

8  fFirst  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Foote,  12  Utah  157  ;  Bryan  v.  Duff,  12  Wash.  233.  J 

*  LVun  Syckel  v.  Dalrymple,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  238 ;   Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Hiltgen, 
62  Minn.  361  ;  Van  Etten  v.  Howell,  40  Nebr.  850  ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,   26  Or.  251  ; 
Shea  v.  Leisy,  85  Fed.  243  ;   Nebr.  Expos.  Ass'n  v.  Townley,  46  Nebr.  898  ;  Taylor  ». 
Hunt.  118  N.  C.  168  ;  Murchie  v.  Peck,  160  111.  175.^ 

1}  ("For  othf>r  instances  illustrating  the  above  distinctions,  see  Guidery  v.  Green, 
95  Cal.  630  ;  Ryan  ».  Cooke,  172  111.  802  ;  Hanck  v,  Wright,  Miss.,  23  So.  422  ; 
Western  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  Nebr.,  74  N.  W.  849;  Ellison  v.  Gray,  N.  J.  L.,  37  Atl. 


§  305  C.~\  NO   ACT   CONSUMMATED.  441 

belong  the  class  of  cases  in  which  it  is  desired  to  show  that  the  per- 
son attempted  to  be  charged  as  a  party  to  a  document  did  not  sign  as 
a  party  but  only  as  a  witness;  this  may  be  shown,  because  it  means 
that  as  to  that  person  there  was  no  legal  act.11 

(c)  In  this  situation  the  execution  of  some  legal  act  is  conceded, 
but  it  is  desired  to  show  that  its  purporting  terms  were,  either  wholly 
or  in  part,  not  intended  by  the  party  doing  the  act.  The  typical 
cases  are  those  of  one  signing  a  blank  paper  afterwards  filled  out  by 
another  without  any  authority  or  differently  from  a  limited  authority; 
of  a  blind  or  illiterate  person  signing  a  document  whose  contents 
are,  fraudulently  or  otherwise,  incorrectly  stated  to  him;  of  an  ordi- 
nary person  signing  a  document  whose  terms  he  has  misread  or  has 
not  read  at  all.  Here  there  is  opportunity  for  much  difference  of 
policy,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  act  and  the  relations  of  the 
parties.  In  general,  it  seems  fair  to  insist  that,  where  the  intention 
was  to  do  a  legal  act  of  some  sort,  the  efficient  element  is  supplied, 
and  the  terms  of  the  specific  act  intended  should  depend  solely  on 
the  document  and  not  on  the  unexpressed  state  of  mind  of  the  party 
doing  the  act;  so  that  a  mistake  due  to  one  or  the  other  of  the  above 
reasons  should  be  immaterial.  At  the  same  time  there  are  certain 
situations  in  which  policy  may  well  allow  a  relaxation  of  this  rule. 
In  the  first  place,  it  need  not  be  enforced  in  favor  of  a  party  who  by 
fraud  or  carelessness  has  brought  about  the  mistake,  —  as  in  the 
case  of  one  fraudulently  misreading  a  document  to  an  illiterate  per- 
son.12 In  the  next  place,  it  need  not  be  enforced  where  the  writing 

1018:  Lowenfeld  v.  Curtis,  U.  S.  App.,  72  Fed.  103.  For  additional  instances,  see 
ante,  §  284,  note  1.  Needless  to  say,  the  application  of  the  distinctions  in  a  given 
instance  may  offer  mnch  room  for  difference  of  opinion.] 

11  nOWTwmw.  Owens,  1  Pinney  473  ;  Ishami?.  Cooper,  N.  J.L.,  39  Atl.  760.     Dis- 
tinguish the  case  of  one  concededly  signing  as  surety,  who  wishes  to  show  that  it  was 
understood  that  he  would  not  be  called  upon  to  pay  ;  this  cnnnot  be  done,  for  it  merely 
involves  a  variation  of  the  obligation  :  Altman  v.  Anton,  91  la.  612.      In  the  law  of 
net/otiable  instruments,  several  questions  of  an  analogous  sort  arise,  but  peculiar  consid- 
erations apply  in  that  field  of  the  law  ;  for  the  effect  of  a  parol  agreement  that  an  in- 
dorsement in  blank  or  in  full  shall  be  without  recourse  against  the  indorser,  see  True  v. 
Bullard,  45  Nebr.  409  ;  Iowa  V.  S.  Bank  v.  Sigstad,  96  la.  491  ;  Martin  v.  Cole,  104  U.  S. 
30  ;  Ames,  Cases  on  Bills  and  Notes,  vol.  ii,  Summary,  "Collateral  Agreement ; "  for  the 
effect  of  an  agreement  that  an  indorsing  payee  is  to  be  treated  as  guarantor,  co-surety, 
or  joint  maker,  see  Hately  v.  Pike,   162  111.  241  ;   Richardson  r.  Foster,  73  Miss. 
12  ;  ante,  §  281  ;  Ames,  ubi  supra  ;  for  the  effect  of  an  agreement  that  joint  makers  or 
maker  and  indorser,  or  indorser  and  indorsee,  are  to  be  treated  between  themselves  as 
sureties,  see  Kendall  v.  Milligan,  62  Ark.  629 ;  McCollum  v.  Boughton,  132  Mo.  601  ; 
Montgomery  v.  Page,   29  Or.  320  ;   ante,  §  281  ;    Ames,  ubi  supra.     In  the   law  of 
aqe,ncy,  also,  some  special  questions  arise,  governed  by  more  or  less  peculiar  considera- 
tions ;  for  the  effect  of  an  agreement  that  a  person  signing  a  contract  is  to  be  treated 
as  agent  only,  or  that  a  person  signing  as  agent  is  to  be  treated  as  also  a  principal,  see 
Frankland  v.  Johnson,  147  111.  520  ;  Tewksbury  v.  Howard,  138  Ind.  103;  Matthews 
v.  Mattrass  Co.,  87  la.  246  :  Armstrong  v.  Andrews,   109  Mich.  587  ;   Wambangh, 
Cases  on  Agency,  658-664,  723-728  ;  for  the  propriety  of  showing  the  existence  of  an 
undisclosed  principal,  see  Brig«s  v.  Partridge,  64  N.  Y.  857  ;  Barbre  v.  Goodale,  28  Or. 
465  :  Wambaugh,  ubi  supra,  627-657,  673-723.1 

12  ("See  Harriman  on  Contracts,  35  ;  Thorougngood's  Case,  2  Co.  Rep.  95;  Foster 
v.  Mackinnon,  L.  R  4  C.  P.  704  ;  O'Donnell  v.  Clinton,  145  Mass.  461 ;  Wanner  » 


442  THE  PAKOL  EVIDENCE  RULE.          [CH.  XXI. 

is  equally  fallacious  in  representing  the  terms  as  understood  by  the 
opposing  party;  in  other  words,  in  the  case  of  mutual  mistake, 
where  in  Chancery  the  reformation  of  the  instrument  is  allowed.18 
In  the  third  place,  a  testator  signing  a  will  is  not  in  the  position  of 
one  on  the  faith  of  whose  act  another  party  to  the  transaction  may 
be  misled,  and  thus  there  may  be  less  objection  than  in  the  case  of 
contracts  to  permitting  the  testator's  ignorance  of  the  contents, 
through  misreading  or  otherwise,  to  be  shown.14  But  all  these  ques- 
tions are  here  seen,  more  clearly  perhaps  than  in  other  parts  of  the 
subject,  to  be  in  truth  questions  in  the  various  departments  of  sub- 
stantive law  concerned  with  the  different  kinds  of  legal  acts;  and 
broad  and  varying  considerations  of  policy  are  concerned,  into  which 
it  is  not  necessary  here  to  enter.] 

§  305  d.  Same :  (2)  "Whether  a  Defence  or  Excuse  exists,  ren- 
dering the  Act  voidable.  [Assuming  that  a  legal  act  has  been  done, 
it  may  be  desired  to  show  that  some  defence  or  excuse  exists,  by 
reason  of  which  the  act  is  voidable  and  may  be  repudiated.  There  is 
here  no  attempt  to  alter  the  terms  of  the  act ;  it  is  conceded,  and  its 
terms  are  conceded ;  but  an  independent  defence  is  set  up.  Whether 
this  defence  may  be  shown  depends  merely  on  whether  the  policy  of 
the  substantive  law  applicable  to  that  class  of  acts  recognizes  the  cir- 
cumstance as  rendering  the  act  voidable  and  constituting  a  defence 
to  its  enforcement.  The  clearest  case  of  this  sort  is  that  of  fraud. 
The  substantive  law  concerned  determines  when  fraud  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  defence,  and  what  circumstances  are  to  be  regarded  as 
amounting  to  fraud.  But  there  is  no  objection  to  the  showing  of 
fraud  from  the  present  point  of  view,  i.  e.  the  constitution  and  inte- 
gration of  legal  acts,  because  no  effort  is  made  to  resort  to  other  than 
the  integrated  act  for  ascertaining  its  terms ;  the  terms  are  conceded 
to  be  represented  by  the  writing  only,  and  the  object  is  to  set  up  in- 
dependent circumstances  rendering  the  act  voidable.1  A  showing  of 
duress,  also,  wherever  the  substantive  law  recognizes  it  as  an  available 
defence,  is  equally  unobjectionable  from  the  present  point  of  view.3 
Possibly  the  proceeding  for  reformation  on  the  ground  of  mutual 
mistake  8  may  be  regarded  as  properly  belonging  under  the  present 
head.  The  more  difficult  case  is  that  of  an  accompanying  agree- 
ment to  hold  property  as  trustee  or  to  hold  it  as  security  only.  It 

Landis,  137  Pa.  61 ;  Bank  v.  Webb,  108  Ala.  132;  Yock  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Ill  Cal.  503  j 
Green  v.  Wilkie,  98  la.  74  ;  Coates  v.  Early,  46  S.  C.  220  ;  Hartford  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Gray, 
80  111.  28.] 

18  fJSee  Wilcox  v.  Lucas,  121  Mass.  22  :  Bush  ».  Hicks,  60  N  Y.  298  ;  Andrews  v. 
Andrews,  81  Me.  837  ;  Storkbridge  Co.  ».  Hudson  Co.,  107  Mass.  290 ;  ante,  §  296  a.] 

14  QSee  Guardhouse  v.  Blackburn,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  109  ;  Fulton  r.  Andrew,  L.  R.  7  H. 
L.  460;  Morrell  v.  Morrell,  L.  R.  7  P.  D.  68;  Stephen.    Diceat  of  Evidence,   4th  ed. 
Apn.  note  33,  and  Pref.  p.  37  ;  Sheer  r.  Sheer,  159  III.  591.] 
TState  v.  Cass,  52  N.  J.  L.  77.] 

1  fSo  also  for  infancy  or  other  legal  incapacity  to  act :  ante,  §  284.] 

•  [Supra,  §  305  d,  note  13  ;  ante,  §  305  c.] 


§§  305  C-305  d.]  VOIDABILITY   OF   ACTS.  443 

may  be  suggested  that  the  title  to  property  can  be  regarded  as 
capable  of  separation  into  various  qualities  or  modalities,  —  title  as 
both  beneficial  and  legal  owner,  title  as  legal  owner  only  (with  the 
beneficial  interest  in  another),  and  title  as  security-holder  only  (with 
the  redemption-interest  in  another).  The  simple  transfer  of  owner- 
ship will  in  all  cases  transfer  the  bare  legal  title,  but  it  may  or  may 
not  carry  with  it  the  beneficial  interest  of  the  second  or  third  sort. 
The  title  being  thus  separable  into  distinct  elements,  it  is  easy  to 
regard  the  act  of  separating  and  retaining  (by  mutual  understanding) 
the  beneficial  interest  of  the  second  or  third  sort  as  an  independent 
circumstance  which  may  be  availed  of  to  cut  down  the  apparent  in- 
terest of  the  title-holder,  by  way  of  defence  or  avoidance.  Thus, 
where  the  circumstances  are  such  as  to  justify,  by  the  substantive 
law,  the  recognition  of  a  resulting  trust,  there  is  no  objection  from  the 
present  point  of  view ;  and  it  may  be  shown  just  as  fraud  could  be 
shown.4  So  also  a  retention  of  the  redemption-interest  in  the  trans- 
feror, with  the  effect  of  giving  the  transferee  a  security-title  only,  may 
be  shown,  as  an  independent  circumstance  constituting  a  defence  to 
his  apparent  right  to  claim  full  and  beneficial  title.6  But  in  the  latter 
case  it  may  happen  that  the  act  of  transfer  clearly  purports  to  give 
not  merely  the  bare  legal  title,  an  element  common  to  all  transfers  of 
title,  but  also  the  full  beneficial  interest,  free  from  any  redemption- 
interest  ;  and  where  this  is  the  case,  all  the  possible  elements  of  a  title 
being  accounted  for  and  covered,  a  supposed  retention  of  the  redemp- 
tion-interest can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  a  separate  act  available  in 
defence,  but  comes  directly  in  competition  with  the  terms  of  the  trans- 
fer, and  is  thus  in  this  instance  not  available.6  Another  sort  of  inde- 
pendent act  which,  by  setting  aside  the  original  act,  substitutes  a  new 
one  and  furnishes  a  defence  to  any  claim  founded  on  the  avoided  one, 
is  a  novation ;  this  may  be  shown,  whether  it  involves  a  novation  in  the 
full  sense,  i.  e.  a  complete  supersession  of  the  original  act,7  or  merely 
a  change  of  some  of  its  terms  by  subsequent  agreement  or  waiver.8 
An  agreement  not  to  sue,  or  not  to  sue  for  a  limited  time,  is  perhaps  not 
to  be  regarded,  at  least  apart  from  equity,  as  an  available  defence ; 9 

4  TFeltz  v.  Walker,  49  Conn.  93.} 

6  [Ante,  §  284;  Campbell  v.  Dearborn,  107  Mass.  130;  Barry  v.  Colville,  129  NYY. 
302  ;  Hieronymus  v.  Glass,  Ala.  23  So.  674  ;  Ahern  v.  McCarthy,  107  Cal.  382  ;  Shad 
v.  Livingston,  31  Fla.  89;  German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gibe,  162  111.  251  ;  Bever  v.  Bever, 
144  Ind.  157;  Libby  v.  Clark,  88  Me.  32;  Dixon  v.  Ins.  Co.,  168  Mass.  48;  Pinch  v. 
Willard,  108  Mich.  204  ;  Vanderhoven  v.  Romaine,  N.  J.  Eq.,  39  Atl.  129;  Voorhies 
v.  Hennpssy,  7  Wash.  243 ;  Shank  v.  Gron",  43  W.  Va.  337  ;  Gettelman  v.  Assur.  Co., 
97  Wis.  237.] 

6  [Thomas  v.  Scutt,  127  N.  Y.  133.      Occasionally  this  is  laid  down  as  a  general 
rule,  in  disregard  of  the  distinction  above  noted  ;  see  Munford  v.  Green,  Ky.  44  S.  W. 
419;  Goon  Gan  v.  Richardson,  16  Wash.  373.] 

7  FGuidery  v.  Green,  95  Cal.  630. ] 

8  LGoss  v."  Nugent,  5  B.  &  Ad.  863 ;  Smith  v.  Kelley,  Mich.,  73  N.  W.  385  ;  Hnr- 
ris  ».-.  Mnrphy,  119  N   C.  34  ;  Dunklre  v.   Goodenough,  68  Vt.  113  ;  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  B. 
Co.  v.  Dickson,  143  111.  368;  see  other  instances  in  §§  302,  303,  antr.^ 

•  [Ford  v.  Beach,  11  Q.  B.  852 ;  Dow  v.  Tuttle,  4  Mass.  883.     Compare  the  case  of 


444  THE   PAEOL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXL 

but  an  agreement  to  forbear  forever  to  sue  is  in  theory  equivalent  to  a 
promise  to  give  a  release,  and  thus,  in  equity  at  least,  is  of  the  nature 
of  a  defence  which  can  be  set  up  in  an  action  on  the  main  contract.10 
But  it  may  be  difficult,  in  specific  instances,  to  determine  whether  the 
agreement  should  be  treated  as  genuinely  one  of  the  above  sort  or  as 
merely  an  agreement  limiting  liability  and  thus  of  an  inadmissible 
sort ;  u  for  example,  an  agreement  not  to  collect  more  than  a  part 
of  the  amount  of  a  note  may  be  regarded  as  not  available,12  but  an 
agreement  to  credit  a  certain  counter-claim  in  payment  may  be  given 
effect.18  It  may  be  added  that  where  the  facts  to  be  shown  negative 
the  very  existence  or  consummation  of  a  legal  act  (as  in  §  305  c,  ante), 
they  may  be  shown  as  against  any  assignee  of  the  supposed  right 
created  by  the  act,  because  he  can  obtain  nothing  if  there  was  noth- 
ing to  transfer  to  him  ;  whereas,  if  the  facts  concern  merely  a  defence 
or  enable  a  consummated  act  to  be  avoided  (as  in  the  present  section), 
the  showing  will,  in  some  departments  of  the  law,  not  be  allowed  as 
against  a  bonafide,  assignee  for  value  of  the  right  created  by  the  act.14] 
§  305  e.  Integration  of  Legal  Acts  by  Intent  of  Parties  j  (1) 
Whether  the  Act  has  been  Integrated  at  all.  [The  principle  of  In- 
tegration —  i.  e.  refusing  to  recognize,  as  a  part  of  the  act  or  as 
furnishing  its  terms,  anything  but  the  final  written  memorial  as 
adopted  by  the  parties  —  assumes  that  there  has  been  an  integration 
into  a  final  written  memorial.  It  is  therefore,  of  course,  always  pos- 
sible to  show  that  a  writing  offered  as  such  has  never  been  enacted 
by  the  parties  as  such  a  memorial,  i.  e.  that  there  never  has  been  an 
integration ;  and  in  such  case  any  negotiations  or  parts  of  the  trans- 
action whatever  may  be  considered  in  order  to  determine  the  entire 
terms  of  the  act.  A  mere  temporary  or  preliminary  memorandum  * 
or  a  series  of  letters,2  for  example,  will  usually  not  be  such  an  exclu- 
sive memorial ;  though  it  is  always  a  question  as  to  the  intent  of 
the  parties  in  the  particular  case.  A  memorandum  made  to  satisfy 
the  fourth  and  seventeenth  sections  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  is  not  as 
such  and  necessarily  the  exclusive  memorial  of  the  transaction.8  A 
receipt,  acknowledging  the  payment  of  money  or  delivery  of  goods, 
is  not  as  such  an  exclusive  memorial  of  the  terms  of  a  contract  con- 
nected with  the  money  or  the  goods ; 4  though  a  document  may  be  at 

a  contemporaneous  agreement  to  renew  :  Hoare  v.  Graham,  3  Campb.  57  ;  Ames,  Cases 
on  Bills  and  Notes,  II,  124,  note.] 

w  ["Dean  v.  Nowhall,  8  T.  R.  168;  Harriman  on  Contracts,  283.] 
»    \Ante,  §  305  c  (ft).] 

u    "Loudennilk  v.  Loudermilk,  98  Ga.  448.] 

18    "Bennett  v.  Tilltnon,  18  Mont.  28  ;  contra:  Phelps  ».  Abbott,  Mich.,  72  N.  W.  3.] 
14    "See  Dow  v.  Tnttle,  supra ;  Martin  v.  Cole,  104  U.  S.  80.] 
1  rRamsbottom  v.  Tunbridge,  2  M.  &  S.  434  ;  Doe  v.  Cartwright,  8  B.  &  Aid.  326  ; 
R.  ».  Wrangle,  2  A.  &  E.  514;  Allen  v.  Pink,  4  M.  &  W.  140;  Vaughan  v.  McCarthy, 
63  Minn.  221.] 

FBnrditt  v.  Howe,  69  Vt.  668.] 
8  rBrowne,  Statute  of  Frauds,  re.  17,  18.] 

«  L-Singleton  v.  Barrett,  2  Or.  &  .1.  3fi8  ;  Equit.  Secur.  Co.  v.  Talhert,  49  La.  An. 
1898  ;  State  0.  Giese,  N.  J.  L.,  86  Atl.  680  ;  Keaton  0.  Jones,  119  N.  C.  43 ;  ante,  §  305.] 


§§  305c£-305/.]  NO  FINAL  MEMORIAL.  445 

the  same  time  a  receipt  and  the  exclusive  memorial  of  contract ; ' 
whence  arises  the  well-known  distinction  that  a  bill  of  lading,  as  a 
receipt  for  goods,  but  not  as  a  contract  of  carriage,  may  be  shown  to 
be  incorrect  in  its  terms.6] 

§  305  /.  Same  :  (2)  Whether  the  Part  of  the  Act  in  Question  has 
been  Integrated.  [Even  though  there  has  been  an  integration,  i.  e. 
a  reduction  of  a  transaction  to  a  final  and  exclusive  written  memorial, 
yet,  since  several  transactions  may  be  consummated  by  the  same  par- 
ties at  the  same  time  of  negotiation,  and  since  the  parties  may  integrate 
one  of  these  transactions  and  not  another,  or  may  integrate  one  part 
of  a  transaction  and  not  another  part,  it  is  of  course  always  open  to 
show  that  the  integration  was  partial  only ;  and  in  such  case  the 
terms  of  the  remainder,  not  covered  by  the  written  memorial,  may  be 
gleaned  from  anything  said  or  done  by  the  parties  independently  of 
the  writing.  Effect  is  given  to  the  written  memorial  as  exclusively 
representing  the  terms  of  the  transaction,  but  only  because  the 
parties  have  so  intended  it,  and  therefore  only  so  far  the  parties 
have  intended  it.  Since  all  depends  thus  on  the  parties'  intention  as 
to  the  extent  or  scope  of  the  integration,  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciple will  depend  almost  entirely  on  the  circumstances  of  each  case, 
—  including  the  kind  of  transaction,  the  usual  terms  of  such  trans- 
actions, the  scope  of  the  writing,  and  the  surrounding  circumstances 
of  the  particular  negotiation.1  No  detailed  rules  can  be  formulated ; 
and  the  working  of  the  principle  can  best  be  understood  by  noticing 
its  application  in  particular  instances.  For  example,  where  a  written 
lease  was  given,  an  oral  agreement  by  the  lessor  to  destroy  rabbits 
on  the  leased  land  was  admitted ; 2  where  a  written  lease  of  a  house  and 
the  furniture  therein  was  made,  an  oral  agreement  by  the  lessor  to 
put  in  certain  furniture  was  excluded ; 8  where  a  deed  of  land  abutting 
on  a  street  was  made,  an  oral  agreement  by  the  vendor  to  have  the 
street  graded  was  admitted ; 4  where  a  deed  of  similar  land  was 
made,  an  oral  agreement  by  the  vendor  to  pay  for  a  sewer  in  the 
course  of  construction  was  admitted  ; 8  where  a  deed  of  two  houses, 

5  [See  Ramsdell  v.  Clark,  20  Mont.  103 ;  Jackson  v.  Ely,  57  Oh.  450 ;  Allen  v.  Mill 
Co.,  13  Wash.  216.3 

6  [The  Delaware,  14  Wall.  579;  Tallassee  F.  M.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  Ala.,  23  So.  139; 
ante,  §  305 ;  McClain,  Cases  on  Carriers,  pp.  233-248  ;  Hutchinson,  Carriers,  §§  122  ff. 
A  passage-ticket  is  usually  not  an  exclusive  memorial  of  the  contract  of  carriage :  Mann 
B.  C.  Co.  v.  Dupre,  13  U.  S.  App.   183;  Hutchinson,  Carriers,  §§  568  ff.  ;  Professor 
Beale,  in  1  Harv.  Law  Rev.  17-3 

1  [It  is  occasionally  said  (e.  g.  in  Naumberg  v.  Young,  44  N.  J.  L.  331,  whose  lan- 
guage has  been  approved  in  Thompson  v.  Libby,  34  Minn.  374  ;  Seitz  v.  Refrig.  Co., 
141  U.  S.  510),  that  the  parties'  intention  as  to  the  exclusive  effect  of  the  document  is 
to  be  gathered  exclusively  from  the  terms  of  the  document  itself  ;  but  this  is  unsound 
in  principle  as  well  as  impossible  in  practice  ;  the  fallacy  is  repudiated  in  Eighmie  ». 
Taylor,  98  N.  Y.  288.  and  has  little  support"] 

a  [Morgan  v.  Griffith,  L.  R.  6  Exch.  70.J 

8    "Angell  v.  Duke,  32  L  T.  N.  s.  320.] 

*    "Durkin  v.  Cobleigh,  Mass.,  30  N.  E.  474.} 

6  [Carr  v.  Dooley,  119  Mass.  294.J 


446  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXL 

with  the  lease  of  a  hall,  was  made,  an  oral  agreement  to  put 
hard-pine  flooring  into  the  hall  was  admitted  ;  6  where  a  deed  of  land 
and  a  store  provided  that  "  this  grant  includes  all  the  shelving  in  the 
building,"  an  agreement  to  sell  personalty  in  the  store  was  ad- 
mitted ;  7  where  a  written  contract  was  made  to  give  possession  of 
the  promisor's  premises  for  the  purpose  of  building,  an  oral  agree- 
ment to  provide  certain  room  for  storage  purposes  was  excluded  ;  8 
where  a  covenant  was  made  to  furnish  a  person's  support,  an  agree- 
ment that  the  promisee  would  live  at  a  certain  place  was  excluded  ;  9 
where  a  written  lease  of  land  was  made,  an  oral  agreement  by  the 
lessor  to  devise  the  lands  to  the  lessees,  on  condition  that  they  im- 
proved the  premises  and  paid  an  annual  rent,  was  admitted  ;  10  where 
a  written  agreement  was  made  to  board  "three  persons,"  an  oral 
agreement  specifying  the  three  was  excluded  ;  u  where  a  written  agree- 
ment was  made  to  build  waterworks,  an  oral  agreement  to  give  bond 
for  faithful  performance  was  excluded  ;  12  where  a  written  stipulation 
was  made  to  discontinue  a  suit  without  costs,  an  oral  agreement  to 
pay  counsel-fees  was  excluded  ;  18  where  a  written  agreement  to  em- 
ploy an  actor  was  made,  an  oral  agreement  to  give  him  certain  parts 
to  play  was  excluded  ;  u  where  a  written  agreement  was  made  for 
cutting,  peeling,  and  driving  timber,  an  oral  agreement  as  to  who 
should  scale  it  was  admitted  ;  15  where  a  written  agreement  was  made 
for  hauling  lumber,  an  oral  agreement  to  furnish  a  right  of  way  was 
excluded  ;  16  where  a  written  agreement  was  made  to  cut,  bank,  and 
deliver  lumber,  an  oral  agreement  to  furnish  a  place  for  banking  it 
was  excluded;  "  where  a  deed  of  fruit-land  was  given,  an  oral  agree- 
ment to  allow  the  buyer  to  take  fruit  from  adjoining  land  of  the 
seller  till  the  trees  bought  should  bear  fruit  was  excluded  ;  "  where 
a  lease  allowed  sub-leasing  for  "business  purposes,"  an  oral  agree- 
ment not  to  sub-lease  for  a  liquor-saloon  was  excluded;19  where  a 
deed  of  land  was  given,  an  oral  agreement  by  the  vendor  not  to  sell 
adjoining  lots  at  a  lower  rate  was  admitted  ;  20  where  a  written  con- 
tract for  the  purchase  of  soap  was  made,  an  agreement  by  the 
vendor  to  advertise  the  soap  was  admitted.21  Most  of  these  in- 


"(  Ira  flam  v.  Pierce,  143  Mass.  386.] 

'Bretto  v.  Levine,  50  Minn.  168.] 

'Dixon-Woods  Co.  v.  Glass  Co.,  169  Pa.  167.] 

Tuttle  ».  Burgett,  53  Oh.  498.] 
^Harman  v.  Harman,  34  U.  S.  App.  316.] 

Rector  v.  Bernaschina,  64  Ark.  650.] 
"lirewton  v.  Glass,  Ala.  22  So.  916.] 
"Patek  v.  Waples,  Mich.  72  N.  W.  995.] 
"Grimston  v.  Cunningham,  1894,  1  Q.  B.  125.] 
"Gould  v.  Excelsior  Co.,  91  Me.  214.] 
"Sutton  v.  Lumber  Co.,  Ky.,  44  S.  W.  86.] 

Oodkia  v.  Monahan,  U.  S.  App.,  83  Fed.  116.] 
^-onp;  ».  Ferine,  41  W.  Va.  314.] 
" 


"Harrison  v.  Howe,  109  Mich.  476.] 

'Unrkemann  v.  Impr.  Co.,  1G7  Mass.  1.] 

"Ayer  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  147  Mass.  46.     Warranties  of  quality,  capacity,  and  the  like 


§  305/.]  NO  FINAL   MEMORIAL.  447 

stances  are  arguable,  in  the  sense  that  a  contrary  decision  could  not 
be  thought  uusupportable ;  and  in  most  of  them  the  decisions  have 
depended  more  or  less  on  the  attendant  circumstances.  But  how- 
ever arguable  the  ruling  may  be  in  a  particular  instance,  the  general 
notion  is  always  the  same  and  is  everywhere  accepted.22  The  inquiry 
is,  for  each  instance  anew,  Was  the  subject  of  the  offered  agreement 
intended  by  the  parties  to  be  covered  or  disposed  of  in  the  written 
memorial  ?  If  they  intended  that  writing  to  represent  the  net  result 
of  their  negotiations  on  that  topic,  then  no  other  matter,  whether  oral 
or  written,  is  to  be  consulted  for  ascertaining  the  terms  of  their  act. 
—  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  test  is  whether  the  parol  agreement 
"  varies  or  adds  to  "  the  written  memorial,  or  whether  it  is  "  incon- 
sistent "  with  it.  But  these,  it  is  obvious,  may  be  fallacious  tests ; 
for,  though  an  oral  agreement  which  is  inconsistent  with  or  varies 
from  the  written  memorial  will  always  be  ineffective  and  inadmis- 
sible, it  is  not  true,  conversely,  that  an  oral  agreement  which  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  written  memorial  is  admissible.  Where  the 
parties  have  clearly  intended  to  cover  the  whole  of  a  subject  hav- 
ing many  possible  details,  the  promisor  may  not  purport  to  make  an 
engagement  as  to  one  of  the  possible  details,  and  thus  an  oral  en- 
gagement on  that  precise  point  is  not  in  strictness  inconsistent  with 
the  written  memorial,  nor  does  it  vary  the  latter ;  yet  it  may  be  inad- 
missible if  the  memorial  apparently  intended  to  embrace  the  whole 
of  the  promise  on  the  general  subject  to  which  that  detail  belongs ; 
for  example,  a  written  contract  of  sale  for  an  engine  is  in  strictness 
not  inconsistent  with  nor  varied  by  an  oral  warranty  of  the  engine's 
working-capacity,  if  the  written  memorial  does  not  refer  in  any  way 
to  the  engine's  capacity  ;  yet  such  a  warranty  would  be  by  most 
Courts  excluded.  It  seems  more  accurate  in  practice  and  more  cor- 
rect on  principle  to  avoid  such  phrasings  of  the  test,  and  to  inquire, 
more  broadly,  whether  the  subject  of  the  offered  agreement  has  been 

furnish  especial  difficulties  ;  whether  such  a  warranty  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  subject 
of  an  independent  transaction  not  intended  to  be  covered  by  the  written  contract  of 
sale  or  manufacture,  must  depend  much  on  the  kind  of  transaction ;  different  views 
have  been  taken  of  this  situation,  but  such  warranties  are  usually  excluded  ;  see  Cha- 
pin  v.  Dobson,  78  N.  Y.  74  ;  Eighmie  v.  Taylor,  98  id.  288  ;  'Hills  v  Farmington, 
Conn.,  39  Atl.  795;  Barrie  ».  Smith,  Ga.,  3l'S.  E.  121;  Conant  v.  Bank,  121  Ind. 
324  ;  Mast  v.  Pierce,  58  la.  579  ;  Zimmerman  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Dolph,  104  Mich.  281 ; 
Thompson  v.  Libby,  34  Minn.  374;  Miller  v.  Electric  Co.,  133  Mo.  205;  Quinn 
v.  Moss,  45  Nebr.  614;  Naumberg  v.  Young,  44  N.  J.  L.  331  ;  Seitz  v.  Refrig.  Co., 
141  U.  S.  510  ;  Van  Winkle  v.  Crowell,  146  id.  42 ;  Milwaukee  B.  Co.  v.  Duncan,  87 
Wis.  120  ;  Case  Plow  Works  v.  N.  &  S.  Co.,  90  id.  590. 

In  deeds,  the  recital  of  the  consideration  given  is  usually  in  the  nature  of  a  mere  re- 
ceipt and  not  of  a  term  of  the  contract  of  transfer,  and  may  therefore  be  contradicted 
when  of  that  nature  only  :  ante,  §§  284,  304  ;  Bauni  v.  Lynn,  72  Miss.  932  (instruc- 
tive case  and  opinion)  ;  Stewart  v.  R.  Co.,  141  Ind.  55  ;  Hill  v.  Whidden,  lf\8  Mass. 
267  ;  Ford  v.  Savage,  111  Mich.  144  ;  Thompson  v.  Bryant,  Miss.,  21  So.  655  ;  Squier 
v.  Evans,  127  Mo.  514  ;  Baird  v.  Baird,  145  N.  Y.  659  ;  so  also  as  to  the  date :  ante, 
§  284  ;  Vau^han  v.  Parker,  112  N.  0.  96  ;  Moore  v.  Smead,  89  Wis.  558-3 
22  QSee  other  instances,  ante,  §  281.] 


448  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   EULE.  [CH.    XXI. 

intended  to  be  wholly  disposed  of  by  the  written  memorial ;  if  so, 
the  agreement  is  not  to  be  considered,  whether  it  is  consistent  or 
inconsistent  with  the  memorial's  specific  terms. 

The  principle  now  under  consideration  finds  frequent  application 
where  it  is  desired  to  imply  into  the  contract  a  custom  or  usage 
which  prevails  for  the  class  of  transactions  involved,  and  would  be 
regarded,  but  for  the  written  memorial,  as  an  implied  term  of  the 
contract.  Ordinarily,  parties  do  not  intend  to  reduce  to  writing  in 
the  memorial  all  the  usages  applicable  to  the  class  of  transactions 
involved;  in  other  words,  the  scope  of  their  intended  integration 
includes  only  such  matters  as  may  or  must  vary  with  the  particular 
transaction,  and  not  such  matters  as  are  uniformly  arranged  for  by 
current  usage ; 28  thus,  in  an  order  for  a  large  quantity  of  flour,  the 
quantity,  the  quality,  the  grade  of  wheat,  the  consignee,  the  time 
and  place  of  delivery,  will  naturally  vary  with  the  particular  order, 
and  a  written  memorial  of  the  contract  will  therefore  have  neces- 
sarily for  its  object  the  reduction  to  certainty  of  these  variable  par- 
ticulars ;  but  the  mode  of  manufacturing,  the  mode  of  packing,  and 
the  mode  of  marking,  may  by  local  usage  be  uniform  in  all  cases, 
and  hence  there  will  usually  be  no  occasion  and  no  intention  to  deal 
with  these  matters  in  the  written  memorial;  in  other  words,  there 
has  been  on  those  points  no  intended  integration ;  and  therefore  it  is 
open  to  resort  to  current  usage  for  the  implied  terms  of  the  contract 
on  those  points.  If,  however,  the  writing,  by  mentioning  one  or 
another  of  those  points,  shows  that  there  has  been  an  intention  to 
deal  with  the  matter  in  the  written  memorial,  or  if  such  an  intention 
can  be  otherwise  ascertained,  then  the  usage  cannot  be  resorted  to  as 
furnishing  a  term  of  the  contract.  Usually,  then,  it  may  be  said, 
that  when  the  written  memorial  contains  nothing  on  the  subject  of 
the  usage  offered,  the  usage  (if  of  such  a  sort  as  by  the  law  of  con- 
tracts would  be  an  implied  term  of  the  contract)  may  be  resorted  to, 
in  spite  of  the  existence  of  the  written  memorial.  Here,  however, 
as  in  all  other  applications  of  the  present  principle,  the  result  will 
depend  chiefly  on  the  circumstances  of  each  case.24] 

28  £"  Parties  are  found  to  proceed  with  the  tacit  assumption  of  these  usages  ;  they 
commonly  reduce  into  writing  the  special  particulars  of  their  agreement,  but  omit  to 
specify  these  known  usages,  which  are  included,  however,  as  of  course,  by  mutual  un- 
derstanding. .  .  .  The  contract  in  truth  is  partly  express  and  in  writing,  partly  im- 
plied or  understood  aud  unwritten:"  Coleridge,  J.,  iii  Brown  v.  Byrne,  8  E.  &  13. 
703.1 

^TSome  instances  are  as  follows  :  Brown  v.  Byrne,  3  E.  &  B.  703  (consignee  "  pay- 
ing freight"  at  a  specified  rate;  custom  to  allow  a  discount  admitted)  ;  Scott  v. 
Hartley,  126  Ind.  239  (sale  of  grain  at  "  50i  net ;"  custom  for  the  consignee  to  deduct 
freight  paid,  excluded);  Fairly  v.  Wappoo  Mills,  44  S.  C.  227  ("sold  2000  tons,  seller 
paying  brokerage  at  10  cents  per  ton  ;  custom  to  pay  brokerage  on  only  the  amount 
delivered,  not  the  amount  contracted  for,  excluded);  Richards  Co.  v.  Hiltcbeitel,  92 
Va.  91  (contract  specifying  the  prices  for  laying  bricks  :  usage  as  to  the  method  of  as- 
certaining the  quantities  laid,  admitted)  ;  Gilbert  v.  McGinnis,  114  111.  28  (agreement 
to  make  advances ;  custom  to  reijuire  notes  for  the  advances,  excluded)  ;  see  many 
more  instances,  ante,  §  292.} 


§§  305/-305#.]        WRITING   REQUIRED   BY   LAW.  449 

§  305  y.  Integration  by  Requirement  of  Law.  [The  process  of 
Integration,  from  which  it  results  that  the  terras  of  a  particular 
transaction  are  to  be  sought  only  in  a  written  memorial,  is  one  de- 
pendent usually  upon  the  intent  of  the  parties.  If  they  have  willed 
that  a  certain  writing  shall  exclusively  be  and  represent  their  act, 
then  the  Court  will  so  treat  it  ;  if  they  have  not  so  willed,  then 
the  Court  will  resort  to  any  negotiations  that  may  have  occurred, 
and  to  any  dealings,  whether  oral  or  written,  to  ascertain  and  piece 
together  the  total  of  terms  of  the  act.  But  there  is  another  case  in 
which  the  Court  may  decline  to  consider  sundry  acts  and  dealings  as 
furnishing  the  terms  of  a  legal  act,  and  may  confine  itself  solely  to  a 
single  written  memorial  ;  and  that  is  where  by  provision  of  law  the 
act  is  to  be  valid  only  when  it  is  transacted  in  the  shape  of  a  single 
written  memorial.  When  the  law  has  provided  that  the  only  way  in 
which  an  act  may  be  given  legal  significance  or  existence  is  by  doing 
it,  and  all  of  it,  in  writing,  then  no  other  conduct  or  dealings,  pur- 
porting to  be  such  an  act,  can  be  considered,  and  evidence  of  them  is 
of  course  inadmissible  because  tending  to  prove  an  immaterial  factum, 
probandum.  The  difference  between  the  effect  of  non-integration 
of  this  sort  and  of  the  preceding  sort  is  that,  in  the  former  case  (in- 
tegration by  intent  of  the  parties),  resort  to  parol1  transactions 
is  forbidden  only  when  the  parties  have  by  intention  made  the 
single  writing  the  exclusive  memorial  ;  and  if  they  have  not,  then 
resort  may  be  had  to  parol  transactions  if  any  occurred  ;  while  in  the 
latter  case  (integration  by  requirement  of  law)  resort  to  parol  trans- 
actions is  absolutely  forbidden,2  so  that  if  the  act  has  not  been  inte- 
grated in  writing  as  required,  a  transaction  in  parol  will  still  be  of 
no  significance  for  the  purpose  in  hand. 

The  cases  in  which  by  requirement  of  law  there  must  be  an  integra- 
tion in  writing  are  of  two  general  sorts  :  (1)  certain  acts  by  ordinary 
persons,  creating,  transferring,  and  extinguishing  rights  and  obliga- 
tions ;  (2)  proceedings  by  judicial  and  other  officers. 

(1)  In  only  a  few  instances  does  a  requirement  of  law  prescribe 
that  an  act,  to  be  valid,  must  be  reduced  to  writing  ;  the  genius  of 
our  law  being  contrary  to  that  of  the  Continental  law  in  this  respect. 
Almost  universally  such  a  requirement  3  is  made  for  wills  of  realty  ;  * 
in  most  jurisdictions  the  requirement  extends  to  wills  of  person- 
alty also  ;  in  probably  all  jurisdictions  an  exception  exists  for  oral 
(nuncupative)  wills  by  soldiers  and  sailors  in  service,  and,  some- 
times, by  persons  on  a  deathbed  or  during  a  journey.6  In  most  juris- 


"parol,"  in  connection  with  the  present  principle  is  properly  meant,  not 
merely  oral  utterances,  but  also  informal  writings,  i.  e.  writings  (letters,  memoranda, 
etc.)  other  than  the  single  and  final  written  memorial  ;  se«  ante,  §  305  a.] 

3  TThere  is  one  apparent  exception,  to  he  noted  later.] 

8  LThis  matter  is  briefly  dealt  with  by  the  author  ante,  §§  261-274,  now  transferred 
to  Appendix  II.] 

*  fSee  Jarman  on  Wills,  6th  Am.  ed.  76.] 

*  £  See  Jarman,  ubi  supra,  784.] 
VOL.  I.—  29 


450  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXL 

dictions,  also,  grants  of  realty  are  required  to  be  reduced  wholly  to 
writing.  The  requirement  of  a  memorandum  of  certain  data  in  a 
transaction  of  sale,  provided  for  in  the  fourth  and  seventeenth  sec- 
tions of  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a  require- 
ment of  the  above  sort ;  that  which  the  statute  requires  is  merely  an 
accompanying  or  collateral  written  memorandum  of  some  parts  of 
the  transaction ; 8  it  thus  differs  in  the  two  important  respects  that 
an  oral  contract  of  sale  may  exist  independently  of  the  memorandum 7 
(whereas  the  written  will,  and  nothing  else,  is  the  testamentary  act), 
and  that  only  certain  parts  of  the  transaction  need  be  noted  in  the 
memorandum  (whereas  the  written  will  must  contain  Qvery  part  of 
the  testamentary  act). 

(2)  It  has  long  been  a  principle  of  our  law,  irrespective  of  any 
statutory  requirement,  that  the  proceedings  of  a  Court  exist  and  are 
to  be  found  only  in  the  "record."8  Precisely  what  the  "record"  is 
has  been  the  subject  of  many  detailed-  rulings  and  much  statutory 
regulation ;  but  the  general  notion  conceives  it  as  the  final  enrol- 
ment or  written  expansion  of  all  the  proceedings  in  a  litigation,  made 
by  the  clerk  or  the  judge,  and  verified  by  the  judge.9  This  "record" 
is,  in  legal  theory,  not  a  testimonial  report  by  the  officer  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, nor  a  copy  of  some  other  written  act ;  it  is  the  proceeding 
and  the  act  itself.10  Nothing  that  is  not  in  this  record  is  a  legal  act 
or  a  part  of  the  proceedings  ;  what  is  not  in  the  record  has  not  been 
done ;  and,  consequently,  it  cannot  be  shown  that  something  _was 
done  which  is  not  noted  in  the  record,  or  that  a  thing  noted  in  the 
record  was  in  truth  done  differently.  The  principle  applies,  of  course, 
only  to  such  proceedings  as  properly  form  a  component  part  of  the 
proceedings ;  and  hence  transactions  not  properly  forming  a  part 
of  the  record  may  be  shown  otherwise  than  by  the  record  ;  and  there 
is  much  learning  as  to  the  discriminations  here  necessary  to  be  taken. 
Moreover,  though  in  legal  theory  the  record  is  the  proceeding  itself, 
nevertheless  it  is  usually  not  prepared  till  an  interval  of  time  has 
elapsed  after  the  actual  oral  proceeding,  and  in  the  meantime  the 
cjerk  or  the  judge  has,  in  a  docket  or  a  minute-book,  made  a  temporary 
note  of  the  various  things  done.  Thus  a  question  may  arise  as  to  the 
propriety  of  using  the  minutes  to  correct  the  record ; n  though  even 
when  this  is  allowed,  the  record  is  still  in  legal  theory  the  proceeding 

8  £3ee  Browne,  Statute  of  Frauds,  cc.  17,  18.     The  statute  is  briefly  treated  by  the 
author,  ante,  §§  262-273,  now  transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 

7_TSo  that,  for  example,  the  memorandum  may  be  made  after  the  actual  contract  of 
sale.j" 

TBriefly  treated  by  the  author,  ante,  §  86/] 

9  LSee  the  nature  and  policy  of  the  doctrine  expounded  in  Pruden  r.  Alden,  23 
Pick.  184;  Ward  v.  Saunders,  6  Ired.  382;  Wells  v.  Stevens,  2  Gray  115.] 

11  £"  The  record  is  tried  by  inspection  ;  and  if  the  judgment  does  not  there  appear, 
the  conclusion  of  law  is  that  none  was  rendered : "  Nisbet,  J.,  in  Bryant  v.  Owen, 
1  Oa.  355,  367."! 

11  FJBy  making  nn  entry  mine  pro  tune ;  see  Jacks  v.  Adamson,  66  Oh.  397  ;  State 
9.  Feister,  Or.,  60  Pac.  661.] 


§  305  g.]  WRITING   REQUIRED   BY  LAW.  451 

itself,  and  stands  effective  until  formally  corrected.  Thus  again, 
resort  may  be  had  to  the  minutes  as  representing  and  constituting 
the  proceeding,  where  the  record  proper  has  been  lost  or  destroyed 
or  has  never  been  made  up  ; 12  and  here  occurs  the  peculiar  difference 18 
between  this  kind  of  integration  by  law  and  the  preceding  kind ;  for 
in  the  case,  for  example,  of  a  will,  if  no  will  in  writing  exists,  no  oral 
or  other  informal  attempt  at  a  will  may  take  its  place ;  while,  if  a 
record  has  not  been  made  up,  the  provisional  minute-book  or  docket 
is  treated  as  representing  the  proceeding. 

There  are  but  few  other  official  proceedings  which  are  treated,  after 
the  analogy  of  judicial  records,  as  constituted  solely  in  and  by  the 
official  writing.  The  principle  is  sometimes  applied  to  the  records  of 
a  public  corporation ; 14  and  is  usually  applied  to  the  journals  of  a 
Legislature.18  The  acknowledgment  by  a  married  woman  that  she 
signs  a  deed  of  her  own  free  will  is  in  many  jurisdictions  treated  as  a 
judicial  proceeding,  and  the  official  certificate  can  thus  not  be  shown 
to  be  incorrect;  but  other  views  have  often  (sometimes  by  express 
statute)  prevailed.16  The  registration  of  a  deed  is  usually  regarded  as 
merely  the  preservation  of  an  official  copy  of  the  original  and  effec- 
tive document;17  but  perhaps  under  the  recent  improved  systems  of 
transfer  the  official  registry  may  be  treated  on  the  principles  of  judicial 
records.18  To  be  distinguished  from  the  principles  applicable  to  judi- 
cial records  is  a  principle,  not  infrequently  treated  as  equivalent,  by 
which  an  official's  report  or  certificate  of  an  act  done  before  him  by  a 
person  wishing  to  do  a  legal  act  is  treated  as  conclusive  testimony 
to  the  nature  of  the  act  done.  There  are  but  few  well-established 
instances  of  this ;  the  chief  one  being  the  magistrate's  report,  as 
required  by  many  statutes,  of  the  statement  of  an  accused  person 

12  £"  Until  they  can  be  made  up,  the  short  notes  must   stand  as  the   record : " 
Pruden  v.  Alden,  23  Pick.   184;  "Minutes  may  be  introduced  as  ...  in  truth  for 
the  time  being  constituting  the  record  itself:"  McGrath    v.   Seagrave,    2    All.   443. 
Where  the  final  record  is  lost,  the  minutes  take  its  place :  Cook  v.  Wood,  1  McCord 
139.] 

13  fSee  note  2,  ante.~] 

14  LSee  Saxton  v.  Sfinnus,  14  Mass.  315;Thayer  v.  Stearns,  1  Pick.  109;  Roland 
v.  District,  161  Pa.  102,  106.     But  there  is  sometimes  a  difference,  in  that  oral  pro- 
ceedings can  be  shown  if  no  record  was  made:  Boggs  v.  Ass'n,  111  Cal.  354;   Za- 
lesky  v.  Ins.  Co.,  102  la.  512;  contra,  Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  397-3 

15  [Post,  §  482.] 

16  £0ne  view  is  that  the  certificate  is  conclusive  except  as  to  appearance  or  juris- 
diction in  general ;    another,  that  it  is  impeachable  only  for    fraud    or   perhaps   for 
mistake ;  another,  that  it  may  be  contradicted  on  any  point ;   see  the  various  views 
represented  in  Elliott  v.  Peirsol,  1  Pet.  328  ;  Edinb.  R"  L.  M.  Co.  v.  Peoples,  102  Ala. 
241 ;   Woodhead  v.  Foulds,  7  Bush  222 ;    Dodge   v.    Hollinshead,   6  Minn.  25,  39 ; 
Davis  v.  Howard,  172  111.  340;  Harkins  v.  Forsyth,   11   Leigh  294.1 

«  [See  Harvey  v.  Thorpe,  28  Ala.  250;  Gaston  v.  Merriam,  33  Minn  271  ;  Flem- 
ing v.  Parry,  24 'Pa.  47;  Hastings  v.  B.  H.  T.  Co.,  9  Pick.  80;  Ames  v.  Phelps, 
18  Pick.  314 ;  Jones,  Real  Property.  §  1475  ;  so  also  as  to  its  non-conclusiveness  m 
regard  to  the  time  of  recording :  Bartlett  v.  Boyd,  34  Vt.  256 ;  Horsley  v.  Garth, 
2  Giatt.  371,  391-3 

w  QSee  articles  in  6  Harv.  L.  Rev.  302,  369,  410 ;  7  id.  24.] 


452  THE   PAEOL   EVIDENCE   EULE.  [CH.    XXL 

examined  before  him ; 19  here  the  real  process  seems  to  be  the  mak- 
ing of  a  specific  witness'  testimony  conclusive.20] 

§  305  h.  Parol  Evidence  Rule  applicable  only  bet-ween  the  Parties. 
[It  is  usually  said  *  that  the  parol-evidence  rule  is  applicable  only  be- 
tween the  parties.  That  this  is  correct,  for  many  purposes  at  least,  may 
be  seen  by  noticing  the  principle  of  the  rule  so  far  as  the  integration 
was  made  by  intent  of  the  parties.  Their  determination  is  that,  for 
the  purposes  of  constituting  a  certain  legal  act  of  theirs,  a  particular 
writing  shall  alone  be  consulted;  but,  so  far  as  concerns  their  rela- 
tions to  other  persons,  their  conduct  and  utterances  extrinsic  to  that 
writing  may  still  be  considered,  so  far  as  such  data  are  not  treated  as 
part  of  that  act  but  become  material  for  some  other  purpose.  For 
example,  where  thfe  issue  is  as  to  adverse  possession  of  a  right  of  way, 
the  deed  not  reserving  such  a  right,  a  conversation  between  grantor 
and  grantee,  the  former  conceding  the  way,  would  be  receivable  as 
affecting  the  adverse  nature  of  the  grantee's  possession ; 2  so  also  a 
creditor,  claiming  to  set  aside  a  mortgage  as  fraudulent,  could  show, 
as  evidence  of  fraud,  the  debtor's  oral  agreement  with  the  mortgagee ; 8 
so,  also,  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  embezzlement,  in  which  the  in- 
tent is  the  material  issue,  an  oral  promise  by  the  employer  to  allow 
certain  siims  to  the  employee,  could  be  shown,  in  spite  of  the  terms 
of  the  written  contract  between  them.4  Where  the  integration  is  re- 

19  fJThis  subject  is  examined  ante,  §  227. 

There  are  many  other  instances  in  which  such  a  conclusive  effect  has  been  claimed 
but  usually  denied  for  an  official  certificate  ;  for  example,  to  a  registration  of  birth 
(Hermann  v.  State,  73  Wis.  248)  ;  to  an  enrolment  of  recruits  by  a  military  officer 
(Wilson  v.  McClure,  50  111.  366)  ;  to  a  notarial  certificate  (Wood  v.  Trust  Co.,  7  How. 
Miss.  609,  630;  Merrill  v.  Sypert,  Ark.,  44  S.  W.  462);  to  the  certificate  of  an  oath- 
taking,  or  jurat  (see  R.  v.  Emden,  9  East  437  ;  Thurston  v.  Slatford,  1  Salk.  284  ; 
Sherman  v.  Needham,  4  Pick.  66). 3 

23  FJThe  feature  superficially  common  to  both  principles  is  that  it  is  forbidden  to 
show  that  the  thing  was  done  other  than  as  stated  in  the  document.  But  the 
reasons  for  this  identical  result  are  not  the  same  in  both  cases.  In  the  case  of  a 
judicial  record,  the  record  is  the  proceeding  ;  consequently  nothing  else  may  be 
consulted  as  constituting  the  proceeding.  In  the  case  of  an  official's  report,  the 
effective  legal  act  is  still  what  was  done  or  said  before  him;  and  his  writing  is  no 
more  than  a  reporting  or  testifying  to  that  act  of  another  person  ;  it  is  a  preferred 
report  and  is  conclusive,  but  it  is  still  only  a  report  (compare  §  97  d,  ante. )  The 
practical  difference  is  that,  in  the  case  of  a  magistrate's  report,  if  it  is  for  any 
reason  not  available  (by  loss  or  destruction,  for  example),  it  is  sufficient  to  prove 
directly  the  oral  statements  of  the  accused  by  one  who  heard  them,  on  the  theory 
that  when  a  preferred  witness  is  unavailable,  an  ordinary  witness  will  suffice ; 
while  in  the  case  of  a  judicial  record,  if  the  record  itself  was  never  made,  then 
the  proceeding  cannot  be  proved  at  all  (as  well  expounded  by  Hubbard,  J.,  in 
Sayles  v.  Briggs,  4  Mete.  421),  and  if  it  was  made  but  is  lost,  then  the  proof 
would  be,  not  of  the  oral  doings,  but  of  the  record's  contents  (Mandeville  v. 
Reynolds,  68  N.  Y.  528,  533  ;  see  post,  §  509),  and  where  by  statute  the  resort 
to  oral  doings  is  allowable  in  order  to  restore  lost  records,  it  is  in  legal  theory, 
not  the  substitution  of  one  kind  of  testimony  for  another,  but  the  re-constitution, 
by  compilation,  of  the  judicial  act  itself.] 


I 


Ants,  §  279.] 

'Ashley  v.  Ashley,  4  Gray  197.] 
J.Jewett  v.  Sundback,  5  S.  D.  Ill,  119.] 
^Walker  v.  State,  Ala.,  23  So.  149  ;  compare  Re  Clapton,  3  Cox  Cr.  126.] 


§§  305  #-305  i.]  INTEEPRETATION.  453 

quired  by  law,  the  same  consequence  may  follow ;  thus,  on  an  issue 
as  to  the  contents  of  a  lost  will  or  of  undue  influence,  the  testator's 
normal  testamentary  intentions  being  admissible  in  evidence,  oral 
statements  of  intention,5  or  a  will  not  duly  executed,  or  a  will  not 
proved  by  the  attesting  witnesses,6  could  be  used  as  showing  the  tes- 
tamentary intention ;  since  here  there  is  no  attempt  to  use  the  utter- 
ances as  having  testamentary  effectiveness.  The  truth  seems  to  be, 
then,  that  the  rule,  as  regards  others  than  the  parties  to  the  act,  does 
not  exclude  extrinsic  utterances  so  far  as  they  are  for  any  purpose  ad- 
missible ;  but  that  even  for  other  parties,  it  would  still  apply  to  ex- 
clude, where  the  object  was  to  show  the  terms  of  the  act  as  the  effective 
transaction  between  the  parties.  Nevertheless,  it  is  common  to  say, 
without  qualification  (as  in  §  279,  ante),  that  the  rule  applies  only  in 
suits  between  the  parties.7] 

§  305  i.  (II)  Interpretation  of  Legal  Acts.  [Assuming  that  a  legal 
act  has  been  consummated  (whether  it  has  or  has  not  been  integrated), 
a  peculiar  situation  and  a  new  set  of  questions  are  presented  when  the 
act  comes  before  the  Courts  for  enforcement.  The  process  of  realizing, 
enforcing,  or  giving  objective  effectiveness  to  the  party's  act  involves 
the  application  of  the  terms  of  the  act  to  external  objects  so  as  to 
carry  out  and  make  good,  by  process  of  law,  the  results  prescribed  by 
the  act.  Assuming  that  there  is  no  legal  objection  to  this  realization 
of  the  act,  then  the  sole  aim  of  the  Court  is  to  ascertain  the  signifi- 
cance of  its  terms,  or,  in  other  words,  the  associations  or  connections 
between  the  terms  of  the  act  and  the  various  possible  objects  of  the 
external  world.  The  process  of  fulfilling  this  aim  is  the  process  of 
Interpretation.  In  order  to  understand  the  questions  which  it  pre- 
sents, two  fundamental  distinctions  must  be  noticed  at  the  outset : 
(1)  the  distinction  between  the  intention  of  the  party  and  the  mean- 
ing  of  his  words ;  (2)  the  distinction  between  various  standards  of 
meaning,  i.  e.  individual,  mutual,  and  customary  meaning. 

(1)  The  distinction  between  "intention"  and  "meaning"  (quite 
apart  from  any  dispute  as  to  the  propriety  of  these  names)  is  vital. 
Interpretation  as  a  legal  process  is  concerned  with  the  meaning  of 
words  and  not  with  the  intention  of  the  one  using  them.1  It  is  com- 

«  VAnte,  §§  14m,  162  e.] 

6  rpemombreun  v.  Walker,  4  Baxt.  199.] 

7  [Tor  other  instances,  see  Dunn  v.  Price,  112  Cal.  46  ;  Roof  v.  Pulley  Co.,  36  Fla. 
284  ;  Kellogg  v.  Tompson,  142  Mass.  76  ;    Plaiufield   F.  N.  B'k   v.  Dunn,    57  N.  J.  L. 
404  ;  Libby  v.  Laud  Co.,  N.  H.,  32  Atl.  772;    Hankinson   v.  Vantine,  152  N.  Y.  20  ; 
Jobnson  v.  Portwood,  89  Tex.  235;  Signa  Iron  Co.  v.  Greeve,  U.    S.  App.,  88  Fed. 
207.1 

1  "[This  distinction  and  the  above  canon,  insisted  upon  by  many  judges  (e.  g. 
Lord  Denman,  C.  J.,  in  Ricktnan  ».  Carstairs,  5  B.  &  Ad.  663  :  "The  question  .  .  . 
is  not  what  was  the  intention  of  the  parties,  but  what  is  the  meaning  of  the  words 
they  have  used")  and  by  Sir  J.  Wigrani,  in  his  treatise  on  "  Extrinsic  Evidence  in 
All  of  the  Interpretation  of  Wills,"  has  been  acutely  and  strenuously  denied  by 
F.  V.  Hawkins,  Esq.,  in  his  paper  "  On  the  Principles  of  Legal  Interpretation  (2  Jurid. 
Soc.  Papers  298  ;  reprinted  in  Thayer's  "Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,"  App.  C) ; 


454  THE   PAROL    EVIDENCE    KULE.  [CH.    XXL 

monly  said,  as  explaining  the  process,  that  the  words  are  symbols, 
and  that  the  object  of  interpretation  is  to  ascertain  the  meaning 
of  the  symbols.  But  it  is  here  still  open  to  believe  that  in  ascertain- 
ing the  "  meaning "  of  the  symbols  we  are  endeavoring  to  ascertain 
the  state  of  the  party's  mind  as  fixed  upon  certain  objects  ;  and  w*> 
are  thus  relegated  once  more  to  his  mental  condition  as  the  ultimate 
object  of  the  investigation.  This  mode  of  defining  the  process  is 
likely  to  mislead,  because  the  private  intent  of  the  party  is  con- 
stantly found  to  be  excluded  by  the  law  from  consideration,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  reconcile  this  prohibition  with  the  theory  that  interpreta- 
tion aims  ultimately  to  ascertain  intention.  Perhaps  a  better  notion 
of  the  distinction  between  intent  and  the  meaning  of  words  may  be 
obtained  from  the  analogy  of  other  illustrations.  Suppose  a  vessel 
coasting  the  shore  and  entering  various  harbors  where  the  Govern- 
ment maintains  a  uniform  system  of  harbor-buoys  of  various  colors 
and  shapes,  indicating  respectively  channels,  sandbars,  sunken  rocks, 
and  safe  anchorages ;  here  the  significance  of  each  kind  of  buoy  is 
known  to  be  the  same  in  every  harbor  under  Government  control. 
But  suppose  the  vessel  to  enter  a  harbor  or  inlet  under  the  control  of 
an  individual  or  a  city  having  a  peculiar  and  different  code  of  usage 
for  the  buoys ;  here  it  is  immaterial  whether  a  red  buoy  under  the 
Government  system  signifies  a  channel  or  a  sandbar ;  the  vital  ques- 
tion for  the  vessel  now  is  what  a  red  buoy  signifies  under  the  code  of 
the  local  authority,  and  all  other  systems  of  meaning  are  thrown 
aside  as  useless.  This  illustrates  that  though,  in  interpreting  a 
party's  (e.  g.  a  testator's)  words,  we  are  concerned  with  his  individual 
meaning,  as  distinguished  from  the  customary  sense  of  words,  still 
we  are  not  dealing  with  his  state  of  mind,  but  with  the  associations 
affixed  by  him  to  an  expressed  symbol  as  indicating  to  others  an  ex- 
ternal object.  That  is  to  say,  the  local  harbor  authorities  may  have 
"  intended  "  to  put  a  green  buoy  instead  of  a  red  buoy,  or  to  have  put 
the  red  buoy  at  another  spot,  just  as  the  testator  may  have  intended 
to  use  other  words ;  but  in  both  cases  the  state  of  mind  as  to  inten- 
tion is  a  wholly  different  thing  from  the  fixed  association,  according 
to  that  individual's  standard,  between  the  expressed  symbol  and  some 
external  object.  To  illustrate  another  aspect  of  the  subject,  sup- 
pose a  game,  e.  g.  of  chess,  to  be  played  by  B  with  his  guest  A.  If 
the  two  are  of  the  same  nation,  their  standards  —  e.  g.  as  to  the 
shape  of  each  chessman,  the  allowable  moves,  and  the  effect  of  a 
move  —  will  be  the  same.  But  some  nations  differ  from  others  in  one 
or  more  of  these  respects  ;  so  that  if,  for  example,  B's  national  rules 

Mr.  Hawkins  calls  the  above  principle  "  a  fallacy  of  no  small  importance,"  since 
interpretation  is  mainly  "a  collecting  of  the  intent  from  all  available  signs  or 
marks."  Nevertheless,  it  would  be  possible  to  show  that  the  fallacy,  on  the  con- 
trary, lies  in  not  recognizing  this  principle  ;  and  its  recognition  seems  to  enable  us 
better  to  understand  the  actual  rules  of  law  ;  see  the  discussions  in  Leonhard,  Das 
Irrthum  bei  inchtigeu  Yurtragen,  referred  to  ante,  §  305  c.] 


§  305  *.]  INTERPRETATION.  455 

allowed  a  rook  to  threaten  diagonally  on  the  board,  A  as  guest  would 
accept  and  accommodate  himself,  as  best  he  might,  to  this  standard  of 
operation.  But,  though  this  much  might  be  conceded  to  B  as  host,  in 
the  adoption  of  his  standards  for  giving  effect  or  meaning  to  his  acts 
of  moving  the  chessmen,  yet  it  would  remain  true  that  his  private  in- 
tent or  state  of  mind,  as  distinguished  from  the  significance  of  his  acts 
of  moving,  would  be  immaterial ;  so  that,  for  example,  his  intent  to 
have  touched  and  moved  a  different  piece,  or  to  have  placed  the  piece 
on  a  different  square,  would  not  be  taken  into  consideration.  In  the 
same  way,  the  process  of  interpretation  may  concern  itself  with  the 
individual  significance  of  a  testator's  words  as  associated  by  his 
standards  with  specific  objects,  but  it  may  at  the  same  time  refuse  to 
concern  itself  with  the  state  of  mind  that  led  up  to  the  use  of  those 
words.2  —  On  the  one  hand,  then,  is  to  be  noted  the  distinction  between 
"  intention  "  (or  state  of  mind  at  the  time  of  acting)  and  "  meaning  " 
(or  the  association  between  specific  words  and  external  objects).  The 
process  of  interpretation  may  best  be  thought  of  as  the  tracing  and 
ascertainment  of  this  association. 

(2)  In  this  process  of  ascertainment,  whose  standard  of  meaning 
shall  be  taken  ?  The  standards  may  be  different,  according  as  the 
transaction  is  a  unilateral  or  a  bilateral  one.  Where  effect  is  to  be 
given  to  the  act  of  a  single  person  —  for  example,  a  testator,  —  there 
is  no  reason  why  his  individual  standard  of  usage  should  not  be  em- 
ployed; for  example,  if  he  names  a  house  on  "Maple  Place,"  the 
words  are  to  be  applied  to  the  locality  habitually  associated  by  him 
with  that  term  even  though  that  locality  is  commonly  designated  as 
"Maple  Street."8  But  if  the  transaction  is  one  in  which  another 
person  has  shared  (as  a  deed  or  contract)  so  that  the  other  person 
has  acted  on  the  faith  of  a  certain  meaning  to  the  words,  then  the 
standard  must  be  enlarged;  it  is  not  to  be  the  individual  standard  of 
the  first  party,  but  the  standard  which  the  other  party  was  reason- 
ably justified  in  acting  upon,  —  primarily  and  usually,  the  standard 
common  to  other  persons  generally,  but,  secondarily  and  peculiarly, 
the  particular  standard  of  the  second  party,  if  that  should  differ  from 
the  standard  of  the  community  and  still  be  a  reasonable  one.  It 
follows  (1)  that  the  individual  meaning  or  sense  used  by  the  first 
party  alone  is  in  itself  immaterial;  *  (2)  that  the  sense  to  be  taken  is 
that  which  the  other  party  was  by  universal  usage  in  the  community 
justified  in  attributing  to  the  words;  (3)  that  provided  both  parties 
are  acquainted  with  a  special  (usually  a  commercial)  usage,  which 

2  fJThe  lav/  might  conceivably  choose  to  give  effect  to  the  intention ;  it  does 
rarely,  as  in  the  case  of  reformation  for  mutual  mistake  ;  why  it  usually  does  not 
is  noted  in  the  next  section.] 

8  ["For  the  supposed  rule  against  disturbing  a  clear  meaning,  see  post,  §  305  Z.] 

4  [Fox  i'.  R.  Co.  v.  Conn.,  38  Atl.  871  ;  Gamble  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  50  Nebr.  463  ;  Kick- 

erson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  149  N.  Y.  307  ;  Fudge  v.  Payne,  86  Va.  306  ;  Anderson  v.  Jarrctt, 

43  W.  Va.  246.     The  case  of  an  ambiguity  in  which  each  party's  sense  is  a  reasonable 

one  (Raffles  v.  Wichelhaus,  2  H.  &  C.  906  ;  "ex  Peerless ")  rests  on  peculiar  grounds/] 


456  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXI 

would  naturally  apply  to  the  case  in  hand,  the  term  may  be  inter- 
preted according  to  that  special  usage ; 6  (4)  that  where  the  first 
party  employs  the  term  in  an  individual  sense,  which  differs  from 
the  general  sense,  but  is  nevertheless  known  to  the  second  party  to 
be  attached  to  the  term,  the  second  party  is  not  entitled  to  invoke 
the  general  standard,  but  must  be  content  with  an  enforcement  ac- 
cording to  this  individual  sense.6] 

§  305  j.  Same:  General  Principle  of  Interpretation.  [In  this 
process  of  ascertaining  the  association  between  specific  words,  as 
used  by  the  person  acting,  and  external  objects,  a  large  field  of  in- 
vestigation is  opened.  So  far  as  concerns  the  implications  of  the 
process  itself,  it  is  natural,  and  it  may  be  accepted  as  a  legal  princi- 
ple, that  all  sources  of  information  should  be  consulted.  The  cir- 
cumstances amid  which  the  person  lived  and  acted,  his  usages  as  to 
words  and  phrases,  his  conduct  and  expressions,  may  all  furnish 
data  throwing  light  upon  his  association  of  specific  objects  with  spe- 
cific words  and  phrases,  — i.  e.  upon  the  meaning  of  such  words  and 
phrases.  "  To  understand  the  meaning  of  any  writer  we  must  first 
be  apprised  of  the  persons  and  circumstances  that  are  the  subject  of 
his  allusions  or  statements;  and  if  these  are  not  fully  disclosed  in 
his  work,  we  must  look  for  illustration  to  the  history  of  the  times 
in  which  he  wrote,  and  to  the  works  of  contemporaneous  authors. 
All  the  facts  and  circumstances,  therefore,  respecting  persons  or 
property  to  which  the  will  relates,  are  undoubtedly  legitimate,  and 
often  necessary  evidence,  to  enable  us  to  understand  the  meaning 
and  application  of  his  words." l  "  The  Court  has  a  right  to  ascertain 
all  the  facts  which  were  known  to  the  testator  at  the  time  he  made 
the  will,  and  thus  to  place  itself  in  the  testator's  position,  in  order 
to  ascertain  the  bearing  and  application  of  the  language  which  he 
uses,  and  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  there  exists  any  person  or 
thing  to  which  the  whole  description  given  in  the  will  can  be, 
reasonably  and  with  sufficient  certainty  applied."2  "To  get  at  the 
intention  expressed  by  the  will,  ...  as  a  will  must  necessarily 
apply  to  persons  and  things  external,  any  evidence  may  be  given  of 
facts  and  circumstances  which  have  any  tendency  to  give  effect  and 
operation  to  the  will;  such  as  the  names,  descriptions,  and  designa- 
tions of  persons,  the  relations  in  which  they  stood  to  the  testator, 
the  facts  of  his  life,  as  having  been  single  or  married  one  or  more 
times,  having  had  children  by  one  or  more  wives,  their  names,  ages, 
places  of  residence,  occupations;  so  of  grandchildren,  brothers  and 

•  rjSee  Armstrong  r.  Oranite  Co.,  111.,  42  N.  E.  186  ;  Eaton  v.  Gladwell,  108  Mich. 
678 ;  Iliokerson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  149  N.  Y.  307;  these  cases  illustrate  that  the  usnge  must 
be  in  fact  known  to  the  other  party,  or  so  general  that  it  was  probably  known  to  him.] 
'  [[For  additional  instances  upon  all  these  points  see  ante,  §§  280,  292. 
For  the  application  here  of   the  supposed  rule  ugainst  disturbing  a   clear  mean- 
ing, see  pott,  §  305  /J 

rixml  Abinger,  C7B.,  in  Doe  v.  Kisrooks,  5  M.  &  W.  363 .] 
»  [Lord  Cairns,  L.  C.,  in  Charter  v.  Charter,  L.  R.  7  H.  L.  364.] 


§§  305  t-305  &.]  INTERPRETATION.  457 

sisters,  nephews  and  nieces;  and  all  similar  facts;  and  the  same 
kind  of  evidence  may  be  given  of  all  facts  and  circumstances  attend- 
ing the  property  bequeathed,  its  name,  place,  and  description,  as  by 
its  former  owner,  present  occupant,  or  otherwise."8  "The  general 
rule  is  that  in  construing  a  will  the  Court  is  entitled  to  put  itself 
into  the  position  of  the  testator,  and  to  consider  all  material  facts 
and  circumstances  known  to  the  testator  with  reference  to  which  he 
is  to  be  taken  to  have  used  the  words  in  the  will."  * 

There  is  thus,  so  far  as  the  natural  suggestions  of  the  process  of 
interpretation  are  concerned,  a  "  free  and  full  range  among  extrinsic 
facts  in  aid  of  interpretation." 6  But  are  there  any  limitations  upon 
this  range  of  search,  other  than  the  ordinary  rules  as  to  the  admissi- 
bility  of  evidence?  It  is  not  easy  to  trace  and  distinguish  the  various 
elusive  shapes  taken  by  certain  supposed  rules  of  limitation.  But 
those  that  have,  in  one  shape  or  another,  received  effect,  correctly 
or  incorrectly,  seem  reducible  to  three  general  rules:  (1)  a  rule 
against  using  declarations  of  intention ;  (2)  a  rule  against  disturbing 
a  clear  meaning;  and  (3)  a  rule  against  correcting  a  false  descrip- 
tion.6] 

§  305  /.'.  Same  :  (l)  Rule  against  using  Declarations  of  Intention. 
[An  established  rule,  never  questioned,  is  that,  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
terpretation, declarations  of  intention  are  not  to  be  consulted.  The 
reason  is  not  that  such  declarations  cannot  throw  light  upon  the  ap- 
plication of  the  words;  for  they  might  conceivably  do  so;  but  that 
their  chief  and  overshadowing  function  and  effect  would  be  to  set  up 
a  rival  declaration  of  volition,  coming  directly  into  competition  with 
the  words  of  the  document  which  alone  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  legal 
act.  Thus,  where  a  will  provides  for  a  bequest  of  the  testator's 
library  to  his  cousin  James,  an  oral  declaration  of  his,  "  I  want  my 
nephew  William  to  have  my  library,"  while  conceivably  it  might 
with  other  facts  help  out  a  disputed  interpretation,  would  be  likely 
to  have  the  paramount  effect,  if  considered,  of  overturning  the 
words  of  the  will  and  substituting,  as  that  part  of  the  testamentary 
act,  a  declaration  not  in  itself  available  as  a  testamentary  act;  in 

8  PShaw,  C.  J.,  in  Tucker  v.  Seaman's  Aid  Society,  7  Met.  188.] 

4  rBlackburn,  J.,  in  Aligned  v.  Blake,  L.  K.  8  Ex.  160.] 

6  rThayer,  Preliminary  Treatise,  414.] 

6  L^°thing  will  here  be  said  about  Lord  Bacon's  distinction  (ante,  §  297)  between 
"  patent "  and  "  latent "  ambiguities  ;  this  "  unprofitable  subtlety,"  which  still  "  per- 
forms a  great  and  confusing  function  in  our  legal  discussions,"  in  spite  of  the 
repeated  exposures  of  its  inutility  as  a  working  rule,  has  been  fully  disposed  of  in 
Professor  Thayer's  Preliminary  Treatise,  pp.  422,  471. 

The  limitations  noted  ante,  §  305  i,  as  to  employing  usage  to  interpret  contracts 
or  deeds,  are  to  be  understood  as  additional  to  those  above  mentioned  ;  but  they 
do  not  flow  from  the  nature  of  data  that  may  be  consulted,  so  much  as  from 
the  standard  controlling  the  entire  process  of  interpretation.  Where  a  unilateral 
act  is  to  be  interpreted,  the  standard  or  object  is  the  sense  employed  by  the 
single  actor  ;  where  a  bilateral  act  is  to  be  interpreted,  the  standard  is  primarily  the 
joint  sense  of  the  two  parties  :  and  the  special  limitations  applicable  in  the  latter 
case  are  thus  outside  of  and  preliminary  to  the  further  limitations  now  to  be  noted.] 


458  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   EULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

other  words,  it  violates  the  rule  of  Integration  already  examined.1 
To  this  rule  of  limitation  there  is  one  exception  well  settled,  and 
another  once  prevailing  but  now  generally  repudiated. 

(a)  Where  an  object  is  described  in  terms  equally  applicable  to 
two  or  more  objects,  the  testator's  declarations  specifying  the  partic- 
ular one  signified  are  admissible;  as  in  the  often-used  illustration, 
if  one  devise  his  manor  of  S.  to  A.  B.,  and  he  has  two  manors,  North 
S.  and  South  S.,  "it  being  clear  that  he  means  to  devise  one  only, 
whereas  both  are  equally  denoted  by  the  words  he  has  used."  2  This 
is  the  situation  ordinarily  known  as  "equivocation;"8  and  the  ex- 
ception is  unquestioned.*  The  same  principle  may  he  applied  to 

1  Qn  the  case  of  wills,  such  declarations  are  excluded  "upon  this  plain  ground, 
because  his  will  ought  to  be  made  in  writing"  (Lord  Abiuger,  C.  B.,  in  Doe  v. 
Hiscocks,  5  M.  &  W.  363  ;  so  also  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Tucker  v.  Seaman's  Aid  Society, 
7  Met.  188)  ;  in  the  case  of  contracts  and  deeds,  because  the  parties  by  intention 
made  the  writing  the  sole  memorial  of  the  act,  and  further,  because  one  party's 
intention  or  sense  is  immaterial.  If  we  could  suppose  that  a  will  were  not  required 
to  be  in  writing  and  signed,  it  would  seem  that  various  declarations  of  testamentary 
intention  might  be  consulted  for  the  purpose  of  determining  which  was  the  effective 
testamentary  act  and  what  its  tenor.  Moreover,  wherever  the  actual  intent  or  state 
of  mind  may,  by  the  Integration  rule,  be  looked  to  for  the  purpose  of  invalidating 
or  reforming  a  supposed  act  (as  in  reformation  of  a  deed  for  mutual  mistake  — 
ante,  §  305  c  —  or  in  those  cases  where  a  testator's  mistake  as  to  the  contents  of  a 
will  may  be  shown  —  ante,  §  305  c),  it  would  seem  that  declarations  of  intention 
could  be  considered.  So  that  the  exclusion  of  such  declarations  in  the  process  of 
interpretation  seems  to  be  explainable,  not  as  a  rule  of  evidence  affecting  interpreta- 
tion, but  as  the  consequence  of  the  rule,  already  treated,  about  integration  or  parol 
evidence.  Professor  Thayer  has  expressed  the  view  (Preliminary  Treatise,  414)  that 
it  is  "  usually  and  rightly  regarded  as  an  excluding  rule  of  evidence  ; "  though  he 
elsewhere  (p.  444)  concedes  that  it  "partakes  of  the  character  of  both"  a  rule  of 
evidence  and  a  rule  of  construction  ;  yet  the  suggestion  of  Lord  Abinger,  supra, 
that  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  general  rule  excluding  utterances  which  compete  with 
the  writing,  seems  preferable. 

Distinguish  the  use  (ante,  §  14  k)  of  ante-testamentary  declarations  of  a  testator 
as  showing  the  probable  contents  of  the  will  as  ultimately  executed ;  here  there  is 
no  attempt  at  interpretation  uor  at  setting  up  declarations  to  compete  with  con- 
ceded contents.] 

a  PBacon's  Maxims,  R.  25  ;  Lord  Abiuger,  C.  B.,  in  Doe  v.  Hiscocks,  5  M.  &  W. 
363.T 

8LHere  the  declarations  are  not  obnoxious  to  the  parol-evidence  or  integration 
rule,  because  they  do  not  compete  for  effect  with  any  terms  of  the  writing,  and  thus 
their  interpretative  force,  as  showing  the  significance  of  the  words  "manor  of  S.," 
can  be  given  full  play  without  the  danger  of  contravening  that  rule  ;  this  is  the 
explanation  of  Parke,  B.,  in  Doe  v.  Needs,  2  M.  &  W.  129:  "The  words  of  the 
will  do  describe  the  object  or  subject  intended  ;  and  the  evidence  of  the  declara- 
tions of  the  testator  has  not  the  effect  of  varying  the  instrument  in  any  way  what- 
ever ;  it  only  enables  the  Court  to  reject  one  of  the  subjects  or  objects  to  which 
the  description  in  the  will  applies  and  to  determine  which  of  the  two  the  devisor 
undenftooa  to  be  signified  by  the  description  which  he  used  in  the  will  ; "  see  the 
same  language  adopted  by  Bigelow,  C.  J.,  in  Bodman  v.  American  Tract  Society, 
9  All.  447."] 

4  EThe  Lord  Cheyney's  Case,  5  Co.  68  b  (on  a  devise  "to  his  son  John  generally," 
it  might  be  shown  "that  he,  at  the  time  of  the  will  made,  named  his  son  John  the 
younger");  Doe  ».  Westlake,  4  B.  &  Aid.  57  ("to  M.  W.,  my  brother,  and  to 
S.  \V.  my  brother's  son ; "  the  testator  had  three  brothers,  each  of  whom  had  a  son 
S.  W.  ;  dcf'torations  naming  S.  W.  the  son  of  R.  W.  were  admitted);  Doe*.  Needs, 
2  M.  &  W.  1C9  ("  to  George  Gord,  the  son  of  Gord  ;  "  there  were  two  George  Gords, 
sons  of  J.  G.  and  G.  G.  respectively  ;  declarations  naming  the  latter  were  admitted)  ; 


§  305-  &.]  INTERPRETATION.  459 

contracts  and  deeds,  so  as  to  admit  the  understanding  of  the  parties, 
though  expressed  independently*of  the  document,  as  to  the  appli- 
cation of  ambiguous  words  or  phrases.6  (a')  Where  a  blank  occurs, 
the  exception  does  not  ordinarily  apply  to  admit  such  declarations; 
because  the  blank  will  usually  indicate  a  deliberate  non-exercise  of 
testamentary  or  contractual  action  on  that  subject  in  the  document, 
and  so  the  use  of  other  declarations  to  supply  the  blank  would  in 
effect  violate  the  rule  of  integration,  already  described,  requiring 
the  terms  of  the  act  to  be  sought  in  the  written  memorial  alone.6 
But  where  the  blank  indicates  merely  the  party's  ignorance  of 
the  complete  description  and  not  a  failure  to  make  a  definite  act 
of  transfer,  the  situation  is  the  ordinary  one  of  an  equivocation.7 
(a")  Where  a  gift  is  to  or  of  one  of  a  class,  the  situation  may  be 
equivalent  to  that  of  a  blank;  e.  g.,  a  devise  to  "A  and  B  and  heirs," 
or  to  "one  of  the  sons  of  C,"  or  to  "my  nephew  D  or  E;  "  for  here 
there  is  a  failure  to  complete  the  testamentary  disposition.8  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  in  effect  a  definite  disposition  giving  an 

Doer.  Allen,  12  A.  &  E.  451)  "to  J.  A.,  the  grandson  of  my  brother  T.  ;"  there 
were  two  such  grandsons,  each  named  J.  A.  ;  declarations  naming  one  of  them  were 
admitted)  ;  Phelan  v.  Slattery,  19  L.  R.  Ire.  177  ("to  my  nephew;"  there  were  five 
persons  who  fulfilled  the  description  ;  the  testator's  instructions  to  his  solicitor  were 
admitted)  ;  Rodman  v.  American  Tract  Society,  9  All.  447  ("to  the  American  Tract 
Society  ;  "  there  were  two  bodies  of  this  name,  one  in  New  York  the  other  in  Boston  ; 
declarations  naming  the  former  to  the  scrivener  of  the  will,  admitted)  ;  Chambers  v. 
Watson,  60  la.  339  (devise  of  "60  acres,  Se  25,  toon  7;  40  acres,  se  24,  toon  6," 
no  range  being  mentioned;  declarations  at  the  time  of  making  the  will,  admitted) ; 
Schlottman  v.  Hoffman,  73  Miss.  188  (figures,  which  might  mean  $5  or  $500)  ;  Bart- 
lett  v.  Remington,  59  N.  H.  364  ("  in  trust  for  Sarah  ; "  evidence  admitted  to  show 
that  Sarah  Sturoc  was  meant).] 

6  CDiggs  v-  Kurtz,  132  Mo.  250  (deed  of  "lot  No.  312,"  not  naming  bound- 
aries or  -plat ;  oral  agreement  admitted)  ;  Maynard  v.  Render,  Ga.,  23  S.  E.  194 
("cords"  of  wood;  mutual  understanding  as  to  a  cord's  length  admitted)  ;  Waldheim 
v.  Miller,  97  Wis.  300  (guaranty  of  "  account  of  B  ; ''  that  the  parties  meant  a  future 
account  only,  admitted) ;  Pfeifer  i>.  Ins.  Co.,  62  Minn.  536  (indorsement,  cancelling  a 
policy  on  two  horses,  so  as  "  to  cover  one  horse  only  ; "  evidence  as  to  which  one  was 
intended,  admitted)  ;  The  Barnstable,  84  Fed.  895  (agreement  to  pay  "the  insurance 
on  the  vessel ;  "  mutual  understanding  as  to  the  kinds  of  risks  covered,  admitted).] 

6  Qln  the  following  instances  the  declarations  were  not  admitted :  Hunt  v.  Hort, 
8  Free.  Ch.  311  ("  to  become  the  property  of  Lady  " ) ;  Baylis  v.  Att'y-Gen'l, 

2  Atk.  237  (money  given  "  according  to  Mr. his  will ").    It  may  be  noted  that  this 

situation  may  occur  even  where  the  document  does  not  contain  what  could  be  termed 
literally  a  blank  ;  for  example,  where  a  will  contained  a  list  of  devisees  indicated  by 
successive  letters,  K,  L,  M,  etc.,  and  provided  that  "the  key  and  index  to  initials  is 
in  my  writing-desk,"  but  the  key  to  the  cipher  was  dated  eight  years  later  than  the 
will ;  this  was  excluded,  because  the  will  was  in  effect  unfinished  when  executed,  and 
the  subsequent  key  was  not  a  valid  testamentary  act.    On  this  principle  the  following 
case  may  be  questionable :  Dennis  v.  Holsapple,  148  Ind.  297  ;  devise  to  "whoever 
shall  take  care  of  me  and  maintain,  nurse,  clothe,  and  furnish  me,  etc.,  during  the  time 
of  life  yet  when  I  shall  need  the  same  ;"  the  claimant  was  allowed  to  show  that  she 
fulfilled  this  description,  and  that  the  testatrix  had  in  asking  her  aid  referred  to  the 
above  provision.] 

7  ([This  was  the  case  in  the  following  instances  :  Price  ».  Page,  4  Ves.  Jr.  679  (be- 
quest to  "           Price,  the  son  of  Price  ")  ;  Marske  v.  "Willard,  169  111.  276  (lease 
of  "  lot  Xo. '  in  assessor's  subdivision  of  Whiting's  block  No.  8  ").] 

•  [>ltham's  Case»  8  Co-  155 »  Strode  v.  Russell,  2  Vern.  621.] 


460  THE  PAROL  EVIDENCE  RULE.          [CH.  XXI. 

election  to  some  donee  to  choose  out  of  a  class  of  objects ;  here  the 
gift  is  not  void  for  uncertainty." 

(£)  Where  the  terms  of  the  will  are  not  applicable  exactly  to  any 
object,  i.  e.  where  the  description  "  is  true  in  part  but  not  true  in 
every  particular;  as  where  an  estate  is  devised  called  A,  and  is 
described  as  in  the  occupation  of  B,  and  it  is  found  that  though 
there  is  an  estate  called  A,  yet  the  whole  is  not  in  B's  occupation, 
or  where  an  estate  is  devised  to  a  person  whose  surname  or  whose 
Christian  name  is  mistaken,  or  whose  description  is  imperfect  or 
inaccurate, " 10  there  seems  no  reason  against  using  declarations  of 
intention ;  because  their  effect  is  not  to  compete  with  the  terms  of  the 
will,  but  merely  to  aid  in  determining  which  is  the  essential  part 
of  the  description  and  which  the  non-essential  part;  the  description 
had  a  definite  sense  for  the  testator,  but  some  part  of  it  has  to  yield, 
being  inaccurate,  and  the  only  effect  of  the  declarations  can  be  to  aid 
in  applying  the  description  as  used  by  the  testator.  That  declara- 
tions of  intention  are  in  such  a  case  admissible  may  fairly  be  said 
to  have  been  once  the  law  in  England;11  but  subsequent  rulings 
have  rejected  such  evidence.12  In  the  United  States  the  evidence 
has  sometimes  been  received.18] 

§  305  /.  Same:  Rule  against  disturbing  a  Clear  Meaning.  [It  is 
often  said  that  where  a  word  or  a  phrase  bears  a  single  clear  meaning 
or  application,  no  showing  will  be  allowed  that  the  party  or  parties 
actually  used  it  in  a  different  sense ;  and  that  therefore  no  evidence 
of  usage  or  circumstances  tending  to  prove  such  a  sense  will  be  con- 
sidered. This  limitation  finds  expression  in  varying  forms;  some- 

9  QBacon,  Maxims,  Rule  25  ;  though  it  would  apparently  not  be  a  case  of  equivoca- 
tion where  declarations  could  be  used.] 

w  TTindal,  C.  J.,  in  Miller  v.  Travers,  8  Bing.  244.] 

11  LTlioinas  v.  Thomas,  6  T.  R.  671  ("  to  my  granddaughter,  Mary  Thomas,  of  L.,  in 
M.  parish  ;  "  there  was  an  M.  T.,  but  she  was  a  great-granddaughter,  and  lived  in  an- 
other parish  ;  there  was  an  E.  E.,  who  was  a  granddaughter  and  lived  in  M.  parish  ; 
declarations  of  intent  made  at  the  time  of  execution  were  held  admissible)  ;  Selwood  v. 
Mildmay,  3  Ves.  Jr.  306  (bequest  of  stock   "in  the  four  per  cent  annuities  of  the 
Bank  of  England  ;"  the  testator  had  only  long  annuities  not  four  per  cents;  instruc- 
tions to  his  attorney  admitted)  ;  Still  v.  Hoste,  6  Madd.  192  (bequest  to  "  Sophia  S., 
daughter  of  P.  S.; "  P.  S.  had  daughters,  but  none  named  Sophia  ;  instructions  to 
scrivener  admitted) ;  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Miller  o.  Travsrs,  quoted  supra;  instances  cited 
ante,  §290,  where  the  author  takes  the  present  view.] 

12  ["Doe  v.  Hiscocks,  5  M.  &  W.  363  (to  "  my  grandson,  J.  H.,  eldest  son  of  the  said 
J.  H.;     J.  H.,  the  father,  had  a  son  S.,  the  eldest  by  his  first  wife,  and  a  son  J.  H., 
the  eldest  by  his  second  wife  ;  instructions  and  declarations  excluded,  almost  solely  on 
the  authority  of  Miller  v.  Travers,  supra  ;  the  decision  thus  rests  on  a  direct  misunder- 
standing) ;  Bernasconi  v.  Atkinson,  10  Hare  345  (following  Doe  w.  Hiscocks)  ;  Drake 
v.  Drake,  8  H.  L  C.  172,  175  (resting  solely  on  Doe  v.  Hiscocks) ;  Charter  v.  Charter, 
L.  R.  7  H.  L.  364  (by  three  judges  ;  but  Lord  Selborne,  one  of  them,  added,  "  Why 
the  law  should  be  so  ...  I  am  not  sure  that  I  clearly  understand  ; "  the  preceding 
cases  were  held  to  control).      Professor  Thayer,    Preliminary  Treatise,   480,   accepts 
this  result  as  sound.] 

18  EThe  question  has  not  often  been  discussed,  because  of  a  tendency  to  ignore  the 
distinction  between  declarations  of  intention  and  other  evidence ;  admitted:  Covert  v. 
Bi-U-rn,  73  In.  564  ;  Lassing  v.  James,  107  Cal.  348;  Oordon  v.  Burris,  141  Mo.  602  ; 
rj-r.l ,1,1,-d :  Kckford  r.  Eckford,  la.,  53  N.  W.  344  ;  Judy  v.  Gilbert,  77  Ind.  96;  Funk 
v.  Davis,  122  id.  :i8l  ;  Ehrman  v.  Hoskins,  57  Miss.  192.] 


§§  305  £-305  /.]  INTERPRETATION.  461 

times,  for  example,  it  is  said  that  outside  circumstances  may  be 
considered  to  identify  and  apply  the  description,  and  if  a  single  object 
is  found  which  exactly  fits  the  description,  then  that  object  alone 
will  be  taken  as  designated  by  the  terms  of  the  document;  some- 
times it  is  said  that  where  no  ambiguity  exists,  no  facts  showing  a 
peculiar  intent  will  be  considered.  These  varying  phrasings,  how- 
ever, seem  to  rest  on  the  same  general  notion,  that,  where  the  literal 
terms  of  the  document  have  a  clear  and  precise  significance  according 
to  general  standards,  then  the  process  of  appealing  to  the  individual 
standard  of  party  or  parties  making  the  document,  and  of  showing 
the  application  or  sense  of  the  words  to  have  been  used  by  them 
peculiarly  and  differently  from  the  ordinary  or  apparent  one,  will 
be  prohibited.  This  attitude  may  be  partly  accounted  for  histori- 
cally, as  a  survival  of  an  early  scholastic  and  narrow  view  of  the 
limits  of  interpretation,1  partly  (in  the  American  cases)  by  a  misap- 
plication of  the  preceding  exclusionary  rule  about  declarations  of 
intention  to  the  whole  field  of  interpretative  data.2  But  it  will  be 
seen  that  it  can  have  no  justification  in  principle.  The  object  of 
interpretation,  as  already  explained,  is  to  discover  and  enforce  the 
terms  of  the  document  in  the  sense  employed  by  the  party  (if  one 
only)  or  parties  (if  two  or  more) ;  and  it  cannot  matter  what  other 
persons  might  have  signified  by  the  words,  if  the  party  himself  has 
not  used  them  in  that  significance.  It  may  be  difficult,  in  a  given 
instance,  to  believe  that  the  party  did  use  them  in  a  peculiar  and  (to 
others)  unnatural  sense,  and  the  evidence  may  be  in  a  given  case 
insufficient  to  convince  that  he  did;  but  if  it  can  be  shown  beyond 
doubt  that  he  did,  then  there  is  no  legal  reason  why  his  sense  and 
application  of  the  words  should  not  be  enforced  and  why  the  data 
that  show  it  should  not  be  considered.  "No  amount  of  evidence," 
said  Sir  George  Jessel,  Master  of  the  Rolls,  in  a  well-known  witti- 
cism, "  would  convince  him  that  black  was  white ;  " 8  but  it  is  one 
thing  not  to  be  convinced  by  the  evidence  in  a  given  case,  and  a  very 
different  thing  not  to  listen  to  evidence  at  all  or  not  to  accept  the 
consequences  if  the  evidence  does  convince.  The  truth  is  that  this 
rule  about  not  disturbing  a  clear  meaning,  so  far  as  it  should  have 
any  recognition,  ought  to  be  (in  the  epigrammatic  phrase  of  Lord 
Justice  Bowen4)  "not  so  much  a  canon  of  construction  as  a  counsel 
of  caution." 

To-day  this  supposed  rule  has  an  anomalous  standing.  On  the 
one  hand,  we  find  it  frequently  mentioned  and  occasionally  enforced ; 
on  the  other  hand,  we  find  rulings  which  clearly  demonstrate  that  it 

1  [This  history  is  fully   expounded  by  Professor  Thayer,    Preliminary   Treatise, 
410,  445.] 

2  ["Usually  by  treating  that  rule  as  equivalent  to  the  exclusion  of  all  "  parol  evi- 
dence    unless  an  "  ambiguity  "  existed.] 

8  rjMitchell  v.  Henry,  24  Sol.  Journ.  890  ;  16  Ch.  D.  181  ;  theqnestion  was  whether 
the  term  "  white  selvage  "  could  be  shown  by  trade  usage  to  be  applicable  to  an  article 
which  to  ordinary  observers  was  dark  gray  or  black.] 

*  \_Re  Jodrell,  44  Ch.  D.  590.] 


462  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE  RULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

has  no  necessary  part  and  no  established  status  in  the  law.  (1)  In 
the  case  of  wills,  it  has  been  repudiated  in  several  rulings  which  go 
to  the  extreme  in  illustrating  the  true  process  of  interpretation, 
namely,  that  of  finding  and  enforcing  the  sense  used  by  the  testator, 
no  matter  what  the  sense  obtaining  among  other  persons;  the  pos- 
sible result  of  this  process  is  typified  in  Chief  Justice  Doe's  summing 
up,6  that  "a  person  known  to  the  testator  as  A.  B.,  and  to  all  others 
as  C.  D.,  may  take  a  legacy  given  to  A.  B. ; "  6  a  frequent  field  for  the 
process  is  in  enforcing  the  testator's  individual  usage  of  terms  which 
ordinarily  have  a  fixed  legal  significance  of  a  different  purport.7  On 
the  other  hand,  there  are  many  rulings  in  which  the  apparent  or  natu- 
ral sense  has  been  enforced,  and  no  showing  of  the  testator's  individual 
and  abnormal  usage  has  been  allowed.8  (2)  In  the  case  of  contracts 
and  deeds,  the  standard  of  usage  is  changed,  i.  e.  it  is  the  joint  sense 

5  TTilton  v.  Amer.  Bible  Soc'y,  60  N.  H.  377.] 

8  LSome  of  the  cases  are  as  follows  :  Ryall  v.  FLannam,  10  Beav.  536  ("to  Elizabeth 
Abbott,  a  natural  daughter  of  E.  A.,  of  the  parish  of  G.,  single  woman,  and  who  for- 
merly lived  in  my  service  ;  "  on  data  too  numerous  to  note  here,  this  description  was 
held  to  signify  John,  the  natural  son  of  E.  A.,  then  married) ;  Parsons  v.  Parsons,  1  Ves. 
Jr.  266  (to  his  "brother  Edward  Parsons;"  taken  to  apply  to  Samuel  P.,  whom  the 
testator  had  habitually  called  Edward  ;  though  there  was  a  deceased  brother  Edward) ; 
Beaumont  v.  Fell,  2  P.  Wins.  141  (to  "  Catherine  Earnley  ; "  interpreted  to  apply  to 
one  Gertrude  Yardley) ;  Blundell  v.  Gladstone,  11  Sim.  467,  on  appeal  in  1  Phillips  279 
(particularly  the  opinion  of  Patteson,  J. )  ;  Powell  v.  Biddle,  2  Dall.  70  (to  "Samuel 
P.,  son  of  S.  P.,  of  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  carpenter  ;  "  S.  P.  had  sons  William  and 
Samuel ;  the  legacy  was  given  to  William,  on  the  strength  of  the  testator's  usage  as  to 
the  name)  ;  Smith  v.  Kimball,  62  N.  H.  606  (to  "Meredith  Institution  ;"  construed 
on  the  facts  as  applicable  to  the  Kimball  Union  Academy  of  Meriden)  ;  Ross  v.  Kiger, 
42  W.  Va.  402  (similar  to  the  preceding  case).] 

7  ["Doe  v.  Beynon,  12  A.  &  E.  431  (to  "her  three  daughters  ;  "  application  to  illegiti- 
mate (laughter,  allowed  to  be  evidenced);  Grant  v.  Grant,  L.  R.  5  C.  P.  727,  per  Black- 
burn, J.  ("  my  nephew,  J.  G. ; "  there  were  two  such  nephews,  sons  respectively  of  the 
testator's  brother  and  of  his  wife's  brother;  the  term  was  held  applicable,  by  the  testa- 
tor's usage,  to  the  latter);  Re  Horner,  37  Oh.  D.  695  (to  "my  sister  C.,   the  wife  of 
T.  H.,"  and  on  her  death,  "among  her  children  ;"  H.   was  only  cohabiting  with  C., 
and  the  testator  knew  this  ;  but  his  words  were  interpreted  to  signify  C.'s  illegitimate 
children);  Re  Jodrell,  44  Ch.  D.  590  (to  "relatives;''  held  to  apply  to  "all  those  the 
testator  had  before  treated  as  relatives,"  even  including  persons  related  through  illegiti- 
mate children);  R>bb's  Estate,  37  S.  C.  19,  28,  39  (to  "such  persons  as  shall  be  enti- 
tled under  the  law ; "   the  law  did  not  recognize  persons  related  through  illegitimacy ; 
but  the  testator's  usage  as  applying  the  terms  to  such  persons  was  admitted).] 

8  ([Stringer  v.  Gardiner,  4  DeG.  &  J.  468  ("  my  said  niece  E.  S. ;"  a  niece  E.  S.  had 
died  before  the  date  of  the  will ;  a  granddaughter  of  this  niece,  also  named  E.  S.,  was 
living  ;  the  description  was  applied  to  the  former,  by  the  present  rule)  ;  Dot-in  v.  Dorin, 
L.  R.  7  H.  L.  568  (to  "our  children  ;"  not  applied  to  two  illegitimate  children  by  a 
person  married  to  the  testator  just  before  the  making  of  the  will,  there  being  no  chil- 
dren after  the  marriage  ;  the  legal  meaning  held,  in  defiance  of  common  sense,  to  apply 
and  to  exclude  those  children);  .R/!  Fish,  1894,  2  Ch.  88  (to  a  "niece  E.  W.;"  there  was 
no  such  niece,  but  there  was  a  legitimate  and  an  illegitimate  grandniece  of  the  wife, 
each  named  E.  W. ;  facts  showing  the  applicability  of  the  terms  to  the  latter  were 
excluded);  American  Bible  Soc'y  v.  Pratt,  9  All.  109  ("Dedham  Bunk;"  there  was 
such  a  bank,  but  also  a  Dedham  Institution  for  Savings  ;  facts  showing  the  applicability 
of  the  term  to  the  latter  were  excluded);  Tucker  v.  Seaman's  Aid  Society,  7  Met.  188 
(to  "the  Seaman's  Aid  Society  in  the  city  of  Boston  ;"  there  were  two  societies,  one 
named  as  above,  the  other  named  the  Seaman's  Friend  Society;  the  bequest  given  to 
the  former,  by  the  present  rule)  ;  Flora  v.  Anderson,  U.  S.  App.,  67  Fed.  182;  see 
other  instances  ante,  §§  288,  290,  295.3 


§§  305  Z-305  m.]  INTERPRETATION.  463 

of  the  parties  that  it  is  to  be  sought;  9  but  if  it  can  be  clearly  dis- 
covered, in  the  shape  of  usage  or  express  agreement,  there  is  on  prin- 
ciple no  objection  to  it  merely  on  the  score  that  it  varies,  however 
widely,  from  the  natural  or  common  or  legal  sense  of  the  terms. 
Such  is  the  attitude  of  many  Courts.10  But  here  also  we  find  many 
rulings  adopting  the  principle  that  a  clear  meaning  cannot  be  over- 
turned, by  any  express  understanding  or  special  usage.11] 

§  305  m.  Same  :  (3)  Rule  against  correcting  a  False  Description. 
[A  doctrine  has  obtained  some  footing  in  the  United  States  that  where 
a  description  does  not  apply  exactly  to  any  object,  but  applies  partly 
to  one  or  partly  to  another,  no  data  at  all  can  be  considered  to  inter- 
pret and  apply  the  description  to  an  object  which  would  be  sufficiently 
and  correctly  described  if  a  part  of  the  terms  of  the  writing  were 
omitted.  This  result  seems  to  have  been  reached  in  part  by  the  influ- 
ence of  the  supposed  rule  (just  explained)  against  disturbing  a  clear 
meaning,  and  in  part  by  the  influence  of  the  Baconian  phrases  about 
ambiguities,  i.  e.  it  is  argued  in  such  rulings  that  there  is  no  am- 
biguity in  such  a  case,  and  then  it  is  assumed  (forgetting  that  the 
excluding  rule  —  ante,  §  305  k,  —  to  which  there  is  an  exception  for 
ambiguities  or  equivocations,  affects  merely  declarations  of  intention) 


rAnfe,  §  305 
L 


Mitchell  v.  Henry,  L.  R.  15  Ch.  D.  181  (stated  supra,  n.  3  ;  James,  L.  J.,  said: 
"The  question  is  not  whether  the  selvage  is  white,  but  whether  it  is  what  the  trade 
know  as  a  white  selvage  ")  ;  Cochran  v.  Ketberg,  3  Esp.  121  (vessel  to  pay  "  five  guineas 
a  day  demurrage;  "  custom  not  to  reckon  Sundays  and  holidays,  held  to  prevail)  ;  Grant 
v.  Maddox,  15  M.  &  W.  737  (actress*  engagement  for  "three  years,"  at  a  certain  salary 
"per  week  in  those  years  respectively;"  custom  to  exclude  vacation-Aveeks,  held  to 
prevail)  ;  Myers  v.  Sari,  3  E.  &  E.  306  (contract  conditioned  on  "  weekly  account  of 
the  work  done  ;  "  trade  usage  held  to  prevail  ;  Blackburn,  J.  :  "  Every  individual  case 
must  be  decided  on  its  own  grounds");  Higgins  v.  Cal.  P.  &  A.  Co.,  Gal.,  52  Pac.  108 
(contract  to  pay  "  fifty  cents  per  ton  for  each  and  every  gross  ton  ;  "  a  statute  provided 
that  20  cwt.  constituted  a  ton  ;  the  parties'  usage  as  signifying  2240  pounds  was  held 
to  prevail  ;  the  opinion  of  Temple,  J.,  is  valuable)  ;  Sullivan  v.  Collins,  Cal.,  89  Pac. 
834  (usage  may  prevail  to  apply  a  tax-deed  description  to  property  otherwise  named 
in  the  tax-list)  ;  Leavitt  v.  Kinnicntt,  157  111.  235  (like  Grant  v,  Maddox,  supra  )  ; 
McChesney  v.  Chicago,  173  id.  75  ("Sec.  23,  18,  14,"  interpreted  by  usage  to  mean 
"range  38,  township  14");  Brody  v.  Chittenden,  la.,  76  N.  W.  1009  ("furniture" 
interpreted  by  usage  to  cover  jewelers'  tools,  etc.);  Brown  v.  Doyle,  Minn.,  72  N.  W. 
814  (warranty  of  a  horse  as  "sure  foal  -getter  ;"  evidence  admitted  to  show  "sure" 
to  mean  60  per  cent);  Com.  v.  Hobbs,  140  Mass.  443  ("white  arsenic,"  in  fact  colored 
with  lamp-black,  "still  remained  the  substance  known  as  white  arsenic");  Fa  mum  v. 
R.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  569  ("noiseless  steam  motor;"  technical  application  to  motors 
making  some  noise,  allowed);  Read  v.  Tacoma  Assoc.,  2  Wash.  198  (deed  running  a  line 
"  west  ;  "  custom  to  run  such  lines  a  little  north  of  west,  admitted).] 

11  QBalfour  v.  Fresno  C.  &  I.  Co.,  109  Cal.  221  ;  Harrison  v.  Tate,  100  Ga.  383  ; 
Armstrong  v.  Granite  Co.,  111.,  42  N.  E.  186;  Allen  v.  Kingsbury,  16  Pic.k.  238  ("  evi- 
dence of  usage  is  never  to  be  received  to  overturn  the  words  of  a  deed");  Brackett 
v.  Bartholomew,  6  Met.  396  ;  Goode  v.  Riley,  153  Mass.  685  ("  You  cannot  prove  a 
mere  private  convention  between  the  parties  to  give  language  a  different  meaning  from 
its  common  one.  It  would  open  too  great  risks  if  evidence  were  admissible  to  show 
that  when  they  said  500  feet  they  agreed  it  should  mean  100  inches,  or  that  Bunker 
Hill  Monument  should  signify  the  Old  South  Church;"  as  to  this,  the  sufficient 
answer  is  that  the  real  significance  of  a  large  proportion  of  commercial  cipher  telegrams 
could  then  never  be  proved)  ;  Brown  v.  Schiapjmcassee,  Mich.,  72  N.  W.  1096  ;  First 
N.  B'k  of  Nashville  v.  R.  Co.,  Tenn.,  46  S.  W.  312;  Standard  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Leslie, 
46  U.  S.  App.  680  ;  see  other  instances  ante,  §§  280,  292-3 


464  THE   PAROL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.    XXI. 

that,  not  merely  declarations  of  intention,  but  all  circumstances  what- 
ever, helping  to  interpret  the  description,  are  to  be  excluded.1  There 
is  no  support  on  principle,  or  in  orthodox  precedent,  for  such  a  result; 
the  process  is  merely  that  of  applying  or  interpreting  a  description, 
and  of  perceiving,  upon  the  comparison  of  the  terms  with  an  external 
object,  that  one  or  more  terms  are  non-essential  and  superfluous, 
and  that  the  remainder  are  vital  and  decisive  indices  of  description. 
Thus,  if  a  will  gives  property  to  "James  Winchendon,  native  of 
Portland,  Maine,  husband  of  my  daughter  Sarah,  carpenter  by  trade, 
and  residing  at  No.  48  West  Street,  Jamesville,"  and  we  find  a  person 
who  fulfils  all  these  terms  except  that  he  lives  at  No.  348  West  Street, 
we  may  treat  that  term  of  the  description  as  non-essential,  and  still 
be  satisfied  that  a  person  fulfilling  the  other  and  essential  terms  is 
the  one  signified.  This  process,  as  including  an  examination  of  all 
the  circumstances,  a  rejection  of  part  of  the  description  as  superfluous, 
and  an  application  of  the  remainder  to  an  object  fulfilling  it,  is  correct 
on  principle,  whether  it  is  as  simple  as  in  the  above  instance  or  more 
extensive  and  radical ;  the  only  question  can  be  whether  in  a  given 
instance  the  circumstances  sufficiently  convince  us  that  a  certain  part 
of  the  description  may  be  rejected  as  non-essential  and  superfluous. 
This  result  has  long  been  established  in  England.8  In  the  United 
States  no  difficulty  seems  to  have  been  experienced  in  cases  other 
than  wills  of  land  containing  erroneous  descriptions.  In  deeds  of 
land  it  seems  to  be  generally  accepted  (according  to  the  maxim,  falsa 
demonstratio  non  nocet)  that  the  process  of  ascertaining  what  terms 
(e.  g.  courses  and  marks)  may  be  rejected  as  non-essential,  and  of 
considering  the  circumstances  for  that  purpose,  is  a  proper  one  ;  the 

1  rjThis  attitude  is  seen  in  the  dissenting  opinion  in  Patch  v.  White,  117  IT.  S.  210, 
cited  post,  where,  after  much  reference  to  ambiguities,  it  is  finally  said:  "  If  there  is 
any  proposition  settled  in  the  law  of  wills,  it  is  that  extrinsic  evidence  is  inadmissible 
to  show  the  intention  of  the  testator,  unless  it  be  to  explain  a  latent  ambiguity  ;  "  here 
the  real  rule  referred  to  is  the  rule  excluding  declarations  of  intention  ;  and  this  unfor- 
tunate confusion  of  declarations  of  intention  with  all  "  extrinsic  evidence"  whatever  is 
frequently  found  as  the  source  of  erroneous  rulings.] 

^  fjCo.  Litt.  3  a :  "  If  lands  be  given  to  Robert,  Earl  of  Pembroke,  where  his  name 
is  Henry,  ...  in  these  and  like  cases  there  can  be  but  one  of  that  dignity  or  name, 
and  therefore  such  a  grant  is  good,  albeit  the  name  of  baptism  is  mistaken  ;  "  Good- 
title  v.  Southern,  1  if.  &  S.  299  ("all  my  farm,  lands,  and  hereditaments  called  T. 
farm,  .  .  .  now  in  the  occupation  of  A.  C. ;  "  though  two  closes  of  T.  farm  were  occu- 

B'ed  by  M.,  the  whole  was  held  to  pass)  ;  Doe  v.  Hnthwaite,  3  B.  &  Aid.  632  (to  "  G. 
.,  eldest  son  of  J.  H.,  etc.,  in  default,  etc.,  to  S.  H.,  second  son  of  J.  H.,  etc.,  in  de- 
fault, etc.,  to  J.  H.,  third  son  of  J.  H.  ;  "  in  fact,  S.  H.  was  third  son  and  J.  H.  second 
son  ;  circumstances  considered  to  show  which  part  of  the  description  was  essential); 
Doe  v.  Hiscocks,  5  M.  &  W.  363  (similar  ruling  ;  see  citation  ante,  §  305  k,  n.  12);  Ca- 
moys  v.  Blundell,  1  H.  L.  C.  778  (similar  ruling  ;  same  will  as  in  Blunddl  v.  Gladstone, 
ante,  $  305  I,  n.  6.  Lord  Brougham  :  "  The  object  must  be  to  get  at  the  meaning  of 
the  testator  in  the  best  way  you  can  ") ;  Bernasconi  v.  Atkinson,  10  Hare  345  (similar 
ruling) ;  Drake  v.  Drake,  8  H.  L.  C.  172  (similar  ruling) ;  Charter  v.  Charter,  L.  R. 
7  H.  L.  982  (similar  ruling,  by  divided  Court) ;  Cowen  v.  Truefitt,  1893,  2  Ch.  651 
(deed  of  rooms  on  second  floor  of  Nos.  18  and  14,  Old  Bond  Street,  with  free  ingress 
"  through  the  staircase  and  passage  of  No.  13 ; "  there  was  a  staircase  and  passage  in 
No.  14,  but  none  in  No.  13;  the  word*  "of  No.  13  "  rejected  M  falsa  demonatratio), ,] 


§  305  m.]  INTERPRETATION.  465 

only  limitation  being  that  enough  must  remain  to  indicate  the  land 
with  certainty.8  Where  a  will  is  involved,  a  distinction  may  con- 
ceivably, though  perhaps  not  properly,  be  taken  between  a  will  devis- 
ing "all  my  land,  to  wit,"  followed  by  the  description  in  question, 
and  a  will  not  so  premising  ownership ;  in  the  former  case,  if  the 
description  names  "the  S.  E.  |  of  the  N.  E.  |  of  sect.  36, 1. 18,  r.  10," 
and  the  testator  owns  no  such  land,  but  owns  the  S.  W.  J  of  the  N. 
E.  £,  then  the  whole  description  may  be  interpreted  to  read,  omitting 
the  first  term  as  non-essential,  "my  laud  in  the  N.  E.  \"  etc.,  which 
is  easily  applied ;  in  the  latter  case,  there  being  no  such  preliminary 
term  in  the  will,  the  description,  omitting  the  first  part,  would  run, 
"the  N.  E.  \  of  sect.  36,"  etc.,  which  could  not  be  enforced,  because 
the  testator  does  not  own  the  whole  N.  E.  %*  Thus  we  have  a  further 
distinction  between  rulings  which  regard  it  possible  to  imply  such  a 
term  as  "  my  land,"  where  it  is  wanting,  and  rulings  which  regard 
such  an  implication  as  improper.6  Of  the  general  state  of  the  rulings 
it  may  be  said  (1)  that  the  process  of  ascertaining  the  non-essential 
terms,  by  considering  all  the  circumstances  and  by  applying  the 
description  with  the  omission  of  the  non-essential  terms,  is  in  the 
United  States  almost  everywhere  treated  (as  it  is  in  England)  as 
proper ;  (2)  that  where  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  obtain  a  sufficient 
description,  to  imply  into  the  will  such  a  term  as  "land  belonging  to 
me,"  there  are  varying  rulings  (in  the  few  instances  where  the  ques- 
tion has  been  raised),  even  by  Courts  of  the  same  jurisdiction.6] 

8  \_Ante,  §  301  ;  see  other  examples  in  Fancher  v.  De  Montegre,  1  Head  40  ;  Higdon. 
v.  Eire,  119  N.  C.  623  ;  Davidson  v.  Shuler,  ib.  582,  and  cases  cited  ;  New  York  L.  I. 
Co.  v.  Aitkin,  125  N.  Y.  661  ;  Gordon  v.  Kitrell,  Miss.,  21  So.  922;  Rushton  v.  Hal- 
lett,  Utah,  30  Pac.  1014.] 

4  [^The  controversy  has  centred  around  the  case  of  Kurtz  v.  Hibner,  55  111.  514 ; 
criticised  by  Judge  Redfield  of  Vermont  in  10  Amer.  Law  Reg.  N.  s.  93,  and  defended 
by  Judge  Caton  of  Illinois,  ib.  353,  and  by  Julius  Rosen  thai,  Esq.,  of  Chicago,  in 
Chicago  Legal  News,  March  18,  1871.  In  that  case,  the  devise  was  of  "  the  west  halt 
of  the  southwest  quarter  of  section  32,  township  35,  range  10,  containing  eighty  acres  ; " 
it  was  offered  to  show,  among  other  circumstances,  that  the  testator  owned  only  one  80- 
acre  tract  in  township  35,  but  in  section  33,  and  that  by  the  draughtsman's  mistake 
"  32  "  had  been  written  instead  of  "  33 ; "  and  a  similar  showing  was  offered  as  to 
another  bequest.  The  second  part  of  this  evidence  (as  to  mistake)  was  rightly  rejected, 
but  the  Court  excluded  the  first  part  also,  and  it  is  from  this  latter  point  of  view  that 
the  ruling  is  to  be  questioned  and  has  been  the  subject  of  controversy.  The  Court  laid 
stress  on  the  fact  that  there  were  no  other  words  in  the  will  by  which  the  description 
could  be  applied  to  section  33.] 

6  [The  answer  to  the  above  suggestions  seems  to  be  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  imply 
any  terms  at  all  into  the  will ;  that  the  inquiry  is  merely  what  object  the  description 
as  a  whole  signifies  in  the  light  of  the  circumstances  ;  and  that  the  circumstance  of  the 
testator's  owning  e.  g.  one  quarter-section  and  not  owning  another  may  suffice  to  indicate 
that  the  description  taken  as  a  whole  was  applied  to  the  former,  even  though  it  is  not 
literally  accurate  in  common  usage.  If  there  were  a  bequest  to  "James  Ryder,"  and 
the  testator's  usage  applied  this  name  to  Joseph  Ryder  of  Jamestown,  it  would  be  use- 
less to  argue  that,  by  striking  out  the  incorrect  "James,'*  the  remaining  "Ryder" 
could  not  be  applied  to  that  particular  Ryder  named  Joseph  because  that  would  mean 
implying  the  word  "Joseph  or  "of  Jamestown  "  into  the  will;  and  yet  the  two  argu- 
ments seem  to  rest  on  the  same  footing.] 

6  L~The  question  seems  to  have  arisen  chiefly  in  Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Iowa,  but  in 
none  of  these  jurisdictions,  particularly  in  Illinois,  are  the  successive  rulings  cov- 
VOL.  i.  —  30 


466  THE   PAEOL   EVIDENCE   RULE.  [CH.   XXI. 

§  305  n.  Discriminations.  [There  are  some  uses  of  data  dealing 
with  a  testator's  intention,  which  must  be  discriminated  from  the 
preceding  questions,  because  they  do  not  in  strictness  involve  a  ques- 
tion of  the  interpretation  of  the  document,  but  of  getting  at  the  testa- 
tor's actual  intention  (as  distinguished  from  the  significance  of  his 
testamentary  words).  The  question  involved  in  them  is  whether  by 
the  substantive  law  his  intention  will  be  given  any  effect  for  the 
purpose  in  hand.  (1)  It  has  already  been  seen  that  a  mistake  in 
writing  the  wrong  words  or  signing  the  wrong  document,  i.  e.  the 
intention  to  make  a  different  document,  is  on  principles  of  substantive 
law  usually  not  to  be  considered  for  the  piirpose  of  invalidating  the 
document  as  signed  (ante,  §  305  e) ;  nevertheless,  there  are  possible 
instances  in  which  this  may  exceptionally  be  allowed  in  the  case  of  a 
will  (ante,  §  305  c)  ;  but  if  this  is  allowed  to  be  done,  it  is  in  no  sense 
a  process  of  interpretation  of  the  testamentary  act,  but  of  invalidating 
or  reforming  it.  (2)  By  the  law  of  wills,  there  may  be  certain  conse- 
quences prescribed  as  to  the  devolution  of  the  estate  in  the  absence  of 
an  expressed  intent  to  the  contrary  ;  where  this  is  the  case,  the  intent 
may  come  in  issue  as  an  independent  fact  under  such  a  rule,  (a)  Thus, 
the  rule  that  the  personal  estate  undisposed  of  should  vest  in  the 
executor,  but  that  a  gift  to  the  executor  would  suffice  to  indicate  an 
intent  not  to  give  him  the  surplus,  allowed  the  testator's  intent  to  be 
inquired  into  for  the  purpose  of  "rebutting  the  equity"  against  the 
executor  created  by  such  a  gift.  By  statute  this  rule  has  in  England 
been  so  changed  that  the  executor  is  not  to  take  unless  the  contrary 
intention  appears  in  the  will  itself.1  (b)  By  statute,  in  some  juris- 
dictions, children  omitted  from  the  provisions  of  a  will  are  neverthe- 
less to  be  given  a  proportionate  share  of  the  estate,  unless  the  intent 
to  disinherit  is  clearly  apparent ;  here  the  intent  is  made  an  inde- 

sistent:  Donehow  v.  Johnson,  113  Ala.  126  ;  Kurtz  v.  Hibner,  55  111.  514  (referred  to 
ante) ;  Bowen  v.  Allen,  43  id.  53  ;  Bishop  v.  Morgan,  82  id.  351  (the  dissenting  opinion 
of  Dickey,  J.,  is  valuable)  ;  Einmert  v.  Hayes,  89  id.  16  ;  Decker  v.  Decker,  121  id. 
341  (practicullv  overruling  Kurtz  v.  Hibner)  ;  Bingel  v.  Volz,  142  id.  214  (following 
Kurtz  v.  Hibner)  ;  Hallady  v.  Hess,  147  id.  588  ;  Cleveland  v.  Spillman,  25  Ind.  95  ; 
Judy  v.  Gilbert,  77  id.  96  ;  Funk  v.  Davis,  112  id.  281  ;  Sturgis  v.  Work,  122  id.  134  ; 
Rook  v.  Wilson,  142  id.  24;  Hartwig  v.  Schiefer,  147  id.  64  ;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Fitz- 
twitrick,  36  la.  674  ;  Christy  v.  Badger,  72  id.  581  ;  Covert  v.  Sebern,  73  id.  564 ; 
Eckford  v.  Eckford,  id.,  53  N.  W.  344  ;  Wilson  v.  Stevens,  Kan.,  51  Pac.  903  ;  Riggs 
v.  Myers,  20  Mo.  239  ;  Gordon  v.  Burris,  141  id.  602  ;  Winkley  v.  Kaime,  32  N.  H. 
268  (useful  case) ;  Jackson  v.  Sill,  11  Johns.  201  ;  Scates  v.  Henderson,  44  S.  C.  548  ; 
Minor  v.  Powers,  Tex.,  24  8.  W.  710  ;  Patch  v.  White,  117  U.  S.  210  ;  Wildberger  v. 
Cheek,  94  Va.  517  ;  Ross  v.  Kiger,  42  W.  Va.  402  ;  ante,  §  301. 

From  the  above  cases  should  be  distinguished  those  in  which  a  real  equivocation 
exists,  e.  g.  where  a  deed  or  will  names  "  the  S.  E.  ^  of  the  N.  W.  \  of  sect.  10,"  but  does 
not  name  range  or  township,  county  or  State  ;  here  the  description  is  equally  and 
correctly  applicable  to  several  pieces  of  land,  and  the  case  is  analogous  to  a  bequest  to 
"John  Smith;"  in  such  cases,  even  declarations  of  intention  would  be  admissible 
(ante,  §  305  k) ;  and  it  is  clear  that  at  least  the  circumstances  may  be  looked  to  in  apply- 
ing the  equivocal  description  :  see  instances  ;  Hnllady  v.  Hess,  147  111.  588  ;  111.  Cent. 
R.  Co.  ?>.  LeBlanc,  74  Miss.  650  ;  Ladnier  v.  Ladnier,  id.,  23  So.  430  ;  aiid  cases  cited 
therein.] 

1  [Ante,  §  296  ;  Jarman,  Wills,  6th  Am.  ed.  391.] 


§  305  n.]  INTERPRETATION.  467 

pendent  issue,  as  affecting  the  disposition  provisionally  prescribed 
by  this  rule  of  law ;  the  question  may  also  arise  whether  the  disin- 
heriting intent  is  to  be  sought  exclusively  in  the  will.2  (c)  A  similar 
inquiry  may  arise  as  to  whether  a  will  was  intended  to  be  an  execution 
of  a  power.8] 

2  QSee  Re  Salmon's  Estate,  107  Cal.  614;  Hawle  v.  R.  Co.,  165  111.  561 ;  Ingersol 
v.  Hopkins,  170  Mass.  401  ;  Carpenter  v.  Snow,  Mich.,  76  N.  W.  78  ;  Atwood's  Estate, 
14  Utah  Lj 

«  [See  Emery  v.  Haven,  N.  H.,  35  AtL  940.} 


408 


WITNESSES  J    ATTENDANCE. 


[CH.   XXII. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

WITNESSES:  ATTENDANCE  IN  COURT,  AND  TESTIMONY  BY  DEPOSITION. 


§§  306-308.   Classification. 

1.   Attendance  to  testify  in  Person. 

§  309.  Subpoena. 

§  310.  Fees  and   Expenses  :   (1)  Civil 
Cases. 

§  311.  Same:  (2)  Criminal  Cases. 

§312.  Witness  in  Custody. 

§  313.  Recognizance. 

§  314.  Time  of  Service  of  Stibptena. 

§  315.  Manner  of  Service. 

§  316.  Protection  from  Arrest. 


§  317.  Same  :  Persons  included. 

§  318.  Same  :  Remedy. 

§  319.  Failure  to  attend,  as  a  Con- 
tempt. 

2.    Testifying  by  Deposition. 

§  320.    At  Common  Law. 

§§  321,  322.    By  Statute. 

§  323.  Same  :  Magistrate's  Certificate  ; 
Mode  of  objecting. 

§§  324,  325.  Dedimus  Potestatem  ;  Dep- 
ositious  in  Perpetuam. 


§  306.  Classification.  Having  thus  considered  the  general  nature 
and  principles  of  evidence,  and  the  rules  which  govern  in  the  pro- 
duction of  evidence,  we  come  now,  in  the  third  place,  to  speak  of 
the  instruments  of  evidence  or  the  means  by  which  the  truth  in  fact 
is  established.  In  treating  this  subject,  we  shall  consider  how  such 
instruments  are  obtained  and  used,  and  their  admissibility  and 
effect. 

§  307.  The  instruments  of  evidence  are  divided  into  two  general 
classes;  namely,  unwritten  and  written.  The  former  is  more  natu- 
rally to  be  first  considered,  because  oral  testimony  is  often  the  first; 
step  in  proceeding  by  documentary  evidence,  it  being  frequently 
necessary  first  to  establish,  in  that  mode,  the  genuineness  of  the 
documents  to  be  adduced. 

§  308.  By  unwritten  or  oral  evidence  is  meant  the  testimony  given 
by  witnesses,  viva  voce,  either  in  open  court  or  before  a  magistrate 
acting  under  its  commission  or  the  authority  of  law.  Under  this 
head  it  is  proposed  briefly  to  consider  the  method,  in  general,  of 
procuring  the  attendance  and  testimony  of  witnesses;  the  compe- 
tency of  witnesses;  the  course  and  practice  in  the  examination  of 
witnesses;  and  herein  of  the  impeachment  and  the  corroboration  of 
their  testimony. 


1.    Attendance  to  testify  in  Person, 

§  309.  Subpoena.  And,  first,  in  regard  to  the  method  of  procuring 
the  attendance  of  witnesses,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  every  Court, 
having  power  definitely  to  hear  and  determine  any  suit,  has,  by  the 
common  law,  inherent  power  to  call  for  all  adequate  proofs  of  the 


§§  306-310.]  FEES   AND    EXPENSES.  469 

facts  in  controversy,  and,  to  that  end,  to  summon  and  compel  the  at- 
tendance  of  witnesses  before  it.1  The  ordinary  summons  is  a  writ 
of  subpoena,  which  is  a  judicial  writ,  directed  to  the  witness,  com- 
manding him  to  appear  at  the  court  to  testify  what  he  knows  in  the 
cause  therein  described,  pending  in  such  court,  under  a  certain  pen- 
alty mentioned  in  the  writ.  If  the  witness  is  expected  to  produce 
any  books  or  papers  in  his  possession,  a  clause  to  that  effect 2  is  in- 
serted in  the  writ,  which  is  then  termed  a  subpoena  duces  tecum." 
The  writ  of  subpoena  suffices  for  only  one  sitting  or  term  of  the  Court. 
If  the  cause  is  made  a  remanet,  or  is  postponed  by  adjournment  to 
another  term  or  session,  the  witness  must  be  summoned  anew.  The 
manner  of  serving  the  subpoena  being  in  general  regulated  by  stat- 
utes, or  rules  of  Court,  which  in  the  different  States  of  the  Union 
are  not  perfectly  similar,  any  further  pursuit  of  this  part  of  the 
subject  would  not  comport  with  the  design  of  this  work.4  And  the 
same  observation  may  be  applied,  once  for  all,  to  all  points  of  prac- 
tice in  matters  of  evidence  which  are  regulated  by  local  law. 

§  310.  Fees  and  Expenses :  (l)  Civil  Cases.  In  order  to  secure  the 
attendance  of  a  witness  in  civil  cases,  it  is  requisite,  by  Stat.  5  Eliz. 
c.  9,  that  he  "have  tendered  to  him,  according  to  his  countenance 
or  calling,  his  reasonable  charges."  Under  this  statute  it  is  held 
necessary,  in  England,  that  his  reasonable  expenses,  for  going  to  and 
returning  from  the  trial,  and  for  his  reasonable  stay  at  the  place,  be 
tendered  to  him  at  the  time  of  serving  the  subpoena  ;  and,  if  he  ap- 
pears, he  is  not  bound  to  give  evidence  until  such  charges  are  actu- 
ally paid  or  tendered,1  unless  he  resides,  and  is  summoned  to  testify, 

1  j  For  the  power  of  a  Legislature  to  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses,  see  post, 
§  319,  note.} 

2  {The  subpoena  must  in  this  case  call  him  to  testify,  as  well  as  to  produce  :  Murray 
v.  Elston,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  212.  { 

8  This  additional  clause  is  to  the  following  effect :  "  And  also,  that  you  do  diligently 
and  carefully  search  for,  examine,  and  inquire  after,  and  bring  with  you  and  produce, 
at  the  time  and  place  aforesaid,  a  bill  of  exchange,  dated,"  etc.  (here  describing  with 
precision  the  papers  and  documents  to  be  produced),  "together  with  all  copies,  drafts, 
and  vouchers,  relating  to  the  said  documents,  and  all  other  documents,  letters,  and 
paper  writings  whatsoever,  that  can  or  may  afford  any  information  or  evidence  in  said 
cause  ;  then  and  there  to  testify  and  show  all  and  singular  those  things  which  you  (or 
either  of  you)  know,  or  the  said  documents,  letters,  or  instruments  in  writing  do  im- 
port, of  and  concerning  the  said  cause  now  depending.  And  this  you  (or  any  of  you) 
shall  in  no  wise  omit  :"  3  Chitty's  Gen.  Practice,  830,  n.  ;  Amey  v.  Long,  9  East  473  ; 
|U.  S.  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  U.  S.  568  ("the  papers  are  required  to  be  stated  or  speci- 
fied only  with  that  degree  of  certainty  which  is  practicable  considering  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  so  that  the  witness  may  be  able  to  know  what  is  wanted  of  him 
and  to  have  the  papers  at  the  trial  so  that  they  can  be  used  if  the  Court  shall  then 
determine  them  to  be  competent  and  relevant  evidence")  ;  to  require  a  solicitor  to  pro- 
duce all  his  books,  papers,  etc.,  relating  to  all  dealings  between  him  and  a  party  to  the 
suit  during  a  term  of  thirty-three  years  is  too  vague  :  Lee  v.  Angas,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  59. } 
rThe  subiwcna  is  not  necessary  if  the  documents  are  in  Court  :  Hunton  v.  Hertz  &  H. 
Co.,  Mich.,  76  N.  W.  1041.] 

4  The  English  practice  is  stated  in  2Tidd'sPrac.  (9th  ed.)  805-809;  1  Stark.  Evid. 
77  el  seq. ;  3  Chitty's  Gen.  Prac.  828-834  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  370-392. 

1  Newton  v.  Harland,  9  Dowl.  16  ;  Atwood  v.  Scott,  99  Mass.  177.  }A  party  as  a 
witness  hus  the  same  privilege :  Penny  v.  Brink,  75  N.  C.  68.} 


470  WITNESSES;  ATTENDANCE.  [CH.  xxn. 

within  the  weekly  bills  of  mortality;  in  which  case  it  is  usual  to 
leave  a  shilling  with  him  upon  the  delivery  of  the  subpoena  ticket. 
These  expenses  of  a  witness  are  allowed  pursuant  to  a  scale,  gradu- 
ated according  to  his  situation  in  life.2*  But  in  this  country  these 
reasonable  expenses  are  settled  by  statutes,  at  a  fixed  sum  for  each 
day's  actual  attendance,  and  for  each  mile's  travel,  from  the  resi- 
dence of  the  witness  to  the  place  of  trial  and  back,  without  regard 
to  the  employment  of  the  witness,  or  his  rank  in  life.  The  sums 
paid  are  not  alike  in  all  the  States,  but  the  principle  is  believed  to 
be  everywhere  the  same.  In  some  States,  it  is  sufficient  to  tender  to 
the  witness  his  fees  for  travel,  from  his  home  to  the  place  of  trial, 
and  one  day's  attendance,  in  order  to  compel  him  to  appear  upon 
the  summons;  but  in  others,  the  tender  must  include  his  fees  for 
travel  in  returning.8  Neither  is  the  practice  uniform  in  this  coun- 
try, as  to  the  question  whether  the  witness,  having  appeared,  is 
bound  to  attend  from  day  to  day,  until  the  trial  is  closed,  without 
the  payment  of  his  daily  fees ;  but  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be,  that 
without  payment  of  his  fees,  he  is  not  bound  to  submit  to  an  examina- 
tion.4 {Where  a  witness  attends  for  two  or  more  cases  tried  together, 
it  may  be  proper  to  allow  attendance  fees  for  all  and  travelling- 
expenses  for  one.6}  It  has  been  held  that  for  witnesses  brought  from 
another  State,  no  fees  can  be  taxed  for  travel,  beyond  the  line  of  the 
State  in  which  the  cause  is  tried. 6  But  the  reasons  for  these  deci- 
sions are  not  stated,  nor  are  they  very  easily  perceived.  In  England, 
the  early  practice  was  to  allow  all  the  expenses  of  bringing  over 
foreign  witnesses,  incurred  in  good  faith;  but  a  large  sum  being 
claimed  in  one  case,  an  order  was  made  in  the  Common  Pleas  that  no 
costs  should  be  allowed,  except  while  the  witness  was  within  the 
reach  of  process.7  This  order  was  soon  afterwards  rescinded,  and 
the  old  practice  restored; 8  since  which  the  uniform  course,  both  in 
that  court  and  in  B.  B.,  has  been  to  allow  all  the  actual  expenses  of 
procuring  the  attendance  of  the  witness,  and  of  his  return.9  {The 
party  summoning  is  of  course  ordinarily  the  one  to  pay  the  fees;  and 

2  2  Phil.  Evid.  pp.  375,  376  ;  2  Tidd's  Prac.  (9th  ed.)  p.  806. 

8  The  latter  is  the  rule  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States.  See  Conkling's  Practice, 
pp.  265,  266  £U.  S.  R.  S.  §  848-3 

*  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Practice  497;  Hallet  v.  Hears,  13  East  15,  16,  n. ;  Mattocks  v. 
Wheaton,  10  Vt.  493  ;  jsee  Bliss  v.  Brainerd,  42  N.  H.  255. | 

6  {See  Barker  v.  Parsons,  145  Mass.  203;  Vernon  G.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  108 
Ind.  128.  [ 

6  Rowland  v.  Lenox,  4  Johns.  311  ;  Newman  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.,   Phillip's  Digest, 
113;  Melvin  v.  Whiting,   13  Pick.  190;  White  v.  Judd,  1  Met.  293;    jKingfield  v. 
Pullen,  54  Me.  398  ;  Crawford  v.  Abraham,  2  Or.  163  ;   contra:  Dutcher  v.  Justices, 
88  Ga.  214.     So  in  the  Federal  Court,  where  the  witness  is  more  than  one  hundred 
miles  from  the  place  of  trial  and  without  the  district :  Anon.,  5  Blatchf.  134  ;  The  Leo, 
5  Bened.  486. } 

7  Hagedorn  v.  Allnnt,  8  Taunt.  379. 

8  Cotton  t>.  Witt,  4  Taunt.  55. 

9  Tremain  v.  Barrett,  6  Taunt.  88  ;  2  Tidd's  Pr.  814  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  376  (9th  ed.) ; 
and  see  Hatching  v.  State,  8  Mo.  288. 


§  310.]  TEES   AND   EXPENSES.  471 

even  when  it  is  the  practice  for  the  party  who  summons  a  witness  to 
produce  him  for  cross-examination  if  he  is  notified  that  the  other 
side  wishes  to  cross-examine  (otherwise  the  witness  not  appearing 
again),  the  fees  for  this  second  appearance  of  the  witness  must  be 
paid  by  the  party  who  originally  summoned  him,  not  the  party  cross- 
examining  him.10}  An  additional  compensation,  for  loss  of  time, 
was  formerly  allowed  to  medical  men  and  attorneys ;  but  that  rule 
is  now  exploded.  But  a  reasonable  compensation  paid  to  a  foreign 
witness,  who  refused  to  come  without  it,  and  whose  attendance  was 
essential  in  the  cause,  will  in  general  be  allowed  and  taxed  against 
the  losing  party.11  There  is  also  a  distinction  [with  reference  to  the 
privilege  of  refusing  to  testify  without  extra  compensation]  between 
a  witness  to  facts,  and  a  witness  selected  by  a  party  to  give  his 
opinion  on  a  subject  with  which  he  is  peculiarly  conversant  from 
his  employment  in  life.  The  former  is  bound,  as  a  matter  of  public 
duty,  to  testify  to  facts  within  his  knowledge;  the  latter  is  under  no 
such  obligation ;  and  the  party  who  selects  him  must  pay  him  for 
his  time,  before  he  will  be  compelled  to  testify.12  [But  though  this 
distinction  may  once  have  been  the  common  law  of  England,18  it 
has  been  almost  universally  repudiated  in  this  country.14  This 
result  may  be  justified  on  these  grounds:  (1)  The  expert  is  not 
asked  to  render  professional  services  as  a  physician,  chemist,  etc. ; 
he  is  asked  merely  to  tell  what  he  knows,  as  other  witnesses  are; 
(2)  the  hardship  on  the  expert  who  loses  his  day's  fees  is  no  greater, 
relatively,  than  upon  the  merchant  or  the  mechanic  who  loses  his 
day's  earnings;  (3)  it  is  only  by  accident,  and  not  by  premeditation 
or  deliberate  resolve  with  reference  to  the  litigation,  that  either  has 
become  desirable  as  a  source  of  evidence;  (4)  so  far  as  concerns  the 
collateral  policy  of  net  deterring  possible  witnesses,  no  one  will 
ever  decline  to  enter  a  professional  calling  because  of  the  fear  of 
being  called  upon  to  spend  his  time  gratuitously  at  trials,  but  per- 
sons are  often  deterred  from  observing  an  accident,  etc.,  because  of 

10  j  Richards  v.  Goddard,  L.  R  17  Eq.  238.  ( 

11  See  Loncrgan  v.  Assurance,  7  Bing.  725,  ib.  729  ;  Collins  v.  Godfrey,  1  B.  &  Ad. 
950. 

"  Webb  v.  Page,  1  C.  &  K.  23  ;  {Clark  v.  Gill,  1  K.  &  J.  19  ;  Re  Working  M.  M. 
S.,  L.  R.  21  Ch.  D.  831.  { 

18  QWhich  seems  doubtful,  in  view  of  Collins  v.  Godefroy,  1  B.  &  Ad.  950,  956  ;  see 
Rules  of  Court  1883,  Ord.  37,  R.  9  ;  Ord.  65,  R.  27.] 

14  £The  leading  cases  are  Ex  parte  Dement,  53  Ala.  389,  opinion  by  Manning,  J., 
and  Dixoii  v.  People,  168  111.  179,  opinion  by  Magrnder,  J. 

Accord:  Flinu  v.  Prairie  Co.,  60  Ark.  204  ;  Board  v.  Lee,  3  Colo.  App.  177,  179  ; 
Fnirchild  v  Ada  Co.,  Ida.,  55  Pae.  654,  semble ;  State  v.  Teipner,  36  Minn.  535  (prac- 
tically overruling  Le  Mere  v.  McHale,  30  id.  410)  ;  Allegheny  Co.  v.  Watt,  3  Pa.  St. 
462  ;  Northampton  Co.  v.  Innes,  26  id.  156  ;  Com.  r.  Higgins",  5  Kulp  Pa.  269  ;  Sum- 
mers v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  365,  377. 

Contra:  Re  Roelker,  1  Sprague  276  ;  17.  S.  r.  Howe,  12  Cent.  L.  J.  192  (both  U.  S. 
District  Court  rulings).  In  Indiana  a  constitutional  provision  forbidding  "particular 
Bervices"  to  be  exacted  gratuitously  is  held  to  allow  a  demand  for  extra  compensation  : 
Buchman  v.  State,  59  Ind.  1,  14 ;  see  also  Daly  ».  Multnomah  Co.,  14  Or.  20  (left 
undecided). 3 


472  WITNESSES;  ATTENDANCE.  [OH  XXIL 

that  fear;  so  that  the  latter,  if  either,  should  be  the  one  to  receive 
extra  compensation.  — So  far,  however,  as  the  demand  of  the  Court 
is  not  for  mere  testimony,  but  for  distinctly  professional  services  — 
e.  g.  a  post  mortem  examination, 15  —  or  for  special  preparation  in  order 
to  become  competent  —  e.  g.  attending  a  trial  to  listen  to  testimony 
to  the  mental  condition  of  a  testator  or  an  accused,16 — the  func- 
tion of  a  witness  is  not  involved,  and  the  expert  may  make  his  own 
terms.  The  question,  moreover,  whether  by  the  practice  of  the  Court 
as  to  costs,  a  witness  or  a  party  may  claim  extra  fees  for  expert  testi- 
mony, is  a  very  different  one,  and  depends  entirely  on  local  regula- 
tions ;  the  expert  may  not  be  privileged  to  refuse  to  testify  without 
such  fees,  but  he  may  nevertheless  conceivably  have  a  claim  by 
statute  for  them  against  the  county  after  testifying,  or  the  party  may 
be  entitled  to  claim  them  in  his  costs.] 

§  311.  Same  :  (2)  Criminal  Cases.  In  criminal  cases,  no  tender  of 
fees  is  in  general  necessary,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  in  order 
to  compel  its  witnesses  to  attend;  it  being  the  duty  of  every  citizen 
to  obey  a  call  of  that  description,  and  it  being  also  a  case,  in  which 
he  is  himself,  in  some  sense,  a  party.1  But  his  fees  will  in  general 
be  finally  paid  from  the  public  treasury.  In  all  such  cases,  the 
accused  is  entitled  to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  wit- 
nesses in  his  favor.2  The  payment  or  tender  of  fees,  however,  is  not 
necessary  in  any  case,  in  order  to  secure  the  attendance  of  the 
witness,  if  he  has  waived  it;  the  provision  being  solely  for  his  bene- 
fit.* But  it  is  necessary  in  all  civil  cases,  that  the  witness  be  sum- 
moned, in  order  to  compel  him  to  testify;  for,  otherwise,  he  is  not 
obliged  to  answer  the  call,  though  he  be  present  in  court;  but  in 
criminal  cases,  a  person  present  in  court,  though  he  have  not  been 
summoned,  is  bound  to  answer.4  And  where,  in  criminal  cases,  the 
witnesses  for  the  prosecution  are  bound  to  attend  upon  the  summons, 
without  the  payment  or  tender  of  fees,  if,  from  poverty,  the  witness 
cannot  obey  the  summons,  he  will  not,  as  it  seems,  be  guilty  of  a 
contempt.6 

16  PCases  in  preceding  note.] 

19  LPeople  v.  Montgomery,  13  Abh.  Pr.  N.  s.  207,  238.1 

1  In  New  York,  witnesses  are  bound  to  attend  for  the  State,  in  all  criminal  prose- 
cutions, and  for  the  defendant,  in  any  indictment,  without  anv  tender  or  payment  of 
fees :  2  Rev.  Stat.  p.  729,  §  65  ;  Chamberlain's  Case,  *  Cowen  49.  In  Pennsylvania, 
the  person  accused  may  have  process  for  his  witnesses  before  indictment :  U.  S.  v.  Moore, 
Wallace  C.  C.  23.  In  Massachusetts,  in  capital  cases,  the  prisoner  may  hnve  process 
to  bring  in  his  witnesses  at  the  expense  of  the  Commonwealth:  William's  Case,  13 
Mass.  501.  In  England,  the  Court  has  power  to  order  the  payment  of  fees  to  witnesses 
for  the  crown,  in  all  cases  of  felony  ;  and,  in  some  cases,  to  allow  further  compensation  : 
Stat.  18  Geo.  Ill,  c.  19 ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  788,  789;  2  Phil.  Evid.  380;  1  Stark. 
Evid.  82,  83. 

3  Const.  U.  S.  Amendments,  art.  6. 

8  Goodwin  v.  West,  Cro.  Car.  522,  540. 

«  R.  v.  Sadler,  4  C.  &  P.   218;  Blackburn  v.  Hargreave,  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  259 
jRobiimon  r.  Trull,  4  Cush.  249.1 

•  2  Phil.  Evid.  879,  883 ;  \U.  8.  v.  Durling,  4  Biss.  C.  C.  609.] 


§§  310-314.]  FEES   AND  EXPENSES.  473 

§  312.  "Witness  in  Custody.  If  a  witness  is  in  custody,  or  is  in  the 
military  or  naval  service,  and  therefore  is  not  at  liberty  to  attend 
without  leave  of  his  superior  officer,  which  he  cannot  obtain,  he  may 
be  brought  into  court  to  testify  by  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  ad  testifi- 
candum.  This  writ  is  grantable  at  discretion,  on  motion  in  open 
court,  or  by  any  judge,  at  chambers,  who  has  general  authority  to 
issue  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  The  application,  in  civil  cases,  is 
made  upon  affidavit,  stating  the  nature  of  the  suit,  and  the  materi- 
ality of  the  testimony,  as  the  party  is  advised  by  his  counsel  and 
verily  believes,  together  with  the  fact  and  general  circumstances  of 
restraint,  which  call  for  the  issuing  of  the  writ;  and  if  he  is  not 
actually  a  prisoner,  it  should  state  his  willingness  to  attend.1  In 
criminal  cases,  no  affidavit  is  deemed  necessary  on  the  part  of  the 
prosecuting  attorney.  The  writ  is  left  with  the  sheriff,  if  the  wit- 
ness is  in  custody;  but  if  he  is  in  the  military  or  naval  service,  it  is 
left  with  the  officer  in  immediate  command;  to  be  served,  obeyed, 
and  returned,  like  any  other  writ  of  habeas  corpus.*  If  the  witness 
is  a  prisoner  of  war,  he  cannot  be  brought  up  but  by  an  order  from 
the  Secretary  of  State;  but  a  rule  may  be  granted  on  the  adverse 
party,  to  show  cause  why  he  should  not  consent  either  to  admit  the 
fact,  or  that  the  prisoner  should  be  examined  upon  interrogatories.8 

§  313.  Recognizance.  There  is  another  method  by  which  the  at- 
tendance of  witnesses  for  the  government,  in  criminal  cases,  is 
enforced,  namely,  by  recognizance.  This  is  the  usual  course  upon 
all  examinations,  where  the  party  accused  is  committed,  or  is  bound 
over  for  trial.  And  any  witness,  whom  the  magistrate  may  order  to 
recognize  for  his  own  appearance  at  the  trial,  if  he  refuses  so  to  do, 
may  be  committed.  Sureties  are  not  usually  demanded,  though  they 
may  be  required,  at  the  magistrate's  discretion;  but  if  they  cannot 
be  obtained  by  the  witness,  when  required,  his  own  recognizance 
must  be  taken.1 

§  314.  Time  of  Service  of  Subpoena.  The  service  of  a  subpoena 
upon  a  witness  ought  always  to  be  made  in  a  reasonable  time  before 
trial,  to  enable  him  to  put  his  affairs  in  such  order,  that  his  attend- 
ance upon  the  Court  may  be  as  little  detrimental  as  possible  to  his 

1  R.  v.  Roddam,  Cowp.  672. 

2  2  Phil.  Evid.   374,  375 ;  Conklines  Pr.  264  ;  1   Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.   503,  504 , 
2  Tidd's  Pr.  809.    {Though  the  process  oy  which  a  prisoner  is  brought  before  the  Court 
as  a  witness  may  be  defective,  yet  when  the  witness  is  in  court,  by  virtue  of  such  pro- 
cess, he  may  be  compelled  to  answer:  Maxwell  v.  Rives,  11  Nev.  213.} 

8  Furly  v.  Newnham,  2  Doug.  419. 

1  2  Hale  P.  C.  282 ;  Bennet  v.  Watson,  8  M.  &  S.  1  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  82 ;  Roscoe's 
(Mm.  Evid.  p.  87  ;  Evans  v.  Rees,  12  Ad.  &  El.  55.  {See  U.  S.  R.  S.  §  879.  In 
State  r.  Grace,  18  Minn.  398,  it  is  said  to  lie  unjust  and  oppressive  and  against  com- 
mon right  to  commit  a  witness  to  jail  in  default  of  bail,  without  some  proof  of  his  intent 
not  to  appear  at  the  trial. 

In  California,  by  statute,  the  witness  for  the  State  in  a  criminal  case,  if  unable  to 
procure-snreties,  may  be  discharged  from  committal  and  his  deposition  taken  :  People 
v.  Lee,  49Cal.  37.} 


474  WITNESSES;  ATTENDANCE.  [CH.  xxn. 

interest.1  On  this  principle,  a  summons  in  the  morning  to  attend 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  has  been  held  insufficient,  though 
the  witness  lived  in  the  same  town,  and  very  near  to  the  place  of 
trial.  In  the  United  States,  the  reasonableness  of  the  time  is  gener- 
ally fixed  by  statute,  requiring  an  allowance  of  one  day  for  every 
certain  number  of  miles  distance  from  the  witness'  residence  to  the 
place  of  trial;  and  this  is  usually  twenty  miles.  But  at  least  one 
day's  notice  is  deemed  necessary,  however  inconsiderable  the  dis- 
tance may  be.2 

§  315.  Manner  of  Service.  As  to  the  manner  of  service,  in  order 
to  compel  the  attendance  of  the  witness,  it  should  be  personal,  since, 
otherwise,  he  cannot  be  chargeable  with  a  contempt  in  not  appearing 
upon  the  summons.1  The  subpoena  is  plainly  of  no  force  beyond  the 
jurisdictional  limits  of  the  court  in  which  the  action  is  pending,  and 
from  which  it  issued;  but  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  sitting  in 
any  district,  are  empowered  by  statute  2  to  send  subpoenas  for  wit- 
nesses into  any  other  district,  provided  that,  in  civil  causes,  the  wit- 
nesses do  not  live  at  a  greater  distance  than  one  hundred  miles  from 
the  place  of  trial.8 

§  316.  Protection  from  Arrest.  Witnesses  as  well  as  parties  are 
protected  from  arrest  while  going  to  the  place  of  trial,  while  attend- 
ing there  for  the  purpose  of  testifying  in  the  cause,  and  while  return- 
ing home,  eundo,  morando,  et  redeundo.1  A  subpoena  is  not  necessary 
to  protection,  if  the  witness  have  consented  to  go  without  one;  nor 
is  a  writ  of  protection  essential  for  this  purpose;  its  principal  use 
being  to  prevent  the  trouble  of  an  arrest  and  an  application  for  dis- 

1  Hammond  v.  Stewart,  1  Stra.  510. 

3  Sims  v.  Kitchen,  5  Esp.  46  ;  2  Tidd's  Pr.  806  ;  3  Chitty's  Gen.  Pr.  801 ;  1  Paine  & 
Doer's  Pr.  497 ;  IScammon  v.  Scammon,  33  N.  H.  52.  { 

1  In  aome  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  in  England,  a  subpasna  ticket,  which  is  a 
copy  of  the  writ,  or  more  properly  a  statement  of  its  substance,  duly  certified,  is  de- 
livered to  the  witness,  at  the  same  time  that  the  writ  is  shown  to  him  :  1  Paine  &  Duer's 
Pr.  496 ;  1  Tidd's  Pr.  806 ;  1  Stark.  Ev.  77 ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  781,  782 ;  2  Phil. 
Evid.  373.      But  the  general  practice  is  believed  to  be,  either  to  show  the  subpoena  to 
the  witness,  or  to  serve  him  with  an  attested  copy.      The  writ,  being  directed  to  the 
witness  himself,  may  be  shown  or  delivered  to  him  by  a  private  person,  and  the  service 
proved  by  affidavit ;  or  it  may  be  served  by  the  sheriff's  officer,  and  proved  by  his  offi- 
cial return. 

2  Stat.  1793,  c.  66;  QJ.  S.  R.  S.  §  876.]     jThis  applies  to  proceedings  in  bank- 
ruptcy also  :  Re  Woodward,  12  Bankr.  Reg.  297.  | 

*  In  most  of  the  States,  there  are  provisions  by  statute  for  taking  the  depositions  of 
witnesses  who  live  more  than  a  specified  number  of  miles  from  the  place  of  trial.  But 
these  regulations  are  made  for  the  convenience  of  the  parties,  and  do  not  absolve  the 
witness  from  the  obligation  of  personal  attendance  nt  the  court,  at  whatever  distance 
it  be  holden,  if  he  resides  within  its  jurisdiction,  and  is  duly  summoned.  In  Georgia, 
the  depositions  of  females  may  be  taken  in  all  civil  cases:  Kev.  St.  1815  (by  Hotch- 
kiss),  p.  586. 

1  This  rule  of  protection  was  laid  down,  upon  delibt-ration,  in  the  case  of  Meekins 
v.  Smith,  1  H.  Bl.  636,  as  extending  to  "all  persons  who  had  relation  to  a  suit,  which 
called  for  their  attendance,  whether  they  were  compelled  to  attend  by  process  or  not 
(in  which  number  bail  were  included),  provided  they  came  bona  fide:'  Randnll  v. 
Gurney,  3  B.  &  Aid.  252;  Hurst's  Case,  4  Dall.  387;  jCoin.  v.  'Huggeford,  9  Pick. 
257.1 


§§314-317.]      SUMMONS;  PROTECTION  FROM  ARREST.  475 

charge,  by  showing  it  to  the  arresting  officer;  and  sometimes,  espe- 
cially where  a  writ  of  protection  is  shown,  to  subject  the  officer  to 
punishment,  for  contempt.2  Preventing,  or  using  means  to  prevent, 
a  witness  from  attending  court,  who  has  been  duly  summoned,  is 
also  punishable  as  a  contempt  of  court.8  On  the  same  principle,  it 
is  deemed  as  a  contempt  to  serve  process  upon  a  witness,  even  by 
summons,  if  it  be  done  in  the  immediate  or  constructive  presence  of 
the  court  upon  which  he  is  attending;  *  though  any  service  elsewhere 
without  personal  restraint,  it  seems,  is  good.  But  this  freedom  from 
arrest  is  a  personal  privilege,  which  the  party  may  waive;  and  if  he 
willingly  submits  himself  to  the  custody  of  the  officer,  he  cannot 
afterwards  object  to  the  imprisonment,  as  unlawful.6  The  privilege 
of  exemption  from  arrest  does  not  extend  through  the  whole  sitting 
or  term  of  the  court  at  which  the  witness  is  summoned  to  attend; 
but  it  continues  during  the  space  of  time  necessarily  and  reasonably 
employed  in  going  to  the  place  of  trial,  staying  there  until  the  trial 
is  ended,  and  returning  home  again.  In  making  this  allowance  of 
time,  the  Courts  are  disposed  to  be  liberal;  but  unreasonable  loiter- 
ing and  deviation  from  the  way  will  not  be  permitted.6  But  a  wit- 
ness is  not  privileged  from  arrest  by  his  bail,  on  his  return  from 
giving  evidence;  and  if  he  has  absconded  from  his  bail,  he  may  be 
retaken,  even  during  his  attendance  at  court.7 

§  317.  Same :  Persons  included.  This  privilege  is  granted  in  all 
cases  where  the  attendance  of  the  party  or  witness  is  given  in  any 
matter  pending  before  a  lawful  tribunal  having  jurisdiction  of  the 
cause.  Thus  it  has  been  extended  to  a  party  attending  on  an  arbitra- 
tion, under  a  rule  of  court ; l  on  the  execution  of  a  writ  of  inquiry ;  3 
to  a  bankrupt  and  witnesses,  attending  before  the  commissioners, 
on  notice;8  to  a  witness  attending  before  a  magistrate,  to  give  his 
deposition  under  an  order  of  court;  *  or  {before  commissioners  on  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  insolvent; 5  or  before  a  legislative  committee.6} 

2  Meekins  v.  Smith,  1  H.  Bl.  636 ;  Arding  v.  Flower,  8  T.  R.  536 ;  Norris  ».  Beach, 
2  Johns.  294  ;  U.  S.  v.  Edme,  9  S.  &  R.  147  ;  Sanford  v.  Chase,  3  Cowen  381  ;  Boura 
v.  Tucket-man,  7  Johns.  538;  \contra:  Exparte  McNeil,  3  Mass.  288,  6  id.  264.} 

8  Com.  v.  Feely,  2  Virg.  Cas.  1. 

*  Cole  v.  Hawkins,  Andrews  275  ;  Blight  ».  Fisher,  1   Peters  C.  C.  41  ;  Miles  v. 
McCullou<rh,  1  Binn.  77. 

*  Brown  v.  Getchell,  11  Mass.  11,  14  ;  Geyer  v.  Irwin,  4  Ball.  107. 

8  Meekins  v.  Smith,  1  H.  Bl.  636  ;  Randall  v.  Gurney,  3  B.  &  Aid.  252 ;  Willing- 
ham  v.  Matthews,  2  Marsh.  57;  Lightfoot  v.  Cameron,  2  W.  Bl.  1113  ;  Selby  v.  Hills, 
8  Bins.  166  ;  Hurst's  Case,  4  Dall.  387  ;  Smythe  v.  Banks,  ib.  329  ;  1  Tidd's  Pr. 
195-197 ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  782,  783  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  374  ;  jChaffee  v.  Jones,  19 
Pick.  260.} 

7  1  Tidd's  Pr.  197  ;  Exparte  Lyne,  3  Stark.  470. 

1  Spence  v.  Stuart,  3  East  89  ;  Sanford  v.  Chase,  3  Cowen  881. 

2  Walters  v.  Rees,  4  J.  B.  Moore  34. 

>  Arding  v.  Flower,  8  T.  R.  534  ;  1  Tidd's  Pr.  197. 

«  Ex  pnrte  Edme,  9  S.  &  R.  147. 

»  {Wood  v.  Neale,  5  Gray  538.} 

6  {Thompson's  Case,  122  Mass.  428  ;  Wilder  v.  Welsh,  1  MacArtb,  666.  J 


476  WITNESSES;   ATTENDANCE.  [CH.  xxn. 

'It  also  includes  witnesses  coming  without  a  subpoena  from  abroad 7 
{or  from  another  of  the  United  States,  whence  he  could  not  be  com- 
pelled to  come.8  In  the  case  of  such  non-residents,  the  object  being 
to  encourage  them  to  attend,  the  exemption  extends  also  to  parties  as 
witnesses,9  and  privileges  them  equally  against  service  on  civil 
process ; 10  and  in  some  jurisdictions  this  policy  is  treated  as  appli- 
cable also  to  attendance  at  a  trial  in  the  same  State  but  in  another 
county  or  district  than  that  in  which  process  would  ordinarily  be 
served.11} 

§  318.  Same :  Remedy.  If  a  person  thus  clearly  entitled  to  privi- 
lege is  unlawfully  arrested,  the  Court,  in  which  the  cause  is  to  be, or 
has  been,  tried,  if  it  have  power,  will  discharge  him  upon  motion: 
and  not  put  him  to  the  necessity  of  suing  out  process  for  that  pur- 
pose, or  of  tiling  common  bail.  But  otherwise,  and  where  the  ques- 
tion of  privilege  is  doubtful,  the  Court  will  not  discharge  him  out 
of  custody  upon  motion,  but  will  leave  him  to  his  remedy  by  writ; 
and  in  either  case  the  trial  will  be  put  off  until  he  is  released.1 

§  319.  Failure  to  attend,  as  a  Contempt.  Where  a  witness  has 
been  duly  summoned,  and  his  fees  paid  or  tendered,  or  the  payment 
or  the  tender  waived,  if  he  wilfully  neglects  to  appear,  he  is  guilty 
of  a  contempt  of  the  process  of  Court,  and  may  be  proceeded  against 
by  an  attachment.1  It  has  sometimes  been  held  necessary  that  the 
cause  should  be  called  on  for  trial,  the  jury  sworn,  and  the. witness 
called  to  testify;  a  but  the  better  opinion  is,  that  the  witness  is  to  be 
deemed  guilty  of  contempt,  whenever  it  is  distinctly  shown  that  he 
is  absent  from  court  with  intent  to  disobey  the  writ  of  subpoena  ;  and 
that  the  calling  of  him  in  court  is  of  no. other  use  than  to  obtain 
clear  evidence  of  his  having  neglected  to  appear;  but  that  is  not 
necessary,  if  it  can  be  clearly  shown  by  other  means  that  he  has  dis- 
obeyed the  order  of  Court.8  An  attachment  for  contempt  proceeds 

7  Tidd's  Practice,  I,  185;  Norris  v.  Beach,  2  Johns.  294. 

8  j  Jones  v.  Kuauas,  31  N.  J.  Eq.  211;  Person  v.  Crier,  66  N.  Y.  124;   May  v. 
Shumway,  16  Gray  86.  | 

9  j  Wilson  v.  Donaldson,  117  Ind.  356  ;  Dungan  v.  Miller,  37  N.  J.  L.  182.} 

10  (Sherman  v.  Gundlach,  37  Minn.  118  ;  Person  v.  Grier,  66  N.  Y.  124;  Matthews 
v.  Tufts,  87  id.  563 ;  In  re  Healey,  53  Vt.  694  ;   Mitchell  v.  Judge,  53  Mich.  541 ; 
s.  c.  aub  nom.  Mitchell  v.  Wixon,  19  N.  W.  Rep.  176;  Palmer  v.  Rowan,  21  Neb. 
452;  Compton  v.  Wilder,  40  Oh.  St.   130  (summons  and  arrest);  Massey  v.  Colville, 
45  N.  J.  L.  119  ;  Dungan  v.  Miller,  37  id.  182.  j 

11  {See  Person  v.  Grier,  66  N.  Y.   124;  Christian  v.  Williams,  35  Mo.  App.  303; 
Mitchell  v.  Judge,  53  Mich.  541  ;    Andrews  v.  Lembeck,  46  Oh.  St.  38  ;  Palmer  v. 
Rowen,  21  Neb.  452;  Mas.sey  v.  Colville,  45  N.  J.  L.  119.  | 

1  1  Tidd's  Pr.  197,  216  ;  2  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  6,  10;  Hnrst's  Case,  4  Dull.  387  ; 
Ex  pirte  Edme,  9  S.  &  R.  147 ;  Sanford  v.  Cliase,  3  Cowen  381;  jsee  Norris  v.  Beach, 
2  Johns.  294;  Person  ».  Grier,  66  N.  Y.  124.  ( 

Where  two  subpoenas  were  served  the  same  day,  on  a  witness,  requiring  his 
attendance  at  different  places,  distant  from  each  other,  it  was  held  that  he  might 
make  his  election  which  he  will  obey:  Icehour  v.  Martin,  Busbee  Law  478. 

Bland  v.  8wafford,  Peake's  Gas.  60. 

•  Barrow  v.  Humphrey*,  8  B.  &  Aid.  698;  2  Tidd's  Pr.  808 ;  I  Wilson  v.  State  57 
Ind.  71.} 


§§  317-319.]        CONTEMPT,    BY   FAILURE   TO  ATTEND.  477 

not  upon  the  ground  of  any  damage  sustained  by  an  individual,  but 
is  instituted  to  vindicate  the  dignity  of  the  Court;4  and  it  is  said 
that  it  must  be  a  perfectly  clear  case  to  call  for  the  exercise  of  this 
extraordinary  jurisdiction.6  The  motion  for  an  attachment  should 
therefore  be  brought  forward  as  soon  as  possible,  and  the  party 
applying  must  show,  by  affidavits  or  otherwise,  that  the  subpoena  was 
seasonably  and  personally  served  on  the  witness,  that  his  fees  were 
paid  or  tendered,  or  the  tender  expressly  waived,  and  that  every- 
thing has  been  done  which  was  necessary  to  call  for  his  attendance.8 
But  if  it  appears  that  the  testimony  of  the  witness  could  not  have 
been  material,  the  rule  for  an  attachment  will  not  be  granted.7  {So, 
when  one  is  served  with  a  subpoena  duces  requiring  him  to  bring 
certain  public  documents  which  might  be  proved  by  copies,  his 
neglect  to  attend  will  not  justify  an  attachment  for  contempt.8  If 
the  witness  has  reasonable  ground  to  believe  that  he  will  not  be 
wanted  at  the  trial;9  or  has  been  excused  by  the  attorney  of  the 
party  who  summoned  him; 10  or  is  too  poor,11  no  attachment  will  lie. 
But  a  witness  who  is  duly  summoned  takes  the  risk  if  he  does  not 
attend  so  early  as  he  might  under  the  summons,  thinking  to  be  able 
to  attend  to  some  other  matter  before  he  goes  to  court ; 12  and  if  it 
appears  that  the  witness  intentionally  defied  the  process  of  the  Court, 
the  fact  that  his  evidence  would  have  been  immaterial  will  not  re- 
lease him  from  the  liability  to  attachment.18}  If  a  case  of  palpable 
contempt  is  shown,  such  as  an  express  and  positive  refusal  to  attend, 
the  Court  will  grant  an  attachment  in  the  first  instance;  otherwise, 
the  usual  course  is  to  grant  a  rule  to  show  cause.14  It  is  hardly  nec- 

4  3  B.  &  Aid.  600,  per  Best,  J.  Where  a  justice  of  the  peace  has  power  to  bind  a 
witness  by  recognizance  to  appear  at  a  higher  court,  he  may  compel  his  attendance 
before  himself  tor  that  purpose  by  attachment:  Bennet  v.  Watson,  3  M.  &  S.  1 ; 
2  Hale  P.  C.  282  ;  Evans  v.  Rees,  12  Ad.  &  El.  55 ;  svpra,  §  313. 

6  Home  v.  Smith,  6  Taunt.  10,  11;  Garden  v.  Creswell,  2  M.  &  W.  319;  R.  v. 
Lord  J.  Russell,  7  Dowl.  693. 

6  2  Tidd's  Pr.  807,  808;  Garden  v.  Creswell,  2  M.  &  W.  319;  1  Paine  &  Duer's 
Pr.  499,  500  ;  Conkling's  Pr.  265. 

*  Dicas  v.  Lawson,  1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  934. 
Corbett  v.  Gibson,  16  Blatchf.  334.  { 
R.  v.  Sloman,  1  Dowl.  61 8.  | 
Farrah  v.  Keat,  6  Dowl.  47o.{ 
2  Phill.  Evid.  383.  ( 
Jackson  v.  Seager,  2  Dowl.  &  L.  13.  ( 

.Chapman  v.  Davis,  3  M.  &  G.  609;  Scholes  v.  Hilton,  10  M.  &  W.  16  ;  appar- 
ently overruling  Tinley  v.  Porter,  5  Dowl.  744,  and  Taylor  v.  Willans,  4  M.  &  P. 
59.  ( 

"  Anon.,  Salk.  84;  4  Bl.  Comm.  286,  287;  K.  v.  Jones,  1  Stra.  185  ;  Jackson  v. 
Mann,  2  Caines  92  ;  Andrews  v.  Andrews,  2  Johns.  Cas.  109 ;  Thomas  v.  Cummins, 
1  Yeates  1 ;  Conkling's  Pr.  265 ;  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  500  ;  2  Tidd's  Pr.  807,  808. 
The  party  injured  by  the  non-attendance  of  a  witness  has  also  his  remedy,  by  action 
on  the  case  for  damages,  at  common  law ;  and  a  further  remedy,  by  action  of  debt, 
is  given  by  Stat.  5  Eliz.  c.  9  ;  but  these  are  deemed  foreign  to  the  object  of  this  work. 
|  For  the  power  of  a  Legislature  to  punish  for  contempt  one  who  fails  to  attend  as  a 
witness,  see  Anderson  v.  Dunn,  6  Wheat.  204;  Kilbourn  v.  Thompson,  103  U.  S.  168; 
Burnham  v.  Morrissey,  14  Gray  226.} 


478  WITNESSES:  DEPOSITIONS.  [CH.  xxn. 

essary  to  add,  that  if  a  witness,  being  present  in  court,  refuses  to  be 
sworn  or  to  testify,  he  is  guilty  of  contempt.  In  all  cases  of  con- 
tempt the  punishment  is  by  fine  and  imprisonment,  at  the  discretion 
of  the  Court.18 


2.    Testifying  by  Deposition. 

§  320.  At  Common  Law.  If  the  witness  resides  abroad,  out  of 
the  jurisdiction,  and  refuses  to  attend,  or  is  sick  and  unable  to 
attend,  his  testimony  can  be  obtained  only  by  taking  his  deposition 
before  a  magistrate,  or  before  a  commissioner  duly  authorized  by 
an  order  of  the  court  where  the  cause  is  pending;  and  if  the  com- 
missioner is  not  a  judge  or  magistrate,  it  is  usual  to  require  that  he 
be  first  sworn.1  This  method  of  obtaining  testimony  from  witnesses, 
in  a  foreign  country,  has  always  been  familiar  in  the  courts  of  ad- 
miralty; but  it  is  also  deemed  to  be  within  the  inherent  powers  of 
all  courts  of  justice.  For,  by  the  law  of  nations,  courts  of  justice, 
of  different  countries,  are  bound  mutually  to  aid  and  assist  each 
other,  for  the  furtherance  of  justice;  and  hence,  when  the  testimony 
of  a  foreign  witness  is  necessary,  the  court  before  which  the  action  is 
pending  may  send  to  the  court  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  Avitness 
resides,  a  writ,  either  patent  or  close,  usually  termed  a  letter  roga- 
tory,  or  a  commission  sub  mutuce  vicissitudinis  obtentu  ac  in  juris 
subsidium,  from  those  words  contained  in  it.  By  this  instrument, 
the  court  abroad  is  informed  of  the  pendency  of  the  cause  and  the 
names  of  the  foreign  witnesses,  and  is  requested  to  cause  their  depo- 
sitions to  be  taken  in  due  course  of  law,  for  the  furtherance  of  jus- 
tice ;  with  an  offer,  on  the  part  of  the  trribunal  making  the  request, 
to  do  the  like  for  the  other,  in  a  similar  case.  The  writ  or  commis- 
sion is  usually  accompanied  by  interrogatories,  filed  by  the  parties 
on  each  side,  to  which  the  answers  of  the  witnesses  are  desired. 
The  commission  is  executed  by  the  judge,  who  receives  it,  either  by 
calling  the  witness  before  himself,  or  by  the  intervention  of  a  com- 
missioner for  that  purpose;  and  the  original  answers,  duly  signed 
and  sworn  to  by  the  deponent,  and  properly  authenticated,  are  re- 
turned with  the  commission  to  the  court  from  which  it  issued.2  The 

16  4  Bl.  Comm.  286,  287;  R.  ».  Beardmore,  2  Burr.  792.  j  If  several  witnesses  are 
arrested  for  contempt,  they  should  be  sentenced  separately,  and  each  held  responsible 
for  his  own  costs  only:  Humphrey  v.  Knapp,  41  Conn.  313.  j 

*  Ponsford  v.  O'Connor,  5  M.  &  W.  673  ;  Clay  v.  Stephenson,  3  Ad.  &  El.  807. 

2  Sue  Clerk's  Praxis,  tit.  27;  Cunningham  v.  Otis,  1  Gall.  166;  Hall's  Adm.  Pr. 
part  2,  tit.  19,  cum.  add.,  and  tit.  27,  cum.  add.  pp.  37,  88,  55-60  ;  Oughton's  Ordo 
Judiciorum,  vol.  i,  pp.  150-152,  tit.  95,  96.  See  also  id.  pp.  139-149,  tit.  88-94.  The 
general  practice,  in  the  foreign  continental  courts,  is,  to  retain  the  original  deposition, 
which  is  i-iitcred  of  record,  returning  n  copy  duly  authenticated.  But  in  the  common- 
law  courts,  the  production  of  the  original  is  generally  required:  Clay  v.  Stephenson, 
7  Ad.  &  El.  185.  The  practice,  however,  is  not  uniform.  See  an  early  instance  o/ 


§§  319-320.]  AT  COMMON   LAW.  479 

Court  of  Chancery  has  always  freely  exercised  this  power,  by  a  com- 
mission, either  directed  to  foreign  magistrates,  by  their  official 
designation,  or,  more  usually,  to  individuals  by  name;  which  latter 
course,  the  peculiar  nature  of  its  jurisdiction  and  proceedings  enables 
it  to  induce  the  parties  to  adopt,  by  consent,  where  any  doubt  exists 
as  to  its  inherent  authority.  The  Courts  of  common  law  in  England 
seem  not  to  have  asserted  this  power  in  a  direct  manner,  and  of  their 
own  authority;  but  have  been  in  the  habit  of  using  indirect  means 
to  coerce  the  adverse  party  into  a  consent  to  the  examination  of 
witnesses,  who  were  absent  in  foreign  countries,  under  a  commission 
for  that  purpose.  These  means  of  coercion  were  various;  such  as 
putting  off  the  trial,  or  refusing  to  enter  judgment,  as  in  case  of 
nonsuit,  if  the  defendant  was  the  recusant  party;  or  by  a  stay  of 
proceedings,  till  the  party  applying  for  the  commission  could  have 
recourse  to  a  court  of  equity,  by  instituting  a  new  suit  there,  auxil- 
iary to  the  suit  at  law.8  But,  subsequently,  the  learned  judges 
appear  not  to  have  been  satisfied  that  it  was  proper  for  them  to 
compel  a  party,  by  indirect  means,  to  do  that  which  they  had  no 
authority  to  compel  him  to  do  directly;  and  they  accordingly  re- 
fused to  put  off  a  trial  for  that  purpose.*  This  inconvenience  was 
therefore  remedied  by  statutes6  which  provide  that  in  all  cases  of  the 
absence  of  witnesses,  whether  by  sickness,  or  travelling  out  of  the 
jurisdiction,  or  residence  abroad,  the  Courts,  in  their  discretion,  for 
the  due  administration  of  justice,  may  cause  the  witnesses  to  be 
examined  under  a  commission  issued  for  that  purpose.  {Under  these 

letters  rogatory,  hi  1  Roll.  Abr.  530,  pi.  15,  temp.  Ed.  I.  The  following  form  may  be 
found  in  1  Peters  C.  C.  236,  n.  (a)  :  — 

UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 

District  of ,  ss. 

The  President  of  the  United  States,  to  any  judge  or  tribunal  having  jurisdiction  of 

civil  causes,  in  the  city  (or  province)  of ,  in  the  kingdom  of ,  Greeting:  — 

Whereas  a  certain  suit  is  pending  in  our Court  for  the  District  of 

,  in  which  A.  B.  is  plaintiff  [or  claimant,  against  the  ship ],  and 

C.  D.  is  defendant,  and  it  has  been  suggested  to  us  that  there  are  witnesses 
residing  within  your  jurisdiction,  without  whose  testimony  justice  cannot  completely 
be  done  between  the  said  parties ;  we  therefore  request  you  that,  in  furtherance  of 
justice,  you  will,  by  the  proper  and  usual  process  of  your  court,  cause  such  witness 
or  witnesses  as  shall  be  named  or  pointed  out  to  you  by  the  said  parties,  or  either 
of  them,  to  appear  before  you,  or  some  competent  person  by  you  for  that  purpose  to  be 
appointed  and  authorized,  at  a  precise  time  and  place,  by  you  to  be  fixed,  and  there  to 
answer,  on  their  oaths  and  affirmations,  to  the  several  interrogatories  hereunto  annexed  ; 
and  that  you  will  cause  their  depositions  to  be  committed  to  writing,  and  returned  to 
us  under  cover,  duly  closed  and  sealed  up,  together  with  these  presents.  And  we 
shall  be  ready  and  willing  to  do  the  same  for  you  in  a  similar  case,  when  required. 
Witness,  etc. 

8  Furlv  v.  Newnham,  Doug.  419  ;  Anon.,  cited  in  Mostyn  v.  Fabrigas,  Cowp.  174; 
2  Tidd's  Pr.  770.  810. 

4  Calliand  v.  Vaughan,  1  B.  &  P.  210.  See  also  Grant  v.  Ridley,  5  Man.  &  Grang. 
203,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  ;  Macaulay  v.  Shackell,  1  Bligh  N.  8.  119,  130,  131. 

8  13  Geo.  Ill,  c.  63,  and  1  W.  IV,  c.  22;  Report  of  Commissioners  on  Chancery 
Practice,  p.  109;  Second  Report  of  Commissioners  on  Courts  of  Common  Law,  pp. 
23.  24. 


480  WITNESSES;  DEPOSITIONS.  [CH.  xxn. 

statutes,  such  a  commission  may  be  issued  on  the  application  of  a 
party  to  the  suit,  either  nominal  or  real,  if  the  testimony  sought  is 
material  to  the  cause ;  so,  when  a  land  company  was  in  the  course 
of  liquidation,  an  application  of  persons  who  are  substantially  mort- 
gage creditors  of  the  company,  to  have  issued  a  commission  to  exam- 
ine witnesses  abroad,  to  test  the  accuracy  of  the  accounts  of  the 
liquidator,  was  granted,  as  an  incident  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
accounts.6  The  commission  may  issue  ex  parte,  on  affidavit  of  appli- 
cant that  great  inconvenience  would  result  otherwise;7  and  it  has 
been  held  that  the  Court  would  not  exercise  its  discretion  to  grant 
the  commission  to  examine  parties  to  the  action  under  1  W.  IV, 
c.  22,  unless  it  were  shown,  by  the  party  applying  therefor,  that 
it  is  necessary  to  the  due  administration  of  justice;  and  that  it  is 
not  enough  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  or  defendant  lives  out  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court.8}  In  general,  the  examination  is  made  by 
interrogatories,  previously  prepared;  but,  in  proper  cases,  the  wit- 
nesses may  be  examined  viva  voce,  by  the  commissioner,  who  in  that 
case  writes  down  the  testimony  given ;  or  he  may  be  examined  partly 
in  that  manner  and  partly  upon  interrogatories.9 

§  321.  By  Statute.  In  the  United  States,  provisions  have  existed 
in  the  statutes  of  the  several  States,  from  a  very  early  period,  for  the 
taking  of  depositions  to  be  used  in  civil  actions  in  the  courts  of  law, 
in  all  cases  where  the  personal  attendance  of  the  witness  could  not 
be  had,  by  reason  of  sickness  or  other  inability  to  attend;  and  also 
in  cases  where  the  witness  is  about  to  sail  on  a  foreign  voyage,  or  to 
take  a  journey  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  and  not  to  return  before  the 
time  of  trial.1  Similar  provisions  have  also  been  made  in  many  of 
the  United  States  for  taking  the  depositions  of  witnesses  in  per- 
petuam  rei  memoriam,  without  the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity,  in  cases 
where  no  action  is  pending.  In  these  latter  cases  there  is  some 
diversity  in  the  statutory  provisions,  in  regard  to  the  magistrates 
before  whom  the  depositions  may  be  taken,  and  in  regard  to  some  of 
the  modes  of  proceeding,  the  details  of  which  are  not  within  the 
scope  of  this  treatise.  It  may  suffice  to  state  that,  generally,  notice 
must  be  previously  given  to  all  persons  known  to  be  interested  in  the 
subject-matter  to  which  the  testimony  i3  to  relate;  that  the  names 
of  the  persons  thus  summoned  must  be  mentioned  in  the  magistrate's 
certificate  or  caption,  appended  to  the  deposition;  and  that  the 
deposition  is  admissible  only  in  case  of  the  death  or  incapacity  of 


Re  Imperial  Land  Co.,  37  L.  T.  R.  N.  s.  688. } 
Spilli-r  v.  Kink  Co.,  27  W.  R.  225.  | 


Castelli  v.  Groom,  16  Jur.  888.  (  [These  matters  are  now  chiefly  regulated  in 
England  by  the  Rules  of  Court  of  1883  ;  see  the  Annual  Practice,  where  the  various 
Orders  nre  given  in  full  with  annotations.] 

9  2  Tid<Ps  Pr.  810,  811  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  274-278  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  pp.  796- 
800  ;  2  Phil.  Kvid.  386-388  ;  Pole  v.  Rogers,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  780. 

1  See  Stnt.  United  States,  1812,  c.  25,  §  3  ;  £U.  S.  Rev.  St.  §§  863  (T.  By  c.  4, 
St.  1892,  it  is  additionally  allowed  to  take  depositions  in  the  Federal  Courts  according 
to  the  mode  of  the  State  in  which  the  court  is  held.]  In  several  of  the  United  States, 
depositions  may,  in  certain  contingencies,  be  taken  and  used  in  criminal  cases. 


§§  320-322.]  UNDER   STATUTES.  481 

the  witness,  and  against  those  only  who  have  had  opportunity  to 
cross-examine,  and  those  in  privity  with  them.2 

§  322.  In  regard,  also,  to  the  other  class  of  depositions,  namely, 
those  taken  in  civil  causes,  under  the  statutes  alluded  to,  there  are 
similar  diversities  in  the  forms  of  proceeding.  In  some  of  the  States, 
the  judges  of  the  courts  of  law  are  empowered  to  issue  commissions, 
at  chambers,  in  their  discretion,  for  the  examination  of  witnesses 
unable  or  not  compellable  to  attend,  from  any  cause  whatever.  In 
others,  though  with  the  like  diversities  in  form,  the  party  himself 
may,  on  application  to  any  magistrate,  cause  the  deposition  of  any 
witness  to  be  taken,  who  is  situated  as  described  in  the  acts.  In 
their  essential  features  these  statutes  are  nearly  alike ;  and  these 
features  may  be  collected  from  that  part  of  the  judiciary  Act  of  the 
United  States,  and  its  supplements,  which  regulate  this  subject.1 
By  that  act,  when  the  testimony  of  a  person  is  necessary  in  any  civil 
cause,  pending  in  a  court  of  the  United  States,  and  the  person  lives 
more  than  a  hundred  miles 2  from  the  place  of  trial,  or  is  bound  on  a 
voyage  to  sea,  or  is  about  to  go  out  of  the  United  States,  or  out  of 
the  district,  and  more  than  that  distance  from  the  place  of  trial,  or  is 
ancient,  or  very  infirm,  his  deposition  may  be  taken  de  bene  esse,  be- 
fore any  iudge  of  any  court  of  the  United  States,  or  before  any  chan- 
cellor or  judge  of  any  superior  court  of  a  State,  or  any  judge  of  a 
county  court,  or  court  of  common  pleas,  or  any  mayor  or  chief  magis- 
trate of  any  city8  in  the  United  States,  not  being  of  counsel,  nor 
interested  in  the  suit ;  provided  that  a  notification  from  the  magis- 
trate before  whom  the  deposition  is  to  be  taken,  to  the  adverse  party, 
to  be  present  at  the  taking,  and  put  interrogatories,  if  he  think  fit, 
be  first  served  on  him  or  his  attorney,  as  either  may  be  nearest,  if 
either  is  within  a  hundred  miles  of  the  place  of  caption ; 2  allowing 
time,  after  the  service  of  the  notification,  not  less  than  at  the  rate  of  one 
day,  Sundays  exclusive,  for  twenty  miles'  travel.4  The  witness  is  to 

2  [[For  the  necessity  of  notice  and  opportunity  to  cross-examine,  see  ante,  §§  1636,  c.] 

1  Stat.  1789,  c.  20,  §  30  ;  Stat.  1793,  c.  22,  §  6  ;  QU.  S.  Rev.  St.  §§  863  ff.]    This 
provision  is  not  peremptory ;  it  only  enables  the  party  to  take  the  deposition,  if  he 
pleases  :  Prouty  v.  Ruggles,  2  Story,  199 ;  4  Law  Rep.  161. 

2  These  distances  are  various  in  the  similar  statutes  of  the  States,  but  are  generally 
thirty  miles,  though  in  some  cases  less. 

*  In  the  several  States,  this  authority  is  generally  delegated  to  justices  of  the  peace. 

4  Under  the  Judiciary  Act,  §  30,  there  must  be  personal  notice  served  upon  the  ad- 
verse party  ;  service  by  leaving  a  copy  at  his  place  of  abode  is  not  sufficient  :  Carring- 
tou  v.  Stimson,  1  Curtis  C.  C.  437.  The  magistrate  in  his  return  need  not  state  the 
distance  of  the  place  of  residence  of  the  party  or  his  attorney  from  the  place  where  the 
deposition  was  taken  :  Voce  v.  Lawrence,  4  McLean  203.  To  ascertain  the  proper 
notice  in  point  of  time  to  be  given  to  the  adverse  party,  the  distance  must  be  reckoned 
from  the  party's  residence  to  the  place  of  caption  :  Porter  v.  Pillsbury,  36  Me.  278. 
Where  the  certificate  states  simply  that  the  adverse  party  was  not  personally  present, 
a  copy  of  the  notice,  and  of  the  return  of  service  thereof,  should  be  annexed;  and  if 
it  is  not  annexed,  and  it  does  not  distinctly  appear  that  the  adverse  party  was  present, 
either  in  person  or  by  counsel,  the  deposition  will  be  rejected :  Carlton  v.  Patterson, 
9  Foster  530  ;  see  also  Bowman  v.  Sanborn,  5  id.  87.  [Tor  the  necessity  of  notice  aa 
giving  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine,  see  mite,  §  163  £>J 
VOL.  I.  —  31 


482  WITNESSES  ;  DEPOSITIONS.  [CH.  xxn. 

be  carefully  examined  and  cautioned,  and  sworn  or  affirmed  to  testify 
the  whole  truth,6  and  must  subscribe  the  testimony  by  him  given, 
after  it  has  been  reduced  to  writing  by  the  magistrate,  or  by  the  de- 
ponent in  his  presence.  The  deposition  so  taken  must  be  retained  by 
the  magistrate,  until  he  shall  deliver  it  with  his  own  hand  into  the 
court  for  which  it  is  taken ;  or  it  must,  together  with  a  certificate  of 
the  causes  or  reasons  for  taking  it,  as  above  specified,  and  of  the 
notice,  if  any,  given  to  the  adverse  party,  be  by  the  magistrate  sealed 
up,  directed  to  the  court,  and  remain  under  his  seal  until  it  is  opened 
in  court.6  And  such  witnesses  may  be  compelled  to  appear  and  de- 
pose as  above  mentioned,  in  the  same  manner  as  to  appear  and  testify 
in  court.7 

§  323.  Same:  Magistrate's  Certificate;  Mode  of  Objecting.  The 
provisions  of  this  act  being  in  derogation  of  the  common  law,  it  has 
been  held  that  they  must  be  strictly  complied  with.1  But  if  it  ap- 
pears on  the  face  of  the  deposition,  or  the  certificate  which  accom- 
panies it,  that  the  magistrate  before  whom  it  was  taken  was  duly 
authorized,  within  the  statute,  it  is  sufficient,  in  the  first  instance, 
without  any  other  proof  of  his  authority  ; a  and  his  certificate  will  be 

6  Where  the  State  statute  requires  that  the  deponent  shall  be  sworn  to  testify  to  the 
truth,  the  whole  truth,  etc. ,  ' '  relating  to  the  cause  for  which  the  deposition  is  to  be  taken," 
the  omission  of  the  magistrate  in  his  certificate  to  state  that  the  witness  was  so  sworn, 
makes  the  deposition  inadmissible  ;  and  the  defect  is  not  cured  by  the  addition  that 
"after  giving  the  deposition  he  was  duly  sworn  thereto  according  to  law  :"  Parsons 
v.  Huff,  38  Me.  137;  Brighton  v.  Walker,  35  id.  132;  Fabyan  o.  Adams,  15  N.  H. 
371.  It  should  distinctly  appear  that  the  oath  was  administered  where  the  witness 
was  examined  :  Erskine  r.  Boyd,  35  Me.  511.  JA  certificate  by  the  magistrate  that 
the  witness  was  "duly  sworn  "  is  sufficient:  Gulf  City  Insurance  Co.  v.  Stephens,  51 
Ala.  121  ;  so  if  the  caption  states  that  the  witness  was  affirmed  by  him  according  to 
law,  for  this  implies  an  objection  by  the  witness  to  swearing  :  Home  v.  Haverhill,  113 
Mass.  344;  but  if  the  caption  omits  the  words  "severally  make  ofith  and  say,''  or 
"make  oath,"  or  "before  me,"  the  deposition  is  inadmissible  :  Ex  parte  Torkington, 
L.  R.  9  Ch.  298;  Allen  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  52;  39  L.  J.  Ch.  627  ;  Powers  v.  Shep- 
herd, 21  N.  H.  60.  So  if  the  witness  is  sworn  to  tell  the  "truth  and  nothing  but  the 
truth  :"  Call  v.  Perkins,  68  Me.  158.  If  a  form  of  oath  is  prescribed  by  statute,  it 
must  be  followed,  or  the  deposition  will  be  inadmissible :  Bacon  v.  Bacon,  33  Wis. 
147. } 

6  The  mode  of  transmission  is  not  prescribed  by  the  statute  ;  and  in  practice  it  is 
usual  to  transmit  depositions  by  post,  whenever  it  is  most  convenient ;  in  which  case 
the  postages  are  included  in  the  taxed  costs  :  Prouty  v.  Rnggles,  2  Story  199  ;  5  Law 
Reporter  161.  Care  must  be  taken,  however,  to  inform  the  clerk,  by  a  proper  super- 
scription, of  the  nature  of  the  document  enclosed  to  his  care  ;  for,  if  opened  by  him 
out  of  court,  though  by  mistake,  it  will  be  rejected  :  Real  v.  Thompson,  8  Oranch  70  ; 
but  see  Law  ».  Law,  4  Greenl.  167.  j  Where,  by  statute,  the  magistrate  is  allowed  to 
return  the  deposition  by  mail,  this  does  not  do  away  the  common-law  methods,  and  he 
may  himself  hand  the  deposition  to  the  clerk  :  Andrews  v.  Parker,  48  Tex.  94.  | 

1  {State  v.  Ingerson,  62  N.  H.  438  ;  Burnham  v.  Stevens,  33  id.  247  ;  State  v. 
Towle,  42  id.  540.  | 

1  Bfll  v.  Morrison,  1  Peters  355  ;   The  Thomas  &  Henry  v.  U.  S.,  1  Brockenbrough 
367  :  Nelson  v.  U.  S.,  1  Peters  C.  C.  235  ;  j  Jones  v.  Neale,  1  Hughes  C.  C.  268;  Wil- 
son Sewing  Machine  Co.  v.  Jackson,  id.  295.  | 

2  l.ngglcs  v.  Bucknor,  1  Paine  858;    Patapsoo  Ins  Co.  v.South^nte,  5  Peters  604 
Fowler  v.  Merrill,  11  How.  875  ;  j  Palmer  v.  Pogc,  35  Me.  368  ;  Hoyt  v.  Hammekin, 
14  How.  846 ;  Lyon  r.  Ely,  24  Conn.  507  ;  West  Boyl»ton  v.  Sterling,  17  Pick.  126 ; 
Littlehale  i>.  Dix,  11  Gush.  36o. } 


§§  322-324]  UNDER   STATUTES.  483 

good  evidence  of  all  the  facts  therein  stated,  so  as  to  entitle  the 
deposition  to  be  read,  if  the  necessary  facts  are  therein  sufficiently 
disclosed.8  [The  terms  of  the  statute  under  which  the  deposition  is 
taken  will  vary  more  or  less  in  each  jurisdiction  as  to  the  preliminary 
facts  required  to  be  shown  and  the  formalities  required  to  be  ob- 
served; and  as  the  decisions  on  this  subject  deal  largely  with  the 
mere  interpretation  of  the  local  statutes,  they  are  without  the  scope 
of  the  present  work.  So  far  as  the  common-law  principles  requiring 
confrontation  and  cross-examination  are  involved,  they  have  been 
already  treated  (ante,  Chap.  XVI).]  {It  may  be  noted, in  general,  as 
to  the  time  when  objections  to  the  admission  of  depositions  should  be 
made,  that  any  objection  based  on  a  defect  or  irregularity  in  the 
manner  of  taking  the  deposition,  and  which  might  be  remedied  by 
retaking  the  deposition,  should  be  made  as  soon  as  the  party  object- 
ing finds  out  the  defect,  and  this  will  generally  be  before  trial.4  If  a 
party,  knowing  of  such  defect,  wait  till  the  trial  before  objecting  to 
the  deposition,  he  will  be  held  to  have  waived  the  objection.  His 
proper  course  is  to  move  to  suppress  the  deposition.  Objections  to 
the  substance  of  the  testimony,  however,  as  that  the  witness  is 
incompetent  or  the  evidence  is  inadmissible,  may  be  taken  at  any 
time  before  the  trial  or  at  the  trial.5} 

§  324.  Dedimus  Potestatem  ;  Depositions  in  Perpetuam.  By  the 
act  of  Congress  already  cited,1  the  power  of  the  Courts  of  the  United 
States,  as  courts  of  common  law,  to  grant  a  dedimus  potestatem  to 
take  depositions,  whenever  it  may  be  necessary,  in  order  to  prevent 
a  failure  or  delay  of  justice,  is  expressly  recognized  ;  and  the  Circuit 
Courts,  when  sitting  as  Courts  of  equity,  are  empowered  to  direct 
depositions  to  be  taken  in  perpetuam  rei  memoriam,  according  to  the 
usages  in  Chancery,  where  the  matters  to  which  they  relate  are  cog- 
nizable in  those  courts.  A  later  statute  2  has  facilitated  the  taking 
of  depositions  in  the  former  of  these  cases,  by  providing  that  when  a 
commission  shall  be  issued  by  a  Court  of  the  United  States,  for  taking 
the  testimony  of  a  witness,  at  any  place  within  the  United  States,  or 
the  territories  thereof,  the  clerk  of  any  Court  of  the  United  States, 
for  the  district  or  territory  where  the  place  may  be,  may  issue  a  sub- 
poena for  the  attendance  of  the  witness  before  the  commissioner,  pro- 
vided the  place  be  in  the  county  where  the  witness  resides,  and  not 
more  than  forty  miles  from  his  dwelling.  And  if  the  witness,  being 
duly  summoned,  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  appear,  or  shall  refuse  to 

8  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Peters  356. 

4  jLeavitt  v.  Baker,  82  Me.  28  :  Doane  v.  Glenn,  21  Wall.  33  ;  Merchants  Dispatch 
Co.  v.  Leysor,  89  111.  43  ;  Stowell  ».  Moore,  89  id.  563  ;  Barnum  v.  Barnum,  42  Md. 
251  ;  Vilmar  v.  Schall,  61  N.  Y.  564.  | 

6  jEslavai;.  Mazange,  1  Woods  C.  C.  623;  Fielden  v.  Lahens,  2  Abb.  App.  Dec. 
Ill  ;  Lord  ».  Moore,  37  Me.  208 ;  Whitney  i;.  Heywood,  6  Cush.  82.  { 

1  Stat.  1789,  c.  20,  §  30. 

9  Stat.  1827,  c.  4.     See  the  practice  and  course  of  proceeding  in  these  cases,  in 
2  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  pp.  102-110  ;  2  Tidd's  Pr.  810-812  ;  £U.  S.  Rev.  St.  §§  866  ff.] 


484  WITNESSES;  DEPOSITIONS.  [CH.  xxn. 

testify,  any  judge  of  the  same  Court,  upon  proof  of  such  contempt, 
may  enforce  obedience,  or  punish  the  disobedience,  in  the  same 
manner  as  the  Courts  of  the  United  States  may  do,  in  case  of  dis- 
obedience to  their  own  process  of  subpoena  ad  testificandum.  Some  of 
the  States  have  made  provision  by  law  for  the  taking  of  depositions, 
to  be  used  in  suits  pending  in  other  States,  by  bringing  the  deponent 
within  the  operation  of  their  own  statutes  against  perjury ;  and 
national  comity  plainly  requires  the  enactment  of  similar  provisions 
in  all  civilized  countries.  But  as  yet  they  are  far  from  being  univer- 
sal; and  whether,  in  the  absence  of  such  provision,  false  swearing 
in  such  case  is  punishable  as  perjury,  has  been  gravely  doubted.8 
Where  the  production  of  papers  is  required,  in  the  case  of  examina- 
tions under  commissions  issued  from  Courts  of  the  United  States,  any 
judge  of  a  Court  of  the  United  States  may,  by  the  same  statute,  order 
the  clerk  to  issue  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  requiring  the  witness  to  pro- 
duce such  papers  to  the  commissioner,  upon  the  affidavit  of  the  ap- 
plicant to  his  belief  that  the  witness  possesses  the  papers,  and  that 
they  are  material  to  his  case ;  and  may  enforce  the  obedience  and 
punish  the  disobedience  of  the  witness,  in  the  manner  above  stated. 

§  325.  But  independently  of  statutory  provisions,  Chancery  has 
power  to  sustain  bills,  filed  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  evidence 
of  witnesses  in  perpetuam  rei  memoriam,  touching  any  matter  which 
cannot  be  immediately  investigated  in  a  court  of  law,  or  where  the 
evidence  of  a  material  witness  is  likely  to  be  lost,  by  his  death,  or 
departure  from  the  jurisdiction,  or  by  any  other  cause,  before  the 
facts  can  be  judicially  investigated.  The  defendant,  in  such  cases, 
is  compelled  to  appear  and  answer,  and  the  cause  is  brought  to  issue, 
and  a  commission  for  the  examination  of  the  witnesses  is  made  out, 
executed,  and  returned  in  the  same  manner  as  in  other  cases  ;  but  no 
relief  being  prayed,  the  suit  is  never  brought  to  a  hearing ;  nor  will 
the  Court  ordinarily  permit  the  publication  of  the  depositions,  except 
in  support  of  a  suit  or  action ;  nor  then,  unless  the  witnesses  are 
dead,  or  otherwise  incapable  of  attending  to  be  examined.4 

'  Calliand  v.  Vaughan,  1  B.  &  P.  210. 
*  Smith's  Chancery  Prac.  284-286. 


§§  324-326.] 


IN   GENERAL. 


485 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 
WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  QUALIFICATIONS. 


§§  326,  327.   In  general. 

§  328  a.  Proof  of  lucompetency. 

1.  Interest. 

§  328  b.  Interest  in  general  as  a  Dis- 
qualification. 

§  328  c.  Parties  in  Civil  Cases ;  Testi- 
mo7iy  to  Own  Intent. 

§  333  a.   Defendants  in  Criminal  Cases. 

§  333  b.  Survivors  of  a  Transaction 
with  a  Deceased  Person. 

§  333  c.    Husband  and  Wife. 

§§  334,  335.  Same  :  Common-law  Rule, 
in  general. 

§  336.  Same :  Matters  occurring  be- 
fore Marriage. 

§§  337,  338.  Same :  Testimony  after 
Death  or  Divorce. 

§  339.  Same:  Marriage  must  be  lawful. 

§  340.  Same :  Waiver  of  Privilege  by  the 
other  Spouse. 

§  341.  Same:  Spouse  not  a  Party,  but 
directly  interested. 

§  342.  Same:  Spouse  not  legally  inter- 


ested. 

§  343.    Same ; 

Necessity. 

§  344.  Same : 
§  345.  Same: 
§  346.  Same  : 


Exceptions  in  Cases  of 

Secret  Facts. 
High  Treason. 
Dying  Declarations. 


2.   Oath. 

§  3C4  a.  Object  and  Xature  of  the  Oath. 

§  3G4  b.  Form  of  the  Oath. 

§  367.  Capacity  to  take  the  Oath  ; 
Children. 

§368.    Same:   Atheists. 

§  369.  Same :  Nature  of  Theological 
Belief. 

§  370.  Same  :  Mode  of  ascertaining 
Belief. 

§  370  a.   Statutory  Changes. 

3.  Menial  Capacity. 

§  370  b.   In  general. 
§  370  c.   Insanity. 
§  370  d.   Infancy. 
§  370  e.   Intoxication. 


4.  Moral  Capacity. 

§  372.   Infamy  ;  Conviction  of  Crime. 

§  373.  Same  :  Kind  of  Crime. 

§  374.   Same  :  Exception  for  a  Party. 

§  375.  Same  :  Judgment  necessary  ; 
Production  of  Record. 

§  376.  Same  :  Conviction  in  another 
Jurisdiction. 

§§  377, 378.'  Same:  Removed  by  Pardon. 

§  378  a.   Same  :  Statutory  Changes. 

§  378  b.   Race,  Religious  Belief. 

§  379.   Accomplices. 

§  380.   Same  :   Corroboration. 

§  381.  Same :  What  amounts  to  Cor- 
roboration. 

§  382.   Same :  Who  are  Accomplices. 

5.  Experiential  Capacity. 

§  430  a.  In  general. 

§  430  b.  Foreign  Law. 

§  430  c.  Medical  Matters. 
§  430  d.    Handwriting  ;  Paper-money, 
etc 

§  430  e.  Value. 

§  430 /.  Discretion  of  Trial  Court. 

§  430  g.  Opinion  Rule. 

6.   Knowledge ;  Personal  Observation. 

§  430  h.  In  general. 

§4301  Quality  of  Knowledge  ;  "Be- 
lief," "Impression,"  "Opinion. 

§  430.;'.  Personal  Observation,  not  Hear- 
say Knowledge. 

§430&.  Same:  Testimony  to  one's  own 
Age. 

§  430  I.  Same  :  Medical  Man's  Knowl- 
edge. 

§  430  TO.  Same  :  Knowledge  of  For- 
eign Law. 

§  430  7i.  Same :  Knowledge  of  Values 
and  Prices.  » 

§  430  o.  Same  :  Sundries. 

§  430  p.  Adequacy  of  Opportunities  of 
Observation  ;  (1 )  Sanity ;  (2)  Value. 

§  430  q.  Testimony  based  on  Telephonic 
Communication. 


§  326.   In  general.     Although,  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  temp- 
tations to  practise  deceit  and  falsehood  may  be  comparatively  few, 


486  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm, 

and  therefore  men  may  ordinarily  be  disposed  to  believe  the  state- 
ments of  each  other ;  yet,  in  judicial  investigations,  the  motives  to 
pervert  the  truth  and  to  perpetrate  falsehood  and  fraud  are  so  greatly 
multiplied,  that  if  statements  were  received  with  the  same  undis- 
criminating  freedom  as  in  private  life,  the  ends  of  justice  could  with 
far  less  certainty  be  attained.  In  private  life,  too,  men  can  inquire 
and  determine  for  themselves  whom  they  will  deal  with,  and  in  whom 
they  will  confide;  but  the  situation  of  judges  and  jurors  renders  it 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  in  the  narrow  compass  of  a  trial,  to  inves- 
tigate the  character  of  witnesses  ;  and  from  the  very  nature  of  judi- 
cial proceedings,  and  the  necessity  of  preventing  the  multiplication 
of  issues  to  be  tried,  it  often  may  happen  that  the  testimony  of  a 
witness,  unworthy  of  credit,  may  receive  as  much  consideration  as 
that  of  one  worthy  of  the  fullest  confidence.  If  no  means  were  em- 
ployed totally  to  exclude  any  contaminating  influences  from  the 
fountains  of  justice,  this  evil  would  constantly  occur.  But  the 
clanger  has  always  been  felt,  and  always  guarded  against,  in  all  civil- 
ized countries.  And  while  all  evidence  is  open  to  the  objection  of 
the  adverse  party,  before  it  is  admitted,  it  has  been  found  necessary 
to  the  ends  of  justice  that  certain  kinds  of  evidence  should  be  uni- 
formly excluded.1 

§  327.  In  determining  what  evidence  shall  be  admitted  and  weighed 
by  the  jury,  and  what  shall  not  be  received  at  all,  or,  in  other  words, 
in  distinguishing  between  competent  and  incompetent  witnesses,  a 
principle  seems  to  have  been  applied  similar  to  that  which  distin- 
guishes between  conclusive  and  disputable  presumptions  of  law, 
namely,  the  experienced  connection  between  the  situation  of  the  wit- 
ness and  the  truth  or  falsity  of  his  testimony.  Thus,  the  law  ex- 
cludes as  incompetent  those  persons  whose  evidence,  in  general,  is 
found  more  likely  than  otherwise  to  mislead  juries;  receiving  and 
weighing  the  testimony  of  others,  and  giving  to  it  that  degree  of 
credit  which  it  is  found  on  examination  to  deserve.  It  is  obviously 
impossible  that  any  test  of  credibility  can  be  infallible.  All  that  can 
be  done  is  to  approximate  to  such  a  degree  of  certainty  as  will  ordi- 
narily meet  the  justice  of  the  case.  The  question  is  not,  whether  any 
rule  of  exclusion  may  not  sometimes  shut  out  credible  testimony ; 
but  whether  it  is  expedient  that  there  should  be  any  rule  of  exclusion 
a,t  all.  If  the  purposes  of  justice  require  that  the  decision  of  causes 
should  not  be  embarrassed  by  statements  generally  found  to  be  de- 
ceptive, or  totally  false,  there  must  be  some  rule  designating  the  class 
of  evidence  to  be  excluded ;  and  in  this  case,  as  in  determining  the 
ages  of  discretion,  arid  of  majority,  and  in  deciding  as  to  the  liability 
of  the  wife  for  crimes  committed  in  company  with  the  husband,  and 
in  numerous  other  instances,  the  common  law  has  merely  followed 
the  common  experience  of  mankind.  It  rejects  the  testimony  of 

1  4  Inst.  279. 


§§  326-328  J]  IN   GENERAL.  487 

parties;  of  persons  deficient  in  understanding;  of  persons  insen- 
sible to  the  obligations  of  an  oath ;  and  of  persons  whose  pecuniary 
interest  is  directly  involved  in  the  matter  in  issue  ;  not  because  they 
may  not  sometimes  state  the  truth,  but  because  it  would  ordinarily 
be  unsafe  to  rely  on  their  testimony.  Other  causes  concur  in  some  of 
these  cases  to  render  the  persons  incompetent,  which  will  be  men- 
tioned in  their  proper  places.  We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider,  in 
their  order,  each  of  these  classes  of  persons  held  incompetent  to  tes- 
tify ;  adding  some  observations  on  certain  descriptions  of  persons, 
held  incompetent  in  particular  cases. 

§  328. 1 

§  328  a.  Proof  of  Incompetency.  [The  capacity  of  an  offered  wit- 
ness is  in  general  assumed  to  exist  as  to  all  qualifications  except  that 
of  experience  and  knowledge  (^os£,  §§  430  a-430 p),  i.e.  so  far  as 
concerns  his  interest,  his  capacity  to  take  the  oath,  his  mental  ca- 
pacity, and  his  moral  capacity,  it  is  assumed  that  he  does  not  belong 
to  one  of  the  forbidden  classes  of  persons,  and  it  is  for  the  opponent 
to  show  that  he  does.  So  far  as  there  are  any  exceptions  to  this,  ap- 
parent or  real,  they  are  noted  under  the  respective  heads  following. 
The  modes  of  evidencing  the  fact  of  incapacity  are  either  the  ordinary 
one  of  producing  other  witnesses  to  testify  to  it,  or  the  preliminary 
examination  of  the  offered  person,  or  both.  In  the  case  of  a  party,  it 
would  often  be  sufficient  to  call  attention  to  the  record.  In  the  case 
of  interest  in  general,  an  examination  of  the  offered  person,  on  a  pre- 
liminary oath,  called  the  voir  dire,  was  customary  at  common  law,1 
and  the  orthodox  doctrine  was  that  the  opponent  might  use  either 
the  voir  dire  or  other  testimony,  but  not  both.  As  to  the  time  of  the 
objection,  the  general  principle  is  that,  if  known  to  the  opponent,  it 
should  be  made  before  the  administration  of  the  oath,2  or  at  any  rate 
before  the  examination  in  chief  has  begun  ;  8  but  that  if  it  is  not  then 
known,  but  is  later  discovered,  it  may  be  made  as  soon  as  discovered. 
The  peculiarities  as  to  each  sort  of  incompetency  are  noticed  under 
the  respective  heads.] 

1.   Interest. 

§  328  b.  Interest,  in  general,  as  a  Disqualification.  [At  common 
law  the  most  important,  because  most  extensive,  ground  of  incapacity 
was  that  supposed  inclination  to  falsify  which  arose  from  the  pros- 
pect of  gaining  or  losing  by  the  issue  of  the  proceedings.  The  cir- 
cumstance creating  this  incapacity  was  known  as  Interest ;  and  the 


"Transferred  post,  preceding  §  365.] 
See  §§  421-424,  Appendix  II.] 
'R.  v.  Frost,  4  State  Tr.  N.  s.  85,  253  ;  §  421,  post 


§421?] 


'State  v.  Downs,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  456  ;  Pillow  v.  Impr.  Co.,  92  Va.  144  ;  post, 


'S 

v.  Ir 


488  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  XXIIL 

theory  was  that  "  from  the  nature  of  human  passions  and  actions 
there  is  more  reason  to  distrust  such  a  biassed  testimony  than  to 
believe  it."  1 

"  If  it  be  objected,  that  interest  in  the  matter  in  dispute  might,  from  the  bias  it 
creates,  be  an  exception  to  the  credit,  but  that  it  ought  not  to  be  absolutely  so 
to  the  competency,  a;iy  more  than  the  friendship  or  enmity  of  a  party,  whose 
evidence  is  offered,  towards  either  of  the  parties  in  the  cause,  or  many  other 
considerations  hereafter  to  be  intimated;  the  general  answer  may  be  this,  that 
in  point  of  authority  no  distinction  is  more  absolutely  settled ;  and  in  point  of 
theory,  the  existence  of  a  direct  interest  is  capable  of  being  precisely  proved ; 
but  its  influence  on  the  mind  is  of  a  nature  not  to  discover  itself  to  the  jury; 
whence  it  hath  been  held  expedient  to  adopt  a  general  exception,  by  which  wit- 
nesses so  circumstanced  are  free  from  temptation,  and  the  cause  not  exposed  to 
the  hazard  of  the  very  doubtful  estimate,  what  quantity  of  interest  in  the  ques- 
tion, in  proportion  to  the  character  of  the  witness,  in  any  instance,  leaves  his 
testimony  entitled  to  belief.  Some,  indeed,  are  incapable  of  being  biassed  even 
latently  by  the  greatest  interest;  many  would  betray  the  most  solemn  obligation 
and  public  confidence  for  an  interest  very  inconsiderable.  An  universal  exclu- 
sion, where  no  line  short  of  this  could  have  been  drawn,  preserves  infirmity  from 
a  snare,  and  integrity  from  suspicion  ;  and  keeps  the  current  of  evidence,  thus 
far  at  least,  clear  and  uninfected."  a 

This  theory  and  policy  was,  up  to  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  not  at  all  out  of  harmony  with  the  moral  and  emotional 
notions  of  the  time ;  and  in  certain  regions  of  our  own  country 
it  is  perhaps  still  not  thought  unnatural.  It  is  consistent  with 
any  state  of  society  in  which  violent  partisanship  colors  the  whole 
mental  and  moral  attitude  of  the  man.  But  with  the  social  changes 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  this  policy  gradually  became  incon- 
gruous, and  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  Courts 
had  already  shown  disfavor  to  it,8  and  the  community  was  ready  to 
perceive  this  incongruity.  The  rigors  of  its  application  had  already 
been  mitigated  by  numerous  exceptions  and  evasions  ;  but  these  only 
served  to  illustrate  the  general  unsoundness  and  impolicy  of  the 
principle  as  a  whole.  The  powerful  sarcasm  of  Jeremy  Bentham 
mercilessly  exposed  its  inconsistencies  and  its  fallacies ;  *  and  by  his 
works,  during  the  first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  an  opinion 
was  created  which  before  long,  under  the  efforts  of  Lord  Brougham 
and  others,  took  shape  in  legislation.  In  1843 5  the  general  rule  of 
disqualification  by  reason  of  interest  was  abolished  in  England  ;  and 
the  first  statute 6  of  the  same  sort  seems  to  have  been  enacted  in  this 

1  Gilbert,  Evidence,  119. 

8  Same,  Lolit's  edition,  223. 

8  QLord  Mansfield,  in  Walton  v.  Shelley,  1  T.  R.  800  ;  Lord  Kenyan,  in  Bent  v. 
Biker.  3  id.  27.] 

4  [JRitionale  of  Judicial  Evidence,  B.  ix,  pt.  iii,  c.  iii,  Bowring's  ed.,  vol.  vii,  393. 
Bonthittn's  doctrines  were  given  currency  in  this  country  by  the  work  on  Evidence  of 
Chief  Justice  Anpli-ton,  of  Maine  ;  see  cc.  i  and  iv  therein.] 

*  ("St.  6-7  Viet.,  c.  85.] 

•  [Rev.  St.  1846,  c.  102,  J  99.] 


§§  328  5-328  <?.]  INTEREST;  PARTIES.  489 

country  in  Michigan  in  1846 ;  to  be  followed  within  two  or  three 
decades  by  the  remaining  jurisdictions.7  The  mass  of  detailed  rules 
and  exceptions  depending  upon  this  principle  have  therefore  ceased 
to  be  law ; 8  and  in  spite  of  the  continued  existence  of  remnants  of 
the  old  policy  (now  to  be  mentioned),  the  decisions  dealing  with  in- 
terest in  general  have  ceased  to  be  of  direct  bearing,  except  in  a  few 
respects,9  and  are  even  for  that  purpose  rarely  referred  to  by  the 
Courts  of  to-day.10 

But  the  abolition  of  this  source  of  incompetency  was  not  completed 
at  once,  nor  has  complete  abolition  yet  been  reached  except  in  a  few 
jurisdictions.  There  were  preserved  certain  important  remnants  of 
the  old  principle;  and  though  some  of  these  have  in  many  jurisdic- 
tions been  done  away  with,  the  change  has  not  always  been  made  at 
the  same  time  or  to  the  same  extent;  and  the  precedents  at  common 
law,  together  with  the  statutory  changes,  on  each  of  these  topics,  form 
separate  bodies  of  law,  not  connected  (except  in  the  general  under- 
lying policy)  with  the  obsolete  and  broad  principle  of  interest  as  a 
disqualification.  These  topics  are  four  in  number:  («)  Parties  in 
civil  cases ;  (&)  Defendants  in  criminal  cases ;  (c)  Survivors  of  a 
transaction  with  a  deceased  person ;  (d)  Husband  and  wife.] 

§  328  c.  Parties  in  Civil  Cases.  [The  notion  of  interest  at  common 
law  included  of  course  the  parties  to  the  case,  for  their  interest  in 
the  issue  of  the  litigation  was  of  the  most  marked  sort.  That  in- 
terest was  the  real  principle  calling  for  their  exclusion  from  testi- 
fying in  their  own  favor  is  clear ; *  and  certain  details  of  the  rule 
rested  on  this  theory,  e.  g.  the  consequence  that  a  mere  titular  or 
nominal  party  might  not  be  excluded,  or  a  party  against  whom  judg- 
ment had  been  given  by  default.  There  were  a  few  direct  exceptions 
to  the  general  rule,  chiefly  based  on  the  necessity  of  employing  such 
testimony  where  none  other  could  be  had,  e.  g.  the  exception  for  the 
owner  of  a  lost  package  testifying  to  its  contents  or  for  the  affidavit 
of  a  party  to  the  loss  of  a  document  once  possessed  by  him.8  But 
this  general  disqualification  also  has  been  abolished  by  legislation  in 
every  jurisdiction.  The  first  statutes  in  England,  beginning  in  1846, 
were  of  a  tentative  and  limited  nature;  and  the  general  abolition  did 
not  come  until  1851  .*  In  this  country,  however,  the  change  was  in 
most  cases  made  at  the  same  time  with  the  general  abolition  of  the 
interest-qualification,  by  declaring  that  interest,  "either  as  a  party 

7  TSee  the  statutes  set  out  in  Appendix  I.] 

8  [Except  in  the  Federal  Court  of  Claims  :  U.  S.  v.  Clark,  96  U.  S.  41.] 

9  [^Chiefly    in    regard    to    the    exclusion    of   interested    survivors,    treated  post, 
§  333  b.  ] 

10  FJThe  sections  of  the  original  text  of  the  author  on  this  subject,  §§  386-430,  have 
therefore  been  placed  in  Appendix  II.] 

1  nVorrall  v.  Jones,  7  Ring.  398.] 

2  ^The  original  sections  expounding  the  rule  and  its  exceptions,  §§  329-333,  347- 
361,  will  be  found  in  Appendix  II.] 

»  [St.  14-15  Viet.,  c.  99.] 


490  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  Ten.  xxm. 

or  otherwise,"  should  not  disqualify;*  though  in  some  jurisdictions 
a  first  step  had  been  taken  by  allowing  a  party  to  testify  in  his  own 
favor  when  summoned  by  his  opponent,  by  admitting  the  complainant 
in  a  bastardy-charge  on  certain  conditions,6  and  by  a  few  other  stat- 
utory beginnings. 

It  is  the  law  in  one  State 6  that  a  person,  whether  party  or  not, 
may  not  testify  to  his  own  intent,  however  material  it  may  be,  be- 
cause he  may  falsely  describe  it  without  possibility  of  exposure  by 
other  witnesses.  This  notion  has  been  everywhere  else  repudiated ; 7 
but  the  repudiation  is  often  put  on  the  ground  that  such  a  rule  ex- 
isted when  parties  were  disqualified,  because  then  a  party  could  not 
testify  to  his  intent  nor  to  anything  else,  and  that  therefore  the  rule 
has  ceased  to  exist  only  by  virtue  of  the  removal  of  that  disqualifica- 
tion.8 Now,  before  that  removal,  any  person,  otherwise  a  competent 
witness,  might  testify  to  his  own  intent  whenever  it  was  material  to 
the  cause;9  and  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  there  was  any  prohibi- 
tion upon  such  testimony.  The  propriety  of  it  is  therefore  by  no 
means  due  to  the  removal  of  parties'  disqualifications  ;  and  it  is  un- 
necessary to  seek  for  any  such  justification  for  its  use.  When,  there- 

*  QSee  the  several  statutes  set  out  in  Appendix  I.  The  earliest  one  seems  to  have 
been  that  of  Connecticut,  in  1849.] 

6  FThe  traces  of  this  are  seen  in  the  doctrine  post,  §  469  c,  at  end.] 

6  L  Alabama  :  see  Manch.  F.  A.  Co.  v.  Feibelman,  Ala.,  23  So.  759  ;  and  along  line 
of  preceding  cases.] 

7  QPeople  v.  Fan-ell,  31  Cal.  582  (leading  case)  ;  Harris  v.  Lumber  Co.,  97  Ga.  465  ; 
Miner  v.  Phillips,  42  111.  131  ;   Wohlford  v.  People,  148  id.  296,  298  ;   Greer  v.  State, 
53  Ind.  420  ;  White  v.  State,  ib.   595  ;  Shockey  »;.   Mills,  71   id.  288  ;  Bidinger  v. 
Bishop,  76  id.  255  ;  Parrish  v.  Thurston,  87  id.  440  ;  Sedgwick  v.  Tucker,  90  id.  281  ; 
Over  v.  Schiffling,  102  id.  193  ;  Heap  v.  Parish,  104  id.  39  ;  Ross  v.  State,  116  id.  497  ; 
Zimmerman  v.  Brannon,   103  la.  144;  Couuselman  v.  Reichart,  ib.   430;   State  v. 
Dillon,  48  La.  An.  1365  ;  Cornina  v.  Exeter,  13  Me.  328  ;  Edwards  v.  Currier,  43  id. 
484  ;  Wheelden  v.  Wilson,  44  id.   18  ;   Cashing  v.  Friendship,  89  id.   525 ;  Fi.sk  v. 
Chester,  8  Gray  508 ;  Kelly  i>.  Cunningham,  1  All.  473,  474  ;    Thacher  v.   Phinney, 
7  id.  149;  Lombard  v.  Oliver,  ib.  157;  Reeder  v.  Holcomb,  105   Mass.  94;  Snow  v. 
Paine,  114  id.  526;  Watkins  v.  Wallace,  19  Mich.  75;  Spalding  v.  Lowe,  56  id.  366, 
374  ;  Berkey  v.  Judd,  22  Minn.  297  ;  Albion  v.  Maple  Lake,  id.,  74  N.  W.  282  ;  Fergu- 
son v.  State,  71  Miss.  805,  813;  Vawter  v.  Hultz,  112  Mo.  633,  640  ;  Gassert  v.  Noyes, 
18  Mont.  216;  State  v.  Harrington,  12  Nev.  135  ;  Gale  v.  Ins.  Co.,  41  N.  H.  175  ; 
Blodgett  Paper  Co.  v.   Farmer,  ib.   402  ;  Severance  v.   Carr,   43  id.   67  ;  Graves  w. 
Graves,  45  iu.  223  ;  Hale  v.  Taylor,  ib.  406  ;  Delano  v.  Goodwin,  48  id.  205  ;  Homans 
v.  Corning,  60  id.  419  ;  Downer  v.  Society,  63  id.  152  ;  People  v.  Ferguson,  8  Cow. 
107;  Cunningham  v.  Freeborn,  11  Wend.  244  ;  Seymour  v.  Wilson,  14  N.  Y.  567  ; 
Griffin  v.  Marquardt,  21  id.  122  ;  Forbes  v.  Waller,  25  id.  439  ;  McKown  v.  Hunter, 
30  id.  625 ;  Bedell  v.  Chase,  34  id.  388  ;  Osborn  v.  Robbins,  36  id.  375  ;  Thurston  v. 
Cornell,  38  id.  287 ;  Dillon  v.  Anderson,  43  id.  236 ;  Cortland  Co.  «>.  Herkitner  Co., 
44  id.  22;  Fiedler  v.  Darrin,  50  id.  443  ;  Kerrains  v.  People,  60  id.  228;  Turner  v. 
Keller,  66  id.  66;  Bayliss  v.  Cockcroft,  81  id.  371 ;  Starin  v.  Kelly,  88  id.  420;  People 
v.  Baker,  96  id.  349;  Crook  v.  Rindskopf,  105  id.  482;  Hard  v.  Ashley,  117  id.  617; 
Grever  v.  Taylor,  53  Oh.  621  ;  Com.  v.  Julius,  173  Pa.  322  ;  Weaver  v.  Cone,  174  id. 
104;  Wallace  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.,  16  Sup.  859;  People  v.  Hughes,  11  Utah  100;  Jack- 
son v.  Com.,  Va.,  30  S.  E.  452;  Hulett  v.  Hulett,  37  Vt.  581,  586;  Stearns  v.  Cos- 
solin,  58  id.  38;  State  v.  Evans,  33  W.  Va.  417,  425  ;  Commercial  B'k  v.  Ins.  Co.,  87 
Wis.  297,  303.] 

8  ["Sanderson,  J.,  in  People  v.  Farrell,  Cal.  ;  People  v.  Hughes,  Utah,  supra."] 

9  L  Answer  of  Judges,  22  How.  St.  Tr.  296,  300.] 


§§  323  c-333  a.]  INTEREST;  PARTIES.  491 

fore,  it  is  a  question  as  to  the  intent  of  an  alleged  criminal  act,  or 
the  intent  of  a  transfer  by  an  insolvent,  or  the  good  faith  of  a  pur- 
chaser from  an  insolvent,  or  the  reliance  of  a  person  on  false  repre- 
sentations, or  the  intent  of  one  having  a  residence  or  making  a  gift, 
or  as  to  any  other  state  of  mind,  the  person  as  to  whom  it  is  predi- 
cated may  testify  to  it.  In  many  instances,  of  course,  the  intent  or 
motive  cannot  be  testified  to,  by  that  person  or  by  any  other,  because 
it  is  immaterial  under  the  substantive  law  applicable  ;  as,  the  private 
intent  of  a  promisor  10  or  of  a  voter.11  Whether  one  may  testify  to 
the  intent  of  another  person  is  also  a  different  question.12] 

§§  329-333. l 

§  333  a.  Defendants  in  Criminal  Cases.  [The  principle  upon 
which  parties  in  civil  cases  were  excluded  was  of  course  regarded  as 
also  excluding  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case,  and  he  was  incom- 
petent to  testify  in  his  own  favor.1  Where  there  were  two  or  more 
co-defendants,  the  rule  prevented  one  of  them  from  testifying  for 
the  other,  until  he  had  been  discharged  from  the  record  as  a  party, 
either  by  a  nolle  prosequi,  a  verdict  of  acquittal,  a  plea  of  guilty,  or 
other  final  disposition;  and  the  same  requirement  was  thought  to 
prevent  the  prosecution  from  calling  him  against  the  other  defend- 
ant, unless  on  the  same  conditions.2  The  accomplice  was  not  as  such 
incompetent,  nor  yet  by  virtue  of  being  interested  through  a  promise 
of  pardon,  but  only  so  far  as  by  being  indicted  and  tried  with  the 
other  he  became  a  party-defendant.8 

This  disqualification,  though  offending  deeply  against  notions  of 
fairness  as  well  as  being  open  to  all  other  objections  to  the  interest- 
disqualification,  was  longer  in  coming  to  its  end.  In  England,  in- 
deed, where  special  reasons  perhaps  gave  greater  plausibility  to  the 
arguments  of  those  who,  solely  in  the  interest  of  accused  persons,  • 
opposed  a  change,  the  abolition  did  not  come  until  1898; 4  but  in  this 
country  the  same  step  had  long  ago  been  taken  in  most  jurisdictions.8 
That  portion  of  the  law  has  therefore  no  longer  any  direct  interest, 
so  far  as  the  abolition  has  been  complete.  But  the  change  has  in 
some  jurisdictions  been  made  in  part  only,  or  by  a  phrasing  not  suffi- 
ciently comprehensive;  and  accordingly  certain  questions  may  there 
still  arise  in  connection  with  the  original  principles.  (1)  Under 

'See  Hibhard  v.  Russell,  16  N.  H.  417-3 

'See  People  v.  Saxton,  22  N.  Y.  309.] 

/See  post,  §  441  &.] 

"Transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 

"For  his  privilege  against  testifying,  see  post,  §  469  rf.] 

"The  original  sections  of  the  author  on  this  subject,  §§  362-363,  will  be  found  in 
Appendix  II.] 

»  TSee  §  379,  post ;  §§  407,  413,  in  Appendix  II.] 

*  QSt.  61-62  Viet.,  c.  36  ;  for  the  history  of  the  change  and  some  of  the  reasons 
for  the  opposition  to  it,  see  99  Law  Times  103  ;  100  id.  412  ;  101  id.  582  ;  103  id. 
297  ;  104  id.  415  ;  30  Law  Journal  218,  277,  288  ;  31  id.  140,  151,  189  ;  32  id.  210, 
862." 

6' 


2.] 

6~LSee  the  statutes  set  out  in  Appendix  I.] 


492  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxni. 

the  English  practice,  before  the  change,  an  accused  person,  though 
he  could  not  testify,  might  make  a  " statement,"  independent  of  the 
address  of  his  counsel.6  In  this  country  a  first  stage  of  statutory 
enactment,  in  some  jurisdictions,  was  to  allow  merely  this  unsworn 
statement;  and  this  stage  has  perhaps  not  yet  been  everywhere  left 
behind.7  A  number  of  questions  —  as  to  cross-examination,  im- 
peachment, etc.  —  call  for  a  special  solution  under  such  a  practice ; 
but  as  it  is  abnormal,  and  will  probably  soon  disappear  forever,  it 
need  not  concern  us  here.8  (2)  The  Legislatures,  having  in  view 
the  disqualifications  of  interested  persons  in  general,  of  parties  in 
civil  actions,  and  of  accused  persons,  and  desiring  to  remove  one  or 
all  of  these  forms  of  the  interest-disqualification,  have  used  varying 
phraseology  for  the  purpose,  and  questions  of  interpretation,  depend- 
ing ultimately  on  the  terms  of  the  statute,  have  arisen.  The  doubt 
thus  most  frequently  raised  is  whether  the  common-law  rules  (above- 
mentioned)  as  to  the  competency  of  a  co-defendant,  or  one  jointly 
indicted,  to  testify  for  the  defence9  or  for  the  prosecution,10  have 
ceased  to  operate.] 

§  333  b.  Survivors  of  a  Transaction  -with  a  Deceased  Person.  [In 
almost  every  jurisdiction  in  this  country,  by  statutes  enacted  in  con- 
nection with  or  shortly  after  the  statute  removing  the  disqualifica- 
tion of  parties  and  of  interested  persons  in  general,  an  exception 
was  carved  out  of  the  old  disqualification  and  allowed  to  perpetuate 
its  principle  within  a  limited  scope.  The  theory  of  the  original 
disqualification  was  that  persons  interested  were  likely  to  bear  false 
witness;  the  reasons  for  abolition  were  in  brief  (1)  that  this  was  true 
to  a  limited  extent  only,  (2)  that,  even  if  true,  yet,  so  far  as  they 
did  not  testify  falsely,  the  hardship  of  exclusion  was  intolerable, 
•(3)  that,  in  any  case,  the  test  of  cross-examination  and  the  other 
processes  of  investigation  would  with  fair  certainty  expose  falsehood; 
(4)  that  no  exclusion  could  be  so  defined  as  to  be  simple,  consistent, 
and  workable.  The  reformers  in  this  country  did  not  accept  these 
arguments  to  their  fullest  extent;  and  they  preferred  to  maintain 
the  disqualification  for  the  situation  in  which  it  seemed  to  them  that 
the  means  of  refuting  a  false  claim  would  be  wanting,  i.  e.  a  claim 
by  one  whose  adversary  was  deceased ;  since,  in  the  vague  metaphor 

8  pi.  v.  Malings,  8  C.  &  P.  242;  R.  v.  Walkling,  ih.  243  ;  R.  v.  Shimmin,  15  Cox 
Or.  122  (with  a  note  referiing  to  other  cases) ;  R.  v.  Millhouse,  ib.  622  (limiting  the 
right) ;  see  People  v.  Thomas,  9  Mich.  314.] 

7  fSee  Appendix  I.] 

8  LSee  Bond  i>.  State,  21  Fla.  738,  759  ;  Smith  v.  State,  25  id.  517  ;  Steele  v.  State, 
83  id.  348  ;  Hart  t>.  State,  88  id.  39  ;  Lester  v.  State,  37  id.  382  ;    Milton  v.  State, 
24  So.  60.] 

9  [See  State  v.  Bogue,  62  Kan.  79,  84  ;  Davis  v.  State,  38  Md.  15,  45  ;  Benson  v. 
U.  S.,  146  U.  S.  325,  387  ;  Bnllard  v.  State,   31   Fla.   266,   284  ;  McGinnis  v.  State, 
4  Wyo.  115  ;  Kid  well  v.  Com.,  97  Ky.  538  ;  State  ".  Franks,  51  S.  C.  259.] 

11  [See  Benson  v.  U.  S.,  14fi  U.  S.  325,  333  ;  State  v.  Asbury,  49  La.  An.  1741 ; 
Smith  v.  Com.,  90  Va.  759  ;  State  w.  Magone,  Or.,  51  Pac.  452  ;  Love  v.  People,  160 
111.  501  ;  State  v.  Smith,  8  S.  U.  547  ;  People  v.  Plyler,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  553.] 


§§  333  a-333  <?.]          INTEREST  ;  SURVIVORS.  493 

often  invoked  by  way  of  a  reason,  "  if  death  has  closed  the  lips  of 
the  one  party,  the  policy  of  the  law  is  to  close  the  lips  of  the 
other."1  This  exception  is  wholly  a  creation  of  statute;  for  as  all 
interested  persons  were  excluded  at  common  law,  the  whole  em- 
braced a  part,  and  there  was  no  occasion  to  define  the  terms  of  any 
such  partial  exclusion.  So  far  as  the  notion  of  interest  is  involved, 
the  principles  of  the  common  law  survive,  and  its  precedents  might 
have  a  bearing;  but  they  are  rarely  resorted  to,  and  the  limits  of 
this  rule  of  exclusion  depend  almost  entirely  on  the  varying  terms 
of  the  local  statute;  these  differences  being  such  that  the  precedents 
in  one  jurisdiction  are  rarely  of  use  in  another.2  It  is  enough  here 
to  note  two  lines  of  distinction  between  the  various  statutes,  viz., 
(1)  some  exclude  only  parties  to  the  cause,  while  the  others  exclude 
any  person  interested  in  the  issue;  (2)  some  exclude  only  testimony 
to  a  specific  transaction  or  communication  with  the  deceased  person, 
while  the  others  exclude  the  disqualified  persons  from  testifying  at 
all  in  the  cause.  As  a  matter  of  policy,  this  survival  of  the  now 
discarded  interest-disqualification  is  deplorable  in  every  respect;  for 
it  is  based  on  a  fallacious  and  exploded  principle,  it  leads  to  as  much 
or  more  injustice  than  it  prevents,  and  it  encumbers  the  profession 
with  a  mass  of  barren  quibbles  over  the  interpretation  of  mere 
words.8] 

§  333  c.  Husband  and  "Wife  [Testimony  by  a  husband  or  wife 
may  involve  any  one  or  more  of  three  distinct  and  independent  prin- 

1  TBrickell,  C.  J.,  in  Louis  v.  Eastern,  50  Ala.  471-3 

!  TSee  the  statutes  in  Appendix  I.] 

8  LCorliss,  J.,  iu  St.  John  v.  Lofland,  5  N.  D.  140:  "We  cannot  say  that  it  was 
the  purpose  of  the  Legislature  to  exclude  all  evidence  merely  because  the  witness  from 
whose  lips  it  might  fall  would  enjoy  the  advantage  of  testifying  to  a  transaction  with  a 
deceased  person,  who  on  that  account  could  not  confront  and  contradict  him.  Statutes 
which  exclude  testimony  on  this  ground  are  of  doubtful  expediency.  There  are  more 
honest  claims  defeated  by  them  by  destroying  the  evidence  to  prove  such  claim  than 
there  would  be  fictitious  claims  established  if  all  such  enactments  were  s\vept  away 
and  all  persons  rendered  competent  witnesses.  To  assume  that  in  that  event  many 
false  claims  would  be  established  by  perjury  is  to  place  an  extremely  low  estimate 
on  human  nature,  and  a  very  high  estimate  on  human  ingenuity  and  adroitness. 
He  who  possesses  no  evidence  to  prove  his  case  save  that  which  such  a  statute 
declares  incompetent  is  remediless.  But  those  against  whom  a  dishonest  demand 
is  made  are  not  left  utterly  unprotected  because  death  has  sealed  the  lips  of  the 
only  person  who  can  contradict  the  survivor,  who  supports  his  claim  with  his 
oath.  In  the  legal  armory,  there  is  a  weapon  whose  repeated  thrusts  he  will  find 
it  difficult,  and  in  many  cases  impossible,  to  parry  if  his  testimony  is  a  tissue  of 
falsehoods,  —  the  sword  of  cross-examination.  For  these  reasons,  which  lie  on  the 
very  surface  of  this  question  of  policy,  we  regard  it  as  a  sound  rule  to  be  applied  in  the 
construction  of  statutes  of  the  character  of  the  one  whose  interpretation  is  here  involved, 
that  they  should  not  be  extended  beyond  their  letter  when  the  effect  of  such  extension 
will  be  to  add  to  the  list  of  those  whom  the  act  renders  incompetent  ns  witnesses." 
If  any  recognition  at  all  is  to  be  given  to  the  considerations  underlying  this  disqualifi- 
cation, there  are  two  simple  ways,  each  having  a  statutory  sanction  to-day,  either  of 
which  would  accomplish  the  purpose  without  the  crude,  technical,  unjust  method  of 
disqualification.  One  is  (as  in  New  Mexico)  to  allow  no  recovery  in  such  cases  on  the 
party's  sole  testimony,  but  to  require  corroboration  of  some  sort.  The  other  is  (as  in 
Connecticut)  in  such  cases  to  admit,  as  well  as  the  surviving  party,  any  declarations  ou 
the  subject  by  the  deceased  opponent.^] 


494  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [en.  XXIIL 

ciples,  not  always  kept  separate  by  authors  and  judges:  (1)  One 
spouse  may  not  testify  for  the  other;  (2)  One  spouse  may  not  testify 
against  the  other;  (3)  One  spouse  may  not  testify  to  confidential 
communications  by  the  other.  The  first  rests  on  the  notion  of  in- 
terest, i.  e.  the  untrustworthiness  of  one  spouse  as  likely  to  favor 
the  other  by  testifying  falsely  on  the  other's  behalf.  The  second 
rests  on  a  notion  of  policy  or  sentiment,  that  it  is  a  hardship  to  the 
one  to  be  condemned  by  the  testimony  of  the  other,  and  that  the 
allowance  of  such  a  practice  would  tend  to  disturb  marital  harmony. 
The  third  rests  on  a  public  policy  similar  to  that  which  protects  con- 
fidential communications  between  attorney  and  client,  government 
and  informer,  and  certain  other  classes  of  persons;  the  thought 
being  that  the  full  activity  and  benefit  of  the  relation  cannot  be 
attained  unless  the  persons  in  it  have  full  security  in  advance  that 
their  confidences  cannot  be  disclosed.  The  distinction  between 
these  three  principles,  both  in  theory  and  in  working  rules,  is  so 
important  that  attention  may  be  called  to  some  of  its  features. 
(1)  Under  the  first  head,  the  exclusion  is  absolute.  It  is  not  a 
matter  of  privilege,  and  the  consent  of  neither  person  can  make  the 
other  competent.  Furthermore,  the  death  of  the  other  person  may 
still  leave  the  survivor  incompetent  to  testify  in  favor  of  the  estate, 
while  divorce  may  destroy  the  incompetency.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  other  person  must  be  a  party  to  the  cause,  or  at  least  interested 
in  it.  Furthermore,  there  are  probably  no  exceptions  to  the  rule  on 
the  score  of  necessity.  (2)  Under  this  head,  the  question  is  in  prin- 
ciple one  of  privilege;  i.  e.,  it  is  a  matter  in  which  perhaps  the  other 
person  to  the  relation  may  by  waiver  allow  the  testimony  to  be  re- 
ceived. Furthermore,  the  testimony  may  perhaps  be  excluded  even 
though  the  other  member  of  the  relation  is  not  a  party-opponent  in 
the  cause.  Again,  the  death  of  the  other  member  may  cause  the 
prohibition  to  cease.  Finally,  there  are  some  well-established  excep- 
tions based  on  reasons  of  necessity.  (3)  Under  the  third  head,  the 
principle  applies  quite  irrespective  of  whether  either  spouse  is  a 
party  to  the  cause.  Moreover,  the  death  or  the  divorce  of  the  other 
member  does  not  affect  the  policy  of  prohibition.  Again,  the  other 
member  may  always  waive  the  privilege.  Finally,  there  are  no  ex- 
ceptions to  the  rule.  —  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  it  is  of  the  highest 
importance  to  distinguish  which  of  these  principles  is  involved  in  a 
given  offer  of  evidence,  especially  since  the  statutory  changes  of  the 
past  forty  years ;  for  by  statute  the  first  above  principle  has  been 
discarded  in  the  majority  of  jurisdictions,  the  second  has  been  dis- 
carded in  a  few  jurisdictions,  and  the  third  has  never  been  and 
probably  never  will  be  infringed  upon.  Thus,  if  a  wife  is  to-day 
called  to  the  stand,  she  may  testify,  in  most  jurisdictions,  if  her 
husband  is  the  party  calling  her;  she  may  do  so,  in  a  few  jurisdic- 
tions only,  if  she  is  called  against  him;  while,  though  he  is  not  a 


§§  333  <?-335.]      INTEREST  ;  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.  495 

party  on  either  side,  she  may  not  testify  to  his  confidential  commu- 
nications ;  though  at  common  law  she  would  have  been  excluded  in 
all  three  cases.  In  the  following  sections,  these  three  distinct  prin- 
ciples are  treated  together  without  discrimination,1  —  a  practice,  to 
be  sure,  to  be  observed  in  many  of  the  earlier  judicial  opinions  on 
the  subject  and  in  several  of  the  statutory  enactments.2  It  will  be 
necessary  to  observe  carefully  the  precise  principle  under  considera- 
tion in  each  passage,  though  this  it  is  not  always  possible  to  ascer- 
tain. The  statutory  changes,8  it  should  be  added,  have  not  always 
taken  the  simple  expedient  of  abolishing  the  first  or  the  first  two  of 
the  above  principles,  but  have  often  qualified  the  change  by  excep- 
tions of  various  sorts,  so  that  the  modern  decisions  are  in  most  cases 
dependent  chiefly  on  the  precise  terms  of  the  local  statute.  It  re- 
mains only  to  be  said  that  the  discarding  of  the  first  principle  above 
(incompetency  of  one  spouse  to  testify  on  behalf  of  the  other)  is  a 
change  demanded  by  all  considerations  of  justice  and  policy,  and 
that  the  exceptions  which  still  encumber  several  statutes  are  mere 
remnants  of  the  obsolete  traditions  of  the  interest-disqualifications;  * 
that  the  discarding  of  the  second  principle  (prohibition  of  one  spouse 
testifying  against  another)  rests  on  a  policy  less  generally  conceded, 
but  equally  required  by  an  enlightened  view  of  the  law  of  evidence; 6 
and  that  the  third  principle  (privacy  of  confidential  communications) 
is  one  which  no  one  is  likely  ever  to  propose  to  abolish.  The  statute 
of  New  Hampshire  may  be  regarded  as  a  model  enactment.] 

§§  334,  335.  Same :  Common-law  Rule,  in  general.  The  rule  by 
which  parties  are  excluded  from  being  witnesses  for  themselves  ap- 
plies to  the  case  of  husband  and  wife  ;  neither  of  them  being  admis- 
sible as  a  witness  in  a  cause,  civil  or  criminal,  in  which  the  other  is 
a  party.1  This  exclusion  is  founded  partly  on  the  identity  of  their 
legal  rights  and  interests,  and  partly  on  principles  of  public  policy, 
•which  lie  at  the  basis  of  civil  society.  For  it  is  essential  to  the  hap- 
piness of  social  life  that  the  confidence  subsisting  between  husband 
and  wife  should  be  sacredly  protected  and  cherished  in  its  most  un- 

1  PThe  third  principle  is  also  treated  ante,  §  254,  q.  r.] 

2  LFor  a  careful  discrimination  of  the  topics,  see  the  Second  Report  of  the  Commis- 
sioners on  Procedure  at  Common  Law,  1853,  p.  12 ;  see  the  differences  illustrated  in 
Saffold  v.  Home,  72  Miss.  470  ;  Mercer  v.  State,  Fla.,  24  So.  154 ;  Southwick  v.  South- 
wick,  49  N.  Y.  510.] 

8  QFor  the  statutes  in  full,  see  Appendix  I.  The  first  general  statute  in  England 
came  in  1853,  St.  16-17  Viet.,  c.  83,  s.  4.] 

*  FSee  Appleton,  Evidence,  c.  ix  ;  Bentham,  Judicial  Evidence,  B.  ix,  pt.  iii.] 

6  LSee  Appleton,  Evidence,  c.  ix.] 

1  An  exception  or  qualification  of  this  rule  is  admitted,  in  cases  where  the  husband's 
account-books  have  been  kept  by  the  wife,  and  are  offered  in  evidence  in  an  action 
brought  by  him  for  goods  sold,  etc.  Here  the  wife  is  held  a  comjietent  witness,  to 
testify  that  she  made  the  entries  by  his  direction  and  in  his  presence ;  after  which  his 
own  suppletory  oath  mny  be  received,  as  to  the  times  when  the  charges  were  made,  and 
that  they  are  just  and  true  :  Littlefifld  v.  Rice,  10  Met.  287;  and  see  Stanton  v.  Will- 
son,  3  Day  37  ;  Smith  y.  Sanford,  12  Pick.  139.  In  the  i>rincipal  case,  the  correctness 
of  the  contrary  decision  in  Carr  v.  Cornell,  4  Vt.  116,  was  denied. 


496  WITNESSES  ;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

limited  extent ;  and  to  break-  down  or  impair  the  great  principles 
which  protect  the  sanctities  of  that  relation  would  be  to  destroy  the 
best  solace  of  human  existence.2  The  principle  of  this  rule  requires 
its  application  to  all  cases  in  which  the  interests  of  the  other  party 
are  involved.  And,  therefore,  the  wife  is  not  a  competent  witness 
against  any  co-defendant  tried  with  her  husband,  if  the  testimony 
concern  the  husband,  though  it  be  not  directly  given  against  him.3 
Nor  is  she  a  witness  for  a  co-defendant,4  if  her  testimony,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  conspiracy,5  would  tend  directly  to  her  husband's  acquittal ; 
nor  where,  as  in  the  case  of  an  assault,6  the  interests  of  all  the  de- 
fendants are  inseparable  ;  nor  in  any  suit  in  which  the  rights  of  her 
husband,  though  not  a  party,  would  be  concluded  by  any  verdict 
therein  ;  nor  may  she,  in  a  suit  between  others,  testify  to  any  matter 
for  which,  if  true,  her  husband  may  be  indicted.7  Yet  where  the 
grounds  of  defence  are  several  and  distinct,  and  in  no  manner  de- 
pendent on  each  other,  no  reason  is  perceived  why  the  wife  of  one 
defendant  should  not  be  admitted  as  a  witness  for  another.8 

§  336.  Same  :  Matters  occurring  before  Marriage.  It  makes  no 
difference  at  what  time  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife  commenced ; 
the  principle  of  exclusion  being  applied  in  its  full  extent  wherever  the 
interests  of  either  of  them  are  directly  concerned.  Thus,  where  the 
defendant  married  one  of  the  plaintiff's  witnesses,  after  she  was 
actually  summoned  to  testify  in  the  suit,  she  was  held  incompetent 
to  give  evidence.1  Nor  is  there  any  difference  in  principle  between 

8  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Peters  223,  per  McLean,  J. ;  supra,  §  254  ;  Co.  Lit.  6  J;  Davis 
v.  Dinwoody,  4  T.  R.  678  ;  Barker  v.  Dixie,  Gas.  temp.  Hardw.  264;  Bentleyv.  Cooke, 
3  Doug.  422,  per  Ld.  Mansfield.  The  rule  is  the  same  in  equity  :  Vowles  v.  Young, 
13  Ves.  144.  So  is  the  law  of  Scotland  :  Alison's  Practice,  p.  461.  See  also  2  Kent 
Comm.  179,  180;  Com.  v.  Marsh,  10  Pick.  57  ;  Robin  v.  King,  2  Leigh  142,  144; 
Snvder  v.  Snyder,  6  Binn.  488;  Corse  t>.  Patterson,  6  Har.  &  Johns.  153  ;  Barbat  v. 
Allen,  7  Exch.  609. 

•  Hale  P.  C.  301  ;  Dalt.  Just.  c.  Ill;  R.  v.  Hood,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  281;  R.  v. 
Smith,  ib.  289.     £But  this  need  not  be  so  where  the  husband  is  not  a  party  :   see 
§842/1 

*  CHolley  v.  State,  105  Ala,  100;  Gillespie  v.  People,  111.,  52  N.  E.  250  ;   Bartlett 
v.  Clough,  94  Wis.  196-3 

6  R.  v.  Locker,  5  Esp.  107,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough,  who  said  it  was  a  clear  rule  of 
the  law  of  England  :  State  ».  Burlingham,  3  Shepl.  104.     But  where  several  are  jointly 
indicted  for  an  offence,  which  might  have  been  committed  either  by  one  or  more,  and 
they  are  tried  separately,  it  has  been  held  that  the  wife  of  one  is  a  competent  witness 
for  the  others:  Com.  v.  Manson,  2  Ashm.  81;  State  v.  Worthing,  1  Redington,  62; 
infra,  §  363,  n.     But  see  Pulleu  t>.  People,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  48. 

>  R.  v.  Frederick,  2  Stra.  1095. 

7  Den  d.  Stewart  v.  Johnson,  8  Harrison  88  ;  Qsee  post,  §  342.1 

1  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  160,  n.  (2) ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  75,  n.  (1).  But  where  the  wife  of 
one  prisoner  was  called  to  prove  an  alibi  in  favor  of  another  jointly  indicted,  she  was 
held  incompetent,  on  the  ground  that  her  evidence  went  to  weaken  that  of  the  witness 
against  her  husband,  by  showing  that  that  witness  was  mistaken  in  a  material  fnct  : 
R.  0.  Smith,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  289.  If  the  conviction  of  a  prisoner,  against  whom  she 
is  called,  will  strengthen  the  hope  of  pardon  for  her  husband,  who  is  already  convicted, 
this  goes  only  to  her  credibility :  R.  v.  Rndd,  1  Leach  IIS,  181.  Where  one  of  two 
persons,  separately  indicted  for  the  same  larceny,  has  been  convicted,  his  wife  is  a 
competent  witness  against  the  other:  R.  v.  Williams,  8  C.  &  P.  284  ;  £see  post,  §  342.] 

1  Pedley  v.  Wellesley,  8  C.  &  P.  558.     This  case  forms  au  exception  to  the  general 


§§335-338.]        INTEREST;  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.  497 

the  admissibility  of  the  husband  and  that  of  the  wife,  where  the  other 
is  a  party.2  And  when,  in  any  case,  they  are  admissible  against  each 
other,  they  are  also  admissible  for  each  other.8 

§  337.  Same :  Testimony  after  Death  or  Divorce.  Neither  is  it 
material  that  this  relation  no  longer  exists.  The  great  object  of  the 
rule  is  to  secure  domestic  happiness  by  placing  the  protecting  seal  of 
the  law  upon  all  confidential  communications  between  husband  and 
wife ;  and  whatever  has  come  to  the  knowledge  of  either  by  means  of 
the  hallowed  confidence  which  that  relation  inspires,  cannot  be  after- 
wards divulged  in  testimony,  even  though  the  other  party  be  no 
longer  living.1  And  even  where  a  wife,  who  had  been  divorced  by 
act  of  Parliament,  and  had  married  another  person,  was  offered  as  a 
witness  by  the  plaintiff,  to  prove  a  contract  against  her  former  hus- 
band, Lord  Alvanley  held  her  clearly  incompetent ;  adding,  with  his 
characteristic  energy,  "  it  never  shall  be  endured  that  the  confidence, 
which  the  law  has  created  while  the  parties  remained  in  the  most 
intimate  of  all  relations,  shall  be  broken  whenever,  by  the  miscon- 
duct of  one  party,  the  relation  has  been  dissolved."  2  [But  the 
preceding  remarks  apparently  apply  to  testimony  revealing  marital 
confidences,  i.  e.  the  third  principle  above  mentioned  in  §  333  b.  As 
to  this  there  can  be  no  doubt,  on  principle,  that  death  or  divorce  does 
not  destroy  the  privilege.8  But  where  such  confidences  are  not  in- 
volved, the  policy  of  preserving  the  marital  peace  does  not  forbid 
one  spouse  from  testifying  against  the  other's  interests  after  the 
latter's  death  or  divorce.4  Nor  is  the  one  incompetent  for  the  other 
after  divorce.6] 

§  338.  This  rule,  [L  e.  the  third  above-mentioned  in  §  333  b,~\  in 
its  spirit  and  extent,  is  analogous  to  that  which  excludes  confidential 

rule,  that  neither  a  witness  nor  a  party  can,  by  his  own  act,  deprive  the  other  party  of 
a  right  to  the  testimony  of  the  witness. 

2  R.  v.  Serjeant,  1  Ry.  &  M.  352.  In  this  case,  the  husband  was,  on  this  ground, 
held  incompetent  as  a  witness  against  the  wife,  upon  an  indictment  against  her  and 
others  for  conspiracy,  in  procuring  him  to  marry  her. 

»  R.  v.  Serjeant,  1  Ry.  &  M.  352. 

1  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Pet.  209. 

8  Monroe  v.  Twistleton,  Peakc's  Evicl.  App.  Ixxxvii  (xci),  expounded  and  con- 
firmed in  Aveson  v.  Lord  Kinnaird,  6  East  192,  193,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough,  and  in 
Doker  v.  Hnsler,  Ry.  &  M.  198,  per  Best,  C.  J.;  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Peters  223.  In 
the  case  of  Beveridge  v.  Minter,  1  C.  &  P.  364,  in  which  the  widow  of  a  deceased  prom- 
isor was  admitted  by  Abbott,  C.  J.,  as  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the  promise, 
in  an  action  against  her  husband's  executors,  the  principle  of  the  rule  dots  not  seem  to 
have  received  any  consideration ;  and  the  point  was  not  saved,  the  verdict  being  for 
the  defendants.  See  also  Terry  v.  Belcher,  1  Bailey  568,  that  the  rule  excludes  the 
testimony  of  a  husband  or  wife  separated  from  each  other,  under  articles.  See  further, 
State  v.  Jolly,  3  Dev.  &  Bat.  110  ;  Barnes  v.  Camack,  1  Barb.  392  ;  {Patton  v.  Wil- 
son, 2  Lea  101 ;  Low's  Estate,  Myrick's  Prob.  (Cal.)  143  ;  Succession  of  Ames,  33  La. 
An.  1317.} 

8  TSee  ante,  §  254.] 

*  LFrench  v.  Ware,  65  Vt.  338,  344  (divorce);  Inman  v.  State,  Ark.,  47  S.  W.  558 
(divorce).  Cmtra..-  Emmons  v.  Barton,  109  CaL  662  (death);  State  v.  Raby,  N.  C., 
28  S.  C.  490  (divorce).] 

6  FjSee  cases  cited  in  note  to  §  344, 
VOL.  I. —32 


498  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

communications  made  by  a  client  to  his  attorney,  and  which  has  been 
already  considered.1  Accordingly,  the  wife,  after  the  death  of  the 
husband,  has  been  held  competent  to  prove  facts  coming  to  her  knowl- 
edge from  other  sources,  and  not  by  means  of  her  situation  as  a  wife, 
notwithstanding  they  related  to  the  transactions  of  her  husband.2 

§  339.  Same  :  Marriage  must  be  lawful.  This  rule  of  protection  is 
extended  only  to  lawful  marriages,  or  at  least  to  such  as  are  innocent 
in  the  eye  of  the  law.  If  the  cohabitation  is  clearly  of  an  immoral 
character,  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  a  kept  mistress,  the  parties 
are  competent  witnesses  for  and  against  each  other.1  On  the  other 
hand,  upon  a  trial  for  polygamy,  the  first  marriage  being  proved 
and  not  controverted,  the  woman,  with  whom  the  second  mar- 
riage was  had,  is  a  competent  witness ;  for  the  second  marriage  is 
void.2  But  if  the  proof  of  the  first  marriage  were  doubtful,  and  the 
fact  were  controverted,  it  is  conceived  that  she  would  not  be  ad- 
mitted.8 It  seems,  however,  that  a  reputed  or  supposed  wife  may  be 
examined,  on  the  voir  dire,  to  facts  showing  the  invalidity  of  the 
marriage.4  Whether  a  woman  is  admissible  in  favor  of  a  man  with 
whom  she  has  cohabited  for  a  long  time  as  his  wife,  whom  he  has 
constantly  represented  and  acknowledged  as  such,  and  by  whom  he 
has  had  children,  has  been  declared  to  be  at  least  doubtful.6  Lord 
Kenyon  rejected  such  a  witness,  when  offered  by  the  prisoner,  in  a 
capital  case  tried  before  him ; '  and  in  a  later  case,  in  which  his  de- 
cisions were  mentioned  as  entitled  to  be  held  in  respect  and  reverence, 
an  arbitrator  rejected  a  witness  similarly  situated ;  and  the  Court, 
abstaining  from  any  opinion  as  to  her  competency,  confirmed  the 
award,  on  the  ground  that  the  law  and  fact  had  both  been  submitted 
to  the  arbitrator.7  It  would  doubtless  be  incompetent  for  another 

1  Supra,  §  237. 

2  Coffin  v.  Jones,  13  Pick.  445  ;  William  v.  Baldwin,  7  Vt.  506;  Cornell  v.  Van- 
artsdalen,  4  Barr  364  ;  Wells  v.  Tucker,  3  Binn.  366 ;  and  see  Saunders  v.  Hendrix, 
5  Ala.  224  ;  McGuire  v.  Muloney,  1  B.  Monr.  224. 

*  Batthews  v.  Galindo,  4  Bing.  610. 

2  l!ull.  N.  P.  287  ;  QWrye  v.  State,  95  Ga.  466.} 

8  QLowery  v.  People,  172  111.  466.]  If  the  fact  of  the  second  marriage  is  in  con- 
troversy, the.  same  principle,  it  seems,  will  exclude  the  second  wife  also  ;  see  2  Stark. 
Evid.  400;  Grid's  Case,  T.  Kayni.  1.  But  it  seems  that  the  wife,  though  inadmis- 
sible as  a  witness,  m?>y  TV  produced  in  court  for  the  purpose  of  being  identified,  al- 
though the  proof  thus  lurnished  may  affix  a  criminal  charge  upon  the  husband  ;  as, 
for  example,  to  shov.  tliat  she  was  the  person  to  whom  he  was  first  married ;  or,  who 
passed  a  note,  which  he  is  charged  with  having  stolen  :  Alison's  Pr.  p.  463. 

«  Peat's  Case,  2  Lew.  Cr.  Cas.  288 ;  Wakelield's  Case,  id.  279. 

6  1  Price  88,  89,  per  Thompson,  C.  B.     If  a  woman  sue  as  &fcme  sole,  her  husband 
is  not  admissible  as  a  witness  for  the  defendant,  to  prove  her  a  feme  covert,  thereby  to 
nonsuit  her:  Bentley  v.  Cooke,  Tr.  24  Geo.  Ill,  B.  R.,  cited  2  T.  R.  265,  269  j  8.  C. 
3  Doug.  422. 

*  Anon.,  cited  by  Richards,  B.,  in  1  Price  83. 

7  Campbell  v.  Twemlow,  1   Price  81,  88,  90,  91 ;  Richards,  B.,  observed,  that  he 
should  certainly  have  done  as  the  arbitrator  aid.     To  admit  the  witness  in  such  a 
case  would  both  encourage  immorality,  and  enable  the  parties  at  their  pleasure  to  per- 

Etrate  fraud,  by  admitting  or  denying  the  marriage,  as  may  suit  their  convenience, 
ence,  cohabitation  and  acknowledgment,  as  husband  and  wife,  are  held  conclusive 


§§  338-341.]  INTEREST ;    HUSBAND   AND   WIFE.  499 

person  to  offer  the  testimony  of  an  acknowledged  wife,  on  the  ground 
that  the  parties  were  never  legally  married,  if  that  relation  were 
always  recognized  and  believed  to  be  lawful  by  the  parties.  But 
where  the  parties  had  lived  together  as  man  and  wife,  believing 
themselves  lawfully  married,  but  had  separated  on  discovering  that 
a  prior  husband,  supposed  to  be  dead,  was  still  living,  the  woman 
was  held  a  competent  witness  against  the  second  husband,  even  as  to 
facts  communicated  to  her  by  him  during  their  cohabitation.8 

§  340.  Same  :  Waiver  of  Privilege  by  the  other  Person.  Whether 
the  rule  [i.  e.  the  second  above-mentioned  in  §  333  b~]  may  be  relaxed, 
so  as  to  admit  the  wife  to  testify  against  the  husband,  by  his  consent, 
the  authorities  are  not  agreed.  Lord  Hardwicke  was  of  opinion  that 
she  was  not  admissible,  even  with  the  husband's  consent ; 1  and  this 
opinion  has  been  followed  in  this  country ; a  apparently  upon  the 
ground,  that  the  interest  of  the  husband  in  preserving  the  confidence 
reposed  in  her  is  not  the  sole  foundation  of  the  rule,  the  public  hav- 
ing also  an  interest  in  the  preservation  of  domestic  peace,  which 
might  be  disturbed  by  her  testimony,  notwithstanding  his  consent. 
The  very  great  temptation  to  perjury,  in  such  case,  is  not  to  be  over- 
looked.8 But  Lord  Chief  Justice  Best,  in  a  case  before  him,4  said  he 
would  receive  the  evidence  of  the  wife,  if  her  husband  consented ; 
apparently  regarding  only  the  interest  of  the  husband  as  the  ground 
of  her  exclusion,  as  he  cited  a  case,  where  Lord  Mansfield  had  once 
permitted  a  plaintiff  to  be  examined  with  his  own  consent. 

§  341.  Same  :  Spouse  not  a  Party,  but  directly  interested.  Where 
the  husband  or  wife  is  not  a  party  to  the  record,  but  yet  has  an  in- 
terest directly  involved  in  the  suit,  and  is  therefore  incompetent  to 
testify,  the  other  also  is  incompetent.1  Thus,  the  wife  of  a  bankrupt 
cannot  be  called  to  prove  the  fact  of  his  bankruptcy,2  [nor  the  wife 
of  a  survivor  incompetent  to  testify  against  the  estate  of  a  deceased 
person.8]  And  the  husband  cannot  be  a  witness  for  or  against  his 
wife,  in  a  question  touching  her  separate  estate,  even  though  there 
are  other  parties  in  respect  of  whom  he  would  be  competent.4  So, 

against  the  parties,  in  all  cases,  except  whore  the  fact  or  the  incidents  of  marriage, 
such  as  legitimacy  and  inheritance,  are  directly  in  controversy  :  see  also  Divoll  v.  Lead- 
better,  4  Pick.  220. 

8  Wells  v.  Fletcher,  5  C.  &  P.  12  ;  Wells  v.  Fisher,  1  M.  &  Rob.  99  and  n. 

1  Barker  v.  Dixie,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  264 ;  Sedgwick  v.  Watkins,  1  Ves.  Jun.  49  ; 
Grigg's  Case,  T.  Raym.  1. 

2  Randall's  Case,  5  City  Hall  Rec.  141,  153,  154  ;  see  also  Colbern's  Case,  1  Wheeler's 
Crim.  Cas.  479. 

8  Davis  v.  Dinwoody,  4  T.  R.  679,  per  Ld.  Kenyon. 

*  Pedley  v.  Wellesley,  3  C.  &  P.  558. 

1  jLabaree  v.  Wood,  54  Vt.  452  ;j  [Buckingham  v.  Roar,  45  Nebr.  244  ;  Wolver- 
ton  v.  Van  Syckel,  Pa.,  31  Atl.  640.  J 

2  Ex  parte  James,  1  P.  Wms.  610,  611.     But  she  is  made  competent  by  statute  to 
make  discovery  of  his  estate :   6  Geo.  IV,  c.  16,  §  37. 

»  QBevelot  v.  Lestrade,  153  111.  625 ;  Stodder  v.  Hoffman,  158  id.  486.  See  Pyle 
v.  Pyle,  ib.  289  ;  Berry  v.  Stevens,  69  Me.  290  J 

*  1  Burr.  424,  per  Ld.  Mansfield ;  Davis  v.  Dinwoody,  4  T.  R.  678 ;   Snyder  R 


500  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxiu 

also,  where  the  one  party,  though  a  competent  witness  in  the  cause, 
is  not  bound  to  answer  a  particular  question,  because  the  answer 
would  directly  and  certainly  expose  him  or  her  to  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion and  conviction,  the  other,  it  seems,  is  not  obliged  to  answer  the 
same  question.5 

The  declarations  of  husband  and  wife  are  subject  to  the  same  rules 
of  exclusion  which  govern  their  testimony  as  witnesses.6 

§  342.  Same :  Spouse  not  legally  interested.  But  though  the 
husband  and  wife  are  not  admissible  as  witnesses  against  each  other, 
where  either  is  directly  interested  in  the  event  of  the  proceeding, 
whether  civil  or  criminal ;  yet,  in  collateral  proceedings,  not  imme- 
diately affecting  their  mutual  interests,  their  evidence  is  receivable, 
notwithstanding  it  may  tend  to  criminate,  or  may  contradict  the 
other,  or  may  subject  the  other  to  a  legal  demand.1  Thus,  where,  in 
a  question  upon  a  female  pauper's  settlement,  a  man  testified  that  he 
was  married  to  the  pauper  upon  a  certain  day,  and  another  woman, 
being  called  to  prove  her  own  marriage  with  the  same  man  on  a  pre- 
vious day,  was  objected  to  as  incompetent,  she  was  held  clearly 
admissible  for  that  purpose ;  for  though,  if  the  testimony  of  both 
was  true,  the  husband  was  chargeable  with  the  crime  of  bigamy,  yet 
neither  the  evidence,  nor  the  record  in  the  present  case,  could  be  re- 
ceived in  evidence  against  him  upon  that  charge,  it  being  res  inter 
alias  acta,  and  neither  the  husband  nor  the  wife  having  any  interest 

Snyder,  6  Binn.  483  ;  Langley  v.  Fisher,  5  Beav.  443.  But  where  the  interest  is  con- 
tingent and  uncertain,  he  is  admissible :  Richardson  o.  Learned,  10  Pick.  261.  See 
further,  Hatfield  v.  Thorp,  5  B.  &  Aid.  589  ;  Cornish  v.  Pugh,  8  D.  &  R.  65  ;  12  Vin. 
Abr.  Evidence  B.  If  an  attesting  witness  to  a  will  afterwards  marries  a  female  lega- 
tee, the  legacy  not  being  given  to  her  separate  use,  he  is  inadmissible  to  prove  the  will : 
Mackenzie  v.  Yeo,  2  Curt.  509.  The  wife  of  an  executor  is  also  incompetent :  Young 
v.  Richards,  ib.  371.  But  where  the  statute  declares  the  legacy  void  which  is  given 
to  an  attesting  witness  of  a  will,  it  has  been  held  that,  if  the  husband  is  a  legatee  and 
the  wife  is  a  witness,  the  legacy  is  void,  and  the  wife  is  admissible  :  Winslow  v.  Kim- 
ball,  12  Shepl.  493 ;  [contra,  semble,  Kettredge  v.  Hodgman,  N.  H.,  32  Atl.  158.] 

6  See  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  168 ;  Den  v.  Johnson,  3  Harr.  87. 

•  Alban  v.  Pritchett,  6  T.  R.  680 ;   Denn  v.  White,  7  id.  112 ;  Kelly  v.   Small, 

2  Esp.  716  ;  Bull  N.  P.  28  ;  Winsmore  v.  Greenbank,  Willes  577.     Whether  where 
the  husband  and  wife  are  jointly  indicted  for  a  joint  offence,  or  are  otherwise  joint  par- 
ties, their  declarations  are  mutually  receivable  against  each  other,  is  still  questioned  ; 
the  general  rule,  as  to  persons  jointly  concerned,  being  in  favor  of  their  admissibility, 
and  the  policy  of  the  law  of  husband  and  wife  being  against  it:  see  Com.  v.  Bobbins, 

3  Pick.  63  ;  Com.  v.  Briggs,  5  id.  429 ;  Evans  v.  Smith,  5  Monroe  363,  364  ;  Turner 
v.  Coe,  5  Conn.  93.     The  declarations  of  the  wife,  however,  are  admissible  for  or 
against  the  husband,  wherever  they  constitute  part  of  the  res  gcstce  which  are  material 
to  be  proved ;  as,  where  he  obtained  insurance  on  her  life  as  a  person  in  health,  she 
being  in  fact  diseased,  Aveson  t».  Lord  Kinnaird,  6  East  188  ;  or,  in  an  action  by  him 
against  another  for  beating  her,  Thompson  v.  Freeman,  Skin.  402 ;  or,  for  enticing  her 
away,  Gilchrist  v.  Bale,  8  Watts  355  ;  or,  in  an  action  against  him  for  her  board,  he 
having  turned  her  out  of  doors,  Walton  v.  Green,  1  C.  &  P.  621.     So,  where  she  acted 
as  his  agent,  supra,  §  334,  n.  ;  Thomas  v.  Hargrave,  Wright,  595.      But  her  declara- 
tions made  after  marriage,  in  respect  to  a  debt  previously  due  by  her,  are  not  admis- 
sible for  the  creditor,  in  an  action  against  the  husband  and  wife,  for  the  recovery  of 
that  debt :  Brown  v.  Lawelle,  6  Blackf.  147. 

1  Fitch  v.  Hill,  11  Mass.  286;  Baring  v.  Reeder,  1  Hen.  &  Mun.  154,  168,  per 
Roane,  J.  la  Griffin  v.  Brown,  2  Pick.  308,  speaking  of  the  cases  cited  to  this  point, 


§§  341-343.]  HUSBAND   AXD   WIFE.  501 

in  the  decision.2  So,  where  the  action  was  by  the  indorsee  of  a  bill 
of  exchange,  against  the  acceptor,  and  the  defence  was,  that  it 
had  been  fraudulently  altered  by  the  drawer,  after  the  acceptance ; 
the  wife  of  the  drawer  was  held  a  competent  witness  to  prove  the 
alteration.8 

§  343.  Same :  Exceptions  in  Cases  of  Necessity.  To  this  general 
rule,  excluding  the  husband  and  wife  as  witnesses,  there  are  some 
exceptions  ;  which  are  allowed  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  partly 
for  the  protection  of  the  wife  in  her  life  and  libert}T,  and  partly  for 
the  sake  of  public  justice.  But  the  necessity  which  calls  for  this 
exception  for  the  wife's  security  is  described  to  mean,  "  not  a  general 
necessity,  as  where  no  other  witness  can  be  had,  but  a  particular 
necessity,  as  where,  for  instance,  the  wife  would  otherwise  be  ex- 
posed, without  remedy  to  personal  injury." 1  Thus,  a  woman  is  a 
competent  witness  against  a  man  indicted  for  forcible  abduction  and 
marriage,  if  the  force  were  continuing  upon  her  until  the  marriage  ; 
of  which  fact  she  is  also  a  competent  witness;  and  this,  by  the 
weight  of  the  authorities,  notwithstanding  her  subsequent  assent 
and  voluntary  cohabitation ;  for  otherwise,  the  offender  would  take 
advantage  of  his  wrong.2  So,  she  is  a  competent  witness  against 

Parker,  C.  J.,  said  :  "  They  establish  this  principle,  that  the  wife  may  be  a  witness  to 
excuse  a  party  sued  for  a  supposed  liability,  although  the  effect  of  her  testimony  is  to 
charge  her  husband  upon  the  same  debt,  in  an  action  afterwards  to  be  brought  against 
him.  And  the  reason  is,  that  the  verdict  in  the  action,  in  which  she  testifies,  cannot 
be  used  in  the  action  against  her  husband ;  so  that,  although  her  testimony  goes  to 
show  that  he  is  chargeable,  yet  he  cannot  be  prejudiced  by  it.  And  it  may  be  observed, 
that,  in  these  very  cases,  the  husband  himself  would  be  a  competent  witness,  if  he  were 
willing  to  testify,  for  his  evidence  would  be  a  confession  against  himself."  Williams 
v.  Johnson,  1  Stra.  504  ;  Vowles  v.  Young,  13  Ves.  144  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  401  ;  see  also 
Mr.  Hargrove's  note  (29)  to  Co.  Lit  6b;  {Com.  v.  Reid,  1  Leg.  Gaz.  Rep.  182,  where 
the  cases  are  fully  discussed  ;{  [Bluman  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  43,  f>8  ;  State  v.  Goforth, 
136  Mo.  Ill  ;  Lihs  v.  Lihs,  44  Nebr.  143  ;  Rios  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  47  S.  W.  987.] 

3  R.  v.  Bathwick,  2  B.  &.  Ad.  639,  647;  s.  P.  R.  v.  All  Saints,  6  M.  &  S.  194.  In 
this  case,  the  previous  decision  in  R.  v.  Cliviger,  2  T.  R.  263,  to  the  effect  that  a  wife 
was  in  every  case  incompetent  to  give  evidence,  even  tending  to  criminate  her  husband, 
was  considered  and  restricted  ;  Lord  Ellenborough  remarking,  that  the  rule  was  there 
laid  down  "somewhat  too  largely."  In  R.  v.  Bathwick,  it  was  held  to  be  "undoubt- 
edly true  in  the  case  of  a  direct  charge  and  pioceeding  against  him  for  any  offence," 
but  was  denied  in  its  application  to  collateral  matters.  But  on  the  trial  of  a  man  for 
the  crime  of  adultery,  the  husband  of  the  woman  with  whom  the  crime  was  alleged  to 
have  been  committed  has  been  held  not  to  be  admissible  as  a  witness  for  the  prosecu- 
tion, as  his  testimony  would  go  directly  to  charge  the  crime  upon  his  wife:  State  v. 
Welch,  13  Shepl.  30  ;  [People  r.  Fowler,  104  Mich.  449.  SeeR.  v.  All  Saints,  6  M. 
&  S.  194  ;  State  v.  Bridgman,  49  Vt.  206  (citing  cases)  ;  Howard  v.  State,  94  Ga.  587.] 

8  Henman  v.  Dickinson,  5  Bing.  183. 

1  Bentley  v.  Cooke,  3  Doug.  422,  per  Ld.  Mansfield.      In  Sedgwick  r.  Watkins, 
1  Ves.  49,  Lord  Thnrlow  spoke  of  this  necessity  as  extending  only  to  security  of  the 
peace,  and  not  to  an  indictment. 

2  1  East's  P.  C.  454  ;  Brown's  Case,  1  Ventr.  243  ;  1  Russ.  on  Crimes,  572 ;  Wake- 
field's  Case,  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  1,  20,  279.      See  also  R.  v.  Yore,  1  Jebb  &  Svines,  563, 
572;  Perry's  Case,  cited  in  McNally's  Evid.   1881  :  R.  v.  Serjeant,  Ry.  &  M.  352; 
1  Hawk.  P.  C.  c.  41,  §  13  ;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  605,  606.    This  case  may  be  considered 
anomalous ;  for  she  can  hardly  be  said  to  be  his  wife,  the  marriage  contract  having 
been  obtained  by  force.     1  Bl.  Comm.  443  ;  McNally's  Evid.   179,  180  ;  3  Chitty's 
Crira.  Law,  817,  n.  (y)  ;  Roscoe's  Crim.  Evid.  115. 


502  WITNESSES  ;    QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.   XXIII. 

him  on  an  indictment  for  a  rape,  committed  on  her  own  person ; 8 
or,  for  an  assault  and  battery  upon  her ; 4  or,  for  maliciously  shoot- 
ing her ; 6  [or  for  incest.6]  She  may  also  exhibit  articles  of  the 
peace  against  him ;  in  which  case  her  affidavit  shall  not  be  allowed 
to  be  controlled  and  overthrown  by  his  own.7  Indeed,  Mr.  East 
considered  it  to  be  settled,  that  "  in  all  cases  of  personal  injuries 
committed  by  the  husband  or  wife  against  each  other,  the  injured 
party  is  an  admissible  witness  against  the  other."  8  But  Mr.  Justice 
Holroyd  thoiight  that  the  wife  could  only  be  admitted  to  prove  facts, 
which  could  not  be  proved  by  any  other  witness.9 

§  344.  Same :  Secret  Facts.  The  wife  has  also,  on  the  same 
ground  of  necessity,  been  sometimes  admitted  as  a  witness  to  testify 
to  secret  facts  which  no  one  but  herself  could  know.  Thus,  upon  an 
appeal  against  an  order  of  filiation,  in  the  case  of  a  married  woman,  she 
was  held  a  competent  witness  to  prove  her  criminal  connection  with 
the  defendant,  though  her  husband  was  interested  in  the  event ; 1 
but  for  reasons  of  public  decency  and  morality,  she  cannot  be 
allowed  to  say,  after  marriage,  that  she  had  no  connection  with  her 
husband,  and  that  therefore  her  offspring  is  spurious.8 

§  345.  Same:  High  Treason.  In  cases  of  high  treason,  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  wife  is  admissible  as  a  witness  against  her  husbind 
has  been  much  discussed,  and  opinions  of  great  weight  have  been 
given  on  both  sides.  The  affirmative  of  the  question  is  maintained,1 

8  Lord  Audley's  Case,  3  Howell's  St.  Tr.  402,  413  ;  Button,  115,  116  ;  Bull.  N.  P. 
287;  ^contra,  but  erroneously,  for  a  rape  before  marriage  :  State  v.  Evaiis,  138  Mo.  116  ; 
see  also  People  v.  Schoonmaker,  Mich.,  75  N.  W.  349.] 

4  Lady  Lawley's  Case,  Bull.  N.  P.  287  ;  R.  v.  Azire,  1  Stra.  633  ;  Soule's  Case, 
5  Greenl.  407  ;  State  v.  Davis,  3  Brevard  3  ;  fJClarke  v.  State,  Ala.,  23  So.  677,  murder 
of  child  by  beating  pregnant  wife.] 

6  Whitehouse's  Case,  cited  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  606. 

8  Estate  v.  Kurd,  101  la.  391 ;  State  v.  Chambers,  87  id.  1,  3  ;  but  a  Court  has  been 
found  to  say  that  bigamy  is  not  an  offence  against  the  wife  :  Boyd  v.  State,  33  Tex.  (Jr. 
470.] 

7  R.  v.  Doherty,  13  East  171  ;  Lord  Vane's  Case,  id.  n.  (a) ;  2  Stra.  1202  ;  R.  v. 
Earl  Ferrers,  1  Burr.  635.     Her  affidavit  is  also  admissible,  on  an  application  for  an 
information  against  him  for  an  attempt  to  take  her  by  force,  contrary  to  articles  of 
separation,  Lady  Lawley's  Case,  Bull.  N.  P.  287  ;  or,  in  a  habeas  corpus  sued  out  by 
him  for  the  same  object,  R.  w.  Mead,  1  Burr.  542. 

8  1  East's  P.  C.   455.     In  Wakefield's  Case,  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  287,  Hullock,  B., 
expressed  himself  to  the  same  effect,  speaking  of  the  admissibility  of  the  wife  only : 
2  Hawk.  P.  C.  c.  46,  §  77;  People,  ex  rel.  Ordronaux,  v.  Chegaray,  18  Wend.  642. 

*  In  R.  v.  Jagger,  cited  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  606. 

1  R.  v.  Reading,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  79,  82 ;  R.  v.  Luffe,  8  East  193  ;  Com.  v.  Shep- 
herd, 6  Binn.  283  ;  State  v.  Pettaway,  3  Hawks  623.      So,  after  divorce  a  vinculo,  the 
wife  may  be  a  witness  for  her  late  husband,  in  an  action  brought  by  him  against  a 
third  person,  for  criminal  conversation  with  her  during  the  marriage  :  Ratclitfu.  Wales, 
1  Hill  N.  Y.  63 ;  Dickerman   v.  Graves,  6  Cush.  308.      So,  it  has  been  held,  that, 
on  an  indictment  against  him  for  an  assault  and  battery  upon  her,  she  is  a  competent 
witness  for  him  to  disprove  the  charge  :  State  v.  Neill,  6  Ala.  685. 

2  COJMJ  v.  Cope,  1  M.  &  Rob.  269,  274  ;  Goodright  ».  MOHS,  Cowp.  594  ;  supra,  §  28. 
1  These  authorities  may  be  said  to  favor  the  affirmative  of  the  question  :  2  Russ.  on 

Crimes,  607  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  286  ;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  252 ;  Mary  Grigg's  Case,  T. 
Raym.  1 ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  404. 


§§  343-364  a.]  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.  503 

on  the  ground  of  the  extreme  necessity  of  the  case,  and  the  nature 
of  the  offence,  tending  as  it  does  to  the  destruction  of  many  lives, 
the  supervision  of  government,  and  the  sacrifice  of  social  happiness. 
For  the  same  reasons,  also,  it  is  said  that,  if  the  wife  should  commit 
this  crime,  no  plea  of  coverture  shall  excuse  her ;  no  presumption  of 
the  husband's  coercion  shall  extenuate  her  guilt.2  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  argued,  that,  as  she  is  not  bound  to  discover  her  husband's 
treason,8  by  parity  of  reason  she  is  not  compellable  to  testify  against 
him.4  The  latter  is  deemed,  by  the  later  text-writers,  to  be  the 
better  opinion.6 

§  346.  Same ;  Dying  Declaration.  Upon  the  same  principle  on 
which  the  testimony  of  the  husband  or  wife  is  sometimes  admitted, 
as  well  as  for  some  other  reasons  already  stated, *  the  dying  declara- 
tions of  either  are  admissible,  where  the  other  party  is  charged  with 
the  murder  of  the  declarant.3 

§§  347-363.1 

§  364.a 

2.    Oath. 

§  364  a  [328]. l  Object  and  Nature  of  the  Oath.  Here  it  is  proper 
to  observe,  that  one  of  the  main  provisions  of  the  law,  for  securing 
the  purity  and  truth  of  oral  evidence,  is,  that  it  be  delivered  under 
the  sanction  of  an  oath.  Men  in  general  are  sensible  of  the  motives 
and  restraints  of  religion,  and  acknowledge  their  accountability  to 
that  Being,  from  whom  no  secrets  are  hid.  In  a  Christian  country, 
it  is  presumed  that  all  the  members  of  the  community  entertain  the 
common  faith,  and  are  sensible  to  its  influences;  and  the  law  founds 
itself  on  this  presumption,  while,  in  seeking  for  the  best  attainable 
evidence  of  every  fact,  in  controversy,  it  lays  hold  on  the  conscience 
of  the  witness  by  this  act  of  religion;  namely,  a  public  and  solemn 
appeal  to  the  Supreme  Being  for  the  truth  of  what  he  may  utter. 
"  The  administration  of  an  oath  supposes  that  a  moral  and  religious 
accountability  is  felt  to  a  Supreme  Being,  and  this  is  the  sanction 
which  the  law  requires  upon  the  conscience,  before  it  admits  him  to 
testify."  a  An  oath  is  ordinarily  defined  to  be  a  solemn  invocation 

3  4  Bl.  Comm.  29. 

«  1  Brownl.  47. 

«  1  Bale's  P.  C.  48,  301  ;  2  Hawk.  P.  C.  c.  46,  §  82  ;  2  Bac.  Ab.  578,  tit  Evid. 
A,  1  ;  1  Chitty's  Crini.  Law  595 ;  McNally's  Evid.  181. 

6  Roscoe's  Crira.  Evid.  114  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  161 ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  71.  See  also 
2  Stark.  Evid.  404,  n.  (6). 

1  Supra,  §  156. 

2  R.  v.  Woodcock,  2  Leach  500 ;  McNally's  Evid.  174  ;  Stoop's  Case,  Addis.  381  ; 
People  v.  Green,  1  Denio  614  ;  j  State  v.  Ryan,  30  La.  An.  Pt.  II,  1176.  | 

1  rrVansferred  to  Appendix  II.~J 

3  FTransferred  ante,  as  §  254  c.j 

1  ["Originally  placed  ante,  as  §  328.] 

a  Wakefield  v.  Ross,  5  Mason  18,  per  Story,  J.     See  also  Menochius,  De  Prsetumpt. 


504  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  XXIIL 

of  the  vengeance  of  the  Deity  upon  the  witness,  if  he  do  not  declare 
the  whole  truth  as  far  as  he  knows  it;8  or,  a  religious  asseveration 
by  which  a  person  renounces  the  mercy  and  imprecates  the  vengeance 
of  Heaven,  if  he  do  not  speak  the  truth.4  But  the  corrrectness  of 
this  view  of  the  nature  of  an  oath  has  been  justly  questioned  by  a 
late  writer,5  on  the  ground  that  the  imprecatory  clause  is  not  essen- 
tial to  the  true  idea  of  an  oath,  nor  to  the  attainment  of  the  object 
of  the  law  in  requiring  this  solemnity.  The  design  of  the  oath  .is 
not  to  call  the  attention  of  God  to  man;  but  the  attention  of  man  to 
God;  — not  to  call  on  Him  to  punish  the  wrong-doer;  but  on  man  to 
remember  that  He  will.6  That  this  is  all  which  the  law  requires  is 
evident  from  the  statutes  in  regard  to  Quakers,  Moravians,  and 
other  classes  of  persons,  conscientiously  scrupulous  of  testifying 
under  any  other  sanction,  and  of  whom,  therefore,  no  other  declara- 
tion is  required.  Accordingly  an  oath  has  been  well  denned,  by  the 
same  writer,  to  be  "  an  outward  pledge,  given  by  the  juror  "  (or  per- 
son taking  it),  "  that  his  attestation  or  promise  is  made  under  an 
immediate  sense  of  his  responsibility  to  God."7  A  security  to  this 
extent,  for  the  truth  of  testimony,  is  all  that  the  law  seems  to  have 
deemed  necessary;  and  with  less  security  than  this,  it  is  believed 
that  the  purposes  of  justice  cannot  be  accomplished. 

§364  b  [371]. l  Form  of  Oath.  It  may  be  added,  in  this  place, 
that  all  witnesses  are  to  be  sworn  according  to  the  peculiar  cere- 
monies of  their  own  religion,  or  in  such  manner  as  they  may  deem 
binding  on  their  own  consciences.  If  the  witness  is  not  of  the 
Christian  religion,  the  Court  will  inquire  as  to  the  form  in  which  an 
oath  is  administered  in  his  own  country,  or  among  those  of  his  own 
faith,  and  will  impose  it  in  that  form.  And  if,  being  a  Christian, 
he  has  conscientious  scruples  against  taking  an  oath  in  the  usual 

lib.  1,  Qn&st.  2,  n.  32,  33  ;  Farinac.  Opera,  torn,  ii,  App.  p.  162,  n.  32,  p.  281,  n.  33  ; 
Bynkershoek,  Observ.  Juris.  Rom.  lib.  6,  c.  2. 

8  1  Stark.   Evid.  22.     The  force  and  utility  of  this  sanction  were  familiar  to  the 
Romans  from  the  earliest  times.    The  solemn  oath  was  anciently  taken  by  this  formula, 
the  witness  holding  a  flint-stone  in  his  right  hand  :  "Si  sciens  fallo,  turn  me  Diespiter, 
salva  urbe  arceqne,  bonis  ejiciat,  ut  ego  hanc  kpidem  :  "  Adam's  Ant.  247 ;  Cic.  Fam. 
Ep.  vii,  1,  12  ;  12  Law  Mag.  (Lond.)  272.     The  early  Christians  refused  to  utter  any 
imprecation  whatever,  Tyler  on  Oaths,  c.  8  ;  and  accordingly,  under  the  Christian 
Emperors,  oaths  were  taken  in  the  simple  form  of  religious  asseveration,  "invocatoDei 
Omnipotentis  nomine,"  Cod.  lib.   2,   tit.   4,   1.  41  ;   " sacrosanctis  evangeliis  tactis," 
Cod.  lib.  3,  tit.  1,  1.  14.   Constantiue  added  in  a  rescript,  "Jurisjurandi  religione  testes, 
|>rius  quam  perhibeant  tt-stimonium,  jamdudum  arctari  praecipimus  : "  Cod.  lib.  4,  tit. 
20,  1.  9.     See  also  Omichundr.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21,  48,  per  Ld.  Hardwicke ;  fi.  c.  Willes 
638;  1  Phil.   Evid.  p.  8;  Atcheson  v.  Everitt,  Cowp.  889.      The  subject  of  oaths  in 
very  fully  and  ably  treated  by  Mr.  Tyler,  in  his  book  on  Oaths,  their  Nature,  Origin, 
and  History  ;  Lond.  1834. 

4  White's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  (4th  ed.)  430. 
•  Tyler  on  Oaths,  pp.  12,  13. 

9  QCurtiss  v.  Strong,  4  Day  66  ;  Clinton  v.  State,  33  Oh.  33  ;   Blackburn  v.  State, 
71  Ala.  319.3 

7  Tyler  on  Oaths,  j>.  15.     See  also  the  report  of  the  Lords'  Committee,  ib.  Introd. 
p.  xiv  ;  3  Inst.  165  ;  Fleta,  lib.  5,  c.  22  ;  Fortescue,  De  Laud.  Leg.  Aiigl.  c.  26,  p.  68. 
1  ^Originally  placed  post,  at  §  371.] 


§§364a-367.]  OATH.  505 

form,  he  will  be  allowed  to  make  a  solemn  religious  asseveration, 
involving  a  like  appeal  to  God  for  the  truth  of  his  testimony,  in  any 
mode  which  he  shall  declare  to  be  binding  on  his  conscience.2  The 
Court,  in  ascertaining  whether  the  form  in  which  the  oath  is  admin- 
istered is  binding  on  the  conscience  of  the  witness,8  may  inquire  of 
the  witness  himself;  and  the  proper  time  for  making  this  inquiry 
is  before  he  is  sworn.  But  if  the  witness,  without  making  any 
objection,  takes  the  oath  in  the  usual  form,  he  may  be  afterwards 
asked,  whether  he  thinks  the  oath  binding  on  his  conscience;  but  it 
is  unnecessary  and  irrelevant  to  ask  him,  if  he  considers  any  form 
of  oath  more  binding,  and  therefore  such  question  cannot  be  asked.4 
If  a  witness,  without  objecting,  is  sworn  in  the  usual  mode,  but, 
being  of  a  different  faith,  the  oath  was  not  in  a  form  affecting  his 
conscience,  as  if,  being  a  Jew,  he  was  sworn  on  the  Gospels,  he  is 
still  punishable  for  perjury,  if  he  swears  falsely.6 

§§  365-366. 1 

§  367.  Capacity  to  take  the  Oath :  Children.  In  respect  to  chil- 
dren, there  is  no  precise  age  within  which  they  are  absolutely 

2  Omichund  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21,  46 ;  8.  c.  Willes  538,  545-549  ;  Ramkissenseat 
v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  19  ;  Atcheson  v.  Ereritt,  Cowp.  389,  390  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  292  ;  1  Phil. 
Evid.  9-11;  1  Stark.  Evid.  22,  23  ;  R.  v.  Morgan,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  54  ;  Vail  v.  Nick- 
erson,  6  Mass.  262 ;  Edmonds  v.  Rowe,  Ry.  &  M.  77  ;  Com.  v.  Buzzell,  16  Pick. 
153  ;  "  Quumque  sit  adseveratio  religiosa,  satis  patet  jusjurandum  attemperandum 
esse  cujusque  religioni  :"  Heinec.  ad  Pand.  pars  3,  §§  13,  15;  "  Quodcunque  nomen 
dederis,  id  utique  constat,  omne  jusjurandum  proficisei  ex  tide  et  persuasione  juran- 
tis  ;  et  inutile  esse,  nisi  quis  cvedat  Deum,  quern  testem  advocat,  perjurii  sui  idoneum 
esse  vendicem.  Id  autem  credat,  qui  jurat  per  Deum  suum,  per  sacra  sua,  et  ex 
sua  ipsius  animi  religione : "  Bynkers.  Obs.  Jur.  Rom.  lib.  6,  c.  2  ;  QMiller  v.  Salo- 
•  mons,  7  Exch.  535;  Gill  v.  Caldwell,  1  111.  53;  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  13  Vt.  362, 
Odell  c.  State,  61  Tenn.  91.  Statutes  sometimes  state  this  explicitly.  Examples 
of  the  form  in  various  religious  sects  are  as  follows :  Fachina  v.  Sabine,  2  Stra.  1104 
(Mahometan);  R.  v.  Entrehman,  C.  &  M.  248  (Chinese);  Newman  w.  Newman, 
7  N.  J.  Eq.  26  (Hebrew) ;  State  v.  Gin  Pon,  16  Wash.  425  (Chinese).  If  no  special 
form  exists  in  the  witness*  religion,  none  is  necessary  ;  R.  v.  Pah-Mah-Gay,  20  U.  C. 
Q.  B.  196.] 

8  By  Stat  1-2  Viet.,  c.  105,  an  oath  is  binding,  in  whatever  form,  if  administered 
in  such  form,  and  with  such  ceremonies  as  the  person  may  declare  binding.  But  the 
doctrine  itself  is  conceived  to  be  common  law. 

*  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  284. 

»  Sells  v.  Hoare,  3  B.  &  B.  232;  State  v.  Whisenhurst,  2  Hawks  458.  But  the 
adverse  party  cannot,  for  that  cause,  have  a  new  trial.  Whether  he  may,  if  a  wit- 
ness on  the  other  side  testified  without  having  been  sworn  at  all,  quaere.  If  the  omis- 
sion of  the  oath  was  known  at  the  time,  it  seems  he  cannot  :  Lawrence  v.  Honghton, 
5  Johns.  129  ;  White  v.  Hawn,  ib.  351.  But  if  it  was  not  discovered  until  after  the 
trial,  he  may:  Hawks  v.  Baker,  6  Greenl.  72. 

1  fJThese  sections,  dealing  with  a  lunatic's  competency,  have  been  placed  in  Ap- 
pendix II.  The  author  treated  the  subject  as  involving  inoompetency  to  take  an  oath  ; 
but  it  is  to-day  recognized  that,  even  where  the  oath  has  been  abolished,  mental 
capacity  to  testify  is  necessary,  and  the  question  is  now  regarded  as  important  only 
from  tliat  point  of  view.  If  the  witness  is  mentally  disqualified,  the  question  of  the 
oath  does  not  arise  ;  if  he  is  mentally  qualified,  the  question  of  the  oath  is  the  same 
for  him  as  for  other  adults.  But  as  a  matter  of  legal  theory,  an  insane  person  may 
not  be  in  a  condition  to  appreciate  the  obligation  of  an  oath  :  R.  v.  Hill,  2  Den.  &  P. 
Cr.  C.  254  ;  Holcomb  v.  Holcorab,  28  Conn.  179  ;  R.  v.  Wbitehead,  L.  R.  1  C.  G 
R.38-3 


506  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

excluded,  on  the  presumption  that  they  have  not  sufficient  under- 
standing. At  the  age  of  fourteen,  every  person  is  presumed  to  have 
common  discretion  and  understanding,  until  the  contrary  appears; 
but  under  that  age  it  is  not  so  presumed;  and  therefore  inquiry  is 
made  as  to  the  degree  of  understanding,  which  the  child  offered  as 
a  witness  may  possess ; l  and  if  he  appears  to  have  sufficient  natural 
intelligence,  and  to  have  been  so  instructed  as  to  comprehend  the 
nature  and  effect  of  an  oath,  he  is  admitted  to  testify,  whatever  his 
age  may  be.2  [The  discretion  of  the  trial  Court  should  be  allowed 
to  control  in  determining  whether  a  given  child  is  competent.8] 
This  examination  of  the  child,  in  order  to  ascertain  his  capacity  to 
be  sworn,  is  made  by  the  judge  at  his  discretion;  and  though,  as 
has  been  just  said,  no  age  has  been  precisely  fixed,  within  which 
a  child  shall  be  conclusively  presumed  incapable,  yet  in  one  case  a 
learned  judge  promptly  rejected  the  dying  declarations  of  a  child  of 
four  years  of  age,  observing,  that  it  was  quite  impossible  that  she, 
however  precocious  her  mind,  could  have  had  that  idea  of  a  future 
state  which  is  necessary  to  make  such  declarations  admissible.4  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  not  unusual  to  receive  the  testimony  of  children 
under  nine,  and  sometimes  even  under  seven  years  of  age,  if  they 
appear  to  be  of  sufficient  understanding;6  and  it  has  been  admitted 
even  at  the  age  of  five  years.8  If  the  child,  being  a  principal  wit- 
ness, appears  not  yet  sufficiently  instructed  in  the  nature  of  an  oath, 
the  Court  [may  then  and  there  instruct  it  or  cause  it  to  be  instructed, 
provided  the  child  is  capable  of  understanding,7  or]  will,  in  its  dis- 
cretion, put  off  the  trial,  that  this  may  be  done.8  But  whether  the 
trial  ought  to  be  put  off  for  the  purpose  of  instructing  an  adult  wit- 
ness has  been  doubted.9 

§  368.  Same :  Atheists.  The  third  class  of  persons  incompetent 
to  testify  as  witnesses  consists  of  those  who  are  insensible  to  the 
obligations  of  an  oath,  from  defect  of  religious  sentiment  and  belief. 

1  rin  Com.  v.  Wilson,  Pa.,  40  Atl.  283,  a  boy  of  thirteen  was  presumed  competent/] 
a  L"R.  ».  Brasier,  East  PI.  Cr.  I,  443  ;]  McNally's  Evid.  p.  149,  c.  11  ;  Bull.  N.  P". 

293  ;  1  Hale  P.  C.  302  ;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  p.  590  ;  Jackson  u.  Gridley,  18  Johns.  98  ; 

{McGuire  v.  People,  44  Mich.  286  ;  McGuff  v.  State,  88  Ala.  151  ;  |  fjFlanagin  v.  State, 

25  Ark.  96 ;  Warner  v.  State,  ib.  447  ;  State  v.  Richie,  28  La.  An.   327  ;  State  v. 

Severson,  78  la.  653  ;  Davis  v.  State,  31  Nebr.  247.] 

•  [Com.  v.  Lvnes,  142  Mass.  580  ;  Day  v.  Day,  56  N.  H.  316 ;  State  v.  Edwards, 
79  N.  C.  650  ;  Wade  v.  State,  50  Ala.  164.1 

«  R.  v.  Pike,  3  C.  &  P.  598;  People  v.  McNair,  21  Wend.  608.  Neither  can  the 
declarations  of  such  a  child,  if  living,  be  received  in  evidence  :  R.  v.  Brasier,  1  East 
P.  C.  443;  {Smith  v.  State,  41  Tex.  352. \ 

6  1  East  P.  C.  442  ;  Com.  v.  Hutchinson,  10  Mass.  225 ;  McNally's  Evid.  p.  154 ; 
State  v.  Whittier,  8  Shepl.  341. 

•  R.  v.  Brasier,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  199 ;  8.  c.  Bull.  N.  P.  298  ;  8.  C.  1  East  P.  C.  443. 

7  [>non.,  i  Leneh  Cr.  C.,  4th  ed.  430  n. ;  R.  v.  Nicholas,  2  C.  &  K.  246  ;  R.  v. 
Baylis,  4  Cox  Cr.  C.  23 ;  People  v.  McNair,  21  Wend.  608  ;  Day  v.  Day,  56  N.  H. 
816  ;  Carter  v.  State,  63  Ala.  63  ;  Com.  v.  Lynes,  142  Mass.  678;  contra:  Patteson, 
J.,  in  R.  v.  Williams,  7  C.  &  P.  320.1 

TAnon.,  R.  v.  Nicholas,  Day  v.  Day,  supra.~\ 

•  R.  v.  Wade,  1  Moo.  Cr.  C.  86 ;  [see  R.  v.  Whitehead,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  R.  33.] 


§§  367-369.]  OATH.  507 

The  very  nature  of  an  oath,  it  being  a  religious  and  most  solemu 
appeal  to  God,  as  the  Judge  of  all  men,  presupposes  that  the  wit- 
ness believes  in  the  existence  of  an  omniscient  Supreme  Being,  who 
is  "  the  rewarder  of  truth  and  avenger  of  falsehood ; " *  and  that, 
by  snch  a  formal  appeal,  the  conscience  of  the  witness  is  affected. 
Without  this  belief,  the  person  cannot  be  subject  to  that  sanction, 
which  the  law  deems  an  indispensable  test  of  truth.2  It  is  not  suffi- 
cient, that  a  witness  believes  himself  bound  to  speak  the  truth  from 
a  regard  to  character,  or  to  the  common  interests  of  society,  or  from 
fear  of  the  punishment  which  the  law  inflicts  upon  persons  guilty  of 
perjury.  Such  motives  have  indeed  their  influence,  but  they  are  not 
considered  as  affording  a  sufficient  safeguard  for  the  strict  observance 
of  truth.  Our  law,  in  common  with  the  law  of  most  civilized  coun- 
tries, requires  the  additional  security  afforded  by  the  religious  sanc- 
tion implied  in  an  oath;  and,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  rejects  all 
witnesses,  who  are  incapable  of  giving  this  security.8  Atheists, 
therefore,  and  all  infidels,  that  is,  those  who  profess  no  religion 
that  can  bind  their  consciences  to  speak  truth,  are  rejected  as  in- 
competent to  testify  as  witnesses.4 

§  369.  Same :  Nature  of  Theological  Belief.  As  to  the  nature  and 
degree  of  religious  faith  required  in  a  witness,  the  rule  of  law,  as 
at  present  understood,  seems  to  be  this,  that  the  person  is  compe- 
tent to  testify,  if  he  believes  in  the  being  of  God,  and  a  future  state 
of  rewards  and  punishments;  that  is,  that  Divine  punishment  will 
be  the  certain  consequence  of  perjury.1  It  may  be  considered  as 
now  generally  settled,  in  this  country,  that  it  is  not  material, 
whether  the  witness  believes  that  the  punishment  will  be  inflicted 
in  this  world,  or  in  the  next;  it  is  enough  if  he  has  the  religious 
sense  of  accountability  to  the  Omniscient  Being,  who  is  invoked  by 
an  oath.3  [Particular  sorts  of  belief  are  often  passed  upon  by  the 

1  Per  Lord  Hardwicke,  1  Atk.  48.  The  opinions  of  the  earlier  as  well  as  later 
jurists,  concerning  the  nature  and  obligations  of  an  oath,  are  quoted  and  discussed 
much  at  large,  in  Omichuud  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21,  and  in  Tyler  on  Oaths,  passim,  to 
which  the  learned  reader  is  referred. 

*  1  Stark.  Evid.  22. 

»  1  Phil.  Evid.  10  (9th  ed.). 

*  Bull.  N.  P.  292  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  22  ;  1  Atk.  40,  45  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  10  (9th  ed.). 

1  The  proper  test  of  the  competency  of  a  witness  on  the  score  of  a  religious  belief 
was  settled,  upon  great  consideration,  in  the  case  of  Omichund  v.  Barker,  Willes,  545, 
s.  c.  1  Atk.  21,  to  be  the  belief  of  a  God,  and  that  he  will  reward  and  punish  us  accord- 
ing to  our  deserts.  This  rule  was  recognized  in  Butts  v.  Swartwood,  2  Cowen  431  ; 
People  v.  Matteson,  ib.  433,  473,  n.  :  and  by  Story,  J.,  in  Wakefield  ».  Ross, 
5  Mason  18  ;  s.  P.  9  Dane's  Abr.  317  ;  and  see  Brock  v.  Milligan,  10  Oh.  125  ;  Arnold 
v.  Arnold,  13  Vt.  362. 

8  Whether  any  belief  in  a  future  state  of  existence  is  necessary,  provided  accounta- 
bility to  God  in  this  life  is  acknowledged,  is  not  perfectly  clear.  In  Com.  v.  Bachelor, 
4  Am.  Jurist,  81,  Thacher,  J.,  seemed  to  think  it  was.  But  in  Hunscom  v.  Hunscom, 
15  Mass.  184,  the  Court  held  that  mere  disbelief  in  a  future  existence  went  only  to 
the  credibility.  This  degree  of  disbelief  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  faith  required  in 
Omichund  v.  Barker.  The  only  case  clearly  to  the  contrary  is  Atwood  v.  Welton, 
7  Conn.  66.  In  Curtiss  v.  Strong,  4  Day  51,  the  witness  did  not  believe  in  the  obliga- 


508  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

Courts,  —  e.  g.  "  that  the  witness  would  go  to  hell  if  he  did  not  tell 
the  truth,"  —  but  a  detailed  examination  of  them  here  would  not  be 
profitable.8] 

§  370.  Same :  Mode  of  ascertaining  Belief.  It  should  here  be 
observed  that  defect  of  religious  faith  is  never  presumed.  On  the 
contrary,  the  law  presumes  that  every  man  brought  up  in  a  Christian 
land,  where  God  is  generally  acknowledged,  does  believe  in  him,  and 
fear  him.  The  charity  of  its  judgment  is  extended  alike  to  all.  The 
burden  of  proof  is  not  on  the  party  adducing  the  witness,  to  prove 
that  he  is  a  believer;  but  it  is  on  the  objecting  party,  to  prove  that 
he  is  not.  Neither  does  the  law  presume  that  any  man  is  a  hypo- 
crite. On  the  contrary,  it  presumes  him  to  be  what  he  professes 
himself  to  be,  whether  atheist  or  Christian;  and  the  state  of  a  man's 
opinions,  as  well  as  the  sanity  of  his  mind,  being  once  proved,  is, 
as  we  have  already  seen,1  presumed  to  continue  unchanged,  until  the 
contrary  is  shown.  The  state  of  his  religious  belief  at  the  time  he 
is  offered  as  a  witness  is  a  fact  to  be  ascertained;  and  this  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  the  common  faith  of  the  country,  unless  the  objector  can 
prove  that  it  is  not.  The  ordinary  mode  of  showing  this  is  by 
evidence  of  his  declarations,  previously  made  to  others; 2  the  person 
himself  not  being  interrogated;8  for  the  object  of  interrogating  a 

tion  of  an  oath ;  and  in  Jackson  v.  Gridley,  18  Johns.  98,  he  was  a  mere  atheist,  with- 
out any  sense  of  religion  whatever ;  all  that  was  said  in  these  two  cases,  beyond  the 
point  in  judgment,  was  extra-judicial.  Qn  England,  the  law  seems  to  have  been 
settled  by  Att'y-Geu'l  v.  Bradlaugh,  14  Q.  B.  D.  697,  holding  that  the  belief  need 
not  extend  to  the  future  state  ;  and  this  is  now  generally  accepted  in  this  country : 
Blocker  v.  Burness,  2  Ala.  355  ;  Noble  v.  People,  1  111.  56  ;  Cent.  M.  T.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rorkafellow,  17  id.  253,  semble ;  Searcy  v.  Miller,  57  la.  613  ;  Free  v.  Buckingham, 
59  X.  H.  225  ;  People  v.  Matteson,  2  Cow.  433  ;  Shaw  v.  Moore,  4  Jones  L  26  ;  State  v. 
Washington,  49  La.  An.,  semble;  Brock  t>.  Milligan,  10  Oh.  121;  Clinton  v.  State, 
83  Oh.  St.  33  ;  Cubbison  v.  M'Creary,  2  W.  &  S.  263 ;  Blair  v.  Seaver,  26  Pa.  276 ; 
Jones  v.  Harris,  1  Strob.  160;  Bennett  v.  State,  1  Swan  411;  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  13 
Vt.  362. 1  In  Maine,  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  Supreme  Being  was  rendered  suffi- 
cient byStat.  1833,  c.  58,  without  any  reference  to  rewards  or  punishments;  Smith  v. 
Coffin,  6  Shepl.  157  ;  but  even  this  seems  to  be  no  longer  required.  See  further,  People 
v.  McGarren,  17  Wend.  460  ;  Cubbison  v.  McCreary,  2  Watts  &  Serg.  262  ;  Brock  v. 
Milligan,  10  Oh.  121  ;  Thurston  v.  Whitney,  2  Law  Rep.  N.  s.  18. 

'  CSee  R-  "•  Holmes,  2  F.  &  F.  788  ;  Vincent  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  121  ;  Draper  v. 
Draper,  68  111.  17 ;  Davidson  v.  State,  39  Tex.  129  ;  State  v.  Michael,  37  W.  Va.  568  ; 
Moore  v.  State,  79  Ga.  498.] 

1  Supra,  §  42  ;  State  v.  Stinson,  7  Law  Reporter,  383. 

2  Swift's  Kvul.  48  ;  Smith  v.  Coffin,  6  Shepi.  157.    It  has  been  questioned,  whether 
the  evidence  of  his  declarations  ought  not  to  be  confined  to  a  period  shortly  anterior  to 
tin-  time  of  proving  them,  so  that  no  change  of  opinion  might  be  presumed  :   Brock  v. 
Milligan,  10  Oh.  126,  per  Wood,  J. 

8  "  The  witness  himself  is  never  questioned  in  modern  practice,  as  to  his  religious 
belief,  though  formerly  it  was  otherwise  (1  Swift's  Dig.  739  ;  5  Mason  19  ;  American 
Jurist,  vol.  iv,  p.  79,  n.).  It  is  not  allowed,  even  after  ne  has  been  sworn  (The  Queen's 
Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  284).  Not  because  it  is  a  question  tending  to  disgrace  him,  but 
because  it  would  be  a  personal  scrutiny  into  the  state  of  his  faith  and  conscience,  foreign 
to  the  spirit  of  our  institutions.  No  man  is  obliged  to  avow  his  belief,  but  if  he  volun- 
tarily does  avow  it,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  avowal  should  not  be  proved,  like  any 
other  tact.  The  truth  and  sincerity  of  the  avowal,  and  the  continuance  of  the  belief 
thus  avowed,  are  presumed,  and  very  justly  too,  till  they  are  disproved.  If  his  opinions 


§§  369-370  b.]  OATH.  509 

witness,  in  these  cases,  before  he  is  sworn,  is  not  to  obtain  the 
knowledge  of  other  facts,  but  to  ascertain  from  his  answers  the  ex- 
tent of  his  capacity,  and  whether  he  has  sufficient  understanding  to 
be  sworn. 

§  370  a.  Statutory  Changes.  [During  the  present  century  there 
has  arisen  an  opinion  that  the  oath,  as  an  additional  security  for 
trustworthiness,  is  without  efficacy  ;  and  upon  this  question  (which 
depends  much  upon  experience  in  particular  communities)  views  of 
great  weight  on  each  side  are  to  be  found.1  But  at  the  same  time 
professional  and  public  opinion  has  also  come  to  see  that,  whatever 
the  efficacy  of  the  oath  may  be  for  those  upon  whose  religious  feel- 
ings it  exerts  an  influence,  the  absolute  exclusion  from  the  witness- 
stand  of  those  who  have  scruples  against  taking  it,  or  of  those  on 
whose  belief  it  has  no  binding  effect,  is  both  unjust  and  impolitic. 
Accordingly,  legislation  has  in  most  jurisdictions  acted  with  the 
purpose  of  removing  these  disadvantages,  and  to  a  great  extent  the 
common-law  rules  involved  in  the  application  of  the  oath  have  been 
superseded.  These  changes  have  been  of  three  sorts.  (1)  In  some 
jurisdictions,  it  has  been  provided  that  no  person  shall  be  incom- 
petent to  testify  because  of  his  religious  opinions.  This,  in  effect, 
leaves  the  oath  as  a  uniform  formality,  but  practically  abolishes  the 
requirements  of  belief  formerly  existing.  (2)  In  other  jurisdictions, 
the  oath  is  made  optional  and  those  who  either  have  scruples  against 
taking  it  or  have  not  the  proper  belief  or  merely  do  not  wish  to  take 
it  (according  to  the  varying  statutes)  are  allowed  to  substitute  an 
affirmation.  (3)  In  still  other  jurisdictions,  the  oath  is  entirely 
abolished,  and  an  affirmation  is  used  as  the  uniform  preliminary 
to  testimony.2] 

3.    Mental  Capacity. 

§  370  b.  In  general.  [A  person  offered  as  a  witness  must  have  the 
organic  capacity  to  receive  correct  impressions,  to  record  them  in 
memory  and  recollect  them,  and  to  narrate  them  intelligently ;  and 

have  been  subsequently  changed,  this  change  will  generally,  if  not  always,  be  provable 
in  the  same  mode  (Atwood  v.  Welton,  7  Conn.  66  ;  Curtis  v.  Strong,  4  Day  51  ;  Swift's 
Evid.  48-50;  Scott  v.  Hooper,  14  Vt.  535  ;  Mr.  Christian's  note  to  3  Bl.  Comm. 
369  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  18  ;  Com.  v.  Bachelor,  4  Am.  Jur.  79,  n.) ; "  1  Law  Reporter, 
Boston,  347.  \Accord:  Com.  v.  Smith,  2  Gray  516  ;|  [Teople  v.  Jenness,  5  Mich. 
319;  Den  v.  Vancleve,  2  South.  653;  Jackson  v.  Gridley,  18  Johns.  220;  Searcy  v. 
Miller,  57  la.  613.  But  the  better  view,  both  in  policy  and  in  logic,  is  that  either 
source  of  information  may  be  used  and  the  witness  may  be  interrogated  :  Barrel  v. 
State,  38  Tenn.  126;  Odell  v.  Koppee,  61  id.  91 ;  Arnd  v.  Amling,  53  Md.  I97,semble; 
Free  r.  Buckingham,  59  N.  H.  225 ;  Donkle  v.  Kohn,  44  Ga.  271,  semble.^ 

1  FSee  Appleton,  Evidence,  c.  xvi.] 

2  Lender  these  varying  statutes  (set  forth  in  Appendix  I),  various  questions  of  inter- 
pretation arise  :  see  Priest  r.  State,  10  Nebr.  399  ;  Cent.  M.  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Rockafellow, 
17  II!.  553  ;  Snyder  v.  Nations,  5  Blackf.  295  ;  Parry «;.  Com.,  3  Gratt.  632;  Bush  ». 
Com.,  80  Ky.  249  ;  Clinton  v.  State,  33  Oh.  St.  81  ;  Fuller  v.   Fuller,   17  Cal.  612; 
Smith  v.  York,  18  Me.  164  ;  R.  v.  Moore,  6  L.  J.  M.  C.  80;  White  v.  Com.,  96  Ky. 
180 ;   State  v.  Washington,  49  La.  An.  1602.] 


510  WITNESSES  ;    'QUALIFICATIONS.  [dL    XXIII. 

this  quite  independently  of  whether  he  is  fitted  by  theological  belief 
to  take  the  oath.  These  fundamental  requirements  continue  to  exist, 
even  though  the  oath  has  been  abolished  or  made  optional.  So  long 
as  the  requirement  of  the  oath  was  invariably  applied,  the  concurrent 
existence  of  these  requirements  was  not  emphasized1  and  seldom 
came  distinctly  into  notice  ;  and  for  this  reason,  it  is  often  difficult  to 
learn,  in  some  of  the  earlier  judicial  opinions,  whether  the  language 
applies  to  the  latter  of  these  subjects  or  to  the  former.  But  at  the 
present  day  it  is  the  latter  that  more  commonly  comes  before  the 
Courts.  The  general  principles  applied  are  based  on  a  natural  view 
of  the  testimonial  needs,  and  look  towards  the  acceptance  of  a  witness 
unless  it  appears  that  he  is  totally  unworthy  of  reliance.]  v 

§  370  c.  Insanity.  [The  older  rule  was  that  the  lunatic  and  the 
idiot  were  absolutely  incompetent,  except  when  the  former  enjoyed  a 
"  lucid  interval."  This  rule  conceived  the  lunatic  as  a  person  sharply 
distinguished  from  a  sane  person  by  entirely  different  qualities,  as  an 
African  is  distinguished  from  a  Caucasian  ;  and  further  conceived  him 
as-objectively  —  i.  e.  with  reference  to  all  matters  of  life  and  con- 
sciousness —  in  the  class  of  incompetents,  as  a  stone  or  a  lump  of  lead 
is  what  it  is  everywhere  and  for  all  purposes.  But  modern  science 
has  led  us  to  appreciate  that  insanity  is  both  graded  and  relative,  — 
i.  e.  that  there  are  degrees  of  transition  which  make  it  impossible  to 
class  all  persons  as  either  sane  or  insane,  and  that  most  forms  of  in- 
sanity affect  certain  topics  only  and  leave  a  greater  or  less  portion  of 
the  mental  operations  in  a  normal  and  trustworthy  condition.  It  fol- 
lows that,  for  the  purposes  of  testimony,  there  should  be  no  inflexible 
rule  of  exclusion  ;  the  inquiry  should  be,  in  the  case  of  each  person, 
whether  the  delusion  or  the  imbecility  is  of  such  a  nature,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  subject  of  the  desired  testimony,  that  the  person  is  wholly 
untrustworthy.  This  doctrine,  first  emphasized  and  excellently  illus- 
trated in  R.  v.  Hill,1  may  now  be  said  to  be  generally  accepted.2  It 
should  follow  that  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court  in  each  case  should 
determine  whether  the  delusion  is  such  as  to  exclude  ;  8  and  that  the 
mere  existence  of  insanity  at  a  former  time  should  not  of  itself  ex- 
clude.4 But  if  the  delusion  existed  at  the  time  of  the  events  and 

1  QFor  this  reason,  perhaps,  the  author's  original  treatment  of  the  subject  did  not 
discriminate  between  the  theological  capacity  to  take  the  oath  and  the  mental  capacity 
to  testify  in  general.] 

1  £1851,    2  Den.  &  P.  Cr.  C.  254  ;  15  Jur.  470;   5Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  547  ;    5  Cox  Cr. 
259.     But  Evans  r.  Hettich,  infra,  and  other  American  rulings,  were  earlier.] 

2  ^Kendall  o.  Mny,  10  All.  64  ;  Worthington  ».  Mencer,  96  Ala.  310  (leading  cases). 
Accord:  Clements  v.  McGinn,  Cal.,  33  Pac.  920  ;  Walker  v.  State,  97  Ala.  85  ;  State  v. 
Weldon,  39  S.  C.  318;  Coleman  v.  Com.,  25  Grat.  873;  Evans  v.  Hettich,  5  Wheat. 
470;  Wright  v.  Express  Co.,  80  Fed.  85  ;  District  v.  Armes,  107  U.  S.  521  ;  Guthrie  v. 
Shaffer,  Old.,  54  Pac.  698  ;  and  cases  in  the  next  two  notes.") 

8  QDen  v.  Vancleve,  2  South.  N.  J.  653  ;  Armstrong  v.  Timmons,  5  Harringt.  345  ; 
Kendall  v.  May,  supra;  Cannady  v.  Lynch,  27  Minn.  436  ;  District  v.  Armes,  supra; 
Pittsb.  &  W.  B.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  U.  S.  App.,  82  Fed.  720  ;  Stater.  Meyers,  46  Nebr. 
152.1 


LPittsb.  &w-  R-  Co-  »•  Thompson,  supra;  Clements  v.  McGinn,  Cal.,  33  Pac.  920.» 
Sarbach  v.  Jones.  20  Kan.  600  ;  Wright  v.  Express  Co.,  supra.'] 


§§  370  6-370  (*.]  MENTAL   CAPACITY.  511 

affected  his  power  to  observe  them  correctly,  it  should  exclude  him ; 8 
or  if  it  did  not  then  exist,  but  has  since  supervened  and  affects  his 
power  to  recollect  and  narrate  correctly,  it  should  exclude  him.6  It 
would  seem  also  that  if  the  aberration,  though  not  affecting  his  intel- 
ligence, has  destroyed  his  moral  responsibility  or  sense  of  truth,  he 
should  be  excluded.7  The  opponent  must  cause  the  iucompetency  to 
appear ; 8  and  this  may  be  ascertained  from  a  voir  dire  examination  9 
or  by  outside  testimony,10  or  by  the  course  of  his  testimony,  in  which 
case  he  may  be  taken  from  the  stand  and  his  testimony  struck  out.11 
The  fact  of  prior  committal  or  present  confinement  in  an  asylum 
would  suffice  to  make  it  necessary  for  the  party  offering  the  witness 
to  show  his  competency.12  Moreover,  the  Court  may,  while  admitting 
him  to  testify,  leave  it  to  the  jury  to  reject  the  testimony  if  they 
deem  him  not  credible.18  A  deaf-and-dumb  person,  in  the  times  of 
less  accurate  knowledge,  was  treated  as  presumably  an  imbecile  and 
therefore  as  incompetent  unless  shown  to  be  sufficiently  intelligent.14 
To-day,  there  appears  to  be  no  such  presumption,15  and  such  persons 
may  testify  so  far  as  any  means  of  communication  are  available.18] 

§  370  d.  Infancy.  [The  child,  as  well  as  the  lunatic,  may  still  be 
excluded,  even  where  the  oath  has  been  made  optional  or  has  been 
abolished,  if  it  appears  not  to  be  capable  to  observe,  to  recollect,  and 
to  narrate  intelligently.  It  is  not  always  possible,  especially  in  the 
earlier  cases,  to  learn  whether  the  language  of  the  Court  is  used  with 
exclusive  reference  to  the  oath-test;  but  that  certain  independent 
requirements  exist  seems  generally  accepted.  In  keeping  with  the 
liberal  modern  principle  accepted  for  insane  persons  is  the  generally 
accepted  principle  that  there  can  be  no  particular  age  at  which  a 
child  invariably  becomes  incompetent;1  and  it  should  follow  that 

5  L~Holcomb  v.  Holcomb,  20  Conn.  179  ;  Worthington  v.  Mencer,  supra.     Contra  : 
Sarbach  v.  Jones,  supra ;  Campbell  v.  State,  23  Ala.  74  ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  1880.] 

6  ["District  v.  Amies,  supra;  Bowdle  v.  R.  Co.,  103. Mich.  272.] 

7  L Worthington  v.  Mencer,  supra;    Hartford  v.  Palmer,  16  Johns.  142;    Cannady 
v.  Lynch,  supra.    Many  Courts  refer  to  this,  but  it  is  not  always  possible  to  tell  whether 
they  have  in  view  the  oath-test  or  this  independent  principle.] 

<*  TMayor  v.  Caldwell,  81  Ga.  78.] 

9  f  District  f.  Armes,  supra  ;  Att'y-Gen'l  «>.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  95.] 

10  [^Contra,  but  erroneous,  Robinson  v.  Dana,  16  Vt.  474  ;  Mayor  v.  Caldwell,  supra, 
is  peculiar.] 

"  PR.  v.  Whitehead,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  R.  33.] 

"  L"See  Spittle  v.  Walton,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  420;  Re  Christie,  5  Paige  Ch.  241  ;  Clements 
v.  McGinn,  Cal.,  33  Pac.  920;  Pittsb.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  U.  S.  App.,  82  Fed. 
720.1 

UTMead  v.  Harris,  101  Mich.  585  ;  Bowdle  v.  R.  Co.,  103  id.  272.] 

14  LSee  Hale  PI.  Cr.  I,  34;  R.  v.  Ruston,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.  408;  Morrison  v.  Leonard, 
3C.  &P.  127.] 

"  [People  D.  McGee,  1  Denio  21  ;  Quinn  v.  Halbert,  55  Vt.  228;  Ritchey  t>.  People, 
23  Colo.  314  ;  State  v.  Howard,  118  Mo.  127,  143  ;  State  v.  Weldon,  39  S.C.  318.J 

16  TFor  modes  of  communication,  see  post,  §§  439d-439A.] 

1  L"R-  v-  Brasier,  1  Leach  Cr.  C.  199,  dealing  primarily  with  the  oath-test,  has  in 
effect  established  this.  Accord :  McGufF  v.  State,  88  Ala.  1 47 ;  Gaiues  v.  State,  99 
Ga.  703;  Draper  v.  Draper,  68  111.  17  ;  Hughes  v.  R.  Co.,  65  Mich.  10;  State  v.  Denis, 
19  La.  An.  119 ;  State  v.  Nelson,  132  Mo.  184  ;  Terr.  v.  De  Guzman,  X.  M.,  42  Pac.  68  ; 


512  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court,  in  view  of  the  circumstances  of  each 
case,  should  be  left  to  determine  for  itself.2  The  principle  upon 
which  their  rulings  should  proceed  is  that  the  child  should  be  suffi- 
ciently mature  to  receive  correct  impressions  by  its  senses  8  and  to 
recollect  and  narrate  intelligently  ;  *  and  also,  it  is  said,  to  appreciate 
the  moral  duty  to  tell  the  truth  ;  6  although,  as  this  moral  sense  is  so 
slow  in  developing  in  children,  even  after  the  age  of  intelligence,  it 
seems  much  more  practical  to  omit  such  a  requirement  and  take  the 
child's  story  for  what  it  may  appear  to  be  worth.6] 

§  370  e.  Intoxication.  [A  person  may  by  intoxication  become 
incompetent.  It  is  clear  that  intoxication  while  on  the  stand,  suffi- 
cient to  destroy  the  present  power  of  intelligent  recollection  and 
narration,  may  suffice  to  exclude;1  and  it  would  seem  that  intoxica- 
tion at  the  time  of  the  events  in  question,  sufficient  to  prevent 
intelligent  observation,  might  equally  suffice  to  exclude.2  But  the 
mere  fact  of  intoxication  is  not  in  itself  sufficient;8  and  confessions 
by  intoxicated  persons  have  often  been  received.4] 

§  371.1 

Wheeler  v.  U.  S.  ,  159  U.  S.  523  ;  and  cases  in  the  next  note.  In  a  few  States,  a  pre- 
sumption of  incompetency  is  said  to  arise  at  a  certain  age  :  see  People  v.  Craig,  111  Cal. 
460  ;  Terr.  v.  De  Guzman,  supra;  State  v.  Michael,  37  W.  Va.  565  ;  Hughes  v.  R.  Co., 
31  N.  W.  605.  Sometimes  a  statute  excludes  those  under  a  certain  age:  see  St.  Louis 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Waren,  Ark.,  48  S.  W.  222.] 

2  [[People  v.  Craig,  111  Cal.  460;  People  v.  Baldwin,  117  id.  244;  Peterson  v.  State, 
47  Ga.  527  ;  Minturn  v.  State,  99  id.  254  ;  People  ».  Walker,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  641  ; 
State  v.  Levy,  23  Minn.  108;  Com.  ?;.  Mullins,  2  All.  296  ;  Com.  v.  Robinson,  165 
Mass.  426;  Freeny  v.  Freeny,  80  Md.  406  ;  State  v.  Nelson,  132  Mo.  184  ;  State  v. 
Prather,  136  id.  20  ;  State  v.  Ridenhour,  102  id.  288;  State  v.  Sawtelle,  66  N.  H.  488; 
State  v.  Jackson,  9  Or.  459  ;  Williams  u.  U.  S.,  3  D.  C.  App.  335,  339;  Wheeler  i;. 
U.  S.,  159  U.  S.  523  ;  State  v.  Reddington,  7  S.  D.  368  ;  State  v.  Juneau,  88  Wis.  180.] 

8  CKelly  v.  State,  75  Ala.  22  ;   People  v.   Bernal,  10  Cal.  66  ;    Mo.  R,  S.  1889, 


§  8925.] 

*  rjCom.  v.  Mullins,  2  All.  296;  White  v.  Com.,  96  Ky.  180;  State  v.  Douglas,  53 
Kan.  669  ;  Terr.  v.  De  Guzman,  N.  M.,  42  Pac.  68.] 

6  ([Johnson  v.  State,  61  Ga.  36;  Williams  v.  State,  109  Ala.  64  ;  State  v.  Redding- 
ton, 7  S.  D.  368;  State  v.  Whittier,  21  Me.  347  ;  Com.  v.  Robinson,  165  Mass.  426; 
Hughes  v.  R.  Co.,  65  Mich.  10  ;  Wheeler  v.  U.  S.,  159  U.  S.  523.] 

6  TSee  Campbftll,  C.  J.,  in  Hughes  v.  R.  Co.,  65  Mich.  10.] 

1  t>ralker's  Trial,  23  How.  St.  Tr.  1153  ;  Hartford  v.  Palmer,  16  Johns.  143;  Gould 
v.  Crawford,  2  Pa.  St.  90  ;  Gebhart  v.  Shindle,  15  S.  &  R.  238  ;  State  v.  Costello,  62 
la.  407,  sernbJe~\ 

*  [[State  v.  Costello,  supra,  semble.     Contra  :    Gebhart  v.  Shindle,  supra  ;  Cole- 
man  v.  Com.,  25  Grat.  865.] 

8  TEskridge  v.  State,  25  Ala.  33  ;  People  v.  Ramirez,  56  Cal.  536.] 

4  LK-  »•  Spilsbury,  7  C.  &  P.  187;  Lester  v.  State,  32  Ark.  730;  State  v.  Feltcs, 
53  la.  496;  Com.  t>.  Howe,  9  Gray  112  ;  State  v.  Grear,  28  Minn.  426  ;  Jefferds  v. 
People,  5  Park.  Cr.  C.  547;  Williams  v.  State,  12  Lea  212;  see  Com.  v.  McCabe,  Pa., 
8  Atl.  54. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  use  of  opium  does  not  make  the  person  incompetent  : 
State  v.  White,  10  Wash.  611. 

For  the  admissibility  of  intoxication,  etc.,  as  impeaching  credibility,  see  post, 
§  450  A.] 

1  [Transferred  ante,  as  §  364  6.3 


§§  370  cZ-373.]  MENTAL  CAPACITY;  MOKAL  CAPACITY.      513 


4.    Moral  Capacity. 

§  372.  Infamy ;  Conviction  of  Crime.1  [The  possession  of  a  truth- 
ful disposition  and  inclination  is  not  regarded  as  an  essential  part 
of  the  equipment  of  a  witness,  in  the  sense  that  his  competency 
depends  upon  it; 2  so  that  neither  is  the  party  offering  him  required 
to  show  that  he  possesses  such  a  character,  nor  may  the  opponent 
exclude  him  by  showing  his  character  for  truth-telling  to  be  bad. 
But  the  notion  of  positive  moral  worth lessness  seems  neverthe- 
less to  have  been  the  foundation  of  the  important  common-law  prin- 
ciple that  infamous  persons  —  i.e.  persons  convicted  of  heinous 
offences  —  are  not  competent  as  witnesses.]  The  basis  of  the  rule 
seems  to  be,  that  such  a  person  is  morally  too  corrupt  to  be  trusted 
to  testify;  so  reckless  of  the  distinction  between  truth  and  falsehood 
and  insensible  to  the  restraining  force  of  an  oath,  as  to  render  it 
extremely  improbable  that  he  will  speak  the  truth  at  all.  Of  such 
a  person  Chief  Baron  Gilbert  remarks,  that  the  credit  of  his  oath  is 
overbalanced  by  the  stain  of  his  iniquity.8  The  party,  however, 
must  have  been  legally  adjudged  guilty  of  the  crime.  If  he  is  stig- 
matized by  public  fame  only,  and  not  by  the  censure  of  law, 
it  affects  the  credit  of  his  testimony,  but  not  his  admissibility  as  a 
witness.4  The  record,  therefore,  is  required  as  the  sole  evidence  of 
his  guilt;  no  other  proof  being  admitted  of  the  crime;  not  only  be- 
cause of  the  gross  injustice  of  trying  the  guilt  of  a  third  person  in  a 
case  to  which  he  is  not  a  party,  but  also,  lest,  in  the  multiplication 
of  the  issues  to  be  tried,  the  principal  case  should  be  lost  sight  of, 
and  the  administration  of  justice  should  be  frustrated.6 

§  373.  Same :  Kind  of  Crime.  It  is  a  point  of  no  small  difficulty 
to  determine  precisely  the  crimes  which  render  the  perpetrator  thus 
infamous.  The  rule  is  justly  stated  to  require,  that  "the  publicum 
judicium  must  be  upon  an  offence,  implying  such  a  dereliction  of 
moral  principle,  as  carries  with  it  a  conclusion  of  a  total  disregard  to 
the  obligation  of  an  oath."  x  But  the  difficulty  lies  in  the  specifica- 
tion of  those  offences.  The  usual  and  more  general  enumeration  is, 
treason,  felony,  and  the  crimen  falsi.*  In  regard  to  the  two  former, 

1  PThe  first  sentence  of  the  original  section  has  been  transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 

2  ^Except  so  far  a3  a  child  or  a  lunatic  may  be  excluded  because  lacking  in  moral 
responsibility :  ante,  §§  370  c,  370  d.H 

*  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  256.     It  was  formerly  thought  that  an  infamous  punish- 
ment, for  whatever  crime,  rendered  the  person  incompetent  as  a  witness,  by  reason  of 
infamy.     But  this  notion  is  exploded;  and  it  is  now  settled  that  it  is  the  crime  and 
not  the  punishment  that  renders  the  man  infamous :    Bull.  N.  P.  292 ;  Pendock  ». 
Mackinder,  Willes  666 ;  QR.  v.  Priddle,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.,  4th  ed.  442  ;  R.  v.  Ford, 
2  Salk.  69.] 

*  2  Dods.  186,  per  Sir  Wm.  Scott :  fJBrown  v.  State,  18  Oh.  St.  510.] 

6  R.  v.  Castell  Careinion,  8  East  77  ;  Lee  v.  Gansel,  Cowp.  3,  per  Ld.  Mansfield. 

i  2  Dods.  186,  per  Sir  Wm.  Scott. 

a  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  17;  6  Com.  Dig.  853,  Testmoigne,  A,  4,  5;  Co.  Lit.  66; 
2  Hale  P.  C.  277 ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  94,  95.     A  conviction  for  petty  larceny  disqualifies, 
as  well  as  for  grand  larceny :   Pendock  v.  Mackinder,,  Willes  665. 
VOL.  i. — 33 


514  WITNESSES;    QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.   XXIII. 

as  all  treasons,  and  almost  all  felonies,  were  punishable  with  death, 
it  was  very  natural  that  crimes,  deemed  of  so  grave  a  character  as  to 
render  the  offender  unworthy  to  live,  should  be  considered  as  ren- 
dering him  unworthy  of  belief  in  a  court  of  justice.  But  the  extent 
and  meaning  of  the  term  crimen  faisi,  in  our  law,  is  nowhere  laid 
down  with  precision.  In  the  Roman  law,  from  which  we  have  bor- 
rowed the  term,  it  included  not  only  forgery,  but  every  species  of 
fraud  and  deceit.8  If  the  offence  did  not  fall  under  any  other  head, 
it  was  called  stellionatus,4  which  included  "all  kinds  of  cozenage  and 
knavish  practice  in  bargaining."  But  it  is  clear,  that  the  common 
law  has  not  employed  the  term  in  this  extensive  sense,  when  apply- 
ing it  to  the  disqualification  of  witnesses;  because  convictions  for 
many  offences,  clearly  belonging  to  the  crimen  faisi  of  the  civilians, 
have  not  this  effect.  Of  this  sort  are  deceits  in  the  quality  of  pro- 
visions, deceits  by  false  weights  and  measures,  conspiracy  to  defraud 
by  spreading  false  news,5  and  several  others.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
has  been  adjudged  that  persons  are  rendered  infamous,  and  therefore 
incompetent  to  testify,  by  having  been  convicted  of  forgery, 6  per- 
jury, subornation  of  perjury,7  suppression  of  testimony  by  bribery, 
or  conspiracy  to  procure  the  absence  of  a  witness,8  or  other  conspir- 
acy to  accuse  one  of  a  crime,9  and  barratry.10  And  from  these  deci- 

8  Cod.  lib.  9,  tit.  22,  ad  legem  Corneliam  de  falsis ;  Cujac.  Opera,  torn,  ix,  in  locum 
(Ed.  Prati,  A.  D.  1839,  4to,  pp.  2191-2200;  1  Brown's  Civ.  &  Adm.  Law,  p.  525); 
Dig.  lib.  48,  tit.  10;  Heinec.  in  Pand.  pars  vii,  §§  214-218.  The  crimen  faisi,  as 
recognized  in  the  Roman  law,  might  be  committed  :  1.  By  words,  as  in  perjury ;  2.  By 
writing,  as  in  forgery ;  3.  By  act  or  deed  ;  namely,  in  counterfeiting  or  adulterating 
the  public  money,  —  in  fraudulently  substituting  one  child  for  another,  or  a  suppositi- 
tious birth,  —  or  in  fraudulently  personating  another,  —  in  using  false  weights  or  meas- 
ures, —  in  selling  or  mortgaging  the  same  thing  to  two  several  persons,  in  two  several 
contracts,  and  in  officiously  supporting  the  suit  of  another  by  money,  etc.,  answering 
to  the  common-law  crime  of  maintenance.  Wood,  Instit.  Civil  Law,  pp.  282,  283 ; 
Halifax,  Analysis  Rom.  Law,  p.  134.  The  law  of  Normandy  disposed  of  the  whole 
subject  in  these  words  :  "  Notandum  siquidem  est,  quod  nemo  in  querela  sua  pro  teste 
recipiendus  est ;  nee  ejus  hseredes  nee  participes  querelae.  Et  hoc  intelligendum  est 
tarn  ex  parte  actoris,  quam  ex  parte  defensoris.  Omnes  autem  illi,  qui  pcrjurio  vel 
loRsione  fidei  sunt  infames,  ob  hoc  etiam  sunt  repellendi,  et  omnes  illi,  qui  in  bello 
succubuerunt :  "  Jura  Normaniae,  c.  62  (in  Le  Grand  Coustumier,  fol.  edit.  1539).  In 
the  ancient  Danish  law,  it  is  thus  defined,  in  the  chapter  entitled  Faisi  crimen  quod 
nam  cense.tur :  "  Falsurn  est,  si  terminum,  finesve  quis  moverit,  monetam  nisi  venia 
vel  mandate  regio  cusserit,  argentum  adulterinum  conflaverit,  nummisve  reprobis  dolo 
malo  emat  vendatque,  vel  argento  adulterino : "  Ancher,  Lex  Cimbrica,  lib.  8,  c.  65, 
p.  249. 

«  Dig.  lib.  47,  tit.  20,  1.  3,  Cujac.  (in  locum)  Opera,  torn,  ix  (ed.  supra),  p.  2224. 
Stellionatus  nomine  siguificatur  omne  crimen,  qucd  nomen  proprium  non  habet,  omnis 
fraus,  qua  nomine  proprio  vacat.  Translatum  autem  esse  nomen  stellionatus,  nemo 
est  qui  nesciat,  ab  animali  ad  homincm  vafrum,  et  decipiendi  peritum  :  Ib. ;  Heinec. 
ad  Pand.  pars,  vii,  §§  147,  148  ;  1  Brown's  f'iv.  &  Adm.  Law,  p.  426. 

6  The  Ville  de  Varsovie,  2  Dods.  174.     But  see  Crowther  v.  Hopwood,  3  Stark.  21. 
8  R.  v.  Davis,  5  Mod.  74. 

7  Co.  Lit.  66;  6  Com.  Dig.  353,  Tesfm.  A.  5. 

8  Clancey's  Case,  Fortesc.  208  :  Bushel  v.  Barrett,  Ry.  &  M.  434. 

•  2  Hale  P.  C.  277  ;  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  46,  §  101  ;  Co.  Lit.  6ft;  R.  v.  Priddlp, 
2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  442  ;  Crowther  v.  Hopwood,  3  Stark.  21,  arg. ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  95; 
2  Dods.  191. 

10  R.  v.  Ford,  2  Salk.  690 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  292.     The  receiver  of  stolen  goods  is 


§§  373-375.]  CONVICTION  FOR  CRIME.  515 

sions,  it  may  be  deduced,  that  the  crimen  falsi  of  the  common  law 
not  only  involves  the  charge  of  falsehood,  but  also  is  one  which  may 
injuriously  affect  the  administration  of  justice,  by  the  introduction 
of  falsehood  and  fraud.  At  least  it  may  be  said,  in  the  language  of 
Sir  William  Scott,11  "so  far  the  law  has  gone  affirmatively;  and  it  is 
not  for  me  to  say  where  it  should  stop,  negatively." 

§  374.  Same :  Exception  for  a  Party.  In  regard  to  the  extent  and 
effect  of  the  disability  thus  created,  a  distinction  is  to  be  observed 
between  cases  in  which  the  person  disqualified  is  a  party,  and  those 
in  which  he  is  not.  In  cases  between  third  persons,  his  testimony 
is  universally  excluded.1  But  where  he  is  a  party,  in  order  that  he 
may  not  be  wholly  remediless,  he  may  make  any  affidavit  necessary 
to  his  exculpation  or  defence,  or  for  relief  against  an  irregular  judg- 
ment, or  the  like; 2  but  it  is  said  that  his  affidavit  shall  not  be  read 
to  support  a  criminal  charge.8  If  he  was  one  of  the  subscribing 
witnesses  to  a  deed,  will,  or  other  instrument,  before  his  conviction, 
his  handwriting  may  be  proved  as  though  he  were  dead.4 

§  375.  Same  :  Judgment  necessary  ;  Production  of  Record.  We 
have  already  remarked,  that  no  person  is  deemed  infamous  in  law, 
until  he  has  been  legally  found  guilty  of  an  infamous  crime.  But 
the  mere  verdict  of  the  jury  is  not  sufficient  for  this  purpose;  for  it 
may  be  set  aside,  or  the  judgment  may  be  arrested,  on  motion  for 
that  purpose.  It  is  the  judgment,  and  that  only,  which  is  received 
as  the  legal  aud  conclusive  evidence  of  the  party's  guilt,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  rendering  him  incompetent  to  testify.1  And  it  must  appear 
that  the  judgment  was  rendered  by  a  Court  of  competent  jurisdiction.2 
Judgment  of  outlawry,  for  treason  or  felony,  will  have  the  same 
effect;8  for  the  party,  in  submitting  to  an  outlawry,  virtually  con- 
fesses his  guilt;  and  so  the  record  is  equivalent  to  a  judgment  upon 
confession.  If  the  guilt  of  the  party  should  be  shown  by  oral  evi- 
dence, and  even  by  his  own  admission  (though  in  neither  of  these 
modes  can  it  be  proved,  if  the  evidence  be  objected  to),*  or,  by  his 

incompetent  as  a  witness :    Cora.  v.  Rogers,  7  Mete.  500.     If  a  statute  declare  the 
perpetrator  of  a  crime  "infamous,"  this,  it  seems,  will  render  him  incompetent  to 
testify :   1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  pp.  256,  257 ;  Co.  Lit.  6  b. 
11  2  Dods.  191.     See  also  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  592,  593. 

1  Even  where  it  is  merely  offered  as  an  affidavit  in  showing  cause  against  a  rule 
calling  upon  the  party  to  answer,  it  will  be  rejected  :  In  re  Sawyer,  2  Q.  B.  721. 

2  Davis  &  Carter's  Case,  2  Salk.  461  ;  R.  v.  Gardner,  2  Burr.  1117  ;  Atcheson  v. 
Everitt,  Cowp.  382 ;  Skinner  v.  Perot,  1  Ashm.  57. 

8  Walker  v.  Kearney,  2  Stra.  1148  ;  R.  v.  Gardner,  2  Burr.  1117. 

*  Jones  v.  Mason.  2  Stra.  833. 

1  6  Com.  Dig.  354,  Testm.  A,  5  ;  R.  v.  Castell  Careinion,  8  East  77  ;  Lee  v.  Gansel, 
Cowp.  3  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  292  ;  Fitch  v.  Smalbrook,  T.  Ray.  32  ;  People  v.  Whipple, 
9  Cowen  707  :  People  v.  Horrick,  13  Johns.  82  ;  Cushman  ».  Loker,  2  Mass.  108  ; 
Castellano  v.  Peillon,  2  Martin  N.  8.  466. 

1  Cooke  v.  Maxwell,  2  Stark.  183. 

8  Co.  Lit.  6  6;  Hawk.  P.  C.  b.  2,  c.  48,  §  22  ;  3  Inst.  212  ;  6  Com.  Dig.  354, 
Testm.  A,  5  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  95,  96.  In  Scotland,  it  is  otherwise :  Tait's  Evid.  p.  347. 

*  [Tor  thia  question,  see  post,  §  461  b,  so  far  as  concerns  the  impeachment  of 
witnesses.] 


516  WITNESSES  ;    QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.    XXIII. 

plea  of  "guilty"  which  has  not  been  followed  by  a  judgment,6  the 
proof  does  not  go  to  the  competency  of  the  witness,  however  it  may 
affect  his  credibility.6  And  the  judgment  itself,  when  offered  against 
his  admissibility,  can  be  proved  only  by  the  record,  or,  in  proper 
cases,  by  an  authenticated  copy,  which  the'  objector  must  offer  and 
produce  at  the  time  when  the  Avitness  is  about  to  be  sworn,  or  at 
farthest  in  the  course  of  the  trial.7 

§  376.  Same  :  Conviction  in  another  Jurisdiction.  Whether  judg- 
ment of  an  infamous  crime,  passed  by  a  foreign  tribunal,  ought  to  be 
allowed  to  affect  the  competency  of  the  party  as  a  witness,  in  the 
courts  of  this  country,  is  a  question  upon  which  jurists  are  not 
entirely  agreed.  But  the  weight  of  modern  opinion  seems  to  be, 
that  personal  disqualifications,  not  arising  from  the  law  of  nature, 
but  from  the  positive  law  of  the  country,  and  especially  such  as  are 
of  a  penal  nature,  are  strictly  territorial,  and  cannot  be  enforced  in 
any  country  other  than  that  in  which  they  originated.1  Acordingly, 
it  has  been  held,  upon  great  consideration,  that  a  conviction  and  sen- 
tence for  a  felony  in  one  of  the  United  States  did  not  render  the 
party  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  the  courts  of  another  State;  though 
it  might  be  shown  in  diminution  of  the  credit  due  to  this  testimony.2 

§  377.  Same :  Removed  by  Pardon.  The  disability  thus  arising 
from  infamy  may,  in  general,  be  removed  in  two  modes:  (1)  by 
reversal  of  the  judgment; l  and  (2)  by  a  pardon.2  The  reversal  of  the 

5  R.  v.  Hinks,  1  Denis.  Cr.  Cas.  84  ;  Qsee  Smith  v.  Brown,  2  Mich.  162.] 

6  R.  v.  Castell  Careinion,  8  East  77  ;  Wicks  v.  Smalbrook,  1  Sid.  51  ;  s.  c.  T.  Ray. 
32;  People  v.  Herrick,  13  Johns.  82  ;  {People  v.  O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  265.  | 

7  Ib.;  Hilts  v.  Colvin,  14  Johns.  182;   Corn.  v.  Green,  17  Mass.  537;  [TBoyd  ». 
State,  94  Tenn.  505];  in  State  v.  Ridgely,  2  Har.  &  McHen.  120,  and  Clark's  Lessee 
v.  Hall,  ib.  378,  which  have  been  cited  to  the  contrary,  pnrol  evidence  was  admitted  to 
prove  only  the  fact  of  the  witness'  having  been  transported  as  a  convict,  not  to  prove 
the  judgment  of  conviction.     £The  record  must  contain  the  caption,  return  of  the  in- 
dictment, the  indictment  and  arraignment ;  a  mittimus,  with  the  judgment,  is  not 
sufficient :  Bartholomew  v.  People,  104  111.  601,  606.     Where  an  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment is  pending,  the  objector  must  show  that  it  h;is  been  dismissed:  Foster  v.  State, 
Tex.  Cr.,  46  S.  W.  231.     It  must  appear  either  that  by  acceptance  of  sentence  or 
affirmance  of  judgment  the  disposition  has  been  final :  Stanley  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  46 
S.  W.  645.J 

1  Story  on  Confl.  of  Laws,  §§  91,  92,  104,  620-625  ;  Martens,  Law  of  Nations,  b.  3, 
c.  3,  §§  24,  25. 

3  Com.  v.  Green,  17  Mass.  515,  539-549  (leading  case)  ;  {Sims  v.  Sims,  75  N.  Y. 
466  ;  National  Trust  Company  v.  Gleason,  77  id.  400;}  [.Logan  v.  U.  S.,  144  U.  S. 
303.1  Contra:  ^Chase  v.  Blodgett,  10  N.  H.  30  (leading  case)  ;]  {State  v.  Foley, 
15  Nev.  64  ;{  State  v.  Candler,  3  Hawks  393,  per  Taylor,  C.  J.,  and  Henderson,  J.; 
Hall,  J.,  dubitante,  but  inclining  in  favor  of  admitting  the  witness;  in  the  cases  of 
State  x.  Ridgely,  2  Har.  &  McHen.  120,  Clark's  Lessee  v.  Hall,  ib.  378,  and  Cole's 
Lessee  v.  Cole,  1  Har.  &  Johns.  572,  which  are  sometimes  cited  in  the  negative,  this 
point  was  not  raised  nor  considered  ;  they  being  cases  of  persons  sentenced  in  England 
for  felony,  and  transported  to  Maryland  under  the  sentence  prior  to  the  Revolution. 

1  ("See  ante,  §  375,  note  7.] 

2  Crosby's  Trial,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  1297  ;  Boyd  v.  IT.  S.,  142  U.  S.  450  ;  Logan  v. 
U.  S.,  144  id.  303;  State  v.  Foley,  15  Nev.  67.     It  was  formerly  doubted  whether  a 
pardon,  without  the  customary  burning  in  the  hand,  sufficed:  Rookwood's  Trial,  13 
How.  St  Tr.  183,  185,  187  ;  Warwick's  Trial,  ib.  1011,  1019.     See  in  general  a  learned 
opinion  by  Mr.  J.  Doe,  in  50  N.  H.  244.] 


§§  375-378  a.]  CONVICTION  FOR  CRIME.  517 

judgment  must  be  shown  in  the  same  manner  that  the  judgment 
itself  must  have  been  proved;  namely,  by  production  of  the  record 
of  reversal,  or,  in  proper  cases,  by  a  duly  authenticated  exemplifi- 
cation of  it.  The  pardon  must  be  proved,  by  production  of  the  char- 
ter of  pardon,  under  the  Great  Seal.  And  though  it  were  granted 
after  the  prisoner  had  suffered  the  entire  punishment  awarded 
against  him,  yet  it  has  been  held  sufficient  to  restore  the  competency 
of  the  witness,  though  he  would,  in  such  case,  be  entitled  to  very 
little  credit.3 

§  378.  The  rule  that  a  pardon  restores  the  competency  and  com- 
pletely rehabilitates  the  party  is  limited  to  cases  where  the  disa- 
bility is  a  consequence  of  the  judgment,  according  to  the  principles 
of  the  common  law.1  But  where  the  disability  is  annexed  to  the 
conviction  of  a  crime  by  the  express  words  of  a  statute,  it  is  generally 
agreed  that  the  pardon  will  not,  in  such  a  case,  restore  the  com- 
petency of  the  offender;  the  prerogative  of  the  sovereign  being 
controlled  by  the  authority  of  the  express  law.  Thus,  if  a  man  be  ad- 
judged guilty  on  an  indictment  for  perjury,  at  common  law,  a  pardon 
will  restore  his  competency;  but  if  the  indictment  be  founded  on  the 
statute  of  5  Eliz.  c.  9,  which  declares  that  no  person,  convicted  and 
attainted  of  perjury  or  subornation  of  perjury,  shall  be  from  thence- 
forth received  as  a  witness  in  any  court  of  record,  he  will  not  be 
rendered  competent  by  a  pardon.2 

§  378  a.  Same :  Statutory  Changes.  [The  policy  of  absolute  ex- 
clusion for  persons  convicted  of  crime  can  no  longer  be  defended.1 
Nevertheless,  legislation  has  not  yet  everywhere  caught  up  with 
enlightened  opinion.  (1)  In  the  greater  number  of  jurisdictions2 
this  disqualification  has  been  entirely  removed.8  (2)  In  a  smaller 
number,  it  is  retained  for  a  few  crimes,  —  usually  the  crime  of  per- 
jury. (3)  In  a  few  jurisdictions,  the  old  crudities  remain.4] 

8  U.  S.  v.  Jones,  2  Wheeler's  Cr.  CAS.  451,  per  Thompson,  J.  By  Stat.  9  Geo.  IV, 
c.  32,  §  3,  enduring  the  punishment  to  which  an  offender  has  been  sentenced  for  any 
felony  not  punishable  with  death  has  the  same  effect  as  a  pardon  under  the  Great  Seal, 
for  the  same  offence ;  and  of  course  it  removes  the  disqualification  to  testify  ;  and  the 
same  effect  is  given  by  §  4  of  the  same  statute,  to  the  endurance  of  the  punishment 
awarded  for  any  misdemeanor,  except  perjury  and  subornation  of  perjury ;  see  also  1  W. 
IV,  c.  37,  to  the  same  effect ;  Tait  on  Evid.  pp.  346,  347.  But  whether  these  enact- 
ments have  proceeded  on  the  ground  that  the  incompetency  is  in  the  nature  of  punish- 
ment, or  that  the  offender  is  reformed  by  the  salutary  discipline  he  has  undergone,  does 
not  clearly  appear. 

1  If  the  pardon  of  one  sentenced  to  the  penitentiary  for  life  contains  a  proviso,  that 
nothing  therein  contained  shall  be  construed,  so  as  to  relieve  the  party  from  the  legal 
disabilities  consequent  upon  his  sentence,  other  than  the  imprisonment,  the  proviso  is 
void,  and  the  party  is  fully  rehabilitated  :  People  v.  Pease,  3  Johns.  Cas.  333. 

2  R.   v.  Ford,  2  Salk.   690;   Dover  v.  M;estaer,  5  Esp.  92,  94;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes, 
595,  596;  R.  r.  Greepe,  2  Salk.  513,  514 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  292;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  21, 
22 ;   Hargrave's  Juridical  Arguments,   vol.  ii,  p.  221  ft  scq.  ;  Amer.   Jur.    xi,   360. 
^Contra,  Diehl  ».  Rogers,  169  Pa.  316.     See  also  the  statutes  in  Appendix  II.] 

1  £See  Appleton,  Evidence,  c.  iii,  condensing  Bentham's  arguments.     There  is  no 
answer  to  them.] 

2  [Beginning  in  1843,  with  St.  6-7  Viet.,  c.  85.] 

1  TFor  the  use  of  a  conviction  in  impeachment,  sevpost,  §  461  6.] 
*  LFor  all  these  statutes,  see  Appendix  I.] 


518  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxni. 

§  378  b.  Race,  Religious  Belief.  [Independently  of  the  oath- 
requirements,  no  Court  has  ever  decided  that  an  immoral  religious 
belief  could  be  a  ground  of  exclusion; *  though  it  was  suggested  by 
Bentham 2  that  cacotheism,  or  a  wicked  religion  which  sanctioned 
and  justified  perjury,  might  well  justify  rejection,  and  though  it  has 
more  than  once  been  argued 8  that  a  Jesuitical  belief  in  absolution  for 
perjury  against  heretics  should  suffice  to  exclude.4  In  many  States, 
until  the  completion  of  the  contest  to  abolish  slavery,  and  in  a  few 
States  even  since  that  time,5  statutes  excluded  the  testimony  of 
negroes,  of  Indians,  and  even  of  persons  of  mixed  blood,  in  all  cases 
except  for  or  against  each  other.  Nothing  is  to  be  said  for  these 
anachronisms,  and  the  question  is  happily  no  longer  a  living  one. 
Nor  can  anything  better  be  said  of  a  similar  exclusion  of  the  testi- 
mony of  the  Chinese,  which  once  was  the  law  of  California.6  The 
modern  and  enlightened  policy  is  to  make  no  discriminations  based 
on  race.] 

§  379.  Accomplices.  The  case  of  accomplices  is  usually  men- 
tioned under  the  head  of  Infamy;  but  we  propose  to  treat  it  more 
appropriately  when  we  come  to  speak  of  persons  disqualified  by 
interest,  since  accomplices  generally  testify  under  a  promise  or 
expectation  of  pardon  or  some  other  benefit.1  But  it  may  here  be 
observed  that  it  is  a  settled  rule  of  evidence  that  a  particeps  criminis, 
notwithstanding  the  turpitude  of  his  conduct,  is  not,  on  that  account, 
an  incompetent  witness  so  long  as  he  remains  not  convicted  and 
sentenced  for  an  infamous  crime.  The  admission  of  accomplices,  as 
witnesses  for  the  government,  is  justified  by  the  necessity  of  the 
case,  it  being  often  impossible  to  bring  the  principal  offenders  to 
justice  without  them.  The  usual  course  is  to  leave  out  of  the  in- 
dictment those  who  are  to  be  called  as  witnesses;  but  it  makes  no 
difference  as  to  the  admissibility  of  an  accomplice,  whether  he  is 
indicted  or  not,  if  he  has  not  been  put  on  his  trial  at  the  same  time 
with  his  companions  in  crime.2  He  is  also  a  competent  witness  in 
their  favor;  and  if  he  is  put  on  his  trial  at  the  same  time  with  them, 
and  there  is  only  very  slight  evidence,  if  any  at  all,  against  him, 
the  Court  may,  as  we  have  already  seen,8  and  generally  will,  forth- 

1  PBut  this  was  suggested  by  O'Neall,  J.,  in  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  258.} 

2  rRationale  of  Judicial  Evidence,  Bowling's  ed.,  I,  235,  V,  134.] 

8  LFreind's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  31,  43,  58  (repudiated  by  L.  C.  J.  Holt);  Darby 
v.  Ouseley,  1  H.  &  N.  6,  10 ;  Com.  v.  Buzzell,  6  Pick.  156  ;  see  Bentham,  Vol.  I,  235, 
Vol.  V,  134.] 

4  PFor  using  this  in  impeachment,  see  post,,  §  450  a.] 

6  L'n  Alabama  the  law  continued  until  1876;  Delaware's  statute-book  is  still  thus 
disfigured  ;  see  Appendix  L] 

8  rDenounced  by  Sawyer,  J.,  in  People  r.  Jones,  31  Cal.  573."! 
nSee  $  413,  in  Appendix  IT.] 

8  See  Jones  n.  Georgia.  1  Kelly  610  ;  [States  Reed,  50  La.  An.,  24  So.  131  ;  State 
v.  Riney,  137  Mo.  102  ;  State  v.  Stewart,  142  id.  412  ;  State  v.  Black,  id.,  44  S.  W. 
841  r  see  ante,  §  333  a.  An  accomplice  may  be  an  interpreter :  State  ».  Kent,  S.  D.. 
62  N.  W.  631.] 

•  Supra,  §  362. 


§§  378  6-380.]  RACE  ;  ACCOMPLICES.  519 

with  direct  a  separate  verdict  as  to  him,  and,  upon  his  acquittal,  will 
admit  him  as  a  witness  for  others.  If  he  is  convicted,  and  the 
punishment  is  by  fine  only,  he  will  be  admitted  for  the  others,  if  he 
has  paid  the  fine.*  But  whether  an  accomplice  already  charged  with 
the  crime,  by  indictment,  shall  be  admitted  as  a  witness  for  the 
government,  or  not,  is  determined  by  the  judges,  in  their  discretion, 
as  may  best  serve  the  purpose  of  justice.  If  he  appears  to  have 
been  the  principal  offender,  he  will  be  rejected.5  And  if  an  accom- 
plice, having  made  a  private  confession,  upon  a  promise  of  pardon 
made  by  the  attorney -general,  should  afterwards  refuse  to  testify, 
he  may  be  convicted  upon  the  evidence  of  that  confession.6 

§  380.  Same :  Corroboration.  The  degree  of  credit  which  ought  to 
be  given  to  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  is  a  matter  exclusively 
within  the  province  of  the  jury.  It  has  sometimes  been  said  that 
they  ought  not  to  believe  him,  unless  his  testimony  is  corroborated 
by  other  evidence;1  and,  without  doubt,  great  caution  in  weighing 
such  testimony  is  dictated  by  prudence  and  good  reason.  But  there 
is  no  such  rule  of  law;  it  being  expressly  conceded  that  the  jury 
may,  if  they  please,  act  upon  the  evidence  of  the  accomplice,  with- 
out any  confirmation  of  his  statement.2  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
judges,  in  their  discretion,  will  advise  a  jury  not  to  convict  of  felony 
upon  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  alone  and  without  corrobora- 
tion;  and  it  is  now  so  generally  the  practice  to  give  them  such 
advice,  that  its  omission  would  be  regarded  as  an  omission  of  duty 
on  the  part  of  the  judge.8  And  considering  the  respect  always  paid 

*  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  597,  600;  R.  v.  Westbeer,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  14  ;  Charnock's 
Case,  4  St.  Tr.  582  (ed.  1730)  ;  8.  c.  12  How.  St.  Tr.  1454  ;  R.  v.  Fletcher,  1  Str. 
633.  The  rule  of  the  Roman  law,  "Nemo,  allegans  turpitudinem  snani,  est  audien- 
dus,"  though  formerly  applied  to  witnesses,  is  now  to  that  extent  exploded.  It  can 
only  be  applied,  at  this  day,  to  the  case  of  a  party  seeking  relief:  see  infra,  §  383,  n. ; 
see  also  2  Stark.  Evid.  9,  10  ;  2  Hale  P.  C.  280;  7  T.  R.  611  ;  Musson  v.  Fales,  16 
Mass.  335;  Churchill  v.  Suter,  4  id.  162;  Townsend  v.  Bush,  1  Conn.  267,  per 
Truiubull,  J. 

6  People  r.  Whipple,  9  Cowen  707 ;  supra,  §  363. 

«  Com.  v.  Knapp,  10  Pick.  477  ;  R.  v.  Burley,  2  Stark.  Evid.  12,  n.  (r). 

1  QThis  doctrine  has  received  considerable  support  in  some  American  jurisdictions, 
apparently  through  a  misunderstanding  of  the  liberal  English  practice  in  charging 
the  jury,  as  explained  in  the  text.     In  these  jurisdictions  corroboratiou  is  required, 
sometimes  by  statute:  Kent  v.  State,  64  Ark.  247  ;  People  v.  Creagan,  Cal.,  53  Pac. 
1082  ;  Schaefer  v.  State,  93  Ga.   177  ;  State  v.  Russell,  90  la.  493  (§  4559) ;  State 
v.  McDonald,  57  Kan.  537  ;  State  v.  Callahan,  47  La.  An.  455  ;  People  v.  Mayhew, 
150  N.  Y.  346    (§  399)  ;   State  v.  Condotte,  N.  D  ,  72  N.  W.  913  (§  8195)  ;   State 
v.  Scott,  28  Or.  331  ;  State  v.  Phelps,  5  S.  D.  480,  488.] 

2  R.  v.  Hastings,  7  C.  &  P.  152,  per  Ld.  Denman,  C.  J.  ;  R.  v.  Jones,  2  Campb. 
132,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  B.  c.  31  How.  St.  Tr.  315;  R.  v.  Atwood,  2  Leach  Cr. 
Cas.  464  ;  R.  v.  Durham,  ib.  478 ;  R.  v.  Dawber,  3  Stark.  34 ;  R.   v.  Barnard,  1  C. 
&  P.  87,  88  JR.  v.  Boyes,  9  Cox  C'r.  32 ;|  People  v.  Costello,  1  Denio  83.      [The  correct 
principle,  as  above  described  by  the  author,  is  clearly  explained  by  Maule,  J.,  in  R.  v. 
Mullins,  7  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1110,  3  Cox  Cr.  526.    In  the  following  jurisdictions  the  ortho- 
dox rule  is  followed  :  Campbell  v.  People,  159  111.  9  ;  Com.  v.  Bishop,  165  Mass.  148  ; 
State  v.  Tobie,  141  Mo.  547  ;  Lamb  v.  State,  40  Nebr.  312,  319  ;  Cox  v.  Com.,  125  Pa. 
103;  State  v.  Green,  48  S.  C.  136.] 

8  Roscoe's  Crim.  Evid.  p.  120  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  12  ;  R.  v.  Barnard,  1  C.  &  P.  87  ;   |R. 


520  WITNESSES  ;    QUALIFICATIONS.  [OH.   XXIII. 

by  the  jury  to  this  advice  from  the  bench,  it  may  be  regarded  as  the 
settled  course  of  practice,  not  to  convict  a  prisoner  in  any  case  of 
felony  upon  the  sole  and  uncorroborated  testimony  of  an  accomplice. 
The  judges  do  not,  in  cases,  withdraw  the  cause  from  the  jury  by 
positive  direction  to  acquit,4  but  only  advise  them  not  to  give  credit 
to  the  testimony. 

§  381.  Same:  What  amounts  to  Corroboration.  But  though  it  is 
thus  the  settled  practice,  in  cases  of  felony,  to  require  other  evi- 
dence in  corroboration  of  that  of  an  accomplice,  yet,  in  regard  to 
the  manner  and  extent  of  the  corroboration  to  be  required,  learned 
judges  are  not  perfectly  agreed.  Some  have  deemed  it  sufficient,  if 
the  witness  is  confirmed  in  any  material  part  of  the  case ; *  others 

v.  Stubbs,  7  Cox  Cr.  48.  [  [)But  this  is  perhaps  exaggerated  :  see  R.  Mullins,  supra  ,•] 
j State  v.  Litchfield,  58  Me.  267  ;  Carroll  v.  Com.,  84  Pa.  107.  The  practice  of  caution 
from  the  bench  is  not  so  uniform  in  the  case  of  misdemeanors  as  in  felonies,  though  the 
distinction  is  rather  one  of  degree  than  of  kind  :  R.  v.  Farler,  8  C.  &  P.  106;  and  the 
extent  of  corroboration,  it  has  been  said,  will  depend  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  crime : 
R.  v.  Jarvis,  2  M.  &  Rob.  40  ;  and  if  the  offence  be  a  statute  one,  as  the  non-repair  of  a 
highway  ;  or  involve  no  great  moral  delinquency,  as  being  present  at  a  prize-fight  which 
terminated  in  manslaughter  :  R.  v.  Hargrave,  5  C.  &  P.  170  ;  R.  v.  Young,  19  Cox  C.  C. 
371  ;  or  the  action  be  for  a  penalty,  the  caution  has  been  refused :  McClory  v.  Wright, 
10  Ir.  Law  514;  Magee  v.  Mark,  11  id.  449.  |  For  the  limitation  of  this  practice  to 
cases  of  felony,  see  R.  v.  Jones,  31  Howell's  St.  Tr.  315,  per  Gibbs,  Attor.-Gen.,  arg. 
See  also  R.  v.  Hargrave,  5  C.  &  P.  170,  where  persons  pi  esent  at  a  fight,  which  resulted 
iu  manslaughter,  though  principals  in  the  second  degree,  were  held  not  to  be  such 
accomplices  as  required  corroboration,  when  testifying  as  witnesses. 

*  [_Re  Meunier,  1894,  2  Q.  B.  415.] 

1  This  is  the  rule  in  Massachusetts,  where  the  law  was  stated  by  Morton,  J.,  in  Com. 
v.  Bosworth,  22  Pick.  397,  as  follows  :  "1.  It  is  competent  for  a  jury  to  convict  on  the 
testimony  of  an  accomplice  alone.  The  principle  which  allows  the  evidence  to  go  to  the 
jury  necessarily  involves  in  it  a  power  in  them  to  believe  it.  The  defendant  has  a  right 
to  have  the  jury  decide  upon  the  evidence  which  may  be  offered  against  him;  and  their 
duty  will  require  of  them  to  return  a  verdict  of  guilty  or  not  guilty,  according  to  the  con- 
viction which  that  evidence  shall  produce  in  their  minds  :  2  Hawk.  P.  C.  c.  46,  §  135; 
1  Hale  P.  C.  304,  305  ;  Roscoe's  Crim.  Ev.  119  ;  1  Phil.  Ev.  32;  2  Stark.  Ev.  18,  20. 
2.  But  the  source  of  this  evidence  is  so  corrupt,  that  it  is  always  looked  upon  with  suspi- 
cion and  jealousy,  and  is  deemed  unsafe  to  rely  upon  without  confirmation.  Hence  the 
Court  ever  consider  it  their  duty  to  advise  a  jury  to  acquit,  where  there  is  no  evidence 
other  than  the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  an  accomplice.  1  Phil.  Evid.  34  ;  2  Stark. 
Evid.  24  ;  R.  v.  Durham,  2  Leach  478  ;  R.  v.  Jones,  2  Campb.  132  ;  1  Wheeler's  Crirn. 
Gas.  418  ;  2  Rogers's  Recorder,  38  ;  5  id.  95.  3.  The  mode  of  corroboration  seems  to  be 
less  certain.  It  is  perfectly  clear,  that  it  need  not  extend  to  the  whole  testimony  ;  but  it 
being  shown  that  the  accomplice  has  testified  truly  in  some  particulars,  the  jury  may  infer 
that  he  has  in  others.  But  what  amounts  to  corroboration  ?  We  think  the  rule  is,  that 
the  corroborative  evidence  must  relate  to  some  portion  of  the  testimony  which  is  mate- 
rial to  the  issue.  To  prove  that  an  accomplice  had  told  the  truth  in  relation  to  irrele- 
vant and  immaterial  matters,  which  were  known  to  everybody,  would  have  no  tendency 
to  confirm  his  testimony,  involving  the  guilt  of  the  party  on  trial.  If  this  were  the 
case,  every  witness,  not  incompetent  for  the  want  of  understanding,  could  always  fur- 
nish materials  for  the  corroboration  of  his  own  testimony.  If  he  could  state  where  ho 
was  born,  where  he  had  resided,  in  whose  custody  he  had  been,  or  in  what  jail,  or  what 
room  in  the  jail,  hu  had  been  confined,  he  might  easily  get  confirmation  of  all  these 
particulars.  But  these  circumstances  having  no  necessary  connection  with  the  guilt  of 
the  defendant,  the  proof  of  the  correctness  of  the  statement  in  relation  to  them  would 
not  conduce  to  prove  that  a  statement  of  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  was  true.  Roscoe's 
Crim.  Evid.  120;  R.  v.  Addis,  6  C.  &  P.  388  ;"  jthis  case  is  reviewed  and  explained 
in  Com.  ».  Holmes,  127  Mass.  424  ;  Com.  v.  Hayes,  140  id.  366; |  FJCom.  v.  Bishop,  165 
id.  148.3  A  similar  view  of  the  nature  of  corroborative  evidence,  in  cases  where  such 


§§  380-382.]  ACCOMPLICES.  521 

have  required  confirmatory  evidence  as  to  the  corpus  delicti  only;  and 
others  have  thought  it  essential  that  there  should  be  corroborating 
proof  that  the  prisoner  actually  participated  in  the  offence ;  and  that, 
when  several  prisoners  are  to  be  tried,  confirmation  is  to  be  required 
as  to  all  of  them  before  all  can  be  safely  convicted;  the  confirmation 
of  the  witness,  as  to  the  commission  of  the  crime,  being  regarded  as 
no  confirmation  at  all,  as  it  respects  the  prisoner;  for,  in  describing 
the  circumstances  of  the  offence,  he  may  have  no  inducement  to  speak 
'  falsely,  but  may  have  every  motive  to  declare  the  truth,  if  he  intends 
to  be  believed,  when  he  afterwards  fixes  the  crime  upon  the  pris- 
oner.8 If  two  or  more  accomplices  are  produced  as  witnesses,  they 
are  not  deemed  to  corroborate  each  other;  but  the  same  rule  is 
applied,  and  the  same  confirmation  is  required,  as  if  there  were 
but  one.8 

§  382.  Same  :  Who  are  Accomplices.  There  is  one  class  of  per- 
sons apparently  accomplices,  to  whom  the  rule  requiring  corroborat- 
ing evidence  does  not  apply;  namely,  persons  who  have  entered  into 
communication  with  conspirators,  but  either  afterwards  repenting, 
or,  having  originally  determined  to  frustrate  the  enterprise,  have 
subsequently  disclosed  the  conspiracy  to  the  public  authorities,  under 
whose  direction  they  continue  to  act  with  their  guilty  confederates 
until  the  matter  can  be  so  far  advanced  and  matured,  as  to  insure 
their  conviction  and  punishment;  *  the  early  disclosure  is  considered 
as  binding  the  party  to  his  duty;  and  though  a  great  degree  of  objec- 

evidence  is  necessary,  was  taken  by  Dr.  Lushington,  who  held  that  it  meant  evidence, 
not  merely  showing  that  the  account  given  is  probable,  but  proving  tacts  ejusdem  generis, 
and  tending  to  produce  the  same  result:  Simmons  v.  Simmons,  11  Jur.  830;  and  see 
M add ox  v.  Sullivan,  2  Rich.  Eq.  4.  fjThe  best  exposition  of  this  more  liberal  view  is 
found  in  R.  v.  Tidd,  33  How.  St.  Tr.  1483.] 

2  R.  D.  Wilkes,  7  C.  &  P.  272,  per  Alderson,  B. ;  R.  v.  Moore,  id.  270  ;  R,  v.  Addis, 
6  C.  &  P.  388,  per  Patteson,  J.  ;  R.  v.  Wells,  1  Mood.  &  M.  326,  per  Littledale,  J.  ; 
R.  v.  Webb,  6  C.  &  P.  595  ;  R.  v.  Dyke,  8  id.  261 ;  R.  v.  Birkett,  8  id.  732  ;  Com.  v. 
Bosworth,  22  Pick.  399,  per  Morton,  J.  The  course  of  opinions  and  practice  on  this 
subject  is  stated  more  at  large  in  1  Phil.  Evid.  pp.  30-38 ;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  pp.  956- 
968,  and  in  2  Stark.  Evid.  p.  12,  n.  (x),  to  which  the  learned  reader  is  referred  ;  see 
also  Roscoe's  Crim.  Evid.  p.  120.  Chief  Baron  Joy,  after  an  elaborate  examination  of 
English  authorities,  states  the  true  rule  to  be  this,  that  "the  confirmation  ought  to  be 
in  such  and  so  many  parts  of  the  accomplice's  narrative,  as  may  reasonably  satisfy  the 
jury  that  he  is  telling  truth,  without  restricting  the  confirmation  to  any  particular 
points,  and  leaving  the  effect  of  such  confirmation  (which  may  vary  in  its  effect  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  particular  case)  to  the  consideration  of  the 
jury,  aided  in  that  consideration  by  the  observations  of  the  judge  : "  Joy  on  the  Evi- 
dence of  Accomplices,  pp.  98,  99.  By  the  Scotch  law,  the  evidence  of  a  single  witness 
is  in  no  case  sufficient  to  wan-ant  a  conviction,  unless  supported  by  a  train  of  circum- 
stances :  Alison's  Practice,  p.  551.  £For  shades  of  definition  in  different  jurisdictions, 
see  j  People  v.  Hooghkerk,  96  N.  Y.  162;(  State  v.  Feuerhaken,  96  la.  299.] 

8  It.  v.  Noakes,  5  C.  &  P.  326,  per  Littledale,  J. :  R.  ».  Bannen,  2  Mood.  Cr.  Cas. 
309  ;  QPeople  v.  Creagan,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  1082 ;  unless  the  other  is  an  accomplice  to  a 
different  crime  :  People  v.  Sternberg,  111  id.  3.]  The  testimony  of  the  wife  of  an  accom- 
plice is  not  considered  as  corroborative  of  her  husband :  R.  v.  Neal,  7  C.  &  P.  168, 
per  Park,  J. 

1  R.  v.  Despard,  28  How.  St.  Tr.  489,  per  Lord  Ellenborongh  ;  {St'iteu.  McKean, 
36  la.  343  ;{  [JR.  v.  Mullins,  7  State  Tr.  N.  8.  1110 ;  8  Cox  Cr.  756 ;  Com.  v.  Hollis- 
ter,  157  Pa.  13.] 


522  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

tion  or  disfavor  may  attach  to  him  for  the  part  he  has  acted  as  an 
informer,  or  on  other  accounts,  yet  his  case  is  not  treated  as  the 
case  of  an  accomplice.  (One  who  purchases  liquor,  sold  illegally, 
in  order  to  obtain  evidence  for  prosecuting,  is  not  an  accomplice.2 
Nor  is  the  victim  of  a  seduction,8  nor  the  woman  upon  whom  an 
abortion  is  performed,4}  [or  with  whom  incest  is  committed;6  nor 
the  person  who  pays  a  bribe,  where  the  prosecution  is  for  demanding 
a  bribe; 6  nor  is  the  thief  an  accomplice  in  the  crime  of  knowingly 
receiving  stolen  goods.7] 

§§  383-385. l 

§§  386-430. 2 

5.    Experiential  Capacity. 

§  430  a.  In  general.  [Besides  the  fundamental  or  organic  powers, 
mental  and  moral,  requisite  for  all  testimony,  there  is  another 
sort  of  capacity,  always  requisite,  —  the  power  of  acquiring  fairly 
accurate  knowledge  so  far  as  the  element  of  skill  enters  into  the  ac- 
quisition of  knowledge.  Such  skill  or  fitness  to  obtain  correct  im- 
pressions comes  from  circumstances  which  may  roughly  be  summed 
up  in  the  term  "experience,"  —  a  term  of  wide  scope  embracing  the 
everyday  use  of  the  faculties,  the  habit  and  practice  of  an  occupa- 
tion, special  study,  professional  training,  etc. ,  which  may  have  con- 
tributed to  form  this  sort  of  capacity. 

Two  or  three  general  principles  are  clear.  (1)  In  legal  theory, 
every  witness  whosoever  is  an  "expert,"  in  the  sense  that  he  must 
be  fitted  to  have  knowledge  on  the  subject  of  which  he  speaks.  But 
since  the  vast  majority  of  subjects  of  testimony  are  matters  of  com- 
mon observation  for  which  the  ordinary  everyday  experience  of 
human  beings  has  fitted  them  to  acquire  correct  impressions,  so  on 
these  subjects  every  witness  is  assumed  to  have  the  necessary  fitness. 
Yet  a  case  may  arise  in  which  it  may  be  lacking,  and  in  which  there- 
fore even  the  ordinary  witness  is  incompetent.  For  example,  every 
one  is  assumed  to  be  able  to  read  and  write,  and  therefore  competent 
to  testify  to  the  signature  of  a  document  which  he  has  seen;  but 
if  it  appears  that  he  cannot  read  writing,  he  may  be  excluded  as  in- 
competent. There  is  therefore,  in  a  strict  sense,  no  class  of  "ex- 
pert "  as  distinguished  from  ordinary  witnesses;  for  every  witness 
must  be  "  expert "  upon  the  subject  of  his  testimony.  There  are 

2  {Com.  v.  Downing,  4  Gray  29.  | 
8  [Keller*.  State,  Ga.,  31  S.  E.  92.J 

*  [Com.  v.  Wood,  11  Gray  85;  Coin.  v.  Boynton,  116  Mass.  343  ;(  [State  v.  Smith, 
99  la.  26.] 

«  [State  v.  Kouhns,  103  la.  720."] 

•  "State  v.  Durnam,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  1127;  see  State  v.  Carr,  28  Or.  389/J 
"Springer  r.  State,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  971-3 


Transferred  to  Appendix  I  I.I 
^Transferred  to  Appendix  II.  J 


§§  382-430  a.]  EXPEKIENTIAL  CAPACITY.  523 

rather  two  broad  classes  of  "experts,"  —  those  who  are  assumed  to 
be  expert,  because  the  matter  is  one  upon  which  most  persons  have 
the  necessary  experience,  and  those  who  must  appear  to  have  a  spe- 
cial or  abnormal  experience,  because  the  subject  of  the  testimony  is 
one  in  which  ordinary  experience  does  not  produce  fitness.  The 
latter  may  be  divided  into  two  subordinate  classes ;  in  one  of  these 
the  experience  is  of  the  sort  called  "  practical ; "  from  the  wood- 
chopper  to  the  advertising  agent  there  is  a  long  list  of  occupations  in 
which  it  is  the  practice  of  the  occupation  which  gives  the  necessary 
fitness;  in  the  other,  it  is  by  some  sort  of  scientific  or  systematic 
training,  usually  termed  "professional,"  that  the  fitness  is  acquired. 
But  these  constantly  shade  off  into  each  other  or  are  intermingled; 
and  the  distinction  has  little  legal  significance.  The  important 
legal  distinction  is  between  the  first  and  the  second  class  above- 
mentioned  ;  though  unfortunately  for  clear  legal  thinking,  the  term 
"  expert "  is  commonly  applied  to  the  second  class  alone. 

(2)  The  experience-capacity  is  in  every  case  a  relative  one,  i.  e. 
relative  to  the  topic  about  which  the  person  is   asked  to  speak. 
Whether  a  person  is  expert  enough  to  testify  must  be  determined 
by  taking  as  our  standpoint  the  subject  of  the  desired  testimony,  and 
then   comparing  with  it  the  qualifications  of  the  offered  witness. 
The  classification  of  the  various  rules  should  not  be  according  to 
classes  of  persons,  but  according  to  classes  of  subjects. 

(3)  It  follows  that  there  are  no  fixed  classes  of  expert  persons,  in 
one  of  which  a  witness  finds  himself  and  remains  permanently.     A 
person  may  be  sufficiently  skilled  for  one  question,  and  totally  un- 
qualified for  the  next.     He  may  be  competent  to  say  whether  the 
deceased  had  gray  hair,  and  incompetent  to  say  what  killed  him; 
competent  to  say  whether  the  deceased  was  asphyxiated  by  gas,  and 
incompetent  to  distinguish  between  coal-gas  and  water-gas;  compe- 
tent to  say  whether  a  hatchet  was  sharp,  and  incompetent  to  tell 
whether  a  stain  upon  it  was  of  human  blood.     The  witness  may 
from  question  to  question  enter  or  leave  the  class  of  persons  fitted  to 
answer.     It   is   desirable  to   appreciate   that   expert  capacity,  is  a 
matter  wholly  relative  to  the  subject  of  the  particular  question;  that 
therefore  the  existence  of  the  capacity  arises  in  theory  as  a  new  in- 
quiry from  question  to  question ;  and  that  a  particular  person  is  not 
to  be  thought  of  as  objectively  or  absolutely  an  expert,  in  the  sense 
that  he  is  absolutely  a  German  or  a  negro  or  six  feet  high. 

The  rulings  of  the  Courts  on  the  present  subject  are  usually  of 
one  of  two  sorts:  (a)  On  what  matters  is  ordinary  experience  in- 
sufficient, i.  e.  is  a  so-called  "  expert "  needed  ?  (6)  If  such  special  ex- 
perience is  needed,  of  what  sort  should  it  be  for  the  matter  in  hand  ? 
So  far  as  the  answer  to  the  latter  question  lays  down  no  general 
principle,  but  merely  declares  the  offered  person  competent  on  the 
circumstances  of  his  experience,  the  ruling  is  of  little  or  no  value  as 


524  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

a  precedent;  and  of  this  sort  are  the  great  majority  of  rulings  on 
this  topic.  In  the  following  sections  the  chief  general  principles 
will  be  noticed.] 

§  430  b.  Foreign  Law.  [It  is  fairly  settled  that  a  witness  to 
foreign  law  need,  not  be  a  professional  follower  of  the  law,  —  coun- 
sel, judge,  or  the  like.  In  England,  however,  it  is  required  that  he 
should  have  followed  an  occupation  in  which  legal  knowledge  on  the 
matters  in  hand  was  necessary.1  In  this  country,  even  this  much 
does  not  seem  to  be  necessary ;  it  is  enough  if  on  the  facts  the  person 
appears  to  have  obtained  the  necessary  familiarity.2  A  custom  of 
merchants  may  sometimes  involve  a  question  of  law.8] 

§  430  c.  Medical  Matters,  [(a)  While  on  matters  strictly  in- 
volving medical  science,  some  special  skill  must  be  shown,  yet  on 
numerous  subjects  of  everyday  experience,  though  involving  health 
or  physical  condition,  no  such  showing  is  necessary.1  Laymen  have 
been  allowed,  for  example,  to  speak  as  to  the  appearance  of  health 
or  illness,2  or  the  kind  or  the  appearance  of  a  wound;  8  but  not  as  to 
the  nature  of  a  disease4  or  the  permanence  of  an  injury.6  As  to 
sanity,  it  is  now  universally  conceded  that  a  layman  is  competent  to 
form  an  opinion.6 

(b)  On  matters  in  which  special  medical  experience  is  necessary, 
the  question  may  arise  whether  a  general  practitioner  will  suffice,  or 
whether  a  specialist  in  the  particular  subject  is  necessary.  The 
Courts  usually  and  properly  repudiate  the  finical  demand  for  the 
latter  class  of  witnesses.7] 

§  430  d.    Handwriting,  Paper-money,  etc.     [Any   person   able   to 

1  TVander  Donckt  v.  Thelusson,  8  C.  B.  812  ;  Sussex  Peerage  Case,  11  Cl.  &  F.  117, 
134.J 

2  QSee  Pickard-i>.  Bailey,  26  N.  H.  170  ;  Kenny  v.  Clarkson,  1  Johns.  394  ;  Chanoine 
v.  Fowler,  3  Wend.  17;  Amer.  L.  I.  &  T.  Co.  v.  Rosenagle,  77  Pa.  515;  Bird's  Case, 
21  Gratt.  801,  808  ;  Phillips  v.  Gregg,  10  Watts  161,  170  ;  State  v.  Cueller,  47  Tex. 
304  ;  People  v.  Lambert,  5  Mich.  362  ;  Layton  v.  Chaylon,  4  La.  An.  319  ;  Marguerite 
v.  Chouteau,  3  Mo.  540,  562  ;  Barrows  v.  Downs,  9  R.  I.  453 ;  Armstrongs.  U.  S.,  6  Ct. 
of  Cl.  226 ;  Molina  v.  U.  S.,  ib.  272.] 

For  the  question  whether  the  witness  has  sufficient  means  of  knowledge  of  the  law 
in  question,  see  post,  §  430  ra. 

TSee  Phelps  v.  Town,  14  Mich.  379  ;  Comstock  v.  Smith,  20  id.  342.] 

1  fSee  Evans  v.  People,  12  Mich.  36  (leading  case).] 

2  LMilton  v.  Kowland,  11  Ala.  737;  Stone  v.  Watson,  37  id.  288:  Bait.  &  L.  T. 
Co.  v.  Cassell,  66  Md.  432  ;   Knight  v.  Smythe,  57  Vt.  530 ;  Smalley  v.  Appleton,  70 
Wis.  344.] 

»  [People  v.  Hong  Ah  Duck,  61  Cal.  390  ;  People  v.  Gibson,  106  id.  458  ;  Linsday 
v.  Peoj.le,  63  N.  Y.  152.  j 

*  [McLean  v.  State,  16  Ala.  679 ;  Thompson  v.  Bertrand,  23  Ark.  733."] 

PAtl.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker,  93  Ga.  462.] 

1  LConn.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lathrop,  111  U.  S.  612.  The  dispute  in  this  connection 
has  arisen  because  of  the  Opinion  rule,  and  the  cases  involving  that  question,  which 
also  usually  deal  with  the  present  one,  are  dealt  with  post.,  §  441  f~\ 

7  [Siebert  v.  People,  143  111.  579  (arsenic-poisoning) ;  State  v.  Hinkle,  6  la.  385 
(chemical  analysis);  Young  v.  Makepeace,  103  Mass.  53  (child-birth);  Hardiman  v. 
Brown,  162  id.  585  (brain-tumor)  ;  Seckinger  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  129  Mo.  690  (in  general) ; 
Kelly  v.  U.  S.,  27  Fed.  618  (same)  ;  Hathaway  v.  Ins.  Co.,  48  Vt.  351  (same).} 


§§  430a-430^r.]        EXPERIENTIAL  CAPACITY.  525 

read  writing  is  competent  to  testify  to  the  identity  or  genuineness 
of  a  style  of  writing  with  which  he  is  acquainted.  The  controversies 
that  arise  in  regard  to  proof  of  handwriting  depend  upon  other  prin- 
ciples, chiefly  (1)  whether  the  witness  has  personal  acquaintance 
with  the  handwriting,  —  dealt  with  post,  §  577 ;  (2)  whether  any 
other  rule  excludes  his  testimony,  — dealt  with  post,  §  579. 

In  speaking  to  the  genuineness  of  bank-notes,  Government  paper, 
and  the  like,  it  seems  not  to  be  necessary  to  have  special  experience 
in  detecting  such  forgeries;  any  occupation  in  which  these  things 
are  habitually  received  and  scrutinized  is  sufficient  to  qualify.1] 

§  430  e.  Value.  [Special  experience  may  often  be  necessary  in 
testifying  to  value;  but  it  is  usually  difficult  to  separate  this  require- 
ment from  that  of  knowledge;  and  accordingly  the  two  subjects  are 
dealt  with  post,  §  430  n.] 

§  430  /.  Discretion  of  Trial  Court.  [In  most  jurisdictions,  it  is 
declared  that  the  determination  of  a  witness'  experiential  qualifica- 
tions should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court.  The  phras- 
ing differs,  and  the  practice  seldom  lives  up  to  the  theory.  In  some 
Courts  this  discretion  is  not  reviewable;  in  others,  it  is  reviewable 
only  in  case  of  its  abuse ;  in  others,  it  is  said  "  largely  "  to  control. 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  beneficent  principle  should  be  further 
extended  and  strictly  observed,  so  that  a  witness'  experiential  quali- 
fications should  be  invariably  left  to  be  determined  by  the  trial  Court 
without  review.1] 

§  430  g.  Opinion  Rule.  [The  requirement  of  special  experience 
for  certain  topics  of  testimony  is  based  on  a  distrust  of  the  powers 
of  one  having  only  ordinary  experience  to  form  intelligent  judgments 
thereon,  and  must  be  distinguished  carefully  from  a  rule  of  exclusion 
which  may  also  operate  to  exclude  persons  not  having  special  experi- 

i  [[State  v.  Cheek,  13  Ired.  120 ;  Yates  v.  Yates,  76  N.  C.  149 ;  Atwood  v.  Corn- 
wall, 28  Mich.  339  ;  May  v.  Dorsett,  30  Ga.  118-3 

1  QSee,  for  the  attitudes  of  the  various  Courts  :  Hunnicutt  v.  Kirkpatrick,  39 
Ark.  172;  Sowden  v.  Quartz  Mining  Co.,  55  Cal.  451;  Fort  Wayne  v.  Coombs,  107 
Ind.  86;  Higgins  v.  Higgins,  75  Me.  346;  Fayette  v.  Chesterville,  77  id.  33  ;  State  ». 
Thompson,  80  id.  200  ;  Lincoln  v.  Barre,  5  Gush.  591  ;  Quinsigamond  B'k  v.  Hobbs, 
11  Gray  257  ;  Bacon  v.  Williams,  13  id.  527 ;  Marcy  v.  Barnes,  16  id.  164  ;  Com.  v. 
Nefus,  135  Mass.  534  ;  Swan  v.  Middlesex,  101  id.  177  ;  Gossler  v.  Refinery,  103  id. 
835  ;  Com.  v.  Williams,  105  id.  67  ;  Tucker  t>.  Railroad,  118  id.  648  ;  Lawrence  v. 
Boston,  119  id.  132  ;  Perkins  v.  Stickney,  132  id.  217  ;  Campbell  ».  Russell,  139  id. 
279  ;  Warren  w.  Water  Co.,  143  id.  164  ;  Hill  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  129  id.  849  ;  Lowell 
v.  Com'rs,  146  id.  412 ;  Com.  v.  Hall,  164  id.  152  ;  41  N.  E.  133 ;  McEwen  ».  Bigelow, 
40  Mich.  217  ;  Ives  v.  Leonard,  50  id.  299  ;  Jones  v.  Tucker,  41  N.  H.  549  ;  Dole  v. 
Johnson,  50  id.  459  ;  Ellingwood  v.  Bragg,  52  id.  490  ;  Goodwin  ».  Scott,  61  id.  114; 
Carpenter  v.  Hatch,  64  id.  576  ;  Nelson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  460  ;  Slocovich  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  108  id.  62  ;  Flynt  v.  Bodenhamer,  80  N.  C.  205  ;  State  v.  Cole,  94  id.  964  ; 
Ardeseo  Oil  Co.  v.  Gilson,  63  Pa.  152;  Sorg  ».  Congregation,  ib.  161  ;  D.  &  C.  Tow- 
boat  Co.  v.  Starrs,  69  id.  41  ;  First  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Wirebach's  Ex'r,  106  id.  44  ;  Howard 
v.  Providence,  6  R.  I.  514  :  Sarle  ».  Arnold,  7  id.  586  ;  Powers  v.  McKenzie,  90  Tenn. 
181  ;  Stillwell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Phelps,  180  U.  S.  527  ;  Wright  v.  Williams  Estate,  47  Vt. 
232  ;  R.  Co.  ».  Bucby,  57  id.  563  ;  Carpenter  t>.  Corinth,  58  id.  216  ;  Bemis  v.  R.  Co., 
ib.  641.3 


526  WITNESSES  ;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  XXIIL 

ence:  but  is  based  on  wholly  different  reasons,  namely,  the  Opinion 
rule.  Assume  that  the  present  rule  has  been  satisfied  and  that  the 
Court  has  determined  that  the  subject  does  not  require  a  person  of 
special  experience,  e.  g.  that,  as  to  whether  a  staiu  on  a  hatchet  is 
of  blood  or  of  paint,  a  layman  and  not  a  chemist  may  testify.  At 
this  point  the  Opinion  rule  begins  to  operate,  and  the  question  will 
arise  whether  the  testimony  of  a  layman  on  this  subject  is  not  super- 
fluous and  unnecessary.  If  the  jury  can  judge  for  themselves  on 
this  matter  equally  as  well  as  the  lay  witness,  it  is  obvious  that  it 
would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  ask  for  any  testimony  from  him  or  from 
a  dozen  or  a  hundred  other  persons  no  more  capable  than  he  of  add- 
ing to  the  jury's  own  information.  Now  if  the  hatchet  is  in  Court 
and  before  the  jury,  the  above  situation  will  exist,  i.  e.  the  layman's 
judgment  as  to  the  nature  of  ihe  stain  will  be  superfluous ;  but  if  the 
hatchet  is  lost  and  the  witness  saw  it  before  it  was  lost,  the  jury  are 
not  in  an  equal  position  with  the  witness,  and  his  testimony  will  not 
be  superfluous.  Or  again,  if  the  inquiry  be  whether  a  person  not 
present  was  disabled  by  an  injury,  it  might  be  thought  that  a  de- 
scription of  the  person's  physical  condition  and  conduct  would  suffi- 
ciently place  before  the  jury  the  data  from  which  they  could  draw, 
equally  well  with  the  witness,  the  inference  whether  he  was  disabled. 
Such,  in  essence,  is  the  Opinion  rule,  — obviously  a  different  thing 
from  the  rules  as  to  experiential  qualifications,  and  yet  not  always 
kept  sufficiently  distinct.  The  two  sets  of  rules  usually  come  into 
application  at  the  same  time,  but  they  are  wholly  independent  in 
principle.  Koughly  speaking,  the  testimony  of  a  witness  admissible 
by  special  experience  is  also  admissible  under  the  Opinion  rule; 
while  that  of  a  witness  admissible  by  ordinary  experience  only  may 
still  be  excluded  by  the  Opinion  rule;  and  this  joint  operation  of  the 
two  rules  has  occasionally  led  to  their  treatment  as  a  single  rule. 
But  the  Opinion  rule  (treated  post,  §§  441  6-441 1)  might  be  entirely 
abolished,  and  yet  that  would  not  affect  in  the  slightest  the  doctrine 
of  experiential  qualifications;  and  the  correct  solution  of  the  many 
troublesome  problems  created  by  the  Opinion  rule  can  be  reached 
only  by  keeping  distinctly  in  mind  the  two  separate  principles  that 
may  be  involved.] 


6.   Knowledge;  Adequate  Observation. 

§  430  h.  In  general.  [Observation,  or  an  adequate  opportunity  to 
obtain  correct  impressions  on  the  subject  of  the  testimony,  is  another 
qualification  necessarily  predicated  of  every  witness.  It  is  common 
to  say  that  the  witness  must  have  knowledge  upon  the  subject,  but 
knowledge  is  an  absolute  term,  implying  the  verity  of  the  thing 
known,  and  such  absolute  verity  is  of  course  not  attributed  to  the 
statements  of  any  witness;  so  that  it  is  more  accurate  to  say  that 


§§  430  #-430 1.]  KNOWLEDGE.  527 

the  witness  must  have  had  the  means  of  obtaining  knowledge,  —  in 
other  words,  must  have  observed,  or  had  the  opportunity  to  observe, 
the  matters  to  which  he  testifies.  In  the  usual  case  a  person  who  is 
not  so  qualified  is  not  put  forward  as  a  witness;  for  the  necessity  of 
this  qualification  is  obvious;  but  the  requirement  is  nevertheless  a 
real  one,  as  has  been  often  pointed  out.1  Its  application  is  usually 
simple  enough;  but  a  few  situations  of  difficulty  have  given  rise 
to  controversies,  which  must  DOW  be  briefly  noticed.] 

§  430  i.  Quality  of  Knowledge  ;  "  Belief,"  "  Impression,"  "  Opinion." 
[When  a  witness  expresses  his  thought  upon  the  matter  in  hand,  it 
may  be  that  he  does  not  assert  it  with  the  positiveness  of  knowledge, 
but  qualifies  his  state  of  mind  on  the  subject  as  a  "  belief,"  "  im- 
pression," "opinion;"  he  may  "think"  or  "suppose "the  matter  to 
be  so.  These  expressions  are  ambiguous  in  that  the  qualification 
may  be  due  to  one  of  three  distinct  sources.  (1)  He  may  have  had 
no  actual  observation  or  source  of  knowledge  at  all,  but  may  have 
made  up  his  mind  merely  by  guess  or  conjecture;  when  this  appears 
to  be  the  case,  he  is  evidently  not  qualified,  and  his  "impression," 
etc.,  is  not  admissible.1  (2)  He  may  have  had  actual  observation  of 
the  matter,  but  he  may  not  have  received  a  very  definite  impression ; 
e.  ff.,  he  saw  a  man,  and  "thought"  it  was  the  accused ;  to  this  defect 
in  the  quality  of  the  impression  the  law  makes  no  objection,  but  re- 
ceives it  for  what  it  is  worth.  (3)  He  may  have  had  entirely  clear 
and  positive  impressions  at  the  time,  but  his  recollection  of  them  is 
not  as  strong  as  it  might  be ;  here,  also,  the  law  accepts  whatever 
quality  of  recollection  he  is  able  to  bring.  In  short,  if  he  has  ac- 
tually observed,  the  quality  of  the  impression  and  the  strength  of  its 
persistence  are  no  grounds  of  objection.  The  rulings  of  the  Courts, 
however,  do  not  always  distinguish  the  exact  point  involved ;  and  it 
is  impossible  to  separate  them.2] 

1  [[State  v.  Allen,  1  Hawks  9  ;  Evans  v.  People,  12  Mich.  35  ;  Wetherbee  v.  Norris, 
103  Mass.  566.] 

1  [Clark  v.  Bigelow,  16  Me.  247  ;  State  v.  Flanders,  38  N.  H.  332 ;  Wood  v. 
Brewer,  57  Ala.  617. 

Accord :  Jordan  v.  Foster,  11  Ark.  142 ;  Tait  v.  Hall,  71  Cal.  152 ;  Macon  &  W. 
R.  Co.  f.  Johnson,  38  Ga.  436 ;  Terr.  v.  McKern,  Ida.,  26  Pac.  123  j  Jones  v.  Chiles, 
83  Ky.  33 ;  Tibhetts  v.  Flanders,  18  N.  H.  292  ;  Kingsbury  v.  Moses,  45  N.  H.  225 ; 
Higbie  v.  Ins.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  604  ;  Carmalt  v.  Post,  8  Watts  411  ;  Duvall's  Ex'r  v. 
Darby,  38  Pa.  59 ;  Atchison  R.  Co.  v.  U.  S.,  15  Ct.  of  Cl.  141  ;  Patten  v.  U.  S., 
ib.  290.] 

.2  Admitted:  Miller's  Case,  8  Wils.  428  ;  Home  Tooke's  Trial,  25  How.  St.  Tr.  71 ; 
Ga'rrells  v.  Alexander,  4  Esp.  37  ;  Hill  v.  Hill's  Adin'r,  9  Ala.  792  ;  Turner  v.  McFee, 
61  id.  470  ;  Bass  Furnace  Co.  v.  Glasscock,  82  id.  456 ;  People  v.  Rolfe,  61  Cal.  640  ; 
Lyon  v.  Lyman,  9  Conn.  60  ;  Dawson  v.  Callaway,  18  Ga.  679;  Goodwyn  v.  Good- 
wyn,  20  id.  620  ;  Huguley  v.  Holstein,  85  id.  272  ;  Rhode  ».  Louthain,  8  Blackf.  413  ; 
State  v.  Porter,  34  la.  133  ;  State  t;.  Lucas,  57  id.  502  ;  State  v.  Seymore,  94  id.  699  ; 
Bradford  v.  Cooper,  1  La.  An.  826;  State  v.  Goodwin,  87  id.  7J3,  715;  Lewis  v. 
Freeman,  17  Me.  260;  Hopkins  u.  Megquire,  85  id.  80  ;  Humphries  v.  Parker,  62  id. 
504  ;  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  10  Mil.  84 ;  Fulton  v.  McCracken,  18  id.  542  ;  Ham- 
ilton  v.  Nickerson,  It  All.  352;  Com.  v.  Kennedy,  Mass.,  48  N.  E.  770;  Johnston 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  106  Mich.  96  ;  Ferris  v.  Thaw,  72  Mo".  450 ;  Greenwell  v.  Crow,  73  id. 


528  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxm. 

§  430  j.  Personal  Observation  ;  not  Hearsay  Knowledge.  [A  wit- 
ness' testimony  must  be  (in  the  words  of  Chief  Baron  Gilbert  *)  "  to 
what  he  knows  and  not  to  that  only  which  he  hath  heard,"  "  for  if 
indeed  he  doth  not  know,  he  can  be  no  evidence."  There  must  be 
personal  observation,  as  distinguished  from  belief  founded  011  the 
report  of  others ; 2  in  judicial  inquiry  the  law  asks  only  for  belief 
founded  on  personal  observation.  The  principle  is  of  simple  and 
frequent  application.  But  the  question  arises,  in  various  situations, 
whether  an  exception  should  be  allowed,  L  e.  whether  for  practical 
purposes  a  belief  or  knowledge  founded  partly  or  wholly  on  others' 
information,  and  not  on  personal  observation,  may  not  suffice.] 

§  430  ja.  Same  :  Contents  of  Documents.  [As  a  general  rule,  a 
person  who  testifies  to  the  contents  of  a  document  must  have  read  it 
himself,  and  not  merely  heard  it  read  by  another  or  otherwise  have 
based  his  belief  on  others'  statements ; 1  and,  conversely,  any  one 
who  has  read  a  document  may  testify  to  its  contents.2  There  is, 
however,  a  classical  exception  to  this  rule,  where  a  copy  of  a  public 
document  is  to  be  proved;  here  a  "cross-reading"  has  always  been 
deemed  sufficient,  though  the  witness  even  here  is  after  all  speaking 
from  hearsay ;  and  it  has  also  been  settled,  on  the  ground  of  practical 
convenience,  that  even  a  cross-reading  is  not  necessary.8] 

640;  State  v.  Bable,  76  id.  504  ;  State  v.  Hopkirk,  84  id.  288  ;  State  ».  Harvey,  131  id. 
339  ;  State  v.  Dale,  141  id.  284 ;  Burnhara  v.  Ayer,  36  N.  H.  185 ;  Nute  v.  Nute,  41 
id.  68  ;  Carrington  v.  Ward,  71  N.  Y.  364  ;  Blake  v.  People,  73  id.  586  ;  Beverly  v. 
Williams,  4  Dev.  &  B.  237  ;  MnRae  v.  Morrison,  13  Ired.  48  ;  State  v.  Lytle,  117 
N.  C.  799  ;  Crowell  v.  Bank,  3  Oh.  St.  411 ;  State  v.  Chee  Gong,  17  Or.  638  ;  Farm- 
ers' Bank  v.  Saling,  id.,  54  Pac.  190  ;  Sigfried  v.  Levan,  6  S.  &  R.  313;  Farmers' 
Bank  v.  Whitelull,  10  id.  112  ;  Shitler  v.  Bremer,  23  Pa.  413  ;  Duvall's  Ex'r  ».  Darby, 
88  id.  69;  Dodge  v.  Baclie,  57  id.  424;  P.  V.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Vance,  115  id.  332; 
Woodward  t>.  State,  4  Baxt.  324;  Swinney  v.  Booth,  28  Tex.  116  ;  Bouldiii  v.  Massie's 
Heirs,  7  Wheat.  153  ;  Riggs  v.  Tayloe,  9  id.  487  ;  State  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  187  ;  State 
v.  Bradley,  67  id.  465  ;  Combs  v.  Coin.,  90  Va.  88,  91  ;  Erd  v.  R.  Co.,  41  Wis.  68. 

Excluded:  R.  v.  Dewhurst,  1  State  Tr.  N.  s.  529,  590  ;  Bedford  v.  Birley,  ib.  1071, 
1171  ;  McDonald  v.  Jacobs,  77  Ala.  525,  527  ;  Morris  v.  Stokes,  21  Ga.  570  ;  Parker 
v.  Chambers,  24  id.  621 ;  Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Stein,  140  Iiid.  61 ;  Simonson  v.  R. 
Co.,  49  la.  88;  Orr  v.  R.  Co.,  94  id.  423;  Carrico  v.  Neal,  1  Dana  Ky.  162  ;  Paty  v. 
Martin,  15  La.  An.  620  ;  Hovey  v.  Chase,  52  Me.  313;  Elbin  v.  Wilson,  33  Md.  144  ; 
Lovejoy  v.  Howe,  55  Minn.  853,  354  ;  Sanchez  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  154  ;  Carmalt  r. 
Post,  8  Watts  411  ;  Fullam  v.  Rose,  181  Pa,  138  ;  Bank  v.  Brown,  Dudley  62,  65; 
Wilcocka  v.  Phillips'  Ex'rs,  1  Wall.  Jr.  49,  53  ;  Guyette  v.  Bolton,  40  Vt.  232. 

1  Evidence,  152. 

9  FJThis  is  a  different  thing  from  the  Hearsay  rule  and  its  exceptions,  which  deal 
with  the  reception  as  evidence  of  statements  by  persons  not  in  Court  and  under  ex- 
amination :  see  ante,  §  99  a.] 

1  QHodges  v.  Hodges,  2  Cash.  460;  Nichols  v.  Kingdom  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  618  ,  Ed- 
wards v.  Noyes,  65  id.  126;  People  v.  Mathis,  N.  C.,  20  S.  E.  710;  McGinniss  v. 
Sawyer,  63  Pa.  266  ;  Coxe  v.  England,  65  id.  222 ;  Johnson  v.  Bolton,  43  Vt.  303. 
Contra:  Mathews  v.  Coalter,  9  Mo.  696,  701.] 

3  ["Fisher  v.  Saunda,  1  Cainp.  193  ;  Hub  v.  Kimball,  52  111.  895  ;  Smith  t>.  Bank, 
45  Nebr.  444.] 

8  fJReid  v.  Margison,  1  Camp.  469  ;  M'Neil  v.  Perchard,  1  Esp.  264  ;  Gyles  v. 
Hill,  1  Camp.  471,  note  ;  Rolf  v.  Dart,  2  Taunt.  52 ;  Fyson  v.  Kemp,  6  C.  &  P.  72; 
R.  v.  Hughes,  1  Cr.  &  D.  13  j  Lynde  v.  Judd,  8  Day  499 ;  Pickard  v.  Bailey,  26  N.  H. 
169.  Contra :  Sloane  Peerage  Case,  6  Cl.  &  F.  42.J 


§§  430/-430J.]  KNOWLEDGE.  529 

§  430  k.  Same :  Testimony  to  one's  own  Age.  [In  strictness,  a 
person's  belief  as  to  his  own  age  rests  upon  hearsay  only,  not  on  ac- 
tual observation  and  recollection.  Nevertheless,  such  belief,  suffi- 
cient as  it  is  for  action  in  the  practical  affairs  of  life,  ought  also  to 
be  admissible  in  judicial  inquiries,  and  such  is  the  conclusion  gen- 
erally accepted.1  Moreover,  there  may  be  cases  in  which,  of  one's 
own  knowledge,  it  may  be  possible  to  state  that  one  was  alive  or  over 
or  under  a  certain  age  at  a  given  time.2] 

§  430  I.  Same  :  Medical  Man's  Knowledge.  [(1)  It  will  usually 
be  the  case  that  the  medical  or  surgical  witness  has  acquired  the 
greater  part  of  his  knowledge  of  professional  matters  in  general  from 
hearsay,  —  both  from  the  data  recorded  in  books  and  journals  and 
from  his  professional  instructors.  It  would  be  absurd  to  deny  judicial 
standing  to  such  knowledge,  because  all  scientific  data  must  be  handed 
down  from  generation  to  generation  by  hearsay,  and  each  student  can 
hope  to  test  only  a  trifling  fraction  of  scientific  truth  by  personal 
experience.  This  attitude  the  Courts  generally  take ;  and  it  is  not 
necessary  that  a  witness  of  this  sort  should  have  learned  his  scien- 
tific truths  by  personal  observation.1  (2)  When  the  medical  or  sur- 
gical witness  is  testifying  to  the  facts  of  a  patient's  condition,  a 
portion  of  his  sources  of  information  must  usually  be  his  patient's 
description  of  internal  symptoms.  If  his  action  in  matters  of  life 
and  death  can  be  based  upon  this,  it  would  seem  that  no  stricter  rule 
was  needed  for  his  testimony  in  Court ;  indeed,  to  separate  the  one 
source  of  belief  from  the  other  would  often  be  impossible ;  and  to 
condemn  a  belief  founded  upon  this  source  would  often  be  to  bar  out 
medical  testimony  entirely.  Accordingly,  it  is  generally  accepted 
that  medical  or  surgical  testimony  is  not  inadmissible  because,  like 
all  such  conclusions,  it  is  founded  in  part  on  the  patient's  own  state- 
ment of  symptoms ; 2  but  such  testimony  founded  on  hearsay  infor- 

1  fJPeople  v.  Ratz,  115  Cal.  132  ;  State  o.  McLain,  49  Kan.  730  ;  Com.  v.  Steven- 
son, H2  Mass.  468,  semble;  Cheever  v.  Congdou,  34  Mich.  295;  Houlton  v.  Mati- 
teulfel,  51  Minn.  185;  State  v.  Marshall,  137  Mo.  463,  semblc;  State  v.  Bowser,  Mont., 
53  Pac.  179  ;  State  v.  Cain,  9  W.  Va.  569  ;  DoHge  v.  State,  Wis.,  75  N.  W.  954.  Con- 
tra: Doe  v.  Ford,  3  U.  C.  Q.  B.  353.  Some  Courts  prefer  to  work  the  problem  out  by 
treating  the  testimony  as  stating  the  family  reputation,  admissible  under  the  Pedigree 
exception  on  restricted  conditions  :  ante,  §  114  c.] 

a  rSee  Hill  v.  Eldredge,  126  Mass.  234  ;  Foltz  ».  State,  33  Ind.  217.] 

1  LT'le  cases  vary  somewhat  in  their  phrasing  :  see  Finnegan  v.  Gasworks  Co.,  159 
Mass.  312  (leading  case) ;  Carter  r.  State,  2  Ind.  619  ;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  16  ; 
Hardiman  v.  Brown,  162  Mass.  58.~> ;  39  N.  E.  192  ;  Marshall  v.  Brown,  50  Mich.  148  ; 
Jackson  v.  Boone,  Ga.,  20  S.  E.  46 ;    Taylor  v.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  306  ;   State  v.  Wood, 
63  id.  495  ;  State  v.  Terrell,  12  Rich.  L.  327.] 

2  QEekles  v.  Bates,  26  Ala.  659  ;  111.  C.  K.  Co.  ».  Sutton,  42  111.  440  ;  Chic.  B.  & 
Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin,  112  id.  17  ;    W.   &  A.  R.  Co.  r.  Stafford,   99  Ga.    187,  semble; 
Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  419  ;  same  v.  Wood,  113  id.  548 ;  same 
v.  Snyder,  117  id.  436 ;  Chic.  St.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  id.  380,  392  ;  Ohio  & 
M.  R.  Co.  v.  Heaton,  137  id.  1  ;  South.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Michaels,  57  Kan.  474  ;  Barber  v. 
Men-iam,  11  All.  324  ;    Laml>erton  v.  Traction  Co.,  N.  J.,  85  Atl.  100,  38  id.  683, 
temble ;  Matteson  v.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  491 ;  People  v.  Strait,  148  id.  566,  semble;  State 
».  Chiles,  44  S.  C.  333  ;  Union  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Novak,  15  U.   S.  App.  400,  414;   Quaife 

TOL.  i.  —  34 


530  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxur. 

mation  from  others  would  be  excluded, 8  though  where  the  person  is 
a  nurse  or  other  attendant,  it  would  seem  that  the  same  necessity  and 
propriety  here  demanded  its  admission.4  The  admission  of  the  pa- 
tient's hearsay  statements  themselves  is,  of  course,  a  different  ques- 
tion, involving  the  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  treated  ante,  §  162  b.~\ 

§  430  ra.  Same  :  Knowledge  of  Foreign  Law.  [So  far  as  our  own 
system  of  law  is  concerned,  it  is  an  undeniable  fact  of  modern  con- 
ditions —  whatever  it  may  have  been  down  to  Coke's  time  —  that 
a  knowledge  of  the  law  may  be  adequately  gained  by  the  mere  study 
of  books  —  i.  e,  hearsay  reports  —  without  attendance  at  court.1 
But  so  far  as  foreign  law  is  concerned,  it  may  well  be  that  some 
practice  of  it  in  the  courts  of  the  country  should  be  exacted  of  the 
witness,  —  not  so  much  because  books  are  not  a  satisfactory  source 
of  knowledge,  as  because  the  ability  to  interpret  and  to  value  the 
sources  thus  consulted  is  better  guaranteed  by  a  practice  among  the 
members  of  the  bar.  Some  such  indefinite  requirement  seems  to  be 
generally  made.2] 

§  430  n.  Same :  Knowledge  of  Values  and  Prices.  [To  know 
values  or  prices  is  to  know  of  acceptances  or  offers  averaged  into  a 
mean  or  probable  figure,  and  all  testimony  to  value  rests  on  an  ac- 
quaintance, more  or  less  indefinitely  implied,  with  such  data.  One 
who  does  not  obtain  these  data  at  first-hand,  but  testifies  to  value 
only  from  a  casual  inquiry  made  of  others,  will  ordinarily  be  ex- 
cluded.1 But  in  most  commercial  occupations  a  dealer's  acquaint- 
ance with  values  rests  partially  or  entirely  on  regular  reports,  in 
journals  or  otherwise,  furnished  for  the  purpose  ;  and,  where  such  is 
the  course  of  trade,  a  dealer  whose  knowledge  is  obtained  in  the 
customary  way  from  prices-current  or  other  sources  accepted  in 
the  trade  may  well  be  qualified  to  testify.2] 

v.  R.  Co.,  48  Wis.  521  ;  Block  v.  R.  Co.,  89  id.  371.  Contra:  Van  Winkle  v.  R.  Co., 
93  la.  509;  People  i>.  Murphy,  101  N.  Y.  130,  semble ;  Davidson  v.  Cornell,  132  id. 
236,  semble;  Abbot  v.  Heath,  84  Wis.  314  ;  Del.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Roalefs,  28  U.  S. 
A  pp.  f>69.] 

»  Qirown  v.  Ins.  Co.,  65  Mich.  815  ;  Rouch  i>.  Zehring,  59  Pa.  78  ;  U.  S.  t>. 
Faulkner,  35  Fed.  732  ;  Vosburg  v.  Putney,  78  Wis.  87.] 

*  \_Contra  :  Heald  o.  Thing,  45  Me.  395  ;  Atch.  T.  &S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier,  27  Kan. 
463;  Wetherbee  v.  Wetherbee,  38  Vt.  454.] 

1  fColeridge,  J.,  in  Baron  de  Bode's  Ca*e,  8  Q.  B.  263."] 

2  LSee  Bristow  v.  Sequeville,  5  Exch.  275 ;  Re  Bondli  s  Goods,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  69  ; 
Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,  26  W.  R.  864  ;  Consol.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cashow,  41  Md.  79  ;  Hall 
v.  Costello,  48  N.  H.  179.] 

i  FGreen  v.  Caulk,  16  Md.  572  ;  Lewis  v.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Gray  511  ;  Kost  v.  Bender, 
25  Mich.  519.  Contra:  Thatcher  v.  Kautcher,  2  Colo.  700  ;  Lush  v.  Druse,  4  Wend. 
317.1 

«[>nith  v-  K-  Co.,  68  N.  C.  115;  Whitney  v.  Thacher,  117  Mass.  53  (leading 
cases);  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Skellie,  86  Ga.  6C  ;  Hudson  v.  R.  Co.,  92  la.  231  ;  Sisson  v.  R. 
Co.,  14  Mich.  490  ;  C.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Perkins,  17  id.  301 ;  Sirrine  v.  Briggs,  31  Mich. 
446  ;  Hoxsiev.  Lumber  Co.,  41  Minn.  548;  Harrison  v.  Glover,  72  N.  Y.  454  ;  Fairley 
v.  Smith,  87  N.  C.  367  ;  Tex.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Donovan,  86  Tex.  378  ;  Cliquot's  Cham- 
pagne, 3  Wall.  141. 

For  the  use  of  the  price-lists  themselves,  as  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule,  see 
ante,  §  162  /.] 


§§  430  1-430  p.]  KNOWLEDGE.  531 

§  430  o.  Same :  Sundries.  [In  still  other  ways,  an  element  of 
hearsay  may  enter  into  a  person's  sources  of  belief,  and  yet  may  not 
practically  be  objectionable,  —  particularly  in  the  case  of  profes- 
sional observers ;  as,  for  example,  tests  by  a  thermometer  whose 
accuracy  rests  on  a  certificate  by  a  professional  authority  ; 1  reckon- 
ing by  a  counting-machine ; 2  statements  by  a  railroad-official  as  to 
car-mileage,  based  on  calculations  made  by  subordinates ; 8  surgeons 
testifying  to  infected  districts,  and  speaking  chiefly  from  reported 
data.*  Testimony  based  on  the  use  of  vacuum-rays  —  Roentgen 
rays — would  seem  to  be  supportable  from  this  point  of  view.6] 

§  430  p.    Adequacy  of  Opportunities  of  Observation  ;   (1)   Sanity  ; 

(2)  Value.     [Whether  a  witness  has  by  his  situation  had  a  sufficient 
opportunity  of  observing  the  matter  in  hand  will  usually  depend 
upon  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court.1    The  cases  in  which  the  ques- 
tion most  commonly  arises  are  those  of  (1)  sanity,  (2)  value,  and 

(3)  handwriting. 

(1)  Sanity.     A  person  put  forward  to  testify  as  to  the  sanity  or  in- 
sanity of  another  person  must,  of  course,  have  had  an  opportunity,  by 
observation  of  the  latter's  conduct,  sufficient  to  form  an  opinion  worth 
listening  to.     To  express  a  test  which  shall  be  flexible  enough  to 
cover  all  situations,  and  at  the  same  time  definite  enough  to  serve  as 
a  rule,  is  perhaps  impossible.2     The  precedents  in  the  various  Courts 
are  little  more  than  rulings  upon  the  particular  witness  before  them, 
and  no  general  test  can  be  said  to  prevail.     It  should  be  noted  that, 
by  long  tradition,  the  attesting  witness  to  a  will  is  always  admissi- 
ble to  speak  as  to  the  testator's  sanity,  whatever  the  length  of  his 
acquaintance  may  have  been.8 

(2)  Value.     Knowledge  of  the  value  of  a  thing  usually  involves, 
first,  a  knowledge  of  the  value  of  the  class  of  things  in  question,  and, 
secondly,  an  acquaintance  with  the  particular  thing  to  be  valued ;  be- 
sides this,  a  third  qualification  may  be  demanded,  viz.,  experience  or 
skill  in  judging  of  values.     A  ruling  as  to  a  value-witness  usually  in- 
volves a  ruling  on  all  three  of  these  matters ;  and  it  is  not  always 
easy  to  distinguish  to  which  of  them  a  particular  phrasing  is  directed, 
especially  as  between  the  first  and  the  third  of  the  above  principles. 

i  ("Hatcher  v.  Dunn,  102  la.  411.1 
a    'More's  Estate,  Cal.,  54  Pnc.  97J 
»    "So.  I.  C.  Line  v.  R.  Co.,  Tenn.,  42  S.  W.  529.] 
*    "Grayson  v.  Lynch,  U.  S.,  16  Sup.  1064.] 

6   "For  the  use  of  photographs  by  this  process  —  a  different  question,  —  see  post, 
§  439  h.  1 

1  rjStillwell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Phelps,  130  U.  S.  527 ;  Montana  R.  Co.  v.  Warren,  137  id. 
353.] 

2  QSee  for  careful  attempts,  Clary  ».  Clary,  2  Ired.  85  ;  Powell  v.  State,  25  Ala. 
72;   Choile  v.  State,  31  Ga.  467;   Beaubien  v.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  503;   Carpenter's 
Estate.  94  Cal.  414.] 

8  FJHpyward  v.  Heyward,  Bay  349 ;  Williams  v.  Spencer,  150  Mass.  349  ;  Garrison 
v.  Wanton,  48  Tex.  303-3 


532  WITNESSES  ;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [CH.  xxin. 

It  will  be  possible  here  merely  to  indicate  the  general  nature  of  the 
controversies  and  the  principles  commonly  applied. 

(a)  As  to  the  first  and  the  third  above  principles  —  experience  in 
judging  values  generally,  and  familiarity  with' the  class  of  values  in 
question  —  it  is  almost  universally  laid  down  that  no  special  training 
or  experience  is  necessary  for  a  witness  to  value,  and  that  an  actual 
acquaintance  with  the  class  of  values  in  question  is  alone  necessary. 
In  particular,  a  witness  to  Zaw^-value  need  not  be  by  occupation  a 
dealer  in  land ;  *  nor  need  he  himself  have  made  purchases  or  sales 
of  land  ; 6  nor  need  he  have  had  personal  knowledge  of  specific  sales  ; 9 
it  is  generally  said  that  any  person  acquainted  with  such  ^  values  may 
testify,  or  any  person  residing  in  or  owning  land  in  the  neighborhood.7 
For  the  value  of  services,  the  witness,  if  the  services  are  of  the  sort 
termed  professional,  must  probably  be  a  member  of  the  profession  ; 8 
for  other  services,  an  acquaintance  with  the  value  of  their  class  is 
necessary ;  *  though  one  who  had  employed  the  person  in  question 
might  testify,  irrespective  of  such  general  knowledge,10  as  well  as  the 
person  himself  who  has  rendered  them.11  For  the  value  of  personalty, 
any  one  familiar  with  the  class  of  values  is  usually  deemed  compe- 
tent ; 12  and  in  any  case  the  owner  of  an  article  may  usually  testify 
to  its  value.18 

(&)  As  to  the  second  principle  above  —  the  witness'  acquaintance 
with  the  particular  thing  to  be  valued,  —  it  is  of  course  necessary  that 
the  witness  should  possess  such  acquaintance ;  "  but  its  sufficiency  in 

4  [j3an  Diego  Land  Co.  v.  Neale,  78  Cal.  76  ;  Snodgrass  v.  Chicago,  152  111.  600  ; 
Pike  '•.  Chicago,  155  id.  656  ;  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawk,  39  Kan.  640  ;  Lincoln  v.  Com., 
164  Mass.  368  ;  Union  Elev.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  135  Mo.  353;  Huff  v.  Hall,  56  Mich. 
458  ;  Lincoln  &  B.  H.  R.  Co.  i>.  Sutherland,  44  Nebr.  526 ;  Chic.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Buel,  id.,  76  N.  W.  571  ;  Robertson  v.  Knapp,  35  N.  Y.  92  ;  P.  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.  r. 
Bunnell,  81  Pa.  426  ;  Hanover  Water  Co.  v.  Iron  Co.,  84  id.  281,  285-3 

6  [[Walker  v.  Boston,  8  Gush.  279  ;  Swan  v.  Middlesex,  101  Mass.  177 ;  N.  E.  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Frazier,  25  Nebr.  54. 3 

«  TChic.  &E.  R.  Co.  v.  Blake,  116  111.  166;  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawk,  39  Kan. 
640.T 

7~L"Hunnicutt  »•  Kirkpntrick,  39  Ark.  172;  Bradshaw  v.  Atkins,  110  111.  332; 
Stone  v.  Covell,  29  Mich.  362  ;  Lehmicke  v.  R.  Co.,  19  Minn.  481;  Thomas  v.  Mai- 
linckrodt,  43  Mo.  65;  Union  El.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  135  id.  353;  N.  E.  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Frazier,  25  Nebr.  54;  Penn.  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Bunnell,  81  Pa.  426  ;  Hanover  Water 
Co.  v.  Iron  Co.,  84  id.  281.] 

8  QSee  Mock  v.  Kelly,  3  Ala.  387  ;  Turnbull  v.  Richardson,  69  Mich.  406 ;  Kelley  v. 
Richardson,  ib.  432 ;  Clark  v.  Ellsworth,  104  la.  442.] 

9  QSee  Chamness  v.  Chamness,  53  Ind.  304  ;  Alt  v.  Syrup  Co.,  19  Nev.  19  ;  Cornell 
v.  Dean,  105  Mass.  435.] 

10  QSee  Doster  v.  Brown,  25  Ga.  25;  Kennett  v.  Fickel,  41  Kan.  213;  Kendall  n. 
May,  10  All.  61,  67  ;  Ritter  v.  Daniels,  47  Mich.  618;  McPetres  v.  Ray,  85  N.  C.  464.J 

"  [Chic.  &  E.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bivans,  142  111.  401  ;  Misso.  P.  Co.  v.  R.  Farmer,  Nebr., 
76  N.  W.  169.] 

12  ([Slate  r.  Finch,  70  la.  317 ;  Brady  v.  Brady,  8  All.  101  ;  Conti.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Horton,  28  Mich.  175  ;  Hood  v.  Maxwell,  1  W.  Va.  221."] 

"  rrhomason  v.  Ins.  Co.,  92  la.  72  ;  Whitesell  v.  Cann,  8  W.  &  S.  371  ;  Adams 
Ex.  Co.  v.  Schlessinger,  75  Pa.  248,  256  ;  Shea  v.  Hudson,  165  Mass.  43.] 

»«  [See  the  principle  set  forth  in  Bedell  v.  R.  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  370 ;  P.  V.  &  C.  R.  Co. 
«.  Vance,  115  Pa.  332] 


§§  430  ^-430  q.]  KNOWLEDGE.  533 

a  given  case  must  be  largely  a  matter  for  the  trial  Court's  discretion, 
depending  on  the  circumstances  of  each  case.15 

(3)  A  witness  to  handwriting  must,  of  course,  have  become  familiar 
by  observation  with  the  style  of  handwriting  in  question  ;  but  it  will 
be  convenient  to  discuss  in  another  place  all  the  questions  connected 
with  proof  of  handwriting.1'] 

§  430  q.  Testimony  based  on  Telephonic  Communication.  [Several 
questions  here  arise,  some  of  them  involving  the  present  principle, 
and  it  is  necessary  carefully  to  distinguish  the  different  evidential 
objections  involved. 

(1)  The  question  of  the  Identity  or  personality  of  the  antiphonal 
speaker  may  arise.  B  asserts  that  certain  words  (assumed  to  be  ad- 
missible) were  uttered  to  him  by  A  over  the  telephone  ;  how  does  B 
know  that  the  speaker  was  A  ?  (a)  It  is  generally  conceded  that  a 
person  may  be  recognized  by  his  voice,1  if  the  hearer  is  acquainted 
with  the  speaker's  voice  ;  assuming,  then,  that  B  is  thus  so  acquainted 
with  A's  voice,  and  that  voices  can  sometimes  be  distinguished  on  the 
telephone,  and  that  in  this  instance  B  did  distinguish  A's  voice,  then 
B's  belief  that  A  was  the  speaker  seems  to  be  well  founded  and  admis- 
sible ;  and  this  seems  generally  conceded.2  (&)  If  there  is  no  recog- 
nition of  voice,  is  B's  belief  in  A's  personality  inadmissible  ?  Or  may 
other  circumstances  give  sufficient  data  for  justifying  and  receiving 
his  belief  ?  There  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  view  that  the  mercantile 
custom,  by  which  the  numbers  in  a  telephone-book  do  correspond  to 
the  stated  addresses,  and  operators  do  call  up  the  correct  office,  and 
the  person  called  up  does'give  a  correct  answer,  is  sufficiently  trust- 
worthy ;  and  that  a  belief  based  on  it  is  admissible,  just  as  a  belief 
based  on  regular  prices-current  or  on  accepted  medical  books  (ante, 
§§  430  I,  430  n)  is  receivable ;  and  this  view  has  some  support  in 
authority.8  Besides  this,  however,  the  particular  case  may  furnish 
other  data  which  suffice  to  give  a  basis  for  the  witness'  belief.4 
(c)  A  similar,  but  different,  question  arises  where  the  antiphonal 
speaker  does  not  purport  to  be  a  particular  person,  but  merely  some 
agent  authorized  to  make  a  contract  or  an  admission;  here  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  he  was  really  a  person  acting  in  the  opponent's  office 

16  QSee  examples  in  Dyer  v.  Rosenthal,  45  Mich.  590  ;  Metzger  v.  Assur.  Co.,  Mich., 
63  N.  W.  647  ;  Lehmicke  v.  R.  Co.,  19  Minn.  482  ;  Slocovich  v.  Ins.  Co.,  108  N.  Y. 
61  ;  Mewes  v.  Pipe- Line  Co.,  170  Pa.  364.] 

16  rPost,  §§  576  ff.] 

1  tassel!  v.  State,  93  Ga.  450  ;  Deal  v.  State,  140  Ind.  354 ;   Ogden  v.  Illinois, 
134  111.  599  ;  Com.  v.  Williams,  105  Mass.  67 ;  State  v.  Hopkirk,  84  Mo.  288.] 

2  PDeering  v.  Shumjiik,  67  Minn.  348  ;  Stepp  v.  State,  81  Tex.  Cr.  349,  352.] 

8  |_Globe  Printing  Co.  v.  Stahl,  23  Mo.  App.  451,  458,  opinion  by  Thompson,  J.  ; 
Wolfe  v.  R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  481.] 

*  QSee  People  v.  McKane,  143  N.  Y.  455  ;  Davis  v.  Walter,  70  la.  466.  Whether 
such  information  is  enough  to  furnish  the  basis  of  an  affidavit  (Murphy  v.  Jack,  142- 
N.  Y.  212),  or  of  a  notary's  certificate  of  acknowledgment  (Banning  v.  Banning,  80 
Cal.  273),  or  of  an  order  discharging  a  juror  (State  v.  Nelson,  19  R.  I.  467),  may  well 
be  a  different  question.] 


534  WITNESSES;  QUALIFICATIONS.  [en.  XXIIL 

and  about  the  opponent's  business,  or  was  a  mere  intruder  or  by- 
stander. On  the  principle  above  suggested,  mercantile  custom  should 
suffice  to  admit  the  testimony,  since  a  person  who  is  called  up  and 
proceeds  to  conduct  the  negotiation  is  prima  facie  a  person  in  the  op- 
ponent's office  and  authorized  to  do  such  things.8  Here,  also,  in  any 
case,  further  data  may  suffice  to  complete  the  gap,  —  as  where  the  de- 
tails of  the  conversation  indicate  a  person  trusted  with  the  business.8 

(2)  The  matter  of  identity  not  being  in  dispute,  there  may  still  be 
a  question  of  the  Hearsay  rule.     If  B,  instead  of  speaking  directly  to 
A,  converses  with  a  clerk  or  a  telephone-operator  at  the  other  end  of 
the  line,  and  the  latter  reports  to  B  A's  statements  (usually  admis- 
sions or  contract-negotiations),  then  B  is  no  longer  in  any  view  a 
witness  to  A's  remarks,  and  we  are  in  truth  asked  to  receive  the 
operator's   hearsay   (i.  e.   extrajudicial)    report   of    A?s    utterances. 
Here  two  or  three  solutions  offer,     (a)  If  we  apply  the  hearsay  rule 
strictly,  the  evidence  is  excluded.7     (b)  But  suppose  that  A  had  sent 
his  clerk  to  B  to  report  orally  the  same  statement ;  here  the  clerk 
would  clearly  be  A's  agent  to  report  A's  admission,  contract-accept- 
ance, etc.,  to  B.     Why  does  not  the  same  principle  admit  the  report 
of  the  telephone-operator,  on  the  theory  that  A,  by  resorting  to  the 
telephone,  has  made  the  operator  his  agent  for  the  purpose  of  commu- 
nicating ?    This  solution  seems  sound,  and  has  more  than  once  been 
accepted.8     (c)  The  preceding  solution  applies  only  where  A  is  a 
party,  and  can  thus  be  affected  by  his  agent's  acts.    It  does  not  cover 
the  case  where  A  is  a  third  person  ;  and  for  this  situation  there 
seems  no  solution  except  by  making  a  distinct  exception  to  the  Hear- 
say rule,  after  the  analogy  of  regular  entries  in  the  course  of  business 
(ante,  §  120  a)  or  of  commercial  reports  (ante,  §  162  I) ;  but  this  solu- 
tion seems  not  yet  to  have  been  attempted  by  any  Court. 

(3)  Occasionally  still  other  principles  may  be  involved;  whether 
there  was  a  sufficiency  of  information  for  an  affidavit,  etc.,9  whether 
a  person  may  corroborate  himself  by  telling  what  he  repeated  at  the 
time  as  the  message  received  ; 10  and  these  must  be  carefully  distin- 
guished from  the  preceding  and  more  troublesome  questions.] 

6  [|Rock  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Potter,  36  111.  App.  592  ;  Wolfe  v.R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  481  ; 
contra :  Obermann  Brewing  Co.  v.  Adams,  35  111.  App.  540.1 

a  QMiss.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Heidenheimer,  82  Tex.  207.    See  Morrell  v.  Lumber  Co.,  51 
Mo.  App.  595.] 

[As  in  Wilson  v.  Coleman,  81  Ga.  299.] 

[Sullivan  v.  Kuykendall,  82  Ky.  489  ;  Oskamp  v.  Gadsden,  35  Nebr.  7.] 
9    'mAnte,  note  4.] 

10  [[Excluded  in  German  B'k  v.  Citizens'  B'k,  101  la.  530,  on  the  principle  of 
S  4696,  post.] 


§§  430  <?-432.]          WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION. 


535 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  ;  MODE  OF  EXAMINATION. 


§  431.   In  general. 

1 .   Sequestration. 
§  432.    Allowable  in  Discretion. 
§  432  a.   Who  may  be  excluded. 
§  432  b.   Exclusion  of  some  only. 
§  432  c.  Consequences  of  Disobedience. 

2.  Leading  Questions. 
§  434.   General  Rule. 
§  435.   Exceptions. 

3.  Recollection. 

§  439  a.  Two  Kinds  of  Recollection, 
Past  and  Present. 

§  439  b.   Record  of  Past  Recollection. 

§  439  c.  Stimulating  (Refreshing)  Pres- 
ent Recollection. 

4.   Modes  of  giving  Testimony. 
§  439  d.   In  general. 
§  439  e.   Interpretation. 


§  439 /.  Writing. 

§  439  g.  Maps,  Drawings,  Diagrams, 
Models. 

§  439  h.  Photographs. 

5.  Opinion  Rule. 

§  441  b.    General  Principle. 

§  441  c.   Matters  of  Law. 

§  441  d.  Conduct  as  to  Care,  Reason- 
ableness, Safety,  etc. 

§  441  e.   Insurance  ;  Increase  of  Risk. 

§  441  /.    Sanity. 

§  441  g.   Value. 

§  441  h.  State  of  Mind  (Intention,  Feel- 
ings,  Meaning,  etc. )  of  another  Person. 

§  441  i.   Same  :  Discriminations. 

§  441 .;'.   Sundries. 

§  441  k.  Hypothetical  Questions  ;  Gen- 
eral Principle. 

§  441 1.  Same  :  Rules  for  the  Use  of 
Hypothetical  Questions. 


§  431.  In  general.  Having  thus  treated  of  the  means  of  procur- 
ing the  attendance  of  witnesses,  and  of  their  competency,  we  come 
now  to  consider  the  manner  in  which  they  are  to  be  examined.  And, 
here,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  subject  lies 
chiefly  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  before  whom  the  cause  is 
tried,  it  being  from  its  very  nature  susceptible  of  but  few  positive 
and  stringent  rules.  The  great  object  is  to  elicit  the  truth  from 
the  witness  ;  but  the  character,  intelligence,  moral  courage,  bias, 
memory,  and  other  circumstances  of  witnesses  are  so  various,  as  to 
require  almost  equal  variety  in  the  manner  of  interrogation,  and  the 
degree  of  its  intensity,  to  attain  that  end.  This  manner  and  degree, 
therefore,  as  well  as  the  other  circumstances  of  the  trial,  must  neces- 
sarily be  left  somewhat  at  large,  subject  to  the  few  general  rules 
which  we  shall  proceed  to  state  ;  remarking  only,  that  wherever 
any  matter  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  one  judge,  his  decision  is  not 
subject  to  be  reversed  or  revised  by  another. 


1.    Sequestration. 

§  432.   Allowable  in  Discretion.     If  the  judge  deems  it  essential 
to  the  discovery  of  truth,  that  the  witnesses  should  be  examined  out 


536  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

of  the  hearing  of  each  other,  he  will  so  order  it.  [The  process  is 
termed,  in  many  American  courts,  "  putting  under  the  rule ; "  but  a 
better  term  seems  "sequestration."]  This  order,  upon  the  motion 
or  suggestion  of  either  party,  is  rarely  withheld,  but,  by  the  weight 
of  authority,  the  party  does  not  seem  entitled  to  it  as  a  matter  of 
right.1 

§  432  a.  Who  may  be  excluded.  [The  ordinary  witness  may 
always  be  subjected  to  this  safeguard.  Where  he  is  also  a  party  to 
the  cause,  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  whether  he  may 
be  subjected  to  it  and  thus  deprived  of  the  opportunity  of  watching 
and  advising  in  the  cause  ;  the  better  opinion  is  that  he  cannot  be 
excluded.1]  An  attorney  in  the  cause,  whose  personal  attendance  is 
necessary,  is  usually  excepted  from  the  order  to  withdraw.3 

§  432  b.  Exclusion  of  some  only.  [It  is  not  necessary  that  all 
should  be  excluded  ;  the  Court  has  discretion  to  exclude  some  and  to 
allow  others  to  remain  ;  and  the  asking  party  cannot  complain  that 
such  exceptions  are  made.1] 

§  432  c.  Consequence  of  Disobedience.  The  course  in  such  cases 
is  either  to  require  the  names  of  the  witnesses  to  be  stated  by  the 
counsel  of  the  respective  parties,  by  whom  they  were  summoned, 
and  to  direct  the  sheriff  to  keep  them  in  a  separate  room  until  they 
are  called  for ;  or,  more  usually,  to  cause  them  to  withdraw,  by  an 

1  In  R.  v.  Cook,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  348,  it  was  declared  by  Lord  C.  J.  Trehy  to  be  grant- 
able  of  favor  only,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Court,  and  this  opinion  was  followed  by 
Lord  C.  J.  Holt,  in  R.  v.  Vanghan,  ib.  494,  and  by  Sir  Michael  Foster,  in  R.  v.  Good- 
ere,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1015  ;  see  also  1  Stark.  Evid.  163  ;  Beamon  v.  Ellice,  4  C.  &  P. 
585,  per  Taunton,  J.  ;  State  v.  Sparrow,  3  Murphy  487.  The  rule  is  stated  by  For- 
tescue,  in  these  words  :  "  Et  si  necessitas  exegerit,  dividantur  testes  hujusmodi,  donee 
ipsi  deposuerint  quicquid  velint,  ita  quod  dictum  unius  non  docebit  aut  concitabit 
eorum  alium  ad  consimiliter  testificandum :"  Fortesc  De  Laud.  Leg.  Angl.  c.  26. 
This,  however,  does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  right  of  the  Court  to  determine  whether 
there  is  any  need  of  a  separate  examination.  Mr.  Phillips  states  it  only  as  the  uniform 
course  of  practice,  that  "the  Court,  on  the  application  of  counsel,  will  order  the  wit- 
nesses on  both  sides  to  withdraw  : "  2  Phil.  Evid.  395  ;  and  see,  accordingly,  Williams 
v.  Hulie,  1  Sid.  131 ;  Swift  on  Evid.  512.  In  Taylor  v.  Lawson,  3  C.  &  P.  543,  Best, 
C.  J.,  regretted  that  the  rule  of  parliamentary  practice,  which  excludes  all  witnesses 
but  the  one  under  examination,  was  not  universally  adopted.  But  in  Southey  v. 
Nash,  7  C.  &  P.  632,  Alderson,  B.,  expressly  recognized  it  as  "the  right  of  either 
party,  at  any  moment,  to  require  that  the  unexamined  witnesses  shall  leave  the  court." 
Lit  was  said,  in  R.  v.  Murphy,  8  C.  &  P.  307,  to  be  "  almost  a  right ;  "  nnd  in  a  few 
Courts  it  is  said  to  be  so  detnandaule  :  Shaw  v.  State,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  477;  Nelson  v. 
State,  2  Swan  237,  257.  But  the  great  majority  of  Courts  treat  it  as  a  matter  of  dis- 
cretion :  McClellan  v.  State,  Ala.,  23  So.  653  ;  People  v.  McCarty,  117  Cal.  65  ;  Parkes 
v.  U.  S.,  Ind.  Terr.,  43  S.  W.  858;  Kent.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Abney,  Ky.,  31  S.  W.  279; 
Com.  v.  Thompson,  159  Mass.  56;  People  v.  Considine,  105  Mich.  149;  State  v.  Duffey, 
128  Mo.  549  ;  Chic.  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  Nebr.,  74  N.  W.  403.  J 

1  Contra:  jPennimau  v.  Hill,  24  W.  R.  245  ;|  accord:  QKent.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Abney, 
Ky.,  31  S.  W.  279  ;  Richards  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  723  ;]  {and  it  is  customary  not  to  ex- 
clude a  party  :  Sidfe  v.  Isaacson.  1  F.  &  F.  194  ;  Charnock  v.  Dewings,  8  C.  &  K.  878.  | 

a  Kverett  v.  Loudham,  5  C.  &  P.  91 ;   Pomeroy  v.  Baddeley,  Ry.  &  M.  430. 

*  CR.  v.  O'Brien,  7  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1,  45  (reporter)  ;  Wobb  v.  State,  100  Ala.  47,  52 
(iherilF) ;  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Phillips,  91  Ga.  526  ;  Keller  v.  State,  id.,  31  S.  E.  92 ;  State 
v.  Whitworth,  126  Mo.  573  (father  of  rape-complainant) ;  Dement  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  46 
8.  W.  917  ;  Johnican  v.  State,  id.,  48  S.  W.  181 ;  Jackson  v.  Com.,  Va/,  30  S.  E.  452.  J 


§§432-434]     SEQUESTRATION;  LEADING  QUESTIONS.  537 

order  from  the  bench,  accompanied  with  notice,  that  if  they  remain 
they  will  not  be  examined.  In  the  latter  case,  if  a  witness  remains 
in  court  in  violation  of  the  order  even  by  mistake,  it  is  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  judge  whether  or  not  he  shall  be  examined.1  The 
course  formerly  was  to  exclude  him  ;  and  this  is  still  the  inflexible 
rule  in  the  Exchequer  in  revenue  cases,  in  order  to  prevent  any 
imputation  of  unfairness  in  proceedings  between  the  crown  and  the 
subject ;  but  with  this  exception,  the  rule  in  criminal  and  civil  cases 
is  the  same.2  The  right  of  excluding  witnesses  for  disobedience  to 
such  an  order,  though  well  established,  is  rarely  exercised  in  Amer- 
ica ; 3  but  the  witness  is  punishable  for  the  contempt. 
§  433.1 

2.   Leading  Questions. 

§  434.  Oeneral  Rule.  In  the  direct  examination  of  a  witness,  it 
is  not  allowed  to  put  to  him  what,  are  termed  leading  questions;  that 
is,  questions  which  suggest  to  the  witness  the  answer  desired.1  The 
rule  is  to  be  understood  in  a  reasonable  sense;  for  if  it  were  not 
allowed  to  approach  the  points  at  issue  by  such  questions,  the  ex- 
aminations would  be  most  inconveniently  protracted.  To  abridge 
the  proceedings,  and  bring  the  witness  as  soon  as  possible  to  the 
material  points  on  which  he  is  to  speak,  the  counsel  may  lead  him 
on  to  that  length,  and  may  recapitulate  to  him  the  acknowledged 
facts  of  the  case  which  have  been  already  established.  The  rule, 
therefore,  is  not  applied  to  that  part  of  the  examination,  which  is 
merely  introductory  of  that  which  is  material.2 

[A  leading  question  is  a  question  which  directly  suggests  the 
answer  that  is  expected ;  *  the  rule  is  intended  to  avoid  the  danger 

1  It  has,  however,  been  held,  that,  if  the  witness  remains  in  court,  in  disobedience 
of  its  order,  his  testimony  cannot,  on  that  ground  alone,  be  excluded  ;  but  that  it  is 
matter  for  observation  on  his  evidence:  Chandler  v.  Home,  2  M.  &  Rob.  423. 

2  Attorney-General  v.  Bulpit,  9  Price  4  ;  Parker  v.  McWilliam,  6  Bing.  688 ;   8.  0. 
4  Moore  &  Payne  480  ;  Thomas  v.  David,  7  C.  &  P.  350 ;  R.  v.  Colley,  1  M.  &  Malk. 
829  ;  Beamon  v.  Ellice,  4  C.  &  P.  585,  and  n.  (6);  jCobbett  v.  Hudson,  1  E.  &  B.  14  ; 
People  v.  Sam  Lung,  70  Cal.  516  ;[  [Thorn  v.  Kemp,  98  Ala.  417,  423  ;  Goon  Bow 
v.  People,  111.,  43  N.  E.  593;  State  v.  Jones,  47  La.  An.  1524;  State  v.  David,  131 
Mo.  380  ;  Holder  v.  IT.  S.,  150  U.  S.  91.     Some  Courts  take  the  distinction  that  the 
disobedience  must  appear  to  have  been  by  collusion  with  the  party :  \  Davis  v.  Byrcl,  94 
Ind.  525;  State  v.  Thomas,   111  id.  516;}  Davenport  v.  Ogg,  15  Kan.  366;  Com. 
v.  Crowley,  168  Mass.  121  ;  People  v.  Piper,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  175;  and  a  few  hold 
that  the  disobedience  should  not  be  visited  by  exclusion  :  R.  v.  Boyle,  1  Lew.  Cr.  C. 
325  ;  Cunningham  v.  State,  97  Ga.  214  ;  Timberlake  v.  Thayer,  Miss.,  23  So.   767  ; 
Brown  v.  Com.,  90  Va.  671  ;j    j  State  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  179;  Hubbard  ».  Hubbard, 
7  Or.  42. } 

8  See  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  254,  256  ;  State  v.  Sparrow,  8  Murph.  487  ;  State  v. 
Brookshire,  2  Ala.  303  ;  Dyer  v.  Morris,  4  Mo.  214  ;  Keith  v.  Wilson,  6  Mo.  435  ; 
{Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624.1 

1  [Transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 

1  Snyder  v.  Snyder,  6  Binn.  483 ;  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3  Washingt.  680  ;  Parkin  ». 
Moon,  7  C.  &  P.  408  ;  Alison's  Practice,  545  ;  Tait  on  Evid.  427. 

2  [Gannon  v.  Stevens,  18  Kan.  457  ;  Hall  v.  Taylor,  45  N.  H.  407  ;  Hansenfluck 
r.  Com.,  85  Va.  707.] 

»  [Page  v.  Parker,  40  N.  H.  63  ;  Cooler  v.  Rhodes,  38  Fla.  240.3 


538  WITNESSES  ;   EXAMINATION.  [CH.   XXIV. 

that  the  questioner  may  suggest  and  the  witness,  unwittingly  or  by 
connivance,  may  assent  to  or  repeat  a  form  of  words  which  does  not 
represent  the  witness'  real  and  unaided  belief.  Any  question,  there- 
fore, may  in  certain  circumstances  be  suggestive  or  leading ;  *  and 
whether  a  particular  question  violates  the  rule  is  usually  and  properly 
said  to  be  determinable  by  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court.6  A  few 
general  types  of  questions,  however,  have  frequently  come  up  for 
ruling  upon  principle.]  Questions  are  objectionable,  as  leading, 
which,  embodying  a  material  fact,  admit  of  an  answer  by  a  simple 
negative  or  affirmative,  [provided  the  inquiry  is  directly  suggestive 
of  the  desired  answer,  —  as,  "  Did  not  the  plaintiff  wear  a  white 
hat  ?  " 6  but  where  it  is  framed  in  the  alternative  —  as,  "  Say  whether 
he  wore  a  white  hat  or  not,"  —  it  is  usually  treated  as  not  neces- 
sarily either  improper  or  proper;  it  may  be  either  according  to  the 
circumstances.7  ]  An  argumentative  or  pregnant  course  of  interro- 
gation is  as  faulty  as  the  like  course  in  pleading ;  the  interrogatory 
must  not  assume  facts  to  have  been  proved  which  have  not  been 
proved;  nor,  that  particular  answers  have  been  given  which  have 
not  been  given.8 

§  435.  Exceptions.  In  some  cases,  however,  leading  questions  are 
permitted,  even  in  a  direct  examination,  —  namely,  where  the  witness 
appears  to  be  hostile  to  the  party  producing  him,  or  in  the  interest  of 
the  other  party,  or  unwilling  to  give  evidence ; l  or  where  an  omission 
in  his  testimony  is  evidently  caused  by  want  of  recollection,  which  a 
suggestion  may  assist ;  thus,  where  the  witness  stated  that  he  could 
not  recollect  the  names  of  the  component  members  of  a  firm,  so  as  to 
repeat  them  without  suggestion,  but  thought  he  might  possibly  recol- 
lect them  if  suggested  to  him,  this  was  permitted  to  be  done ; 2  so, 
where  the  transaction  involves  numerous  items  or  dates ;  so,  where, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  mind  of  the  witness  cannot  be  directed 

«  TSteer  v.  Little,  44  N.  H.  616.] 

6  LR.  v.  Murphy,  8  C.  &  P.  306  ;  Ohlsen  v.  Terrero,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  129 ;  Blevins  v. 
Pope,  7  Ala.  374  ;    Doran  v.  Mullen,  78  111.  145  ;   Shockey  v.  Mills,  71  Ind.  291  ; 
People  v.  Goldensen,  76  Cal.  349  ;  Welch  v.  Stipe,  95  Oa.  762  ;  State  v.  Bauerkemper, 
9o  la.  562;   Francis  v.  Rosa,  151  Mass.  534;  People  v.  Roat,  Mich.,  76  N.  W.  91  ; 
State  v.  Dneatrow,  137  Mo.  44  ;  Harvard  v.  Stiles,  Nebr.,  74  N.  W.  399  ;  Trenton  R. 
Co.  v.  Cooper,  N.  .1.,  87  Atl.  730  ;  Crenshaw  v.  Johnson,  120  N.  C.  270  ;  State  v. 
Johnson,  43  S.  C.  123  ;  St.  Clair  u.  U.  S.,  154  U.  S.  134,  150. 

For  the  rule  as  to  depositions,  see  also  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §  851. ] 

«  TNicholls  v.  Dowding,  1  Stark.  81  ;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  448.] 

7  [People  ».    Mather,   supra;    McKeown   v.    Harvey,    40   Mich.    228;    State  ». 
Wickliff,  95  la.  386;  Coogler  v.  Rhodes,  38  Fla.  240  ;  Steer  v.  Little,  44  N.  H.  616.] 

»  Hill  v.  Coombe,  1  Stark.  Evid.  163,  n.;  Turney  v.  State,  8  Sm.  &M.  103  ;  [Steer 
v.  Little,  44  N.  H.  616  ;  Carpenter  v.  Ambroson,  20  111.  172;  Davis  v.  Cook,  14  Nev. 
287  ;  Re  Hine,  68  Conn.  551.] 

1  Clarke  v.  Saffery,  Ry.  &  M.  126,  per  Best,  C.  J. ;  R.  v.  Chapman,  8  C.  &  P.  558  ; 
R.  v.  Ball,  id.  745  ;  R.  v.  Murphy,  id.  297  ;  Bank  of  North.  Liberties  v.  Davis.  6  Watts 
&  Serg.  285  ;  Towns  v.  Alford,  2  Ala.  378  ;  [State  v.  Benner,  64  Me.  279  ;  Bradsliaw 
v.  Combs,  102  III  434 ;  McBride  v.  Wallace,  62  Mich.  453  ;  Putnam  v.  U.  S.,  162 
U.  S.  687.] 

1  Acerro  v.  Petroni,  1  Stark.  100,  per  Ld.  Ellenborongh  ;  [Herring  v.  Skaygs,  78 
Ala.  453  ;  State  v.  Jeandell,  6  Harringt.  475  ;  Severance  v.  Carr,  43  N.  II.  67 ;  O'Hagan 
9.  Dillon,  76  N.  Y.  178.] 


§§  434-435.]  LEADING  QUESTIONS.  539 

to  the  subject  of  inquiry,  without  a  particular  specification  of  it; 8  as, 
where  he  is  called  to  contradict  another,  as  to  the  contents  of  a  letter, 
which  is  lost,  and  cannot,  without  suggestion,  recollect  all  its  con- 
tents, the  particular  passage  may  be  suggested  to  him ;  so,  where  a 
witness  is  called  to  contradict  another,  who  had  stated  that  such  and 
such  expressions  were  used,  or  the  like,  counsel  are  sometimes  per- 
mitted to  ask,  whether  those  particular  expressions  were  used,  of 
those  things  said,  instead  of  asking  the  witness  to  state  what  was 
said.4  [So,  also,  it  may  be  necessary  to  put  questions  in  this  form 
to  a  child6  or  to  an  ignorant  person,6  or  to  one  having  a  defect  of 
speech.7]  Where  the  witness  stands  in  a  situation  which  of  necessity 
makes  him  adverse  to  the  party  calling  him,  as,  for  example,  on  the 
trial  of  an  issue  out  of  Chancery,  with  power  to  the  plaintiff  to  exam- 
ine the  defendant  himself  as  a  witness,  he  may  be  cross-examined,  as 
a  matter  of  right.8  [In  general,  on  cross-examination,  since  the  wit- 
ness may  be  assumed  not  to  be  inclined  to  favor  the  cross-examiner, 
questions  leading  in  form  are  allowable,9  —  though  there  seems  to  have 
been  in  England  for  some  time  a  difference  of  opinion  on  this  point.10 
Where  the  cross-examined  witness  turns  out  really  to  favor  the 
cross-examining  party  and  to  be  hostile  to  the  party  calling  him,  the 
prohibition  of  course  applies.11]  Indeed,  when  and  under  what  cir- 
cumstances a  leading  question  may  be  put,  is  a  matter  resting  in  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  Court,  and  not  a  matter  which  can  be  assigned 
for  error.12  [A  question  by  the  judge,  it  may  be  added,  cannot  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  be  obnoxious  to  the  present  principle,  since  the  judge 
is  not  supposed  to  favor  either  side,  and  therefore  neither  for  the 
questioner  nor  for  the  witness  can  the  supposed  danger  of  improper 
suggestion  exist.18] 

8  L"Nicholls  v.  Dowding,  1  Stark.  81 ;  DeHaven  v.  DeHaven,  77  Ind.  240  ;  Bullard 
V.  Hascall,  25  Mich.  136.] 

«  Courteen  v.  Touse,  1  Campb.  43 ;  Edmonds  v.  Walter,  3  Stark.  7  ;  1  Stark.  Evid. 
152 ;  [Thcenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moog,  78  Ala.  310;  People  v.  Ah  Yute,  60  Cal.  95 ;  Gunter 
v.  Watson,  4  Jones  L.  457 ;  Un.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  161  U.  S.  451 ;  Norton  w. 
Parsons,  67  Vt.  526 ;  Rounds  v.  State,  57  Wis.  53.] 

6  ["Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  498.] 

6  [Doran  v.  Mullen,  78  111.  345.] 

T  QBelknap  v.  Stewart,  38  Nebr.  304,  310.] 

8  Clarke  v.  Saffery,  Ry.  &  M.  126. 

•  [Parkin  v.  Moon,  7  C.  &  P.  409  ;  U.  S.  v.  Dickerson,  2  McLean  831 ;  Harrison  v. 
Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  582 ;  State  v.  Benner,  64  Me.  279.  The  language  of  many 
judges,  that  leading  questions  may  be  put  to  adverse  witnesses,  probably  is  intended 
to  include  this  situation.  Distinguish  here  the  Question  whether  one's  own  case  may 
be  gone  into  on  cross-examination,  which  may  incidentally  involve  the  present  question: 
post,  §  445.] 

10  fSfiven  Bishops'  Trial,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  310;  Hardy's  Trial,  24  id.  659;  Anon., 

1  Lew.  Cr.  C.  322  ;  Joseph  Chitty,  Practice  of  the  Law,  III,  892.     In  Wilson's  Trial, 

2  Green  (Sc.)  119,  the  counsel,  Mr.  Murray,  on  being  told  that  by  Scotch  law  he 
could  not  lead  on  cross-examination,   remarked:   "  I  remember  hearing  a  judge  in 
England,  upon  that  being  stated  to  him,  saying,  '  Great  God!     What  a  country  1 '  "] 

"  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  498. 
M  TSee  ante,  §  434.] 

18  LLord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.,  in  25  Parl.  Deb.  207 ;  Enps  v.  State,  19  Ga.  Ill ; 
Dunn  v.  People,  172  I1L  582 ;  Com.  v.  Galavan,  9  AIL  272.  J 


540  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxry. 

3.   Recollection. 

§§  436-439.1 

§  439  a.  Two  Kinds  of  Recollection,  Past  and  Present.  [It  is 
to-day  generally  understood  that  there  are  two  sorts  of  recollection 
which  are  properly  available  for  a  witness,  —  past  recollection  and 
present  recollection.  In  the  latter  and  usual  sort,  the  witness  either 
has  a  sufficiently  clear  recollection,  or  can  summon  it  and  make  it  dis- 
tinct and  actual  if  he  can  stimulate  and  refresh  it,  and  the  chief  ques- 
tion is  as  to  the  propriety  of  certain  means  of  stimulating  it,  —  in 
particular,  of  using  written  or  printed  notes,  memoranda,  or  other 
things  as  refreshing  it.  In  the  former  sort,  the  witness  is  totally 
lacking  in  present  recollection  and  cannot  revive  it  by  stimulation, 
but  there  was  a  time  when  he  did  have  a  sufficient  recollection  and 
when  it  was  recorded,  so  that  he  can  adopt  this  record  of  his  then 
existing  recollection  and  use  it  as  sufficiently  representing  the  tenor 
of  his  knowledge  on  the  subject.  This  use  of  a  past  recollection 
depends  of  course  on  certain  conditions ;  while  the  stimulation  of  an 
actual  present  recollection  need  be  subject  to  no  fixed  rules;  and  it  is 
through  the  improper  application  of  the  limitations  of  the  one  case  to 
the  other  that  some  confusion  of  decisions  has  arisen.  It  will  there- 
fore be  profitable  to  examine  first  the  conditions  appropriate  to  the 
use  of  a  record  of  past  recollection.] 

§  439 1.  Record  of  Past  Recollection.  [(1)  The  record  (memoran- 
dum, note,  entry,  etc.)  must  have  been  made  at  or  about  the  time  of 
the  event  recorded.  Whether  in  a  given  case  it  was  made  so  near  that 
the  recollection  may  be  assumed  to  have  been  then  sufficiently  fresh 
must  depend  on  the  circumstances  of  the  case.1  (2)  The  witness 
need  not  have  made  the  record  himself; 2  the  essential  thing  is  that 
he  should  be  able  to  guarantee  that  the  record  actually  represented 
his  recollection  at  the  time,8  and  this  he  may  be  able  to  do,  either  by 

1  (^Transferred  to  Appendix  II,  because  the  treatment  was  misleading,  in  view  of 
the  modern  development  of  the  doctrines.] 

1  QSome  illustrations  of  the  practice  will  be  found  in  the  following  cases  :  Anderson 
v.  Whalley,  3  C.  &  K.  54  ;  Fraser  t>.  Fraser,  14  U.  C.  C.  P.  70 ;  S.  G.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ». 
Riley,  15  Aid.  54  ;  Swartz  v.  Chickering,  58  id.  290  ;  Watson  v.  Walker,  23  N.  H.  496  ; 
O'tfeale  ».  Walton,  1  Rich.  234;   Ballard  v.  Ballard,  5  id.  495;  Bates  v.  Preble,  151 
U.  S.  154;  Pinney  v.  Andrus,  41  Vt.  648.] 

2  rjBurrough  o.   Martin,   2  Camp.  112  ;   Green  ».  Caulk,  16  Md.  573  ;  Jacob  v. 
Lindsay,  1  East  560  ;  R.  ?>.  Philpotta,  5  Cox  Cr.  829 ;  R.  v.  Langton,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  D. 
296  ;  Birmingham  v.  McPoland,  96  Ala.  363 ;  Torrey  v.  Burney,  113  id.  496  ;  McGowan 
v.  McDonald,  111  Cal.  57 ;  Grant  v.  Dreyfus,  id.,  52  Pac.  1074 ;  Curtis  v.  Bradley,  65 
Conn.  99  ;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  39  Kan.  451  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Sands,  27  Me. 
458;   Owens  v.  State,  16  Md.  807;    Pillsbury  v.  Locke,  33  N.  H.  96;   Kearney  v. 
Themanson,  48  Nebr.  74  ;  State  v.  Lyon,  89  N.  C.  568;  Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11 
Gratt.  546  ;  Hazer  v.  Streich,  92  Wis.  505. 

Where  the  record  was  made  by  another  person,  and  the  witness  has  not  perused  it 
and  known  it  at  the  time  to  be  correct,  it  is  of  course  inadmissible  :  Hematite  M.  Co.  v. 
R.  Co.,  92  Ga.  268,  272  ;  Pingree  v.  Johnson,  69  Vt,  225.1 

•  CAcklen  v.  Hickman,  63  Ala.  499  ;  Davis  v.  Field,  66  Vt.  426.] 


§  436-439  b.  REFRESHING  RECOLLECTION.  541 

virtue  of  his  general  custom  in  making  such  records,4  or  (as  in  the 
common  case  of  an  attesting  witness)  by  his  assurance  that  he  would 
not  have  made  the  record  if  he  had  not  believed  it  correct.6  (3)  The 
original  record  (in  accordance  with  the  general  principle  as  to  pri- 
mary evidence,  post,  §  563  a)  should  be  produced,  not  a  copy  ;6  never- 
theless, a  copy  may  be  used  if  the  original  is  lost  or  otherwise 
unavailable.7  Since  the  process  of  making  a  copy  of  it  is  a  distinct 
thing  from  the  process  of  making  the  original  record,  there  is  no  rea- 
son why  the  copy  may  not  be  one  made  by  another  person,  if  properly 
proved  by  the  other  person  on  the  stand.8  This  being  so,  why  is  not 
a  copy  receivable  of  a  report  originally  oral  ?  The  situation  is  the 
same,  except  that  the  salesman,  workman,  etc.,  instead  of  hand- 
ing the  bookkeeper,  clerk,  etc.,  a  written  statement  of  the  trans- 
action, makes  an  oral  statement,  which  is  transcribed,  and  in  effect 
represents  the  first  person's  recollection  as  orally  reported  by 
him.  The  joint  testimony  of  the  two  ought  to  be  receivable  on 
principle ;  and  such  is  the  result  generally  reached  by  the  Courts, 
though  usually  the  reports  are  required  to  have  been  made  in  the 
regular  course  of  business.9  In  such  a  case,  if  the  original  observer 
is  not  produced  together  with  the  person  recording  it,  the  Hearsay 
rule  forms  an  obstacle  ;  and  accordingly  the  use  of  these  records 
under  such  circumstances  has  been  treated  ante,  §  120  a.  (4)  As  a 

4  FJAs  in  the  case  of  notaries  (Morris  v.  Sargent,  18  la.  95 ;  Miller  v.  Hackley, 
5  Johns.  375  ;  Bank  v.  Cowan,  7  Humph.  70),  bank-officers  (New  Haven  B'k  v. 
Mitchell,  15  Conn.  224  ;  Bell  v.  Hagerstown  B'k,  7  Gill  226;  Mathias  v.  O'Neill,  94 
Mo.  525),  and  others  (Leonard  v.  Mixon,  96  Ga.  239).] 

6  ["Pearson  v.  Wightman,  1  Mills  Const.  344  ;  Maugham  v.  Hubbard,  2  M.  &  Ryl.  5  ; 
R.  v.  St.  Martin's,  2  A.  &  E.  210;  Haven  v.  Wendell,  11  N.  H.  112.     There  is  jxjrhaps 
in  Massachusetts  a  peculiar  additional  limitation,  not  found  elsewhere,  and  due  to  the 
course  of  historical  development,  that  the  record  must  have  been  a  regular  entry  in  the 
course  of  business :  see  Shove  v.  Wiley,  18  Pick.  558  ;  Costello  v.  Crowell,  133  Mass. 
352  ;  Cobb  v.  Boston,  109  id.  444.] 

•  FJDoe  v.  Perkins,  3  T.  R.  754  ;  Home  v.  Mackenzie,  5  Cl.  &  F.  628  ;  Topham  v. 
McGivgor,  1  C.  &  K.  320 ;  Lord  Talbot  v.  Cusack,  17  Ir.  C.  L.  213  ;  Clifford  v.  Drake, 
110  111.  135;  Bonnet  v.  Glatfeldt,  120  id.  166  (see,  as  apparently  inconsistent,  Chic. 
R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  id.  344;  Brown  v.  Lnehrs,  79  id.  575);  Adams  v.  Board,  37  Fla. 
266  ;  Stanwood  v.  McLellan,  48  Me.  475  ;  Thomas  v.  Price,  30  id.  484  ;  Banking 
House  v.  Darr,  139  Mo.  660;  Ryerson  v.  Grover,  1  N.  J.  L.  459;  Halsey  v.  Sinse- 
baugh,  15  N.  Y.  485  ;  Marcly  v.  Shults,  29  id.  346 ;  Downs  v.  R.  Co.,  47  id.  87  ; 
Mead  v.  McGraw,  19  Oh.  St.  55  ;  State  v.  Lyon,  89  N.  C.  568  ;  Bank  v.  Zorn,  14  S.  C. 
444  ;  Rogers  v.  Burton,  Peck  108  ;  Beets  v.  State,  Meigs  106  ;  Ins.  Co.  r.  Weide, 
9  Wall.  677 ;  Davis  v.  Field,  56  Vt.  420  ;  Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11  Gratt.  547.] 

7  FSee  the  cases  in  the  preceding  note.] 

8  fstater.  Shinborn,  46  N.  H.  503;  Smith  v.  Sanford,  12  Pick.  140;  Holmes  r. 
Marsuen,  ib.  171,  semble;   Morris  v.  Briggs,  3  Gush.  343  ;   Barker  v.  Haskell,  9  id. 
218  ;  White  v.  Wilkinson,  12  La.  An.  360 ;  Chic.  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Hewitt,  22  U.  S. 
App.  646  ;  The  Norma,  35  id.  421.     Contra:  Peck  v.  Valentine,  94  N.  Y.  569,  but 
this  case  is  discredited  by  Mayor  v.  R.  Co.,  post.~^ 

9  QMayor  v.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  572 ;  Harwood  v.  Mulry,  8  Gray  250  (leading  cases); 
Stettauer'i-.  White,  12  LI.  An.  360  ;  Littlefield  v.  Rice,  10  Mete.  289;  Kent  v.  Garvin, 
1  Gray  150;  Miller  w.  Shay,  145  Mass.  163;   Ingraham  v.  Bockins,  9  S.  &  R.  285; 
Clough  »'.  Little,  3  Rich.  L.  353 ;  Green  v.  Cawthorn,  4  Dev.  L.  409 ;  Shear  v.  Van 
Dyke.  10  Hun  529 ;  Thomas  v.  Porter,  4  Strob.  Eq.  163  ;  The  Norma,  85  U.  S.  App. 
421.     Contra :  Lewis  v.  Kramer,  3  Md.  286.] 


542  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

measure  of  fairness  and  a  precaution  against  imposition,  the  opponent 
may  demand  that  the  record  be  shown  him  for  purposes  of  inspec- 
tion and  cross-examination.10  (5)  Since  the  witness  has  verified  and 
adopted  the  record  as  representing  his  knowledge  on  the  subject,  it 
becomes  a  part  of  his  testimony,  "just  as  if  without  it  the  witness 
had  orally  repeated  the  words  from  memory,"  u  and  may  therefore  be 
read  aloud  by  him  and  shown  to  the  jury,  or  otherwise  put  in  evi- 
dence.13 A  few  Courts  speak  of  the  writing  as  "  not  in  itself  evi- 
dence," la  —  meaning  apparently  —  what  cannot  be  denied  —  that  it 
has  no  standing  except  as  verified  and  adopted  by  the  witness.  A 
few  others  expressly  refuse  to  allow  it  to  be  "  read  in  evidence,"  w  or 
"given  in  evidence ; " 15  but  this  must  be  regarded  as  erroneous.16  (6)  A 
local  doctrine  in  New  York  requires  it  to  appear  that  the  witness' 
present  memory  is  exhausted  before  he  is  allowed  to  adopt  a  record 
of  past  recollection ; 17  but  this  seems  unpractical  and  unsound.] 

§  439  c.  Stimulating  (Refreshing)  Present  Recollection.  [Here 
the  witness  is  proceeding  to  testify  from  a  present  and  existing  rec- 
ollection, but  he  is  unable  to  produce  that  recollection  by  unaided 
mental  effort,  and  the  question  is  whether  a  resort  to  notes,  etc.,  to 

19  fjHardy's  Trial,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  824 ;  R.  «.  St.  Martin's,  2  A.  &  E.  10 ;  Beech  v. 
Jones,  5  C.  B.  696 ;  Loyd  v.  Freshfield,  2  C.  &  P.  332 ;  Adae  v.  Zangs,  44  la.  536 ; 
Hall  v.  Ray,  18  N.  H.  126  ;  Nicholson  v.  Withers,  2  McCord  429 ;  Chute  v.  State,  19 
Minn.  277.] 

11  [Bryan  v.  Moring,  94  N.  0.  687.1 

12  [Howard  v.  McDonough,  77  N.  Y.  592  ;  Mason  v.  Phelps,  48  Mich.  126;  Moots 
v.  State,  21  Oh.  St.  653.     Accord,  on  this  general  principle  :  Jacob  v.  Lindsay,  1  East 
460  ;  Loyd  v.  Freshfield,  2  C.  &  P.  332 ;  Mims  v.  Sturtevant,  36  Ala.  630 ;  Acklen's 
Ex'r  v.  Hickman,  63  id.  8;  State  v.  Brady,  100  la.  191  ;  Mineral  Point  R.  Co.  v.  Keep, 
22  111.  20  ;  Solomon  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  34  Kan.  443  ;  Wright  v.  Wright,  58  id.  525 ; 
Cobb  ».  Boston,  109  Mass.  444  ;   Mason  v.  Phelps,  48  Mich.  126  ;  Haven  v.  Wendell, 
11  N.  H.  112  ;  Kelsea  t».  Fletcher,  48  id.  282 ;  Watts  v.  Sawyer,  55  id.  40 ;  Pinkham  v. 
Ben  ton,  62  id.  687  ;  Halsey  o.  Sinsebaugh,  15  N.  Y.  485  ;  Russell  v.  R.  Co.,  17  id.  134  ; 
Marcly  v.  Shults,  29  id.  346  ;  McCormick  v.  R.  Co.,  49  id.  303;  Flood  v.  Mitchell, 
68  id.  509 ;  Howard  v.  McDonough,  77  id.  592 ;  Peck  v.  Valentine,  94  id.  569  ;  N.  Y. 
C.  B'k  v.  Madden,  114  id.  280;  Bryan  v.  Moring,  94  N.  C.  687  ;  F.  M.  Bank  v.  Boraef, 
1  Rawle  152  ;  Haig  v.  Newton,  1  Mills  Const.  Ct.  423 ;  Columbia  v.  Harrison,  2  id. 
212  ;  Mt.  Terry  M.  Co.  v.  White,  S.  D.,  74  N.  W.  1060;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide,  9  Wall. 
677 ;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weides,  14  id.  379 ;  Ruch  v.  Bock  Island,  97  U.  S.  695  ;  Lapham  v. 
Kelly,  35  Vt.  198;   Davis  v.  Field,   56  id.  426;  Bates  ».   Sabin,   64  id.  511,  520; 
Williams  v.  Wager,  ib.  326,  336  ;  Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11  Gratt.  547.] 

18  Qt.  v.  St.  Martin's,  2  A.  &  E.  210;  Lipscomb  v.  Lyon,  19  Nebr.  521 ;  Vinal  t>. 
Oilman.  21  W.  Va.  309.] 

14  TBounds  v.  State,  57  Wis.  52.] 

16  [Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Am.  Co.,  63  Ark.  187;  People  v.  Elyea,  14  Cal.  144; 
Hoffman  v.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  60.] 

16  Qln  Bates  v.  Preble,  151  U.  S.  149,  155,  there  is  complete  confusion  of  thought. 
In  Massachusetts,  both  theory  and  practice  seem  unsettled:  see  Costello  v.  Crowcll, 
133  Mass.  352,  and  cases  cited.  In  Curtis  v.  Bradley,  65  Conn.  99,  an  ingenious 
but  questionable  theory  is  advanced.] 

«  CRussell  i>.  R.  Oo.  17  N.  Y.  134;  People  v.  McLaughlin,  150  id.  365.  This 
heterodox  limitation  has  of  late  leavened  the  doctrine  of  a  few  other  Courts  :  State  v. 
Baldwin,  36  Kan.  15;  State  B'k  v.  Brewer,  '100  la.  576,  scmble;  Stahl  v.  Duluth, 
Minn.,  74  N.  W.  143  (vet  compare  Chute  v.  State,  19  id.  277) ;  Jaques  v.  Horton,  76 
Ala.  243;  Weaver  v.  Bromley.  65  Mich.  214  :  Friendly  v.  Lee,  20  Or.  205 ;  Vicksburg 
R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien.  119  U.  S/99.] 


§§  439  6-439  <?.]         BEFRESHING  RECOLLECTION.  543 

stimulate  and  revive  it  is  under  the  circumstances  improper.  The 
vagaries  of  memory  being  infinite,  it  would  be  futile  for  the  law  to 
attempt  to  determine  by  fixed  rules  what  things  have  or  have  not  a 
potency  to  stimulate  recollection.  It  can  only  act  on  the  circum- 
stances of  each  case,  excluding  the  desired  aid  only  when  it  is  appar- 
ent or  likely  that  the  witness  is  not  really  aided  but  is  repeating  a 
form  of  words  of  whose  truth  he  has  no  knowledge.  (1)  Accordingly, 
so  far  as  concerns  stimulation  by  reference  to  a  writing  or  the  like, 
the  fundamental  notion  is  that  any  paper  may  in  the  circumstances 
be  properly  used  for  the  purpose.1  In  particular,  (2)  that  the  paper 
was  pot  written  by  the  witness  himself  is  no  objection  ; 2  and  it  is 
therefore  incorrect  (confusing  this  with  the  preceding  subject)  to 
require  that  the  paper  be  one  written  by  the  witness  or  under  his 
direction  or  known  to  him  to  be  correct.8  Nevertheless,  papers 
prepared  by  others  may,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case, 
be  so  suspicious  or  questionable  as  to  make  their  use  improper.4 
(3)  Furthermore,  it  is  not  an  objection  that  the  paper  is  a  copy,  and 
not  an  original,  provided  it  does  in  fact  serve  to  revive  the  recollec- 
tion.6 (4)  Again,  it  is  equally  immaterial  that  the  paper  was  not 
made  at  or  about  the  time  of  the  event ;  for  it  is  not  used  as  a  record 
of  a  past  memory  (as  in  the  cases  in  §  439  £),  and  its  power  to  stim- 
ulate and  revive  the  memory  by  the  allusions  which  it  contains  must 
be  precisely  the  same  whether  it  was  made  at  the  time  or  not.  This 
is  the  necessary  result  of  the  principle  involved,  and  is  maintained  by. 
a  number  of  Courts  ; 6  but  many,  misled  by  the  limitation  applicable 

1  FJLawes  v.  Reed,  2  Lew.  Cr.  C.  152,  note ;  Henry  v.  Lee,  2  Chitty  124  ;  Huff  v. 
Bennett,  6  N.  Y.  337  ;  Dunlop  v.  Berry,  3  Scam.  327;  McNeely  v.  Duff,  50  Kan.  488.] 

2  ["Henry  v.  Lee,  supra;  Lawes  v.  Reed,  supra ;  Smith  v.  Morgan,  2  Moo.  &  R.  257  ; 
R.  v.  Watson,  3  C.  &  K.  Ill ;  R.  v.  Williams,  8  Cox  Cr.  343  ;  Atkins  v.  State,  16 
Ark.  589;  Dunlop  v.  Berry,  3  Scam.  327;  Miner  v.  Phillips,  42  111.   131  ;  State  ». 
Kremling,  53  la.  209  ;  State  v.  Lull,  37  Me.  246  ;  Cameron  v.  Blackman,  39  Mich.  108  ; 
Culver  v.  Lumber  Co.,  53  Minn.  360,  365  ;  Huff  v.  Bennett,  6  N.  Y.  337  ;  McCormick 
v.  R.  Co.,  49  id.  303;  Bigelow  v.  Hall,  91  id.  145  ;  Stater.  Staton,  114 N.  C.  813,  816  ; 
State  v.  Fiuley,  118  id.  1161 ;  O'Neale  v.  Walton,  1  Rich.  L.  234;  Berry  v.  Jourdan, 
11  id.  67,  78 ;  Bank  v.  Zorn,  14  S.  C.  444  ;  State  v.  Collins,  15  id.  373  ;  Hill  i?.  State, 
17  Wis.  675 ;  Folsom  v.  Log-driving  Co.,  41  id.  602.] 

»  QAs  in  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  2047;  Coffin  v.  Vincent,  12  Cush.  98  ;  State  v.  Cardoza, 
11  S.  C.  238  ;  Walker  r.  State,  Ala.,  23  So.  149.] 

*  ["Noel's  Motion,  3  T.  R.  752  (notes  written  out  by  solicitor  for  witness)  ;  Alcock 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  13  Q.  B.  292,  305  ("swearing  by  reference"  to  a  deposition)  ;  Layer  ». 
Wagstaff,  5  Beav.  462  (deposition  prepared  for  witness).] 

»  fJDunlop  v.  Berry,  3  Scam.  327;  Huff  v.  Bennett,  6  N.  Y.  337;  Folsom  v.  Log- 
driving  Co.,  41  Wis.  602  (leading  cases).  Accord:  Tanner  v.  Taylor,  3  T.  R.  754; 
Doe  v.  Perkins,  ib.  749  ;  Anon.,  1  Lew.  Cr.  101  ;  R.  v.  Williams,  6  Cox  Cr.  343  ;  Law- 
sou  v.  Gloss,  6  Colo.  134  ;  Erie  Preserving  Co.  ».  Miller,  52  Conn.  444  ;  Finch  v.  Bar- 
clay, 87  Ga.  393  ;  Iglehart  v.  Jernegan,  16  111.  513  ;  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  id. 
345  ;  Davie  v.  Jones,  68  Me.  393  ;  Bullock  v.  Hunter,  44  lid.  425 ;  Hopjwr  r.  Beck, 
83  id.  647;  Coffin  v.  Vincent,  12  Cush.  98  ;  Cameron  r.  Blackman,  39  Mich.  108  ; 
Hudnutt  v.  Comstock,  50  id.  596  ;  Clough  v.  State,  7  Nebr.  336 ;  Huff  v.  Bennett, 
6  N.  Y.  337;  Merely  v.  Shults,  29  id.  346  ;  McCormick  v.  R.  Co.,  49  id.  303  ;  H.  &  T. 
C.  R.  Co.  v.  Burke,  55  Tex.  342  ;  Watson  v.  Miller,  82  id.  285 ;  State  v.  Hopkins,  56 
Vt.  258  ;  Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11  Gratt.  530,  547.] 

6  QBank  v.  Zorn,  14  S.  C.  444  ;  Folsom  v.  Log-driving  Co.,  41  Wis.  602 ;  and  many 


544  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

to  a  record  of  past  recollection  (ante,  §  439  £),  require  that  the  paper 
should  be  one  contemporaneous  with  the  event.7  (5)  Upon  the 
erroneous  view  just  referred  to,  it  has  recently  been  declared 8  that, 
on  being  surprised  by  the  testimony  of  one's  own  witness,  one  may 
not  refer  to  former  testimony  or  a  deposition  by  the  same  witness  and 
endeavor  to  stimulate  the  memory  to  a  correction ;  basing  this  result 
chiefly  on  the  supposed  principle  that  the  reference  for  refreshing 
must  always  be  to  a  contemporary  writing.  That  this  supposed  prin- 
ciple, as  applied  to  refreshing  by  deposition  or  former  testimony,  is 
wholly  unsound  may  be  understood  by  noting  the  numerous  decisions 
in  which  this  mode  of  refreshing  has  been  allowed ; 9  while,  indepen- 
dently of  this  supposed  principle,  there  is  no  reason  why  refreshment 
may  not  be  equally  well  attained  by  the  counsel's  oral  reference  to 
or  reading  from  the  deposition,  etc.,  as  by  the  witness'  own  perusal 
of  it,  and  the  precedents  abundantly  sustain  this  practice.10  (6)  As 
a  matter  of  fairness  and  to  prevent  imposition,  the  paper  must  be 
produced  in  Court,  on  demand,  for  inspection  and  cross-examination 
by  the  opponent.11  (7)  But  since,  in  Lord  Ellenborough's  words,  "it 
is  not  the  memorandum  that  is  the  evidence,  but  the  recollection  of 
the  witness,"  12  the  party  whose  witness  uses  it  has  no  right  to  have 
it  read  to  or  handed  to  the  jury  ;  "  it  is  only  the  opponent  who  may 
do  this  in  case  he  wishes  to  cast  doubt  on  the  reality  of  the  refresh- 
ment of  memory.14] 

of  the  cases  cited  in  notes  1,  2,  and  5,  ante,  where  it  is  clear  that  the  paper  must  have 
been  made  long  after  the  event,  —  in  particular,  the  cases  in  which  depositions  were 
used."] 

1  [Steinkeller  v.  Newton,  9  C.  &  P.  313  ;  Whitfield  v.  Aland,  2  C.  &  K.  1015  ; 
Paige  v.  Carter,  64  Cal.  489  ;  Sanders  v.  Wakefield,  41  Kan.  11  ;  Bigelow  v.  Hall,  91 
N.  Y.  145;  Maxwell  v.  Wilkinson,  113  U.  S.  657  ;  Putnam  v.  U.  S.,  162  id.  687.] 

8  [Putnam  v.  U.  S.,  162  U.  S.  687;  the  opinion  confuses  the  bearings  of  the  pres- 
ent subject  and  that  of  impeaching  one's  own  witness  (post,  §  444).] 

9  [See  the  following  cases  in  notes  1  and  2,  ante ;  R.  v.  Watson,  Smith  v.  Morgan, 
R.  v.  Williams,  Atkins  v.  State,  State  v.  Kremling,  State  v.  Staton,  and  others.] 

10  [R.  v.  Edwards,  8  C.  &  P.  26,  31  ;  R.  v.  Barnet,  4  Cox  Cr.  269  ;  R.  v.  Ford, 
5  id.  184  ;  R.  v.  Williams,  8  id.  343  ;  R.  v.  Quin,  2  F.  &  F.  818  ;  Harvey  v.  State, 
40  Ind.  519  ;  Stanley  v.  Stanley,  112  id.  145  ;  Johnson  v.  Gwin,  100  id.  466,  474  ; 
Beaubieu  v.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  459,  485;  Hurley  v.  State,  46  Oh.  313.  The  only  con- 
trary decision,  Com.  v.  Phelps,  11  Gray  73,  is  based  on  no  precedent.] 

"  [Hardy's  Trial,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  824  ;  R.  v.  Ramsden,  2  C.  &  P.  603  ;  £ord  v. 
Colvin,  2  Drewr.  205  ;  Duncan  v.  Seeley,  34  Mich.  369  ;  Tibbetts  v.  Sterberg,  66  Barb. 
201  (leading  cases).  There  should  be  no  question  on  this  point,  but  a  few  Courts  take 
the  opposite  view:  Addington  ».  Wilson,  6  Ind.  133;  State  v.  Cheek,  13  Ired. 
114.T 

""[Henry  v.  Loe,  2  Chitty  124.] 

«  [Gregory  v.  Taverner,  6  C.  &  P.  281  ;  Acklen  v.  Hickman,  63  Ala.  498 ;  Curtis 
v.  Bradley,  65  Conn.  99  ;  Elmore  v.  Overton,  104  Ind.  548,  655  ;  Com.  v.  Ford,  130 
Mass.  66;  Watts  v.  Sawyer,  55  N.  H.  40  ;  Howard  v.  McDonough,  77  N.  Y.  592  ; 
Friendly  ».  Lee,  20  Or.  202. 

Contra :  Iglehart  v.  Jernegan,  16  111.  518  (mistakenly  applying  the  doctrine  for  past 
recollection).] 

14  [Gregory  v.  Taverner,  Acklen  v.  Hickrnan,  Com.  v.  Ford,  tupra;  Com.  v.  Jeffs, 
132  Mass.  5  ;"  Smith  v.  Jackson,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  843.] 


§§  439  <?-439y.]       REFRESHING  HECOLLECTION.  545 

4.     Modes  of  Testifying. 

§  439  (L  In  general.  [A  witness'  testimony,  being  an  attempt  to 
communicate  to  the  tribunal  the  knowledge  possessed  by  the  witness, 
will  usually  employ  the  ordinary  mode  of  expression,  viz.,  oral  utter- 
ance in  the  language  customary  in  judicial  proceedings  of  the  locality- 
But  there  are  other  modes  of  communication,  and  the  need  for  resort- 
ing to  them  often  rises.  As  to  one  and  all  of  them,  it  should  be 
noted  that  whatever  mode  of  communication  is  employed  presupposes 
a  qualified  witness  as  its  testimonial  support  and  cannot  of  itself 
have  any  standing  independently  of  some  witness  whose  knowledge 
it  serves  to  represent.  Thus,  a  map  or  model  or  photograph  cannot 
of  itself  be  receivable,  but  must  enter  as  representing  some  witness' 
testimony  in  graphic  form.  Conversely,  the  maker  of  the  map,  model, 
or  photograph  is  not  necessarily  the  person  who  must  use  it;  for  any 
qualified  witness  may  adopt  it  as  representing  the  idea  which  he 
wishes  to  convey.] 

§  439  e.  Interpretation.  [A  dumb  person  may  be  heard  as  a  wit- 
ness by  any  mode  of  communication  which  is  intelligible.1  Persons 
speaking  an  alien  language  may  be  heard  through  interpreters,  and 
the  necessity  of  this  should  be  determined  by  the  trial  Court.2  In 
the  same  way  a  person  may  be  appointed  to  repeat  the  words  of  one 
who  cannot  speak  loud  enough.8  But  an  interpreter,  under  the  Hear- 
say rule,  must  be  sworn  as  a  witness.4] 

§  439 /.  Writing.  [It  may  happen  that  a  writing  will  form  part 
of  a  witness'  testimony,  —  as  where  he  uses  a  record  of  past  recollec- 
tion,1 or  where  he  proves  a  copy  of  a  document.2] 

§  439  g.  Maps,  Drawings,  Diagrams,  Models.  [That  a  witness  may 
properly  communicate  his  knowledge  in  the  form  of  a  map,  drawing, 
or  diagram,  has  never  been  doubted,  and  in  numerous  instances  they 
have  been  received  to  describe  all  manner  of  physical  objects,  from 
houses  and  land  to  blood-corpuscles  ;  and  the  mode  of  representation, 
whether  termed  chart,  map,  plan,  diagram,  sketch,  or  otherwise,  is 
immaterial.1  The  map,  etc.,  on  the  principle  already  explained,  must 

1  [Huston's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.,  4th  ed.  408  ;  Morrison  v.  Leonard,  3  C.  &  P.  127; 
State  v.  De  Wolf,  8  Conn.  98  ;  Snyder  v.  Nations,  5  Blackf.  295;  Ska^gs  v.  State,  108 
Ind.  57;  Com.  v.  Hill,  14  Mass.  207  j  People  v.  McGee,  1  Denio  21 ;  State  v.  Howard, 
118  Mo.  127,  144.3 

2  [People  v.  Young,  108  Cal.  8  (C.  C.  P.  §  1884);  Skaggs  v.  State,  108  Ind.  58 
(R.  S.  §  495) ;  State  v.  Severson,  78  la.  653.] 

8  [Lord  Mohuu's  Trial,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  990  ;  Conner  v.  State,  25  Ga.  521J 


'Ante,  §  162^. 
"Ante,  §  439  b 


."] 
.  J 


2  [_Post,  §  563  q.  For  other  instances,  see  Black  v.  Black,  38  Ala.  112  ;  Sizer  ». 
Burt,  4  Denio  429  ;  State  v.  Kent,  S.  D.,  62  N.  \V.  631  ;  Names  v.  Ins.  Co.,  104  la, 
612.1 

1  L^atson's  Trial,  32  How.  St.  Tr.  125  ;  Nolin  v.  Farmer,  21  Ala.  71 ;  Campbell 
».  State,  23  id.  83  ;  Humes  v.  Bernstein,  72  id.  553  ;  Wilkinson  v.  State,  106  id.  23  ; 
Burton  v.  State,  115  id.  1  ;  Goldsborough  v.  Piddnnk,  87  la.  599,  601 ;  State  v.  Knight, 
43  Me.  130  ;  Clapp  v.  Norton,  106  Mass.  33  ;  Coin.  v.  Holliston,  107  id.  233  ;  Paine  v. 
Woods,  108  id.  168  ;  Barrett  v.  Murphy,  140  id.  143  ;  Bennison  v.  Walbank,  38  Minn, 
VOL.  i.  —  35 


546  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

be  verified  or  otherwise  put  in  as  a  part  of  some  one's  testimony,  and 
it  may  be  excluded  either  because  not  verified  at  all  or  because  the 
witness  using  it  has  no  knowledge  of  the  thing  it  purports  to  repre- 
sent.2 Conversely,  on  the  same  principle,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
user  of  the  map,  if  acquainted  with  the  object  it  represents,  should  be 
the  maker,8  or  that  the  map  should  be  an  official  one.4  An  official  map 
is  admissible  without  verification  by  a  witness  on  the  stand,  because 
the  official  is  in  effect  testifying  to  it  under  an  exception  to  the  Hear- 
say rule.6  Where  a  map  is  referred  to  as  a  part  of  a  description  in  a 
deed,  or  is  a  part  of  a  public  record  determining  boundaries,  it  is  of 
course  not  testimony,  but  a  part  of  the  legal  transaction,  and  the 
present  principles  are  not  involved. 

A  model  is  governed  by  the  same  principles  just  described  as  ap- 
plying to  maps  and  diagrams.6 

It  may  often  be  desirable  to  permit  a  dramatic  mode  of  com- 
munication, as  by  draping  clothing  on  a  dress-frame,7  putting  on  a 
burglar's  mask,8  and  the  like;9  and  at  trials  for  infringement  of 
musical  copyright,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  have  the  music  in  question 
played  or  sung  in  court.10] 

§  439  h.  Photographs.  [So  far  as  concerns  the  accuracy  of  the 
photographic  process,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  credit  it 1  with  a  neces- 
sary correctness  independent  of  human  control.  It  is  certain  that 
the  conditions  of  the  process  can  be  so  manipulated  that  the  photo- 
graph is  as  false  as  the  falsest  witness.2  But  this  is  no  reason  for 
excluding  the  testimonial  use  of  the  photograph.  It  stands  precisely 

313  ;  Ordway  v.  Haynes,  50  N.  H.  159  ;  People  v.  Johnson,  140  N.  Y.  350,  354  ; 
Stater.  Whiteacre,  98  N.  C.  753;  Dobson  v.  Whisenhart,  101  id.  647;  Bui-well  v. 
Sneed,  104  id.  120;  Griffith  v.  P.ive,  72  Tex.  187;  Bunker  Hill  Co.  v.  Schmelling, 
U.  S.  App.,  79  Fed.  263 ;  State  v.  Hunter,  18  Wash.  670  ;  Poling  v.  K.  Co.,  38  W.  Va. 
645,  657  ;  State  v.  Harr,  ib.  58,  63.] 

2  [See  11.  v.  Mitchell,  6  Cox  Cr.  82  ;  Humes  v.  Bernstein,  72  Ala.  553  ;  Adams  v. 
State,  23  Fla.  538  ;  Moon  v.  State,  68  Ga.  695  ;  W.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Stafford,  99  id. 
187  ;  K.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Horan,  131  111.  303  ;  Ripper.  R.  Co.,  23  Minn.  22  ;  People  ». 
Johnson,  140  N.  Y.  350  ;  Com.  v.  Switzer,  134  Pa.  388  ;  Vilas  v.  Reynolds,  6  Wis. 
224.1 

*  [Fuller  ».  State,  Ala.,  23  So.  688  ;  Campbell  v.  Slate,  ib.  83;  Shook  v.  Pate,  50 
Ala.  92 ;  State  v.  Whiteacre,  98  N.  C.  753.") 

*  [Turner  v.  U.  S.,  30  U.  S.  A]>p.  90  ;  Hale  v.  Rich,  48  Vt.  224 ;  Wood  v.  Willard, 
36  id.  82;  Justen  v.  Scharf,  111.,  51  N.  E.  695-3 

5  rrost,  §  498.] 

8  [See  Davis  v.  Power  Co.,  107  Cal.  563 ;  People  v.  Searcy,  id.  53  Pac.  359  ;  Penn. 
Coal  Co.  v.  Kelly,  156  111.  9  ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Berry,  96  Ky.  604 ;  State  v.  Fox, 
25  N.  J.  L.  602  ;  Earl  v.  Leffler,  10  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  807.] 

*  ["People  w.Durrant,  116  Cal.  179.] 

8  ["State  v.  Ellwood,  17  R.  I.  763,  769.] 

9  [See  Liuehan  v.  State,  113  Ala.  70  ;    People  v.  Chin  Hane,  108  Cal.  597  ;  Tudor 
Iron  Works  v.  Weber,  31  111.  App.  312.] 

10  [Article  by  Irving  Browne,  Eso.,  "Practical  Tests  in  Evidence,"  5  Green  Bag 
187  ;  and  see  People  v.  Linkhaw,  69  N.  C.  214.] 

1  [As  in  Franklin  v.  State,  69  Ga.  42  ("a  truthful  and  impartial  witness,  the 
sun  ").] 

2  [See  striking  illustrations  of  this  in  the  Strand  Magazine,  February,  1895,  and 
later  numbers,  particularly  May-July,  1898.] 


§§  439  #-439  h.]          MODES  OF  TESTIFYING.  547 

on  the  same  footing  as  the  diagram  or  the  model ;  it  is  equally  legiti- 
mate as  a  mode  of  communicating  testimony  in  appropriate  instances, 
and  it  may  be  most  helpful,  but  it  equally  requires  and  rests  upon 
the  credit  of  some  witness.  In  general,  then,  the  photograph  is 
everywhere  recognized  as  a  permissible  mode  of  testimony  where  ap- 
propriate,8 and  it  has  been  received  in  proof  of  land,  buildings,  rail- 
road-crossings, train-wrecks,  bridges,  tracks,  human  beings,  particular 
parts  of  the  body,  documents,  signatures,  and  sundry  other  things. 
The  photograph  must  be  verified  by  some  one  who  has  knowledge  of 
the  object  represented  and  can  testify  that  the  photograph  represents 
his  idea  of  the  object;4  but,  on  the  principle  already  explained,  it  is 
not  necessary6  that  the  witness  should  be  the  person  taking  the  pho- 
tograph, for  even  though  he  is  not,  the  photograph,  nevertheless,  may 
serve  to  convey  his  ideas.*  In  Massachusetts  the  admirable  principle 

8  Qn  the  following  cases  the  photograph  was  sometimes  excluded  for  one  of  the  rea- 
sons mentioned  later  in  the  text,  but  their  general  capability  of  use  under  proper  circum- 
stances was  recognized :  Tichborne's  Trial,  Charge  to  Jury,  II,  640  ;  Re  Stephens, 
L.  R.  9  C.  P.  187  ;  Durst  v.  Masters,  L.  R.  1  P.  D.  378  ;  Luke  v.  Calhoun  Co.,  52  Ala. 
118;  K.  C.  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  90  id.  27 ;  In  re  Jessup,  81  Cal.  418  ;  People  v. 
Durrant,  116  id.  179  ;  Dyson  v.  R.  Co.,  57  Conn.  24  ;  Adams  v.  State,  28  Fla.  538  ; 
Ortiz  v.  State,  30  id.  256,  265  ;  Franklin  v.  State,  69  Ga.  42  ;  Shaw  v.  State,  83  id. 
102  ;  Travelers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sheppard,  85  id.  790  ;  Rockford  v.  Russell,  9  111.  App.  233  ; 
Duffin  v.  People,  107  111.  119;  C.  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Monaghan,  140  id.  483  ; 
Beavers  v.  State,  58  Ind.  530,  535;  Keyes  v.  State,  122  id.  529  ;  Miller  v.  R.  Co.,  128 
id.  97;  Locke  v.  R.  Co.,  46  la.  110  ;  Reddin  v.  Gates,  52  id.  213;  German  Theol. 
School  v.  Dubuque,  64  id.  737  ;  Barker  v.  Perry,  67  id.  148 ;  State  v.  "Windahl,  95  id. 
470  ;  Shorten  v.  Judd,  56  Kan.  43  ;  State  v.  Hersom,  90  Me.  273  ;  People's  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Green,  56  Md.  93;  Dorsey  v.  Habersack,  84  Md.  117;  Marcy  v.  Barnes,  16  Gray 
163  ;  Hollenbeck  v.  Rowley,  8  All.  475  ;  Blair  v.  Pelham,  118  Mass.  421  ;  Randall  ». 
Chase,  133  id.  213;  Verran  v.  Baird,  150  id.  142  ;  Com.  v.  Campbell,  155  id.  537; 
Turnery.  R.  Co.,  158  id.  261,  265;  Corn.  v.  Morgan,  159  id.  375,  378  ;  Farrell  v. 
Weitz,  160  id.  288  ;  Gilbert  v.  R.  Co.,  ib.  403  ;  Com.  v.  Robertson,  162  id.  90  ;  Harris 
v.  Quincy,  id.,  50  N.  E.  1042  ;  Carey  ?;.  Hubbardston,  id.,  51  N.  E.  521  ;  Foster's 
Will,  34'  Mich.  23  ;  Maclean  r.  Scripps,  52  id.  218  ;  Brown  v.  Ins.  Co.,  65  id.  315  ; 
Bedell  v.  Berkey,  76  id.  440  ;  Leidlein  v.  Meyer,  95  id.  586,  591  ;  State  v.  Holden,  42 
Minn.  354  ;  Cooper  v.  R.  Co.,  54  id.  379,  383  ;  State  v.  O'Reilly,  126  Mo.  597  ;  Marion 
v.  State,  20  Neb.  240 ;  Omaha  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Beeson,  36  id.  361,  364  ;  Goldsboro  v.  R. 
Co.,  N.  J.  L.,  37  Atl.  433  ;  Cozzens  v.  Higgins,  1  Abb.  App.  Cas.  451  ;  33  How.  Pr. 
436  ;  Ruloff  v.  People,  45  N.  Y.  224 ;  Cowley  v.  People,  83  id.  477;  People  v  Budden- 
sieck,  103  id.  500  ;  Archer  v.  R.  Co.,  106  id.  603  ;  People  v.  Johnson,  111  id.  370  ; 
Alberti  v.  People,  118  id.  88  ;  People  v.  Smith,  121  id.  581  ;  People  v.  Fish,  125  id. 
147;  People  v.  Webster,  139  id.  73,  83  ;  People  v.  Pustolka,  149  id.  570  ;  Hampton  v. 
R.  Co.,  120  N.  C.  534;  Udderzook  v.  Com.,  76  Pa.  352  ;  Com.  v.  Connors,  156  id. 
147,  151  ;  Beardslee  v.  Columbia  Tp.,  id.,  41  Atl.  617;  State  v.  Ellwood,  17  R.I.  763, 
771  ;  State  v.  Kelley,  46  S.  C.  55  ;  24  S.  E.  60;  Eborn  v.  Zimpelman,  47  Tex.  519  ; 
Howards.  Russell,  75  id.  171  ;  Ayers  v.  Harris,  77  id.  113,  115;  Buzard  v.  McAnulty, 
ib.  447;  M.  K.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  id.,  15  S.  W.  714  ;  T.  B.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v. 
Warner,  88  id.  642  ;  Luco  v.  U.  S.,  23  How.  531  :  Leather  v.  Wrecking  Co.,  2  Wood 
682: 
373 
69  Vt. 

4  TThis  is  mentioned  in  almost  every  ruling.] 

6  [As  erroneously  intimated  in  Kana.  C.  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  90  Ala.  27  ;  Hol- 
lenbeck v.  Rowley,  8  All.  475.] 

6  rjCowley  v.  People,  83  N.  Y.  478  ;  "Archer  v.  R.  Co..  106  id.  603  ;  Luke  v.  Cal- 
houn Co.,  52  Ala.  118  ;  Locke  ».  R.  Co.,  46  la.  110  ;  State  v.  Holden,  42  Minn.  354  ; 
People  v.  Jackson,  111  N.  Y.  370;  Com.  ».  Connors,  156  Pa.  147,  151.] 


548  WITNESSES  ;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

is  fully  established 7  that  the  sufficiency  of  the  verification  should  be 
left  wholly  to  the  trial  judge.  A  photograph  is,  of  course,  inadmis- 
sible where  the  thing  represented  is  irrelevant  or  otherwise  inadmis- 
sible, —  as  where  it  represents  a  person  or  place  at  a  time  when  the 
conditions  were  not  the  same  as  at  the  time  in  issue,8  or  where  the 
Court  refuses  to  regard  personal  resemblance  as  evidence  of  pater- 
nity.9 Special  questions  arise  where  photographic  reproductions  of 
writing  are  concerned.  That  in  general  a  photograph,  particularly 
an  enlarged  one,  of  a  writing,  is  a  proper  method  of  exhibiting  its 
contents  seems  clear ; 10  the  analogous  use  of  the  microscope  is  not 
without  precedent.11  But  the  rule  of  Primariness  (post,  §  563)  will 
usually  have  a  bearing.  (1)  If  the  original  is  not  produced,  but  can 
be,  the  photograph  should  be  rejected.12  (2)  If  the  original  cannot  be 
obtained,  the  photograph  should  be  used  as  the  best  available  evi- 
dence.18 (3)  If  the  original  is  at  hand,  photographic  groupings  of 
the  specimens  used  as  a  standard  and  the  disputed  writing  may  be 
highly  instructive,  and  can  well  be  used.14  The  originals  being  also 
at  hand,  it  may  be  profitable  to  exhibit  in  large  detail  the  peculiari- 
ties of  the  writing  by  magnified  photographs,  and  there  seems  every 
reason  for  allowing  this.16 

The  use  of  photographs  taken  by  the  vacuum-tube  —  Roentgen 
rays  —  may  involve  slightly  different  principles.  Since  the  operator 
will  usually  not  have  perceived  the  object  —  usually  a  concealed  bone 
—  with  his  ordinary  organs  of  vision,  he  will  not  be  able  to  put  for- 
ward the  photograph  as  corresponding  to  the  results  of  his  own  obser- 
vation; nevertheless,  if  he  can  testify  that  the  process  is  known  to 

7  PSee  cases  in  note  3,  ante  ;  in  Florida  and  Illinois  similar  rulings  have  been  made.] 

8  LAs  in  Ortiz  v.  State,  Fla.,  cases  in  Mass.,  Brown  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Mich.,  Cooper  v. 
R.  Co.,  Minn.,  Hampton  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  C.,  all  in  note  3,  awfe.] 

»  PSce  ante,  §  14s.] 

10  L^arcy  v.   Barnes,   16  Gray  163,  and  cases  in  notes  post,  where  its  propriety  is 
assumed.     Only  two  cases  seem  to  have  negatived  this  principle :  Taylor  Will  Case, 
10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  s.  318 ;  Hynes  v.  McDermott,  82  N.  Y.  51  ;  question  reserved  in  Geer 
v.  M.  L.  &  M.  Co.,  134  Mo.  85 ;  excluded  in  Tome  v.  R.  Co.,  39  Md.  93,  because  all 
comparison  of  specimens  was  forbidden.     In  Duffin  v.  People,  107  111.  113,  119,  a 
photograph  was  used    to    show    merely  the  words,  the   handwriting  not   being  in 
<|iirstion.J 

11  FJFrank  v.  Bank,  13  Jones  &  Sp.  459  ;  Eannon  v.  Galloway,  2  Baxt.  282  ;  it  has 
also  lieen  used  for  other  objects  :  Barker  v.  Perry,  67  la.  148  ;  State  v.  Knight,  43  Me. 
131.1 

"TMaclean  v.  Scripps,  52  Mich.  218.] 

18  L&  Stephens,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  187  ;  Foster's  Will,  34  Mich.  23,  semble;  Maclean  v. 
Scripps,«Mpra,  semble ;  Eborn  v.  Zimpelman,  47  Tex.  519;  Howard  v.  Kussell,  75, 
id.  171  ;  Avers  v.  Harris,  77  id.  113  ;  Buzard  v.  McAnulty,  ib.  447  ;  Daly  v.  Maguire, 
6  Blatchf.  137  ;  Leather  v.  Wrecking  Co.,  2  Wood  682  ;  Owen  v.  Mining  Co.,  13  U.  S. 
App.  248,  270.  Contra  (inadvertently),  Houston  v.  Blythe,  60  Tex.  508;  doubtful, 
Duffin  v.  People,  107  111.  119.] 

14  rjR.  v.  Castro  (Tichborne  Trial),  Charge  of  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  appendix  to  Vol.  II  ; 
Luco  v.  U.  S.  23  How.  531  ;  rejected  as  unnecessary  ou  the  facts  :  Crane  v.  Horton, 

5  Wash.  481.] 

16  £Marry  v.  Barnes.  16  Gray  163;  Riggs  v.  Powell,  142  111.  453;  Foster's  Will, 
54  Mich.  23,  semble;  Hynes  v.  McDermott,  82  N.  Y.  51,  semble;  Crane  v.  Horton, 

6  Wash.  481  ;  Rowell  v.  Fuller.  59  Vt.  695.     Contra :  Taylor  Will  Case,  10  Abb.  Pr. 
K.a.  318.J 


§§  439  £-441  £.]  MODE   OF  TESTIFYING.  549 

him  (by  experience  or  otherwise)  to  give  correct  representations,  the 
photograph  is  in  effect  supported  by  his  testimony,  and  stands  on  the 
same  footing  as  a  photograph  of  an  object  whose  otherwise  invisible 
details  have  been  rendered  discernible  by  a  magnifying  lens.16] 

5.    Opinion  Rule. 

§§  440-441. l 

§  441  b.  General  Principle.  [The  Opinion  rule  is  a  rule  based 
on  the  thought  that  when  all  the  data  for  drawing  an  inference  are 
before  the  jury,  or  can  be  placed  before  them,  it  is  superfluous  to  add, 
by  way  of  testimony,  the  inference  which  they  can  equally  well  draw 
for  themselves.  For  example,  if  a  witness,  A,  testifying  to  the  facts 
of  a  street  accident,  in  which  the  defendant's  horse  is  said  to  have 
become  unmanageable  and  run  over  the  plaintiff,  has  detailed  the 
relative  situation  of  the  parties,  the  behavior  of  the  horse,  the  efforts 
of  the  defendant  to  check  him,  and  all  other  circumstances  of  the 
event,  and  is  then  asked  whether  the  defendant  could  have  stopped 
the  horse  before  it  reached  the  plaintiff,  or  whether  the  plaintiff 
could  have  avoided  it  in  season,  it  would  be  natural  to  object  that  the 
data  for  this  inference  were  fully  before  the  jury,  and  that  they  were 
equally  in  a  position  with  the  witness  to  draw  an  inference  from 
them.  If  a  witness  to  an  alleged  assault  with  a  knife,  as  to  which  it 
is  said  that  the  plaintiff  was  the  cause  of  his  own  injury  by  grasping 
the  knife  while  in  the  defendant's  hands,  is  shown  the  knife  and 
asked  whether  the  person  could  have  grasped  the  knife  without  cut- 
ting his  hand,  it  may  here  also  be  suggested  that  the  jury  have  all 
the  data  before  them  and  can  make  this  inference  equally  as  well  as 
the  witness.  The  essence  of  the  principle  thus  suggested  is  that  the 
witness'  influence  is  superfluous  and  unnecessary,  and  should  there- 
fore not  be  brought  into  the  case.  Such  is  the  notion  which  under- 
lies the  so-called  Opinion  rule.  The  witness'  opinion  is  excluded, 
not  because  inferences  as  such  are  objectionable  —  for  a  witness' 
knowledge  and  all  knowledge  is  made  up  of  inferences,  —  but  because 
the  inference  under  the  circumstances  is  superfluous,  and  because  if 
one  person  could  be  summoned  and  inquired  of  in  this  way,  then  the 
opinion  of  a  score  could  equally  be  asked,  all  of  them  superfluous  and 
calculated  to  encumber  the  trial,  without  adding  anything  to  the  es- 
sential data  already  before  the  jury.  The  opinion  of  a  so-called  ex- 
pert and  the  opinion  of  a  layman  may  upon  this  principle  be  equally 
superfluous  and  inadmissible,  while,  conversely,  the  opinion  of  a  lay- 
man as  well  as  that  of  an  expert  may  be  helpful  and  necessary.  The 
application  of  this  principle  is  often  finical  and  unpractical,  and 
the  reason  of  the  rule  is  sometimes  lost  sight  of  and  arbitrary  dis- 

16  (T"he  Roentgen-ray   photograph  was  held  admissible  in  Bruee  v.  Beall,  Tenn., 
41  S.  W.  445.     In  various  lower  Courts  there  seem  to  have  been  divergent  rulings.] 
1  ^Transferred  to  Appendix  II.] 


550  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv, 

tinctions  put  forth;  but  that  such  is  the  principle  in  its  essence,  and 
that  it  still  supplies  a  living  test  for  the  solution  of  the  particular 
instances,  is  constantly  illustrated  in  judicial  opinion ;  thus,  Gibson, 
J.,  in  Cornell  v.  Green:1  "It  is  a  good  general  rule  that  a  witness  is 
not  to  give  his  impressions,  but  to  state  the  facts  from  which  he  re- 
ceived them,  and  thus  leave  to  the  jury  to  draw  their  own  conclusion; 
.  .  .  but  I  take  it  that  wherever  the  facts  from  which  a  witness  re- 
ceived an  impression  are  too  evanescent  in  their  nature  to  be  recol- 
lected, or  are  too  complicated  to  be  separately  and  distinctly  narrated, 
his  impressions  from  these  facts  become  evidence;"  Walworth,  C., 
in  Clark  v.  Fisher :  2  "  The  opinions  of  witnesses  are  never  received 
as  evidence  where  all  the  facts  on  which  such  opinions  are  founded 
can  be  ascertained  and  made  intelligible  to  the  Court  or  jury;" 
Campbell,  J.,  in  Evans  v.  People  : 8 "  It  is  an  elementary  rule  that  where 
the  Court  or  jury  can  make  their  own  deductions  they  shall  not  be 
made  by  those  testifying.  In  all  cases,  therefore,  where  it  is  possible 
to  inform  the  jury  fully  enough  to  enable  them  to  dispense  with  the 
opinions  or  deductions  of  witnesses  from  things  noticed  by  them- 
selves or  described  by  others,  such  opinions  or  deductions  should  not 
be  received." 

There  is,  therefore,  no  rule  admitting  opinions  or  inferences  when 
made  by  one  class  of  persons  —  experts  —  and  excluding  them  when 
made  by  another  class  —  laymen;  but  there  is  a  rule  excluding  them 
whenever  they  are  superfluous  and  admitting  them  whenever  they 
are  not.  Nevertheless,  since  the  so-called  expert  —  i.  e.  a  person 
having  special  skill  in  a  particular  subject  (ante,  §  430  a)  —  will  by 
hypothesis  usually  be  better  able  than  the  jury  to  draw  inferences  on 
such  matters,  it  occurs  in  practice  that  experts  usually  are  able  to  be 
helpful  with  their  opinions  and  are  therefore  usually  —  but  not  nec- 
essarily —  allowed  to  state  them.  Thus,  in  practice,  opinions  are 
receivable,  first,  from  persons  having  special  skill  (whether  the  data 
in  question  have  been  personally  observed  by  them  or  are  stated  to 
them)  whenever  that  special  skill  enables  them,  better  than  the 
jury,  to  draw  inferences  on  the  subject;  *  secondly,  from  persons  who 
have  no  special  skill  but  have  personally  observed  the  matter  in 
issue,  and  cannot  adequately  state  or  recite  the  data  so  fully  and 
accurately  as  to  put  the  jury  completely  in  the  witness'  place  and 
enable  them  equally  well  to  draw  the  inference.6  The  absurdities 
which  disfigure  the  application  of  the  rule  come  chiefly  from  a  too 


"108.  &R.  16-3 
'1  PaiKeUh.  174-3 
'12  Mich.  35-3 


"Phrasinga  of  the  test  for  this  class  will  be  found  in  Clifford  v.  Richardson,  18  Vt. 
627  ; Baylor  v.  Monroe,  43  Conn.  44  ;  Protection  Ins.  Co.  v.  Manner,  2  Oh.  St.  457  ; 
Hamilton  v.  B.  Co.,  36  la.  37.] 

6  rPhrnsirurs  of  the  test  for  this  class  will  be  found  in  Cornell  v.  Green,  10  S.  &  R. 
16  ;  BufFum  r.  K.  Co.,  4  II.  I.  2_'3  ;  Evans  v.  People,  12  Mich.  35  ;  Bates  v.  Sharon, 
45  Vt.  481  ;  11.  v.  Schulz,  43  Oh.  282-3 


§  441  5.]  OPINION   BULE.  551 

illiberal  interpretation  of  the  latter  notion;  i.e.,  it  is  frequently 
ruled  that  a  personal  observer  can  sufficiently  state  the  observed  data 
without  adding  his  inference,  although  a  just  view  of  the  situation 
would  recognize  that  too  much  credit  has  been  given  to  the  witness' 
powers  of  narration,  and  that  in  truth  it  is  impossible  for  the  data 
to  be  fully  recited.  For  instance,  rulings  that  a  witness  may  not 
state  whether  a  person's  answer  was  made  in  a  jocular  or  a  serious 
manner,6  whether  the  conduct  of  the  parties  evinced  a  mutual 
attachment,7  and  the  like,  err  in  this  manner.  A  more  liberal  ten- 
dency in  this  respect  seems  to  be  making  its  way  in  recent  times ; 
but  the  reports  are  overloaded  with  decisions  of  the  sort  that  ought 
never  even  to  have  been  called  for;  and  a  prominent  feature  in  the 
application  of  the  rule  is  the  petty  and  unprofitable  quibbling  to 
which  it  gives  rise.8 

It  would  be  impossible  to  rehearse  in  this  place  the  hundreds  of 
minor  and  detailed  matters  upon  which  rulings  have  been  obtained. 
The  principle  already  described  will  serve  to  solve  most  of  the  ques- 
tions, although  it  must  be  understood  that  its  judicial  interpretation 
in  the  narrow  spirit  above-mentioned  is  frequently  to  be  expected. 
It  will  be  sufficient  here  to  note  the  chief  topics  of  complication  and 
difficulty. 

It  ought  first,  however,  to  be  noticed  that  certain  reasons  or  tests 
sometimes  put  forward  for  this  rule  are  unfounded.  (1)  It  is  said 
that  the  witness  is  not  to  "usurp  the  functions  of  the  jury."  '  The 
answer  is  simply  that  he  is  not  attempting  to  usurp  them, — not 
attempting  to  decide  the  issue  and  thus  usurp  their  place,  but  merely 
to  give  evidence,  which  they  may  or  may  not  accept,  as  they  please.10 
Even  though  his  opinion  is  admitted,  it  is  not  decisive,  especially 
when  it  is  considered  that  opinions  might  be  given  by  witnesses  on 
both  sides.  (2)  It  is  sometimes  said  that  an  opinion  is  not  to  be 
offered  on  "the  very  issue  before  the  jury."  u  But  this,  as  once  re- 
marked,12 would  rather  "  seem  to  be  a  very  good  reason  for  its  admis- 
sion." If  the  witness  can  add  instruction  over  and  above  what  the 
jury  are  able  to  obtain  from  the  data  before  them,  it  is  no  objection 
that  he  refers  to  the  precise  matter  in  issue;  and  if  his  opinion  is 
superfluous,  it  is  inadmissible  even  though  it  concerns  a  matter  not 
directly  a  part  of  the  issue.18 

The  distinction,  moreover,  must  be  noticed  (1)  between  this  rule 
and  the  rule  that  for  matters  requiring  special  skill  the  witness  must 

"Beebe  v.  Dehann,  8  Ark.  520,  571.] 
"Leckey  r.  Bloser,  24  Pa.  404.] 

"See  the  trenchant  utterances  of  Doe,  J.,  in  State  v.  Pike,  49  N.  H.  423.] 
^Lincoln  v.  R.  Co.,  23  Wend.  432.] 
"Campbell,  J.,  in  Beaubien  v.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  507.] 
hVost  v.  Conroy,  92  Ind.  471.] 
'Danforth,  J.,  in  Snow  v.  R.  Co.,  65  Me.  231.] 

"Poole  v.  Deane,  152   Mass.  591  ;  Van  Wycklen  v.  Brooklyn,  118  N.  Y.  429; 
v.  Collin  Co.,  80  Tex.  517;  Fenwick  v.  Bell,  1  C.  &  K.  312  and  note.] 


I 

10 

11 
H 

13 

Scalf 


552  WITNESSES  J  EXAMINATION.  [CH.   XXIV. 

be  shown  to  possess  it,  i.  e.  to  be  qualified  as  an  expert  (ante,  §  430  a). 
He  may  be  qualified  as  an  expert,  and  yet  his  inferences  as  to  the 
matter  in  hand  may  not  be  needed  by  the  jury,  under  the  circum- 
stances, and  may  therefore  be  inadmissible.  (2)  There  is  also  a 
difference  between  excluding  the  "opinion,"  i.e.  inference,  under 
the  present  rule,  of  one  who  has  personally  observed  the  matter  in 
hand,  and  excluding  the  "opinion,"  i.  e.  conjecture  or  impression,  of 
one  who  has  not  personal  knowledge  but  has  merely  come  to  believe 
upon  improper  data  and  is  therefore  not  qualified  at  all  as  a  witness, 
—  a  distinction  explained  ante,  §  430  i.~\ 

§  441  c.  Matters  of  Law.  [In  a  few  classes  of  instances  the  wit- 
ness' opinion  is  excluded  because  it  virtually  involves  an  assertion 
as  to  the  legal  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  certain  facts ;  and  here 
the  data  can  be  stated  and  the  jury  under  the  Court's  instruction  can 
equally  apply  the  law.  To  state  whether  a  testator  was  capable  of 
making  a  will  is  therefore  improper;  but  there  is  much  difference  of 
practice  among  Courts  as  to  the  phraseology  allowable  in  inquiring 
for  the  desired  data.1  So  it  is  by  some  regarded  as  improper  to  ask 
whether  a  person  was  solvent,  the  fact  of  solvency  involving  in 
strictness  the  application  of  a  legal  definition.2  Whether  a  fence 
was  a  partition  fence  has  been  thought  to  be  a  question  not  open  to 
objection,8  but  not  whether  a  person  had  a  duty  to  repair  such  a 
fence; 4  and  sundry  other  instances  are  to  be  found.6] 

§  441  d.  Conduct  as  to  Care,  Reasonableness,  Safety,  etc.  [To  the 
question  whether  a  person  was  careful  or  reasonable,  or  a  place 
safely  constructed,  or  a  machine  skilfully  handled,  it  seems  that  no 
objection  was  felt  by  the  English  Courts  under  orthodox  practice; 1 
but  the  course  of  decisions  in  this  country  has  generally  found  such 
questions  obnoxious  to  the  Opinion  rule.  There  is,  however,  no 
harmony  in  the  rulings,  and  recent  decisions  show  a  more  liberal 
practice.9  The  topics  included  are,  e.  g.,  the  quality  of  work,  the 

1  £See  Hewlett  v.  Wood,  55  Ala.  635  ;  Ashcraft  v.  De  Armond,  44  la.  233;  May  v. 
Bradlee,  127  Mass.  419  ;  Poole  v.  Dean,  152  id.  590;  Kempsey  v.  McGinness,  21  Mich. 
141  (leading  case)  ;  Pinney's  Will,  27  Minn.    282  ;  Farrell  v.  Brennan,  32  Mo.  334 ; 
Bost  v.  Host,  87  N.  C.  478 ;    Horah  v.   Knox,  ib.  485 ;    Wilkinson  v.  Pearson,  23  Pa. 
120  ;  Brown  v.  Mitchell,  88  Tex.  350;  Melendy  v.  Spaulding,  54  Vt.  517-3 

2  [XJhenault  v.  Walker,  14  Ala.  154;  States.  Myers,  54  Kan.  206;  Hayes  v.  Wells, 
34  Md.  518;  Noyes  v.  Brown,  32  Vt.  431.     Contra:  Swan  v.  Gilbert,  111.,  51  N.  E. 
604.1 

8TAvary  v.  Searcy,  50  Ala.  55.] 

•  rChic.  &  A.  K.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  67  111.  145.1 

»  LSee  Merritt  v.  Seaman,  6  N.  Y.  175 ;  Burwell  v.  Sneed,  104  N.  C.  120  ;  Shef- 
field v.  Sheffield,  8  Tex.  87  ;  Massiiro  v.  Noble,  11  111.  531  ;  Mclsaac  .  Lighting  Co., 
Mass.,  51  N.  E.  524 ;  Arents  v.  11.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  50  id.  422.1 

1  QJones  v.  Boyce,  1  Stark.  493  (propriety  of  jumping)  ;  Jackson  v.  Tollett,  2  id. 
88  (prudence  of  coachman);   Malton  v.  Nesbit,  1  C.  &  P.  72  (prudence  of  mariner)  ; 
Fenwick  v.  Bell,  ib.  812  (possibility  of  avoiding  collision)  ;  Drew».  New  River  Co.,  6  id. 
755  (safety  of  sidewalk)  ;  Wilken  v.  Market  Co.,  2  Bing.  N.    C.  281   (necessity  of  ob- 
struction) ;  Sills  v.  Brown,  9  C.  &  P.  604  (duty  of  captain). ] 

2  [J  )nly  a  few  recent  examples  from  each  jurisdiction  are  given  :  McCarthy  v.  R. 
Co.,  102  Ala.  193,  203  (safety  of  loading)  ;  Culver  v.  R.  Co.,   108  id.  330  (safety  of 


§§  441 5-441  d.]  OPINION  RULE.  553 

proper  method  of  construction  or  use  or  management  of  a  machine, 
the  safety  or  danger  of  a  place,  the  appropriate  mode  of  surgical 
treatment,  the  safety  of  a  mode  of  riding  or  driving,  the  need  of  ~p> 
pairs,  the  possibility  of  avoiding  an  injury,  and  all  other  matters 
involving  a  judgment  upon  human  conduct  according  to  the  circum- 
stances.] 

place)  ;  Orr  v.  State,  id.  23  So.  C96  (danger  of  rock)  ;  Rowland  v.  R.  Co.,  110  Cal. 
513  (feasibility  of  stopping  car)  ;  Fogel  v.  R.  Co  ,  id.  42  Pac.  565  (feasibility  of  avoid- 
ing accident)  ;  Redfield  v.  R.  Co.,  112  id.  220  (safety  of  operating  car) ;  Denver  S.  P.  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  12  Colo.  24  (necessity  of  track-walker)  ;  Grant  v.  Varney,  21  id. 
329  (proper  mode  of  timbering  mine)  ;  Porter  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  17  Conn.  255  (sufficiency 
of  darn)  ;  Ryan  v.  Bristol,  63  id.  26,  37  (danger  of  place)  ;  Camp  v.  Hall,  39  Fla. 
535  (carelessness  as  cause  of  injury) ;  Aug.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Dorsey,  68  Ga.  236  (pru- 
dence of  employee's  conduct)  ;  E.  T.  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  76  id.  536  (negli- 
gence of  defendant)  ;  Ward  v.  Salisbury,  12  111.  369  (skill  of  ship's  management) ; 
Chic.  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingersoll,  65  111.  402  (feasibility  of  delivering  grain);  Spring- 
field v.  Coe,  166  id.  22  (carefulness  of  conduct)  ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Spain, 
61  Ind.  462  (sufficiency  of  fence) ;  Bonebrake  v.  Board,  141  id.  62  (sufficiency  of 
bridge)  ;  Sievers  r.  P.  B.  &  L.  Co.,  id.  50  N.  E.  877  (safety  of  gearing)  ;  Fnnston  v. 
R.  Co.,  61  la.  455  (feasibility  of  turning  team)  ;  Betts  v.  R.  Co.,  92  id.  343  (suffi- 
ciency of  cattle-cars) ;  Reifsnider  v.  R.  Co.,  90  id.  76  (proper  position  of  brakeman)  ; 
Kan.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Peavey,  29  Kan.  177  (proper  way  of  coupling)  ;  Murray  v.  Board, 
58  id.  1  (safety  of  bridge)  ;  Cherokee  Co.  v.  Dickson,  55  id.  62  (skill  of  employee)  ; 
Claxton  v.  R.  Co.,  13  Bush  643  (safety  of  machinery) ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen, 
Ky.,  39  S.  W.  13  (duty  of  giving  signal) ;  Mayhew  v.  Mining  Co.,  76  Me.  Ill  (suitable- 
ness of  apparatus);  Marston  v.  Dingley,  88  id.  546  (skill  of  photograph)  ;  Bait.  & 
Y.  R.  Co.  v.  Leonhardt,  66  Md.  77  (safety  of  conduct  and  of  place)  ;  Bait.  &  S.  P.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hackett,  Md.,  39  Atl.  510  (construction  of  water-outlet)  ;  Lang  v.  Terry,  163 
Mass.  138  (mode  of  managing  machine)  ;  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  161  id.  51  (propriety  of 
putting  boy  at  work) ;  McCarthy  v.  Duck  Co.,  165  id.  165  (adequacy  of  pulley)  ; 
Merkle  v.  Bennington,  68  Mich.  143  (repair  of  bridge) ;  Cross  v.  R.  Co.,  69  id.  369 
(safety  of  place)  ;  Lau  v.  Fletcher,  104  id.  295  (safety  of  machinery)  ;  Lindsley  v. 
R.  Co.,  36  Minn.  544  (mode  of  caring  for  cattle);  Morris  v.  Ins.  Co.,  63  id.  420 
(safety  of  mode  of  threshing);  Peterson  v.  J.  W.  Co.,  id.,  73  N.  W.  510  (feasi- 
bility of  gearing-guard)  ;  Greenwell  v.  Crow,  73  Mo.  639  (safety  of  deposit-place)  ; 
Czezewski  v.  R.  Co.,  121  id.  201,  212  (proper  position  of  driver) ;  Benjamin  v.  R.  Co., 
13-3  id.  274  (safety  of  coal-hole  cover) ;  Kan.  C.  M.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  72 
Miss.  491  (proper  construction  of  cattle-guards);  State  v.  Giroux,  19  Mont.  149 
(fitness  of  parent  as  guardian)  ;  Folsom  v.  R.  Co.,  N.  H.,  38  Atl.  160  (likelihood  of 
train  frightening  horse)  ;  Ferguson  v.  Hubbell,  97  N.  Y.  512  (propriety  of  firing  fal- 
low) ;  O'Neil  v.  R.  Co.,  129  id.  125  (required  distance  for  stopping  a  truck) ;  Tillett 
0.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  C.  1031  (negligence  in  coupling  cars)  ;  Ouverson  v.  Grafton,  5  N.  D. 
281  (tendency  of  machine  to  frighten  horses) ;  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tobin,  32  Oh.  St.  94  (pru- 
dent management,  of  steamboat);  Heath  v.  Glisan,  3  Or.  67  (propriety  of  surgical 
treatment) ;  Elder  v.  Coal  Co.,  157  Pa.  490  (sufficiency  of  precautions)  ;  Cookson  v. 
R.  Co.,  179  id.  184  (propriety  of  place  of  listening  for  train)  ;  Auberle  v.  McKees- 
port,  179  id.  321  (danger  of  bridge)  ;  Wilson  ».  R.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  598  (carefulness  of 
driving)  ;  Ward  v.  R.  Co.,  19  S.  C.  522  (time  to  avoid  injury) ;  Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co. 
V.  Reagan,  96  Tenn.  128  (proper  mode  of  uncoupling  cars);  Bruce  v.  Bcall,  id.,  41 
S.  W.  445  (prudence  of  using  elevator  cable)  ;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Compton,  75 
Tex.  673  (safety  of  train-hand  equipment)";  McCray  v.  R.  Co.,  89  id.  168  (sufficiency 
of  rail)  ;  Transp.  Line  v.  Hope,  95  U.  S.  298  (safety  of  mode  of  towing)  ;  North 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Urlin,  158  id.  273  (carefulness  of  medical  examination)  ;  Atl.  Ave.  R.  Co. 
».  Van  Dyke,  38  0.  S.  App.  334  (operation  of  electrical  motor)  ;  Crane  Co.  v.  Col.  C. 
Co.,  46  id.  52  (skill  in  laying  gas-pipe)  ;  State  r.  McCoy,  15  Utah  136  (necessity  of 
abortion  to  save  life)  ;  Hayes  ».  R,  Co.,  id.,  53  Pac.  1001  (proper  construction  of 
sheds);  Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  339  (suitableness  of  tackle-block) ;  Sawyer  v.  Shoe 
Co.,  id.,  38  Atl.  311  (safety  of  fastening)  ;  Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin,  93  Va.  791 
(safety  of  thawing  dynamite  at  fire)  ;  Norf.  &  C.  R.  Co.  ».  Lumber  Co.,  92  id.  413 
(necessity  of  precautions  against  accidents) ;  Seliger  v.  Bastian,  66  Wis.  522  (pru- 
dent way  of  doing  work)  ;  Mulcairns  v.  Janesville,  67  id.  35  (propriety  of  mode  of 
construction).] 


554  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

§  441  e.  Insurance ;  Increase  of  Risk.  [Whether  expert  testimony 
by  professional  insurance-men  may  be  received  to  throw  light  on  the 
effect  of  a  given  circumstance  in  causing  an  increase  of  risk,  is  a 
question  depending  largely  on  the  issues  involved  and  upon  the  pre- 
cise purpose  of  ths  inquiry.  (1)  If  the  question  is  as  to  the  duty  of 
an  insurance-broker  as  a  reasonable  person  to  provide  for  new  contin- 
gencies affecting  the  nature  of  the  risk,  it  would  seem  that  expert 
testimony  should  be  received.1  (2)  If  the  question  is  whether  the 
proximity  of  a  railroad  has  increased  either  the  actual  risk  of  fire  or 
the  insurance-rates  demanded  for  adjacent  property,  the  same  result 
seems  proper.2  (3)  When  the  question  is  whether  a  policy  should  be 
forfeited  for  a  misrepresentation  said  to  be  material  or  for  an  uncom- 
municated  increase  of  risk,  we  find  much  difference  of  opinion.  By 
one  group  of  decisions  the  testimony  is  indiscriminately  admitted,8 
but  by  another  group  rejected,4  while  other  Courts  take  the  view  that 
it  depends  upon  whether  the  particular  fact  said  to  have  increased 
the  risk  is  one  upon  which  common  knowledge  would  suffice,  and  if 
it  would,  the  testimony  is  excluded.6  If  the  question  in  form  asks, 
not  as  to  the  witness'  opinion,  but  as  to  the  usage  of  insurers  in 
increasing  rates  on  such  facts,  some  Courts  still  exclude  it,6  while 
others  admit  it.7  The  correct  explanation  seems  to  be  that  the  true 
issue  is,  not  as  to  the  actual  increase  of  risk,  but  whether  the  fact 
in  question  would  have  caused  the  insurer,  iu  entering  into  the 
contract,  to  charge  a  higher  rate ; 8  and  in  this  view  the  testimony 

1  rChapman  v.  Walton,  10  Bing.  57.] 
[See  Pingery  v.  R.  Co.,  78  la.  442  ;  Webber  v.  R.  Co.,  2  Mete.  149-3 

8  [^Materiality  of  misrepresentation :  Linderaan  v.  Desborough,  8  B.  &  C.  587  ; 
Rickards  v.  Murdock,  10  id.  527  ;  Leitch  v.  Ins.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  107  ;  Moses  v.  Jns.  Co., 
1  Wash.  C.  C.  388 ;  Marshall  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2  id.  358. 

Increase  of  risk:  Schmidt  v.  Ins.  Co.,  41  111.  299  ;  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Catlin,  163 
id.  256  ;  Mitchell  v.  Ins.  Co.,  32  la.  424  ;  Stennett  v.  Ins.  Co.,  68  id.  675  (undecided); 
Planters'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rowland,  66  Md.  244  ;  Lapham  v.  Ins.  Co.,  24  Pick.  3  ; 
Daniels  v.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Gush.  420 ;  Kern  v.  Ins.  Co.,  40  Mo.  21  ;  Schenck  v.  Ins.  Co., 
24  N.  J.  L.  451.] 

4  F Materiality  of  misrepresentation :  Carter  v.  Boehm,  3  Burr.  1914,  1918  ;  Durrell 
v.  Baderley,  Holt  N.  P.  284 ;  Rawls  v.  Ins.  Co.,  27  N.  Y.  293  ;  Higbie  v.  Ins.  Co.,  53 
id.  604. 

Increase  of  risk :  Joyce  v.  Ins.  Co.,  45  Me.  168  ;  Cannell  v.  Ins.  Co.,  59  id.  591  ; 
Thayer  v.  Ins.  Co.,  70  id.  539  ;  Kirby  v.  Ins.  Co.,  9  Lea  142.] 

6  QTlie  following  cases  do  not  always  put  the  principle  as  broadly  as  above  :  Mulry 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Gray  545  ;  Lyman  v.  Ins.  Co.,  14  All.  335  ;  Hills  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Mich. 
479 ;  Jefferson  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cotheal,  7  Wend.  77  ;  Cornish  v.  Ins.  Co.,  74  N.  Y.  297  ; 
Protection  Ins.  Co.  ».  Harmer,  2  Oh.  St.  457  ;  Milwaukee  R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  94  U.  S. 
472  ;  Penn  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  M.  S.  B.  &  T.  Co.,  37  U.  S.  A  pp.  692  (best  opinion).] 

6  Qlns.  Co.  v.  Eshelmaun,  30  Oh.  St.  655  ;  Durrell  v.  Bederley,  Joyce  v.  Ins.  Co., 
Cannell  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Rawls  v.  Ins.  Co.,  supra."] 

7  QChauraud  v.  Angerstein,   Peake  N.  P.  44  ;   Haywood  v.  Rogers,  4  East  592  ; 
Berthon  v.   Loughman,  2  Stark.  258  ;  Mitchell  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Planters    Mut.  Ins.  Co.  ». 
Rowland,   Kern  v.   Ins.  Co.,  Moses  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Marshall  v.  Ins.  Co.,  IVnn  M.  L.  Ins. 
Co.  v.  M.  8.  B.  &  T.  Co.,  supra.'] 

8  QSee  this  view  well  expounded  by  Joy,  C.  B. ,  in  Quin  v.  Ass.  Co.,  infra  (the 
leading  case,  voluminously  representing  all  the  views);   Black,  C.  J.,  in  Hartman  v, 
Inn.  Co.,  infra ;  Curtis,  J.,  iu  Hawes  v.  Ins.  Co.,  infra,  and  Franklin  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Gruver,  infra."] 


§§  441  e-441/.]  OPINION  RULE.  555 

in  the  former  shape  (i.  e.  as  to  actual  increase)  should  be  excluded,9 
but  iu  the  latter  shape  (i.  e.  the  usage  of  the  insurer  or  of  insurers 
generally)  it  should  be  admitted; 10  unless,  perhaps,  the  policy  refers 
only  to  a  risk  increased  "to  the  knowledge  of  the  insured."  "] 

§  441  /.  Sanity.  [In  England  there  never  has  been  any  doubt 
that  the  opinions  of  lay  witnesses,  duly  qualified  by  acquaintance 
and  observation,  are  receivable  upon  a  question  of  mental' sanity.1 
In  this  country,  however,  an  early  misunderstood  ruling 2  served  to 
raise  the  doubt  ;  8  and  since  that  time  the  objection  has  been  raised 
and  considered  in  nearly  every  Court  that  such  testimony  is  obnox- 
ious to  the  Opinion  rule.  The  doubt  seems  now  almost  everywhere 
to  have  been  settled  in  favor  of  receiving  the  testimony ; 4  but  in 
some  Courts  certain  restrictions  are  imposed  which  make  the  proper 
form  of  question  a  matter  of  some  nicety  and  difficulty.  It  may  be 
noted  (1)  that  in  a  majority  of  jurisdictions  it  is  required  that  the 
witness  precede  his  statement  of  opinion  by  reciting  the  observed 
data  by  which  he  has  been  led  to  it;  (2)  that  by  long  tradition  the 
opinion  of  the  attesting  witness  as  to  the  testator's  sanity  is  re- 
garded as  receivable  unconditionally;  (3)  that,  as  to  the  local  modi- 
fied forms  (represented  chiefly  by  the  rules  of  Massachusetts  and  New 
York)  which  have  found  favor,  their  general  notion  is  that  an  opinion 
as  to  the  general  condition  of  sanity  or  insanity  should  be  excluded, 
while  an  opinion  as  to  the  rationality  or  irrationality  of  particular 
conduct  is  receivable.6] 

9  QBerthon  v.  Loughman,  2  Stark.  258,  Holroyd,  J. ;  Quin  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Joues  &  Car. 
(Ir.)  332,  336 ;  Hawes  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Curt.  230.] 

10  QElton  v.  Larkins,  5  C.  &  P.  387  ;  Quin  v.  Ass.  Co.,  supra  ;  lonides  v.  Fender, 
L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  535  ;  Fiske  v.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Pick.  312  ;  Merriam  v.  Ins.  Co.,  21  id.  163, 
semble;  Luce  v.  Ins.  Co.,  105  Mass.  302,  110  id.  363  ;  First  Cong.  Church  v.  Ins.  Co., 
158  id.  475  ;  Hartman  v.  Ins.  Co.,  21  Pa.  477  ;  Franklin  Fire  lus.  Co.  f.  Gruver,  100 
id.  273  ;  Pelzer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sun  Fire  Office,  36  S.  C.  263  ;  M'Lanahan  v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Pet. 
188;  Hawes  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Curt.  230.  J 

11  FJFrankliu  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gruver,  100  Pa.  273  ;  and  probably  Loomis  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  81  Wis.  366.1 

1  QAitken  v.  McMeckan,  1895,  App.  Gas.  310,  is  merely  one  of  the  latest  of  a  long 
line  of  instances,  the  greater  number  of  which  are  cited  in  the  opinions  of  Mr.  J.  Doe, 
tn/raj 

fPoole  v.  Richardson,  3  Mass.  330.] 

8  L"The  argument  for  exclusion  is  best  set  forth  in  Dewitt  v.  Barley,  9  N.  Y.  387  ;  the 
argument  for  admission  in  Clary  v.  Clary,  2  Ired.  80 ;  Norris  v.  State,  16  Ala.  779,  and 
pre-eminently  in  the  unanswerable  presentation  of  Doe,  J.,  in  Boardman  v.  Woodman, 
47  N.  H.  144,  and  State  ;>.  Pike,  49  id.  414,  as  well  as  the  opinion  of  Foster,  C.  J.,  in 
Hardy  ».  Merrill,  56  id.  250.] 

4  QThe  witness  must  of  course  be  qualified  by  acquaintance  or  the  like  :  ante, 
§  430  p.] 

6  QOnly  a  recent  case  or  two  in  each  jurisdiction  are  given  ;  the  rulings  in  New 
York,  Massachusetts,  and  Pennsylvania  should  be  avoided  by  other  Courts,  because 
the  doctrine  has  there  passed  through  several  distinct  stages,  and  a  given  ruling  may 
not  represent  the  current  practice:  Yarbrough  v.  State,  105  Ala.  43  ;  Shaetfer  v.  State, 
61  Ark.  241  ;  Wax's  Estate,  106  Cal.  343;  Kimberley's  Appeal,  68  Conn.  428;  Arm- 
strong D.  State,  30  Fla.  170,  201 ;  Welch  v.  Stipe,  95  Ga.  762  ;  Jamison  v.  People,  145 
111.  357,  377;  Grand  Lodge  v.  Wieting,  168  id.  408;  Hamrick  v.  Hamrick,  134  Ind. 
324  ;  State  v.  McDonough,  104  la.  6 ;  State  v.  Benerman,  Kan.,  53  Pac.  874 ;  Arner. 
Ace.  Co.  v.  Fiddler,  Ky.,  36  S.  W.  528;  Fayette  v.  Chesterville,  77  Me.  33 ;  Williams 


556  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

§  441  g.  Value.  [The  doubt  was  at  one  time  raised  whether 
ordinary  testimony  to  value  was  not  obnoxious  to  the  Opinion  rule; l 
but  this  doubt  nowhere  obtained  sanction  from  the  Courts  (except  in 
New  Hampshire),  and  no  longer  presents  a  living  question.  Never- 
theless, in  issues  involving  value  there  may  be  testimony  which  is 
open  to  an  analogous  doubt,  and  this  doubt  has  in  some  cases  found 
judicial  favor.  Only  one  or  two  of  the  commonest  instances  can 
here  be  mentioned.  (1)  Where  land  is  taken  by  eminent  domain, 
and  the  substantive  law  allows  the  injury  or  benefit  to  the  remaining 
land,  of  which  a  part  has  been  taken,  to  be  considered  in  the  estima- 
tion of  total  damages,  it  is  by  some  Courts  considered  that  testimony 
in  form  stating  the  total  damage  to  the  land  is  objectionable,  the 
Opinion  rule  requiring  the  elements  or  detailed  data  to  be  stated,  and 
leaving  it  to  the  jury  to  estimate  the  total  damage.  Other  Courts, 
while  recognizing  the  same  principle,  consider  that  it  is  not  objec- 
tionable for  the  witness  to  state  the  values  of  the  land  before  the 
taking  and  after  taking,  — though  it  is  usually  a  mere  matter  of 
arithmetic  to  infer  from  that  the  total  damage.  Still  other  Courts 
put  no  limitation  on  such  evidence.2  (2)  In  actions  for  personal 

v.  Williams,  47  MJ.  326;  May  v.  Bradlee,  127  Mass.  418;  Com.  v.  Brayman,  136  id. 
439  ;  Cowles  v.  Merchants,  140  id.  381  ;  Poole  v.  Dean,  152  id.  590 ;  McConnell  v. 
Wildes,  153  id.  490  ;  Clark  v.  Clark,  168  Mass.  523 ;  Sullivan  v.  Foley,  Mich.,  70 
^.  W.  322  ;  Lamb  v.  Lippincott,  id.,  73  N.  W.  887 ;  Woodcock  v.  Johnson,  36  Minn. 
218  ;  Sheehan  v.  Kearney,  Miss.,  21  So.  46;  State  v.  Williamson,  106  Mo.  170  ;  Terr. 
v.  Roberts,  9  Mont.  15  ;  Hay  v.  Miller,  48  Nebr.  156 ;  State  t'.  Lewis,  20  Nev.  345 ; 
Boardman  v.  Woodman,  47  N.  H.  134;  State  v.  Pike,  49  id.  407  ;  Hardy  v.  Merrill, 
56  id.  227  ;  Carpenter  v.  Hatch,  64  id.  576  ;  Geng  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  482  ;  Terr.  v. 
Padilla,  N.  M.,  46  Pac.  346  ;  Clapp  v.  Fullerton,  34  N.  Y.  194  ;  Holcomb  v.  Hoi- 
comb,  95  id.  320  ;  People  v.  Packenham,  115  id.  202 ;  Paine  v.  Aldrich,  133  id.  546  ; 
People  v.  Taylor,  138  id.  398  ;  People  v.  Strait,  148  id.  566;  People  v.  Youngs,  151 
id.  210  ;  People  v.  Burgess,  153  id.  561  ;  People  v.  Koerner,  154  id.  355  ;  Wyse  v. 
Wyse,  155  id.  367  ;  State  v.  Potts,  100  N.  C.  462 ;  Clark  v.  State,  12  Oh.  487  :  First 
Nat'l  B'k  v.  Wirebach,  106  Pa.  45  ;  Taylor  v.  Com.,  109  id.  270  ;  Shaver  v.  McCarthy, 

110  id.   348  ;  Elcessor  v.  Elcessor,  146  id.  363 ;  Heyward  v.  Hazard,  Bay  335  ;  Dove 
v.  State,  3  Heisk.  365  ;  Brown  v.  Mitchell,  87  Tex.  140  ;  Conn.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Lathrop, 

111  U.S.  612;    Chilstensen's  Estate,   Utah,  53   Pac.   1003;    Westmore  v.   Sheffield, 
56  Vt.  247  ;  Whitelaws  v.  Sims,  90   Va.  588  ;  State  r.  Maier,  36  W.  Va.  757  ;  Yauke 
v.  State,  51  Wis.  468.] 

1  QThe  argument  in  answer  to  it  may  be  found  in  an  opinion  by  Doe,  J.,  in  State  v. 
Pike,  49  N.  H.  422.]| 

2  QThe  reasoning  of  the  different  views  may  be  seen  in  Yost  i».  Conroy,  92  Ind.  465  ; 
Swan  v.  Middlesex,  107  Mass.  178;  Snow  v.  R.  Co.,  65  Me.  231.     The  following  list 
contains  a  case  or  two  from  the  various  jurisdictions:   Haralson  v.  Campbell,  63  Ala. 
277  ;  Tex.  &  S.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirby,  44  Ark.  106 ;  C.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Minns,  71  Ga.  244  ; 
Pike  v.  Chicago,  155  111.  656;  Chic.   P.  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,   159  id.  406;  Yost 
v.  Conroy,  92  Ind.  465  ;  Lewis  v.  Ins.  Co.,  71  la.  97  ;  Kans.  C.   R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  24 
Kan.  34  ;  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Kuhn,  38  id.   676  ;  Tucker  v.  R.  Co.,   118  Mass.  547  ; 
Beale  v.  Boston,  166  id.  63  ;  Grand  Rapids  v.  R.  Co.,  58  Mich.  647 ;  Sherman  v.  R.  Co., 
80  Minn.  228  ;  Emmons  ».  R.  Co.,  41  id.  133  ;  St.  Louis  v.  Kanken,  95  Mo.  192 ;  Union 
Kiev.  Co.  v.  R.  Co.,  135  id.  353 ;  N.  E.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier,  25  Nebr.  55  ;  F.  E.  & 
M.  V.  R.  Co.  v.  Marlt-y,  ib.  145 ;  Low  v.  R.  Co.,  45  N.  H.  381  ;  Roberts  v.  R.  Co.,  128 
N.  Y.  465  ;   Becker  v.  R.  Co.,  131  id.  513;  Sixth  A.  R.  Co.  v.  El.   R.  Co.,  133  id.  548 
(''ifro  i-t  a  peculiarity  in  the  doctrine  of  this  Court  ns  to  speculative  estimates)  ;  C.  & 
P.  R.  Co.  v.  Ball,  5  Oh.  St.  573  ;  Portland  v.  Kamm,  10  Or.  384  ;  P.  &  N.  Y.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bunnell,  81  Pa.  426  ;  Lee  t>.  Water  Co.,  176  id.  223;   Brown  v.  R.  Co.,  12  R.  I.  238 ; 


§§  441  #-441 »'.]  OPINION  EULE.  .          557 

injury,  it  is  sometimes  said  that  opinions  as  to  the  money-value  of 
the  injury  are  inadmissible;8  and,  likewise,  in  actions  on  contracts, 
that  opinions  as  to  the  damage  caused  are  inadmissible.4] 

§  441  h.  State  of  Mind  (Intention,  Feelings,  Meaning,  etc.)  of  an- 
other Person.  [In  ordinary  human  dealings,  the  formation  and  ex- 
pression of  estimates  as  to  another's  mental  state  is  constant  and 
necessary.  There  is  no  good  reason  why  testimony  about  it,  based 
on  personal  observation  of  the  other  person's  conduct,  should  not  be 
admissible,  so  far  as  the  Opinion  rule  is  concerned ;  for  it  is  clearly 
impossible  to  remember  and  re-state  to  the  jury  all  the  minute  data 
of  conduct  and  words  which  have  served  to  convey  the  impression. 
Such  was  the  orthodox  common-law  view;1  and  such  is  the  rule  to- 
day perpetuated  in  most  jurisdictions.2  Nevertheless,  by  many 
Courts  the  Opinion  rule  is  deemed  (but  without  reason)  to  exclude 
such  testimony;8  a  common  application  of  this  prohibition  is  to 
testimony  as  to  the  effect  of  a  conversation  or  the  meaning  intended 
by  it,4  though  here  also  the  Opinion  rule  should  in  strictness  usually 
not  exclude  the  testimony.6] 

§  441  i.  Same :  Discriminations.  [One  source  of  the  apparent  con- 
fusion of  rulings  upon  this  subject  is  that  the  intention  or  other 
state  of  mind  of  a  person  may  not  be  of  legal  consequence,  under  the 
substantive  law  of  the  case,  and  for  this  reason  evidence  of  it  will 
be  excluded.  In  the  formation  of  contract,  the  private  understand- 
ing or  meaning  of  one  of  the  parties  would  usually  be  legally  immate- 

Montana  R.  Co.  v.  Warren,  137  U.  S.  352;  Blair  v.  Charleston,  43  W.  Va.  62 ;  Seattle 
&  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilchrist,  4  Wash.  509,  513  ;  Church  v.  Milwaukee,  31  Wis.  620;  Neil- 
son  v.  R.  Co.,  58  id.  520-3 

a  [Thomas  v.  Hamilton,  71  Ind.  277 ;  Cent.  R.  &  B.  Co.  p.  Kelly,  58  Ga.  110  ;  Bain 
v.  Cushman,  60  Vt.  343.  See  Dushane  v.  Benedict,  120  U.  S.  647.] 

*  ^Mitchell  v.  Allison,  29  Ind.  44.     Contra:  Fitzgerald  v.  Hayward,  50  Mo.  521. 
See  Ferguson  v.  Stafford,  33  Ind.  164;  Linn  v.  Sigsbee,  67  111.  75;  Ironton  Land  Co. 
v.  Butchart,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  749  ;  Jones  v.  Fuller,  19  S.  C.  70.] 

1  QSee  examples  in  Frost's  Trial,  22  How.  St.  Tr.  484  ;  Answer  of  the  Judges,  ib. 
296,  300  ;  Home  Tooke's  Trial,  25  id.  420  ;  Watson's  Trial,  32  id.  67  ;  Earl  of  Thanet's 
Trial,  27  id.  927  ;  Tandy's  Trial,  ib.  1215.  j 

2  [The  following  cases  allow  a  witness  to  testify  whether  another  person  was  going 
to  shoot,  or  knew  of  a  matter,  or  had  hostile  feelings,  or  was  in  good  spirits,  or  under- 
stood English,  etc.,  the  witness  heing  assumed  to  have  personal  observation  :  Taylor  v. 
People,  21  Colo.  426  ;  Berry  v.  State,  10  Ga.  514,  529  ;  Pelamourges  v.  Clark,  9  la.  16; 
Kuen  v.  Upmier,  98  id.  393 ;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  10  ;  Tobin  v.  Shaw,  45  Me.  348  ; 
M'Kee  v.  Nelson,  4  Cow.  355.] 

8  [See  Dyer  v.  Dyer,  87  Ind.  19 ;  Carpenter  v.  Calvert,  83  111.  70;  First  Nat'l  Bank 
v.  Booth,  102  la.  333;  Cole  v.  R.  Co.,  93  Mich.  77;  Manahan  v.  Halloran,  66  Minn. 
483;  People  v.  McLaughlin,  150  N.  Y.  365  ;  Hamer  v.  Bank,  9  Utah  215. 

This  heresy  perhaps  started,  at  any  rate  has  been  most  fully  developed,  in  Alabama  ; 
a  recent  illustration  is  Guntner  v.  State,  111  Ala.  23 ;  but  in  this  State  any  direct  testi- 
mony of  intent  is  excluded  :  see  ante,  §  328  c.] 

*  L~\Vhitmore  v.  Ainsworth,  Cal.,  38  Pac.  196 ;  Hewitt  v.  Clark,  91  111.  608  ;  State  v. 
Brown,  86  la.  121  ;  Peerless  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Gates,  61  Minn.  124 ;  Braley  v.  Braley,  16 
N.  H.  431 ;  People  v.  Sharp.  107  N.  Y.  461 ;  Norton  v.  Parsons,  67  Vt.  526."! 

6  [Tiske  v.  Cowing,  61  N.  H.  432  (leading  case)  ;  State  v.  Earnest,  56  Kan.  31  ; 
Walker  v.  R.  Co.,  104  Mich.  606;  Woodworth.  v.  Thompson,  44  Nebr.  311;  Garrett 
v.  Tel.  Co.,  92  la.  449.} 


558  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

rial,  and  for  this  reason  testimony  about  this  is  often  excluded ;  * 
although  testimony  as  to  the  understanding  common  to  both  parties 
would  not  be.2  For  the  same  reason,  where  a  transaction  has  been 
reduced  to  writing,  the  intentions  of  the  parties,  as  well  as  even 
their  expressions  independent  of  the  writing,  cannot  be  used  to 
compete  with  or  overthrow  the  writing.8  Again,  where  a  person's 
conduct  with  reference  to  land  used  as  a  highway  has  amounted  to  a 
dedication  of  his  property  to  such  purposes,  his  secret  intent  to  the 
contrary  may  be  in  law  immaterial.4  So,  too,  the  fraudulent  intent 
of  the  assignee  of  an  insolvent's  property  is  under  most  statutes  im- 
material.5 Again,  by  the  law  of  defamation,  the  established  or 
general  sense  or  meaning  of  the  uttered  words  is  usually  to  be  taken, 
not  the  private  understanding  of  either  the  utterer  or  a  hearer.6  In 
these  and  other  ways  a  question  of  substantive  law  may  arise  as  to 
the  materiality  of  a  person's  intent,  motive,  or  the  like;  and  the 
decision  of  such  questions  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  operation 
of  the  Opinion  rule.  Certain  other  principles  of  evidence,  also, 
involving  the  proof  of  a  state  of  mind,  must  be  discriminated  from 
the  Opinion  rule;  as,  whether  expressions  of  intention  or  emotion 
may  be  received  under  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  (ante,  §§  162  c, 
162  d),  or  whether  declarations  of  intent  of  residence  or  of  testa- 
mentary revocation  or  execution  are  admissible  (ante,  §§  162  c,  162  e).~\ 
§  441  j.  Sundries.  [The  Opinion  rule  is  constantly  invoked 
against  countless  varieties  of  statements,  and  an  enumeration  of  the 
various  rulings  in  this  place  would  be  impossible.  It  is  enough  to 
say  that  for  certain  common  and  simple  types  of  statement,  their 
propriety  is  well  settled,  upon  the  general  principle  already  de- 
scribed above.  These  classes  of  statements  are  occasionally  sum- 
marized by  Courts,  in  terms  more  or  less  variant;  but  the  following 
passage  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  ordinary  judicial  attitude : l  "  All 
concede  the  admissibility  of  the  opinions  of  non-professional  men 
upon  a  great  variety  of  unscientific  questions  arising  every  day  and 
in  every  judicial  inquiry.  These  are  questions  of  identity,  hand- 
writing, quantity,  value,  weight,  measure,  time,  distance,  velocity, 
form,  size,  age,  strength,  heat,  cold,  sickness,  and  health;  questions, 
also,  concerning  various  mental  and  moral  aspects  of  humanity,  such 
as  disposition  and  temper,  anger,  fear,  excitement,  intoxication, 
veracity,  general  character,  and  particular  phases  of  character  and 

1  ["Murray  v.  Bethune,  1  Wend.  196;  BonfieM  v.  Smith,  12  M.  &  W.  403;  Tracy 
v.  McManus,  58  N.  Y.  257  ;  Slater  v.  D.  S.  &  H.  Co.,  94  Ga.  687  ;  anf,e,  §  805  t1.] 
;  fGarrctt  v.  Tel.  Co.,  92  la.  449  ;  Wheeler  v.  Campbell,  68  Vt.  98-3 

8  LFor  example,  McCormick  v.  Huse,  66  111.  319  ;  this  involves  the  parol-evidence 
rule,  ante,  §§  305  e,  805/.] 

4  FFor  example,  Indianapolis  t<.  Kingsburv,  101  Ind.  213.]] 

8  TFor  example,  Hathaway  v.  Brown,  18  Minn.  423.] 

9  ("See  instances  in  Dairies  v.  Hartley,  3  Exch.  200 ;  Republican  P.  Co.  v.  Miner, 
12  Colo.  85  ;  Callahan  v.  Ingram,  122  Mo.  855,  375.] 

1  CFoster,  C.  J.,  in  Hardy  v.  Merrill,  56  N.  H.  241.] 


§§  441  z-441  k.]  OPINION  RULE.  559 

other  conditions  and  things,  both  moral  and  physical,  too  numerous 
to  mention."] 

§  441  k.  Hypothetical  Questions  ;  General  Principle.  [Where  a 
witness  testifies  by  stating  his  inferences  from  facts  not  personally 
observed  by  him,  it  is  necessary,  for  the  sake  of  the  jury  in  dealing 
with  his  testimony,  that  the  data  on  which  he  bases  his  inference 
be  specified  by  him  and  stated  as  assumed  or  hypothetical.  For 
example,  suppose  that  a  medical  man  were  asked,  in  a  case  of  alleged 
homicide,  where  the  deceased  had  been  found  dead  in  the  water, 
"  What  in  your  opinion  was  the  cause  of  death  ? "  and  he  were  to 
answer,  "Strangulation;"  and  suppose  that  the  real  basis  of  his 
statement  was  the  fact  of  congestion  of  the  windpipe.  Had  the  wit- 
ness had  personal  observation  of  the  body,  this  fact  of  congestion 
would  also  be  stated  by  him,  either  on  his  direct  examination  or  on 
his  cross-examination,  as  the  observed  fact  known  by  him  and  lead- 
ing to  his  opinion.  But  if  he  had  not  had  any  personal  observation 
of  the  body,  and  formed  his  opinion  merely  upon  testimony  listened 
to  or  upon  other  intimations  of  the  fact  of  congestion,  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  jury,  merely  from  his  statement  of  opinion,  to 
know  what  were  the  data  for  the  opinion.  It  would  therefore  be 
necessary  for  him,  in  stating  his  opinion,  not  only  to  specify  the 
data  for  it  (if  this  were  all,  it  might  be  done  by  a  question  on  cross- 
examination),  but  to  specify  them  hypothetically,  i.  e.  as  only  as- 
sumed by  him  to  exist.  Assuming,  he  says,  the  congestion  to  be  a 
fact  (as  to  which  he  knows  nothing  one  way  or  the  other),  then  his 
inference  is  that  strangulation  was  the  cause  of  death.  The  jury  is 
thus  put  in  a  position  to  use  his  opinion  intelligently;  for  if  they 
later  find  congestion  as  a  fact  (supplied  by  other  testimony),  they 
will  apply  his  opinion  as  based  upon  that  fact,  and  give  it  the 
weight  it  deserves;  but  if  they  find  that  there  was  no  congestion  in 
fact,  they  will  repudiate  his  opinion  as  having  no  application  to  the 
actual  facts.  Thus,  the  necessity  for  stating  the  data  hypothetically 
arises  because  the  witness  has  no  personal  knowledge  of  them  and 
because  it  cannot  before  the  jury's  retirement  be  known  what  data 
they  will  find  to  be  facts  and  therefore  what  opinions  are  applicable 
to  the  case  as  found  by  the  jury.  In  other  words,  the  jury  must 
have  the  means  of  distinguishing  between  opinions  based  on  data 
found  by  them  to  be  true  and  opinions  based  on  data  found  by  them 
not  to  be  true.1  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  hypothetical  question 

1  C^or  good  expositions  of  this  reasoning  by  the  Courts,  see  L.  C.  Erskine,  in  Mel- 
ville's Trial,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  1065  ;  Curtis,  J.,  in  U.  S.  v.  McGlue,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  1  ; 
Dean,  J.,  in  Lake  v.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  C.  557 ;  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Dickenson  v.  Fitch- 
Imrg,  13  Gray  556  ;  Christiancy,  J.,  in  Kemnsey  v.  McGinnis,  21  Mich.  139  (particu- 
larly good)  ;  Kingman,  C.  J.,  in  State  v.  Mealicott,  9  Kan.  288;  Morris,  C.,  in  Burns 
v.  Barenfeld,  84  Ind.  48  ;  Ruger,  C.  J.,  in  People  v.  McElvaine,  121  N.  Y.  290  ; 
McGill,  C.,  in  Malynek  v.  State,  N.  J.  L.,  40  Atl.  572.  The  earliest  instance  of  a 
ruling  on  the  principle  seems  to  be  Lord  Hardwicke's  (1760)  in  Earl  Ferrer's  Trial, 
19  How.  St.  Tr.  943;  though  Beckwith  v.  Sydebotham,  1  Camp.  116  (1807),  is  usually 
taken  as  the  starting-point  ot  the  doctrine. 3 


560  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv 

is  necessary,  because  otherwise  the  witness  would  "usurp  the  func- 
tion of  the  jury."  But  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  no  risk  of  usurpa- 
tion; the  Court  does  not  empower  the  expert  witness  to  decide- any 
facts,  nor  is  the  jury  bound  to  accept  his  assertion.  The  real  situa- 
tion is  rather  the  opposite;  the  risk  is  that  the  expert's  opinion  will 
be  worthless  unless  it  is  clarified  for  the  benefit  of  the  jury.  The 
true  principle  is  a  simple  one;  and  to  speak  of  usurpation  tends 
simply  to  obscure  the  principle.] 

§  441  L  Same  :  Rules  for  the  Use  of  Hypothetical  Questions.  [(1) 
Kind  of  Witness.  As  a  matter  of  academic  nicety,  it  might  be 
thought  to  follow  that  even  a  witness  speaking  from  personal  ob- 
servation might  be  required  to  specify  the  data  for  the  opinion  he 
founds  on  his  observation;  and  to  this  extent  a  few  rulings  have 
gone.1  But  in  such  a  case  the  direct  examination  or  the  cross- 
examination  sufficiently  brings  out  the  data  that  serve  to  found  the 
opinion  on;  and  it  may  be  taken  as  a  proper  deduction  of  principle 
that  the  hypothetical  statement  of  the  data  need  not  be  made  except 
by  witnesses  not  having  personal  observation  of  the  data  for  their 
opinion.2  It  follows,  also,  that  the  same  person  may  testify  from 
data  in  part  based  on  personal  observation  and  in  part  stated  hypo- 
thetically ; 8  and,  of  course,  a  skilled  witness  may  properly  testify 
from  personal  observation  only.4 

(2)  Particularity  of  Data  as  stated.  The  purpose  of  the  hypo- 
thetical presentation  requires  that  the  data  put  forward  to  serve 
as  premises  should  be  particularized  with  sufficient  distinctness. 
Various  situations  present  themselves  to  be  tested  under  this  prin- 
ciple, (a)  An  answer  based  upon  all  the  testimony  in  the  case  is 
generally  considered  as  improper,  because  the  data  are  too  volumi- 
nous to  be  precisely  understood  and  kept  in  mind,  and  because  it 
is  impossible  for  the  jury  to  tell  which  parts  of  the  testimony  the 
witness  has  taken  for  true.6  Nevertheless,  many  Courts,  having 
chiefly  in  mind  the  second  consideration  above,  allow  such  an  answer 

1  QHitcheock  v.  Burgett,  38  Mich.  507;  Van  Denseu  v.  Newcomer,  40  id.  119; 
McDonald  v.  McDonald,  Ind.,  41  N.  E.  346,  semble.] 

a  pi.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  11  Oh.  St.  337  ;  Brown  v.  Huffard,  69  Mo.  305  ;  Tullis 
v.  Rnnkin,  N.  D.,  68  N.  W.  187  ;  People  v.  Youngs,  N.  Y.,  45  N.  E.  460;  New 
York  El.  Eq.  Co.  v.  Blair,  U.  S.  A  pp.,  79  Fed.  896.] 

8  CLouisv.  &  N.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Foley,  104  Ind.  418;  State  v.  Clark,  15  S.  C.  407  ; 
Wetherhee  v.  Wetherbee,  88  Vt.  454  ;  Pannell  v.  Com.,  86  Pa.  269  ;  Mullin's  Estate, 
Cal.,  42  Pac.  646;  State  v.  Wright,  Mo.,  35  S.  W.  1145  ;  Selleck  v.  Janesville,  Wis., 
75  N.  W.  975.] 

*  [Bennett  v.  Fail,  26  Ala.  610 ;  Louisv.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Shires,  108  111.  631  ; 
State  v.  Felter,  25  la.  75.] 

6  TEnrl  Ferrer's  Trial,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  943 ;  R.  v.  Wright,  R.  &  R.  457  ;  R.  v. 
Oxford,  4  State  Tr.  N.  8.  497,  532  ;  Sills  v.  Brown,  9  C.  &  P.  604  ;  Key  v.  Thomson, 
13  N.  Br.  227;  Diffin  v.  Daw,  22  id.  108  ;  People  v.  Ooldenson,  76  fal.  350  ;  Bishop 
v.  Spining,  88  Ind.  144:  Smith  v.  Hickenhutton,  57  la.  738;  Woodhnry  v.  Ohear, 
7  Gray  471  ;  Spear  v.  Richardson,  87  N.  H.  34,  wmble;  People  v.  MrElvaine,  121 
N.  Y.  250  ;  Anltman  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  S.  D.,  6rt  N.  W.  1081 ;  The  Clement,  2  Curt. 
C.  C.  369 ;  Quinn  v.  Higgins,  68  Wis.  669, 


§ §441  £-441  &]  OPINION  RULE.  561 

if  the  testimony  is  not  conflicting,  or,  more  cautiously,  exclude  it 
unless  the  facts  testified  to  are  undisputed.6  (5)  An  answer  based 
upon  a  portion  of  the  testimony  (in  the  usual  instance,  to  a  question, 
"  Upon  what  you  have  heard  of  the  testimony  in  the  case,  what  is 
your  opinion  ?  ")  should  be  treated  upon  the  same  principle,  and  is 
usually  held  improper.7  (c)  An  answer  based  on  an  assumption 
of  the  truth  of  the  testimony  for  one  party  is  perhaps  less  objection- 
able ; 8  its  admission  should  depend  on  the  testimony  in  the  partic- 
ular case.9  (d)  An  answer  based  on  the  testimony  of  two  or  more 
specified  witnesses  should  be  treated  in  the  same  way.10  (e)  An 
answer  based  on  the  testimony  of  a  single  witness'  testimony  should 
be  received,  unless  the  data  are  too  complicated  or  obscure ;  but  the 
rulings  are  not  uniform.11 

(3)  Kind  of  Data  that  may  be  assumed,  (a)  Since  the  data  to 
be  assumed  as  the  basis  are  those  which  it  is  expected  or  claimed 
the  jury  will  subsequently  adopt  as  true,  it  would  be  both  wasteful 
of  time  and  misleading  to  assume  data  which  there  is  not  a  fair 
chance  the  jury  will  accept;  and  a  limitation  for  this  purpose  is 
accepted  by  all  Courts.  The  phrasing  differs;  usually  it  is  said 
that  there  must  be  "  some  evidence  tending  to  prove  "  them ;  or  that 
they  must  be  "within  the  possible  or  probable  range  of  the  evidence; 
or  that  they  must  concern  facts  which  "the  jury  might  legitimately 
find  upon  the  evidence."  12  The  discretion  of  the  trial  Court  should 

«  [Page  v.  State,  61  Ala,  18  ;  Pyle  v.  Pyle,  111.,  41  N.  E.  999 ;  Tefft  v.  Wilcox, 
6  Kan.  58  ;  Chalmers  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  Mass.,  42  N.  E.  98  ;  Oliver  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  49  N.  E. 
117;  Walker  v.  Rogers,  24  Md.  243  ;  Kempsey  v.  McGinniss,  21  Mich.  138,  Storer's 
Will,  28  Minn.,  11  C.  &  F.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  May,  20  Oh.  223 ;  Olmsted  v.  Gere,  100  Pa. 
131,  sembJe ;  Amendaiz  v.  Stillman,  67  Tex.  462  ;  State  v.  Hayden,  51  Vt.  304  ;  Ben- 
nett v.  State,  57  Wis.  81  ;  Gates  v.  Fleischer,  67  id.  508 ;  Kreuziger  v.  R.  Co.,  73  id. 
163.] 

7  [Champ  v.   Com.,  2  Mete.   Ky.  27  ;  Connell  v.  McNett,  Mich.,  67  N.  W.  344  ; 
Malynek  i>.  State,  N.  J.  L.,  40  Atl.  572  ;  Lake  v.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  C.  557  ;  Sanchez 
i\  People,  22  N.  Y.  154.     Admitted:  Swauson  v.  Mellen,  Minn.,  69  N.  W.  620  ;  State 
v.  Hayden,  51  Vt.  299.] 

8  Admitted:  Polk  v.  State,   36  Ark.  123;    Schneider  v.  Manning,  121  111.  387; 
Pyle  v.  Pyle,  id.,  41  N.  E.  999.     Excluded :  People  v.  McElvaine,  121  N.  Y.  250.] 

9  TDexter  v.  Hall,  15  Wall.  26.] 

10  [Excluded:  Wilkinson  v.  Moseley,  30  Ala.  573  ;  Snelling's  Will,  136  N.  Y.  515  ; 
Reynolds  v.  Robinson,  64  id.  595  ;    Guiterman  v.  S.  S.  Co.,   83  id.  366.     Admitted : 
Bowen  v.  Huntington,  31  W.  Va.  694  (but  see  Kerr  v.  Lunsford,  31  id.  672).] 

11  [Admitted  :  State  v.  Baptiste,  26  La.  An.  137  ;  Twombly  v.  Leach,  11  Cush.  402  ; 
Hunt  v.  Gaslight  Co.,  8  All.  170 ;    McCollum  i>.  Seward,  62  N.  Y.  318  ;  Seymour  v. 
Fellows,  77  id.  180  ;   State  v.  Hayden,  51  Vt.  305  ;    Bennett  v.  State,   57  Wis.  81  ; 
McKeon   v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  69  N.  W.  175.     Excluded:    Barber's  Estate,   63  Conn.   393, 
408  ;  Chic.  &  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Glenny,  111.,  51  N.  E.  896  ;  Craig  v.  R.  Co.,  98  Ind.  112  ; 
Stoddard  v.  Winchester,  157  Mass.  567  ;  Detzur  v.  Brewing  Co.,   Mich.,   77  N.  W. 
948  ;  Link  v.  Sheldon,  136   N.   Y.  1,   9  ;   Manuf.   A.   I.  Co.  v.  Dorgan,   16  U.   S. 
App.  290.] 

12  QFor  the  phrasing  in  various  jurisdictions,  see  the  following  cases  :  Courvoisier 
v.  Raymond,  Colo.,  47  Pac.  284  ;  Barber's  Estate,  63  Conn.  393,  409  ;    Kelly  v.  Per- 
rault,  Ida.,  48  Pac.  45  ;  Grand  Lodge  v.  Wieting,  111.,  48  N.  E.  59  ;  Conway  v.  State, 
118  Ind.  490  ;  Meeker  v.  Meeker,  74  la.  355  ;    Davis  v.  Ins.   Co.,    Kan.,  52  Pac.  67  ; 
Baxter  v.  Knox,  Ky.,  44  S.  W.  972  ;  Powers  v.  Mitchell,  77  Me.  369  ;  Oliver  v.  R.  Co., 
Mass  ,  49  N.  E.  117  ;  People  v.  Foglesong,  Mich.,  74  N.  W.  730  ;  Peterson  v.  R.  Co., 

VOL.   I.  —  36 


562  WITNESSES;  EXAMINATION.  [CH.  xxiv. 

control  in  applying  the  principle.  (5)  The  party  is  entitled  to  the 
witness'  opinion  on  any  state  of  facts  within  the  above  range;  and 
hence,  as  a  matter  of  principle  alone,  the  question  need  not  cover 
the  entire  mass  of  data  put  forward  by  the  party  as  his  case,  but 
may  cover  any  selected  part  of  them.18  Nevertheless,  such  a  practice 
is  found  to  lend  itself  to  abuses,  and  to  allow  opinions  to  be  given  in 
such  a  way  as  to  mislead  the  jury,  by  concealing  their  real  signifi- 
cance or  by  unduly  emphasizing  certain  favorable  or  unfavorable 
data.  Accordingly,  a  Court  is  often  found  excluding  answers  not 
based  on  all  the  material  parts  of  one  witness'  testimony 14  or  unduly 
emphasizing  selected  data  culled  from  the  whole  case.18  (c)  The 
number  of  data  covered  by  a  question  is  immaterial ; 16  but  lengthy 
questions  may  tend  to  mislead  or  confuse  the  jury,  and  may  properly 
be  excluded,  in  the  trial  Court's  discretion.17 

(4)  The  form  of  the  question  must  in  strictness  be  hypothetical, 
i.  e.  clearly  assuming  the  data  as  unproved;18  but  it  should  be 
enough,  though  the  form  is  not  expressly  hypothetical,  if  in  effect  it 
appears  that  the  data  are  stated  as  assumptions  and  not  as  facts.19] 

38  Minn.  515  ;  Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  Mo.,  44  S.  W.  1053  ;  Morrill  v.  Tegarden,  19Nebr. 
536 ;  Lindenthal  v.  Hatch,  N.  J.  L.,  39  Atl.  662  ;  People  v.  Augsbury,  97  N.  Y.  504 ; 
Burnett  r.  E.  Co.,  N.  C.,  26  S.  E.  819;  Rober  v.  Herring,  115  Pa.  608;  North  A.  A. 
Ass'n  v.  Woodson,  U.  S.  App.,  64  Fed.  689  ;  Hathaway  v.  Ins.  Co.,  48  Vt.  351  ;  Kerr 
».  Lnnsford,  31  W.  Va.  672;  Tebo  v.  Augusta,  Wis.,  63  N.  W.  1045.] 

13  [[People  t-.  Durrant,  Cal.,  48  Pac.  75  ;  Barber's  Estate,  63  Conn.  393.  409  ;  Louisv. 
N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  t».  Wood,  113  Ind.  554  ;  Turnbull  v.  Richardson.  69  Mich.  413  ; 
Merrill  r.  Hershfield,  Mont.,  47  Pac.  997;  Stearns  v.  Field,  90  N.  Y.  640;  First  N. 
B'k  v.  Wirebach,  106  Pa.  44  (the  reason  well  expounded)  ;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 
Compton,  75  Tex.  673  J 

"  [See  Davis  v.  State,  38  Md.  40 ;  Hand  v.  Brookline,  126  Mass.  326  ;  Jewett  v. 
Brooks,  134  id.  505."] 

16  [See  People  v.  Vanderhoof,  71  Mich.  176  ;  Gottlieb  v,  Hartman,  3  Colo.  61  ;  Pet- 
erson v.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn.  515  ;  Thayerr.  Davis,  38  Vt.  163-3 

16  TMayo  v.  Wright,  63  Mich.  43.] 

17  Lgee  Davis  v.  Ins.   Co.,  Kan.,  52  Pac.  67;  Howes  v.  Colburn,  Mass.,  43  N.  E. 
125  ;  Forsyth  v.  Doolittle,  120  U.  S.  78.] 

«  [Chalmers  v.  Mfg.  Co.,  Mass.,  42  NT  E.  98  ;  Jones  v.  R.  Co.,  43  Minn.  281 ;  State 
v.  Keene,  100  N.  C.  511  ;  Gilman  v.  Stratford,  50  Vt.  725.] 

19  QMcCollum  v.  Saward,  62  N.  Y.  318;  Kempsey  v.  McGinnias,  21  Mich.  139.] 


441 Z-442.]          WITNESSES  ;  IMPEACHMENT. 


563 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  IMPEACHMENT  AND  DISCREDITING  ;   CROSS- 
EXAMINATION. 


1.    Who  may  be  Impeached. 

§  442.   Impeaching  one's  own  Witness. 

§  443.  Same  :  Rule  not  applicable  to  a 
Compulsory  Witness. 

§  443  «.  Same  :  (1)  By  Evidence  of 
Bias,  Interest,  or  Corruption. 

§  443  b.  Same  :  (2)  By  Evidence  of 
Error ;  Contradicting  the  Witness. 

§  444.  Same:  (3)  By  Evidence  of  Prior 
Inconsistent  Statements. 

§  444  a.  Same  :  Who  is  one's  own  Wit- 
ness. 

§  444  b.   Accused  as  a  Witness. 

§  444  c.  Impeaching  Witness  im- 
peached. 

§  444  d.  Hearsay  Statements  ;  Attest- 
ing Witness. 

2.   Cross-examination,  in  general. 

§  445.  Putting  in  one's  own  Case  on 
Cross-examination. 

§§  446-449.   Sundries. 


3.  Kinds  of  Impeaching  Evidence. 

§  450.   Bias. 

§  450  a.   Corruption. 

§  450  b.   Insanity,  Intoxication,  etc. 

§  461  a.  Character  ;  (1)  Kind  of  Char- 
acter. 

§  461  b.  Character  ;  (2)  Proof  by  Par- 
ticular Acts  of  Misconduct. 

§  461  c.  Character  ;  (3)  Proof  by  Per. 
sonal  Knowledge  or  Opinion. 

§46  Id.  Character;  (4)  Proof  by  Repu- 
tation. 

§  461  e.  Contradiction  ;  Collateral  Error. 

§  461 /.  Prior  Inconsistent  Statements. 

§  462.  Same :  Witness'  Attention  must 
be  called. 

§  462  a.  Same  :  What  is  an  Inconsist- 
ent Statement. 

§  462  b.  Same  :  Explanations  ;  Whole 
of  Statement. 

§§  463-465.  Same  :  Inconsistent  State- 
ments in  Writing ;  Rule  in  The  Queen's 
Case. 

§  465  a.  Same  :  Theory  and  Policy  of 
the  Rule. 


1.      Who  may  be  Impeached. 

§  442.  Impeaching  one's  own  Witness.  When  a  party  offers  a 
witness  in  proof  of  his  cause,  he  thereby,  in  general,  represents  him 
as  worthy  of  belief.  He  is  presumed  to  know  the  character  of  the 
witnesses  he  adduces ; 1  and  having  thus  presented  them  to  the 
Court,  the  law  will  not  permit  the  party  afterwards  to  impeach  their 
general  reputation  for  truth,  or  to  impugn  their  credibility  by  gen- 
eral evidence,  tending  to  show  them  to  be  unworthy  of  belief ; 2  for 
this  would  enable  him  to  destroy  the  witness  if  he  spoke  against 
him,  and  to  make  him  a  good  witness  if  he  spoke  for  him,  with  the 
means  in  his  hand  of  destroying  his  credit  if  he  spoke  against  him. 
[It  will  be  noted  that  this  consideration  applies  solely  to  impeach- 
ment of  character ;  the  thought  being  that  if  a  witness  realized  that, 

1  PN either  of  these  statements  is  correct  in  point  of  fact ;  the  true  reason  is  merely 
one  of  policy,  as  explained  later ;  see  the  article  by  May,  C.  J.,  in  11  Amer.  Law  Re- 
view, 264  ff.,  in  which  the  fallacies  of  the  rule  here  concerned  are  vigorously  criticised.] 

2  Bull.  N.  P.  297;  Ewer  v.  Ambrose,  3  B.  &  C.  746  ;  Stockton  v.  Demuth,  7  Watts 
89  ;  Smith  v.  Piice,  8  id.  447.     QTo  this  extent  the  rule  is  universally  accepted.] 


564  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

unless  his  testimony  were  favorable,  the  party  calling  him  would 
endeavor  publicly  to  fix  a  bad  character  upon  him,  the  witness  would 
have  a  strong  motive  to  make  his  testimony  as  favorable  as  possible, 
without  regard  to  the  truth.  The  weakness  of  this  argument  is  that 
it  applies  just  as  strongly  to  an  opponent's  witness,  and  yet  it  has 
never  been  thought  to  demand  a  prohibition  against  attacking  his 
character.  But  the  reason  has  always  been  accepted  as  sufficient. 
The  only  doubt  has  been  as  to  how  far  it  applies  to  exclude  impeach- 
ment by  other  modes,  viz.  (1)  bias,  interest,  or  corruption,  (2)  error, 
by  contradicting,  (3)  prior  inconsistent  statements.  These  we  may 
take  up  in  this  order-,  first  of  all,  however,  noticing  a  case  to  which 
the  reason  of  the  main  rule  as  to  character  does  not  apply.] 

§  443.  Same  :  Rule  not  applicable  to  Compulsory  Witness.  Where 
the  witness  is  not  one  of  the  party's  own  selection,  but  is  one  whom 
the  law  obliges  him  to  call,  such  as  the  subscribing  witness  to  a 
deed,  or  a  will,  or  the  like  ;  here  he  can  hardly  be  considered  as  the 
witness  of  the  party  calling  him,  and  therefore,  as  it  seems,  his  char- 
acter for  truth  may  be  generally  impeached.1 

[The  chief  matter  of  controversy  is  whether  the  principle  of  the 
rule  applies  also  to  all  the  various  modes  in  which  a  witness  may  be 
impeached  other  than  by  character-evidence.] 

§  443  a.  Same :  (1)  By  Evidence  of  Bias,  Interest,  or  Corruption. 
[The  reason  above  explained  should  not,  it  would  seem,  operate  to 
exclude  evidence  of  bias,  nor  of  interest,1  nor,  in  any  case,  of  cor- 
rupt action ;  2  but  the  opposite  view  is  usually  taken.] 

§  443  b.  Same  :  (2)  By  Evidence  of  Error ;  Contradicting  the  Wit- 
ness. It  is  exceedingly  clear  that  the  party,  calling  a  witness,  is  not 
precluded  from  proving  the  truth  of  any  particular  fact,  by  any  other 
competent  testimony,  in  direct  contradiction,  to  what  such  witness 
may  have  testified  ;  and  this  not  only  where  it  appears  that  the  wit- 
ness was  innocently  mistaken,  but  even  where  the  evidence  may 
collaterally  have  the  effect  of  showing  that  he  was  generally  un- 
worthy of  belief.1  [If  this  were  not  so,  a  party  would  be  (as  Courts 

1  Lowe  v.  Jolliffe,  1  W.  Bl.  365  ;  Poth.  on  Obi.  by  Evans,  vol.  ii,  p.  232,  App.  No. 
16  ;  Williams  v.  Walker,  2  Rich.  Eq.  291 ;  and  see  Goodtitle  W.Clayton,  4  Burr.  3224  ; 
Cowden  v.  Reynolds,  12  S.  &  R.  281  ;  but  see  Whitaker  v.  Salisbury,  15  Pick.  544, 
545  ;  Dennett  v.  Dow,  5  Shepl.  19  ;  Brown  v.  Bellows,  4  Pick.  179.  fJThe  r"le  i3 
commonly  said  not  to  be  applicable  to  a  compulsory  witness:  People  v.  Case,  105 
Mich.  92 ;  Whitman  v.  Morey,  63  N.  H.  448,  456  ;  Shorey  v.  Hussey,  32  Me.  579  ; 
but  the  cases  which  distinctly  declare  this  of  character  evidence  are  few  :  see  Dif- 
fendcrfer  v.  State,  Ind.,  32  N.  E.  87  ;  Thornton  v.  Thornton,  89  Vt.  122,  155.  A 
great  inroad  upon  the  rule,  and  one  deserving  imitation,  has  been  made  in  Vermont 
by  treating  all  eye-witnesses  called  by  the  State  on  a  criminal  charge  as  in  effect  com- 
pulsory witnesses:  State  v.  Slack,  69  Vt.  486.] 

1  \jOmtn:  Fenton  v.   Hughes,  7  Ves.  Jr.  87;  Johnson  v.  Varick,   5  Cow.   239; 
Stewart  v.  Hood,  10  Ala.  600  ;  Fairly  v.  Fairly,  88  Miss.  280,  289.] 

2  {^Contra:  State  v.  Shonhausen,  26  La.  An.  421.     Accord:  Dunn  o.  Aslett,  2  Mo. 
&Rol>.  122.1 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  297;  Alexander  r.  Gibson,  2  Campb.  555  ;  Richardson  v.  Allan, 
2  Stark.  334  ;  Ewer  v.  Ambrose,  8  B.  &  C.  746 ;  6  D.  &  It.  127 ;  s.  c.  4  B.  &  C.  25  ; 


§§  442-444]       IMPEACHING  ONE'S  OWN  WITNESS.  565 

have  more  than  once  pointed  out)  virtually  at  the  mercy  of  his  first 
witness.  It  follows,  moreover,  that  a  counsel,  without  offering  other 
witnesses,  may  argue  that  his  own  witness  is  in  error.2] 

§  444.  Same :  (3)  By  Evidence  of  Prior  Inconsistent  Statements. 
Whether  it  be  competent  for  a  party  to  prove  that  a  witness  whom  he 
has  called,  and  whose  testimony  is  unfavorable  to  his  cause,  had  pre- 
viously stated  the  facts  in  a  different  manner,  is  a  question  upon 
which  there  exists  some  diversity  of  opinion.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
is  urged,  that  a  party  is  not  to  be  sacrificed  to  his  witness;  that  he  is 
not  represented  by  him,  nor  identified  with  him  ;  and  that  he  ought 
not  to  be  entrapped  by  the  arts  of  a  designing  man,  perhaps  in  the 
interest  of  his  adversary.1  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  said,  that  to  ad- 
mit such  proof  would  enable  the  party  to  get  the  naked  declarations 
of  a  witness  before  the  jury,  operating,  in  fact,  as  independent  evi- 
dence ;  and  this,  too,  even  where  the  declarations  were  made  out  of 
court,  by  collusion,  for  the  purpose  of  being  thus  introduced.2  But 
the  weight  of  authority  seems  in  favor  of  admitting  the  party  to  show 
that  the  evidence  has  taken  him  by  surprise,  and  is  contrary  to  the 
examination  of  the  witness  preparatory  to  the  trial,  or  to  what  the 
party  had  reason  to  believe  he  would  testify ;  or,  that  the  witness  has 
recently  been  brought  under  the  influence  of  the  other  party,  and  has 
deceived  the  party  calling  him.  For  it  is  said  that  this  course  is  ne- 
cessary for  his  protection  against  the  contrivance  of  an  artful  witness; 
and  that  the  danger  of  its  being  regarded  by  the  jury  as  substantive 
evidence  is  no  greater  in  such  cases  than  it  is  where  the  contradictory 
declarations  are  proved  by  the  adverse  party.8  [Though  there  can 

Friedlander  v.  London  Assur.  Co.,  4  B.  &  Ad.  193  ;  Lawrence  v.  Barker,  5  Wend.  305, 
per  Savage,  C.  J.  ;  Cowden  v.  Reynolds,  12  S.  &  R,  281 ;  Bradley  v.  Ricardo,  8  Bing. 
57  ;  Jackson  v.  Leek,  12  Wend.  105  ;  Stockton  v.  Demuth,  7  Watts  39  ;  Brown  v. 
Bellows,  4  Pick.  179,  194  ;  Perry  ?>.  Massey,  1  Bail.  32  ;  Spencer  v.  White,  1  Ired. 
239  ;  Dennett  v.  Dow,  5  Shepl.  19  ;  Me  Arthur  v.  Hurlbert,  21  Wend.  190  ;  Att'y- 
Gen.  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  91  ;  llJur.  478  ;  The  Lochlibo,  14  Jur.  792  :  1  Eng.  L.  & 
Eq.  645.  L~This  doctrine  is  universally  accepted  ;  the  earlier  law  apparently  excluded 
this  also,  but  Rice  v.  Oatfield,  2  Stra.  1095,  in  1738,  seems  to  have  led  the  way  to  the 
present  view.  The  English  statute  mentioned  in  the  next  section  inadvertently  raised 
a  doubt,  which  was  virtually  read  out  of  the  statute  by  Greenough  v.  Eccles,  5  C.  B. 
N.  s.  786  ;  see  Coles  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  70  ;  R.  v.  Dytche,  17  Cox  Cr.  39  ; 
Robinson  v.  Reynolds,  23  U.  C.  Q.  B.  560,  upon  the  terms  of  the  statute.] 

2  [Mitchell  v.  Sawyer,  115  111.  650,  657;  Webber  v.  Jackson,  79  Mich.  175; 
Schmidt  v.  Dunham,  50  Minn.  96  ;  McLean  v.  Clark,  31  Fed.  501.  Contra,  but  quite 
unsound:  Claflin  v.  Dodson,  111  Mo.  195,  201;  Dravo  v.  Fabel,  132  U.  S.  487,  490; 
Graves  v.  Davenport,  50  Fed.  881.] 

1  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  904,  905  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  447. 

2  Ibid.;  Smith  v.  Price,  8  Watts  447;  Wright  v.  Beckett,  1  M.  &  Rob.  414,  428, 
per  Bolland,  B. 

3  Wright  v.  Beckett,  1  M.  &  Rob.  414,  416,  per  Ld.  Denman  ;  Rice  v.  New  Eng. 
Marine  Ins.  Co. ,  4  Pick.  439  ;  R.  v.  Oldroyd,  Russ.  &  Ry.  88,  90,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough 
and  Mansfield,  C.  J.  ;  Brown  v.  Bellows,  4  Pick.  179 ;  State  v.  Norris,  1  Hayw.  437, 
438  ;   2  Phil.  Evid.  450-463  ;  Dunn  v.  Aslett,  2  M.  &  Rob.  122 ;  Bank  of  Northern 
Liberties  v.  Davis,  6  Watts  &  Serg.  285;   infra,  §  467,  n.     But  see  Holdsworth  v. 
Mayor  of  Dartmouth,  2  M.  &  Rob.  153  ;  R.  v.  Ball,  8  C.  &  P.  745  ;  and  R.  v.  Farr,  ib. 
768,  where  evidence  of  this  kind  was  rejected.     QThe  matter  remained  in  doubt,  in 
England,  even  after  Melhuish  v.  Collier,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  493,  in  1850,  and  the  statute 


566  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

hardly  be  any  doubt  to-day  tnat  all  the  considerations  of  policy  and 
principle  are  in  favor  of  allowing  the  unlimited  use  of  this  sort  of 
evidence,4  yet  the  former  currency  of  the  doubts  on  the  subject,  and  the 
varying  solutions  reached  in  the  early  English  practice,  have  led  to  a 
great  variety  in  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  Courts  in  this  country. 
It  will  be  enough  here  to  point  out  the  chief  varieties  of  form  now  to 
be  found.  (1)  There  are  Courts  which  admit  the  evidence  freely  in  any 
shape  ;  this  result  has  often  been  reached  by  statute.  (2)  There  are 
a  few  Courts  which  have  —  usually  in  the  earlier  rulings  —  rejected 
the  evidence  in  every  shape.  (3)  There  is  a  view  by  which  the  evi- 
dence is  admitted  when  the  party  has  been  surprised  or  "  entrapped  " 
or  "  misled  "  by  the  witness ;  but  this  of  course  is  usually  the  case, 
whenever  such  evidence  is  offered.  (4)  By  another  view,  the  incon- 
sistent statement  may  not  be  proved  by  other  witnesses,  but  may  be 
brought  out  by  a  question  to  the  witness  himself.  (5)  Another  view 
is  Uiat  such  evidence,  however  obtained,  should  not  be  received  to  dis- 
credit the  witness,  but  that  the  inquiry  may  be  made  of  the  witness 
himself  in  order  to  stimulate  his  recollection  and  induce  a  correction. 
(6)  Still  another  view,  closely  connected  with  the  last  two,  excludes 
outside  evidence,  but  allows  the  question  to  be  put  to  the  witness  him- 
self, primarily  to  stimulate  recollection,  but  does  not  object  to  the 
incidental  discrediting  effect.  (7)  Another  variation  is  to  allow  the 
question  to  be  put  to  the  witness  himself  for  either  purpose,  but  ad- 
mits outside  testimony  only  where  the  witness  is  hostile.  (8)  Finally, 
certain  Courts  which  admit  the  self-contradiction  freely,  exclude  a 
certain  kind  of  such  statements  because  they  are  not  in  truth  contra- 
dictory and  merely  serve  to  introduce  hearsay.8  It  must  be  added 

17-18  Viet.,  c.  125,  s.  22,  passed  in  1854,  allowed  the  use  of  such  evidence,  subject  to 
the  trial  Court's  discretion  ;  but  the  phrasing  of  the  statute  was  unfortunate,  and  has 
led  to  much  difference  of  opinion  in  its  interpretation :  see  Greenough  v.  Eccles,  5  C.  B. 
N.  s.  786  ;  Reed  v.  King,  30  L.  T.  290  ;  Faulkner  v.  Brine,  1  F.  &  F.  254  ;  Dear  v. 
Knight,  ib.  433  ;  Martin  v.  Ins.  Co.,  ib.  505;  Jackson  v.  Thomason,  1  B.  &  S.  745  ; 
Ryberg  v.  Smith,  32  L.  J.  P.  M.  &  A.  112  ;  Cresswell  v.  Jackson,  4  F.  &  F.  3 ;  Pound 
».  Wilson,  ib.  301  ;  Coles  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  1  P.  &  D.  70  ;  Anstell  v.  Alexander,  16 
L.  T.  N.  s.  830  ;  R.  v.  Little,  15  Cox  Cr.  319 ;  Rice  v.  Howard,  L.  R.  16  Q.  B.  D. 
681.] 

*  [[See  the  exposition  by  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.,  in  Wright  v.  Beckett,  1  Mo.  &  Rob. 
418,  425  ;  Erie,  J.,  in  Melhuish  v.  Collier,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  493  ;  Starkie,  Evidence,  I, 
217  ;  Second  Report  of  Common  Law  Practice  Com'rs,  1853,  p.  16  ;  J.  H.  Bentou,  Jr., 
arguendo,  in  Hurlburt  v.  Bellows,  50  N.  H.  112.] 

6  FJThe  cases  are  as  follows  :  Winston  v.  Moseley,  2  Stew.  137 ;  Campbell  v.  State, 
23  Ala.  44,  76  ;  Hemingway  v.  Garth,  51  id.  530  ;  Thompson  v.  State,  99  id.  173,  175 ; 
Louisv.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  101  id.  34,  43  ;  Feibelman  v.  Assur.  Co.,  108  id.  180; 
Thomas  v.  State,  id.,  23  So.  665  ;  Ark.  Code,  §  2523  ;  Ward  v.  Young,  42  Ark.  543, 
553  ;  Cal.  Code,  C.  P.  §  2049  ;  People  v.  Jacobs,  49  Cal.  384  ;  People  v.  Bushton,  80 
id.  161  ;  People  v.  Wallace,  89  id.  158,  163;  People  v.  Mitchell,  94  id.  550,  556; 
People  v.  Kruger,  100  id.  523  ;  Re  Kennedy,  104  id.  429,  431  ;  Hyde  v.  Buckner,  108 
id.  52-J  ;  People  v.  Crespi,  115  id.  50  ;  People  v.  Durrant,  116  id.  179  ;  Thiele  v.  New- 
man, ib.  571 ;  Babcock  v.  People,  13  Colo.  519  ;  Ga.  Code,  §  3869  ;  McDaniel  v.  State, 
53  Ga.  253  ;  Dixon  v.  State,  86  id.  754  ;  Garrett  v.  Sparks,  60  id.  582,  586;  Ind.  Code, 
§  244  ;  Quinn  v.  State,  14  Ind.  589  ;  Judy  v.  Johnson,  16  id.  371  ;  Hill  v.  Ooodc,  18 
id.  207,  209  ;  R.  S.  1881,  §  1796  ;  Hull  v.  State,  93  id.  128,  132  ;  Conway  v.  State, 


§§  444-444  a.]     IMPEACHING  ONE'S  OWN  WITNESS.  567 

that  the  rule  about  showing  a  written  statement  to  the  witness  (post, 
§  463)  and  the  rule  about  refreshing  memory  by  writings  (ante, 
§  439  c),  as  well  as  the  general  principles  involved  in  the  use  of 
inconsistent  statements  (post,  §  461/),  constantly  come  into  play  in 
union  with  the  present  principle,  and  the  operation  of  the  several 
sets  of  rules  should  be  carefully  distinguished.] 

§  444  a.  Same  :  Who  is  one's  own  Witness.  [For  the  purposes 
of  applying  the  preceding  principles,  it  is  often  necessary  to  deter- 
mine who  is  one's  own  witness,  within  the  scope  of  the  rule  forbid- 
ding impeachment.  On  each  of  the  situations  presenting  difficulty, 
there  is  much  difference  of  opinion.  The  fact  of  calling  the  witness 
would  ordinarily  suffice  to  make  the  rule  applicable,  and  to  furnish  a 
test ;  but  this  seems  often  to  result  in  unfairly  tying  the  hands  of 
the  party  calling  him  where  the  witness  is  palpably  hostile ;  and  the 
whole  policy  of  the  rule,  except  so  far  as  it  forbids  attacking  char- 
acter, is  so  questionable,  that  perhaps  a  conflict  between  the  re- 

118  id.  482,  488  ;  Crocker  v.  Agenbroad,  122  id.  585  ;  Miller  v.  Cook,  124  id.  101, 104  ; 
Blough  v.  Parry,  144  id.  463  ;  Humble  v.  Shoemaker,  70  la.  223,  226  ;  State  v.  Cum- 
mins, 76  id.  133,  135  ;  Hull  v.  R.  Co.,  84  id.  311,  315  ;  Smith  v.  Dawley,  92  id.  312  ; 
Spaulding  v.  R.  Co.,  98  id.  205  ;  Hall  v.  Manson,  99  id.  698  ;  Johnson  v.  Leggett,  28 
Kan.  590,  605  ;  St.  L.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver,  35  id.  412,  431  ;  State  v.  Sorter, 
52  id.  531  ;  Ky.  Code,  §  660 ;  Champ  v.  Com.,  2  Mete.  17,  23 ;  Blackburn  v. 
Com.,  12  Bush  181,  184  ;  Wren  v.  R.  Co.,  Ky.,  20  S.  W.  215  ;  P.  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  id.,  38  S.  W.  482 ;  State  v.  Thomas,  28  La,  An.  827  ;  State  v. 
Simon,  37  id.  569  ;  State  v.  Boyd,  38  id.  105  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  47  id.  1225  ;  State  v. 
Vickers,  ib.  1574;  Dennett  v.  Dow,  17  Me.  19,  22;  Chamberlain  v.  Sands,  27  id. 
458,  466  ;  De  Sobry  v.  De  Laistre,  2  H.  &  J.  219  ;  Queen  t>.  State,  5  id.  232  ;  Frank- 
lin B'k  v.  Navig.  Co.,  11  G.  &  J.  36;  Sewell  v.  Gardner,  48  Md.  178,  183  ;  Mass.  St. 
1869,  c.  425  ;  Ryerson  v.  Abington,  102  Mass.  531  ;  Brannon  v.  Hursell,.112  id.  63, 
70  ;  Day  v.  Cooley,  118  id.  524,  526  ;  Brooks  v.  Weeks,  121  id.  433  ;  Force  v.  Martin, 
122  id.  5  ;  Com.  «.  Donahoe,  133  id.  407;  Dillon  v.  Pinch,  110  Mich.  149  ;  People  v. 
O'Neill,  107  id.  556  ;  People  v.  Gillespie,  111  id.  241  ;  Gilbert  v.  R.  Co.,  id.,  74 
N.  W.  1010  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  12  Minn.  486;  State  v.  Tall,  43  id.  273,  275  ;  Sel- 
over  v.  Bryant,  54  id.  434  ;  Moore  v.  R.  Co.,  59  Miss.  243,  248  ;  Dunlap  v.  Richard- 
son, 63  id.  447,  449  ;  Chism  v.  State,  70  id.  742  ;  Bacot  v.  Lumber  Co.,  id.,  23  So. 
481;  Dunn  v.  Dunnaker/87  Mo.  597,  600;  State  v.  Burks,  132  id.  363;  State 
v.  Bloor,  20  Mont.  754;  Hurlburt  v.  Bellows  50  N.  H.  105,  116;  Whitman  v. 
Morey,  63  id.  448,  456  ;  Brewer  v.  Porch,  17  N.  J.  L.  377,  379 ;  Kohl  v.  State,  59  id. 
445;  Lawrence  v.  Barker,  5  Wend.  301,  305;  People  v.  Safford,  5  Den.  112,  116; 
Thompson  v.  Blanchard,  4  N.  Y.  303,  311  ;  Bullard  v.  Pearsall,  53  id.  230;  Coulter  v. 
Express  Co.,  56  id.  585, 588 ;  Becker  v.  Koch,  104  id.  394,  402;  Cross  v.  Cross,  108  id.  628; 
People  v.  Kelly,  113  id.  647,  651  ;  De  Meli  v.De  Meli,  120  id.  485,  490  ;  People  v.  Bur- 
gess, 153  id.  561 ;  State  v.  Norrisj  1  Hayw.  429,  437  ;  Sawrey  v.  Murrell,  2  id.  397  ; 
Neil  v.  Childs,  10  id.  195,  197;  Hice  v.  Cox,  12  id.  315;  State  v.  Taylor,  88  id.  696; 
George  v.  Triplett,  5  N.  D.  50;  Hurley  v.  State,  46  Oh.  320,  322;  Langford  r. 
Jones,  18  Or.  307,  325;  State  v.  Steeves,  29  id.  85  ;  State  r.  Bartmess,  id.,  54  Pac. 
167;  Rapp  v.  Le  Blanc,  1  Dall.  63  ;  Cowden  v.  Reynolds,  12  S.  &  R.  281,  283  ;  Craig  r. 
Craig,  5  Rawle  91,  95;  Stockton  v.  Demuth,  7  "Watts  39,  41;  Smith  v.  Price,  8  id. 
441 ;  Bank  of  N.  Liberties  v.  Davis,  6  W.  &  S.  285,  288  ;  Harden  v.  Hays,  9  Pa.  St. 
151,  159;  Stearns  v.  Bank,  53  id.  490  ;  McNerney  r.  Reading,  150  id.  611,  615  j  Mor- 
ris v.  Guffey,  id.,  41  Atl.  731 ;  Bauskett  v.  Keith,  22  S.  C.  199  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  43 
id.  123  ;  Story  v.  Saunders,  8  Humph.  663,  666  ;  Erwin  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  519; 
Ross  v.  State,  id.,  45  S.  W.  808;  Hickory  v.  U.  S.,  151  U.  S.  303,  309;  St.  Clair  v. 
U.  S.,  154  id.  134,  150;  Fairchild  v.  Bascomb,  35  Vt.  398,  417;  Cox  v.  Eayres,  55  id. 
24,  35  ;  Hurlburt  v.  Hurlburt,  63  id.  667,  670 ;  Good  v.  Knox,  64  id.  97,  99 ;  Sutton 
v.  R.  Co.,  Wis.,  73  N.  W.  993;  Collins  v.  Hall,  id.,  75  N.  W.  416;  Arnold  v.  State, 
5  Wyo.  439.3 


568  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [en.  xxv. 

quirements  of  its  technicalities  and  the  unfairness  of  the  result  is 
inevitable,  and  will  account  for  the  judicial  differences  of  opinion. 
"Where  the  opposing  party  may  be  called  (under  statutory  enact- 
ments), it  would  seem  fair  to  relax  the  rule.1  A  co-defendant  testi- 
fying for  himself  seems  also  to  be  without  its  scope.2  Where  a 
witness  was  originally  called  by  one  party,  but  has  then  been  re-called 
by  the  opponent,  it  would  seem  that  the  rule  of  prohibition  applies 
to  the  former,8  but  not  to  the  latter.4  Where  a  deposition  is  con- 
cerned, as,  for  example,  where  it  has  been  used  by  the  taking  party 
only,  or  by  the  cross-examining  party  only,  or  by  both,  a  variety  of 
solutions  are  possible.6  A  great  variety  of  other  situations  may  pre- 
sent the  question.6] 

§  444  b.  Accused  as  a  "Witness.  [When,  under  the  modern  stat- 
utes removing  common-law  disqualifications,  the  defendant  in  a 
criminal  case  takes  the  stand  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  two  distinct 
questions  arise,  to  one  of  which  the  answer  of  the  Courts  is  clear  and 
unanimous,  to  the  other  doubtful  and  inharmonious. 

(1)  Is  his  position  as  a  witness  so  separable  from  his  position  as  a 
defendant  that  what  would  be  usable  to  impeach  him  as  a  witness, 
but  would  not  be  available  against  him  merely  as  a  defendant,  may 
still  be  used  ?  In  particular,  may  his  bad  character  be  shown,  may 
this  character  be  searched  into  on  cross-examination,  may  the  other 
tests  applicable  to  witnesses  be  employed  ?  The  answer,  as  policy 
clearly  demands,  is  in  the  affirmative  ;  for  otherwise,  if  he  were  a 
false  witness,  the  customary  methods  of  exposing  this  would  not  be 
available,  and  the  investigation  of  truth  and  the  punishment  of  crime 
would  be  defeated.  These  reasons *  have  led  to  the  general  accept- 
ance of  the  rule  that  an  accused  person  taking  the  stand  as  a  wit- 
ness may  be  impeached  precisely  like  any  other  witness,  i.  e.  by 

1  [T"he  cases  differ,  and  statutes  have  sometimes  expressly  declared  him  to  be  an  op- 
posing witness;  see  Mair  v.  Culy,  10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  321,  325  ;  Warren  v.  Gabriel,  51  Ala. 
235  ;  Drennen  v.  Lindsay,  15  Ark.  361 ;  Garretttf.  Sparks,  60  Ga.  582 ;  Crocker  v.  Agen- 
broad,  122  Ind.  585  ;  Hunt  v.  Coe,  15  la.  197  ;  Thomas  v.  McDaneld,  88  id.  380  ;  Pfef- 
ferkorn  v.  Seefield,  66  Minn.  223  ;  Suter  v.  Page,  64  id.  444 ;  Chandler  v.  Freeman,  50 
Mo.  239  ;  Imhoff  v.  McArthur,  id.,  48  S.  W.  456  ;  Strudwick  v.  Brodnax,  83  N.  C.  401, 
403  ;  Coatcs  v.  Wilkes,  92  id.  376  ;  Helms  v.  Green,  105  id.  251,  262  ;  Brubaker  v.  Tay- 
lor, 76  Pa.  83,  87  ;  Dravo  v.  Fabel,  132  U.  S.  487,  489  ;  Good  v.  Knox,  64  Vt.  97.] 

a  rState  v.  Goff,  117  N.  C.  755  ;  State  v.  Adams,  49  S.  C.  414.] 

»  [Contra:  Hall  v.  Manson,  99  la.  698."] 

*  [jSawrey  v.  Murrell,  2  Hayw.  397.  Contra :  Barker  v.  Bell,  46  Ala.  216,  223 ; 
Artz  v.  R.  Co.,  44  la.  284  ;  Smith  v.  Ass.  Co.,  65  Fed.  765.] 

6  QSee  Carville  v.  Stout,  10  Ala.  798,  802  ;  Bunzel  v.  Haas,  id.,  22  So.  568  ;  Young 
r.  Wood,  11  B.  Monr.  123,  134;  Steinbach  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2Caines  129;  Crary  v.  Sprague, 
12  Wend.  41 ;  People  v.  Moore,  15  id.  420  ;  Neil  v.  Childs,  10  I  red.  195  ;  Richmond 
v.  Richmond,  10  Yerg.  343  ;  Story  v.  Saunders,  8  Humph.  663  ;  Elliot  v.  Shultz,  10  id. 
2-J3.] 

8  QSee  Bebee  v.  Tinker,  2  Root  160  ;  Milton  ».  State,  Fla.,  24  So.  60  ;  Powers  v. 
State,  80  Ind.  77  ;  Collery  v.  Transit  Co.,  Pa.,  39  Atl.  813  ;  Watson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Wash. 
C.  C.  480.] 

1  QSet  forth  in  Com.  v.  Bonner,  97  Mass.  587 ;  by  Buskirk,  C.  J.,  in  Fletcher  v. 
State,  49  Ind.  130  ;  and  by  Breaux,  J.,  in  State  v.  Murphy,  45  La.  An.  958.] 


§§  444a-4446.]          ACCUSED  AS  WITNESS.  569 

reputation  as  evidence  of  character,  by  cross-examination  to  charac- 
ter, by  conviction  of  crime,  and  the  like.2  (a)  It  follows,  incident- 
ally, that  this  may  be  done  against  him  as  a  witness,  irrespective  of 
the  rule  which  protects  his  character  as  a  defendant  from  attack 
(ante,  §  14  6)  until  he  has  offered  it  in  defence,  (b)  It  follows,  also, 
that  only  such  a  character  as  affects  him  testimonially  may  be  used 
against  him  —  i.  e.  in  most  jurisdictions,  his  character  for  veracity 
(post,  §  461  a)  —  until  he  sets  up  his  character  as  evidence  of  inno- 
cence (ante,  §  14  &).8  The  accused  may  not  offer  his  testimonial 
character  (which  may  be  different  from  the  character  that  would  be 
evidence  of  innocence;  ante,  §  14:b,post,  §  461  a),  until  it  has  been 
impeached,  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  §  469  a,  post.* 
(c)  The  unsworn  statement  of  a  defendant,  which  until  recently  in 
some  jurisdictions  he  was  allowed  to  make  (ante,  §  333  a),  did  not  con- 
stitute him  a  witness,  for  the  present  purpose.6  (<?)  It  was  at  one 
time  supposed  in  New  York  that  the  scope  of  cross-examination  to 
misconduct  was  narrower  for  a  defendant-witness  than  for  others  ; ' 
but  this  limitation  seems  no  longer  to  be  law  in  that  jurisdiction,7 
nor  elsewhere. 

(2)  The  second  question  is  whether,  since  a  witness  has  the  privi- 
lege of  declining  to  answer  questions  tending  to  criminate  him,  and 
since  this  privilege  may  be  waived  by  a  witness,  either  expressly  or 
by  implication,  the  voluntary  taking  of  the  stand  by  an  accused  per- 
son is  a  waiver  of  the  privilege  which  will  leave  him  obliged  to 

2  L"Hays  v.  State,  110  Ala.  60  ;  Clark  v.  Reese,  35  Cal.  89,  96  ;  People  v.  Reinhart, 
J59  id.  449;  People  v.  Hickman,  113  id.  80;  People  v.  Mayes,  ib.  618;  People  v. 
Arnold,  116  id.  682  ;  People  v.  Sears,  119  id.  267  ;  People  r/Reed,  id.,  52  Pac.  835  ; 
People  v.  Dole,  id.,  77  N.  W.  576  ;  State  v.  Griswold,  67  Conn.  290  ;  Fletcher  v. 
State,  49  lad.  124,  130 ;  Mershon  v.  State,  51  id.  14,  21 ;  State  v.  Bloom,  68  id.  54  ; 
State  v.  Beal,  ib.  346 ;  South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  id.  579 ;  State  v.  Kirkpatrick,  63  la. 
554,  559  ;  State  v.  Teeter,  69  id.  717,  719  ;  State  v.  O'Brien,  81  id.  93;  State  v.  Pfefferle, 
36  Kan.  90,  92;  McDonald  t;.  Coin.,  86  Ky.  13;  Burdette  v.  Com.,  93  id.  77  ;  Mont- 
gomery p.  Com.,  Ky.,  30  S.  W.  602  ;  Barton  v.  Com.,  id.,  32  S.  W.  172  ;  Trusty  u. 
Com.,  id.,  41  S.  W.  766  ;  Justice  v.  Com.,  id.,  46  S.  W.  499 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  45  La.  An. 
605,  607 ;  State  v.  Murphy,  ib.  959  ;  State  v.  Southern,  48  id.  628 ;  State  v.  Wat- 
son, 65  Me.  79  ;  State  v.  Witham,  72  id.  531,  534 ;  State  v.  Farmer,  84  id.  436  ;  Hoi- 
brook  v.  Dow,  12  Gray  357,  359;  Com.  v.  Brennan,  97  Mass.  587  ;  Com.  v.  Graham,  99 
id.  421  ;  Root  v.  Hamilton,  105  id.  23  ;  People  v.  Sutherland,  104  Mich.  468  ;  People  v. 
Parmelee,  id.,  70  N.  W.  577  ;  Georgia  v.  Bond,  id.,  72  N.  W.  232  ;  State  v.  Sauer,  42 
Minn.  259;  State  v.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380,  390;  State  v.  Testerman,  68  id.  408,  414; 
State  v.  Rugan,  ib.  215  ;  State  v.  Cooper,  71  id.  436,  442  ;  State  v.  Rider,  90  id.  54, 
63  ;  95  id.  474,  486  ;  State  v.  Taylor,  98  id.  240,  244 ;  State  v.  Smith,  125  id.  2,  6j 
State  ».  Dyer,  139  id.  199  ;  State  v.  Cohn,  9  Nev.  179,  189;  State  v.  Huff,  11  id.  17, 
27  ;  Terr.  v.  De  Gutman,  N.  M.,  42  Pac.  68;  People  v.  Conroy,  153  N.  Y.  174;  State 
v.  Traylor,  N.  C.,  28  S.  E.  493  ;  Asher  v.  Terr.,  Okl.,  54  Pac.  445;  State  v.  Bartmess, 
Or.,  54  Pac.  166;  State  r.  McGuire,  15  R.  I.  23  ;  Stdte  v.  Turner,  36  S.  C.  534,  543; 
Hill  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  521,  524 ;  Bell  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  276  ;  Holley  v.  State,  id., 
46  S.  W.  39.] 

8  VE.  g.  iu  People  v.  Reed,  Cal.,  supra,~\ 

4  TE.  g.  in  Hays  v.  State,  Ala.,  $upra.j 

6  LSee  Hart  v.  'State,  38  Fla.  39;  Lester  v.  State,  37  id.  382;  Blackburn  v.  State,  71 
Ala.  321  ;  see  People  v.  Thomas,  9  Mich.  314.] 

6  PSee  the  citations  post,  under  §  461  £>.] 

7  LSee  People  v.  Conroy,  153  N.  Y.  174J 


570  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [en.  xxv. 

answer  such  questions  on  cross-examination.  A  Court  may  answer 
in  the  affirmative  the  first  question  above,  by  holding  that  any  im- 
peaching questions  may  properly  be  put  to  such  a  witness  oil  cross- 
examination,  but  the  question  will  still  remain  open  whether,  for 
such  of  those  questions  as  involve  self-crimination,  the  witness  is 
privileged  not  to  answer.  This  question  is  wholly  distinct,  and  is 
treated  post,  §  469  d,  under  the  head  of  Privilege ;  but  the  discrimi- 
nation should  be  insisted  on,  for  we  occasionally  find  the  inquiry 
stated,  "  May  an  accused  person  on  the  stand  be  cross-examined  like 
any  other  witness  ? "  as  if  but  one  question  were  involved,  and 
without  noticing  the  necessary  discrimination.] 

§  444  c.  Impeaching  Witness  impeached.  [May  the  impeaching 
witness  himself  be  impeached  ?  No  doubt  here  arises  (the  answer 
being  in  the  affirmative),  except  for  character-evidence.  For  such 
evidence  it  has  always  been  thought  that  convenience  and  propriety 
require  some  limit  to  be  put  to  the  process  of  mutual  abuse.  Three 
solutions  have  found  favor  ;  one,  to  prohibit  entirely  the  impeach- 
ment of  an  impeaching  witness'  character ;  another,  to  allow  such 
impeachment  of  the  impeaching  witness,  but  no  more ;  a  third,  to 
leave  the  matter  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court ;  the  last  being 
of  course  the  preferable  rule.1] 

§  444  c?.  Hearsay  Statements;  Attesting  "Witness.  [Statements 
admitted  under  exceptions  to  the  Hearsay  rule  are  in  effect  testi- 
mony ;  and  the  process  of  impeaching  or  discrediting  the  deceased 
or  absent  declarant  is  proper  both  in  theory  and  in  policy ;  but  the 
cases  can  be  more  conveniently  collected  under  the  heads  of  the 
respective  exceptions  (ante-,  Chaps.  X-XV).  The  proof  of  the  sig- 
nature of  a  deceased  or  absent  attesting-witness  is  in  effect  the  intro- 
duction of  his  testimony  to  the  document's  execution ;  and  on  this 
principle  it  has  been  considered  proper  to  allow  his  impeachment  in 
the  ways  appropriate  for  other  witnesses.1] 

2.    Cross-examination  in  general. 

§  445.  Putting  in  one's  own  Case  on  Cross-examination.  When 
a  witness  has  been  examined  in  chief,  the  other  party  has  a  right  to 
cross-examine  him.1  But  a  question  often  arises,  whether  the  wit- 

i  [See  Rector  v.  Rector,  8  111.  105, 117  ;  State  v.  Brant,  14  la.  182  ;  State  v.  Moore, 
25  id.  137  ;  Starks  v.  People,  5  Denio  106,  109  ;  State  v.  Cherry,  63  N.  0.  495  ; 
Wayne,  J.,  in  Gaines  v.  Relf,  12  How.  555.] 

*  QFor  the  use  of  such  a  witness"  prior  inconsistent  statements,  see  post,  §  462. 
Impeachment  by  character-evidence  is  proper:  Doe  v.  Harris,  7  C.  &  P.  330;  Lawless 
v.  Guelbreth,  8  AIo.  139  ;  Vandyke  v.  Thompson,  1  Harringt.  109  ;  Boylan  v.  Meeker, 
28  N.  J.  L.  274,  294;  Chamberlain  v.  Torrance,  14  Grant  Ch.  181,  184;  Los*-«  v. 
Loxee,  2  Hill  609  ;  State  ».  Thomason,  1  Jones  L.  274,  semble;  Braddce  v.  Brownfield, 
9  Watts  124;  Harden  v.  Hays,  9  Pa.  St.  158;  Gardenhire  v.  Parks,  2  Yer«.  23.] 

1  If  the  witness  dies  after  he  has  been  examined  iu  chief,  and  before  his  cross- 
examination,  it  has  been  held  that  his  testimony  is  inadmissible  :  Kissam  v.  Forrest, 
25  Wend.  651 ;  [ante,  $  163  e.]  But  in  equity  its  admissibility  is  in  the  discretion 


§§4445-445.]  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  571 

ness  has  been  so  examined  in  chief,  as  to  give  the  other  party  this 
right.  If  the  witness  is  called  merely  for  the  purpose  of  producing 
a  paper,  which  is  to  be  proved  by  another  witness,  he  need  not  be 
sworn.3  Whether  the  right  of  cross-examination,  that  is,  of  treat- 
ing the  witness  as  the  witness  of  the  adverse  party,  and  of  examin- 
ing him  by  leading  questions,  extends  to  the  whole  case  or  is  to  be 
limited  to  the  matters  upon  which  he  has  already  been  examiued  in 
chief,  is  a  point  upon  which  there  is  some  diversity  of  opinion.  In 
England,  when  a  competent  witness  is  called  and  sworn,  the  other 
party  will,  ordinarily,  and  in  strictness,  be  entitled  to  cross-examine 
him,  though  the  party  calling  him  does  not  choose  to  examine  him 
in  chief;8  unless  he  was  sworn  by  mistake;4  or,  unless  an  imma- 
terial question  having  been  put  to  him,  his  further  examination  in 
chief  has  been  stopped  by  the  judge.6  And  even  where  a  plaintiff 
was  under  the  necessity  of  calling  the  defendant  in  interest  as  a  wit- 
ness, for  the  sake  of  formal  proof  only,  he  not  being  party  to  the 
record,  it  has  been  held  that  he  was  thereby  made  a  witness  for  all 
purposes,  and  might  be  cross-examined  to  the  whole  case.6  In  some 
of  the  American  courts  the  same  rule  has  been  adopted;7  but  in 
others,  the  contrary  has  been  held ; "  and  the  rule  is  now  considered 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  to  be  well  established 
[therein]  that  a  party  has  no  right  to  cross-examine  any  witness, 
except  as  to  facts  and  circumstances  connected  with  the  matters 
stated  in  his  direct  examination;  and  that  if  he  wishes  to  examine 

of  the  Court,  in  view  of  the  circumstances:  Gass  v.  Stinson,  3  Sumn.  104-108  ;  post, 
§554. 

*  Perry  v.  Gibson,  1  Ad.  &  El.  48  ;  Davis  v.  Dale,  1  M.  k  M.  514  ;  Keed  v.  James, 
1  Stark.  132  ;  Rush  v.  Smith,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  94  ;  Summers  v.  Moseley,  2  C.  &  M.  477. 
{Where  the  State  has  summoned  a  witness,  and  the  witness  has  been  sworn,  but  not 
examined,  the  prisoner  has  no  right  to  cross-examine  him  as  to  the  whole  case  :  Austin 
v.  State,  14  Ark.  555.     If  a  witness  gives  no  testimony  in  his  examination  in  chief, 
he  cannot  be  cross-examined  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  him :   Bracegirdle  v.  Bailey, 
1  F.  &  F.  536.     At  a  preliminary  hearing,  to  determine  the  competency  of  evidence, 
the  judge  may  refuse  to  permit  cross-examination  :  Com.  c.  Morrell,  99  Mass.  542.  { 

8  R.   v.  Brooke,  2  Stark.  472  :  Phillips  v.  Earner,  1  Esp.  357 ;  Dickinson  v.  Shee, 
4  Esp.  67  ;  R.  v.  Murphy,  1  Armst.  Macartn.  &  Ogle,  204. 

*  Clifford  v.  Hunter,  3  C.  &  P.  16 ;   Rush  v.  Smith,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  94  ;  Wood  v. 
Mackinson,  2  M.  &  Rob.  273. 

6  Creevy  v.  Carr,  7  C.  &  P.  64. 

6  Morgan  v.  Brydges,  2  Stark.  314. 

7  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  490,  498;   jBlackington  v.  Johnson,  126  Mass.  21  ; 
Com.  r.  Morgan,  107  id.  199;}  Jackson  v.  Varick,  7  Cowen  238  ;  2  Wend.  166;  Fulton 
Bank  v.  Stafford,  2  Wend.  483  ;   j  Linsley  v.  Lovely,  26  Vt.  123  ;  Mask  v.  State,  32 
Miss.  405  ;  State  v.  Savers,  58  Mo.  585.  ( 

8  jBell  v.  Chambers",  38  Ala.  660  ;  Toole  v.  Nichol,  43  id.  406,  419  ;}  [Taggart  v. 
Bosch,  Cal.,  48  Pac.  1092  ;  Thalheim  i>.  State,  38  Fla.  169;]   j  Brown  v.  State,  28  Ga. 
199  ;(    [jState  v.   Larkins,  Ida.,   47  Pac.  945;    Bonnet  v.   Glattfeldt,  120  111.  172; 
Wheeler  &  W.  M.  Co.  v.  Barrett,  172  id.  610 ;  Johnson  v.  Wiley,  74  Ind.  237  ;  Riordan. 
v.  Guggerty,  74  la.  690  ;]   jLawder  v.  Henderson,  36  Kan.  754;  Hnynes  v.  Ledyard, 
33  Mich.  319  ;  State  v.  Chamberlain,  89  Mo.  132  ;}  fAtwood  v.  Marshall,  Nebr.,  71 
N.  W.  1064  ;]  {Buckley  v.  Buckley,  12  Nev.  423  ;}  (_State  v  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  229  ; 
State  v.  PaiK'oast,  5  N.  D.  516  ;]  { Fulton  v.  Bank,  92  Pa.  112  : }  fJWendt  v.  R.  Co.,  S.  D., 
68  N.  W.  749  ;  Miller  v.  Miller,  92  Va.  510  ;  Bishop  v.  Averill,  17  Wash.  209.] 


572  WITNESSES  ;  IMPEACHMENT,  [CH.  xxv. 

him  to  other  matters,  he  must  do  so  by  making  the  witness  his  own, 
and  calling  him,  as  such,  in  the  subsequent  progress  of  the  cause.9 
[A  few  Courts,  however,  leave  it  to  the  trial  judge's  discretion  to 
allow  the  introduction  of  the  cross-examiner's  own  case  at  that 
stage.10  The  rule  adopted  in  the  majority  of  jurisdictions,  prohibit- 
ing such  evidence  on  cross-examination,  seems  much  inferior  to  the 
original  and  orthodox  rule,  not  only  in  the  matter  of  fairness  and 
due  liberty  of  procedure,  but  also  in  respect  to  the  petty  quibbles 
which  it  inevitably  brings  in  its  train.11  —  Whether  a  re-cross- 
examination  should  be  allowed,  either  after  a  re-direct  examination, 
or  after  the  witness  has  left  the  stand  without  cross-examination,  or 
as  complementary  to  the  original  cross-examination  and  after  the 
witness  has  left  the  stand,  is  generally  said  to  be  within  the  discre- 
tion of  the  trial  Court;12  but  in  the  first  case  it  should  cover  only 
the  matters  dealt  with  on  the  re-direct  examination.18] 

§  446.  Sundries.  The  power  of  cross-examination  has  been  justly 
said  to  be  one  of  the  principal,  as  it  certainly  is  one  of  the  most  effi- 
cacious, tests,  which  the  law  has  devised  for  the  discovery  of  truth. 
By  means  of  it  the  situation  of  the  witness  with  respect  to  the  par- 
ties, and  to  the  subject  of  litigation,  his  interest,  his  motives,  his 
inclination  and  prejudices,  his  means  of  obtaining  a  correct  and  cer- 
tain knowledge  of  the  facts  to  which  he  bears  testimony,  the  manner 
in  which  he  has  used  those  means,  his  powers  of  discernment,  mem- 
ory, and  description  are  all  fully  investigated  and  ascertained,  and 
submitted  to  the  consideration  of  the  jury,  before  whom  he  has  testi- 
fied, and  who  have  thus  had  an  opportunity  of  observing  his  demeanor, 
and  of  determining  the  just  weight  and  value  of  his  testimony.  It 
is  not  easy  for  a  witness,  who  is  subjected  to  this  test,  to  impose  on 
a  Court  or  jury  ;  for  however  artful  the  fabrication  of  falsehood  may 
be,  it  cannot  embrace  all  the  circumstances  to  which  a  cross-examina- 
tion may  be  extended.1 

§  447.  Whether,  when  a  party  is  once  entitled  to  cross-examine  a 
witness,  this  right  continues  through  all  the  subsequent  stages  of  the 
cause,  so  that  if  the  party  should  afterwards  recall  the  same  witness, 
to  prove  a  part  of  his  own  case,  he  may  interrogate  him  by  leading 
questions,  and  treat  him  as  the  witness  of  the  party  who  first  adduced 
him,  is  also  a  question  upon  which  different  opinions  have  been  held. 

•  Philadelphia  &  Trenton  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stimpson,  14  Peters  448,  461. 

1°  QHuntsville  R.  Co.  v.  Corpening,  97  Ala.  681  ;  Harrington  v.  Mining  Co.,  19 
Mont.  411.] 

u  TFor  some  attempts  to  frame  a  definition  of  the  "  facts  connected  with  the  matters 
stateain  the  direct  examination,"  which  may  be  entered  into,  see  Dole  v.  Wooldredge, 
142  Mas*.  184  ;  Chandler  v.  Allison,  10  Mich.  477.1 

u  ("Nixon  v.  Beard,  111  Ind.  142  ;  Chapman  v.  Jame*,  96  la.  233  ;  State  v.  RoMn- 
son,  Or.,  48  Pac.  357 ;  People  v.  Thiede,  11  Utah  241  ;  Atl.  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Rieger,  Va., 
28  8.  R.  590.] 

"  nioellering  v.  Evans,  121  Ind.  196.] 
1  Starkie,  Evidence,  I,  160. 


§§  445-448.]  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  573 

Upon  the  general  ground,  on  which  this  course  of  examination  is  per- 
mitted at  all,  namely,  that  every  witness  is  supposed  to  be  inclined 
most  favorably  towards  the  party  calling  him,  there  would  seem  to  be 
no  impropriety  in  treating  him,  throughout  the  trial,  as  the  witness 
of  the  party  who  first  caused  him  to  be  summoned  and  sworn.1  But 
as  the  general  course  of  the  examination  of  witnesses  is  subject  to 
the  discretion  of  the  judge,  it  is  not  easy  to  establish  a  rule  which 
shall  do  more  than  guide,  without  imperatively  controlling,  the  exer- 
cise of  that  discretion.2  A  party,  however,  who  has  not  opened  his 
own  case,  will  not  be  allowed  to  introduce  it  to  the  jury  by  cross- 
examining  the  witnesses  of  the  adverse  party,8  though,  after  opening 
it,  he  may  recall  them  for  that  purpose. 

§  447  a  [466].  If  the  memory  of  the  witness  is  refreshed  by  a 
paper  put  into  his  hands,  the  adverse  party  may  cross-examine  the 
witness  upon  that  paper,  without  making  it  his  evidence  in  the  cause. 
But  if  it  be  a  book  of  entries,  he  cannot  cross-examine  as  to  other 
entries  in  the  book  without  making  them  his  evidence.1  But  if  the 
paper  is  shown  to  the  witness  merely  to  prove  the  handwriting,  this 
alone  does  not  give  the  opposite  party  a  right  to  inspect  it,  or  to 
cross-examine  as  to  its  contents.2  And  if  the  paper  is  shown  to  the 
witness  upon  his  cross-examination,  and  he  is  cross-examined  upon 
it,  the  party  will  not  be  bound  to  have  the  paper  read,  until  he  has 
entered  upon  his  own  case.8 

§  448.  We  have  already  stated  it  as 'one  of  the  rules  governing 
the  production  of  testimony,  that  the  evidence  offered  must  corre- 
spond with  the  allegations,  and  be  confined  to  the  point  in  issue. 
And  we  have  seen  that  this  rule  excludes  all  evidence  of  collateral 
facts,  or  those  which  afford  no  reasonable  inference  as  to  the  prin- 
cipal matter  in  dispute.1  Thus,  where  a  broker  was  examined  to 
prove  the  market  value  of  qertain  stocks,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not 
compellable  to  state  the  names  of  the  persons  to  whom  he  had  sold 
such  stocks.2  As  the  plaintiff  is  bound,  in  the  proof  of  his  case,  to 
confine  his  evidence  to  the  issue,  the  defendant  is  in  like  manner 
restricted  to  the  samepoint;  and  the  same  rule  is  applied  to  the 
respective  parties  through  all  the  subsequent  stages  of  the  cause,  — 

1  ["See  ante,  §  444  a.~} 

2  1  Stark.  Evid.  162 ;  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  498  ;  j  Wallace  v.  Taunton  Street 
Railway,  119  Mass.  91;  Com.  v.  Lyden,  113  id.  452 ;  Thomas  v.  Loose,  114  Pa.  St.  47; 
Langley  w.  Wadsworth,  99  N.  Y.  63.  { 

8  Ellmaker  v.  Bulkley,  16  S.  &  R.  77;  1  Stark.  Evid.  164  ;  see  §  445,  ante. 

1  Gregory  v.  Tavernor,  6  C.  &  P.  280  ;  and  see  Stephens  v.  Foster,  ib.  289. 

2  Russell  v.  Rider,  6  C.  &  P.  416 ;  Sinclair  o.  Stevenson,   1  id.  582 ;  s.  c.  2  Bing. 
514. 

8  Holland  v.  Reeves,  7  C.  &  P.  36.  jlf,  on  cross-examination,  the  examining  coun- 
sel requests  the  witness  to  produce  a  letter  to  which  the  witness  refers,  and  examining 
counsel  reads  the  letter,  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  put  the  letter  in  evidence  or  to 
read  the  letter  to  the  jury  :  Carradine  v.  Hotchkiss,  120  N.  Y.  611. } 

1  Supra,  §§  51,  52. 

a  Jonau  v.  Ferrand,  3  Rob.  La.  366. 


574  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

all  questions  as  to  collateral  facts,  except  in  cross-examination,  being 
strictly  excluded.  The  reasons  of  this  rule  have  been  already  inti- 
mated. If  it  were  not  so,  the  true  merits  of  the  controversy  might 
be  lost  sight  of,  in  the  mass  of  testimony  to  other  points,  in  which 
they  would  be  overwhelmed;  the  attention  of  the  jury  would  be 
wearied  and  distracted ;  judicial  investigations  would  become  inter- 
minable ;  the  expenses  might  be  enormous ;  and  the  characters  of 
witnesses  might  be  assailed  by  evidence  which  they  could  not  be  pre- 
pared to  repel.8  It  may  be  added,  that  the  evidence  not  being  to  a 
material  point,  the  witness  could  not  be  punished  for  perjury,  if  it 
were  false.4 

§  449.  In  cross-examinations,  however,  this  rule  is  not  usually  ap- 
plied with  the  same  strictness  as  in  examinations  in  chief  ;  but,  on 
the  contrary,  great  latitude  of  interrogation  is  sometimes  permitted 
by  the  judge,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion,  where,  from  the  tem- 
per and  conduct  of  the  witness,  or  other  circumstances,  such  course 
seems  essential  to  the  discovery  of  the  truth,  or,  where  the  cross- 
examiner  will  undertake  to  show  the  relevancy  of  the  interrogatory 
afterwards,  by  other  evidence.1  On  this  head,  it  is  difficult  to  lay 
down  any  precise  rule.2  But  it  is  a  well-settled  rule  that  a  witness 
cannot  be  cross-examined  as  to  any  fact  which  is  collateral  and 
irrelevant  to  the  issue,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  him 
by  other  evidence,  if  he  should  deny  it,  thereby  to  discredit  his  tes- 
timony ;  •  and,  if  a  question  is  put  to  a  witness  which  is  collateral 
or  irrelevant  to  the  issue,  his  answer  cannot  be  contradicted  by 
the  party  who  asked  the  question;  but  it  is  conclusive  against 
him.4-5 

8  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  909,  910. 

4  But  a  question,  having  no  bearing  on  the  matter  in  issue,  may  be  made  material 
by  its  relation  to  the  witness'  credit,  and  false  swearing  thereon  will  be  perjury:  R.  v. 
Overton,  2  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  263. 

1  Haigh  v.  Belcher,  7  C.  &  P.  389  ;  supra,  §  52. 

2  Lawrence  v.  Barker,  5  Wend.  305.     LFor  cross-examination  to  character,  see  post, 
§  461  &.] 

8  Spenceley  v.  I)e  Willott,  7  East  108  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  164  ;  Lee's  Case,  2  Lewin's 
Cr.  Cas.  154;  Harrison  v.  Gordon,  ib.  156. 

*  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Campb.  637 ;  Odiorne  v.  Winkley,  2  Gall.  51,  53 ;  Ware  v. 
Ware,  8  Greenl.  52  ;  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  116,  149;  Lawrence  o.  Barker,  5  Wend. 
301,  305  ;  Meagoe  v.  Simmons,  3  C.  &  P.  75  ;  Crowley  v.  Page,  7  id.  789  ;  Com.  v. 
Buzzell,  16  Pick.  157,  158 ;  Palmer  v.  Trower,  14  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  470  ;  8  Exch.  247 
Qlt  is  the  latter  part  of  this  process,  the  contradiction,  with  which  this  prohibition 
is  really  concerned,  —  a  subject  treated  post,  §  461  e.  As  to  the  former  part  of  it,  the 
cross-examination,  it  is  doubtful  if  there  ever  was  a  rule  which  forbade  it  upon  collat- 
eral points,  though  such  a  rule  has  since  been  laid  down  on  the  faith  of  the  above  text. 
The  true  view  seems  to  be  as  stated  by  Robinson,  C.  J.,  in  R.  v.  Brown,  21  U.  C.  Q.  B. 
324  :  "  He  [the  cross-examiner]  is  not  in  such  cases  obliged  to  explain  the  object  of  his 
question,  because  that  might  often  defeat  his  object ;  but  he  must  be  content  to  take 
tne  answers."] 

6  [Tor  the  last  half  of  this  section,  dealing  with  the  subject  of  §§  461  /,  462  a, 
see  Appendix  II.] 


§§  448-450  a.]  KINDS  OF  EVIDENCE.  575 


3.    Kinds  of  Impeaching  Evidence. 

§  450.  Bias.  [The  partiality  of  a  witness  for  one  party  or  side,  or 
his  prejudice  against  the  other  side,  is  always  regarded  as  bearing 
on  the  trustworthiness  of  his  testimony.  One  way  of  showing  the 
existence  of  such  bias  is  his  prior  expression  of  such  feelings. 
Thus,  it  is  always  allowable  to  inquire] 1  of  the  witness  for  the  pros- 
ecution, in  cross-examination,  whether  he  has  not  expressed  feelings 
of  hostility  towards  the  prisoner.2  The  like  inquiry  may  be  made 
in  a  civil  action;  and  if  the  witness  denies  the  fact,  he  may  be  con- 
tradicted by  other  witnesses.8  [But  the  use  of  such  evidence  is 
allowable  independently  of  its  effect  as  a  contradiction  of  the  wit- 
ness. In  some  Courts  the  limitation  is  laid  down  that  the  details  of 
the  quarrel  or  other  exhibition  of  feeling  are  not  to  be  gone  into;  but 
the  phrasing  of  this  limitation  varies.4  The  witness  may  explain 
away  his  expressions  as  not  due  to  real  prejudice.6  Some  Courts 
require,  in  analogy  to  the  principle  described  post,  §  462,  that  the 
witness'  attention  be  first  called  to  the  alleged  utterance  before  other 
evidence  of  it  can  be  offered.6  Another  way  of  showing  the  prob- 
able existence  of  such  bias  is  to  prove  the  witness'  relationship  with 
a  party  by  blood  or  marriage  or  by  illicit  intercourse;7]  thus,  in 
assumpsit  upon  a  promissory  note,  the  execution  of  which  was  dis- 
puted, it  was  held  material  to  the  issue,  to  inquire  of  the  subscrib- 
ing witness,  she  being  a  servant  of  the  plaintiff,  whether  she  was 
not  his  kept  mistress ; 8  [so  also  the  pendency  of  litigation  with  the 
opponent  may  tend  to  show  bias  against  him.9] 

§  450  a.    Corruption.     [The  witness'  corrupt  readiness  to  swear 

1  [This  sentence  originally  began  :  "  So,  also,  it  has  been  held  not  irrelevant  to 
the  guilt  or  innocence  of  one  charged  with  a  crime,  to  inquire."] 

2  R.  v.  Yewin,  cited  2  Campb.  638. 

8  At  wood  v.  Welton,  7  Conn.  66  ;  {Martin  v.  Farnham,  5  Foster  195  ;  Drew  v. 
Wood,  6  id.  363  ;  Cooley  v.  Norton,  4  Gush.  93  ;  Long  v.  Lamkin,  9  id.  361  ;  Newton 
v.  Harris,  2  Selden  345;  Com.  v.  Byron,  14  Gray  31  ;}  [State  v.  McFarlain,  41  La. 
An.  687  ;  Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Nebr.  253.] 

*  [Titus  v.  Ash,  24  N.  H.  323,  331 ;  Ellsworth  v.  Potter,  41  Vt.  689 ;  Jones  v. 
State,  76  Ala.  15  ;  People  v.  Goldenson,  76  Cal.  349.] 

6  [Chadwick's  Trial,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  362;  R.  v.  McKenna,  Cr.  &  Dbc  Abr.  579  ; 
Hall  v.  State,  51  Ala.  15 ;  People  y.  Fultz,  109  Cal.  258.] 

8  [The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  313  ;  Carpenter  v.  Wall,  11  A.  &  E.  804 ;  Baker  v. 
Joseph,  16  Cal.  177  ;  State  v.  Goodbier,  48  La.  An.  770  ;  State  v.  Glynn,  51  Vt.  579 ; 
Davis  v.  State,  Minn.,  70  N.  W.  984  ;  State  v.  Ellsworth,  30  Or.  145.  Contra:  Lucas 
v.  Flinn,  35  la.  14 ;  Cook  v.  Brown,  34  N.  H.  471.] 

7  [Smith  v.  State,  143  Ind.  685  :  Long  v.  Booe,  106  Ala.  570  ;  State  v.  Smith,  8  S.  D 
547;  U.  S.  v.  Davis,  33  Fed.  865.] 

8  Thomas  v.  David,  7  0.  &  P.  350  ;  [Holly  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  36  S.  W.  532  ;  State  v. 
Johnson,  48  La.  An.  437.] 

9  [Hitchcock  v.  Moore,  70  Mich.  115  ;  Pierce  v.  Gilson,  9  Vt.  222;  brit  not  neces- 
sarily so  :  Langhorne  v.  Com.,  76  Va.  1016,  1024.    Thatthe  party-witness  is  protected 
by  liability-insurance  cannot  be  shown  :  McQuillan  v.  Light  Co.,  Conn.,  40  Atl.  928  ; 
Demars  ?'.*Mfg.  Co.,  N.  H.,  40  Atl.  902  ;  contra:  Day  v.  Donohue,  N.  J.   L.,  41  AtL 
934.     Compare  §  14  o,  ante.] 


576  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

falsely  is  another  fact  that  will  tell  against  his  trustworthiness.  It 
may  be  evidenced  by  his  prior  expressions  indicative  of  such  general 
willingness,1  or  by  a  distinct  offer  to  swear  falsely,2  or  by  an 
attempt  to  suborn  another  witness,8  or  by  his  receipt  of  a  bribe;  but 
that  he  has  been  offered  a  bribe  and  has  rejected  it  is  irrelevant,4 
except  so  far  as  the  opponent's  connection  can  be  shown,  and  then 
its  only  effect  is  that  of  the  party's  admission  of  the  weakness  of  his 
case.6] 

§  450  b.  Insanity,  Intoxication,  etc.  [A  witness'  insanity,  while 
it  may  not  have  sufficed  to  exclude  him  from  the  stand,  may  never- 
theless be  used  to  discredit  him.1  Intoxication  also,  if  it  be  of  such 
a  degree  as  to  deserve  the  name,  is  admissible  for  this  purpose.2 
An  impairment  of  the  faculties  from  the  use  of  morphine  is  equally 
relevant,8  as  well  as  an  impairment  of  the  memory  by  disease  or 
old  age.4  But  the  mere  fact  of  being  endowed  with  a  less  satisfac- 
tory memory  than  the  normal  one  is  a  matter  too  open  to  miscon- 
struction to  be  availed  of  in  this  way.6] 

§§  451-456. 1 

§§  457-461. 2 

§  461  a.  Character ;  (l)  Kind  of  Character.  [The  fundamental 
trait  desirable  in  a  witness  is  the  disposition  to  tell  truth,  and  hence 
the  trait  of  character  that  should  naturally  be  shown  in  impeaching 
him  is  his  bad  character  for  veracity.  But  there  has  always  been 
more  or  less  support 1  for  the  use  of  bad  general  character  —  i.  e 

*  £De  la  Motte's  Trial,  21  How.  St.  Tr.  791  ("I  swear  anything")  ;  Beaubien  v. 
Cicotte,  12  Mich.  484  ("  I  played  good  Lord  and  good  devil "  )  ;  Sweet  v.  Gilrnore,  S.  C., 
30  S.  E.  394  ;  but  not  merely  by  his  belief  as  to  a  religious  sanction  for  false  swearing  : 
Freind's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  31,  43,  58 ;  Darby  «;.  Ouseley,  1  H.  &  N.  6,  10  ;  Com. 
v.  Buzzell,  6  Pick.  156  ;  see  Bentham,  vol.  i,  235,  vol.  v,  134  ;  though  in  some  Courts 
by  a  general  atheistic  belief:  Com.  v.  Burke,  16  Gray  33;  State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  C. 
534,  543  ;  Odell  v.  State,  61  Tenn.  91  ;  contra:  People  v.  Copsey,  71  Cal.  548.] 

2  [[Roberts  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  20  S.  W.  267  ;  Alward  v.  Oaks,  63  Minn.  190 ;  Barkly 
v.  Copeland,  74  Cal.  1,  5.] 

8  Q'-'Onl  Stafford's  Trial,  7  How.  St.  Tr.  1401  ;  Maharajah  Nuncomar's  Trial,  20  id. 
1035  ;  Matthews  v.  Lumber  Co.,  Mich.,  67  N.  W.  1008  ;  State  v.  Stein,  79  Mo.  330; 
Martin  v.  Barnes,  7  Wis.  242.] 

*  [[See  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  305 ;  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  91 ; 
Com.  v.  Sacket,  22  Pick.  395.] 

6  ("See  ante,  §  195  a.] 

1  PFowke's  Trial,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  1175  ;  State  v.  Hayward,  62  Minn.  474.] 

2  L  Walker's  Trial,  23  How.  St.  Tr.  1157;  Rector  v.  Rector,  8  111.  105,  117;  Tnttle 
v.  Russell,  2  Day  202  ;  Com.  v.  Fitzgerald,  2  All.  297  ;  Mace  v.  Reed,  89  Wis.   440 ; 
State  v.  Nolan,  92  la.  491  ;  Willis  v.  State,  43  Nebr.  102.] 

8  {[McDowell  p.  Preston,  26  Ga.  535  ;  State  v.  Glein,  17  Mont.  17;  People  v.  Web- 
ster, 139  N.  Y.  73,  86;  State  v.  Robinson,  12  Wash.  491.     Excluded:  Franklin  v. 
Franklin,  90  Tenn.  49;  Botkin  v.  Cassady,  la.,  76  N.  W.  723.] 

4  QAlleman  v.  Stepp,  52  la.  627;  People  v.  Genung,  11  Wend.  18;  Isler  v.  Dewey, 
75  N.  C.  466  ;  Lord  v.  Beard,  79  id.  12.  Contra:  Merritt  v.  Merritt,  20  111.  65,  SO.] 

6  [Bell  v.  Rinner,  16  Oh.  St.  46;  Ah  Tong  v.  Fruit  Co.,  112  Cal.  679;  Goodwyn 
v.  Goodwyn,  20  Ga.  620.  Contra:  Com.  v.  Cooper,  5  All.  497.] 

1  ^Transferred  post,  to  follow  §  469.] 

9  ^Transferred  to  Appendix  II  ;  the  subject  is  expanded  into  the  ensuing  sections, 
461  a  to  <;.] 

1  QThe  argument  is  set  forth  in  State  v.  Boswell,  2  Dev.   210;  Bakeman  v.  Eose, 


§§  450  a-461  a.]  CHARACTER.  577 

the  man  as  a  whole,  not  specifically  the  trait  of  veracity  —  as  neces- 
sarily involving  an  impairment  of  veracity.  This  was  the  original 
English  doctrine;  but  it  was  replaced,  in  the  early  1800s,2  by  the 
first-mentioned  principle,  with  the  exception  that  the  witness  was 
allowed  to  base  his  statement  as  to  the  other's  veracity  upon  his 
knowledge  of  the  other's  general  character.  In  this  country  the 
better  doctrine  that  the  trait  of  veracity  only  could  be  considered 
was  early  introduced;  and  this  is  the  rule  in  the  great  majority  of 
jurisdictions.8  In  those  jurisdictions  allowing  the  use  of  general 

18  Wend.  146,  151  ;  and  is  answered  in  Gilchrist  v.  M'Kee,  4  Watts  381 ;  State  ». 
Smith,  7  Vt.  143  ;  Carter  v.  Cavenaugh,  1  Greene  la.  173  ;  State  v.  Randolph,  24  Conn. 
363,  367.] 

2  PSee  post,  §  461  c.~\ 

8  LSpace  does  not  suffice  to  analyze  the  course  of  rulings  in  each  State :  McCutch- 
en's  Adm'rs  v.  McCutchen,  9  Port.  650,  655  ;  Sorrelle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  540  ;  Nugent 
v.  State,  18  id.  526  ;  Ward  v.  State,  28  id.  53,  64 ;  Boles  r.  State,  46  id.  206  ;  DeKalb 
Co.  v.  Smith,  47  id.  412  ;  Holland  v.  Barnes,  53  id.  86  ;  Motes  v.  Bates,  80  id.  382, 
385  ;  Davenport  v.  State,  85  id.  336,  338  ;  Mclnerny  v.  Irvin,  90  id.  275,  277  ;  B.  U. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hale,  ib.  8,  11 ;  Mitchell  v.  State,  94  id.  68,  73  ;  Rhea  v.  State,  100  id.  119; 
Byers  v.  State,  105  id.  31 ;  Yarbrough  v.  State,  ib.  43;  McCutchen  v.  Loggins,  109 
id.  457  ;  Crawford  v.  State,  112  id.  1  ;  White  v.  State,  114  id.  10  ;  Pleasant  v.  State, 
15  Ark.  624,  651  ;  Majors  v.  State,  29  id.  112  ;  Hollingsworth  v.  State,  53  id. 
387,  394  ;  People  v.  Yslas,  27  Cal.  630,  633 ;  C.  C.  P.  §  2051  ;  People  v.  Markham, 
64  id.  157,  163  ;  People  v.  Johnson,  106  id.  289  ;  People  v.  Chin  Hane,  108  id.  597; 
People  v.  Prather,  id.,  53  Pac.  259  ;  People  v.  Silva,  id.,  54  Pac.  146 ;  State  v.  Shields, 
45  Conn.  256,  263  ;  Robinson  v.  State,  16  Fla.  835,  839  ;  Mercer  v.  State,  id.,  24  So. 
154  ;  Stokes  v.  State,  18  Ga.  17,  37 ;  Smithwick  v.  Evans,  24  id.  463  ;  Weathers  ». 
Barkdale,  30  id.  889  ;  Wood  v.  State,  48  id.  192,  292  ;  Frye  v.  Bank,  11  111.  367, 
378;  Crabtree  v.  Kile,  21  id.  183;  Cook  ».  Hunt,  24  id.  535,  550  ;  Dimick  v.  Downs, 
82  id.  570,  573  ;  Tedens  v.  Schumers,  112  id.  263,  266  ;  Spiesv.  People,  122id.  1,  208 ; 
Ind.  C.  C.  §  242;  Walker  v.  State,  6  Blackf.  3;  I.  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Anthony,  43  Ind. 
183,  193;  Rawles  v.  State,  56  id.  439;  Smock  v.  Pierson,  68  id.  405  ;  Fletcher  ». 
State,  49  id.  131  ;  Farley  v.  State,  57  id.  334 ;  State  v.  Bloom,  68  id.  55  ;  State  v. 
Beal,  ib.  346  ;  R.  S.  1881,  §  1803  ;  Wachstetter  v.  State,  99  Ind.  298;  Anderson 
v.  State,  104  id.  471  ;  Randall  v.  State,  132  id.  543  ;  Carter  v.  Cavenaugh,  1  Greene 
171  ;  State  v.  Later,  8  la.  420,  424  ;  Kilburn  v.  Mullen,  22  id.  502  ;  State  v.  Vincent, 
24  id.  570,  574  ;  State  v.  Egan,  59  id.  637 ;  State  v.  Kirkpatrick,  63  id.  559  ;  Craft  v. 
State,  3  Kan.  450,  480  ;  Coates  v.  Sulan,  21  id.  341  ;  Noel  v.  Dickey,  3  Bibb  268 ; 
Mobley  v.  Hamit,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  591 ;  Hume  v.  Scott,  3  id.  261  ;  Thurman  v.  Virgin, 
18  B.  Monr.  792  ;  Young  v.  Com.,  6  Bush  316;  Corn.  v.  Wilson,  Ky.,  82  S.  W.  166; 
State  v.  Parker,  7  La.  An.  83,  87  ;  State  v.  Jackson,  44  id.  160,  162;  State  v.  Taylor, 
45  id.  605,  609  ;  Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  19  Me.  375,  377  ;  State  v.  Bruce,  24  id.  71 ; 
Thayer  v.  Boyle,  30  id.  475,  481 ;  Shawu.  Emery,  42  id.  59,  64  ;  Sidelinger  v.  Bucklin, 
64  id.  371  ;  State  r.  Morse,  67  id.  428  ;  Hntchings  v.  Cavalier,  3  H.  &  McH.  389  ; 
Brown  v.  State,  72  Md.  468,  480;  Com.  »,  Murphy,  14  Mass.  387 ;  Com.  v.  Churchill, 
11  Pick.  539 ;  Quinsigamond  Bank  v.  Hobbs,  11  Gray  257  ;  Pierce  v.  Newton,  13  id. 
528;  Webber  v.  Hanke,  4  Mich.  198,  203;  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  id.  173,  185; 
Rudsdill  v.  Slingerland,  18  Minn.  380  ;  Mordand  v.  Lawrence,  23  id.  84,  88  ;  New- 
man  v.  Mackin,  13  Sm.  &  M.  383,  387;  Head  v.  State,  44  Miss.  731,  751  ;  Smith  v. 
State,  58  id.  867 ;  French  v.  Sale,  63  id.  386,  393  ;  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  74  id.  93  ;  State 
v.  Shields,  13  Mo.  236  ;  Day  v.  State,  ib.  422,  426  ;  State  v.  Hamilton,  55  id.  520, 
522  ;  State  v.  Breeden,  58  id.  507  ;  State  v.  Clinton,  67  id.  380,  390  ;  State  v.  Miller, 
71  id.  591  ;  State  v.  Grant,  79  id.  133  ;  State  v.  Rider,  90  id.  54,  63  ;  95  id.  474,  486  ; 
State  v.  Taylor,  98  id.  240,  245 ;  State  v.  Shroyer,  104  id.  441,  446 ;  State  v.  Smith, 
125  id.  2,  6;  State  v.  Duffey,  128  id.  549;  State  v.  Sibley,  131  id.  519;  State  v. 
Weeden,  133  id.  70;  State  v.  Dyer,  139  id.  199  ;  State  v.  May,  142  id.  135  ;  State  v. 
Summar,  id.,  45  S.  W.  254  ;  State  v.  Ferguson,  9  Nev.  106,  120  ;  State  v.  Larkin, 
Hid.  314,  330;  State  v.  Howard,  9  N.  H.  486;  Chase  v.  Blodgett,  10  id.  24  ;  Hoitt 
r.  Moulton,  21  id.  592  ;  State  v.  Forschner,  43  id.  89;  State  v.  Mairs,  1  N.  J.  L.  456 ; 
VOL.  i.  — 37 


578  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

character,  the  question  may  also  arise  whether  character  for  any 
other  specific  vice  than  mendaciousness  may  be  shown;  the  better 
opinion  repudiates  such  a  practice.4] 

§  461  b.  Character ;  (2)  Proof  by  Particular  Acts  of  Misconduct. 
[One  sort  of  evidence  of  character  is  conduct  exhibiting  that  charac- 
ter. How  far  may  the  witness'  character  be  exposed  by  introducing 
particular  instances  of  conduct  throwing  light  on  that  character  ? 
The  important  line  of  distinction  here  is  between  proof  by  outside 
testimony  —  i.  e.  by  other  witnesses  —  and  proof  by  cross-examina- 
tion of  the  witness  to  be  impeached. 

(a)  By  other  Witnesses.  It  has  long  been  settled *  that  testimony 
from  other  witnesses  of  particular  instances  of  misconduct  is  an 
improper  mode  of  discrediting,  because  of  the  confusion  of  issues 
and  waste  of  time  that  would  thus  be  involved,  and  because  of  the 
unfair  surprise  to  the  witness,  who  cannot  know  what  variety  of 
false  charges  may  be  specified  and  cannot  be  prepared  to  expose  their 
falsity.3  This  rule  excluding  proof  by  other  witnesses  is  well  settled 
and  everywhere  accepted. 

(ft)  Conviction  of  Crime.  The  above  reasons  cease  to  be  appli- 
cable where  the  discrediting  fact  is  the  conviction  of  a  crime,  be- 
cause the  proof  of  this,  by  the  record  of  conviction  or  a  copy  of  it, 
does  not  lead  to  confusion  of  issues  and  does  not  operate  upon  the 
witness  with  unfair  surprise.8  (£>')  Accordingly,  proof  by  the 
record  of  conviction  of  crime  is  universally  conceded  to  be  a  proper 
mode  of  impeachment.4  (&")  As  to  what  kinds  of  crimes  may  here 
be  employed,  there  is  no  general  agreement.  When  conviction  as  a 

Atwood  v.  Impson,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  157  ;  King  v.  Ruckman,  ib.  316,  357 ;  Territory  ». 
De  Guzman,  N.  M.,  42  Pac.  69;  Jackson  ».  Lewis,  13  Johns.  505;  Troup  v.  Sher- 
wood, 3  Johns.  Ch.  558,  566  ;  Bakeman  v.  Rose,  18  Wend.  146  ;  People  v.  Abbott,  19  id. 
198;  People  v.  Rector,  ib.  579;  Johnson  v.  People,  3  Hill  178;  People  v.  Blakeley, 

4  Park.   Or.  182;   Carlson  o.   Winterson,   N.  Y.,    42  N.  E.  347  ;    Stater.  Stallings, 
2  Hayw.  300  ;  State  v.  Boswell,  2  Dev.  209  ;   State  v.  O'Neale,   4  Ired.  88 ;  State  v. 
Dove,  10  id.  469,  473  ;   State  v.  Perkins,  66  N.  C.  127;   Wilson  v.  Runyan,  Wright, 
652 ;  Bticklin  v.  State,  20  Oh.  18  ;  French  v.  Millard,  2  Oh.  St.  50 ;   Craig  v.  State, 

5  id.  607  ;  Hillis  v.  Wylie,  26  id.  576 ;  Gilchrist  v.  M'Kee,  4  Watts  380,  381 ;  Anon., 
1  Hill  S.  C.  258  ;  Clark  v.  Bailey,  2  Strobh.  Eq.  143,  144  ;  Gilliam  v.  State,  1  Head 
88 ;  Merriman  v.  State,  3  Lea  393,  394 ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  13  Tex.  168,  176  ;  Boon  v. 
Weathered,  23  id.  675,  678 ;  Ayres  v.  Duprey,  27  id.  593,  599  ;  Johnson  v.   Brown, 
51  id.  65,  77 ;  Kennedy  v.  Upshaw,  66  id.  442,  452 ;  U.  S.  v.  White,  5  Cr.  C.  C.  43  ; 
U.  S.  v.  Vansickle,  2  McLean  219;  U.  S.  v.  Dickinson,  ib.  325,  329;  Gaines  v.  Relf, 
12  How.  555  ;  Teese  v.  Huntington,  23  How.  2,  13  ;  U.  S.  v.  Breedmeyer,  6  Utah  143, 
146  ;  State  v.  Marks,  id.,  51  Pac.  1089 ;  Morse  v.  Pineo,  4  Vt.  281 ;  State  v.  Smith, 
7  id.  141 ;  Spears  ».  Forrest,  15  id.  435  ;  Crane  v.  Thayer,  18  id.  168  ;  State  v.  Four- 
nier,  68  id.  262 ;  Ligon  v.  Ford,  5  Munf.   10,  16  ;  Uhl  v.  Com.,  6  Grott.  706,  708 ; 
Lemons  v.  State,  4  W.  Va.  755  ;  Ketchingman  r.  State,  6  Wis.  426,  431 .] 

*  QSee  the  argument  pro  in  State  v.  Sibley,  132  Mo.  102  ;  the  argument  eon  in 
Bakeman  v.  Rose,  18  Wend.  146.     The  cases  will  be  found  in  the  preceding  note."] 

1  C8^"1""*?  with  Rookwood's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  209,  iu  1696,  and  fairly  e»- 
tablished  by  the  time  of  Layer's  Trial,  16  id.  246,  in  1722.~| 

*  [These  reasons  are  set  forth  fully  in  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  149  ;  Second  Report 
of  Common  Law  Practice  Com'rs,  1853,  p.  22  ;  People  v.  Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  395-3 

•  [Teople  v.  Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  396.") 

•  L^or  the  nature  of  the  record  required,  see  ante,  §  375-3 


§§461  a-461  £.]  CHARACTER.  579 

ground  for  total  disqualification  was  abolished  by  statute,  the  statute 
usually  provided  for  the  use  of  such  evidence  in  impeachment,  and 
accordingly  the  statute  often  indicates  the  precise  range  allowable.* 
Where  it  does  not,  the  question  may  arise  whether  the  kinds  of 
crime  are  to  be  the  same  as  were  formerly  sufficient  to  disqualify,  or 
whether  they  are  to  be  limited  to  those  which  affect  the  trait  of 
veracity.  In  most  jurisdictions  the  former  solution  is  reached.* 
(V")  Where  the  conviction  is  sought  to  be  proved  by  questioning  the 
witness  himself  on  cross-examination,  the  objection  arises  that,  by 
the  rule  of  Primariness  (post,  §  563  a  ;  ante,  §  375),  the  contents  of 
the  record  cannot  be  proved  orally;  and  this  objection  was  origi- 
nally held  fatal.  But  as  there  was  in  truth  no  danger  in  accepting 
the  witness'  own  admission  that  he  was  convicted,  and  as  any  other 
method  usually  involved  inordinate  expense,7  the  propriety  of  prov- 
ing the  conviction  by  cross-examination  has  come  in  most  jurisdic- 
tions to  be  conceded,  usually  by  statute,  but  occasionally  by  judicial 
decision.* 

6  fSee  the  statutes  set  out  in  Appendix  II.] 

6  LSpace  does  not  suffice  to  analyze  the  cases  :  St.  17-18  Viet.  c.  125,  ss.  25,  103  ; 
Campbell  v.  State,  23  Ala.  44,  73 ;  Prior  v.  State,  99  id.  196  ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  2051  ; 
People  r.  Reinhart,  39  Cal.  449  ;  People  v.  Anianacus,  50  id.  233,  235  ;  People  v.  Caro- 
lan,  79  id.  195  ;  People  v.  Chin  Hane,  108  id.  597  ;  State  v.  Randolph,  24  Conn.  363, 
365 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  46  Ga.  118  ;  Coleman  v.  State,  94  id.  85 ;  Killian  v.  R.  Co.,  97 
id.  727  ;  Shaw  v.  State,  id.,  29  S.  E.  477  ;  Bartholomew  v.  People,  104  111.  601,  607; 
Harmers  r.  McClelland,  74  la.  318,  322  ;  State  r.  O'Brien,  81  id.  96  ;  Burdette  v.  Com, 
93  Ky.  76 ;  State  v.  Watson,  63  Me.  128, 136  ;  65  id.  79  ;  State  v.  Farmer,  84  id.  440  ; 
McLaughlin  p.  Mencke,  80  Md.  83  ;  Com.  v.  Bonner,  97  Mass.  587  ;  Com.  v.  Gorham, 
99  id.  420  ;  Wilbur  v.  Flood,  16  Mich.  44  ;  Clemens  v.  Conrad,  19  id.  174 ;  Dickinson 
r.  Dustin,  21  id.  564  ;  People  »'.  Driscoll,  47  id.  416;  People  v.  Mausaunan,  60  id.  15, 
21 ;  Helwig  v.  Lascowski,  82  id.  621  ;  State  v.  Curtis,  39  Minn.  359;  State  v.  Saner, 
42  id.  259 ;  State  v.  Adamson,  43  id.  200 ;  State  v.  Rugan,  68  Mo.  215  ;  State  v.  Tay- 
lor, 98  id.  240,  244  ;  State  v.  Miller,  100  id.  622;  State  v.  Donnelley,  130  id.  642  ; 
State  v.  Smith,  125  id.  2;  Gardner  ».  R.  Co.,  135  id.  90  ;  State  v.  Dyer,  139  id.  199; 
State  v.  Grant,  id.,  45  S.  W.  1103;  State  v.  Black,  15  Mont.  143  ;  Chase  v.  Blodgett, 
10  N.  H.  22,  24  ;  Clement  v.  Brooks,  13  id.  92,  99  ;  Hoitt  v.  Moulton,  21  id.  592  ;  St. 
July  13,  1871 ;  Roop  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  479 ;  Territory  v.  Chavez,  N.  M.,  45  Pac. 
1107  ;  Carpenter  v.  Nixon,  5  Hill  260  ;  Newcomb  v.  Griswold,  24  N.  Y.  298;  Gardner 
v.  Bartholomew,  40  Barb.  327  ;  West  v.  Lynch,  7  Daly  246 ;  Sims  v.  Sims,  75  N.  Y. 
472  ;  P.  C.  §  714  ;  People  v.  Noelke,  94  id.  137,  144  ;  Spiegel  v.  Hays,  118  id.  660  ; 
Coble  v.  State,  31  Oh.  St.  102 ;  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  257;  State  v.  Wyse,  33  S.  C.  593 ; 
Goode  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr.  505,  508  ;  U.  S.  v.  Neverson,  1  Mackie  152,  172  ;  Bait.  & 
0.  R.  Co.  v.  Rambo,  16  U.  S.  App.  277,  281;  Langhorne  v.  Com.,  76  Va.  1016  ;  State 
v.  Payne,  6  Wash.  563,  569;  Fosdahl  v.  State,  89  Wis.  482.] 
rCooley,  C.  J.,  in  Clemens  v.  Conrad,  19  Mich.  175.] 

8  L^01"  the  state  of  the  law  in  the  various  jurisdictions,  see  the  following  cases  :  St. 
17-18  Viet.  c.  125,  ss.  25,  103;  Henman  v.  Lester,  12  C.  B.  N.  8.  776;  Baker  v. 
Trotter,  73  Ala.  277,  281  ;  Code  1897,  §  1796  ;  Thompson  v.  State,  100  Ala.  70,  72  ; 
Murphy  r.  State,  108  id.  10;  Scott  r.  State,  49  Ark.  156,  158  ;  South.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
White,  58  id.  277,  279  ;  People  v.  Reinhart,  39  Cal.  449  ;  People  v.  McDonald,  ib. 
697  ;  People  v.  Manning,  48  id.  335,  338 ;  C.  C.  P.  §  2051  ;  People  v.  Rodiigo,  69  Cal. 
606;  Peoples.  Dillwood,  id.,  39  Pac.  439 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  46  Ga.  118;  Killian  v. 
R.  Co.,  97  id.  727  ;  Huff  v.  State,  id.,  30  S.  E.  868  ;  Gage  v.  Eddy,  167  111.  102  ;  Far- 
ley v.  State,  57  Ind.  334  ;  State  v.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90,  92 ;  Burdette  v.  Com.,  93  Ky. 
78  ;  McLaughlin  v.  Mencke,  80  Md.  83  ;  Advocate-General  v.  Hancock,  1  Quincy 
461  ;  Com.  v.  Quin,  5  Gray  479  ;  Com.  v.  Gorham,  99  Mass.  420,  421  ;  Com.  v.  Sul- 
livan, 161  id.  59;  Wilbur  v.  Flood,  16  Mich.  44;  Clemens  v.  Conrad,  19  id.  174; 


530  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

(e)  Scope  of  Cross-examination.  By  the  reasons  above-men- 
tioned, the  impeaching  party  (except  when  proving  a  conviction  of 
crime)  is  relegated  exclusively  to  the  cross-examination  of  the  wit- 
ness to  be  impeached,  as  the  sole  mode,  not  open  to  the  above  ob- 
jections, of  bringing  out  particular  conduct  affecting  character.9  Are 
there  here  any  further  limitations  upon  the  scope  of  his  inquiries, 
or  is  there  absolute  freedom  for  the  cross-examiner  in  this  process  ? 
(<?')  There  may  be,  first,  a  limitation  as  to  relevancy.  Not  all  mis- 
conduct indicates  a  bad  character,  and  not  all  evil  deeds  indicate  a 
lack  of  the  truth-telling  disposition.  On  principle,  only  such  mis- 
conduct as  exposes  a  lack  of  voraciousness  or  honesty  should  be  in- 
quired after  (except  in  jurisdictions  where  general  bad"  character  is 
regarded  as  relevant),  e.  g.  fraud,  forgery,  perjury,  etc.  To  this 
conclusion  come  a  number  of  Courts.  But  others  (even  in  jurisdic- 
tions treating  veracity -character  as  alone  relevant)  allow  the  inquiry 
to  range  over  all  sorts  of  misconduct,  —  e.  g.  robbery,  assault,  or 
prostitution,  —  however  irrelevant  to  veracity.  But,  whatever  the 
attitude  of  a  Court  on  the  above  point,  it  may  also  make  a  distinction 
between  the  actual  misconduct  itself  and  the  mere  charge  of  miscon- 
duct—  as  by  arrest,  indictment,  etc.,  — excluding  the  latter  as  not 
in  itself  involving  any  guilt  or  reproach  for  the  person  thus  —  per- 
haps falsely —  charged.10  (e")  There  may,  secondly,  be  a  limitation 
based  on  the  general  impropriety  of  allowing  an  unrestrained  raking- 
up  of  the  witness'  misdeeds  and  of  thus  making  the  witness-box  a 
source  of  annoyance  and  terror  both  to  reputable  and  disreputable 
persons  alike.  The  utility  of  such  exposures  is  comparatively  so 
small  and  the  abuse  of  such  cross-examination  by  unscrupulous 
counsel  is  so  common  that  some  measures  of  restriction  are  highly 
desirable,  and  this  attitude  of  the  Courts  may  well  be  emphasized  as 
the  only  proper  one.  The  object  is  attained,  in  most  jurisdictions, 
by  declaring  the  trial  Court  to  have  discretion  to  set  limits  to  such 
an  examination  (irrespective  of  its  relevancy),  and  to  forbid  it  when- 
ever it  seems  to  be  unnecessary  or  profitless  or  undesirable;11  and 

Dickinson  v.  Dustin,  21  id.  565 ;  People  ».  Driscoll,  47  id.  416  ;  People  ».  Mausaunan, 

60  id.  15,  21  ;  Helwitf  v.  Lascowski,  82  id.  621 ;  Jackson  v.  State,  Miss.,  21  So.  707  ; 

Stater.  Rugan,  68  Mo.  215;  State  v.  Miller,  100  id.  622;  State  v.  Martin,   124  id. 

614  ;  State  v.  Black,  15  Mont.  143  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  43  N.  H.  636,  638  ;  People  v. 

Herrick,  13  Johns.  82,  84  ;  Hilts  v.  Colvin,  14  id.  182,  ]84  ;  Newcomb  r.Griswold,  24 

Jf.  Y.  299  ;  Real  v.  People,  42  id.  273,  281  ;  Perry  v.  People,  86  id.  353,  358  ;  Penal 

Code,  §  714  ;  People  v.  Noelke,  94  N.  Y.  137,  144  ;  Spiegel  v.  Hays,  118  id.  660  ;  Wroe 

v.  State,  20  Oh.  St.  471 ;  Asher  v.  Terr.,  Okl.,  64  Pac.  445 ;  Moore  i>.  State,  96  Tenn. 

209  ;  Dunbar  v.  U.  S.,  156  IT.  S.  191  ;  Durland  v.  U.  S.,  id.,  16  Sup.  508  ;  Bait.  &  0. 

R.   Co.   v.  Rambo,   16  U.  S.  App.  277,  284  ;  State  v.  Slack,   69  Vt.   486  ;  State  v. 

Payne,  6  Wash.  663,  668  ;  Kirschner  v.  State,  9  Wis.  140,  144  ;  Ingalls  v.  State,  43 

id.  647,  654;  McKesson  v.  Sherman,  51  id.  303,  311.1 

•  rWell  explained  in  Oxier  v.  U.  S.,  Ind.  Terr.,  38  S.  W.  331.] 
M  LPeople  v.  Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  268  ;  Ryan  v.  People,  79  id.  597  ;  State  v.  Greenburg, 

Kan.,  53  Pac.  61.] 

11  PThe  phrasings  differ  ;  see  the  policy  of  this  limitation  eloquently  set  forth  in 

Third  Gl.  West.  T.  Co.  v.  Loomis,  32  N.  Y.  127,  132  ;  see  another  good  exposition  in 

Terr.  v.  Chavez,  N.  Mt-x.,  45  Pac.  1107.] 


§  461  b.]  CHARACTER.  581 

such  is  the  rule  now  in  vogue  in  the  majority  of  jurisdictions.  A 
few  Courts,  with  courage  and  wisdom,  have  taken  the  step  of  for- 
bidding entirely  such  cross-examination  to  character.12  A  few 
others,  on  the  contrary,  still  impose  no  limitations,  other  than  those 
of  relevancy  above  referred  to.  —  Unfortunately,  not  all  Courts  have 
steadily  and  definitely  committed  themselves  to  any  one  of  the  pre- 
ceding varieties  of  rules;  and  in  some  jurisdictions  —  e.g.  in  Kew 
York  —  it  is  possible  to  ascertain  the  state  of  the  law  only  by  a  care- 
ful comparison  of  a  series  of  rulings.  The  above  distinctions  seem 
to  be  substantially  all  that  have  been  taken  —  irrespective  of  trifling 
local  variations  —  and  will  serve  as  a  guide  to  the  condition  of  the 
law  in  a  given  jurisdiction.18 — It  must  be  added  that  the  witness' 

12  \_E.  g.  Elliott  v.  Boyles,  31  Pa.  67  ;  Com.  v.  Schaffner,  146  Mass.  512  ;  Anthony 
v.  State,  Ida.,  55  Pac.  884  (by  statute).} 

13  ([For  the  state  of  the  law  in  the  various  jurisdictions,  see  the  following  cases  : 
Maskull's  Trial,  21  How.  St.  Tr.  667;   Rowan's  Trial,  22  id.  1115  ;  Watson's  Trial,  32 
id.  295;   R.  v.  Hunt,  1  State  Tr.  N.  8.  171,  220,  234  ;   R.  v.  Duffey,  7  id.  795,  892; 
Henman  v.  Lester,  12  C.  B.  N.  s.  776;   Second  Report  Common  Law  Practice  Com'rs, 
1853,  p.  21 ;   R.  v.  Orton  (Tichborne  Trial),  Charge  of  C.  J.  Cockburn,  II,  720,  722  ; 
Stephen  Hist.  Crim.  Law,  I,  433  ;   Rules  of  Court,  1883,   Ord.   36,   R.  38,  and  the 
line  of  cases  cited  post,  §469  i;    Boles  v.   State,   46  Ala.  206;  Kelms  v.    Steiner, 
113  id.  562;  Pleasant  v.  State,  13  Ark.  360,  377;  15  id.  624,  649;  Hollingsworth  v. 
State,  53  id.  387,  389  ;   Holder  v.  State,  58  id.  478  ;  Clark  v.  Reese,  35  Cal.  89,  96  ; 
People  v.  Snellie,  48  id.  338  ;   C.  C.  P.  §  2051 ;   People  v.  Manning,  48  Cal.  335,  338  ; 
Hiiikle  r.  R.  Co.,  55  id.  627,  632;   People  v.  Hamblin,  68  id.   101,  103  ;    People  v. 
Carolan,  79  id.  195  ;   Cockrill  v.  Hall,  76  id.  192,  196  ;  Sharon  v.  Sharon,  79  id.  633, 
673  ;  Davis  v.  Powder  Works,  84  id.  617,  627  ;  People  v.  Tiley,  ib.  651,  652  ;  Jones  v. 
Duchow,  87  id.  109,  114;   People  v.  Wells,  100  id.  459,  462;  People  v.  Un  Dong,  106 
id.  83;   People  v.  Chin  Haue,   ]08  id.  597;    People  v.  Ross,  115  id.  233;   People  v. 
Silva,  id.,  54  Pac.  146  ;   People  v.  Piercy,  id.,  55  Pac.  141  ;   Steene  v.  Aylesworth,  18 
Conn.  244  ;  Kelsey  v.  Ins.  Co.,  35  id.  225,  233;  State  v.  Ward,  49  id.  433,  442  ;  State 
v.   Ferguson,  id.,  41  Atl.  769  ;    Goon  Bow  v.  People,   111.,  43  N.  E.  593  ;  Walker  v. 
State,  6    Blackf.  3  ;    Hill   v.   State,  4   Ind.  112 ;    Townsend  v.  State,  13  id.   358  ; 
Bersch  v.  State,  ib.  436 ;   South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  id.  579,  584  ;    Bessette  p.  State, 
101  id.  85,  88 ;   Spencer  v.  Robbins,  106  id.  580,  586 ;  Bedgood  v.  State,  115  id.  279 ; 
Parker  v.  State,  136  id.  284  ;    Blough  v.  Parry,  144  id.  463  ;    Shears  v.  State,  147  id. 
51  ;    Miller  v.  Dill,  id.,  49  N.  E.  272;  Vancleave  v.  State,  id.,  49  N.  E.  1060;   Ellis 
v.  State,  id.,  52  N.  E.  82  ;  Oxier  v.  U.  S.,  Ind.  T.,  38  S.  W.  331 ;   Oats  v.  U.  S.,  id., 
38  S.  W.  673;  Madden  v.  Koester,  52  la.  692;  State  v.  Osborne,  96  id.  281  ;  State  ». 
Watson,  102  id.   651;    State  v.  Chingren,  id.,  74  N.  W.  946;    State  v.  Pfefferle,  36 
Kan.  90,  92 ;   State  v.  Reed,  53  id.  767  ;    State  v.  Greenburg,  id.,  53  Pac.  61 ;    Bur- 
dette  v.  Com.,  93  Ky.  77  ;  Roberts  v.  Com.,  id.,  20  S.  W.  267 ;  Com.  v.  Wilson,  id., 
32  S.  W.  166  ;  Warren  v.  Com.,  99  id.  370  ;   Leslie  v.  Com.,  id.,  42  S.  W.  1095  ;  State 
v.  Murphy,  45  La.  An.  958,  961  ;   State  v.  Dudoussat,  47  id.  977  ;  State  v.  Southern, 
48  id.  628;   Smith  ».  State,  64  Md.  25;    Hathaway  v.  Crocker,  7  Met.  266;   Com.  v. 
Shaw,  4  Cush.  593  ;  Com.  v.  Savory,  10  id.  535,  537 ;  Com.  v.  Hill,  ib.  530,  532  ;  Smith 
v.  Castles,  1  Gray  108,  112;    Com",  v.  Quin,  5  id.  479,  480;    Gardner  v.  Way,  8  id. 
189  ;  Holbrook  v.  Dow,  12  id.  357  ;  Prescott  v.  Ward,  10  All.  204,  209  ;  Com.  v.  Regan, 
105  Mass.  593  ;   Com.  v.  Mason,  ib.  163,  168  ;  Coin.  v.  McDonald,  110  id.  405  ;  Jen- 
nings v.  Machine  Co.,  138  id.  594,  597  ;  Com.  r.  Schaffner,  146  id.  512,  515  ;  Wilbur 
v.  Flood,  16  Mich.  43 ;   Arnold  v.  Nye,  23  id.  295  ;  Gale  v.  People,  26  id.  157 ;   Beebe 
v.  Knapp,  28  id.  53,  72  ;  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  id.  183  ;  Bissell  v.  Starr,  32  id.  297  ; 
Saunders  t>.  People,  38  id.  218  ;  People  v.  Knapp,  42  id.  267  ;  People  v.  Whitson,  43 
id.  420;  People  ».  Niles,  44  id.  608;  Hamilton  v.  People,  46  id.  188  ;  Marx  t>.  Hilsen- 
degen,  ib.  337 ;  Driscoll  v.  People,  47  id.  417;  Helwig  ».  Lascowski,  82  id.  621  ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Foote,  93  id.  38  ;   People  v.  Kohler,  ib.  625,  630  ;   People  v.  Harrison,  ib.  596 ; 
People  v.  Mills,  94  id.  630,  637  ;  People  v.  Sutherland,  104  id.  468  ;  Kingston  v.  R.  Co., 
id.,  70  N.  W.  315  ;  People  v.  Parraelee,  id.,  70  N.  W.   577  ;   McArdle  v.  McAi-dle, 


582  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

privilege  (if  there  be  one)  not  to  disclose  matters  disgracing  him  is  a 
very  different  question  from  the  present  one  (though  sometimes,  in 
the  earlier  English  cases  and  in  a  few  modern  cases,  not  distin- 
guished from  it);  and  is  treated  post,  §  469  t.] 

§  461  c.  Character  :  (3)  Proof  by  Personal  Knowledge  or  Opinion. 
[The  most  natural  way  to  learn  what  disposition  to  truth-telling  is 
possessed  by  a  witness  would  be  to  receive  the  estimates  of  those 
who  are  personally  and  intimately  acquainted  with  him  and  have 
had  ample  opportunity  to  learn  his  true  character;  and  such  was  the 
original  and  orthodox  practice,  both  in  England  and  in  this  country.1 
Such  continues  to  be  the  rule  in  England,  the  inquiry  being  usually 
in  the  form,  "  Would  you  believe  him  on  oath  ? "  but  permissibly 
also,  "Knowing  his  general  character,  would  you  believe  him  on 
oath  ? " 2  In  this  country,  by  a  series  of  misunderstandings, 1  the 
orthodox  practice  has  been  widely  departed  from,  and  a  variety  of 
rules  obtain,  (a)  In  a  few  jurisdictions,  personal  opinion  in  any 
form  is  absolutely  excluded,  (b)  In  a  few  jurisdictions  the  ortho- 
dox permission  of  it  is  retained,  (c)  In  many  jurisdictions,  the 
impeaching  witness  may  be  asked,  "Knowing  his  reputation  (or, 

12  Minn.  98,  107  ;  State  v.  MeCartey,  17  id.  76,  86  ;  State  v.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380,  390  ; 
Muller  v.  Hospital  Assoc.,  73  id.  242 ;  State  v.  Miller,  100  id.  606,  621 ;  State  v.  Martin, 
124  id.  514 ;  State  o.  Gesell,  ib.  531 ;  Coins  v.  Moberly,  127  id.  116  ;  Hancock  i;.  Black- 
well,  139  id.  440;  State  v.  Grant,  id.,  45  S.  W.  1103  ;  Anon.,  37  Miss.  54,  58  ;  Head  r. 
State,  44  id.  731,  751  ;  Tucker  t>.  Tucker,  74  id.  93  ;  State  v.  Gleim,  17  Mont.  17  ;  Hill 
v.  State,  42  Nebr.  503  ;  Myers  v.  State,  51  id.  517  ;  State  v.  Huff,  11  Nev.  17,  26 ; 
Clement  v.  Brooks,  13  N.  H.  92,  99;  State  v.  Staples,  47  id.  113,  117  ;  Gutterson  ».' 
Morse,  58  id.  165  ;  Fries  v.  Brugler,  12  N.  J.  L.  79;  Paul  v.  Paul,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  25; 
Roop  v.  State,  58  N.  J.  L.  479  ;  Territory  v.  De  Gutman,  N.  M.,  42  Pac.  68  ;  Ter- 
ritory v.  Chavez,  id.,  45  Pac.  1107  ;  Borrego  v.  Territory,  id.,  46  Pan.  349  ;  People  v. 
Rector,  19  Wend.  573,  582  ;  Carter  v.  People,  2  Hill  317;  Howard  v.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Den. 
504,  506  ;  Lohman  v.  People,  1  N.  Y.  385  ;  People  »>.  Gay,  7  id.  378  :  Newcomb  v. 
Griswold,  24  id.  299  ;  Third  G.  W.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Loomis,  32  id.  127,  138  ;  Lipe  v. 
Eisenlerd,  32  id.  238;  La  Beau  v.  People,  34  id.  230  ;  Shepard  vi  Parker,  36  id.  517; 
Brandon  v.  People,  42  id.  265,  268;  Real  v.  People,  ib.  280 ;  Connors  v.  People,  50  id. 
240;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  id.  176;  Southworth  v.  Bennett,  58  id.  659  ;  People  v.  Casey, 
72  id.  393,  398 ;  People  v.  Brown,  ib.  571 ;  People  v.  Crapo,  76  id.  288 ;  Ryan  i>. 
People,  79  id.  597  ;  People  v.  Court,  83  id.  436,  460 ;  Nolan  v.  R,  Co.,  87  id.  63,  68  ; 
People  v.  Noelke,  94  id.  137,  143;  People  t>.  Irving,  95  id.  541  ;  People  v.  Clark  102  id 
736;  People  v.  Giblin,  115  id.  196,  199;  Van  Bokkelen  v.  Berdell,  130  id.  141,  145; 
People  v.  McCormack,  135  id.  663  ;  People  v.  Porthy,  id.  ;  50  N.  E.  800  ;  State  v. 
Pancoast,  5  N.  D.  516  ;  State  w.  Patterson,  2  Ired.  346,  358;  State  v.  Garrett,  Bushee 
358 ;  State  v.  March,  1  Jones  I,.  526  ;  State  v.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  32 ;  Wroe  v.  State,  20 
Oh.  St.  460,  469;  Lee  v.  State,  21  id.  151 ;  Coble  ».  State,  31  id.  102;  Hamilton  v. 
State,  34  id.  86  ;  Bank  v.  Slemmons,  ib.  142,  147  ;  Hanoff  v.  State,  37  id.  180  ;  Steeples 
v.  Newton,  7  Or.  110,  114;  Elliott  v.  Boyles,  31  Pa.  65,  67  ;  Hill  v.  State,  91  Tenn. 
621,  523;  Zanone  o.  State,  97  id.  101  ;  Ryan  v.  State,  ib.  206;  Exon  v.  State,  33  Tex. 
Cr.  461 ;  Evansich  »».  R.  Co.,  61  Tex.  24,  28  ;  Dillingham  v.  Ellis,  86  id.  447;  U.  S. 
v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  373  ;  Thiede  w.  Utah,  159  U.  S.  510 ;  Smith  v.  U.  S..  161  U.  S.  85 ; 
Tla-koo-yel-lee  v.  U.  S.,  167  id.  274  ;  Tingle  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.  App.,  87  Fed.  320;  State 
v.  Fournier,  68  Vt.  262:  State  v.  Slack.  69  id.  486  ;  State  v.  Conkle,  16  W.  Va.  736, 
764;  Ketchingman  v.  State,  6  Wis.  426,  430;  Kirschner  v.  State,  9  id.  140.  143; 
Ingalls  v.  State,  48  id.  647.  654  ;  McKesson  v.  Sherman,  51  id.  303,  311-3 

1  [The  authorities  are  fully  set  forth  in  an  article  by  the  present  editor  in  32  Aroer. 
I,aw  Rev.  713,  entitled  ''  Proof  of  Character  by  Personal  Knowledge  or  Opinion  ;  it« 
History."] 

*  £R.  v.  Hemp,  5  C.  &  P.  468 ;  R.  v.  Brown,  10  Cox  Cr.  453.] 


§§  461  i-461  c.]  CHARACTER.  583 

character),"  or  "From  his  reputation  (or,  character^  would  you  be- 
lieve him  on  oath  ? "  (d)  In  many  jurisdictions,  the  same  form  is 
used,  but  the  witness'  belief  is  to  be  taken  simply  as  a  way  of  meas- 
uring the  quality  of  the  reputation  as  understood  by  him.*  (e)  In 
many  jurisdictions  holding  character  for  veracity  to  be  alone  relevant 
(ante,  §  461  a),  the  same  form  is  used,  except  that  the  reputation  or 
character  premised  must  be  solely  that  for  veracity.  It  is  sometimes 
difficult  to  ascertain  which  of  these  rules  is  the  accepted  law  of  a 
given  jurisdiction,  but  the  above  enumeration  seems  to  include  all 
the  varieties.*  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  orthodox  practice  has 

8  £See  this  view  explained  in  Hillis  v.  Wylie,  26  Oh.  St.  576  ;  Hamilton  v.  People, 
29  Mich.  185.3 

4  QThe  cases  are  as  follows  :  McCutchen  v.  McCutchen,  9  Port.  655  ;  Sorrelle  v. 
Craig,  9  Ala.  539  ;  Hadjo  v.  Gooden,  13  id.  721  ;  Dave  v.  State,  22  id.  23,  38  ;  Mar- 
tin v.  Martin,  25  id.  211  ;  Ward  v.  State,  28  id.  63 ;  Mose  v.  State,  36  id.  211,  230  ; 
Bullard  v.  Lambert,  40  id.  210  ;  Artope  v.  Goodall,  53  id.  318,  325  ;  Smith  v.  State, 
88  id.    76;   Holmes   v.   State,    ib.  26;  Monitor  v.  State,  ib.   116;  Jackson  v.  State, 
106  id.   12;    Crawford    r.    State,   112   id.    1;    McAlpine   v.  State,  id.,   23   So.  130; 
Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624,  653  ;  Snow  v.  Grace,  29  id.  131,  136 ;  Majors  v.  State, 
ib.  112;  Hudspeth  v.  State,  50  id.  534,  543;  Stevens  v.  Irwin,  12  Cal.  306,   308; 
People  v.  Tyler,  35  id.  553  ;  People  v.  Methvin,  53  id.  68 ;  Wise  v.  Wakefield,  118  id. 
107 ;   State   ».    Randolph,    24   Conn.   363,    367  :   Robinson   v.  Burton,  5  Harringt. 
335,   339;    Long   v.   State,    11   Fla.  295,  297;  Robinson  v.  State,    16jd.  835,  840; 
Stokes  v.  State,  18   Ga.    17,  37 ;   Smithwick  v.  Evans,  24  id.  463 ;  S.   F.  &  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Wideman,  99  id.  245;  Frye  v.    Bank,   11   111.   367,  378;  Eason  v.  Chapman, 
21  id.  33;  Crabtree    r.    Kile,    ib.   183;    Cook  v.  Hunt,  24   id.   535,   550;  Crabtree 
v.    H.-igenbaugh,   25   id.   238  ;  Massey  v.  Bank,  104  id.  327,  334  ;  Bank  v.  Keeler, 
109  id.  385,  390;  Spies  v.  People,  122  id.  1,  208;  Gifford  v.  People,  148  id.  173,  176; 
I.  P.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Anthony,  43  Ind.  183,  193  ;  Carter  ».  Cavenaugh,  1  Greene  171, 
177;    State  v.    Egan,   59  la.   636  ;  State  v.  Johnson,  40  Kan.  266,  269  ;  Mobley  v. 
Hamit,  1  A.   K.   Marsh.    591  ;  Thurman  v.  Virgin,  18  B.  Monr.  792 ;  Henderson  ». 
Haynes,  2  Mete.  342,  348  ;   Young  v.  Com.,  6  Bush  316;  Stanton  v.  Parker,   5  Bob. 
108" :  Paradise  v.  Ins.  Co.,  6  La.  An.  596,  598  ;  State  v.   Parker,  7  id.  83,  85 ;  State 
v.  Christian,   44  id.  950,    952  ;   Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  19  Me.  375  ;  Knight «;.  House, 
29  Md.  198  ;  Bates  v.   Barber,    3  Cush.  110  ;    Com.  v.   Lawler,   12  All.  586  ;    Web- 
ber ».    Hanke,  4   Mich.    198;    Hamilton   v.   People,    29   id.    173,    185;    Keator  v. 
People,  32  id.  486 ;  Mason  v.  Phe.lps,  48  id.  131 ;  Rudsdill  v.  Slingerland,  18  Minn. 
380,   383  ;  French  ».   Sale,    63    Miss.   386,  393  ;   Day  v.  State,  13  Mo.   425  ;   State 
v.   King,  83  id.  555;   State  r.    Howard,   9  N.  H.  486;    Hoitt  v.  Moulton,   21   id. 
592  ;   Kelley  v.   Proctor,  41  id.    139,   145 ;    King  v.  Ruckman,  20  N.  J.    Eq.   316, 
357 ;    Troup  v.  Sherwood,  3   Johns.   Ch.    558 ;    Fulton   Bank   ».   Benedict,    1   Hall 
Sup.  493,  499,  558  ;  Bakeman  v.  Rose,  18  Wend.    151  ;  People  v.  Abbot,  19  Wend. 
199;  People  v.  Davis,  21  id.  309,  315  ;   Johnson   v.   People,   3  Johns.   178;    Stacy  ». 
Graham,  14   N.  Y.  492,  501  ;  Wehrkamp  ».  Willet,  4  Abb.  App.  548 ;  Foster  v.  New- 
brough,  58  N.  Y.  482 ;  Adams  v.  Ins.   Co.,  70  id.   166,   170  ;  Carlson  v.  Winterson, 
147  id.  652,  723 ;  State  v.  Boswell,  2  Dev.  211 ;  Downey  v.  Murphy,  1  Dev.  &  B.  84 ; 
State  v.  O'Neale,  3  Ired.  88  ;  State  v.  Parks,  ib.  297  ;  Hooper  v.  Moore,  2  Jones  L. 
428  ;  State  ».  Caveness,  78  N.  C.   486 ;    Wilson   v.   Runyon,   Wright  652 ;   Seely  v. 
Blair,  ib.  685;  Bucklin  v.  State,  20  Oh.  18  ;  French  r.   Millard,  2  Oh.  St.   44,  50  ; 
Craig  v.  State,  5  id.  607  ;  Hillis  v.  Wylie,  26  id.  576  ;  Kimmel  v.  Kimmel,  3  S.  &  R. 
336  ;  Wiker.  Lightner,  11  id.  199  ;  Bogle  v.  Kreitzer,  46  Pa.  465,   470;  Lyman  v. 
City,  56  id.  488,  502  ;  Kitchen  v.  Tyson,  3  Murph.  314  ;  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  256  ;  State 
v.  Ford,  3  Strobh.  521 ;  Chapman  v.  Cooley,  12  Rich.  661  ;  State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  C. 
539  ;  Sweet  v.  Gilmore,  id.,  30  S.  C.  394";  Gardenhire  ».  Parks,  2  Yerg.   23;  Ford 
v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  92,  100  ;  Gilliam  ».  State,  1   Head  38 ;  Merriman  v.  State,  3  Lea 
393,  394;  Boon  v.  State,  23  Tex.  675,  686;  Ayres  v.  Duprey,  27  id.  593,  599  ;  John- 
son ».  Brown,  51  id.  65,  77;  U.  S.  v.  White,  5   Cr.  C.  C.  38.   42;  Wood  v.  Mann, 
2  Snmner  32 ;  Gass  v.  Stinson,  ib.  610 ;  U.  S.  v.  Vausickle,  2  McLean  221  ;  Gaines  v. 
Relf,  13  How.  554;    Teese  v.  Huntington,  23  id.    2,   13;   State  ».    Marks,   Utah, 


584  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

been  departed  from,  for  it  furnished  the  most  satisfactory  mode  of 
learning  a  witness'  character.6 

The  practice  in  proving  a  defendant's  character  was  (ante,  §  14  £) 
originally  precisely  the  same,  i.  e.  resort  was  permissible  and  usual 
to  those  who  had  a  personal  acquaintance  with  his  conduct  and  had 
been  enabled  to  judge  of  his  character.6  But  in  more  recent  times  in 
England  the  rule  of  exclusion  has  been  adopted ; 7  and  in  a  majority 
of  American  jurisdictions  such  personal  knowledge  or  opinion  is  now 
excluded.8  There  is  here  also  much  cause  for  regret  that  any  change 
has  occurred;  for  it  has  deprived  accused  persons  of  the  most  trust- 
worthy and  effective  testimony  to  support  their  character. ?] 

§  461  d.  Character:  (4)  Proof  by  Reputation.  [Owing  to  the  pre- 
vailing doctrine  explained  in  the  preceding  section,  the  chief  avail- 
able source  for  proving  a  witness'  character  is  his  reputation.  The 
terms  "  reputation  "  and  "  character  "  thus  are  often  used  interchange- 
ably; and  occasionally  the  two  ideas  themselves  are  confounded. 
But  they  are  nevertheless  distinct,  and  should  always  be  thought  of 
as  distinct,  in  order  to  solve  correctly  many  of  the  problems  that 
are  presented  in  evidencing  character  by  reputation.  The  actual 
character  or  disposition  of  the  witness  is  the  fact  primarily  relevant 
as  indicating  the  probable  truthfulness  of  the  witness  in  his  testi- 
mony, and  the  reputation  (i.  e.  the  estimation  of  that  character  by 
the  community)  is  merely  one  source  (though  the  chief  one)  of  evi- 
dence of  that  character.1  The  questions  that  arise  depend  some- 

51  Pac.  1089  ;  Powers  v.  Leach,  26  Vt.  279;  Willard  v.  Goodenough,  30  id.  396  ; 
Uhl  v.  Com.,  6  Gratt.  706,  708  ;  Langhorne  v.  Com.,  76  Va.  1022  ;  State  v.  Miles, 
15  Wash.  534  ;  Wilson  v.  State,  3  Wis.  798.] 

6  QSee  the  criticisms  of  Wright,  J.,  in  Seely  v.  Blair,  Wright  685 ;  Berry,  J.,  in 
State  v.  Lee,  22  Minn.  209.] 

8  L~Davison's  Trial,  31  How.  St.  Tr.  186  ;  Hardy's  Trial,  24  id.  999 ;  see  other  author- 
ities  in  the  article  just  referred  to.] 

7  TR.  v.  Rowton,  Leigh  &  C.  520,  10  Cox  Cr.  25,  two  judges  dissenting.] 

8  L^he  cases  on  botli  sides  are  as  follows,  including  character  for  a  prosecutrix, 
employee,  etc.,  as  well  as  for  a  defendant :   Jackson  v.  State,  78  Ala.  472  ;  Hussey  v. 
State,  87  id.  133  ;  People  r.  Casey,  53  Cal.  361 ;  People  v.  Samonset,  97  id.  448,  450 ; 
People  v.  Wade,  118  id.  672  ;  Stow  v.  Converse,  3  Conn.  343  ;  State  v.  Jerome,  33  id. 
265,  269  ;  Stamper  v.  Griffin,  12  Ga.  453,  456  ;  Col.  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Christian.  97  id. 
56  ;  Hirschman  v.  People,  101  111.  568,  574  ;  Bowlus  v.  State,  130  Ind.  227,  230  ;  State 
v.  Starrett,  68  la.  76  ;  State  v.  Cross,  ib.  180,  195  ;  Butler  v.  R.  Co.,  87  id.  206,  210  ; 
Lacy  v.  Kossuth  Co.,  id.,  75  N.  W.  689  ;  Baldwin  v.  R.  Co.,  4  Gray  333  ;  Gahagan  v. 
R.  Co.,  1  All.  190 ;  Com.  v.  O'Brien,  119  Mass.  345  ;  Day  v.  Ross,  154  id.  13 ;  McGuerty 
v.  Hale,  161  id.  51 ;  Lewis  v.  Emery,  108  Mich.  641 ;  People  v.  Holmes,  111  id.  364 ; 
State  v.  Lee,  22  Minn.  407,  409 ;  Boettger  v.  Iron  Co.,  136  Mo.  531  ;  Langston  v.  R. 
Co.,  id.,  48  S.  W.  835  ;  Berneker  v.  State,  40  Nebr.  810,  815  ;  Colder  v.  Lund,  50  id. 
867  ;  State  ».  Pearce,  15  Nev.  188,  190  ;  Maynr  v.  People,  80  N.  Y.  377;  People  v. 
Greenwall,  180  id.  302  ;  Pierce  v.  Myrick,  1  Dev.  345.  346;  Bottoms  v.  Kent,  3  Jones 
L.  160;  Gandolfo  r.  State,  11  Oh.  St.  114  ;  Marts  v.  State,  26  id.  162,  168  ;  Zitzer  v. 
Merkel,  24  Pa.  408;  Frazier  v.  R.  Co.,  38  id.  104,  111  ;  Hays  v.  Millar,  77  id.  239; 
Galveston  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  Tex.,  48  S.  W.  570 ;  Dufresne  v.  Weise,  46 
Wis.  290,  297.] 

9  QSeo  the  unanswerable  arguments  of  Erie,  C.  J.,  and  Willcs,  J.,  diss.,  in  R.  v. 
Rowton,  Leigh  &  C.  532,  539;  Berry,  J.,  in  State  v.  Lee,  22  Minn.  410;   Stephen, 
Digent  of  Evidence,  3d  Eng.  ed.,  note  xxv.] 

1  fS'-e  the  exposition  by  Woodwnrd.  J.,  in  Andre  v.  State,  5  la.  389,  394  ;  Cald- 
well,  J.,  in  Bucklin  v.  State.  20  Oh.  23.] 


§§461  c-461  d.]  CHARACTER.  585 

times  on  the  relevancy  of  the  character  and  sometimes  on  the  nature 
and  formation  of  a  reputation ;  and  the  precise  nature  of  the  inquiry 
needs  constantly  to  be  kept  in  mind.  The  topics  that  concern  this 
subject  (apart  from  the  kind  of  character  that  is  relevant,  treated 
ante,  §  461  a)  are  chiefly  as  follows :  (1)  The  time  of  the  character 
provable ;  (2)  the  nature  and  formation  of  a  reputation ;  (3)  the  per- 
sons qualified  to  testify  to  reputation;  (4)  the  cross-examination  of 
such  witnesses  to  reputation.  The  cases  dealing  with  reputation- 
evidence  of  a  defendant's  character  will  here  be  considered  at  the 
same  time,  since  the  questions  are  usually  the  same  for  both  classes. 
(1)  Time  of  Character  or  Reputation.  Character  is  a  continuous 
quality,  not  quickly  changed  or  changeable.  The  character  of  the 
witness  at  the  time  of  testifying  is  that  which  affects  his  truthful- 
ness; but  his  character  at  another  time  may  well  be  considered  as 
evidencing  his  character  at  the  time  of  testifying.  As  regards  prior 
character,  there  are  three  different  views  represented  among  the 
Courts.  One  view,  and  the  correct  one,  is  that  character  at  any 
preceding  time  is  admissible,  provided  it  is  not  too  remote  in  time 
to  have  real  probative  value.2  A  second  view  is  that  prior  character 
is  not  to  be  resorted  to  unless  for  some  reason  it  is  difficult  or  impos- 
sible to  show  present  character.8  A  third  view,  without  foundation 
in  principle  or  in  policy,  declines  altogether  to  admit  prior  charac- 
ter.4 As  to  subsequent  character,  the  question  is  a  different  one.  A 
person's  character  after  a  certain  time  is  equally  as  indicative  of 
his  character  at  that  time  as  is  his  character  at  a  prior  time,  and  no 

2  [^Expounded  by  Cowen,  J.,  in  People  v.  Abbot,  19  Weud.  200;  Beardsley,  J.,  in 
Sleeper  v.  Van  Middlesworth,  4  Den.  429.] 

8  ["Expounded  in  Willard  v.  Goodenough,  30  Vt.  397 ;  Brown  v.  Perez,  89  Tex.  282-3 
*  QSet  forth  in  Fisher  v.  Conway,  21  Kan.  25.  The  cases  representing  these  three 
attitudes  are  as  follows :  Martin  v.  Martin,  25  Ala.  210;  Kelly  v.  State,  60  id.  19; 
Yarbrough  v.  State,  105  id.  43  ;  Prater  v.  State,  107  id.  26 ;  Snow  v.  Grace,  29  Ark. 
131,  136;  Lawson  v.  State,  32  id.  220,222;  Caldwell  v.  State,  17  Conn.  467,  472; 
Watkins  v.  State,  82  Ga.  231 ;  Holmes  v.  Stateler,  17  111.  453  ;  Blackburn  v.  Mann,  85 
id.  222  ;  Kirkham  v.  People,  170  id.  9  ;  Walker  v.  State,  6  Blackf.  3;  King  v.  Hersey, 
2  Ind.  403  ;  Rucker  v.  Beaty,  3  id.  71 ;  Rogers  v.  Lewis,  19  id.  405  ;  Aurora  v.  Cobb, 
21  id.  510  ;  Abshire  v.  Mather,  27  id.  381,  384  ;  Chance  v.  R.  Co.,  32  id.  475 ;  I.  P. 
&  C.  E.  Co.  v.  Anthony,  43  id.  192 ;  Stratton  v.  State,  45  id.  468,  472 ;  Rawles  ».  State, 
56  id.  439  ;  L.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  66  id.  50  ;  Smock  v.  Pierson,  68  id. 
405  :  Sage  v.  State,  127  id.  15,  27  ;  Hauk  v.  State,  148  id.  238  ;  Manners  v.  McClel- 
land, 74  la.  318,  322 ;  State  v.  Potts,  78  id.  659  ;  Schoep  v.  Ins.  Co.,  104  id.  354 ; 
Fisher  v.  Conway,  21  Kan.  18,  25  ;  Coates  v.  Sulan,  41  id.  341,  343;  Young  v.  Com., 
6  Bush  317  ;  Marion  v.  Lambert,  10  id.  295  ;  Mitchell  v.  Com.,  78  Ky.  219 ;  Turner  v. 
King,  98  id.  253  ;  State  v.  Taylor,  45  La.  An.  605,  609  ;  Parkhurst  v.  Ketchum,  6  All. 
408;  Com.  v.  Billings,  97  Mass.  405;  Webber  v.  Hanke,  4  Mich.  198,  204  ;  Hamilton 
v.  People,  29  id.  173,  178 ;  Keator  v.  People,  32  id.  485;  Wood  v.  Matthews,  73  Mo. 
477  ;  Waddingham  v.  Hulett,  92  id.  533  ;  State  v.  Summar,  id.,  45  S.  W.  254  ;  State  v. 
Fovschner,  43  N.  H.  89  ;  Shuster  v.  State,  N.  J.  L.,  41  Atl.  701  ;  People  v.  Abbot,  19 
Wend.  200  ;  Losee  v.  Losee,  2  Johns.  613  ;  Sleeper  v.  Van  Middlesworth,  4  Den.  429 ; 
Graham  v.  Chrystal,  2  Abb.  App.  265  ;  State  v.  Lanier,  79  N.  C.  622  ;  Hamilton  i>. 
State,  30  Oh.  St.  82;  Morss  v.  Palmer,  15  Pa.  51,  56  ;  Smith  v.  Hine,  179  id.  203  ; 
Miller  v.  Miller,  id.,  41  Atl.  277 ;  Vaughn  v.  Clarkson,  R.  I.,  34  Atl.  989  ;  State  v.  Fry, 
Tenn.,  35  S.  W.  883  ;  Ayres  v.  Duprey,  27  Tex.  593,  599  ;  Johnson  v.  Brown,  51  id.  65, 
75  ;  Mynatl  v.  Hudson,  66  id.  66,  67  ;  Brown  v.  Perez,  89  id.  282  ;  Teese  v.  Huntington, 
23  How.  2,  14  ;  Willard  v.  Goodeuough,  30  Vt.  397  ;  Amidon  v.  Hosley,  54  id.  25. 


586  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

difficulty  on  this  score  arises ;  and  indeed,  for  witnesses,  the  situa- 
tion is  not  presented  except  when  the  testimony  is  offered  by  deposi- 
tion taken  some  time  beforehand.  But,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  trustworthiness  of  the  reputation  used  as  evidencing  the  charac- 
ter, an  objection  may  be  suggested  to  a  reputation  obtaining  post 
litem  motam,  i.  e.  after  trial  begun  or  after  controversy  started, 
especially  in  the  case  of  an  accused  person's  reputation;  for  un- 
founded suspicions  engendered  by  the  accusation  may  have  contrib- 
uted to  color  the  reputation  and  render  it  untrustworthy,  and  even 
a  witness'  reputation  may  thus  be  unfairly  affected.6  For  this 
reason  many  Courts  decline  to  receive  a  reputation  predicated  of  a 
time  since  trial  begun  or  accusation  brought  or  deed  committed. 
The  precise  limitations  vary  in  different  jurisdictions.' 

(2)  In  inquiring  into  the  limitations  affecting  the  nature  and  for- 
mation of  a  reputation,  it  must  be  remembered  that  reputation  is 
used  only  by  way  of  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  (ante,  Chap. 
XII),  and  that  it  must  therefore  take  such  a  solid  and  definite  shape 
as  to  be  worthy  of  attention  and  to  justify  the  exceptional  resort  to 
such  evidence.  Mere  rumors  are  of  course  not  reputation.7  A  repu- 
tation involves  the  notion  of  the  general  estimate  of  the  community 
as  a  whole,  —  not  what  a  few  persons  say,  nor  what  many  say,  but 
what  the  community  generally  believes ; 8  the  phrasings  used  by 
Courts  are  varied,  but  the  principle  is  unquestioned.9  It  is  not  nec- 
essary that  the  community  as  a  whole,  or  a  given  proportion  of 
them,  should  have  been  heard  to  speak  on  the  subject ;  it  is  what  they 

6  FJSee  the  expositions  by  Battle,  J.,  in  State  v.  Johnson,  Winst.  151  ;  Hines,  J.,  in 
White  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  486"] 

«  [Excluded:  Brown  v.  State,  46  Ala.  175,  184  ;  White  v.  State,  111  id.  92  ;  White 
v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  485,  486  ;  People  ».  Brewer,  27  Mich.  133,  135  ;  Reid  v.  Reid,  17  N". 
J.  Eq.  101 ;  State  v.  Forschner,  43  N.  H.  89,  90  ;  State  v.  Laxton,  76  N.  C.  216,  218 ; 
C.  &  F.  M.  Ins.  Co.  v.  May,  20  Oh.  224  ;  Wroe  v.  State,  20  Oh.  St.  472  ;  State  v.  Ken- 
yon,  18  R.  I.  217,  223;  State  w.  Johnson,  Winston  151  ;  State  v.  King,  9  S.  D.  628  ,• 
Moore  v.  State,  96  Tenn.  209  ;  Lea  v.  State,  94  id.  495 ;  Johnson  v.  Brown,  51  Tex, 
65,  76;  Spurr  ».  U.  S.,  U.  S.  App.,  87  Fed.  701  ;  State  v.  Marks,  Utah,  51  Pac.  1089  ; 
Carter  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  169  ;  Stirling  v.  Sterling,  41  Vt.  80 ;  Armidon  v.  Hosley, 
54  id.  25.  Admitted:  Fisher  v.  Conway,  21  Kan.  18,  25  ;  Mask  v.  State,  36  Miss.  77, 
89 ;  State  v.  Howard,  9  N.  H.  486 ;  Dollner  v.  Lintz,  84  N.  Y.  669 ;  Smith  v.  Hine, 
179  Pa.  203.] 

i  TFord  v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  101  ;  Dame  v.  Kenney,  25  N.  H.  320  ;  State  v.  Laxton, 
76  N.  C.  216  ;  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624,  653.1 

•  [Well  explained  in  Kimmel  v.  Kimmel,  3  S.  &  R.  337  ;  Pickens  v.  State,  61  Miss. 
566.] 

9  FJThe  following  rulings  deal  with  a  variety  of  phrasings :  Maskall's  Trial,  21  How. 
St.  Tr.  684;  Sorrelle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  539  ;  Hadjor.  Gooden,  13  id.  720,  722 ;  Mose  v. 
State,  36  id.  211,  229  ;  Haley  v.  State,  63  id.  86;  Jackson  v.  State,  78  id.  473  ;  Regnier 
v.  Cabot,  7  111.  40  ;  Crabtree  v.  Kile,  21  id.  183  ;  Crabtree  v.  Hagenbaugh,  25  id.  233, 
238  ;  Fahnestock  v.  State,  23  Ind.  231,  238  ;  Meyncke  v.  State,  68  id.  404  ;  Coates  v. 
Sulan,  46  Kan.  341  ;  Vernon  v.  Tucker,  30  Md.  456,  462 ;  Jackson  r.  Jackson,  82  id. 
17  ;  Com.  v.  Rogers,  136  Mass.  158 ;  Webber  v.  Hanke,  4  Mich.  198  ;  Lenox  v.  Fuller, 
39  id.  271  ;  Sanford  v.  Rowley,  93  id.  119,  122  ;  Powers  v.  Presgroves,  38  Miss.  227, 
241  ;  Pickens  v.  State,  61  id.  566  ;  French  v.  Sale,  63  id.  386,  394  ;  Matthewson  v. 
Burr,  6  Nebr.  312,  316 ;  Hereom  v.  Henderson,  23  N.  H.  498,  506  ;  State  v.  O'Neale, 
3  Ired.  68  ;  State  v.  Parks,  ib.  296;  French  v.  Millard,  2  Oh.  St.  44  ;  Kimmel  o.  Kim- 


§  461  d.]  CHARACTER.  587 

believe  that  is  important.10  Furthermore,  their  belief  may  be  as 
well  indicated  by  their  silence  as  well  as  by  their  utterances;  and 
accordingly  the  fact  that  no  one  has  been  heard  to  say  anything 
against  the  person's  veracity  or  honesty  or  other  quality  in  question 
is  universally  deemed  to  be  equivalent  to  a  reputation  attributing 
that  virtue  to  the  person,11  and  therefore  to  be  admissible.15'  The 
reputation,  moreover,  can  be  supposed  to  be  trustworthy  only  so  far 
as  it  has  arisen  among  those  who  have  had  opportunities  of  ascer- 
taining the  person's  character,  i.  e.  it  must  be  predicated  of  the  per- 
sons among  whom  he  dwells,  not  of  persons  in  a  different  place  or  in 
a  place  where  he  has  merely  sojourned ; 13  the  form  of  the  question 
usually  refers  to  the  opinion  in  the  "neighborhood"  or  the  "com- 
munity ; "  but  the  sanctioned  phrasings  vary.14  Since  a  person,  espe- 
cially in  the  conditions  of  modern  society,  may  have  special  relations 
with  different  classes  of  persons  forming  distinct  spheres  of  ac- 
quaintance, and  may  in  the  one  exhibit  various  qualities  which  are 
not  brought  out  in  the  other,  it  would  seem  to  be  proper  to  receive 
reputation  from  such  particular  circles,  — as  a  workman's  reputation 
in  the  factory  or  a  broker's  reputation  in  the  exchange;15  but  the 
Courts  here  take  varying  attitudes.16 

(3)  The  witness  to  reputation  must  be  one  who,  by  residence  in 
the  community,  or  otherwise,  has  had  an  opportunity  to  learn  the 
community's  estimate,  and  the  preliminary  inquiry,  whether  he 
knows  the  person's  reputation,  is  usually  insisted  upon.17  A  person 
who  lives  out  of  the  neighborhood  is  therefore  not  qualified ; 18  and 

mel,  3  S.  &  R.  337  ;  Wike  v.  Lightner,  11  id.  199  ;  Snyder  ».  Com.,  85  Pa.  519,  522  ; 
State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  C.  534,  540  ;  Gaines  v.  Relf,  12  How.  555  ;  State  v.  Marks,  Utah, 
51  Pac.  1089.] 

10  fPickens  v.  State,  61  Miss.  567  ;  Robinson  v.  State,  16  Fla.  835.] 

11  |_See  the  reasoning  in  R.  v.  Rowton,  Leigh  &  C.  520,  535,  536 ;  Hussey  v.  State, 
87  Ala.  130  ;  Taylor  v.  Smith,  16  Ga.  10  ;  Conkey  v.  Carpenter,  108  Mich.  1  ;  Lemons 
V.  State,  4  W.  Va.  761.] 

12  [^Except  for  Walker  v.  Moors,  122  Mass.  502,  apparently  not  law  since  Day  v. 
Day,  154  id.  14,  the  cases  all  hold  as  above  stated.     But  this  form  is  not  applicable  in 
proving  a  bad  character:  French  v.  Sale,  63  Miss.  886,  393.] 

18  ["Brace,  J.,  in  Waddingham  v.  Hulett,  92  Mo.  533.] 

14  LSee  Boswell  v.  Blackman,  12  Ga.  593  ;  Aurora  v.  Cobb,  21  Ind.  510  ;  Rawles  v. 
State,  56  id.  441  ;  Smock  v.  Pierson,  68  id.  405 ;  Banners  v.  McClelland,  74  la.  322  ; 
Henderson  v.  Haynes,  2  Mete.  342,  348  ;  Combs  v.  Com.,  97  Ky.  24  ;  State  v.  Johnson, 
41  La.  An.  574  ;  Powers  v.  Presgroves,  38  Miss.  227,  241 ;  French  v.  Sale,  63  id.  386, 
394  ;  Warlick  ».  Peterson,  58  Mo.  408,  416  ;  Waddingham  v.  Hulett,  92  id.  533 ;  State 
v.  Pettit,  119  id.  410;  Kelley  v.  Proctor,  41  N.  H.  140,  146 ;  Griffin  v.  State,  14  Oh. 
St.  63  ;  Boon  v.  Weathered,  '23  Tex.  675,  686  ;  State  v.  Gushing,  14  Wash.  527.] 

15  rWell  expounded  by  Lnmpkin,  J.,  in  Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  221.] 

M  LSee  People  v.  Markham,  64  Cal.  157  (police)  ;  Sage  v.  State,  127  Ind.  15,  27 
(prison)  ;  Keener  v.  State,  supra  (several  illustrations)  ;  State  v.  Clifton,  30  La.  An. 
951  (boarding-house)  ;  Thomas  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  224  (prison)  ;  Williams  r.  U.  S., 
168  U.  S.  382  (custom-house) ;  Smith  ».  U.  S.,  161  U.  S.  85  (criminals)  ;  see  Brown 
*.  U.  S.,  164  id.  221.] 

17  L~Wetherbee  v.  Norris,  103  Mass.  566  ;  Kelley  v.  Proctor,  41  N.  H.  139  ;  Carlson  v. 
Winterson,  147  N.  Y.  652,  723  ;  State  v.  O'Neale,  4  Ired.  88.] 

18  rSorrelle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  586 ;  Buchanan  v.  State,  109  id.  7  ;  Wallia  v.  White, 
58  Wis.  26.] 


588  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

it  has  been  doubted  whether  a  person  who  has  merely  visited  the 
neighborhood  for  the  express  purpose  of  learning  the  reputation  is 
qualified.19 

(4)  In  testing  a  witness  who  speaks  to  good  character,  it  will  ex- 
pose the  untrustworthiness  of  his  testimony  if  he  admits  that  rumors 
of  misconduct  are  known  to  him;  for  the  knowledge  of  such  rumors 
may  well  be  inconsistent  with  his  assertion  that  the  person's  reputa- 
tion is  good.20  Accordingly,  the  propriety  of  inquiring  whether  he 
has  not  heard  that  the  person  whose  reputation  he  has  supported  has 
been  charged  with  this  or  that  misdeed  has  usually  been  conceded. 
A  few  Courts,  however,  usually  through  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
real  purpose  of  the  inquiry  and  supposing  it  to  be  in  violation  of 
the  rule  against  proving  particular  acts  of  misconduct  (ante,  §  461  i), 
have  forbidden  it.21  On  a  similar  principle,  a  witness  impeaching 
reputation  may  be  tested  on  cross-examination  by  requiring  him  to 
specify  the  sources  of  his  information,  and  in  particular  the  persons 
whose  remarks  have  served  to  give  rise  to  his  assertion  that  the 
reputation  is  bad;  because  there  is  practically  no  other  effective  way 
of  exposing  a  false  or  unfounded  assertion  of  a  bad  reputation.22 
This  practice  seems  to  be  generally  conceded  to  be  proper.28  The 
preceding  two  principles  apply  in  the  proof  of  a  defendant's  or 
other  person's  reputation  as  well  as  of  a  witness'  reputation.] 

§  461  e.  Contradiction  ;  Collateral  Error.  [One  way  of  discredit- 
ing a  witness  is  by  showing  him  to  have  made  an  erroneous  state- 
ment, at  some  one  or  more  points  in  his  testimony.  The  inference 
is  that  if  he  is  in  error  on  one  point,  he  may  be  or  probably  is  on 

19  QMawson  v.  Hartsink,  4  Esp.  102 ;  Douglass  v.  Tousey,  2  Wend.  354.  Contra  : 
Foulkes  v.  Sellway,  3  Esp.  236.] 

2°  ^Expounded  by  Parke,  B.f  in  R.  v.  Wood,  5  Jur.  225  ;  McClellan,  J.,  in  Moulton 
V.  State,  88  Ala.  119.] 

21  QThe  cases  on  both  sides  are  as  follows  :  R.  v.  Hodgkiss,  7  C.  &  P.  298 ;  R.  v. 
Rogan,  1  Cox  Cr.  291 ;  Bullard  v.  Lambert,  40  Ala.  204  ;  Holmes  v.  State,  88  id.  29  ; 
Ingrain  v.  State,  67  id.  72  ;  De  Arman  v.  State,  71  id.  361  ;  Tesney  v.  State,  77  id.  38  ; 
Jackson  v.  State,  78  id.  472;  Moulton  v.  State,  88  id.  120  ;  Thompson  i>.  State,  100  id. 
70,  71  ;  Evans  v.  State,  109  id.  11 ;  White  v.  State,  111  id.  92  ;  Terry  v.  State,  id.,  23 
So.  776;  People  v.  Mayes,  113  Cal.  618 ;  People  v.  Burns,  id.,  53  Pac.  1096  ;  Pulliam 
v.  Cantrell,  77  Ga.  563,  565;  Olivers  Pate,  43  Ind.  134;  Mc.Douel  v.  State,  90  id. 
324  ;  Wachstetler  v.  State,  99  id.  295  ;  Randall  v.  State,  132  id.  542  ;  Griffith  v. 
State,  140  id.  163  ;  Shears  v.  State,  147  id.  51 ;  Gordon  v.  State,  3  la.  415  ;  State  o. 
Arnold,  12  id.  487  ;  Barr  v.  Hack,  46  id.  310  ;  State  v.  Sterrett,  71  id.  387  ;  Hanners 
v.  McClelland,  74  id.  320  ;  State  v.  McGee,  81  id.  19  ;  State  v.  Lee,  95  id.  427  ;  State  v. 
McDonald,  57  Kan.  537 ;  State  r.  Donelon,  45  La.  An.  744,  754  ;  State  v.  Pain,  48 
id.  311  ;  Com.  ».  O'Brien,  119  Mass.  346;  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173,  188  ; 
Kearney  v.  State,  68  Miss.  233,  236  ;  Olive  v.  State,  11  Nebr.  1,  27  ;  Patterson  v.  State, 
41  id.  538  ;  Basye  v.  State,  45  id.  261  ;  Luther  v.  Skeen,  8  Jones  L.  356  ;  State  v.  Dill, 
48  S.  C.  249  ;  U.  S.  ».  Whitaker,  6  McLean  342,  344  ;  Davis  v.  Franke,  33  Gratt. 
426.] 

^JExnounded  by  Church,  C.  J.,  in  Weeks  v.  Hall,  19  Conn.  877;  Coolny,  J.,  in 
Annis  o.  People,  13  Mich.  517 ;  Fletcher,  J.t  in  Bates  v.  Barber,  4  Gush.  109.] 

a  QSt-ite  v.  Allen,  100  la.  7  ;  Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  19  Me.  375,  381  ;  Bnkeman  v. 
Rose,  14  Wend.  105,  110,  18  id.  150  (qualified) :  McDermott  v.  State,  13  Oh.  St.  335 ; 
Willard  v.  Goodenough,  30  Vt.  396.] 


§§  461  tf-461  e.]         CHARACTER ;   CONTRADICTION.  589 

other  points,  the  probability  depending  largely  on  the  closeness  of 
connection  between  the  error  thus  exposed  and  the  other  parts  of  his 
testimony.  The  fact  of  his  error  does  not  necessarily  indicate  the 
source  of  it;  i.  e.,  it  may  have  proceeded  from  wilful  falsehood,  or 
from  unconscious  prejudice,  or  from  faulty  recollection  or  observa- 
tion, or  from  some  other  source;  but  whatever  its  source,  the  simple 
fact  of  error  tends  to  affect  the  trustworthiness  of  the  rest  of  his  tes- 
timony. The  demonstration  of  the  error  is  commonly  accomplished 
by  calling  other  witnesses  who  testify  to  the  opposite  effect,  and 
thus,  if  their  contradiction  of  him  is  believed,  the  error  is  shown. 
Thus  the  process  has  come  usually  to  be  spoken  of  as  contradicting 
the  witness ;  but  obviously  the  contradiction  is  merely  its  dramatic 
feature;  it  is  the  fact  that  the  contradicting  witnesses  are  believed, 
i.  e.  the  fact  of  error  by  the  first  witness,  that  is  significant.  The 
chief  limitation  here  laid  down  is  that  this  process  of  exposing 
error  by  bringing  other  witnesses  to  contradict  shall  not  be  resorted 
to  on  "  collateral "  matters.  The  reasons  for  this  are,  in  part,  the 
reason  of  unfair  surprise  (inability  to  anticipate  and  prepare;  ante, 
§  14  a),  but  mainly  the  reason  of  confusion  of  issues  (ante,  §  14  a)  by 
introducing  new  witnesses  and  new  issues  which  would  tend  to  pro- 
long the  trial  and  confuse  the  main  issues  before  the  jury.1  The 
term  "  collateral, "  however,  is  too  indefinite  to  be  of  much  value  as 
a  decisive  test  in  a  given  case.  The  reason  for  the  rule  supplies  a 
test  which  further  defines  the  term  "collateral"  and  is  more  certain 
in  application.  Since  the  reason  of  the  rule  excludes  witnesses 
whose  testimony  would  introduce  new  issues,  over  and  above  those 
which  already  might  be  entered  into,  the  test  of  collateralness  should 
naturally  be,  Could  the  fact,  for  which  they  are  offered  in  contra- 
diction, have  been  shown  in  evidence  for  any  purpose  independently 
of  this  contradiction  ? 2  This  test  has  been  explicitly  adopted  for 
the  present  rule  by  a  few  Courts  only; 8  commonly  the  term  "collat- 
eral" is  used  without  further  definition;4  but  as  applied  to  the  sub- 
ject of  the  next  section,  where  the  considerations  and  the  rule  are 
practically  the  same,  the  above  test  has  a  much  greater  vogue. 
Broadly  speaking,  then,  contradiction  by  other  witnesses  may  be 
made  (1)  on  facts  relevant  to  some  issue  in  the  case,  and  (2)  on  facts 
otherwise  admissible  to  impeach  a  witness.  For  the  first  sort,  the 
special  controversy  involved  in  each  case  must  supply  the  solution ; 
the  variety  is  of  course  infinite.6  For  the  second  sort,  we  have  only 

1  ["Expounded  by  Alderson,  B.,  and  Rolfe,  B.,  in  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch. 
104  ;  Robinson,  C.  .T.,  in  R,  v.  Brown,  21  U.  C.  Q.  B.  334  ;  Story,  J.,  in  Odiorne  v. 
Winkley,  2  Gallis.  52 ;  Allen,  J.,  in  Charlton  v.  Unis,  4  Gratt.  62  ;  Redfield,  C.  J.,  in 
Powers  v.  Leach,  26  Vt.  277.] 

2  TAtfy-Gen'l  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  104.] 

8  fPeople  v.  Chin  Mook  Sow,  51  Cal.  597  ;  Langhome  v.  Com.,  76  Va.  1019,  .wmWe.] 
4  Qn  New  Hampshire,  peculiarly,  the  matter  is  left  to  the  trial  Court's  discretion  : 
Perkins  v.  Roherge,  N.  H.,  39  Atk.  583.] 

6  £Good  illustrations  of  cases  near  the  dividing  line  may  be  found  in  Com.  v.  Buz- 


590  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

to  ask  what  facts  are  otherwise  regarded  as  admissible  to  impeach, 
i.  e.  independently  of  the  first  witness  having  already  made  as- 
sertions about  them.8  Of  these,  facts  showing  bias  or  corruption 
are  always  material7  and  facts  affecting  his  source  of  knowledge,8 
but  facts  affecting  character,  being  otherwise  inadmissible  (ante, 
§  461  b),  are  here  also  to  be  excluded.9  It  was  once  thought,  and 
is  still  occasionally  said,  that  the  rule  applies  only  to  exclude  con- 
tradiction of  statements  made  on  cross-examination,  and  not  of 
statements  "volunteered,"  i.  e.  made  on  the  direct  examination;10 
'but  this  is  erroneous.11] 

§  461  f.  Prior  Inconsistent  Statements.  [Another  mode  of  dis- 
crediting a  witness  is  by  showing  (either  through  cross-examination 
or  by  other  witnesses)  that  the  witness  has  at  another  time  stated 
the  opposite  of  what  he  now  states  or  has  otherwise  varied  from  his 
present  story.  Here,  "that  which  sets  aside  his  credit  and  over- 
throws his  evidence,"  in  the  words  of  Chief  Baron  Gilbert,1  is  "the 
repugnancy  of  his  evidence,"  "inasmuch  as  contraries  cannot  be 
true,"  and  therefore  he  must  be  in  error  in  at  least  one  of  the  two 
statements;  and  if  in  error  once,  then  perhaps  also  in  other  unde- 
tected instances.  The  probative  value  of  this  process  —  showing 
error  and  the  capacity  to  err  —  is  therefore  much  the  same  as  in 
that  of  the  preceding  section,  though  the  mode  is  somewhat  different. 
The  probative  force  thus  arising  merely  from  the  inconsistency  and 
the  apparent  falsity  of  one  of  the  two  statements,  it  follows,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  the  admission  of  the  prior  inconsistent  statement  does 
not  violate  the  Hearsay  rule, 2  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  it  is  not 
to  be  taken  as  affirmative  evidence  of  the  fact  stated  in  it; '  for  the 
reason,  in  both  cases,  that  it  is  not  offered  as  a  testimonial  assertion, 
but  only  as  inconsistent  with  the  present  statement. 

A  limitation  here  obtains  which  is  practically  identical  with  that 
enforced  for  the  preceding  topic,  viz.,  that  the  proof  of  inconsistent 
(or  self-contradictory)  statements  cannot  be  made  through  other 

zell,  16  Pick.  158 ;  R.   v.  Brown,  21  U.  C.  Q.  B.  330,  336  ;  Stephens  v.  People,  19 
N.  Y.  72  ;  Ludtke  v.  Herzog,  30  U.  S.  App.  637  ;  Chic.  C.R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  169  111.  287.3 

*  QR.  v.  Overton,  2  Moo.  Or.  C.  263  :  "  Everything  is  material  that  affects  the  credit 
of  the  witness."] 

7  [Thomas  t>.  David,  7  C.  &  P.  350;  Melhiiish  v.  Collier,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  493  ;  Helwig 
v.  Lascowski,  82  Mich.  623  ;   State  r.  McKinstry,  100  la.  82  ;  State  v.  Twombly,  60 
N.  H.  491.    The  ruling  in  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Camp.  637,  has  always  been  regarded 
as  erroneous.] 

8  ("Whitney  v.  Boston,  98  Mass.  316.] 

9  "Hamilton  v.  People,  46  Mich.  186  ;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  175.] 
w    'People  v.  Roemer,  114  Cal.  51  ;  Un.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Reese,  56  Fed.  291J 
11    "As  fully  explained  by  Walker,  J.,  in  Blakey  v.  Blakey,  33  Ala.  619. J 

1  Vrilbert,  Evidence,  147,  150.] 

2  £As  was  sometimes  imagined ;  but  Mr.  Starkie  disposed  of  this  fallacy  :  Evidence, 
I,  20«  ;  see  ante,  §  100.] 

*  ["Explained   by  Allen,  J.,  in  Charlton   v.   Unis,   4  Gratt.  6  ;   Shaw,  C.  J.,  in 
Gould  v.  Lead  Co.,  9  Gush.   346.     This  is  universally  accepted,   and  citations  ara 
unnecessary.]  / 


§§  461  0-462.]  INCONSISTENT   STATEMENTS.  591 

witnesses  upon  matters  "collateral"  to  the  issue.  The  reasons  of 
convenience  requiring  this  rule  are  the  same  as  those  explained  in 
the  preceding  section.4  The  term  "collateral"  is  here  of  little 
service  in  testing  a  given  offer  of  evidence;  and  a  more  careful  and 
useful  definition  of  it  (as  already  explained  in  the  preceding  section) 
is,  Could  the  fact,  as  to  which  the  inconsistency  is  predicated,  have 
been  shown  in  evidence  by  other  witnesses,  independently  of  the 
inconsistency?6  This  definite  test  has  been  accepted  and  applied 
in  a  few  Courts  of  this  country ; 6  though  not  usually  in  a  correct 
shape.7  But  most  Courts  merely  apply  the  indefinite  term  "collat- 
eral" to  the  particular  facts  of  each  case.8  As  pointed  out  in  the 
topic  of  the  preceding  section,  the  orthodox  doctrine 9  regards  facts 
showing  bias  or  corruption  as  not  collateral;10  and  this  doctrine  is 
generally  accepted  in  this  country ; u  although  a  few  Courts  have 
taken  the  opposite  and  clearly  erroneous  view.12  The  same  fallacy 
referred  to  in  the  preceding  section,  viz.,  that  nothing  said  on  the 
direct  examination  is  "collateral"  in  the  sense  that  inconsistent 
statements  cannot  be  shown,  sometimes  appears  here  also,18  but  is 
generally  repudiated.14] 

§  462.  Same:  "Witness1  Attention  must  be  called.1  Before  this 
can  be  done,  it  is  generally  held  necessary,  in  the  case  of  verbal 
statements,  first  to  ask  him  as  to  the  time,  place,  and  person  in- 
volved in  the  supposed  contradiction.  It  is  not  enough  to  ask  him 
the  general  question,  whether  he  has  ever  said  so  and  so,  nor 

*  [See  the  cases  cited  note  1,  §  461  « ;  and  the  following  opinions :  Seavy  v.  Dearborn, 
19  N.  H.  356  ;  Seller  v.  Jenkins,  97  Ind.  436.] 

6  [Pollock,  C.  B.,  in  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  99.1 

6  [Askew  v.  People,  23  Colo.  446  ;  Staser  v.  Hogan,  120  Ind.  220  ;  Williams  v. 
State,  73  Miss.  820;  Johnston  v.  Spencer,  16  Nebr.  321 ;  Combs  v.  Winchester,  39  N. 
H.  16  ;  Hildeburn  v.  Curran,  65  Pa.  63  ;  State  v.  Davidson,  9  S.  D.  564  ;  Saunders  v. 
R.  Co.,  Tenn.,  41  S.  W.  1031 ;  Langhorne  v.  Com.,  76  Va.  1019,  semble.^ 

7  [/.  e.,  it  is  usually  put,  Would  the  fact  be  admissible  "as  a  part  of  his  case, 
tending  to  establish  his  plea "  ?     But  this  obviously  does  not  cover  the  case  of  facts 
showing  bias  or  corruption,  which  are  admissible ;  see  further,  supra.] 

8  [The  rule  is  universally  accepted,  and  specific  rulings  are  of  little  use  as  prece- 
dents.    It  need  only  be  noted  that  in  Massachusetts,  beginning  with  Prescott  v.  Ward, 
10  All.  205,  and  thence  leaping  over  a  dozen  cases  to  Phillips  v.  Marblehead,  148  Mass. 
828,  and  thereafter  steadily  enforced,  the  doctrine  is  that  the  trial  Court's  discretion 
determines  what  is  collateral,  and  whether  inconsistencies  on  collateral  matters  may 
be  shown.] 

9  [As  expressly  stated  in  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Hitchcock,  supra.~\ 

10  [There  were  originally  contradictory  rulings  in  England  ;  Yewin's  Case,  2  Camp. 
638,  note;  R.  v.  Barker,  3"C.  &  P.  590;  R.  v.  Robins,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  512,  being  for 
admission ;  and  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Camp.  637  ;  Harrison  v.  Gordon,  2  Lew.  156 ; 
Lee's  Case,  ib.  154,  being  for  exclusion  ;  but  this  conflict  was  brought  to  an  end 
by  Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Hitchcock,  supra.  This  accounts  for  the  exclusion  by  a  small 
number  of  Courts  in  this  country  ;  see  note  12,  post."^ 

"  [Johnson  v.  Wiley,  74  Ind.  239  ;  Day  v.  Stickuey,  14  All.  258  ;  U.  S.  v.  Schindler, 
18  Blatch.  230,  are  leading  cases.] 

"  [Clark  v.  Clark,  65  N.  C.  661  ;  State  v.  Heacock,  la.,  76  N.  W.  654;  Lang, 
borne  v.  Com.,  76  Va.  1019  (in  part).] 

18  [Forde's  Case,  16  Gratt.  557.] 

14  fSeller  v.  Jenkins,  97  Ind.  437  ;  Williams  v.  State,  73  Miss.  820.] 
1  [For  the  original  opening  sentences,  see  Appendix  II.] 


592  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

whether  he  has  always  told  the  same  story;  because  it  may  fre- 
quently happen,  that,  upon  the  general  question,  he  may  not  remem- 
ber whether  he  has  so  said;  whereas,  when  his  attention  is  challenged 
to  particular  circumstances  and  occasions,  he  may  recollect  and  ex- 
plain what  he  has  formerly  said.2  This  course  of  proceeding  is  con- 
sidered indispensable,  from  a  sense  of  justice  to  the  witness;  for  as 
the  direct  tendency  of  the  evidence  is  to  impeach  his  veracity,  com- 
mon justice  requires  that,  by  first  calling  his  attention  to  the  subject, 
he  should  have  an  opportunity  to  recollect  the  facts,  and,  if  neces- 
sary, to  correct  the  statement  already  given,  as  well  as  by  a  re- 
examination  to  explain  the  nature,  circumstances,  meaning,  and 
design  of  what  he  is  proved  elsewhere  to  have  said.8  [The  inquiry 
of  the  witness  to  be  discredited  must  specify,  it  is  usually  said,  the 
time,  place,  and  person  (addressee)  of  the  supposed  inconsistent 
statement; 4  but  the  fixing  of  this  specified  form  is  to  be  deprecated, 
for  it  leads  to  innumerable  petty  technicalities;  in  principle  and  in 
policy,  the  inquiry  need  merely  state  enough  fairly  to  recall  the 
statement  to  the  witness'  mind  if  he  has  made  it:6 

Suppose  that  it  is  impossible  to  make  the  inquiry,  the  witness 
being  absent  or  deceased  at  the  time  of  the  trial ;  may  the  inconsist- 
ent statement  be  shown,  though  the  witness'  attention  has  not  been 
called  ?  The  argument  from  policy  is  substantially  the  same  in  all 
the  cases  of  this  sort;  but  there  are  four  distinct  classes  of  cases, 
and  the  law  may  not  be  the  same  for  all ;  namely,  (1)  a  deposition, 
(2)  testimony  at  a  former  trial,  (3)  a  dying  declaration,  (4)  the  attes- 
tation of  a  deceased  or  absent  attesting  witness.  (1)  Where  the  wit- 
ness to  be  discredited  testifies  by  deposition,  there  is  good  reason  for 

3  Angus  v.  Smith,  1  M.  &  Malk.  473,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  ;  Crowley  ».  Page,  1  C.  & 
P.  789,  per  Parke,  B. ;  R.  v.  Shellard,  9  id.  277  ;  R.  v.  Holden,  8  id.  606 ;  Palmer 
v.  Haight,  2  Barb.  210 ;  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  313. 

8  R..  v.  St.  George,  9  C.  &  P.  483,  489 ;  Carpenter  v.  Wall,  11  Ad.  &  El.  803. 
Qt  seems  fairly  clear  that  no  such  rule  existed  in  England  before  the  decision  in  The 
Queen's  Case,  supra,  in  1820;  and  American  judges  have  repeatedly  said  that  it  was 
not  known  in  the  early  practice  of  the  Atlantic  jurisdictions  in  this  country.  This  is 
why  the  rule  never  became  a  part  of  the  common  law  in  several  Atlantic  jurisdictions. 
It  is  still  not  the  law  in  Maine  (New  Portland  v.  Kingfield,  55  Me.  176) ;  Massachu- 
setts (Carvillo  v.  Westford,  163  Mass.  544;  Allin  v.  Whittemore,  id.,  50  N.  E.  618; 
except  for  one's  own  witness,  by  Pub.  St.  c.  169,  §  22)  ;  New  Hampshire  (Cook  r. 
Brown,  34  N.  H.  471) ;  New  Jersey  (Fries  v.  Brugler,  12  N.  J.  L.  80,  semble)  ;  while 
in  Connecticut  (Hedge  v.  Clapp,  22  Conn.  266),  and  Pennsylvania  (Sharp  v.  Emmet, 
5  Whart.  288,  300  ;  Walden  v.  Finch,  70  Pa.  436  ;  Cronkrite  v.  Trexler,  id.,  41  Atl.  22), 
it  is  to  be  required  only  in  the  trial  Court's  discretion  or  subject  to  exceptions  ;  in  all 
other  jurisdictions  where  the  matter  has  come  up,  it  is  required,  and  citations  are 
unnecessary.  As  a  matter  of  policy,  the  discretionary  form  is  unquestionably  prefer- 
able, for  a  rigid  rule  requiring  the  question  to  be  put  becomes  too  often  a  mere  tech- 
nicality and  leads  to  quibbles  and  to  unfair  hardships;  see  the  criticisms  of  Davis,  J., 
in  Downer  v.  Dana,  19  Vt.  345 ;  and  Church,  C.  J.,  in  Hedge  v.  Clapp,  22  Conn. 
266.1 

*~LThU  phrase  appears  to  have  originated  in  Angus  v.  Smith,  Moo.  &  M.  474  ;  the 
form  varies  in  different  jurisdictions,  and  even  in  the  same  Court ;  but  in  substance  it 
is  almost  universal,  where  the  question  is  required."] 

•  [South.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  113  Ala.  620  ("  The  n^e  I*  not  ironclad  ") ;  Ptate  v 
Glynn,  61  Vt.  679-3 


§  462.]  INCONSISTENT   STATEMENTS.  593 

dispensing  with  the  requirement,  since  the  cross-examiner  cannot 
know  beforehand  what  the  witness  will  answer,  and  therefore  cannot 
usually  be  prepared  to  inquire  as  to  inconsistent  statements.6  The 
Courts,  however,  are  divided  in  their  views.7  (2)  Where  the  testi- 
mony of  a  witness  at  a  former  trial  is  used,  the  arguments  of  policy 
are  substantially  the  same,  though  there  is  less  reason  for  favoring 
the  impeaching  party ;  but  the  precedents  thus  far  are  harmonious  in 
making  the  inquiry  indispensable.8  (3)  On  the  other  hand,  for 
impeaching  a  dying  declarant,  a  deceased  person's  statement  against 
interest,  or  the  like,  the  precedents  are  practically  unanimous  in 
holding  the  inquiry  not  necessary.9  (4)  The  case  of  a  deceased  or 
absent  attesting-witness  should  be  treated  in  the  same  way;  and  this 
was  the  early  English  practice,10  followed  generally  in  this  country;  u 
but  the  original  rule  was  afterwards  repudiated  in  England.12  —  It 
has  sometimes  also  been  said  that  where  the  inconsistent  statement 
is  itself  in  a  deposition  or  other  sworn  statement,  the  inquiry  is 
unnecessary;1*  but  the  reasoning  seems  unsound,14  and  is  generally 
repudiated.16  In  any  case,  if  the  witness  has  left  the  stand,  he  may 

6  QSee  the  exposition  by  Davis,  J.,  in  Downer  v,  Dana,  19  Vt.  346  ;  Agnew,  J.,  in 
Walden  v.  Finch,  70  Pa.  463  ;  Shiras,  J.,  in  Mattox  v.  U.  S.,   156  U.  S.  257  ;  and, 
eontra,  by  Daniel,  J.,   in  Unis  v.  Charlton,  12  Gratt.  495;  Brinkerhoff,  C.  J.,  in 
Runyan  v.  Price,  15  Oh.  St.  14.] 

7  £Not  required :  Daggett  w.Tolman,  8  Conn.  171  ;  Walden  v.  Finch,  70  Pa.  463  ; 
Hazard  v.  R.  Co.,  2  R.  I.  62 ;  Downer  v.  Dana,  18  Vt  346,  semble  ;  Billings  v.  ins.  Co., 
id.,  41  Atl.  516. 

Acquired :  Doe  v.  Wilkinson,  35  Ala.  470  ;  Griffith  v.  State,  37  Ark.  330 ;  Ryan  v. 
People,  21  Colo.  119  ;  Wright  v.  Hicks,  15  Ga.  167  ;  Williamson  v.  Peel,  29  la.  458 ; 
Greer  v.  Higgins,  20  Kan.  424  ;  State  v.  Wiggins,  50  La.  An.,  23  So.  334  (but  see 
Fletcher  v.  Henley,  13  La.  An.  192)  ;  Matthews  v.  Dare,  20  Md.  269;  Gregory  v. 
Cheatharn,  36  Mo.  161 ;  Stacy  v.  Graham,  14  N.  Y.  498  ;  Fulton  ».  Hughes,  63  Miss. 
61  ;  Runyan  v.  Price,  15  Oh.  St.  14;  Titus  v.  State,  7  Baxt  132;  Weir  v.  McGee,  25 
Tex.  Suppl.  20,  32;  Ayers  v.  Watson,  132  U.  S.  394,  401,  semble;  Unis  v.  Charlton, 
12  Gratt.  495  ;  State  v.  Carter,  8  Wash.  272,  276.] 

8  QSharp  v.  Hicks,  94  Ga.  624 ;  Craft  v.  Com.,  81  Ky.  252  ;  Hanscom  w.  Burmood, 
35  Nebr.  504  ;  Hubbard  v.  Briggs,  31  N.  Y.  536 ;  McCullough  v.  Dobson,  133  id.  124 ; 
Mattox  0.  U.  S.,   156  U.  S.  237,  three,  judges  dissenting;  Carver  ».  U.  S.,  164  id. 
694  ;  see  Griffith  v.  State,  37  Ark.  324.] 

9  fAveson  v.  Kinnaird,  6  East  188,  195;  Moore  v.  State,  12  Ala.  764;  People  v. 
Lawrence,  21  Cal.  368 ;  State  v.  Lodge,  9  Houst  542  ;  Battle  v.  State,  74  Ga.  101  ; 
Dunn  ».  People,  172  I1L  582  ;  Nelms  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  505  ;  State  v.  Shaffer,  23 
Or.  555;  M'Pherson  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  279;   Carver  v.  U.S.,  164   U.    S.   694,   two 
judges  dissenting.     Contra:  Wroe  ».  State,  20  Oh.  St.  469.] 

10  ("Wright  v.  Littler,  3  Burr.  1244,  1255  ;  Durham  ».  Beaumont,  1  Camp.  210.] 

11  LWell  expounded  by  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  Hays  17.  Harden,  9  Pa   St.  158  ;  N.  Hill 
(later  a  judge),  in  note  to  Losee  v.  Losee,  2  Hill  609.     Accord:  Reformed  Church  v. 
Ten  Eyck,  25  N.  J.  L.  40,  47;  Boylan  v.  Meeker,  28  id.  274,  294  ;  M'Elwee  v.  Sutton, 
2  Bail"  129  ;  Smith  ».  Asbell,  2  Strobh.  141.    Undecided :  Bott  v.  Wood,  56  Miss.  136. 
Compare  §  444(2,  ante.~\ 

12  QStobart  v.  Dryden,  1  M.  &  W.  615,  the  reasoning  is  unsatisfactory.     Accord: 
Runyan  v.  Price,  15  Oh.  St.  6.] 

13  (^Thompson  o.  Gregor,  11  Colo.  533  ;   King  v.  State,  77  Ga.  736,  and  prior  cases  ; 
Robinson  v.  Hutchinson,  31  Vt.  449.] 

14  fWell  explained  by  Wright,  J.,  in  Samuels  v.  Griffith,  13  la.  106.] 

15  TDoe  v.  Wilkinson,  35  Ala.  471  (qualified),  and  prior  cases  ;  People  v.  Devine, 
44  Cal.  458  ;  State  v.  Collins,  32  la.  41,  and  prior  cases  ;  Fletcher  v.  Fletcher,  5  L* 
An.  408 ;  Hammond  v.  Dike,  42  Minn,  27.] 

VOL.    L  — 38 


594  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

be  recalled,  in  the  trial  Court's  discretion,  in  order  to  put  the 
inquiry.16 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  substantive  statement  to  be  con- 
fronted by  the  inconsistent  statement  is  by  hypothesis  something 
said  before  the  inquiry  is  made  of  him,  and  independently  of  his 
answer  to  it.  (1)  Consequently,  it  is  immaterial  that  he  answers 
that  he  does  not  remember  whether  he  made  the  inconsistent  state- 
ment; e.  g.,  if  he  has  testified,  "A  was  at  X,"  a  prior  statement  that 
"A  was  at  Y "  is  none  the  less  inconsistent,  even  though  he  answers 
on  inquiry  that  he  does  not  remember  saying  so;  the  inquiry  is 
made  merely  for  fairness'  sake,  and  not  to  secure  an  answer  which 
shall  be  contradictory.17  (2)  Consequently,  also,  if  there  has  been 
no  substantive  assertion  by  the  witness,  prior  to  the  cross-examiner's 
calling  his  attention  by  the  inquiry,  there  is  nothing  with  which  the 
extra-judicial  statement  can  be  inconsistent,  and  therefore  it  is 
inadmissible;  *.  e.,  it  is  inadmissible  to  prove  that  he  did  say  "A 
was  at  X,"  when  his  only  testimony  on  the  subject  is  that  he  did  not 
say  that  A  was  at  X,  since  there  is  here  no  inconsistency  but  merely 
an  error  on  what  is  usually  a  collateral  matter,  viz.,  whether  he 
made  a  certain  remark.18  (3)  It  is  by  some  maintained  that  if  the 
witness  clearly  admits  making  the  inconsistent  statement,  there  is 
no  need  of  other  evidence  to  prove  it; 19  but  the  better  view  is  that 
the  opponent  is  still  entitled  to  the  advantage  of  proving  it  by  his 
own  witnesses.20] 

§  462  a.  Same :  What  ia  an  Inconsistent  Statement.  [It  is  not 
necessary  that  there  should  be  a  total  opposition  or  contrariety  be- 
tween the  assertion  made  on  the  stand  and  the  other  statement;  the 
discrediting  quality  lies  in  their  being  substantially  variant  or  in- 
consistent.1 The  other  statement  may  be  oral  or  in  writing;  it  may 
be  in  words  or  by  conduct.2  Where  it  is  broad  and  indefinite,  and 
touches  only  the  general  merits  of  the  case,  difficult  instances  often 
arise ;  thus,  A  testifies  for  the  prosecution  that  he  saw  B  near  the 

i«  fPeople  v.  Shaw,  111  Cal.  171  ;  State  v.  Reed,  89  Mo.  171.] 

17  L  H"8  doubt  was  raised  by  Pain  v.  Beeston,  1  Mo.  &  Kob.  20,  and  Long  v.  Hitch- 
cock, 9  C.  &  P.  619  ;  but  the  opposite  view,  expressed  by  Parke,  B.,  in  Crowley  ?;.  Page, 
7  C.  &  P.  789,  has  always  been  considered  as  law  ;  it  is  well  explained  by  Hemming- 
way,  J.,  in  Billings  v.  State,  52  Ark.  303  ;  other  recent  cases  are  South.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 113  Ala.  620;  Pickard  v.  Bryant,  92  Mich.  433 ;   State  v.  Kelley,  46  S.  C.  55.] 

18  FGood  illustrations  of  this  may  be  found  in  Bearss  v.  Copley,  ION.  Y.  93  ;  Combs 
v.  Winchester,  39  N.  H.  18 ;  Williams  v.  State,  73  Miss.  820.     Courts  have  no  differ- 
ence of  opinion  here  ;  but  counsel  often  make  the  error.] 

»  QParke,  B.,  in  Crowley  r.  Page,  7  C.  &  P.  789 ;  Ray  v.  Bell,  24  111.  451  ;  State 
v.  Ooodhier,  48  La.  An.  770 ;  State  v.  Cooper,  83  Mo.  698.] 

»  [Uwis  v.  Post,  1  Ala.  69  ;  Hathaway  v.  Crocker,  7  Mete.  264;  Fremont  B.  &  E. 
Co.  ».  Peters,  45  Nebr.  856;  Singleton  v.  State,  39  Fla.  520,  s«mfc/e.] 

1  TIL  S.  P.  Holmes,  1  Cliff.  116;   Foster  v.  Worthing,  146  Mass.  607;  Seller  v. 
Jenkins,  97  Ind.  439.] 

2  r/S.  f)-  a  plaintiff  who  testified  that  he  had  been  confined  to  the  house  with  illness 
wa»  shown  to  have  been  seen  out  walking:  Wallace  v.  R.  Co.,  119  Mass.  91  ;  other 
examples  in  I'.oimemort  v.  Gill,  165  id.  493  ;  Daniels  v.  Conrad,  4  Leigh  402.] 


§§  462-462  6.]          INCONSISTENT  STATEMENTS.  595 

scene  of  the  arson;  is  it  admissible  to  show  that  A  has  elsewhere 
declared  that  he  is  sure  that  B  is  innocent  ?  It  is  common  with 
some  Courts  to  say  that  such  statements  are  inadmissible  because 
mere  opinions;  but  this  seems  unsound;  the  true  inquiry  is,  Does 
the  other  statement  in  effect  involve  an  assertion  inconsistent  with 
that  made  on  the  stand  ?*  The  precedents  are  not  harmonious,  and 
much  depends  on  the  terms  of  the  specific  assertion.4  It  must  be 
added  that  where  opinion-testimony  has  been  properly  received  on 
the  stand  (as,  from  an  expert),  an  inconsistent  expression  of  opinion, 
as  all  concede,  may  be  shown.6  —  A  failure  to  assert  a  fact,  when  it 
would  have  been  natural  to  do  so  had  it  existed,  may  be  equivalent 
to  an  assertion  of  its  non-existence,  and  may  thus  be  available  on  an 
inconsistent  statement;  an  omission  to  make  a  claim  or  assertion  in 
prior  legal  proceedings  may  be  thus  available;6  or  an  omission  to 
make  an  assertion  when  formerly  upon  the  stand;7  and  even  his 
failure  to  take  the  stand  at  all  where  it  would  have  been  natural 
to  do  so.8  It  ought  to  follow  that  where  a  witness  now  fails  to 
recollect  a  matter  or  says  that  he  knows  nothing,  his  former  positive 
assertion  on  the  point  is  to  be  treated  as  an  inconsistency;  but  the 
opposite  view  has  usually  been  taken,  probably  because  the  extra- 
judicial  assertion  is  too  likely  to  be  given  an  improper  testimonial 
force.9] 

§  462  b.  Same :  Explanations ;  Whole  of  Statement.  [The  witness 
whose  statement  is  thus  offered  against  him  may  of  course  explain  it 
away  as  best  he  can,  so  as  to  demonstrate  that  there  was  no  incon- 
sistency or  that  there  was  a  sufficient  reason  for  it.1  It  follows  that 

»  ["Well  put  in  Handy  v.  Canning,  166  Mass.  107.] 

*  fSee  the  following  cases :  Elton  ?>.  Lavkins,  5  C.  &  P.  89,  390  ;  Gilbert  v.  Gooder- 
harn,  6  U.  C.  C.  P.  41,  45  ;  Backer  v.  Beaty,  3  Ind.  71  ;  Welch  v.  State,  104  id.  349; 
State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  14  ;  State  v.  Kingsbury,  58  Me.  241  ;  Emerson  v.  Stevens, 
6  All.  112  ;  Com.  v.  Mooney,  110  Mass.  100  ;  Com.  v.  Wood,  111  id.  410  ;  Handy  v. 
Canning,  166  id.  107  ;  People  v.  Stackhouse,  49  Mich.  77  ;  McClellan  «'.  F.  W.  &  B. 
I.  R.  Co.,  105  id.  101  ;  Johnston  v.  Spencer,  51  Nebr.  198  ;  Nute  v.  Nute,  41  N.  H. 
71  ;  City  Bank  v.  Young,  43  id.  460  ;  People  v.  Jackson,  3  Park.  Cr.  597  ;  Patchin  v. 
Ins.  Co.,  13  N.  Y.  270  ;  Schell  v.  Plumb,  55  id.  599  ;  Mayer  v.  People,  80  id.  377  ; 
State  v.  Davidson,  9  S.  D.  564  ;  Saunders  v.  B.  Co.,  Tenn.,  41  S.  W.  1031-3 

5  [[People  r.  Donovan,  43  Cal.  165  ;  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Greenl.  44,  55;  Liddle  v.  Bank, 
158  Mass.  15  ;  Silverstein  v.  O'Brien,  165  id.  512;  Beaubien  v.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  487  ; 
Sanderson  u.  Nashua,  44  N.  H.  494;  Patchin  v.  Ins.  Co.,  13  N.  Y.  270  ;  Brooks  ».  R. 
Co.,  N.  Y.,  50  N.  E.  945  ;   Krider  v.  Philadelphia,   180  Pa.  78 ;   Sellars  v.  S.-llars, 

2  Heisk.  430.] 

6  TSee  examples  in  Charles  v.  State,  Fla.,  18  So.  369  ;  Snyder  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  519.] 

7  L\Vell  explained  in  Perry  v.  Baird,  117  Mass.  165  ;  examples  in  Com.  v.  Hawkins, 

3  Grav  464  ;  Brigham  v.  Fayerweather,  140  Mass.  412  ;  Alward  v.  Oaks,  63  Minn.  190.] 

8  ESee  Brock  v.  State,  26  Ala.   106;    Com.  v.  Smith,  163  Mass.   411;  People  v. 
Wirth,  108  Mich.  307  ;  State  v.  Staley,  14  Minn.  117.    Compare  on  these  points  §  195  b, 
ante.~\ 

9  ^Admitted:   Nute  v.  Nute,  41  N.  H.  67.     Excluded:  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  & 
B.  299  ;  People  v.  Dice,  Cal.,  52  Pac.  477  ;  Saylor  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  33  S.  W.  185;  State  v. 
Reed,  60  Me.  550;  Stockton  v.  Demuth,  7  Watts  41.] 

1  £This  is  not  doubted  ;  see  the  expositions  by  Gucbrist,  J.,  in  State  v.  Winkley, 
14  N.  H.  491 ;  Daiiforth,  J.,  in  State  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  146.] 


596  WITNESSES  ;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.   XXV. 

where  the  witness  wishes  to  show  that  his  statement  has  been  dis- 
torted by  the  production  of  a  fragment  only,  he  may  add  those  por- 
tions of  it  which  show  its  true  significance  and  substantial  tenor.2 
In  this  country,  however,  it  is  common  to  say  that  he  may  put  in, 
not  only  such  portions,  but  the  whole  of  it,  whether  of  a  conversa- 
tion 8  or  of  a  deposition.4] 

§  463.  Same :  Inconsistent  Statements  in  Writing ;  Rule  in  The 
Queen's  Case.  [The  rule  (§  462)  that  the  witness'  attention  must  first 
be  called]  prevails  in  cross-examining  a  witness  as  to  the  contents  of 
a  letter  or  other  paper  written  by  him ;  [but  it  is  here  applied  in  a 
peculiar  and  stringent  form.]  The  counsel  will  not  be  permitted  to 
represent,  in  the  statement  of  a  question,  the  contents  of  a  letter, 
and  to  ask  the  witness  whether  he  wrote  a  letter  to  any  person  with 
such  contents,  or  contents  to  the  like  effect;  without  having  first 
shown  to  the  witness  the  letter,  and  having  asked  him  whether  he 
wrote  that  letter,  and  his  admitting  that  he  wrote  it.1  For  the  con- 
tents of  every  written  paper,  according  to  the  ordinary  and  well- 
established  rules  of  evidence,  are  to  be  proved  by  the  paper  itself, 
and  by  that  alone,  if  it  is  in  existence.2  But  it  is  not  required  that 
the  whole  paper  should  be  shown  to  the  witness.  Two  or  three  lines 
only  of  a  letter  may  be  exhibited  to  him,  and  he  may  be  asked, 
whether  he  wrote  the  part  exhibited.  If  he  denies,  or  does  not 
admit,  that  he  wrote  that  part,  he  cannot  be  examined  as  to  the  con- 
tents of  such  letter,  for  the  reason  already  given;  nor  is  the  opposite 
counsel  entitled,  in  that  case,  to  look  at  the  paper."  And  if  he 
admits  the  letter  to  be  his  writing,  he  cannot  be  asked  whether 
statements,  such  as  the  counsel  may  suggest,  are  contained  in  it,  but 
the  whole  letter  itself  must  be  read,  as  the  only  competent  evidence 
of  that  fact.4  According  to  the  ordinary  rule  of  proceeding  in  such 
cases,  the  letter  is  to  be  read  as  the  evidence  of  the  cross-examining 
counsel  in  his  turn,  when  he  shall  have  opened  his  case;  but  if  he 
suggests  to  the  Court  that  he  wishes  to  have  the  letter  read  imme- 

2  [Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  294;  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.,  in 
Prince  v.  Sarao,  7  A.  &  E.  627.] 

8  [Washington  v.  State,  63  Ala.  192 ;  State  v.  Wiiikley,  14  N.  H.  491 ;  Emery  v. 
State,  92  Win.  146.] 

*  [Lowe  v.  State,  97  Ga.  792  ;  Wilkerson  v.  Eilers,  114  Mo.  245,  251  ;  State  v. 
Punshon,  133  id.  44  ;  Huntley  v.  Terr.,  Okl.,  54  Pac.  314  ;  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3  Wash. 
C.  C.  583.     The  analogous  rule  in  regard  to  admissions  by  a  party  ante,  §  201,  should 
be  consulted.] 

1  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  286;  Bellinger  v.  People,  8  Wend.  595,  598; 
R.  v.  Edwards,  8  C.  &  P.  26  ;  R.  v.  Taylor,  ib.  726.     If  the  paper  is  not  to  be  had,  a 
certified  copy  may  be  used :   R.  v.  Shellard,  9  id.  277.     So,  where  a  certified  copy  is 
in  the  case  for  other  purposes,  it  may  be  used  for  this  also  :   Davies  v.  Davies,  ib.  253. 
But  the  witness,  on  his  own  letter  being  shown  to  him,  cannot  be  asked  whether  he  wrote 
it  in  answer  to  a  letter  to  him  of  a  certain  tenor  and  import,  such  letter  not  being 
produced ;  see  McDonnell  v.  Evans,  16  Jur.  103,  where  the  rule  in  question  is  fully 
discussed. 

2  rPost,  Chap.  XXX.] 

*  K.  v.  Duncombe,  8  C.  &  P.  369. 

*  Ibid. ;  2  Brod.  &  Biug.  288. 


§5  462  6-465  a.]      INCONSISTENT  STATEMENTS.  597 

diately,  in  order  to  found  certain  questions  upon  its  contents,  after 
they  shall  have  been  made  known  to  the  Court,  which  otherwise 
could  not  well  or  effectually  be  done,  that  becomes  an  excepted  case; 
and  for  the  convenient  administration  of  justice,  the  letter  is  per- 
mitted to  be  read,  as  part  of  the  evidence  of  the  counsel  so  proposing 
it,  subject  to  all  the  consequences  of  its  being  considered.6 

§  464.  If  the  paper  in  question  is  lost,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
course  of  examination,  just  stated,  cannot  be  adopted..  In  such  case, 
it  would  seem,  that  regularly  the  proof  of  the  loss  of  the  paper 
should  first  be  offered,  and  that  then  the  witness  may  be  cross- 
examined  as  to  its  contents;  after  which  he  may  be  contradicted  by 
secondary  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the  paper.  But  where  this 
course  would  be  likely  to  occasion  inconvenience,  by  disturbing  the 
regular  progress  of  the  cause,  and  distracting  the  attention,  it  will 
always  be  in  the  power  of  the  judge,  in  his  discretion,  to  prevent 
this  inconvenience,  by  postponing  the  examination,  as  to  this  point, 
to  some  other  stage  of  the  cause.1 

§  465.  [It  follows,  from  what  has  just  been  said,  that]  a  witness 
cannot  be  asked  on  cross-examination,  whether  he  has  written  such 
a  thing,  stating  its  particular  nature  or  purport:  the  proper  course 
being  to  put  the  writing  into  his  hands,  and  to  ask  him  whether  it  is 
his  writing.  And  if  he  is  asked  generally,  whether  he  has  made 
representations,  of  the  particular  nature  stated  to  him,  the  counsel 
will  be  required  to  specify,  whether  the  question  refers  to  represen- 
tations in  writing  or  in  words  alone;  and  if  the  former  is  meant,  the 
inquiry,  for  the  reasons  before  mentioned,  will  be  suppressed,  unless 
the  writing  is  produced.1  But  whether  the  witness  may  be  asked 
the  general  question,  whether  he  has  given  any  account,  by  letter  or 
otherwise,  differing  from  his  present  statement,  — the  question  being 
proposed  without  any  reference  to  the  circumstance,  whether  the 
writing,  if  there  be  any,  is  or  is  not  in  existence,  or  whether  it  has 
or  has  not  been  seen  by  the  cross-examining  counsel,  —  is  a  point 
which  is  considered  still  open  for  discussion.  But  so  broad  a  ques- 
tion, it  is  conceived,  can  be  of  very  little  use,  except  to  test  the 
strength  of  the  witness'  memory,  or  his  confidence  in  assertion; 
and,  as  such,  it  may  well  be  suffered  to  remain  with  other  questions 
of  that  class,  subject  to  the  discretion  of  the  judge.2 

§  465  a.  Same :  Theory  and  Policy  of  the  Rule.  [The  rule  in  The 
Queen's  Case,  examined  in  the  preceding  sections,  is  understood  to 
have  come  from  the  Bench  as  a  surprise  to  the  profession,  and  it  did 
not  fail  to  receive  unfavorable  criticism  from  competent  writers,1  — 

6  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  289,  290 ;  TRomertze  «*'•  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  579  ; 
compare  Peyton  v.  Morgan  Park,  172  111.  102 ;  O'Riley  v.  Clampet,  53  Minn.  539.3 
1  See  McDonnell  v.  Evans,  16  Jur.  103;  11  Com.  B.  930. 

1  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  292-294. 

2  This  question  is  raised  and  acutely  treated  in  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  932-938.     See 
also  R.  v.  Shellard,  9  C.  &  P.  277;  R.  v.  Holden,  8  id.  608. 

1  CPhillipps,  Evidence,  I,  299  ;  Starkie,  Evidence,  I,  203  ;  Best,  Evidence,  §  478  ; 
Second  Report  of  Common  Law  Practice  Commission,  1853,  p.  20.3 


598  WITNESSES;  IMPEACHMENT.  [CH.  xxv. 

criticism  so  trenchant  and  so  effective  that  within  a  generation  in 
England  a  statute  was  enacted  which  substantially  nullified  it,  and 
merely  left  to  the  trial  Court  the  discretionary  power  of  applying  such 
a  rule  where  needed.2  The  objections  to  the  rule  are  not  difficult  to 
perceive.  (1)  It  does  not  seem  to  be  required  by  strict  principle. 
So  far  as  concerns  the  above  rule  as  to  calling  the  witness'  attention 
to  his  supposed  prior  statement,  it  is  entirely  satisfied  by  the  counsel's 
oral  inquiry  without  showing  or  producing  the  letter.  It  is  only  by 
virtue  of  the  Primariness  rule  (post,  §563  a)  that  production  is  required, 
i.  e.  the  rule  "  that  the  contents  of  a  written  instrument,  if  it  be  in 
existence,  are  to  be  proved  by  that  instrument  itself,  and  not  by  parol 
evidence."8  But  this  rule  is  not  violated  here;  for  (a)  the  cross- 
examiner  is  not  seeking  to  prove  the  document's  contents  at  this 
stage,  but  merely  to  meet  the  requirement  of  the  law  that  the  wit- 
ness must  be  warned  that  the  inconsistent  writing  will  be  produced; 
(£)  even  where  the  witness  in  answer  admits  executing  the  document, 
this  does  not  involve  proof  of  its  contents,  and  so  long  as  the  counsel 
does  not  try  to  take  the  answer  as  proof  of  contents,  there  is  no  vio- 
lation of  the  Primariness  rule ;  (c)  even  if  the  counsel  sought  to  take 
the  answer  as  evidence  of  the  writing's  contents,  the  principle  of  the 
Primariness  rule  may  well  be  thought  not  violated,  for  that  principle 
is  based  on  the  possibility  of  misrepresentation  by  the  party  failing 
to  produce  the  writing,  and  if  he  is  willing  to  take  the  answer  of 
the  adversary's  witness  as  evidence  of  contents,  the  reason  for 
applying  the  Primariness  rule  falls  away.  (2)  From  the  point  of 
view  of  policy,  the  prohibition  against  asking  the  witness  without 
showing  him  the  writing  is  an  unfortunate  one;  for  "one  of  the  best 
tests  of  the  memory  or  the  veracity  of  a  witness,  the  trial  of  his 
recollection  or  candor  as  to  what  he  has  himself  written  on  the  sub- 
ject on  which  he  has  just  been  deposing,  is  entirely  destroyed  by  his 
being  made  aware  of  the  existence  and  contents  of  the  document; "  * 
in  other  words,  the  chance  of  showing  to  the  tribunal  either  that  the 
witness  cannot  remember  or  incorrectly  remembers  or  that  he  is 
willing  to  falsify  as  to  the  contents,  is  entirely  taken  away  by  the 
requirement  that  the  writing  must  be  shown  to  him  at  that  stage. 
The  rule,  then,  so  far  as  it  does  not  allow  the  counsel  to  wait  until 
the  putting  in  of  his  own  case,  but  requires  him  in  advance,  before 

«  £1854,  St.  17-18  Viet.  c.  125,  s.  24  ;  1865,  St.  28-29  Viet.  c.  18,  a.  5  :  "A  wit- 
ness may  be  cross-examined  as  to  previous  statements  made  hy  him  in  writing  or 
reduced  into  writing,  without  such  writing  being  shown  to  him  ;  but  if  it  is  intended  to 
contradict  such  witness  by  the  writing,  his  attention  must,  before  sueli  contradictory 
proof  can  be  given,  be  called  [i.  e.  orally,  not  by  showing  the  writing]  to  those  parts  of 
the  writing  which  are  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  so  contradicting  him  ;  provided 
always  that  it  shall  be  competent  for  the  judge,  at  nny  time  during  the  trial,  to  require 
the  production  of  the  writing  for  his  inspection,  and  he  may  thereupon  make  such  use 
of  it  for  the  purposes  of  the  trial  as  he  shall  think  fit ; "  applied  in  Slndden  v.  Sergeant, 
1  F.  &  F.  322 ;  Ireland  n.  Stiff,  il>.  340  ;  Farrow  v.  Blomfield,  ib.  653.] 
TAbbott,  C.  J.,  in  The  Queen's  Case.] 

4  ^Report  of  Com'rs,  ante,  u.  1 ;  see  also  Starkic,  Phillips,  and  Best,  loc.  cit.~\ 


§  465  a.]  PRIOR  INCONSISTENT  STATEMENTS.  599 

cross-examining,  to  produce  and  to  show  the  writing  to  the  witness, 
is  both  unsound  in  principle  and  unfair  in  policy.  Its  alteration  by 
statute  in  England  must  be  regarded  as  a  just  step,  and  it  is  to  be 
regretted  that  (owing  in  part  to  ignorance  of  this  change  and.  of 
the  reasons  for  it)  so  many  Courts  in  this  country  have  come  to  adopt 
the  rule  in  The  Queen's  Case  long  after  its  repudiation  in  the  juris- 
diction of  its  origin.  In  almost  all  the  jurisdictions  where  the 
matter  has  come  up  for  adjudication,  the  rule  is  followed.6  It  is 
universally  (though  perhaps  not  properly)  regarded  as  applying  also 
to  oral  statements  reported  in  writing  at  the  time  by  another  person, 
—  as,  a  deposition  or  testimony  at  a  former  trial.8] 
§  466. 7 

5  FJOf  the  following  Courts,  it  would  seem  that  the  rule  does  not  obtain  in  Vermont, 
and  that  it  is  doubtful  or  qualified  in  Iowa,  Michigan,  and  the  Federal  Supreme  Court  : 
Floyd  v.  State,  82  Ala.  22 ;   Wills  v.  State,  74  id.  24  ;   Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moog,  78 
id.  310;   Gunter  v.  State,  83  id.  106;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  2052  ;   People  ».  Donovan,  43 
Cal.  162,  165  ;  Leonard  v.  Kingsley,  50  id.  628,  630;  People  ».  Hong  Ah  Duck,  61- id. 
387,  394  ;  People  v.  Ching  King  Chang,  74  id.  392,  393  ;  People  v.  Dillwood,  id.,  39 
Pac.  438 ;  People  ».  Lambert,  id.,  52  Pac.  307  ;  Stebbins  v.  Sacket,  5  Conn.  258,  262  ; 
Simmons  v.  State,  32  Fla.  387,  391  ;  Stamper  v.  Griffin,  12  Ga.  454  ;  Swift  v.  Madden, 
165  111.  41  ;   Peyton  v.  Morgan  Park,  172  id.  102  ;    Morrison  v.  Myers,  11  la.  539; 
Callanan  r.  Shaw,  24  id.  454  ;   State  v.  Collins,  32  id.  41  ;   State  v.  Callegari,  41  La. 
An.  580  ;  Com.  v.  Kelley,  112  Mass.  452 ;  Lightfoot  v.  People,  16  Mich.  513  ;   Toohey 
v.  Plummer,  69  id.  346;  Maxted  v.  Fowler,  94  id.  106,  111;   O'Riley  v.  Clampet,  53 
Minn.  539 ;   Cavanah  v.  State,  56  Miss.  307  ;   Gregory  v.  Cheatham,  36  Mo.   161  ; 
Prewitt  v.  Martin,  59  id.  334 ;   State  v.  O'Brien,  18  Mont.  1 ;   Haines  v.  Ins.  Co.,  52 
N.  H.  467,  470  ;    Bellinger  v.  People,  8  Wend.  599  ;   Clapp  p.  Wilson,  5  Den.  286, 
288  ;  Newcomb  v.  Griswold,  24  N.  Y.  301 ;  Romertze  v.  Bank,  49  id.  578,  580  ;  Gaff- 
ney  v.  People,  50  id.  423  ;    State  v.  Steeves,  29  Or.  85  ;   Titus  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  132, 
136  ;  Toplitz  v.  Hedden,  146  U.  S.  254  ;  Randolph  r.  Woodstock,  35  Vt.  295.} 

6  [Jin  England,  the  Resolution  of  Judges,  in  1837,  printed  in  7  C.  &  P.  676,  required 
this  ;  but  peculiar  considerations  were  there  involved  ;  see  R.  v.  Edwards,  8  C.  P.  26, 
29 ;   R.  v.  Coveney,  ib.  31 ;  R.  v.  Holden,  ib.  609  ;  R.  v.  Shellard,  9  id.  279 ;   for  cer- 
tain attempted  evasions  of  this  part  of  the  rule,  see  R.  v.  Newton,  15  L.  T.  26 ;    R.  v. 
Ford,  5  Cox  Cr.  184  ;  R.  v.  Edwards,  supra;    R.  v.  Barnet,  4  Cox  Cr.  269;  compare 
ante,  §§  97  d  and  439  c.     In  the  United  States,  this  Dart  of  the  rule  is  illustrated  by 
the  cases  in  the  preceding  note  in  Alabama,  California,  Florida,  Louisiana,  Michigan, 
Mississippi,  New  Hampshire,  New  York.     In  Tennessee  alone  this  application  of  it 
seems  to  be  repudiated/] 

T  [Transferred  ante,  aa  §  447  a.] 


600 


WITNESSES. 


[CH.   XXVL 


CHAPTER  XXYI. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :  REHABILITATION  ;  RE-EXAMINATION  AND 

REBUTTAL. 


1.  Re-examination  and  Rebutted,  in 
general. 

§  466  a.    Order  of  Topics ;   Discretion 
of  Trial  Court. 

2.   Rehabilitation  of  a  Witness. 

§  467.   Explaining  away  Discrediting 
Facts. 


§  468.  Re-examination  on  Irrelevant 
Matter. 

§  469  a.  Supporting  by  Evidence  of 
Good  Character. 

§  469  b.  Corroboration  by  Evidence  «f 
Prior  Similar  Statements. 

§  469  c.  Same :  Fresh  Complaint  of 
Rape ;  Constancy  of  Accusation  in  Bas- 
tardy. 


1.   Re-examination  and  Rebuttal,  in  general. 

§  466  a.    Order  of  Topics ;   Discretion  of  the  Trial  Court.  [So  far 

as  the  evidence  of  the  opponent  is  to  be  explained  away,  contra- 
dicted, or  otherwise  refuted,  by  any  process  which  consists  merely 
in  diminishing  or  negativing  its  force,  the  original  party  has  the 
right  to  do  this,  either  by  a  re-examination  following  immediately 
upon  the  cross-examination  of  his  witness,  or  by  new  witnesses  called 
in  rebuttal  after  the  opponent's  own  evidence  has  been  put  in.  But 
anything  beyond  this  cannot  belong  to  him  as  of  strict  right;  the 
reason  being  that  "  all  questions  that  are  asked  are  to  be  asked  at 
the  proper  time,"  otherwise,  the  trial  "will  be  in  perpetual  con- 
fusion ; "  l  and  the  proper  time  for  all  matters  not  rendered  material 
by  the  course  of  the  opponent's  cross-examinations  or  his  own  wit- 
nesses' testimony  is  the  original  party's  direct  examinations  of  his 
witnesses.  Nevertheless,  "to  obviate  the  effects  of  inadvertence,"8 
it  will  often  be  fair  to  allow  a  party  to  do  at  a  later  stage  what  he 
might  and  should  have  done  at  an  earlier  one.  The  propriety  of 
thus  making  an  exception  must  depend  largely  on  the  circumstances 
of  each  case ;  and  for  this  reason  it  is  universally  held,  in  almost  all 
the  varieties  of  situations  thus  presented,  that  the  allowance  of  such 
evidence  out  of  its  natural  order  is  to  be  determined  by  the  discretion 
of  the  trial  Court.  The  line  between  the  evidence  which  is  merely 
explanatory  of  and  rendered  necessary  by  the  opponent's,  and  evi- 
dence which  might  have  been  introduced  at  an  earlier  stage,  is  often 
difficult  to  draw ; 8  but  the  principle  is  apparent.  A  variety  of  situa- 
tions for  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court  may  present 
themselves.  (1)  In  the  re-examination  of  a  witness  immediately  after 

1  PL.  C.  Hardwicke,  in  Lord  Lovat's  Trial,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  658.3 
1  rScott,  J.,  in  Rticker  v.  Eddings,  7  Mo.  118.] 

*  LSee  Simmons  v.  Havens,  101  N.  Y.  433 ;  State  v.  Dilley,  15  Or.  75;  Schaaer  v. 
State,  36  Wis.  429-3 


§  466  a.]  ORDER   OF  EXAMINATION.  601 

his  cross-examination,  or  in  the  stage  of  rebuttal  after  the  opponents' 
own  evidence  has  all  been  put  in,  it  may  be  desired  to  add  testimony 
of  new  facts,  i.  e.  matter  which  was  omitted  in  the  direct  examina- 
tions as  a  whole  or  in  that  of  the  particular  witness  but  might  have 
been  there  put  in.  This  may  be  done  in  the  trial  Court's  discretion.4 
(2)  In  the  re-examination  of  a  particular  witness  or  in  the  general 
stage  of  rebuttal,  it  may  be  desired  to  repeat  or  emphasize  or  detail 
more  precisely  a  matter  already  testified  to  in  chief.  This  also  may 
be  done  in  the  trial  Court's  discretion,6  and  a  re-examination  to 
make  corrections  should  be  treated  in  the  same  way.6  (3)  After  a 
witness  has  been  cross-examined  and  dismissed,  it  may  become 
desirable  to  re-call  him  to  the  stand  for  further  direct  examination; 
this  may  be  granted  or  refused  in  the  trial  Court's  discretion.' 
(4)  After  one  re-examination,  it  may  be  desired  to  re-examine  the 
witness  a  second  time,  either  immediately  after  a  re-cross-examina- 
tion or  after  the  witness  has  left  the  stand ;  this  may  be  granted  or 
refused  in  discretion.8  (5)  After  the  evidence  has  been  put  in  by  each 
party  and  the  case  declared  closed,  and  even  after  argument  or  charge 
begun,  it  may  become  important  to  supply  omissions ;  and  here  also 
the  discretion  of  the  Court  must  control.9  (6)  Upon  the  opponent's 
side,  the  whole  process  of  surrebuttal,  including  a  re-cross-examina- 
tion of  a  particular  witness  and  the  impeachment  of  re-direct  testi- 
mony, as  well  as  the  explanation  or  surrebuttal  of  evidence  given  in  the 

4  EMorehouse  v.  Morehouse,  Conn.,  39  Atl.  516;  A.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Randall,  85 
Ga.  314 ;  White  v.  State,  100  id.  659  ;  Kidd  v.  State,  101  id.  528;  Young  v.  Bennett, 
5  111.  47 ;  Springfield  v.  Dalby,  139  id.  38  ;  Chytraus  ».  Chicago,  160  id.  18 ;  Wash. 
Ice  Co.  v.  Bradley,  171  id.  255  ;  C.  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Staton,  Ind.,  43  N.  E.  312  ; 
State  v.  Ruhl,  8  la.  450  ;  State  v.  Pruett,  49  La.  An.  283  ;  Wallace  v.  R.  Co.,  119 
Mass.  93;  Com.  v.  Kennedy,  id.  48,  N.  E.  770  ;  Maier  v.  Ben.  Ass'n,  107  Mich.  687  ; 
Minkley  v.  Springwells,  id.,  71  N.  W.  649  ;  Davis  v.  State,  Minn.,  70  N.  W.  894  ; 
Winterton  v.  I.  C.  R.  Co.,  73  Miss.  831 ;  Fullerton  v.  Fordyce,  Mo.,  44  S.  W.  1053; 
Murphy  v.  State,  43  Nebr.  34  ;  Ream  v.  State,  id.,  73  N.  W.  227  ;  People  v.  Bu- 
chanan, 145  N.  Y.  1 ;  People  v.  Koerner,  154  id.  355  ;  Campbell  v.  Brown,  183  Pa. 
112  ;  State  v.  Ballou,  R,  I.,  40  Atl.  861;  State  v.  Clyburn,  16  S.  C.  378;  State  v. 
Jacobs,  28  id.  30,  37  ;  Baird  v.  Gleckler,  7  S.  D.  284  ;  Story  v.  Saunders,  8  Humph. 
667  ;  Watkins  v.  Rist,  68  Vt.  486;  McManus  w.  Mason,  43  W.  Va.  196  ;  McGowan  v. 
R.  Co..  91  Wis.  147  ;  Stanhilber  v.  Graves,  97  id.  515.  j 

6  QPigg  »•  State»  145  Ind-  56°  5   DiHard  v.  State,  58  Miss.  389  ;   King  v.  State,  74 
id.  576  ;  Collins  v.  State,  46  Xebr.  37.] 

«  fHumphrey  v.  State,  78  Wis.  571. 3 

7  Q  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  249;  Rucker  v.  Eddings,  7  Mo.  118  (leading  cases); 
Crawford  v.  State,  112  Ala.  1 ;  Boston  v.  State,  94  Ga.  590;  Anderson  T.  Co.  v.  Fuller, 
111.,  51  N.  E.  251  ;   Louisville  Ins.  Co.  v.  Monarch,  99  Ky.  578  ;   Robbins  v.  R.  Co., 
165  Mass.  30  ;    Legore  v.  State,  Md.,  41  Atl.  60  ;   State  v.  Fitzgerald,  130  Mo.  407  ; 
Severance  v.  Hilton,  24  N.  H.  147 ;  Faust  v.  U.  S.,  163  U.  S.  452  J 

8  fBi-own  v.  State,  72  Md.  468,  475.] 

9  LDyer  v.  State.  88  Ala.  229;   Plummer  v.  Mercantile  Co.,  23  Colo.  190  ;   Brooke 
».  People,  ib.  375;  Huff  v.  State,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  808;   Kimball  v.  Saguin,  86  la.  186, 
192  ;  Froman  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  42  S.  W.  728  ;  State  v.  Gaubert,  49  La.  An.  1692  ;  State 
v.  Eisenhour,  132  Mo.  140  ;  State  v.  Laycock,  141  id.  274 ;  Sweeney  v.  H.jul,  23  Nev. 
409 ;  Sutton  v.  Walters,  118  N.  C.  495;  State  v.  Isenhart,  Or.,  52  Pac.  569  ;  State  v. 
Derrick,  44  S.  C.  344 ;   Omaha  Bridge  Cases,  10  U.  S.  App.  98,  191 ;    Hart  v.  U.  S., 
U.  S.  App.  ;  84  Fed.  799  ;   Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin's  Adrn'r,  93  Va.  791  ;  Buchanan 
v.  Cook,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  102;  Perdue  v.  C.  &  C.  Co.,  40  W.  Va.  372.] 


602  WITNESSES'   REHABILITATION.  [CH.   XXVI. 

general  stage  of  rebuttal,  seems  also  to  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
trial  court.10] 

2.    Rehabilitation  of  a  Witness. 

§  467.  Explaining  away  Discrediting  Facts.  [It  has  just  been 
noticed  that  the  process  of  explaining  away  discrediting  evidence  be- 
longs naturally  in  the  re-examination.  The  modes  by  which  such  dis- 
crediting evidence  may  be  explained  away  vary  largely,  of  course,  with 
the  case  in  hand ;  but  certain  types  are  constantly  recurring.  Where 
expressions  or  circumstances  indicating  bias  have  been  brought  out 
by  the  opponent,  they  may  be  explained,  and  accounted  for,  so  far  as 
possible.1  The  same  principle  applies  to  a  discrediting  by  prior 
inconsistent  statements  ;]  after  a  witness  has  been  cross-examined 
respecting  a  former  statement  made  by  him,  the  party  who  called  him 
has  a  right  to  re-examine  him  to  the  same  matter.2  The  counsel  has 
a  right,  upon  such  re-examination,  to  ask  all  questions  which  may  be 
proper  to  draw  forth  an  explanation  of  the  sense  and  meaning  of  the 
expressions,  used  by  the  witness  on  cross-examination,  if  they  be 
in  themselves  doubtful;  and  also  of  the  motive  by  which  the  witness 
was  induced  to  use  those  expressions;  but  he  has  no  right  to  go 
further  and  to  introduce  matter  new  in  itself,  and  not  suited  to  the 
purpose  of  explaining  either  the  expressions  or  the  motives  of  the 
witness.8  This  point,  after  having  been  much  discussed  in  The 
Queen's  Case,  was  brought  before  the  Court  several  years  afterwards, 
when  the  learned  judges  held  it  as  settled,  that  proof  of  a  detached 
statement,  made  by  a  witness  at  a  former  time,  does  not  authorize 
proof,  by  the  party  calling  that  witness,  of  all  that  he  said  ,at  the 
same  time,  but  only  of  so  much  as  can  be  in  sqrne  way  connected 
with  the  statement  proved.4  Therefore,  where  a  witness  had  been 
cross-examined  as  to  what  the  plaintiff  said  in  a  particular  conversa- 
tion, it  was  held  that  he  could  not  be  re-examined  as  to  the  other 
assertions,  made  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  same  conversation,  but  not 
connected  with  the  assertions  to  which  the  cross-examination  related ; 
although  the  assertions  as  to  which  it  was  proposed  to  re-examine 
him  were  connected  with  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.6 

™  [[See  Willard  v.  Pettit,  Ind.,  39  N.  E.  991 ;  Hendron  v.  Robinson,  9  B.  Monr. 
505;  State  v.  Spencer,  45  La.  An.  1,  9  ;  Devonshire  v.  Peters,  104  Mich.  501 ;  Arga- 
bright  v.  State,  Nebr.,  76  N.  W.  876  ;  Stephens  v.  People,  19  N.  Y.  573.} 

1  [See  ante,  §  450.] 

2  In  the  examination  of  witnesses  in  Chancery  under  a  commission  to  take  depo- 
sitions, the  plaintiff  is  not  allowed  to  re-examine,  unless  upon  a  special  case,  and  then 
only  as  to  matters  not  comprised  in  the  former  interrogatories  :  King  of  Hanover  v. 
Wheatley,  4  Beav.  78. 

*  Such  was  the  opinion  of  seven  out  of  eight  judges  whose  opinion  was  taken  in 
the  House  of  Lords,  in  The  Queen's  Case,  as  delivered  by  Lord  Tenterden,  2  Brod.  & 
Bing.  297.  FjSee  this  subject  treated  ants.,  §  462  6.] 

4  Prince  v.  Samo,  7  Ad.  &  El.  627. 

6  Prince  v.  Samo,  supra.  In  this  case,  the  opinion  of  Lord  Tenterden,  in  The 
Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  298,  quoted  in  1  Stark.  Evid.  180,  that  evidence  of  the 
whole  conversation,  if  connected  with  the  suit,  was  admissible,  though  it  were  of  mat- 
ters not  touched  in  the  cross-examination,  was  considered  and  overruled. 


§§  466  a-469  a.]     EXPLAINING  IMPEACHING  FACTS.  603 

[That  a  witness  who  has  been  discredited  by  proof  of  a  conviction 
for  crime  may  show  that  he  was  innocent  or  that  the  circumstances 
were  extenuating,  is  obnoxious  to  the  principle  that  it  is  the  con- 
viction which  discredits,  and  also  to  the  principle  forbidding  confusion 
of  issues  on  collateral  points  ; 6  but  a  few  Courts  allow  the  witness 
himself  to  make  whatever  explanation  he  can,  the  latter  principle  not 
applying  to  such  a  process ; 7  or  to  testify  that  he  has  reformed.8 
Where  the  fact  of  arrest  or  indictment  is  allowed  to  be  inquired 
about  on  cross-examination  (ante,  §  461  i),  there  seems  to  be  no 
objection  to  allowing  an  explanation  of  innocence  on  re-examina- 
tion.9 Where  on  cross-examination  of  a  witness  to  the  good  reputa- 
tion of  another  witness,  derogatory  facts  of  the  latter's  conduct  are 
brought  out  (ante,  §  461  d"),  an  explanation  here  also  seems  allowable.10 
Where  an  impeaching  witness  to  reputation,  on  cross-examination  to 
the  sources  of  his  knowledge,  has  named  specific  reports  and  rumors, 
the  principle  of  confusion  of  issues  forbids  an  attempt  in  rebuttal  to 
disprove  by  other  witnesses  the  existence  of  such  reports.11]* 

§  468.  Re-examination  on  Irrelevant  Matter.  If  the  counsel  chooses 
to  cross-examine  the  witness  to  facts,  which  were  not  admissible  in 
evidence,  the  other  party  has  a  right  to  re-examine  him  as  to  the 
evidence  so  given.  Thus,  where  issue  was  joined  upon  a  plea  of 
prescription,  to  a  declaration  for  trespass  in  G.,  and  the  plaintiff's 
witnesses  were  asked,  in  cross-examination,  questions  respecting  the 
user  in  other  places  than  G-.,  which  they  proved ;  it  was  held  that 
the  plaintiff,  in  re-examination,  might  show  an  interruption  in  the 
user  in  such  other  places.  But  an  adverse  witness  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  obtrude  such  irrelevant  matter,  in  answer  to  a  question 
not  relating  to  it ;  and  if  he  should,  the  other  party  may  either  cross- 
examine  to  it,  or  may  apply  to  have  it  stricken  out  of  the  judge's 
notes.1 

§  469.1 

§  469  a.  Supporting  by  Evidence  of  Good  Character.  [Since  a 
witness'  character  for  veracity  is  assumed  to  be  good,  there  is  on 
principle  no  reason  for  proving  his  good  character  in  his  support 

6  QState  v.  Watson,  65  Me.  79 ;  Cora.  v.  Gallagher,  126  Mass.  55 ;  Gertz  v.  R. 
Co.,  137  id.  77  ;  Lamoureux  v.  R.  Co.,  169  id.  338-3 

•  TChase  v.  Blodgett,  10  N.  H.  22  ;  Sims  v.  Sims,  75  N.  Y.  473.] 

8  THolmes  v.  Statelet1,  17  111.  453  ;  Conley  v.  Meeker,  85  N.  Y.  618,  semble  ;  Tenn. 
C.  I.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Haley,  U.  S.  App.,  85  Fed.  534.] 

9  [JR.  v.  Noel,  6  C.  &  P.  336;  Driscoll  v.    People,   47  Mich.   417  ;  Hill  v.   State, 
91  Tenn.  521  ;  see  Ellis  «.  State,  Ind.,  52  N.  E.  82.] 

1°  ("State  v.  Stearns,  94  N.  C.  976,  semble;  Abernethy  v.  Com.,  101  Pa.  322,  328.] 
"  [jSonneborn  v-  Bernstein,  49  Ala.   172;  Robbins  v.  Spencer,  121  Ind.  596  ;  Mc- 
Dermott  v.  State,  13  Oh.  St.  3.] 

1  Blewett  v.  Tregonning,  3  Ad.  &  El.  554  ;  {State  v.  Cardoza,  11  S.  C.  195  ;  Good- 
man v.  Kennedy,  10  Neb.  270  ;  see  Schaser  v.  State,  36  Wis.  429  ;  Furbush  v.  Good- 
win, 5  Fost.  425 ;  Mitchell  v.  Sellman,  5  Md.  376 ;  Shedden  v.  Patrick,  2  Sw.  &  Tr. 
170.  | 

1  [[Transferred  to  Appendix  II,  being  insufficient  by  reason  of  its  brevity ;  the 
subject-matter  ia  represented  in  the  following  two  sections.] 


604  WITNESSES;  REHABILITATION.  [CH.  XXVL 

until  it  has  been  affected  by  some  of  the  opponent's  discrediting 
evidence.1  The  question,  then,  is,  When  is  a  witness'  character 
disparaged  by  the  opponent's  evidence  ? 

(1)  A  direct  attack  upon  his  general  character  (by  reputation  or 
personal  opinion)  of  course  presents  such  a  situation.2 

(2)  Where  by  evidence  of   particular   misdeeds,  brought  out  on 
cross-examination,  or  by  proof  of  conviction  for  crime,  the  character 
is  impeached,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  good  character  should  be 
received  in  rebuttal.8     But,  after  all,  the  evidence  of  good  character 
explains  nothing;  if  the  misdeed  is  admitted  on  cross-examination 
or  proved  by  record  it  remains  as  a  fact,  and  a  good  reputation  can- 
not take  away  this  fact  nor  the  inference  from  it.4     These  oppos- 
ing views  have  each  found  support  in  the  different  jurisdictions.5 
(3)  Evidence  of  bias  or  interest  does  not  reflect  on  character,  and 
hence  the  supporting  proof  of  character  is  unnecessary.6     (4)  Evi- 
dence of  prior  inconsistent  statements  (ante,  §  461  /)  does  not  neces- 
sarily or  even  probably  reflect  on  character ;  a  defect  of  memory  or 
observation  or  a  prejudice  may  account  for  them ;  and  no  support 
for  the  character  is  needed.7     Nevertheless,  it  is  conceivable  that  the 
witness  is  now  falsifying  through  a  wicked  disposition,  and  that  this 
possibility  may  properly  be  rebutted.8     But  the  former  view  is  the 
more  natural  one;   as  a  matter  of  precedent,  the  jurisdictions  are 
fairly  divided  between  the   two  views.9     (5)  Where  the  impeach- 

1  [[This  is  generally  conceded;   but  in  Connecticut  an   old   tradition  allows  the 
character  of  a  "  stranger"  to  be  supported  even  before  impeachment :  State  v.  Ward,  49 
Conn.  429,  442.] 

2  FThis  has  never  been  doubted."] 


^Expounded  by  Nelson,  C.  J.,  in  People  y.  Rector,  19  Wend.  610.] 


Expounded  by  Bronson,  J.,  in  People  u.  Rector,  supra.~] 

"The  cases  are  as  follows  :  Doe  r.   Walker,   4   Esp.    50  ;  Bamh'eld   v.   Massey, 
1  Camp.  460 ;  Dodd  v.  Norris,  3  id.  519 ;  R.  v.  Clarke,  2  Stark.  241  ;  Bate  v.  Hill, 

1  C.  &  P.  100  ;  Provis  v.  Reed,  5  Bing.  435,   438  ;  Doe  v.   Harris,  7  C.   &  P.   330  ; 
Lewis  v.  State,  35  Ala.  386 ;  People  o.  Ah  Fat,    48   Cal.  61,   64  ;  C.  C.    P.    §  2053  ; 
People  v.  Amanacus,  50  Cal.   233  ;  Rogers  v.  Moore,  10  Conn.  14  ;  State  v.   Ward, 
49  id.  429,  442  ;  State  v.  Boyd,  38  La.  An.  374 ;  State  v.  Fruge,  44  id.  165  ;  Vernon 
v.  Tucker,  30  Md.  456,  462  ;  Russell  v.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  143,  154;  Harrington  v.  Lin- 
coln, 4  Gray  563,  567  ;  McCarty  v.  Leary,  118  Mass.  510;  People  v.  Rector,  19  Wend. 
569,  595  ;  Carter  v.  People,  2  Hill  317  ;  People  v.  Hulse,  3  id.  309,  314;  People  v. 
Gay,  7  N.  Y.  378,  381  ;  Stacy  v.  Graham,  14  id.  492,  501;  Webb  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St. 
351,  358;  Braddee  v.  Brownneld,  9  Watts  124;  Hoard  v.  State,   15  Lea  318,   323; 
Paine  v.  Tilden,  20  Vt.  554,  564;  Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  id.  601,  609;  George  v. 
Pilcher,  28  Gratt.  299,  315;  Reynolds  r.  R.  Co.,  92  Va.  400J 

«  TFirst  N.  B'k  v.  Com.  U.  Ass.  Co.,  Or.,  52  Pac.  1050. J 
f  Expounded  by  Wardlaw,  J.,  in  Chapman  v.  Cooley,  12  Rich.  659.] 

8  LExpounded  by  Cowen,  J.,  in  People  v.  Rector,  19  Wend.  583  ;  Frazer,  J.,  in 
Clem  v.  State,  33  Ind.  427.] 

8  ("The  cases  are  as  follows  :  Hadjo  v.  Gooden,  13  Ala.  718,  720  ;  Holley  v.  State, 
105  id.  100;  Towns  v.  State,  111  id.  1  ;  People  v.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  61,  64  ;  People  v. 
Bush,  65  id.  129;  Rogers  v.  Moore,  10  Conn.  14  ;  Mercer  v.  State,  Fla.,  24  So.  154  ; 
Stampers.  Griffin,  12  Ga.  458;  McEwen  v.  Springfield,  64  id.  159,  165;  Pulliarn  v. 
Can  troll,  77  id.  563,  568  ;  Paxton  v.  Dye,  26  Ind.  394  ;  Clark  v.  Bond,  29  id.  555 ; 
Harris  v.  State,  30  id.  131  ;  Clem  v.  State,  33  id.  418,  427;  S.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v. 
Frawley,  110  id.  18,  26  ;  State  v.  Archer,  73  la.  320,  323;  Code,  §  663  ;  Vance  v.  Vance, 

2  Mete.  581  ;  State  v.  Boyd,  38  La.  An.  374  ;  Davis  v.  State,  38  Md.  15,  49  ;  Russell 


§§  469  a-469  5.]      GOOD  CHARACTER  IN  SUPPORT.  605 

ment  has  consisted  merely  in  showing  an  error  by  contradiction  from 
other  witnesses  (§  461  e.  ante),  the  reasoning  is  the  same  as  for  the 
preceding  sort,10  except  that  the  possibility  of  a  reflection  on  char- 
acter is  here  even  more  remote ;  here  all  but  a  few  Courts  agree  in 
considering  the  supporting  evidence  unnecessary.11] 

§  469  b.  Corroboration  by  Evidence  of  Prior  Similar  Statements. 
[In  the  eighteenth  century  it  was  considered  proper  to  receive  such 
statements  in  corroboration,  even  before  the  witness  had  been  dis- 
credited in  any  way.1  But  this  doctrine  has  wholly  passed  away; 
for  it  is  clear  that  an  untrustworthy  story  is  not  made  more  trust- 
worthy by  any  number  of  repetitions  of  it.a  There  must  at  least 
have  been  some  sort  of  discrediting  of  the  witness,  which  the  con- 
sistent statements  help  to  remove.  The  question  is,  then,  What  sort 
of  discrediting  evidence  is  explained  away  or  otherwise  answered  by 
proof  of  similar  consistent  statements  ?  (1)  It  is  clear  that  evidence 
of  bad  character  is  in  no  way  answered  by  such  evidence ;  though  a 
few  Courts  are  able  to  see  value  in  it.8  (2)  After  evidence  of  a  prior 

v.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  143,  154  ;  Brown  ».  Mooers,  6  Gray  451 ;  Com.  v.  Ingraham,  7  id. 
46,  48  ;  State  v.  Cooper,  71  Mo.  436,  442 ;  People  v .  Hulse,  3  Hill  309,  313  ;  Starks 
v.  People,  5  Den.  106,  108  ;  Stacy  v.  Graham,  14  N.  Y.  492,  501;  Isler  v.  Dewey,  71 
N.  C.  14;  Webb  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  351,  357;  Glaze  v.  \Vhitley,  5  Or.  164,  167; 
Sheppard  v.  Yocum,  10  id.  402,  413;  First  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Coin.  U.  Ass.  Co.,  id.,  52 
Pac.  1050;  Braddee  v.  Brownfield,  9  Watts  124 ;  Wertz  v.  May,  21  Pa.  274,  279  ;  Farr 
v.  Thompson,  Cheves  S.  C.  37,  43;  Chapman  v.  Cooley,  12  Rich.  654,  658;  State  v. 
Jones,  29  S.  C.  201,  230 ;  State  v.  Rice,  49  id.  418  ;  Burrell  v.  State,  18  Tex.  713,  730  ; 
State  v.  Roe,  12  Vt  93,  111  ;  Paine  v.  Tilden,  20  id.  554,  564;  Sweet  v.  Sherman,  21 
id.  23,  29 ;  Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  id.  601,  608  ;  George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt.  299, 

8150 

10  [The  argument  for  exclusion  has  been  expounded  by  Parker,  C.  J. ,  in  Russell 
v.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  154;  Earle,  J.,  in  Farr  v.   Thompson,  Cheves  43;  Walker,  J.,  in 
Tedens  v.  Schumers,  112  111.  263  ;  Bleckly,  C.  J.,  in  Miller  r.  R.  Co.,  93  Ga.  480.    No 
Court  taking  the  contrary  view  seems  to  have  attempted  a  justification  of  it.] 

11  [The  cases  on  both  sides  are  as  follows :  Durham  v.  Beaumont,  1  Camp.  207; 
Newton  v.  Jackson,  23  Ala.  335,  344 ;  M.  &  G.  R.  Co.   v.  Williams,  54  id.  168,  172 ; 
Rogers  v.  Moore,  10  Conn.  14;  Sanssy  v.  R.  Co.,  22  Fla.  327,  330 ;  Bell  v.  State,  100 
Ga.  78  ;  Tedens  v.  Schumers,  112  111.  263,  266 ;  Pruitt  v.  Cox,  21  Ind.   15  ;  Johnson 
v.  State,  ih.  329  ;  Braun  v.  Campbell,  86  id.  516  ;  Presser  v.   State,  77  id.  274,  280; 
L.  N.  A.  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Frawley,  110  id.   18,  27;  State  v.  Archer,  73  la.  320,  323  ; 
Code  §  663  ;  Vance  v.  Vance,  2  Mete.   Ky.  581  ;  State  v.  Desforges,  48  La.  An.  73  ; 
Vernon  v.  Tucker,  30  Md.  456,  462  ;  Davis  v.  State,  38  id.  15,  74  ;  Russell  v.  Coffin, 
8  Pick.  143,  154  ;  Hey  wood  v.  Reed,  4  Gray  574,  58]  ;  Brown  v.   Mooers,  6  id.  451  ; 
Com.  v.  Ingraham,  7  id.  46,  48  ;•  People  v.  Rector,  19  Wend.  569,  586  ;  People  r.  Hulse, 
3  Hill  309,  313;  Starks  v.  People,  5  Den.  106,  108  ;  March  v.  Harrell,  1  Jones  329, 
331;  Isler  v.  Dewey,  71  N.  C.  14  ;  Glaze  v.  Whitley,  5  Or.  164,  167;  Sheppard  v. 
Yocum,  10  id.  402,  413;  Braddee  v.    Brownfield,  9  Watts  124;  Farr  v.  Thompson, 
Cheves  S.  C.  37,  43 ;  Chapman  v.  Cooley,  12  Rich.  65,4,  660 ;  State  v.  Jones,  29  S.  C. 
201,  330  ;    Richmond  v.   Richmond,  10  Yerg.  343,  345  ;    Spurr  v.  U.  S.,  U.  S.  App., 
87  Fed.  701  ;  Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  Vt.  601,  608 ;  George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt. 
299,  315;  State  v.  Nelson,  13  Wash.  528.] 

1  ([Gilbert,  Evidence,  68,  150  ;   Buller,  Nisi  Prius,  294  ;   Sir  John  Freind's  Trial, 
13  How.  St.  Tr.  270.      Lutterell  v.  Reynell,  1  Mod.  282,  usually  cited  for  this  older 
doctrine,  seems  in  truth  to  concern  a  use  of  the  evidence  still  recognized  as  proper.] 

2  [Explained  by  Story,  J.,  in  Ellicott  o.  Pearl,  10  Pet.  439;  Reade,  J.,  in  State  v. 
Parish,  79  N.  C.  612.     The  later  view  is  to-day  universally  accepted  ;  for  the  peculiar 
case  of  rape  complaints,  however,  see  post,  §  469  c.] 

8  [Excluded:  Mason  v.  Vestal,  88  Gal.  396;  State  v.  Vincent,  24  la.  570  ;  Stolp  *. 


606  WITNESSES;  REHABILITATION.  [CH.  XXVL 

inconsistent  statement  (ante,  §  461  /)  it  is  perhaps,  at  first  thought, 
of  value  to  show  other  consistent  statements.4  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  latter  in  no  sense  explain  away  the  former ;  the  inconsist- 
ency on  that  occasion  is  just  as  damaging,  even  though  the  other 
story  has  been  repeated  a  score  of  times.6  There  is,  however,  one 
purpose  for  which  such  evidence  has  a  legitimate  value,  viz.,  to  show 
that  the  alleged  inconsistent  statement  never  was  made,  since  con- 
stancy in  the  story  now  told  makes  it  less  likely  that  the  supposed 
different  one  was  ever  uttered.6  But  this  third  possibility  is  rarely 
noticed  ; 7  and  most  Courts  decide  the  question  one  way  or  the  other, 
according  as  they  are  persuaded  by  the  first  or  the  second  argu- 
ment.8 By  Courts  admitting  such  evidence  of  consistent  statements 

Blair,  68  111.  541  ;  Sidelinger  v.  Bucklin,  64  Me.  373  ;  Eobb  v.  Hackley,  23  Wend.  50 
(overruling  earlier  cases) ;  Scott  v.  State,  Tex.  (Jr.,  47  S.  W.  531  ;  Gibbs  v.  Linsley, 
13  Vt.  208,  215. 

Admitted:  Sonneborn  v.  Bernstein,  49  Ala.  168 ;  State  v.  Thomason,  1  Jones  L. 
274  ;  Henderson  v.  Jones,  10  S.  &  R.  322. 

Moreover  those  Courts  admitting  this  after  "  any  impeaching  evidence,"  post,  would 
of  course  admit  it  here  also.] 

*  FAs  expounded  by  Smith,  C.  J.,  in  Jones  v.  Jones,  79  N.  C.  249.] 

6  LAs  expounded  by  Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  Craig  i>.  Craig,  5  Rawle  97  ;  Bigelow,  C.  J., 
in  Cory  v.  Jenkins,  10  Gray  488.] 

6  ^Acutely  explained  by  Cooley,  J.,  in  Stewart  v.  People,  23  Mich.  74 ;  so  also 
Johnson,  J.,  in  Lyles  v.  Lyles,  1  Hill  Eq.  78  ;  Brackenridge,  J.,  in  Garwood  v.  Dennis, 
4  Binn.  314,  339.] 

7  [[But  certain  peculiar  cases  are  perhaps  explained  by  this,  or  something  like  it : 
State  v.  Dennin,  32  Vt.  158;  Zell  v.  Com.,  94  Pa.  258,  266,  273;  Hewitt  v.  Cory,  150 
Mass.  445 ;  Brown  v.  People,  17  Mich.  429,  435.1 

8  FJThe  cases  on  both  sides  are  as  follows :   Nichols  v.  Stewart,  20  Ala.  358,  361 ; 
Sonneborn  v.  Bernstein,  49  id.  168,  171  ;  Jones  v.  State,  107  id.  93;  People  v.  Doyell, 
48  Cal.  85,  90  ;  Barkley  v.  Vestal,  88  id.  396,  398;  McCord  v.  State,  83  Ga.  521,  531 ; 
Stolp  v.  Blair,  68  111.  541,  543 ;  Coffin  v.  Anderson,  4  Blackf.  395,  398 ;  Beauchamp  v. 
State,  6  id.  299,  308  ;  Perkins  v.  State,  4  Ind.  222 ;  Daily  v.  State,  28  id.  285  ;  Brook- 
bank  v.  State,  55  id.  169,  172;  Carter  v.  Carter,  79  id.  466;  Hodges  v.  Bales,  102  id. 
494,  500  ;  L.  &  P.  G.  T.  Co.  v.  Heil,  118  id.  135;  Hobbs  v.  State,  133  id.  404,  407; 
Hinshaw  v.  State,  147  id.  334;   Reynolds  v.  State,  ib.  3;   State  v.  Vincent,  24  la. 
570,  574;   State  v.  Langford,  45  La.  An.  1177;   State  v.  Cady,  46  id.  1346,  1349; 
McAleer  v.  Horsey,  35  Md.  439,  465;  St.  1874,  c.  386;  Mallonee  v.  Duff,  72  Md. 
283,  287;  State  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  147;  Hunt  v.  Roylance,  11  Cash.  117,  121  ;  Com.  v. 
Jenkins,  10  Gray  485,  487;  Hewitt  v.  Corey,  150  Mass.  445;  Stewart  v.  People,  23 
Mich.  63,  74;  Brown  v.  People,  17  id.  429,  435;  Head  v.  State,  44  Miss.  731.  751  ; 
State  v.  Taylor,  134  Mo.  109  ;  French  v.  Merrill,  6  N.  H.  465,  467;  Judd  v.  Brent- 
wood,  46  id.  430  ;  Jackson  v.  Etz,  5  Cow.  314.  320  ;  People  v.  Vane,  12  Wend.  78  ; 
People  v.  Moore,  15  id.  420,  423  ;  People  v.  Rector,  19  id.  569,  583  ;  Robh  v.  Hackley, 
23  id.  50  ;  Dudley  v.  Bolles,  24  id.  465,  472 ;  Johnson  v.  Patterson.  2  Hawks  183  ; 
State  v.  Twitly,  ib.  449 ;  State  v.  George,  8  Ire.  324,  328 ;  Hoke's  Ex'rs  v.  Fleming, 
10  id.  263,  266  ;  State  v.  Dove,  ib.  469,  473;  March  v.  Harrell,  1  Jones  L.  329;  State 
v.  Thomason,  ib.  274;  Wallace   v.  Grizzard,  114  N.  C.  488;  Turnbull  r.  O'Hnra.   4 
Yeates  446,  451  ;  Packer  v.  Gonsalus,  1  S.  &  R.  526,  536  ;  Foster  v.  Shaw,  7  id.  156, 
162;  Henderson  v.  Jones,  10  id.  322;  Craig  v.  Craig,  5  Rnwle  91  ;  McKee  v.  Jones, 
6  Pa.  425,  428  ;  Crooks  v.  Bunn,  136  id.  368,  371  ;  Lyles  v.  Lvles,  1  Hill  Eq.  S.  C.  77 ; 
State  v.  Thomas,  3  Strobh.  269,  271 ;   Story  v.  Saunders,  8  Humph.  663.  666 ;  Dosset 
v.  Miller,  3  Sneed,  72,  76;  Quern  v.  Morrow,  1  Coldw.  123,  134  ;  Third  Nat'l  Bank  v. 
Robinson,  1   Baxt  479,  484  :  Hayes  r.  Chatham,  6  Lea  1,  110;  Glass  »>.  Bennett,  89 
Tenn.  478,  481 ;  Graham  v.  McReynolds,  90  id.  673,  694  :  Goode  v.  State,  32  Tex.  Cr. 
505,  508 ;  Red  v.  State,  id.,  46  S.  W.  408;  Wright  v.  Deklvne,  1  PH.  C.  C.  199,  203  ; 
Conrad  v.  Griffey,  11  How.  480,  490  ;  Ellicotti*.  Pearl,  1  McLean  206,  211 ;  10  Pet.  412, 
439  ;  Mnnsnn  v.  Hustings.  12  Vt.  346,  350 ;  Gibbs  v.  Linsby,  13  id.  208.  215;  Stater. 
Flint,  60  id.  307,  310,  319.] 


§§  469  5-469  c.~\  SIMILAR  STATEMENTS.  607 

it  is  sometimes  said  that  they  must  have  been  uttered  before  the 
contradictory  one,9  but  this  seems  unnecessary.  (3)  Where  the  im- 
peachment has  consisted  merely  in  showing  error,  by  contradicting 
through  other  witnesses  (ante,  §  461  e),  consistency  of  statement  can 
be  of  no  help ;  otherwise,  the  witness  who  repeated  his  story  to  the 
greatest  number  of  persons  would  be  the  most  credible ;  yet  a  few 
Courts  see  value  in  such  evidence.10  (4)  Where  the  impeachment 
consists  in  a  charge  of  bias  or  interest  or  corruption,  there  is  value  in 
showing  a  prior  consistent  statement  before  the  time  when  the  sup- 
posed bias  or  interest  or  corruption  could  have  existed ;  for  it  thus 
appears  that  his  present  testimony  cannot  be  attributed  to  bias  or 
the  like.11  (5)  Similarly,  where  it  has  been  shown  that  the  witness 
failed  to  speak  of  the  matter  at  a  time  when  he  might  have  done  so, 
and  the  inference  is  suggested  that  his  present  story  is  therefore  a 
matter  of  recent  contrivance,  it  is  useful  to  show  that  the  witness,  on 
the  contrary,  has  already  made  the  same  statement,  and  thus  is  not 
now  for  the  first  time  making  it,  the  inference  of  recent  contrivance 
being  thus  rebutted.12  (6)  It  is  sometimes  said  that  this  sort  of  evi- 
dence is  admissible  after  impeachment  of  any  sort,  in  particular, 
after  any  impeachment  by  cross-examination ; 18  but  there  is  no  rea- 
son for  such  a  loose  rule.14] 

§  469  c.  Same  :  Fresh  Complaint  of  Rape ;  Constancy  of  Accu- 
sation in  Bastardy.  [1.  The  use  of  a  complaint  by  the  woman,  on  a 
trial  for  rape,  may  be  considered  in  three  aspects  ;  and  the  apparent 
confusion  of  rulings  results  largely  from  the  fact  that  the  Courts 
have  had  these  three  possible  theories  to  choose  from,  and  have 
both  chosen  differently  and  at  the  same  time  failed  frequently  to 
indicate  their  attitude  toward  the  other  theories. 

9  TGraham  v.  McReynolds,  90  Tenn.  673,  697 ;  Conrad  v.  Griffey,  11  How.  480,  491.] 

10  LThe  cases  on  both  sides  are  as  follows  :  Stolp  v.  Blair,  68  111.  541,  543  ;  Carter  t>. 
Carter,  79  Ind.  466,  468 ;  Hodges  v.  Bales,  102  id.  494,  500 ;  State  v.  Vincent,  24  la. 
570,  574 ;  State  v.  Dudoussat,  47  La.  An.   977  ;  Cooke  v.  Curtis,  6  H.  &  J.  93  ;  W. 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davison,  30  Md.  92,  104 ;  McAleer  v.  Horsey,  35  id.  439,  463  ;  Mail- 
land  v.  Bank,  40  id.  540,  559  ;  Bloomer  v.  State,  48  id.   521,  537  ;  Mallonee  v.  Duff, 
72  id.  283,  287  ;  Riney  v.  Vanlandingham,  9  Mo.  807,  812  ;  People  v.  Vane,  12  Wend. 
78;  Robb  v.   Hackley,  23  Wend.  50  ;  Dudley  v.  Bolles,  24  id.   465,  472;  March  v. 
Harrell,   1  Jones  L/329;  Bullinger  v.  Marshall,  70  N.  C.  520,  524;  Henderson*. 
Jones,  10  S.  &  R.  322  ;  Hester  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  139,   158  ;  Glass  v.  Bennett,  89  Tenn. 
478,  481 ;  United  States  v.  Neverson,  1  Mackey  152,  169  ;  Wright  v.  Deklyne,  1  Pet. 
C.  C.  199,  203 ;  Munson  v.  Hastings,  12  Vt,  346,  350.  J 

11  ^Expounded  in  Evans,  Notes  to  Pothier,  II,  247  ;  good  examples  in  Barkly  v. 
Copeland,  74  Cal.  1,  5  ;  Com.  v.  Jenkins,  10  Gray  485 ;  State  v.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304,  307, 
316.     The  rule  is  nowhere  disputed.] 

12  PJGood  statements  are  found  in  Com.  v.  Wilson,  1  Gray  338  ;  Com.  v.  Jenkins,  10 
id.  485  ;  Munson  v.  Hastings,  12  Vt.  346,  350  ;  State  v.  Flint,  60  id.  304,  309,  317. 
The  principle  is  everywhere  conceded,  though  its  application  is  sometimes  difficult ; 
see,  for  instance,  State  v.  Cruise,  19  la.  312  ;  Bait.  C.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Knee,  83  Md.  77  ; 
and  the  cases  in  note  7,  swpra.] 

13  FJStolp  v.  Blair,  68  111.  541,  543 ;  Cooke  v.  Curtis,  6  H.  &  J.  93 ;  Com.  ».  Wilson, 
1  Gray  338  ;  Davenport  v.  McKee,  98  N.  C.  500.] 

14  [This  loose  form  of  statement, usually  found,  if  at  all,  in  the  early  cases,  has  been 
expressly  repudiated  in  New  York  (see  the  cases  ante)  and  Missouri :  State  v.  Taylor, 
134  Mo.  109  ;  and,  apart  from  North  Carolina,  it  is  probably  not  law  anywhere  to-day. 
The  proper  mode  is  to  decide  each  of  the  above  situations  upon  its  own  merits.] 


608  WITNESSES;  REHABILITATION.  [CH.  xxvi. 

(1)  The  complaint  may  be  treated  as  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay 
rule,  and  thus  admissible  as  evidence  of  the  facts  stated.     This  view, 
as  explained  ante,  §  102,  is  adopted  by  very  few  Courts.     It  is  to  be 
noted  here,  however,  for  comparison  with  the  other  theories,  that  it 
involves  three  important  consequences,  viz.,  (a)  the  particular  terms, 
and  not  merely  the   fact,  of  the  complaint  are  receivable ;    (6)  the 
woman  need  not  be  a  witness  ;    (c)  if  a  witness,  she  need  not  have 
been  impeached.     In  these  points  it  differs  from  one  or  the  other  of 
the  following  theories. 

(2)  The  complaint  may  be  treated  from  the  point  of  view  of  prior 
inconsistent  statements.     It  has  already  been  seen  (§  462  a)  that  a 
witness'  failure  to  speak  when  it  would  have  been  natural  to  do  so  is 
in  effect  an  inconsistent  statement  and  may  be  proved  in  impeach- 
ment.    When  a  woman  testifies  to  a  rape,  and  the  rape  is  denied,  the 
fact  that  the  woman  made  no  complaint,  at  or  shortly  after  the  time 
of  the  alleged  rape,  is  significant  against  her  in  precisely  this  way. 
Moreover,  if  it  were  not  shown  that  she  thus  complained,  the  oppo- 
nent might  well  argue  and  the  jury  infer  that  she  did  not  complain. 
It  is  therefore  only  just  that  the  prosecution  should  forestall  this 
assumption  by  showing  that  she  did  complain,  i.  e.  that  she  did  not 
behave  with  a  silence  inconsistent  with  her  present  story.     This  use  of 
the  mere  fact  of  the  complaint  is  universally  allowed.1     Moreover,  if 
she  did  not  complain,  the  reasons  for  her  silence  may  be  shown,2  just 
as  any  other  apparently  inconsistent  statements  may  be  explained 
away    (ante,  §  462  b).     By  the  ancient  tradition  the  complaint  must 
have  been  made  freshly  after  the  alleged  assault,  and  a  few  Courts 
preserve  this  rule,3  but  the  better  view  is  that  lapse  of  time  does  not 
exclude  the  fact.4    Certain  special  consequences   follow  from  the 
present  theory :    (a)  The  fact  of  the  complaint,  not  its  terms  or  de- 
tails, is  all  that  is  admitted,  for  the  fact  alone  is  needed  to  rebut  the 
supposed  inconsistent  silence ; 5  this  is  the  marked  feature  of  this 
theory  as  distinguished  from  the  ensuing  one ;  the  exclusion  of  the 

1  [[The  theory  is  well  expounded  by  Woodruff,  J.,  in  Baccio  v.  People,  41  N.  Y. 
268  ;  Allen,  J.,  in  Brogy's  Case,  10  Gratt.  729.] 

2  [[Expounded  by  Bellows,  J.,  in  State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  155  ;  Woodruff,  J.,  in 
Baccio  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  268.     The  rule  is  not  disputed.! 

8  nt.  v.  Lillyraan,  1896,  2  Q.  B.  167,  170  ;  People  v.  O'Sullivan,  104  N.  Y.  481, 
490  ;  Dunn  v.  State,  45  Oh.  St.  249,  252  ;  Com.  v.  Cleary,  Mass.,  51  N.  E.  746  (un- 
decided  ;  but  time  is  in  trial  Court's  discretion) ;  People  v.  Lambert,  Gal.,  52  Pac.  307."] 

«  [[People  v.  Gage,  62  Mich.  271,  semblt;  State  v.  Marcks,  140  Mo.  656  ;  State  v. 
Knapp,  45  N.  H.  155,  semble;  State  v.  Niles,  47  Vt.  82,  86.] 

»  [Griffin  v.  State,  76  Ala.  29,  31 ;  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  649;  People  v.  Lam- 
berr,  Cal.,  52  Pac.  307;  Stephen  v.  State,  11  Ga.  225,  233;  Poison  v.  State,  137  Ind. 
519,  523;  McMurrin  v.  Ri^by,  80  la.  322,  325  ;  State  v.  Mulkern,  85  Me.  106,  107; 
People  v.  Bernor,  Mich.,  74  N.  W.  184  ;  State  v.  Shettleworth,  18  Minn.  208,  212; 
State  v.  Jones,  61  Mo.  232,  285  ;  Mathews  v.  State,  19  Nebr.  330,  337  ;  State  v.  Knapp, 
45  N.  H.  148,  155;  Baccio  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  265,  271  ;  Harmon  v.  Terr.,  Okl.,  49 
Pac.  55 ;  Pefferlins?  v.  State,  40  Tex.  486,  492 ;  State  v.  Bedard,  65  Vt.  278,  284 ; 
Brojzy's  Case,  10  Gratt.  722,  726  ;  State  v.  Hunter,  18  Wash.  670 ;  Hannon  v.  State, 
70  Wis.  448,  452.] 


§  469  C.]  COMPLAINT  OF  EAPE.  609 

terras  of  the  statement  is,  by  implication  or  expressly,  a  repudiation 
of  the  theory  of  an  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule  and  of  the  theory 
of  corroboration  below  explained  ;  (b)  the  woman  must  be  a  wit- 
ness, for  her  silence  is  supposed  to  be  evidential  only  as  inconsistent 
with  her  testimony,  and  if  she  does  not  testify  there  is  no  inference 
to  be  rebutted ; 6  yet  only  rarely  is  this  requirement  made ;  (c)  the 
woman  need  not  have  been  impeached.7 

(3)  The  third  theory  is  that  of  similar  consistent  statements  (ante, 
§  469  b).  The  testimony  of  an  ordinary  witness  who  has  been  im- 
peached in  certain  ways  may  be  corroborated,  as  we  have  seen,  by  evi- 
dence of  his  similar  and  consistent  statements  made  at  other  times. 
It  is  a  legitimate  application  of  that  principle  to  admit  the  woman's 
prior  complaint  in  the  present  instance.  Upon  this  theory,  (a)  it 
follows  that  the  details  or  terms  of  the  statement  are  admissible,  as 
they  would  be  for  any  other  witness ; 8  this  peculiarly  distinguishes 
this  theory  from  the  preceding  one.  (b)  It  follows,  also,  that  the 
woman  must  have  testified  ;  for  otherwise  there  is  no  witness  to  cor- 
roborate.9 (c)  It  follows,  also,  that  she  must  have  been  impeached, 
for  this  is  a  part  of  the  general  rule  allowing  corroboration  by  con- 
sistent statements,  the  Courts  differing  as  to  the  precise  kind  of 
impeachment  that  must  have  occurred  (ante,  §  469  b)  ; 10  yet  there  are 
Courts  which  do  not  carry  out  the  principle  to  this  extent  but  allow  the 
complaint  to  be  put  in  evidence  on  the  direct  examination  and  before 
any  impeachment.11 

The  practical  result,  taken  in  the  rough,  of  these  different  possible 
theories  is  (1)  the  fact  of  complaint  is  universally  admitted  ;  (2) 
the  details  or  terms  of  it  (a)  are  by  a  very  few  Courts  admitted 
under  the  first  theory,  (b)  are  by  a  very  few  other  Courts  admitted 
under  the  third  theory,  even  on  direct  examination,  (c)  are  by  most 

6  [Teople  v.  O'Sullivan,  104  N.  Y.  481,  486  ;  Com.  v.  Cleary,  Mass.,  51  N.  E.  746 ; 
undecided  in  Brogy's  Case,  10  Gratt.  722,  727.    The  English  raliiigs  are  obscure  :  R.  r. 
Megson,  9  C.  &  P.  420  ;  R.  v.  Guttridge,  ib.  471  ;  R.  ».  Walker,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  212.] 

7  rCom.  r.  Cleary,  Mass.,  51  N.  E.  746,  semWe.] 

8  (The  cases  in  the  next  two  notes  all  accept  this.] 

9  QR.  v.  Megson,  9  C.  &  P.  420  ;  R.  r.  Guttridge,  ib.  471,  setnble;  People  r.  Graham, 
21  Cal.  261  ;  Weldon  v.  State,  32  Ind.  81 ;  Thompson  v.  State,  38  id.  39 ;  State  v. 
Meyers,  46  Nebr.  152  ;  People  v.  McGee,  1  Denio  19  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Oh.  St. 
593  ;  Phillips  r.  State,  9  Humph.  246.] 

10  fJThe  following  Courts  seem  to  require  impeachment  of  one  sort  or  another :  Griffin 
v.  State,  76  Ala.  29  ;  Pleasant  v.  State.  15  Ark.  624,  649;  Thompson  v.  State,  38  Ind. 
39  ;  McMurrin  v.  Rijrby,  80  la.  322 ;  State  v.   Langford,  45  La.  An.  1177  ;  State  v. 
Jones,  61  Mo.  232  ;  Oleson  v.  State,  11  Nebr.   276 ;  Baccio  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  265, 
269;  Stater.  Marshall,  Phillips  N.  C.  49;  States  Sargent,  Or.,  49  Pac.  889;  Phil- 
lips v.  State,  9  Humph.  246  ;  Thompson  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  472. 

The  English  rulings  were  at  first  not  clear :  R.  P.  Eyre,  2  F.  &  F.  579  ;  R.  r.  Wood, 
14  Cox  Cr.  47;  bnt  hi  R.  v.  Lillyman,  1896,  2  Q.  B/167,  177,  the  ruling  is  the  same 
as  in  the  cases  in  the  next  note.] 

11  ["These  seem  to  be  as  follows:  State  v.  Byrne,  47  Conn.  465;  U.  S.  v.  Snowden, 
2  D.  C.  App.  89 ;  People  v.  McGee,  1  Denio  19 ;  Dunn  v.  State,  45  Oh.  St.  249,  and 
prior  cases;  Ellicott  r.  Pearl,  1  McLean,  206,  211. 

Most  of  the  rulings  prescribe  that  the  complaint  should  have  been  recent ;  but  this 
is  strictly  unnecessary,  under  the  present  theory.] 
VOL.  i.  —  39 


610  WITNESSES;  KEHABILITATION.  [CH.  xxvi. 

Courts  declared  inadmissible  by  virtue  of  the  first  and  the  second 
theories,  but  by  a  majority  within  this  majority  are  nevertheless 
admitted  under  the  third  theory,  i.  e.  after  impeachment. 

2.  At  the  time  when  disqualification  by  reason  of  interest  prevailed, 
statutes  were  passed  by  which  the  mother  of  a  bastard  became  a  com- 
petent witness  in  bastardy  proceedings  provided  she  had  been  "  con- 
stant in  her  accusation,"  in  that  during  her  travail  she  had  charged 
the  paternity  of  the  child  upon  the  same  person  now  defendant  in  the 
bastardy  proceedings.12  Since  the  abolition  of  incompetency  by  inter- 
est, these  declarations  (no  longer  essential  to  make  the  mother  com- 
petent) present  themselves  in  a  new  aspect,  i.  e.  whether  they  are 
admissible  in  corroboration  of  the  testimony  of  the  mother.  It  is 
generally  held,  in  those  jurisdictions  where  their  use  for  the  above 
purpose  once  prevailed,  that  they  are  still  admissible  in  corrobora- 
tion  ; 1S  but  elsewhere  their  use  seems  to  be  repudiated.14] 

w  PSee  Appendix  II,  §  349.] 

18  fHarty  v.  Malloy,  67  Conn.  339  ;  Leonard  v.  Bolton,  148  Mass.  66  (under  statute).] 

14  LState  v.  Spencer,  Minn.,  75  N.  W.  893 ;  Stoppert  v.  Nierle,  4,5  Nebr.  105.] 


§§469t?-469d.]  SELF-CRIMINATION.  611 


CHAPTER   XXVII. 

WITNESSES  (CONTINUED)  :   PRIVILEGE. 

§  469 j.   Same:    (2)   Matters  Collateral 
to  the  Issue. 

§  469  k.  Same  :  (3)  Indirect  Exposure. 


§  469  d.  Self-crimination  ;  (1)  By  Testi- 
mony on  the  Stand. 

§  469  e.  Same :  (2)  By  Exhibition  of 
the  Person,  or  the  like. 

§  469 /.  Same:  (3)  By  Production  of 
Documents. 

§  469  g.   Civil  Liability  or  Loss. 

§  469  h.  Forfeiture. 

§  469  i.  Infamy  or  Disgrace:  (1)  Mat- 
ters Material  to  the  Issue. 


§  469  I.  Same  :  Summary. 

§  469  m.  Corporal  Inspection  of  Civil 


Party. 


§  469  n.   Witness'  Production  of  Title- 


deeds. 


§  469  d  [451].  Self-crimination;  (1)  By  Testimony  on  the  Stand. 
Where  it  reasonably  appears  that  the  answer  will  have  a  tendency  to 
expose  the  witness  to  a  penal  liability,  or  to  any  kind  of  punishment, 
or  to  a  criminal  charge ;  here  the  authorities  are  exceedingly  clear 
that  the  witness  is  not  bound  to  answer.1 

[A  number  of  distinct  topics  here  present  themselves,  (a)  The 
criminality  of  the  matter  inquired  about.  It  does  not  matter  that 
the  proceeding  is  civil  in  form,  so  long  as  it  is  penal  in  its  nature.3 
But  the  Courts  of  a  given  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction  are  concerned 
only  with  the  laws  of  that  sovereignty ;  and  hence  it  is  immaterial 
that  the  matter  involves  a  crime  by  some  other  system  of  law,  so  long 
as  it  is  not  a  crime  by  the  law  administered  in  the  Court  of  the  trial.8 
Furthermore,  if  the  matter  inquired  about  has  ceased  to  be  the  sub- 
ject of  criminal  prosecution  against  the  witness,  there  is  no  field  for 
the  privilege.  Thus,]  if  the  prosecution  to  which  he  might  be  ex- 
posed is  barred  by  lapse  of  time,  the  privilege  ceases,  and  the  witness 
is  bound  to  answer ; 4  [and  his  claim  of  privilege  at  a  former  time, 

1  Southard  v.  Eexford,  6  Cowen  254 ;  1   Burr's  Trial  245  ;  E.  India  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell,  1  Ves.  247  ;  Paxton  v.  Douglass,  19  Ves.  225  ;  Gates  v.  Hardacre,  3  Taunt.  424  ; 
Macbride  v.  Macbride,  4  Esp.  243  ;  R.  v.  Lewis,  id.  225 ;  R.  v.  Slaney,  5  C.  &  P.  213; 
R.  v.  Pegler,  5  C.  &  P.  521  ;  Dodd  v.  Norris,  3  Campb.  519  ;  Maloney  v.  Bartley,  id. 
210.     QFor  the  history  of  this  privilege,  see  an  article  by  the  present  editor  in  5  Harv. 
L.  Rev.  71,  entitled  "  Nemo  tenetur  seipsum  prodere."]     This  rule  is  also  adminis- 
tered in  Chancery,  where  a  defendant  will  not  be  compelled  to  discover  that  which,  if 
answered,  would  tend  to  subject  him  to  a  penalty  or  punishment,  or  which  might,  lead 
to  a  criminal  accusation,  or  to  ecclesiastical  censures  :  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  524,  576,  577, 
592-598  ;  Mclntyre  v.  Mancius,  16  Johns.  592  ;  Wigram  on  Discovery,  pp.  61,  150,  195 
(1st  Am.  ed.)  ;  id.  §§  130-133,  271  (2d  Lond.  ed.)  ;  Mitford's  Eq.  PL  157-163. 

2  £Lees  o.  U.  S.,  150  U.  S.  476  (penalty  under  alien  immigration  statute ;  privilege 
applies) ;  Thruston  v.  Clark,  107  Cal.   285  (removal  from  office ;  privilege  applies) 
Miller  v.  State,  110  Ala.  69  (bastardy  ;  privilege  not  applicable).] 

8  CKing  of  Sicilies  ».  Wilcox,  7  State  Tr.  N.  s.  1049,  1062 ;  Brown  v.  Walker, 
161  U.  S.  591.] 

*  Roberts  v.  Allatt,  1  M.  &  Malk.  192  ;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  229,  252-255  ; 
rjLamson  o.  Boyden,  111.,  43  N.  E.  781  ;  South.  R.  V.  Co.  v.  Russell,  91  Ga.  808. 
But  it  is  usually  said  that  the  party  opposing  the  privilege  must  show  that  no  prosecu- 
tion was  begun  or  is  pending.] 


612  WITNESSES;  PRIVILEGE.  [CH.  xxvii 

the  statutory  period  having  elapsed  in  the  meantime,  may  be  used 
against  him  as  an  admission.8  So,  also,  where  the  witness  has  re- 
ceived a  pardon,  or  has  been  by  statute  indemnified  or  eased  from  all 
prosecution  for  the  offence,  there  is  no  crimination  involved,  and 
therefore  no  privilege.6  On  the  same  principle  a  legislative  pardon 
or  immunity  granted  in  advance  to  those  who  testify,  and  operating 
by  virtue  of  the  act  of  testifying,  renders  the  privilege  no  longer  ap- 
plicable to  an  answer  sought  under  such  a  statute,  because  "  any  evi- 
dence that  he  may  give  under  such  a  statutory  direction  will  not  be 
1  against  himself,'  for  the  reason  that  by  the  very  act  of  giving  evi- 
dence he  becomes  exempted  from  any  prosecution  or  punishment  for 
the  offence  respecting  which  his  evidence  is  given."  7  But  it  is  clear 
that  the  disclosure  of  the  criminal  matter,  against  which  his  privi- 
lege protects  him,  may  be  made,  not  merely  by  an  answer  directly 
involving  the  charge,  but  equally  by  an  answer  involving  a  matter 
connected  more  or  less  indirectly  with  such  a  charge.  In  the  phrase 
of  Chief  Justice  Marshall,]  if  the  fact  to  which  he  is  interrogated 
forms  but  one  link  in  the  chain  of  testimony,  which  is  to  convict  him, 
he  is  protected  ;  [in  other  words,  if  the  matter  of  the  answer  would 
tend  to  criminate  him,  the  privilege  applies  to  it.8  An  important 
consequence  of  this  is  that  a  statutory  immunity  which  provides 
merely  that  the  evidence  thus  given  shall  not  be  used  against  the 
witness  is  faulty,  so  far  as  its  purpose  is  to  render  the  privilege  in- 
applicable, since  the  privilege  protects  him  against  disclosures  which 
even  tend  to  criminate,  and  thus,  although  the  precise  answer  made 
could  not  under  the  statute  be  offered  in  evidence  against  him,  never- 
theless other  facts  discovered  by  means  of  it  could  still  be  so  used, 
and  therefore  the  use  of  them  thus  obtained  would  involve  a  viola- 
tion of  the  privilege  to  that  extent.9  The  only  mode  by  which  the 
privilege  can  be  made  inapplicable  seems  to  be  by  an  entire 

6  THolt  v.  State,  Tex.  Cr.,  45  S.  W.  1016  ;  Childs  v.  Merrill,  66  Vt.  302."] 

6  LThis  is  an  old  expedient  ;  see  Bishop  Atterbury's  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  604  ; 
Lord  Chancellor  Macclestield's  Trial,  ib.  921,  1147.  A  promise  of  pardon  to  an 
accomplice  cannot  suffice,  because  this  gives  only  an  "  equitable  right  "  to  immunity  : 
Ex  pnrt.e  Irvine,  74  Fed.  945,  964-3 

*  \_Ex,  parte  Cohen,  104  Cal.  524.  Accord  :  State  v.  Nowell,  58  N.  H.  314  ;  Brown  v. 
Walker,  161  U.  8.  591  ;  see  People  t>.  Sharp,  107  N.  Y.  427  ;  Frazee  v.  State, 
58  Ind.  8  ;  Floyd  v.  State,  7  Tex.  215  ;  Kendrick  v.  Com.,  78  Va.  490  ;  People  v. 
Sternberg,  111  Cal.  3;  Park  v.  Johnson,  86  la.  475  ;  Lamson  v.  Boyden,  111.,  43  N.  E. 
781  ;  Henderson  v.  State,  95  Ga.  326.] 

8  [Tarkhurst  v.  Lowten,  2  Swanst.  215  ;  R.  v.  Hulme,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  877;  People 
v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  252  ;  Burr's  Trial,  I,  244;  L.  C.  Macclesfield's  Trial,  16  How.  St. 
Tr.  920  (the  former  incumbent  of  an  office  asked  what  was  the  greatest  price  it  was 
ever  sold  for;  privileged);  Smith  v.  Smith,  116  N.  C.  886  (divorce;  whether  the 
witness  had  had  intercourse  with  the  defendant,  a  single  act  not  being  criminal; 


9  QCom.  v.  Emery,  107  Mass.  172  ;  C'ounselman  v.  Hitchcock,  142  U.  S.  547. 
The  variety  of  phrasing  in  the  constitutional  provisions  (collected  post,  in  Appendix  I), 
e.  g.  exempting  one  from  "  being  a  witness,"  "  furnishing  evidence,"  "giving  evidence," 
against  himself,  are  not  usually  ri-gnrded  as  affecting  the  result.  The  reasoning  of  th« 
above  cases  is  not  beyond  criticism.] 


§  469  £?.]  SELF-CRIMINATION.  613 

immunity  granted  for  the  offence  itself  to  which  the  testimony 
relates.10 

(#)  The  making  of  the  claim,  and  its  determination.  Being  in- 
tended solely  for  the  witness'  sake,]  the  privilege  is  his  own,  and  not 
that  of  the  party ;  counsel,  therefore,  will  not  be  allowed  to  make 
the  objection ;  n  [nor,  if  the  Court  erroneously  disregards  the  privi- 
lege, may  the  party  complain  of  the  error.12]  Whether  it  may  tend 
to  criminate  or  expose  the  witness  is  a  point  upon  which  the  Court 
are  bound  to  instruct  him ; 18  and  which  the  Court  will  determine, 
under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case ; 14  but  without  requiring  the 
witness  fully  to  explain  how  he  might  be  criminated  by  the  answer, 
which  the  truth  would  oblige  him  to  give ; 16  for  if  he  were  obliged  to 
show  how  the  effect  would  be  produced,  the  protection  which  this 
rule  of  law  is  designed  to  afford  him  would  at  once  be  annihilated. 
[It  is  not  necessary  that  the  witness  should  expressly  say  that  the 
answer  would  criminate  him,  if  this  is  clear  from  the  nature  of  the 
question.16]  But  the  Court  will  not  prevent  the  witness  from  an- 
swering it,  if  he  chooses  :  they  will  only  advertise  him  of  his  right 
to  decline  it.17 

(c)  [The  waiver  of  the  privilege,  by  testifying  in  part.     The  wit- 

10  fJSee  the  cases   in  note  7,  ante.     The  argument,  considered  and  repudiated  in 
Brown  v.  Walker,   161  U.  S.  591,   that  above  and  beyond  the    criminality,    which 
may  be  removed  by  statute,  there  is  an  infamy  and  disgrace  not  removable  by  any 
statute,  but  also  within  the  protection  of  the  privilege,  is  wholly  unfounded,  and  it  is 
a  matter  of  surprise  that  any  support  was  found  for  it  in  a  dissenting  opinion.     It 
seems  to  rest  upon  a  confusion  of  the  present  privilege  with  that  treated  post,  §  469  i, 
the  latter  being  wholly  distinct  historically,  and  not  being  within  the  purview  of  the 
Constitution.     The  article  referred  to  ante,  note  1,  will  serve  to  explain  this.J 

11  Thomas  v.  Newton,  1  M.  &  M.  48,  note  ;  R.  v.  Adey,  1  M.  &  Rob.  94 ;  j  Com.  v. 
Shaw,  4  Cush.  594  ;  State  v.  Wentworth,  65  Me.  234  ;|   [[State  „.  Pancoast,  5  N.  D. 
516  ;  Ingersol  v.  McWillie,  87  Tex.  647  ;  contra,  as  to  counsel  claiming  on  witness' 
behalf :  Clifton  v.  Granger,  86  la.  573.     Nor  may  counsel  even  ask  that  the  witness 
be  warned  :  State  v.  Butler,  47  S.  C.  25  ;  contra:  State  v.  Pancoast,  supra^ 

12  [JR.  v.  Kinglake,  22  L.  T.  N.  s.  335  ;  Samuel  v.  People,  164  111.  379 ;  Morgan  v. 
Halberstadt,  20  U.  S.  App.  417,  424;]  j  except  where  he  is  also  the  witness:  People 
v.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571  ;  State  ?>.  Wentworth,  65  Me.  234.  { 

18  Close  v.  Olney,  1  Denio  319.  [There  is  good  authority  for  the  contrary  view ; 
see  Dunn  v.  State,  99  Ga,  211  ;  though  the  early  English  practice  seems  to  have 
favored  giving  the  warning;  see  L.  C.  Macclesfield's  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  850  ;  Bain- 
bridge's  Trial,  22  id.  143  ;  Watt's  Trial,  23  id.  1265-3 

14  [The  earlier  English  rulings  were  not  harmonious  :  R.  v.  Garbett,  1  Den.  Cr.  C. 
236  ;  Fisher  v.  Ronalds,  12  C.  B.  762  ;  Adams  v.  Lloyd,  3  H.  &  N.  361  ;  Osborn  v. 
Dock  Co.,  10  Exch.  702  ;  Sidebottom  v.  Adkins,  3  Jur.  N.  s.  631  ;  Ex  parte  Fernandez, 
10  C.  B.  N.  s.  3,  39 ;  but  in  R.  v.  Boyes,  1  B.  &  S.  311,  it  was  finally  decided  that 
"  the  Court  must  see,  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  nature  of  the  evi- 
dence which  the  witness  is  called  to  give,  that  there  is  reasonable  ground  to  apprehend 
danger  to  the  witness  from  his  being  compelled  to  answer."  Accord :  Ex  parte  Senior, 
37  Fla.  1 ;  Ex  parte  Irvine,  74  Fed.  954 ;_]  \Exparte  Schofield,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  D.  230  ;f 
[see  Brown  v.  Walker,  161  U.  S.  591  ;  People  v.  Forbes,  N.  Y.,  38  N.  E.  303  ; 
Warner  v.  Lucas,  10  Oh.  336  ;  Kirschner  v.  State,  9  Wis.  140.] 

"  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  229 ;  1  Burr's  Trial  245 ;  Southard  v.  Rexford, 
6  Cowen  254,  255  ;  Bellinger  v.  People,  8  Wend.  595 ;  fjsee  Janvrin  v.  Scammon, 
29  X.  H.  280  ;  QChamberlain  v.  Willson,  12  Vt.  491  ;]  Short  i>.  Mercier,  15  Jur.  93. 

18  fJAlston  v.  State,  109  Ala.  5l7»  Perkins  v.  Bank,  17  Wash.  100.} 

w  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  252. 


614  WITNESSES;  PRIVILEGE.  [CH.  xxvn. 

ness  may,  of  course,  waive  the  privilege.]  In  all  cases  where  the 
witness,  after  being  advertised  of  his  privilege,  chooses  to  answer,  he 
is  bound  to  answer  everything  relative  to  the  transaction.18  [But 
here  certain  discriminations  are  necessary,  (c')  "Where  the  witness  is 
not  a  party,  and  has  not  yet  been  asked  an  incriminating  question, 
there  has  been  no  waiver,  and  hence  as  soon  as  such  a  question  is 
reached,  the  answer  may  be  declined.  But  where  an  incriminating 
question  has  been  answered,  he  may  not  refuse  to  explain  the  whole 
of  the  subject  of  that  answer.19  (c")  Where  the  witness  is  a  party 
several  situations  may  arise.  A  voluntary  giving  of  testimony  at  a 
former  stage  of  the  case  will  usually  not  be  treated  as  a  waiyer.20  But 
the  taking  of  the  stand  to  give  testimony  in  chief,  particularly  by  a 
defendant  in  a  criminal  case,  may  well  be  treated  as  a  waiver  so  far  as 
to  oblige  him  to  submit  to  a  cross-examination.  Here  at  least  three 
views  may  be  distinguished  ;  one  is  that  there  the  party  may  never- 
theless stop  at  any  point  he  chooses  j  another  is  that  he  is  open  to 
cross-examination  precisely  as  any  other  witness  is ;  still  another  is 
that  he  is  open  to  cross-examination  only  on  facts  material  to  the 
issue ;  but  the  phrasing  of  the  rules  differs  more  or  less  in  various 
jurisdictions;  and  in  any  event  it  would  seem  that  a  distinction 
ought  to  be  made  between  a  party  to  a  civil  case  and  an  accused  in  a 
criminal  case.21  Whether  the  waiver,  if  any,  extends  so  far  as  to  per- 
mit the  prosecution  to  recall  the  accused  to  the  stand  after  he  has 
left  it  is  also  a  matter  on  which  opinions  differ.22 

M  Dixon  ».  Vale,  1  C.  &  P.  278 ;  State  v.  K ,  4  N.  H.  562  ;  East  v.  Chapman, 

1  M.  &  Malk.  46  ;  s.  c.  2  C.  &  P.  570;  Low  v.  Mitchell,  6  Shepl.  372.  [The  author's 
text  also  reads  :  "  He  may  claim  the  protection  at  any  stage  of  the  inquiry,  whether  lie 
has  already  answered  the  question  in  part,  or  not  at  all  : "  R.  v.  Garbett,  1  Den.  Cr. 
C.  236;  Exparte  Cossens,  Buck's  Bankr.  Cas.  531,  545;  but  this  is  obviously  mis- 
leading in  connection  with  the  above  passage.] 

19  L~But  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion  and  phrasing  here ;  see  R.  ».  Garbett, 
1  Den.  Cr.  C.  236;  Norfolk  v.  Gaylord,  28  Conn.  309;  Low  v.  Mitchell,  18  Me.  372  ; 
Foster  v.  Pierce,  11  Cush.  437;  Foster  v.  People,  18  Mich.  266;  Amherst  ».  Hollis, 
9  N.  H.  107  ;  Coburn  v.  Odell,  30  N.  H.  540,  554  ;  Chesapeake  Club  v.  State,  63  Md. 
446  Q  { Mayo  v.  Mayo,  119  Mass.  290  ;  Com.  v.  Pratt,  126  id.  462.  { 

»  "LGeorg.  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Lybrend,  99  Ga.  421  (former  trial);  Samuel  v.  People,  164 
111.  379  (making  affidavit)  ;]  jCullen's  Case,  24  Gratt.  624  (testifying  before  coroner). } 

81  QSee,  for  the  various  views,  Cooley,  Const.  Limit.  317  ;  Fisher  v.  Fisher,  30  L.  J. 
P.  M.  A.  24  ;  Buchanan  v.  State,  109  Ala.  7  ;  People  v.  Gallagher,  100  Cal.  466,  476  ; 
People  v.  Dole,  id.,  51  Pac.  945  ;  Bradford  v.  People,  22  Colo.  157  ;  Ex  pnrte  Senior,  37 
Fla.  1  ;  State  v.  Larkins,  Ida.,  47  Pac.  945;  Saylor  v.  Com.,  97  Ky.  184  ;]  jState  v. 
Witham,  72  Me.  531  ;  Roddy  v.  Finnegan,  43  Md.  490  ;  Com.  v.  Price,  10  Gray  472  ; 
Com.  v.  Mullen,  97  Mass.  545  ;  Andrews  v.  Frye,  104  id.  235  ;  Worthington  v.  Scrib- 
ncr,  109  id.  487  ;  Com.  v.  Morgan,  107  id.  199  ;  Com.  v.  Nichols,  114  id.  285  ;  Com. 
v.  Tolliver,  119  id.  -312  ;j  [Com.  v.  Smith,  163  id.  411 ;  State  v.  Ober.  52  N.  H.  459  ;] 
j Connors  v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  240  ;  People  v.  Brown,  72  id.  571  ;}  QState  v.  Pancoast, 
6  N.  D.  516  ;  State  v.  Moore,  Or.,  48  Pac.  468  ;  Clapp  t>.  State,  94  Tenn.  186  ;  State 
v.  Duncan,  7  Wash.  336;  State  v.  O'Hara,  17  id.  525.  For  the  treatment  of  a  de- 
fendant merely  making  a  "  statement,"  see  Hackney  v.  State,  101  Ga.  512. 

The  principle  that,  apart  from  the  privilege  against  criminating  questions,  a  de- 
fendant taking  the  stand  may  be  impeached  like  any  other  witness  (ante,  §  444  b), 
must  be  carefully  distinguished,  though  the  two  are  occasionally  confused  in  judicial 
opinions.] 

M  QSee  Thomas  v.  State,  100  Ala.  63  ;  State  ».  Home,  9  Kan.  123 ;  State  v.  Lewis, 
6  id.  374.] 


§§  469  rf-469  e.]  SELF-CRIMINATION.  615 

(d)  Drawing  inferences  from  the  claim  of  the  privilege.]     If  the 
witness  declines  answering,  no  inference  of  the  truth  of  the  fact  is 
permitted  to  be  drawn  from  that  circumstance.28    [But  some  discrim- 
minations  must  here  be  made.     The  theory  on  which  it  is  supposed 
to  be  improper  to  draw  inferences  from  the  claim  of  privilege  is  that 
otherwise  the  privilege  would  in  effect  be  nullified  by  making  the 
failure  to  answer  equivalent  to  an  admission  of  the  incriminating 
circumstance,  and  thus  in  truth  making  the  witness  testify  in  spite  of 
his  privilege.     So  far,  then,  as  a  defendant's  conduct  does  not  consist 
in  a  claim  of  privilege,  there  is  no  objection  to  the  drawing  of  such 
inferences  as  would  be  proper  in  the  ordinary  case  of  a  party's  con- 
duct.   Thus,  the  defendant's  failure  to  produce  witnesses  who  might 
well  have  been  produced  is  (on  the  principle  of  §§  1956,  ff.,  ante)  a 
proper  subject  of  comment ; 2*  or  his  failure  to  produce  any  other  pre- 
sumably available  evidence,26  as,  to  account  for  the  recent  possession 
of  stolen  goods ; 28  and,  on  the  same  principle,  where  his  privilege  has 
ceased  by  waiver,  his  refusal  to  answer  particular  questions,  or  fail- 
ure to  make  explanations,  is  a  proper  subject  for  inference.27] 

(e)  No  answer  forced  from  him  by  the  presiding  judge,  after  he  has 
claimed  protection,  can  be  afterwards  given  in  evidence  against  him.28 

§  469  e.  Same  :  (2)  By  Exhibition  of  the  Person,  or  the  like.  [The 
scope  of  the  privilege,  in  history  and  in  principle,  includes  only  the 

28  Rose  v.  Blakemore,  Ry.  &.  Mo.  383 ;  ptillman  v.  Tucker,  Peake  Add.  Cas.  222 ; 
but  there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  on  this  point  in  English  practice  :  Bayley,  J.,  in 
R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  153  ;  Reporter's  note  to  Rose  v.  Blakemore,  supra.  In  this 
country  a  few  jurisdictions  do  not  forbid  the  inference  to  be  drawn  :  j  State  ».  Bartlett, 
55  Me.  200  ;(  Parker  v.  State,  N.  J.,  39  Atl.  651 ;  but  the  great  majority  accept  the 
rule  stated  in  the  text ;  the  prohibition  of  course  usually  finds  application  in  the  coun- 
sel's argument  to  the  jury  ;  in  most  States  the  statute  qualifying  the  accused  to  testify 
(post,  Appendix  I)  expressly  makes  this  prohibition;  see  People  v.  Sanders,  114  Cal. 
216  ;  Quinn  v.  People,  123  111.  333  ;  Long  v.  State,  56  Ind.  182  ;  State  v.  Baldoser, 
88  la.  55 ;  State  v.  Curnazy,  id.,  76  N.  W.  805 ;  State  v.  Holmes,  65  Minn.  230  ; 
Reddick  v.  State,  72  Miss.  1008  ;  ] Garner.  Litchfield,  2  Mich.  340  ;(  People  v.  Hoch, 
150  N.  Y.  291  ;  People  0.  Fitzgerald,  id.,  50  N.  E.  846  ;  jPhelin  v.  Kenkerdine,  20  Pa. 
354  ;{  State  v.  Hull,  18  R.  I.  207  ;  Wilson  v.  U.  S.,  149  U.  S.  60.  A  question  sometimes 
arises  even  as  to  the  propriety  of  the  judge  so  charging  the  jury  ;  see  State  v.  Johnson, 
50  La.  An.,  23  So.  199.  Under  the  English  statute  of  1898  (ante,  §  333  a)  allowing 
an  accused  person  to  testify,  but  forbidding  comment  by  the  prosecution  on  his  silence, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  judge  may  nevertheless  comment  upon  it  .-  R.  v.  Rhodes,  1899, 
1  Q.  B.  77.  j 

24  fJPeople  i>.  Mills,  94  Mich.  630,  638  ;  contra,  but  wholly  unsound  in  reasoning : 
State  v.  Hull,  18  R.  I.  207.  But  the  non-production  of  a  privileged  or  incompetent 
witness  is  a  different  matter:  Graves  i>.  U.  S.,  150  U.  S.  118.] 

28  [Frazer  v.  State,  135  Ind.  38.] 

28  TJackson  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  342.] 

27  LState  v.  Glave,  51  Kan.  330;  Taylor  v.  Com.,  Ky.,  34  S.  W.  227;  {Com.  v. 
Morgan,  107  Mass.  199  ;  State  v.  Ober,  52  N.  H.  459 ;  Stover  v.  People,  56  N.  Y.315;{ 
so  also,  for  a  claim  at  a  former  time,  where  the  offence  has  been  barred  by  limitation : 
ante,  note  5.] 

38  R.  v.  Garbett,  2  0.  &  K.  474.  [That  this  kind  of  an  objection  cannot  be  taken 
by  a  party  as  such,  see  ante,  notes  11,  12.  It  has  been  suggested  that  testimony  given 
in  violation  of  the  privilege  cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  a  charge  of  perjury  ;  but  this 
seems  to  involve  an  entire  misapprehension  of  the  principle  of  the  privilege;  to  men- 
tion but  one  reason,  the  testimony  in  that  case  is  not  evidence  of  any  offence,  but  is  the 
offence  itself;  see  U.  S.  v.  Bell,  81  Fed.  830,  852  ;  Com.  v.  Turner,  98  Ky.  526  ;  post, 
Vol.  Ill,  §  191.] 


616  WITNESSES;  PRIVILEGE.  [CH.  XXVIL 

process  of  testifying,  by  word  of  mouth  or  in  writing,  i.  e.  the  process 
of  disclosure  by  utterance.  It  has  no  application  to  such  physical, 
evidential  circumstances  as  may  exist  on  the  witness'  body  or  about 
his  person.  The  privilege  does  not  rest  on  the  extreme  notion  that  a 
guilty  person  is  entitled  to  conceal  as  much  as  he  can  of  the  evidence 
of  his  crime ;  but  on  the  notion  that  he  should  not  be  made  to  confess 
it  out  of  his  own  mouth.1  Nevertheless,  in  the  last  generation  a  false 
and  sentimental  tenderness  for  the  guilty  accused  has  created  a  ten- 
dency in  some  quarters  to  extend  the  privilege  in  ways  unimagined 
by  those  who  laid  its  foundations;  and  the  question  is  now  often 
raised  whether  the  privilege  does  not  protect  an  accused  person  from 
the  inspection  or  search  or  exhibition  of  his  person.  In  the  great 
majority  of  jurisdictions  this  extension  has  received  no  sanction ; 2 
for  example,  the  accused  may  be  compelled  to  stand  up  in  court  for 
identification ; 8  a  physician  may  be  sent  to  examine  him,  while  in 
jail,  as  to  his  mental  condition ; 4  a  measurement  of  the  accused's 
feet,  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  footprints,  may  be  taken ; 5  the 
accused  may  be  compelled  to  place  his  foot  in  tracks  for  the  purpose 
of  noting  the  correspondence.6  But  the  opposite  view  has  been 
taken,  for  some  of  these  things,  by  a  few  Courts.7] 

§  469  f.  Same:  (3)  By  Production  of  Documents.  [The  purpose 
of  the  privilege  is  to  exempt  one  from  testifying,  i.  e.  from  any  mode 
of  disclosure  peculiarly  that  of  a  witness  in  the  ordinary  sense.  A 
witness  may  testify  by  the  use  of  writings,  and  not  merely  by  oral 
utterances;  it  is  therefore  perhaps  a  consequence  of  the  principle 
that  the  production  of  documents  is  within  the  protection  of  the 
privilege ;  and  it  has  been  so  generally  regarded.1  But  the  defend- 
ant's production  of  documents  after  the  manner  of  a  witness  is  a 
different  thing  from  the  official  seizure  and  impounding  of  incrimin- 
ating documents.  In  the  latter  case,  the  defendant  is  not  called  upon 
to  testify  by  producing  the  books ;  the  situation  is  no  different  from 
the  carrying  away  of  a  bundle  of  counterfeit  bills  or  of  stolen  goods 
or  of  a  murderer's  weapon ;  no  doubt  the  accused  is  unwilling  that 

1  TSee  the  article  already  referred  to,  in  5  Harv.  Law  Rev.  71.] 

2  LSee  excellent  expositions  by  Rodman,  J.,  in  State  v.  Graham,  74  N.  c.  648 ;  Cox, 
J.,  in  U.  S.  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  382.1 

8  TState  v.  Reasby,  100  la.  231. J 

4    "People  v.  Kemmler,  119  N.  Y.  580.] 

6  "U.  S.  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  382.] 
jState  v.  Graham,  74  N.  C.  647.] 

7  L*For  other  cases  on  both  sides,  see  Shields  ».  State,  104  Ala.  35;  Day  v.  State,  63 
Ga.  669  ;    Blackwell  v.  State,  67  id.  76 ;    Myers  v.  State,  97  id.  76  ;    State  v.  Prud- 
homtne,  25  La.  An.  523;   People  v.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228  ;   State  v.  Ah  Chuey,  14  Nev. 
79;  State  v.  Garrett,  71  N.  C.  85;  Johnson  v.  Com.,  115  Pa.  369,  395  ;  State  v.  Atkin- 
son, 40  S.  C.  363 ;  Stokes  v.  State,  5  Baxt.  619  ;  Lines  p.  State,  15  Lea  125  ;  Walker 
v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  245  ;  State  v.  Nordstrom,  7  Wash.  506.     Distinguish  the  ques- 
tion wlipther  the  body,  etc.,  itself  may  voluntarily  be  shown  :  ante,  §  13  c.] 

1  CR.  r.  Parnell,  2  T.  R.  202,  note ;  R.  v.  Granatelli,  7  State  Tr.  N.  s.  979,  986 ; 
Lamson  r.  Boyden,  160  111.  613  ;  Ex  parte  Wilson,  Tex.  Cr.,  47  S.  W.  996  ;  Boyd  v. 
U.  8.,  116  U.  S.  616  ;  U.  S.  v.  Lead  Co.,  75  Fed.  94.] 


§§  469  e-469  A.]    SELF-CRIMINATION;  CIVIL  LIABILITY.  617 

these  things  should  be  taken,  but  he  is  not  being  called  upon  as  a 
witness ;  accordingly,  the  privilege  is  not  violated,  whether  it  is  tools 
or  clothing  or  documents  that  are  taken.8] 

§  469  g  [452].  Civil  Liability  or  Loss.  Where  the  witness,  by 
answering,  may  subject  himself  to  a  civil  action  or  pecuniary  loss, 
or  charge  himself  with  a  debt.  This  question  was  very  much  dis- 
cussed in  England,  in  Lord  Melville's  case  ;•  and,  being  finally  put  to 
the  judges  by  the  House  of  Lords,  eight  judges  and  the  chancellor 
were  of  opinion  that  a  witness,  in  such  case,  was  bound  to  answer, 
and  four  thought  that  he  was  not.  To  remove  the  doubts  which  were 
thrown  over  the  question  by  such  a  diversity  of  opinion  among 
eminent  judges,  a  statute  was  passed,1  declaring  the  law  to  be,  that 
a  witness  could  not  legally  refuse  to  answer  a  question  relevant  to 
the  matter  in  issue,  merely  on  the  ground  that  the  answer  may 
establish,  or  tend  to  establish,  that  he  owes  a  debt,  or  is  otherwise 
subject  to  a  civil  suit,  provided  the  answer  has  no  tendency  to  accuse 
himself,  or  to  expose  him  to  any  kind  of  penalty  or  forfeiture.  In 
the  United  States,  this  act  is  generally  considered  as  declaratory  of 
the  true  doctrine  of  the  common  law;  and,  accordingly,  by  the  cur- 
rent of  authorities,  the  witness  is  held  bound  to  answer.2  But  neither 
is  the  statute  nor  the  rule  of  the  common  law  considered  as  compelling 
a  person  interested  in  the  cause  as  party,  though  not  named  on  the 
record,  to  testify  as  a  witness  in  the  cause,  much  less  to  disclose  any- 
thing against  his  own  interest; 8  [but  the  abolition  of  disqualification 
by  reason  of  being  a  party  or  having  an  interest  has  taken  away  this 
privilege,  and  made  the  party  compellable  as  well  as  competent.4]  • 

§  469  h  [453].  Forfeiture.  Where  the  answer  will  subject  the 
witness  to  a  forfeiture  of  his  estate.  In  this  case,  as  well  as  in  the 
case  of  an  exposure  to  a  criminal  prosecution  or  penalty,  it  is  well 

2  ([State  v.  Griswold,  67  Conn.  290  ;  State  ».  Pomeroy,  130  Mo.  489  ;  Stater.  Flynn, 
36  N.  H.  64  (leading  case)  ;  State  v.  Atkinson,  40  S.  C.  363,  372  ;  State  v.  Nordstrom, 
7  Wash.  506  ;  but  see  People  v.  Spiegel,  143  N.  Y.  107;  Boyd  v.  U.  S.,  116  U.S.  616  ; 
Hoover  v.  M'Chesney,  81  Fed.  472. 

Even  supposing  the  search  or  capture  to  be  in  violation  of  some  law,  the  illegality 
in  the  acquisition  of  the  evidential  data  does  not  exclude  the  evidence  :  ante,  §  254  a.  J 

1  46  Geo.  Ill,  c.  37;  2  Phil.  Evid.  420;  1  Stark.  Evid.  165. 

2  Bull  v.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  9  ;  Baird  v.  Cochran,  4  S.  &  R.  397  ;  Nass  v.  Van- 
swearingen.  7  S.  &  R.  192  ;  Taney  v.  Kemp,  4  H.  &  J.  348  ;  Naylor  v.  Semmes,  4  G. 
&  J.  273 ;  City  Bank  v.  Bateman,  7  H.  &  J.  104 ;  Stoddert  ».  Manning,  2  H.  &  G.  147  ; 
Copp  t>.  Upham,  3  N.  H.  159 ;  Cox  v.  Hill,  3  Ohio  411,  424 ;  Planters'  Bank  v.  George, 

6  Martin  670;  Jones  v.  Lanier,  2  Dev.  Law  480;  Conover  v.  Bell,  6  Monr.  157;  Gor- 
ham  v.  Carroll,  3  Littell  221  ;  Zollicoffer  v.  Tnrney,  6  Yerg.  297;  Ward  r.  Sharp,  15 
Vt.  115.     The  contrary  seems  to  have  been  held  in  Connecticut:  Benjamin  v.  Hath- 
away, 3  Conn.  528,  532. 

8  R,  v.  Woburn,  10  East  395 ;  Mauran  v.  Lamb,  7  Cowen  174  ;  Appleton  r.  Boyd, 

7  Mass.  131  ;  Fenn  v.  Granger,  3  Campb.  177;  People  v.  Irving,  1  \\eud.  20  ;  White 
v.  Evprest,  1  Vt.  181. 

*  F/See  ante,  §  328  c.  For  discovery  in  Chancery,  see  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  273  ff.  For 
the  distinction  between  civil  and  penal  liability,  as  regards  the  privilege  against  self- 
crimination,  see  ante,  §  469  rf.  For  the  privilege  of  a  party  as  to  documents,  see  also 
post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  295-307.3 


618  WITNESSES;  PRIVILEGE.  [CH.  xxvn 

settled  that  a  witness  is  not  bound  to  answer ; l  and  this  is  an  estab- 
lished rule  in  equity  as  well  as  at  law.2 

§  469  i  [454].  Infamy  or  Disgrace ;  (1)  Matters  Material  to  the 
Issue.  Where  the  answer,  though  it  will  not  expose  the  witness  to 
any  criminal  prosecution  or  penalty,  or  to  any  forfeiture  of  estate,  yet 
has  a  direct  tendency  to  degrade  his  character.  On  this  point  there 
has  been  a  great  diversity  of  opinion,  and  the  law  still  remains  not 
perfectly  settled  by  authorities.  But  the  conflict  of  opinions  may 
be  somewhat  reconciled  by  a  distinction,  which  has  been  very  prop- 
erly taken  between  cases  where  the  testimony  is  relevant  and  material 
to  the  issue,  and  cases  where  the  question  is  not  strictly  relevant,  but 
is  collateral,  and  is  asked  only  under  the  latitude  .allowed  in  a  cross- 
examination.  In  the  former  case,  there  seems  great  absurdity  in  ex- 
cluding the  testimony  of  a  witness  merely  because  it  will  tend  to 
degrade  himself  when  others  have  a  direct  interest  in  that  testimony, 
and  it  is  essential  to  the  establishment  of  their  rights  of  property,  of 
liberty,  or  even  of  life,  or  to  the  course  of  public  justice.  Upon  such 
a  rule,  one  who  had  been  convicted  and  punished  for  an  offence,  when 
called  as  a  witness  against  an  accomplice,  would  be  excused  from  tes- 
tifying to  any  of  the  transactions  in  which  he  had  participated  with 
the  accused,  and  thus  the  guilty  might  escape.  And,  accordingly,  the 
better  opinion  seems  to  be,  that  where  the  transaction,  to  which 
the  witness  is  interrogated,  forms  any  part  of  the  issue  to  be  tried, 
the  witness  will  be  obliged  to  give  evidence,  however  strongly  it  may 
reflect  on  his  character.1 

§  469.;'  [455].  Same :  (2)  Matters  Collateral  to  the  Issue.  But 
where  the  question  is  not  material  to  the  issue,  but  is  collateral  and 
irrelevant,  being  asked  under  the  license  allowed  in  cross-examina- 
tion, it  stands  on  another  ground.  In  general,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  the  rule  is,  that,  upon  cross-examination,  to  try  the  credit  of  a 
witness,  only  general  questions  can  be  put ;  and  he  cannot  be  asked 
as  to  any  collateral  and  independent  fact,  merely  with  a  view  to  con- 
tradict him  afterwards  by  calling  another  witness.  The  danger  of 
such  a  practice,  it  is  said,  is  obvious,  besides  the  inconvenience  of 
trying  as  many  collateral  issues  as  one  of  the  parties  might  choose 
to  introduce,  and  which  the  other  could  not  be  prepared  to  meet.1 
Whenever,  therefore,  the  question  put  to  the  witness  is  plainly  of 
this  character,  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  it  falls  under  this  rule,  and 
should  be  excluded.  But  the  difficulty  lies  in  determining,  with 
precision,  the  materiality  and  relevancy  of  the  question  when  it  goes 

*  6  Corbett's  P.  D.  167;  1  Hall's  Law  J.  223;  2  Phil.  Evid.  420;  [see  ante, 
§  469  <z.j 

a  Mitford's  En.  PI.  157,  161  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §8  607,  846. 

1  2  Phil.  Evid.  421  ;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  250-254,  per  Murcy,  J.  ;  Peake's 
Evid.  (by  Norris)  p.  92;  Cundell  v.  Pratt,  1  M.  &  Malk.  108  ;  Swift's  Evid.  80.  So 


in  Scotland :  Alison's  Practice,  p.  528. 

1  Spencely  ».  De  Willott,  7  East  108,  110. 


§§  469  A-469  &.]  DISGRACE.  619 

to  the  character  of  the  witness.  There  is  certainly  great  force  in 
the  argument,  that  where  a  man's  liberty,  or  his  life,  depends  upon 
the  testimony  of  another,  it  is  of  infinite  importance  that  those 
who  are  to  decide  upon  that  testimony  should  know,  to  the  greatest 
extent,  how  far  the  witness  is  to  be  trusted.  They  cannot  look  into 
his  breast  to  see  what  passes  there  ;  but  must  form  their  opinion  on 
the  collateral  indications  of  his  good  faith  and  sincerity.  Whatever, 
therefore,  may  materially  assist  them  in  this  inquiry  is  most  essen- 
tial to  the  investigation  of  truth ;  and  it  cannot  but  be  material  for 
the  jury  to  understand  the  character  of  the  witness  whom  they  are 
called  upon  to  believe,  and  to  know  whether,  although  he  has  not 
been  convicted  of  any  crime,  he  has  not  in  some  measure  rendered 
himself  less  credible  by  his  disgraceful  conduct.2  The  weight  of 
this  argument  seems  to  have  been  felt  by  the  judge  in  several  cases 
in  which  questions  tending  to  disgrace  the  witness  have  been  per- 
mitted in  cross-examination. 

§  469  A;  [456].  Same:  (3)  Indirect  Exposure.  It  is  however,  gen- 
erally conceded,  that  where  the  answer,  which  the  witness  may  give, 
will  not  directly  and  certainly  show  his  infamy,  but  will  only  tend 
to  disgrace  him,  he  may  be  compelled  to  answer.  Such  is  the  rule  in 
equity,  as  held  by  Lord  Eldon ; 1  and  its  principle  applies  with  equal 
force  at  common  law;  and,  accordingly,  it  has  been  recognized  in 
the  common-law  courts.2  In  questions  involving  a  criminal  offence, 
the  rule,  as  we  have  seen,8  is  different ;  the  witness  being  permitted 
to  judge  for  the  most  part  for  himself,  and  to  refuse  to  answer  wher- 
ever it  would  tend  to  subject  him  to  a  criminal  punishment  or  for- 
feiture. But  here  the  Court  must  see  for  itself  that  the  answer 
will  directly  show  his  infamy,  before  it  will  excuse  him  from  testify- 
ing to  the  fact.*  Nor  does  there  seem  to  be  any  good  reason  why  a 
witness  should  be  privileged  from  answering  a  question  touching  his 
present  situation,  employment,  and  associates,  if  they  are  of  his  own 
choice  ;  as,  for  example,  in  what  house  or  family  he  resides,  what  is 
his  ordinary  occupation,  and  whether  he  is  intimately  acquainted  and 
conversant  with  certain  persons,  and  the  like ;  for,  however  these 
may  disgrace  him,  his  position  is  one  of  his  own  selection.6 

The  great  question,  however,  [i.  e.  the  one  referred  to  in  the  pre- 
ceding section,]  whether  a  witness  may  not  be  bound  in  some  cases 
to  answer  an  interrogatory  to  his  own  moral  degradation,  where, 

2  1  Stark.  Evid.  170. 

1  Parkhurst  v.  Lowten,  1  Meriv.  400  ;  s.  c.  2  Swanst.  194,  216 ;  Foss  v.  Haynes, 
1  Redingt.  81  ;  and  see  Story  Eq.  PI.  §§  585,  596. 

2  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  232,  252,  254  ;  State  v.  Patterson,  2  Ired.  346. 
8  Supra,  §  469  d. 

4  Macbride  v.  Macbride,  4  Esp.  242,  per  Ld.  Alvanley ;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend. 
254,  per  Marcy,  J. 

6  Thus,  when  a  witness  was  asked,  whether  she  was  not  cohabiting  with  a  particular 
individual,  in  a  state  of  incest,  Best,  C.  J.,  prohibited  the  question  ;  stating  expressly, 
that  he  did  this  only  on  the  ground  that  the  answer  would  expose  her  to  punishment  : 
Cundell  v.  Pratt,  1  M.  &  Malk.  108. 


620  WITNESSES;  PRIVILEGE.  [CH.  xxvn. 

though  it  is  collateral  to  the  main  issue,  it  is  relevant  to  his  character 
for  veracity,  has  not  yet  been  brought  into  direct  and  solemn  judg- 
ment, and  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  an  open  question,  notwith- 
standing the  practice  of  eminent  judges  at  Nisi  Prius,  in  favor  of 
the  inquiry,  under  the  limitations  we  have  above  stated.6 

§  469  I.  Same  :  Summary.  [It  will  be  seen  from  the  preceding 
sections  that  the  supposed  privilege  against  answering  questions 
involving  disgrace  or  infamy  was  well  understood  not  to  exist  where 
the  matter  inquired  about  merely  tended  to  expose  the  infamy,  nor 
where,  though  directly  involving  infamy,  it  was  material  to  the  issues 
of  the  case  ;  there  thus  remained  in  doubt  only  the  case  where  it  was 
not  material  to  the  issues  but  was  "collateral,"  i.e.  practically,  where 
it  was  relevant  merely  to  the  witness'  character  and  credibility.  This 
remaining  case  was  for  a  time  the  subject  of  conflicting  rulings ;  and 
in  1853  the  Commissioners  for  Common  Law  Practice  recommended 
its  statutory  recognition;1  but  the  ensuing  statute2  failed  to  give 
this  recognition,  and  since  that  time  the  understanding  at  the  Eng- 
lish Bar  seems  to  have  been  that  no  such  privilege  exists.8  In  this 
country  the  same  difference  of  opinion  existed,  two  generations 
ago,  in  certain  jurisdictions,  but  was  generally  settled  against  the 
existence  of  the  privilege ;  and  its  place  was  practically  taken  by 
the  discretionary  power  of  the  trial  Court  over  cross-examination  to 
character  (ante,  §  4616).  In  several  jurisdictions,  however,  chiefly 
the  newer  States,  this  result  was  lost  sight  of  and  a  sanction  was 
given  to  the  privilege.  It  has,  however,  no  reason  for  existence, 
wherever  the  trial  Court  has  a  discretionary  power  to  limit  the 
cross-examination.4] 

6  See  1  Stark.  Evid.  167-172  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  423-428 ;  Peake'a  Evid.  by  Norris, 
pp.  202-204. 

1  ["Second  Report,  p.  22.] 
rSt.  17-18  Viet.,  c.  125,  §§  25,  103.] 

8  QSee  the  citations  ante,  §  461  b;  also,  Day,  Common  Law  Procedure  Act,  4th  ed. 
278  ;  Stephen,  Digest  of  Evidence,  3d  Eng.  ed.,  art.  129,  note  xlvi;  Rules  of  Court, 
1883,  Ord.  36,  R.  38.] 

4  L~The  following  cases,  including  only  one  or  two  of  the  most  recent  from  the  vari- 
ous jurisdictions,  will  show  the  state  of  the  law  ;  it  may  be  noted,  however,  that  it  is 
not  always  possible  to  be  certain  whether  the  Court  is  sanctioning  a  privilege  or  is 
merely  setting  limits  to  the  subjects  of  cross-examination  (see  the  precedents  ante, 
§  461  6)  :  Boles  v.  State,  46  Ala.  204  ;  Polk  v.  State,  40  Ark.  482,  487  ;  Hollingsworth 
v.  State,  53  id.  387  ;  Clark  v.  Reese,  35  Cal.  89,  96  ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  2065 ;  State  v. 
Ward,  49  Conn.  433,  442  ;  South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  Ind.  583;  Oxier  v.  U.  S.,  Ind. 
T.,  38  S.  \V.  331;  State  v.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90;  Burdette  v.  Com.,  93  Ky.  76; 
McCampbell  v.  McCampbell,  id.,  46  S.  W.  18;  Com.  v.  Savary,  10  Cush.  5?5;  People 
v.  McLean,  71  Mich.  309  ;  State  o.  Bilansky,  3  Minn.  246,  257;  Muller  r.  Hospital 
Assoc.,  73  Mo.  242  ;  State  v.  Talbot,  ib.  359  ;  Head  v.  State,  44  Miss.  731,  751  ;  State 
v.  Black,  15  Mont.  143  ;  Hill  v.  State,  42  Nebr.  503;  State  v.  Huff,  11  Nev.  17,  28  ; 
State  v.  Staples,  47  N.  H.  113,  117  ;  Fries  v.  Brugler,  12  N.  J.  L.  79 ;  Roop  v.  State, 
68  id.  479;  Borrego  v.  Terr.,  N.  M.,  46  Pac.  349;  People  v.  Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  290  ; 
Coble  v.  State,  31  Oh.  St.  102  ;  Elliott  t>.  Boyles,  81  Pa.  67  ;  Torre  v.  Summers,  2  Nott 
&  M.  269;  Titus  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  134  ;  Morris  v.  State,  38  Tex.  603;  State  v.  John- 
son, 28  Vt.  515 ;  Kirschuer  v.  State,  9  \VU.  140 ;  McKesson  v.  Sherman,  51  id.  303. 
311.] 


§§  469 £-469  w.]    DISGRACE;  INSPECTION  OF  PARTY.  621 

•§469w.  Corporal  Inspection  of  Civil  Party.  [Since  the  abolition 
of  the  disqualification  of  parties  as  witnesses,  and  with  it  of  the 
parties'  privilege  against  testifying  (ante,  §  328  c),  the  question  has 
often  been  raised  whether  a  civil  plaintiff  can  be  compelled  to  exhibit 
his  person  to  the  jury,  or  to  submit  to  an  inspection  by  witnesses 
of  the  opponent  or  by  appointees  of  the  Court,  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  evidence  of  a  corporal  condition  material  to  the  case.  The 
need  of  such  evidence  as  may  be  thus  afforded  is  most  urgent  and 
most  common  in  actions  for  personal  injury,  where  without  such  an 
opportunity  the  defendant  is  in  many  cases  practically  deprived  of 
the  means  of  disputing  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  plaintiff's 
injury  except  by  cross-examination  and  impeachment  of  the  latter's 
own  witnesses;  and  the  opportunity  of  maintaining  a  false  claim  is 
thus  materially  strengthened  and  often  made  impregnable,  in  cases 
where  an  examination  of  the  person  would  reveal  the  truth.  That 
no  such  privilege  exists  as  a  matter  of  principle  and  precedent  seems 
certain.  That  every  consideration  of  policy  opposes  its  establish- 
ment and  requires  resort  to  such  a  process  seems  unquestionable.1 
A  very  few  Courts  have  seen  fit  to  recognize  such  a  privilege.2  But 
the  great  majority  of  jurisdictions  have  refused  to  do  so,  and,  either 
by  decision  or  by  statute,  have  sanctioned  the  obtaining  of  such 
evidence,  usually  by  providing  for  an  examination  by  expert  wit- 
nesses of  the  opponent  or  by  appointees  of  the  Court,  the  measure  to 
be  taken  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court,  in  such  cases  as  it  may 
seem  necessary  and  useful,  under  such  conditions  as  do  not  injure 
health  or  offend  decency,  and  upon  application  made  at  a  seasonable 
time.8  Similar  measures  may  with  equal,  appropriateness  be  taken 
in  other  than  cases  of  personal  injury.4] 

1  [See  excellent  expositions  by  Gunnison,  P.  J.,  in  Hess  v.  R.  Co.,  7  Penn.  Co.  Ct. 
565  ;  Biddle,  J.,  in  Demenstein  v.  Reichelson,  34  W.  N.  C.  Pa.  295 ;  Beck,  J.,  in 
Schroeder  v.  R.  Co.,  47  la.  379.] 

2  [Mills  v.  R.  Co.,  Del.  Super.,  40  Atl.  1114;  Joliet  S.  R.  Co.  ».  Caul,  143  111. 
177  ;  Peoria  D.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  144  id.  227  ;  Penns.  Co.  v.  Newmeyer,  129  Ind. 
401,  409  ;  R.  Co.  ».  Botsford,  141  U.  S.  250;  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  U.  S.  App., 
80  Fed.  278-3 

8  Q  Early  cases  in  the  following  courts  are  omitted  :  St.  81-32  Viet.,  c.  119,  s.  26 
(injuries  in  railway  accidents)  ;  Ontar.  St.  54  Viet.,  c.  11  (personal  injuries  in  general) ; 
Clouse  ».  Colemau,  16  Out.  Pr.  541 ;  King  v.  State,  100  Ala.  85  ;  St.  Louis  S.  W.  R. 
Co.  v.  Dobbins,  60  Ark.  485;  Sav.  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Wainwright,  99  Ga.  255;  Hall 
v.  Mauson,  99  la.  698  ;  South.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Michaels,  57  Kan.  474;  Belt  E.  L.  Co.  v. 
Allen,  Ky.,  43  S.  W.  89;  Belle  N.  D.  Co.  v.  Riggs,  id.,  45  S.  W.  99 ;  Graves  r.  Battle 
Creek,  95  Mich.  266  ;  Strndgeon  ».  Sand  Beach,  107  id.  496  ;  Shepard  v.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo. 
629 ;  Owens  v.  R.  Co.,  95  id.  169,  177  ;  N.  Y.  Laws  1893,  c.  721  ;  Lyon  v.  R.  Co.,  142 
N.  Y.  298  ;  Miami  &  M.  T.  Co.  v.  Baily,  37  Oh.  St.  104,  107  ;  Demenstein  v.  Rich- 
ardson, Hess  v.  R.  Co.,  Pa.,  supra;  Chic.  R.  I.  &  T.  R.  Co.  v.  Langston,  Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  47  S.  W.  1027,  48  S.  W.  610;  Bagley  ».  Mason,  69  Vt.  175  ;  Groundwater  v. 
Washington,  92  Wis.  56  ;  O'Brien  v.  La  Crosse,  id.,  75  N.  W.  81. 

In  the  following  States,  the  rulings  incline  against  the  privilege,  without  deciding: 
Hatfield  v.  R.  Co.,  33  Minn.  130  ;  Stuart  ».  Havens,  17Nebr.  211  ;  Chadron  v.  Glover, 
43  id.  732 ;  Gulf  C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Norfleet,  78  Tex.  321,  324.] 

*  ££.  g.  Smith  v.  King,  62  Conn.  515,  where  the  plaintiff  was  required  at  the 
Court's  discretion  to  write  his  signature  for  comparison.  In  Martin  v.  Elliot,  106  Mich. 


622  WITNESSES;  PKIVILEGE.  [CH.  xxvu. 

469  n  [246].  Witness'  Production  of  Title-deeds.  Where  an  attor- 
ney is  called  upon,  whether  by  subpoena  duces  tecum,  or  otherwise,  to 
produce  deeds  or  papers  belonging  to  his  client,  who  is  not  a  party  to 
the  suit,  the  Court  will  inspect  the  documents,  and  pronounce  upon 
their  admissibility,  according  as  their  production  may  appear  to 
be  prejudicial  or  not  to  the  client;  in  like  manner  as  where  a  witness 
objects  to  the  production  of  his  own  title-deeds.1  And  the  same 
discretion  will  be  exercised  by  the  Courts,  where  the  documents 
called  for  are  in  the  hands  of  solicitors  for  the  assignees  of  bank- 
rupts ; 2  though  it  was  at  one  time  thought  that  their  production  was 
a  matter  of  public  duty.8  So,  if  the  documents  called  for  are  in  the 
hands  of  the  agent  or  steward  of  a  third  person,  or  even  in  the  hands 
of  the  owner  himself,  their  production  will  not  be  required  where, 
in  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  it  may  injuriously  affect  his  title.* 
This  extension  of  the  rule,  which  will  be  more  fully  treated  here- 
after,5 is  founded  on  a  consideration  of  the  great  inconvenience  and 
mischief  which  may  result  to  individuals  from  a  compulsory  disclos- 
ure and  collateral  discussion  of  their  titles,  in  cases  where,  not  being 
themselves  parties,  the  whole  merits  cannot  be  tried. 

[The  remaining  rules  of  exclusion  to  which  the  term  "  privilege  "  is 
usually  applied  have  already  been  dealt  with  in  preceding  Chapters.6] 

130,  the  refusal  to  compel  a  plaintiff  to  allow  an  examination  of  a  horse  wan-anted 
sound  seems  improper. 

In  divorce,  on  an  issue  of  impotence,  the  examination  of  either  party  is  compellable  : 
Bishop,  Marr.  &  Div.,  II,  §  590  and  cas.  cit.  "To  prevent  doubtfulness  in  heirs,"  the 
writ  de  venire  inspiciendo  compelled  an  examination  of  the  widow  :  Bacon,  Abridgm. 
"Bastard,'1  A  ;  Re  Blakemore,  14  L.  J.  Ch.  N.  s.  336.] 

1  Copeland  v.  Watts,  1  Stark.  95 ;  Amey  v.  Long,  9  East  473 ;  s.  c.  1  Campb.  14  ; 
Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  186;  1  Phil.  Evid.  175;  Reynolds  v.  Rowley,  3  Rob.  La.  201; 
Travis  v.  January,  ib.  227  ;  Qas  to  documents  subject  to  an  attorney's  lien,  see  Davis 
v.  Davis,  90  Fed.  791  ;  Lewis  v.  Powell,  1897,  1  Ch.  678.] 

a  Bateson  v.  Hartsink,  4  Esp.  43 ;  Cohen  ».  Templar,  2  Stark.  260 ;  Laing  v.  Bar- 
clay, 3  id.  38 ;  Hawkins  v.  Howard,  Ry.  &  M.  64 ;  Corsen  v.  Dubois,  Holt's  Cas. 
239;  Bull  v.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  9,  14;  Volant  v.  Soyer,  22  Law  J.  C.  P.  83;  16  Eng. 
Law&Eq.  426;  13  C.  B.  231. 

•  Pearson  v.  Fletcher,  5  Esp.  90,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough. 

*  R.  v.  Hunter,  3  C.  &  P.  591  ;  Pickering  v.   Noyes,  1  B.   &  C.   262 ;  Roberts  v. 
Simpson,  2  Stark.  203;  Doe  v.  Thomas,  9  B.  &  C.  288  ;  Bull  v.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  9, 
14  ;  and  see  Doe  v.  Langdon,  12  Q.  B.  711  ;  13  Jur.  96  ;  Doe  v.  Hertford,  13  Jur.  632; 
[Doe  v.  Clifford,  2  C.  &  K.  448  ;   Kemp  v.  King,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  437 ;  R.  c.  Woodley, 
1  id.  390 ;  Thompson  v.  Mosely,  5  C.  &  P.  501 ;  Goss  P.  P.  Co.  v.  Scott,  89  Fed.  81 8 ; 
and  post,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  295-307.1 

6  rSeepott,  Vol.  Ill,  §§  295-307.] 

6  LChapterXIX,  §§  236  tf.  (privileged  communications  between  attorney  and  client, 
informer  and  government,  husband  and  wife,  etc.)  ?  Chapter  XXIII,  §§  334  tf.  (testi- 
mony of  wife  or  husband  against  the  other).'] 


§§  469  n-471.]    INSPECTION  OF  RECORDS. 


623 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 


PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS. 


§  470.   Classification  of  Writings. 

1.   Inspection  of  Records  and  Public 
Documents. 

§§  471,  472.    Records  of  Royal  Courts. 

§  473.    Records  of  Inferior  Tribunals. 

§  474.   Quasi-public  Records. 

§  475-   Books  of  Public  Officers. 

§  476.    Inspection  Injurious  to  Public 
Interest. 

§§  477,  478.    Procedure    in    obtaining 
Inspection. 

2.   Mode  of  Proof  of  Public  Documents. 

§  479.   Acts  of  State. 
§§  480,  481.   Legislative  Acts. 
§  482.   Legislative  Journals. 
§§  483-485.  Official  Registers. 


§  485  a.   Registered  Conveyances. 
§§  486-488.   Foreign  Laws. 
§  489.   Same :  Laws  of  Domestic  States. 
§  490.   Same  :  Judicial  Notice. 

3.   Admissibility  and  Effect  of  Public 
Documents. 

§  491.  Legislative  Recitals  and  Jour- 
nals, Proclamations,  Diplomatic  Corre- 
spondence, etc. 

§  492.   Government  Gazette. 
§  493.   Official  Registers. 
§  494.    Same :  Ship's  Register. 
Ship's  Log-book. 
Requisites    of    Official 


§  495.    Same 
§  496.    Same 
Character. 

§  497.   Same  :  Historical  Works. 


§  498.   Official  Certificates. 


§  470.  Classification  of  "Writings.  Writings  are  divisible  into 
two  classes;  namely,  public  and  private.  The  former  consists  of  the 
acts  of  public  functionaries,  in  the  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial 
departments  of  government,  including,  under  this  general  head,  the 
transactions  which  official  persons  are  required  to  enter  in  books  or 
registers,  in  the  course  of  their  public  duties,  and  which  occur  within 
the  circle  of  their  own  personal . knowledge  and  observation;  to  the 
same  head  may  be  referred  the  consideration  of  documentary  evi- 
dence of  the  acts  of  State,  the  laws  and  judgments  of  courts  of 
foreign  governments.  Public  writings  are  susceptible  of  another 
division,  they  being  either  (1)  judicial,  or  (2)  not  judicial;  and,  with 
respect  to  the  means  and  mode  of  proving  them,  they  may  be  classed 
into  (1)  those  which  are  of  record,  and  (2)  those  which  are  not  of 
record.  It  is  proposed  to  treat,  first,  of  public  documents;  and, 
secondly,  of  those  writings  which  are  private.  And,  in  regard  to 
both  classes ,  our  inquiries  will  be  directed  (1)  to  the  mode  of  obtain- 
ing an  inspection  of  such  documents  and  writings;  (2)  to  the  method 
of  proving  them;  and  (3)  to  their  admissibility  and  effect. 

1.    Inspection  of  Records  and  Public  Documents. 

§  471.  Records  of  Royal  Courts.  And,  first,  in  regard  to  the  in- 
spection of  public  documents,  it  has  been  admitted,  from  a  very  early 
period,  that  the  inspection  and  exemplification  of  the  records  of  the 
king's  courts  is  the  common  right  of  the  subject.  This  right  was 


624  PUBLIC  DOCUMENTS.  [CH.   XXVIIL 

extended,  by  an  ancient  statute,1  to  cases  where  the  subject  was 
concerned  against  the  king.  The  exercise  of  this  right  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  restrained  until  the  reign  of  Charles  II.,  when, 
in  consequence  of  the  frequency  of  actions  for  malicious  prosecution, 
which  could  not  be  supported  without  a  copy  of  the  record,  the  judges 
made  an  order  for  the  regulation  of  the  sessions  at  the  Old  Bailey 
prohibiting  the  granting  of  any  copy  of  an  indictment  for  felony, 
without  a  special  order,  upon  motion  in  open  court,  at  the  general 
jail  delivery.3  This  order,  it  is  to  be  observed,  relates  only  to  in- 
dictments for  felony.  In  cases  of  misdemeanor,  the  right  to  a  copy 
has  never  been  questioned.8  But  in  the  United  States,  no  regulation 
of  this  kind  is  known  to  have  been  expressly  made;  and  any  limita- 
tion of  the  right  to  a  copy  of  a  judicial  record  or  paper,  when  applied 
for  by  any  person  having  an  interest  in  it,  would  probably  be  deemed 
repugnant  to  the  genius  of  American  institutions.4 

§  472.  Where  writs,  or  other  papers  in  cause,  are  officially  in  the 
custody  of  an  officer  of  the  court,  he  may  be  compelled  by  a  rule  of 
court  to  allow  an  inspection  of  them,  even  though  it  be  to  furnish 
evidence  in  a  civil  action  against  himself.  Thus,  a  rule  was 
granted  against  the  marshal  of  the  King's  Bench  prison,  in  an  action 
against  him  for  an  escape  of  one  arrested  upon  mesne  process,  to 
permit  the  plaintiff's  attorney  to  inspect  the  writ  by  which  he  was 
committed  to  his  custody.1 

§  473.  Records  of  Inferior  Tribunals.  In  regard  to  the  records  of 
inferior  tribunals,  the  right  of  inspection  is  more  limited.  As  all 
persons  have  not  necessarily  an  interest  in  them,  it  is  not  necessary 
that  they  should  be  open  to  the  inspection  of  all,  without  distinc- 
tion. The  party,  therefore,  who  wishes  to  inspect  the  proceedings 
of  any  of  those  Courts,  should  first  apply  to  that  Court,  showing  that 
he  has  some  interest  in  the  document,  and  that  he  requires  it  for  a 
proper  purpose.1  If  it  should  be  refused,  the  Court  of  Chancery, 

1  46  Ed.  Ill,  in  the  preface  to  3  Coke,  p.  iv. 

2  Orders  and  Directions,  16  Car.  II,  prefixed  to  Sir  J.  Kelyng's  Reports,  Order  vii. 
With  respect  to  the  general  records  of  the  realm,  in  snch  cuses,  copies  are  obtained 
upon  application  to  the  Attorney-General :  Legatt  v.  Tollervey,  14  East  306.     But  if 
the  copy  were  obtained  without  order,  it  will  not,  on  that  account,  be  rejected  :  ibid. ; 
Jordan  v.  Lewis,  id.  305,  n.  (b)  ;  Caddy  v.  Barlow,  1  M.  &  Ry.  275.     But  Lord  Chief 
Justice  Willes,  in  R.  v.  Brangan,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  32,  in  the  case  of  a  prosecution  for 
robbery,  evidently  vexatious,   refused  an  application  for  a  copy  of  the  record,  on  the 
ground  that  no  order  was  necessary  ;  declaring,  that  "  by  the  laws  of  the  realm  every 
prisoner,  upon  his  acquittal,  had  an  undoubted  right  and  title  to  a  copy  of  the  record 
of  such  acquittal,  for  any  use  he  might  think  fit  to  make  of  it ;  and  that,  after  a  de- 
iirni'l  of  it  had  been  made,  the  proper  officer  might  be  punished  for  refusing  to  make 
it  out."     A  strong  doubt  of  the  legality  of  the  order  of  16  Car.  II  was  also  raised  in 
Browne  v.  Gumming,  10  B.  &  C.  70. 

»  Morrison  v.  Kelly,  1  W.  Bl.  385. 

4  Stone  v.  Crocker,  24  Pick.  88,  per  Morton,  J.  The  only  case,  known  to  the 
author,  in  which  the  English  rule  was  acted  on,  is  that  of  People  v.  Poyllon,  2  Caines 
202,  in  which  a  copy  was  moved  for  and  granted. 

1  Fox  v.  Jones,  7  B.  &  C.  732. 

1  If  he  has  no  legal  interest  in  the  record,  the  Court  may  refuse  the  application: 
Powell  v.  Bradbury,  4  C.  B.  641  ;  infra,  §  659. 


§§  471-474.]  INSPECTION   OF  KECORDS.  625 

upon  affidavit  of  the  fact,  may  at  any  time  send,  by  a  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari,  either  for  the  record  itself,  or  an  exemplification.  The 
King's  Bench  in  England,  and  the  Supreme  Courts  of  common  law 
in  America,  have  the  same  power  by  mandamus  ; 2  and  this  whether 
an  action  be  pending  or  not.* 

§  474.  Quasi-public  Records.  There  are  other  records  which  par- 
take both  of  a  public  and  private  character,  and  are  treated  as  the 
one  or  the  other,  according  to  the  relation  in  which  the  applicant 
stands  to  them.  Thus,  the  books  of  a  corporation  are  public  with 
respect  to  its  members,  but  private  with  respect  to  strangers.1  In 
regard  to  its  members,  a  rule  for  inspection  of  the  writings  of  the 
corporation  will  be  granted  of  course,  on  their  application,  where 
such  inspection  is  shown  to  be  necessary,  in  regard  to  some  partic- 
ular matter  in  dispute,  or  where  the  granting  of  it  is  necessary,  to 
prevent  the  applicant  from  suffering  injury  or  to  enable  him  to  per- 
form his  duties ;  and  the  inspection  will  then  be  granted,  only  so 
far  as  is  shown  to  be  essential  to  that  end.2  But  a  stranger  has  no 
right  to  such  rule,  and  it  will  not  be  granted,  even  where  he  is  de- 
fendant in  a  suit  brought  by  the  corporation.8  In  this  class  of 
records  are  enumerated  parish  books;4  transfer  books  of  the  East  India 
Company,6  public  lottery  books,6  the  books  of  incorporated  banking 
companies,7  a  bishop's  registry  of  presentations,8  and  some  others  of 
the  like  kind.  If  an  inspection  is  wanted  by  a  stranger,  in  a  case 
not  within  this  rule  of  the  common  law,  it  can  only  be  obtained  by  a 
bill  for  a  discovery;  a  Court  of  equity  permitting  a  discovery  in 
some  cases,  and  under  some  circumstances,  where  Courts  of  law  will 
not  grant  an  inspection.9  And  an  inspection  is  granted  only  where 
civil  rights  are  depending;  for  it  is  a  constant  and  invariable  rule, 
that,  in  criminal  cases,  the  party  shall  never  be  obliged  to  furnish 
evidence  against  himself.10 

2  Gresley  on  Evid.  pp.  115,  316  ;  Wilson  v.  Rogers,  2  Stra.  1242  ;  R.  v.  Smith, 
1  Stra.  126  ;  R.  v.  Tower,  4  M.  &  S.  162 ;  Herbert  v.  Asbburner,  1  Wils.  297;  R.  v. 
Allgood,  7  T.  R.  746  ;  R.  v.  Sheriff  of  Chester,  1  Chitty  479. 

8  R.  v.  Lucas,  10  East  235,  236,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough. 

1  Gresley  on  Evid.  116. 

2  R.  v.  Merchant  Tailors'  Co.,  2  B.  &  Ad.  115  ;  State  of  Louisiana,  ex  rel.  Hatch,  v. 
City  Bank  of  New  Orleans,  1  Rob.  La.  470 ;  People  v.  Throop,  12  Wend.  183. 

8  Mayor  of  Southampton  v.  Graves,  8  T.  R.  590.  The  party,  in  such  case,  can  only 
give  notice  to  the  corporation  to  produce  its  books  and  papers,  as  in  other  cases  be- 
tween private  persons :  see,  accordingly,  Burrell  v.  Nicholson,  3  B.  &  Ad.  649  ;  Bank 
of  Utica  v.  Milliard,  5  Cowen  419  ;  s.  c.  6  id.  62  ;  Imperial  Gas  Co.  v.  Clarke,  7  Bing. 
9.") ;  R.  v.  Justices  of  Buckingham,  8  B.  &  C.  375. 

*  Cox  v.  Copping,  5  Mod.  396 ;  Newell  v.  Simpkin,  6  Bing.  565 ;  Jacocks  v.  Gil- 
Him,  3  Murph.  47. 

s  Geery  v.  Hopkins,  2  Ld.  Ray.  851 ;  8.  c.  7  Mod.  129 ;  Shelling  v.  Farmer,  1  Str.  646. 

6  Schinotti  v.  Bumstead,  1  Tidd's  Pr.  594. 

7  Brace  v.  Ormond,  1  Meriv.  409  ;  People  v.  Throop,  12  Wend.  183  ;  Union  Bank 
v.  Knapp,  3  Pick.  96 ;  Mortimer  v.  M'Callan,  6  M.  &  W.  68  ;  jMcKavlin  v.  Bresslin, 
S  Gray  177.  f 

8  R.  v.  Bishop  of  Ely,  8  B.  &  C.  112;  Finch  v.  Bishop  of  Ely,  2  M.  &  Ry.  127. 

9  Gresley  on  Evid.  H6,  117. 

10  Tidd's  Pr.  593.     Under  this  rule,  an  information,  in  the  nature  of  quo  warranto, 
VOL.   i.  —  40 


626  PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS.  [CH.   XXVIII. 

§  475.  Books  of  Public  Officers.  Inspection  of  the  books  of  public 
officers  is  subject  to  the  same  restriction  as  in  the  case  of  corpora- 
tion books ;  and  access  to  them  will  not  be  granted  in  favor  of  per- 
sons who  have  no  interest  in  the  books.  Thus,  an  inspection  of  the 
books  of  the  post-office  has  been  refused,  upon  the  application  of  the 
plaintiff,  in  a  qui  tarn  action  against  a  clerk  in  the  post-office,  for 
interfering  in  the  election  of  a  member  of  Parliament,  because  the 
action  did  not  relate  to  any  transaction  in  the  post-office,  for  which 
alone  the  books  were  kept.1  Upon  the  same  ground,  that  the  subject 
of  the  action  was  collateral  to  the  subject-matter  and  design  of  the 
books,  an  inspection  of  the  books  of  the  custom-house  has  been 
refused.2  Such  inspections  are  also  sometimes  refused  on  grounds 
of  public  policy,  the  disclosure  sought  being  considered  detrimental 
to  the  public  interest.  Upon  the  same  principle  of  an  interest  in  the 
books,  the  tenants  of  a  manor  are  generally  entitled  to  an  inspec- 
tion of  the  court-rolls,  wherever  their  own  rights  are  concerned ;  but 
this  privilege  is  not  allowed  to  a  stranger.8 

§  476.  Inspection  injurious  to  Public  Interest.  But,  in  all  cases  of 
public  writings,  if  the  disclosure  of  their  contents  would,  either  in 
the  judgment  of  the  Court  or  of  the  chief  executive  magistrate,  or 
the  head  of  department,  in  whose  custody  or  under  whose  control 
they  may  be  kept,  be  injurious  to  the  public  interests,  an  inspection 
will  not  be  granted.1 

§  477.  Procedure  in  obtaining  Inspection.  The  motion  for  a  rule 
to  inspect  and  take  copies  of  books  and  writings,  when  an  action  is 
pending,  may  be  made  at  any  stage  of  the  cause,  and  is  founded  on 
an  affidavit,  stating  the  circumstances  under  which  the  inspection  is 
claimed,  and  that  an  application  therefor  has  been  made  to  the 
proper  quarter  and  refused.1 

§  478.  But  when  no  action  is  pending,  the  proper  course  is  to 
move  for  a  rule  to  show  cause  why  a  mandamus  should  not  issue, 
commanding  the  officer  having  custody  of  the  books  to  permit  the 
applicant  to  inspect  them,  and  take  copies.  The  application  in  this 
case  should  state  some  specific  object  sought  by  the  inspection,  and 
be  supported  by  an  affidavit,  as  in  the  case  preceding.  If  a  rule  is 
made  to  show  cause  why  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  war- 
ranto  should  not  be  filed,  a  rule  for  an  inspection  will  be  granted  to 
the  prosecutor,  immediately  upon  the  granting  of  a  rule  to  show 
cause.  But  if  a  rule  be  made  to  show  cause  why  a  mandamus  should 

is  considered  as  merely  a  civil  proceeding  :  R.  v.  Babb,  3  T.  R.  582.     See  also  R.  v. 
Dr.  Purnell,  1  Wils.  239. 

1  Crew  v.  Blackburn,  cited  1  Wils.  240  ;  Crew  v.  Saunders,  2  Str.  1005. 

*  Atherfold  v.  Beard,  2  T.  R.  610. 

*  R.  v.  Shelley,  3  T.  R.  141  ;  11.  v.  Allgood,  7  id.  746.     See  R.  v.  Hostmen  of  New- 
castle, 2  Stra.  1223,  n.  (1),  by  Nolan. 

1  Supra,  §§  250,  251,  and  cases  there  cited. 

*  1  Tidd's  I'r.  595,  596 ;  jsee  lasigi  v.  Brown,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  401  ;  infra,  §  559.} 


§§  475-479.]  INSPECTION  OF  RECORDS.  627 

not  be  awarded,  the  rule  for  an  inspection  will  not  be  granted,  until 
the  mandamus  has  been  issued  and  returned.1 

2.    Mode  of  Proof  of  Public  Documents.* 

§  479.  Acts  of  State.  We  proceed  now  to  consider  the  mode  of 
proof  of  public  documents,  beginning  with  those  which  are  not  judi- 
cial ;  and,  first,  of  acts  of  State. 

It  has  already  been  seen  that  Courts  will  judicially  take  notice  of 
the  political  constitution  or  frame  of  the  government  of  their  own 
country,  its  essential  political  agents,  or  officers,  and  its  essential 
ordinary  and  regular  operations.  The  great  Seal  of  the  State  and 
the  seals  of  its  judicial  tribunals  require  no  proof.1  Courts  also 
recognize,  without  other  proof  than  inspection,  the  seals  of  State  of 
other  nations  which  have  been  recognized  by  their  own  sovereign.2 
The  seals,  also,  of  foreign  Courts  of  admiralty,  and  of  notaries- 
public,  are  recognized  in  the  like  manner.8  Public  statutes,  also, 
need  no  proof,  being  supposed  to  exist  in  the  memories  of  all;  but, 
for  certainty  of  recollection,  reference  is  had  either  to  a  copy  from 

1  1  Tidd's  Pr.  596;  R.  v.  Justices  of  Surrey,  Sayer  144  ;  R.  v.  Shelley,  3  T.  R.  141  ; 
R.  v.  Hollister,  Gas.  temp.  Hardw.  245. 

2  Qln  the  following  sections,  at  least  three  distinct  principles  have  constantly  to  be 
invoked,  and  must  be  carefully  discriminated.     (1)  The  rule  of  Primariness  requires 
that  the  original  of  a  writing  be  produced  or  its  absence  accounted  for  (post,  §§  563  a,  ff.). 
Under  this  rule,  public  documents  usually  need  not  be  produced,  because  of  the  incon- 
venience involved  in  removing  them  from  their  places  of  official  custody  (§  563 /). 
(2)    The  rule  against  Hearsay  requires  that  a  witness  to  a  fact  shall  give  his  testimony 
in  court  under  oath  and  cross-examination  ;  but  one  of  the  exceptions  to  this  rule  allows 
official  statements  to  be  receivable  without  calling  the  officer  himself,  if  by  statute  or 
otherwise  a  duty  exists  for  him  to  make  the  statement  (ante,  §  162  m).     On  this  prin- 
ciple official  registers,  certificates,  and  the  like,  are  received ;  and  the  question  arises 
in  each  instance  whether  the  principle  of  the  exception  sanctions  the  use  of  such  a 
hearsay  statement.     (3)  The  genuineness  of  an  official  document  —  i.  e.  the  fact  that 
it  was  executed  by  the  officer  purporting  to  execute  it  —  would  ordinarily  have  to  be 
proved  as  the  genuineness  of  any  other  document  is  ;  but  in  many  cases  where  a  seal 
is  appended,  and  sometimes  even  where  no  seal  is  appended,  this  genuineness  is  as- 
sumed.    The  seal  is  in  such  cases  usually  said  to  be  judicially  noticed  ;  but  the  case 
seems  rather  to  be  one  of  a  real  presumption,  or  of  the  presence  of  a  purporting  official 
seal  being  treated  as  a  sufficient  evidence  of  genuineness  (ante,  §  14  w).  — All  three  of 
these  principles  may  have  to  be  applied  to  the  same  offered  document.     Thus,  if  a 
paper  purporting  to  be  a  certified  copy  of  an  official  marriage-register  is  offered,  it  must 
first  be  asked  why  the  original  is  not  produced  ;  this  objection  being  satisfied,  the 
question  then  arises  whether  the  register  itself  is  receivable  under  the  Hearsay  excep- 
tion as  testimony  to  the  facts  recorded  in  it,  and,  again,  whether  uuder  the  same  ex- 
ception the  certified  copy  is  receivable  to  show  the  register's  contents ;  finally,  the 
genuineness  of  the  certified  copy  must  somehow  be  indicated. 

In  the  following  sections,  under  the  sub-title  "Mode  of  Proof,"  all  three  of  these 
principles  are  involved;  under  the  sub- title  "Admissibility  and  Effect,"  usually  the 
second  principle  alone  is  involved.] 

1  Womack  v.  Dearman,  7  Port.  513. 

2  [Ante,  §  4.] 

8  Ante,  §§  4-6 ;  Story  on  Confl.  of  Laws,  §  643 ;  Robinson  v.  Oilman,  7  Shepl. 
299  ;  Coit  v.  Millikin,  1  Denio  376.  A  protest  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  in  a  foreign 
country,  is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  seal  of  the  foreign  notary  :  Willes  550  ;  Anon., 
12  Mod.  345 ;  Bayley  on  Bills,  515  (Phillips  &  Sewall's  ed.)  ;  Story  on  Bills,  §§  276, 
277  ;  La  Cay  gas  v.  Larionda,  4  Mart.  283  ;  [ante,  §  5.] 


628  PUBLIC  DOCUMENTS;  MODE  OF  PROOF.     [CH.  xxvin. 

the  legislative  rolls,  or  to  the  book  printed  by  public  authority.4 
Acts  of  State  may  be  proved  by  production  of  the  original  printed 
document  from  a  press  authorized  by  government.6  Proclamations, 
and  other  acts  and  orders  of  the  executive,  of  the  like  character,  may 
be  proved  by  production  of  the  government  gazette,  in  which  they 
were  authorized  to  be  printed.6  Printed  copies  of  public  documents, 
transmitted  to  Congress  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and 
printed  by  the  printer  to  Congress,  are  evidence  of  those  documents.7 
And  here  it  may  be  proper  to  observe,  that,  in  all  cases  of  proof  by 
a  copy,  if  the  copy  has  been  taken  by  a  machine,  worked  by  the 
witness  who  produces  it,  it  is  sufficient.8  The  certificate  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  is  evidence  that  a  particular  person  has  been  rec- 
ognized as  a  foreign  minister.9  And  the  certificate  of  a  foreign 
governor,  duly  authenticated,  is  evidence  of  his  own  official  acts.10 

§  480.  Legislative  Acts.  Next,  as  to  legislative  acts,  which  con- 
sist of  statutes,  resolutions,  and  orders,  passed  by  the  legislative 
body.  In  regard  to  private  statutes,  resolutions,  etc.?  the  only  mode 
of  proof,  known  to  the  common  law,  is  either  by  means  of  a  copy, 
proved  on  oath  to  have  been  examined  by  the  roll  itself;  or,  by  an 
exemplification  under  the  Great  Seal.  But  in  most  if  not  all  of  the 
United  States,  the  printed  copies  of  the  laws  and  resolves  of  the 
Legislature,  published  by  its  authority,  are  competent  evidence 
either  by  statute  or  judicial  decision ;  and  it  is  sufficient  prima  facie, 
that  the  book  purports  to  have  been  so  printed.1  It  is  the  invariable 
course  of  the  Legislatures  of  the  several  States,  as  well  as  of  the 
United  States,  to  have  the  laws  and  resolutions  of  each  session 
printed  by  authority.  Confidential  persons  are  selected  to  compare 
the  copies  with  the  original  rolls,  and  superintend  the  printing. 
The  very  object  of  this  provision  is  to  furnish  the  people  with  au- 
thentic copies;  and,  from  their  nature,  printed  copies  of  this  kind, 
either  of  public  or  private  laws,  are  as  much  to  be  depended  on  as  the 
exemplification,  verified  by  an  officer  who  is  a  keeper  of  the  record.8 

«  Bull.  N.  P.  225  ;  ("see  §  482.] 

*  R.  v.  Withers,  cited  5  T.  R.  442  ;  Watkins  v.  Holman,  16  Pet.  25  ;  [post,  §  492.] 
8  R.  v.  Holt,  5  T.  R.  4,36  ;  Van  Omeron  o.  Dowick,  2  Carapb.  42 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  226  ; 

Attorney-General  v.  Theakstone,  8  Price  89.  An  appointment  to  a  commission  in  the 
army  cannot  be  proved  by  the  gazette:  R.  v.  Gardner,  2  Campb.  513;  Kirwan  v. 
Cockburn,  5  Esp.  233  ;  see  also  R.  v.  Forsyth,  R.  &  Ry.  274,  275,  Tand  post,,  §  492.] 

7  Radcliff  v.  United  Ins.  Co.,  7  Johns.  38,  per  Kent,  C.  J.  ;  jwhiton  v.  Ins.  Co., 
109  Mass.  24  ;  Gregg  v.  Forsyth,  24  How.  179  ;|  [and  post,  §  489.] 

»  Simpson  v.  Thoreton,  2  M.  &  Rob.  433. 

•  U.  S.  v.  Benner,  1  Baldw.  238. 

10  U.  S.  v.  Mitchell,  3  Wash.  95  ;  [post,  §  491.] 

1  Young  v.  Bank  of  Alexandria,  4  Cranch  388  ;  Biddis  v.  James,  6  Binn.  321,  326  ; 
R.  v.  Forsyth,  Russ.  &  Ry.  275  ;  see  post,  §  489.     {The  archives  of  "the  late  so-called 
Confederate  Government"  must  be  produced  in  the  original  :  Schaben  v.  U.  S.,  6  Ct. 
Cl.  230.} 

2  Per  Tilghman,  C.  J.,  6  Binn.  326.     See  also  Watkins  v.  Holman,  16  Pet.  25  ; 
Holt,  C.  J.,  held  that  an  act,  printed  by  the  king's  printers,  was  always  good  evi- 
dence to  a  jury  ;  though  it  was  not  sufficient  upon  an  issue  of  nul  tiel  record:  Anon., 
2  Salk.  566.     [See  post,  §  489.] 


§§  479-482.]         LEGISLATIVE   ACTS   AND  JOURNALS.  629 

§  481.  If  in  a  private  statute  a  clause  is  inserted,  that  it  shall  be 
taken  notice  of,  as  if  it  were  a  public  act;  this  not  only  dispenses 
with  the  necessity  of  pleading  it  specially,  but  also  changes  the 
mode  of  proof,  by  dispensing  with  the  production  of  an  exemplified 
or  sworn  copy.1 

§  482.  Legislative  Journals.  In  regard  to  the  journals  of  either 
branch  of  the  Legislature,  a  former  remark 1  may  be  here  repeated, 
equally  applicable  to  all  other  public  records  and  documents ;  namely , 
that  they  constitute  an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  which  requires 
the  production  of  the  best  evidence,  and  may  be  proved  by  examined 
copies.  This  exception  is  allowed,  because  of  their  nature,  as  orig- 
inal public  documents,  which  are  not  removable  at  the  call  of  indi- 
viduals, and  because,  being  interesting  to  many  persons,  they  might 
be  necessary,  as  evidence,  in  different  places  at  the  same  time.2 
Moreover,  these  being  public  records,  they  would  be  recognized  as 
such  by  the  Court,  upon  being  produced,  without  collateral  evidence 
of  their  identity  or  genuineness ;  *  and  it  is  a  general  rule,  that, 
whenever  the  thing  to  be  proved  would  require  no  collateral  proof 
upon  its  production,  it  is  provable  by  a  copy.4  These  journals  may 
also  be  proved  by  the  copies  printed  by  the  government  printer,  by 
authority  of  the  House.5  [Whether  the  enrolled  act,  as  approved  by 
the  Governor  or  President,  signed  by  the  presiding  officers  of  the 
Legislature,  and  filed  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  is  to  be  taken  as 
the  final  and  determinative  document  in  ascertaining  either  the  terms 
of  a  statute  or  the  validity  of  its  enactment  with  reference  to  the 
number  of  votes,  of  readings,  etc.,  has  been  a  subject  of  much  con- 
troversy; the  opposing  view  being  that  resort  may  be  had  to  the 
legislative  journals  for  the  purpose  of  overriding  or  correcting  the 
certificate  of  enrolment.  The  arguments  both  of  policy  and  princi- 
ple seem  clearly  to  forbid  such  a  resort;6  this  was  the  orthodox 
common-law  doctrine ; 7  and  it  has  been  perpetuated  in  a  minority  of 
American  jurisdictions ; 8  the  majority  (perhaps  justified  in  part 

1  Beaumont  v.  Mountain,  10  Bing.  404.     The  contrary  seems  to  have  been  held  in 
Brett  v.  Beales,  1  M.  &  Malk.  421 ;  but  that  case  was  overruled,  as  to  this  point,  in 
Woodward  v.  Cotton,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  44,  47  ;  [>ee  ante,  §  6  6.3 

*  Supra,  §  91. 

2  Lord  Melville's  Case,  29  Howell's  St.  Tr.  683-685  ;  R.  v.  Lord  George  Gordon, 
2  Doug.  593,  and  n.  (3)  ;  Jones  v.  Randall,  Lofft  383,  428;  s.  c.  Cowp.  17. 

3  ["But  compare  §  6  a,  ante."^ 

*  R.  D.  Smith,  1  Stra.  126. 

6  Root  v.  King,  7  Cowen  613,  636;  Watkins  v.  Holmau,  16  Pet.  25;  and  see  also 
post,  §  484. 

6  [The  leading  opinion  is  that  of  Beasley,  C.  J.,  in  Pangborn  v.  Young,  32  N.  J.  L. 
29,  — an  arsenal  of  arguments  ;  for  other  good  opinions,  see  Nelson,  C.  J.,  in  Hunt  t1. 
Van  Alstyne,  25  Wend.   605  ;  Zane,  C.  J.,   in  Ritchie  v.  Richards,   14   Utah  345  ; 
Irvine,  C/J.,  in  Webster  v.  Hastings,  Nebr.,  77  N.  W.  127;  Frazer,  J.,  in  Evans  v. 
Browne,  30  Ind.  514;  the  leading  opinion  on  the  other  side  is  that  of  Murray,  C.  J., 
in  Fowler  v.  Pierce,  2  Cal.  165.] 

7  ["Gilbert,  Evidence,  7,  10  ;  R.  v.  Arundel,  Hob.  109  ;  Bowes  p.  Broadhead,  Style 
155.T 

8  LOnly  the  latest  case  or  two  in  each*  jurisdiction  are  given:  Sherman  v.  Story, 


630  PUBLIC  DOCUMENTS;  MODE  OF  PEOOF.       [CH.  xxvm. 

by  constitutional  phraseology)  refuse  to  treat  the  enrolment  as 
conclusive.9] 

§  483.  Official  Registers.  The  next  class  of  public  writings  to  be 
considered  consists  of  official  registers,  or  books  kept  by  persons  in 
public  office,  in  which  they  are  required,  whether  by  statute  or  by 
the  nature  of  their  office,  to  write  down  particular  transactions, 
occurring  in  the  course  of  their  public  duties,  and  under  their  per- 
sonal observation.  These  documents,  as  well  as  all  others  of  a 
public  nature,  are  generally  admissible  in  evidence,  notwithstanding 
their  authenticity  is  not  confirmed  by  those  usual  and  ordinary 
tests  of  truth,  the  obligation  of  an  oath,  and  the  power  of  cross- 
examining  the  persons,  on  whose  authority  the  truth  of  the  docu- 
ments depends.  The  extraordinary  degree  of  confidence,  it  has  been 
remarked,  which  is  reposed  in  such  documents,  is  founded  principally 
upon  the  circumstance,  that  they  have  been  made  by  authorized  and 
accredited  agents  appointed  for  the  purpose ;  but  partly  also  on  the 
publicity  of  their  subject-matter.  Where  the  particular  facts  are 
inquired  into  and  recorded  for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  those  who 
are  empowered  to  act  in  making  such  investigations  and  memorials 
are  in  fact  the  agents  of  all  the  individuals  who  compose  the  State; 
and  every  member  of  the  community  may  be  supposed  to  be  privy 
to  the  investigation.  On  the  ground,  therefore,  of  the  credit  due  to 
agents  so  empowered,  and  of  the  public  nature  of  the  facts  them- 
selves, such  documents  are  entitled  to  an  extraordinary  degree  of 
confidence ;  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  they  should  be  confirmed  and 
sanctioned  by  the  ordinary  tests  of  truth.  Besides  this,  it  would 
always  be  difficult,  and  often  impossible,  to  prove  facts  of  'a  public 
nature,  by  means  of  actual  witnesses  upon  oath.1 

§  484.  These  books,  therefore,  are  recognized  by  law,  because  they 
are  required  by  law  to  be  kept,  because  the  entries  in  them  are  of 
public  interest  and  notoriety,  and  because  they  are  made  under  the 
sanction  of  an  oath  of  office,  or  at  least  under  that  of  official  duty. 
They  belong  to  a  particular  custody,  from  which  they  are  not  usually 

30  Tal.  253  (but  see  Hale  v.  McGettigan,  114  id.  112)  ;  Harwood  v.  Wentworth,  Ariz., 
42  Pac.  1025 ;  Eld  v.  Gorham,  20  Conn.  8 ;  Evans  v.  Browne,  30  Ind.  514  ;  Mayor  v. 
Harwood,  32  Md.  471 ;  Green  v.  Weller,  32  Miss.  650 ;  Pangborn  v.  Young,  32  N.  J.  L. 
29  ;  People  v.  Com'rs,  54  N.  Y.  276  ;  Ritchie  v.  Richards,  14  Utah  345  ;  White  v. 
Hinton,  3  Wyo.  753;  see  Gardner  v.  Barney,  6  Wall.  499.] 

9  [Expartc  Howard  H.  I.  Co.,  Ala.,  24  So.  516  ;  Chicot  Co.  v.  Davies,  40  Ark. 
200;  State  v.  Hocker,  36  Fla.  358  :  State  v.  Boise,  Ida.,  51  Pac.  110,  semble  ;  Spangler 
v.  Jacoby,  14  111.  297;  Larrison  v.  R.  Co.,  77  111.  11  (construed  in  Ottawa  r.  Perkins, 
94  U.  S.  260)  ;  Koehler  v.  Hill,  60  la.  543  ;  Hart  v.  McElroy,  72  Mich.  446 ;  State  v. 
Peterson,  38  Minn.  143  ;  State  v.  Field,  119  Mo.  593  ;  Webster  v.  Hastings,  Nebr., 
77  N.  W.  127  ;  Opinion  of  the  Justices.  52  N.  H.  622;  Cohn  v.  Kingsley,  Or.,  49  Pac. 
985;  State  v.  Platt,  2  S.  C.  150.  In  California  and  Indiana  this  view,  once  main- 
tained, has  been  repudiated.  A  series  of  rulings  carrying  on  the  controversy  in  New 
York  has  an  historical  interest ;  see  Warner  v.  Beers,  23  Wend.  103  ;  Thomas  v. 
Dakm,  22  id.  9,  112;  People  v.  Pnrdy,  2  Hill  31  ;  4  id.  384  ;  People  v.  Supervisors, 
8  N.  Y.  317.] 

1  Stark.  livid.  195  ;    [ante,  §  162  m.] 


§§  482-484.]  OFFICIAL  EEGISTERS.  631 

taken  but  by  special  authority,  granted  only  in  cases  where  inspec- 
tion of  the  book  itself  is  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  identifying 
the  book,  or  the  handwriting,  or  of  determining  some  question  aris- 
ing upon  the  original  entry,  or  of  correcting  an  error  which  has 
been  duly  ascertained.  Books  of  this  public  nature,  being  them- 
selves evidence,  when  produced,  their  contents  may  be  proved  by  an 
immediate  copy  duly  verified.1  Of  this  description  are  parish  regis- 
ters ; 2  the  books  of  the  Bank  of  England,  which  contain  the  transfers 
of  public  stock;8  the  transfer  books  of  the  East  India  Company; 4 
the  rolls  of  courts  baron ; 6  the  books  which  contain  the  official  pro- 
ceed ings  of  corporations,  and  matters  respecting  their  property,  if 
the  public  at  large  is  concerned  with  it ; 8  books  of  assessment  of 
public  rates  and  taxes;7  vestry  books;8  bishops'  registers,  and 
chapter-houce  registers ; 9  terriers ; 10  the  books  of  the  post-office,  and 
custom-house,  and  registers  of  other  public  offices ; u  prison  regis- 
ters ; 12  enrolment  of  deeds ; 18  the  registers  of  births  and  of  mar- 
riages, made  pursuant  to  the  statutes  of  any  of  the  United  States ;  M 

1  Lynch  v.  Clerke,  3  Salk.  154,  per  Holt,  C.  J.  ;  2  Doug.  593,  594,  n.  (8).     The 
handwriting  of  the  recording  or  attesting  officer  is  prima  facie  presumed  genuine : 
Bryan  v.  Wear,  4  Mo.  106. 

2  2  Phil.  Evid.  183-186 ;  Lewis  v.  Marshall,  5  Pet.  472,  475  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  205 ; 
see  Childress  v.  Cutter,  16  Mo.  24,  and  post,  §  493. 

8  Breton  v.  Cope,  Peake's  Cas.  30 ;  Marsh  v.  Collnett,   2  Esp.   665  ;  Mortimer  v. 
M'Callan,  6  M.  &  W.  58. 
*  2  Doug.  593,  n.  (3). 
6  Bull.  N.  P.  247  ;  Doe  v.  Askew,  10  East  520. 

6  Warriner  v.  Giles,  2  Stra.  954  ;  ib.  1223,  n.  (1) ;  Marriage  v.  Lawrence,  3  B.  & 
Aid.  144,  per  Abbott,  C.  J. ;  Gibbon's  Case,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  810 ;  Moore's  Case,   ib. 
854;  Owings  v.  Speed,  5  Wheat.  420;  {Loving  v.  Warren  County,  14  Bush  316; 
Butler  v.  Ins.  Co.,  45  Iowa  93 ;  Fraser  v.  Charleston,  8  S.  C.  318. } 

7  Doe  v.  Seaton,  2  Ad.  &  El.  171,  178,  per  Patteson,  J. ;  Doe  v.  Arkwright,  ib.  182, 
u.,  per  Denman,  C.  J.  ;  K.  v.  King,  2  T.  R.  234 ;  Ronkendorff  v.  Taylor,  4  Pet.  349, 
360  ;  Doe  v.  Cartwright,  Ry.  &  M.  62  ;  [[Smith  v.   Andrews,  1891,   2  Ch.   678,  680, 
694 ;  White  v.  B.  &  F.  G.  Co.,  Ark.,  45  S.  W.  1060  ;  Painter  v.  Hall,  75  Ind.  208 ; 
Beekman  v.  Hamlin,  23  Or.  313 ;  Hanover  Water  Co.  v.  Iron  Co.,  84  Pa.  285  ;  contra: 
Hecht  v.  Eherke,  95  la.  757  ;  Anthony  v.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  60.     But  their  use  as 
containing  admissions  of  the  opponent  may  rest  oil  other  grounds ;  see  Tolleson  v. 
Posey,  32  Ga.  372  ;  Hall  v.  Bishop,  78  Ind.  370.] 

8  R.  v.  Martin,  2  Cainp.  100.     See,  as  to  church  records,  Sawyer  v.  Baldwin,  11 
Pick.  494. 

9  Arnold  v.  Bishop  of  Bath  and  Wells,  5  Bing.  316;  Coombs  v.  Coether,  1  M.  & 
Malk.  398. 

10  Bull.  N.  P.  248 ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  201.     See  infra,  §  496. 

»  Bull.  N.  P.  249  ;  R.  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  24  ;  R.  v.  Rhodes,  ib.  29  ; 
D'Israeli  v.  Jowett,  1  Esp.  427  ;  Barber  v.  Holmes,  3  id.  190;  Wallace  r.  Cook,  5  id. 
117  ;  Johnson  v.  Ward,  6  id.  48  ;  Tompkins  v.  Attorney-General,  1  Dow  404 ;  R,  v. 
Grimwood,  1  Price  369  ;  Henry  v.  Leigh,  3  Campb.  499 ;  U.  S.  v.  Johns,  4  Dall.  412, 
415.  [Tor  a  postmaster's  register,  see  Miller  v.  Boykin,  70  Ala.  469.] 

13  Salte  v.  Thomas,  3  B.  &  P.  188;  R.  v.  Aikles,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  435;  ([White  v. 
U.  S.,  164  U.  S.  100 ;  U.  S.  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  380.] 

18  Bull.  N.  P.  229  ;  Kinnersley  r.  Orpe,  1  Doug.  56  ;  Hastings  v.  Blue  Hill  Tump. 
Corp.,  9  Pick.  80  ;  Qsee  post,  §  485 a.] 

"  Milford  v.  Worcester,  7  Mass.  48  ;  Com.  v.  Littlejohn,  15  id.  163  ;  Sumner  v. 
Sebec,  3  Greenl.  223  ;  Wedgewood's  Case,  8  id.  75  :  Jacocks  v.  Gilliam,  3  Murphy 
47;  Martin  v.  Gunby,  2  H.  &  J.  248  ;  Jackson  t>.  Boneham,  15  Johns.  226  ;  Jackson 
v.  King,  5  Cowen  237  ;  Richmond  v.  Patterson,  3  Ohio  368 ;  [see  R.  v.  Weaver,  L.  R. 


632  PUBLIC  DOCUMENTS;  MODE  OF  PKOOF.      [CH.  xxvm. 

the  registration  of  vessels  in  the  custom-house; 15  and  the  books  of 
record  of  the  transactions  of  towns,  city  councils,  and  other  munici- 
pal bodies.1'  In  short,  the  rule  may  be  considered  as  settled,  that 
every  document  of  a  public  nature,  which  there  would  be  an  incon- 
venience in  removing,  and  which  the  party  has  a  right  to  inspect, 
may  be  proved  by  a  duly  authenticated  copy.17 

§  485.  It  is  deemed  essential  to  the  official  character  of  these  books 
that  the  entries  in  them  be  made  promptly,  or  at  least  without  such 
long  delay  as  to  impair  their  credibility,  and  that  they  be  made  by 
the  person  whose  duty  it  was  to  make  them,  and  in  the  mode  required 
by  law,  if  any  has  been  prescribed.1  When  the  books  themselves  are 
produced  they  are  received  as  evidence,  without  further  attestation. 
But  they  must  be  accompanied  by  proof  that  they  come  from  the 
proper  repositor}^.2  Where  the  proof  is  by  a  copy,  an  examined  copy, 
duly  made  and  sworn  to  by  any  competent  witness,  is  always  admis- 
sible. Whether  a  copy  certified  by  the  officer  having  legal  custody 
of  the  book  or  document,  he  not  being  specially  appointed  by  law  to 
furnish  copies,  is  admissible,  has  been  doubted ;  but  though  there  are 
decisions  against  the  admissibility,  yet  the  weight  of  authority  seems 
to  have  established  the  rule  that  a  copy  given  by  a  public  officer, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  keep  the  original,  ought  to  be  received  in  evidence.8 

2  C.  C.  R.  85  ;  Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  37,  69  ;  j  Tucker  v.  People,  117  111.  91  ;{ 
Com.  v.  Hayden,  163  Mass.  453 ;  Royal  Soc.  G.  F.  v.  McDonald,  N.  J.  L.,  35  Atl. 
1061  ;  Succession  of  Justus,  48  La.  An.  1096.] 

16  U.  S.  v.  Johns,  4  Ball.  415  ;  Colson  v.  Bonzey,  6  Greenl.  474  ;  Hacker  v.  Young, 
6  N.  H.  95;  Coolidge  v.  Ins.  Co.,  14  Johns.  308  ;  Catlett  v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Wend.  561. 

w  Saxton  v.  Nimms,  14  Mass.  320,  321 ;  Thayer  v.  Stearns,  1  Pick.  109  ;  Taylor  v. 
Henry,  2  Pick.  401  ;  Denning  v.  Roome,  6  Wend.  651 ;  Dudley  v.  Grayson,  6  Monroe 
259  ;  Bishop  v.  Cone,  3  N.  H.  513. 

17  Gresley  on  Evid.  115;  ante,  §  482.     FJSo,  also,  meteorological  records  (Huston  v. 
Council  Bluffs,  101  la.  33  ;  Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99  U.  S.  660);  election-registers  (En- 
field  v.  Ellington,  67  Conn.  459;  Patton  v.  Coates,  41  Ark.  lil)  ;  and  military  record- 
books  (Board  i;.  May,  67  Ind.  561).     In  almost  every  jurisdiction  statutes  now  enact 
the  general  principle  above  stated,  or  enumerate  the  chief  kinds  of  official  registers  ad- 
missible.    See  other  examples  in    {Worcester  v.  Northborough,  140  Mass.  400;  The 
Maria  Das  Dorias,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  163  ;|  Daly  v.  Webster,  1  U.  S.  App.  573,  611.] 

1  Doe  v.  Bray,  8  B.  &  C.  813 ;  Walker  v.  Wingfield,  18  Ves.  443.      A  certificate 
that  a  certain  fact  appears  of  record  is  not  sufficient ;  the  officer  must  certify  a  trans- 
cript of  the  entire  record  relating  to  the  matter  :  Owen  v.  Boyle,  3  Shepl.  147  ;  QGood- 
rich  v.  Conrad,  24  la.  254  ;  Greer  v.  Fergerson,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  943.] 

2  1  Stark.   Evid.  202 ;   Atkins  v.  Hatton,  2  Anstr.  387  ;   Armstrong  v.  Hewitt, 
4  Price  216 ;  Pulley  v.  Hilton,  12  id.  625  ;  Swinnerton  v.  Marquis  of  Stafford,  3  Taunt. 
91 ;  Baillie  v.  Jackson,  17  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  181,  10  Sirn.  167. 

8  United  States  v.  Percheman,  7  Pet.  51,  85;  Oakes  v.  Hill,  14  Pick.  442,  448  ; 
Abbott  on  Shipping,  p.  63,  n.  1  (Story's  ed.);  United  States  v.  Johns,  4  Dall.  412, 
415;  Judice  v.  Chretien,  3  Rob.  La.  15;  Wells  v.  Compton,  ib.  171  ;  ^Ferguson  v. 
Clilford,  37  N.  H.  85  ;  Barcello  v.  Hapgood,  118  N.  C.  712;  Bryant  v.  Kelton,  1  Tex. 
436;  contra:  State  v.  Cake,  24  N.  J.  L.  516.1  In  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
this  rule  is  the  statute  of  the  United  States  ofMarch  27,  1804  ("U.  S.  R.  S.  §  906  J  by 
which  it  is  enacted,  that  "all  records  and  exemplifications  of  office-books,  which  are  or 
may  be  kept  in  any  public  office  of  any  State,  not  appertaining  to  a  court,  shall  be  proved 
or  admitted  in  any  other  court  or  office  in  any  other  State,  by  the  attestation  of  the 
keeper  of  the  said  records  or  books,  and  the  seal  of  his  office  thereunto  annexed,  if  there 
be  a  seal,  together  with  a  certificate  of  the  presiding  justice  of  the  court  of  the  county 
or  district,  as  the  case  may  be,  in  which  such  office  is  or  may  be  kept  ;  or  of  the  Gov- 


§§  484-485  a.]  OFFICIAL  REGISTERS;  RECOKDED  CONVEYANCES.    633 

§  485  a.  Registered  Conveyances.  [Under  the  statutes  providing 
for  the  recording  or  registration  of  conveyances  of  land,  the  principles 
here  in  hand  receive  frequent  application.  The  phraseology  of  the 
local  statutes  is  usually  of  chief  importance ;  but  the  general  applica- 
tion of  the  common-law  principles  and  the  bearing  of  the  statutory 
changes  may  here  be  briefly  noticed. 

(1)  The  rule  of  Primariness  (post,  §  563  a)  requires  that  the 
original  of  a  writing  be  produced  or  accounted  for ;  and  the  question 
thus  arises  whether  the  original  of  a  recorded  deed  need  be  produced. 
There  are  in  vogue  at  least  three  different  solutions  of  this  question. 
(a)  By  one  view  the  situation  is  no  different  from  the  ordinary  one  j 
the  deed  must  be  accounted  for,  as  any  other  writing  must  be,  in  one 
of  the  ways  noted  post,  §§  563a-563i.  (#)  By  another  and  modified 
view,  introduced  usually  by  statute,  the  party  proving  the  deed  need 
merely  show  (as  commonly  provided,  an  affidavit  suffices)  that  the 
original  is  lost  (thus  not  varying  the  common  law)  or  is  out  of  his 
control  (thus  varying  the  common  law  to  the  extent  that  he  need  not 
notify  the  possessor,  if  an  opponent,  to  produce,  nor  subpoena  him,  if 
a  third  person).1  A  variation  of  this  view,  formulated  usually  in 
decisions,  is  that  the  party  need  not  account  for  the  deed  unless  he  is 
the  grantee  therein  (and  thus  presumably  has  it  in  his  possession)  or 
his  opponent  is  the  grantee  (in  which  case  it  is  presumably  available 
for  the  former  if  he  gives  notice  to  produce)  ;  except  in  these  two 
cases,  the  document  is  presumed  to  be  out  of  his  control,  and  he  need 
not  otherwise  account  for  it.a  (e)  A  third  variation  goes  to  the  other 

ernor,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Chancellor,  or  the  Keeper  of  the  Great  Seal  of  the 
State,  that  the  said  attestation  is  in  due  form,  and  by  the  proper  officer  ;  and  the  said 
certificate,  if  given  by  the  presiding  justice  of  a  court,  shall  be  further  authenticated 
by  the  clerk  or  prothonotary  of  the  said  court,  who  shall  certify,  under  his  hand  and 
the  seal  of  his  office,  that  the  said  presiding  justice  is  duly  commissioned  and  qualified  ; 
or  if  the  said  certificate  be  given  by  the  Governor,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Chan- 
cellor, or  Keeper  of  the  Great  Seal,  it  shall  be  under  the  Great  Seal  of  the  State  in  which 
the  said  certificate  is  made.  And  the  said  records  and  exemplifications,  authenticated 
as  aforesaid,  shall  have  such  faith  and  credit  given  to  them  in  every  court  and  office 
within  the  United  States,  as  they  have  by  law  or  usage  in  the  courts  or  offices  of  the 
State  from  whence  the  same  are  or  shall  be  taken."  By  another  section  this  provision 
is  extended  to  the  records  and  public  books,  etc.,  of  all  the  Territories  of  the  United 
States ;  Qand  in  most  jurisdictions,  statutes  now  enact  a  general  rule  similar  to  that  of  the 
Federal  statute,  or  enumerate  the  chief  kinds  of  documents  provable  by  certified  copy. 
A  good  survey  of  the  principles  is  to  be  found  in  Fountain  v.  Lynn,  N.  J.,  31  Atl. 
1026.]  The  earlier  American  authorities,  opposed  to  the  rule  in  the  text,  are  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  F.nglish  rule  :  2  Phil.  Evid.  130-134  ;  jbut  now,  in  England,  by  14- 
15  Viet.,  c.  99,  §  14,  whenever  any  book  or  other  document  is  of  such  a  public  nature 
as  to  be  admissible  in  evidence  in  its  mere  production  from  the  proper  custody,  and  no 
statute  exists  which  renders  its  contents  provable  by  means  of  a  copy,  any  copy  thereof 
or  extract  therefrom  shall  be  admissible  in  evidence  if  it  is  proved  to  be  an  examined 
copy,  or  if  it  purports  to  be  signed  and  certified  as  a  true  copy  by  the  officer  who  has 
the  custody  of  the  original,  j  Where  the  law  does  not  require  or  authorize  an  instru- 
ment or  matter  to  be  recorded,  a  copy  of  the  record  of  it  is  not  admissible  in  evidence: 
Fitler  v.  Shotwell,  7  Watts  &  Serg.  14  ;  Brown  v.  Hicks,  1  Pike  232 ;  Haile  v.  Palmer, 
5  Mo.  403. 

1  CSee  examples  in  Booth  v.  Cook,  20  111.  130  ;  Brown  v.  Griffith,  70  Cal.  14.    The 
statutes  vary  in  their  phraseology.] 

2  QSee  examples  in   Bolton  v.    Curamings,   25  Conn.   410  ;    Eaton  i».    Campbell, 


634  PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS.  [CH.   XXVIII. 

extreme,  and  treats  the  registration-acts  as  intended  to  relieve  entirely 
any  person  desiring  to  prove  a  deed  from  the  necessity  of  accounting 
for  the  original ;  this  rule  is  in  most  instances  the  creation  of  statute.8 

(2)  The  correctness  of  the  copy  offered  must  somehow  be  proved, 
assuming  that  the  original  is  accounted  for.     A  sworn  or  examined 
copy  will  suffice ;  but  whether  a  certified  copy  by  the  custodian  of  the 
original  is  admissible  depends  on  whether  by  an  exception  to  the 
Hearsay  rule  such  an  official  statement  is  receivable ;  this,  though 
covered  by  the  (American)  common-law  principle  referred  to  in  the 
preceding  section,  is  usually  expressly  provided  for  by  the  registration- 
statutes. 

(3)  The  due  execution  of  the  deed  must  somehow  be  proved. 
Probably  no  common-law  principle  would  suffice  to  make  by  implica- 
tion the  recording  officer's  certificate  of  copy  receivable  also  to  prove 
the  execution  of  the  deed.     But  where  the  statute  of  registration  has 
provided  for  preliminary  proof  (by  acknowledgment  or  by  witnesses) 
to  a  notary  or  directly  to  the  recording  officer,  and  the  officer  is  not 
allowed  to  record  until  this  preliminary  proof  has  been  made,  his 
certificate  of  record  imports  a  due  execution  of  the  deed;    this  is 
usually  regarded  as  a  necessary  implication  from  such  statutes,  even 
where  no  express  provision  to  that  effect  is  made.4   Since  his  certificate, 
as  evidence  of  the  contents  and  the  execution  of  the  deed  is  received, 
by  exception,  as  an  official  statement  which  he  is  authorized  and  re- 
quired to  make,  it  is  not  received  except  where  it  is  thus  authorized, 
i.  e.  where  the  deed  is  lawfully  recorded.6] 

§  486.  Foreign  Laws.  In  regard  to  foreign  laws,  the  established 
doctrine  now  is,  that  no  Court  takes  judicial  notice  of  the  laws  of  a 
foreign  country,  but  they  must  be  proved  as  facts.  And  the  better 
opinion  seems  to  be,  that  this  proof  must  be  made  to  the  Court,  rather 
than  to  the  jury.  "  For,"  observes  Mr.  Justice  Story,  "  all  matters  of 
law  are  properly  referable  to  the  Court,  and  the  object  of  the  proof 
of  foreign  laws  is  to  enable  the  Court  to  instruct  the  jury  what, 
in  point  of  law,  is  the  result  of  the  foreign  law  to  be  applied  to  the 
matters  in  controversy  before  them.  The  Court  are,  therefore,  to 
decide  what  is  the  proper  evidence  of  the  laws  of  a  foreign  country ; 
and  when  evidence  is  given  of  those  laws,  the  Court  are  to  judge  of 
their  applicability,  when  proved,  to  the  case  in  hand."  l 

7  Pick.  10 ;  Com.  r.  Emery,  2  Gray  80 ;  Andrews  v.  Davison,  17  N.  H.  413 ;  Pratt 
c.  Battles,  34  Vt.  391.] 

8  TSee  Tully  v.  Canfield,  60  Mo.  99.1 

4  LSee  good  expositions  by  McCoy,  J.,  in  Eady  v.  Shivey,  40  Ga.  684 ;  Mills,  J.,  in 
Womack  v.  Hughes,  Litt.  Sel.  C.  291;  Marshall,  J.,in  Ratcliffv.  Trimble,  12  B.  Monr. 
32  ;  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Com.  v.  Emery,  2  Gray  80  :  Baldwin,  J.,  in  Pollard  v.  Lively, 
2  Gratt.  216  ;  Reese,  J.,  in  Saundere  p.  Harris,  6  Humph.  345 ;  Overton,  J.,  in  Smith 
v.  Martin,  2  Overt.  '208. j 

6  C^66  good  expositionR  by  Handy,  J.,  in  Lock  v.  Mayne,  39  Miss.  157  ;  Owsley,  J., 
in  Rutland  v.  Jordan,  3  Bibb  186  ;  Sawyer,  J.,  in  Landers  v.  Bolton,  26  Cal.  393.] 

1  Story  on  Conflict  of  Laws,  §  638. 


§§  485  a-488.]  FOREIGN  LAWS.  635 

§  487.  "  Generally  speaking,  authenticated  copies  of  the  written 
laws,  or  of  other  public  instruments  of  a  foreign  government,  are 
expected  to  be  produced.  For  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  any 
civilized  nation  will  refuse  to  give  such  copies,  duly  authenticated, 
which  are  usual  and  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  administering  jus- 
tice in  other  countries.  It  cannot  be  presumed  that  an  application 
to  a  foreign  government  to  authenticate  its  own  edict  or  law  will  be 
refused ;  but  the  fact  of  such  a  refusal  must,  if  relied  on,  be  proved. 
But  if  such  refusal  is  proved,  then  inferior  proofs  may  be  admissible.1 
Where  our  own  government  has  promulgated  any  foreign  law,  or  ordi- 
nance of  a  public  nature,  as  authentic,  that  may,  of  itself,  be  sufficient 
evidence  of  the  actual  existence  and  terms  of  such  law  or  ordinance.2 

§  488.  "  In  general,  foreign  laws  are  required  to  be  verified  by  the 
sanction  of  an  oath,  unless  they  can  be  verified  by  some  high  author- 
ity, such  as  the  law  respects,  not  less  than  it  respects  the  oath  of  an 
individual.1  The  usual  mode  of  authenticating  foreign  laws  (as  it  is  of 
authenticating  foreign  judgments),  is  by  an  exemplification  of  a  copy, 
under  the  great  Seal  of  a  State ;  or  by  a  copy  proved  to  be  a  true  copy, 
by  a  witness  who  has  examined  and  compared  it  with  the  original ; 
or  by  the  certificate  of  an  officer  properly  authorized  by  law  to  give 
the  copy;  which  certificate  must  itself  also  be  duly  authenticated.2 
But  foreign  unwritten  laws,  customs,  and  usages  may  be  proved,  and 
indeed  must  ordinarily  be  proved,  by  parol  evidence.  The  usual  course 
is  to  make  such  proof  by  the  testimony  of  competent  witnesses,  in- 
structed in  the  laws,  customs,  and  usages,  under  oath.8  Sometimes, 
however,  certificates  of  persons  in  high  authority  have  been  allowed 
as  evidence,  without  other  proof." 4 

[It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  proof  of  a  foreign  law  raises  several 
distinct  questions  of  evidence,  the  respective  principles  involved 
having  no  concern  with  each  other.  (1)  In  the  first  place,  the  Court 
will  not  take  judicial  notice  of  a  foreign  law;  it  must  be  proved, 
as  being  a  fact,  and  not  a  law.5  (2)  To  whom  should  the  evidence 

1  Church  v.  Hubbart,  2  Cranch  237. 

2  Story  on  Conflict  of  Laws,  §  640  ;  Talbot  v.  Seeman,  1  Cranch  38. 

1  Church  v.  Hnbbart,  2  Cranch  237  ;  Brackett  v.  Norton,  4  Conn.  517;  Hempstead 
v.  Reed,  6  Conn.  480  ;  Dyer  v.  Smith,  12  id.  384.    But  the  Court  may  proceed  on  its 
own  knowledge  of  foreign  laws,  without  the  aid  of  other  proof ;  and  its  judgment  will 
not  be  reversed  for  that  cause,  unless  it  should  appear  that  the  Court  was  mistaken  as 
to  those  laws  :  State  v.  Rood,  12  Vt.  396. 

2  Church  v.  Hubbart,  2  Cranch  238 ;  Packard  v.  Hill,  2  Wend.  411  ;  Lincoln  v. 
Battelle,  6  id.  475. 

8  Church  n.  Hubbart,  2  Cranch  237  ;  Dalrymple  v.  Dalrymple,  2  Hagg.  Consist. 
App'x,  pp.  115-144 ;  Brush  v.  Wilkins,  4  Johns.  Ch.  520 ;  Mostyn  v.  Fabrigas,  Cowp. 
174.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  witness  should  be  of  the  legal  profession  :  R.  v.  Dent, 
1  C.  &  K.  97.  But  whether  a  woman  is  admissible  as  peritus,  quaere:  R.  v.  Povey,  14 
Eng.  Law  &  En.  549  ;  17  Jur.  120.  And  see  Wilcocks  v.  Phillips,  Wall.  Jr.  47. 

4  Story  on  Confl.  of  Laws,  §§  641,  642 ;  ib.  §§  629-640  ;  In  re  Dormoy,  3  Hagg. 
Eccl  767,'  769 ;  R.  v.  Picton,  30  Howell's  State  Trials,  515-673  ;  The  Diana,  1  Dods. 
95,  101,  102. 

6  [Ante,  §  6  &.] 


636  PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS.  [CH.   XXVIII. 

be  addressed  for  determination,  to  the  judge  or  to  the  jury  ?  The 
better  opinion  is  that  it  should  be  addressed  to  the  judge,  though 
the  opposite  view  is  usually  maintained.6  (3)  May  the  terms  of 
the  law,  if  it  is  a  statute,  be  proved  by  an  expert  witness,  instead 
of  by  an  exemplification  or  other  copy  ?  It  is  usually  said  that  in 
such  a  case  a  copy  must  be  used.  But  the  argument  for  the  opposite 
view  is  that  the  state  of  the  law  at  a  given  time  consists  not  merely 
of  the  words  of  the  statute,  but  of  such  additional  elements  as  the 
construction  and  effect  given  to  them  by  usage  and  judicial  decision 
and  the  repealing  or  modifying  effect  of  later  statutes;  so  that  to 
testify  to  the  condition  of  the  statute  law  is  not  necessarily  to  testify 
merely  to  the  terms  of  a  document,  and  thus  (on  the  principle  of 
§  563  o,  post)  may  be  allowed  with  producing  the  statute  or  a  copy 
of  it.  This  argument  has  much  force,  but  has  rarely  prevailed; 
except  that  expert  testimony  to  the  judicial  interpretation  of  a 
statute  already  proven  by  copy  would  not  be  objected  to.7  Where 
the  law  is  found  in  usage  or  judicial  precedent,  the  oral  testimony 
of  an  expert  is  concededly  receivable.8  (4)  When  such  testimony 
from  an  expert  is  admissible,  the  witness  offered  must  be  shown 
to  be  qualified,  by  training  and  by  acquaintance  with  the  law  in 
question,  to  testify ;  this  is  a  question  depending  largely  on  the  facts 
of  each  case.9  (o)  When  proof  of  a  statute  is  made  by  copy,  the 
Hearsay  rule  is  encountered.  A  sworn  or  examined  copy  is  satisfac- 
tory, because  the  witness  is  upon  the  stand.  An  exemplified  copy 
has  always  been  regarded  as  an  official  statement,  admissible  by  ex- 
ception.10 The  chief  question  arises  as  to  a  printed  volume  purporting 
to  contain  the  statute's  terms ;  for  it  cannot  be  admitted  unless  by 
exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule.  At  common  law  it  was  generally  held 
(though  there  were  inharmonious  rulings)  that  a  volume  printed  by 
official  authority  was  admissible,  and  that  a  volume  purporting  to  be 
so  printed  would  be  assumed  to  be  genuine ; n  and  in  most  jurisdic- 

«  [Ante,  §  81  </.] 

7  L-See  Mostyn  v.  Fabrigas,  Cowp.  161,  174 ;   Picton's  Trial,  30  How.  St.  Tr.  509 ; 
Lacon  v.  Higgins,  3  Stark.  178;  Alivon  v.  Furnival,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  291  ;  Millar  v.  Hein- 
rir.k,  4  Camp.  155  ;  Baron  de  Bode's  Case,  8  Q.  B.  250  (leading  case);  Cocks  v.  Purday, 
2  C.  &  K.  270 ;  Nelson  v.  Bridport,  8  Beav.  539  (leading  case)  ;  Sussex  Peerage  Case, 
11  Cl.  &  F.  115  ;  Bremer  v.  Freeman,  10  Moore  P.  C.  362  ;  Walker  v.  Forbes,  31  Ala. 
10;   Me  Deed  v.  McDeed,  67  111.  545;   Canale  v.  People,  id.  52  N.  E.  310;  Line  ». 
M:u;k,  14  In.l.  330  ;  Baynham  v.  Canton,  3  Pick.  295  ;  Kline  v.  Baker,  99  Mass.  254  ; 
Charlotte  v.  Chouteau,"25  Mo.  465,  473;   Emery  v.  Berry,  28  N.  H.  473;  Chanoine 
»>.   Fowler,   3  Wend.  177  (leading  case)  ;   Lincoln  v.  Battelle,  6  id.   482  ;    Hynes  v. 
McDermott,  82  N.  Y.  52  ;    Barrows  v.  Downs,  9  R.  I.  446  (leading  case) ;  Church  v. 
Hubbart,  2  Cranch  238  (leading  case)  ;   Pierce  v.  Insdeth,  106  U.  S.  551.     lu  some 
jurisdictions  statutes  have  regulated  the  matter.] 

8  ("Citations  in  preceding  note.] 

"Treated  ante,  §§  430  b,  430  ?n.] 

_AnU,  §§  479,  487.] 

Owen  v.  Boyle,  3  Shepl.  147;  Hecla  P.  Co.  v.  Signa  I.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  53  N.  E. 
650 ;  U.  S.  v.  Glassware,  4  Uw  Reporter  36  ;  Armstrong  v.  U.  S.,  6  Ct.  Cl.  225 ; 
]  Knnis  v.  Smith,  14  How.  400  ;|  compare  §  489.  Printed  copies  proved  by  a  witness 
t  .  !«•  currently  accepted  aa  correct  are  also  usually  admitted :  Spaulding  v.  Vincent, 
LM  Vt.  501  ;  Barrows  v.  Downs,  9  R.  I.  453  ;  Dawson  v.  Peterson,  110  Mich.  431.] 


§§  488-489.]  FOREIGN  LAW.  637 

tions  statutes  have  made  similar  provisions  (varying  more  or  less), 
and  have  sometimes  permitted  the  use  of  volumes  shown  to  be 
accepted  in  the  foreign  country  as  correctly  containing  the  laws. 
{6)  A  treatise  upon  the  unwritten  law  of  a  foreign  country  is 
sometimes  admitted,  by  way  of  exception  to  the  Hearsay  rule.12] 

§  489.  Same  :  Laws  of  Domestic  States.  The  relations  of  the 
United  States  to  each  other,  in  regard  to  all  matters  not  surrendered 
to  the  general  government  by  the  national  Constitution,  are  those  of 
foreign  States  in  close  friendship,  each  being  sovereign  and  independ- 
ent.1 Upon  strict  principles  of  evidence,  therefore,  the  laws  and 
public  documents  of  one  State  can  be  proved  in  the  Courts  of  an- 
other only  as  other  foreign  laws  ;  and  accordingly,  in  some  of  the 
States,  such  proof  has  been  required.2  But  the  Courts  of  other  States, 
and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  being  of  opinion  that 
the  connection,  intercourse,  and  constitutional  ties  which  bind  to- 
gether these  several  States  require  some  relaxation  of  the  strictness 
of  this  rule,  have  accordingly  held  that  a  printed  volume,  purporting 
on  the  face  of  it  to  contain  the  laws  of  a  sister  State,  is  admissible  as 
prima  facie  evidence,  to  prove  the  statute  laws  of  that  State.8  The 
act  of  Congress  respecting  the  exemplification  of  public  office  books  * 
is  not  understood  to  exclude  any  other  modes  of  authentication  which 
the  Courts  may  deem  it  proper  to  admit.6  And  in  regard  to  the  laws 
of  the  States,  Congress  has  provided,6  under  the  power  vested  for 
that  purpose  by  the  Constitution,  that  the  acts  of  the  Legislatures  of 
the  several  States  shall  be  authenticated  by  having  the  seal  of  their 
respective  States  fixed  thereto;  but  this  method,  as  in  the  case  of 
public  books  just  mentioned,  is  not  regarded  as  exclusive  of  any  other 
which  the  States  may  respectively  adopt.7  Under  this  statute  it  is 
held  that  the  seal  of  the  State  is  a  sufficient  authentication,  with- 
out the  attestation  of  any  officer  or  any  other  proof  ;  and  it  will  be 
presumed  prima  facie  that  the  seal  was  affixed  by  the  proper  officer.1 


e,  §  162  j.] 

1  Ltfra,  §  504. 

2  Brackett  v.  Norton,  4  Conn.  517,  521  ;    Hempstead  v.  Reed,  6  id.  480  ;   Pack. 
ard  v.  Hill,  2  Wend.  411. 

8  Young  v.  Bank  of  Alexandria,  4  Cranch  384,  388  ;  Thompson  v.  Musser,  1  Ball. 
458,  463;  Biddis  v.  James,  6  Binn.  321,  327;  Muller  v.  Morris,  2  Barr  85;  Raynham 
o.  Canton,  3  Pick.  293,  296;  Kean  v.  Rice,  12  S.  &  R.  203;  State  v.  Stade,  1  D.  Chipm. 
-303  ;  Comparet  v.  Jernegan,  5  Blackf.  375  ;  Taylor  v.  Bank  of  Illinois,  7  Monroe  585  ; 
Taylor  v.  Bank  of  Alexandria,  5  Leigh  471  ;  Clarke  v.  Bank  of  Mississippi,  5  Eng.  51  6  ; 
Allen  v.  Watson,  2  Hill  S.  C.  319  ;  Hale  v.  Rose,  2  Pennington  591  ;  contra:  Van 
Buskirk  v.  Mnlock,  18  N.  J.  L.  185.  Qln  most  jurisdictions  statutes  now  provide  for 
the  admission  of  printed  volumes  purporting  to  he  printed  "by  authority;"  for  in- 
•stances  of  the  construction  of  this  phrase,  see  Rogero  v.  Zippel,  33  Fla.  625  ;  j  Wilt  v. 
Cutler,  38  Mich.  189  ;(  Goodwin  v.  Assur.  Soc.,  id.,  66  N.  W.  157  ;  Bride  v.  Clark, 
161  Mass.  130;  Glenn  v.  Hunt,  120  Mo.  330.] 

•  Stat.  March  27,  1804,  cited  supra,  §  485. 

•  See  cases  cited  supra,  n.  (2). 

•  Stat.  May  26,  1790  ;  £U.  S.  R.  S.  §  905.] 
1  Lothrop  v.  Blake,  3  Barr  483. 

8  U.  S.  v.  Amedy,  11  Wheat.  392;  U.  S.  v.  Johns,  4'DaU.  412,  State  v.  Carr, 
•S  N.  H.  367  ;  Qsee  Warner  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  95.]  jThe  exemplification  may  be  of 


638  PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS.  [CH.   XXVIII. 

§  490.  Same :  Judicial  Notice.  The  reciprocal  relations  between 
the  national  government  and  the  several  States,  comprising  the 
United  States,  are  not  foreign  but  domestic.  Hence,  the  Courts  of 
the  United  States  take  judicial  notice  of  all  the  public  laws  of  the 
respective  States  whenever  they  are  called  upon  to  consider  and  ap- 
ply them.  And,  in  like  manner,  the  Courts  of  the  several  States  take 
judicial  notice  of  all  public  acts  of  Congress,  including  those  which 
relate  exclusively  to  the  District  of  Columbia,  without  any  formal 
proof.1  But  private  statutes  must  be  proved  in  the  ordinary  mode.2 

3.  Admissibility  and  Effect  of  Public  Documents* 
§  491.  Legislative  Recitals  and  Journals,  Proclamations,  Diplo- 
matic Correspondence,  etc.  We  are  next  to  consider  the  admissibility 
and  effect  of  the  public  documents  we  have  been  speaking  of,  as  in- 
struments of  evidence.  And  here  it  may  be  generally  observed,  that 
to  render  such  documents,  when  properly  authenticated,  admissible 
in  evidence,  their  contents  must  be  pertinent  to  the  issue.  It  is  also 
necessary  that  the  document  be  made  by  the  person  whose  duty  it 
was  to  make  it,  and  that  the  matter  it  contains  be  such  as  belonged 
to  his  province,  or  came  within  his  official  cognizance  and  observa- 
tion. Documents  having  these  requisites  are,  in  general,  admissible 
to  prove,  either  prima  facie  or  conclusively,  the  facts  they  recite. 
Thus,  where  certain  public  statutes  recited  that  great  outrages  had 
been  committed  in  a  certain  part  of  the  country,  and  a  public  procla- 
mation was  issued,  with  similar  recitals,  and  offering  a  reward  for  the 
discovery  and  conviction  of  the  perpetrators,  these  were  held  admis- 
sible and  sufficient  evidence  of  the  existence  of  those  outrages,  to 
support  the  averments  to  that  effect  in  an  information  for  a  libel 
on  the  government  in  relation  to  them.1  So,  a  recital  of  a  state  of 
war,  in  the  preamble  of  a  public  statute,  is  good  evidence  of  its  exist- 
ence, and  it  will  be  taken  notice  of  without  proof ;  and  this,  whether 
the  nation  be  or  be  not  a  party  to  the  war.2  So,  also,  legislative  res- 
olutions are  evidence  of  the  public  matters  which  they  recite.8  The 
journals,  also,  of  either  House  are  the  proper  evidence  of  the  action 
of  that  House  upon  all  matters  before  it.4  The  diplomatic  correspond- 

such  part  of  a  statute  as  bears  on  the  point  in  dispute,  and  need  not  be  of  the  whole 
statute  :  Grant  v.  Coal  Co.,  80  Pa.  208.    As  to  the  seal,  see  Fisk  v.  Woodruff,  15  111.  15.} 

1  Owings  v.  Hull,  9  Pet.  607  ;    Hinde  v.  Vattier,  5   id.  398  ;    Young  v.  Bank  of 
Alexandria,  4  Cranch  384,  388  ;    Canal  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  G.  &  J.  1,  63 ;  Qreated 
ante,  §  6  6."] 

2  Lelandv.  Wilkinson,  6  Pet.  317. 

1  R.  ».  Sutton,  4  M.  &  S.  532. 

2  R.  v.  De  Berenger,  3  M.  &  S.  67,  69.     See  also  Brazen  Nose  College  v.  Bishop  of 
Salisbury,  4  Taunt.  831  ;  PLane  v.  Harris,  16  Ga.  217  ;  but  recitals  in  private  statutes 
are  not  admissible :  Elraonaorff  v.  Carmichael,  3  Litt.  473.]    jSo  also  the  proclamation 
of  a  Governor  declaring  one  elected  to  Congress  :  Lurton  v.  Gilliam,  2  111.  577  ;|   P_but 
compare  Masons'  F.  A.  A.  t;.  Riley,  Ark.,  45  S.  W.  684.] 

8  R.  v.  Francklin,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  637. 

*  Jones  v.  Randnll,  Cowp.  17  ;   Root  v.  King,  7  Cowen  613  ;    Spangler  u.  Jacoby, 
14  111.  299  ;  CWoo.lrt.ffr.  State,  Ark.,  82  S.  W.  102 ;  compare  §  482,  ante.] 


§§  490-493.]    LEGISLATIVE  JOURNALS;  OFFICIAL  REGISTERS,  ETC.    639 

ence  communicated  by  the  President  to  Congress  is  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  the  acts  of  foreign  governments  and  functionaries  therein 
recited.6  A  foreign  declaration  of  war  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  day 
when  the  state  of  war  commenced.6  Certified  copies,  under  the  hand 
and  seal  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  of  the  letters  of  a  public  agent  res- 
ident abroad,  and  of  the  official  order  of  a  foreign  colonial  governor 
concerning  the  sale  and  disposal  of  a  cargo  of  merchandise,  have  been 
held  admissible  evidence  of  those  transactions.7  How  far  diplomatic 
correspondence  may  go  to  establish  the  facts  recited  therein  does  not 
clearly  appear;  but  it  is  agreed  to  be  generally  admissible  in  all 
cases,  and  to  be  sufficient  evidence,  whenever  the  facts  recited  come 
in  collaterally,  or  by  way  of  introductory  averment,  and  are  not  the 
principal  point  in  issue  before  the  jury.8 

§  492.  Government  Gazette.  The  government  Gazette  is  admis- 
sible and  sufficient  evidence  of  such  acts  of  the  Executive,  or  of  the 
Government,  as  are  usually  announced  to  the  public  through  that 
channel,  such  as  proclamations,1  and  the  like.  For,  besides  the 
motives  of  self-interest  and  official  duty  which  bind  the  publisher 
to  accuracy,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that  intentionally  to  publish  any- 
thing as  emanating  from  public  authority,  with  knowledge  that  it 
did  not  so  emanate,  would  be  a  misdemeanor.2  But,  in  regard  to 
other  acts  of  public  functionaries,  having  no  relation  to  the  affairs  of 
government,  the  Gazette  is  not  admissible  evidence.8 

§  493.  Official  Registers.  In  regard  to  official  registers,  we  have 
already  stated l  the  principles  on  which  these  books  are  entitled  to 
credit ;  to  which  it  is  only  necessary  to  add,  that  where  the  books 
possess  all  the  requisites  there  mentioned,  they  are  admissible  as 
competent  evidence  of  the  facts  they  contain.  But  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered that  they  are  not,  in  general,  evidence  of  any  facts  not  required 
to  be  recorded  in  them,  and  which  did  not  occur  in  the  presence  of 
the  registering  officer.2  Thus,  a  parish  register  is  evidence  only  of 

6  Radcliff  v.  United  Ins.  Co.,  7  Johns.  38,  51  ;  Talbot  v.  Seeman,  1  Cranch  1.  37, 
38.  jThe  American  State  Papers,  published  by  order  of  Congress,  are  admissible  as 
evidence  ;  and  the  copies  of  documents  contained  are  evidence,  like  the  originals  : 
Doe  v.  Roe,  13  Fla.  602 ;  Nixon  v.  Porter,  34  Miss.  697  ;  Dutillett  v.  Blanchard,  14  La. 
An.  97  ;  Bryan  v.  Forsyth,  19  How.  334.  | 

6  Thelluson  v.  Gosling,  4  Esp.  266 ;  Bradley  v.  Arthur,  4  B.  &  C.  292,  304.     See 
also  Foster,  Disc.  1,  c.  2,  §  12,  that  public  notoriety  is  sufficient  evidence  of  the  exist- 
6nc6  of  wjir 

7  Bingham  v.  Cabot,  3  Dall.  19,  23,  39-41. 

8  Radcliff  v.  United  Ins.  Co.,  7  Johns.  51,  per  Kent,  C.  J. 

1  R.  v.  Holt,  5  T.  R.  436,  443  ;  Attorney-General  v.  Theakstone,  8  Price  89;  supra, 
§  479,  and  cases  cited  in  note  ;  Gen.  Picton's  Case,  30  How.  St.  Tr.  493. 
3  2  Phil.  Evid.  108. 
8  R.  v.  Holt,  5  T.  R.  443,  per  Ld.  Kenyon ;  j  Brundred  v.  Del  Hoyo,  20  N.  J.  L.  328. | 

1  Supra,  §§  483-485. 

2  Fitler  v.  Sbotwell,  7  Watts  &  Serg.  14  ;   Brown  v.  Hicks,  1  Pike  232  ;    Haile  v. 
Palmer,  5  Mo.  403 ;   supra,  §  485.     [T'hus,  a  register  of  deaths  is  not  evidence  of  the 
cause  of  death  :  Metrop.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  79  Md.  375.     For  a  ruling  admitting  a 
register  to  show  illegitimacy,  see  Glenister  v.  Harding,  29  Ch.  D.  991.     A  register 
containing  an  entire  family-tree  was  admitted  in  Success,  of  Justus,  48  La.  An.  1096J 


640  PUBLIC    DOCUMENTS.  [CH.    XXVIII. 

the  time  of  the  marriage,  and  of  its  celebration  de  facto ;  for  these 
are  the  only  facts  necessarily  within  the  knowledge  of  the  party  mak- 
ing the  entry.8  So,  a  register  of  baptism,  taken  by  itself,  is  evidence 
only  of  that  fact ;  though  if  the  child  were  proved  aliunde  to  have 
then  been  very  young,  it  might  afford  presumptive  evidence  that  it 
was  born  in  the  same  parish.4  Neither  is  the  mention  of  the  child's 
age  in  the  register  of  christenings  proof  of  the  day  of  his  birth  to  sup- 
port a  plea  of  infancy.5  In  all  these  and  similar  cases  the  register  is 
no  proof  of  the  identity  of  the  parties  there  named  with  the  parties 
in  controversy ;  but  the  fact  of  identity  must  be  established  by  other 
evidence.6  It  is  also  necessary,  in  all  these  cases,  that  the  register 
be  one  which  the  law  requires  should  be  kept,  and  that  it  be  kept  in 
the  manner  required  by  law.7  Thus,  also,  the  registers  kept  at  the 
navy  office  are  admissible  to  prove  the  death  of  a  sailor,  and  the  time 
when  it  occurred,8  as  well  as  to  show  to  what  ship  he  belonged,  and 
the  amount  of  wages  due  to  him.9  The  prison  calendar  is  evidence 
to  prove  the  date  and  fact  of  the  commitment  and  discharge  of  a  pris- 
oner.10 The  books  of  assessment  of  public  taxes  are  admissible  to 
prove  the  assessment  of  the  taxes  upon  the  individuals,  and  for  the 
property  therein  mentioned.11  The  books  of  municipal  corporations 

8  Doe  v.  Barnes,  1  M.  &  Rob.  386,  389. 

*  R.  v.  North  Petherton,  5  B.  &  C.  508  ;  Clark  v.  Trinity  Church,  5  Watts  &  Serg. 
266. 

6  Burghart  v.  Angerstein,  6  C.  &  P.  690.  See  also  R.  v.  Clapham,  4  C.  &  P.  29  ; 
Huet  v.  Le  Mesurier,  1  Cox  Eq.  275 ;  Childress  v.  Cutter,  16  Mo.  24 ;  \Re  Wintle, 
L.  R.  9  Eq.  373. } 

6  Birt  v.  Barlow,  1  Doug.  170;   Bain  v.  Mason,  1  C.  &  P.  202  and  n. ;  "Wedgwood's 
Case,  8  Greenl.  75.     As  to  proof  of  identity,  see  ante,  §  38,  n. 

7  See  the  cases  cited  supra,  §  484,  n.  14  ;  Newham  v.  Raithby,  1  Phillim.  315.    There- 
fore the  books  of  the  Fleet  and  of  a  Wesleyan  chapel  have  been  rejected  :    Read  v. 
Passer,  1  Esp.  213;  Whittuck  v.  Waters,  4  C.  &  P.  375.     It  is  said  that  a  copy  of  a 
register  of  baptism,  kept  in  the  island  of  Guernsey,  is  not  admissible ;  for  which  Huet 
v.  Le  Mesurier,  1  Cox  Eq.  275,  is  cited ;    but  the  report  of  that  case  is  short  and  ob- 
scure ;  and,  for  aught  appearing  to  the  contrary,  the  register  was  rejected  only  as  not 
competent  to  prove  the  age  of  the  person.     It  is  also  said,  on  the  authority  of  Leader 
v.  Barry,  1  Esp.  353,  that  a  copy  of  a  register  of  a  foreign  chapel  is  not  evidence  to 
prove  a  marriage ;   but  this  point,  also,  is  very  briefly  reported,  in  three  lines  ;  and  it 
does  not  appear  but  that  the  ground  of  the  rejection  of  the  register  was  that,  it  was  not 
authorized  or  required  to  be  kept  by  the  laws  of  France,  where  the  marriage  was  cele- 
brated;  namely,  in  the  Swedish  Ambassador's  chapel,  in  Paris;  and  such,  probably 
enough,  was  the  fact.     Subsequently  an  examined  copy  of  a  register  of  marriages  in 
Barbadoes  has  been  admitted :    Good  w.  Good,  1  Curt.  755.     In  the  United  States,  an 
authenticated  copy  of  a  foreign  register,  legally  kept,  is  admissible  in  evidence :  Kings- 
ton v.  Lesley,  10  S.  &  R.  383,  389.     ^Moreover,  in  the  United  States  such  registers 
are  usually  held  admissible  under  the  exception  for  regular  en  tries,  ante,  §  120  a.J 

8  Wallace  v.  Cook,  5  Esp.  117  ;  Barber  v.  Holmes,  3  id.  190. 

9  R.  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  Leach  Cr.  Gas.  24 ;  R.  v.  Rhodes,  ib.  29. 

w.Salte  v.  Thomas,  3  B.  &  P.  188;  R.  v.  Aickles,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  435  Q  ante, 
§  184,  n.  10.1 

11  Doe  w.Seaton,  2  Ad.  &  El.  178;  Doe  v.  Arkwright,  ib.  182,  n.;  R.  v.  King, 
2  T.  R.  234  ;  Ronkendorffw.  Taylor,  4  Pet.  349,  360  ;  jOom.  v.  Heffron,  102  Mass.  148  ;( 
ptee  ante,  §  484.  n.  7  ;  and  additional  examples  of  other  official  registers  will  be  found 
in  that  section."]  Such  books  are  also  prima  facie  evidence  of  domicile :  Doe  v.  Cart- 
wright,  Ry.  &  M.  62 ;  1  C.  &  P.  218. 


§§  493-495.]  OFFICIAL  REGISTERS.  641 

are  evidence  of  the  elections  of  their  officers,  and  of  other  corporate 
acts  there  recorded.12  The  books  of  private  corporations  are  admis- 
sible for  similar  purposes  between  members  of  the  corporation,  for  as 
between  them  the  books  are  of  the  nature  of  public  books  ; 18  and  all 
the  members  of  a  company  are  chargeable  with  knowledge  of  the 
entries  made  on  their  books  by  their  agent,  in  the  course  of  his  busi- 
ness, and  with  the  true  meaning  of  those  entries,  as  understood  by 
him."  But  the  books  cannot,  in  general,  be  adduced  by  the  corpora- 
tion in  support  of  its  own  claims  against  a  stranger.18 

§  494.  Same :  Ship's  Register.  The  registry  of  a  ship  is  not  of 
the  nature  of  the  public  or  official  registers  now  under  consideration, 
the  entry  not  being  of  any  transaction  of  which  the  public  officer 
who  makes  the  entry  is  conusaut.  Nor  is  it  a  document  required  by 
the  law  of  nations,  as  expressive  of  the  ship's  national  character. 
The  registry  acts  are  considered  as  institutions  purely  local  and 
municipal,  for  purposes  of  public  policy.  The  register,  therefore,  is 
not  of  itself  evidence  of  property,  except  so  far  as  it  is  confirmed  by 
some  auxiliary  circumstance,  showing  that  it  was  made  by  the 
authority  or  assent  of  the  person  named  in  it,  and  who  is  sought  to 
be  charged  as  owner.  "Without  such  connecting  proof,  the  register 
has  been  held  not  to  be  even  prima  facie  evidence,  to  charge  a  person 
as  owner ;  and  even  with  such  proof,  it  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of 
ownership;  for  an  equitable  title  in  one  person  may  well  consist 
•with  the  documentary  title  at  the  custom-house  in  another.  Where 
the  question  of  ownership  is  merely  incidental,  the  register  alone  has 
been  deemed  sufficient  prima  facie  evidence.  But  in  favor  of  the 
person  claiming  as  owner  it  is  no  evidence  at  all,  being  nothing  more 
than  his  own  declaration.1 

§  495.  Same :  Ship's  Log-book.  A  ship's  log-book,  where  it  is 
required  by  law  to  be  kept,  is  an  official  register,  so  far  as  regards 
the  transactions  required  by  law  to  be  entered  in  it ;  but  no  further. 
Thus,  the  act  of  Congress  l  provides,  that  if  any  seaman  who  has 
signed  the  shipping  articles  shall  absent  himself  from  the  ship 
without  leave,  an  entry  of  that  fact  shall  be  made  in  the  log-book, 
and  the  seaman  will  be  liable  to  be  deemed  guilty  of  desertion.  But 
of  this  fact  the  log-book,  though  an  indispensable  document,  in  mak- 
ing out  the  proof  of  desertion,  in  order  to  incur  a  forfeiture  of  wages, 

«  R.  v.  Martin,  2  Campb.  100;  [ante,  §  484,  n.  16  ;]  {Halleck  v.  Boylston,  117 
Mass.  469.} 

i»  Mnrriage  v.  Lawrence,  3  B.  &  Aid.  144 ;  Gibbon's  Case,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  810. 
"  Allen  v.  Coit,  6  Hill  N.  Y.  318. 

«  London  v.  Lynn,  1  H.  Bl.  214,  n.  (c)  ;  Com.  v.  Woelper,  8  S.  &  R.  29 ;  Highland 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  McKean,  10  Johns.  154  ;  [ante,  §  199."] 

1  3  Kent  Comm.  149,  150 ;  Weston  v.  Penniman,  1  Mason  306,  318,  per  Story,  J.  ; 
Bixby  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  8  Pick.  86 ;  Colson  v.  Bonzey,  6  Greenl.  474  ;  Abbott  on 
Shipping,  pp.  63-66  (Story's  ed.  and  notes)  ;  Tinkler  v.  Walpole,  14  East  226  ;  Mclvei 
v.  Humble,  16  id.  169 ;  Fraser  v.  Hopkins,  2  Taunt.  5  ;  Jones  o.  Pitcher,  3  Stew.  & 
Port.  135  ;  ["Flower  v.  Young,  3  Camp.  240  ;  post.  Vol.  Ill,  §419.] 
i  Stat.  1790,  c.  29,  §  5;  [see  U.  S.  R.  S.  §§  4290-2,  4598.3 
VOL.  I.  —  41 


642  PUBLIC   DOCUMENTS.  [CH.   XXVIIL 

is  never  conclusive,  but  only  prima  facie  evidence,  open  to  explana- 
tion, and  to  rebutting  testimony.  Indeed,  it  is  in  no  sense  per  se 
evidence,  except  in  the  cases  provided  for  by  statute ;  and  therefore 
it  cannot  be  received  in  evidence,  in  favor  of  the  persons  concerned 
in  making  it,  or  others,  except  by  force  of  a  statute  making  it  soj 
though  it  may  be  used  against  any  persons  to  whom  it  may  be 
brought  home,  as  concerned  either  in  writing  or  directing  what 
should  be  contained  therein.2 

§  496.  Same  :  Requisites  of  Official  Character.  To  entitle  a  book 
to  the  character  of  an  official  register,  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  be 
required  by  an  express  statute  to  be  kept ;  nor  that  the  nature  of  the 
office  should  render  the  book  indispensable.  It  is  sufficient  that  it 
be  directed  by  the  proper  authority  to  be  kept,  and  that  it  be  kept 
according  to  such  directions.1  Thus,  a  book  kept  by  the  secretary  of 
bankrupts  by  order  of  the  Lord  Chancellor,  was  held  admissible  evi- 
dence of  the  allowance  of  a  certificate  of  bankruptcy.2  Terriers  seem 
to  be  admitted  partly  on  the  same  principle ;  as  well  as  upon  the 
ground  that  they  are  admissions  by  persons  who  stood  in  privity 
with  the  parties,  between  whom  they  are  sought  to  be  used.8 

§  497.  Historical  Works.  Under  this  head  may  be  mentioned 
books  and  chronicles  of  public  history,  as  partaking  in  some  degree 
of  the  nature  of  public  documents,  and  being  entitled  on  the  same 
principles  to  a  great  degree  of  credit.  Any  approved  public  and 
general  history,  therefore,  is  admissible  to  prove  ancient  facts  of  a 
public  nature,  and  the  general  usages  and  customs  of  the  country.1 
But  in  regard  to  matters  not  of  a  public  and  general  nature,  such  as 
the  custom  of  a  particular  town,  a  descent,  the  nature  of  a  particular 
abbey,  the  boundaries  of  a  country,  and  the  like,  they  are  not  admis- 
sible.2 

§  498.  Official  Certificates.  In  regard  to  certificates  given  by 
persons  in  official  station,  the  general  rule  is,  that  the  law  never 

3  Abbott  on  Shipping,  p.  468,  n.  1  (Story's  ed. )  ;  Orne  v.  Townsend,  4  Mason 
544  ;  Cloutman  v.  Tunison,  1  Sumner  373 ;  U.  S.  v.  Gibert,  2  id.  19,  78 ;  The  Socie- 
dade  Feliz,  1  W.  Rob.  303,  311  ;  JThe  Hercules,  1  Sprague  534.} 

1  [White  v.  U.  S.,  164  U.  S.  100;  Daly  v.  Webster,  1  U.  S.  App.  573.1 
Henry  o.  Leigh,  3  Campb.  499,  501. 

8  By  the  ecclesiastical  canons,  an  inquiry  is  directed  to  be  made,  from  time  to  time, 
of  the  temporal  rights  of  the  clergyman  in  every  parish,  and  to  be  returned  into  the 
registry  of  the  bishop.    This  return  is  denominated  a  terrier  :  Cowel,  Int.  verb.  Terror, 
sell,  catalogits  terrarum  ;  Bnrrill,  Law  Diet.  verb.  Terrier.    See  also  ante,  §  485. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  248,  249  ;  Morris  v.  Harmer,  7  Pet.  554 ;  Case  of  Warren  Hasting, 
referred  to  in  30  How.  St.  Tr.  492  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  606 ;  Neal  v.  Fry,  cited 
1  Salk.  281  ;  Lord  Bridgewater's  Case,  cited  Skin.  15.  The  statements  of  the  chron- 
iclers, Stow  and  Sir  W.  Dugdale,  were  held  inadmissible  as  evidence  of  the  fact,  that 
a  person  took  his  seat  by  special  summons  to  Parliament  in  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII  : 
The  Vaux  Peerage  Case,  5  Clark  &  Fin.  538.  [These  works  seem  properly  to  be  ad- 
missible, not  under  the  present  principle,  but  under  that  of  §  189,  ante,  where  the  sub- 
ject has  been  already  treated."] 

9  Stainer  v.  Droitwich,  1  Salk.  281  ;  s.  o.  Skin.  623  ;    Piercy's  Case,  Tho.  Jones, 
164  ;  Evans  v.  Getting,  6  C.  &  P.  586  and  n. 


'§§  495-498.]  OFFICIAL  REGISTERS.  643 

allows  a  certificate  of  a  mere  matter  of  fact,  not  coupled  with  any 
matter  of  law,  [or  not  expressly  authorized  by  law,]  to  be  admitted 
as  evidence.1  If  the  person  was  bound  to  record  the  fact,  then  the 
proper  evidence  is  a  copy  of  the  record,  duly  authenticated.  But  as 
to  matters  which  he  was  not  bound  to  record,  his  certificate,  being 
extra-official,  is  merely  the  statement  of  a  private  person,  and  will 
therefore  be  rejected.2  So,  where  an  officer's  certificate  is  made  evi- 
dence of  certain  facts,  he  cannot  extend  its  effect  to  other  facts,  by 
stating  those  also  in  the  certificate ;  but  such  parts  of  the  certificate 
will  be  suppressed.8  The  same  rules  are  applied  to  an  officer's  re- 
turn.4 [By  statute,  however,  many  kinds  of  certificates  are  expressly 
authorized  to  be  made,  and  are  then  usually  treated  as  admissible  ; 
for  example,  certificates  of  marriage,6  of  birth,6  of  the  organization 
of  corporations,7  and  the  like.  So  also  a  report  of  official  investiga- 
tions, made  in  pursuance  of  official  duty,  may  be  receivable,  though 
Courts  are  here  inclined  to  require  an  express  statutory  declaration 
of  aduiissibility.8] 

1  Willes,  549,  550,  per  Willes,  Ld.  Ch.  J. ;  {Downing  v.  Hasten,  21  Kan.  178; 
Bullock  v.  Wallingfonl,  55  N.  H.  619;  Hopkins  v.  Millard,  9  R.  I.  37  ;  Stonerv.  Ellis, 
6  Ind.  152  ;  Cross  v.  Mill  Co.,  17  111.  54.  [  QThe  only  certificate  admissible  at  common 
law  seems  to  have  been  the  notary's  certificate  of  protest,  which  was  receivable  to  show 
the  facts  of  presentment  and  non-payment  of  a  foreign  bill  (see  the  principle  explained 
in  Adams  v.  Wright,  14  Wis.  413 ;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Barksdale,  34  Mo.  563);  but  by 
statute  in  most  jurisdictions  the  certificate  is  now  made  receivable  (1)  for  inland  bills 
also,  and  (2)  to  prove  all  such  facts  as  are  customarily  certified  in  it,  in  some  cases  includ- 
ing also  the  fact  and  mode  of  notice,  reputed  residence  of  the  party,  and  nearest  post- 
office  ;  for  a  collection  of  authorities,  see  Daniel,  Negotiable  Instruments,  II,  §  959 ;  note 
to  96  Am.  Dec.  605. 

For  the  certificate  of  a  recorded  conveyance,  see  ante,  §  485  ;  for  the  certificate  ofujiidi- 
cial  record,  see  post,  §§  503  ff.] 

'-'  Oakes  v.  Hill,  14  Pick.  442,  448 ;  Wolfe  v.  Washbnrn,  6  Cowen  261 ;  Jackson  v. 
Miller,  ib.  751 ;  Governor  v.  McAffee,  2  Dev.  15,  18  ;  U.  S.  v.  Buford,  3  Peters  12,  29; 
j  Hanson  v.  South  Scituate,  115  Mass.  336  ;  Wayland  v.  Ware,  109  id.  248 ;  Childress  v. 
Cutter,  16  Mo.  24.  ( 

8  Johnson  v.  Hocker,  1  Dall.  406,  407  ;  Governor  v.  Bell,  3  Murph.  331 ;  Governor  v. 
Jeffreys,  1  Hawks  207  ;  Stewart  v.  Allison,  6  S.  &  R.  324,  329 ;  Newman  v.  Doe,  4  How. 
Miss.  522;  {Wood  v.  Knapp,  100  N.  Y.  114. [ 

*  Gator  v.  Stokes,  1  M.  &  S.  599 ;   Arnold  v.  Tourtellot,  13  Pick.  172.     £A  sheriff's 
return  is  usually  treated  as  a  certificate  made  under  official  duty,  and  therefore  admissi- 
ble to  prove  the  facts  certified  (Browning  v.  Flanagin,  22  N.  J.  L.  567 ) ;  the  chief  contro- 
versies that  arise  are  (1 )  how  far  the  recitals  are  binding,  —  a  question  depending  mainly 
on  the  law  of  judgments,  —  and  (2)  whether  the  recitals  of  sale  are  evidence  of  his  au- 
thority to  sell  under  an  unproduced  judgment,  —  a  question  of  the  rule  of  Piimariness; 
statutes  usually  regulate  both  these  matters ;  see  good  discussions  of  the  common-law 
principle  in  Hihn  v.  Peck,  30  Cal.  280 ;  Rollins  v.  Henry,  78  N.  C.  342.] 
State  v.  Melton,  120  N.  C.  591 ;  State  v.  Isenhart,  Or.,  52  Pac.  569.] 
'Com.  »;.  Phillips,  Mass.,  49  N.  E.  632.] 
'Nat'l  B'k  v.  Galland,  14  Wash.  502.] 

"SeeR.  v.  Labouchere,  14  Cox  Cr.  419,  427  ;  State  v.  Krause,  58  Kan.  651 ;  Bir- 
mingham v.  Pettit,  21  D.  C.  209  ;  Bardsley  v.  Sternberg,  18  Wash.  612;]  jCushing  v. 
R.  Co.,  143  Mass.  78.  (  Qt  is  on  this  principle,  apparently,  that  official  surveys  and  maps 
are  admissible  ;  see  Daniel  v.  Wilkin,  7  Exch.  429 ;]  {Com.  v.  King,  150  Mass.  223 ;  Pol- 
hill  v.  Brown,  84  Ga.  342. } 


644 


RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL  WRITINGS  [CH.  XXIX. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

RECORDS  AND   JUDICIAL  WRITINGS. 


1.   Mode  of  proving  Judicial  Records. 

§.500.  Statutes. 

§  501.  Judicial  Records,  in  general. 

§  502.  Same  :  Production  of  the  Record 
itself. 

§  503.  Same :  Court  Seals  recognized. 

§  504.  Domestic  State  Records  ;  Proof 
under  Federal  Statute. 

§  505.  Same :  Kind  of  Record  affected. 

§  506.  Same  :  Form  of  Attestation. 

§  507.  Office  Copies. 

§  508.  Examined  Copies. 

§  509.  Lost  Records. 

§  510.  Verdicts. 

§  511.  Decrees  in  Chancery. 

§  512.  Answers  in  Chancery. 

§  513.  Records  of  Inferior  Courts. 

§  514.  Foreign  Judgments. 

§  515.  Inquisitions. 

§  516.  Depositions  in  Chancery. 

§  517.  Depositions  under  Commission. 

§  518.  Testaments. 

§  519.  Letters  of  Administration. 

§  520.  Magistrates'  Examinations  in 

Criminal  Cases. 

§  521.  Writs. 

2.   Admissibility  and  Effect  of  Judgments 
and  Records. 

§  522.   In  general. 

§  523.  General  Principle :  Judgments 
bind  Parties  and  Privies,  but  not  Strangers. 

§  524.    Binding  Effect  must  be  Mutual. 

§  525.  Exception  for  Judgments  in 
Rem. 

§  526.  Exception  for  Judgments  on 
Public  Matters. 

§  527.  Exception  for  Judgments  on 
Collateral  Facts. 


§  527  a.   Judgments  as  Admissions. 

§  528.  Judgments  bind  only  for  Mate« 
rial  Issues. 

§  529.  Proceedings  must  have  been 
Final. 

§  530.  Judgment  must  have  been  on 
Merits. 

§  531.   Former  Recovery. 

§  532.    Same  :  Identity  of  Issue. 

§  533.  Same :  Former  Recovery  in 
Tort. 

§  534.  Judgment  conclusive  if  Issue 
necessarily  involved. 

§  535.  Who  are  Parties. 

§  536.   Who  are  Privies. 

§  537.   Judgments  in  Criminal  Cases. 

§§  538,  539.   Judgments  as  Facts. 

§  539  a.  Judgment  against  Joint  and 
Several  Contractors. 

§  540.   Foreign  Judgments. 

§  541.    Same  :  In  Rem. 

§  542.  Same :  In  Garnishment  or  Trus- 
tee Process. 

§  543.   Same :  Conclusiveness. 

§§  544,  545.  Same  :  Affecting  Personal 
Status. 

§§  546,  547.   Same  :  In  Personam. 

§  548.  Same:  Judgments  of  Domestic 
States. 

§  549.  Same :  Parties  in  Foreign  Judg- 
ments. 

§  550.  Judgments  of  Ecclesiastical 
Courts. 

§  551.    Decrees  in  Chancery. 

§  552.   Depositions. 

§  553.   Same :  Cross-examination. 

§  554.   Same  :  In  Equity. 

§  655.  Same :  As  involving  Reputa- 
tion. 

§  556.   Inquisitions  of  Lunacy,  etc. 


§  499.  THE  next  class  of  written  evidence  consists  of  Records  and 
Judicial  Writings.  And  here,  also,  as  in  the  case  of  Public  Docu- 
ments, we  shall  consider,  first,  the  mode  of  proving  them;  and, 
secondly,  their  admissibility  and  effect. 


1.    Mode  of  proving  Judicial  Records.1 

§  500.    Statutes.     The  case  of  statutes,  which  are  records,  has 
already  been  mentioned  under  the  head  of  legislative  acts,  to  which 
1  £0n  the  subjects  of  this  chapter,  see  again  note  2,  §  478,  antc.^\ 


§§  499-502.]  IN   GENERAL.  645 

they  seem  more  properly  to  belong,  the  term  record  being  generally 
taken  in  the  more  restricted  sense,  with  reference  to  judicial  tribu- 
nals. It  will  only  be  observed,  in  this  place,  that,  though  the  Courts 
will  take  notice  of  all  public  statutes  without  proof,  yet  private  stat- 
utes must  be  proved,  like  any  other  legislative  documents ;  namely, 
by  an  exemplification  under  the  Great  Seal,  or  by  an  examined  copy, 
or  by  a  copy  printed  by  authority. 

§  501.  Judicial  Records,  in  general.  As  to  the  proofs  of  records, 
this  is  done  either  by  mere  production  of  the  records,  without  more, 
or  by  a  copy.  Copies  of  records  are,  (1)  exemplifications;  (2)  copies 
made  by  an  authorized  officer;  (3)  sworn  copies.  Exemplifications 
are  either,  first,  under  the  Great  Seal ;  or,  secondly,  under  the  seal 
of  the  particular  Court  where  the  record  remains.1  When  a  record 
is  the  gist  of  the  issue,  if  it  is  not  in  the  same  Court,  it  should  be 
proved  by  an  exemplification.  By  the  course  of  the  common  law, 
where  an  exemplification  under  the  Great  Seal  is  requisite,  the  record 
may  be  removed  into  the  Court  of  Chancery,  by  a  certiorari,  for  that 
is  the  centre  of  all  the  Courts,  and  there  the  Great  Seal  is  kept.  But 
in  the  United  States,  the  Great  Seal  being  usually  if  not  always  kept 
by  the  Secretary  of  State,  a  different  course  prevails ;  and  an  exem- 
plified copy,  under  the  seal  of  the  Court,  is  usually  admitted,  even 
upon  an  issue  of  mil  tiel  record,  as  sufficient  evidence.8  When  the 
record  is  not  the  gist  of  the  issue,  the  last-mentioned  kind  of  exem- 
plification is  always  sufficient  proof  of  the  record  at  common  law.* 

§502.  Same:  Production  of  the  Record  itself .  The  record  itself 
is  produced  only  when  the  cause  is  in  the  same  Court,  whose  record 
it  is;  or,  when  it  is  the  subject  of  proceedings  in  a  superior  Court.1 
And  in  the  latter  case,  although  it  may  by  the  common  law  be 
obtained  through  the  Court  of  Chancery,  yet  a  certiorari  may  also  be 
issued  from  a  superior  Court  of  common  law  to  an  inferior  tribunal, 
for  the  same  purpose,  whenever  the  tenor  only  of  the  record  will 
suffice;  for  in  such  cases  nothing  is  returned  but  the  tenor,  that  is, 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  227,  228.  An  exemplification  under  the  Great  Seal  is  said  to  be  of 
itself  a  record  of  the  greatest  validity  :  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  19  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  226. 
Nothing  but  a  record  can  be  exemplified  iu  this  manner  :  3  Inst.  173. 

a  Vail  v.  Smith,  4  Cowen  71  ;  LKingman  v-  Cowles,  103  Mass.  283.]  See  also  Pe- 
poon  v.  Jenkins,  2  Johns.  Cas.  119  ;  8.  0.  Colem.  &  Cain.  Cas.  60.  In  some  of  the  States, 
copies  of  record  of  the  Courts  of  the  same  State  attested  by  the  clerk,  have,  either  by  im- 
memorial usage,  or  by  early  statutes,  been  received  as  sufficient  in  all  cases  :  Vance  v. 
Reardon,  2  Nott  &  MoCord  299  ;  Ladd  v.  Blunt,  4  Mass.  402  ;  QPonder  v.  Shumans, 
80  Ga.  505.]  Whether  the  seal  of  the  Court  to  such  copies  is  necessary  in  Massachu- 
setts, qucere;  and  see  Com.  v.  Phillips,  11  Pick.  30  ;  {settled  in  the  negative  in  Com. 
v.  Downing,  4  Gray  29  ;}  QCom.  v.  Kennedy,  Mass.,  48  N.  E.  782.  The  reason  for 
requiring  the  seal  seems  to  be  that  otherwise  it  would  be  necessary  to  prove  the  official 
character  of  the  signer,  as  well  as  his  signature;  see  Chambers  v.  People,  5  111.  351.] 

*  1  Gilb.  Evid.  26;  jTillotson  v.  Warner,  3  Gray  574.  ( 

1  | The  original  record  is  always  admissible  instead  of  a  copy:  Folsom  v.  Cressey, 
73  Me.  270  ;  State  ».  Bartlett,  47  id.  396  ;  Odiorne  ».  Bacon,  6  Cush.  185  ;  Miller  ». 
Hale,  26  Pa.  432  ;  Gray  v.  Davis,  27  Conn.  447  ;  Britton  v.  State,  54  Ind.  535  ;{ 
["even  though  the  original  is  unlawfully  brought  from  its  place  of  custody :  Stevison  v, 
Earnest,  80  111.  513.] 


646  RECOKDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXIX. 

a  literal  transcript  of  the  record,  under  the  seal  of  the  Court;  and 
this  is  sufficient  to  countervail  the  plea  of  nul  tiel  record?  Where 
the  record  is  put  in  issue  in  a  superior  Court  of  concurrent  jurisdic- 
tion and  authority,  it  is  proved  by  an  exemplification  out  of  Chan- 
cery, being  obtained  and  brought  thither  by  a  certiorari  issued  out  of 
Chancery,  and  transmitted  thence  by  mittimus.* 

§  503.  Same  :  Court  Seals  recognized.  In  proving  a  record  by  a 
copy  under  seal,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  Courts  recognize 
without  proof  the  seal  of  State,  and  the  seals  of  the  superior  Courts 
of  justice,  and  of  all  Courts  established  by  public  statutes.1  And  by 
parity  of  reason  it  would  seem  that  no  extraneous  proof  ought  to  be 
required  of  the  seal  of  any  department  of  State,  or  public  office 
established  by  law,  and  required  or  known  to  have  a  seal.2  And 
here  it  may  be  observed,  that  copies  of  records  and  judicial  proceed- 
ings, under  seal,  are  deemed  of  higher  credit  than  sworn  copies,  as 
having  passed  under  a  more  exact  critical  examination.8 

§  504.  Domestic  State  Records;  Proof  under  Federal  Statute.  In 
regard  to  the  several  States  composing  the  United  States,  it  has 
already  been  seen,  that  though  they  are  sovereign  and  independent, 
in  all  things  not  surrendered  to  the  national  government  by  the  Con- 
stitution, and,  therefore,  on  general  principles,  are  liable  to  be 
treated  by  each  other  in  all  other  respects  as  foreign  States,  yet 
their  mutual  relations  are  rather  those  of  domestic  independence, 
than  of  foreign  alienation.1  It  is  accordingly  provided  in  the  Con- 
stitution, that  "  full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given,  in  each  State, 
to  the  public  act,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of  every  other 
State.  And  the  Congress  may,  by  general  laws,  prescribe  the  man- 
ner in  which  such  acts,  records,  and  proceedings  shall  be  proved,  and 

2  Woodcrafts  Kinaston,  2  Atk.  317,318;  1  Tidd's  Pr.  398  ;  Butcher  &  Aldworths' 
Case,  Cro.  El.  821.  Where  a  domestic  record  is  put  in  issue  by  the  plea,  the  question 
is  tried  by  the  Court,  notwithstanding  it  is  a  question  of  fact.  And  the  judgment  of  a 
Court  of  record  of  a  sister  State  in  the  Union  is  considered,  for  this  purpose,  as  a  domes- 
tic judgment :  Hall  v.  Williams,  6  Pick.  237  ;  Carter  v.  Wilson,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  362  ; 
jso  also  of  a  Federal  Circuit  Court  :  Williams  v.  Wilkes,  14  Pa.  St.  228. }  But  if  it  is 
a  foreign  record,  the  issue  is  tried  by  the  jury  :  State  v.  Isham,  3  Hawks  185  ;  Adams 
v.  Betz,  1  Watts  425  ;  Baldwin  v.  Hale,  17  Johns.  272.  The  reason  is,  that  in  the 
former  case,  the  judges  can  themselves  have  an  inspection  of  the  very  record  ;  but  in 
the  latter,  it  can  only  be  proved  by  a  copy,  the  veracity  of  which  is  a  mere  fact  within 
the  province  of  the  jury.  And  see  Collins  v.  Mathews,  5  East  473.  In  New  York,  the 
question  of  fact,  in  every  case,  is  now,  by  statute,  referred  to  the  jury :  Trotter  v.  Mills, 
6  Wend.  512. 

»  1  Tidd's  Pr.  398. 

i  Olive  v.  Gum,  2  Sid.  145, 146,  per  Witherington,  C.  B. ;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  19  ;  12  Vin. 
Abr.  132,  133,  tit.  Evid.  A,  b,  69  ;  Delafield  v.  Hand,  3  Johns.  310,  314  ;  Den  v.  Vree- 
landt,  2  Halst.  355.  The  seals  of  counties  palatine  and  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Courts  are 
judicially  known,  on  the  same  general  principle.  See  also,  as  to  Probate  Courts,  Chase 
r.  Hathaway,  14  Mass.  222 ;  Judge  i>.  Briggs,  3  N.  II.  309. 

«  Ante,  §  6. 

«  2  Phil.  Evid.  130  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  227. 

1  Mills  o.  Duryee,  7  Cranch  481;  Hampton  v.  McConnell,  3  Wheat.  234;  ante, 
§§  479,  489. 


§§  502-505.]       RECORDS   UNDER  FEDERAL   STATUTE.  647 

the  effect  thereof." 2  Under  this  provision  it  has  been  enacted  that 
"the  records  and  judicial  proceedings  of  the  Courts  of  any  State 
shall  be  proved  or  admitted,  in  any  other  Court  within  the  United 
States,  by  the  attestation  of  the  clerk  and  the  seal  of  the  Court  an- 
nexed, if  there  be  a  seal,  together  with  a  certificate  of  the  judge, 
chief  justice,  or  presiding  magistrate,  as  the  case  may  be,  that  the 
said  attestation  is  in  due  form.  And  the  said  records  and  judicial 
proceedings,  authenticated  as  aforesaid,  shall  have  such  faith  and 
credit  given  to  them,  in  every  Court  within  the  United  States,  as 
they  have  by  law  or  usage  in  the  Courts  of  the  State  from  whence 
said  records  are  or  shall  be  taken."8  By  a  subsequent  act,  these 
provisions  are  extended  to  the  Courts  of  all  Territories  subject  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  United  States.4 

§  505.  Same  :  Kind  of  Record  affected.  It  seems  to  be  generally 
agreed  that  this  method  of  authentication,  as  in  the  case  of  public 
documents  before  mentioned,  is  not  exclusive  of  any  other  which  the 
States  may  think  proper  to  adopt.1  It  has  also  been  held  that  these 
acts  of  Congress  do  not  extend  to  judgments  in  criminal  cases,  so  as 
to  render  a  witness  incompetent  in  one  State,  who  has  been  con- 
victed of  an  infamous  crime  in  another.2  The  judicial  proceedings 
referred  to  in  these  acts  are  also  generally  understood  to  be  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Courts  of  general  jurisdiction,  and  not  those  which  are 
merely  of  municipal  authority;  for  it  is  required  that  the  copy  of 
the  record  shall  be  certified  by  the  clerk  of  the  Court,  and  that  there 
shall  also  be  a  certificate  of  the  judge,  chief  justice,  or  presiding 
magistrate,  that  the  attestation  of  the  clerk  is  in  due  form.  This,  it 
is  said,  is  founded  on  the  supposition  that  the  Court,  whose  proceed- 
ings are  to  be  thus  authenticated,  is  so  consituted  as  to  admit  of  such 
officers;  the  law  having  wisely  left  the  records  of  magistrates,  who 
may  be  vested  with  limited  judicial  authority,  varying  in  its  objects 
and  extent  in  every  State,  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  the  State 
into  which  they  may  be  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  being  carried 
into  effect.8  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  the  judgments  of 
justices  of  the  peace  are  not  within  the  meaning  of  these  constitu- 
tional and  statutory  provisions.4  But  the  proceedings  of  Courts  of 

'  Const.  U.  S.  art.  iv,  §  1. 

«  Stat.  U.  S.  May  26,  1790,  2  LL.  U.  S.  c.  38  (11)  ;  C*L  S.  R.  S.  §  905.] 

*  Stat.   U.  S.  March  27,   1804,  3  LL.   U.  S.  c.   409  (56)  ;  QU.  S.  R.  S.  §  905. 
The  construction  of  this  statute  in  the  Federal  Court  may  be  best  ascertained  by  con- 
sulting Gould  &  Tucker's  Notes  to  the  Revised  Statutes,  ad  loc.~\ 

1  Kean  v.  Rice,  12  S.  &  R.  203,  208 ;  State  v.  Stade,  1  D.  Chinm.  303  ;  Raynham 
».  Canton,  3  Pick.  293  ;  Biddis  v.  James,  6  Binn.  321 ;  Ex  parte  Povall  3  Leigh  816  ; 
Pepoon  «>.  Jenkins,  2  Johns.  Cas.  119  ;  Ellmore  v.  Mills,  1  Hayw.  359  ;  {Otto  ».  Trump, 
115  Pa.  430  ;[  QHawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  37,  69  ;  Garden  City  S.  Co.  v.  Miller,  157  la, 
225  ;  Kingmau  v.  Cowles,  103  Mass.  283  ;  Ellis's  App.,  55  Minn.  401.1 

8  Com.  v.  Green,  17  Mass.  515  ;  supra,  §  376,  and  cases  there  cited. 

*  Warren  v.  Flagg,  2  Pick.  450,  per  Parker,  C.  J. 

4  Warren  r.  Flagg,  2  Pick.  448  ;  Robinson  v.  Prescott,  4  N.  H.  450  ;  Mahurin  v. 
Bickford,  6  id.  567  ;  Silver  Lake  Bank  v.  Harding,  5  Ohio,  545  ;  Thomas  v.  Robinson, 


648  RECORDS   AND    JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

chancery  and  of  probate,  as  well  as  of  the  Courts  of  common  law, 
may  be  proved  in  the  manner  directed  by  the  statute.6 

§  506.  Same:  Form  of  Attestation.  Under  these  provisions  it 
has  been  held  that  the  attestation  of  the  copy  must  be  according  to 
the  form  used  in  the  State  from  which  the  record  comes ;  and  that  it 
must  be  certified  to  be  so,  by  the  presiding  judge  of  the  same  Court, 
the  certificate  of  the  clerk  to  that  effect  being  insufficient.1  Nor 
will  it  suffice  for  the  judge  simply  to  certify  that  the  person  who 
attests  the  copy  is  the  clerk  of  the  Court,  and  that  the  signature  is 
in  his  handwriting.2  The  seal  of  the  Court  must  be  annexed  to  the 
record  with  the  certificate  of  the  clerk,  and  not  to  the  certificate  of 
the  judge.8  If  the  Court,  whose  record  is  certified,  has  no  seal,  this 
fact  should  appear,  either  in  the  certificate  of  the  clerk,  or  in  that  of 
the  judge.4  And  if  the  Court  itself  is  extinct,  but  its  records  and 
jurisdiction  have  been  transferred  by  law  to  another  Court,  it  seems 
that  the  clerk  and  presiding  judge  of  the  latter  tribunal  are  compe- 
tent to  make  the  requisite  attestations.6  If  the  copy  produced  pur- 
ports to  be  a  record,  and  not  a  mere  transcript  of  minutes  from  the 
docket,  and  the  clerk  certifies  "that  the  foregoing  is  truly  taken 
from  the  record  of  the  proceedings  "  of  the  Court,  and  this  attestation 
is  certified  to  be  in  due  form  of  law,  by  the  presiding  judge,  it  will 
be  presumed  that  the  paper  is  a  full  copy  of  the  entire  record,  and 
will  be  deemed  sufficient.6  It  has  also  been  held  that  it  must  appear 
from  the  judge's  certificate,  that  at  the  time  of  certifying  he  is  the 
presiding  judge  of  that  Court;  a  certificate  that  he  is  "the  judge 
that  presided"  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  or  that  he  is  "the  senior 
judge  of  the  Courts  of  law  "  in  the  State,  being  deemed  insufficient.7 

3  Wend.  267  ;  j Bryan  v.  Farnsworth,  19  Minn.  239.  f  In  Connecticut  and  Vermont, 
it  is  held  that  if  the  justice  is  bound  by  law  to  keep  a  record  of  his  proceedings,  they 
are  within  the  meaning  of  the  act  of  Congress  :  Bissell  v.  Edwards,  5  Day  363 ;  Stark- 
weather v.  Loorais,  2  Vt.  573 ;  Blodget  v.  Jordan,  6  id.  580  ;  Scott  v.  Cleveland, 
8  Monroe  62. 

6  Scott  v.  Blanchard,  8  Martin  N.  s.  303  ;  Hunt  v.  Lyle,  8  Yerg.  142  ;  Barbour  v. 
Watts,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  290,  293 ;  Balfour  v.  Chew,  5  Martin  N.  s.  517  ;  Johnson  v. 
Rannels,  6  id.  621 ;  Ripple  v.  Ripple,  1  Rawle  386 ;  Craig  v.  Brown,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  352. 

1  Drummond  v.  Magruder,  9  Cranch  122;  Craig  ».  Brown,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  352  ;  j  Van 
Storch  v.  Griffin,  71  Pa.  St.  240  ;  see  Burnell  v.  Weld,  76  N.  Y.  103  ;  Shown  v.  Barr, 
11  Ired.  296.  [     The  judge's  certificate  is  the  only  competent  evidence  of  this  fact: 
Smith  v.  Blagge,  1  Johns.  Cas.  238 ;   and  it  is  conclusive :  Ferguson  v.  Harwood, 
7  Cranch  408. 

2  Craig  v.  Brown,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  352.     ]If  the  certificate  states  that  there  is  no  clerk 
of  the  Probate  Court,  but  that  the  duties  of  the  clerk  are  discharged  by  the  judge,  this 
is  a  sufficient  attestation,  being  correct  in  all  the  other  particulars :  Cox  v.  Jones,  52 
Ga.  438.  | 

8  Turner  v.  Waddington,  8  Wash.  126.  And  being  thus  affixed,  and  certified  by 
the  clerk  it  proves  itself:  Dunlap  v.  Waldo,  6  N.  H.  450. 

4  Craig  v.  Brown,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  852  ;  Kirkland  t>.  Smith,  2  Martin  N.  a.  497  ;  {see 
Simons  v.  Cook,  29  Iowa  324. } 

6  Thomas  v.  Tanner,  6  Monroe  52  ;  jDarrnh  v.  Watson,  86  Iowa  116. } 

6  Fi-rguson  v.  Harwood,  7  Cranch  408 ;  Edmiston  v.  Schwartz,  13  S.  &  R.  135  ; 
Goodman  v.  James,  2  Rob.  La.  297. 

'  Stephennon  v.  Bannister,  8  Bibb  369  ;  Kirkland  v.  Smith,  2  Martin  N.  s.  497 ; 


§§  505-508.]    FEDERAL  STATUTE  J  OFFICE  COPIES.  649 

The  clerk  also  who  certifies  the  record  must  be  the  clerk  himself  of 
the  same  Court,  or  of  its  successor,  as  above  mentioned ;  the  certifi- 
cate of  his  under-clerk,  in  his  absence,  or  of  the  clerk  of  any  other 
tribunal,  office,  or  body,  being  held  incompetent  for  this  purpose.8 

§  507.  Office  Copies.  An  office  copy  of  a  record  is  a  copy  authen- 
ticated by  an  officer  intrusted  for  that  purpose;  and  it  is  admitted  in 
evidence  upon  the  credit  of  the  officer  without  proof  that  it  has  been 
actually  examined.1  The  rule  on  this  subject  is,  that  an  office  copy, 
in  the  same  Court,  and  in  the  same  cause,  is  equivalent  to  the 
record;  but  in  another  Court,  or  in  another  cause  in  the  same  Court, 
the  copy  must  be  proved.2  But  the  latter  part  of  this  rule  is  applied 
only  to  copies  made  out  by  an  officer  having  no  other  authority  to 
make  them,  than  the  mere  order  of  the  particular  Court,  made  for 
the  convenience  of  suitors;  for  if  it  is  made  his  duty  by  law  to 
furnish  copies,  they  are  admitted  in  all  Courts  under  the  same  juris- 
diction.8 And  we  have  already  seen,  that  in  the  United  States  an 
officer  having  the  legal  custody  of  public  records  is  ex  officio  compe- 
tent to  certify  copies  of  their  contents.* 

§  508.  Examined  Copies.  The  proof  of  records,  by  an  examined 
copy,  is  by  producing  a  witness  who  has  compared  the  copy  with 
the  original,  or  with  what  the  officer  of  the  Court  or  any  other  person 
read  as  the  contents  of  the  record.  It  is  not  necessary  for  the  per- 
sons examining  to  exchange  papers,  and  read  them  alternately  both 
ways.1  But  it  should  appear  that  the  record,  from  which  the  copy 
was  taken,  was  found  in  the  proper  place  of  deposit,  or  in  the  hands 
of  the  officer,  in  whose  custody  the  records  of  the  Court  are  kept. 
And  this  cannot  be  shown  by  any  light  reflected  from  the  record 
itself,  which  may  have  been  improperly  placed  where  it  was  found. 
Nothing  can  be  borrowed  ex  visceribus  judicii,  until  the  original  is 
proved  to  have  come  from  the  proper  Court.8  And  the  record  itself 

j  Settle  v.  Allison,  8  Ga.  201 ;  see  Van  Storch  ».  Griffin,  71  Pa.  240 ;  Bennett  v.  Ben- 
nett, Deady  300.  { 

8  Attestation  by  an  under-clerk  is  insufficient  :  Samson  v.  Overton,  4  Bibb  409  ; 
J  Morris  v.  Pathin,  24  N.  Y.  394. }  So,  by  late  clerk  not  now  in  office  :  Donohoo  v. 
Brannon,  1  Overton  328.  So,  by  clerk  of  the  council,  in  Maryland  :  Schnertzell  r. 
Young,  3  H.  &  McHen.  502.  See  further,  Conkling's  Practice,  256 ;  1  Paine  &  Duet's 
Practice,  480,  481. 

1  2  Phil.  Evid.  131 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  229. 

8  Dcnn  v.  Fulford,  2  Burr.  1179,  per  Ld.  Mansfield.  Whether,  upon  trial  at  law 
of  an  issue  out  of  Chancery,  office  copies  of  depositions  in  the  same  cause  in  Chancery 
are  admissible,  has  been  doubted  ;  but  the  better  opinion  is,  that  they  are  admissible  : 
Highfield  v.  Peake,  1  M.  &  Malk.  109  ;  Studdy  v.  Sanders,  2  D.  &  Ky.  347  ;  Hennell 
v.  Lyon,  1  B.  &  Aid.  182  ;  contra,  Burnand  v.  Nerot,  1  C.  &  P.  578. 

8  But  his  certificate  of  the  substance  or  purport  of  the  record  is  inadmissible  :  Mc- 
Guire  v.  Say  ward,  9  Shepl.  230;  {Gest  v.  R.  Co.,  30  La.  An.  28  ;  English  v.  Sprague, 
33  Me.  440;  Anderson  v.  Nagle,  12  W.  Va.  98  ;[  QLamar  v.  Pearre,  90  Ga.377;  Parker 
v.  Cleaveland,  37  Fla,  39-3 

*  Ante,  §  485. 

1  Reid  v.  Margison,  1  Campb.  469 ;  Gyles  v.  Hill,  ib.  471,  n.;  Fyson  v.  Kemp,  6  C. 
&  P.  71 ;  Rolf  v.  Dart,  2  Taunt.  52;  Hi'll  v.  Packard,  5  Wend.  387  ;  Lynde  v.  Judd, 
3  Day  499  ;  \jinte,  §  430y«.] 

2  Adamthwaite  v.  Synge,  1  Stark.  183 ;  {Woods  v.  Banks,  14  N.  H.  101. J 


650  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

must  have  been  finally  completed  before  the  copy  is  admissible  in 
evidence.  The  minutes  from  which  the  judgment  is  made  up,  and 
even  a  judgment  in  paper,  signed  by  the  master,  are  not  proper 
evidence  of  the  record.8 

§  509.  Lost  Records.  If  the  record  is  lost,  and  is  ancient,  its  ex- 
istence and  contents  may  sometimes  be  presumed; :  but  whether  it  be 
ancient  or  recent,  after  proof  of  the  loss,  its  contents  may  be  proved, 
like  any  other  document,  by  any  secondary  evidence,  where  the  case 
does  not,  from  its  nature,  disclose  the  existence  of  other  and  better 
evidence.2 

§  510.  Verdicts.  A  verdict  is  sometimes  admissible  in  evidence, 
to  prove  the  finding  of  some  matter  of  reputation,  or  custom,  or  par- 
ticular right.1  But  here,  though  it  is  the  verdict,  and  not  the  judg- 
ment, which  is  the  material  thing  to  be  shown,  yet  the  rule  is,  that, 
where  the  verdict  was  returned  to  a  Court  having  power  to  set  it 
aside,  the  verdict  is  not  admissible,  without  producing  a  copy  of  the 
judgment  rsndered  upon  it;  for  it  may  be  that  the  judgment  was 
arrested,  or  that  a  new  trial  was  granted.  But  this-  rule  does  not 
hold  in  the  case  of  a  verdict  upon  an  issue  out  of  Chancery,  because 
it  is  not  usual  to  enter  up  judgment  in  such  cases.2  Neither  does  it 
apply  where  the  object  of  the  evidence  is  merely  to  establish  the  fact 
that  the  verdict  was  given,  without  regard  to  the  facts  found  by  the 
jury,  or  to  the  subsequent  proceedings  in  the  cause.8  And  where, 
after  verdict  in  ejectment,  the  defendant  paid  the  plaintiff's  costs, 
and  yielded  up  the  possession  to  him,  the  proof  of  these  facts,  and 
of  the  verdict,  has  been  held  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  rule,  without 
proof  of  a  judgment.4 

8  Bull.  N.  P.  228  ;  R.  v.  Smith,  8  B.  &  C.  341 ;  Godefroy  v.  Jay,  8  C.  &  P.  192 ; 
Lee  v.  Meecock,  5  Esp.  177 ;  R.  v.  Bellamy,  Ry.  &  M.  171 ;  Porter  v.  Cooper,  6  C. 
&  P.  354  ;  Fj>n  this,  see  ante,  §  305  g.]  But  the  minutes  of  a  judgment  in  the  House 
of  Lords  are  the  judgment  itself,  which  it  is  not  the  practice  to  draw  up  in  form :  Jones 
v.  Randall,  Cowp.  17. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  228  ;  Green  v.  Proude,  1  Mod.  117,  per  Ld.  Hale. 

2  See  ante,  §  84,  post,    §  563,   and  cases  there  cited.      See  also  Adams  v.  Betz, 

1  Watts  425,  428  ;  Stockbridge  v.  West  Stockbridge,  12  Mass.  400 ;  Donaldson  v.  Win- 
ter, 1  Miller  137 ;  Newcomb  v.  Drummond,  4  Leigh  57 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  228  ;  Knight  v. 
Dauler,  Hard.  323  ;  Anon.,  1  Salk.  284,  cited  per  Holt,  C.  J. ;  Gore  v.  Elwell,  9  Shepl. 
442;  jTillotson  v.  Warner,  3  Gray  574  ;  Com.  v.  Roark,  8  Cush.  210;  Simpson  v. 
Norton,  45  Me.  281;  Hall  v.  Manchester,  40  N.  H.  410;  Burton  v.  Driggs,  20  Wall. 
125  ;  Eaton  v.  Hall,  5  Mete.  287  ;  Petrie  v.  Benfield,  3  T.  R.  476. } 

i  [See  ante,  §  139.] 

a  Bull.  N.  P.  234;  Pitton  v.  Walter,  1  Stra.  162  ;  Fisher  v.  Kitchingman,  Willes 
367  ;  Ayrey  v.  Davenport,  2  N.  R.  474;  Donaldson  v.  Jude,  2  Bibb  60.  Hence  it  is 
not  necessary,  in  New  York,  to  produce  a  copy  of  the  judgment  upon  a  verdict  given 
in  a  justice's  Court,  the  justice  not  having  power  to  set  it  aside:  Felter  v.  Mulliner, 

2  Johns.  181 ;  {see  Wells  v.  Stevens,  2  Gray  115  ;  Kendall  v.  Powers,  4  Mstc.  553.} 
In  North  Carolina,  owing  to  an  early  looseness  of  practice  in  making  up  the  record,  a 
copy  of  the  verdict  is  received  without  proof  of  the  judgment ;  the  latter  being  pre- 
sumed, until  the   contrary   is  shown  :  Deloach   v.  Worke,  3   Hawks  36.      See  also 
Evans  D.Thomas,   2  Stra.  833;  Dayrell  v.  Bridge,  ib.  1264;  Thurston  v.   Slatford, 
1  Salk.  284.     If  the  docket  is  lost  before  the  record  is  mnde  up,  it  will  be  considered 
as  a  loss  of  the  record  :  Prnden  v.  Alden,  23  Pick.  184  ;  \jinte,  §  305  g."] 

8  Barlow  v.  Dupuy,  1  Martin  N.  s.  442. 
4  Sbaeffer  v.  Kreitzer,  6  Biun.  430. 


§§508-512.]  VERDICT;  DECREE;  ANSWER.  651 

§  511.  Decrees  in  Chancery.  A  decree  in  Chancery  may  be  proved 
by  an  exemplification,  or  by  a  sworn  copy,  or  by  a  decretal  order  in 
paper,  with  proof  of  the  bill  and  answer.1  And  if  the  bill  and 
answer  are  recited  in  the  order,  that  has  been  held  sufficient,  with- 
out other  proof  of  them.2  But  though  a  former  decree  be  recited  in 
a  subsequent  decree,  this  recital  is  not  proper  evidence  of  the  for- 
mer.3 The  general  rule  is,  that,  where  a  party  intends  to  avail  him^ 
self  of  a  decree,  as  an  adjudication  upon  the  subject-matter,  and  not 
merely  to  prove  collaterally  that  the  decree  was  made,  he  must  show 
the  proceedings  upon  which  the  decree  was  founded.  "  The  whole 
record,"  says  Chief  Baron  Corny ns,  "which  concerns  the  matter  in 
question,  ought  to  be  produced."  4  But  where  the  decree  is  offered 
merely  for  proof  of  the  res  ipsa,  namely,  the  fact  of  the  decree,  here, 
as  in  the  case  of  verdicts,  no  proof  of  any  other  proceeding  is  re- 
quired.5 The  same  rules  apply  to  sentences  in  the  admiralty  and  to 
judgments  in  Courts  baron,  and  other  inferior  Courts.6 

§  512.  Answers  in  Chancery.  The  proof  of  an  answer  in  Chancery 
may,  in  civil  cases,  be  made  by  an  examined  copy.1  Regularly,  the 
answer  cannot  be  given  in  evidence  without  proof  of  the  bill  also, 
if  it  can  be  had.2  But,  in  general,  proof  of  the  decree  is  not  neces- 
sary, if  the  answer  is  to  be  used  merely  as  the  party's  admission 
under  oath  or  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  him  as  a  witness,  or 
to  charge  him  upon  an  indictment  for  perjury.  The  absence  of  the 
bill,  in  such  cases,  goes  only  to  the  effect  and  value  of  the  evidence, 
and  not  to  its  admissibility.8  In  an  indictment  for  perjury  in  an 
answer,  it  is  considered  necessary  to  produce  the  original  answer, 
together  with  proof  of  the  administration  of  the  oath ;  but  of  this 
fact,  as  well  as  of  the  place  where  it  was  sworn,  the  certificate  of  the 
master,  before  whom  it  was  sworn,  his  signature  also  being  proved, 
is  sufficient  prima  fade  evidence.4  The  original  must  also  be  pro- 
duced on  a  trial  for  forgery.  In  civil  cases,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
the  answer  was  made  upon  oath.6  But  whether  the  answer  be 

1  Trowel  v.  Castle,    1  Keb.  21,  confirmed    by   Bailey,    B.,  in  Blower  v.  Hollis, 
1  Cromp.  &  Mees.  396  ;  4  Com.  Dig.  97,  tit.  Evidence,  C,  1 ;  Gresley  011  Evid.  p.  109. 

2  Bull.  N.  P.  244;  1  Keb.  21. 

8  Winans  v.  Dunham,  5  Wend.  47  ;  Wilson  v.  Conine,  2  Johns.  280. 

*  4  Com.  Dig.  tit.  Evidence,  A,  4  ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  138,  139.     The  rule  equally  ap- 
plies to  decrees  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Courts  :  Leake  w.  Marquis  of  Westmeath,  2  M.  & 
Rob.  394. 

6  Jones  v.  Randall,  Cowp.  17. 
«  4  Com.  Dig.  97,  98,  tit.  Evidence,  C,  1. 
1  Ewer  v.  Ambrose,  4  B.  &  C.  25. 

8  1  Gilb.  Evid.  55,  56 ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  pp.  108,  109;  [see  ante,  §  201.] 
8  Ewer  r.  Ambrose,  4  B.  &  C.  25 ;  Rowe  r.  Brenton,  8  B.  &  C.  737,  765 ;  Lady 
Dartmouth  v.  Roberts,  16  East  334,  339,  340. 

*  Bull.  N.  P.  238,  239  ;  R.  v.  Morris,  2  Burr.  1189  ;  R.  v.    Benson,   2  Campb. 
508  ;  R.  r.  Spencer,  Ry.  &  M.  97.     The  jurat  is  not  conclusive  ns  to  the  place  :  R. 
v.  Emden,  9  East  487.     The  same  strictness  seems  to  be  required  in  an  action  on  the 
case  for  a  malicious  criminal  prosocutiou  :   16  East   340;    2  Phil.  Evid.  140;   sed 
gitcere. 

*  Bull.  N.  P.  238. 


652  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXIX. 

proved  by  production  of  the  original,  or  by  a  copy,  and  in  whatever 
case,  some  proof  of  the  identity  of  the  party  will  be  requisite.  This 
may  be  by  proof  of  his  handwriting;  which  was  the  reason  of  the 
order  iti  Chancery  requiring  all  defendants  to  sign  their  answers;  or 
it  may  be  by  any  other  competent  evidence.6 

§  513.  Records  of  Inferior  Courts.  The  judgments  of  inferior 
Courts  are  usually  proved  by  producing  from  the  proper  custody  the 
book  containing  the  proceedings.  And  as  the  proceedings  in  these 
Courts  are  not  usually  made  up  in  form,  the  minutes,  or  examined 
copies  of  them,  will  be  admitted,  if  they  are  perfect.1  If  they  are 
not  entered  in  books,  they  may  be  proved  by  the  officer  of  the  Court,  or 
by  any  other  competent  person.2  In  either  case,  resort  will  be  had 
to  the  best  evidence,  to  establish  the  tenor  of  the  proceedings  ;  and, 
therefore,  where  the  course  is  to  record  them,  which  will  be  pre- 
sumed until  the  contrary  is  shown,  the  record,  or  a  copy,  properly 
authenticated,  is  the  only  competent  evidence.8  The  caption  is  a 
necessary  part  of  the  record ;  and  the  record  itself,  or  an  examined 
copy,  is  the  only  legitimate  evidence  to  prove  it.4 

§  514.  Foreign  Judgments.  The  usual  modes  of  authenticating 
foreign  judgments  are,  either  by  an  exemplification  of  a  copy  under 
the  Great  Seal  of  a  State  ; l  or  by  a  copy,  proved  to  be  a  true  copy  by 
a  witness  who  has  compared  it  with  the  original ;  or  by  the  certifi- 
cate of  an  officer,  properly  authorized  by  law  to  give  a  copy,  which 
certificate  must  itself  also  be  duly  authenticated.2  If  the  copy  is 

8  R.  v.  Morris,  5  Burr.  1189  ;  R.  v.  Benson,  2  Campb.  608.  It  seems  that  slight 
evidence  of  identity  will  be  deemed  prima  facie  sufficient.  In  Hennell  v.  Lyon,  1  B. 
&  Aid.  182,  coincidence  of  name  and  character  as  administrator  was  held  sufficient ; 
and  Lord  Ellenborough  thought  that  coincidence  of  name  alone  ought  to  be  enough  to 
call  upon  the  party  to  show  that  it  was  some  other  person ;  see  also  Hodgkinson  v. 
Willis,  3  Campb.  401  ;  Quid  ante,  §  43  a,  post,  §  575  a.] 

1  Arundell  v.  White,  14  East  216  ;  Fisher  v.  Lane,  2  W.  Bl.  834;  R.  v.  Smith,  8  B. 

6  C.  342,  per  Ld.  Tenterden. 

2  Dyson  v.  Wood,  3  B.  &  C.  449,  451. 

8  See,  as  to  justices'  Court,  Matthews  v.  Houghton,  2  Fairf.  377  ;  Holcomb  v.  Cor- 
nish, 8  Conn.  375,  380 ;  Wolfe  i».  Washburn,  6  Cowen  261 ;  Webb  v.  Alexander, 

7  Wend.  281,  286  ;   j  Brown  v.  Edson,  23  Vt.  435  ;  State  v.  Bartlett,  47  Me.  396  ;  Com. 
v.  Ford,  14  Gray  389  ;  Goldstone  v.  Davidson,  18  Cal.  41  ;  McGrath  v.  Seagrave,  2  All. 
443  ;  Strong  v.  Bradley,  13  Vt.  9 ;  Story  v.  Kimball,  6  id.  541  ;  Pike  v.  Crehore,  40 
Me.  503  ;  Day  v.  Moore,  13  Gray  522  ;  Brackett  v.  Hoitt,  20  N.  H.  257  ;  Smith  v. 
Redden,  5  Har.  321  ;  Lancaster  t«.  Lane,   19  111.  242;  Brush  v.  Blanchard,  ib.  31  ; 
Magee  ».  Scott,  32  Pa.  539.  {    As  to  Probate  Courts,  Chase  v.  Hathaway,  14  Mass.  222, 
227  ;  Judge  of  Probate  v.  Briggs,  3  N.  H.  309.     As  to  justices  of  the  sessions,  Com.  y. 
Bolkom,  3  Pick.  281. 

*  R.  v.  Smith,  8  B.  &  C.  341,  per  Bailey,  J. 

i  VAnte,  §  479.1 

8  Church  a.  Hiibbart,  2  Cranch  228,  per  Marshall,  C.  J.;  supra,  §  488,  and  cases 
there  cited.  [The  matter  is  usually  regulated  by  statute  ;  see  an  illustration  of  the 
various  aspects  of  the  subject  in  Garden  City  Sand  Co.  v.  Miller,  157  111.  225.]  Proof 
by  a  witness,  who  saw  the  clerk  affix  the  seal  of  the  Court,  and  attest  the  copy  with 
his  own  name,  the  witness  having  assisted  him  to  compare  it  with  the  original,  was 
held  sufficient  :  Buttrick  v.  Allen,  8  Mass.  273  ;  {see  also  Pickard  v.  Bailey,  6  Foster 
152; |  so,  where  the  witness  testified  that  the  Court  had  no  seal:  Packard  v.  Hill, 
7  Cowen  434. 


§§  512-517.]     FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS;  DEPOSITIONS.  653 

certified  under  the  hand  of  the  judge  of  the  Court,  his  handwriting 
must  be  proved.8  If  the  Court  has  a  seal,  it  ought  to  be  affixed  to 
the  copy,  and  proved ;  even  though  it  be  worn  so  smooth,  as  to  make 
no  distinct  impression.4  And  if  it  is  clearly  proved  that  the  Court 
has  no  seal,  it  must  be  shown  to  possess  some  other  requisites  to  en- 
title it  to  credit.5  If  the  copy  is  merely  certified  by  an  officer  of  the 
Court,  without  other  proof,  it  is  inadmissible.6 

§  515.  Inquisitions.  In  cases  of  inquisitiones  post  mortem  and  other 
private  offices,  the  return  cannot  be  read,  without  also  reading  the 
commission.  But  in  cases  of  more  general  concern,  the  commission 
is  of  such  public  notoriety  as  not  to  require  proof.1 

§  516.  Depositions  in  Chancery.  With  regard  to  the  proof  of  depo- 
sitions in  Chancery,  the  general  rule  is,  that  they  cannot  be  read,  with- 
out proof  of  the  bill  and  answer,  in  order  to  show  that  there  was  a 
cause  depending,  as  well  as  who  were  the  parties,  and  what  was  the 
subject-matter  in  issue.  If  there  were  no  cause  depending,  the  depo- 
sitions are  but  voluntary  affidavits ;  and  if  there  were  one,  still  the 
depositions  cannot  be  read,  unless  it  be  against  the  same  parties,  or 
those  claiming  in  privity  with  them.1  But  ancient  depositions,  given 
when  it  was  not  usual  to  enroll  the  pleadings,  may  be  read  without 
antecedent  proof.2  They  may  also  be  read  upon  proof  of  the  bill, 
but  without  proof  of  the  answer,  if  the  defendant  is  in  contempt,  or 
has  had  an  opportunity  of  cross-examining,  which  he  chose  to  forego.* 
And  no  proof  of  the  bill  or  answer  is  necessary,  where  the  deposi- 
tion is  used  against  the  deponent,  as  his  own  declaration  or  admis- 
sion, or  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  him  as  a  witness.4  So, 
where  an  issue  is  directed  out  of  Chancery,  and  an  order  is  made 
there,  for  the  reading  of  the  depositions  upon  the  trial  of  the  issue, 
the  Court  of  law  will  read  them  upon  the  order,  without  antecedent 
proof  of  the  bill  and  answer,  provided  the  witnesses  themselves  can- 
not be  produced.6 

§  517.  Depositions  under  Commission.  Depositions  taken  upon 
interrogatories,  under  a  special  commission,  cannot  be  read  without 
proof  of  the  commission  under  which  they  were  taken,  together  with 

8  Henry  v.  Adey,  3  East  221 ;  Buchanan  v.  Rucker,  1  Campb.  63.  The  certificate 
of  a  notary  public  to  this  fact  was  deemed  sufficient  in  Yeaton  v.  Fry,  5  Cranch  335. 

*  Cavan  v.  Stewart,  1  Stark.  525  ;  Flindt  v.  Atkins,  3  Campb.  215,  n.  ;  Gardere  i>. 
Ins.  Co.,  7  Johns.  514. 

6  Black  v.  Lord  Braybrook,  2  Stark.  7,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  Packard  v.  Hill, 
7  Cowen  434. 

6  Appleton  v.  Ld.  Braybrook,  2  Stark.  6  ;  s.  c.  6  M.  &  S.  34 ;  Thompson  v.  Stewart, 
3  Conn.  171. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  228,  229;  Pfor  their  admissibility,  see  post,  §  556.] 

1  2  Phil.  Evid.  149 ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  185 ;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  56,  57  ;  [ante,  §  163  a.] 

8  1  Gilb.  Evid.  64 ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  185  ;  Bayley  ».  Wylie,  6  Esp.  85. 

8  Cazenove  v.  Vaughan,  1  M.  &  S.  4  ;  Carnngton  ».  Cornock,  2  Sim.  567. 

«  Highfield  v.  Peake,  1  M.  &  Malk.  109;  [ante,  §§  178,  201,  512.1 

*  Palmer  ».  Lord  Aylesbury,  15  Ves.  176  ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  185  ;  "Bayley  ».  Wylie, 
6  Esp.  85. 


654  EECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WHITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

the  interrogatories,  if  they  can  be  found.  The  absence  of  the  inter- 
rogatories, if  it  renders  the  answers  obscure,  may  destroy  their  effect, 
but  it  does  not  prevent  their  being  read.1  Both  depositions  and  affi- 
davits, taken  in  another  domestic  tribunal,  may  be  proved  by  examined 
copies.8 

§  518.  Testaments.  Testaments,  in  England,  are  proved  in  the 
Ecclesiastical  Courts  ;  and,  in  the  United  States,  in  those  Courts 
which  have  been  specially  charged  with  the  exercise  of  this  branch 
of  that  jurisdiction,  generally  styled  Courts  of  Probate,  but  in  some 
States  known  by  other  designations,  as  Orphans'  Courts,  etc.  There 
are  two  modes  of  proof,  —  namely,  the  common  form,  which  is  upon 
the  oath  of  the  executor  alone,  before  the  Court  having  jurisdiction  of 
the  probate  of  wills,  without  citing  the  parties  interested,  and  the 
more  solemn  form  of  law,  per  testes,  upon  due  notice  and  hearing  of 
all  parties  concerned.1  The  former  mode  has,  in  the  United  States, 
fallen  into  general  disuse.  By  the  common  law,  the  Ecclesiastical 
Courts  have  no  jurisdiction  of  matters  concerning  the  realty  ;  and 
therefore  the  probate,  as  far  as  the  realty  is  concerned,  gives  no 
validity  to  the  will.2  But  in  most  of  the  United  States,  the  probate 
of  the  will  has  the  same  effect  in  the  case  of  real  estate  as  in  that  of 
the  personalty ;  and  where  it  has  not,  the  effect  will  be  stated  here- 
after.8 This  being  the  case,  the  present  general  course  is  to  deposit 
the  original  will  in  the  registry  of  the  Court  of  Probate,  delivering 
to  the  executor  a  copy  of  the  will,  and  an  exemplification  of  the  de- 
cree of  allowance  and  probate.  And  in  all  cases  where  the  Court  of 
Probate  has  jurisdiction,  its  decree  is  the  proper  evidence  of  the  pro- 
bate of  the  will,  and  is  proved  in  the  same  manner  as  the  decrees  and 
judgments  of  other  Courts.4  A  Court  of  common  law  will  not  take 
notice  of  a  will,  as  a  title  to  personal  property,  until  it  has  been  thus 
proved ; 6  and  where  the  will  is  required  to  be  originally  proved  to 
the  jury  as  documentary  evidence  of  title,  it  is  not  permitted  to  be 
read  unless  it  bears  the  seal  of  the  Ecclesiastical  Court,  or  some  other 
mark  of  authentication.6 

§  519.  Letters  of  Administration.  Letters  of  administration  are 
granted  under  the  seal  of  the  Court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  pro- 

i  Rowe  v.  Brenton,  8  B.  &  C.  737,  765. 

«  Supra,  §§  507,  508  ;  Highfield  u.  Peake,  1  M.  &  Malk.  110.      In  criminal  cases, 
some  proof  of  identity  of  the  person  is  requisite  :  supra,  §  512. 
i  2  Bl.  Comm.  508. 

8  Hoe  v.  Nelthrope,  3  Salk.  154  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  245,  246. 
8  See  infra,  §  550,  and  Vol.  II.  tit.  Wills,  §  672. 

*  Supra,  §§  501-509,  513  ;  Chase  v.  Hathaway,  14  Mass.  222,  227 ;  Judge  of  Pro- 
bate v.  Briggs,  3  N.  H.  309  ;  Farnsworth  v,  Briggs,  6  id.  561. 

6  Stone  v.  Forayth,  2  Doug.  707.  The  character  of  executor  may  be  proved  by  the 
act-book,  without  producing  the  probate  of  the  will :  Cox  v.  Allingham,  Jacob  514  ; 
and  see  Doe  v.  Mew,  7  Ad.  &  El.  240. 

•  R.  v.  Barnes,  1  Stark.  243  ;  Shumway  v.  Holbrook,  1  Pick.  114.      See  further, 
2  Phil.  Evid.  172 ;  Gorton  v.  Dyson,  1  B.  &  B.  221,  per  Richardson,  J.  :  ^statutes  no" 
almost  everywhere  provide  for  the  terms  of  admission.^ 


§§517-521.]          WILLS;  ADMINISTRATION;  ETC.  655 

bate  of  wills ;  and  the  general  course  in  the  United  States,  as  in  the 
case  of  wills,  is  to  pass  a  formal  decree  to  that  effect,  which  is  en- 
tered in  the  book  of  records  of  the  Court.  The  letter  of  administra- 
tion, therefore,  is  of  the  nature  of  an  exemplification  of  this  record, 
and  as  such  is  received  without  other  proof.  But  where  no  formal 
record  is  drawn  up,  the  book  of  acts,  or  the  original  minutes  or  me- 
morial of  the  appointment,  or  a  copy  thereof  duly  authenticated,  will 
be  received  as  competent  evidence.1 

§  520.  Magistrates'  Examinations  in  Criminal  Cases.  Examinations 
of  prisoners  in  criminal  cases  are  usually  proved  by  the  magistrate  or 
clerk  who  wrote  them  down.1  But  there  must  be  antecedent  proof  of 
the  identity  of  the  prisoner  and  of  the  examination.  If  the  prisoner 
has  subscribed  the  examination  with  his  name,  proof  of  his  hand- 
writing is  sufficient  evidence  that  he  has  read  it ;  but  if  he  has 
merely  made  his  mark,  or  has  not  signed  it  at  all,  the  magistrate  or 
clerk  must  identify  the  prisoner,  and  prove  that  the  writing  was  duly 
read  to  him,  and  that  he  assented  to  it.2 

§  521.  Writs.  In  regard  to  the  proof  of  writs,  the  question  whether 
this  is  to  be  made  by  production  of  the  writ  itself,  or  by  a  copy,  de- 
pends on  its  having  been  returned  or  not.  If  it  is  only  matter  of 
inducement  to  the  action,  and  has  not  been  returned,  it  may  be  proved 
by  producing  it.  But  after  the  writ  is  returned  it  has  become  matter 
of  record,  and  is  to  be  proved  by  a  copy  from  the  record,  this  being 
the  best  evidence.1  If  it  cannot  be  found  after  diligent  search,  it 
may  be  proved  by  secondary  evidence,  as  in  other  cases.2  The  fact, 
however,  of  the  issuing  of  the  writ  may  sometimes  be  proved  by  the 
admission  of  the  party  against  whom  it.  is  to  be  proved.8  And  the 
precise  time  of  suing  it  out  may  be  shown  by  parol.4 

1  The  practice  on  this  subject  is  various  in  the  different  States,  FJand  is  regulated 
almost  entirely  by  statute ;]  see  Dickinson  v.  McCraw,  4  Rand.  158 ;  Seymour  v. 
Beach,  4  Vt.  493  ;  Jackson  v.  Robinson,  4  Wend.  436 ;  Farnsworth  v.  Briggs,  6  N.  H. 
661  ;  Hoskins  v.  Miller,  2  Dev.  360 ;  Owings  v.  Beall,  1  Litt.  257,  259  ;  Browning  v. 
Huff,  2  Bailey  174,  179  ;  Owings  v.  Hull,  9  Pet.  608,  626.  See  also  Bull.  N.  P.  246  ; 
Elden  v.  Kesdel,  8  East  187  ;  2  M.  &  S.  567,  per  Bailey,  J.  •  2  Phil.  Evid.  172,  173 ; 
1  Stark.  Evid.  255. 

1  2  Hale  P.  C.  52,  284. 

2  See  supra,  §§  224,  225,  227,  22.. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  234;  Foster  v.  Trull,  12  Johns.  456  ;  Pigot  v.  Davis,  3  Hawks  25  ; 
Frost  t>.  Shapleigh,  7  Greenl.  236 ;  Brush  v.  Taggart,  7  Johns.  19 ;  Jenner  v.  Joliffe, 
6  id.  9. 

2  Supra,  §  84. 

8  As,  in  an  action  by  the  officer  against  the  bailee  of  the  goods  attached,  for  which 
he  has  given  a  forthcoming  obligation,  reciting  the  attachment :  Lyman  v.  Lyman,  11 
Mass.  317;  Spencer  v.  Williams,  2  Vt.  209;  Lowry  t>.  Cady,  4  id.  504;  Foster  «?. 
Trull,  12  Johns.  456.  So  where  the  sheriff  is  sued  for  an  escape,  and  has  not  re- 
turned the  precept  on  which  the  arrest  was  made  :  Hinman  v.  Rees,  13  id.  529. 

*  Lester  v.  Jenkins,  8  B.  &  C.  339  ;  Morris  v.  Pugh,  3  Burr.  1241  ;  Wilton  ». 
Girdlestone,  5  B.  &  Aid.  847  ;  Michaels  v.  Shaw,  12  Wend.  587  ;  Allen  v.  Portland 
Stage  Co.,  8  Greeul.  438  ;  Taylor  v.  Dundass,  1  Wash.  94. 


656  RECOKDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXIX 

2.    A.dmissibility  and  Effect  of  Judgments  and  Records.1 

§  522.  In  general.  We  proceed  in  the  next  place  to  consider  the 
admissibility  and  effect  of  records  as  instruments  of  evidence.  The 
rules  of  law  upon  this  subject  are  founded  upon  these  evident  princi- 
ples or  axioms,  that  it  is  for  the  interest  of  the  community  that  a 
limit  should  be  prescribed  to  litigation;  and  that  the  same  cause  of 
action  ought  not  to  be  brought  twice  to  a  final  determination.  Jus- 
tice requires  that  every  cause  be  once  fairly  and  impartially  tried; 
but  the  public  tranquillity  demands  that,  having  been  once  so  tried, 
all  litigation  of  that  question,  and  between  those  parties,  should  be 
closed  forever. 

§  523.  General  Principle :  Judgments  bind  Parties  and  Privies,  but 
not  Strangers.  It  is  also  a  most  obvious  principle  of  justice,  that 
no  man  ought  to  be  bound  by  proceedings  to  which  he  was  a  stran- 
ger ;  but  the  converse  of  this  rule  is  equally  true,  that  by  proceed- 
ings to  which  he  was  not  a  stranger  he  may  well  be  held  bound. 
Under  the  term  parties,  in  this  connection,  the  law  includes  all  who 
are  directly  interested  in  the  subject-matter,  and  had  a  right  to 
make  defence,  or  to  control  the  proceedings,  and  to  appeal  from  the 
judgment.  This  right  involves  also  the  right  to  adduce  testimony, 
and  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses  adduced  on  the  other  side.  Per- 
sons not  having  these  rights  are  regarded  as  strangers  to  the  cause.1 
But  to  give  full  effect  to  the  principle  by  which  parties  are  held 
bound  by  a  judgment,  all  persons  who  are  represented  by  the  parties, 
and  claim  under  them,  or  in  privity  with  them,  are  equally  concluded 
by  the  same  proceedings.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  term 
privity  denotes  mutual  or  successive  relationship  to  the  same  rights 
of  property.2  The  ground,  therefore,  upon  which  persons  standing 
in  this  relation  to  the  litigating  party  are  bound  by  the  proceedings 
to  which  he  was  a  party  is,  that  they  are  identified  with  him  in 
interest;  and  wherever  this  identity  is  found  to  exist,  all  are  alike 
concluded.  Hence,  all  privies,  whether  in  estate,  in  blood,  or  in 
law,  are  estopped  from  litigating  that  which  is  conclusive  upon  him 
with  whom  they  are  in  privity.8  And  if  one  covenants  for  the  re- 

1  [The  topics  of  the  ensuing  sections  are  for  the  most  part  not  concerned  with  the 
law  of  evidence.  3 

1  Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  538,  n. ;  Carter  v.  Bennett,  4  Fla. 
852  ;  j  Hale  v.  Finch,  104  U.  S.  261  ;  Butterfield  v.  Smith,  101  id.  570  ;  Prichard  v. 
Farrar,  116  Mass.  213  ;  Vose  v.  Morton,  4  Cush.  27.}  Where  a  father,  during  the  ab- 
sence of  hia  minor  son  from  the  country,  commenced  an  action  of  crim.  con.  as  his 
prochein  amy,  the  judgment  was  held  conclusive  against  the  son,  after  his  majority; 
the  prochein  amy  having  been  appointed  by  the  Court :  Morgan  v.  Thorne,  9  Dowl. 
228. 

a  Supra,  §  189 ;  see  also  §§  19,  20. 

•  Carver  v.  Jackson,  4  Peters  85,  86  ;  Case  v.  Reeve,  14  Johns.  81.  See  also  Kin- 
nersley  v.  Wm.  Orpe,  2  Doug.  517,  expounded  in  14  Johns.  81,  82,  by  Spencer,  J. 
JClapp  v.  Herrick,  129  Mass.  292  ;  Ballou  v.  Ballon,  110  N.  Y.  402  ;  Parkhurst  v.  Ber- 
dell,  ib.  892  ;  Chapin  v.  Curtis,  28  Conn.  888 :  Emery  v.  Fowler,  89  Me.  826  :  Key  v. 
Dent,  14  Md.  86.  | 


§§  522-527.]  EFFECT   OF   JUDGMENTS.  657 

suits  or  consequences  of  a  suit  between  others,  as  if  he  covenants 
that  a  certain  mortgage,  assigned  by  him,  shall  produce  a  specified 
sum,  he  thereby  connects  himself  in  privity  with  the  proceedings, 
and  the  record  of  the  judgment  in  that  suit  will  be  conclusive  evi- 
dence against  him.* 

§  524.  Binding  Effect  must  be  Mutual.  But  to  prevent  this  rule 
from  working  injustice,  it  is  held  essential  that  its  operation  be 
mutual.  Both  the  litigants  must  be  alike  concluded,  or  the  proceed- 
ings cannot  be  set  up  as  conclusive  upon  either.  For  if  the  adverse 
party  was. not  also  a  party  to  the  judgment  offered  in  evidence,  it 
may  have  been  obtained  upon  his  own  testimony;  in  which  case,  to 
allow  him  to  derive  a  benefit  from  it  would  be  unjust.1  Another 
qualification  of  the  rule  is,  that  a  party  is  not  to  be  concluded  by  a 
judgment  in  a  prior  suit  or  prosecution,  where,  from  the  nature  or 
course  of  the  proceedings,  he  could  not  avail  himself  of  the  same 
means  of  defence,  or  of  redress,  which  are  open  to  him  in  the  second 
suit.2 

§  525.  Exception  for  Judgments  in  Rem.  An  apparent  exception 
to  this  rule,  as  to  the  identity  of  the  parties,  is  allowed  in  the  cases 
usually  termed  proceedings  in  rem,  which  include  not  only  judgments 
of  condemnation  of  property,  as  forfeited  or  as  prize,  in  the  Ex- 
chequer or  Admiralty,  but  also  the  decisions  of  other  Courts  directly 
upon  the  personal  status  or  relations  of  the  party,  such  as  marriage, 
divorce,  bastardy,  settlement,  and  the  like.1  These  decisions  are 
binding  and  conclusive,  not  only  upon  the  parties  actually  litigating 
in  the  cause,  but  upon  all  others;  partly  upon  the  ground  that,  in 
most  cases  of  this  kind,  and  especially  in  questions  upon  property 
seized  and  proceeded  against,  every  one  who  can  possibly  be  affected 
by  the  decision  has  a  right  to  appear  and  assert  his  own  rights  by 
becoming  an  actual  party  to  the  proceedings ;  and  partly  upon  the 
more  general  ground  of  public  policy  and  convenience,  it  being 
essential  to  the  peace  of  society  that  questions  of  this  kind  should 
not  be  left  doubtful,  but  that  the  domestic  and  social  relations  of 
every  member  of  the  community  should  be  clearly  defined  and 
conclusively  settled  and  at  rest.8 

§  526.  Exception  for  Judgments  on  Public  Matters.  A  further  ex- 
ception is  admitted  in  the  case  of  verdicts  and  judgments  upon  sub- 
jects of  a  public  nature,  such  as  customs,  and  the  like;  in  most  all 
of  which  cases,  evidence  of  reputation  is  admissible;  and  also  in 
cases  of  judgments  in  rent,  which  may  be  again  mentioned  hereafter.1 

§  527.    Exception  for  Judgments  on  Collateral  Facts.     A  judgment, 

*  Rapelye  v.  Prince,  4  Hill  119. 

1  Wood  v.  Davis,  7  Cranch  271 ;  Davis  v.  Wood,  1  Wheat.  6. 

2  1  Stark.  Evid.  214,  215. 

1  }  As  to  divorce,  see  Burlen  v.  Shannon,  3  Gray  387  ;  as  to  pedigree,  see  Ennis  o. 
Smith,  14  How.  400.  [ 
«  1  Stark  Evid.  27,  28. 
i  See  infra,  §§  541,  542,  544,  555. 
VOL.   L  —  42 


658  RECORDS  AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

when  used  by  -way  of  inducement,  or  to  establish  a  collateral  fact, 
may  be  admitted,  though  the  parties  are  not  the  same.  Thus,  the 
record  of  a  conviction  may  be  shown,  in  order  to  prove  the  legal 
infamy  of  a  witness.  So,  it  may  be  shown,  in  order  to  let  in  the 
proof  of  what  was  sworn  at  the  trial,  or  to  justify  proceedings  in  ex- 
ecution of  the  judgment.  So,  it  may  be  used  to  show  that  the  suit 
was  determined;  or  in  proper  cases,  to  prove  the  amount  which  a 
principal  has  been  compelled  to  pay  for  the  default  of  his  agent; 
or,  the  amount  which  a  surety  has  been  compelled  to  pay  for  the 
principal  debtor;  and,  in  general,  to  show  the  fact,  that  the  judg- 
ment was  actually  rendered  at  such  a  time,  and  for  such  an  amount.1 
§  527  a.  Judgments  as  Admissions.  A  record  may  also  be  ad- 
mitted in  evidence  in  favor  of  a  stranger,  against  one  of  the  parties, 
as  containing  a  solemn  admission,  or  judicial  declaration  by  such 
party,  in  regard  to  a  certain  fact.  But  in  that  case  it  is  admitted 
not  as  a  judgment  conclusively  establishing  the  fact,  but  as  the  de- 
liberate declaration  or  admission  of  the  party  himself  that  the  fact 
was  so.  It  is  therefore  to  be  treated  according  to  the  principles 
governing  admissions,  to  which  class  of  evidence  it  properly  belongs. 
Thus,  where  a  carrier  brought  trover  against  a  person  to  whom  he 
had  delivered  the  goods  intrusted  to  him,  and  which  were  lost,  the 
record  in  this  suit  was  held  admissible  for  the  owner,  in  a  subsequent 
action  brought  by  him  against  the  carrier,  as  amounting  to  a  confes- 
sion in  a  Court  of  record,  that  he  had  the  plaintiff's  goods.1  So,  also, 
where  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  of  trespass  guare  clausum  fregit, 
claimed  title  by  disseisin,  against  a  grantee  of  the  heirs  of  the  dis- 
seisee, it  was  held  that  the  count,  in  a  writ  of  right  sued  by  those 
heirs  against  him,  might  be  giyen  in  evidence,  as  their  declaration 
and  admission  that  their  ancestor  died  disseised,  and  that  the  present 
plaintiff  was  in  possession.2  So,  where  two  had  been  sued  as  part- 
ners, and  had  suffered  judgment  by  default,  the  record  was  held 
competent  evidence  of  an  admission  of  the  partnership,  in  a  subse- 
quent action  brought  by  a  third  person  against  them  as  partners.* 
And  on  the  same  ground,  in  a  libel  by  a  wife  for  a  divorce,  because 
of  the  extreme  cruelty  of  the  husband,  the  record  of  his  conviction 
of  an  assault  and  battery  upon  her,  founded  upon  his  plea  of  guilty, 
was  held  good  evidence  against  him,  as  a  judicial  admission  of  the 
fact.  But  if  the  plea  had  been  "not  guilty,"  it  would  have  been 
otherwise.4 

1  See  further,  infra,  §§  538,  539  ;  Locke  v.  Winston,  10  Ala.  849  ;  King  v.  Chase, 
15  N.  H.  9  ;  Green  v.  New  River  Co.,  4  T.  R,  589;  j Chamberlain  ».  Carlisle,  26  N.  H. 
640;  Key  v.  Dent,  14  Md.  86.  | 

1  Tiley  v.  Cowling,  1  Ld.  Raym.  744,  per  Holt,  C.  J.;  8.  0.  Bull.  N.  P.  243  ;  Par- 
sons  o.  Copelaml,  33  Me.  370. 

8  Rohison  v.  Swett,  8  Greenl.  316;  supra,  §  195;  Wells  v.  Compton,  3  Rob.  La. 
171.  And  see  Kellenbcrger  v.  Stnrtevant,  7  Cush.  465. 

•  Crajjin  P.  Carleton,  8  Shepl.  492. 

«  Bradley  v.  Bradley,  2  Fairf.  367  ;  Woodruff  v.  Woodruff,  ib.  475. 


§§  527-529.]  EFFECT   OF  JUDGMENTS.  659 

§  528.  Judgments  bind  only  for  Material  Issues.  The  principle 
upon  which  judgments  are  held  conclusive  upon  the  parties  requires 
that  the  rule  should  apply  only  to  that  which  was-  directly  in  issue, 
and  not  to  everything  which  was  incidentally  brought  into  contro- 
versy during  the  trial.  We  have  seen  that  the  evidence  must  corre- 
spond with  the  allegations,  and  be  confined  to  the  point  in  issue.  It 
is  only  to  the  material  allegations  of  one  party  that  the  other  can  be 
called  to  answer;  it  is  only  upon  such  that  an  issue  can  properly  be 
formed;  to  such  alone  can  testimony  be  regdlarly  adduced ;  and  upon 
such  an  issue  only  is  judgment  to  be  rendered.  A  record,  therefore, 
is  not  held  conclusive  as  to  the  truth  of  any  allegations,  which  were 
not  material  nor  traversable;  but  as  to  things  material  and  travers- 
able,  it  is  conclusive  and  final.  The  general  rule  on  this  subject  was 
laid  down  with  admirable  clearness,  by  Lord  Chief  Justice  De  Grey, 
in  the  Duchess  of  Kingston's  case,1  and  has  been  repeatedly  con- 
firmed and  followed,  without  qualification.  "From  the  variety  of 
cases,"  said  he,  "relative  to  judgments  being  given  in  evidence  in 
civil  suits,  these  two  deductions  seem  to  follow  as  generally  true: 
First,  that  the  judgment  of  a  Court  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  directly 
upon  the  point  is,  as  a  plea,  a  bar,  or,  as  evidence,  conclusive  be- 
tween the  same  parties,  upon  the  same  matter,  directly  in  question 
in  another  Court;  secondly,  that  the  judgment  of  a  Court  of  exclusive 
jurisdiction,  directly  upon  the  point,  is,  in  like  manner,  conclusive 
upon  the  same  matter,  between  the  same  parties,  coming  inciden- 
tally in  question  in  another  Court,  for  a  different  purpose.2  But 
neither  the  judgment  of  a  concurrent  nor  exclusive  jurisdiction  is 
evidence  of  any  matter,  which  came  collaterally  in  question,  though 
within  their  jurisdiction;  nor  of  any  matter  incidentally  cognizable; 
nor  of  any  matter  to  be  inferred  by  argument  from  the  judgment."  * 

§  529.  Proceedings  must  have  been  Final  It  is  only  where  the 
point  in  issue  has  been  determined,  that  the  judgment  is  a  bar.  If 
the  suit  is  discontinued,  or  the  plaintiff  becomes  nonsuit,  or  for  any 
other  cause  there  has  been  no  judgment  of  the  Court  upon  the  matter 
in  issue,  the  proceedings  are  not  conclusive.1 

1  20  How.  St.  Tr.  538  ;  expressly  adopted  and  confirmed  in  Harvey  v.  Bichards, 
2  Gall.  229,  per  Story,  .T.  ;  and  in  Hibshman  ».  Dulleban,  4  Watts  183,  per  Gibson, 
C.  J.  ;  and  see  King  t».  Chase,  15  N.  H.  9. 

2  Thus,  a  judgment  at  law  against  the  validity  of  a  bill,  as  having  been  given  for  a 
gambling  debt,  is  conclusive  of  that  fact  in  equity  also  :  Pearce  v.  Gray,  2  Y.  &  C.  322. 
Plans,  and  documents  referred  to  in  the.  pleadings,  are  conclusive  upon  the  parties,  if 
they  are  adopted  by  the  issues  and  make  part  of  the  judgment ;  but  not  otherwise  : 
Hobbs  v.  Parker,  1  Kedingt.  143. 

8  See  2  Kent  Comm.  119-121 ;  Story  on  Conn,  of  Laws,  §§591-593,  603-610  ;  Ar- 
nold v.  Arnold,  17  Pick.  7  ;  j  Lewis  v.  Boston,  130  Mass.  339 ;  Stockwell  v.  Silloway, 
113  id.  384;  Allen  v.  Trustees,  102  id.  262;  United  States  Felting  Co.  ».  Asbestos 
Felting  Co.,  18  Blatchf.  310 :  Price  v.  Dewey,  6  Sawy.  493  ;  Putnam  v.  Clark,  34  N. 
J.  Ef|.  532;  Jordan  v.  Van  Epps,  85  N.  Y.  427.  | 

1  Knox  P.  Waldoborough,  5  Greenl.  185;  Hull  v.  Blake,  13  Mass.  155;  Sweigart 
».  Berk,  8  S.  &  R.  305  ;  Bridge  ».  Sumner,  1  Pick.  371 ;  3  Bl.  Comm.  296,  377  J 


660  RECORDS   AND  JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXIX. 

§  530.  Judgment  must  have  been  on  Merits.  So,  also,  in  order  to 
constitute  the  former  judgment  a  complete  bar,  it  must  appear  to 
have  been  a  decision  upon  the  merits ;  and  this  will  be  sufficient, 
though  the  declaration  were  essentially  defective,  so  that  it  would 
have  been  adjudged  bad  on  demurrer.1  But  if  the  trial  went  off  on  a 
technical  defect,2  or  because  the  debt  was  nob  yet  due,8  or  because 
the  Court  had  not  jurisdiction,4  or  because  of  a  temporary  disability 
of  the  plaintiff  to  sue,8  or  the  like,6  the  judgment  will  be  no  bar  to  a 
future  action. 

§  531.  Former  Recovery.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  former  recov- 
ery may  be  shown  in  evidence,  under  the  general  issue,  as  well  as 
pleaded  in  bar;  and  that  when  pleaded,  it  is  conclusive  upon  the 
parties.1  But  whether  it  is  conclusive  when  given  in  evidence  is 
a  point  which  has  been  much  doubted.  It  is  agreed  that  when 
there  has  been  no  opportunity  to  plead  a  matter  of  estoppel  in  bar, 
and  it  is  offered  in  evidence,  it  is  equally  conclusive  as  if  it  had 
been  pleaded.2  And  it  is  further  laid  down  that  when  the  matter 
to  which  the  estoppel  applies  is  alleged  by  one  party,  and  the  other, 
instead  of  pleading  the  estoppel,  chooSes  to  take  issue  on  the  fact,  he 
waives  the  benefit  of  the  estoppel,  and  leaves  the  jury  at  liberty  to 
find  according  to  the  fact.8  This  proposition  is  admitted,  in  its 
application  to  estoppels  arising  from  an  act  of  the  party  himself,  in 
making  a  deed  or  the  like;  but  it  has  been  denied  in  its  application 
to  judgments  recovered;  for,  it  is  said,  the  estoppel,  in  the  former 
case,  is  allowed  for  the  benefit  of  the  other  party,  which  he  may 
waive;  but  the  whole  community  have  an  interest  in  holding  the 
parties  conclusively  bound  by  the  results  of  their  own  litigation. 
And  it  has  been  well  remarked,  that  it  appears  inconsistent  that  the 
authority  of  a  resjudicata  should  govern  the  Court,  when  the  matter 
is  referred  to  them  by  pleading,  but  that  a  jury  should  be  at  liberty 
altogether  to  disregard  it,  when  the  matter  is  referred  to  them  in 
evidence;  and  that  the  operation  of  so  important  a  principle  should 
be  left  to  depend  upon  the  technical  forms  of  pleading  in  particular 

jHolbert's  Est.,  57  Cal.  257.  j  So,  if  the  judgment  has  been  reversed  :  Wood  v.  Jack- 
son,  8  Wend.  9.  If  there  hits  been  no  judgment,  it  has  been  ruled  that  the  pleadings 
are  not  admissible  as  evidence  of  the  facts  recited  in  them  :  Holt  v.  Miers,  9  C.  &  P. 
191. 

1  Hughes  v.  Blake,  1  Mason  515,  519,  per  Story,  J. 

2  Ibid.;  Lane  v.  Harrison,  6  Muiif.  573;  McDonald  v.  Rainor,  8  Johns.  442;  Lam- 
pen  v.  Kedgewin,  1  Mod.  207. 

*  N.  Eng.  Bank  v.  Lewis,  8  Pick.  113. 
4  Kstill  v.  Taul,  2  Yerg.  467,  470. 

6  Dixon  p.  Sinclear,  4  Vt.  354. 

8  j  Homer  v.  Brown,  16  How.  354  (agreed  facts). } 

1  Trevivan  v.  Lawrence,  1  Salk.  276  ;  s.  o.  3  id.  151  ;  Outran  v.  Morewood,  3  East 
346;  Kitchen  v.  Campbell,  3  Wils.  804;  s.  c.  2  W.  Bl.  827;  j  Warren  v.  Comings, 
6  Cush.  103  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Carlisle,  26  N.  H.  540  ;  Meiss  v.  Gill,  44  Oh.  St.  258.  | 

2  Howard  v.  Mitchell,  14  Mass.  241  ;  Adams  v.  Barnes,  17  iJ.  365.     So,  in  equity : 
Dows  v.  McMichael,  6  Paige  139. 

*  Howard  v.  Mitchell,  supra  ;  Adams  v.  Barnes,  supra. 


§§  530-532.]  EFFECT   OF   JUDGMENTS.  661 

actions.4  And  notwithstanding  there  are  many  respectable  oppos- 
ing decisions,  the  weight  of  authority,  at  least  in  the  United  States, 
is  believed  to  be  in  favor  of  the  position,  that  where  a  former  recov- 
ery is  given  in  evidence,  it  is  equally  conclusive,  in  its  effect,  as  if 
it  were  specially  pleaded  by  the  way  of  estoppel.6 

§  532.  Same :  Identity  of  Issue.  When  a  former  judgment  is 
shown  by  way  of  bar,  whether  by  pleading,  or  in  evidence,  it  is 
competent  for  the  plaintiff  to  reply,  that  it  did  not  relate  to  the 
same  property  or  transaction  in  controversy  in  the  action,  to  which 
it  is  set  up  in  bar;1  and  the  question  of  identity,  thus  raised,  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  jury,  upon  the  evidence  adduced.2  And  though 
the  declaration  in  the  former  suit  may  be  broad  enough  to  include 
the  subject-matter  of  the  second  action,  yet  if,  upon  the  whole  record, 
it  remains  doubtful  whether  the  same  subject-matter  were  actually 
passed  upon,  it  seems  that  parol  evidence  may  be  received  to  show 
the  truth.8  So,  also,  if  the  pleadings  present  several  distinct  propo- 
sitions, and  the  evidence  may  be  referred  to  either  or  to  all  with  the 
same  propriety,  the  judgment  is  not  conclusive,  but  only  prima  facie 
evidence  upon  any  one  of  the  propositions,  and  evidence  aliunde  is 
admissible  to  rebut  it.4  Thus  where  the  plaintiff  in  a  former  action 

«  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  512. 

6  Marsh  v.  Pier,  4  Rawle  288.  A  similar  view,  with  the  like  distinction,  was  taken 
by  Huston,  J.,  in  Kilheffer  v.  Hen-,  17  S.  &  R.  325,  326.  See  also  to  the  point  that 
the  evidence  is  conclusive,  Shafert).  Stonebraker,  4  G.  &  J.  345  ;  Cist  v.  Zeigler,  16  S. 
&  R.  282  ;  Betts  v.  Starr,  5  Conn.  550,  553  ;  Preston  v.  Harvey,  2  H.  &  Mun.  55  ; 
Estill  v.  Taul,  2  Yerg.  467,  471  ;  King  v.  Chase,  15  N.  H.  9  ;  jKrekeler  v.  Hitter,  62 
N.  Y.  372;  Thompson  v.  Roberts,  24  How.  Pr.  233  ;  Perkins  v.  Walker,  19  Vt.  144  ; 
Gray  v.  Pingry,  17  id.  419. }  In  New  York,  as  remarked  by  Savage,  C.  J.,  in  Wood 
v.  Jackson,  8  Wend.  24,  25,  the  decisions  have  not  been  uniform,  nor  is  it  perfectly 
clear  where  the  weight  of  authority  or  of  argument  lies.  But  in  the  later  case  of 
Lawrence  v.  Hunt,  10  id.  83,  84,  the  learned  judge,  who  delivered  the  opinion  of 
the  Court,  seemed  inclined  in  favor  of  the  conclusiveness  of  the  evidence.  See,  to 
the  same  point,  Hancock  v.  Welsh,  1  Stark.  347  ;  Whately  v.  Menheim,  2  Esp.  608 ; 
Strutt  v.  Bovingdon,  5  id.  56-59 ;  R.  v.  St.  Pancras,  Pt-ake  220  ;  Duchess  of 
Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  538  ;  Bird  v.  Randall,  3  Burr.  1353.  The  contrary 
decision  of  Vooght  v.  Winch,  2  B.  &  Aid.  662,  was  cited,  but  without  being  approved, 
by  Best,  C.  J.,  in  Stafford  v.  Clark,  1  C.  &  P.  405,  and  was  again  discussed  in  the 
same  case,  2  Bing.  377  ;  but  each  of  the  learned  judges  expressly  declined  giving  any 
opinion  on  the  point.  This  case,  however,  is  reconciled  with  other  English  cases  by 
Mr.  Smith,  on  the  ground  that  it  means  no  more  than  this,  that  where  the  party 
might  plead  the  record  by  estoppel,  but  does  not,  he  waives  its  conclusive  character. 
See  2  Smith's  Leading  Cases,  434,  444,  445.  The  learned  author,  in  the  note  here  re- 
ferred to,  has  reviewed  the  doctrine  of  estoppels  in  a  masterly  manner. 

The  judgment  of  a  court-martial,  when  offered  in  evidence  in  support  of  a  justifica- 
tion of  imprisonment,  by  reason  of  military  disobedience  and  misconduct,  is  not  re- 
garded as  conclusive  ;  for  the  special  reasons  stated  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  Wall  v. 
McNtimara,  1  T.  R.  536  ;  accord,  Hannaford  v.  Hunn,  2  C.  &  P.  148. 

1  jFor  a  good  exposition  of  the  principle,  see  Bigelow  v.  Winsor,  1  Gray  299.  | 

a  So,  if  a  deed  is  admitted  in  pleading,  proof  of  the  identity  may  still  be  required. 
Johnston  v.  Cottinghaui,  1  Armst.  Macartn.  &  Ogle  11 ;  and  see  Garrott  v.  Johnson,  11 
G.  &  J.  173. 

8  It  is  obvious  that,  to  prove  what  was  the  point  in  issue  in  a  previous  action  at 
common  law,  it  is  necessary  to  produce  the  entire  record :  Foot  ».  Glover,  4  Blackf. 
313.  And  see  Morris  v.  Keyes,  1  Hill  540  ;  Glascock  v.  Hays,  4  Dana  59. 

*  Henderson  v.  Kenuer,  1  Rich.  474. 


662  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL  WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXIX. 

declared  upon  a  promissory  note,  and  for  goods  sold,  but  upon  exe- 
cuting the  writ  of  inquiry,  after  judgment  by  default,  he  was  not 
prepared  with  evidence  on  the  count  for  goods  sold,  and  therefore 
took  his  damages  only  for  the  amount  of  the  note;  he  was  admitted, 
in  a  second  action  for  the  goods  sold,  to  prove  the  fact  by  parol,  and 
it  was  held  no  bar  to  the  second  action.6  And  upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple, if  one  wrongfully  take  another's  horse  and  sell  him,  applying 
the  money  to  his  own  use,  a  recovery  in  trespass,  in  an  action  by 
the  owner  for  the  taking,  would  be  a  bar  to  a  subsequent  action  of 
assumpsit  for  the  money  received,  or  for  the  price,  the  cause  of 
action  being  proved  to  be  the  same.6  But  where,  from  the  nature 
of  the  two  actions,  the  cause  of  action  cannot  be  the  sam6  in  both,  no 
averment  will  be  received  to  the  contrary.  Therefore,  in  a  writ  of 
right,  a  plea  in  bar  that  the  same  title  had  been  the  sole  subject  of 
litigation  in  a  former  action  of  trespass  quare  clausum  fregit,  or  in  a 
former  writ  of  entry,  between  the  same  parties,  or  others  privy  in 
estate,  was  held  to  be  a  bad  plea.7  Whether  the  judgment  in  an 
action  of  trespass,  upon  the  issue  of  liberum  tenementum,  is  admis- 
sible in  a  subsequent  action  of  ejectment  between  the  same  parties, 
is  not  perfectly  clear;  but  the  weight  of  American  authority  is  in 
favor  of  admitting  the  evidence.8 

*  Seddon  v.  Tutop,  6  T.  R.  608  ;  Hadley  v.  Green,  2  Tyrwh.  390.  See  ace.  Bridge 
v.  Gray,  14  Pick.  55 ;  Webster  v.  Lee,  5  Mass.  334  ;  Ravee  r.  Farmer,  4  T.  R.  146 ; 
Thorpe  v.  Cooper,  5  Bing.  116  ;  Phillips  v.  Berick,  16  Johns.  136.  But  if  the  jury 
have  passed  upon  the  claim,  it  is  a  bar,  though  they  may  have  disallowed  it  for  want 
of  sufficient  evidence  :  Stafford  v.  Clark,  2  Bing.  377,  382,  per  Best,  C.  J.;  Phillips  ». 
Berick,  supra.  So,  if  the  fact  constituting  the  basis  of  the  claim  was  proved,  among 
other  things,  before  an  arbitrator,  but  he  awarded  no  damages  for  it,  none  having 
been  at  that  time  expressly  claimed  :  Dunn  v.  Murray,  9  B.  &  C.  780.  So,  if  he  sues 
for  part  only  of  an  entire  and  indivisible  claim  ;  as,  if  one  labors  for  another  a  year, 
on  the  same  hiring,  and  sues  for  a  month's  wages,  it  is  a  bar  to  the  whole  :  Miller  v. 
Covert,  1  Wend.  487.  But  it  seems  that,  generally,  a  running  account  for  goods  sold 
and  delivered  does  not  constitute  an  entire  demand  :  Badger  v.  Titcomb,  15  Pick. 
415  ;  contra,  Guernsey  v.  Carver,  8  Wend.  492.  So,  if,  having  a  claim  for  a  greater 
amount  consisting  ot  several  distinct  particulars,  he  sues  in  an  inferior  Court,  and 
takes  judgment  for  a  less  amount  :  Bagot  v.  Williams,  3  B.  &  C.  235.  So,  if  ho 
obtains  an  interlocutory  judgment  for  his  whole  claim,  but,  to  avoid  delay,  takes  a 
rule  to  compute  on  one  item  only,  and  enters  a  nolle  proscqui  as  to  the  other  :  Bow- 
den  v.  Home,  7  Bing.  716. 

6  17  Pick.  13,  per  Putnam,  J.;  Young  ».   Black,   7  Cranch  565  ;   Liveimore  v. 
Herschell,  3  Pick.   33;  (Norton  v.  Doherty,  3  Gray  372;  see  Greene  v.  Clarke,  2 
Kernan  343  ;  Gilbert  v.  Thompson,  9  Cush.  848,  350;  Potter  v.  Baker,  19  N.  H.  166.  | 
Whether  parol  evidence  would  be  admissible,  in  such  case,  to  prove  that  the  damages 
awarded  in  trespass  were  given  merely  for  the  tortious  taking,  without  including  the 
value  of  the  goods,  to  which  no  evidence  had  been  oifered,  qucere  ;  and  see  Loomis  t». 
Green,  7  Greenl.  386. 

7  Arnold  r.  Arnold,  17  Pick.  4;  Bates  v.  Thompson,  ib.  14,  n.  ;  Bennett  v.  Holmes, 
1  Dev.  &  Bat.  486. 

8  Hoey  v.  Furtnan,  1  Bnrr  295.     And  see  Meredith  v.  Gilpin,  6  Price  146 ;  Kerr 
v.  Chess,  7  Watts  371  ;  Foster  v.  McDivit,  9  id.  849  ;  j  McDowell  v.  Langdon,  3  Gray 
613 ;  for  other  illustrations  involving  actions  about  land,  see  Doak  v.   Wiswell,  83 
Me.  355  ;  Small  v.  Leonard,  26  Vt.  209 ;  Morgan  v.  Barker,  ib.  602 ;  Brings  v.  Wells, 
12  Barb.  667  ;  Wood  v.  Le  Baron,  8  Cush.  471,  473;  Root  v.  Fellowes,  tf  Cush.  29  ; 
Washington  Steam  Packet  Co.  v.  Sickles,  24  How.  333  ;  White  v.  Chase,  128  Mass. 
168;  Clapp  v.  Herrick,  129  id.  292  ;  Drake  v.  Merrill,  2  Jones  L.  368;  Churchill  v. 


§§  532-533.]  EFFECT   OF  JUDGMENTS.  663 

§  533.  Same:  Former  Recovery  in  Tort.  The  effect  of  former 
recovery  has  been  very  much  discussed,  in  the  cases  where  different 
actions  in  tort  have  successively  been  brought,  in  regard  to  the  same 
chattel ;  as,  for  example,  an  action  of  trover,  brought  after  a  judg- 
ment in  trespass.  Here,  if  title  to  the  property  was  set  up  by  the 
defendant  in  the  first  action,  and  it  was  found  for  him,  it  is  clearly  a 
bar  to  a  second  action  for  the  same  chattel ; l  even  though  brought 
against  one  not  a  party  to  the  former  suit,  but  an  accomplice  in  the 
original  taking.8  So,  a  judgment  for  the  defendant  in  trover,  upon 
trial  of  the  merits,  is  a  bar  to  an  action  for  money  had  and  received, 
for  the  money  arising  from  the  sale  of  the  same  goods.8  But,  whether 
the  plaintiff,  having  recovered  judgment  in  trespass,  without  satisfac- 
tion, is  thereby  barred  from  afterwards  maintaining  trover  against 
another  person  for  the  same  goods,  is  a  point  upon  which  there  has 
been  great  diversity  of  opinion.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  said  that,  by 
the  recovery  of  judgment  in  trespass  for  the  full  value,  the  title  to 
the  property  is  vested  in  the  defendant,  the  judgment  being  a  security 
for  the  price ;  and  that  the  plaintiff  cannot  take  it  again,  and  there- 
fore cannot  recover  the  value  of  another.*  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
argued,  that  the  rule  of  transit  in  rent  judicatam  extends  no  farther 
than  to  bar  another  action  for  the  same  cause  against  the  same 
party  ; 8  that,  on  principle,  the  original  judgment  can  imply  nothing 
more  than  a  promise  by  the  defendant  to  pay  the  amount,  and  an 
agreement  by  the  plaintiff  that,  upon  payment  of  the  money  by  the 
defendant,  the  chattel  shall  be  his  own;  and  that  it  is  contrary  to 
justice  and  the  analogies  of  the  law,  to  deprive  a  man  of  his  property 
without  satisfaction,  unless  by  his  express  consent.  "  Solutio  pretii 
emptionis  loco  habetur."  The  weight  of  authority  seems  in  favor  of 
the  latter  opinion.6 

Holt,  127  Mass.  165;  Burke  v.  Miller,  4  Gray  114;  Sargent  v.  Fitzpatrick,  ib.  511; 
Buttrick  v.  Holden,  8  Cush.  233  ;  White  v.  Coatsworth,  2  Selden  137. 

For  other  illustrations  involving  actions  about  contracts,  see  Burnett  v.  Smith, 
4  Gray  50;  Staples  v.  Goodrich,  21  Barb.  317;  Warren  ».  Comings,  6  Cush.  103  ;  Sage 
v.  McAlpin,  11  id.  165;  Lehan  v.  Good,  8  id.  302  ;  Harding  v.  Hale,  2  Gray  399  ; 
Button  v.  Woodman,  9  Cush.  255;  Eastman  v.  Cooper,  15  Pick.  276.  | 

1  Putt  ».  Roster,  2  Mod.  818 ;  3  id.  1,  s.  c.  nom.  Putt  v.  llawstern  ;  see  2  Show. 
211  ;  Skin.  40,  67;  s.  c.  T.  Raym.  472. 

3  Ferrers  v.  Arden,  Cro.  El.  668  ;  s.  c.  6  Co.  7. 

»  Kitchen  v.  Campbell,  3  Wils.  304 ;  s.  c.  2  W.  Bl.  827  ;  see  ante,  §  532. 

*  Broome  v.  Wooton,  Yelv.  67 ;  Adams  v.  Bronghton,  2  Stra,  1078:  s.  c.  Andrews 
18 ;  White  v.  Philbrick,  5  Greenl.  147  ;  Rogers  v.  Moore,  1  Rice  60. 

6  Drake  v.  Mitchell,  3  East  258  ;  Campbell  v.  Phelps,  1  Pick.  70,  per  Wilde,  J. 

6  Putt  v.  Rawstern,  3  Mod.  1  ;  Jenk.  Cent.  p.  1S9  ;  1  Shew.  Touchst  227  ;  More 
v.  Watts,  12  Mod.  428;  s.  c.  1  Ld  Raym.  614  ;  Lutterell  v.  Reynell,  1  Mod.  282; 
Bro.  Abr.  tit.  Judgm.  pi.  98 ;  Morton's  Case,  Cro.  El.  30  ;  Cocke  v.  Jcnnor,  Hob.  6C  ; 
Livingston  v.  Bishop,  1  Johns.  290  ;  Rawson  ».  Turner,  4  id.  425 ;  2  Kent  Comm. 
888  ;  Curtis  v.  Groat,  6  Johns.  168  ;  Corbet  ct  al.  v.  Barnes,  W.  Jones,  377  ;  Cro.  Car. 
443 ;  s.  c.  7  Vin.  Abr.  341,  pi.  10 ;  Barb  v.  Fish,  5  West.  Law  Journ.  278.  The 
foregoing  authorities  are  cited  as  establishing  principles  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine 
of  Broome  r.  Wooton.  The  following  cases  are  direct  adjudications  to  the  contrary 
of  that  case  :  Sanderson  r.  Caldwell,  2  Aiken  195  ;  Osterhout  r.  Roberts  8  Cowen  43  ; 
Elliot  v.  Porter,  5  Dana  299.  See  also  Campbell  v.  Phelps,  1  Pick.  70,  per  Wilde,  J.; 


664  RECORDS  AND   JUDICIAL  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

§  534.    Judgment  Conclusive,  if  Issue  necessarily  Involved.     It  is 

not  necessary,  to  the  conclusiveness  of  the  former  judgment,  that 
issue  should  have  been  taken  upon  the  precise  point  which  is  contro- 
verted in  the  second  trial ;  it  is  sufficient,  if  that  point  was  essential 
to  the  finding  of  the  former  verdict.  Thus,  where  the  parish  of 
Islington  was  indicted  and  convicted  for  not  repairing  a  certain  high- 
way, and  afterwards  the  parish  of  St.  Pancras  was  indicted  for  not 
repairing  the  same  highway,  on  the  ground  that  the  line  dividing  the 
two  parishes  ran  along  the  middle  of  the  road ;  it  was  held,  that  the 
former  record  was  admissible  and  conclusive  evidence  for  the  defend- 
ants in  the  latter  case,  to  show  that  the  road  was  wholly  in  Islington ; 
for  the  jury  must  have  found  that  it  was  so,  in  order  to  find  a  verdict 
against  the  defendants.1 

§  535.  "Who  are  Parties.  We  have  already  observed,  in  general, 
that  parties  in  the  larger  legal  sense  are  all  persons  having  a  right 
to  control  the  proceedings,  to  make  defence,  to  adduce  and  cross- 
examine  witnesses,  and  to  appeal  from  the  decision,  if  any  appeal 
lies.  Upon  this  ground,  the  lessor  of  the  plaintiff  in  ejectment,  and 
the  tenant,  are  the  real  parties  to  the  suit,  and  are  concluded  in  any 
future  action  in  their  own  names,  by  the  judgment  in  that  suit.1  So, 
if  there  be  a  trial  between  B.'s  lessee  and  E.,  who  recovers  judgment ; 
and  afterwards  another  trial  of  title  to  the  same  lands,  between  E.'s 
lessee  and  B.,  the  former  verdict  and  judgment  will  be  admissible  in 
evidence  in  favor  of  E.'s  lessee  against  B.;  for  the  real  parties  in 
both  cases  were  B.  and  E.a 

Claxton  v.  Swift,  2  Show.  441,  494  ;  Jones  ».  McNeil,  2  Bail.  466;  Cooper  v.  Shep- 
herd, 2  M.  G.  &  S.  266.  The  just  deduction  from  all  the  authorities,  as  well  as  the 
right  conclusion  upon  principle,  seems  to  be  this,  —  that  the  judgment  in  trespass  or 
trover  will  not  transfer  the  title  of  the  goods  to  the  defendant,  although  it  is  pleadable 
in  bar  of  any  action  afterwards  brought  by  the  same  plaintiff,  or  those  in  privity  with 
him,  against  the  same  defendant,  or  those  in  privity  with  him.  See  3  Am.  Law  Mag. 
pp.  49-57.  And  as  to  the  original  parties,  it  seems  a  just  rule,  applicable  to  all  per- 
sonal actions,  that  wherever  two  or  more  are  liable  jointly  and  not  severally,  a  judg- 
ment against  one,  though  without  satisfaction,  is  a  bar  to  another  action  against  any 
of  the  others  for  the  same  cause ;  but  it  is  not  a  bar  to  an  action  against  a  stranger. 
As  far  as  an  action  in  the  form  of  tort  can  be  said  to  be  exclusively  joint  in  its  nature, 
this  rule  may  govern  it,  but  no  farther.  This  doctrine,  as  applicable  to  joint  contracts, 
has  been  recently  discussed  in  England,  in  the  case  of  King  v.  Hoare,  13  M.  &  W. 
494,  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  judgment  against  one  alone  was  a  bar  to  a  subsequent 
action  against  the  other. 

l  Bex  v.  St.  Pancras,  Peake  219;  2  Sannd.  159,  n.  10,  by  Williams.  And  see 
Andrews  r.  Brown,  3  Cush.  130;  j Butler  v.  Glass  Co.,  126  Mass.  512.  (  So,  where, 
upon  a  complaint  for  flowing  the  plaintiff's  lands,  under  a  particular  statute,  damages 
wore  awarded  for  the  past,  and  a  prospective  assessment  of  damages  made  for  the  future, 
flowage  ;  upon  a  subsequent  application  for  an  increase  of  the  assessment,  the  defend- 
ant was  precluded  from  setting  np  a  right  in  himself  to  flow  the  land,  for  the  right 
must  necessarily  have  been  determined  in  the  previous  proceedings  :  Adams  v.  Pearson, 
7  Pick.  341. 

1  Doe  v.  Hnddart,  2  Cr.  M.  &  R.  816,  322  ;  Doe  v.  Preece,  1  Tyrw.  410  ;  Aslin  v. 
Parkin,  2  Burr.  665  ;  Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  El.  3,  19  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  232  ;  Graves 
9.  Joice,  5  Cowen  261,  and  cases  there  cited. 

3  Bull.  N.  P.  232;  Calhoun  v.  Dunning,  4  Dall.  120.  So,  a  judgment  in  trespass 
•gainst  one  who  justifies  as  the  servant  of  J.  S.  is  evidence  against  another  defendant 


§§  534-537.]  EFFECT   OF   JUDGMENTS.  665 

§  536.  Who  are  Privies.  The  case  of  privies,  which  has  already 
been  mentioned,  is  governed  by  principles  similar  to  those  which 
have  been  stated  in  regard  to  admissions  ; 1  the  general  doctrine  being 
this,  that  the  person  who  represents  another,  and  the  person  who  is 
represented,  have  a  legal  identity ;  so  that  whatever  binds  the  one, 
in  relation  to  the  subject  of  their  common  interest,  binds  the  other 
also.  Thus,  a  verdict  and  judgment  for  or  against  the  ancestor  bind 
the  heir.2  So,  if  several  successive  remainders  are  limited  in  the 
same  deed,  a  judgment  for  one  remainder-man  is  evidence  for  the 
next  in  succession.*  But  a  judgment,  to  which  a  tenant  for  life  was 
a  party,  is  not  evidence  for  or  against  the  reversioner,  unless  he  came 
into  the  suit  upon  aid  prayer.4  So,  an  assignee  is  bound  by  a  judg- 
ment against  the  assignor,  prior  to  the  assignment.5  There  is  the 
like  privity  between  the  ancestor  and  all  claiming  under  him,  not  only 
as  heir,  but  as  tenant  in  dower,  tenant  by  the  curtesy,  legatee,  devisee, 
etc.8  A  judgment  of  ouster,  in  a  quo  warranto,  against  the  incumbent 
of  an  office,  is  conclusive  evidence  against  those  who  derive  their  title 
to  office  under  him.7  Where  one  sued  for  diverting  water  from  his 
works,  and  had  judgment ;  and  afterwards  he  ,and  another  sued  the 
same  defendants  for  a  similar  injury  ;  the  former  judgment  was  held 
admissible  in  evidence  for  the  plaintiffs,  being  prima  facie  evidence 
of  their  privity  in  estate  with  the  plaintiff  in  the  former  action.8  The 
same  rule  applies  to  all  grantees,  they  being  in  like  manner  bound  by 
a  judgment  concerning  the  same  land,  recovered  by  or  against  their 
grantor,  prior  to  the  conveyance.9 

§  537.  Judgments  in  Criminal  Cases.  Upon  the  foregoing  prin- 
ciples, it  is  obvious  that,  as  a  general  rule,  a  verdict  and  judgment  in 
a  criminal  case,  though  admissible  to  establish  the  fact  of  the  mere 
rendition  of  the  judgment,  cannot  be  given  in  evidence  in  a  civil 
action,  to  establish  the  facts  on  which  it  was  rendered.1  If  the  de- 
fendant was  convicted,  it  may  have  been  upon  the  evidence  of  the 

in  another  action,  it  appearing  that  he  also  acted  by  the  command  of  J.  S.,  who  was 
considered  the  real  party  in  both  cases  :  Kinnersly  v.  Orpe,  2  Doug.  517  ;  1  id.  56. 

l  Supra,  §§  180,  189,  523. 

a  Locke  v.  Norborne,  3  Mod.  141. 

*  Bull.  N.  P.  232;  Pyke  v.  Crouch,  1  Ld.  Raym.  730. 

*  Bull.  N.  P.  232. 

6  Adams  v.  Barnes,  17  Mass.  365. 

*  Locke  v.  Norborne,  3  Mod.  141 ;  Ontram  v.  Morewood,  3  East  353. 

7  R.  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  York,  5  T.  R.  66,  72,  76 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  231 ;  R,  v.  Hebden, 
2  Stra.  1109,  n.  1. 

8  Blakemore  t>.  Glamorganshire  Canal  Co.,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  133. 

9  Foster  v.  E.  of  Derby,  1  Ad.  &  El.  787,  per  Littledale,  J. 

1  Mead  v.  Boston,  3  Cush.  404.  jBut  a  judgment  is  admissible  and  conclusive  evi- 
dence in  another  criminal  case  against  the  same  defendant,  as  to  any  facts  decided  in 
the  judgment :  Coin.  v.  Evans,  101  Mass.  25;  see  Dennis's  Case,  110  id.  18.  The 
record  of  the  conviction  of  a  thief,  on  his  plea  of  guilty  to  an  indictment  against  him 
alone  for  stealing  certain  property,  is  not  admissible  in  evidence  to  prove  the  theft,  on 
the  trial  of  a  receiver  of  that  property,  upon  an  indictment  against  him  alone,  which 
indictment  does  not  aver  that  the  thief  has  beeu  convicted :  Com.  ».  Elisha,  3  Gray 
460. 1 


666  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

very  plaintiff  in  the  civil  action  ;  and  if  he  was  acquitted,  it  may  have 
been  by  collusion  with  the  prosecutor.  But  beside  this,  and  upon 
more  general  grounds,  there  is  no  mutuality ;  the  parties  are  not  the 
same  ;  neither  are  the  rules  of  decision  and  the  course  of  proceeding 
the  same.  The  defendant  could  not  avail  himself,  in  the  criminal 
trial,  of  any  admissions  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  civil  action  ;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  jury  in  the  civil  action  must  decide  upon  the  mere 
preponderance  of  evidence,  whereas,  in  order  to  a  criminal  conviction, 
they  must  be  satisfied  of  the  party's  guilt,  beyond  any  reasonable 
doubt.  The  same  principles  render  a  judgment  in  a  civil  action  inad- 
missible evidence  in  a  criminal  prosecution.2 

§  538.  Judgments  as  Facts.  But,  as  we  have  before  remarked,1 
the  verdict  and  judgment  in  any  case  are  always  admissible  to  prove 
the  fact,  that  the  judgment  was  rendered,  or  the  verdict  given;  for 
there  is  a  material  difference  between  proving  the  existence  of  the 
record  and  its  tenor,  and  using  the  record  as  the  medium  of  proof  of 
the  matters  of  fact  recited  in  it.  In  the  former  case,  the  record  can 
never  be  considered  as  res  inter  alias  acta;  the  judgment  being  a  pub- 
lic transaction,  rendered  by  public  authority,  and  being  presumed  to 
be  faithfully  recorded.  It  is  therefore  the  only  proper  legal  evidence 
of  itself,  and  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  fact  of  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment,  and  of  all  the  legal  consequences  resulting  from  that  fact, 
whoever  may  be  the  parties  to  the  suit  in  which  it  is  offered  in  evi- 
dence. Thus,  if  one  indicted  for  an  assault  and  battery  lias  been 
acquitted,  and  sues  the  prosecutor  for  malicious  prosecution,  the 
record  of  acquittal  is  evidence  for  the  plaintiff,  to  establish  that  fact, 
notwithstanding  the  parties  are  not  the  same.  But  if  he  were  con- 
victed of  the  offence,  and  then  is  sued  in  trespass  for  the  assault,  the 
record  in  the  former  case  would  not  be  evidence  to  establish  the  fact 
of  the  assault ;  for,  as  to  the  matters  involved  in  the  issue,  it  is  res 
inter  alios  acta. 

§  539.  The  distinction  between  the  admissibility  of  a  judgment  as 
a  fact,  and  as  evidence  of  ulterior  facts,  may  be  further  illustrated  by 
the  instances  in  which  it  has  been  recognized.  Thus,  a  judgment 
against  the  sheriff  for  the  misconduct  of  his  deputy  is  evidence 

2  ]  Bull.  N.  P.  233  ;  R.  v.  Boston,  4  East  572  ;  Jones  v.  White,  1  Stra.  68,  per 
Pratt,  J.  Some  of  the  older  authorities  have  laid  much  stress  upon  the  question, 
whether  the  plaintiff  in  the  civil  action  was  or  was  not  a  witness  on  the  indictment ; 
but  this  distinction  was  repudiated  by  Parke,  B.,  in  Blakemore  v.  Glamorganshire 
Canal  Co.,  2  C.  M.  &  B.  139.  A  record  of  judgment  in  a  criminal  case,  upon  a  plea 
of  guilty,  is  admissible  in  a  civil  action  against  the  party,  as  a  solemn  judicial  confes- 
sion of  the  fact  ;  and,  according  to  some  authorities,  it  is  conclusive.  But  its  conclu- 
siveness  has  since  been  doubted ;  for  the  plea  may  have  been  made  to  avoid  expense. 
See  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  523,  n.  4 ;  2  Phil.  Evid.  25;  Bradley  v.  Bradley,  2  Fairf.  867; 
K.  v.  Morean,  12  Jur.  626  ;  11  Q.  B.  1028 ;  Clark  v.  Irvin,  9  Ham.  131.  But  the  plea 
of  nolo  conteiidere  is  an  admission  for  that  trial  only,  and  is  not  admissible  in  a  subse- 
quent action :  Com.  r.  Horton,  9  Pick.  206  ;  Guild  v.  Lee,  3  Law  Reporter  p.  433  ; 
lupra,  §§  179,  216. 

»  Supra,  §  527. 


§§  537-540.]  EFFECT   OF   JUDGMENTS.  667 

against  the  latter  of  the  fact,  that  the  sheriff  has  been  compelled 
to  pay  the  amount  awarded,  and  for  the  cause  alleged ;  but  it  is  not 
evidence  of  the  fact  upon  which  it  was  founded,  namely,  the  miscon- 
duct of  the  deputy,  unless  he  was  notified  of  the  suit  and  required  to 
defend  it.1  So  it  is  in  other  cases,  where  the  officer  or  party  has  a 
remedy  over.2  So,  where  the  record  is  matter  of  inducement,  or 
necessarily  introductory  to  other  evidence ;  as,  in  an  action  against 
the  sheriff  for  neglect,  in  regard  to  an  execution ; 8  or  to  show  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  upon  a  former  trial ; 4  or  where  the  judgment 
constitutes  one  of  the  muniments  of  the  party's  title  to  an  estate,  as 
where  a  deed  was  made  under  a  decree  in  Chancery,8  or  a  sale  was 
made  by  a  sheriff,  upon  an  execution.6  So,  where  a  party  has  con- 
current remedies  against  several,  and  has  obtained  satisfaction  upon 
a  judgment  against  one,  it  is  evidence  for  the  others.7  So,  if  one  be 
sued  alone,  upon  a  joint  note  by  two,  it  has  been  held,  that  the  judg- 
ment against  him  may  be  shown  by  the  defendants,  in  bar  of  a  second 
suit  against  both,  for  the  same  cause,  to  prove  that,  as  to  the  former 
defendant,  the  note  is  extinct.8  So  a  judgment  inter  alias  is  admissi- 
ble, to  show  the  character  in  which  the  possessor  holds  his  lands.9 

§  539  a.  Judgment  against  Joint  and  Several  Contractors.1  But 
where  the  contract  is  several  as  well  as  joint,  it  seems  that  the  judg- 
ment in  an  action  against  one  is  no  bar  to  a  subsequent  action  against 
all ;  nor  is  the  judgment  against  all,  jointly,  a  bar  to  a  subsequent 
action  against  one  alone.  For  when  a  party  enters  into  a  joint  and 
several  obligation,  he  in  effect  agrees  that  he  will  be  liable  to  a  joint 
action,  and  to  a  several  action  for  the  debt.  In  either  case,  therefore, 
the  bar  of  a  former  judgment  would  not  seem  to  apply;  for,  in  a 
legal  sense,  it  was  not  a  judgment  between  the  same  parties,  nor 
upon  the  same  contract.  The  contract,  it  is  said,  does  not  merely 
give  the  obligee  an  election  of  the  one  remedy  or  the  other,  but 
entitles  him  at  once  to  both,  though  he  can  have  but  one  satisfaction.8 

§  540.  Foreign  Judgments.  In  regard  to  foreign  judgments,  they 
are  usually  considered  in  two  general  aspects :  first,  as  to  judgments 

1  Tyler  v.  Ulmer,  12  Mass.  166,  per  Parker,  C.  J. 

2  Kip  v.  Brigham,  6  Johns.  158;  7  id.  168  ;  Griffin  v.  Brown,  2  Pick.  304;  Weld 
».  Nichols,  17  id.  538  ;  Head  v.  McDonald,  7  Monr.  203. 

8  Adams  v.  Balch,  5  Greenl.  188. 

*  Clarges  v.  Sherwin,  12  Mod.  343  ;  Foster  v.  Shaw,  7  S.  &  K.  156. 

6  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wheat.  213. 

6  Witmer  v.  Schlatter,  2  Rawle  359  ;  Jackson  v.  Wood,  3  Wend.  27,  34  •  Fowler 
v.  Savage,  3  Conn.  90,  96. 

7  Farwell  v.  Billiard,  3  N.  H.  318. 

8  Ward  v.  Johnson,  13  Mass.  148.     See  also  Lechmere  v.  Fletcher,  1  C.  &  M.  623, 
634,  635,  per  Bayley,  B. 

9  Davis  v.  Lowndes,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  607,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.      See  further,  supra, 
§  527  a;  Wells  v.  Compton,  3  Hob.  La.  171. 

1  ("This  section  seems  properly  to  follow  §  536.] 

2  U.  S.  v.  Cushinan,   2  Sumn.   426,  437-441,  per  Story,  J.      See  also  Sheehy 
v.  Mandeville,  6  Cranch  253,  265  ;  Lechmere  v.  Fletcher,  1  C.  &  M.  623,  634.  635, 
per  Bayley,  B. ;  Kirkpatrick  v.  Stingley,  2  Carter  269. 


668  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXIX. 

in  rem  ;  and,  secondly,  as  to  judgments  in  personam.  The  latter  are 
again  considered  under  several  heads:  first,  where  the  judgment  is 
set  up  by  way  of  defence  to  a  suit  in  a  foreign  tribunal ;  secondly, 
where  it  is  sought  to  be  enforced  in  a  foreign  tribunal  against  the 
original  defendant,  or  his  property ;  and,  thirdly,  where  the  judg- 
ment is  either  between  subjects  or  between  foreigners,  or  between 
foreigners  and  subjects.1  But,  in  order  to  found  a  proper  ground  of 
recognition  of  a  foreign  judgment,  under  whichsoever  of  these  aspects 
it  may  come  to  be  considered,  it  is  indispensable  to  establish,  that 
the  Court  which  pronounced  it  had  a  lawful  jurisdiction  over  the 
cause,  over  the  thing,  and  over  the  parties.  If  the  jurisdiction  fails 
as  to  either,  it  is  treated  as  a  mere  nullity,  having  no  obligation,  and 
entitled  to  no  respect  beyond  the  domestic  tribunals.2 

§  541.  Foreign  Judgments  in  Rem.  As  to  foreign  judgments  in 
rem,  if  the  matter  in  controversy  is  land,  or  other  immovable  prop- 
erty, the  judgment  pronounced  in  the  forum  rei  sitce  is  held  to  be  of 
universal  obligation,  as  to  all  the  matters  of  right  and  title  which 
it  professes  to  decide  in  relation  thereto.1  "The  same  principle," 
observes  Mr.  Justice  Story,2  "  is  applied  to  all  other  cases  of  proceed- 
ings in  rem,  where  the  subject  is  movable  property,  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Court  pronouncing  the  judgment.8  Whatever  the  Court 
settles  as  to  the  right  or  title,  or  whatever  disposition  it  makes  of 
the  property  by  sale,  revendication,  transfer,  or  other  act,  will  be 
held  valid  in  every  other  country,  where  the  same  question  comes 
directly  or  indirectly  in  judgment  before  any  other  foreign  tribunal. 
This  is  very  familiarly  known  in  the  cases  of  proceedings  in  rem  in 
foreign  Courts  of  admiralty,  whether  they  are  causes  of  prize,  or  of 
bottomry,  or  of  salvage,  or  of  forfeiture,  or  of  any  of  the  like  nature, 
over  which  such  Courts  have  a  rightful  jurisdiction,  founded  on  the 
actual  or  constructive  possession  of  the  subject-matter.4  The  same 

1  In  what  follows  on  the  subject  of  foreign  judgments,  I  have  simply  transcribed 
and  abridged  what  has  recently  been  written  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  in  his  learned  Com- 
mentaries on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  ch.  15  (2d  ed. ). 

2  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §§  584,  586  ;  Rose  v.  Himely,  4  Cranch  269,  270,  per  Mar- 
shall, C.   J.;  Smith  v.   Knowlton,   11    N.    H.  191;    Rangely   v.   Webster,   ib.  299; 
{Thompson  v.  Whitman,  18  Wall.   457  ;  Guthrie  v.  Lowry,  84  Pa.  St.  533.      There 
seems  to  be  no  such  presumption  in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction  of  foreign  Courts,  or  of  in- 
ferior domestic  tribunals,  according  to  the  maxim  "  omnia  prsesumuntur  rite  esse  aeta," 
as  that  which  exists  in  favor  of  the  superior  Courts,  in  a  State  or  country,  in  their  own 
tribunals :  Graham  v.  Whitely,   2   Butcher  254  ;  Goulding  v.  Clark,  34  N.  H.  148. 
But  where  the  question  of  jurisdiction  is  established,  the  same  favorable  presumption, 
should  be  applied  to  all  judgments:  State  ».  Hinchman,  27  Pa.  St.  479.} 

l  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §§  532,  645,  551,  591. 

«  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  592.     See  also  id.  §  597. 

8  See  Kames  on  Equity,  b.  8,  ch.  8,  §  4. 

4  Croudsou  ».  Leonard,  4  Cranch  433 ;  Williams  v.  Armroyd,  7  id.  423 ;  Rose  v. 
Himely,  4  id.  241;  Hudson  v.  Guestier,  ib.  293;  The  Mary,  9  id.  126,  142-146; 
1  Stark.  Evid.  pp.  246-248  ;  Marshall  on  Insur.  b.  1,  ch.  9,  §  6,  pp.  412,  435  ;  Grant 
v.  McLacblin,  4  Johns.  34;  Peters  v.  Warren  Ins.  Co.,  3  Sumner,  389;  131ad  v.  J'.am- 
field,  3  Swanst.  604,  605 ;  Bradstreet  v.  Neptune  Insur.  Co.,  3  Sumner  600  ;  Mngoun 
v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Story  167.  The  different  degrees  of  credit  given  to  foreign  sentences  of 


§§  540-543.]  EFFECT   OF   JUDGMENTS.  6G9 

rule  is  applied  to  other  Courts  proceeding  in  rem,  such  as  the  Court 
of  Exchequer  in  England,  and  to  other  Courts  exercising  a  like  juris- 
diction in  rem  upon  seizures.6  And  in  cases  of  this  sort  it  is  wholly 
immaterial  whether  the  judgment  be  of  acquittal  or  of  condemnation. 
In  both  cases  it  is  equally  conclusive.6  But  the  doctrine,  however, 
is  always  to  be  understood  with  this  limitation,  that  the  judgment 
has  been  obtained  bona  fide  and  without  fraud ;  for  if  fraud  has  inter- 
vened, it  will  doubtless  avoid  the  force  and  validity  of  the  sentence.7 
So  it  must  appear  that  there  have  been  regular  proceedings  to  found 
the  judgment  or  decree ;  and  that  the  parties  in  interest  in  rem  have 
had  notice,  or  an  opportunity,  to  appear  and  defend  their  interests, 
either  personally,  or  by  their  proper  representatives,  before  it  was 
pronounced ;  for  the  common  justice  of  all  nations  requires  that  no 
condemnation  shall  be  pronounced,  before  the  party  has  an  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard." 8 

§  542.  Judgments  in  Garnishment  or  Trustee  Process.  Proceedings 
also  by  creditors  against  the  personal  property  of  their  debtor,  in  the 
hands  of  third  persons,  or  against  debts  due  to  him  by  such  third 
persons  (commonly  called  the  process  of  foreign  attachment,  or  gar- 
nishment, or  trustee  process),  are  treated  as  in  some  sense  proceed- 
ings in  rem,  and  are  deemed  entitled  to  the  same  consideration.1  But 
in  this  last  class  of  cases  we  are  especially  to  bear  in  mind,  that,  to 
make  any  judgment  effectual,  the  Court  must  possess  and  exercise  a 
rightful  jurisdiction  over  the  res,  and  also  over  the  person,  at  least 
so  far  as  the  res  is  concerned ;  otherwise  it  will  be  disregarded.  And 
if  the  jurisdiction  over  the  res  be  well  founded,  but  not  over  the  per- 
son, except  as  to  the  res,  the  judgment  will  not  be  either  conclusive 
or  binding  upon  the  party  in  personam,  although  it  may  be  in  rem* 

§  543.    Conclusiveness  of  Foreign  Judgments  in  Rem.     In  all  these 

condemnation  in  prize  causes,  by  the  American  State  Courts,  are  stated  in  4  Cowen 
520,  n.  3  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  232  (6th  ed.),  notes  by  Metcalf.  See  also  2  Kent  Coinm. 
120,  121.  If  a  foreign  sentence  of  condemnation  as  prize  is  manifestly  erroneous,  as  if 
it  professes  to  be  made  on  particular  grounds,  which  are  set  forth,  but  which  plainly 
do  not  warrant  the  decree  :  Calvert  v.  Bovill,  7  T.  R.  523  ;  Pollard  ».  Bell,  8  T.  R. 
444  ;  or,  on  grounds  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nations  :  3  B.  &  P.  215,  per  Ld.Alvauley, 
C.  J.;  or.  if  there  be  any  ambiguity  as  to  what  was  the  ground  of  condemnation,  it  is 
not  conclusive :  Dalgleish  t>.  Hodgson,  7  Bing.  495,  504. 

6  Ibid.  ;  1  Stark  on  Evid.  pp.  228-232,  240-248 ;  Gelston  v.  Hoyt,  3  Wheaton 
246  ;  Williams  v.  Armroyd,  7  Cranch  423. 

«  Ibid. 

*  Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case,  11  State  Trials  261,  262  ;  s.  c.  20  How.  St.  Tr.  355, 
638  ;  Bradstreet  v.  Ins.  Co.,  8  Sumner  600  ;  Magoun  v.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Story  157.  If  the 
foreign  Court  is  constituted  by  persons  interested  in  the  matter  iu  dispute,  the  judg- 
ment is  not  binding:  Price  v.  Dewhurst,  8  Sim.  279. 

8  Sawyer  v.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Mass.  291 ;  Bradstreet  ».  Ins.  Co.,  8  Sumner  600  ;  Magoun 
p.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Story  157. 

i  See  cases  cited  in  4  Cowen  520,  521,  n.  ;  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  549 ;  Holmes  v. 
Remsen,  20  Johns.  229;  Hull ».  Blake,  13  Mass.  153;  McDaniel  ».  Hughes,  8  East 
367  ;  Phillips  v.  Hunter,  2  H.  BL  402,  410. 

a  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  592  a.  See  also  id.  §  549  andn. ;  Bissell  v.  Briggs,  9  Mass, 
468 ;  3  Burge  Comm,  on  Col.  &  For.  Law,  pt.  2,  ch.  24,  pp.  1014-1019. 


670  EECOEDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

cases  the  same  principle  prevails,  that  the  judgment  acting  in  rem 
shall  be  held  conclusive  upon  the  title  and  transfer  and  disposition 
of  the  property  itself,  in  whatever  place  the  same  property  may  after- 
wards be  found,  and  by  whomsoever  the  latter  may  be  questioned ; 
and  whether  it  be  directly  or  incidentally  brought  in  question.  But 
it  is  not  so  universally  settled  that  the  judgment  is  conclusive  of  all 
points  which  are  incidentally  disposed  of  by  the  judgment,  or  of  the 
facts  or  allegations  upon  which  it  professes  to  be  founded.  In  this 
respect,  different  rules  are  adopted  by  different  States,  both  in  Europe 
and  in  America.  In  England,  such  judgments  are  held  conclusive,  not 
only  in  rem,  but  also  as  to  all  the  points  and  facts  which  they  profess- 
edly or  incidentally  decide.1  In  some  of  the  American  States  the 
same  doctrine  prevails.  While  in  other  American  States  the  judg- 
ments are  held  conclusive  only  in  rem,  and  may  be  controverted  as 
to  all  the  incidental  grounds  and  facts  on  which  they  profess  to  be 
founded.2 

§  544.  Foreign  Judgments  affecting  Personal  Status.  A  similar 
doctrine  has  been  contended  for,  and  in  many  cases  successfully, 
in  favor  of  sentences  which  touch  the  general  capacity  of  persons, 
and  those  which  concern  marriage  and  divorce.  Foreign  jurists 
strongly  contend  that  the  decree  of  a  foreign  Court,  declaring  the 
state  (status)  of  a  person,  and  placing  him,  as  an  idiot,  or  a  minor, 
or  a  prodigal,  under  guardianship,  ought  to  be  deemed  of  universal 
authority  and  obligation.  So  it  doubtless  would  be  deemed,  in  regard 
to  all  acts  done  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  sovereign  whose  tribu- 
nals pronounced  the  sentence.  But  in  the  United  States  the  rights 
and  powers  of  guardians  are  considered  as  strictly  local ;  and  no 
guardian  is  admitted  to  have  any  right  to  receive  the  profits  or  to 
assume  the  possession  of  the  real  estate,  or  to  control  the  person  of 
his  ward,  or  to  maintain  any  action  for  the  personalty,  out  of  the  States, 
under  whose  authority  he  was  appointed,  without  having  received  a 
due  appointment  from  the  proper  authority  of  the  State,  within  which 
the  property  is  situated,  or  the  act  is  to  be  done,  or  to  whose  tribunals 
resort  is  to  be  had.  The  same  rule  is  also  applied  to  the  case  of  execu- 
tors and  administrators.1 

1  In  Blad  v.  Bamfield,  decided  by  Lord  Nottingham,  and  reported  in  3  Swanst.  604, 
a  perpetual  injunction  was  awarded  to  restrain  certain  suits  of  trespass  and  trover  for 
seizing  the  goods  of  the  defendant  (Bamfield)  for  trading  in  Iceland,  contrary  to  certain 
jirivileges  granted  to  the  plaintiff  and  others  ;  the  property  was  seized  and  condemned 
in  the  Danish  Courts  ;  Lord  Nottingham  held  the  sentence  conclusive  against  the  suits, 
and  awarded  the  injunction  accordingly. 

a  Story Confl.  Laws,  §  593.  See  4  Cowen  522,  n.,  and  cases  there  cited;  Vanden- 
heuvel  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Cain.  Gas.  217  ;  2  Johns.  Cas.  451,  481  ;  Robinson  v.  Jones, 
8  Mass.  638  ;  Maley  v.  Shattuck,  SCranch  488;  2  Kent  Comm.  Lect.  37,  pp.  120,  121 
(4th  ed.),  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Tarleton  v.  Tarleton,  4  M.  &  Selw.  20;  Peters  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  3  Sumn.  889;  Gelston  ».  Hoyt,  8  Wheat.  246. 

1  Story,  Confl.  Laws,  §§  499,  504,  694  ;  Morrell  v.  Dickey,  1  Johns.  Ch.  153  ;  Kraft 
r.  Wickey,  4  G.  &  J.  832 ;  Dixon  v.  Ramsay,  3  Cranch  319.  See,  as  to  foreign  ex- 
ecutors and  administrators,  Story  Cuiifl.  Laws,  §§  513-523.  Supra  §  525  and 


§§  543-546.]  EFFECT   OF  JUDGMENTS.  671 

§  545.  Iii  regard  to  marriages,  the  general  principle  is,  that  between 
persons  sui  juris,  marriage  is  to  be  decided  by  the  law  of  the  place 
where  it  is  celebrated.  If  valid  there,  it  is  valid  everywhere.  It  has 
a  legal  ubiquity  of  obligation.  If  invalid  there,  it  is  invalid  every- 
where. The  most  prominent,  if  not  the  only  known,  exceptions  to 
this  rule,  are  marriages  involving  polygamy  and  incest ;  those  pro- 
hibited by  the  public  law  of  a  country  from  motives  of  policy ;  and 
those  celebrated  in  foreign  countries  by  subjects  entitling  themselves, 
under  special  circumstances,  to  the  benefit  of  the  laws  of  their  own 
country.1  As  to  sentences  confirming  marriages,  some  English  jurists 
seem  disposed  to  concur  with  those  of  Scotland  and  America,  in  giving 
to  them  the  same  conclusiveness,  force,  and  effect.  If  it  were  not  so, 
as  Lord  Hardwicke  observed,  the  rights  of  mankind  would  be  very 
precarious.  But  others,  conceding  that  a  judgment  of  a  third  country, 
on  the  validity  of  a  marriage  not  within  its  territories,  nor  had  between 
subjects  of  that  country,  would  be  entitled  to  credit  and  attention,  deny 
that  it  would  be  universally  binding.2  In  the  United  States,  how- 
ever, as  well  as  in  Scotland,  it  is  firmly  held  that  a  sentence  of  divorce, 
obtained  bona  fide  and  without  fraud,  pronounced  between  parties 
actually  domiciled  in  the  country,  whether  natives  or  foreigners,  by  a 
competent  tribunal,  having  jurisdiction  over  the  case,  is  valid,  and 
ought  to  be  everywhere  held  a  complete  dissolution  of  the  marriage, 
in  whatever  country  it  may  have  been  originally  celebrated.8 

§  546.  Foreign  Judgments  in  Fersonam.  "In  the  next  place,  as  to 
judgments  in  personam  which  are  sought  to  be  enforced  by  a  suit  in  a 
foreign  tribunal.  There  has  certainly  been  no  inconsiderable  fluctua- 
tion of  opinion  in  the  English  Courts  upon  this  subject.  It  is  admitted 
on  all  sides,  that,  in  such  cases,  the  foreign  judgments  are  prima  facie 
evidence  to  sustain  the  action,  and  are  to  be  deemed  right  until  the 
contrary  is  established ; 1  and,  of  course,  they  may  be  avoided,  if  they 
are  founded  in  fraud,  or  are  pronounced  by  a  Court  not  having  any 
competent  jurisdiction  over  the  cause.2  But  the  question  is,  whether 

1  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §§  80,  81,  113.     See  post,  VoL  II.  (7th  ed.)  §§  460-464,  tit 
Marriage. 

2  Roach  v.  Gai-van,  1  Ves.  157 ;  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §§  595,  596 ;  Sinclair  v.  Sin- 
clair,  1  Hagg.  Consist.  297  ;  Scrimshire  v.  Scrimshire,  2  id.  395,  410. 

8  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  597 ;  see  also  the  lucid  judgment  delivered  by  Gibson,  C.  J., 
in  Dorsey  v.  Dorsey,  7  Watts  350.  The  whole  subject  of  foreign  divorces  has  received 
a  masterly  discussion  by  Mr.  Justice  Story,  in  his  Commentaries  on  the  Conflict  of 
Laws,  c.  7,  §§  200-230  b. 

1  See  Walker  v.  Witter,  1  Doug.  1,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Arnott  v.  Redfern,  3  Bing. 
853  ;  Sinclair  v.  Fraser,  cited  1  Doug.  4,  5,  n. ;  Houlditch  v.  Donegal,  2  Cl.  &  F.  479  ; 
8.  c.  8  Bligh  301  ;  Don  o.  Lippman,  5  Cl.  &  F.  1,  19,  20  ;  Price  v.  Dewhurst,  8  Sim. 
279  ;  Alivon  v.  Furnival,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  277  ;  Hall  v.  Odber,  11  East  118  ;  Ripple  v. 
Ripple,  1  Rawle  386. 

2  See  Bowles  v.  Orr,  1  Younge  &  ColL  464  ;  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §§  544-550  ;  Fer- 
guson v.  Mahon,  3  Perry  &  Dav.  143  ;  8.  c.  11  Ad.  &  El.   179  ;  Price  v.  Dewhurst, 
8  Simons  279,  302  :  Don  v.  Lippman,  5  Cl.  &F.  1, 19-21  ;  Bank  of  Australasia  v.  Nias, 
15  Jur.  967.     So,  if  the  defendant  was  never  served  with  process  :  ib.     And  see  Hen- 
derson v.  Henderson,  6  Q.  B.  288. 


672  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WHITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

they  are  not  deemed  conclusive ;  or  whether  the  defendant  is  at  liberty 
to  go  at  large  into  the  original  merits,  to  show  that  the  judgment  ought 
to  have  been  different  upon  the  merits,  although  obtained  bona  fide. 
If  the  latter  course  be  the  correct  one,  then  a  still  more  embarrassing 
consideration  is,  to  what  extent,  and  in  what  manner,  the  original 
merits  can  be  properly  inquired  into." 8  But  though  there  remains  no 
inconsiderable  diversity  of  opinion  among  the  learned  judges  of  the 
different  tribunals,  yet  the  present  inclination  of  the  English  Courts 
seems  to  be,  to  sustain  the  conclusiveness  of  foreign  judgments.4 

§  547.  "  The  general  doctrine  maintained  in  the  American  Courts, 
in  relation  to  foreign  judgments  in  personam,  certainly  is,  that  they 
are  prima  facie  evidence ;  but  that  they  are  impeachable.  '  But  how  far, 
and  to  what  extent,  this  doctrine  is  to  be  carried,  does  not  seem  to  be 
definitely  settled.  It  has  been  declared  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court,  and  its  power  over  the  parties  and  the  things  in  controversy, 
may  be  inquired  into ;  and  that  the  judgment  may  be  impeached  for 
fraud.  Beyond  this,  no  definite  lines  have  as  yet  been  drawn." l 

§  548.  Judgments  of  Domestic  States.  We  have  already  adverted 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the  United  States, 
in  regard  to  the  admissibility  and  effect  of  the  judgments  of  one  State 
in  the  tribunals  of  another.1  By  these  provisions,  such  judgments, 
authenticated  as  the  statutes  provide,  are  put  upon  the  same  footing 
as  domestic  judgments.2  "But  this,"  observes  Mr.  Justice  Story, 
"does  not  prevent  an  inquiry  into  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  in 
which  the  original  judgment  was  rendered,  to  pronounce  the  judg- 
ment, nor  an  inquiry  into  the  right  of  the  State  to  exercise  authority 
over  the  parties,  or  the  subject-matter,  nor  an  inquiry  whether  the 

8  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  603. 

*  Ib.  §§  604-606.     See  Guinness  v.  Carroll,  1  B.  &  Ad.  459  ;  Becquet  ».  McCarthy, 
2  B.  &  A.  951  ;  {and  the  observations  of  Judge  Redfield,  in  the  notes  to  his  edition  of 
Story  on  Conflict  of  Laws,  §§61 8  a,  618  k.\     In  Houlditch  v.  Donegal,  8  Bligh  301, 
337-340,  Lord  Brougham  held  a  foreign  judgment  to  be  only  prima  facie  evidence,  and 
gave  his  reasons  at  large  for  that  opinion.     On  the  other  hand,  Sir  L.  Shadwell,  in 
Martin  v.  Nicolls,  3  Sim.  458,  held  the  contrary  opinion,  that  it  was  conclusive  ;  and 
also  gave  a  very  elaborate  judgment  upon  the  point,  in  which  he  reviewed  the  principal 
authorities.     Of  course,  the  learned  judge  meant  to  accept,  and  did  accept  in  a  later 
case  (Price  v.  Dewhurst,  8  Sim.  279,  302),  judgments  which  were  produced  by  fraud. 
See  also  Don  v.  Lippman,  6  Cl.  &  F.  1,  20,  21 ;  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §§  545-550,  605, 
607 ;  Alivon  v.  Furnival,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  277,  284. 

1  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  608.  See  also  2  Kent  Comm.  119-121,  and  the  valuable 
notes  of  Mr.  Metcalf  to  his  edition  of  Starkie  on  Evid.  vol.  i.  pp.  232,  233  (6th  Am. 
ed. );  Wood  v.  Watkinson,  17  Conn.  500.  The  American  cases  seem  further  to  agree, 
that  when  a  foreign  judgment  comes  incidentally  in  question,  as,  where  it  is  the  foun- 
dation of  a  right  or  title  derived  under  it,  and  the  like,  it  is  conclusive.  If  a  foreign 
judgment  proceeds  upon  an  error  in  law,  apparent  upon  the  face  of  it,  it  may  be  im- 
peached everywhere  ;  as,  if  a  French  Court,  professing  to  decide  according  to  the  law 
of  England,  clearly  mistakes  it  :  Novelli  v.  Rossi,  2  B.  &  Ad.  757. 
Supra,  §§  504-506.  And  see  Flonrenoy  v.  Durke,  2  Brev.  206. 

*  Taylor  v.  Bryden,  8  Johns.  173.     Where  the  jurisdiction  of  an  inferior  Court 
depends  on  a  fact  which  such  Court  must  necessarily  and  directly  decide,  its  decision 
is  taken  as  conclusive  evidence  of  the  fact  :  Britain  v.  Kinnard,  1  B.  &  B.  432  ;  Betts  v. 
Bagley,  12  Pick.  572,  582,  per  Shaw,  C.  J.  ;  Steele  v.  Smith,  7  Law  Rep.  461. 


§§  546-550.]  EFFECT   OF  JUDGMENTS.  673 

judgment  is  founded  in,  and  impeachable  for,  a  manifest  fraud.  The 
Constitution  did  not  mean  to  confer  any  new  power  upon  the  States ; 
but  simply  to  regulate  the  effect  of  their  acknowledged  jurisdiction 
over  persons  and  things  within  their  territory.  It  did  not  make  the 
judgments  of  other  States  domestic  judgments,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes ;  but  only  gave  a  general  validity,  faith,  and  credit  to  them 
as  evidence.8  No  execution  can  issue  upon  such  judgments,  without 
a  new  suit  in  the  tribunals  of  other  States.  And  they  enjoy  not  the 
right  of  priority,  or  privilege,  or  lien,  which  they  have  in  the  State 
where  they  are  pronounced,  but  that  only  which  the  lex  fori  gives  to 
them  by  its  own  laws,  in  the  character  of  foreign  judgments."  * 

§  549.  Parties  in  Foreign  Judgments.  The  common  law  recognizes 
no  distinction  whatever,  as  to  the  effect  of  foreign  judgments, 
whether  they  are  between  citizens  or  between  foreigners,  or  between 
citizens  and  foreigners;  deeming  them,  of  equal  obligation  in  all 
cases,  whoever  are  the  parties.1 

§  550.  Judgments  of  Ecclesiastical  Courts.  In  regard  to  the  de- 
crees and  sentences  of  Courts,  exercising  any  branches  of  the  ecclesi- 
astical jurisdiction,  the  same  general  principles  govern,  which  we 
have  already  stated.1  The  principal  branch  of  this  jurisdiction,  in 
existence  in  the  United  States,  is  that  which  relates  to  matters  of 
probate  and  administration.  And  as  to  these,  the  inquiry,  as  in 
other  cases,  is,  whether  the  matter  was  exclusively  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Court,  and  whether  a  decree  or  judgment  has  been 
passed  directly  upon  it.  If  the  affirmative  be  true,  the  decree  is 
conclusive.  Where  the  decree  is  of  the  nature  of  proceedings  in 
rem,  as  is  generally  the  case  in  matters  of  probate  and  administra- 
tion, it  is  conclusive,  like  those  proceedings,  against  all  the  world. 
But  where  it  is  a  matter  of  exclusively  private  litigation,  such  as,  in 
assignments  of  dower,  and  some  other  cases  of  jurisdiction  conferred 
by  particular  statutes,  the  decree  stands  upon  the  footing  of  a  judg- 
ment at  common  law.3  Thus,  the  probate  of  a  will,  at  least  as  to 
the  personalty,  is  conclusive  in  civil  cases,  in  all  questions  upon  its 
execution  and  validity.8  The  grant  of  letters  of  administration  is, 

8  See  Story's  Comment,  on  the  Constit.  TJ.  S.  ch.  29,  §§  1297-1307,  and  cases  there 
cited  ;  Hall  v.  Williams,  6  Pick.  237  ;  Bissell  v.  Briggs,  9  Mass.  462  ;  Shutnway  ». 
Stillman,  6  Wend.  447  ;  Evans  v.  Tatem,  9  Serg.  &  R.  260  ;  Benton  v.  Burgot,  10  id. 
240  ;  Harrod  v.  Barretto,  1  Hall  155;  s.  c.  2  id.  302;  Wilson  v.  Niles,  ib.  358; 
Hoxie  v.  Wright,  2  Vt.  263  ;  Bellows  v.  Ingham,  ib.  575  ;  Aldrich  v.  Kinney,  4  Conn. 
880  ;  Bennett  v.  Morley,  1  Wilcox  100.  See  further,  1  Kent  Comm.  260,  261,  and  n.  (rf); 
As  to  the  effect  of  a  discharge  under  a  foreign  insolvent  law,  see  the  learned  judgment 
of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Betts  v.  Bagley,  12  Pick.  572. 

4  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  609  ;  McElmoyle  ».  Cohen,  13  Pet.  312,  328,  329 ;  Story 
Confl.  Laws,  §  582  a,  n. 

1  Story  Confl.  Laws,  §  610. 

i  2  Smith's  Leading  Cases,  446-448. 

»  Supra,  §§  525,  528. 

8  Poplin  v.  Hawke,  8  N.  H.  124  ;  1  Jarman  on  Wills,  pp.  22-24,  and  notes  by  Per- 
kins ;  Langdon  v.  Goddard,  3  Story  13  ;  jCrippen  v.  Dexter,  13  Gray  330.  J     See  port, 
Vol.  II,  §§315,  693. 
VOL.  i.  —  43 


674  RECORDS  AND  JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

in  general,  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  intestate's  death ;  for  only 
upon  evidence  of  that  fact  ought  they  to  have  been  granted.4  And 
if  the  grant  of  administration  turned  upon  the  question  as  to  which 
of  the  parties  was  next  of  kin,  the  sentence  or  decree  upon  that 
question  is  conclusive  everywhere,  in  a  suit  between  the  same  par- 
ties for  distribution.6  But  the  grant  of  administration  upon  a 
woman's  estate  determines  nothing  as  to  the  fact  whether  she  were  a 
feme  covert  or  not;  for  that  is  a  collateral  fact,  to  be  collected  merely 
by  inference  from  the  decree  or  grant  of  administration,  and  was  not 
the  point  directly  tried.6  Where  a  Court  of  probate  has  power  to 
grant  letters  of  guardianship  of  a  lunatic,  the  grant  is  conclusive  of 
his  insanity  at  that  time,  and  of  his  liability,  therefore,  to  be  put 
under  guardianship,  against  all  persons  subsequently  dealing  directly 
with  the  lunatic,  instead  of  dealing,  as  they  ought  to  do,  with  the 
guardian.7 

§  551.  Decrees  in  Chancery.  Decrees  in  Chancery  stand  upon  the 
same  principles  with  judgments  at  common  law,  which  have  already 
been  stated.  Whether  the  statements  in  the  bill  are  to  be  taken 
conchisively  against  the  complainant  as  admissions  by  him,  has 
been  doubted;  but  the  prevailing  opinion  is  supposed  to  be  against 
their  conclusiveness,  on  the  ground  that  the  facts  therein  stated  are 
frequently  the  mere  suggestions  of  counsel,  made  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  an  answer,  under  oath.1  If  the  bill  has  been  sworn  to, 
without  doubt  the  party  would  be  held  bound  by  its  statements,  so 
far  as  they  are  direct  allegations  of  fact.  The  admissibility  and 

*  Thompson  v.  Donaldson,  3  Esp.  63 ;  French  v.  French,  1  Dick.  268  ;  Succession 
of  Homblin,  3  Rob.  La.  130;  Jeffers  t>.  Radcliff,  10  N.  H.  242;  {see  Mutual  Benefit 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Tisdale,  91  U.  8.  238,  243 ;  Jochumsen  v.  Suffolk  Savings  Bank,  3  Allen 
87,  94  ;  Day  v.  Floyd,  130  Mass.  488 ;  Tisdale  v.  Ins.  Co.,  26  Iowa  177 ;  s.  c.  28  id. 
12  ;  Clayton  v.  Gresbam,  10  Ves.  288 ;  Leach  v.  Leach.  8  Jur.  111.]  But  if  the  fact 
that  the  intestate  is  living,  when  pleadable  in  abatement,  is  not  so  pleaded,  the  grant 
of  administration  is  conclusive:  Newman  v.  Jenkins,  10  Pick.  515.  In  Moons  ».  De 
Bernales,  1  Rnss.  301,  the  general  practice  was  stated  and  not  denied  to  be,  to  admit 
the  letters  of  administration,  as  sufficient  proof  of  the  death,  until  impeached  ;  but  the 
Master  of  the  Rolls,  in  that  case,  which  was  a  foreign  grant  of  administration,  refused 
to  receite  them  ;  but  allowed  the  party  to  examine  witnesses  to  the  fact. 

6  Barrs  v.  Jackson,  1  Phil.  Ch.  582 ;  2  Y.  &  C.  585  ;  Thomas  v.  Ketteriche,  1  Ves. 
333. 

8  Blackham's  Case,  1  Salk.  290,  per  Holt,  C.  J.  See  also  Hibshman  v.  Dulleban, 
4  Watts  183. 

7  Leonard  v.  Leonard,  14  Pick.  280.     But  it  is  not  conclusive  against  his  subsequent 
capacity  to  make  a  will :  Stone  v.  Damon,  12  Mass.  488  ;  Qsee  post,  §  556.] 

1  Doe  v.  Sybourn,  7  T.  R.  3.  The  bill  is  not  evidence  against  the  party  in  whose 
name  it  is  filed,  until  it  is  shown  that  he  was  privy  to  it.  When  this  privity  is  es- 
tablished, the  bill  ia  evidence  that  such  a  suit  was  instituted,  and  of  its  subject-mat- 
ter ;  but  not  of  the  plaintiffs  admission  of  the  trnth  of  the  matters  therein  stated, 
unless  it  were  sworn  to.  The  proceedings  after  answer  are  admissible  in  evidence  of 
the  privity  of  the  party  in  whose  name  the  bill  was  filed  :  Boileau  v.  Rudlin,  12  Jur. 
899  ;  2  Exch.  665;  and  see  Durden  v.  Cleveland,  4  Ala.  225  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  235.  See 
further,  as  to  the  admission  of  bills  and  answers,  and  to  what  extent,  Randall  v.  Par- 
ramore,  1  Fk.  409  :  Roberts  *.  Tennell,  8  Monr.247 ;  Clarke  v.  Robinson,  5  B.  Monr. 
55  ;  Adams  v.  McMillan,  7  Port,  73  ;  [ante,  §§  178,  201.] 


§§  550-553.]  DECREES  ;  IMPOSITIONS.  675 

effect  of  the  answer  of  the  defendant  is  governed  by  the  same  rules.3 
But  a  demurrer  in  Chancery  does  not  admit  the  facts  charged  in  the 
bill;  for  if  it  be  overruled,  the  defendant  may  still  answer.  So  it 
is,  as  to  pleas  in  Chancery;  these,  as  well  as  demurrers,  being 
merely  hypothetical  statements,  that,  supposing  the  facts  to  be  as 
alleged,  the  defendant  is  not  bound  to  answer.8  But  pleadings,  and 
depositions,  and  a  decree,  in  a  former  suit,  the  same  title  being  in 
issue,  are  admissible  as  showing  the  acts  of  parties,  who  had  the 
same  interest  in  it  as  the  present  party,  against  whom  they  are 
offered.* 

§  552.  Depositions.1  In  regard  to  depositions,  it  is  to  be  observed, 
that,  though  informally  taken,  yet  as  mere  declarations  of  the  wit- 
ness, under  his  hand,  they  are  admissible  against  him,  wherever  he 
is  a  party,  like  any  other  admissions ;  or,  to  contradict  and  impeach 
him,  when  he  is  afterwards  examined  as  a  witness.  But,  as  second- 
ary evidence,  or  as  a  substitute  for  his  testimony  viva  voce,  it  is 
essential  that  they  be  regularly  taken,  under  legal  proceedings  duly 
pending,  or  in  a  case  and  manner  provided  by  law.2  And  though 
taken  in  a  foreign  State,  yet  if  taken  to.be  used  in  a  suit  pending 
here,  the  forms  of  our  law,  and  not  of  the  foreign  law,  must  be 
pursued.8  But  if  the  deposition  was  taken  in perpetuam,  the  forms 
of  the  law  under  which  it  was  taken  must  have  been  strictly  pursued, 
or  it  cannot  be  read  in  evidence.4  If  a  bill  in  equity  be  dismissed 
merely  as  being  in  its  substance  unfit  for  a  decree,  the  depositions, 
when  offered  as  secondary  evidence  in  another  suit,  will  not  on  that 
account  be  rejected.  But  if  it  is  dismissed  for  irregularity,  as,  if  it 
come  before  the  Court  by  a  bill  of  revivor,  when  it  should  have  been 
by  an  original  bill,  so  that  in  truth  there  was  never  regularly  any 
such  cause  in  the  Court,  and  consequently  no  proofs,  the  depositions 
cannot  be  read;  for  the  proofs  cannot  be  exemplified  without  bill 
and  answer,  and  they  cannot  be  read  at  law,  unless  the  bill  on  which 
they  were  taken  can  be  read.6 

§  553.  Same :  Cross-examination.  We  have  seen,  that  in  regard 
to  the  admissibility  of  a  former  judgment  in  evidence  it  is  generally 

«  Supra,  §§171,  179,  186,  202. 

»  Tomkins  v.  Ashby,  1  M.  &  Malk.  32,  33,  per  Abbott,  Ld.  C.  J. 

*  Viscount  Lorton  v.  Earl  of  Kingston,  5  Clark  &  Fin.  269. 

1  [[On  the  whole  subject  of  the  next  three  sections,  see  a  fuller  treatment,  ante, 
§§  163-163  ».] 

3  As  to  the  manner  of  taking  depositions,  and  in  what  cases  they  may  be  taken,  see 
supra,  §§  320-325. 

8  Evans  v.  Eaton,  7  Wheat.  426  ;  Farley  v.  King,  S.  J.  Court,  Maine,  in  Lincoln, 
Oct.  Term,  1822,  per  Preble,  J.  But  depositions  taken  in  a  foreign  country,  under  its 
own  laws,  are  admissible  here  in  proof  of  probable  cause,  for  the  arrest  and  extradition 
of  a  fugitive  from  justice,  uport  the  preliminary  examination  of  his  case  before  a  judge  ! 
see  Metzger's  Case,  before  Betts,  J.,  5  N.  Y.  Legal  Obs.  83. 

«  Gould  v.  Gould,  3  Story  516. 

6  Backhouse  v.  Middleton,  1  Ch.  Cas.  173,  175  ;  Hall  v.  Hoddesdon,  2  P.  Wins. 
162;  Vaughan  v.  Fitzgerald,  1  Sch.  &  Lefr.  316. 


676  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

necessary  that  there  be  a  perfect  mutuality  between  the  parties; 
neither  being  concluded,  unless  both  are  alike  bound.1  But  with 
respect  to  depositions,  though  this  rule  is  admitted  in  its  general 
principle,  yet  it  is  applied  with  more  latitude  of  discretion;  and 
complete  mutuality,  or  identity  of  all  the  parties,  is  not  required. 
It  is  generally  deemed  sufficient,  if  the  matters  in  issue  were  the 
same  in  both  cases,  and  the  party,  against  whom  the  deposition  is 
offered,  had  full  power  to  cross-examine  the  witness.  Thus,  where 
a  bill  was  pending  in  Chancery,  in  favor  of  one  plaintiff  against  sev- 
eral defendants,  upon  which  the  Court  ordered  an  issue  of  devisavit 
vel  non,  in  which  the  defendants  in  Chancery  should  be  plaintiffs, 
and  the  plaintiff  in  Chancery  defendant;  and  the  issue  was  found  for 
the  plaintiffs;  after  which  the  plaintiff  in  Chancery  brought  an  eject- 
ment on  his  own  demise,  claiming  as  heir-at-law  of  the  same  tes- 
tator, against  one  of  those  defendants  alone,  who  claimed  as  devisee 
under  the  will  formerly  in  controversy;  it  was  held,  that  the  testi- 
mony of  ono  of  the  subscribing  witnesses  to  the  will,  who  was  ex- 
amined at  the  former  trial,  but  had  since  died,  might  be  proved  by 
the  defendant  in  the  second  action,  notwithstanding  the  parties  were 
not  all  the  same ;  for  the  same  matter  was  in  controversy,  in  both 
cases,  and  the  lessor  of  the  plaintiff  had  precisely  the  same  power  of 
objecting  to  the  competency  of  the  witness,  the  same  right  of  calling 
witnesses  to  discredit  or  contradict  his  testimony,  and  the  same 
right  of  cross-examination,  in  the  one  case,  as  in  the  other.2  If  the 
power  of  cross-examination  was  more  limited  in  the  former  suit,  in 
regard  to  the  matters  in  controversy  in  the  latter,  it  would  seem  that 
the  testimony  ought  to  be  excluded.8  The  same  rule  applies  to 
privies,  as  well  as  to  parties. 

§  554.  Same:  In  Equity.  But  though  the  general  rule,  at  law,  is, 
that  no  evidence  shall  be  admitted,  but  what  is  or  might  be  under 
the  examination  of  both  parties ; *  yet  it  seems  clear,  that,  in  equity, 
a  deposition  is  not,  of  course,  inadmissible  in  evidence  because  there 
has  been  no  cross-examination  and  no  waiver  of  the  right.  For  if 
the  witness,  after  his  examination  on  the  direct  interrogatories, 
should  refuse  to  answer  the  cross-interrogatories,  the  party  produc- 
ing the  witness  will  not  be  deprived  of  his  direct  testimony,  for,  upon 
application  of  the  other  party,  the  Court  would  have  compelled  him 

l  Supra,  §  524. 

3  Wright  f.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  El.  3  ;  12  Vin.  Abr.  tit.  Evidence,  A,  b,  31,  pi.  45, 
47.  As  to  the  persons  who  are  to  be  deemed  parties,  see  supra,  §§  523,  535. 

*  Hardr.  315  ;  Cazenove  v.  Vaughan,  1  M.  &  S.  4  ;  Qsee  ante,  §§  163  a,  6.J  It  has 
been  held  that  the  deposition  of  a  witness  before  the  coroner,  upon  an  inquiry  touching 
the  death  of  a  person  killed  by  a  collision  of  vessels,  was  admissible  in  an  action  for 
the  negligent  management  of  one  of  them,  if  the  witness  is  shown  to  be  beyond 
sea  :  Sills  v.  Brown,  9  C.  &  P.  601,  603,  per  Coleridge,  J. ;  Bull.  N.  P.  242  ;  JR.  v. 
Eriswell,  8  T.  R.  707,  712,  721  ;  J.  Kely.  55. 

1  Cazenovo  v.  Vaughan,  1  M.  A  S.  4,  6;  Attorney-General  v.  Davison,  1  McCl.  & 
Y.  160  ;  Gass  v.  Stinson,  3  Sumu.  98,  104,  105. 


§§  553-556.]  DEPOSITIONS.  677 

to  answer.2  So,  after  a  witness  was  examined  for  the  plaintiff,  but 
before  he  could  be  cross-examined,  he  died;  the  Court  ordered  his 
deposition  to  stand;8  though  the  want  of  the  cross-examination 
ought  to  abate  the  force  of  his  testimony.'1  So,  where  the  direct 
examination  of  an  infirm  witness  was  taken  by  the  consent  of  par- 
ties, but  no  cross-interrogatories  were  ever  filed,  though  the  witness 
lived  several  months  afterwards,  and  there  was  no  proof  that  they 
might  not  have  been  answered,  if  they  had  been  filed;  it  was  held, 
that  the  omission  to  file  them  was  at  the  peril  of  the  party,  and  that 
the  deposition  was  admissible.6  A  new  commission  may  be  granted, 
to  cross-examine  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  abroad,  upon  subsequent 
discovery  of  matter,  for  such  examination.8  But  where  the  deposi- 
tion of  a  witness,  since  deceased,  was  taken,  and  the  direct  examina- 
tion was  duly  signed  by  the  magistrate,  but  the  cross-examination, 
which  was  taken  on  a  subsequent  day,  was  not  signed,  the  whole 
was  held  inadmissible.7 

§  555.  Depositions  as  involving  Reputation.  Depositions,  as  well 
as  verdicts,  which  relate  to  a  custom,  or  prescription,  or  pedigree, 
where  reputation  would  be  evidence,  are  admissible  against  stran- 
gers ;  for  as  the  declarations  of  persons  deceased  would  be  admissible 
in  such  cases,  a  fortiori  their  declarations  on  oath  are  so.1  But  in 
all  cases  at  law,  where  a  deposition  is  offered  as  secondary  evidence, 
that  is,  as  a  substitute  for  the  testimony  of  the  witness  viva  voce,  it 
must  appear  that  the  witness  cannot  be  personally  produced;  unless 
the  case  is  provided  for  by  statute,  or  by  a  rule  of  the  Court.2 

§  556.  Inquisitions  of  Lunacy,  etc.  The  last  subject  of  inquiry 
under  this  head  is  that  of  inquisitions.  These  are  the  results  of 
inquiries,  made  under  competent  public  authority,  to  ascertain  mat- 
ters of  public  interest  and  concern.  It  is  said  that  they  are  analo- 
gous to  proceedings  in  rem,  being  made  on  behalf  of  the  public;  and 
that  therefore  no  one  can  strictly  be  said  to  be  a  stranger  to  them. 
But  the  principle  of  their  admissibility  in  evidence,  between  private 
persons,  seems  to  be,  that  they  are  matters  of  public  and  general 
interest,  and  therefore  within  some  of  the  exceptions  to  the  rule  in 
regard  to  hearsay  evidence,  which  we  have  heretofore  considered.1 
Whether,  therefore,  the  adjudication  be  founded  on  oath  or  not  the 
principle  of  its  admissibility  is  the  same;  and,  moreover,  it  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  hearsay  evidence,  in  having  peculiar  guaran- 

2  Courteney  v.  Hoskins,  2  Russ.  253. 

8  Arunilel  v.  Arundel,  1  Chan.  R.  90. 

4  O'Callaghan  v.  Murphy,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  158 ;  Gass  v.  Stinson,  3  Sumn.  98,  106, 
107  ;  but  see  Kissam  v.  Forrest,  25  Wend.  651  ;  [ante,  §  163  e."^ 

6  Gass  v.  Stinson,  3  Sumn.  98,  where  this  subject  is  fully  examined  by  Story,  J. 

6  King  of  Hanover  v.  Wheatley,  4  Beav,  78. 

7  R.  v.  France,  2  M.  &  Rob.  207. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  239,  240  ;  {ante,  §  139.1 
a  [Ante,  §  163  A.] 
1  Supra,  §§  127-140. 


678  RECORDS   AND   JUDICIAL  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXIX. 

ties  for  its  accuracy  and  fidelity.2  The  general  rule  in  regard  to 
these  documents  is,  that  they  are  admissible  in  evidence,  but  that 
they  are  not  conclusive  except  against  the  parties  immediately  con- 
cerned, and  their  privies.8  Thus,  an  inquest  of  office,  by  the 
attorney -general,  for  lands  escheating  to  the  government  by  reason- 
of  alienage,  was  held  to  be  evidence  of  title,  in  all  cases,  but  not 
conclusive  against  any  person,  who  was  not  tenant  at  the  time  of  the 
inquest,  or  party  or  privy  thereto,  and  that  such  persons,  therefore, 
might  show  that  there  were  lawful  heirs  in  esse,  who  were  not 
aliens.4  So,  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  inquisitions  of  lunacy 
may  be  read;  but  that  they  are  not  generally  conclusive  .against  per- 
sons not  actually  parties.5  But  inquisitions,  extrajudicially  taken, 
are  not  admissible  in  evidence.6  [A  coroner's  inquisition  of  death 
has  been  admitted.7] 

2  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  578,  579  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  260,  261,  263. 

3  See  ante,  §  550,  that  the  inquisition  is  conclusive  against  persons  who  undertake 
subsequently  to  deal  with  the  lunatic  instead  of  dealing  with  the  guardian,  and  seek 
to  avoid  his  authority,  collaterally,  by  showing  that  the  party  was  restored  to  his 
reason. 

4  Stokes  v.  Dawes,  4  Mason  268,  per  Story,  J. 

6  Sergeson  v.  Sealey,  2  Atk.  412  :  Den  v.  Clark,  5  Halst.  217,  per  Ewing,  C.  J.  ; 
Hart  v.  Deamer,  6  Wend.  497  ;  Faulder  v.  Silk,  3  Campb.  126 ;  2  Madd.  Chan.  578  ; 
EPflneger  v.  State,  46  Nebr.  493  ;  Rodgcrs  v.  Rodgers,  56  Kan.  483.] 

«  Glossop  v.  Pole,  3  M.  &  S.  175  ;  Latkow  v.  Earner,  2  H.  Bl.  437  ;  pn  Naanes  v. 
State,  143  Ind.  299,  a  statutory  commission's  report  as  to  committal  to  an  asylum 
was  excluded  on  this  ground  ;  see  also  Dewey  v.  Algire,  37  Nebr.  6.1 

7  ["Grand  Lodge  v.  Wieting,  168  111.  408  ;  contra,  Germania  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Ross-Lewin, 
24  Colo.  43.3 


§§  556-557.] 


PRIVATE   WRITINGS. 


679 


CHAPTER  XXX. 


PRIVATE   WRITINGS. 


§  557.   In  general. 


1.   Production  and  Inspection. 

§§  559,  560.  Production  by  Bill  or 
Order. 

§  563.  Mere  Inspection  as  making  Doc- 
uments Evidence  for  Producing  Party. 

2.    Proving  Contents. 
§  563  a.    General  Principle. 

(a)    General  Rule:    the   Writing  itself  to 
be  produced  or  accounted  for. 

§  563  6.  Loss  or  Destruction  ;  Dili- 
gence of  Search. 

§  563  c.  Possession  of  Opponent ;  No- 
tice to  Produce. 

§  563  d.  Same :  Procedure  in  giving 
Notice. 

§  563  e.  Writings  in  a  Third  Person's 
Control  ;  Writings  out  of  the  Jurisdiction. 

§  563 /.    Public  Documents. 

§  563  g.    Appointments  to  Office. 

§  563  h.  Summaries  of  Voluminous 
Entries. 

§  563  i.   Non-portable  Writings. 

(b)    Exceptions  to  the  Rule. 

§  563 .;'.    Vow  Dire. 

§§  563  k,  563  I.  Admissions  of  Oppo- 
nent. 

§  563  m.   Sundry  Exceptions. 

(c)   Rule  not  Applicable. 

§  563  n.  Writings,  as  distinguished 
from  Other  Objects. 

§  563  o.  Contents  of  a  Writing,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  Other  Facts. 

§  563  p.  What  Writing  is  the  Original 
to  be  proved. 

(d)    Kinds  of  Secondary  Evidence. 
§  563  q.    Preferred  Copies. 
§  563  r.    Copy  of  a  Copy. 

3.   A  Iteration  of  Documents. 

§  564.  Presumption  as  to  Time  of  Al- 
teration. 

§  565.  Effect  of  Alteration  as  Avoiding 
the  Instrument. 


§  566.  Same :  Alteration  and  Spolia- 
tion. 

§§  567,  568.  Same :  Immaterial  Altera- 
tions. 

§  568  a.   Same  :  Alterations  by  Consent. 

4.   Proving  Execution  of  Attested 
Documents. 

§  569.  Attesting  Witness  must  be 
Called. 

§  569  a.    Kind  of  Document  affected. 

§  569  b.  Opponent's  Admission,  as  dis- 
pensing with  the  Rule. 

§  569  c.    Who  is  Attesting  Witness. 

§  569  d.  Number  of  Witnesses  to  be 
Called. 

§  570.  Exceptions :  (1)  Ancient  In- 
struments. 

§  571.  Same  :  (2)  Claim  by  Opponent 
under  the  Instrument. 

§  572.  Same :  (3)  Attesting  Witness 
Unavailable. 

§  572  a.    Same  :  Diligent  Search. 

§  573.  Same  :  (4)  Official  Bonds ;  Regis- 
tered Deeds. 

§  573  b.  Same  :  (5)  Instrument  not 
Directly  in  Issue. 

§  575.  Witness  Unavailable  in  Person  ; 
Proof  of  Signature. 

5.  Proving  Execution  of  Other  (Unattested) 
Writings. 

§  575  a.   In  general ;  Identity  of  Signer. 

§  575  b.  Genuineness  of  Ancient  Docu- 
ments. 

•§  575  c.    Replies  received  by  Mail. 

§  576.  Proof  by  Comparison  of  Hand- 
writing. 

§  577.   Same :  Qualified  Witnesses. 

§  578.    Same  :  Ancient  Writings. 

§  578  a.  Same:  Comparison  of  Speci- 
mens by  the  Jury. 

§  578  b.    Same  :  Testing  the  Witness. 

§§  579-581.  Same  :  Expert  Testifying 
from  Comparison  of  Specimens. 

§  581  a.  Discriminations  ;  Comparison 
of  Spelling ;  Testimony  to  a  Feigned 
Hand;  etc. 

6.    Conclusion. 
§  584.  Conclusion. 


§  557.   In  general.     The  last  class  of  written  evidence  which  we 
propose  to  consider  is  that  of  private  writings.     And,  in  the  discus- 


680  PKIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXX. 

sion  of  this  subject,  it  is  not  intended  separately  to  mention  every 
description  of  writings  comprised  in  this  class,  but  to  state  the 
principles  which  govern  the  proof,  adniissibility,  and  effect  of  them 
all.  In  general,  all  private  writings  produced  in  evidence  must  be 
proved  to  be  genuine ;  but  in  what  is  now  to  be  said,  particular 
reference  is  had  to  solemn  obligations  and  instruments,  under  the 
hand  of  the  party,  purporting  to  be  evidence  of  title ;  such  as  deeds, 
bills,  and  notes.  These  must  be  produced,  and  the  execution  of 
them  generally  be  proved,  or  their  absence  must  be  duly  accounted 
for,  and  their  loss  supplied  by  secondary  evidence. 
§  558. J 

1.   Production  and  Inspection. 

§  559.  Production  by  Bill  or  Order.  The  production  of  private 
writings,  in  which  another  person  has  an  interest,  may  be  had  either 
by  a  bill  of  discovery,  in  proper  cases,  or  in  trials  at  law  by  a  writ  of 
subpoena  duces  tecum,1  directed  to  the  person  who  has  them  in  his 
possession.  The  Courts  of  N  common  law  may  also  make  an  order  for 
the  inspection  of  writings  in  the  possession  of  one  party  to  a  suit  in 
favor  of  the  other.  The  extent  of  this  power,  and  the  nature  of  the 
order,  whether  it  should  be  peremptory,  or  in  the  shape  of  a  rule  to 
enlarge  the  time  to  plead,  unless  the  writing  is  produced,  does  not 
seem  to  be  very  clearly  agreed ; 2  and,  in  the  United  States,  the 
Courts  have  been  unwilling  to  exercise  the  power  except  where  it  is 
given  by  statute.8  It  seems,  however,  to  be  agreed,  that  where  the 
action  is  ex  contractu,  and  there  is  but  one  instrument  between  the 
parties,  which  is  in  the  possession  or  power  of  the  defendant,  to 
•which  the  plaintiff  is  either  an  actual  party  or  a  party  in  interest, 

1  [Transferred  post,  as  §  563  &.] 

1  See  the  course  in  a  parallel  case,  where  a  witness  is  ont  of  the  jurisdiction,  supra, 
§  320.     It  is  no  sufficient  answer  for  a  witness  not  obeying  this  subpoena,  that  the  in- 
strument required  was  not  material:  Dqe  v.  Kelly,  4  Dowl.  273  ;  but  see  R.  v.  Lord 
John  Russell,  7  id.  693  ;  and  ante,  §  319. 

2  Supra,  §  320.     If  the  applicant  has  no  legal  interest  in  the  writing,  which  he 
requests  leave  to  inspect,  it  will  not  be  granted :  Powell  v.  Bradbury,  4  C.  B.  541 ; 
13  Jur.  349  ;  and  see  ante,  §  473. 

8  rjSucb  statutes  now  exist  in  probably  every  jurisdiction.]  |By  the  act  of  Sept.  24, 
1789,  IT.  8.  R.S.  §  724,  it  is  provided  that  the  Courts  of  the  United  States  "shall  have 
power  in  all  actions  at  law,  on  motion  and  due  notice  thereof  being  given,  to  require  the 
parties  to  produce  books  or  writings  in  their  possession  or  power,  which  contain  evi- 
dence pertinent  to  the  issue,  in  cases  and  under  circumstances  where  they  might  be 
compelled  to  produce  the  same  by  the  ordinary  rules  of  proceeding  in  Chancery;" 
and  in  case  of  the  non-production  thereof  upon  such  order  the  Court  may  direct  a 
nonsuit  or  default.  Under  this  statute,  an  order  to  produce  may  be  applied  for  before 
trial,  upon  notice.  A  primafucie  case  of  the  existence  of  the  paper  and  its  materiality 
must  be  made  out ;  and  the  Court  will  then  pass  an  order  nisi,  leaving  the  opposite 
party  to  produce  or  to  show  cause  at  the  trial,  where  alone  the  materiality  can  be 
finally  decided  :  lasigi  v.  Brown,  1  Curtis  C.  C.  401.  For  other  decisions  under  this 
nection  of  the  statute,  see  Hylton  v.  Brown,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  298  ;  Bas  v.  Steele,  3  id. 
881;  Dunham  ».  Riley,  4  id.  126  ;  Vnsse  v.  Mifflin,  id.  519  ;  see  also  po.it,  Vol.  Ill, 
§§  902-299.  In  England,  the  power  was  granted  by  St.  17-18  Viet.,  c.  125.} 


§§  557-563.]  PRODUCTION  AND  INSPECTION.  681 

and  of  which  he  has  been  refused  an  inspection,  upon  request,  and 
the  production  of  which  is  necessary  to  enable  him  to  declare  against 
the  defendant,  the  Court,  or  a  judge  at  chambers,  may  grant  him  a 
rule  on  the  defendant  to  produce  the  document,  or  give  him  a  copy 
for  that  purpose.*  Such  order  may  also  be  obtained  by  the  defend- 
ant on  a  special  case ;  such  as,  if  there  is  reason  to  suspect  that  the 
document  is  forged,  and  the  defendant  wishes  that  it  may  be  seen 
by  himself  and  his  witnesses.8  But,  in  all  such  cases,  the  applica- 
tion should  be  supported  by  the  affidavit  of  the  party,  particularly 
stating  the  circumstances.6 

§  560.  When  the  instrument  or  writing  is  in  the  hands  or  power 
of  the  adverse  party,  there  are,  in  general,  except  in  the  cases  above 
mentioned,  no  means  at  law  of  compelling  him  to  produce  it ;  but 
the  practice  in  such  cases  is  to  give  him  or  his  attorney  a  regular 
notice  to  produce  the  original ;  not  that,  on  proof  of  such  notice, 
he  is  compellable  to  give  evidence  against  himself,  but  to  lay  a 
foundation  for  the  introduction  of  secondary  evidence  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  document  or  writing,  by  showing  that  the  party  has  done 
all  in  his  power  to  produce  the  original,1  [as  explained  in  the  ensu- 
ing sections.] 

§§  561,  562. ! 

§  563.  Mere  Inspection  as  making  Documents  Evidence  for  Party 
Producing.  The  regular  time  for  calling  for  the  production  of 
papers  is  not  until  the  party  who  requires  them  has  entered  upon 
his  case ;  until  which  time  the  other  party  may  refuse  to  produce 
them,  and  no  cross-examination,  as  to  their  contents,  is  usually  per. 
mitted.1  The  production  of  papers,  upon  notice,  does  not  make  them 
evidence  in  the  cause,  unless  the  party  calling  for  them  inspects 
them,  so  as  to  become  acquainted  with  their  contents ;  in  which  case, 
the  English  rule  is,  that  they  are  admitted  as  evidence  for  both 
parties.2  The  reason  is,  that  it  would  give  an  unconscionable  advan- 
tage to  enable  a  party  to  pry  into  the  affairs  of  his  adversary  for  the 
purpose  of  compelling  him  to  furnish  evidence  against  himself,  with- 
out, at  the  same  time,  subjecting  him  to  the  risk  of  making  whatever 

*  3  Chitty's  Gen.  Pr.  433,  434  ;  1  Tidd's  Pr.  590-592  ;  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  486-488  ; 
Graham's  Pr.  524  ;  Lawrence  v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.,  11  Johns.  245,  n.  (a)  ;  Jackson  v. 
Jones,  3  Cow.  17  ;  Wallis  v.  Murray,  4  id.  399  ;  Dcuslow  v.  Fowler,  2  id.  592  ;  Daven- 
bagh  v.  M'Kinnie,  5  id.  27  ;  Utica  Bank  v.  Hilliard,  6  id.  62. 

6  Brush  v.  Gibbon,  3  Cowen  18,  n.  (a). 

6  3  Chitty's  Gen.  Pr.  434. 

i  2  Tidd's  Pr.  802 ;  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  483 ;  Graham's  Pr.  528. 

1  ["Transferred  post,  as  §§  563  c,  563  rf.] 

1  Supra,  §§  447,  463,  464. 

2  2  Tidd's  Pr.  804  ;  Calvert  v.  Flower,  7  C.  &  P.  386  ;  TWilson  v.  Bowie,  1  id.  8. 
A  contrary  ruling  is  found  in  Sayer  v.  Kitchen,  1  Esp.  209.J     j  But  where  the  plaintiff 
on  his  examination  in  chief  denies  the  existence  of  a  written  contract,  the  defendant, 
may  interpose,  and  give  evidence  upon  a  collateral  issue,  whether  there  was  a  written 
contract,  before  the  plaintiff  is  allowed  to  give  evidence  of  its  terms:  Cox  v.  Couve- 
less,  2F.  &F.  139.} 


682  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXX. 

he  inspects  evidence  for  both  parties.    But  in  the  American  Courts 
the  rule  on  this  subject  is  not  uniform.8 

2.   Proving  Contents. 

§  563  a.  General  Principle.  [One  of  the  most  common  and  most 
important  of  the  concrete  rules  subsumed  under  the  general  notion 
that  the  best  evidence  must  be  produced,  and  that  one  with  which  the 
phrase  "  best  evidence  "  1  is  now  almost  exclusively  associated,  is  the 
rule  that,  when  the  contents  of  a  writing  are  to  be  proved,  the  writ- 
ing itself  must  be  produced  before  the  tribunal,  or  its  absence 
accounted  for  before  testimony  to  its  contents  is  admitted.  The  pro- 
duction of  the  writing,  as  a  means  of  proving  its  contents,  is  perhaps 
in  strictness  to  be  regarded  as  rather  a  case  of  "real  evidence,"  i.  e. 
proof  by  the  tribunal's  inspection  of  the  thing  itself ;  in  other  words, 
proof  without  the  use  of  either  testimonial  or  circumstantial  evi- 
dence ; 2  so  that  proof  of  the  contents  without  production  of  the  writ- 
ing would  properly  be  regarded  as  the  first  stage  of  the  resort  to 
evidence.  Nevertheless,  proof  by  production  of  the  writing  is  com- 
monly spoken  of  as  using  "  primary  evidence,"  and  proof  by  wit- 
nesses testifying  by  copy  or  otherwise  is  commonly  spoken  of  as  using 
"  secondary  evidence." 

The  questions  arising  under  this  rule  may  be  grouped  under  four 
heads :  a.  The  rule  itself ;  b.  The  exceptions  to  the  rule  ;  c.  The 
situations  to  which  the  rule  has  no  application  because  they  are 
without  its  scope ;  d.  The  further  rules  as  to  the  kinds  of  secondary 
evidence  allowable.] 

2  (a)  General  Rule:  the  Writing  itself  to  be  produced  or  accounted  for. 

[The  rule  may  be  phrased  thus :  Where  the  contents  of  a  writing 
are  desired  to  be  proved,  the  writing  itself  must  be  produced,  or  its 
absence  sufficiently  accounted  for  before  other  evidence  of  its  contents 
can  be  admitted.  The  main  subject  of  inquiry  and  controversy  is  thus 
the  second  branch  of  the  rule,  i.  e.  In  what  situations  is  the  non-pro- 
duction of  the  original  writing  to  be  regarded  as  sufficiently  accounted 

«  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  484  ;  Withers  v.  Gillespy,  7  S.  &  R.  14.  The  English  rule 
was  adopted  in  Jordan  v.  Wilkins,  2  Wash.  C.  C.  482,  484,  n.  ;  Randel  v.  Chesapeake, 
&  Del.  Can.  Co.,  1  Harriiigt.  233,  284  ;  Penobscot  Boom  Corp.  v.  Lamson,  4  Shepl. 
224  ;  Anderson  v.  Root,  8  Sm.  &  M.  362  ;  Com.  v.  Davidson,  1  Cush.  33.  [The 
real  question  in  doubt,  and  supposed  to  be  settled  by  Calvert  v.  Flower,  supra,  was 
whether  mere  inspection  alone  made  them  evidence  (as  therein  decided)  or  whether 
nothing  short  of  actually  using  them  in  evidence  would  have  that  effect.  The  English 
rule  is  adopted  in  Reed  v.  Anderson,  12  Cush.  481  ;  Clark  v.  Fletcher,  1  All.  53  (lead- 
ing case)  ;  Long  v.  Drew,  114  Mass.  77;  Cushman  v.  Coleman,  92  Ga.  772.  The  other 
view  is  accepted  in  Austin  v.  Thomson,  45  N.  H.  113  (leading  case)  ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P, 
$  1930.JJ 

1  Qtor  the  various  senses  of  this  phrase,  and  the  other  rules  sometimes  denoted  by 
it,  see  ante,  Chap.  VIII.] 

2  [See  ante,  §§  13  a, 


§§  563-563  b.]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  683 

for,  in  order  to  admit  other  evidence  ?    These  various  situations  may 
now  be  noticed.] 

§  563  b  [558].  Loss  or  Destruction ;  Diligence  of  Search.  If  the 
instrument  is  lost,  the  party  is  required  to  give  some  evidence  that 
such  a  paper  once  existed,1  though  slight  evidence  is  sufficient  for  this 
purpose,2  and  that  a  bonafide  and  diligent  search  has  been  unsuccess- 
fully made  for  it  in  the  place  where  it  was  most  likely  to  be  found,  if 
the  nature  of  the  case  admits  such  proof;  after  which,  his  own  affida- 
vit is  admissible  to  the  fact  of  its  loss.8  The  same  rule  prevails  where 
the  instrument  is  destroyed ;  [unless  the  destruction  was  by  the  party 
wishing  to  prove  the  contents,  for  then  no  evidence  will  be  received 
unless  the  party  can  show  that  the  destruction  was  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  suppressing  evidence  or  for  any  other  fraudulent  purpose.4] 

1  £This  includes  proof  of  the  execution  or  genuineness  of  the  writing,  which  would 
of  course  equally  have  to  be  made  even  were  the  original  produced  :]  Jackson  v.  Frier, 
16  Johns.  196  ;  Kiiuball  v.  Morrell,  4  Greenl.  368  ;  Kelsey  v.  Hanmer,  18  Conn.  311  ; 
Porter  v.  Ferguson,  4  Fla.   102  ;  QR.  v.  Culpepper,  Skinner  673 ;  Comer  v.  Hart,  79 
Ala.  389  ;  Hayden  v.  Mitchell,  Ga.,  30  S.  E.  286  ;  Fox  v.  Pedigo,  Ky.,  40  S.  W.  249  ; 
Weiler  v.  Monroe  Co.,  74  Miss.  682  ;  Bachelder  v.  Nutting,  16  N.  H.  261.     Compare 
Stosve  v.  Querner,  L.  R.  5  Ex.  Ch.  155.]     In  regard  to  the  order  of  the  proof,  namely, 
whether  the  existence  and  genuineness  of  the  paper,  and  of  course  its  general  character  or 
contents,  must  be  proved  before  any  evidence  can  be  received  of  its  loss,  the  decisions 
are  not  uniform.     The  earlier  and  some  later  cases  require  that  this  order  should  be 
strictly  observed :  Goodier  v.  Lake,  1  Atk.  446  ;  Sims  v.  Sims,  2  Rep.  Const.  Ct.  225  ; 
Kimball  v.  Morrell,  4  Greenl.  368  ;  Stockdale  v.  Young,  3  Strobh.  501,  n.     In  other 
cases,  it  has  been  held,  that,  in  the  order  of  proof,  the  loss  or  destruction  of  the  paper 
must   first  be  shown:  Wills  v.   McDole,  2  South.  501;  Sterling  v.   Potts,  ib.  773: 
Shrowders  v.  Harper,   1  Harringt.   444  ;  Flinn  v.  McGonigle,  9  Watts  &  Serg.  75; 
Murray  v.  Buchanan,  7  Blackf.   549;  Parke  v.  Bird,  3  Barr  360.     But,  on  the  one 
hand,  it  is  plain,  that  the  proof  of  the  loss  of  a  document  necessarily  involves  some 
descriptive  proof  of  the  document  itself,  though  not  to  the  degree  of  precision  subse- 
quently necessary  in  order  to  establish  a  title  under  it ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
strong  probability  of  its  loss  has  been  held  sufficient  to  let  in  the  secondary  evidence 
of  its  contents:   Bouldin  v.  Massie,  7  Wheat.   122,  154,  155.    These  considerations 
will  go  far  to  reconcile  most  of  the  cases  apparently  conflicting.     Qn  Fitch  v.  Bogue, 
19  Conn.  285,  and  Groff  v.  Ramsey,  19  Minn.  44,  the  order  of  the  proof  is  left  to  de- 
pend on  the  circumstances  of  each  case.      In   Mattocks  r.  Stearns,  9  Vt.  326,   the 
"  usual  "  order  is  the  one  first  above  mentioned.] 

2  rjBut  in  Kiise  v.  Neason,  66  Pa.  253,  it  is  said  that  the  evidence  must  be  "  of  the 
most  positive  and  unequivocal  kind."] 

8  Ante,  §  349,  [^transferred  to  Appendix  I.  This  use  of  affidavits  was  a  partial  ex- 
ception to  the  rule  forbidding  parties  to  testify.  But  since  the  abolition  of  that  rule, 
the  party  may  take  the  stand  as  a  witness,  and  thus  his  affidavit  is  subject  to  the  Hear- 
say rule  (ante,  §  163  a),  and  would  seem  to  be  no  longer  admissible  except  where  the 
older  practice  has  been  expressly  perpetuated  by  statute  ;  see  Becker  r.  Quigg,  54  111. 
390.  Note  that  this  affidavit  was  allowable  only  to  prove  loss,  and  not  to  prove  the 
contents.] 

4  ("The  phrasing  differs,  but  this  seems  to  be  the  most  usual  and  satisfactory  form  ; 
see  Johnson's  Case,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  437  ;  7  East  65  ;  Kensington  v.  Inglis,  8  id.  273, 
288  ;  Lewis  v.  Hartley,  7  C.  &  P.  405  ;  Rodgers  r.  Crook,  97  Ala.  722  ;  Miller  v.  State, 
110  id.  69  ;  Bracken  ».  State,  111  id.  68  ;  Bagley  v.  McMickle,  9  Cal.  430  (leading 
case)  ;  Bagley  v.  Eaton,  10  id.  126,  148  ;  Bank  v.  Sill,  5  Conn.  106  ;  Blake  v.  Fash,  44 
111.  302;  Anderson  B.  Co.  v.  Applegate,  13  Ind.  339  ;  Rudolph  v.  Lane,  57  id.  115  ; 
Tobin  r.  Shaw,  45  Me.  331  ;  Joannes  v.  Bennett,  5  All.  169  ;  Stone  v.  Sanborn,  104 
Mass.  319  ;  Gage  v.  Campbell,  131  id.  566  ;  Wright  v.  State,  Md.,  41  Atl.  795  ;  Gugins 
v.  Van  Gorder,  10  Mich.  523  ;  People  v.  Sharp,  54  id.  523  ;  People  v.  Lange,  90  id. 
454;  Shrimpton  v.  Netzorg,  104  id.  225;  Wiuona  v.  Huff,  11  Minn.  119,  130; 


684  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

What  degree  of  diligence  in  the  search  is  necessary,  it  is  not  easy 
to  define,  as  each  case  depends  much  on  its  peculiar  circumstances ; 
and  the  question,  whether  the  loss  of  the  instrument  is  sufficiently 
proved  to  admit  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents,  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  Court  and  not  by  the  jury.6  But  it  seems  that,  in 
general,  the  party  is  expected  to  show  that  he  has  in  good  faith  ex- 
hausted, in  a  reasonable  degree,  all  the  sources  of  information  and 
means  of  discover}'  which  the  nature  of  the  case  would  naturally 
suggest,  and  which  were  accessible  to  him.*  It  should  be  recollected, 
that  the  object  of  the  proof  is  merely  to  establish  a  reasonable  pre- 
sumption of  the  loss  of  the  instrument,  and  that  this  is  a  preliminary 
inquiry  addressed  to  the  discretion  of  the  judge.  If  the  paper  was 
supposed  to  be  of  little  value,  or  is  ancient,  a  less  degree  of  diligence 
will  be  demanded,  as  it  will  be  aided  by  the  presumption  of  loss  which 
these  circumstances  afford.  If  it  belonged  to  the  custody  of  certain 
persons,  or  is  proved  or  may  be  presumed  to  have  been  in  their  pos- 
session, they  must,  in  general,  be  called  and  sworn  to  account  for  it, 
if  they  are  within  reach  of  the  process  of  the  Court ; 7  and  so  if  it 

Skinner  v.  Henderson,  10  Mo.  205  ;  Broadwell  v.  Stiles,  8  N.  J.  L.  (leading  case)  ; 
Vananken  v.  Hornbeck,  14  id.  178  ;  Wyckoff  o.  Wyckoff,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  401  ;  Clark  v. 
Hornbeck,  17  id.  430,  451  ;  Livingston  v.  Rogers,  2  Johns.  Gas.  488  ;  Jackson  v. 
Lamb,  7  Cow.  431  ;  Blade  v.  Noland,  12  Wend.  173  ;  Clute  v.  Small,  17  id.  238; 
Enders  v.  Sternbergh,  40  N.  Y.  264  ;  Steele  v.  Lord,  70  id.  280  ;  Mason  v.  Libbey, 
90  id.  683  ;  McAulay  v.  Earnhart,  1  Jones  L.  503 ;  Pollock  v.  Wilcox,  68  N.  C.  46  ; 
Shortz  v.  Unangst,  3  W.  &  S.  45  ;  State  v.  Head,  38  S.  C.  258  ;  Anderson  v.  Alaberry, 

2  Heisk.  653;  Riggs  v.  Tayloe,  9  Wheat.  483  (leading  case) ;  Rentier  v.  Bank,  ib.  581, 
597  ;  State  v.  Marsh,  Vt.,  40  Atl.  836.    For  this  principle  as  a  reason  for  the  substan- 
tive rule  of  law  holding  a  deed's  destruction  by  the  grantee  to  be  a  revesting  of  title 
in  the  grantor,  see  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323  ;  Jones,  Real  Property,  11, 
§  1259.] 

6  ri'agor.  Page,  15  Pick.  368  ;  J  Smith  v.  Brown,  151  Mass.  339  ;  Walker  v.  Curtis, 
116  id.  98  ;  Lindauer  v.  Meyberg,  27  Mo.  App.  185 ;  Stratton  v.  Hawks,  43  Kan. 
541  ;  Glassell  v.  Mason,  32  Ala.  719 ;  Woodworth  v.  Barker,  1  Hill  N.  Y.  176  ; 
Bachelder  v.  Nutting,  16  N.  H.  261 ;{  Smith  v.  Mason,  1  C.  &  K.  48 ;  Tyree  v. 
Magness,  I  Sneed  276.] 

6  R.  v.  Morton,  4  M.  &  S.  48  ;  R.  v.  Castleton,  6  T.  R.  236  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  336-340  ; 
Wills  v.  McDole,  2  South.  501  ;  Thompson  v.  Travis,  8  Scott  85  ;  Parks  v.  Dunkle, 

3  Watts  &  Serg.  291 ;  Gathercole  ».  Miall,  15  L.  J.  Exch.  179  ;  Doe  v.  Lewis,  15  Jur. 
512  ;  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  400.     Q"  I  think  that  we  may  collect  from  R.  v.  Morton,  the  only 
rule,  namely,  that  no  general  rule  exists.     The  question  in  every  case  is,  whether  there 
has  been  evidence  enough  to  satisfy  the  Court  before  which  the  trial  is  had  that,  to  use 
the  words  of  Bayley,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Denio,  'a  bona  fide  and  diligent  search  was  made  for 
the  instrument  where  it  was  likely  to  be  found  ; '  "  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.,  in  R.  ».  Kenil- 
worth,  7  Q.  B.  642.     The  truth  is,  then,  that  the  detailed  rules  mentioned  later  in  the 
paragraph  above  are  to  be  regarded  as  hints  of  caution  rather  than  rules  of  prac- 
tice.    The  tenor  of  Lord  Denman's  remark  is  generally  approved ;  for  similar  utterances, 
with  varying  phrasings  of  the  nature  of  the  search  required,  see  Doe  v.  Biggers,  6  Ga. 
188  ;  Simpson  v.  Norton,  45  Me.  281  ;  Glenn  v.  Rogers,  3  Md.  312  ;  Pickard  v.  Bailey, 
26  N.  H.  152;  Johnson  v.  Arnwine,  42  N.  J.  L.  451  ;  Jackson  v.  Frier,  16  Johns.  193; 
Flinn  ».  M'Gonigle,  9  W.  &  S.  75  ;  Congdon  v.  Morgan,  1 4  S.  C.  587  ;  Minor  v.  Til- 
lotson,  7  Pet.  99 ;  Fletcher  v.  Jackson,  23  Vt  581.     Nevertheless,  a  few  Courts  occa- 
sionally treat  such  sjiecific  cautions  as  definite  rules  to  bo  satisfied  ;  e.  g.  Cook  v.  Hunt, 
24  111.  535,  550.     Most  Supreme  Courts  follow  the  unsatisfactory  practice  of  re-exam- 
ining the  ruling  of  the  trial  Court  as  a  matter  of  law,  thus  burdening  th«  reports 
with  rulings  useless  as  precedents,  instead  of  leaving  the  whole  question  to  the  trial 
Court.] 

'  Ralph  v.  Brown,  8  Watts  &  Serg.  395  ;  FJCook  v.  Hunt,  24  111.  535.] 


§§  563  6-563  c.]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  685 

might  or  ought  to  have  been  deposited  in  a  public  office,  or  other 
particular  place,  that  place  must  be  searched.8  If  the  search  was 
made  by  a  third  person,  he  must  be  called  to-  testify  respecting  it.9 
And  if  the  paper  belongs  to  his  custody,  he  must  be  served  with  a 
sribpoena  duces  tecum  to  produce  it.10  If  it  be  an  instrument  which  is 
the  foundation  of  the  action,  and  which,  if  found,  the  defendant  may 
be  compelled  again  to  pay  to  a  bona  fide  holder,  the  plaintiff  must 
give  sufficient  proof  of  its  destruction  to  satisfy  the  Court  and  jury 
that  the  defendant  cannot  be  liable  to  pay  it  a  second  time.11  And  if 
the  instrument  was  executed  in  duplicate,  or  triplicate,  or  more  parts, 
the  loss  of  all  the  parts  must  be  proved  in  order  to  let  in  secondary 
evidence  of  the  contents.12  Satisfactory  proof  being  thus  made  of 
the  loss  of  the  instrument,  the  party  will  be  admitted  to  give  second- 
ary evidence  of  its  contents. 

§  563  c  [561].  Possession  of  Opponent ;  Notice  to  Produce.  [If 
the  writing  is  in  the  hands  of  the  opponent,  and  the  opponent  refuses 
to  produce  it,  the  writing  itself  may  be  regarded  as  unavailable  and 
other  evidence  of  its  contents  be  received.  But  it  will  be  seen  that 
a  preliminary  showing  must  first  be  made  of  the  above  two  facts, 
namely,  (1)  that  the  writing  is  in  the  opponent's  possession,  and 
(2)  that  he  refuses  to  produce  it. 

(1)  For  this  purpose,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show  actual  manual 
custody  by  the  opponent;  "it  is  enough  if  it  is  in  his  power." l  The 
presumption  of  receipt  that  follows  from  the  mailing  of  a  letter  duly 

8  PHowe  v.  Fleming,  123  Ind.  263.] 

9  QBut  where  the  searcher  himself  is  called,  and  wishes  to  testify  that  another  per- 
son of  whom  he  inquired  in  his  search  made  replies  as  to  the  loss  or  destruction  of  the 
document,  the  question  arises  whether  such  replies,  being  hearsay,  are  admissible.     It 
seems  to  have  been  settled  in  England  (after  conflicting  rulings  :  R.  v.  Denio,  7  B.  &  C. 
620  ;  R.  v.  Stourbridge,  8  id.  96  ;  R.  v.  Rawden,  2  A.  &  E.  156)  that  the  tenor  of  in- 
quiry and  reply  may  be  received,  on  the  sound  principle  that  the  replies  are  not  used 
as  themselves  hearsay  testimony  to  the  loss,  but  merely  as  indicating  that  the  search  was 
reasonable  in  stopping  at  that  point:  R.  v.  Kenilworth,  7  Q.  B.  642  ;  R.  v.  Saffron  Hill, 
1  E.  &  B.  93 ;  R.  ».  Braintree,  1  E.  &  E.  51  ;  Smith  v.  Smith,  10  Ir.  R.  Eq.  273.     Ac- 
cord: Harper  v.  Scott,  12  Ga.  125  ;  Higgins  r.  Watson,  1  Mich.  428.} 

w  Bull  v.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  14  ;  Qor  this,  see  post,  §  563  e.T 

"  Hansard  v.  Robinson,  7  B.  &  C.  90  ;  Lubbock  v.  Tribe,  3  M.  fc  W.  607.  See  also 
Peabody  v.  Dentou,  2  Gall.  351 ;  Anderson  v.  Robson,  2  Bay  495  ;  Davis  v.  Dodd, 
4  Taunt.  602  ;  Pierson  v.  Hutchinson,  2  Campb.  211  ;  Rowley  t>.  Ball,  3  Cowen  303  ; 
Kirby  v.  Sisson,  2  Wend.  550  ;  Murray  v.  Carret,  8  Call  373  ;  Mayor  v.  Johnson, 
3  Campb.  324  ;  Swift  v.  Stevens,  8  Conn.  431  ;  Ramuz  v.  Crowe,  11  Jur.  715  ;  post, 
Vol.  II,  §  156  ;  f_this  is  a  question  of  substantive  law,  which  has  in  many  jurisdictions 
been  dealt  with  by  statute.j 

12  Bull.  N.  P.  254 ;  B.  u.  Castleton,  6  T.  R.  236  ;  Doe  v.  Pulman,  3  Q.  B.  622  ; 
TAlivon  v.  Furnival,  1  Cr.  M.  &  R,  277,  292  :  Cincinn.  N.  0.  &  T.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Dis- 
brow,  76  Ga.  253 ;  Dyer  v.  Fredericks,  63  Me.  1 73  ;  compare  §  563  p,  postr\ 

1  [Parry  v.  May,  1  Moo.  &  Rob.  280.  Thus,  it  is  enough  to  show  custody  in  an 
agent :  Baldney  v.  Ritchie,  1  Stark.  338 ;  Partridge  v.  Coates,  Ry.  &  Mo.  153 ;  Irwin 
v.  Lever,  2  F.  &  F.  296  ;  for  other  instances  of  third  persons'  custody,  see  Sinclair  ». 
Stevenson,  1  C.  &  P.  582  ;  Morris  v.  Vanderen,  1  Dall.  64  ;  Gimbel  v.  Hufford,  46  lud 
125.3 


686  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

addressed  and  stamped 2  should  suffice  to  show  possession ;  *  and  the 
sufficiency  of  the  evidence  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  judge.4 

(2)  The  refusal  of  the  opponent  to  produce  the  document  is  treated 
as  making  the  document  unavailable  for  the  first  party,  and  thus  as 
permitting  him  to  prove  its  contents  otherwise ;  and  this  is  so  even 
though  he  might  have  obtained  a  statutory  order  compelling  produc- 
tion,6 and  even  though  the  opponent's  refusal  is  made  under  a  just 
claim  of  privilege.6  In  order  to  put  the  opponent  in  default  as  having 
refused  production,  it  is  usually  necessary  that  he  should  have  been 
notified  that  the  document  in  question  will  be  needed  at  the  trial. 
The  nature  of  the  notice  is  considered  in  §  562,  post ;  the  situations 
in  which  notice  is  unnecessary  may  first  be  considered.] 

There  are  three  cases  in  which  such  notice  to  produce  is  not  neces- 
sary. First,  where  the  instrument  to  be  produced  and  that  to  be 
proved  are  duplicate  originals ;  for,  in  such  case,  the  original  being 
in  the  hands  of  the  other  party,  it  is  in  his  power  to  contradict  the 
duplicate  original  by  producing  the  other,  if  they  vary ; 7  secondly, 
where  the  instrument  to  be  proved  is  itself  a  notice,  such  as  a  notice 
to  quit,  or  notice  of  the  dishonor  of  a  bill  of  exchange ; 8  and,  thirdly, 
where,  from  the  nature  of  the  action,  the  defendant  has  notice  that 
the  plaintiff  intends  to  charge  him  with  possession  of  the  instrument, 
as,  for  example,  in  trover  for  a  bill  of  exchange.9  And  the  principle 

2  [Ante,  §  40.] 

8  LAugur  S.  A.  &  G.  Co.  v.  Whittier,  117  Mass.  451  ;  but  sundry  distinctions  may 
here  be  taken;  see  Dana  i>.  Kemble,  19  Pick.  112;  Roberts  v.  Spencer,  123  Mass. 
397  ;  Dix  v.  Atkins,  128  id.  43  ;  Gage  v.  Meyers,  59  Mich.  300 ;  Rosenthal  v.  Walker, 
111  U.  S.  185.] 

*  QHarvey  v.  Mitchell,  2  Moo.  &  Rob.  366 ;]  {Dix  v.  Atkins,  128  Mass.  43  ;  Rob- 
erts v.  Spencer,  123  id.  397.  { 

6  PMcLain  v.  Winchester,  17  Mo.  49.] 

TR.  v.  Barker,  3  C.  &  P.  591 ;  State  v.  Boomer,  103  la.  106.] 

7  Jury  v.  Orchard,  2  B.  &  P.  39.  41  ;  Doe  v.  Somerton,  7  Q.  B.  58  ;  s.  c.  9  Jur. 
775  ;  Swain  v.  Lewis,  2  C.  M.  &  R.  261 ;  TPhilipson  v.  Chase,  2  Carapb.  110  ;  Hollen- 
beck  v.  Stanberry,  38  la.  325 ;  Cleveland  R.  Co.  v.  Perkins,  17  Mich.  296.     But  this 
rests  in  reality  upon  a  different  principle  ;  see  §  563  p,  postr\ 

8  QBut  this  must  be  taken  with  qualifications.     (1)  A  notice  may  often  be  a  dupli- 
cate original,  as  if  two  copies  are  written  at  the  same  time,  and  one  served  and  the 
other  retained  ;  no  notice  would  be  necessary  before  using  the  latter :  .Tory  v.  Orchard, 
supra;  Gottlieb  v.  Danvers,  1  Esp.  455;  Johnson  v.  Haight,  13  Johns.  470;  Barr  v. 
Armstrong,  56  Mo.  577,  586.     (2)  On  the  principle  of  the  next  note,  a  notice  may 
sometimes  in  itself  contain  warning  that  it  will  be  needed  —  as,  a  notice  to  quit  or  a 
notice  to  produce,  — and  thus  notice  to  produce  it  will  not  be  necessary  ;  see  tlie  cases 
following.     (3)  A  kind  of  rule-of-thumb  has  often  been  advanced  that,  irrespective  of 
the  preceding  principles,  "  a  notice  to  produce  a  notice  is  not  necessary."      But  this 
rule  cannot  be  taken  as  a  safe  guide,   for  such  notice  is  often  required.     It  is  not 
always  easy  to  ascertain  which  of  the  preceding  rules  is  in  the  Court's  mind.     In  the 
following  cases  notice  to  produce  a  notice  was  held  necessary :    Langdon  v.  Hulls, 

5  Esp.  156  ;  Jones  v.  Robinson,  11  Ark.  504  ;  Frank  v.  Longstreet,  44  Ga.  178  ;  Rutl. 

6  B.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thrall,  35  Vt.  536  (leading  case).     In  the  following  cases  it  was 
held  unnecessary  :  Kine  t>.  Beaumont,  3  B.  &  B.  288  (leading  case)  ;  Swain  v.  Lewis, 
2  C.  M.  &  R.  261  ;  Gethin  v.  Walker,  59  Cal.  502;  Brown  v.  Booth,  66  111.  419  ; 
McLenon  v.  Bank,  7  T.  B.  Monr.  676 ;  Loranger  v.  Jardine,  56  Mich.  518  ;  Lenvitt  v. 
Simes,  3  N.  H.  14;  McMillan  v.  Baxley,  112  N.  C.  578;  Eisenhart  v.  Slaynmker,  14 
S.  &  R.  153.] 

9  Jolley  v.  Taylor,  1  Campb.  143  ;  Scott  V.  Jones,  4  Taunt.  865 ;  Bucher  v.  Jnrratt, 


§§  563  e-563  d.]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  687 

of  the  rule  does  not  require  notice  to  the  adverse  party  to  produce  a 
paper  belonging  to  a  third  person,  of  which  he  has  fraudulently  ob- 
tained possession ;  as  where,  after  service  of  a  subpoena  duces  tecum, 
the  adverse  party  had  received  the  paper  from  the  witness  in  fraud 
of  the  subpoena.10  Proof  that  the  adverse  party,  or  his  attorney,  has 
the  instrument  in  court,  does  not,  it  seems,  render  notice  to  produce 
it  unnecessary ;  for  the  object  of  the  notice  is  not  only  to  procure  the 
paper,  but  to  give  the  party  an  opportunity  to  provide  the  proper 
testimony  to  support  or  impeach  it.11 

§  563  d  [562].  Same ;  Procedure  in  giving  Notice.  The  notice 
may  be  directed  to  the  party  or  to  his  attorney,  and  may  be  served  on 
either; l  and  it  must  describe  the  writing  demanded,  so  as  to  leave  no 
doubt  that  the  party  was  aware  of  the  particular  instrument  intended 
to  be  called  for.2  But  as  to  the  time  and  place  of  the  service  no  pre- 
cise rule  can  be  laid  down,  except  that  it  must  be  such  as  to  enable 
the  party,  under  the  known  circumstances  of  the  case,  to  comply  with 
the  call.8  Generally,  if  the  party  dwells  in  another  town  than  that 

3  B.  &  P.  143  ;  Whitchead  v.  Scott,  1  Moo.  &  R.  2  ;  Boss  v.  Bruce,  1  Day  100  ;  People 
v.  Holbrook,  13  Johns.  90  ;  M'Lean  v.  Hertzog,  6  S.  &  R.  154 ;  THow  v.  Hall,  14  East 
274;  R.  v.  Elworthy,  10  Cox  Cr.  579;  Rose  v.  Lewis,  10  MfcL  483.  So  also  on  a 
criminal  charge  of  forgery  or  larceny  :  R.  v.  Haworth,  4  C.  &  P.  254  ;  McGinnis  v. 
State,  24  Ind.  500  (leading  case)  ;  People  v.  Holbrook,  13  Johns.  90  ;  Com.  v.  Messin- 
ger,  1  Binn.  273  (leading  case).  For  examples  of  the  principle,  see  Colling  v.  Treweek, 
6  B.  &  C.  394 ;  Read  v.  Gamble,  10  A.  &  E.  597  ;  R.  ».  Elworthy,  10  Cox  Cr.  579  ; 
Columb.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Tillman,  79  Ga.  607  ;  Spencer  v.  Boardman,  118  111.  553  ; 
State  v.  Mayberry,  48  Me.  218  ;  Dade  v.  Ins.  Co.,  54  Minn.  336;  State  v.  Flanders, 
118  Mo.  227  ;  Howell  v.  Huyck,  2  Abb.  App.  423  (leading  case).  Compare  the  prin- 
ciple of  §  563  o,  post.] 

w  2  Tidd's  Pr.  803  ;  FJLeeds  v.  Cook,  4  Esp.  256 ;  Neally  v.  Greenough,  25  N.  H. 
825.] 

11  Doe  v.  Grey,  1  Stark.  283 ;  Exall  v.  Partridge,  ib.  ;  Knight  v.  Waterford,  4  Y.  & 
C.  284  ;  [Bate  v.  Kinsey,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  38.  But  this  doctrine  has  been  repudiated  in 
England  :  Dwyer  v.  Collins,  7  Exch.  639  (leading  case) ;  for  it  rests  on  a  misunder- 
standing of  principle  ;  the  real  purpose  of  the  requirement  of  notice  is  to  show  that 
the  document  is  not  within  the  power  of  the  first  party  to  obtain,  and  a  notice  at  the 
trial,  followed  by  refusal,  suffices  to  show  this,  where  the  document  is  in  Court.  This 
is  the  view  universally  taken  in  this  country  :  Ferguson  v.  Miles,  8  111.  358,  364  ;  Dana 
v.  Boyd,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  587 ;  Hanselman  v.  Doyle,  90  Mich.  142  (discretion)  ;  Bickley 
v.  Bank,  39  S.  C.  281-3 

1  L~Att'y-Gen'l  v.  Le  Merchant,  2  T.  E.  201,  note  ;  Houseman  v.  Roberts,  5  C.  &  P. 
894  ;  Mattocks  ».  Stearns,  9  Vt.  326.     But  on  the  facts  it  may  not  be  sufficient  to 
serve  it  upon  the  attorney  :  Aflalo  v.  Fourdrinier,  M.  &  M.  334,  note ;  Byrne  v.  Harvey, 
2  Mo.  &  Rob.  89  ;  Lathrbp  v.  Mitchell,  47  Ga.  610. 3 

2  [Rogers  »•  distance,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  179  ;  Lawrence  v.  Clark,  14  M.  &  W.  250  ; 
Burke  v.  T.  M.  W.  Co.,  12  Cal.  403.     A  general  notice  to  produce  all  documents  relat- 
ing to  the  cause  would  probably  be  insufficient :  Jones  t>.  Edwards,  1  McCl.  &  Y.  139  ; 
Smyth  v.  Sandeman,  2  Cox  Cr.  239  ;  France  v.  Lucy,  Ry.  &  Mo.  341.     But  the  precise 
document  need  not  be  specified  :  Jacob  v.  Lee,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  33  ;  Morris  v.  Hauser,  ib. 
892  ;  McDowell  v.  Ins.  Co.,  164  Mass.  444.] 

8  ["Rogers  v.  distance,  2  Mo.  &  Rob.  179  ;  Sturge  v.  Buchanan,  10  A.  k  E.  598  ; 
Lloyd  v.  Mostyn,  2  Dowl.  Pr.  N.  s.  476  ;  Littleton  v.  Clayton,  77  Ala.  571  ;  Glenn  v. 
Rogers  3  Md.  312  ;  the  sufficiency  of  time  should  be  left  entirely  to  the  trial  Court's 
discretion  :  George  v.  Thompson,  4  Dowl.  Pr.  656  ;  Burke  v.  T.  M.  W.  Co.,  12  Cal.  403  ; 
Cummings  v.  McKinney,  5  111.  57  ;  Brock  v.  Ins.  Co.,  la.,  75  N.  W.  683  ;  Wiuona  v. 
Huff,  11  Minn.  119.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  notice  must  be  in  writing  :  Cum- 
mings v.  McKiuney,  5  111.  57  ;  contra :  Smith  v.  Young,  1  Camp.  440.] 


688  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

in  -which  the  trial  is  had,  a  service  on  him  at  the  place  where  the  trial 
is  had,  or  after  he  has  left  home  to  attend  the  Court,  is  not  sufficient.4 
But  if  the  party  has  gone  abroad,  leaving  the  cause  in  the  hands  of 
his  attorney,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  left  with  the  attorney  all  the 
papers  material  to  the  cause,  and  the  notice  should  therefore  be  served 
on  the  latter.5  The  notice,  also,  should  generally  be  served  previous 
to  the  commencement  of  the  trial.6  [If  the  opponent,  having  con- 
trol of  the  document,  refuses  to  produce  it  in  response  to  the  notice, 
he  will  be  prevented,  as  a  penalty,  from  afterwards  offering  it  on 
his  own  behalf  to  contradict  the  evidence  of  contents  offered  by  the 
'  first  party.7] 

§  563  e.  Writings  in  a  Third  Person's  Control ;  Writings  out  of 
the  Jurisdiction.  [(1)  If  the  writing  is  in  a  third  person's  control, 
and  the  person  is  within  the  jurisdiction,  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  un- 
available for  the  party  desiring  to  use  it,  until  he  has  by  subpoena 
duces  tecum  resorted  to  the  power  of  the  law  to  obtain  it ;  so  that 
the  mere  fact  of  the  third  person's  possession,  or  of  notice  to  him,  or 
demand  upon  him,  is  insufficient  to  excuse  non-production.1  If  the 
person  would  be  privileged  from  producing  the  document,2  it  would 
seem  that  he  ought  still  to  be  summoned,  since  it  cannot  be  assumed 
that  he  would  not  waive  his  privilege ;  but  upon  this  point  there  is  a 
difference  of  judicial  opinion.8 

(2)  If  the  writing  is  in  the  control  of  a  third  person  without  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Court,  no  resort  to  legal  force  is  of  service.  But 
it  is  possible  to  maintain  that  the  party  desiring  to  use  the  document 
should  at  least  make  an  effort  to  obtain  the  writing  by  consent  of  its 

*  George  v.  Thompson,  4  Dowl.  656;  Foster  v.  Pointer,  9  C.  &  P.  718.    See  also, 
as  to  the  time  of  service,  Holt  v.  Miers,  9  C.  &  P.  191  ;  R.  v.  Kitsen,  20  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 
690  ;  Dears.  C.  C.  187. 

6  [Bryan  t>.  Wagstaff,  2  C.  &  P.  125.  As  to  documents  in  another  jurisdiction  bnt 
in  the  party's  control,  see  Ehrensperger  v.  Anderson,  3  Exch.  148  ;  Bushnell  v.  Colony, 
28  111.  204  ;  Mortlock  v.  Williams,  76  Mich.  568  ;  Dade  v.  Ins.  Co.,  54  Minn.  336. 
That  the  party  is  confined  in  jail  is  no  objection  :  R.  v.  Robinson,  5  Cox  Cr.  183.1 

«  2  Tidd's  Pr.  803  ;  Hughes  v.  Budd,  8  Dowl.  315  ;  Firkin  v.  Edwards,  9  C.  &  P. 
478  ;  Gibbons  v.  Powell,  ib.  634  ;  Bate  v.  Kinsey,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  38  ;  Emerson  v.  Fisk, 
6  Greenl.  200  ;  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  485,  486. 

1  jDoon  u.  Donaher,  113  Mass.  151  ;  Gage  v.  Campbell,  131  id.  566  ;|  FJDoe  v. 
Cockell,  6  C.  &  P.  525  ;  Doe  t>.  Hodgson,  12  A.  &  E.  135  ;  Bognrt  v.  Brown,  5  Pick. 
18 ;  McGinness  v.  School  District,  39  Minn.  499 ;  Flemming  ?».  Lawless,  N.  J.  Eq.,  38 
Atl.  864;  see  Helzer  v.  Helzer,  Pa.,  41  Atl.  40;  contra,  but  unsound:  Moulton  v. 
Mason,  21  Mich.  363.] 

1  £R.  v.  Castleton,  1  T.  R.  236 ;  Whitford  v.  Tritin,  10  Bing.  395  ;  Rncker  v. 
McNeely,  5  Blackf.  123  ;  Dickerson  v.  Talbot,  14  B.  Monr.  60;  Chnplain  v.  Briscoe, 
\  Sin.  &  M.  198 ;  contra,  semble.,  So.  Car.  C.  C.  P.  c.  12,  §  419  ;  in  Boaworth  v.  Clark, 
62  Ga.  286,  it  is  left  to  the  trial  Court's  discretion.  It  has  been  ruled  in  England  that 
even  the  person's  disobedience  to  the  subpoena  would  not  be  sufficient :  Jesus  College  w. 
Gibbs,  1  Y.  &  C.  145,  156  ;  R.  v.  Llanfaethly,  2  E.  &  B.  940  ;  but  this  would  hardly 
be  followed.] 

•  [Ante,  i  240  ff.  (attorney  and  client)  ;  §  469  n  (title-deeds)  ;  §  469  /  (self-crimi- 
nation)."] 

9  T Accord:  U.  8.  v.  Porter,  8  Day  283  ;  contra:  Phelps  v.  Prew,  8  E.  &  B.  430  ; 
see  Richards  r.  Stewart,  2  Day  328  ;  R.  v.  Leatharn,  3  E.  &  E.  658  ;  State  ».  Durham, 
N.  C .,  28  S.  E.  26.] 


§§563^-563^.]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  689 

possessor ;  *  and  upon  this  point  there  is  much  difference  of  opinion. 
A  number  of  Courts  distinctly  insist  that  some  such  effort  must  have 
been  made ; 6  the  majority  of  rulings  either  assume  or  decide  that  no 
effort  to  obtain  is  necessary  ;  •  and  in  a  few  rulings  the  effort  actually 
made  was  held  sufficient  on  the  facts.7] 

§  563  /  [91].  Public  Documents.1  Thus,  the  contents  of  any  rec- 
ord of  a  judicial  Court,  and  of  entries  in  any  other  public  books  or 
registers,  may  be  proved  by  au  examined  copy.  This  exception,  ex- 
tends to  all  records  and  entries  of  a  public  nature,  in  books  required 
by  law  to  be  kept ;  and  is  admitted  because  of  the  inconvenience  to 
the  public  which  the  removal  of  such  documents  might  occasion,  es- 
pecially if  they  were  wanted  in  two  places  at  the  same  time ;  and 
also,  because  of  the  public  character  of  the  facts  they  contain,  and  the 
consequent  facility  of  detection  of  any  fraud  or  error  in  the  copy.* 
[The  extent  to  which  this  principle  has  been  applied,  and  the  kinds 
of  documents  which,  by  statute  or  by  decision,  are  treated  as  not 
necessary  to  be  produced,  have  already  been  considered  in  dealing 
with  the  subject  of  public  documents  and  judicial  records.8] 

§  563  g  [92].  Appointments  to  Office.  For  the  same  reason,  and 
from  the  strong  presumption  arising,  from  the  undisturbed  exercise 

4  [Jit  has  been  ruled  in  England  that  the  document's  being  out  of  the  jurisdiction 
is  never  an  excuse  for  not  producing  it:  Steinkeller  v.  Newton,  9  C.  &  P.  313  ;  but 
this  is  unsound,  and  would  probably  not  be  followed  anywhere. ] 

8  pee  Boyle  v.  Wiseman,  10  Exch.  647  ;  Townsend  c.  Atwater,  5  Day  298  ;  Waite 
v.  High,  96  la.  742;  Wood  v.  Ctillen,  13  Minn.  394  ;  Farrell  v.  Brennan,  32  Mo.  328  ; 
Robards  v.  McLean,  8  Ired.  522  :  Turner  v.  Yates,  16  How.  14,  26  ;  Comstock  ». 
Carnley,  4  Blatchf.  58;  Dwyer  ».  Dunbar,  5  Wall.  318;]  jBeall  v.  Poole,  27  Md. 
645  ;  Lowry  v.  Harris,  12  Minn.  255 ;  Leese  r.  Clark,  29  Cal.  664 ;  Peck  ».  Parchen, 
52  Iowa  46  ;  Newcomb  v.  Noble,  10  Gray  47. } 

6  [Bruce  ».  Nicolopulo,  11  Exch.  129  ;  Pensacola  R.  Co.  v.  Schaffer,  76  Ala.  233; 
Bozeiuan  v.  Browning,  31  Ark.  364 ;  Zellerbach  v.  Allenberg,  99  Cal.  57,  73  ;  Shep- 
ard  v.  Giddings,  22  Conn.  282 ;  Miller  v.  McKinnon,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  467 ;  Mitchell  v. 
Jacobs,  17  111.  235;  Hall  v.  Bishop,  78  Ind.  370  ;  Waller  v.  Cralle,  8  B.  Monr.  11; 
Knickerbocker  v.  Wileox,  83  Mich.  201 ;  Kleeberg  v.  Schrader,  Minn.,  72  N.  W.  59  ; 
St.  Louis  P.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen,  9  Mo.  416,  439  ;  Reed  v.  State,  15  Oh.  217',  Otto  ». 
Trump,  115  Pa.  425  ;  Hagaman  ».  Gillis,  9  S.  D.  61  ;  Burton  v.  Driggs,  20  Wall.  125  ; 
Hayward  R.  Co.  ».  Duncklee,  30  Vt.  29,  39.] 

7  £Beall  v.  Bearing,  7  Ala.  124  ;  Fisher  ».  Greene,  95  111.  94;  Bullis  v.  Easton, 
96  la.  513  ;  Combs  v.  Breathitt  Co.,  Ky.,  46  S.  W.  505  ;  Sayles  v.  Bradley  &  M.  Co., 
Tex.,  49  S.  W.  209.] 

1  [The  first  sentence  in  the  original  text  read:  "The  rule  rejecting  secondary  evi- 
dence is  subject  to  some  exceptions  ;  grounded  either  on  public  convenience,  or  on  the 
nature  of  the  facts  to  he  proved."  But,  as  already  pointed  out,  these  various  con- 
ditions excusing  production  of  the  original  are  not  ao  much  exceptions  to  the  rule  as 
parts  of  the  rule  itself.] 

«  Buller  N.  P.  226  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  189  ;  {Berry  v.  Raddin,  11  Allen  577  ;  Winers 
r.  Laird,  27  Tex.  616;  Davis  v.  Gray,  17  Ohio  St.  330  ;  Camden  R.  R.  v.  Stewart, 
4  Green  N.  J.  343-  Curry  v.  Raymond,  28  Pa.  St.  144;  Bovee  v.  McLean,  24  Wis.  225  ; 
Dunham  v.  Chicago,  55  III  357  ;  Coons  v.  Renick,  11  Tex.  134.  | 

But  this  exception  does  not  extend  to  an  answer  in  Chancery,  where  the  party  is 
indicted  for  perjury  therein  ;  for  there  the  original  must  be  produced,  in  order  to  iden- 
tify the  party,  by  proof  of  his  handwriting;  the  same  reason  applies  to  depositions  and 
affidavits  :  R.  t>.  Howard,  1  M.  &  Rob.  189. 

*  rAtite,  Chaps.  XXVIII  and  XXIX  ;  see  the  explanation  in  §  478,  note  2,  as  t/ 
the  relative  bearing  of  various  principles  on  the  use  of  such  documents.] 
VOL.  i.  —  44 


690  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

of  a  public  office,  that  the  appointment  to  it  is  valid,  it  is  not,  in  gen- 
eral, necessary  to  prove  the  written  appointments  of  public  officers. 
All  who  are  proved  to  have  acted  as  such  are  presumed  to  have  been 
duly  appointed  to  the  office,  until  the  contrary  appears ; 1  and  it  is 
not  material  how  the  question  arises,  whether  in  a  civil  or  criminal 
case,  nor  whether  the  officer  is  or  is  not  a  party  to  the  record ; 2  unless, 
being  plaintiff,  he  unnecessarily  avers  his  title  to  the  office,  or  the 
mode  of  his  appointment ;  in  which  case,  as  has  been  already  shown, 
the  proof  must  support  the  entire  allegation.8  These  and  similar  ex- 
ceptions are  also  admitted,  as  not  being  within  the  reason  of  the  rule, 
which  calls  for  primary  evidence ;  namely,  the  presumption  of  fraud, 
arising  from  its  non-production. 

§  563  A  [93].    Summaries  of  Voluminous  Entries.     A  further  re- 

1  U.  S.  p.  Reybarn,  6  Pet.  352,  367  ;  K.  ».  Gordon,  2  Leach  Or.  C.  581,  585,  586  ; 
R.   r.  Shelley,  1  id.  381,  n.  ;  Jacob  v.  U.  S.,  1    Brockenb.  520  ;  Milnor  v.  Tillotson, 
7   Pet.  100,  101  ;  Berryman  v.  Wise,  4  T.  R.  366  ;  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dan- 
dridge,  12  Wheat.  70  ;  Doe  v.  Brawn,  5  B.  &  A.  243  ;  Cannell  ».  Curtis,  2  Bing.N.  C. 
228,  234  ;  R.  v.  Verelst,  3  Cainpb.  432  ;  R.  v.  Howard,  1  M.  &  Rob.  187  ;  McGahey  ». 
Alston,  2  M.  &  W.  206,  211  ;  R.  r.  Vickery,  12  Q.  B.  478  ;  j  Webber  v.  Davis,  5  Allen 
393;    Jacob   v.    U.    S.,   1   Brock.   520;   New    Portland  v.    Kingfield,  55  Me.   172; 
Woolsey  v.  Rondout,  4  Abb.  App.  Dec.  639  ;(   L~State  v.  Findley,  101  Mo.  217  ;  State 
v.  Taylor,  Vt.,  39  Atl.  447  ;  ante,  §§  38  a,  83.]     But  there  must  be  some  color  of  right 
to  the  office,  or  an  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  the  public  for  such  length  of  time  as 
will  authorize  the  presumption  of  at  least  a  colorable  election  or  appointment :  Wilcox 
».  Smith,  5  Wend.  231,  234.     This  rule  is  applied  only  to  public  offices;  where  the 
office  is  private,  some  proof  must  be  offered  of  its  existence  and  of  the  appointment  of 
the  agent  or  incumbent :  Short  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  464,  468. 

An  officer  de  facto  is  one  who  exercises  an  office  under  color  of  right,  by  virtue  of 
some  appointment  or  election,  or  of  such  acquiescence  of  the  public  as  will  authorize 
the  presumption,  at  least  of-a  colorable  appointment  or  election  ;  being  distinguished, 
on  the  one  hand,  from  a  mere  usurper  of  office,  and  on  the  other  from  an  officer  de 
jure:  Wilcox  v.  Smith,  5  Wend.  231  ;  Plymouth  v.  Painter,  17  Conn.  585;  Burke  v. 
Elliott,  4  Ired.  355.  Evidence  is  admissible,  not  only  to  show  that  he  exercised  the 
office  before  or  at  the  period  in  question,  but  also,  limited  to  a  reasonable  time,  that  he 
exercised  it  afterwards :  Doe  v.  Young,  8  Q.  B.  63.  QBut  distinguish  from  the  present 
question  —  proof  of  a  de  jure  officer's  lawful  apjxnntment  —  the  question  of  substan- 
tive law  whether  a  de  facto  officer's  acts  are  valid.] 

2  R.  ».  Gordon,  2  Leach  C.  C.  581  ;  Berryman  v.  Wise,  4  T.  R.  366;  M'Gahey  v. 
Alston,  2  M.  &  W.  206,  211  ;  Radford  v.  Mclntosh,  3  T.  R.  632 ;  Cross  v.  Kaye,  6  id. 
663  ;  James  v.  Brawn,  5  B.  &  Aid.  243  ;  R.  v.  Jones,  2  Carnpb.  131  ;  R.  v.  Verelst, 
3  id.  432  ;  {Corn.  v.  McCue,  16  Gray  226 ;  Com.   v.  Kane,  108  Mass.  423  ;  Sawyer 
o.  Steele,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  464.}     A  commissioner  appointed  to  take  affidavits  is  a  pub- 
lic officer,  within  this  exception  :  R.  v.  Howard,  1  M.  &  Rob.   187  ;  see  also  U.  S.  v. 
Reyburn,  6  Pet.  352,  367  ;  R.  v.  Newton,  1  Car.  &  Kir.  469 ;  Doe  v.  Barnes,  10  Jur. 
520  ;  8  Q.  B.  1037;  Plumer  v.  Brisco,  12  Jur.  351 ;  11  Q.  B.  46  ;  Doe  v.  Young,  8  id.  63. 

•  Supra,  §  56  ;  Cannell  o.  Curtis,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  228 ;  Moises  v.  Thornton,  8  T.  R. 
303  ;  The  People  v.  Hopson,  1  Denio  574.  In  an  action  by  the  sheriff  for  his  pound- 
age, proof  that  he  has  acted  as  sheriff  has  been  hold  sufficient  prima  facie  evidence 
that  he  is  so,  without  proof  of  his  appointment :  Bunbury  v.  Matthews,  1  Car.  &  Kir. 
380.  But  in  New  York  it  has  been  held  otherwise:  Peoples.  Hopson,  supra.  jSo, 
although  proof  of  the  legal  organization  of  a  corporation  requires  the  production  of 
the  record  which  is  required 'by  the  statutes,  or  a  certified  copy  of  it,  yet  the  fact  that 
the  corporation  is  rfe  facto  a  corporation  and  transacts  a  certain  kind  of  business,  may 
be  proved  by  its  officers,  or  other  relevant  evidence  :  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Glendon  Co., 
120  Mass.  97;  Miller  v.  Wild  Cat,  etc.  Co.,  52  Ind.  61  ;  its  corporate  acts  should  be 
proved  by  its  records:  Central  Bridge,  etc.  Corporation  v.  Lowell,  15  Gray  106  ;  Bay 
View  Aasoc.  t>.  Williams,  60  Cal.  353.  | 


§§  563  #-563/]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  691 

laxation  of  the  rule  has  been  admitted,  where  the  evidence  is  the 
result  of  voluminous  facts,  or  of  the  inspection  of  many  books  and 
papers,  the  examination  of  which  could  not  conveniently  take  place 
in  court.  Thus,  if  there  be  one  invariable  mode  in  which  bills  of 
exchange  have  been  drawn  between  particular  parties,  this  may  be 
proved  by  the  testimony  of  a  witness  conversant  with  their  habit  of 
business,  and  speaking  generally  of  the  fact,  without  producing  the 
bills.  But  if  the  mode  of  dealing  has  not  been  uniform,  the  case  does 
not  fall  within  this  exception,  but  is  governed  by  the  rule  requiring 
the  production  of  the  writings.1  So,  also,  a  witness  who  has  in- 
spected the  accounts  of  the  parties,  though  he  may  not  give  evidence 
of  their  particular  contents,  may  be  allowed  to  speak  to  the  general 
balance,  without  producing  the  accounts.2  And  where  the  question 
is  upon  the  solvency  of  a  party  at  a  particular  time,  the  general  re- 
sult of  an  examination  of  his  books  and  securities  may  be  stated  in 
like  manner.8  [Generally,  however,  it  is  said  that  the  offering  party 
must  at  least  have  the  originals  at  hand  where  the  opponent  can  con- 
sult them  if  he  chooses.4] 

§  563  i  [94].  Non-portable  Writings,  tinder  this  head  may  be 
mentioned  the  case  of  inscriptions  on  walls  and  fixed  tables,  mural 
monuments,  gravestones,  surveyors'  marks  on  boundary  trees,  etc., 
which,  as  they  cannot  conveniently  be  produced  in  court,  may  be 
proved  by  secondary  evidence.1 

2  (5)  Exceptions  to  the  Rule. 

563  j  [95].  Voir  Dire.  Another  exception  is  made,  in  the  examina- 
tion of  a  witness  on  the  voir  dire,  and  in  preliminary  inquiries  of 

1  Spencer  v.  Billing,  3  Campb.  310. 

2  Roberts  v.  Doxon,  Peake  83.     But  not  as  to  particular  facts  appearing  on  the 
books  or  deducible  from  the  entries :  Dupuy  v.  Truman,  2  Y.   &  C.   341;  jHunt  ». 
Roylance,  11  Cush.  117  ;  Poor  v.  Robinson,  13  Bush  290.} 

8  Meyer  v.  Sefton,  2  Stark.  274. 

4  £For  additional  instances  of  the  principle's  application,  covering  the  proof  of 
vouchers,  account-books,  copyright-violations,  official  entries  and  records,  and  the 
like,  see  Lewis  v.  Fullerton,  2  Beav.  6  ;  1  De  G.  &  Sm.  260  ;  Woodruff  v.  State, 
61  Ark.  157,  170 ;  San  Pedro  L.  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  Cal.,  53  Pac.  410 ;  Adams  t>.  Board, 
37  Fla.  266 ;  Gant  v.  Carmichael,  31  Ga.  737  ;  Thornburgh  v.  R.  Co.,  14  Ind.  499 ; 
Rogers  t>.  State,  99  id.  218  ;  Hollingsworth  v.  State,  111  id.  289  ;  Equit.  Ace.  I.  Co. 
v.  Stout,  135  id.  444;  Chic.  S.  L.  &  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott,  141  id.  267  ;  State  w. 
Caldwell,  79  la.  432  ;  State  v.  Brady,  100  id.  1 91 ;  Lynn  v.  Cumberland,  77  Md.  449 ; 
Boston  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Dana.  1  Gray  83,  89,  104  (leading  case) ;  Walker  v.  Curtis,  116 
Mass.  98;  Bicknell  v.  Mellett,  160  id.  328  ;  Hoffman  v.  Peck,  Mich.,  71  N.  W.  1095; 
State  i?.  Levventhal,  55  Miss.  589;  Ritchie  v.  Kinney,  46  Mo.  298  ;  State  v.  Findley,  101 
id.  217  ;  Bartley  v.  State,  Nebr.,  73  N.  W.  744  ;  Shepherd  v.  Hamilton  Co.,  8  Heisk. 
380  ;  Lawrence  v.  Dana,  4  Clitf.  1,  72  ;  Burton  v.  Driggs,  20  Wiill.  125  ;  Ludtke  ». 
Herzog,  30  U.  S.  App.  637  ;  West  Pub.  Co.  v.  Lawyers'  Coop.  P.  Co.,  id.,  79  Fed.  756  ; 
Rollins  v.  Board,  id.,  90  Fed.  575  :  North  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Keyes,  id.,  91  Fed.  47-3 

1  Doe  v.  Cole,  6  C.  &  P.  360  ;  R.  v.  Fursey,  ib.  81  ;  QCobden  v.  Boulton,  2  Camp. 
108  ;  Bartholomew  v.  Stephens,  8  C.  &  P.  728  ;  Mortimer  v.  MrCallan,  6  M.  &  W. 
58  ;  Sayer  v.  Glossop,  2  Exch.  409;  Steams  v.  Doe,  12  Gray  482.]  But  if  they  can 
conveniently  be  brought  into  court,  their  actual  production  is  required  ;  thus,  where 
it  was  proposed  to  show  the  contents  of  a  printed  notice,  hung  up  in  the  office  of 
the  party,  who  was  a  carrier,  parol  evidence  of  its  contents  was  rejected,  it  not  being 
affixed  to  the  freehold  :  Jones  v.  Tarlton,  1  Dowl.  Pr.  N.  s.  625,  £9  M.  &  W.  675 ; 
see  R.  v.  Edge,  Wills,  Circ.  Evid.  5th  Am.  ed.  212  (coffin-plate). j 


692  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

the  same  nature.  If,  upon  such  examination,  the  witness  discloses 
the  existence  of  a  written  instrument  affecting  his  competency,  he 
may  also  be  interrogated  as  to  its  contents.  To  a  case  of  this  kind, 
the  general  rule  requiring  the  production  of  the  instrument,  or  notice 
to  produce  it,  does  not  apply  ;  for  the  objecting  party  may  have  been 
ignorant  of  its  existence,  until  it  was  disclosed  by  the  witness ;  nor 
could  he  be  supposed  to  know  that  such  a  witness  would  be  produced. 
So,  for  the  like  reason,  if  the  witness  on  the  voir  dire  admits  any 
other  fact  going  to  render  him  incompetent,  the  effect  of  which  has 
been  subsequently  removed  by  a  written  document,  or  even  a  record, 
he  may  speak  to  the  contents  of  such  writing,  without  producing  it ; 
the  rule  being  that  where  the  objection  arises  on  the  voir  dire,  it 
may  be  removed  on  the  voir  dire.1  If,  however,  the  witness  produces 
the  writing,  it  must  be  read,  being  the  best  evidence.2 

§  563  k  [96],  Admissions  of  Opponent.  It  may  be  proper,  in 
this  place,  to  consider  the  question,  whether  a  verbal  admission  of  the 
contents  of  a  writing,  by  the  party  himself,  will  supersede  the  neces- 
sity of  giving  notice  to  produce  it ;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  such 
admission,  being  made  against  the  party's  own  interest,  can  be  used, 
as  primary  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the  writing,  against  him  and 
those  claiming  under  him.  Upon  this  question,  there  appears  some 
discrepancy  in  the  authorities  at  Nisi  Prius.1 

1  Phil.   &  Am.  on   Evid.   149  ;  1   Phil.   Evid.  154,   155  ;  Batchers'  Co.  v.  Jones, 
1  Esp.  160  ;  Botham  v.  Swingler,  ib.  164  ;  R.  v.  Gisburn,  15  East  57  ;  Carlisle  v.  Eady, 
1  C.  &  P.  234,  n.  ;  Miller  v.  Mariner's  Church,  7  Greenl.  51  ;  Sewell  v.  Stubba,  1  C. 
&  P.  73  ;  pklacdonnell  v.  Evans,  11  C.  B.  930,  937 ;  Robertson  v.  Allen,  16  Ala.  106  ; 
Babcock  v.  Smith,  31  111.  57  ;  Oaks  v.  Weller,  16  Vt.  63.] 

2  Butler  v.   Carver,   2  Stark.  434.     A  distinction  has  been  taken  between  cases 
where  the  competency  appears  from  the  examination  of  the  witness,  and  those  where  it 
is  already  apparent  from  the  record,  without  his  examination  ;  and  it  has  been  held 
that  the  latter  case  falls  within  the  rule,  and  not  within  the  exception,  and  that  the 
writing  which  restores  the  competency  must  be  produced.     See  ace.  Goodhay  v.  Hen- 
dry,  1  M.  &  M.  319,  per  Best,  C.  J.,  and  id.  321,  n.,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.     But  see  Carlisle 
v.  Eady,  1  C.  &   P.  234,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  Wandless  v.  Cawthorne,  1   M.  &  M.  321,  n., 
per  Parke,  J. ;  QLuiiniss  v.  Row,  10  A.  &  E.   606  J  contra.     See  1  Phil.  Evid.  154, 
155. 

i  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  363,  364 ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  346,  347  ;  see  the  Monthly  Law 
Magazine,  vol.  v.  pp.  175-187,  where  this  point  is  distinctly  treated.  Qn  England  the 
decision  in  Slatterie  v.  Pooley,  6  M.  &  W.  664,  is  in  favor  of  the  use  of  such  admis- 
sions without  the  writing's  production.  Slatterie  v.  Pooley  has  been  followed  in  Eng- 
land, though  sometimes  with  misgivings :  King  t>.  Cole,  2  Exch.  628  ;  Murray  v. 
Gregory,  5  id.  467  ;  Boulter  v.  Peplow,  9  C.  B.  498;  B.  v.  Basingstoke,  14  Q.  B. 
611  ;  Pritchard  v.  Bagshawe,  11  C.  B.  459 ;  Sanders  v.  Karnell,  1  F.  &  F.  356.  It  is 
not  followed  in  Ireland :  Lawless  v.  Queale,  8  Ir.  L.  R.  382  ;  Parsons  v.  Purcell,  12  id. 
90.  In  the  United  States,  there  are  three  views  represented ;  the  majority  of  Courts 
agree  with  the  English  doctrine :  Morey  v.  Hoyt,  62  Conn.  542  ;  Blackington  v.  Rock- 
land,  66  Me.  332  (in  part) ;  Com.  v.  Wesley,  166  Mass.  248 ;  Williams  v.  Brickell, 
37  Miss.  682  ;  Edwards  ».  Tracy,  62  Pa.  375,  sembfe ;  Dunbar  v.  U.  S.,  156  U.  S.  185  ; 
Taylor  v.  Peck,  21  Gratt.  11  ;  a  few  Courts  repudiate  the  doctrine:  Haliburton  v. 
Fletcher,  22  Ark.  453;  Grimes  v.  Fall,  15  Cal.  63  ;  Fox  v.  People,  95  111.  71  ;  Cornet 
r.  Bertelsmann,  61  Mo.  118  (in  part)  ;  and  a  few  Courts  allqw  such  admissions  to  be 
used  if  the  document  is  not  in  the  offeror's  power  to  produce  :  Flournay  v.  Newton, 
8  Ga.  306  ;  Griffith  v.  Huston,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  385  ;  Mandeville  v.  Reynolds,  68  N.  Y. 
528.  For  the  reasons  pro  and  con  upon  the  policy  of  using  such  evidence,  see  the 


§§  563/-5G3 k.]  PEOVING  CONTENTS.  693 

But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  there  is  a  material  difference  between 
proving  the  execution  of  an  attested  instrument,  when  produced,  and 
proving  the  party's  admission  that  by  a  written  instrument,  which  is 
not  produced,  a  certain  act  was  done.  In  the  former  case,  the  law  is 
well  settled,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  that  when  an  attested  in- 
strument is  in  court,  and  its  execution  is  to  be  proved  against  a  hos- 
tile party,  an  admission  on  his  part,  unless  made  with  a  view  to  the 
trial  of  that  cause,  is  not  sufficient.  This  rule  is  founded  on  reasons 
peculiar  to  the  class  of  cases  to  which  it  is  applied.  A  distinction  is 
also  to  be  observed  between  a  confessio  juris  and  a  confessio  facti. 
If  the  admission  is  of  the  former  nature,  it  falls  within  the  rule  al- 
ready considered,  and  is  not  received ; 2  for  the  party  may  not  know 
the  legal  effect  of  the  instrument,  and  his  admission  of  its  nature  and 
effect  may  be  exceedingly  erroneous.  But  where  the  existence,  and 
not  the  formal  execution,  of  a  writing  is  the  subject  of  inquiry,  or 
where  the  writing  is  collateral  to  the  principal  facts,  and  it  is  on 
these  facts  that  the  claim  is  founded,  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be 
that  the  confession  of  the  party,  precisely  identified,  is  admissible 
as  primary  evidence  of  the  facts  recited  in  the  writing ;  though 
it  is  less  satisfactory  than  the  writing  itself.8  Very  great  weight 
ought  not  to  be  attached  to  evidence  of  what  a  party  has  been  sup- 
posed to  have  said ;  as  it  frequently  happens,  not  only  that  the 
witness  has  misunderstood  what  the  party  said,  but  that,  by  uninten- 
tionally altering  a  few  of  the  expressions  really  used,  he  gives  an  effect 
to  the  statement  completely  at  variance  with  what  the  party  actually 
did  say.4  Upon  this  distinction  the  adjudged  cases  seem  chiefly  to 
turn.  Thus,  where,  in  an  action  by  the  assignees  of  a  bankrupt  for 
infringing  a  patent-right  standing  in  his  name,  the  defendant  pro- 
posed to  prove  the  oral  declaration  of  the  bankrupt  that  by  certain 
deeds  an  interest  in  the  patent-right  had  been  conveyed  by  him  to 
a  stranger,  the  evidence  was  properly  rejected;  for  it  involved  an 
opinion  of  the  party  upon  the  legal  effect  of  the  deeds.8  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  fact  of  the  tenancy  of  an  estate,  or 
that  one  person,  at  a  certain  time,  occupied  it  as  the  tenant  of  a  cer- 

opinions  of  Parke,  B.,  in  Slatterie  v.  Pooley,  and  Pennefather,  C.  J.,  in  Lawless  ». 
Queale. 

Distinguish  (1 )  the  question  whether  a  witness'  admissions  "on  the  stand,  as  to  the 
contents  of  a  writing  of  his,  will  suffice  on  cross-examination  without  producing  the 
writing,  ante,  §  463  ;  (2)  the  cases  mentioned  in  §§  563  I,  563  o,  post.~\ 

2  Supra,  §  86  ;  Moore  v.  Hitchcock,  4  Wend.  292,  298,  299  ;  Paine  v.  Tucker, 
7  Shepl.  138. 

8  Howard  v.  Smith,  3  Scott  N.  R.  574  ;  Smith  v.  Palmer,  6  Gush.  515.  [The  author 
seems  here  to  be  dealing  with  the  question  noted,  post,  §  563  o,  i.  e.  the  admission  of  a 
fact  independent  of  the  contents  of  a  document.] 

*  Per  Parke,  J.,  in  Earle  v.  Picken,  5  C.  &  P.  542,  n.  See  also  1  Stark.  Evid.  35, 
86  ;  2  id.  17 ;  infra,  §§  200,  203  ;  Ph.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  391,  392  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  372. 

5  Bloxam  v.  Elsie,  1  C.  &  P.  558  ;  s.  c.  Ry.  &M.  187.  See  to  the  same  point,  R.  v. 
Hube,  Peake  132  ;  Thomas  v.  Ansley,  6  Esp.  80  ;  Scott  v.  Clare,  3  Campb.  236 ;  R.  v. 
Careinion,  8  East  77  ;  Harrison  v.  More,  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  365,  n. ;  1  Phil.  Evid. 
847,  n. ;  R.  v.  Inhabitants  of  Castle  Morton,  3  B.  &  Aid.  588. 


694  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

tain  other  person,  may  be  proved  by  oral  testimony.  But  if  the  terms 
of  the  contract  are  in  controversy,  and  they  are  contained  in  a  writing, 
the  instrument  itself  must  be  produced.6 

§  563  I  [97].  There  is  a  class  of  cases,  which  seem  to  be  exceptions 
to  this  rule,  and  to  favor  the  doctrine  that  oral  declarations  of  a  party 
to  an  instrument,  as  to  its  contents  or  effect,  may  be  shown  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  direct  proof  by  the  writing  itself.  But  these  cases  stand 
on  a  different  principle,  namely,  that  where  the  admission  involves 
the  material  fact  in  pais,  as  well  as  a  matter  of  law,  the  latter  shall 
not  operate  to  exclude  evidence  of  the  fact  from  the  jury.  It  is 
merely  placed  in  the  same  predicament  with  mixed  questions  of  law 
and  fact,  which  are  always  left  to  the  jury,  under  the  advice  and 
instructions  of  the  Court.1  Thus,  where  the  plaintiff  in  ejectment 
had  verbally  declared  that  he  had  "sold  the  lease,"  under  which  he 
claimed  title,  to  a  stranger,  evidence  of  this  declaration  was  admitted 
against  him.2  It  involved  the  fact  of  the  making  of  an  instrument 
called  an  assignment  of  the  lease,  and  of  the  delivery  of  it  to  the 
assignee,  as  well  as  the  legal  effect  of  the  writing.  So,  also,  similar 
proof  has  been  received,  that  the  party  was  "possessed  of -a  lease- 
hold,"8 "held  a  note,"4  "had  dissolved  a  partnership,"  which  was 
created  by  deed,8  and  that  the  indorser  of  a  dishonored  bill  of 
exchange  admitted  that  it  had  been  "duly  protested."6  What  the 
party  has  stated  in  his  answer  in  Chancery  is  admissible  on  other 
grounds;  namely,  that  it  is  a  solemn  declaration  under  oath  in  a 
judicial  proceeding,  and  that  the  legal  effect  of  the  instrument  is 
stated  under  the  advice  of  counsel  learned  in  the  law.  So,  also, 
where  both  the  existence  and  the  legal  effect  of  one  deed  are  recited 
in  another,  the  solemnity  of  the  act,  and  the  usual  aid  of  counsel, 
take  the  case  out  of  the  reason  of  the  general  rule,  and  justify  the 
admission  of  such  recital,  as  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  legal  effect 
of  the  instrument,  as  well  as  conclusive  proof  of  its  execution.7 
There  are  other  cases  which  may  seem,  at  first  view,  to  constitute 
exceptions  to  the  present  rule,  but  in  which  the  declarations  of  the 
party  were  admissible,  either  as  .contemporaneous  with  the  act  done, 

•  Brewer  v.  Palmer,  3  Esp.  213  ;  R.  v.  Inhabitants  of  Holy  Trinity,  7  B.  &  C.  611 ; 
s.  c.  1  Man.  &  Ry.  444  ;  Strother  t>.  Barr,  5  Bing.  136 ;  Ramsbottom  v.  Tunbridge, 
2  M.  &  S.  434  ;  [see  post,  §  563  0.3 

l  U.  S.  o.  Battiate,  2  Sumn.  240.     And  see  Newton  ».  Belcher,  12  Q.  B.  921. 

a  Doe  d.  Lowden  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  230. 

8  Digby  v.  Steel,  3  Campb.  115. 

«  Sewell  v.  Stubbs,  1  C.  &  P.  73. 

6  Doe  d.  Waithman  v.  Miles,  1  Stark.  181  ;  4  Campb.  875. 

8  Gibbons  v.  Coggon,  2  Campb.  188.  Whether  an  admission  of  the  counterfeit  char- 
acter of  a  bank-note,  which  the  party  had  passed,  is  sufficient  evidence  of  the  fact, 
without  producing  the  note,  qiuere ;  and  see  Com.  v.  Bigelow,  8  Met.  235. 

rjln  nil  these  cases  the  author  seems  to  be  dealing  with  the  question  noted  post, 
§  5<J3  o.T 

7  Ashmore  v.  Hardy,  7  C.  &  P.  501  ;  Digby  v.  Steel,  3  Campb.  115;  Burleigh  v. 
Stibbs,  5  T.  R.  465;  West  v.  Davis,  7  East  363  ;  Paul  v.  Meek,  2  Y.  &  J.  116;  Breton 
v.  Cope,  Peake  30. 


§§  563  £-563  m.]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  695 

and  expounding  its  character,  thus  being  part  of  the  res  gestce /  or,  as 
establishing  a  collateral  fact,  independent  of  the  written  instrument. 
Of  this  sort  was  the  declaration  of  a  bankrupt,  upon  his  return  to  his 
house,  that  he  had  been  absent  in  order  to  avoid  a  writ  issued  against 
him;8  the  oral  acknowledgment  of  a  debt  for  which  an  unstamped 
note  had  been  given ; '  and  the  oral  admission  of  the  party,  that  he 
was  in  fact  a  member  of  a  society  created  by  deed,  and  had  done 
certain  acts  in  that  capacity.10 

§  563  in.  Sundry  Exceptions.  [In  a  few  other  classes  of  cases, 
exceptions  to  the  rule  have  been  said  to  exist,  (a)  It  is  sometimes 
said  that  the  rule  is  not  enforced  where  the  document  is  collateral  to 
the  issue.1  There  seems  to  be  no  genuine  and  established  exception 
to  this  effect ;  the  cases  in  which  such  an  explanation  is  advanced  as 
the  reason  may  almost  all  be  justified  equally  well  upon  the  principle 
of  §  563  o,  post,  i.  e.  that  the  rule  has  no  application  in  cases  where 
the  offer  is  to  prove,  not  the  contents  of  the  document,  but  some 
other  fact  independent  of  the  contents.  Such  a  fact  may  perhaps 
be  termed  a  "  collateral "  fact,  but  the  rule  in  hand  does  not  apply 
to  such  facts,  and  therefore  no  exception  to  the  rule  need  be  invoked 
in  order  to  prove  them.  (6)  The  rule  in  The  Queen's  Case  (ante,  §  463) 
denies  the  propriety  of  making  an  exception  to  the  rule  in  hand 
where  a  witness  is  on  cross-examination  asked  about  the  contents  of 
a  writing  of  his  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  him  by  the  writing. 
The  propriety  of  this  ruling  and  the  state  of  the  law  is  examined 
under  that  head,  (c)  The  proof  of  a  conviction  of  crime,  for  the 
purpose  of  discrediting  a  witness,  involves  the  contents  of  the  record 
of  conviction ;  and  at  common  law  it  was  therefore  usually  held  that 
the  record  or  a  copy  of  it  must  be  produced.  But  by  statute,  almost 
universally,  this  has  been  changed,  and  the  proof  allowed  to  be  made 
by  the  testimony  of  the  witness  himself  on  cross-examination  (antet 
§  461  6).] 

(2)  (c)  Rule  not  Applicable. 

[The  rule  requiring  that  a  writing  be  itself  produced  or  its  absence 
accounted  for,  whenever  its  contents  are  to  be  proved,  does  not  apply  to 
an  offer  to  prove  a  fact  other  than  the  contents  of  a  writing;  hence, 
proof  of  such  other  fact  may  be  made  irrespective  of  the  rule  iu  ques- 
tion,— not  because  of  an  exception  to  the  rule,  but  because  such  cases 
are  without  the  scope  of  the  rule.  It  is  thus  necessary  to  examine 
the  scope  and  boundaries  of  the  rule  in  these  respects.  Three  general 
sorts  of  questions  arise:  (1)  What  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  "writing"? 
(2)  When  is  the  object  of  proof  the  "  contents "  of  a  writing  ?  (3) 
What  is  "  the  "  writing  whose  contents  are  to  be  proved  ?] 

•  Newman  v.  Stretch,  1  M.  &  M.  338. 

•  Singleton  v.  Barrett,  2  C.  &  J.  368. 

10  Alderson  v.  Clay,  1  Stark.  405  ;  Harvey  v.  Kay,  9  B.  &  C.  366. 
1  £See  (titfe,  §§  89,  90,  563  I,  and  cases  cited.} 


696  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

§  563  n.  "Writings,  as  distinguished  from  other  Objects.  [The  policy 
of  requiring  the  production  of  a  writing,  but  not  of  other  things  than 
writings,  seems  to  rest  on  the  possibilities  of  error  in  remembering 
specific  words  and  phrases,  and  the  important  effects  that  may  depend 
upon  such  errors.  As  a  general  policy,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  its 
propriety;  and  so  far  as  concerns  things  not  writings,  nor  bearing 
writing  upon  them,  it  may  be  regarded  as  settled  that  the  rule  does 
not  apply.1  But  sometimes  a  thing  not  a  document  bears  inscribed 
upon  it  words  or  marks  communicating  iatelligence,  the  inscription 
being  either  a  mere  identifying  circumstance  or  so  brief  and  simple 
that  there  can  be  no  greater  possibility  of  error  about  it  than  about 
the  other  non-inscriptional  features  of  the  object.  In  such  cases, 
should  the  rule  be  regarded  as  applying?  Here  there  is  no  sem- 
blance of  agreement  in  the  rulings;  perhaps  the  most  satisfactory 
solution  would  be  to  leave  the  matter  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial 
Court.2] 

§  563  o.  Contents  of  a  "Writing,  as  distinguished  from  other  Facts. 
[The  rule  requiring  production  of  the  writing  applies  only  where  it  is 
desired  to  prove  the  contents  of  the  writing.  It  follows  that  the 
proof  of  other  facts,  more  or  less  concerned  with  the  writing,  but 
not  involving  its  contents,  may  be  proved  without  production.  This  is 
sometimes  expressed  by  say  ing  that  for  proof  of  "  collateral "  facts  pro- 
duction is  not  required.1  The  difficulty  lies  in  applying  the  principle, 
and  it  is  as  impossible  to  reconcile  the  cases  as  it  is  natural  to  see  why 
there  may  be  difference  of  opinion  in  the  solution  of  a  given  instance.8 
Whether  a  person  may  testify,  without  producing  the  appropriate 
document,  to  the  fact  of  his  ownership  of  property,8  or  of  his  tenancy,4 

1  £R.  v.  Francis,  L.  R,  2  C.  C.  R.  128  (counterfeit  ring) ;  Lucas  v.  Williams,  1892, 
•2  Q.  B.  113  (painting)  ;  Clarke  ».  Robinson,  5  B.  Monr.  55  (slave) ;  Com.  r.  Pope,  103 
Mass.  440  (clothes) ;  Com.  v.  Welch,  134  id.  473  (liquor-tumbler).  Lewis  v.  Hartley, 
7  C.  &  P.  405,  is  hardly  sound.] 

a  [^Production  not  required  :  Feilding's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1347 ;  Burrell  v. 
North,  2  C.  &  K.  680,  semble  ;  Com.  v.  Blood,  11  Gray  74.  Production  required  :  R.  v. 
Johnson,  7  East  65,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  437  ;  R.  v.  Hinley,  1  Cox  Cr.  13  ;  R.  v.  Farr,  4  F. 
&  F.  336  ;  State  v.  Osborn,  1  Root  152  ;  State  v.  Blodget,  ib.  534  ;  Whitney  v.  State,  1 0 
Ind.  404  ;  Frazee  v.  State,  58  id.  8  ;  Caldwell  v.  State,  63  id.  283  ;  Wright  v.  State,  Md., 
41  Atl.  795.  The  ruling  in  R.  v.  Hunt,  8  B.  &  Aid.  566,  1  St.  Tr.  N.  s.  171,  232,  252, 
that  banners  bearing  alleged  treasonable  inscriptions  need  not  be  produced,  seems  un- 
sound, and  has  been  disapproved  :  Butler  v.  Mountgarret,  6  H.  L.  C.  639  ;  R.  v.  Hinley, 
jwpraj 

1  £3uch  a  phrasing,  perhaps  not  incorrect,  though  not  lucid,  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  statement  that  the  rule  does  not  apply  where  the  writing's  contents  are  only 
"  collaterally  "  or  incidentally  in  issue  ;  this  seems  unsound,  though  it  is  sometimes 
enforced  in  rulings.] 

2  fSee  other  citations  ante,  §§  563  7,  89,  90.1 

8  \_Accard:  Street  ».  Nelson,  67  Ala.  504  ;  Gallagher  v.  Assur.  Co.,  Pa.,  24  Atl.  115  ; 
contra  :  Westf'ield  Cigar  Co.  ».  Ins.  Co.,  169  Mass.  382  ;  Kirkpatrick  v.  Clark,  132 
111.  842.] 

*  [Accord:  Taylor  ».  Peck,  21  Gratt.  11 ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Whitehead,  74  Ga.  441; 
contra :  Gilbert  v.  Kennedy,  22  Mich.  5, 18  ;  Putnam  v.  Goodell,  31  N.  H.  419.  When 
the  terms  of  the  lease  are  involved,  the  lease  must  be  produced  ;  but  this  line  of  distinc- 
tion is  not  easy  to  apply;  compare  R.  r.  Holy  Trinity,  7  B.  &  C.  611;  Strother  v. 
Barr,  5  Bing.  136 ;  B.  v.  Merthyr  Tidvil,  1  B.  &  Ad.  29.  j 


§§  563  n-563  p.]  PROVING  CONTENTS.  697 

or  of  a  transfer  of  land,6  or  of  a  transfer  of  personalty,*  has  been 
variously  treated  by  the  Courts.  The  fact  of  payment,  it  is  gen- 
erally said,  may  be  shown  without  production ; 7  so  also  the  fact 
of  a  notice's  delivery  or  publication  (though  not  its  terms).8  In 
an  action  for  conversion  of  a  document,  the  fact  of  conversion,  it 
would  seem,  maybe  shown  without  production;9  though  the  same 
result  may  also  be  reached  on  the  principle  (ante,  §  563  c)  that  the 
pleading  gives  notice  to  the  opponent,  and  thus  the  rule  requiring 
production  is  satisfied.10] 

§  563  p.  What  Writing  is  the  Original  to  be  proved.  [The  rule 
applies  to  the  proof  of  the  contents  of  whatever  writing  is  desired  to 
be  proved.  In  the  course  of  a  transaction  more  than  one  document 
may  play  a  part;  and  the  substantive  law  determining  the  issues  in 
the  case  will  usually  indicate  which  one  is  to  be  the  objective  of  proof 
for  the  purpose  in  hand ;  the  rule  will  then  apply  to  that  document 
only,  and  the  others  need  not  be  accounted  for.  Since  the  solution 
will  thus  depend  mainly  on  the  issues  in  the  case,  and  the  purpose  of 
the  proof  under  those  issues,  only  a  few  illustrations  of  the  chief 
applications  of  the  principle  need  be  given.  Where  the  contents  of 
a  telegram  are  to  be  proved,  it  will  depend  upon  the  law  of  contracts 
and  the  precise  purpose  in  hand  whether  the  dispatch  as  given  to  the 
operator  or  the  dispatch  as  delivered  to  the  addressee  is  the  original  to 
be  accounted  for.1  Where  printed  numbers  of  a  book  or  newspaper  are 
concerned,  the  number  to  be  proved  will  depend  on  the  kind  of  issue, 
—  whether  an  action  against  a  reporter  or  a  publisher  for  libel,  or 
against  a  printer  for  services,  or  against  a  publisher  for  infringement 
of  copyright,  and  so  on.2  Where  the  title  to  land  is  in  issue,  the 
substantive  law  will  indicate  whether  a  land-grant  or  land-patent  is 
to  be  regarded  as  the  original  document  of  title  or  merely  as  a  certified 
'Accord:  Showman  v.  Lee,  86  Mich.  556;  contra:  Primrose  v.  Browing,  56  Ga, 

'Accord:  Davis  v.  Reynolds,  1  Stark.  115  ;  Sirrine  v.  Briggs,  31  Mich.  443  ;  con- 
tra :  Trice  v.  Wolfer,  Or.,  52  Pac.  759.] 

7  ^Chambers  r.  Hunt,  22  N.  J.  L.  552  ;  Cramer  v.  Shrimer,  18  Md.  140  ;  White- 
side  v.  Hoskins,  20  Mont.  361  ;  Davidson  v.  Peck,  4  Mo.  438  (leading  case).     Where 
Ryment  is  by  written  instrument,  a  different  result  may  be  reached ;  see  Breton  v.  Cope, 
iake  30 ;  Coonrod  v.  Madden,  126  Ind.  197.] 
«  TLingle  v.  Chicago,  172  111.  170 ;  Rutl.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Thrall,  35  Vt.  536.] 

•  LScott  v.  Jones,  4  Taunt.  865  ;  Bucher  v.  Jarratt,  3  B.  &  B.  143  (lending  case)  ; 
so  also  for  an  action  against  a  bailee  for  loss  of  papers  :  First  N.  B'k  of  B.  v.  First  N. 
B'kofN.,  Ala.,  22  So.  976.] 

w  TSee  citations  in  §  563  c.] 

i  ["See  R.  w.  Regan,  16  Cox  Cr.  203 ;  Whilden  v.  Bank,  64  Ala.  1,  13,  30 ;  West 
U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Blance,  94  Ga,  431  ;  Anheuser-Busch  B.  Ass'n  v.  Hutmacher,  127  111. 
651 ;  Riordan  v.  Guggerty,  74  la.  688 ;  West.  U.  Tel.  Co.  ».  Hopkins,  49  Ind.  223 ; 
Nickerson  t>.  Spindell,  164  Mass.  25  ;  Wilson  v.  R.  Co.,  31  Minn.  481  ;  Williams  v. 
Brickell,  37  Miss.  682  ;  Oregon  S.  Co.  v.  Otis,  14  Abb.  N.  C.  388  ;  100  N.  Y.  446; 
U.  S.  v.  Dunbar,  60  Fed.  75  ;  Durkee  v.  R.  Co.,  29  Vt.  127  (leading  case)  ;  State  v. 
Hopkins,  50  id.  316.] 

*  [See  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  116  ;  Adams  v.  Kelly,  Ry.  &  Mo.  157  ;  Johnson  ». 
Morgan,  7  A.  &  E.  233 ;  Boosey  v.  Davidson,  13  Q.  B.  257  ;  McGrath  v.  Cox,  3  U.  C. 
Q.  B.  332 ;  compare  note  5, 


698  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

copy  of  the  original.8  It  may  further  be  noticed  that  when  docu- 
ments of  title  or  obligation  are  made  in  counterpart,  each  counterpart 
is  usually  to  be  regarded  as  an  original  ;4  that,  on  the  same  principle, 
identical  impressions  from  the  same  type-setting  of  a  printing-machine 
will  ordinarily  (unless  a  particular  copy  is  fixed  upon  by  the  issues) 
be  regarded  as  equally  originals  in  regard  to  each  other ; 6  and  that  a 
letter-press  copy  is  never  regarded  as  equivalent  to  the  letter  itself.6] 

2  (d)  Kinds  of  Secondary  Evidence. 

§  563  q.  Preferred  Copies.1  Whether  the  law  recognizes  any  de- 
grees in  the  various  kinds  of  secondary  evidence,  and  requires  the 
party  offering  that  which  is  deemed  less  certain  and  satisfactory  first 
to  show  that  nothing  better  is  in  his  power,  is  a  question  which  is  not 
yet  perfectly  settled.  On  the  one  hand,  the  affirmative  is  urged  as 
an  equitable  extension  of  the  principle  which  postpones  all  secondary 
evidence,  until  the  absence  of  the  primary  is  accounted  for ;  and  it  is 
said  that  the  same  reason  which  requires  the  production  of  a  writing, 
if  within  the  power  of  a  party,  also  requires  that,  if  the  writing  is 
lost,  its  contents  shall  be  proved  by  a  copy,  if  in  existence,  rather 
than  by  the  memory  of  a  witness  who  has  read  it;  and  that  the 
secondary  proof  of  a  lost  deed  ought  to  be  marshalled  into,  first,  the 
counterpart ;  secondly,  a  copy ;  thirdly,  the  abstract,  etc. ;  and,  last  of 
all,  the  memory  of  a  witness.2  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  said  that  this 
argument  for  the  extension  of  the  rule  confounds  all  distinction  be- 
tween the  weight  of  evidence  and  its  legal  admissibility ;  that  the 
rule  is  founded  upon  the  nature  of  the  evidence  offered,  and  not  upon 
its  strength  or  weakness ;  and  that  to  carry  it  to  the  length  of  estab- 
lishing degrees  in  secondary  evidence,  as  fixed  rules  of  law,  would 
often  tend  to  the  subversion  of  justice,  and  always  be  productive  of 
inconvenience.  If,  for  example,  proof  of  the  existence  of  an  abstract 
of  a  deed  will  exclude  oral  evidence  of  its  contents,  this  proof  may  be 
withheld  by  the  adverse  party  until  the  moment  of  trial,  and  the  other 

•  [See  Minor  v.  Tillotson,  7  Pet.  99  ;  U.  S.  v,  Percheman,  ib.  51,  78  ;  U.  S.  ». 
Sutler,  21  How.  170 ;  U.  S.  v.  Castro,  24  id.  346. 

See  other  instructive  instances  of  the  general  principle,  in  State  v.  Halstead,  73  la. 
876  ;  MisHO.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  Palmer,  Nebr.,  76  N.  W.  169  ;  Fox  v.  Umbson,  8  N.  J.  L. 
275  ;  Kelly  v.  Elevator  Co.,  N.  D.,  75  N.  W.  264  ;  State  ».  McCauley,  17  Wash.  88.1 

•  [Doe  v.  Palmer,  3  Q.  B.  622  ;  j Gardner  v.  Eberhart,  82  111.  316  ;  Brown  t>.  Wood- 
man, 6  C.  &  P.  206  ;  Colling  v.  Tremeck,  6  B.  &  C.  398  ;  Cleveland  R.  Co.  v.  Perkins, 

17  Mich.   296;  Hubbard  v.  Russell,   24  Barb.  404  ;  State  v.  Gurnee,  14  Kan.  Ill; 
Dyer  v.  Fredericks,  63  Me.  173,  592 ;  Roe  v.  Davis.  7  East  362  ;  Houghton  v.  Koeriig, 

18  C.  B.  235  ;  Mann  v.  Godbold,  8  Bing.  292.  f     The  same  principle  has  been  applied 
to  notices  made  out  in  duplicate  :  Philipson  v.  Chase,  2  Campb.  110  ;  Hollenbeck  v. 
Stanbcrry,  38  la.  325 ;  compare  §  563  6,  ante.l 

fSee  R.  v.  Watson,  supra,  note  2,  and  other  cases  in  that  note."] 

•  PNodin  v.  Murray,  2  Campb.  228  ;  Spottiswood  v.  Weir,  66  Cal.  525 ;  King  v. 
Worthington,  73  111.  161  ;  Traber  v.  Hicks,  131  Mo.  180.] 

1  PThe  following  text  of  the  author  was  originally  placed  as  a  note  to  §  84,  ante.~\ 
«  Ludlain,  ex  dem.  Hunt,  Lofft  362. 


§§  563^-563^.]  PROVING   CONTENTS.  699 

side  be  defeated,  or  the  cause  be  greatly  delayed ;  and  the  same  mis- 
chief may  be  repeated,  through  all  the  different  degrees  of  the  evi- 
dence. It  is  therefore  insisted,  that  the  rule  of  exclusion  ought  to 
be  restricted  to  such  evidence  only  as  upon  its  face  discloses  the 
existence  of  better  proof ;  and  that,  where  the  evidence  is  not  of  this 
nature,  it  is  to  be  received,  notwithstanding  it  may  be  shown  from 
other  sources  that  the  party  might  have  offered  that  which  was  more 
satisfactory ;  leaving  the  weight  of  the  evidence  to  be  judged  of  by 
the  jury  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.8  Among  the  cases 
cited  in  support  of  the  affirmative  side  of  the  question,  there  is  no 
one  iu  which  this  particular  point  appears  to  have  been  expressly 
adjudged,  though  in  several  of  them  *  it  has  been  passingly  adverted  to 
as  a  familiar  doctrine  of  the  law.  On  the  other  hand,  the  existence  of 
any  degrees  in  secondary  evidence  was  doubted  by  Patterson,  J.,6  and 
expressly  denied  by  Parke,  J. ; 6  and  in  the  more  recent  case  of  Doe  d. 
Gilbert  v.  Ross,  in  the  Exchequer,  where  proper  notice  to  produce  an 
original  document  had  been  given  without  success,  it  was  held  that 
the  party  giving  the  notice  was  not  afterwards  restricted  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  secondary  evidence  he  would  produce  of  the  contents  of 
the  document ;  and,  therefore,  having  offered  an  attested  copy  of  the 
deed  in  that  case,  which  was  inadmissible  in  itself  for  want  of  a 
stamp,  it  was  held  that  it  was  competent  for  him  to  abandon  that 
mode  of  proof,  and  to  resort  to  parol  testimony,  there  being  no  de- 
grees in  secondary  evidence ;  for  when  once  the  original  is  accounted 
for,  any  secondary  evidence  whatever  may  be  resorted  to  by  the  party 
seeking  to  use  the  same.7  The  American  doctrine,  as  deduced  from 
various  authorities,  seems  to  be  this,  that  if,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case  itself,  it  is  manifest  that  a  more  satisfactory  kind  of  secondary 
evidence  exists,  the  party  will  be  required  to  produce  it;  but  that, 
where  the  nature  of  the  case  does  not  of  itself  disclose  the  existence 
of  such  better  evidence,  the  objector  must  not  only  prove  its  exist- 
ence, but  also  must  prove  that  it  was  known  to  the  other  party  in 
season  to  have  been  produced  at  the  trial.  Thus,  where  the  record 
of  a  conviction  was  destroyed,  oral  proof  of  its  existence  was  rejected, 
because  the  law  required  a  transcript  to  be  sent  to  the  Court  of  Ex- 

«  See  4  Monthly  Law  Mag.  265-279. 

*  As  in  Sir  E.  Seymour's  Case,  10  Mod.  8  ;  Villiers  v.  Villiers,  2  Atk.  71 ;  Rowland- 
son  v.  Waimvright,  1  Nev.  &  Per.  8  ;  and  others. 

6  In  Rowlandson  v.  Wainwright,  supra ;  tacitly  denied  by  the  same  judge  in  Coyle 
v.  Cole,  6  C.  &  P.  359,  and  by  Parke,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Fursey,  ib.  81  ;  and  by  the  Court  in 
R.  v.  Hunt,  3  B.  &  Aid.  446. 

6  In  Brown  v.  Woodman,  6  C.  &  P.  206  ;  see  also  Hall  v.  Ball,  3  Scott  N.  R.  577. 

T  See  Doe  v.  Ross,  8  Dowl.  389  ;  s.  c.  7  M.  &  W.  102 ;  Doe  v.  Jack,  1  Allen  476, 
483  ;  jsee  Hall  v.  Ball,  3  M.  &  G.  242  ;  Brown  v.  Woodman,  6  C.  &  P.  206;  Jeans  i>. 
Wheedon,  2  M.  &  Rob.  486;  Brown  v.  Brown,  27  L.  J.  Q.  B.  173;  Quick  v.  Quick, 
33  L.  J.  P.  &  M.  146;  Johnson  v.  Lyford,  37  id.  65.  (  CBut  *ne  original  English 
doctrine  seems  to  have  gone  so  far  as  to  prefer  a  certified  or  examined  copy  of  a  record 
to  oral  testimony  by  recollection  :  StillingfiVet  v.  Parker,  6  Mod.  248  ;  and  this  seems 
to  be  conceded  as  still  the  law  by  Lord  Abinger,  in  Doe  v.  Ross,  supra."^ 


700  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

chequer,  which  was  better  evidence.8  In  all  these  and  the  like  cases, 
the  nature  of  the  fact  to  be  proved  plainly  discloses  the  existence  of 
some  evidence  in  writing,  of  an  official  character,  more  satisfactory 
than  mere  oral  proof;  and  therefore  the  production  of  such  evidence 
is  demanded.9  But  where  there  is  no  ground  for  legal  presumption 
that  better  secondary  evidence  exists,  any  proof  is  received  which  is 
not  inadmissible  by  other  rules  of  law ;  unless  the  objecting  party  can 
show  that  better  evidence  was  previously  known  to  the  other,  and 
might  have  been  produced;  thus  subjecting  him,  by  positive  proof, 
to  the  same  imputation  of  fraud  which  the  law  itself  presumes  when 
primary  evidence  is  withheld.  Thus,  where  a  notarial  copy  was 
called  for,  as  the  best  evidence  of  the  contents  of  a  lost  note,  the 
Court  held,  that  it  was  sufficient  for  the  party  to  prove  the  note  by 
the  best  evidence  actually  in  his  power ;  and  that  to  require  a  notarial 
copy  would  be  to  demand  that  of  the  existence  of  which  there  was  no 
evidence,  and  which  the  law  would  not  presume  was  in  the  power  of 
the  party,  it  not  being  necessary  that  a  promissory  note  should  be 
protested.10  [According,  then,  to  the  so-called  American  rule,  (1)  a 
certified  or  examined  copy  of  a  public  record  is  preferred  to  oral 
testimony  of  contents  (though  this  has  perhaps  not  ceased  to  be  the 
rule  in  England  also) ; u  (2)  any  written  copy  of  a  private  instru- 
ment is,  if  it  exists,  preferred  to  oral  testimony  (though  this  is  prob- 
ably the  law  in  only  a  minority  of  jurisdictions) ; ia  but  (3)  no 
preference  is  demanded  for  a  certified  copy  over  a  sworn  or  exam- 
ined copy.18] 

§  563  r.  Copy  of  a  Copy.  [It  has  sometimes  been  said  that  a 
copy  of  a  copy  is  not  admissible ;  such  testimony  being,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Baron  Alderson,1  "  but  the  shadow  of  a  shade."  But  this 
rule  "is  correct  in  itself  when  properly  understood  and  limited  to 
its  true  sense."  *  (1)  It  seems  to  have  effect  in  two  instances,  not 

8  Hilts  v.  Colvin,  14  Johns.  182  ;  see  also  Battles  v.  Holley,  6  Greenl.  145  ;  Cook 
».  Wood,  1  McCord  139  ;  Lyons  v.  Gregory,  3  Hen.  &  Munf.  237  ;  Lowry  v.  Cady, 
4  Vt.  504  ;  Doe  v.  Greenlee,  3  Hawks  281. 

9  Such  also  is  the  view  taken  by  Ch.  B.  Gilbert.     See  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  5. 
See  also  Collins  u.  Maule,  8  C.  &  P.  502;  Everingham  v.  Roundell,  2  M.  &  Rob.  138; 
Harvey  v.  Thomas,  10  Watts  63  ;  [compare  note  7,  ante.] 

1°  Renner  v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  9  Wheat.  582,  587  ;  Denn  v.  McAllister,  2  Halst. 
46,  53 ;  U.  S.  i'.  Britton,  2  Mason  464,  468.  But  where  it  was  proved  that  a  copy  ex- 
isted of  a  note,  he  was  held  bound  to  prove  it  by  the  copy  :  U.  S.  v.  Britton,  supra. 

"  [Harvey  v.  Thorpe,  28  Ala.  250  (leading  case)  ;  Redd  i>.  State,  Ark.,  47  S.  W. 
119  ;  Bowden  v.  Achor,  95  Ga.  243 ;  Mariner  v.  Saundere,  10  111.  113  ;  Horseman  v, 
Todhunter,  12  la.  230  ;]  {see  also  Graham  v.  Campbell,  56  Ga.  258  ;  Williams  v. 
Waters,  36  id.  454 ;  Illinois  Co.  v.  Bonner,  75  111.  315  ;  Nason  v.  Jordon,  62  Me.  480  ; 
Cornet  v.  Williams,  20  Wall.  226;  Winn  v.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  663.  [ 

"  [Accord:  Smith  o.  Axtell,  1  N.  J.  L.  494  ;  Stevenson  v.  Hoy,  43  Pa.  191 ;  contra, 
Jacques  r.  Horton,  76  Ala.  238  ;  Carpenter  v.  Dame,  10  Ind.  125  ;  Eslow  v.  Mitchell, 
26  Mich.  500  ;  Minneap.  T.  Co.  v.  Nimocks,  53  Minn.  381 ;  Goodrich  v.  Weston,  102 
Mass.  862 .] 

18  [Blackmnn  v.  Dowling,  57  Ala.  78;  Otto  v.  Trump,  115  Pa.  425  ;  compare  ante, 
§§485,488,  514.] 

1  rEveringham  v.  Roundell,  2  Moo.  &  Rob.  138.] 

2  [Story,  J.,  in  Winn  t>.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  663,  677.] 


§§  563  <2-564.]         PROVING  CONTENTS  ;  ALTERATIONS  701 

depending  on  the  same  principle :  first,  when  the  copy  offered  is  "  a 
copy  of  a  copy  from  a  record,  the  record  being  still  in  existence,"  3 
and  the  same  rule  seems  to  apply  to  a  copy  of  a  copy  of  any  other 
original  still  in  existence ;  *  secondly,  when  the  copy  from  which  the 
offered  copy  is  taken  is  not  shown  to  be  correct,  in  which  case  the 
offered  copy  is  defective  simply  because  it  does  not  yet  appear  to  be 
a  copy.6  (2)  But  even  in  these  cases  the  offered  copy  may  be  made 
admissible  by  directly  connecting  it  with  the  original,  either  by  hav- 
ing compared  it  anew  with  the  original,6  or  by  using  it  to  refresh  one's 
memory  (ante,  §  439  b)  of  the  original.7  (3)  Although  the  record  of  a 
conveyance  is  usually  regarded  as  only  an  official  copy  of  an  original, 
the  present  rule  does  not  forbid  the  use  of  a  copy  of  the  record 8  or  of 
a  re-record.9] 

3.  Alteration  of  Documents. 

§  564.  Presumption  as  to  Time  of  Alteration.  If,  on  the  production 
of  the  instrument,  it  appears  to  have  been  altered,  it  is  incumbent  on 
the  party  offering  it  in  evidence  to  explain  this  appearance.1  Every 
alteration  on  the  face  of  a  written  instrument  detracts  from  its  credit, 
and  renders  it  suspicious ;  and  this  suspicion  the  party  claiming  under 
it  is  ordinarily  held  bound  to  remove.8  If  the  alteration  is  noted  in 
the  attestation  clause  as  having  been  made  before  the  execution  of 
the  instrument,  it  is  sufficiently  accounted  for,  and  the  instrument 
is  relieved  from  that  suspicion.  And  if  it  appears  in  the  same  hand- 
writing and  ink  with  the  body  of  the  instrument,  it  may  suffice.  So, 
if  the  alteration  is  against  the  interest  of  the  party  deriving  title 
under  the  instrument,  as,  if  it  be  a  bond  or  note,  altered  to  a  less 
sum,  the  law  does  not  so  far  presume  that  it  was  improperly  made  as 

3  QWinn  v.  Patterson,  supra ;  Cameron  t>.  Peck,  37  Conn.  763  ;  Goodrich  v.  Wes- 
ton,  102  Mass.  362;  Drumm  ».  Cessnuu,  58  Kan.  331.     Thus,  if  the  original  record  is 
destroyed,  the  copy  of  a  certified  copy  is  admissible  :  Smith  v.  Lindsey,  89  Mo.  76  ; 
Howard  v.  Quattlebaum,  46  S.  C.  95  ;  see  Coraett  v.  Williams,  20  Wall.  226,  245.] 

4  RVinn  v.  Patterson,   Cameron   v.    Peck,  supra;  contra:   Goodrich  v.  Weston, 

Towler  v.  Hoffman,  31  Mich.  215  ;  Crane  Co.  v.  Tierney,  111.,  51  N.  E.  715.] 
Gregory  v.  McPherson,  13  Cal.  562,  574.] 
"Dunlap  v.  Berry,  5  111.  326  ;  Fowler  v.  Hoffman,  supra.] 
"Stetson  v.  Gulliver,  2  Cush.  494  ;  Winn  v.  Patterson,  supra.] 
JCrisnen  v.  Hannavan,  72  Mo.  548,  556.] 

1  The  Roman  civil  law  on  the  subject  of  alterations  agrees  in  the  main  with  the 
common  law  ;  but  the  latter,  in  this  as  in  other  cases,  has  greatly  the  advantage,  in 
its  facility  of  adaptation  to  the  actual  state  of  the  facts.     The  general  rule  is  the  same 
in  both  codes:  Mascard.  vol.  iv,  Concl.  1261,  n.  1-24. 

2  Perk.  Conv.  55;  Henman  v.  Dickinson,  5  Bing.  183,  184;  Knight  v.  Clements, 
8  Ad.  &  El.  215 ;  Newcomb  v.  Presbrey,  8  Met.  406.     But  where  a  farm  was  devised 
from  year  to  year  by  parol,  and  afterwards  an  agreement  was  signed,  containing  stipu- 
lations as  to  the  mode  of  tillage,  for  breach  of  which  an  action  was  brought,  and,  on 
producing  the  agreement,  it  appeared  that  the  term  of  years  had  been  written  "seven," 
but  altered  to  "  fourteen;  "  it  was  held  that  this  alteration,  being  immaterial  to  the  parol 
contract,  need  not  be  explained  by  the  plaintiff:  Earl  of  Falmouth  v.  Roberts,  9  M.  & 
W.  469.     See  further,  Cariss  v.  Tattersall,  2  Man.  &  Gr.  890;  Clifford  v.  Parker,  ib. 
909. 


702  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

to  throw  on  him  the  burden  of  accounting  for  it.8  And,  generally 
speaking,  if  nothing  appears  to  the  contrary,  the  alteration  will  be 
presumed  to  be  contemporaneous  with  the  execution  of  the  instru- 
ment.4 But  if  any  ground  of  suspicion  is  apparent  upon  the  face  of 
the  instrument,  the  law  presumes  nothing,  but  leaves  the  question 
of  the  time  when  it  was  done  as  well  as  that  of  the  person  by  whom, 
and  the  intent  with  which,  the  alteration  was  made,  as  matters  of 
fact,  to  be  ultimately  found  by  the  jury  upon  proofs  to  be  adduced 
by  the  party  offering  the  instrument  in  evidence.  The  cases  on  this 
subject  are  not  in  perfect  harmony ;  but  they  are  understood  fully 
to  support  the  doctrine  just  stated.  They  all  agree,  that  where  any 
suspicion  is  raised  as  to  the  genuineness  of  an  altered  instrument, 
whether  it  be  apparent  upon  inspection,  or  made  so  by  extraneous 
evidence,  the  party  producing  the  instrument,  and  claiming  under  it, 
is  bound  to  remove  the  suspicion  by  accounting  for  the  alteration. 
It  is  also  generally  agreed,  that  inasmuch  as  fraud  is  never  to  be 
presumed,  therefore,  if  no  particular  circumstances  of  suspicion  attach 
to  an  altered  instrument,  the  alteration  is  to  be  presumed  innocent, 
or  made  prior  to  its  execution.6  But  an  exception  to  this  rule  of  the 
presumption  of  innocence  seems  to  be  admitted  in  the  case  of  nego- 
tiable paper;  it  having  been  held  that  the  party  producing  and 
claiming  under  the  paper  is  bound  to  explain  every  apparent  and 
material  alteration,  the  operation  of  which  would  be  in  his  own  favor.0 
Another  exception  has  been  allowed,  where  the  instrument  is,  by 

8  Bailey  v.  Taylor,  11  Conn.  531  ;  Coulson  v.  "Walton,  9  Pet.  62. 

*  Trowel  v.  Castle,  1  Keb.  22  ;  Fitzgerald  v.  Faucoiiberge,  Fitzg.  207,  213;  Co.  Lit. 
225  6  ;  Doe  o.  Catamore,  15  Jur.  728 ;  5  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  349  ;  Bailey  v.  Taylor,  11  Conn. 
531,  534  ;  Gooch  v.  Bryant,  1  Shepl.  386,  390 ;  Crabtree  v.  Clark,  7  id.  337  ;  Vanhorne 
v.  Dorrance,  2  Dall.  306  ;  and  see  Pullen  v.  Hutchinson,  12  Shepl.  249,  254;  Wikoffs 
Appeal,  3  Am.  Law  Jour.  N.  s.  493,  503. 

The  reporter's  marginal  notes  in  Burgoyne  ».  Showier,  1  Robb.  Eccl.  5,  and  Cooper 
v.  Bockett,  4  Moore  P.  C.  C.  419,  state  the  broad  proposition,  that  alterations  in  a.  will, 
not  accounted  for,  are  primo,  facie  presumed  to  have  been  made  after  its  execution. 
But,  on  examination  of  these  cases,  they  are  found  to  turn  entirely  on  the  provisions 
of  the  Statute,  of  Wills,  1  Viet.,  c.  26,  §  21,  which  directs  that  all  alterations,  made 
before  the  execution  of  the  will,  be  noted  in  a  memorandum  upon  the  will,  and  attested 
by  the  testator  and  witnesses ;  if  this  direction  is  not  complied  with,  it  may  well  be 
presumed  that  the  alterations  were  subsequently  made  ;  and  so  it  was  held,  upon  the 
language  of  that  statute,  and  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  respecting  wills,  in  Doe  v. 
Palmer,  15  Jur.  836,  839  ;  in  which  the  case  of  Cooper  v.  Bockett  was  cited  by  Lord 
Campbell,  and  approved,  upon  the  ground  of  the  statute. 

6  Gooch  i>.  Bryant,  1  Shepl.  386  ;  Crabtree  v.  Clark,  7  id.  337  ;  Wickes  v.  Caulk, 
5  H.  &  J.  41;  Gillet  v.  Sweat,  I  Gilm.  475  ;  Doe  v.  Catamore,  15  Jur.  728  ;  5  Eng. 
Law  &  Eq.  349;  Co.  Lit.  225  b,  note  by  Butler;  jBoothby  v.  Stanley,  34  Me.  515; 
North  River  Meadow  Co.  o.  Shrewsbury  Church,  2  N.  J.  Eq.  424.  |  In  Jackson  v. 
Osborn,  2  Wend.  555,  it  was  held  that  the  party  claiming  under  a  deed  was  bound  to 
account  for  the  alterations  in  it,  and  that  no  presumption  was  to  be  made  in  its  favor ; 
but  in  Bailey  v.  Taylor,  11  Conn.  531,  it  was  held  that  nothing  was  to  be  presumed 
either  way,  but  the  question  was  to  be  submitted  freely  to  the  jury. 

«  Knight  v.  Clements,  8  Ad.  &  El.  215  ;  Clifford  v.  Parker,  2  M.  &  G.  909  ;  Simp- 
aon  v.  8  tack  house,  9  Barr  186;  McMicken  v.  Bnnuchamp,  2  Miller  La.  290  ;  see  also 
Henman  v.  Dickinson,  5  Bing.  183 ;  Bishop  v.  Chambre,  3  C.  &  P.  55;  Humphreys  v. 
Guillow,  13  N.  H.  385  ;  Hills  v.  Barnes,  11  id.  395  ;  Taylor  v.  Mosely,  6  C.  &  P.  273; 


§  564]  ALTERATIONS.  703 

the  rules  of  practice,  to  be  received  as  genuine,  unless  its  genuine- 
ness is  denied  on  oath  by  the  party,  and  he  does  so ;  for  his  oath  is 
deemed  sufficient  to  destroy  the  presumption  of  innocence  in  regard 
to  the  alteration,  and  to  place  the  instrument  in  the  condition  of  a 
suspected  paper.7 

[But  the  modern  tendency  is  to  avoid  stating  the  problem  in 
the  form  of  such  a  rule  with  its  exceptions,  and,  in  particular, 
to  abandon  the  so-called  presumption  against  fraud  and  in  favor 
of  innocence,  by  which  the  alteration  of  a  deed  is  presumed  to 
have  been  made  before  execution;  and  to  raise  no  genuine  pre- 
sumption (ante,  §  14  w)  in  that  regard ;  so  that  the  burden  is  deter- 
mined by  the  pleadings,  and  the  question  usually  goes  to  the  jury, 
upon  all  the  evidence,  whether  the  party  having  the  burden  under 
the  pleadings  has  proved  his  case.8  Thus,  in  an  action  against  a 
woman  as  surety  to  a  bond,  the  date  being  altered  from  a  time 
during  coverture  to  a  time  after  coverture  ended,  the  burden  was 
held  to  be  upon  the  plaintiff  to  show  that  the  alteration  was  made 
before  execution ; 9  while  on  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  to  which  a 
claim  of  homestead-exemption  was  set  up,  the  burden  was  held  to  be 
upon  the  defendant  to  show  that  the  words  "  and  homestead,"  inter- 
lined in  the  mortgage,  were  inserted  after  execution.10  Nevertheless, 
the  older  form  of  statement  is  still  often  met  with.11] 

It  is  also  clear,  that  it  is  for  the  Court  to  determine,  in  the  first 
instance,  whether  the  alteration  is  so  far  accounted  for,  as  to  permit 
the  instrument  to  be  read  in  evidence  to  the  jury,  who  are  the  ulti- 
mate judges  of  the  fact.12  But  whether,  in  the  absence  of  all  other 
evidence,  the  jury  may  determine  the  time  and  character  of  the  alter- 
ation from  inspection  alone,  is  not  universally  agreed.18 

Whitfield  v.  Collingwood,  1  Car.  &  Kir.  325  ;  Davis  v.  Carlisle,  6  Ala.  707 ;  Walters 
v.  Short,  5  Gilm.  252  ;  Cariss  v.  Tattersall,  2  M.  &  G.  890.  But  in  Davis  v.  Jenney, 
1  Met.  221,  it  was  held  that  the  burden  of  proof  was  on  the  defendant ;  \contra,  Wilde 
v.  Armsby,  6  Cush.  314  ;  see  Clark  v.  Eckstein,  22  Pa.  St.  507;  Paine  w.  Edsell,  19 
id.  178.  ( 

f  Walters  v.  Short,  5  Gilm.  252. 

8  rjEly  v.  Ely,  6  Gray  439  ;  Comstock  v.  Smith,  26  Mich.  306  ;  Hayden  v.  Goodnow, 
39  Conn.  164  ;  Hagan  v.  Ins.  Co.,  81  la.  321  ;  Magee  v.  Allison,  94  id.  527;  Stough  v. 
Ogden,  49  Nebr.  291  ("in  the  end,  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  upon  all  of  the 
evidence  adduced  ");  Hunt  v.  Gray,  35  N.  J.  L.  227  ;  Wolferman  v.  Bell,  6  Wash.  84.] 

9  TNesbitt  v.  Turner,  155  Pa.  429.] 

10  [Rosenberg  v.  Jett,  72  Fed.  90.  See  also  Pough  v.  Mitchell,  3  D.  C.  App.  321  ; 
Kelly  v.  Thuey,  143  Mo.  422;  Courcamp  v.  Weber,  39  Nebr.  533.] 

nTSee  Bedgood  v.  McLain,  89  Ga.  793 ;  Foley-Wadsworth  Co.  v.  Solomon,  9  S.  D. 
511  ;  House  v.  Robertson,  Tex.,  34  S.  W.  640  ;  Yakima  N.  B'k  v.  Knipe,  6  Wash.  348.] 

12  Tillou  v.  Clinton,  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Barb.  564 ;  Ross  v.  Gould,  5  Greenl.  204  ;  jsee 
Clark  v.  Eckstein,  22  Pu.  507.} 

18  In  some  cases  they  have  been  permitted  to  do  so :  Bailey  ».  Taylor,  11  Conn. 
531  ;  Gooch  v.  Bryant,  1  Shepl.  386  ;  Crabtree  v.  Clark,  7  id.  337  ;  Doe  v.  Catamore, 
15  Jur.  728  ;  5  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  349  ;  Vanhorne  v.  Dorrance,  2  Dall.  306  ;  |Printup 
V.  Mitchell,  17  Ga.  558  ;|  and  see  Wiekes  v.  Caulk,  5  H.  &  J.  41  ;  Pullen  v.  Shaw, 
3  Dev.  238  ;  in  which  last  case  it  was  held  that  where  the  alteration  was  apparently 
against  the  interest  of  the  holder  of  the  instrument,  it  should  be  presumed  to  have 
been  made  prior  to  its  execution.  But  in  some  other  cases  the  Courts  have  required 


704  PRIVATE  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

§  565.  Effect  of  Alteration  as  avoiding  the  Instrument.1  Though 
the  effect  of  the  alteration  of  a  legal  instrument  is  generally  dis- 
cussed with  reference  to  deeds,  yet  the  principle  is  applicable  to  all 
other  instruments.  The  early  decisions  were  chiefly  upon  deeds, 
because  almost  all  written  engagements  were  anciently  in  that  form  ; 
but  they  establish  the  general  proposition,  that  written  instruments 
which  are  altered,  in  the  legal  sense  of  that  term,  as  hereafter 
explained,  are  thereby  made  void.3  The  grounds  of  this  doctrine  are 
twofold.  The  first  is  that  of  public  policy,  to  prevent  fraud,  by 
not  permitting  a  man  to  take  the  chance  of  committing  a  fraud 
without  running  any  risk  of  losing  by  the  event  when  it  is  detected.8 
The  other  is,  to  insure  the  identity  of  the  instrument/ and  prevent 
the  substitution  of  another  without  the  privity  of  the  party  con- 
cerned.4 The  instrument  derives  its  legal  virtue  from  its  being  the 
sole  repository  of  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  solemnly  adopted  as 
such,  and  attested  by  the  signature  of  the  party  engaging  to  perform 
it.  Any  alteration,  therefore,  which  causes  it  to  speak  a  language 
different  in  legal  effect  from  that  which  it  originally  spake,  is  a 
material  alteration. 

§  566.  Same  :  Alteration  and  Spoliation.  A  distinction,  however, 
is  to  be  observed  between  the  alteration  and  the  spoliation  of  an  in- 
strument as  to  the  legal  consequences.  An  alteration  is  an  act  done 
upon  the  instrument  by  which  its  meaning  or  language  is  changed. 
If  what  is  written  upon  or  erased  from  the  instrument  has  no  ten- 
dency to  produce  this  result,  or  to  mislead  any  person,  it  is  not  an 
alteration.  The  term  is,  at  this  day,  usually  applied  to  the  act  of 
the  party  entitled  under  the  deed  or  instrument,  and  imports  some 
fraud  or  improper  design  on  his  part  to  change  its  effect.  But 
the  act  of  a  stranger  without  the  participation  of  the  party  inter- 

the  exhibition  of  some  adminicular  proof,  being  of  opinion  that  the  jury  ought  not  to 
be  left  to  conjecture  alone,  upon  mere  inspection  of  the  instrument  ;  see  Knight  v. 
Clements,  Clifford  v.  Parker,  and  Cariss  v.  Tattersall,  supra. 

Other  cases,  in  accordance  with  the  rules  above  stated,  are  the  following  :  Cumber- 
land B;mk  v.  Hall,  1  Halst.  215  ;  Sayre  v.  Reynolds,  2  South.  737;  Mathews  v.  Coalter, 
9  Mo.  705  ;  Herrick  v.  Malin,  22  Wend.  388  ;  Harrington  v.  Bank  of  Washington,  14 
S.  &  R.  405  ;  Horry  District  v.  Hanion,  1  N.  &  McC.  554  ;  Haffeltinger  v.  Shutz,  16 
S.  &  R.  44  ;  Beaman  v.  Russell,  20  Vt.  205  ;  in  this  last  case  the  subject  of  alterations 
is  very  fully,  considered  and  the  authorities  classed  and  examined  in  the  able  judgment 
delivered  by  Hall,  J.  Where  an  alteration  is  apparent,  it  has  been  held  that  the  party 
impeaching  the  instrument  may  prove  collateral  facts  of  a  general  character,  such  as 
alterations  in  other  notes,  which  formed  the  consideration  for  the  note  in  question, 
tending  to  show  that  the  alteration  in  it  was  fraudulent :  Rankin  v.  Blackwell,  2  Johns.- 
Cas.  198  ;  Qsee  ante,  §  14  q.~\  { For  entries  in  books  of  account,  see  Adams  v.  Couilliard, 
102  Mass.  167  ;  Shells  v.  West,  17  Cal.  324.  f 

1  [The  subject  of  the  following  five  sections  is  one  of  substantive  law,  not  of  the 
law  oi  evidence.! 

«  Masters  v.  Miller,  4  T.  R.  329,  830  ;  Newell  v.  Mayberry,  8  Leigh  250. 

*  Masters  v.  Miller,  supra,  per  IA.  Kenyon. 

4  Sanderson  v.  Symomls,  1  H.  &  B.  430,  per  Dallas,  C.  J.  It  is  on  this  ground  that 
the  alteration  of  a  deed,  in  an  immaterial  part,  is  sometimes  fatal,  where  its  identity  is 
put  in  issue  by  the  pleadings,  every  part  of  the  writing  being  then  material  to  the 
identity ;  see  supra,  §§  58,  69  ;  Hunt  v.  Adams,  6  Mass.  521. 


§§  565-568.]  ALTERATIONS.  705 

ested,  is  a  mere  spoliation  or  mutilation  of  the  instrument,  not 
changing  its  legal' operations  so  long  as  the  original  writing  remains 
legible,  and,  if  it  be  a  deed,  any  trace  remains  of  the  seal.  If,  by 
the  unlawful  act  of  a  stranger,  the  instrument  is  mutilated  or  defaced, 
so  that  its  identity  is  gone,  the  law  regards  the  act,  so  far  as  the 
rights  of  the  parties  to  the  instrument  are  concerned,  merely  as  an 
accidental  destruction  of  primary  evidence,  compelling  a  resort  to 
that  which  is  secondary ;  and,  in  such  case,  the  mutilated  portion 
may  be  admitted  as  secondary  evidence  of  so  much  of  the  original 
instrument.  Thus,  if  it  be  a  deed,  and  the  party  would  plead  it,  it 
cannot  be  pleaded  with  a  profert,  but  the  want  of  profert  must  be 
excused  by  an  allegation  that  the  deed,  meaning  its  legal  identity  as 
a  deed,  has  been  accidentally,  and  without  the  fault  of  the  party, 
destroyed.1  And  whether  it  be  a  deed  or  other  instrument,  its  orig- 
inal tenor  must  be  substantially  shown,  and  the  alteration  or  mutila- 
tion accounted  for  in  the  same  manner  as  if  it  were  lost. 

§  567.  Same :  Immaterial  Alterations.  In  considering  the  effect 
of  alterations  made  by  the  party  himself,  who  holds  the  instrument, 
a  further  distinction  is  to  be  observed  between  the  insertion  of  those 
words  which  the  law  would  supply  and  those  of  a  different  char- 
acter. If  the  law  would  have  supplied  the  words  which  were  omit- 
ted, and  were  afterwards  inserted  by  the  party,  it  has  been  repeatedly 
held,  that  even  his  own  insertion  of  them  will  not  vitiate  the 
instrument;  for  the  assent  of  the  obligor  will,  in  such  cases,  be 
presumed.  It  is  not  an  alteration  in  the  sense  of  the  law,  avoiding 
the  instrument ;  although,  if  it  be  a  deed,  and  to  be  set  forth  in  hcec 
verba,  it  should  be  recited  as  it  was  originally  written.1 

§  568.   It  has  been  strongly  doubted  whether  an  immaterial  altera- 

i  Powers  v.  "Ware,  2  Pick.  451;  Read  t'.  Brookman,  3  T.  R.  152  ;  Morrill  v.  Otis, 
12  N.  H.  466.  The  necessity  of  some  fraudulent  intent,  carried  home  to  the  party 
claiming  under  the  instrument,  in  order  to  render  the  alteration  fatal,  was  strongly  in- 
sisted on  by  Buller,  J.,  in  Masters  v.  Miller,  4  T.  R.  334,  335.  And,  on  this  ground, 
at  least  tacitly  assumed,  the  old  cases,  to  the  effect  that  an  alteration  of  a  deed  by  a 
stranger,  in  a  material  part,  avoids  the  deed,  have  been  overruled.  In  the  following 
cases,  the  alteration  of  a  writing,  without  fraudulent  intent,  has  been  treated  as  a  merely 
accidental  spoliation:  Henfree  v.  Bromley,  6  East  309  ;  Cutts,  in  error,  v.  U.  S.,  1  Gall. 
69 ;  U.  S.  v.  Spalding,  2  Mason  478 ;  Rees  ».  Overbaugh,  6  Cowen  746 ;  Lewis  v. 
Payn,  8  id.  71  ;  Jackson  v.  Malin,  15  Johns.  297,  per  Platt,  J. ;  Nichols  v.  Johnson, 
10  Conn.  192;  Marshall  v.  Gougler,  10  S.  &  R.  164  ;  Palm.  403;  Wilkinson  v.  John- 
son, 3  B.  &  C.  428  ;  Raper  v.  Birkbeck,  15  East  17  ;  {Boyd  v.  McConuell,  10  Humph. 
68  ;  Lee  v.  Alexander,  9  B.  Monr.  25.  |  The  old  doctrine,  that  every  material  altera- 
tion of  a  deed,  even  by  a  stranger,  and  without  privity  of  either  party,  avoided  the 
deed,  was  strongly  condemned  by  Story,  J.,  in  U.  S.  v.  Spalding,  supra,  as  repugnant 
to  common  sense  and  justice,  as  inflicting  on  an  innocent  |wrty  all  the  losses  occasioned 
by  mistake,  by  accident,  by  the  wrongful  acts  of  third  persons,  or  by  the  providence  of 
Heaven  ;  and  which  ought  to  have  the  support  of  unbroken  authority  before  a  Court 
of  law  was  bound  to  surrender  its  judgment  to  what  deserved  no  better  name  than  a 
technical  quibble. 

1  Hunt  v.  Adams,  6  Mass.  519,  522  ;  Waugh  ».  Bussell,  5  Taunt.  707  ;  Paget  v. 
Paget,  3  Chan.  Rep.  410  ;  Zouch  ».  Clay,  1  Ventr.  185  ;  Smith  v.  Crooker,  5  Mass. 
538  ;  Hale  v.  Russ,  1  Greenl.  334  ;  Kuapp  v.  Maltby,  13  Wend.  587 ;  Brown  v.  Pink- 
ham,  18  Pick.  172  ;  jsee  Reed  v.  Kemp,  16  111.  445;  Arnold  v.  Jones,  2  R.  I.  345.) 
VOL.  I.  —  45 


706  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

tion  in  any  matter,  though  made  by  the  obligee  himself,  will  avoid  the 
instrument,  provided  it  be  done  innocently,  and  to  no  injurious  pur- 
pose.1 But  if  the  alteration  be  fraudulently  made  by  the  party  claim- 
ing under  the  instrument,  it  does  not  seem  important  whether  it  be  in 
a  material  or  an  immaterial  part ;  for,  in  either  case,  he  has  brought 
himself  under  the  operation  of  the  rule  established  for  the  prevention 
of  fraud ;  and,  having  fraudulently  destroyed  the  identity  of  the  in- 
strument, he  must  take  the  peril  of  all  the  consequences.2  But  here, 
also,  a  further  distinction  is  to  be  observed  between  deeds  of  con- 
veyance and  covenants  ;  and  also  between  covenants  or  agreements 
executed  and  those  which  are  still  executory.  For  if  the  grantee  of 
land  alter  or  destroy  his  title-deed,  yet  his  title  to  the  land  is  not 
gone.  It  passed  to  him  by  the  deed  ;  the  deed  has  performed  its 
office  as  an  instrument  of  conveyance,  and  its  continued  existence  is 
not  necessary  to  the  continuance  of  title  in  the  grantee ;  but  the  es- 
tate remains  in  him  until  it  has  passed  to  another  by  some  mode  of 
conveyance  recognized  by  the  law.8  The  same  principle  applies  to 
contracts  executed  in  regard  to  the  acts  done  under  them.  If  the 
estate  lies  in  grant,  and  cannot  exist  without  deed,  it  is  said  that  any 
alteration  by  the  party  claiming  the  estate  will  avoid  the  deed  as  to 
him,  and  that  therefore  the  estate  itself,  as  well  as  all  remedy  upon 
the  deed,  will  be  utterly  gone.4  But  whether  it  be  a  deed  conveying 
real  estate  or  not,  it  seems  well  settled  that  any  alteration  in  the  in- 
strument, made  by  the  grantee  or  obligee,  if  it  be  made  with  a  fraud- 
ulent design,  and  do  not  consist  in  the  insertion  of  words  which  the 
law  would  supply,  is  fatal  to  the  instrument,  as  the  foundation  of  any 

1  Hatch  v.  Hatch,  9  Mass.  311,  per  Sewall,  J.  ;  Smith  v.  Dnnbar,  8  Pick.  246. 

2  If  an  obligee  procure  a  person,  who  was  not  present  at  the  execution  of  the  bond, 
to  sign  his  name  as  an  attesting  witness,,  this  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  fraud,  and 
voids  the  bond :  Adams  v.  Frye,  3  Met.  103.     But  it  is  competent  for  the  obligee  to 
rebut  the  inference  of  fraud  by  proof  that  the  act  was  done  without  any  fraudulent 

Kirpose ;  in  which  case  the  bond  will  not  be  thereby  rendered  void :  ib.  ;  and  see 
omer  v.  Wallis,  11  Mass.  309;  Smith  v.  Dunbar,  8  Pick.  246.  But  this  latter  point 
was  decided  otherwise  in  Marshall  v.  Gougler,  10  S.  &  R.  164.  And  where  the  holder 
of  a  bond  or  a  note  under  seal  procured  a  person  to  alter  the  date,  for  the  purpose  of 
correcting  a  mistake  in  the  year  and  making  it  conform  to  the  truth,  this  was  held 
to  avoid  the  bond  :  Miller  v.  Gilleland,  S.  C.  Pa.,  1  Am.  Law  Reg.  672,  Lowrie  and 
Woodward,  JJ.,  dissenting.  jThe  making  a  note  payable  at  a  particular  place  is  a 
material  alteration  :  Burchfield  v.  Moore,  25  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  123 ;  3  El.  &  Bl.  683  ; 
see  also  Warrington  v.  Early,  22  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  208  :  2  El.  &  Bl.  763  :  Meyer  v. 
Huneke,  55  N.  Y.  412. } 

8  Hatch  v.  Hatch,  9  Mass.  307  ;  Dr.  Leyfield's  Case,  10  Co.  88  ;  Bolton  v.  Carlisle, 
2  H.  Bl.  259 ;  Davis  v.  Spooner,  3  Pick.  284  ;  Barrett  v.  Thorndike,  1  Greenl.  73  ; 
Lewis  v.  Payn,  8  Cowen  71  ;  Jackson  v.  Gould,  7  Wend.  364  ;  Beckrow's  Case,  Hetl. 
138.  Whether  the  deed  may  still  be  read  by  the  party  as  evidence  of  title,  is  not 
agreed  ;  that  it  may  be  read,  see  Doe  ».  Hirst,  8  Stark.  60 ;  Lewis  v.  Payn,  8  Cowen 
71  ;  Jackson  v.  Gould,  7  Wend.  864  ;  that  it  may  not,  see  Babb  v.  Clemson,  10  S.  &  R. 
419;  Withers  v.  Atkinson,  1  Watts  236;  Chesley  v.  Frost,  1  N.  H.  145;  Newell  v. 
Mayberry,  8  Leigh  250  ;  Bliss  v.  Mclntyre,  18  Vt.  466  ;  £and  compare  the  application 
of  the  principle  of  §  563  b,  ante."] 

*  Moore  v.  Salter,  3  Buistr.  79,  per  Coke,  C.  J.  ;  Lewis  v.  Payn,  8  Cowen  71 ', 
tupra,  {  265. 


§§  568-568  a.]  ALTERATIONS.  707 

remedy  at  law,  upon  the  covenants  or  undertakings  contained  in  it.* 
And,  in  such  case,  it  seems  that  the  party  will  not  be  permitted  to 
prove  the  covenant  or  promise  by  other  evidence.6  But  where  there 
are  several  parties  to  an  indenture,  some  of  whom  have  executed  it, 
and  in  the  progress  of  the  transaction  it  is  altered  as  to  those  who 
have  not  signed  it,  without  the  knowledge  of  those  who  have,  but  yet 
in  a  part  not  at  all  affecting  the  latter,  and  then  is  executed  by  the 
residue,  it  is  good  as  to  all.7 

§  568  a.  Same  :  Alterations  by  Consent.  In  all  these  cases  of 
alterations,  it  is  further  to  be  remarked,  that  they  are  supposed  to 
have  been  made  without  the  consent  of  the  other  party.  For,  if  the 
alteration  is  made  by  consent  of  parties,  such  as  by  filling  up  of  blanks, 
or  the  like,  it  is  valid.1  But  here,  also,  a  distinction  has  been  taken 
between  the  insertion  of  matter  essential  to  the  existence  and  opera- 
tion of  the  instrument  as  a  deed,  and  that  which  is  not  essential  to 
its  operation.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that  an  instrument  which, 
when  formerly  executed,  was  deficient  in  some  material  part,  so  as  to 
be  incapable  of  any  operation  at  all,  and  was  no  deed,  could  not  after- 
wards become  a  deed  by  being  completed  and  delivered  by  a  stranger, 
in  the  absence  of  the  party  who  executed  it,  and  unauthorized  by  an 
instrument  under  seal.2  Yet  this  rule,  again,  has  its  exceptions,  in 
divers  cases,  such  as  powers  of  attorney  to  transfer  stock,8  navy  bills,4 

6  Ib.  ;  Davidson  v.  Cooper,  11  M.  &  W.  778  ;  Jackson  v.  Gould,  7  Wend.  364  ; 
Hatch  v.  Hatch,  9  Mass.  307  ;  Barrett  v.  Thorndike,  1  Greenl.  73  ;  Withers  v.  Atkin- 
son, 1  Watts  236 ;  Arrison  v.  Harnistead,  2  Barr  191  ;  Whitmer  v.  Frye,  10  Mo.  348  ; 
Mollett  v.  Wackerbarth,  5  C.  B.  181  ;  Agriculturist  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  15  Jur.  489 ; 
4  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  211. 

6  Mnrtendale  v.  Follett,  1  N.  H.  95  ;  Newell  v.  Mayberry,  3  Leigh  250  ;  Blade  v. 
Noland,  12  Wend.  173  ;  Arrison  v.  Harmstead,   2  Barr  191.     The  strictness  of  the 
English  rule,  that  every  alteration  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  or  promissory  note,  even  by 
consent  of  the  parties,  renders  it  utterly  void,  has  particular  reference  to  the  stamp 
act  of  1  Ann.  stat.  2,  c.  22  ;  Chitty  on  Bills,  pp.  207-214. 

7  Doe  r.  Binghatn,  4  B.  &  Aid.  672,  675,  per  Bayley,  J. ;  Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine, 
6  M.  &  W.  208,  209. 

1  Markham  v.  Gonaston,  Cro.  El.  626  ;  Moor  547  ;  Zouch  v.  Clay,  1  Ventr.  185  ; 
2  Lev.   35;  j  Plank- Road  Co.    v.    Wetsel,   21  Barb.  56;  Ratcliife  v.  Planters'  Bank, 
2  Sneed  425;  Shelton  ».  Deering,  10  B.  Mon.  405.     Where  the  date  of  a  note  under 
seal  was  altered  from  1836  to  1838,  at  the  request  of  the  payee,  and  in  the  presence  of 
the  surety,  but  without  his  assent,  the  note  was  avoided  as  to  the  surety  :  Miller  v. 
Gilleland,  19  Pa.  St.  119.  |     So,  where  a  power  of  attorney  was  sent  to  B,  with  his 
Christian  name  in  blank,  which  he  filled  by  inserting  it,  this  was  held  valid  :  Eagleton 
v.  Gutteridge,  11  M.  &  W.  468.     This  consent  may  be  implied  :  Halev.  Russ,  1  Greenl. 
334  ;  Smith  v.  Crooker,  5  Mass.  538  ;  19  Johns.  396  per  Kent,  C.     {A  probate  bond 
executed  by  a  principal  and  two  sureties  was  altered  by  the  judge  of  probate  with  the 
consent  of  the  principal,  but  without  the  knowledge  of  the  sureties,  by  increasing  the 
penal  sum,  and  was  then  executed  by  two  additional  sureties  who  did  not   know  of 
the  alteration,  and  was  approved  by  the  judge  of  probate  ;  and  it  was  held  that  the 
bond,  though  binding  on  the  principal,  was  void  as  to  all  the  sureties  :  Howe  v.  Pea- 
body,  2  Gray  556.     See  Taylor  v.  Johnson,  17  Ga.  521  ;  Phillips  v.  Wells,  2  Sneed 
154';  Ledford  v.  Vandyke,  Busbee  L.  480  ;  Burchfield  v.  Moore,  25  Eng.  Law  &  Eq. 
123;  3  El.  &B1.  683.  | 

2  Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine,  6  M.  &  W.  200,  216. 

8  Commercial  Bank  of  Buffalo  v.  Kortwright,  22  Wend.  348. 
*  Per  Wilson,  J.,  in  Masters  v.  Miller,  1  Austr.  229. 


708  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

custom-house  bonds,8  appeal  bonds,6  bail  bonds,7  and  the  like,  which 
have  been  held  good,  though  executed  in  blank  and  afterwards  filled 
up  by  parol  authority  only.8 


4.  Proving  Execution  of  Attested  Documents. 

§  569.  Attesting  "Witness  must  be  called.  The  instrument,  being 
thus  produced  and  freed  from  suspicion,  must  be  proved  by  the  sub- 
scribing witnesses,  if  there  be  any,  or  at  least  by  one  of  them.  Vari- 
ous reasons  have  been  assigned  for  this  rule  ;  but  that  upon  which  it 
seems  best  founded  is,  that  a  fact  may  be  known  to  the  subscribing 
witness  not  within  the  knowledge  or  recollection  of  the  obligor,  and 
that  he  is  entitled  to  avail  himself  of  all  the  knowledge  of  the  sub- 
scribing witness  relative  to  the  transaction.1  [Another  reason  is 
that]  the  party,  to  whose  execution  he  is  a  witness,  is  considered  as 
invoking  him,  as  the  person  to  whom  he  refers,  to  prove  what  passed 
at  the  time  of  attestation.8 

§  569  a.  Kind  of  Document  affected.1  The  rule,  though  originally 
framed  in  regard  to  deeds,  is  now  extended  to  every  species  of  writ- 
ing attested  by  a  witness.2  [But  modern  legislation  has  in  most  ju- 

*  22  Wend.  366. 

6  Ex  parte  Decker,  6  Cowen  59  ;  Exparte  Kerwin,  8  id.  118. 

7  Hale  v.  Russ,  1  Greenl.  334  ;  Gordon  v.  Jeffery,  2  Leigh  410 ;  Vanhook  v.  Barnett, 

4  Dev.  L.  272.     But  see  Harrison  v.   Tiernans,  4  Rand.   177 ;  Gilbert  v.   Anthony, 
1  Yerg.  69. 

8  In  Texira  v.  Evans,  cited  1  Anstr.  228,  where  one  executed  a  bond  in  blank,  and 
sent  it  into  the  money  market  to  raise  a  loan  upon,  and  it  was  negotiated,  and  filled 
up  by  parol  authority  only,  Lord  Mansfield  held  it  a  good  bond.     This  decision  was 
questioned  by  Mr.  Preston  in  his  edition  of  Shep.  Touchst.  p.  68,  and  it  was  expressly 
overruled  in  Hibblewhite  w.  McMorine,  6  M.  &  W.  215.     It  is  also  contradicted  by 
McKee  v.  Hicks,  2  Dev.  L.  379,  and  some  other  American   cases.     But  it  was  con- 
firmed in  Wiley  v.  Moor,  17  S.  &  R,  438  ;  Knapp  v.  Maltby,  13  Wend.  587 ;  Commer- 
cial Bank  of  Buffalo  v.  Kortwright,  22  Wend.  348  ;  Boardman  v.  Gore,  1  Stew.  517  ; 
Duncan  v.  Hodges,  4  McCord  239 ;  and  in  several  other  cases  the  same  doctrine  has 
been  recognized.     Instruments  executed  in  this  manner  have  become  very  common, 
and  the  authorities  as  to  their  validity  are  distressingly  in  conflict,  but  upon  the  prin- 
ciple adopted  in  Hudson  v.  Revett,  5  Bing.  868,  there  is  very  little  difficulty  in  hold- 
ing such  instruments  valid,  and  thus  giving  full  effect  to  the  actual  intentions  of  the 
parties,  without  the  violation  of  any  rule  of  law  ;  see  West  v.  Steward,  14  M.  &  W. 
47 ;  Hartley  v.  Manson,  4  M.  &  G.  172 ;  Duncan  v.  Hodges,  4  McCord  239  ;  Parker  ». 
Hill,  8  Met.  447  ;  Hope  v.  Harman,  11  Jur.   1097  ;  Goodright  v.  Strapham,   Cowp. 
201  ;  U.  8.  v.  Nelson,  2  Brockenbr.  64  ;  post,  Vol.  II,  §  297. 

1  Per  Le  Blanc,  J.,  in  Call  v.  Dunning,  4  East  54  ;  Manners  v.  Postan,  4  Esp.  240, 
per  Ld.  Alvanley,  C.  J.  ;  3  Preston  on  Abstracts  of  Title,  73. 

2  Cussons  v.  Skinnor,  11  M.  &  W.  168,  per  Ld.  Abinger ;  Hollenback  v.  Fleming, 
6  Hill  N.  Y.  303.     fJThe  truth  seems  to  be,  however,  that  these  are  reasons  discovered 
a  posteriori  to  support  a  rule  which  had  been  handed  down  as  a  tradition  from  primitive 
times;  see  its  origin  explained  in  Thayer,  Preliminary  Treatise  on  Evidence,  502/] 

1  [jThe  original  §  5G9  lias  been  subdivided  further  into  §§  569  a,  569  b  ;  the  original 

5  569  a  is  now  §  569  c.] 

8  Doe  v.  Durnfonl,  2  M.  &  S.  62,  which  was  a  notice  to  quit ;  so,  of  a  warrant  to 
distrain:  Higgs  v.  Dixon,  2  Stark.  180  ;  a  receipt:  Heckert  v.  Haine,  6  Binn.  16; 
Wishart  v.  Downey,  15  S.  &  R.  77  ;  McMahan  o.  McGrady,  5  S.  &  II.  314  ;  jsee  other 
instances  in  Barber  v.  Terrell,  54  Ga.  146;  Warner  v.  R.  Co.,  81  Ohio  St.  265.  | 


§§  568a-569c.]    EXECUTION  OF  ATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.  709 

risdictions  limited  the  scope  of  the  rule  to  documents  for  which  the 
law  requires  attestation  as  an  element  of  validity,  i.  e.  chiefly  wills, 
and,  in  some  jurisdictions,  deeds  of  land.8] 

§  569  b.  Opponent's  Admission,  as  dispensing  •with  the  Rule. 
Such  being  the  principle  of  the  rule,  its  application  has  been  held  in- 
dispensable, even  where  it  was  proved  that  the  obligor  had  admitted 
that  he  had  executed  the  bond,1  and  though  the  admission  was  made 
in  answer  to  a  bill  of  discovery.2 

§  569  c  [569  a,.]  "Who  is  an  Attesting  Witness.  A  subscribing  [or 
attesting]  witness  is  one  who  was  present  when  the  instrument  was 
executed,  and  who,  at  that  time,  at  the  request  or  with  the  assent  of 
the  party,  subscribed  his  name  to  it  as  a  witness  of  the  execution. 
If  his  name  is  signed,  not  by  himself  but  by  the  party,  it  is  no  attes- 
tation. Neither  is  it  such,  if  though  present  at  the  execution,  he  did 
not  subscribe  the  instrument  at  that  time,  but  did  it  afterwards, 
and  without  request,  or  by  the  fraudulent  procurement  of  the  other 
party.  But  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  should  have  actually  seen  the 
party  sign,  or  have  been  present  at  the  very  moment  of  signing ;  for 
if  he  is  called  in  immediately  afterwards,  and  the  party  acknowledges 
his  signature  to  the  witness,  and  requests  him  to  attest  it,  this  will 
be  deemed  part  of  the  transaction,  and  therefore  a  sufficient  attesta- 
tion.1 

8  QSee  the  reasons  well  expounded  in  the  Second  Report  of  the  Common  Law  Pro- 
cedure Commission,  1853,  p.  23  ;  the  English  statute  is  St.  17-18  Viet.,  c.  125,  s.  26. 
The  American  statutes  vary  in  many  particulars. 

Distinguish  those  statutes  which  admit  as  genuine  a  document  whose  genuineness 
of  execution  is  not  denied  before  trial  by  a  special  traverse  or  is  not  denied  at  the 
trial  by  the  oath  of  the  party  charged  ;  these  in  effect  make  a  rule  of  pleading.] 

1  Abbot  v.  Plumbe,  1  Doug.  216,  referred  to  by  Lawrence,  J.,  in  7  T.  R.  2t>7,  and 
again  in  2  East  187  ;  and  confirmed  by  Lord  Ellenborough  as  an  inexorable  rule,  in 
R.  v.  Harringworth,  4  M.  &  S.  353 ;  the  admission  of  the  party  may  be  given  in  evi- 
dence ;  but  the  witness  must  also  be  produced,  if  to  be  had.  This  rule  was  broken  ia 
upon,  in  the  case  of  the  admitted  execution  of  a  promissory  note,  in  Hall  v.  Phelps, 
2  Johns.  451  ;  but  the  rule  was  afterwards  recognized  as  binding  in  the  case  of  a  deed, 
in  Fox  v.  Reil,  3  Johns.  477,  and  confirmed  in  Henry  v.  Bishop,  2  Wend.  575. 

a  Call  v.  Dunning,  4  East  53  (but  see  Bowles  v.  Langworthy,  5  T.  R.  366)  ;  Streeter 
v.  Bartlett,  5  M.  G.  &  Sc.  562  ;  ([Richmond  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  92  Ala.  226;  Hawkins  ». 
Ross,  100  id.  459  ;  McVicker  v.  Conkle,  96  Ga.  584  ;  Brigham  v.  Palmer,  3  All.  450. 
This  is  so  whether  the  admission  is  by  the  obligor  a  third  person  or  (in  the  strict 
sense)  by  the  obligor  a  party-opponent.  Moreover,  even  the  opponent's  admission  as 
a  witness  on  the  stand  will  not  suffice  :  Whyman  v.  Garth,  8  Exch.  803  ;  McVicker  v. 
Conkle,  supra  ;  compare  Barry  r.  Ryan,  4  Gray  523  ;  contra,  Rayburn  ».  Lumber 
Co.,  57  Mich.  273.  But  a  so-called  judicial  admission  (i.  e.  an  express  waiver  for 
the  purposes  of  the  trial ;  ante,  §  205)  will  suffice :  Bringloe  v.  Goodson,  8  Scott  71  ; 
Whyman  v.  Garth,  Hawkins  v.  Ross,  Richmond  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  supra.  Under  statutes 
which  require  a  denial  of  execution  to  be  expressly  pleaded  or  made  by  oath,  the  rule 
for  calling  the  attesting  witness  would  not  obtain,  because  the  execution,  which  is  the 
object  of  such  proof,  cannot  be  put  in  issue  except  on  those  conditions.] 

1  Hollenback  v.  Fleming,  6  Hill  N.  Y.  303;  Cussons  v.  Skinner,  11  M.  &  W.  168  ; 
Ledgard  v.  Thompson,  ib.  41,  per  Parke,  B.  "  Si  [testes]  in  confectione  chartre  prse- 
sentes  non  fuerint,  sufficit  si  postmodum,  in  praesentia  donatoris  et  donatorii  fueriut 
recitata  etconcessa  :  "  Bracton,  b.  2,  c.  16,  §  12,  fol.  38,  a  ;  Fleta,  1.  3,  c.  14,  §  13, 
p.  200  ;  and  see  Brackett  v.  Mountfort,  2  Fairf.  115.  [That  the  person  signing  is  not 
named  as  attesting  witness  does  not  prevent  the  application  of  the  rule  :  Chaplain  r. 
Briscoe,  11  Sm.  &  M.  372.  A  notary  taking  the  acknowledgment  of  an  affidavit  is  not 
an  attesting  witness  :  Lavretta  v.  Holcomb,  98  Ala.  503.] 


710  PRIVATE  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

§  569  d.  Number  of  "Witnesses  to  be  called.  [Though  there  be 
more  than  one  attesting  witness  named  upon  the  document,  orthodox 
tradition  has  always  been  that  only  one  of  them  need  be  called  to 
prove  execution.1  In  the  case  of  wills,  there  was  no  departure  from 
this  rule ; 2  though  the  Chancery  Court  had  here  a  tradition  of  its 
own  by  which  it  customarily  required  all  the  witnesses  to  be  called.8 
From  the  statutes  requiring  wills  to  be  attested  by  a  specified  num- 
ber of  witnesses,  a  special  argument  for  calling  all  might  be  thought 
to  arise ;  but  the  orthodox  rule  has  in  general  been  perpetuated ; 4 
though  by  statute  it  has  sometimes  been  expressly  changed.] 

§570.  Exceptions:  (l)  Ancient  Instruments.  To  this  rule,  requiring 
the  production  of  the  subscribing  witnesses,  there  are  several  classes 
of  exceptions. 

The  first  is,  where  the  instrument  is  thirty  years  old;  in  which 
case,  as  we  have  heretofore  seen,1  it  is  said  to  prove  itself,  the 
subscribing  witnesses  being  presumed  to  be  dead,  and  other  proof 
being  presumed  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  the  party.  But  such  doc- 
uments must  be  free  from  just  grounds  of  suspicion,  and  must  come 
from  the  proper  custody,2  or  have  been  acted  upon,  so  as  to  afford 
some  corroborative  proof  of  their  genuineness.8  And,  in  this  case, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  call  the  subscribing  witnesses,  though  they  be 
living.4  This  exception  is  coextensive  with  the  rule  applying  to  an- 

1  [Holdfast  v.  Dowling,  2  Str.  1254  ;  {Melcher  v.  Flanders,  40  N.  H.  139  ;}  O'Sul- 
livan  v.  Overton,  56  Conn.   102  ;  Sowell  v.  Bank,  Ala.,  24  So.  585  ;  though  a  Court 
sometimes  claims  a  discretion  :  Gelott  v.  Goodspeed,  8  Gush.  411.] 

2  [Buller,  Nisi  Prius,  264 ;  provided,  of  course,  he  can  prove  all  the  elements  of 
due  execution.] 

8  [See  Bootle  v.  Blundell,  19  Ves.  Jr.  494,  500,  505,  509  ;  Bullen  v.  Michel,  4  Dow 
297,  331  ;  Tatham  v.  Wright,  2  Russ  &  My.  1,  8,  16,  30.] 

4  [Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  E.  3,  22  (leading  case)  ;  Slinghoff  v.  Bruner,  111., 
61  N.  E.  772  ;  Jackson  v.  Legrange,  19  Johns.  386  ;  Cornell  v.  Woolley,  42  N.  Y.  378  ; 
Lambert  v.  Cooper,  29  Gratt.  61 ;  left  undecided  :  Abbott  v.  Abbott,  41  Mich.  540  ; 
contra,  semble :  Jones'  Will,  Wis.,  79  N.  W.  684-3 

1  Supra,  §  21,  and  cases  there  cited;  see  also  Doe  v.  Davis,  10  Q.  B.  314  ;  Crane 
v.  Marshall,  4  Shepl.  27  ;  Green  v.  Chelsea,  24  Pick.  71.    [The  doctrine  about  ancient 
instruments,  as  applied  irrespective  of  the  attesting  witness  rule,  is  also  treated  post, 
§  575  i.] 

2  Supra,  §  142  ;  [transferred  post,  as  §  575  6  ;]  and  see  Slater  v,  Hodgson,  9  Q.  B. 
727. 

8  See  supra,  §§  21,  142  ;  [transferred  post,  as  §  575  b;^  Doe  d.  Edgett  v.  Stiles, 
1  K<;rr  New  Br.  338;  {Goodwin  v.  Jack,  62  Me.  414  ;  Johnson  v.  Shaw,  41  Tex.  428.} 
Mr.  Evans  thinks  that  the  antiquity  of  the  deed  is  alone  sufficient  to  entitle  it  to  be  read; 
and  that  the  other  circumstances  only  go  to  its  effect  in  evidence  :  2  Poth.  Obi.  App. 
xvi,  §  5,  p.  149  ;  see  also  Doe  v.  Btirdett,  4  Ad.  &  El.  1,  19  ;  Brett  v.  Beales,  1  M.  i 
Malk.  416,  418  ;  Jackson  v.  haroway,  3  Johns.  Cas.  283.  In  some  cases  proof  of  pos- 
session, under  the  deed,  or  will,  seems  to  have  been  deemed  indispensable  ;  but  the 
principle  pervading  them  all  is  that  of  corroboration  merely ;  that  is,  that  some  evi- 
ilt'ii<-«!  shall  be  offered,  auxiliary  to  the  apparent  antiquity  of  the  instrument,  to  raise  a 
sufficient  presumption  in  its  favor;  as  to  this  point,  see  supra,  §  144  ;  [transferred 
post,  as  §  575  6.] 

*  Marsh  v.  Colnett,  2  Esp.  665 ;  Doe  v.  Burdett,  4  Ad.  &  El.  1,  19 ;  Doe  t>.  Deakin, 
8  C.  &  P.  402;  Jackson  v.  Christman,  4  W«nd.  277,  282,  283  ;  Doe  v.  Wolley,  8  B.  & 
C.  22  ;  Fetherly  v.  Waggoner,  11  Wend.  603  ;  [Gardner  v.  Granuiss,  57  Ga.  539,  555; 
Shaw  v.  Pmhiiig,  57  Mo.  416 ;  contra :  Smith  v.  lUinkin,  20  111.  14,  23.] 


§§  569  rf-571.]      EXECUTION   OF  ATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.  711 

cient  writings  of  every  description,  provided  they  have  been  brought 
from  the  proper  custody  and  place ;  for  the  finding  them  in  such  a 
custody  and  place  is  a  presumption  that  they  were  honestly  and  fairly 
obtained  and  preserved  for  use,  and  are  free  from  suspicion  of  dis- 
honesty.6 But  whether  it  extends  to  the  seal  of  a  private  corpora- 
tion has  been  doubted,  for  such  a  case  does  not  seem  clearly  to  be 
within  the  principle  of  the  exception.6 

§  571.  Exceptions :  (2)  Claim  by  Opponent  under  the  Instrument. 
A  second  exception  to  this  rule  is  allowed  where  the  instrument  is 
produced  by  the  adverse  party,  pursuant  to  notice,  the  party  produc- 
ing it  claiming  an  interest  under  the  instrument.  In  this  case,  the 
party  producing  the  instrument  is  not  permitted  to  call  on  the  other 
for  proof  of  its  execution  ;  for,  by  claiming  an  interest  under  the  in- 
strument, he  has  admitted  its  execution.1  The  same  principle  is  ap- 
plied where  both  parties  claim  similar  interests  under  the  same  deed ; 
in  which  case,  the  fact  of  such  claim  may  be  shown  by  parol.3  So, 
where  both  parties  claim  under  the  same  ancestor,  his  title-deed, 
being  equally  presumable  to  be  in  the  possession  of  either,  may  be 
proved  by  a  copy  from  the  registry.8  But  it  seems  that  the  interest 
claimed  in  these  cases  must  be  of  an  abiding  nature.  Therefore, 
where  the  defendant  would  show  that  he  was  a  partner  with  the 
plaintiff,  and,  in  proof  thereof,  called  on  the  plaintiff  to  produce  a 
written  personal  contract,  made  between  them  both,  as  partners  of 
the  one  part,  and  a  third  person  of  the  other  part,  for  labor  which 
had  been  performed,  which  was  produced  accordingly,  the  defendant 
was  still  held  bound  to  prove  its  execution.4  The  interest,  also, 
which  is  claimed  under  the  instrument  produced  on  notice,  must,  in 
order  to  dispense  with  this  rule,  be  an  interest  claimed  in  the 
same  cause.  Therefore,  where  in  an  action  by  an  agent  against  his 
principal  for  his  commission  due  for  procuring  him  an  apprentice, 
the  indenture  of  apprenticeship  was  produced  by  the  defendant  on 
notice,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  still  bound  to  prove  its  exe- 
cution by  the  subscribing  witness ;  and  that,  having  been  nonsuited 
for  want  of  this  evidence,  he  was  not  entitled  to  a  new  trial  on  the 

6  12  Vin.  Abr.  tit.  Evidence,  A,  b,  5,  pi.  7,  cited  by  Ld.  Ellenborough,  in  Roe  v. 
Rawlings,  7  East  291 ;  Gov.,  etc.  of  Chelsea  Waterworks  i>.  Cowper,  1  Esp.  275;  Forbes 
v.  Wale,  1  W.  Bl.  532 ;  Wynne  v.  Tyrwhitt,  4  B.  &  Aid.  376. 

«  R.  v.  Bathwick,  2  B.  &  Ad.  639,  648. 

1  Pearce  v.  Hooper,  3  Taunt.  60  ;  Carr  v.  Burdiss,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  784,  785 ;  Orr  v. 
Morrice,  3  Br.  &  Bing.   139;  Bradshaw  v,  Bennett,  1  M.  &  Rob.  143.      In  assumpsit 
by  a  servant  against  his  master,  for  breach  of  a  written  contract  of  service,  the  agree- 
ment being  produced  under  notice,  proof  of  it  by  the  attesting  witness  was  held  un- 
necessary :  Bell  v.  Chaytor,  1  Car.  &  Kirw.  162  ;  5  C.  &  P.  48  ;  Qsee  other  examples 
in  Herring  v.  Rogers,  30  Ga.  615 ;  McGregor  v.  Wait,  10  Gray  72  ;  Gorton  v.  Dyson, 
1  B.  &  B.  219  (will).] 

2  Doe  v.  Wilkins,  4  Ad.  &  El.  86  ;  s.  c.  5  Nev.  &  M.  434 ;  Knight  v.  Martin, 
1  Gow  26. 

*  Burghardt  v.  Turner,  12  Pick.  534  ;  \jseepost,  §  573-3 

*  Collins  v.  Bayutum,  1  Q.  B.  117. 


712  PRIVATE  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

ground  of  surprise,  though  he  was  not  previously  aware  that  there 
was  a  subscribing  witness,  it  not  appearing  that  he  had  made  any  in- 
quiry on  the  subject.6  So,  where  the  instrument  was  taken  by  the 
party  producing  it,  in  the  course  of  his  official  duty,  as,  for  example, 
a  bail  bond,  taken  by  the  sheriff,  and  produced  by  him  on  notice,  its 
due  execution  will  prima  facie  be  presumed.6  Subject  to  these  ex- 
ceptions, the  general  rule  is,  that  where  the  party  producing  an 
instrument  on  notice  is  not  a  party  to  it,  and  claims  no  beneficial 
interest  under  it,  the  party  calling  for  its  production  and  offering  it 
in  evidence,  must  prove  its  execution.7 

§  572.  Exceptions  :  (3)  Attesting  Witness  Unavailable.  A  third 
class  of  exceptions  to  this  rule  arises  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
witnesses  themselves,  the  party,  either  from  physical  or  legal  obsta- 
cles, being  unable  to  adduce  them.1  Thus,  if  the  witness  is  proved 
or  presumed  to  be  dead ; 2  or  cannot  be  found  after  diligent  inquiry  ;  * 
or,  is  resident  beyond  the  sea ; 4  or,  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Court ; 6  or,  is  a  fictitious  person,  whose  name  has  been  placed  upon 

6  Rearden  v.  Minter,  5  M.  &  Gr.  204. 

6  Scott  v.  Waithman,  3  Stark.  168  ;  [>ee  post,  §  573.] 

'  Betts  v.  Badger,  12  Johns.  223  ;  Jackson  v.  Kingsley,  17  id.  158.  Qt  was  at  one 
time  thought  that  mere  possession  of  the  document  by  the  opponent,  and  production 
on  notice,  dispensed  with  the  present  rule :  R.  v.  Middlezoy,  2  T.  K.  41  ;  but  after 
some  fluctuation  this  doctrine  was  properly  repudiated :  Gordon  v.  Secretan,  8  East 
548  ;  Pearce  v.  Hooper,  Orr  v.  Morrice,  supra.  The  old  rule  is  sometimes  applied  iu 
this  country  :  Stevenson  v.  Dunlap,  7  T.  B.  Monr.  134,  semble;  Hobby  v.  Alford,  73 
Ga.  791.  Betts  v.  Badger,  supra,  accepted  it ;  but  Jackson  v.  Kingsley,  supra,  took 
the  modern  view.  3 

1  [This  seems  not  to  be  an  exception  to  the  rule,  but  rather  a  satisfaction  of  it ; 
i.e.  the  rule  merely  requires  that  the  witness  be  called  if  he  can  be  had.] 

2  Anon.,  12  Mod.  607  ;  Barnes  v.  Trornpowsky,  7  T.  R.  265 ;  Adams  v.  Kerr,  1  B. 
&  P.  360 ;  Banks  v.  Farquharson,  1  Dick.  167  ;  Mott  v.  Doughty,  1  Johns.  Gas.  230  ; 
Dudley  v.  Sumner,  5  Mass.  463.     That  the  witness  is  sick,  even  though  despaired  of, 
is  not  sufficient :  Harrison  v.  Blades,  3  Campb.  457  ;  \_contra,  semble  :  Jones  v.  Brewer, 

4  Taunt.  46.     Statutes  often  provide  for  this  and  the  ensuing  situations,  so  far  as  con- 
cerns will-witnesses.] 

8  Coghlan  v.  Williamson,  1  Doug.  93  ;  Cunliffe  v.  Sefton,  2  East  183  ;  Call  v. 
Dunning,  5  Esp.  16  ;  4  East  53 ;  Crosby  v.  Piercy,  1  Taunt.  364 ;  Jones  v.  Brinkley, 
1  Hayw.  20;  Anon.,  12  Mod.  607  ;  Wardell  r/Fermor,  2  Campb.  282;  Jackson  ». 
Burton,  11  Johns.  64  ;  Mills  v.  Twist,  8  id.  121  ;  Parker  v.  Haskins,  2  Taunt.  223  ; 
Whittemore  v.  Brooks,  1  Greenl.  57 ;  Burt  v.  Walker,  4  B.  &  Aid.  697  ;  Pytt  v. 
Griffith,  6  Moore  538 ;  Austin  v.  Rumsey,  2  C.  &  K.  736  ;  fJHartford  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Gray,  80  111.  28.] 

4  Anon.,  12  Mod.  607 ;  Barnes  v.  Trompowsky,  7  T.  R.  266. 

6  Holmes  v.  Pontin,  Peake  99  ;  Banks  v.  Farquharson,  1  Dick.  168  ;  Cooper  v. 
Marsden,  1  Esp.  1  ;  Prince  v.  Blackburn,  2  East  250;  Sluby  v.  Champlin,  4  Johns. 
461 ;  Dudley  «;.  Sumner,  4  Mass.  444  ;  Homer  v.  Wallis,  id.  309  ;  Cooke  v.  Woodrow, 

5  Cranch  13  ;  Baker  v.  Blunt,  2  Hayw.  404 ;  Hodnett  v.  Forman,  1  Stark.  90  ;  Glubb 
v.  Edwards,  2  M.  &  Rob.  300  ;  Engles  v.  Bruington,  4  Yeates  345 ;  Wiley  v.  Bean, 
1  Oilman  302  ;  Dunbar  v.  Marden,  13  N.  H.  311  ;  jTeall  v.  Van  Wyck,  10  Barb.  N.  Y. 
376 ;  Foote  t».  Cobb,  18  Ala.  585  ;  Cox  v.  Davis,  17  id.  714 ;{   [Mariner  v.  Saunders, 
10  111.  113  ;  Jewell  v.  Chamberlain,  41  Nebr.  254  ;  there  is  much  variance  of  phrase  as 
to  whether  residence  or  mere  absence  in  the  other  jurisdiction  suffices.      The  instru- 
ment's execution  abroad  raises  the  presumption  that  the  witness  is  without  the  juris- 
diction :  Valentine  ».  Piper,  22  Pick.  85.     It  is  usually  said  that  no  effort  to  take  his 
deposition  is  neressary :  Settle  v.  Allison,  8  Ga.  201  ;  Allison's  Estate,  104  la.  130.] 
If  the  witness  has  set  out  to  leave  the  jurisdiction  by  sea,  but  the  ship  has  been  beaten 


§§  571-572.]  EXECUTION  OF  ATTESTED   DOCUMENTS.  713 

the  deed  by  the  party  who  made  it ; '  or,  if  the  instrument  is  lost, 
and  the  name  of  the  subscribing  witness  is  unknown;7  or,  if  the 
witness  is  insane  ; 8  or,  has  subsequently  become  infamous  ; 9  or,  has 
become  the  adverse  party  ; 10  or,  has  been  made  executor  or  adminis- 
trator to  one  of  the  parties,  or  has  otherwise,  and  without  the  agency 
of  the  party,  subsequently  become  interested,  or  otherwise  incapaci- 
tated ;  n  or  was  incapacitated  at  the  time  of  signing,  but  the  fact  was 
not  known  to  the  party  ; 12  in  all  these  cases,  the  execution  of  the  in- 
strument may  be  proved  by  other  evidence.  If  the  adverse  party, 
pending  the  cause,  solemnly  agrees  to  admit  the  execution,  other 
proof  is  not  necessary.18  And  if  the  witness,  being  called,  denies,  or 
does  not  recollect,  having  seen  it  executed,  it  may  be  established  by 
other  evidence.14  If  the  witness  has  become  blind,  it  has  been  held 
that  this  did  not  excuse  the  party  from  calling  him ;  for  he  may  be 
able  still  to  testify  to  other  parts  of  the  res  gestce  at  the  time  of  sign- 
ing.16 If  the  witness  was  infamous  at  the  time  of  attestation,  or  was 
interested,  and  continues  so,  the  party  not  then  knowing  the  fact,  the 
attestation  is  treated  as  a  nullity.16  [If  the  witness  fails  to  recollect 

back,  he  is  still  considered  absent :  Ward  v.  Wells.  1  Taunt.  461.  See  also  Emery  ». 
Twombly,  5  Shepl.  65. 

6  Fassett  v.  Brown,  Peake  23. 

f  Keeling  v.  Ball,  Peake's  Ev.  App.  78  ;  [Turner  v.  Gates,  90  Ga.  731,  744  ;  Cong- 
don  v.  Morgan,  14  S.  C.  587 ;  see  R.  v.  St.  Giles,  1  E.  &  B.  642.] 

8  Currie  v.  Child,  3  Campb.  283  ;  see  also  3  T.  R.  712,  per  Buller,  J.  ;  [Ala.  Code 
1897,  §  4276 ;  Cal.  C.  C.  P.  §  1315.] 

9  Jones  v.  Mason,  2  Stra.  833  ;  [Sears  v.  Dillingham,  12  Mass.  358.]     If  the  con- 
viction  were  previous  to  the  attestation,  it  is  as  if  not  attested  at  all :  1  Stark.  Evid. 
325. 

10  Strange  v.  Dashwood,  1  Cooper  Ch.  Gas.  497. 

u  Goss  v.  Tracy,  1  P.  Wms.  289  ;  Godfrey  v.  Norris,  1  Stra.  34  ;  Davison  v.  Bloomer, 
1  Dall.  123  ;  Bulkley  v.  Smith,  2  Esp.  697  ;  Cunliffe  v.  Sefton,  2  East  183 ;  Bernett 
v.  Taylor,  9  Ves.  381;  Hamilton  v.  Marsden,  6  Binn.  45;  Hamilton  v.  Williams, 
1  Hayw.  139  ;  Hovill  v.  Stephenson,  5  Bing.  493,  per  Best,  C.  J. ;  Saunders  v.  Ferrill, 
1  Ired.  97  ;  [Bennet  v.  Robinson,  3  Stew.  &  P.  227  ;  Jones  v.  Phelps,  5  Mich.  218.] 

12  Nelius  v.  Brickell,  1  Hayw.  19  ;  [see  note  16,  infra.~\ 

18  Laing  v.  Kaine,  2  B.  &  P.  85 ;  [ante,  §  569  b,  note  27] 

14  Abbott  v.  Plumbe,  1  Doug.  216  ;  Lesher  v.  Levan,  2  Dall.  96  ;  Ley  v.  Ballard, 
3  Esp.  173  [leading  case]  ;  Powell  v.  Black ett,  1  id.  97  ;  Park  v.  Mears,  3  id.  171  ; 
Fitzgerald  v.  Elsee,  2  Campb.  635  ;  Blurton  v.  Toon,  Skin.  639  ;  McCraw  v.  Gentry, 
3  Campb.  232;  Grellier  v.  Neale,  Peake  198  ;  Whitaker  v.  Salisbury,  15  Pick.  534; 
Quimby  v.  Buzzell,  4  Shepl.  470  ;  [Tarrant  v.  Ware,  25  N.  Y.  425  (leading  case)  ; 
Clarke  v.  Dunuavant,  10  Leigh  13,  33  (leading  case)  ;  Barnewall  v.  Murrell,  108  Ala. 
366;  Buchanan  v.  Grocery  Co.,  Ga.,  31  S.  E.  105;  Martin  v.  Perkins,  56  Miss. 
204;  Mays  v.  Mays,  114  Mo.  536  ;  Gable  v.  Ranch,  50  S.  C.  95  ;  Simmons  v.  Leonard, 
91  Tenn.  183.  But  hi  Illinois  there  is  a  peculiar  rule  forbidding  the  contradiction  of 
the  attesting  witnesses  as  to  the  fact  of  a  testator's  sanity  ou  appeal  from  a  grant  of 
probate,  though  not  on  appeal  from  a  refusal  of  probate  ;  see  Walker  v.  Walker,  3  111. 
291  ;  Andrews  v.  Black,  43  id.  256  ;  Hobart  r.  Hobart,  154  id.  610.] 

18  Cronk  v.  Frith,  9  C.  &  P.  197;  s.  c.  1  M.  &  Rob.  262,  per  Ld.  Abinger,  C.  B.  ; 
Rees  v.  Williams,  1  De  G.  &  Sirs.  314  ;  in  a  former  case  of  Pedler  v.  Paige,  1  M.  & 
Rob.  258,  Parke,  J.,  expressed  himself  of  the  same  opinion,  but  felt  bound  by  the 
opposite  ruling  of  Ld.  Holt,  in  Wood  v.  Drury,  1  Ld.  Ravin.  734  ;  [contra,  Taylor,  J., 
in  Baker  v.  Blount,  2  Hayw.  404  ;  qucere  whether  the  ruling  in  Wood  v.  Drury  was  as 
above  stated.] 

16  Swire  v.  Bell,  5  T.  R.  371 ;  Honeywood  v.  Peacock,  3  Oxnipb.  196  ;  Amherst  Bank 
v.  Root,  2  Met.  522  ;  [Doe  v.  Twigg,  5  U.  C.  Q.  B.  167  ;  Harding  v.  Harding,  18  Pa. 


714  PRIVATE  WETTINGS.  [CH.    XXX. 

anything  of  the  transaction,  the  rule  requiring  his  production  is  never- 
theless satisfied,  and  the  party  may  go  on  to  proof  of  the  witness' 
signature,  as  if  the  latter  were  deceased.17] 

§  572  a  [574].  Same:  Diligent  Search.  The  degree  of  diligence 
in  the  search  for  the  subscribing  witnesses  is  the  same  which  is  re- 
quired in  the  search  for  a  lost  paper,  the  principle  being  the  same  in 
both  cases.1  It  must  be  a  strict,  diligent,  and  honest  inquiry  and 
search,  satisfactory  to  the  Court,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case.3 
It  should  be  made  at  the  residence  of  the  witness,  if  known,  and  at 
all  other  places  where  he  may  be  expected  to  be  found  ;  and  inquiry 
should  be  made  of  his  relatives,  and  others  who  may  be  supposed  to 
be  able  to  afford  information.8  And  the  answers  given  to  such  in- 
quiries may  be  given  in  evidence,  they  being  not  hearsay,  but  parts 
of  the  res  gestce.* 

If  there  is  more  than  one  attesting  witness,  the  absence  of  them  all 
must  be  satisfactorily  accounted  for,  in  order  to  let  in  the  secondary 
evidence.6 

§  573.  Exceptions :  (4)  Official  Bonds ;  Registered  Deeds.  (1)  A 
fourth  exception  has  been  sometimes  admitted,  in  regard  to  office 
bonds,  required  by  law  to  be  taken  in  the  name  of  some  public  func- 
tionary, in  trust  for  the  benefit  of  all  persons  concerned,  and  to  be 
preserved  in  the  public  registry  for  their  protection  and  use ;  of  the 
due  execution  of  which,  as  well  as  of  their  sufficiency,  such  officer 
must  first  be  satisfied  and  the  bond  approved,  before  the  party  is 
qualified  to  enter  upon  the  duties  of  his  office.  Such,  for  example, 
are  the  bonds  given  for  their  official  fidelity  and  good  conduct,  by 
guardians,  executors,  and  administrators,  to  the  judge  of  probate. 

340  ;  so  that  the  handwriting  cannot  be  proved  as  an  attestation,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  witness  need  not  be  called,  and,  if  the  instrument  is  valid  without  attesta- 
tion, its  execution  may  be  proved  in  the  ordinary  way.] 

17  QGreenotigh  v.  Greenough,  11  Pa.  489  ;  Kirk  v.  Carr,  54  id.  285  ;  Tyler's  Estate, 
Cal.,  53  Pac.  928 ;  Kelly  v.  Sharp  S.  Co.,  99  Ga.  393.]  Where  one  of  the  attesting 
witnesses  to  a  will  has  no  recollection  of  having  subscribed  it,  but  testifies  that  the 
signature  of  his  name  thereto  is  genuine  ;  the  testimony  of  another  attesting  witness, 
that  the  first  did  subscribe  his  name  in  the  testator's  presence,  is  sufficient  evidence  of 
that  fact :  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Met.  349 ;  see  also  Quimby  v.  Buzzell,  4  Shepl.  470  ; 
New  Haven  Co.  Bank  v.  Mitchell,  15  Conn.  206.  If  the  witness  to  a  deed  recollects 
seeing  the  signature  only,  but  the  attesting  clause  is  in  the  usual  formula,  the  jury 
will  be  advised,  in  the  absence  of  controlling  circumstances,  to  find  the  sealing  and 
delivery  also :  Burling  v.  Paterson,  9  C.  &  P.  570  ;  see  supra,  §  38  a. 

1  Ante,  §  558. 

2  [Woodman  w.  Segar,  12  Shepl.  90  ;  McGennis  v.  Allison,  10  S.  &  R.  197  ("  What 
ia  reasonable  innuiry  ?     There  can  be  no  fixed  and  settled  rule  ").] 

8  fSee  a  good  illustration  of  the  principle  in  Gallagher  t>.  Assur.  Co.,  Pa.,  24  Atl. 
115.J~  The  cases  on  this  subject  are  numerous;  but  as  the  application  of  the  rule  is  a 
matter  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  under  the  particular  circumstances  of  each  case, 
it  is  thought  unnecessary  to  encumber  the  work  with  a  particular  reference  to  them. 

4  [Compare  ante,  §  563  i.] 

•  Cunliffe  v.  Sefton,  2  East  183  ;  Kelsey  v.  Hanmer,  18  Conn.  311 ;  Doe  v.  Hathe- 
way,  2  Allen  N.  B.  69  ;  [Gelott  v.  Goodspeed,  8  Gush.  411  ;  Howard  v.  Russell, 
Ga.,  30  S.  E.  802;  this  is  apparently  the  universal  rule;  but  in  Alabama,  by 
statute,  a  different  result  is  reached :  Barnewall  v.  Murrell,  103  Ala.  366.] 


§§  572-573  b.]        EXECUTION  OF  ATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.  715 

Such  documents,  it  is  said,  have  a  high  character  of  authenticity,  and 
need  not  be  verified  by  the  ordinary  tests  of  truth,  applied  to  merely 
private  instruments,  namely,  the  testimony  of  the  subscribing  wit- 
nesses ;  but  when  they  are  taken  from  the  proper  public  repository, 
it  is  only  necessary  to  prove  the  identity  of  the  obligor  with  the  party 
in  the  action.1  Whether  this  exception,  recently  asserted,  will  be 
generally  admitted,  remains  to  be  seen.2 

(2)  The  case  of  deeds  enrolled  would  require  a  distinct  considera- 
tion  in  this  place,  were  not  the  practice  so  various  in  the  different 
States,  as  to  reduce  the  subject  to  a  mere  question  of  local  law,  not 
falling  within  the  plan  of  this  work.  In  general,  it  may  be  remarked, 
that,  in  all  the  United  States,  provision  is  made  for  the  registration 
and  enrolment  of  deeds  of  conveyance  of  lands  ;  and  that,  prior  to 
such  registration,  the  deed  must  be  acknowledged  by  the  grantor, 
before  the  designated  magistrate  ;  and,  in  case  of  the  death  or  refusal 
of  the  grantor,  and  in  some  other  enumerated  cases,  the  deed  must 
be  proved  by  witnesses,  either  before  a  magistrate,  or  in  a  court  of 
record.  But,  generally  speaking,  such  acknowledgment  is  merely 
designed  to  entitle  the  deed  to  registration,  and  registration  is,  in 
most  States,  not  essential  to  passing  the  estate,  but  is  only  intended 
to  give  notoriety  to  the  conveyance,  as  a  substitute  for  livery  of 
seisin.  And  such  acknowledgment  is  not  generally  received,  as  prima 
facie  evidence  of  the  execution  of  the  deed,  unless  by  force  of  some 
statute,  or  immemorial  usage,  rendering  it  so;8  but  the  grantor,  or 
party  to  be  affected  by  the  instrument,  may  still  controvert  its  gen- 
uineness and  validity.  But  where  the  deed  falls  under  one  of  the 
exceptions,4  and  has  been  proved  [to  the  appropriate  official]  per  testes, 
there  seems  to  be  good  reason  for  receiving  this  probate,  duly  authen- 
ticated, as  sufficient  prima  facie  proof  of  the  execution  [so  as  thus  to 
dispense  with  the  rule  requiring  the  calling  of  attesting  witnesses] ; 
and  such  is  understood  to  be  the  course  of  practice,  as  settled  by  the 
statutes  of  many  of  the  United  States.6 

§  573  a.1 

§  573  b.  Exceptions :  (5)  Instrument  not  directly  in  Issue.  A 
fifth  exception  to  the  rule  requiring  proof  by  the  subscribing  wit- 

l  Kello  v.  Maget,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  414. 

8  QAn  analogous  exception  may  exist  where  the  opponent  is  an  official  who  cannot 
deny  the  execution  without  admitting  that  he  failed  in  his  duty  to  secure  execution  ; 
see  Scott  v.  Waithman,  3  Stark.  168.  J 

8  [This  aspect  of  the  subject,  i.  e.  whether  a  certified  copy  of  the  record  of  convey- 
ance is  admissible  in  proof  of  execution,  has  been  treated  ante,  §  485  a.] 

*  [These  exceptions  are  now  the  rule.] 

6  See  4  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  32,  c.  29,  §  1,  note,  and  c.  2,  §§  77,  80,  notes  (GreenleaPs 
ed.)  ;  2  Lomax's  Dig.  353  ;  Morris  v.  Wadsworth,  17  Wend.  103  ;  Thvman  v.  Cameron, 
24  id.  87;  Brotherton  v.  Livingston,  3  W.  &  S.  334;  Vance  ».  Schuyler,  1  Gilm.  111. 
160  ;  fJDoe  v.  Johnson,  8  111.  522  ;  Job  v.  Tebbetts,  10  id.  376;  Foxworth  r.  Brown, 
Ala.,  24  So.  1  ;  Fletcher  v.  Home,  75  Ga.  134;  Samuel  v.  Borrowscalo,  104  Mass.  207.1 

i  (^Transferred  post,  as  §  5756;  it  does  not  concern  the  attestiug-witness  rule,  ana 
was  here  clearly  out  of  place.] 


716  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

ness  is  admitted,  where  [the  execution  of]  the  instrument  is  not 
directly  in  issue,  but  comes  incidentally  in  question  in  the  course  of 
the  trial ;  in  which  case,  its  execution  may  be  proved  by  any  compe- 
tent testimony,  without  calling  the  subscribing  witness ; l  [and  also 
(though  here  the  rule  is  not  subjected  to  an  exception,  but  is  merely 
not  applicable)  where  not  the  instrument's  execution,  but  merely  its 
existence  or  dealings  with  it,  are  desired  to  be  shown.2] 

§  574.1 

§  575.  Witness  Unavailable  in  Person ;  Proof  of  Signature.  When 
secondary  evidence  of  the  execution  of  the  instrument  is  thus  rendered 
admissible,  [by  reason  of  the  impossibility  of  obtaining  the  witness' 
testimony  in  person  (ante,  §  572),  the  next  inquiry  is  as  td  the  require- 
ments if  any  that  attend  the  vise  of  inferior  grades  of  evidence.  Prov- 
ing the  signature  of  an  attesting  witness  is  in  effect  using  his  hearsay 
statement  as  to  the  execution  of  the  instrument ; l  and  various  ques- 
tions arise  in  regard  to  this  mode  of  proof. 

(1)  In  the  first  place,  supposing   resort  to   be   had  to   proof  of 
execution  by  proof  of  the  attesting  witness'  signature,]  it  will  not 
be  necessary  to  prove  the  handwriting  of  more  than  one  witness.2 

(2)  And  this  evidence  is  in  general  deemed  sufficient  to  admit  the 
instrument  to  be  read;8  some  Courts  have  also  required  proof  of 
the  handwriting  of  the  obligor,  in  addition  to  that  of  the  subscribing 
witness ;  but  on  this  point  the  practice  is  not  uniform.4 

(3)  [Where  proof  of  the  signature  of  the  witness  alone  is  sufficient, 

1  QCurtis  v.  Belknap,  21  Vt.  433 ;  Ayers  v.  Hewitt,  1  Applet.  281  ;   {see  Com.  v. 
Castles,  9  Gray  121  ;   Re  Mair,  42  L.  J.  N.  s.  Ch.  882;}    Demombreun  v.   Walker, 
4  Baxt.  199  ;  fleckert  v.  Haine,  6  Binn.  16  (leading  case)  ;  Steiner  v.  Trainum,  98  Ala. 
815 ;  Summerour  v.  Felker,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  448.] 

2  fRandp.  Dodge,  17  N.  H.  343,  357;  see  Skinner  v.  Brigham,  126  Mass.  132.] 

1  ("Transferred  ante,  as  §  572  a,  where  it  clearly  belongs.] 

t  LLosee  v.  Losee,  2  Hill  N.  Y.  609,  and  note' by  N.  Hill,  Esq.  (afterwards  judge)  ; 
Hays  v.  Harden,  6  Pa.  St.  412;  Boylan  v.  Meeker,  28  N.  J.  L.  274,  295.  Stobart  v. 
Dryden,  1  M.  &  W.  615,  contra,  is  clearly  unsound.  Compare  §  444  d,  ante.~^ 

2  Adams  v.  Kerr,  1  B.  &  P.  360 ;  3  Preston  on  Abstracts  of  Title,  pp.   72,  73  ; 
fJStebbins  v.  Duncan,  108  U.  S.  32.     This  is  generally  conceded  for  deeds.     But  where 
attesting  witnesses  are  required  by  law,  as  for  wills,  it  may  well  be  argued  that  the 
signatures  of  all  the  required  number  should  be  proved  if  possible :  Hopkins  v.  Albert- 
son,  2  Bay  484;  Jones  v.  Arterburn,  11  Humph.  97  ;  contra:  Jackson  v.  Burton,  11 
Johns.  64.     Statutes  often  prescribe  such  a  rule.] 

«  Kay  ».  Brookman,  3  C.  &  P.  555;  Webb  v.  St.  Lawrence,  3  Bro.  P.  C.  640;  Mott 
v.  Doughty,  1  Johns.  Cas.  230  ;  Sluby  v.  Champlin,  4  Johns.  461 ;  Adams  v.  Kerr,  1  B. 
ft*  P.  360;  Cunliffe  v.  Sefton,  2  East  183  ;  Prince  v.  Blackburn,  ib.  250  ;  Douglas  v. 
Sanderson,  2  Dull.  116;  Cooke  v.  Wood  row,  5  Cranch  13;  Hamilton  v.  Marsden, 
6  Minn.  45;  Powers  v.  McFerran,  2  S.  &  R.  44  ;  McKinder  v.  Littlejohn,  1  Ired.  66. 

4  [Tlunket  v.  Bowman,  2  Mc.Cord  139  (leading  case)  ;~J  Clark  v.  Courtney,  5  Pet. 
819;  Hopkins  r.  De  Graffenreid,  2  Bay  187;  Oliphant  w.Taggart,  1  id.  255";  Irving 
v.  Irving,  2  Hayw.  27;  Clark  v.  Saunderson,  8  Binn.  192;  Jackson  v.  La  Grange,  19 
Johns.  386  ;  Jackson  v.  Waldron,  13  Wend.  178,  183,  197,  198,  semble;  see  also  Gough 
».  Cecil,  1  Selw.  N.  P.  533,  n.  (7),  (10th  ed.) ;  Thomas  v.  Turnley,  3  Rob.  La.  206  ; 
Dunlwr  v.  Marden,  13  N.  H.  311.  fWhere  the  document  is  required  by  law  to  be 
attested,  it  would  seem  that  this  double  proof  might  be  required  :  Kewsom  w.  Luster, 
18  111.  175  ;  Cram  v.  Ingalls,  18  N.  H.  613  ;  left  undecided  in  Hohart  v.  Hobart,  154 
111.  610;  Scott  v.  Hawk,  la.,  75  N.  W.  36.8.  In  the  case  of  wills,  express  statutory 
proviaiona  often  exist.] 


§§  573  5-575  a.]      EXECUTION  OF  ATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.  717 

the  effect  is  merely  (it  may  be  argued)  to  prove  a  statement  of  the 
attesting  witness  that  a  person  by  the  name  of  the  maker  of  the  in- 
strument did  execute  it,  leaving  open  the  question  whether  that  person 
was  the  same  with  the  party  of  the  same  name  in  the  cause,  so  that 
such  evidence  could  suffice  only  on  condition  of]  being  accompanied 
with  proof  of  the  identity  of  the  party  sued  with  the  person  who 
appears  to  have  executed  the  instrument ;  which  proof,  it  seems,  is 
now  deemed  requisite,6  especially  where  the  deed  on  its  face  excites 
suspicion  of  fraud.' 

(4)  The  instrument  may  also  in  such  cases  be  read,  upon  proof  of 
the  handwriting  of  the  obligor,  or  party  by  whom  it  was  executed; T 
but  in  this  case  also  it  is  conceived,  that  the  like  proof  of  the  identity 
of  the  party  should  be  required. 

(5)  If  there  be  no  subscribing  witness,  the  instrument  is  sufficiently 
proved  by  any  competent  evidence  that  the  signature  is  genuine.8 

5.   Proving  Execution  of  Other  (Unattested)  Writings. 

§  575  a.  In  general;  Identity  of  Signer.  [Wherever  proof  of 
execution  is  made  by  proving  the  signature  of  the  document  to  be 
that  of  the  person  whose  name  it  is,  the  question  arises  whether 
something  more  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  identify  the  person 
whose  signature  is  thus  proved  with  the  party  to  the  cause.  The 
argument  is,  in  the  language  of  Baron  Bayley,1  that  "the  utmost 
effect  you  can  give  "  "  is  to  consider  it  as  establishing  that  A.  B.  of 
C.  in  the  county  of  York  executed  the  instrument;  but  you  must 
go  a  step  further  and  show  that  the  defendant  is  A.  B.  of  C.  in  the 
county  of  York."  Where  the  witness  to  the  signature  can  also  tes- 
tify to  identity  of  person,  this  requirement  is  sufficiently  fulfilled. 

6  Whitelock  v.  Musgrove,  1  Cr.  &  M.  511  ;  ^followed  in  Jones  v.  Jcnes,  9  M.  &  W. 
75  ;  doubted  by  Patteson,  J.,  in  Greenshields  v.  Crawford,  ib.  314.     The  earlier  cases 
seem  to  have  ignored  this  necessity.     The  argument  against  it  is  that  identity  of  name 
is  always  some  evidence,  and  may  be  sufficient  evidence,  of  identity  of  person  (ante, 
§43  a):] 

8  QKimball  v.  Davis,  19  Wend.  437,  442;  approved,  by  11  to  9,  in]  Brown  v.  Kim- 
ball,  25  id.  259,  270  ;  (^questioned  in  Northrop  v.  Wright,  7  Hill  47(5,  493  ;  see  Steb- 
bins  v.  Duncan,  108  U.  S.  32 ;  and  distinguish  the  question  of  §  575  a,  post^ 

7  Valentine  v.  Piper,  22  Pick.  90;    contra,  Jaclcson  t*.  Waldron,    13  Wend.  178. 
QBut  this  was  not  the  orthodox  common-law  rule,  which  required  the  proof  of  the 
witness"  signature,  unless  it  was  unavailable  :    Barnes  v.  Trompowsky,  7  T.   R.   265  ; 
and  this  is  still  the  rule  in  the  Federal  Courts :  Clarke  v.  Courtney,  5  Pet.  319,  344  ; 
Stebbins  v.  Duncan,    108  U.    S.    32.     But  a  number  of  Courts  allow  proof  of  the 
maker's  signature,  without  that  of  the  witness'  signature,  if  the  latter  signed  by  mark : 
Watt  v.  Kilburn,  7  Ga.  356  ;  Delany  v.  Delany,  24  Ark.  7;  or  if  the  document  was  one 
not  required  by  law  to  be  attested :  Newsom  v.  Luster,  13  111.  175  (leading  case)  ;  Lan- 
ders v.  Bolton,  26  Cal.   393  ;  or  absolutely  and  without  such  restrictions :   {Jones  ». 
Roberts,  65  Me.  273  ;  {Valentine  t>.  Piper,  su^rra ;  Smith  Charities  v.  Connolly,  157 
Mass.  272  ;  Snider  v.  Burks,  84  Ala.  53 ;  Standback  v.  Thornton,  Ga.,  31  S.  E.  805. 
Statutes  often  expressly  adopt  this  last  rule.J 

8  Pullen  v.  Hutchiuson,  12  Shepl.  249 ;  £this  subject  is  dealt  with  in  the  ensuing 
sections.]] 

1  QWhiteloeke  v.  Musgrove,  1  Cr.  &  M.  520  ;  this  -was  said  of  proving  aii  attesting 
witness'  signature ;  but  the  illustration  applies  here  also.] 


718  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.  XXX. 

But  where  the  witness  to  the  signature  does  not  know  the  party  to 
the  cause,  some  other  source  of  proof  must  be  sought.  The  presump- 
tion from  identity  of  name  (ante,  §  43  a)  should  usually  suffice,  where 
it  applies ;  but  some  Courts  have  inclined  to  require  additional  evidence 
to  an  undefined  extent.2] 

§  575  b  [141-144].  Genuineness  of  Ancient  Documents.1  (1)  A 
second  exception  to  the  rule,  rejecting  hearsay  evidence,  is  allowed  in 
cases  of  ancient  possession,  and  in  favor  of  the  admission  of  ancient 
documents  in  support  of  it.  In  matters  of  private  right,  not  affecting 
any  public  or  general  interest,  hearsay  is  generally  inadmissible. 
But  the  admission  of  ancient  documents,  purporting  ,to  constitute 
part  of  the  transactions  themselves,  to  which,  as  acts  of  ownership, 
or  of  the  exercise  of  right,  the  party  against  whom  they  are  produced 
is  not  privy,  stands  on  a  different  principle.  It  is  true,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  the  documents  in  question  consist  of  evidence  which  is 
not  proved  to  be  part  of  any  res  gestce,  because  the  only  proof  of  the 
transaction  consists  in  the  documents  themselves ;  and  these  may 
have  been  fabricated,  or,  if  genuine,  may  never  have  been  acted 
upon.  And  their  effect,  if  admitted  in  evidence,  is  to  benefit  persons 
connected  in  interest  with  the  original  parties  to  the  documents,  and 
from  whose  custody  they  have  been  produced.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  such  documents  always  accompany  and  form  a  part  of  every 
legal  transfer  of  title  and  possession  by  act  of  the  parties ;  and  there 
is,  also,  some  presumption  against  their  fabrication,  where  they  refer 

2  [[The  cases  cited  ante,  §  43  a,  usually  deal  with  this  question  also,  and  ample 
illustration  will  there  be  found/] 

A  written  instrument,  not  attested  by  a  subscribing  witness,  is  sufficiently  proved 
to  authorize  its  introduction,  by  competent  proof  that  the  signature  of  the  person, 
whose  name  is  undersigned,  is  genuine.  The  party  producing  it  is  not  required  to  pro- 
ceed further  upon  a  mere  suggestion  of  a  false  date  when  there  are  no  indications  of 
falsity  found  upon  the  paper,  and  prove  that  it  was  actually  made  on  the  day  of  the 
date.  After  proof  that  the  signature  is  genuine,  the  law  presumes  that  the  instrument 
in  all  its  parts  is  genuine  also,  when  there  are  no  indications  to  be  found  upon  it  to 
rebut  such  a  presumption;  see  Pullen  v.  Hutchinson,  12  Shepl.  254  ;  {Leflerts  v.  State, 
49  N.  J.  L.  27;  Brayley  v.  Kelly,  25  Minn.  160.  { 

1  QThe  author's  treatment  in  the  following  sections  embraces  two  wholly  distinct 
topics,  (1)  whether  the  mere  execution  of  an  ancient  deed  or  lease  is  evidence  of  an- 
cient possession  of  the  land  granted  or  leased  ;  this  subject  is  explained  and  the  more 
recent  cases  cited  ante,  §  108,  notes  21,  22  ;  (2)  whether  an  ancient  document's  .genu- 
ineness (i.  e.  execution),  is  sufficiently  evidenced  by  its  age,  custody,  etc.  The  latter 
subject  (already  briefly  referred  to  by  the  author  in  §  21,  ante),  alone  concerns  us  here ; 
but  it  is  impossible  to  separate  his  treatment  of  the  two  topics  ;  the  parts  here  numbered 
(2)  and  (4)  (originally  §§  142,  144)  deal  chiefly  with  the  present  subject.  The  par- 
ticularly confusing  feature  is  that  for  both  doctrines  there  was  and  is  a  question  whether 
some  acts  of  possession  need  be  shown  ;  but  in  the  former  doctrine  this  requirement  (as 
said  at  the  end  of  (3))  asked  peculiarly  for  acts  of  modern  possession. 

It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the  author  refers  to  the  former  doctrine  (as  to  the  mak- 
ing of  the  document  being  evidence  of  possession)  as  if  it  were  an  exception  to  the 
Hearsay  rule,  and  placed  the  text  originally  under  that  head.  But  this  is  erroneous ; 
the  making  of  the  document,  if  evidence,  is  circumstantial  evidence  ;  it  could  only  be 
regarded  as  hearsay  evidence  (see  ante,  §§99  a,  100)  by  treating  it  as  involving  the 
admission  of  the  recitals  in  the  deed  or  lease  ;  and  not  only  is  this  not  the  way  in 
which  the  documents  were  used,  but  such  recitals  would  usually  show  only  title  and 
not  possession. ] 


§§  575  a-575  £.]    EXECUTION  OF  UNATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.        719 

to  coexisting  subjects  by  which  their  truth  might  be  examined.2  On 
this  ground,  therefore,  as  well  as  because  such  is  generally  the  only 
attainable  evidence  of  ancient  possession,  this  proof  is  admitted, 
under  the  qualifications  which  will  be  stated. 

(2)  As  the  value  of  these  documents  depends  mainly  on  their 
having  been  contemporaneous,  at  least,  with  the  act  of  transfer,  if 
not  part  of  it,  care  is  first  taken  to  ascertain  their  genuineness ;  and 
this  may  be  shown  prima  facie,  by  proof  that  the  document  comes 
from  the  proper  custody,  or  by  otherwise  accounting  for  it.  Docu- 
ments found  in  a  place  in  which,  and  under  the  care  of  persons  with 
whom,  such  papers  might  naturally  and  reasonably  be  expected  to  be 
found,  or  in  the  possession  of  persons  having  an  interest  in  them,  are 
in  precisely  the  custody  which  gives  authenticity  to  documents  found 
within  it.  "  For  it  is  not  necessary,"  observed  Tindal,  C.  J.,  "  that 
they  should  be  found  in  the  best  and  most  proper  place  of  deposit. 
If  documents  continue  in  such  custody,  there  never  would  be  any 
question  as  to  their  authenticity :  but  it  is  when  documents  are  found 
in  other  than  their  proper  place  of  deposit,  that  the  investigation 
commences,  whether  it  is  reasonable  and  natural,  under  the  circum- 
stances in  the  particular  case,  to  expect  that  they  should  have  been 
in  the  place  where  they  are  actually  found ;  for  it  is  obvious,  that, 
while  there  can  be  only  one  place  of  deposit  strictly  and  absolutely 
proper,  there  may  be  many  and  various  that  are  reasonable  and  prob- 
able, though  differing  in  degree ;  some  being  more  so,  some  less ;  and, 
in  those  cases,  the  proposition  to  be  determined  is,  whether  the  actual 
custody  is  so  reasonably  and  probably  accounted  for,  that  it  impresses 
the  mind  with  the  conviction  that  the  instrument  found  in  such  cus- 
tody must  be  genuine.  That  such  is  the  character  and  description  of 
the  custody  which  is  held  sufficiently  genuine  to  render  a  document 
admissible  appears  from  all  the  cases."  8 

8  Phil.  Evid.  273  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  66,  67;  Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse,  5  T.  R.  413,  n., 
per  Lord  Mansfield. 

8  Per  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Bishop  of  Meath  v.  Marquess  of  Winchester,  3  Bing.  N.  C. 
183,  200,  201  [leading  case],  expounded  and  confirmed  by  Parke,  B.,  in  Croughton  ». 
Blake,  12  M.  &  W.  205,  208  ;  and  in  Doe  d.  Jacobs  v.  Phillips,  10  Jur.  34  ;  8  Q.  B. 
158  ;  {Whitman  v.  Heneberry,  73  111.  109  ;  U.  S.  v.  Castro,  24  How.  346  ;j  [[Gibson  v. 
Poor,  21  N.  H.  440  (leading  case) ;  Doe  v.  Eslava,  11  Ala.  1028  (leading  case).]  See 
also  Lygon  t>.  Strutt,  2  Anstr.  601 ;  Swinnerton  v.  Marquis  of  Stafford,  3  Taunt.  91  ; 
Bullen  v,  Michel,  4  Dow  297;  Earl  v.  Lewis,  4  Esp.  1  ;  Randolph  v.  Gordon,  5  Price 
312 ;  Manby  v.  Curtis,  1  id.  225,  232,  per  Wood,  B.  ;  Bertie  v.  Beaumont,  2  id.  303, 
307  ;  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wheat.  213,  221 ;  Winn  v.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  663-675 ;  Clarke 
v.  Courtney,  5  id.  319,  344;  Jackson  v.  Laroway,  3  Johns.  Cas.  283,  approved  in  Jack- 
son v.  Luquere,  5  Cowen  221,  225;  Hewlett  t>.  Cock,  7  Wend.  371,  374;  Duncan 
v.  Beard,  2  Nott  &  McC.  400  ;  Middleton  v.  Mass,  ib.  55  ;  Doe  v.  Beynon,  4  P.  &  D. 
193  ;  Doe  v.  Pearce,  2  M.  &  Rob.  240 ;  Tolman  v.  Emerson,  4  Pick.  160 ;  ante,  §§  570, 
n.  2  ;  §  21 ;  Doe  v.  Roberts,  11  M.  &  W.  520  ;  Doe  v.  Keeling,  11  Q.  B.  884  ; 
PHarlan  v.  Howard,  79  Ky.  373  ;  Whitman  v.  Shaw,  166  Mass.  451 ;  Martin  v. 
Bowie,  37  S.  C.  102,  1 10  ;"  Templeton  t».  Luckett,  41  U.  S,  App.  392."]  Whether 
a  document  comes  from  the  proper  custody  is  a  question  for  the  judge  and  not 
for  the  jury  to  determine  :  Doe  v.  Keeling,  supra  ;  Reea  v.  Walters,  3  M.  &  W.  527, 
631. 


720  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXX. 

(3)  It  is  further  requisite,4  where  the  nature  of  the  case  will  admit 
it,  that  proof  be  given  of  some  act  done  in  reference  to  the  docu- 
ments offered  in  evidence,  as  a  further  assurance  of  their  genuine- 
ness, and  of  the  claiming  of    title  under  them.     If  the  document 
bears  date  post  litem  motam,  however  ancient,  some  evidence  of  cor- 
respondent acting   is   always   scrupulously  required,   even  in  cases 
where  traditionary  evidence  is  receivable.6    But  in  other  cases  where 
the  transaction  is  very  ancient,   so  that  proof  of  contemporaneous 
acting,  such  as  possession,  or  the  like,  is  not  probably  to  be  obtained, 
its  production  is  not  required.6     But  where  unexceptionable  evidence 
of  enjoyment,  referable  to  the  document,  may  reasonably  be  expected 
to  be  found,   it  must  be  produced.7     If  such  evidence,  referable  to 
the  document,  is  not  to  be  expected,  still  it  is  requisite  to  prove  some 
acts  of  modern  enjoyment,  with  reference  to  similar  documents,  or 
that  modern  possession  or  user  should  be  shown,  corroborative  of 
the  ancient  documents.8 

(4)  Under  these  qualifications,  ancient  documents,  purporting  to 
be  a  part  of  the  transactions  to  which  they  relate,  and  not  a  mere 
narrative  of  them,  are  receivable  as  evidence  that  those  transactions 
actually  occurred.     And  though   they   are    spoken   of    as   hearsay 
evidence  of  ancient  possession,  and  as  such  are  said  to  be  admitted 
in  exception  to  the  general  rule  ;  yet  they  seem  rather  to  be  parts  of 
the  res  gestce,  and  therefore  admissible  as  original  evidence,  on  the 
principle  already  discussed.     An  ancient  deed,  by  which  is  meant 
one  more  than  thirty  years  old,9  having  nothing  suspicious  about  it,10 
is  presumed  to  be  genuine  without  express  proof,  the  witnesses  being 
presumed  dead ;  and,  if  it  is  found  in  the  proper  custody,11  and  is 
corroborated  by  evidence  of  ancient  or  modern  corresponding  enjoy- 
ment,12 or  by  other  equivalent  or  explanatory  proof,  it  is  to  be  pre- 

4  FJThe  ensuing  paragraph  is  dealing  with  the  first  of  the  two  doctrines  above-men- 
tioned in  note  1  ;  for  the  more  recent  authorities,  see  ante,  §  108,  notes  21,  22.1 
6  1  Phil.  Evid.  277  ;  Brett  v.  Scales,  1  Mood.  &  M.  416. 

6  Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse,  5  T.  R.  412,  413,  n.,  per  Ld.  Mansfield. 

7  1  Phil.  Evid.  277;  Plaxton  v.  Dare,  10  B.  &  C.  17. 

8  Rogers  v.  Allen,  1  Campb.  309,  311  ;  Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse,  5  T.  R.  412,  n. 

9  fJThe  original  period  seems  to  have  been  forty  years :  Gilbert,  Evidence,  100  ; 
Benson  v.  Olive,  Bunbury  280  ;  Gittings  v.  Hall,  1   H.  &  J.  14;  but  the  period  of 
thirty  years  was  afterwards  taken  :  R.  r.  Farringdon,  2  T.  R.  466  ;  and  is  now  univer- 
sally accepted.     The  mere  bearing  of  such  a  date  is  not  enough  ;  the  document's  exist- 
ence must  be  traced  back  for  that  period  ;  see  examples  in  Shaller  v.  Brand,  6  Binn. 
435  ;  Quinn  v.  Eagleston,  108  111.  248.     The  computation  backwards  may  begin  from 
the  time  of  production,  not  merely  the  time  of  suit  begun :  Gardner  v.  Granniss,  67 
Ga.  539,  5.14.]     In  Jackson  v.  Blanshan,  3  Johns.  392,  the  question  was  whether  the 
thirty  years  should  be  computed  from  the  date  of  the  will,  or  from  the  time  of  the  tes- 
tator's death  ;  and  the  Court  held,  that  it  should  be  computed  from  the  time  of  his 
death;   but  on  this  point  Spencer,  J.,  differed  from  the  rest  of  the  Court;  and  his 
opinion,  which  seems  more  consistent  with  the  principle  of  the  rule,  is  fully  sustained 
by  Doe  v.  Deakin,  3  C.  &  P.  402  ;  Doe  v.  Wolley,  8  B.  &  C.  22  ;  McKenire  v.  Fraser, 
9  VM.  5 ;  Gough  v.  Gough,  4  T.  R.  707,  n.  ;  Man  v.  Ricketts,  7  Beav.  93. 

»  QHill  v.  Nisbet,  58  Ga.  586  ("  It  must  exhibit  an  honest  face") ;  Harlan  v.  How- 
ard.  79  Ky.  378  ("  unblemished  by  any  alterations  ").] 
"  fSee  ante,  liciti-  3.] 
13  It  ha*  lie-en  made  a  question,  whether  the  document  may  be  read  in  evidence, 


§  575  £.]  EXECUTION   OF   UNATTESTED   DOCUMENTS.  721 

sumed  that  the  deed  constituted  part  of  the  actual  transfer  of 
property  therein  mentioned;  because  this  is  the  usual  and  ordinary 
course  of  such  transactions  among  men.  The  residue  of  the  trans- 
action may  be  as  unerringly  inferred  from  the  existence  of  genuine 
ancient  documents,  as  the  remainder  of  a  statue  may  be  made  out 
from  an  existing  torso,  or  a  perfect  skeleton  from  the  fossil  remains 
of  a  part. 

[So  far,  then,  as  concerns  the  admission  of  ancient  documents  with- 
out direct  proof  of  their  execution,  the  above  rule  makes  four 
requirements :  (a)  The  document  must  have  been  in  existence  for 
thirty  years  or  more;  (b)  it  must  have  been  found  in  a  proper  cus- 
tody, i.  e.  in  a  place  consistent  with  its  genuineness ;  (c)  it  must 
not  have  a  suspicious  appearance ;  and  (d)  there  must  be,  if  it  pur- 
ports to  convey  title  to  land,  some  other  attendant  circumstance  cor- 
roborating its  genuineness,  —  either  possession  of  the  land  or  some 
other  item  of  corroboration.  The  rule  may  be  applied  to  any  kind  of 
a  document  u  (though  the  last  requirement  is  not  essential  except  for 
documents  dealing  with  land) ;  and  if  the  proper  showing  as  above 
can  be  made,  a  copy  may  be  used  where  the  original  is  lost.1*  The 

before  the  proof  of  possession  or  other  equivalent  corroborative  proof  Is  offered ;  but  it 
is  now  stated  that  the  document,  if  otherwise  apparently  genuine,  may  be  first  read  ; 
for  the  question,  whether  there  has  been  a  corresponding  possession,  can  hardly  be 
raised  till  the  Court  is  made  acquainted  with  the  tenor  of  the  instrument :  Doe  ».  Pass- 
ingham,  '2  C.  &  P.  440.  A  graver  question  has  been  whether,  Qn  the  case  of  a  deed 
or  will  of  land,]  the  proof  of  possession  is  indispensable ;  or  whether  its  absence  may 
be  supplied  by  other  satisfactory  corroborative  evidence.  In  Jackson  v.  Laroway, 
3  Johns.  Gas.  283,  it  was  held  by  Kent,  J.,  against  the  opinion  of  the  other  judges, 
that  it  was  indispensable,  on  the  authority  of  Fleta,  lib.  6,  c.  34 ;  Co.  Lit.  66;  Isack 
v.  Clarke,  1  Roll.  132  ;  James  v.  Trollop,  Skin.  239 ;  2  Mod.  322  ;  Forbes  v.  Wale, 
1  W.  Bl.  532  ;  and  the  same  doctrine  was  again  asserted  by  him,  in  delivering  the 
judgment  of  the  Court,  in  Jackson  v.  Blanshan,  3  Johns.  292,  298  ;  see  also  Thomp- 
son v.  Bullock,  1  Bay  364  ;  Middleton  v.  Mass,  2  Nott  &  McC,  55  [leading  case]  ;  Car- 
roll v.  Norwood,  1  Har.  &  J.  174,  175  ;  Shaller  v.  Brand,  6  Binn.  439  ;  Doe  v.  Phelps, 
9  Johns.  169,  171.  But  the  weight  of  authority  at  present  seems  clearly  the  other 
way ;  and  it  is  now  agreed,  that,  where  proof  of  possession  cannot  be  had,  the  deed 
may  be  read,  if  its  genuineness  is  satisfactorily  established  by  other  circumstances ; 
see  Ld.  Rancliffe  v.  Parkins,  6  Dow  202,  per  Ld.  Eldon ;  McKenire  v.  Fraser,  9  Ves. 
5  ;  Doe  r.  Passingham,  2  C.  &  P.  440 ;  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wheat.  213,  221 ;  Jackson  ». 
Laroway,  3  Johns.  Cas.  283,  287;  Jackson  v.  Luquere,  5  Cowen  221,  225  ;  Jackson  v. 
Lamb,  7  id.  431  ;  Hewlett  v.  Cock,  7  Wend.  371,  373,  374  ;  Willson  v.  Betts,  4Denio 
201.  rjThe  latter  view,  i.  e.  that  possession  is  merely  one  circumstance  of  corrobora- 
tion, and  that  its  place  may  equally  well  be  taken  by  other  corroborative  circumstances, 
is  the  sound  view,  and  is  to-day  the  one  generally  accepted  ;  see  Carnthers  v.  Eldridge, 
12  Gratt.  670,  687  (leading  case) ;  Pridgen  v.  G'reen,  80  Ga.  737 ;  Sanger  v.  Merritt, 
120  N.  Y.  109,  124  ;  Walker  v.  Walker,  67  Pa.  185;  Smith  v.  Rankin,  20  111.  14  ; 
the  fact  of  public  registration  may  suffice  :  Allison  v.  Little,  88  Ala.  512  ;  some  Courts 
say  that  possession  need  not  be  shown  if  no  evidence  of  it  can  be  had :  Long  ».  Mc- 
Dow,  87  Mo.  197  ;  Harlau  P.  Howard,  79  Ky.  373.] 

18  FjSee  instances  in  Wynne  v.  Tyrwhitt,  4  B.  &  Aid.  376  ;  Doe  v.  Turnbull,  5  U.  C. 
Q.  B.  129  ("any  written  documents  whatever")  ;  Enfield  v.  Ellington,  67  Conn.  459  ; 
Cooney  r.  Packing  Co.,  169  111.  370 ;  Stnucker  v.  Penns.  R.  Co.,  Pa.,  41  Atl.  457  ; 
Almy  v.  Church,  18  R.  I.  182;  Aldrich  v.  Griffith,  66  Vt.  390,  404.] 

M  fJGreen  v.  Proude,  1  Mod.  117;  New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Benedict,  169 
Mass.  262 ;  Briggs  v.  Henderson,  49  Mo.  531  ;  Townsend  v.  Downer,  32  Vt.  183,  211  ; 
contra:  Trammell  «>.  Thurmond,  17  Ark.  203,  218;  Patterson  v.  Collier,  75  Ga.   419. 
This  question  arises  usually  for  a  certified  copy  of  an  old  deed  defectively  recorded.^ 
VOL.  I. — 46 


722  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

circumstances  above  operate  as  sufficient  evidence  not  merely  of  the 
genuineness  of  signature,  but  also  of  all  other  facts  going  to  con- 
stitute a  due  execution,  such  as*  the  existence  of  a  power  of  attorney 
to  make  the  deed.18  That  these  circumstances  create  a  real  presump- 
tion of  genuineness,  shifting  the  burden  of  producing  evidence  (ante, 
§  14  w),  seems  not  to  be  the  law ;  they  merely  amount  to  sufficient 
evidence  to  let  the  document  go  to  the  jury  (atite,  §  14  y)  to  determine 
its  genuineness.16] 

§  575  c  [573  a].  Replies  received  by  Mail.  A  further  exception  to 
the  rule  requiring  proof  of  handwriting  has  been  admitted,  in  the 
case  of  letters  received  in  reply  to  others  proved  to  have  been 
sent  to  the  party.  Thus,  where  the  plaintiff's  attorney  wrote  a  letter 
addressed  to  the  defendant  at  his  residence,  and  sent  it  by  the  post, 
to  which  he  received  a  reply  purporting  to  be  from  the  defendant;  it 
was  held,  that  the  letter  thus  received  was  admissible  in  evidence, 
without  proof  of  the  defendant's  handwriting,  and  that  letters  of  an 
earlier  date  in  the  same  handwriting  might  also  be  read,  without 
other  proof.1 

§  576.  Proof  by  Comparison  of  Handwriting.1  In  considering  the 
proof  of  private  writings,  we  are  naturally  led  to  consider  the  subject 
of  the  comparison  of  hands,  upon  which  great  diversities  of  opinion 
have  been  entertained.  This  expression  seems  formerly  to  have 
been  applied  to  every  case  where  the  genuineness  of  one  writing 
was  proposed  to  be  tested  before  the  jury  by  comparing  it  with 
another,  even  though  the  latter  were  an  acknowledged  autograph ; a 
and  it  was  held  inadmissible,  because  the  jury  were  supposed  to  be 
too  illiterate  to  judge  of  this  sort  of  evidence :  a  reason  long  since 
exploded.8  All  evidence  of  handwriting,  except  where  the  witness 

«  [Robinson  v.  Craig,  1  Hill  S.  C.  389 ;  King  v.  Little,  1  Gush.  436  ;  contra  :  Fell 
v.  Young,  63  111.  106 ;  compare  Tolman  v.  Emerson,  4  Pick.  160.] 

16  [Accord:  ante,  §  81  e,  note  4 ;  see  Scott  v.  Delany,  87  111.  146  ;  contra:  Wisdom 
v.  Reeves,  110  Ala.  418,  428,  434.] 

l  Ovenston  v.  Wilson,  2  Car.  &  Kir.  1  ;  Kinney  v.  Flynn,  2  R.  I.  319  ;  McKonkey 
V.  Gaylord,  1  Jones  L.  94  ;  [Harrington  v.  Fry,  1  C.  &  P.  290  ;  White  v.  Tolliver 
110  Ala.  300;  Ragan  v.  Smith,  Ga.,  29  S.  E.  759;  Davis  v.  Robinson,  67  la.  355  ; 
Norwegian  Plow  Co.  v.  Hunger,  52  Kan.  371  ;  Boykin  v.  State,  50  La.  An.,  24  So. 
141  ;  Connecticut  v.  Bradish,  14  Mass.  296  ;  People's  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Geisthardt,  Nebr., 
75  N.  W.  582  ;  Armstrong  v.  Advance  T.  Co.,  5  S.  D.  12;  National  Ace.  Soc.  v. 
Spiro,  47  U.  S.  App.  293  ;  see  H.  ».  Saunders,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  D.  19.  The  same  prin- 
ciple might  be  applied  to  a  telegram :  Taylor  v.  Steamer  Robert  Campbell,  20  Mo. 
254.  Distinguish  the  principle  of  §  40,  ante,  as  to  the  presumption  of  delivery  from 
the  mailing  of  a  letter  duly  stamped  and  addressed.] 

1  [For  the  history  of  this  mode  of  proof,  see  an  article  by  the  editor  in  80  Amer. 
L.  Rev.  481.     There  are  four  chief  topics  of  inquiry:  (1)  Who  is  qualified  as  a  wit- 
ness to  handwriting  ;  (2)  whether  experts  speaking  from  a  study  of  standard  speci- 
mens may  testify  ;  (3)  whether  such  specimens  may  be  used  by  the  jury  ;  (4)  how  a 
witness  to  handwriting  may  be  tested  on  cross-examination.] 

2  [And  also  to  any  witness  testifying  from  the  similarity  of  the  writing  in  issue  to 
others  which  he  has  seen.] 

•  The  admission  of  evidence  by  comparison  of  hands,  in  Col.  Sidney's  Case, 
9  How.  St.  Tr.  467,  was  one  of  the  grounds  of  reversing  his  attainder ;  yet,  though  it 
clearly  appears  that  his  handwriting  was  proved  by  two  witnesses,  who  had  seen  him 


§§  5755-577.]      EXECUTION  OF  UNATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.          723 

saw  the  document  written,  is,  in  its  nature,  comparison.  It,  is  the 
belief  which  a  witness  entertains,  upon  comparing  the  writing  in 
question  with  its  exemplar  in  his  mind,  derived  from  some  previous 
knowledge.4  The  admissibility  of  some  evidence  of  this  kind  is 
now  too  well  established  to  be  shaken.  It  is  agreed  that,  if  the 
witness  has  the  proper  knowledge  of  the  party's  handwriting,  he 
may  declare  his  belief  in  regard  to  the  genuineness  of  the  writing 
in  question.  He  may  also  be  interrogated  as  to  the  circumstances 
on  which  he  founds  his  belief.6  The  point  upon  which  learned 
judges  have  differed  in  opinion  is,  upon  the  source  from  which  this 
knowledge  is  derived,  rather  than  as  to  the  degree  or  extent  of  it. 

§  577.  Same:  Qualified  Witnesses  ;  (1)  Ex  visu  scriptionia  ;  (2)  Ex 
scriptis  olim  visis.  There  are  two  modes  of  acquiring  this  knowledge 
of  the  handwriting  of  another,  either  of  which  is  universally  admitted 
to  be  sufficient,  to  enable  a  witness  to  testify  to  its  genuineness. 

(1)  The  first  is  from  having  seen  him  write.  It  is  held  sufficient 
for  this  purpose,  that  the  witness  has  seen  him  write  but  once,  and 
then  only  his  name.1  The  proof  in  such  case  may  be  very  light ; 
but  the  jury  will  be  permitted  to  weigh  it.2 

write,  and  by  a  third  who  had  paid  bills  purporting  to  have  been  indorsed  by  him, 
this  was  held  illegal  evidence  in  a  criminal  case  ;  fjas  to  this  interesting  historical 
question  of  the  real  ruling  in  Sidney's  Trial,  and  the  ground  for  the  reversal  of  his 
attainder,  see  30  Amer.  L.  Rev.  492.  But  it  must  be  noted  that  so  far  as  evidence 
by  comparison  was  allowed  at  all,  there  was  originally  no  objection  to  showing  speci- 
mens to  the  jury  :  30  Amer.  L.  Rev.  491 ;  this  exclusion  did  not  grow  up  till  the  end 
of  the  1700s.i 

4  Doe  v.  Suckermore,  5  Ad.  &  El.  730,  per  Patteson,  J. 

6  R.  v.  Murphy,  8  C.  &  P.  297  ;  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  295. 

1  Garrells  v.  Alexander,  4  Esp.  37;  j  Pepper  v.  Barnett,  22  Gratt.   405;  Bowman 
v.  Sanborn,  25  N.  H.  87  ;  Hopkins  v.  Megquire,  35  Me.  78  ;  West  v.  State,  2  N.  J.  L. 
212  ;(  pState  v.  Goodwin,  37  La.  An.  713;  Biggins'  Estate,  68  Vt.   198;  yet  a  case 
may  arise  in  which  this  would  be  insufficient ;  see  People  v.  Corey,   148  N.  Y.  476.] 
In  Powell  v.  Ford,  2  Stark.  164,  the  witness  had  never  seen  the  defendant  write  his 
Christian  name  ;  but  only  "  M.  Ford,''  and  then  but  once ;  whereas  the  acceptance  of 
the  bill  in  question  was  written  with  both  the  Christian  and  surname  at  full  length  ; 
and  Lord  Ellenborough  thought  it  not  sufficient,  as  the  witness  had  no  perfect  exem- 
plar of  the  signature  in  his  mind.       But  in  Lewis  v.  Sapio,  1  M.  &  Malk.  39,  where 
the  signature  was  "  L.  B.  Sapio,"  and  the  witness  had  seen  him  write  several  times, 
but  always   "  Mr.  Sapio,"  Lord   Tenterden   held  it  sufficient.      A  witness  has  also 
been  permitted  to  speak  as  to  the  genuineness  of  a  person's  mark,  from  having  seen  it 
affixed  by  him  on  several  occasions:  George  v.  Surrey,  1  M.  &  Malk.  516  ;  fjCarson's 
Appeal,  59  Pa.  493.]     But  where  the  knowledge  of  the  handwriting  has  been  obtained 
by  the  witness  from  seeing  the  party  write  his  name  for  that  purpose,  after  the  com- 
mencement of  the  suit,  the  evidence  is  held  inadmissible  :  Stranger  v.  Searle,  1  Esp. 
14  ;  see  also  Page  v.  Homans,  2  Shepl.  478. 

2  In  Slaymakerw.  Wilson,  1  Penn.  216,  the  deposition  of  a  witness,  who  swore  posi- 
tively to  her  father's  hand,  was  rejected,  because  she  did  not  say  how  she  knew  it  to 
be  his  hand.     But  in  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pi>'k.  490,  such  evidence  was  very  properly 
held  sufficient,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  for  the  other  party  to  explore  the  sources  of 
the  deponent's  knowledge,  if  he  was  not  satisfied  that  it  was  sufficient ;  fjand  it  seems 
that  a  preliminary  statement  by  the  witness  that  he  is  acquainted  with  the  person's 
handwriting  suffices  unless  the  opponent  chooses  to  inquire  further  :  State  v.   Miu- 
ton,  116  Mo.  605,  614  ;  Stoddard  v.  Hill,  38  S.  C.  385  ;  see  Richardson  v.  Stringfel- 
low,  100  Ala.  416  ;  Riggs  v.  Powell,  142  111.  453,  456. 

The  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  witness  saw  the  act  of  writing  is  immaterial : 
Diggins'  Estate,  supra  ,-]  {and  that  the  time  of  this  writing  seen  was  subsequent  to 
the  date  of  the  writing  in  issue  is  also  immaterial:  Keith  v.  Lathrop,  10  Cush.  453. J 


724  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

(2)  The  second  mode  is,  from  having  seen  letters,  bills,  or  other 
documents,  purporting  to  be  the  handwriting  of  the  party,  and  hav- 
ing afterwards  personally  communicated  with  him  respecting  them  ;  * 
or  acted  upon  them  as  his,  the  party  having  known  and  acquiesced 
in  such  acts  founded  upon  their  supposed  genuineness  ;  or,  by  such 
adoption  of  them  [by  the  party  whose  writing  is  in  dispute]  into  the 
ordinary  business  transactions  of  life,  as  induces  a  reasonable  pre- 
sumption of  their  being  his  own  writings  ; 4  evidence  of  the  identity 
of  the  party  being  of  course  added  aliunde,  if  the  witness  be  not 
personally  acquainted  with  him.  In  both  these  cases,  the  witness 
acquires  his  knowledge  by  his  own  observation  of  facts,  occurring 
under  his  own  eye,  and,  which  is  especially  to  be  remarked,  without 
having  regard  to  any  particular  person,  case,  or  document. 

§  578.  Same  :  Ancient  Writings.  This  rule,  requiring  personal 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  witness,  has  been  relaxed  in  two  cases. 
Where  writings  are  of  such  antiquity,  that  living  witnesses  cannot 
be  had,  and  yet  are  not  so  old  as  to  prove  themselves.1  Here  the 
course  is,  to  produce  other  documents,  either  admitted  to  be  genuine, 
or  proved  to  have  been  respected  and  treated  and  acted  upon  as  such, 
by  all  parties ;  and  to  call  experts  to  compare  them,  and  to  testify 
their  opinion  concerning  the  genuineness  of  the  instrument  in 
question.2 

§  578  a.  Same :  Comparison  of  Specimens  by  the  Jury.1  Where 
other  writings,  admitted  to  be  genuine,  are  already  in  the  case  ;  here 
the  comparison  may  be  made  by  the  jury,  with  or  without  the  aid  of 
experts.2  The  reason  assigned  for  this  is,  that  as  the  jury  are  [other- 

»  j Pearson  v.  McDaniel,  62  Ga.  100  ;{   [[Redd  v.  State,  Ark.,  47  S.  W.  119.] 

*  Doe  v.  Suckermore,  5  Ad.  &  El.  731,  per  Pattesori,  J.  ;  Lord  Ferrers  v.  Shirley, 
Fitzg.  195  ;  Carey  v.  Pitt,  Peake's  Evid.  App.  81  ;  Thorpe  v.  Gisburne,  2  0.  &  P.  21  ; 
Harrington  ».  Fry,  Ry.  fc  M.  90;  Com.  v.  Carey,  2  Pick.  47  ;  Johnson  v.  Daverne,  19 
Johns.  134;  Burr  v.  Harper,  Holt  420;  Pope  v.  Askew,  1  Ired.  16;  {Sill  v.  Reese, 
47  Cal.  294  ;  Spottiswood  v.  Weir,  80  id.  450 ;(  [[Violet  v.  Rose,  39  Nebr.  660.]  jSo, 
the  teller  of  a  bank  who  has  paid  money  out  upon  checks  whose  genuineness  is  not 
afterwards  disputed,  is  competent  :  Brigham  v.  Peters,  1  Gray  139,  145.}  fJThe  mere 
receiving  of  a  reply,  or  a  series  of  replies,  in  course  of  correspondence,  purporting  to 
be  signed  by  the  person  addressed,  should  ordinarily  be  a  sufficient  foundation  of 
knowledge:  Bullis  v.  Eaton,  96  la.  513  ;  Redding  v.  Redding's  Estate,  69  Vt.  500;] 
\contra :  McKeone  v.  Barnes,  108  Mass.  344  ;  see  Burress  v.  Coin.,  27  Gratt.  934.} 

1  Supra,  §  570. 

8  See  2Q  Law  Mag.  323  ;  Brunei*.  Rawlings,  7  East  282  ;  Morewood  v.  Wood,  14 id. 
828  ;  Gould  v.  Jones,  1  W.  Bl.  384 ;  Doer.  Tarver,  Ry.  &  M.  143  ;  Jackson  v.  Brooks, 
8  Wend.  426. 

1  ["This  originally  formed  part  of  the  preceding  section.] 

2  Griffith  v.  Williams,  1  C.  &  J.  47  ;  Solita  v.  Yarrow,  1  M.  &  Rob.   133  ;  R.  v. 
Morgan,  ib.  134,  n.  ;  Doe  v.  Newton,  5  Ad.  &  El.  514  ;  Bromage  v.  Rice,  7  C.  &  P. 
648  ;  Hammond's  Case,  2  Greenl.  33  ;  Waddington  v.  Cousins,  7  C.  &  P.  595.     QThis 
•entence,  which  contains  two  important  fallacies,  and  has  misled  many  Courts,  nt-eds 
some  examination.     (1)  a.  In  the  first  place,  the  practice  of  proving  handwriting  by 
submitting  specimens  to  the  jury  was  originally  orthodox  and  unquestioned  ;  so  fnr  as 
proof  by  similarity  was  allowed  at  all,  no  discrimination  was  made  against  submitting 
•pecirnens  to  the  jury  ;  see  30  Amer.  L.  Rev.  491.     b.  Then  doubts  grew  up  about  this 
practice  ;  and  tho  Courts  of  Exchequer  and  King's  Bench,  in  1830  and  1836  ( Griffith 
v.  Williams,  Doe  ».  Newton,  tupru)  restricted  the  use  of  such  comparison  to  docu- 


§§  577-578  J.]      EXECUTION  OF  UNATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.          725 

wise  and  in  any  event]  entitled  to  look  at  such  writings  for  one  pur- 
pose, it  is  better  to  permit  them,  under  the  advice  and  direction  of 
the  Court,  to  examine  them  for  all  purposes,  than  to  embarrass  them 
with  impracticable  distinctions,  to  the  peril  of  the  cause.  [Neverthe- 
less, there  is  to-day  much  difference  of  practice  in  the  limitations  em- 
ployed by  the  various  Courts ;  some  follow  the  orthodox  rule  and 
allow  the  jury's  comparison  of  specimens  for  documents  already  in 
the  case;  others  allow  it  (in  some  instances,  under  statutes)  for 
specimens  proved  to  the  Court  to  be  genuine ;  others  apply  certain  of 
the  distinctions  mentioned  in  the  next  section  as  applicable  to  experts' 
use  of  specimens.  In  England,  the  limitations  were  at  common  law 
different  for  comparison  by  the  jury  and  comparison  by  experts;  but 
often  the  same  limitations  are  by  American  Courts  or  by  statute  made 
applicable  to  both.8 

When  specimens  are  allowed  to  be  used,  they  must  of  course  be 
fair  specimens.  A  specimen  written  in  Court,  or  after  controversy 
begun,  for  the  express  purpose  of  affording  a  standard  and  on  behalf 
of  the  party  offering  it,  may  well  be  thought  untrustworthy,  and  is 
usually  excluded ;  although  it  is  occasionally  held  to  be  admissible 
in  discretion.4 

§  578  b.  Same  :  Testing  the  "Witness.  Where  tests  are  desired  to 
be  employed  against  an  opposing  witness  or  party,  there  is  no  reason 
to  apprehend  that  the  party  seeking  to  make  them  can  distort  the 
evidence  in  his  favor.  Accordingly  the  use  of  specimens  written 
post  litem  motam  by  an  opposing  party  or  witness  is  generally  al- 
lowed.1 Where  it  is  desired  to  test  a  witness  to  handwriting  by  sub- 
men  ts  "  already  in  the  case,"  i.  e.  documents  whose  authenticity  had  in  any  event  to 
be  established  by  being  material  upon  some  other  issue  in  the  case.  c.  Thus,  the 
phrase  in  the  above  sentence,  "admitted  to  be  genuine,"  is  not  a  restriction  applicable 
to  the  use  of  specimens  by  the  jury  ;  such  specimens  as  are  already  and  otherwise  in 
the  case  may  be  used,  whether  or  not  they  have  been  admitted  by  the  opponent  to  be 
genuine.  This  restriction,  "admitted  to  be  genuine,"  is  borrowed  from  the  doctrine 
about  experts'  use  of  specimens  (§  579),  and  has  no  application  to  the  jury's  use.  Never- 
theless, the  author's  statement  above  has  served  to  introduce  it  into  some  American 
Courts.  (2)  The  concluding  clause  above,  "with  or  without  the  aid  of  experts,"  is 
also  incorrect.  Comparison  of  specimens  by  experts  was  not  allowed  at  common 
law;  see  30  Amer.  L.  Rev.  495  ;  only  by  St.  17-18  Viet.,  c.  125,  §  27,  in  1854,  was 
such  testimony  established  as  admissible  ;  hence  comparison  by  the  jury  "  with  the  aid 
of  experts  "  does  not  represent  the  English  common  law  ;  but  this  phrase  has  served  as 
authority  for  some  American  Courts  ;  see  post,  §  579. ] 

8  fJFor  this  reason  it  seems  best  to  marshall  the  cases  dealing  with  both  uses  to- 
gether in  the  next  sections.] 

«  {See  Doe  v.  Wilson,  10  Moo.  P.  C.  502  ;  Cobbett  v.  Kilminster,  4  F.  &  F.  490  ; 
Chandler  v.  LeBarron,  45  Me.  534  ;  King  v.  Donahoe,  110  Mass.  155  ;  Com.  v.  Allen, 
128  id.  46  ;  R.  v.  Taylor,  6  Cox  Cr.  58  ;  Williams  v.  State,  61  Ala.  33  ;}  QHickory  v 
U.  S.,  151  U.  S.  303-3 

J  For  press-copies,  as  specimens,  see  Com.  v.  Jeffries,  7  All.  562 ;  Com.  v.  Eastman, 
1  Cush.  189.} 

TFor  photographic  copies,  see  ante,  §  439  h.~^ 

*  fJSee  the  cases  in  the  preceding  note,  and  also  Layer's  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  192  ; 
Smith  v.  King,  62  Conn.  515  ;  Bradford  v.  People,  Colo.,  43  Pac.  1013. 

That  no  privilege  would  excuse  a  person  from  being  subjected  to  this  test,  see  ante, 
§  469  e,  and  Smith  v.  King,  supra."] 


726  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  [CH.    XXX 

mitting  to  him  a  specimen  not  already  in  the  case,  with  the  intention 
of  proving  the  incorrectness  of  his  judgment  should  it  be  erroneous, 
and  thus  of  discrediting  his  pretended  ability  to  identify  the  person's 
handwriting,  the  objection  that  such  a  test  would  involve  too  much 
time  and  a  confusion  of  issues  has  occasionally  been  thought  to  avail; 
but  there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  invariably  do  so ;  and  such  a 
test  may  be  so  useful  and  telling  that  it  ought  always  to  be  allow- 
able, subject  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  Court.2] 

§  579.  Same :  Expert  testifying  from  Comparison  of  Specimens. 
A  third  mode  of  acquiring  knowledge  of  the  party's  handwriting  was 
proposed  to  be  introduced  in  the  case  of  Doe  v.  Suckermore  ;  l  upon 
which,  the  learned  judges  being  equally  divided  in  opinion,  no  judg- 
ment was  given ;  namely,  by  first  satisfying  the  witness,  by  some 
information  or  evidence  not  falling  under  either  of  the  two  preced- 
ing heads,  that  certain  papers  were  genuine,  and  then  desiring  the 
witness  to  study  them,  so  as  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  party's 
handwriting,  and  fix  an  exemplar  in  his  mind ;  and  then  asking  him 
his  opinion  in  regard  to  the  disputed  paper ;  or  else,  by  offering  such 
papers  to  the  jury,  with  proof  of  their  genuineness,  and  then  asking 
the  witness  to  testify  his  opinion,  whether  those  and  the  disputed 
paper  were  written  by  the  same  person.  This  method  supposes  the 
writing  to  be  generally  that  of  a  stranger ;  for  if  it  is  that  of  the 
party  to  the  suit,  and  is  denied  by  him,  the  witness  may  well  derive 
his  knowledge  from  papers,  admitted  by  that  party  to  be  genuine,  if 
such  papers  were  not  selected  nor  fabricated  for  the  occasion,  as  has 
already  been  stated  in  the  preceding  section.  It  is  obvious  that  if 
the  witness  does  not  speak  from  his  own  knowledge,  derived  in  the 
first  or  second  modes  before  mentioned,  but  has  derived  it  from  papers 
shown  to  him  for  that  purpose,  the  production  of  these  papers  may 
be  called  for,  and  their  genuineness  contested.  So  that  the  third 
mode  of  information  proposed  resolves  itself  into  this  question ; 
namely,  whether  documents,  irrelevant  to  the  issues  on  the  record, 
may  be  received  in  evidence  at  the  trial,  to  enable  the  jury 2  to  insti- 
tute a  comparison  of  hands,  or  to  enable  a  witness  so  to  do. 

§  580.  In  regard  to  admitting  such  evidence,  upon  an  examination 

2  [See  Bishop  Atterbury's  Trial,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  571  ;  Hughes  v.  Rogers,  8  M.  & 
W.  123  ;  Griffits  v.  I  very,  11  A.  &  E.  322  ;  Younge  «>.  Honner,  1  C.  &  K.  51  ;  First 
Nat'l  B'k  v.  Allen,  100  Ala.  476,  489  ;  Neal  ».  Neal,  58  Cal.  287  ;  McDonald  t>.  Mo- 
Donald,  Ind.,  41  N.  E.  340  ;  Tucker  v.  Hyatt,  id.,  42  N.  E.  1047  ;  Browning  v.  Gos- 
nell,  91  la.  448;  Page  v.  Homans,  14  Me.  482;  People  v.  Murphy,  135  N.  Y.  450. 
The  majority  of  these  rulings,  proceeding  on  the  above  reasons,  confine  the  testing  to 
questions  on  cross-examination,  and  exclude  the  demonstration  by  other  testimony  of 
the  witness'  error  (on  the  analogy  of  §  461  e,  post).  But  this  result  seems  unnecessary 
and  unsound ;  that  the  fair  use  of  such  tests  is  orthodox  in  precedent,  is  shown  by 
Bishop  Atterbury's  Trial,  supra,  an  interesting  and  instructive  case.] 

1  5  A.  &  E.  703  ;  pt  was  proposed,  and  almost  uniformly  rejected,  long  before  Doe 
v.  Suckermore  ;  see  cases  cited  in  30  Amer.  L.  Rev.  495.] 

2  [The  use  by  the  jury,  treated  in  the  foregoing  section,  is  not  involved  in  the  pres- 
ent question.] 


§§  578  5-581.]      EXECUTION  OF  UNATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.         727 

in  chief,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  enabling  the  jury  to  judge  of  the 
handwriting,  the  modern  English  decisions  are  clearly  opposed  to  it.1 
For  this,  two  reasons  have  been  assigned :  namely,  first,  the  danger 
of  fraud  in  the  selection  of  the  writings  offered  as  specimens  for  the 
occasion ;  and,  secondly,  that,  if  admitted,  the  genuineness  of  these 
specimens  may  be  contested,  and  others  successively  introduced,  to 
the  infinite  multiplication  of  collateral  issues,  and  the  subversion  of 
justice  ;  to  which  may  be  added  the  danger  of  surprise  upon  the  other 
party,  who  may  not  know  what  documents  are  to  be  produced,  and, 
therefore,  may  not  be  prepared  to  meet  the  inferences  drawn  from 
them.  The  same  mischiefs  would  follow,  if  the  same  writings  were 
introduced  to  the  jury  through  the  medium  of  experts. 

§  531.  But,  with  respect  to  the  admission  of  papers  irrelevant  to 
the  record,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  creating  a  standard  of  comparison 
of  handwriting,  the  American  decisions  are  far  from  being  uniform. 
If  it  were  possible  to  extract  from  the  conflicting  judgments  a  rule 
which  would  find  support  from  the  majority  of  them,  perhaps  it 
would  be  found  not  to  extend  beyond  this  :  that  such  papers  can  be 
offered  in  evidence  to  the  jury,  only  when  no  collateral  issue  can  be 
raised  concerning  them ;  which  is  only  where  the  papers  are  either  con- 
ceded to  be  genuine,  or  are  such  as  the  other  party  is  estopped  to  deny; 
or  are  papers  belonging  to  the  witness,  who  was  himself  previously  ac- 
quainted with  the  party's  handwriting,  and  who  exhibits  them  in 
confirmation  and  explanation  of  his  own  testimony.1  [The  funda- 
mental types  of  rulings  are  four ;  by  one  form,  the  rule  is  to  exclude 
altogether  expert  testimony  based  on  specimens  exhibited  to  the  wit- 
ness (as  in  England  at  common  law) ;  by  another,  the  rule  is  to  re- 
ceive such  testimony  (usually  subject  to  the  trial  Court's  discretion) 
after  the  specimens  are  proved  to  the  Court  to  be  genuine ;  by  an- 
other, the  rule  receives  testimony  founded  on  specimens  already  other- 
wise in  the  case ;  and  by  a  fourth  form,  the  testimony  must  be  based 
on  specimens  conceded  by  the  opponent  to  be  genuine ;  then,  besides 
these,  there  are  other  forms  involving  a  combination  of  some  of  the 
above  limitations,  —  as,  to  receive  testimony  founded  on  specimens  al- 
ready in  the  case  and  conceded  by  the  opponent  to  be  genuine;  or,  to 

1  Bromage  v.  Rice,  7  C.  &  P.  548 ;  Waddington  ».  Cousins,  ib.  595 ;  Doe  v.  New- 
ton, 5  Ad.  &  El.  514 ;  Hughes  v.  Rogers,  8  M.  &  W.  123  ;  Griffits  v.  Ivery,  11  Ad.  & 
El.  322  ;  The  Fitzwalter  Peerage,  10  Cl.  &  Fin.  193  ;  R.  v.  Barber,  1  Car.  &  Kir.  434  ; 
see  also  R.  v.  Murphy,  1  Armstr.  Macartn.  &  Ogle  204  ;  R.  v.  Caldwell,  ib.  324.  [This 
statement  might  perhaps  mislead.  The  cases  here  cited,  with  Griffith  v.  Williams, 
and  Doe  v.  Suckermore,  supra,  do  admit  specimens  for  the  jury's  use,  but  only  when 
they  are  already  in  the  case.  But  (this  point  also  being  involved  in  most  of  the  above 
rulings)  they  exclude  absolutely  the  testimony  of  experts  based  on  comparison  of  speci- 
mens; t.  e.,  the  two  questions  were  differently  decided  at  common  law,  as  already  ex- 
plained in  §  578  a.  As  to  the  reasons  for  the  above  limitations  to  the  jury's  use,  the 
chief  reasons  are  correctly  stated  by  the  author  in  the  remainder  of  the  section.] 

1  Smith  P.  Fenner,  1  Gallis.  170.  fJBut  this  last  is  not  a  real  case  of  testimony 
based  on  comparison  ;  the  witness  already  knows  the  writing  otherwise,  as  in  §  577, 
Mfe] 


728  PRIVATE  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

receive  testimony  founded  on  specimens  already  in  the  case  or  con- 
ceded to  be  genuine  ;  moreover,  the  same  form  of  rule  sometimes  is, 
and  sometimes  is  not,  applied  to  the  jury's  use  arid  to  experts'  use. 
Of  the  above  forms,  the  first  is  historically  correct  according  to  the 
English  common  law,  while  the  second  one  is  in  policy  and  principle 
the  only  justifiable  one.  In  view  of  the  varying  forms  of  the  rule,  it 
is  of  little  service  for  the  practitioner  to  seek  to  use  as  authorities 
the  precedents  established  elsewhere  than  in  his  own  jurisdiction.2] 

2  QSo  far  as  principle  and  policy  are  concerned,  the  case  of  Doe  v.  Suckermore,  5  A. 
&  E.  710,  contains  almost  every  argument  that  has  ever  been  advanced  on  either  side. 
The  English  statute  of  1854  (St.  17-18  Viet.,  c.  125,  §  27),  which  represents  the  most 
satisfactory  rule,  and  has  been  adopted  by  statute  in  several  American  •jurisdictions,  is 
as  follows  :  "Comparison  of  a  disputed  writing  with  any  writing  proved  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  judge  to  be  genuine,  shall  be  permitted  to  be  made  by  witnesses ;  and  such 
writings,  and  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  respecting  the  same,  may  be  submitted  to 
the  Court  and  jury  as  evidence  of  the  genuineness,  or  otherwise,  of  the  writing  in 
dispute."  The  cases  in  the  United  States  are  as  follows  (and  these  include,  as  already 
noted,  rulings  as  to  both  jury's  use  and  experts'  use)  :  — 

A  la.  :  Little  v.  Beazley,  2  Ala.  703 ;  State  v.  Givens,  5  id.  754  ;  Christ  v.  State, 
21  id.  145  ;  Bishop  v.  State,  30  id.  41  ;  Kirksey  v.  Kirksey,  41  id.  636  ;  Bestor  v.  Rob- 
erts, 58  id.  333;  Williams  v.  State,  61  id.  39;  Moon's  Adm'r  v.  Crowder,  72  id.  88; 
Snider  v.  Burks,  84  id.  56  ;  Gibson  v.  Trowbridge,  96  id.  357  ;  Curtis  c.  State,  24  So. 
Ill ;  Ark.:  Miller  v.  Jones,  32  Ark.  343  ;  Cal.  :  Sill  o.  Reese,  47  Cal.  343  ;  Colo.: 
Bradford  v.  People,  43  Pac.  1013  ;  Conn.:  Lyon  ».  Lyman,  9  Conn.  60 ;  Tyler  v.  Todd, 
36  id.  222  ;  Oa.  :  Doe  v.  Roe,  16  Ga.  525  ;  Boggus  v.  State,  34  id.  278  ;  McVicker 
v.  Conkle,  24  S.  E.  23  ;  Axson  v.  Belt,  30  id.  262  ;  HI.  :  Pate  v.  People,  8  111. 
664  ;  Jmnpertz  v.  People,  21  id.  407 ;  Kernin  v.  Hill,  37  id.  209 ;  Brobston  e.  Cahill, 
64  id.  358  ;  Riggs  v.  Powell,  142  id.  453  ;  Rogers  v.  Tyley,  144  id.  652,  665  ;  Ind.  : 
Chance  v.  Gravel  Road  Co.,  32  Ind.  474  ;  Burdick  v.  Hunt,  43  id.  386  ;  Jones  v.  State, 
60  id.  241  ;  Forgey  v.  Bank,  66  id.  124  ;  Hazzard  v.  Vickery,  78  id.  64  ;  Shorb  v. 
Kinzie,  80  id.  502  ;  Walker  v.  Steele,  121  id.  440  ;  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Gordon,  124 
id.  495;  Bowen  v.  Jones,  41  N.  E.  400;  McDonald  v.  McDonald,  41  N.  E.  340; 
Tucker  v.  Hyatt,  42  N.  E.  1047  ;  la. :  Hyde  t*.  Woolfolk,  1  la.  162 ;  Morris  v.  Sargent, 
18  id.  97  ;  Borland  v.  Walrath,  33  id.  132 ;  Wilson  v.  Irish,  62  id.  263  ;  Winch  v. 
Norman,  65  id.  188  ;  Riordan  v.  Guggerty,  74  id.  691  ;  State  v.  Farrington,  90  id.  673  ; 
Kan.  :  Macomber  v.  Scott,  10  Kan.  339;  Joseph  v.  National  B'k,  17  id.  260;  Abbott 
v.  Coleman,  22  id.  252 ;  Ort  v.  Fowler,  31  id.  485  ;  Gilmore  v.  Swisher,  52  Pac.  426  ; 
Ky.:  McAllister  v.  McAllister,  7  B.  Monr.  270;  Hawkins  v.  Grimes,  13  id.  261 ;  Fee 
v.  Taylor,  83  Ky.  263  ;  Froman  v.  Com.,  42  S.  W.  728  ;  La.  :  State  v.  Fritz,  23  La. 
An.  56  ;  Me. :  Chandler  v.  Le  Barren,  45  Me.  534;  Woodman  v.  Dana,  52  id.  13; 
State  v.  Thompson,  80  id.  194  ;  Md. :  Tome  v.  R.  Co.,  39  Md.  89,  93  ;  Herrick  v. 
Swomley,  56  id.  459  ;  Mass. :  Hall  v.  Huse,  10  Mass.  39  ;  Homer  v.  Wallis,  11  id.  312  ; 
Salem  B'k  ».  Gloucester  B'k,  17  id.  526;  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  490  ;  Richardson 
».  Newcomb,  21  id.  317 ;  Com.  v.  Eastman,  1  Cush.  217  ;  Ward  v.  Fuller,  7  Gray  178  ; 
Bacon  v.  Williams,  13  id.  527;  McKeone  v.  Barnes,  108  Mass.  346;  Com.  v.  Coe,  115 
id.  503  ;  Demerritt  v.  Randall,  116  id.  331  ;  Mich.  :  Vinton  v.  Peck,  14  Mich.  287  ; 
Van  Sickle  v.  People,  29  id.  64 ;  Foster's  Will,  34  id.  26 ;  First  Nat'l  B'k  r.  Robert, 
41  id.  711;  People  v.  Parker,  67  id.  224;  Minn.:  Morrison  v.  Porter,  35  Minn.  425  ; 
Miss. :  Wilson  r.  Beauchamp,  50  Miss.  32 ;  Garvin  v.  State,  52  id.  209  ;  Mo.  :  State 
v.  Scott,  45  Mo.  804;  State  v.  Clinton,  67  id.  385  ;  State  v.  Tompkins,  71  id.  616  ; 
Springer  v.  Hall,  83  id.  697  ;  Rose  v.  First  Nat'l  B'k,  91  id.  401 ;  State  v.  Minton,  116 
id.  605;  State  v.  Thompson,  84  S.  W.  81  ;  Geer  v.  M.  L.  &  M.  Co.,  34  S.  W.  1099  ; 
State  v.  Goddard,  48  S.  W.  82  ;  Mont. :  Davis  v.  Fredericks,  3  Mont.  262  ;  Baxter  w. 
Hamilton,  51  Pac.  265;  Nebr.  :  Huff  r.  Nims,  11  Nebr.  365;  Banking  Co.  v.  Shoe- 
maker, 81  id.  134  ;  Bank  v.  Williams,  35  id.  410  ;  First  Nat'l  B'k  v.  Carson,  67  N.  W. 
779;  N.  H.:  Myers  v.  Toscan,  8  N.  H.  47  ;  Bowman  v.  S.mborn,  25  id.  110;  Reed 
v.  Spaulding,  42  id.  121;  State  v.  Shinborn,  46  id.  503;  State  p.  Hastings,  53  id, 
460  ;  Carter  v.  Jackson,  58  id.  157  ;  N.  J.  :  West  v.  State,  22  N.  J.  L.  241 ;  Rev.  St. 
p.  381,  $  9  ;  Mnt.  Ben.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brown,  80  N.  J.  En.  201  ;  N.  Y.:  Jackson  r. 
Van  Dusen,  5  Johns.  155  ;  Jackson  v.  Phillips,  9  Cow.  112  ;  Wilson  v.  Kirk  In  ud,  5  Hill, 


§§  581-581  a.]    EXECUTION  OF  UNATTESTED  DOCUMENTS.  729 

§  581  a.  Discriminations  ;  Comparison  of  Spelling  •  Testimony  to 
a  Feigned  Hand,  etc.  A  distinction,  however,  has  been  recently  taken, 
between  the  case  of  collateral  writings  offered  in  evidence  to  prove 
the  general  style  or  character  of  the  party's  autograph,  and  of  similar 
writings  when  offered  to  prove  a  peculiar  mode  of  spelling  another 
person's  name,  or  other  words,  in  order  to  show  from  this  fact  that 
the  principal  writing  was  his  own.  Thus  where,  to  an  action  for  a 
libel,  the  defendant  pleaded  that  the  plaintiff  had  sent  to  him  a  libel- 
lous letter,  and,  to  prove  this,  gave  in  evidence  the  envelope,  in  which 
the  defendant's  name  was  spelt  with  a  superfluous  t,  and  then  offered 
in  evidence  some  other  letters  of  the  plaintiff,  in  which  he  had  spelt 
the  defendant's  name  in  the  same  peculiar  manner ;  which  last-men- 
tioned letters  Patteson,  J.,  rejected  ;  it  was  held  that  the  rejection  was 
wrong,  and  that  the  letters  were  admissible.1 

Experts  are  received  to  testify  whether  the  writing  is  a  real  or  a 
feigned  hand.2  Where  one  writing  crosses  another,  an  expert  may 

182  ;  Van  Wyck  v.  Mclntosh,  14  N.  Y.  439 ;  Dubois  v.  Baker,  30  id.  361  ;  Randolph 
v.  Loughlin,  48  id.  459  ;  Miles  v.  Loomis,  75  id.  292  ;  Hynes  v.  McDermott,  82  id.  492  ; 
Peck  v.  Callaghan,  95  id.  73  ;  People  v.  Murphy,  ]35  id.  453;  People  v.  Corey,  4 
N.  E.  1066  ;  N.  C. :  Outlaw  v.  Hurdle,  1  Jones  L.  165  ;  Otey  v.  Hoyt,  3  id.  410  ;  State 
v.  Woodruff,  67  N.  C.  91  ;  Yates  v.  Yates,  76  id.  149  ;  McLeod  v.  Bullard,  84  id.  529 ; 
Tuttle  v.  Rainey,  98  id.  514  ;  Fuller  v.  Fox,  101  id.  120;  Tunstall  v.  Cobb,  109  id. 
820  ;  State  v.  De  Graff,  113  id.  688 ;  Riley  v.  Hall,  26  S.  E.  47  ;  State  v.  Noe,  25  S.  E. 
812;  N.  Dak.:  Dakota  v.  O'Hare,  1  N.  D.  43  ;  Ohio:  Hicks  r.  Person,  19  Oh.  441 ; 
Calkins  v.  State,  14  Oh.  St.  222  ;  Bragg  v.  Colwell,  19  id.  407  ;  Pavey  v.  Pavey,  30  id. 
602  ;  Koons  «;.  State,  36  id.  199  ;  Bell  v.  Brewster,  44  id.  696  ;  Or.  :  Osmun  v.  Winters, 
46  Pac.  780  ;  Munkers  v.  Ins.  Co.,  46  Pac.  850  ;  State  v.  Tice,  48  Pac.  367  ;  Pa. :  Mc- 
Corkle  v.  Binns,  5  Binney  348 ;  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Whitehill,  10  S.  &  R.  Ill  ;  Bank  v. 
Jacobs,  1  Pa.  180  ;  Callan  v.  Gaylord,  3  Watts  321  ;  Baker  v.  Haines,  6  Whart.  291 ; 
Depue  o.  Place,  7  Pa.  St.  428  ;  McNair  v.  Com.,  26  id.  390  ;  Travis  v.  Brown,  43  id.  9  ; 
Haycock  v.  Grenp,  57  id.  441 ;  Aumick  v.  Mitchell,  82  id.  211  ;  Berryhill  v.  Kirchner, 
96  "id.  492;  Foster  v.  Collner,  107  id.  313  ;  Rockey's  Estate,  155  id.  456  ;  S.  Car.: 
Boman  v.  Plunkett,  McCord  518 ;  Bird  v.  Miller,  1  McMull.  124  ;  Bennett  v.  Mathewes, 
5  S.  C.  478  ;  Benedict  v.  Flanagan,  18  id.  506  ;  Weaver  v.  Whilden,  33  id.  190  ;  Tenn. : 
Clark  v.  Rhodes,  2  Heisk.  207 ;  Kannon  v.  Galloway,  2  Baxt.  231 ;  Wright  v.  Hessey, 
3  id.  44  ;  Franklin  v.  Franklin,  90  Tenn.  50  ;  Powers  v.  McKenzie,  ib.  179  ;  Tex.  : 
Hanley  v.  Grandy,  28  Tex.  211  ;  Eborn  v.  Zimpelman,  47  id.  518  ;  Kennedy  v.  Upshaw, 
64  id.  "420  ;  Matlock  v.  Glover,  63  id.  236  ;  Smyth  v.  Caswell,  67  id.  572;  Wagoner  o. 
Ruply,  69  id.  703 ;  Jester  v.  Steiner,  86  Tex.  415  ;  U.  S. :  Smith  v.  Fenner,  1  Gall.  175  ; 
Strother  o.  Lucas,  6  Pet.  766  ;  Rogers  v.  Ritter,  12  Wall.  321  ;  U.  S.  v.  Darnand,  3  Wall. 
Jr.  181 ;  Medway  v.  U.  S.,  6  Ct.  of  Cl.  428 ;  Moore  v.  U.  S.,  91  U.  S.  270 ;  U.  S.  v. 
Jones,  10  Fed.  470  ;  U.  S.  v.  McMillan,  29  id.  247  ;  Williams  v.  Conger,  125  U.  S.  413  ; 
U.  S.  v.  Mathias,  36  Fed.  893;  Holmes  v.  Goldsmith,  147  U.  S.  150,  163;  Hickory  v. 
U.  S.,  151  id.  303  ;  National  Ace.  Soc.  v.  Spiro,  U.  S.  App.,  78  Fed.  775  ;  Richardson  v. 
Green,  15  U.  S.  App.  488,  507  ;  Utah:  Durnell  v.  Sowden,  5  Utah  222  ;  Vt. :  Rich 
v.  Trimble,  2  Tyler  349  ;  Gifford  v.  Ford,  5  Vt.  535  ;  Adams  v.  Field,  21  id.  264  ;  State 
v.  La  Vigne,  39  id.  234  ;  State  v.  Hopkins,  43  id.  20  ;  Rowell  v.  Fuller,  59  id.  692 ; 
Va. :  Gardner's  Adm'r  v.  Vidal,  6  Rand.  106 ;  Rowt's  Adm'x  v.  Kile's  Adm'r,  1  Leigh 
216  ;  Wash.  :  Moore  v.  Palmer,  44  Pac.  142  ;  W.  Va.  :  Clay  v.  Robinson,  7  W.  Va. 
359;  Clay  v.  Alderson's  Adm'r,  10  id.  53  ;  State  v.  Henderson,  29  id.  158  ;  State  v. 
Koontz,  31  id.  129  ;  Wis.:  Pierce  v.  Northey,  14  Wis.  9,  13  ;  Hazleton  v.  Union  Bank, 
82  id.  47.1 

1  Brookes  v.  Tichbourn,  14  Jur.  1122,  2  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  374.     In  Jackson  v.  Phillip, 
9  Cowen  94,  where  the  facts  were  of  a  similar  character,  the  collateral  deed  was  offered 
and  rejected  on  the  sole  ground  of  comparison  of  hands  ;  the  distinction  in  the  text  not 
having  been  taken  or  alluded  to. 

2  Goodtitle  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  497 ;   Hammond's  Case,  2  Greenl.  33 ;  Moody  r. 


730  PRIVATE  WRITINGS.  [CH.   XXX. 

testify  which,  in  his  opinion,  was  the  first  made ; 8  [and  whether  or 
when  an  alteration  was  made.4  The  expert  whose  opinion  is  receiv- 
able for  these  purposes  is  not  necessarily  to  be  a  person  following 
the  profession  of  an  expert  in  handwriting ; 6  whether  a  particular 
witness  is  sufficiently  qualified  can  hardly  be  indicated  by  any  gen- 
eral definition.6] 

6.    Conclusion. 

§§  582,  583.1 

§  584.  Conclusion.  Having  thus  completed  the  original  design  of 
this  volume,  in  a  view  of  the  principles  and  rules  of  the  law  of  evi- 
dence, understood  to  be  common  to  all  the  United  States,  this  part  of 
the  work  is  here  properly  brought  to  a  close.  The  student  will  not  fail 
to  observe  the  symmetry  and  beauty  of  this  branch  of  the  law,  under 
whatever  disadvantages  it  may  labor  from  the  manner  of  treatment ; 
and  will  rise  from  the  study  of  its  principles,  convinced,  with  Lord 
Erskine,  that  "  they  are  founded  in  the  charities  of  religion  —  in  the 
philosophy  of  nature  —  in  the  truths  of  history  —  and  in  the  experi- 
ence of  common  life." 1 

Rowell,  17  Pick.  490  ;  Com.  v.  Carey,  2  Pick.  47  ;  Lyon  v,  Lyman,  9  Conn.  55  ;  Hub- 
ley  v.  Vanhorne,  7  S.  &  R.  185;  Lodge  v.  Phipher,  11  id.  333;  £Com.  v.  Webster, 
5  Cush.  301  ;  Fitzwalter  Peerage  Case,  10  Cl.  &  F.  193;  jWithee  v.  Howe,  45  Me. 
571  ;  Sudlow  w.  Warshing,  108  N.  Y.  522  ;}  contra,  semble:  Carey  v.  Pitt,  Peake  Add. 
Cas.  131 ;  Gurney  v.  Langlands,  5  B.  &  Ad.  330-3 

8  Cooper  v.  Bockett,  4  Moore  P.  C.  433. 

*  fRoss  v.  Sebastian,  111.,  43  N.  E.  708  ;  Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  Vt.  601.] 
TR.  v.  Silverlock,  1894,  2  Q.  B.  766  ;  Christman  v.  Pearson,  la.,  69  N.  W.  1055.] 

«  QSee  examples  in  Birm.  N.  Bk.  v.  Bradley,  Ala.,  19  So.  791  ;  Bradford  v.  People, 
Colo.,  43  Pac.  1013  ;  State  v.  David,  Mo.,  33  S.  W.  28  :  Koruegay  v.  Kornegay,  N.  C., 
23  S.  E.  257.] 

1  [[Transferred  to  Appendix  I  I.I 

i  24  How.  St.  Tr.  966. 


APPENDIX  I. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS  CONCERNING  EVIDENCE; 
STATUTES  AFFECTING  COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES.1 


ALABAMA. 

Constitution,  1875. 

Art.  I,  §  7.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  has  a  right 
...  to  be  confronted  by  the  witnesses  against  him ;  .  .  .  and  that 
he  shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

§  19.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  except  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  his  own  confes- 
sion in  open  Court. 

Code,  1897  (Martin). 

§  1794.  In  civil  suits  and  proceedings,  there  must  be  no  exclusion 
of  any  witness  because  he  is  a  party,  or  interested  in  the  issue  tried, 
except  that  no  person  having  a  pecuniary  interest  in  the  result  of  the 
suit  or  the  proceeding  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the  party  to 
whom  his  interest  is  opposed,  as  to  any  transaction  with,  or  state- 
ment by  the  deceased  person  whose  estate  is  interested  in  the  result 
of  the  suit  or  proceeding,  or  when  such  deceased  person,  at  the  time 
of  such  transaction  or  statement,  acted  in  any  representative  or  fidu- 
ciary relation  whatsoever  to  the  party  against  whom  such  testimony 
is  sought  to  be  introduced,  unless  called  to  testify  thereto  by  the 
party  to  whom  such  interest  is  opposed,  or  unless  the  testimony  of 
such  deceased  person  in  relation  to  such  transaction  or  statement  is 
introduced  in  evidence  by  the  party  whose  interest  is  opposed  to  that 
of  the  witness,  or  has  been  taken  and  is  on  file  in  the  cause.  No  per- 
son who  is  an  incompetent  witness  under  this  section  shall  make 
himself  competent  by  transferring  his  interest  to  another. 

1  FJThe  following  pages  contain  two  sets  of  statutory  enactments  :  (1)  the  enact- 
ments in  the  Constitutions  of  the  various  States  dealing  with  any  matter  of  evidence  ; 
(2)  the  enactments  in  the  statutes  of  the  various  States  dealing  with  the  capacity  of 
witnesses  as  affected  by  interest,  religious  belief,  infancy,  insanity,  infamy,  and  mari- 
tal relationship  ;  the  selections  are  confined  to  this  subject,  because  it  is  one  (and 
almost  the  only  one)  upou  which  the  changes  have  been  so  general  as  to  establish  new 
general  principles  ;  other  statutory  changes  are  chiefly  in  the  nature  of  local  variations. 

The  date  given  for  the  Constitution  is  the  date  of  its  adoption  ;  the  date  given  for 
the  statutes  is  (so  far  as  possible)  the  date  of  the  latest  compilation,  whether  officially 
authorized  or  not.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  notice  session  laws  enacted  since  the 
dates  of  these  compilations. 3 


732  APPENDIX  I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

§  1795.  No  objection  must  be  allowed  to  the  competency  of  a 
witness  because  of  his  conviction  for  any  crime,  except  perjury  or 
subornation  of  perjury ;  but  if  he  has  been  convicted  of  other  infa- 
mous crime,  the  objection  goes  to  his  credibility. 

§  5297.  On  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints,  or  other  crim- 
inal proceedings,  the  person  on  trial  shall,  at  his  own  request,  but  not 
otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness ;  and  his  failure  to  make  such  re- 
quest shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him,  nor  be  the  subject 
of  comment  by  counsel. 

§  5298.  There  shall  be  no  exclusion  of  a  witness  in  a  criminal 
case,  because,  on  conviction  of  the  defendant,  he  may  be  entitled  to  a 
reward,  or  to  a  restoration  of  property,  or  to  the  whole  or  any  part 
of  the  fine  or  penalty  inflicted  ;  such  objection  is  addressed  to  the 
credibility,  not  to  the  competency,  of  the  witness. 

§  5301.  When  two  or  more  defendants  are  jointly  indicted,  the 
Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  evidence  for.  the  defence  has  com- 
menced, order  any  defendant  to  -be  discharged  from  the  indictment, 
in  order  that  he  may  be  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  ;  and  such 
order  operates  as  an  acquittal  of  such  defendant,  provided  he  does 
testify. 

§  '5302.  When  two  or  more  defendants  are  jointly  indicted,  the 
Court  may  direct  a  verdict  of  acquittal  to  be  entered  in  favor  of  any 
one  of  them,  against  whom  there  is  not,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Court, 
evidence  sufficient  to  put  him  on  his  defence  ;  and  being  acquitted,  he 
may  be  a  witness. 

ARIZONA. 

Revised  Statutes,  1887. 

§  2037.  All  persons,  without  exception,  otherwise  than  is  speci- 
fied in  the  next  two  sections,  who,  having  organs  of  sense,  can  per- 
ceive, and,  perceiving,  can  make  known  their  perceptions  to  others, 
may  be  witnesses.  Therefore,  neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who 
have  an  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  or  proceeding,  are  ex- 
cluded ;  nor  those  who  have  been  convicted  of  crime  ;  nor  persons  on 
account  of  their  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief;  although  in 
every  case  the  credibility  of  the  witness  may  be  drawn  in  question. 

§  2038.  The  following  persons  cannot  be  witnesses  in  a  criminal 
action :  — 

1.  Those  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production 
for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age,  who  appear  incapable  of  receiv- 
ing just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are  examined, 
or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  2039.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  encourage  confidence  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate  ;  therefore, 
a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following  cases  :  — 


ARKANSAS.  733 

1.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife,  without 
her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband,  without  his  con- 
sent ;  .  .  .  but  this  exception  does  not  apply  to  a  crimhial  action  or 
proceeding,  for  a  crime  committed  by  one  against  the  other. 

2.  An  attorney  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  his  client,  be  ex- 
amined as  to  any  communication  made  by  the  client  to  him,  or  his 
advice  given  thereon  in  the  course  of  professional  employment. 

3.  A  clergyman  or  priest  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  the  person 
making  the  confession,  be  examined  as  to  any  confession  made  to  him 
in  his  professional  character  in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined  by 
the  church  to  which  he  belongs. 

•  §  2040.  A  defendant  in  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  cannot  be 
compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself;  but  if  he  offer  himself  as 
a  witness,  he  may  be  cross-examined  by  the  counsel  for  the  Territory 
as  to  all  matters  about  which  he  was  examined  in  chief.  His  neglect 
or  refusal  to  be  a  witness  cannot  in  any  manner  prejudice  him,  nor  be 
used  against  him  on  the  trial  or  proceeding. 

ARKANSAS. 
Constitution,  1874. 

Art.  II,  §  8.  No  person  shall  ...  be  compelled  in  any  criminal 
case  to  be  a  witness  against  himself. 

§  10.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right 
.  .  .  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

§  14.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession  in 
open  Court. 

§  26.  .  .  .  Nor  shall  any  person  be  rendered  incompetent  to  be  a 
witness  on  account  of  his  religious  belief ;  but  nothing  herein  shall 
be  construed  to  dispense  with  oaths  or  affirmations. 

Art.  Ill,  §  9.  In  trials  of  contested  elections  and  in  proceedings 
for  the  investigation  of  elections,  no  person  shall  be  permitted  to 
withhold  his  testimony  on  the  ground  that  it  may  criminate  himself 
or  subject  him  to  public  infamy ;  but  such  testimony  shall  not  be 
used  against  him  in  any  judicial  proceeding,  except  for  perjury  in 
giving  such  testimony. 

Art.  XIX,  §  1.  No  person  who  denies  the  being  of  a  God  shall 
...  be  competent  to  testify  as  a  witness  in  any  Court. 

Schedule,  §  2  (same  as  Gen.  St.  §  2914,  post}. 

Digest  of  Statutes,  1894  (Sandels  and  Hill). 

§  2908.  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  testify  in 
criminal  cases  by  reason  of  being  the  person  injured  or  defrauded, 
or  intended  to  be  injured  or  defrauded,  or  because  he  would  be  en- 


734  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

titled  to  satisfaction  for  the  injury,  or  may  be  liable  to  pay  the  costs 
of  prosecution. 

§  2909.  In  all  cases  where  two  or  more  persons  are  jointly  or  other- 
wise concerned  in  the  commission  of  any  crime  or  misdemeanor,  either 
of  such  persons  may  be  sworn  as  a  witness  in  relation  to  such  crime  or 
misdemeanor  ;  but  the  testimony  given  by  such  witness  shall  in  no  in- 
stance be  used  against  him  in  any  criminal  prosecution  for  the  same 
offence. 

§  2910.  On  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  informations,  com- 
plaints, and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged  with  the 
commission  of  crimes,  offences,  and  misdemeanors,  the  person  so 
charged  shall,  at  his  own  request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent 
witness,  and  his  failure  to  make  such  request  shall  not  create  any 
presumption  against  him. 

§  2911.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  indicted  in  the  same  in- 
dictment, either  may  testify  in  behalf  of  or  against  the  other  defendant 
or  defendants. 

§  2912.  All  persons  now  convicted  and  sentenced,  or  who  may 
hereafter  be  convicted  and  sentenced  to  the  penitentiary  of  the  State 
of  Arkansas,  shall  be  competent  witnesses  during  and  after  their 
term  of  imprisonment,  to  testify  in  all  prosecutions,  suits,  or  investi- 
gations touching  the  ill  treatment  of  persons  convicted  of  felony  and 
the  unsanitary  condition  of  the  penitentiary  and  camps  in  which  said 
convicts  have  been  or  may  hereafter  be  confined,  and  of  the  kind  and 
quality  of  food  furnished  such  convicts. 

§  2913.  The  competency  of  such  convicts  to .  testify  shall  be  lim- 
ited to  the  matters  set  out  in  the  preceding  section,  unless  such  con- 
victs are  pardoned  by  the  governor  of  the  State. 

§  2914.  In  civil  actions,  no  witness  shall  be  excluded  because  he 
is  a  party  to  a  suit  or  interested  in  the  issue  to  be  tried :  provided, 
in  actions  by  or  against  executors,  administrators,  or  guardians,  in 
which  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or  against  them,  neither  party 
shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the  other  as  to  any  transaction 
with  or  statements  of  the  testator,  intestate,  or  ward,  unless  called  to 
testify  thereto  by  the  opposite  party  ;  Provided  further,  this  section 
may  be  amended  or  repealed  by  the  general  assembly. 

§  2915.  All  persons  except  those  enumerated  in  the  next  section 
shall  be  competent  to  testify  in  a  civil  action. 

§  2916.   The  following  persons  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify :  — 

First.  Persons  convicted  of  a  capital  offence,  or  of  perjury, 
subornation  of  perjury,  burglary,  robbery,  larceny,  receiving  stolen 
goods,  forgery,  or  counterfeiting,  except  by  consent  of  the  parties. 

Second.  Infants  under  the  age  of  ten  years,  and  over  that  age  if 
incapable  of  understanding  the  obligation  of  an  oath. 

Third.  Persons  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  being 
produced  as  witnesses. 


CALIFORNIA.  735 

Fourth.  Husband  and  wife,  for  or  against  each  other,  or  con- 
cerning any  communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the 
marriage,  whether  called  as  a  witness  while  that  relation  subsists  or 
afterward,  but  either  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  for  the  other  in 
regard  to  any  business  transacted  by  the  one  for  the  other  in  the 
capacity  of  agent. 

§  2917.  All  other  objections  to  witnesses  shall  go  to  their  credit 
alone,  and  be  weighed  by  the  jury  or  tribunal  to  which  their  evidence 
is  offered. 

CALIFORNIA. 
Constitution,  1879. 

Art.  I,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  be  a 
witness  or  juror  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  religious 
belief. 

§  13.  ...  No  person  shall  ...  be  compelled,  in  any  criminal 
case,  to  be  a  witness  against  himself.  .  .  .  The  Legislature  shall 
have  the  power  to  provide  for  the  taking,  in  the  presence  of  the 
accused  and  his  counsel,  of  depositions  of  witnesses  in  criminal 
cases,  other  than  cases  of  homicide,  when  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  the  witness,  from  inability  or  other  cause,  will  not  attend  the 
trial. 

§  20.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
evidence  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in 
open  court. 

Penal  Code,  1889  (Deering). 

§  1102.  The  rules  of  evidence  in  civil  actions  are  applicable  also 
to  criminal  actions,  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Code. 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1889  (Deering). 

§  1879.  All  persons,  without  exception,  otherwise  than  is  specified 
in  the  next  two  sections,  who,  having  organs  of  sense,  can  perceive, 
and,  perceiving,  can  make  known  their  perceptions  to  others,  may  be 
witnesses.  Therefore,  neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who  have 
an  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  or  proceeding  are  excluded ;  nor 
those  who  have  been  convicted  of  crime ;  nor  persons  on  account  of 
their  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief ;  although  in  every  case 
the  credibility  of  the  witness  may  be  drawn  in  question,  as  provided 
in  section  1847. 

§  1880.    The  following  persons  cannot  be  witnesses :  — 

1.  Those  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production 
for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten   years  of    age,  who   appear    incapable   of 
receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are 
examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly. 


736  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

3.  Parties  or  assignors  of  parties  to  an  action  or  proceeding,  or 
persons  in  whose  behalf  an  action  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted, 
against  an  executor  or  administrator  upon  a  claim,  or  demand 
against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person,  as  to  any  matter  of  fact 
occurring  before  the  death  of  such  deceased  person. 

§  1881.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  encourage  confidence  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate ;  therefore, 
a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following  cases :  — 

1.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife,  without 
her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband,  without  his  con- 
sent ;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterwards,  be,  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication  made  by 
one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage ;  but  this  exception  does  not 
apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by  one  against  the  other,  nor  to 
a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed  by  one  against 
the  other. 

COLORADO. 
Constitution,  1876. 

Art.  II,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  denied  any  civil  or  political 
right,  privilege,  or  capacity,  on  account  of  his  opinions  concerning 
religion;  but  the  liberty  of  conscience  hereby  secured  shall  not  be 
construed  to  dispense  with  oaths  or  affirmations. 

§  9.  ...  No  person  can  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the  testi- 
mony of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  his  confession  in 
open  Court. 

§  16.  In  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

§  17.  .  .  .  Such  deposition  [of  a  witness  in  criminal  cases]  shall 
not  be  used,  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  the  personal  attendance 
of  the  witness  might  be  procured  by  the  prosecution,  or  is  procured 
by  the  accused. 

§  18.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself  in  a 
criminal  case. 

Art.  VII,  §  9.  In  trials  of  contested  elections,  and  for  offences 
arising  under  the  election  law,  no  person  shall  be  permitted  to 
withhold  his  testimony  on  the  ground  that  it  may  criminate  him- 
self, or  subject  him  to  public  infamy ;  but  such  testimony  shall  not 
be  used  against  him  in  any  judicial  proceeding,  except  for  perjury  in 
giving  such  testimony. 

Annotated  Statutes,  1891  (Mills). 

§  1170.  The  party  or  parties  injured  shall  in  all  cases  be  compe- 
tent witnesses,  unless  he,  she,  or  they  shall  be  rendered  incompetent 
by  reason  of  his,  her,  or  their  infamy  or  other  legal  iucompetency 


COLORADO.  737 

other  than  that  of  interest.  The  credibility  of  all  such  witnesses 
shall  be  left  to  the  jury  as  in  other  cases. 

§  1171 :  Hereafter  in  all  criminal  cases  tried  in  any  Court  of  this 
State,  the  accused,  if  he  so  desire,  shall  be  sworn  as  a  witness  in 
the  case,  and  the  jury  shall  give  his  testimony  such  weight  as  they 
think  it  deserves  ;  but  in  no  case  shall  a  neglect  or  refusal  of  the 
accused  to  testify  be  taken  or  considered  any  evidence  of  his  guilt  or 
innocence. 

§  1172.    Approvers  shall  not  be  allowed  to  give  testimony. 

§  1173.  The  solemn  affirmation  of  witnesses  shall  be  deemed 
sufficient. 

§  4816.  That  no  party  to  any  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  or 
person  directly  interested  in  the  event  thereof,  shall  be  allowed  to 
testify  therein,  of  his  own  motion,  or  in  his  own  behalf,  by  virtue 
of  the  foregoing  section  [now  §  4822]  when  any  adverse  party  sues 
or  defends  as  the  trustee  or  conservator  of  an  idiot,  lunatic,  or  dis- 
tracted person,  or  as  the  executor  or  administrator,  heir,  legatee,  or 
devisee  of  any  deceased  person,  or  as  guardian  or  trustee  of  any  such 
heir,  legatee,  or  devisee,  unless  when  called  as  a  witness  by  such  ad- 
verse party  so  suing  or  defending ;  and  also,  except  in  the  following 
cases,  namely :  — 

First.  In  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  a  party  or  interested 
person  may  testify  to  facts  occurring  after  the  death  of  such  deceased 
person. 

Second.  When  in  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  any  agent  of 
any  deceased  person  shall,  in  behalf  of  any  person  or  persons  suing 
or  being  sued,  in  either  of  the  capacities  above  named,  testify  to  any 
conversation  or  transaction  between  agent  and  the  opposite  party  or 
parties  in  interest,  such  party  or  parties  in  interest  may  testify  con- 
cerning the  same  conversation  or  transaction. 

Third.  When  in  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  any  such 
party  suing  or  defending  as  aforesaid,  or  any  person  having  a  direct 
interest  in  the  event  of  such  action,  suit  or  proceeding,  shall  testify 
in  behalf  of  such  party  so  suing  or  defending,  to  any  conversation  or 
transaction  with  the  opposite  party  or  parties  in  interest,  then  such 
opposite  party  in  interest  shall  also  be  permitted  to  testify  as  to  the 
same  conversation  or  transaction. 

Fourth.  When  in  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  any  witness 
not  a  party  to  the  record,  or  not  a  party  in  interest,  or  not  an  agent  of 
such  deceased  person,  shall  in  behalf  of  any  party  to  such  action,  suit, 
or  proceeding,  testify  to  any  conversation  or  admission  by  any  adverse 
party  or  parties  in  interest,  occurring  before  the  death  and  in  the  ab- 
sence of  such  deceased  person,  such  adverse  party  or  parties  in  interest 
may  also  testify  to  the  same  admission  or  conversation. 

Fifth.  When  in  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  the  deposi- 
tion of  such  deceased  person  shall  be  read  in  evidence  at  the  trial,  a.ny 
VOL.  i.  —  47 


738  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

adverse  party  or  parties  in  interest  may  testify  as  to  all  matters  and 
things  testified  to  in  such  deposition  by  such  deceased  person,  and  not 
excluded  for  irrelevancy  or  incompeteucy. 

§  4818.  That  in  any  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  by  or  against  any 
surviving  partner  or  partners,  joint  contractor  or  contractors,  no  ad- 
verse party  or  person  adversely  interested  in  the  event  thereof,  shall, 
by  virtue  of  section  one  of  this  act,  be  rendered  a  competent  witness 
to  testify  to  any  admission  or  conversation  by  any  deceased  partner 
or  joint  contractor,  unless  some  one  or  more  of  the  surviving  part- 
ners or  joint  contractors  were  also  present  at  the  time  of  such  admis- 
sion or  conversation. 

§  4821.  No  person  shall  be  deemed  incompetent  to  testify  as  a 
witness  on  account  of  his  or  her  opinion  in  relation  to  the  Supreme 
Being  or  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments ;  nor  shall  any 
witness  be  questioned  in  regard  to  his  or  her  religious  opinions. 

§  4822.  All  persons,  without  exception,  other  than  those  specified 
in  the  next  three  sections,  and  in  the  second,  third,  fourth,  seventh, 
and  eighth  sections  of  chapter  one  hundred  and  four  of  the  general 
laws,  may  be  witnesses.  Neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who  have 
an  interest  in  the  event  or  proceeding  shall  be  excluded ;  nor  those 
who  have  been  convicted  of  crime ;  nor  persons  on  account  of  their 
opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief ;  although  in  every  case  the 
credibility  of  the  witness  may  be  drawn  in  question,  as  now  provided 
by  law,  but  the  conviction  of  any  person  for  any  crime  may  be  shown 
for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the  credibility  of  such  witness  ;  and  the 
fact  of  such  conviction  may  be  proved  like  any  other  fact  not  of 
record,  either  by  the  witness  himself  (who  shall  be  compelled  to  tes- 
tify thereto),  or  by  any  other  person  cognizant  of  such  conviction,  as 
impeaching  testimony  or  by  any  other  competent  testimony. 

§  4823.    The  following  persons  shall  not  be  witnesses :  — 

1.  Those  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production 
for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age  who  appear  incapable  of  receiv- 
ing just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are  examined 
or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  4824.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  encourage  confidence  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate  ;  therefore 
a  person  shall  not  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following  cases :  — 

1.  A  husband  shall  not  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife  without 
her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband  without  his  con- 
sent ;  .  .  .  but  this  exception  does  not  apply  to  a  civil  action  or  pro- 
ceeding by  one  against  the  other,  nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding 
for  a  crime  committed  by  one  against  the  other. 

2.  An  attorney  shall  not,  without  the  consent  of  his  client,  be  ex- 
amined as  to  any  communication  made  by  the  client  to  him,  or  his 
advice  given  thereon  in  the  course  of  professional  employment. 


DISTRICT   OF   COLUMBIA.  739 

3.  A  clergyman  or  priest  shall  not,  without  the  consent  of  the  per- 
son making  the  confession,  be  examined  as  to  any  confession  made  to 
him  in  his  professional  character  in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined 
by  the  church  to  which  he  belongs. 

4.  A  physician  or  surgeon  duly  authorized  to  practise  his  profes- 
sion under  the  laws  of  this  State,  shall  not,  without  the  consent  of  his 
patient,  be  examined  as  to  any  information  acquired  in  attending  the 
patient,  which  was  necessary  to  enable  him  to  prescribe  or  act  for  the 
patient. 

5.  A  public  officer  shall  not  be  examined  as  to  communications 
made  to  him  in  official  confidence,  when  the  public  interests,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  Court,  would  suffer  by  the  disclosure. 

DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA. 
Compiled  Statutes,  1894  (Abert  and  Lovejoy). 

Ch.  71,  §  1.  ...  The  parties  thereto,  and  the  persons  in  whose 
behalf  any  such  action  or  proceeding  may  be  brought  or  defended, 
and  all  persons  interested  in  the  same,  shall,  except  as  provided  in 
the  following  section,  be  competent  and  compellable  to  give  evidence, 
either  viva  voce  or  by  deposition,  according  to  the  practice  of  the 
Court,  on  behalf  of  any  of  the  parties  to  the  action  or  other  proceed- 
ings. 

§  2.  Nothing  in  the  preceding  section  shall  render  any  person 
who  is  charged  with  an  offence  in  any  criminal  proceeding  competent 
or  compellable  to  give  evidence  for  or  against  himself ; 

Or  render  any  person  compellable  to  answer  any  question  tending 
to  criminate  himself ; 

Or  render  a  husband  competent  or  compellable  to  give  evidence  for 
or  against  his  wife,  or  a  wife  competent  or  compellable  to  give  evi- 
dence for  or  against  her  husband,  in  any  criminal  proceeding  or  in 
any  proceeding  instituted  in  consequence  of  adultery  ; 

Nor  shall  a  husband  be  compellable  to  disclose  any  communication 
made  to  him  by  his  wife  during  the  marriage,  nor  shall  a  wife  be  com- 
pellable to  disclose  any  communication  made  to  her  by  her  husband 
during  the  marriage. 

§  3.  The  people  called  Quakers,  those  called  Nicolites  or  New 
Quakers,  those  called  Tunkers,  and  those  called  Menonists,  holding  it 
unlawful  to  take  an  oath  on  any  occasion,  shall  be  allowed  to  make 
their  solemn  affirmation  as  witnesses,  in  the  manner  that  Quakers  have 
been  heretofore  allowed  to  affirm,  which  affirmation  shall  be  of  the 
same  avail  as  an  oath,  to  all  intents  and  purposes  whatever. 

§  4.  That  before  any  of  the  persons  aforesaid  shall  be  admitted 
as  a  witness  in  any  court  of  justice  in  this  District  [StateJ  the  Court 
shall  be  satisfied,  by  such  testimony  as  they  may  require,  that  such 


740  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

person  is  one  of  those  who  profess  to  be  conscientiously  scrupulous 
of  taking  an  oath. 

§  5.  In  the  Courts  of  the  United  States  no  witness  shall  be  ex- 
cluded in  any  action  on  account  of  color,  or  in  any  civil  action  because 
he  is  a  party  to  or  interested  in  the  issue  tried  :  provided,  that  in 
actions  by  or  against  executors,  administrators,  or  guardians,  in  which 
judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or  against  them,  neither  party  shall  be 
allowed  to  testify  against  the  other,  as  to  any  transaction  with,  or 
statement  by,  the  testator,  intestate,  or  ward,  unless  called  to  testify 
thereto  by  opposite  party,  or  required  to  testify  thereto  by  the  Court. 

§  7.  In  all  judicial  proceedings  in  the  District  there  shall  be  no 
exclusion  of  any  witness  on  account  of  color. 

§  8.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  informations,  complaints, 
and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged  with  the  commission  of 
crimes,  offences,  and  misdemeanors,  in  the  United  States  Courts,  Terri- 
torial Courts,  and  Courts-martial,  and  Courts  of  inquiry,  in  any  State 
or  Territory,  including  the  District  of  Columbia,  the  person  so  charged 
shall,  at  his  own  request  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness. 

And  his  failure  to  make  such  request  shall  not  create  any  pre- 
sumption against  him. 

CONNECTICUT. 
Constitution,  1875. 

Art.  I  §  9.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  have  the 
right  .  .  .  to  be  confronted  by  the  witnesses  against  him.  .  .  He  shall 
not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

Art.  IX  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless 
on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  con- 
fession in  open  court. 

General  Statutes,  1887. 

§  1094.  In  actions  by  or  against  the  representatives  of  deceased 
persons,  the  entries,  memoranda,  and  declarations  of  the  deceased,  rel- 
evant to  the  matter  in  issue,  may  be  received  as  evidence ;  and  in 
actions  by  or  against  the  representatives  of  deceased  persons,  in  which 
any  trustee  or  receiver  is  an  adverse^  party,  the  testimony  of  the  de- 
ceased, relevant  to  the  matter  in  issue,  given  at  his  examination, 
upon  the  application  of  said  trustee  or  receiver,  shall  be  received  in 

evidence. 

§  1097.  A  wife  shall  be  a  competent  witness  against  her  hus- 
band in  any  action  brought  against  him  for  necessaries  furnished  her 
while  living  apart  from  him. 

§  1098.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any  action 
by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  same  as  a  party  or  other- 
wise, or  of  his  disbelief  in  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being,  or  of 


DELAWARE.  741 

his  conviction  of  crime ;  but  such  interest  or  conviction  maybe  shown 
for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credit. 

§  1623.  Any  person  on  trial  for  crime  shall  be  a  competent  wit- 
ness, and  at  his  or  her  option  may  testify  or  refuse  to  testify,  upon 
such  trial,  and  if  such  person  has  a  husband  or  wife,  he  or  she  shall 
be  a  competent  witness,  but  may  elect  or  refuse  to  testify  for  or 
against  the  accused,  except  that  a  wife  when  she  has  received  per- 
sonal violence  from  her  husband,  may,  upon  his  trial  therefor,  be 
compelled  to  testify  in  the  same  manner  as  any  other  witness.  The 
neglect,  or  refusal,  of  an  accused  party  to  testify  shall  not  be  com- 
mented upon  to  the  Court  or  jury. 

DELAWARE. 
Constitution,  1831. 

Art.  I,  §  7.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  hath  a  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  in  their  examination  face  to  face ;  ...  he 
shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

Art.  VI,  §  16.  In  civil  causes,  when  pending,  the  Superior  Court 
shall  have  the  power,  before  judgment,  ...  of  directing  the  exam- 
ination of  witnesses  that  are  aged,  very  infirm,  or  going  out  of  the 
State,  upon  interrogatories  de  bene  esse,  to  be  read  in  evidence  in  case 
of  the  death  or  departure  of  the  witnesses  before  the  trial,  or  inabil- 
ity by  reason  of  age,  sickness,  bodily  infirmity,  or  imprisonment,  then 
to  attend ;  and  also  the  power  of  obtaining  evidence  from  places  not 
within  the  State. 

Revised  Statutes^  1893. 

Ch.  107,  §  4.  In  criminal  prosecutions,  a  free  negro  or  free  mulatto, 
if  otherwise  competent,  may  testify,  if  it  shall  appear  to  the  Court 
that  no  competent  white  witness  was  present  at  the  time  the  fact 
charged  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed ;  or  that  a  white  witness, 
being  so  present,  has  since  died  or  is  absent  from  the  State  and  cannot 
be  produced :  provided,  that  no  free  negro  or  free  mulatto  shall  be 
admitted  as  witness  to  charge  a  white  man  with  being  the  father  of  a 
bastard  child. 

Laws  (vol.  11),  1859,  ch.  598,  §  1.  A  party  to  the  record  in  any 
action  or  judicial  proceeding,  or  a  person  for  whose  immediate  bene- 
fit such  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended,  may  be  examined  as 
if  under  cross-examination,  at  the  instance  of  the  adverse  party,  or 
any  of  them,  and  for  that  purpose  may  be  compelled  in  the  same 
manner,  and  subject  to  the  same  rules  of  examination  as  any  other 
witness  to  testify  ;  but  the  party  calling  for  such  examination  shall 
not  be  excluded  [concluded  ?]  thereby,  but  may  rebut  his  testimony 
by  other  evidence. 

§  2.   A  party  proposing  to  examine  a  party  adverse  in  interest  may 


742  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

have  the  same  process  and  means  of  compelling  attendance  and  re- 
sponse as  the  law  provides  in  the  case  of  ordinary  witnesses. 

§  3.  No  person  shall  be  excluded  from  testifying  as  a  witness  by 
reason  of  his  having  been  convicted  of  a  felony,  but  evidence  of  the 
fact  may  be  given  to  affect  his  credibility. 

Laws  (vol.  16),  1881,  ch.  537,  §  1.  No  person  shall  be  incom- 
petent to  testify  in  any  civil  action  or  proceeding  whether  at  law  or 
in  equity,  because  he  is  a  party  to  the  record  or  interested  in  the 
event  of  the  suit  or  matter  to  be  determined:  provided,  that  in 
actions  or  proceedings  by  or  against  executors,  administrators,  or 
guardians,  in  which  judgment  or  decree  may  be  rendered  for  or 
against  them,  neither  party  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the 
other  as  to  any  transaction  with  or  statement  by  the  testator,  intes- 
tate, or  ward,  unless  called  to  testify  thereto  by  the  opposite  party. 

Laws  (vol.  19),  1893,  ch.  777,  §  1.  ...  Each  and  every  person 
accused,  or  who  shall  be  accused,  of  any  felony,  misdemeanor,  or 
offence  whatsoever,  punishable  by  the  laws  of  this  State,  now  or  here- 
after in  force,  shall,  upon  his  or  her  trial  before  any  tribunal  estab- 
lished by  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  this  State,  have  the  right  to 
testify  in  his  or  her  own  behalf,  and  shall  also  have  the  right  to  tes- 
tify for  or  against  any  other  person  or  persons  jointly  tried  with  him 
or  her ;  provided,  however,  that  a  refusal  to  testify  shall  not  be  con- 
strued or  commented  upon  as  an  indication  of  guilt. 

Kev.  St.  ch.  108,  §  5.  The  usual  oath  in  this  State  shall  be  by 
swearing  upon  the  Holy  Evangels  of  Almighty  God ;  the  person  to 
whom  it  is  administered  laying  his  right  hand  upon  the  book  and 
kissing  it. 

§  6.  A  person  may  be  permitted  to  swear  with  the  uplifted  hand  ; 
that  is  to  say,  he  shall  lift  up  his  right  hand  and  swear  by  the  ever- 
living  God,  the  searcher  of  all  hearts,  that,  etc.,  and  at  the  end  of  the 
oath  shall  say,  "  As  I  shall  answer  to  God  at  the  Great  Day." 

§  7.  A  person  conscientiously  scrupulous  of  taking  an  oath  may 
be  permitted,  instead  of  swearing,  solemnly,  sincerely,  and  truly  to 
declare  and  affirm  to  the  truth  of  the  matters  to  be  testified. 

§  8.  A  person  believing  in  any  other  than  the  Christian  religion 
may  be  sworn  according  to  the  peculiar  ceremonies  of  his  religion,  if 
there  be  any  such. 

FLORIDA. 
Constitution,  1887. 

Declaration  of  Rights,  §  5.  ...  No  person  shall  be  rendered  in- 
competent as  a  witness  on  account  of  his  religious  opinions. 

§  11.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

§  12.  No  person  shall  be  ...  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to 
be  a  witness  against  himself. 


FLORIDA.  743 

§  23.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  except  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in 
open  Court. 

Revised  Statutes,  1892. 

§  1095.  No  person,  in  any  Court  or  before  any  officer  acting  judi- 
cially, shall  be  excluded  from  testifying  as  a  witness,  by  reason  of  his 
interest  in  the  event  of  the  action  or  proceeding,  or  because  he  is  a 
party  thereto ;  provided,  however,  that  no  party  to  such  action  or 
proceeding,  nor  any  person  interested  in  the  event  thereof,  nor  any 
person  from,  through,  or  under  whom,  any  such  party  or  interested 
person  derives  any  interest  or  title  by  assignment  or  otherwise,  shall 
be  examined  as  a  witness  in  regard  to  any  transaction  or  communi- 
cation between  such  witness  and  a  person  at  the  time  of  such  exami- 
nation deceased,  insane,  or  lunatic,  against  the  executor,  administrator, 
heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  assignee,  legatee,  devisee,  or  survivor  of 
such  deceased  person,  or  the  assignee  or  committee  of  such  insane 
person  or  lunatic ;  but  this  prohibition  shall  not  extend  to  any  trans- 
action or  communication  as  to  which  any  such  executor,  administra- 
tor, heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  assignee,  legatee,  devisee,  survivor,  or 
committeeman  shall  be  examined  on  his  own  behalf,  or  as  to  which 
the  testimony  of  such  deceased  person  or  lunatic  shall  be  given  in 
evidence. 

§  1096.  Persons  who  have  been  convicted  in  any  Court  in  this 
State  of  murder,  perjury,  piracy,  forgery,  larceny,  robbery,  arson, 
sodomy,  or  buggery,  shall  not  be  competent  witnesses.  Even  a  par- 
don of  a  person  convicted  of  perjury  shall  not  render  him  competent.. 
Such  conviction  may  be  proved  by  questioning  the  proposed  witness, 
or  if  he  deny  it,  by  producing  a  record  of  his  conviction. 

§  1097.  Testimony  as  to  the  general  character,  and  an  admission 
of  proof,  as  provided  in  §  1096,  of  the  conviction  of  any  witness  who 
shall  have  been  convicted  in  this  State  of  any  crime  other  than  those 
mentioned  in  said  section,  or  who  shall  have  been  convicted  of  any 
crime  in  any  other  State,  may  be  given  in  evidence  to  affect  his 
credibility. 

§  2863.   The  provisions  of  law  relative  to  the  competency  of  wit- 
nesses in  civil  cases  shall  obtain  also  in  criminal  cases. 

Ch.  4029.  In  the  trial  of  civil  actions  in  this  State,  neither  the 
husband  nor  the  wife  shall  be  excluded  as  witnesses,  where  either  the 
said  husband  or  wife  is  an  interested  party  to  the  suit  pending. 

Ch.  4036,  §  1.  Atheists,  agnostics,  and  all  persons  who  do  not  be- 
lieve in  the  doctrine  of  future  rewards  and  punishments,  shall  be 
permitted  to  testify  in  any  of  the  Courts  in  this  State. 

§  2.  Said  person  or  persons  may  solemnly  affirm  instead  of  taking 
an  oath. 

§  2908.   In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the 


744  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

right  of  making  a  statement  to  the  jury,  under  oath,  of  the  matter  of 
his  defence  or  her  defence. 

GEORGIA. 
Constitution,  1877. 

Art.  I,  sect.  1,  par.  5.  Every  person  charged  with  an  offence 
against  the  laws  of  this  State  .  .  .  shall  be  confronted  with  the 
witnesses  testifying  against  him. 

Par.  6.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  give  testimony  tending  in 
any  manner  to  criminate  himself. 

Sect.  2,  par.  2.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason, 
except  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or 
confession  in  open  Court. 

Code,  1895. 

§  5268.   Religious  belief  goes  only  to  the  credit. 

§  5269.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  be  excluded  by 
reason  of  incapacity,  for  crime  or  interest,  or  from  being  a  party, 
from  giving  evidence,  either  in  person  or  by  deposition ;  .  .  .  but 
every  person  so  offered  shall  be  competent,  and  compellable  to  give 
evidence  on  behalf  of  either  or  any  of  the  parties  to  the  said  suit, 
action,  or  other  proceeding,  except  as  follows  :  — 

1.  Where  any  suit  is  instituted  or  defended  by  a  person  insane  at 
the  time  of  trial,  or  by  an  indorsee,  assignee,  transferee,  or  by  the 
personal  representative   of  a  deceased  person,  the  opposite  party 
shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own  favor  against  the  insane 
or  deceased  person,  as  to  transactions  or  communications  with  such 
insane  or  deceased  person. 

2.  Where  any  suit  is  instituted  or  defended  by  partners,  persons 
jointly  liable,  or  interested,  the  opposite  party  shall  not  be  admitted 
to  testify  in  his  own  favor  as  to  transactions  or  communications  solely 
with  an  insane  or  deceased  partner,   or  person  jointly  liable   or 
interested. 

3.  Where  any  suit  is  instituted  or  defended  by  a  corporation,  the 
opposite  party  shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf 
to  transactions  or  communications  solely  with  a  deceased  or  insane 
officer  or  agent  of  the  corporation. 

4.  Where  a  person  not  a  party,  but  a  person  interested  in  the  result 
of  the  suit,  is  offered  as  a  witness,  he  shall  not  be  competent  to  testify, 
if  as  a  party  to  the  cause  he  would  for  any  cause  be  incompetent. 

5.  No  agent  or  attorney-at-law  of  the  surviving  or  sane  party,  at 
the  time  of  the  transaction  testified  about,  shall  be  allowed  to  testify 
in  favor  of  a  surviving  or  sane  party,  under  circumstances  where  the 
principal,  a  party  to  the  cause,  could  not  testify;  nor  can  a  surviving 
party  or  agent  testify  in  his  own  favor,  or  in  favor  of  a  surviving  or 
sane  party,  as  to  transactions  or  communications  with  a  deceased 


IDAHO.  745 

or  insane  agent,  under  circumstances  where  such  witness  would  be 
incompetent  if  deceased  agent  had  been  principal. 

6.  In  all  cases  where  the  personal  representative  of  the  deceased 
or  insane  party  has  introduced  a  witness  interested  in  the  event  of  a 
suit,  who  has  testified  as  to  transactions  or  communications  on  the 
part  of  the  surviving  agent  or  party  with  a  deceased  or  insane 
party  or  agent,  the  surviving  party  or  his  agent  may  be  examined 
in  reference  to  such  facts  testified  to  by  said  witness. 

§  5270.  There  shall  be  no  other  exceptions  allowed  under  the 
foregoing  paragraphs. 

§  5272.  Nothing  contained  in  section  5269  shall  apply  to  any 
action,  suit,  or  proceeding  in  any  court,  instituted  in  consequence  of 
adultery,  or  to  any  action  for  breach  of  promise  of  marriage. 

§  5273.  Persons  who  have  not  the  use  of  reason,  as  idiots, 
lunatics  during  lunacy,  and  children  who  do  not  understand  the 
nature  of  an  oath,  are  incompetent  witnesses. 

§  5274.  Drunkenness,  which  dethrones  reason  and  memory,  in- 
capacitates during  its  continuance. 

§  5275.  No  physical  defects  in  any  of  the  senses  incapacitates  a 
witness.  An  interpreter  may  explain  his  evidence. 

§  5276.  The  Court  must,  by  examination,  decide  upon  the  capa- 
city of  one  alleged  to  be  incompetent  from  idiocy,  lunacy  or  insanity, 
or  drunkenness,  or  childhood. 

§  5279.  The  sanction  of  an  oath,  or  affirmation  equivalent 
thereto,  is  necessary  to  the  reception  of  any  oral  evidence.  The 
Court  may  frame  such  affirmation  according  to  the  religious  faith  of 
the  witness. 

IDAHO. 
Revised  Statutes,  1887. 

§  5956.  All  persons  without  exception,  otherwise  than  is  speci- 
fied in  the  next  two  sections,  who,  having  organs  of  sense,  can  per- 
ceive, and,  perceiving,  can  make  known  their  perceptions  to  others, 
may  be  witnesses.  Therefore,  neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who 
have  an  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  or  proceeding  are  excluded ; 
nor  those  who  have  been  convicted  of  crime ;  nor  persons  on  account 
of  their  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief;  although  in  every 
case  the  credibility  of  the  witness  may  be  drawn  in  question,  by  the 
manner  in  which  he  testifies,  by  the  character  of  his  testimony,  or 
by  evidence  affecting  his  character  for  truth,  honesty,  or  integrity,  or 
his  motives,  or  by  contradictory  evidence ;  and  the  jury  are  the 
exclusive  judges  of  his  credibility. 

§  5957.    The  following  persons  cannot  be  witnesses  :  — 

1.  Those  who   are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of   their   pro- 
duction for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age,  who  appear  incapable  of 


746  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are 
examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly. 

3.  Parties  or  assignors  of  parties  to  an  action  or  proceeding,  or 
persons  in  whose  behalf  an  action  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted,  against 
an  executor  or  an  administrator,  upon  a  claim  or  demand  against  the 
estate  of  a  deceased  person,  as  to  any  matter  of  fact  occurring  before 
the  death  of  such  deceased  person. 

§  5958.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy 
of  the  law  to  encourage  confidence  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate ; 
therefore  a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following 
cases : — 

1.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife,  without 
her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband,  without  his  con- 
sent ;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterwards,  be,  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication  made  by 
one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage ;  but  this  exception  does  not 
apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by  one  against  the  other,  nor  to 
a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed  by  violence 
of  one  against  the  person  of  the  other. 

§  8141.  The  rules  for  determining  the  competency  of  witnesses 
in  civil  actions  are  applicable  also  to  criminal  actions  and  proceedings, 
except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Code. 

§  8142.  Except  with  the  consent  of  both,  or  in  cases  of  criminal 
violence  upon  one  by  the  other,  neither  husband  nor  wife  are  com- 
petent witnesses  for  or  against  each  other  in  a  criminal  action  or 
proceeding  to  which  one  or  both  are  parties. 

§  8143.  A  defendant  in  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  to  which 
he  is  a  party,  is  not,  without  his  consent,  a  competent  witness  for  or 
against  himself.  His  neglect  or  refusal  to  give  such  consent  shall 
not  in  any  manner  prejudice  him  nor  be  used  against  him  on  the  trial 
or  proceeding. 

ILLINOIS. 
Constitution,  1870. 

Art.  II,  §  3.  ...  No  person  shall  be  denied  any  civil  or  political 
right,  privilege,  or  capacity,  on  account  of  his  religious  opinions ;  but 
the  liberty  of  conscience  hereby  secured  shall  not  be  construed  to 
dispense  with  oaths  or  affirmations. 

§  9.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face. 

§  10.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to  give 
evidence  against  himself. 

Revised  Statutes,  1898  (Kurd). 

Ch.  38,  §  426.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any 
criminal  case  or  proceeding  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of 


ILLINOIS.  747 

the  same,  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his  having  been 
convicted  of  any  crime,  but  such  interest  or  conviction  may  be  shown 
for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credibility :  provided,  however,  that 
a  defendant  in  any  criminal  case  or  proceeding  shall  only  at  his  own 
request  be  deemed  a  competent  witness,  and  his  neglect  to  testify 
shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him,  nor  shall  the  Court 
permit  any  reference  or  comment  to  be  made  to  or  upon  such  neglect. 

Ch.  51,  §  1.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any 
civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  except  as  hereinafter  stated,  by  rea- 
son of  his  or  her  interest  in  the  event  thereof,  as  a  party  or  other- 
wise, or  by  reason  of  his  or  her  conviction  of  any  crime ;  but  such 
interest  or  conviction  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the 
credibility  of  such  witness ;  and  the  fact  of  such  conviction  may  be 
proven  like  any  fact  not  of  record,  either  by  the  witness  himself 
(who  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  thereto)  or  by  any  other  witness 
cognizant  of  such  conviction,  as  impeaching  testimony,  or  by  any 
other  competent  evidence. 

§  2.  No  party  to  any  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  or  person 
directly  interested  in  the  event  thereof,  shall  be  allowed  to  testify 
therein  of  his  own  motion,  or  in  his  own  behalf,  by  virtue  of  the 
foregoing  section,  when  any  adverse  party  sues  or  defends  as  the 
trustee  or  conservator  of  any  idiot,  habitual  drunkard,  lunatic,  or 
distracted  person,  or  as  the  executor,  administrator,  heir,  legatee, 
or  devisee  of  any  deceased  person,  or  as  guardian  or  trustee  of  any 
such  heir,  legatee,  or  devisee,  unless  when  called  as  a  witness  by  such 
adverse  party  so  suing  or  defending,  and  also  except  in  the  following 
cases,  namely :  — 

First.  In  any  such  event,  suit,  or  proceeding,  a  party  or  inter- 
ested person  may  testify  to  facts  occurring  after  the  death  of  such 
deceased  person,  or  after  the  ward,  heir,  legatee,  or  devisee  shall  have 
attained  his  or  her  majority. 

Second.  When,  in  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  any  agent  of 
any  deceased  person  shall,  in  behalf  of  any  person  or  persons  suing 
or  being  sued,  in  either  of  the  capacities  above  named,  testify  to  any 
conversation  or  transaction  between  such  agent  and  the  opposite 
party  or  party  in  interest,  such  opposite  party  or  party  in  interest 
may  testify  concerning  the  same  conversation  or  transaction. 

Third.  Where,  in  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  any  such 
party  suing  or  defending,  as  aforesaid,  or  any  person  having  a  direct 
interest  in  the  event  of  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  shall  testify 
in  behalf  of  such  party  so  suing  or  defending,  to  any  conversation  or 
transaction  with  the  opposite  party  or  party  in  interest,  then  such 
opposite  party  or  party  in  interest  shall  also  be  permitted  to  testify 
as  to  the  same  conversation  or  transaction. 

Fourth.  Where,  in  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  any  wit- 
ness, not  a  party  to  the  record,  or  not  a  party  in  interest,  or  not  an 


748  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

agent  of  such  deceased  person,  shall,  in  behalf  of  any  party  to  such 
action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  testify  to  any  conversation  or  admission 
by  any  adverse  party  or  party  in  interest,  occurring  before  the  death 
and  in  the  absence  of  such  deceased  person,  such  adverse  party 
or  party  in  interest  may  also  testify  as  to  the  same  admission  or 
conversation. 

Fifth.  Where,  in  any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  the  depo- 
sition of  such  deceased  person  shall  be  read  in  evidence  at  the  trial, 
any  adverse  party  or  party  in  interest  may  testify  as  to  all  matters 
and  things  testified  to  in  such  deposition  by  such  deceased  person,  and 
not  excluded  for  irrelevancy  or  incompetency. 

§  4.  In  any  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  by  or  against  any  surviv- 
ing partner  or  partners,  joint  contractor  or  contractors,  no  adverse 
party,  or  party  adversely  interested  in  the  event  thereof,  shall,  by 
virtue  of  section  1  of  this  Act,  be  rendered  a  competent  witness,  to 
testify  to  any  admission  or  conversation,  by  any  deceased  partner  or 
joint  contractor,  unless  some  one  or  more  of  the  surviving  partners 
or  joint  contractors  were  also  present  at  the  time  of  such  admission  or 
conversation ;  and  in  every  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  a  party  to  the 
same,  who  has  contracted  with  an  agent  of  the  adverse  party,  the 
agent  having  since  died,  shall  not  be  a  competent  witness,  as  to  any 
conversation  or  transaction  between  himself  and  such  agent,  except 
where  the  conditions  are  such,  that  under  the  provisions  of  sections 
2  and  3  of  this  Act,  he  would  have  been  permitted  to  testify,  if  the 
deceased  person  had  been  a  principal  and  not  an  agent. 

§  5.  No  husband  or  wife  shall,  by  virtue  of  section  1  of  this  A.ct, 
be  rendered  competent  to  testify  for  or  against  each  other  as  to  any 
transaction  or  conversation  occurring  during  the  marriage,  whether 
called  as  a  witness  during  the  existence  of  the  marriage,  or  after  its 
dissolution,  except  in  cases  where  the  wife  would,  if  unmarried,  be 
plaintiff  or  defendant,  or  where  the  cause  of  action  grows  out  of  a 
personal  wrong  or  injury  done  by  one  to  the  other  or  grows  out  of 
the  neglect  of  the  husband  to  furnish  the  wife  with  a  suitable  sup- 
port; and  except  in  cases  where  the  litigation  shall  be  concerning 
the  separate  property  of  the  wife,  and  suits  for  divorce ;  and  except 
also  in  actions  upon  policies  of  insurance  of  property,  so  far  as 
relates  to  the  amount  and  value  of  the  property  alleged  to  be  injured 
or  destroyed,  or  in  actions  against  carriers,  so  far  as  relates  to  the 
loss  of  property  and  the  amount  and  value  thereof,  or  in  all  matters 
of  business  transactions  where  the  transaction  was  had  and  con- 
ducted by  such  married  woman  as  the  agent  of  her  husband,  in  all 
of  which  cases  the  husband  and  wife  may  testify  for  or  against  each 
other,  in  the  same  manner  as  other  parties  may,  under  the  provisions 
of  this  act:  provided,  that  nothing  in  this  section  contained  shall 
be  construed  to  authorize  or  permit  any  such  husband  or  wife  to 
testify  to  any  admissions  or  conversations  of  the  other,  whether  made 


INDIANA.  749 

by  him  to  her  or  by  her  to  him,  or  by  either  to  third  persons,  except 
in  suits  or  causes  between  such  husband  and  wife. 

§  6.  Any  party  to  any  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  may  compel 
any  adverse  party  or  person  for  whose  benefit  such  action,  suit,  or  pro- 
ceeding is  brought,  instituted,  prosecuted,  or  defended,  to  testify  as  a 
witness  at  the  trial,  or  by  deposition,  taken  as  other  depositions  are 
by  law  required,  in  the  same  manner,  and  subject  to  the  same  rules, 
as  other  witnesses. 

§  7.  In  any  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  no  person  who  would, 
if  a  party  thereto,  be  incompetent  to  testify  therein,  under  the  pro- 
visions of  sections  2  or  3,  shall  become  competent  by  reason  of  any 
assignment  or  release  of  his  claim,  made  for  the  purpose  of  allowing 
such  person  to  testify. 

INDIANA. 
Constitution,  1851. 

Art.  I,  §  7.  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  as  a  witness 
in  consequence  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  religion. 

§  8.  The  mode  of  administering  an  oath  or  affirmation  shall  be  such 
as  may  be  most  consistent  with  and  binding  upon  the  person  to  whom 
such  oath  or  affirmation  may  be  administered. 

§  13.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face. 

§  14.  .  .  .  No  person,  in  any  criminal  prosecution,  shall  be  com- 
pelled to  testify  against  himself. 

§  29.  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  except  on  the  testi- 
mony of  two  witnesses  to  same  overt  act,  or  upon  his  confession  in 
open  court. 

Revised  Statutes,  1897  (Thornton). 

§  509.  All  persons,  whether  parties  to  or  interested  in  the  suit, 
shall  be  competent  witnesses  in  a  civil  action  or  proceeding,  except 
as  herein  otherwise  provided. 

§  510.  The  following  persons  shall  not  be  competent  witnesses  :  — 

First.  Persons  insane  at  the  time  they  are  offered  as  witnesses, 
whether  they  have  been  so  adjudged  or  not. 

Second.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age,  unless  it  appears  that 
they  understand  the  nature  and  obligation  of  an  oath. 

§  511.  In  suits  or  proceedings  in  which  an  executor  or  adminis- 
trator is  a  party,  involving  matters  which  occurred  during  the  life- 
time of  the  decedent,  where  a  judgment  or  allowance  may  be  made 
or  rendered  for  or  against  the  estate  represented  by  such  executor  or 
administrator,  any  person  who  is  a  necessary  party  to  the  issue  or 
record,  whose  interest  is  adverse  to  such  estate,  shall  not  be  a  com- 
petent witness  as  to  such  matters  against  such  estate  :  provided, 
however,  that  in  cases  where  a  deposition  of  such  decedent  has  been 
taken,  or  he  has  previously  testified  as  to  the  matter,  and  his  testi- 


750  APPENDIX  I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

mony  or  deposition  can  be  used  as  evidence  for  such  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator, such  adverse  party  shall  be  a  competent  witness  for 
himself,  but  only  as  to  any  matters  embraced  in  such  deposition  or 
testimony. 

§  512.  In  all  suits  by  or  against  heirs  or  devisees,  founded  on  a 
contract  with  or  demand  against  the  ancestor,  to  obtain  title  to  or 
obtain  possession  of  property,  real  or  personal,  of,  or  in  right  of,  such 
ancestor,  or  to  affect  the  same  in  any  manner,  neither  party  to  such 
suit  shall  be  a  competent  witness  as  to  any  matter  which  occurred 
prior  to  the  death  of  the  ancestor. 

§  513.  When  in  any  case  an  agent  of  a  decedent  shall  testify  on 
behalf  of  an  executor,  administrator,  or  heirs,  concerning  any  trans- 
action, as  having  been  had  by  him,  as  such  agent,  with  a  party  to  the 
suit,  his  assignor  or  grantor,  and  in  the  absence  of  the  decedent ;  or 
if  any  witness  shall,  on  behalf  of  the  executor,  administrator,  or  heirs, 
testify  to  any  conversation  or  admission  of  a  party  to  the  suit,  his  as- 
signor or  grantor,  as  having  been  had  or  made  in  the  absence  of  the 
deceased;  then  the  party  against  whom  such  evidence  is  adduced, 
his  assignor  or  grantor,  shall  be  competent  to  testify  concerning  the 
same  matter.  No  person  who  shall  have  acted  as  an  agent  in  the 
making  or  continuing  of  a  contract  with  any  person  who  may  have 
died,  shall  be  a  competent  witness  in  any  suit  upon  or  involving  such 
contract,  as  to  matters  occurring  prior  to  the  death  of  such  decedent, 
on  behalf  of  the  principal  to  such  contract,  against  the  legal  repre- 
sentatives or  heirs  of  the  decedent,  unless  he  shall  be  called  by  such 
heirs  or  legal  representatives.  And  in  such  case  he  shall  be  a  com- 
petent witness  only  as  to  matters  concerning  which  he  is  interrogated 
by  such  heirs  or  representatives.  When,  in  any  case,  a  person  shall 
be  charged  with  unlawfully  taking  or  detaining  personal  property,  or 
having  done  damage  thereto,  and  such  person  by  his  pleading  shall 
defend  on  the  ground  that  he  is  executor,  administrator,  guardian,  or 
heir,  and  as  such  has  taken  or  detains  the  property,  or  has  done  the 
acts  charged,  then  no  person  shall  be  competent  to  testify  who  would 
not  be  competent  if  the  person  so  defending  were  the  complainant ; 
but  when  the  person  complaining  cannot  testify,  then  the  party  so 
defending  shall  also  be  excluded. 

§  514.  When  the  husband  or  wife  is  a  party,  and  not  a  compe- 
tent witness  in  his  or  her  own  behalf,  the  other  shall  also  be  ex- 
cluded ;  except  that  the  husband  shall  be  a  competent  witness  in  a 
suit  for  the  seduction  of  his  wife,  but  she  shall  not  be  competent. 

§  515.  In  all  cases  in  which  executors,  administrators,  heirs,  or 
devisees  are  parties,  and  one  of  the  parties  to  the  suit  shall  be  in- 
competent, as  hereinbefore  provided,  to  testify  against  them,  then 
the  assignor  or  grantor  of  a  party  making  such  assignment  or  grant 
voluntarily  shall  be  deemed  a  party  adverse  to  the  executor  or  ad- 
ministrator, heir,  or  devisee,  as  the  case  may  be :  provided,  however, 


IOWA.  751 

that  in  all  cases  referred  to  in  sections  276,  277,  278,  and  279  of  said 
act — said  sections  being  numbered  in  the  Revised  Statutes  of  1881, 
498,  499,  500,  and  501  —  any  party  to  such  suit  shall  have  the  right 
to  call  and  examine  any  party  adverse  to  him  as  a  witness,  or  the 
Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  require  any  party  to  a  suit,  or  other  per- 
son, to  testify,  and  any  abuse  of  such  discretion  shall  be  renewable 
[reviewable  ?]  on  appeal. 

§  516.  In  all  actions  by  an  executor  or  administrator  on  contracts 
assigned  to  the  decedent,  when  the  assignor  is  alive  and  a  com- 
petent witness  in  the  cause,  the  executor  or  administrator  and 
the  defendant  or  defendants  shall  be  competent  witnesses  as  to  all 
matters  which  occurred  between  the  assignor  and  the  defendant  or 
defendants,  prior  to  notice  of  such  assignment. 

§  518.  No  want  of  belief  in  a  Supreme  Being  or  in  the  Christian 
religion  shall  render  a  witness  incompetent ;  but  the  want  of  such 
religious  belief  may  be  shown  upon  the  trial.  In  all  questions  affect- 
ing the  credibility  of  a  witness,  his  general  moral  character  may  be 
given  in  evidence. 

[Criminal  cases.]  §  1889.  The  following  persons  are  competent 
witnesses :  — 

First.    All  persons  who  are  competent  to  testify  in  civil  actions. 

Second.     The  party  injured  by  the  offence  committed. 

Third.     Accomplices,  when  they  consent  to  testify. 

Fourth.  The  defendant,  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf.  But  if  the 
defendant  do  not  testify,  his  failure  to  do  so  shall  not  be  commented 
upon  or  referred  to  in  the  argument  of  the  cause,  nor  commented  upon, 
referred  to,  or  in  any  manner  considered  by  the  jury  trying  the  same ; 
and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Court,  in  such  case,  in  its  charge,  to  in- 
struct the  jury  as  to  their  duty  under  the  provisions  of  this  section. 

§  1895.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  included  in  one  prosecu- 
tion, the  Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendant  has  gone  into 
his  defence,  direct  any  defendant  to  be  discharged,  that  he  may  be  a 
witness  for  the  State.  A  defendant  may  also,  when  there  is  not  suffi- 
cient evidence  to  put  him  on  his  defence,  at  any  time  before  the  evi- 
dence is  closed,  be  discharged  by  the  Court  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
testimony  for  a  co-defendant. 

IOWA. 
Constitution,  1857. 

Art.  I,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  ...  rendered  incompetent  to 
give  evidence  in  any  Court  of  law  or  equity,  in  consequence  of  his 
opinions  on  the  subject  of  religion;  and  any  party  to  any  judicial 
proceeding  shall  have  the  right  to  use  as  a  witness,  or  take  the  testi- 
mony of,  any  other  person,  not  disqualified  on  account  of  interest, 
who  may  be  cognizant  of  any  fact  material  to  the  case ;  and  parties 
to  suits  may  be  witnesses,  as  provided  by  law. 


752        APPENDIX  I:  CONSTITUTIONS  AND  STATUTES. 

§  10.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  and  in  cases  involving  the  life 
or  liberty  of  an  individual,  the  accused  shall  have  a  right  ...  to  be 
confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

§  16.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the 
evidence  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in  open 
court. 

Annotated  Code,  1897. 

§  4601.  Every  human  being  of  sufficient  capacity  to  understand 
the  obligation  of  an  oath  is  a  competent  witness  in  all  cases,  both 
civil  and  criminal,  except  as  herein  otherwise  declared. 

§  4603.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  in  any  action  or  proceed- 
ing in  any  Court,  or  before  any  officer  acting  judicially,  shall  be 
excluded  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  action  or  pro- 
ceeding, or  because  he  is  a  party  thereto,  except  as  provided  in 
this  chapter." 

§  4604.  No  party  to  any  action  or  proceeding,  nor  any  person 
interested  in  the  event  thereof,  nor  any  person  from,  through,  or 
under  whom  any  such  party  or  interested  person  derives  any  interest 
or  title  by  assignment  or  otherwise,  and  no  husband  or  wife  of  any 
said  party  or  person,  shall  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  regard  to  any 
personal  transaction  or  communication  between  such  witness  and  a 
person  at  the  commencement  of  such  examination,  deceased,  insane, 
or  lunatic ;  against  the  executor,  administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of 
kin,  assignee,  legatee,  devisee,  or  survivor  of  such  deceased  person, 
or  the  assignee  or  guardian  of  such  insane  person  or  lunatic.  But 
this  prohibition  shall  not  extend  to  any  transaction  or  communication 
as  to  which  any  such  executor,  administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin, 
assignee,  legatee,  devisee,  survivor,  or  guardian  shall  be  examined 
on  his  own  behalf,  or  as  to  which  the  testimony  of  such  deceased  or 
insane  person  or  lunatic  shall  be  given  in  evidence. 

§  4606.  Neither  the  husband  nor  wife  shall  in  any  case  be  a 
witness  against  the  other,  except  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  a  crime 
committed  one  against  the  other,  or  in  a  civil  action  or  proceeding 
one  against  the  other ;  but  they  may  in  all  civil  and  criminal  cases  be 
witnesses  for  each  other. 

§  4607.  Neither  husband  nor  wife  can  be  examined  in  any  case 
as  to  any  communication  made  to  the  one  by  the  other  while  married, 
nor  shall  they,  after  the  marriage  relation  ceases,  be  permitted  to  re- 
veal in  testimony  any  such  communication  made  while  the  marriage 
subsisted. 

§  5484.  Defendants  in  all  criminal  proceedings  shall  be  competent 
witnesses  in  their  own  behalf,  but  cannot  be  called  as  witnesses  by 
the  State ;  and  should  a  defendant  not  elect  to  become  a  witness,  this 
fact  shall  not  have  any  weight  against  him  on  the  trial,  nor  shall  the 
attorney  or  attorneys  for  the  State,  during  the  trial,  refer  to  the  fact 
that  the  defendant  did  not  testify  in  his  own  behalf;  and  should  they 


KANSAS.  753 

do  so,  such  attorney  or  attorneys  will  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor, 
and  defendant  shall  for  that  cause  alone  be  entitled  to  a  new  trial. 

KANSAS. 
Constitution,  1859. 

Bill  of  Rights,  §  7.  ...  Nor  shall  any  person  be  incompetent  to 
testify  on  account  of  religious  belief. 

§  10.  In  all  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  be  allowed  ...  to 
meet  the  witness  face  to  face.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  a  witness 
against  himself. 

§  13.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
evidence  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in  open 
court. 

General  Statutes,  1897  {Webb). 

Ch.  95,  §  330.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any 
civil  action  or  proceeding  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the 
same,  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  a  crime ; 
but  such  interest  or  conviction  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of 
affecting  his  credibility. 

§  331.  Nothing  in  the  preceding  section  contained  shall  in  any 
manner  affect  the  laws  now  existing  relating  to  the  settlement  of 
estates  of  deceased  persons,  infants,  idiots,  or  lunatics,  or  the  attesta- 
tion of  the  execution  of  last  wills  and  testaments,  or  of  conveyances 
of  real  estate,  or  of  any  other  instrument  required  by  law  to  be  attested. 

§  333.  No  party  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf  in 
respect  to  any  transaction  or  communication  had  personally  by  such 
party  with  a  deceased  person,  when  the  adverse  party  is  the  executor, 
administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  surviving  partner,  or  assignee 
of  such  deceased  person,  where  they  have  acquired  title  to  the  cause 
of  action  immediately  from  such  deceased  person;  nor  shall  the  as- 
signor of  a  thing  in  action  be  allowed  to  testify  in  behalf  of  such 
party  concerning  any  transaction  or  communication  had  personally 
by  such  assignor  with  a  deceased  person  in  any  such  case  ;  nor  shall 
such  party  or  assignor  be  competent  to  testify  to  any  transaction  had 
personally  by  such  party  or  assignor  with  a  deceased  partner  or  joint 
contractor  in  the  absence  of  his  surviving  partner  or  joint  contractor, 
when  such  surviving  partner  or  joint  contractor  is  an  adverse  party. 
If  the  testimony  of  a  party  to  the  action  or  proceeding  has  been  taken, 
and  he  afterward  die,  and  the  testimony  so  taken  shall  be  used  after 
his  death  in  behalf  of  his  executors,  administrators,  heirs-at-law,  next 
of  kin,  assignee,  surviving  partner,  or  joint  contractor,  the  other  party 
or  the  assignor  shall  be  competent  to  testify  as  to  any  and  all  mat- 
ters to  which  the  testimony  so  taken  relates. 

§  334.  The  following  persons  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify: 
VOL.  i.  —  48 


754  APPENDIX  I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

First,  persons  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  produc- 
tion for  examination ;  second,  children  under  ten  years  of  age  who 
appear  incapable  of  receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting 
which  they  are  examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly ;  third,  Husband 
and  wife,  for  or  against  each  other,  except  concerning  transactions  in 
which  one  acted  as  the  agent  of  the  other,  or  when  they  are  joint 
parties  and  have  a  joint  interest  in  the  action ;  but  in  no  case  shall 
either  be  permitted  to  testify  concerning  any  communication  made 
by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage,  whether  called  while  that 
relation  subsisted  or  afterward ;  and  provided  that  in  all  actions  for 
divorce  hereafter  to  be  tried,  the  parties  thereto,  or  either  of  them, 
shall  be  competent  to  testify  upon  all  material  matters  involved  in  the 
controversy  to  the  same  extent  as  other  witnesses  might  do. 

Ch.  102,  §  217.  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  tes- 
tify in  criminal  causes  by  reason  of  his  being  the  person  injured  or 
defrauded,  or  intended  to  be  injured  or  defrauded,  or  that  would  be 
entitled  to  satisfaction  for  the  injury  or  is  liable  to  pay  the  costs  of 
the  prosecution  ;  or  by  reason  of  his  being  the  person  on  trial  or  ex- 
amination ;  or  by  reason  of  being  the  husband  or  wife  of  the  accused; 
but  any  such  facts  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  or 
her  credibility :  provided,  that' no  person  on  trial  or  examination,  nor 
wife  or  husband  of  such  person,  shall  be  required  to  testify  except  as 
a  witness  on  behalf  of  the  person  on  trial  or  examination. 

§  218.  The  neglect  or  refusal  of  the  person  on  trial  to  testify,  or 
of  a  wife  to  testify  on  behalf  of  her  husband,  shall  not  raise  any  pre- 
sumption of  guilt,  nor  shall  that  circumstance  be  referred  to  by  any 
attorney  prosecuting  in  the  case,  nor  shall  the  same  be  considered  by 
the  Court  or  jury  before  whom  the  trial  takes  place. 

KENTUCKY. 
Constitution,  1891. 

§  5.  ...  The  civil  rights,  privileges,  or  capacities  of  no  person  shall 
be  taken  away,  or  in  any  wise  diminished  or  enlarged,  on  account  of 
his  belief  or  disbelief  of  any  religious  tenet,  dogma,  or  teaching. 

§  11.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  has  the  right  .  .  . 
to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face.  .  .  .  He  cannot  be  compelled  to 
give  evidence  against  himself. 

§  229.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  except  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  his  own  confes- 
sion in  open  court. 

Statutes,  1899  (Carroll). 

§  1645.  In  all  criminal  and  parol  prosecutions  now  pending  or 
hereafter  instituted  in  any  of  the  Courts  of  this  Commonwealth,  the 
defendant  on  trial,  on  his  own  request,  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  in 


KENTUCKY.  755 

his  own  behalf,  but  the  failure  to  do  so  shall  not  be  commented  on  or 
be  allowed  to  create  any  presumption  against  him. 

§  1646.  The  defendant  requesting  that  he  be  allowed  to  testify 
shall  not  be  allowed  to  testify  in  chief,  after  any  other  witness  has 
testified  for  the  defence. 

§  1648.  If  a  conspiracy  is  charged  in  the  indictment  and  proven 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Court,  then  each  defendant  named  in  the 
indictment  may  testify  on  his  own  behalf  as  above  provided. 

Civil  Code  of  Practice,  1895  (Carroll). 

§  605.  Subject  to  the  exceptions  and  modifications  contained  in 
section  six  hundred  and  six,  every  person  is  competent  to  testify  for 
himself  or  another,  unless  he  be  found  by  the  Court  incapable  of  un- 
derstanding the  facts  concerning  which  his  testimony  is  offered. 

§  606.  (1)  Neither  a  husband  nor  his  wife  shall  testify,  even  after 
the  cessation  of  their  marriage,  concerning  any  communication  be- 
tween them  during  marriage.  Nor  shall  either  of  them  testify  against 
the  other.  Nor  shall  either  of  them  testify  for  the  other,  except  in 
an  action  for  lost  baggage  or  its  value  against  a  common  carrier,  an 
innkeeper,  or  a  wrongdoer,  and  in  such  action  either  or  both  of  them 
may  testify ;  and  except  in  actions  which  might  have  been  brought 
by  or  against  the  wife,  if  she  had  been  unmarried,  and  in  such  actions 
either  but  not  both  of  them  may  testify. 

(2)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-section  seven  of  this  section, 
no  person  shall  testify  for  himself  concerning  any  verbal  statement 
of,  or  any  transaction  with,  or  any  act  done  or  omitted  to  be  done 
by,  an  infant  under  fourteen  years  of  age,  or  by  one  who  is  of  un- 
sound mind  or  dead  when  the  testimony  is  offered  to  be  given,  except 
for  the  purpose  and  to  the  extent  of  affecting  one  who  is  living,  and 
who,  when  above  fourteen  years  of  age  and  of  sound  mind  heard  such 
statement,  or  was  present  when  such  transaction  took  place,  or  when 
such  act  was  done  or  omitted,  unless  (a)  the  infant  or  his  guardian 
shall  have  testified  against  such  person  with  reference  to  such  state- 
ment, transaction,  or  act ;  or  (&)  the  person  of  unsound  mind  shall, 
when  of  sound  mind,  have  testified  against  such  person  with  refer- 
ence thereto;  or  (c)  the  decedent,  or  a  representative  of  or  some  one 
interested  in  his  estate,  shall  have  testified  against  such  person,  with 
reference  thereto ;  or  (d)  an  agent  of  the  decedent  or  person  of  unsound 
mind,  with  reference  to  such  act  or  transaction,  shall  have  testified 
against  such  person  with  reference  thereto,  or  be  living  when  such 
person  offers  to  testify  with  reference  thereto. 

(3)  No  person  shall  testify  for  himself  against  a  party  who  is  not 
before  the  Court  otherwise  than  by  constructive  service  of  a  sum- 
mons. 

(4)  No  person  shall  testify  for  himself  in  chief  in  an  ordinary 


756  APPENDIX  I  :  CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

action,  after  introducing  other  evidence  for  himself  in  chief ;  nor  in 
an  equitable  action  after  taking  other  testimony  for  himself  in  chief. 

(5)  No  attorney  shall  testify  concerning  a  communication  made  to 
him,  in  his  professional  character,  by  his  client,  or  his  advice  thereon, 
without  the  client's  consent;  nor  shall  a  clergyman  or  priest  testify 
to  any  confession  made  to  him,  in  his  professional  character,  in  the 
course  of  discipline  enjoined  by  the  church  to  which  he  belongs,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  person  confessing. 

(6)  If  the  right  of  a  person  to  testify  for  himself  be  founded  upon 
the  fact  that  one  who  is  dead  or  of  unsound  mind  has  testified  against 
him,  the  testimony  of  such  person  shall  be  confined  to  the  facts  or 
transactions  to  which  the  adverse  testimony  related. 

(7)  A  person  may  testify  for  himself  as  to  the  correctness  of  origi- 
nal entries  made  by  him  against  persons  who  are  under  no  disability 
—  other  than  coverture,  or  infancy  and  coverture  combined  —  in  an 
account-book  according  to  the  usual  course  of  business,  though  the  per- 
son against  whom  they  were  made  may  have  died  or  become  of  unsound 
mind ;  but  no  person  shall  testify  for  himself  concerning  entries  in  a 
book,  or  the  contents  or  purport  of  any  writing,  under  the  control  of 
himself,  or  of  himself  and  others  jointly,  if  he  refuse  or  fail  to  pro- 
duce such  book  or  writing  and  to  make  it  subject  to  the  order  of  the 
Court  for  the  purposes  of  the  action,  if  required  to  do  so  by  the 
party  against  whom  he  offers  .to  testify. 

(8)  No  prisoner  in  a  penitentiary  of  this  State  or  of  any  other 
country  shall  testify ;  nor  shall  any  person  testify  for  himself  against 
such  prisoner. 

(9)  The  assignment  of  a  claim  by  a  person  who  is  incompetent  to 
testify  for  himself  shall  not  make  him  competent  to  testify  for  another. 

(10)  A  party  may  compel  an  adverse  party  to  testify  as  any  other 
witness. 

(11)  None  of  the  preceding  provisions  of  this  section  apply  to 
affidavits   for    provisional    remedies,   or    to    affidavits   of   claimants 
against  the  estates  of  deceased  or  insolvent  persons,  or  affect  the 
competency  of  attesting  witnesses  of  instruments  which  are  required 
by  law  to  be  attested. 

§  607.  All  other  objections  to  witnesses  shall  go  to  their  credit 
alone,  and  be  weighed  by  the  jury  or  tribunal  to  which  their 
evidence  is  offered. 

§§  608,  609  (admits  party's  testimony  in  rebuttal  of  new  testimony 
by  opponent  since  deceased  or  become  unsound,  in  mind). 

LOUISIANA. 
Constitution,  1879. 

Art.  6.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against 
himself  in  a  criminal  case  or  in  any  proceeding  that  may  subject 


MAINE.  757 

him  to  criminal  prosecution,  except  where  otherwise  provided  in  this 
constitution. 

Art.  8.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the 
right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

Art.  151.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  except 
on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  his 
confession  in  open  court. 

Art.  174.  Any  person  may  be  compelled  to  testify  in  any  lawful 
proceeding  against  any  one  who  may  be  charged  with  having  com- 
mitted the  offence  of  bribery,  and  shall  not  be  permitted  to  withhold 
his  testimony  upon  the  ground  that  it  may  criminate  him  or  subject 
him  to  public  infamy;  but  such  testimony  shall  not  afterwards  be 
used  against  him  in  any  judicial  proceeding,  except  for  perjury  in 
giving  such  testimony. 

Code  of  Practice,  1894  (Garland). 

§  479.  If  the  religious  opinions  of  a  witness  are  opposed  to  his  taking 
an  oath,  his  affirmation  of  the  truth  of  his  testimony  shall  suffice. 

§  482.  If  the  witness  be  objected  to  on  the  ground  of  his  having 
a  direct  or  indirect  interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  the  party  mak- 
ing the  objections  may  examine  such  witness  on  oath  as  to  the  exist- 
ence of  such  interest,  and  the  witness  must  be  sworn  to  answer  the 
truth  on  the  questions  which  shall  be  put  to  him  on  that  head :  pro- 
vided, that  the  competent  witness  of  any  covenant  or  fact,  whatever 
it  may  be,  in  civil  matters,  is  a  person  of  proper  understanding :  pro- 
vided further,  that  the  husband  cannot  be  a  witness  for  or  against  his 
wife,  nor  the  wife  for  or  against  her  husband,  but  that  in  any  case 
where  the  husband  and  wife  may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants 
and  have  a  separate  interest,  they  shall  be  competent  witnesses  for  or 
against  their  separate  interest  therein. 

MAINE. 
Constitution,  1819. 

Art.  I,  §  6.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  have  a 
right  ...  to  be  confronted  by  the  witnesses  against  him.  ...  He 
shall  not  be  compelled  to  furnish  or  give  evidence  against  himself. 

§  12.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in 
open  court. 

Revised  Statutes,  1883. 

Ch.  82,  §  92.  No  person  is  an  incompetent  witness  on  account  of 
his  religious  belief ;  but  he  is  subject  to  the  test  of  credibility ;  and 
a  person  who  does  not  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being 
may  testify  under  solemn  affirmation  and  is  subject  to  the  pains  and 
penalties  of  perjury. 


758  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

§  93.  No  person  is  excused  or  excluded  from  testifying  in  any  civil 
suit  or  proceeding  at  law  or  in  equity,  by  reason  of  his  interest  in 
the  event  thereof  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  except  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided, but  such  interest  may  be  shown  to  affect  his  credibility  •  and 
the  husband  or  wife  of  either  party  may  be  a  witness. 

§  94.  No  defendant  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  in  any  suit  when 
the  cause  of  action  implies  an  offence  against  the  criminal  law  on  his 
part.  If  he  offers  himself  as  a  witness,  he  waives  his  privilege  of 
not  criminating  himself,  but  his  testimony  shall  not  be  used  against 
him  in  any  criminal  prosecution  involving  the  same  subject-matter. 

§  98.  The  five  preceding  sections  do  not  apply  to  cases  where  at 
the  time  of  taking  testimony  or  at  the  time  of  trial  the  party  prose- 
cuting or  the  party  defending  or  any  one  of  them  is  an  executor  or 
an  administrator  or  is  made  a  party  as  heir  of  a  deceased  party; 
except  in  the  following  cases  :  — 

1.  The  deposition  of  a  party  or  his  testimony  given  at  a  former 
trial  may  be  used  at  any  trial  after  his  death ;  if  the  opposite  party 
is  then  alive,  and  in  that  case  the  latter  may  also  testify.  2.  In  all 
cases  in  which  an  executor,  administrator,  or  other  legal  representa- 
tive of  a  deceased  person  is  a  party,  such  party  may  testify  to  any 
facts  admissible  upon  the  rules  of  evidence,  happening  before  the 
death  of  such  person ;  and  when  such  person  so  testifies,  the  adverse 
party  is  neither  excluded  nor  excused  from  testifying  in  reference  to 
such  facts,  and  any  such  representative  party  or  heir  of  a  deceased 
party  may  testify  to  any  fact  admissible  upon  general  rules  of  evi- 
dence, happening  after  the  decease  of  the  testator,  intestate,  or  ances- 
tor ;  and  in  reference  to  such  matters  the  adverse  party  may  testify. 
3.  If  the  representative  party  is  nominal  only,  both  parties  may  be 
witnesses  ;  if  the  adverse  party  is  nominal  only,  and  had  parted  with 
his  interest,  if  any,  during  the  lifetime  of  the  representative  party's 
testator  or  intestate,  he  is  not  excluded  from  testifying,  if  called  by 
either  party ;  and  in  an  action  against  an  executor  or  administrator, 
if  the  plaintiff  is  nominal  only,  or,  having  had  an  interest,  disposed 
of  it  in  the  lifetime  of  the  defendant's  testator  or  intestate,  neither 
party  to  the  record  is  excused  or  excluded  from  testifying.  4.  In  an 
action  by  or  against  an  executor,  administrator,  or  other  legal  repre- 
sentative of  a  deceased  person,  in  which  his  account  books  or  other 
memoranda  are  used  as  evidence  on  either  side,  the  other  party  may 
testify  in  relation  thereto.  5.  In  actions  where  an  executor,  admin- 
istrator, or  other  legal  representative  is  a  party,  and  the  opposite 
party  is  an  heir  of  the  deceased,  said  heir  may  testify  when  any 
other  heir  of  the  deceased  testifies  at  the  instance  of  such  executor, 
administrator,  or  other  legal  representative. 

§  99.  The  rules  of  evidence  which  apply  to  actions  by  or  against 
executors  or  administrators  apply  in  actions  where  a  person  shown  to 
the  Court  to  be  insane  is  solely  interested  as  a  party. 


MARYLAND.  759 

§  103.  A  person  to  whom  an  oath  is  administered  shall  hold  up  his 
hand,  unless  he  believes  that  an  oath  administered  in  that  form  is  not 
binding,  and  then  it  may  be  administered  in  a  form  believed  by  him 
to  be  binding.  One  believing  in  any  other  than  the  Christian  religion 
may  be  sworn  according  to  the  ceremonies  of  his  religion. 

§  104.  Persons  conscientiously  scrupulous  of  taking  an  oath  may 
affirm  as  follows :  "  I  affirm  under  the  pains  and  penalties  of  perjury," 
which  affirmation  is  of  the  same  force  and  effect  as  an  oath. 

§  105.  No  person  is  incompetent  to  testify  in  any  Court  or  legal 
proceeding  in  consequence  of  having  been  convicted  of  an  offence; 
but  such  conviction  may  be  shown  to  affect  his  credibility. 

Ch.  134,  §  19.  ...  In  all  criminal  trials  the  accused  shall,  at  his 
own  request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness.  He  shall  not 
be  compelled  to  testify  on  cross-examination  to  facts  that  would  con- 
vict or  furnish  evidence  to  convict  him  of  any  other  crime  than  that 
for  which  he  is  on  trial ;  and  the  fact  that  he  does  not  testify  in  his 
own  behalf  shall  not  be  taken  as  evidence  of  his  guilt.  The  husband 
or  wife  of  the  accused  is  a  competent  witness. 

MARYLAND. 
Constitution,  1867. 

Declaration  of  Rights,  Art.  21.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  every 
man  hath  a  right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him,  ...  to  examine  the  witnesses  for  and  against  him  on  oath. 

Art.  22.  No  man  ought  to  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against 
himself  in  a  criminal  case. 

Art.  36.  ...  Nor  shall  any  person,  otherwise  competent,  be  deemed 
incompetent  as  a  witness  or  juror  on  account  of  his  religious  belief; 
provided  he  believes  in  the  existence  of  God,  and  that  under  His  dis- 
pensation such  person  will  be  held  morally  accountable  for  his  acts 
and  be  rewarded  or  punished  therefor  either  in  this  world  or  the 
world  to  come. 

Art.  39.  That  the  manner  of  administering  an  oath  or  affirmation 
to  any  person  ought  to  be  such  as  those  of  the  religious  persuasion, 
profession,  or  denomination  of  which  he  is  a  member,  generally  esteem 
the  most  effectual  confirmation  by  the  attestation  of  the  Divine  Being. 

Public  General  Laws,  1888  (Poe). 

Art.  35,  §  1.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  hereafter  be 
excluded,  by  reason  of  incapacity  from  crime  or  interest,  from  giving 
evidence,  either  in  person  or  by  deposition,  according  to  the  practice 
of  the  Courts,  in  the  trial  of  any  issue  joined  or  hereafter  to  be  joined, 
or  of  any  matter  or  question,  or  on  any  inquiry  arising  in  any  suit, 
action,  or  proceeding,  civil  or  criminal,  in  any  Court,  or  before  any 


760  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND  STATUTES. 

judge,  jury,  justice  of  the  peace,  or  other  person  having,  by  law  01 
by  consent  of  the  parties,  authority  to  hear,  receive,  and  examine 
evidence;  but  every  person  so  offered  may  and  shall  be  admitted  to 
give  evidence,  notwithstanding  that  such  person  may  or  shall  have 
an  interest  in  the  matter  in  question,  or  in  the  event  of  the  trial  of 
any  issue,  matter,  question,  or  inquiry,  or  of  the  suit,  action,  or  pro- 
ceeding in  which  he  is  offered  as  a  witness,  and  notwithstanding  that 
such  person  offered  as  a  witness  may  have  been  previously  convicted 
of  any  crime  or  offence ;  but  no  person  who  has  been  convicted  of  the 
crime  of  perjury  shall  be  admitted  to  testify  in  any  case  or  proceed- 
ing whatever ;  and  the  parties  litigant,  and  all  persons  in  whose  behalf 
any  suit,  action,  or  other  proceeding  may  be  brought  or  defended,  them- 
selves, and  their  wives  and  husbands,  shall  be  competent  and  com- 
pellable  to  give  evidence  in  the  same  manner  as  other  witnesses,  except 
as  hereinafter  excepted. 

§  2.  When  an  original  party  to  a  contract  or  cause  of  action  is 
dead  or  shown  to  be  a  lunatic  or  insane,  or  when  an  executor  or 
administrator  is  a  party  to  the  suit,  action,  or  other  proceedings, 
either  party  may  be  called  as  a  witness  by  his  opponent ;  but  shall  not 
be  admitted  to  testify  on  his  own  offer,  or  upon  the  call  of  his  co-plain- 
tiff or  co-defendant,  otherwise  than  now  by  law  allowed,  unless  a 
nominal  party,  merely,  except  in  case  where  the  party  to  such  suit, 
action,  or  other  proceeding  has  died,  or  become  lunatic  or  insane, 
after  having  testified  in  his  own  behalf,  then  the  opposite  party 
shall  be  a  competent  witness  on  his  own  behalf  in  such  case,  not- 
withstanding the  executor  or  administrator  of  such  deceased  person, 
or  committee  of  such  lunatic  or  insane  person,  has  become  a  party 
to  such  suit,  action,  or  other  proceeding,  but  shall  only  testify  as  to 
matters  upon  which  such  deceased,  lunatic,  or  insane  person  was 
examined  and  testified  to :  provided,  that  when  an  executor,  adminis- 
trator, guardian,  or  committee  of  a  lunatic  or  insane  person  is  a 
party  to  the  suit,  action,  or  proceeding,  when  the  cause  of  action  has 
arisen  on  a  contract  made  with  such  executor,  administrator,  guar- 
dian, or  committee,  or  out  of  transactions  between  such  executor, 
administrator,  guardian,  or  committee  and  the  other  party,  or  when 
the  executor,  administrator,  guardian,  or  committee  testifies  as  to 
any  conversation  had  with  the  other  party,  either  party  may  be 
examined  as  a  witness  as  provided  for  in  the  other  sections  of  this 
article :  and  provided  further,  that  it  shall  not  be  competent  for  any 
party  to  the  cause,  who  has  been  examined  therein  as  a  witness,  to 
corroborate  his  testimony  when  impeached  by  proof  of  his  own 
declaration  or  statement  made  to  third  persons  out  of  the  presence 
and  hearing  of  the  adverse  party :  and  provided  further,  that  when- 
ever the  contract  or  cause  of  action  in  issue  and  on  trial  was  made 
or  contracted  with  an  agent,  the  death  or  insanity  of  .his  principal 
shall  not  prevent  any  party  to  the  suit  or  proceeding  from  being  a 


MASSACHUSETTS.  761 

witness  in  the  case:  provided,  such,  agent  shall  be  living  and  com- 
petent to  testify. 

§  3.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints,  and  other  pro- 
ceedings against  persons  charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes  and 
offences,  and  in  all  proceedings  in  the  nature  of  criminal  proceedings 
in  any  Court  of  this  State,  and  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  other 
person  acting  judicially,  the  person  so  charged  shall  at  his  own 
request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  deemed  a  competent  witness  ;  but  the 
neglect  or  refusal  of  any  such  person  to  testify  shall  not  create  any 
presumption  against  him.  In  all  criminal  proceedings  the  husband 
or  wife  of  the  accused  party  shall  be  competent  to  testify ;  but  in 
no  case,  civil  or  criminal,  shall  any  husband  or  wife  be  competent 
to  disclose  any  confidential  communication  made  by  the  one  to  the 
other  during  the  marriage ;  and  in  suits,  actions,  bills,  or  other  pro- 
ceedings instituted  in  consequence  of  adultery,  or  for  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  a  divorce,  or  for  damages  for  breach  of  promise  of 
marriage,  no  verdict  shall  be  permitted  to  be  recovered,  nor  shall 
any  judgment  or  decree  be  rendered,  upon  the  testimony  of  the 
plaintiff  alone ;  but  in  all  such  cases  testimony  in  corroboration  of 
that  of  the  plaintiff  shall  be  necessary. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 
Constitution,  1780. 

Declaration  of  Eights,  Art.  12.  No  subject  shall  ...  be  compelled 
to  accuse,  or  furnish  evidence  against  himself.  And  every  subject 
shall  have  a  right  to  produce  all  proofs  that  may  be  favorable  to 
him ;  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

Public  Statutes,  1882;  and  Supplements  0/1888  and  1895. 

Ch.  169,  §  13.  The  usual  mode  of  administering  oaths  now  prac- 
tised in  this  Commonwealth,  with  the  ceremony  of  holding  up  the 
hand,  shall  be  observed  in  all  cases  in  which  an  oath  may  be  adminis- 
tered by  law,  except  as  hereinafter  provided. 

§  14.  When  a  person  to  be  sworn  before  a  Court  or  magistrate 
declares  that  a  peculiar  mode  of  swearing  is  in  his  opinion  more 
solemn  and  obligatory  than  by  holding  up  the  hand,  the  oath  may 
be  administered  in  such  mode. 

§  15.  Every  Quaker  when  called  on  to  take  an  oath  shall  be  per- 
mitted, instead  of  swearing,  solemnly  and  sincerely  to  affirm,  under 
the  pains  and  penalties  of  perjury. 

§  16.  Every  person  who  declares  that  he  has  conscientious  scruples 
against  taking  any  oath  shall,  when  called  upon  for  that  purpose,  be 
permitted  to  affirm  in  the  manner  prescribed  for  Quakers,  if  the  Court 
or  magistrate  on  inquiry  is  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  such  declaration. 

§  17.   Every  person  believing  in  any  other  than  the  Christian  relig- 


762  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

ion  may  be  sworn  according  to  the  peculiar  ceremonies  of  his  re- 
ligion, if  there  are  any  such.  Every  person  not  a  believer  in  any 
religion  shall  be  required  to  testify  truly  under  the  pains  and  penal- 
ties of  perjury ;  and  the  evidence  of  such  person's  disbelief  in  the 
existence  of  God  may  be  received  to  affect  his  credibility  as  a  witness. 

§  18.  No  person  of  sufficient  understanding,  whether  a  party  or 
otherwise,  shall  be  excluded  from  giving  evidence  in  any  proceeding 
civil  or  criminal,  in  Court,  or  before  a  person  having  authority  to 
receive  evidence,  except  in  the  following  cases :  First,  neither 
husband  nor  wife  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  as  to  private  conversa- 
tions with  each  other ;  Second,  neither  husband  nor  Fife  shall  be 
compelled  to  be  a  witness  on  any  trial  upon  an  indictment,  com- 
plaint, or  other  criminal  proceeding,  against  the  other;  Third,  in 
the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints,  and  other  proceedings 
against  persons  charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes  or  offences, 
a  person  so  charged  shall  at  his  own  request,  but  not  otherwise, 
be  deemed  a  competent  witness  ;  and  his  neglect  or  refusal  to  testify 
shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him. 

§  19.  The  conviction  of  a  witness,  of  a  crime  may  be  shown  to 
affect  his  credibility. 

MICHIGAN. 
Constitution,  181 

Art.  IV,  §  41.  The  Legislature  shall  not  diminish  or  enlarge  the 
civil  or  political  rights,  privileges,  and  capacities  of  any  person  on 
account  of  his  opinion  or  belief  concerning  matters  of  religion. 

Art.  VI,  §  28.  In  every  criminal  prosecution,  the  accused  shall 
have  the  right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him. 

§  30.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  upon  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession 
in  open  court. 

§  32.  No  person  shall  be  compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a 
witness  against  himself. 

§  34.  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  be  a  witness  on 
account  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief. 

Compiled  Laws,  1897  (Miller). 

Ch.  282,  §  93.  The  usual  mode  of  administering  oaths  now  prac- 
tised in  this  State,  by  the  person  who  swears  holding  up  the  right 
hand,  shall  be  observed  in  all  cases  in  which  an  oath  may  be  admin- 
istered by  law,  except  in  the  cases  herein  otherwise  provided. 

§  94.  When  the  Court,  magistrate,  or  other  officer  before  whom 
any  person  is  to  be  sworn  shall  be  satisfied  that  such  person  has  any 
particular  mode  of  swearing  which  is  in  his  opinion  more  solemn  or 


MICHIGAN.  763 

obligatory  than  holding  up  the  hand,  such  Court  or  officer  may  adopt 
that  mode  of  administering  the  oath. 

§  95.  Every  person  conscientiously  opposed  to  taking  an  oath 
shall,  when  called  on  to  take  an  oath,  be  permitted,  instead  of 
swearing,  solemnly  and  sincerely  to  affirm,  under  the  pains  and 
penalties  of  perjury. 

§  96.  No  person  shall  be  deemed  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  any 
Court,  matter,  or  proceeding,  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  the  sub- 
ject of  religion ;  nor  shall  any  witness  be  questioned  in  relation  to 
his  opinions  thereon,  either  before  or  after  he  shall  be  sworn. 

§  99.  No  person  shall  be  excluded  from  giving  evidence  in  any 
matter,  civil  or  criminal,  by  reason  of  crime,  or  for  any  interest  of 
such  person  in  the  matter,  suit,  or  proceeding  in  which  such  testimony 
may  be  offered,  or  by  reason  of  marital  or  other  relationship  to  any 
party  thereto  ;  but  such  interest,  relationship,  or  conviction  of 
crime  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  in  question  the 
credibility  of  such  witness,  except  as  is  hereafter  provided. 

§  100.  On  the  trial  of  any  issue  joined,  or  in  any  matter,  suit,  or 
proceeding,  in  any  Court,  or  before  any  officer  or  person  having,  by 
law  or  by  consent  of  parties,  authority  to  hear,  receive,  and  examine 
evidence,  the  parties  to  any  such  suit  or  proceeding  named  in  the 
record,  and  persons  for  whose  benefit  such  suit  is  prosecuted  or  de- 
fended, may  be  witnesses  therein,  in  their  own  behalf  or  otherwise, 
in  the  same  manner  as  otherwise,  except  as  hereinafter  otherwise 
provided;  and  the  deposition  of  any  such  party  or  person  may  be 
taken  and  used  in  evidence  under  the  rules  and  statutes  governing 
depositions,  and  any  such  party  or  person  may  be  proceeded  against, 
and  compelled  to  attend  and  testify,  as  provided  by  law  for  other 
witnesses.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  in  any  criminal  case  or 
proceeding,  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  same  as  a 
party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his  having  been  convicted  of  any 
crime ;  but  such  interest  or  conviction  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose 
of  affecting  his  credibility :  provided,  however,  that  a  defendant  in 
any  criminal  case  or  proceeding  shall  only  at  his  own  request  be 
deemed  a  competent  witness,  and  his  neglect  to  testify  shall  not 
raise  any  presumption  against  him,  nor  shall  the  Court  permit  any 
reference  or  comment  to  be  made  to  or  upon  such  neglect. 

§  101.  That  when  a  suit  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended 
by  the  heirs,  assignees,  devisees,  legatees,  or  personal  representa- 
tives of  a  deceased  person,  the  opposite  party,  if  examined  as  a 
witness  on  his  own  behalf,  shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  at  all  to 
matters  which,  if  true,  must  have  been  equally  within  the  knowledge 
of  such  deceased  person;  and  when  any  suit  or  proceeding  is  prose- 
cuted or  defended  by  any  surviving  partner  or  partners,  the  opposite 
party,  if  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  shall  not  be 
admitted  to  testify  at  all  in  relation  to  matters  which,  if  true,  must 


764  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

have  been  equally  within  the  knowledge  of  the  deceased  partner  and 
not  within  the  knowledge  of  any  one  of  the  surviving  partners.  And 
when  any  suit  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended  by  any  cor- 
poration, the  opposite  party,  if  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own 
behalf,  shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  at  all  to  matters  which,  if 
true,  must  have  been  equally  within  the  knowledge  of  a  deceased 
officer  or  agent  of  the  corporation  and  not  within  the  knowledge  of 
any  surviving  officer  or  agent  of  the  corporation,  nor  when  any  suit 
or  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended  by  the  heirs,  assigns,  devi- 
sees, legatees,  or  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased  person  against 
a  corporation,  shall  any  person  who  is  or  has  been  an  officer  or  agent 
of  any  such  corporation  be  allowed  to  testify  at  all  in  relation  to 
matters  which,  if  true,  must  have  been  equally  within  the  knowledge 
of  such  deceased  person;  provided,  that  whenever  the  words  "the 
opposite  party  "  occur  in  this  section,  it  shall  be  deemed  to  include 
the  assignors  or  assignees  of  the  claim  or  any  part  thereof  in 
controversy. 

§  102.  A.  husband  shall  not  be  examined  as  a  witness,  for  or 
against  his  wife,  without  her  consent;  nor  a  wife,  for  or  against  her 
husband,  without  his  consent,  except  in  cases  where  the  cause  of 
action  grows  out  of  a  personal  wrong  or  injury  done  by  one  to  the 
other,  or  grows  out  of  the  refusal  or  neglect  to  furnish  the  wife  or 
children  with  suitable  support  within  the  meaning  of  Act  No.  136 
of  the  Session  Laws  of  1883,  and  except  in  cases  where  the  hus- 
band or  wife  shall  be  a  party  to  the  record  in  a  suit,  action,  or  pro- 
ceeding where  the  title  to  the  separate  property  of  the  husband  or 
wife  so  called  or  offered  as  a  witness,  or  where  the  title  to  property 
derived  from,  through,  or  under  the  husband  or  wife  so  called  or 
offered  as  a  witness,  shall  be  the  subject-matter  in  controversy  or 
litigation  in  such  suit,  action,  or  proceeding,  in  opposition  to  the 
claims  or  interest  of  the  other  of  said  married  persons  who  is  a 
party  to  the  record  in  such  suit,  action,  or  proceeding;  and  in  all 
such  cases,  such  husband  or  wife  who  makes  such  claim  of  title,  or 
under  or  from  whom  such  title  is  derived,  shall  be  as  competent  to 
testify  in  relation  to  said  separate  property  and  the  title  thereto, 
without  the  consent  of  said  husband  or  wife,  who  is  a  party  to  the 
record  in  such  suit,  action,  or  proceeding,  as  though  such  marriage 
relation  did  not  exist;  nor  shall  either,  during  the  marriage  or  after- 
wards, without  the  consent  of  both,  be  examined  as  to  any  communi- 
cation made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage ;  but  in  any 
action  or  proceeding  instituted  by  the  husband  or  wife  in  conse- 
quence of  adultery  the  husband  and  wife  shall  not  be  competent  to 
testify. 

Act  1887,  No.  82.  Whenever  a  child  under  the  age  of  ten  years  is 
produced  as  a  witness  the  Court  shall  by  an  examination,  made  by 
itself,  publicly,  or  separate  and  apart,  ascertain  to  its  own  satisfac- 


MINNESOTA.  765 

tion  whether  such  child  has  sufficient  intelligence  and  sense  of  obli- 
gation to  tell  the  truth  to  be  safely  admitted  to  testify;  and  in  such 
case  such  testimony  may  be  given  on  a  promise  to  tell  the  truth 
instead  of  upon  oath  or  statutory  affirmation,  and  shall  be  given  such 
credit  as  to  the  Court  or  jury,  if  there  be  a  jury,  it  may  appear  to 
deserve. 

Acts  1897,  No.  212.  A  husband  may  testify  for  or  against  his 
wife  without  her  consent,  and  a  wife  may  testify  for  or  against  her 
husband  without  his  consent,  in  all  criminal  prosecutions  for  bigamy; 
provided,  however,  that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  permit  a  husband  or  wife  to  testify  against  the  other 
without  the  consent  of  both  concerning  any  communications  made  by 
one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage. 

MINNESOTA. 
Constitution. 

Art.  I,  §  6.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy 
the  right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

§  7.  No  person  .  .  .  shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to 
be  witness  against  himself. 

§  9.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act  or  on  confession  in 
open  court. 

§  17.  ...  Nor  shall  any  person  be  rendered  incompetent  to  give 
evidence  in  any  court  of  law  or  equity  in  consequence  of  his  opinion 
upon  the  subject  of  religion. 

General  Statutes,  1894  (Wenzell,  Lane,  Tiffany). 

§  5658.  All  persons,  except  as  hereinafter  provided,  having  the 
power  and  faculty  to  perceive  and  make  known  their  perceptions  to 
others,  may  be  witnesses;  neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who 
have  an  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  are  excluded,  nor  those 
who  have  been  convicted  of  crime,  nor  persons  on  account  of  their 
religious  opinions  or  belief;  although  in  every  case  the  credibility 
of  the  witnesses  may  be  drawn  in  question.  And  on  the  trial  of  all 
indictments,  complaints,  and  other  proceedings  against  persons 
charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes  or  offences,  the  person  so 
charged  shall  at  his  request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  deemed  a  compe- 
tent witness;  nor  shall  the  neglect  or  refusal  to  testify  create  any 
presumption  against  the  defendant,  nor  shall  such  neglect  be  alluded 
to  or  commented  upon  by  the  prosecuting  attorney  or  by  the  Court. 

§  5659.  A  party  to  the  record  of  any  civil  action  or  proceeding,  or 
a  person  for  whose  immediate  benefit  such  action  or  proceeding  is 
prosecuted  or  defended,  or  the  directors,  officers,  superintendent,  or 
managing  agents  of  any  corporation  which  is  a  party  to  the  record 


766  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

in  such  action  or  proceeding,  may  be  examined  upon  the  trial  thereof 
as  if  under  cross-examination  at  the  instance  of  the  adverse  party  or 
parties  or  any  of  them,  and  for  that  purpose  may  be  compelled  in 
the  same  manner  and  subject  to  the  same  rules  for  examination  as 
any  other  witness  to  testify,  but  the  party  calling  for  such  examina- 
tion shall  not  be  concluded  thereby,  but  may  rebut  it  by  counter- 
testimony. 

§  5660.  It  shall  not  be  competent  for  any  party  to  an  action,  or 
interested  in  the  event  thereof,  to  give  evidence  therein  of  and  con- 
cerning any  conversation  with  or  admission  of  a  deceased  or  insane 
party  or  person,  relative  to  any  matter  at  issue  between  the  parties. 

§  5661.  The  following  persons  are  not  competent  to  testify  in  any 
action  or  proceeding:  First,  those  who  are  of  unsound  mind  or  in- 
toxicated at  the  time  of  their  production  for  examination;  Second, 
children  under  ten  years  of  age,  who  appear  incapable  of  receiving 
just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are  examined  or 
of  relating  them  truly. 

§  5662.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  encourage  confidence,  and  preserve  it  inviolate;  therefore 
a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following  cases :  — 

First.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife  with- 
out her  consent;  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband  without  his 
consent;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterward,  be,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication 
made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage;  but  this  exception 
does  not  apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by  one  against  the 
other,  nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed 
by  one  against  the  other,  nor  to  proceedings  supplementary  to 
execution. 

Second.  An  attorney  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  his  client,  be 
examined  as  to  any  communication  made  by  the  client  to  him,  or  his 
advice  given  thereon,  in  the  course  of  professional  duty. 

Third.  A  clergyman  or  priest  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  the 
person  making  the  confession,  be  examined  as  to  the  confession 
made  to  him  in  his  professional  character,  in  the  course  of  discipline 
enjoined  by  the  church  to  which  he  belongs. 

Fourth.  A  regular  physician  or  surgeon  cannot,  without  the  con- 
sent of  his  patient,  be  examined  in  a  civil  action,  as  to  any  infor- 
mation acquired  in  attending  the  patient,  which  was  necessary  to 
enable  him  to  prescribe  or  act  for  the  patient. 

Fifth.  A  public  officer  cannot  be  examined  as  to  communications 
made  to  him  in  official  confidence,  when  the  public  interest  would 
suffer  by  the  disclosure. 

§  5663.  Every  person  who  declares  that  he  has  conscientious  scru- 
ples against  taking  an  oath,  or  swearing  in  any  form,  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  make  his  solemn  declaration  or  affirmation. 


MISSISSIPPI.  767 

§  5664.  Whenever  the  Court  before  which  any  person  is  offered  as 
witness  is  satisfied  that  such  person  has  any  peculiar  mode  of  swear- 
ing, which  is  more  solemn  and  obligatory,  in  the  opinion  of  such 
person,  than  the  usual  mode,  the  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  adopt 
such  mode  of  swearing  such  person. 

§  5665.  Every  person  believing  in  any  other  than  the  Christian 
religion  shall  be  sworn  according  to  the  peculiar  ceremonies  of  his 
religion,  if  there  are  any  such  ceremonies. 

§  5666.  The  Court  before  whom  an  infant,  or  a  person  apparently 
of  weak  intellect,  is  produced  as  a  witness,  may  examine  such  person 
to  ascertain  his  capacity,  and  whether  he  understands  the  nature  and 
obligations  of  an  oath;  and  any  Court  may  inquire  of  any  person 
what  are  the  peculiar  ceremonies  observed  by  him  in  swearing, 
which  he  deems  most  obligatory. 

§  6841.  A  person  heretofore  or  hereafter  convicted  of  any  crime 
is,  notwithstanding,  a  competent  witness  in  any  case  or  proceeding, 
civil  or  criminal,  but  the  conviction  may  be  proved  for  the  purpose 
of  affecting  the  weight  of  his  testimony,  either  by  the  record  or  by 
his  cross-examination  upon  which  he  must  answer  any  proper  ques- 
tion relevant  to  that  inquiry;  and  the  party  cross-examining  is  not 
concluded  by  the  answer  to  such  question. 

§  2216.  Whenever  in  any  action  in  any  court  the  defendant  shall 
plead  or  answer  the  defence  of  usury,  either  party  to  the  action 
may  be  a  witness  on  his  own  behalf  on  the  trial,  except  in  actions 
in  which  the  opposite  party  sues  or  defends  as  administrator  or 
personal  representative  of  a  deceased  person;  except,  also,  actions 
in  which  the  opposite  party  claims  as  assignee  and  the  original 
assignor  is  deceased. 

MISSISSIPPI. 
Constitution,  1890. 

Art.  Ill,  §  10.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless 
on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act  or  on  con- 
fession in  open  court. 

§  26.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  a  right 
...  to  be  confronted  by  the  witnesses  against  him ;  .  .  .  and  he 
shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

General  Statute  Laws,  1892  (Thompson,  Dillard,  and  Campbell). 

§  1738.  Every  person,  whether  a  party  to  the  suit  or  not,  shall  be 
competent  to  give  evidence  in  any  suit  at  law  or  in  equity,  and  shall 
not  be  incompetent  by  reason  of  any  interest  in  the  result  thereof, 
or  in  the  record  as  an  instrument  of  evidence  in  other  suits;  and 
such  weight  shall  be  given  to  the  evidence  of  parties  and  interested 
witnesses  as,  in  view  of  the  situation  of  the  witnesses  and  other 


768  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

circumstances,  it  may  fairly  be  entitled  to.  Any  party  may,  by 
subpoena,  as  in  other  cases,  compel  any  other  party  to  the  suit  to 
appear  and  give  evidence. 

§  1739.  Husband  and  wife  may  be  introduced  by  each  other  as 
•witnesses  in  all  cases,  civil  or  criminal,  and  shall  be  competent 
witnesses  in  their  own  behalf,  as  against  each  other,  in  all  contro- 
versies between  them. 

§  1740.  A  person  shall  not  testify  as  a  witness  to  establish  his 
own  claim  or  defence  against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  which 
originated  during  the  lifetime  of  such  deceased  person,  or  any  claim 
he  has  transferred  since  the  death  of  such  decedent.  But  such  per- 
son shall  be  permitted  to  give  evidence  in  support  of ^  his  claim  or 
defence  against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  which  originated 
after  the  death  of  such  deceased  person  in  the  course  of  admin- 
istering his  estate. 

§  1741.  The  accused  shall  be  a  competent  witness  for  himself  in 
any  prosecution  for  crime  against  him;  but  the  failure  of  the 
accused  in  any  case  to  testify  shall  not  operate  to  his  prejudice  or 
be  commented  on  by  counsel. 

§  1742.  A  person  shall  not  be  incompetent  as  a  witness  because  of 
religious  belief  or  the  want  of  it. 

§  1743.  A  conviction  of  a  person  for  any  offence,  except  perjury 
and  subornation  of  perjury,  shall  not  disqualify  such  person  as  a 
witness,  but  such  conviction  may  be  given  in  evidence  to  impeach 
his  credibility.  A  person  convicted  of  perjury  or  subornation  of 
perjury  shall  not  afterwards  be  a  competent  witness  in  any  case, 
although  pardoned  or  punished  for  the  same. 

§  1744.  Any  witness,  being  scrupulous  of  taking  an  oath,  may  give 
testimony  upon  his  solemn  affirmation,  which  shall  be  as  good  and 
effectual  as  an  oath.  The  form  of  affirmation  shall  be,  in  substance, 
as  follows,  to  wit:  "  You  do  solemnly  and  truly  declare  and  affirm," 
etc.  In  all  cases  where  an  oath  or  affidavit  is  required  by  law,  it 
shall  be  sufficient  if  the  same  be  made  or  given  on  the  solemn  affir- 
mation of  the  party. 

MISSOURI. 
Constitution,  1875. 

Art.  II,  §  5.  ...  No  person  can,  on  account  of  his  religious 
opinions,  ...  be  disqualified  from  testifying. 

§  13.  .  .  .  No  person  can  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  his  confes- 
sion in  open  court. 

§  22.  In  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

§  23.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself  in  a 
criminal  cause. 


MISSOURI.  769 

Revised  Statutes,  1889. 

§  4216.  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  testify  in 
criminal  causes  by  reason  of  his  being  the  person  injured  or  de- 
frauded or  intended  to  be  injured  or  defrauded,  or  that  would  be 
entitled  to  satisfaction  for  the  injury,  or  is  liable  to  pay  the  costs 
of  the  prosecution. 

§  4217.  When  two  or  more  persons  shall  be  jointly  indicted  or 
prosecuted,  the  Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendants  have 
gone  into  their  defence,  direct  any  defendant  to  be  discharged,  that 
he  may  be  a  witness  for  the  State.  A  defendant  shall  also,  when 
there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  put  him  on  his  defence,  at  any  time 
before  the  evidence  is  closed,  be  discharged  by  the  Court  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  his  testimony  for  a  co-defendant. 

§  4218.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  as  a  witness  in 
any  criminal  cause  or  prosecution  by  reason  of  being  the  person  on 
trial  or  examination,  or  by  reason  of  being  the  husband  or  wife  of 
the  accused;  but  any  such  facts  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of 
affecting  the  credibility  of  such  witness :  provided,  that  no  person  on 
trial  or  examination,  nor  wife  or  husband  of  such  person,  shall  be 
required  to  testify,  but  any  such  person  may,  at  the  option  of  the 
defendant,  testify  in  his  behalf,  or  on  behalf  of  a  co-defendant,  and 
shall  be  liable  to  cross-examination,  as  to  any  matter  referred  to  in 
his  examination  in  chief,  and  may  be  contradicted  and  impeached  as 
any  other  witness  in  the  case :  provided,  that  in  no  case  shall  husband 
or  wife,  when  testifying  under  the  provisions  of  this  section  for  a 
defendant,  be  permitted  to  disclose  confidential  communications  had 
or  made  between  them  in  the  relation  of  such  husband  and  wife. 

§  8918.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any  civil 
suit  or  proceeding  at  law  or  in  equity,  by  reason  of  his  interest  in 
the  event  of  the  same  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  but  such  interest  may 
be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credibility :  provided,  that 
in  actions  where  one  of  the  original  parties  to  the  contract  or  cause 
of  action  in  issue  and  on  trial  is  dead,  or  is  shown  to  the  Court  to  be 
insane,  the  other  party  to  such  contract  or  cause  of  action  shall  not 
be  admitted  to  testify  either  in  his  own  favor  or  in  favor  of  any  party 
to  the  action  claiming  under  him,  and  no  party  to  such  suit  or  pro- 
ceeding whose  right  of  action  or  defence  is  derived  to  him  from  one 
who  is,  or  if  living  would  be,  subject  to  the  foregoing  disqualifica- 
tion, shall  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own  favor,  except  as  in  this 
section  is  provided;  and  where  an  executor  or  administrator  is  a 
party,  the  other  party  shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own 
favor,  unless  the  contract  in  issue  was  originally  made  with  a  person 
who  is  living  and  competent  to  testify,  except  as  to  such  acts  and 
contracts  as  have  been  done  or  made  since  the  probate  of  the  will  or 
the  appointment  of  the  administrator:  provided,  further,  that  in 
VOL.  i.  —  49 


770  APPENDIX  I:   CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

actions  for  the  recovery  of  any  sum  or  balance  due  on  account,  and 
when  the  matter  at  issue  and  on  trial  is  proper  matter  of  book  ac- 
count, the  party  living  may  be  a  witness  in  his  own  favor,  so  far  as 
to  prove  in  whose  handwriting  his  charges  are,  and  when  made,  and 
no  farther. 

§  8920.  Any  party  to  any  civil  action  or  proceeding  may  compel 
any  adverse  party,  or  any  person  for  whose  immediate  and  adverse 
benefit  such  action  or  proceeding  is  instituted,  prosecuted,  or  de- 
fended, to  testify  as  a  witness  in  his  behalf,  in  the  same  manner  and 
subject  to  the  same  rules  as  other  witnesses ;  provided  that  the  party 
so  called  may  be  examined  by  the  opposite  party,  under  the  rules 
applicable  to  the  cross-examination  of  witnesses. 

§  8922.  No  married  woman  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in 
any  civil  suit  or  proceeding  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  or  against  her 
husband,  whether  joined  or  not  with  her  husband  as  a  party,  in  the 
following  cases,  to  wit:  First,  in  actions  upon  policies  of  insurance 
of  property,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  amount  and  value  of  the  prop- 
erty alleged  to  be  injured  or  destroyed;  second,  in  actions  against 
carriers,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  loss  of  the  property  and  the  amount 
and  value  thereof;  third,  in  all  matters  of  business  transactions  when 
the  transaction  was  had  and  conducted  by  such  married  woman  as 
the  agent  of  her  husband;  and  no  married  man  shall  be  disqualified 
in  any  such  civil  suit  or  proceeding  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  or 
against  his  wife,  whether  he  be  joined  with  her  or  not  as  a  party, 
when  such  suit  or  proceeding  is  based  upon,  grows  out  of,  or  is  con- 
nected with  any  matter  of  business  or  business  transaction  where 
the  transaction  or  business  was  had  with  or  was  conducted  by  such 
married  man  as  the  agent  of  his  wife :  provided,  that  nothing  in  this 
section  shall  be  construed  to  authorize  or  permit  any  married  woman, 
while  the  relation  exists  or  subsequently,  to  testify  to  any  admis- 
sion or  conversation  of  her  husband,  whether  made  to  herself  or  to 
third  parties. 

§  8925.  The  following  persons  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify: 
First,  a  person  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  his  production  for 
examination;  second,  a  child  under  ten  years  of  age,  who  appears 
incapable  of  receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which 
they  are  examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly;  third,  an  attorney, 
concerning  any  communication  made  to  him  by  his  client  in  that  re- 
lation, or  his  advice  thereon,  without  the  consent  of  such  client; 
fourth,  a  minister  of  the  gospel  or  priest  of  any  denomination,  con- 
cerning a  confession  made  to  him  in  his  professional  character,  in 
the  course  of  discipline  enjoined  by  the  rules  of  practice  of  such 
denomination;  fifth,  a  physician  or  surgeon,  concerning  any  infor- 
mation which  he  may  have  acquired  from  any  patient  while  attend- 
ing him  in  a  professional  character,  and  which  information  was 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  prescribe  for  such  patient  as  a  physician, 
or  do  any  act  for  him  as  a  surgeon. 


MONTANA.  771 

MONTANA. 
Constitution,  1889. 

Art.  Ill,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  denied  any  civil  or  political 
right  or  privilege  on  account  of  his  opinions  concerning  religion; 
but  the  liberty  of  conscience  hereby  secured  shall  not  be  construed 
to  dispense  with  oaths  or  affirmations. 

§  9.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  except  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  his  confes- 
sion in  open  court. 

§  16.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

§  17.  .  .  .  [In  criminal  proceedings,  if  a  witness]  cannot  give 
security,  his  deposition  shall  be  taken  in  the  manner  prescribed  by 
law,  and  in  the  presence  of  the  accused  and  his  counsel,  or  without 
their  presence,  if  they  shall  fail  to  attend  the  examination  after 
reasonable  notice  of  the  time  and  place  thereof.  Any  deposition 
authorized  by  this  section  may  be  received  as  evidence  on  the  trial, 
if  the  witness  shall  be  dead  or  absent  from  the  State. 

§  18.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself  in  a 
criminal  proceeding. 

Codes  and  Statutes,  1895  (Sanders). 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  §  3160.  A  witness  is  a  person  whose 
declaration  under  oath  is  received  as  evidence  for  any  purpose, 
whether  such  declaration  be  made  on  oral  examination  or  by  depo- 
sition or  affidavit. 

§  3161.  All  persons,  without  exception,  otherwise  than  is  speci- 
fied in  the  next  two  sections,  who,  having  organs  of  sense,  can  per- 
ceive, and  perceiving  can  make  known  their  perceptions  to  others, 
may  be  witnesses.  Therefore,  neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who 
have  an  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  or  proceeding  are  excluded; 
nor  those  who  have  been  convicted  of  crime ;  nor  persons  on  account 
of  their  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief;  although,  in  every 
case,  the  credibility  of  the  witness  may  be  drawn  in  question,  as 
provided  in  section  3123. 

§  3162.    The  following  persons  cannot  be  witnesses :  — 

1.  Those  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production 
for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age,  who  appear  incapable  of  re- 
ceiving just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are  exam- 
ined, or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  3163.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy 
of  the  law  to  encourage  confidence  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate; 
therefore,  a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following 
cases : — 


772  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

1.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife,  without 
her  consent;  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband,  without  his 
consent;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterward,  be,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication 
made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage;  but  this  exception 
does  not  apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by  one  against  the 
other,  nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed 
by  one  against  the  other. 

Penal  Code,  §  2440.  The  rules  for  determining  the  competency  of 
witnesses  in  civil  actions  are  applicable  also  to  criminal  actions  and 
proceedings,  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Code* 

§  2441.  Except  with  the  consent  of  both,  or  in  cases  of  criminal 
violence  upon  one  by  the  other,  neither  husband  nor  wife  is  a  com- 
petent witness  for  or  against  the  other  in  a  criminal  action  or  pro- 
ceeding to  which  one  or  both  are  parties. 

§  2442.  A  defendant  in  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  cannot  be 
compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself;  but  he  may  be  sworn, 
and  may  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  and  the  jury  in  judging  of  his 
credibility  and  the  weight  to  be  given  to  his  testimony,  may  take 
into  consideration  the  fact  that  he  is  the  defendant,  and  the  nature 
and  enormity  of  the  crime  of  which  he  is  accused.  If  the  defendant 
does  not  claim  the  right  to  be  sworn,  or  does  not  testify,  it  must  not 
be  used  to  his  prejudice,  and  the  attorney  prosecuting  must  not  com- 
ment to  the  Court  or  jury  on  the  same. 

§  2443.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  jointly  or  otherwise  con- 
cerned in  the  commission  of  an  offence,  any  one  of  such  persons  may 
testify  for  or  against  the  other  in  relation  to  the  offence  committed, 
but  the  testimony  of  such  witness  must  not  be  used  against  him  in 
any  criminal  action  or  proceeding. 

NEBRASKA. 
Constitution,  1875. 

Art.  1,  §  IV.  No  person  shall  ...  be  incompetent  to  be  a  witness 
on  account  of  his  religious  belief;  but  nothing  herein  shall  be  con- 
strued to  dispense  with  oaths  and  affirmations. 

§  XI.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

§  XII.  No  person  shall  be  compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to 
give  evidence  against  himself. 

§  XIV.  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act  or  on  confession 
in  open  court. 

Compiled  Statutes,  1897  (Brown  and  Wheeler). 

§  5902.  Every  human  being  of  sufficient  capacity  to  understand  the 
obligation  of  an  oath,  is  a  competent  witness  in  all  cases,  civil  and 


NEBRASKA.  773 

criminal,  except  as  otherwise  herein  declared.  The  following  per- 
sons shall  be  incompetent  to  testify :  First,  persons  of  unsound  mind 
at  the  time  of  their  production;  second,  Indians  and  negroes  who 
appear  incapable  of  receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respect- 
ing which  they  are  examined,  or  of  relating  them  intelligently  and 
truly;  third,  husband  and  wife,  concerning  any  communication 
made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage,  whether  called  as  a 
witness  while  that  relation  subsists  or  afterward;  fourth,  an  attor- 
ney, concerning  any  communication  made  to  him  by  his  client  dur- 
ing that  relation  or  his  advice  thereon,  without  the  client's  consent  in 
open  court  or  in  writing  produced  in  court;  fifth,  a  clergyman  or 
priest,  concerning  any  confession  made  to  him  in  his  professional 
character  in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined  by  the  church  to 
which  he  belongs,  without  the  consent  of  the  person  making  the 
confession. 

§  5903.  No  person  having  a  direct  legal  interest  in  the  result  of 
any  civil  action  or  proceeding,  when  the  adverse  party  is  the  repre- 
sentative of  a  deceased  person,  shall  be  permitted  to  testify  to  any 
transaction  or  conversation  had  between  the  deceased  person  and  the 
witness,  unless  the  evidence  of  the  deceased  person  shall  have  been 
taken  and  read  in  evidence  by  the  adverse  party  in  regard  to  such 
transaction  or  conversation,  or  unless  such  representative  shall  have 
introduced  a  witness  who  shall  have  testified  in  regard  to  such  trans- 
action or  conversation,  in  which  case  the  person  having  such  direct 
legal  interest  may  be  examined  in  regard  to  the  facts  testified  to  by 
such  deceased  person  or  such  witness,  but  shall  not  be  permitted  to 
further  testify  in  regard  to  such  transaction  or  conversation. 

§  5905.  The  husband  can  in  no  case  be  a  witness  against  the  wife, 
nor  the  wife  against  the  husband,  except  in  a  criminal  proceeding 
for  a  crime  committed  by  the  one  against  the  other,  but  they  may  in 
all  criminal  prosecutions  be  witnesses  for  each  other. 

§  5906.  Neither  husband  nor  wife  can  be  examined  in  any  case  as 
to  any  communication  made  by  the  one  to  the  other  while  married, 
nor  shall  they,  after  the  marriage  relation  ceases,  be  permitted  to 
reveal,  in  testimony,  any  such  communication  made  while  the  mar- 
riage subsisted. 

§  5908.  The  prohibitions  in  the  preceding  sections  do  not  appljr  to 
cases  where  the  party  in  whose  favor  the  respective  provisions  are 
enacted  waives  the  rights  thereby  conferred. 

§  7199.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any  crim- 
inal prosecution  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  same,  as 
a  party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  any  crime, 
but  such  interest  or  conviction  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of 
affecting  his  credibility.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints, 
and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged  with  the  commissions 
of  crimes  or  offences,  the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request, 


774        APPENDIX  I:  CONSTITUTIONS  AND  STATUTES. 

but  not  otherwise,  be  deemed  a  competent  witness;  nor  snail  the 
neglect  or  refusal  to  testify  create  any  presumption  against  him,  nor 
shall  any  reference  be  made  to,  nor  any  comment  upon,  such  neglect 
or  refusal. 

§  7200.  When  two  or  more  persons  shall  be  indicted  together,  the 
Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendant  has  gone  into  his  de- 
fence, direct  any  one  of  the  defendants  to  be  discharged,  that  he  may 
be  a  witness  for  the  State. 

NEVADA. 

Constitution,  1864. 

Art.  I,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  be  a 
witness  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  his  religious  belief. 

§  8.  ...  No  person  shall  ...  be  compelled,  in  any  criminal 
case,  to  be  a  witness  against  himself. 

§  19.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession 
in  open  court. 

General  Statutes,  1885  (Baily  and  Hammond). 

§  3398.  All  persons,  without  exception,  otherwise  than  as  speci- 
fied in  this  chapter,  who,  having  organs  of  sense,  can  perceive,  and 
perceiving  can  make  known  their  perceptions  to  others,  may  be  wit- 
nesses in  any  action  or  proceeding  in  any  court  of  the  State.  Facts 
which  by  the  common  law  would  cause  the  exclusion  of  witnesses 
may  still  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  their  credibility. 

§  3399.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any  action 
or  proceeding  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  religious 
belief,  or  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  felony,  but  such  conviction 
may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credibility,  and  the 
jury  is  to  be  the  exclusive  judges  of  his  credibility,  or  by  reason  of 
his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  action  or  proceeding  as  a  party 
thereto  or  otherwise,  but  the  party  or  parties  thereto,  and  the  person 
in  whose  behalf  such  action  or  proceeding  may  be  brought  or  de- 
fended, shall,  except  as  hereinafter  excepted,  be  competent  and  be 
compellable  to  give  evidence,  either  viva  voce  or  by  deposition  or 
upon  a  commission,  in  the  same  manner  and  be  subject  to  the  same 
rules  of  examination  as  other  witnesses  on  behalf  of  himself,  or 
either  or  any  of  the  parties  to  the  action  or  proceeding. 

§  3401.  No  person  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  under  the  provisions 
of  §  377  [3399]  when  the  other  party  to  the  transaction  is  dead,  or 
when  the  opposite  party  to  the  action,  or  the  person  for  whose  imme- 
diate benefit  the  action  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended,  is 
the  representative  of  a  deceased  person,  when  the  facts  to  be  proved 
transpired  before  the  death  of  such  deceased  person:  provided,  that 


NEW   HAMPSHIRE.  775 

when  such  deceased  person  was  represented  in  the  transaction  in 
question  by  any  agent  who  is  living,  and  who  testifies  as  a  witness 
in  favor  of  the  representative  of  such  deceased  person,  in  such  case 
the  other  party  may  also  testify  in  relation  to  such  transaction,  and 
nothing  contained  in  such  section  shall  affect  the  laws  in  relation  to 
any  instrument  required  to  be  attested ;  provided,  further,  that  when 
husband  or  wife  is  insane  and  has  been  so  declared  by  a  commission 
of  lunacy,  or  in  due  form  of  law,  the  other  shall  be  a  competent  wit- 
ness to  testify  as  to  any  fact  which  transpired  before  or  during  such 
insanity,  but  the  privilege  of  so  testifying  shall  cease  on  the  restora- 
tion to  soundness  of  the  insane  husband  or  wife,  unless  upon  the 
consent  of  both,  in  which  case  they  shall  be  competent  witnesses. 

§  3402.  The  following  persons  cannot  be  witnesses :  First,  those 
who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production  for  exam- 
ination; second,  children  under  ten  years  of  age  who  appear  incapa- 
ble of  receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they 
are  examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  3403.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  for  or  against 
his  wife  without  her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband 
without  his  consent;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  after- 
wards, be,  without  the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any 
communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage.  But 
this  exception  shall  not  apply  to  an  action  or  proceeding  by  one 
against  the  other. 

§  4562.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints,  and  other  pro- 
ceedings against  persons  charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes  or 
offences,  the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request  but  not 
otherwise,  be  deemed  a  competent  witness;  the  credit  to  be  given  to 
his  testimony  being  left  solely  to  the  jury,  under  the  instructions  of 
the  Court. 

§  4563.  Nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  construed  as  compelling 
any  such  person  to  testify ;  and  in  all  cases  wherein  the  defendant 
to  a  criminal  action  declines  to  testify,  the  Court  shall  specially  in- 
struct the  jury  that  no  inference  of  guilt  is  to  be  drawn  against  him 
for  that  cause. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE. 
Constitution,  1793. 

Part  I,  art.  15.  No  subject  shall  .  .  .-be  compelled  to  accuse  or 
furnish  evidence  against  himself.  And  every  subject  shall  have  a 
right  ...  to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

Public  Statutes,  1891. 

Ch.  224,  §  10.  No  other  ceremony  shall  be  necessary  in  swearing 
than  holding  up  the  right  hand,  but  any  other  form  or  ceremony 


776  APPENDIX   I:   CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

may  be  used  which  the  person  to  whom  the  oath  is  administered  pro- 
fesses to  believe  more  binding  upon  the  conscience. 

§  11.  Persons  scrupulous  of  swearing  may  affirm;  the  word 
"affirm"  being  used  in  administering  the  oath,  instead  of  the  word 
"swear,"  and  the  words  "this  you  do  under  the  pains  and  penalties 
of  perjury,"  instead  of  the  words  "so  help  you  God." 

§  12.  No  person  who  believes  in  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being 
shall  be  excluded  from  testifying  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  mat- 
ters of  religion. 

§  13.  No  person  shall  be  excused  or  excluded  from  testifying  or 
giving  his  deposition  in  any  civil  cause  by  reason  of  his  interest 
therein,  as  a  party  or  otherwise. 

§  16.  When  one  party  to  a  cause  is  an  executor,  administrator,  or 
the  guardian  of  an  insane  person,  neither  party  shall  testify  in  re- 
spect to  facts  which  occurred  in  the  lifetime  of  the  deceased  or 
prior  to  the  ward's  insanity,  unless  the  executor,  administrator,  or 
guardian  elects  so  to  testify,  except  as  provided  in  the  following 
section. 

§  17.  When  it  clearly  appears  to  the  Court  that  injustice  may  be 
done  without  the  testimony  of  the  party  in  such  case,  he  may  be 
allowed  to  testify;  and  the  ruling  of  the  Court,  admitting  or  reject- 
ing his  testimony,  may  be  excepted  to  and  revised. 

§  18.  When  either  party  of  record  is  not  the  party  in  interest,  and 
the  party  whose  interest  is  represented  by  the  party  of  record  is  an 
executor,  administrator,  or  insane,  the  adverse  party  shall  not  tes- 
tify, unless  the  executor,  administrator,  or  guardian  of  the  insane 
person  elects  to  testify  himself,  or  to  offer  the  testimony  of  such 
party  of  record. 

§  19.  In  an  action  brought  by  an  indorsee  or  assignee  of  a  bill  of 
exchange,  promissory  note,  or  mortgage  against  an  original  party 
thereto,  the  defendant  shall  not  testify  in  his  own  behalf  if  either  of 
the  original  parties  to  the  bill,  note,  or  mortgage  is  dead  or  insane, 
unless  the  plaintiff  elects  to  testify  himself  or  to  offer  the  testimony 
of  an  original  party  thereto. 

§  20.  Husband  and  wife  are  competent  witnesses  for  or  against 
each  other  in  all  cases  civil  and  criminal,  except  that  neither  shall 
be  allowed  to  testify  as  to  any  statement,  conversation,  letter,  or 
other  communication  made  to  the  other  or  to  another  person,  nor  as 
to  any  matter  which  in  the  opinion  of  the  Court  would  lead  to  a 
violation  of  marital  confidence. 

§  24.  In  the  trial  of  indictments,  complaints,  and  other  proceed- 
ings against  persons  charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes  and 
offences,  the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request,  but  not 
otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness. 

§  25.  Nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  construed  as  compelling 
any  such  person  to  testify,  nor  shall  any  inference  of  his  guilt  result 


NEW  JERSEY.  777 

if  he  does  not  testify,  nor  shall  the  counsel  for  the  prosecution  com- 
ment thereon  in  case  the  respondent  does  not  testify. 

§  26.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  on  account  of  his 
having  been  convicted  of  an  infamous  crime,  but  the  record  of  such 
conviction  may  be  used  to  affect  his  credit  as  a  witness. 

NEW  JERSEY. 
Constitution,  1844. 

Art.  1,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  denied  the  enjoyment  of  any 
civil  right  merely  on  account  of  his  religious  principles. 

§  8.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
.  .  .  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

§  14.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession 
in  open  court. 

General  Statutes,  1896. 

Evidence,  §  1.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  in  any  action  or 
proceeding  of  a  civil  or  criminal  nature  shall  be  excluded  by  reason 
of  his  having  been  convicted  of  crime,  but  such  conviction  may  be 
shown  on  cross-examination  of  the  witness,  or,  by  the  production  of 
the  record  thereof,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credit. 

§  2.  In  all  civil  actions  in  any  court  of  record  in  this  State  the 
parties  thereto  shall  be  admitted  to  be  sworn  and  give  evidence 
therein,  when  called  as  witnesses  by  the  adverse  party  in  such  action; 
and  when  any  party  is  called  as  a  witness  by  the  opposite  party,  he 
shall  be  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  to  examination  and  cross- 
examination  as  other  witnesses;  provided,  that  no  party  to  a  suit 
shall  be  compelled  to  be  sworn  or  give  evidence  in  any  action  brought 
to  recover  a  penalty  or  to  enforce  a  forfeiture;  and  provided,  also, 
that  this  section  shall  not  apply  to  suits  for  divorce. 

§  3.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any  suit  or 
proceedings  at  law  or  in  equity  by  reason  of  his  or  her  interest  in 
the  event  of  the  same  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  but  such  interest  may 
be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  or  her  credit;  provided, 
nevertheless,  that  no  party  shall  be  sworn  in  any  case  when  the 
opposite  party  is  prohibited  by  any  legal  disability  from  being  sworn 
as  a  witness,  or  either  of  the  parties  in  a  cause  sue  or  are  sued  in  a 
representative  capacity,  except  as  hereinafter  provided. 

§  4.  A  party  to  a  suit  in  a  representative  capacity  may  be  ad- 
mitted, as  a  witness  therein,  and  if  called  as  a  witness  in  his  own 
behalf,  and  admitted,  the  opposite  party  may  in  like  manner  be 
admitted  as  a  witness. 

§  5.  In  any  trial  or  inquiry  in  any  suit,  action,  or  proceeding  in 
any  court,  or  before  any  person  having  by  law  or  consent  of  parties 


778  APPENDIX  I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

authority  to  examine  witnesses  or  hear  evidence,  the  husband  or  wife 
of  any  person  interested  therein  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  shall  be 
competent  and  cbmpellable  to  give  evidence  the  same  as  other  wit- 
nesses, on  behalf  of  any  party  to  such  suit,  action,  or  proceeding; 
provided,  that  nothing  herein  shall  render  any  husband  or  wife  com- 
petent or  cornpellable  to  give  evidence  for  or  against  the  other  in  any 
criminal  action  or  proceeding,  or  in  any  action  or  proceeding  for 
divorce  on  account  of  adultery,  except  to  prove  the  fact  of  marriage, 
or  in  any  action  for  criminal  conversation ;  nor  shall  any  husband  or 
wife  be  conipellable  to  disclose  any  confidential  communication  made 
by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage. 

§  6.  The  complainant  or  petitioner  in  any  action,  or  proceeding  of 
an  equitable  nature  in  any  court,  shall  be  a  competent  witness  to 
disprove  so  much  of  the  defendant's  answer  as  may  be  responsive  to 
the  allegations  contained  in  the  bill  of  complaint  or  petition,  and  any 
defendant  in  any  such  action  or  proceeding  shall  be  a  competent 
witness  for  or  against  any  other  defendant  not  jointly  interested 
with  him  in  the  matter  in  controversy. 

§  7.  Upon  the  trial  of  any  indictment  for  falsely  making,  alter- 
ing, forging,  or  counterfeiting,  or  for  uttering  or  publishing  as  true, 
any  record,  deed,  or  other  instrument  or  writing,  no  person  named 
in  such  record,  deed,  or  other  instrument  or  writing,  or  whose  name 
or  any  part  of  whose  name  is  or  purports  to  be  written  or  signed 
therein  or  thereto,  shall  on  that  account  be  deemed  so  taken  to  be 
an  incompetent  witness. 

§  8.  Upon  the  trial  of  any  indictment,  allegation,  or  accusation  of 
any  person  charged  with  crime,  the  person  indicted  or  accused  shall 
be  admitted  to  testify  as  a  witness  upon  such  trial,  if  he  shall  offer 
himself  as  a  witness  therein  in  his  own  behalf. 

§  51.  ...  [Ante,  §  5,  declared  to]  authorize  husband  or  wife  in 
any  criminal  action  against  either,  to  give  evidence  to  prove  the 
fact  of  marriage. 

§  53.  In  all  civil  actions  in  any  court  of  law  or  equity  of  this 
State,  any  party  thereto  may  be  sworn  and  examined  as  a  witness, 
notwithstanding  any  party  thereto  may  sue  or  be  sued  in  a  represent- 
ative capacity;  provided,  nevertheless,  that  this  supplement  shall 
not  extend  so  as  to  permit  testimony  to  be  given  as  to  any  trans- 
action with  or  statement  by  any  testator  or  intestate  represented  in 
said  action. 

§  54.  Upon  any  trial  hereafter  had,  of  any  indictment  of  any 
person  charged  with  the  crime  of  murder  or  manslaughter,  the  hus- 
band or  wife  of  the  person  so  charged  shall  be  admitted  to  testify 
as  a  witness  upon  such  trial,  if  he  or  she  offer  himself  or  herself  as 
a  witness  therein  on  behalf  of  the  person  so  charged. 

§  57.  Upon  the  trial  of  any  indictment,  allegation,  or  accusation 
of  any  person  charged  with  crime,  the  wife  or  husband  of  the  person 


NEW  MEXICO.  7.79 

indicted  or  accused  shall  be  admitted  to  testify  as  a  witness  in  be- 
half of  such  person  upon  such  trial,  if  he  or  she  shall  be  offered  and 
produced  as  a  witness  therein  by  the  person  so  indicted  or  accused. 

§  73.  Any  husband  or  wife  may  give  evidence  on  their  own  be- 
half, or  for  or  against  each  other,  in  any  proceedings  in  this  State 
for  divorce  on  account  of  adultery,  any  law  of  this  State  to  the  con- 
trary, notwithstanding. 

NEW  MEXICO. 
Compiled  Laws,  1897. 

§  3014.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  hereinafter  be  ex- 
cluded by  reason  of  any  alleged  incapacity  from  interest,  from  giv- 
ing evidence,  either  in  person  or  by  deposition,  according  to  the 
practice  of  the  court,  on  the  trial  of  any  issue  joined,  or  of  any 
matter  in  question  or  on  any  inquiry  arising  in  any  civil  suit,  action, 
or  proceeding  in  any  court,  or  before  any  judge,  coroner,  justice  of 
the  peace,  officer,  or  person  having,  by  law  or  by  consent  of  parties, 
authority  to  hear,  receive,  and  examine  evidence  in  this  Territory. 

§  3015.  Every  person  so  offered  shall  be  admitted  to  give  evidence 
on  oath  or  solemn  affirmation  in  those  cases  wherein  affirmation  is 
by  law  receivable;  notwithstanding  that  such  person  has  an  interest 
in  the  matter  in  question,  or  in  the  event  of  the  trial  of  any  issue, 
matter,  question,  or  inquiry,  or  of  the  suit,  action,  or  proceeding  in 
which  he  is  offered  as  a  witness. 

§  3016.  Hereafter,  in  the  courts  of  this  Territory  no  person  offered 
as  a  witness  shall  be  disqualified  to  give  evidence  on  account  of  any 
disqualification  known  to  the  common  law,  but  all  such  common-law 
disqualifications  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the  cred- 
ibility of  any  such  witness  and  for  no  other  purpose;  provided,  how- 
ever, that  the  presiding  judge,  in  his  discretion,  may  refuse  to 
permit  a  child  of  tender  years  to  be  sworn,  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
judge,  such  child  has  not  sufficient  mental  capacity  to  understand 
the  nature  and  obligation  of  an  oath. 

§  3017.  On  the  trial  of  any  issue  joined,  or  of  any  matter  or  ques- 
tion, or  on  any  inquiry  arising  in  any  civil  suit,  action,  or  other  pro- 
ceeding in  any  court  of  law  or  equity  in  this  Territory,  or  before  any 
person  having,  by  law  or  by  consent  of  parties,  authority  to  hear, 
receive,  and  examine  evidence,  the  parties  to  such  proceedings,  and 
the  persons  in  whose  behalf  any  such  suit,  action,  or  other  proceed- 
ing is  brought  or  instituted,  or  opposed  or  defended,  shall,  except  as 
hereinafter  excepted,  be  competent  and  compellable  to  give  evidence, 
either  viva  voce  or  by  deposition,  according  to  the  practice  of  the 
court,  on  behalf  of  themselves  or  of  either  of  the  parties  to  the  suit, 
action,  or  proceeding,  and  the  husbands  and  wives  of  such  parties 
and  persons  shall  except  as  hereinafter  excepted,  be  competent  to 


780  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

give  evidence,  either  viva  voce  or  by  deposition,  according  to  the 
practice  of  the  court,  on  behalf  of  either  or  any  of  the  parties  to  the 
said  suit,  action,  or  proceeding. 

§  3019.  Nothing  herein  contained  shall  apply  to  the  trial,  in  any 
action,  suit,  or  other  civil  proceeding,  of  the  question  of  the  adul- 
tery of  any  party,  or  the  husband  or  wife  of  any  party  to  such  action, 
suit,  or  proceeding. 

§  3020.  No  husband  shall  be  compelled  to  disclose  any  communi- 
cation made  by  his  wife  during  the  marriage,  and  no  wife  shall  be 
compelled  to  disclose  any  communication  made  to  her  by  her  husband 
during  the  marriage. 

§  3201.  In  a  suit  by  or  against  the  heirs,  executors,  administrators, 
or  assigns  of  a  deceased  person,  an  opposite  or  interested  party  to 
the  suit  shall  not  obtain  a  verdict,  judgment,  or  decision  therein, 
on  his  own  evidence,  in  respect  to  any  matter  occurring  before  the 
death  of  the  deceased  person,  unless  such  evidence  is  corroborated 
by  some  other  material  evidence. 

§  3431.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  informations,  complaints, 
and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged  with  the  commission 
of  crimes,  offences,  and  misdemeanors  in  the  courts  of  this  Terri- 
tory, the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request,  but  not  other- 
wise, be  a  competent  witness;  and  his  failure  to  make  such  request 
shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him. 

§  3432.  Hereafter  the  husband  or  wife  of  any  defendant  in  any 
trial  on  a  prosecution  for  crime  before  any  Court  or  officer  author- 
ized to  hear  or  try  said  prosecution  shall  be  a  competent  witness  to 
testify  in  favor  of,  but  not  against,  such  defendant;  provided,  that 
such  husband  or  wife  shall  be  a  competent  witness  to  testify  against 
any  such  defendant  where  the  prosecution  is  for  any  unlawful  assault 
or  violence  forcibly  committed  by  the  defendant  on  the  person  of 
such  witness. 

NEW  YORK. 

Constitution,  1895. 

Art.  I,  §  3.  ...  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  be  a 
witness  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief. 

§  6.  No  person  shall  ....  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to 
be  a  witness  against  himself. 

Art.  XIII,  §  4.  Any  person  charged  with  receiving  a  bribe,  or 
with  offering  or  promising  a  bribe,  shall  be  permitted  to  testify  in 
his  own  behalf  in  any  civil  or  criminal  prosecution  therefor. 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure  (Birdseye's  Revised  Statutes,  1896). 

§  828.  Except  as  otherwise  specially  prescribed  in  this  title,  a 
person  shall  not  be  excluded  or  excused  from  being  a  witness,  by 
reason  of  his  or  her  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  or  special  pro- 


NEW  YORK.  781 

ceeding;  or  because  he  or  she  is  a  party  thereto;  or  the  husband  or 
wife  of  a  party  thereto,  or  of  a  person  in  whose  behalf  an  action  or 
special  proceeding  is  brought,  opposed,  prosecuted,  or  defended. 

§  829.  Upon  the  trial  of  an  action,  or  the  hearing  upon  the  merits 
of  a  special  proceeding,  a  party  or  a  person  interested  in  the  event, 
or  a  person  from,  through,  or  under  whom  such  a  party  or  interested 
person  derives  his  interest  or  title  by  assignment  or  otherwise,  shall 
not  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  or  interest,  or  in 
behalf  of  the  party  succeeding  to  his  title  or  interest,  against  the 
executor,  administrator,  or  survivor  of  a  deceased  person,  or  the 
committee  of  a  lunatic,  or  a  person  deriving  his  title  or  interest  from, 
through,  or  under  a  deceased  person  or  lunatic,  by  assignment  or 
otherwise,  concerning  a  personal  transaction  or  communication  be- 
tween the  witness  and  the  deceased  person  or  lunatic,  except  where 
the  executor,  administrator,  survivor,  committee,  or  person  so  deriv- 
ing title  or  interest  is  examined  in  his  own  behalf,  or  the  testimony 
of  the  lunatic  or  deceased  person  is  given  in  evidence  concerning 
the  same  transaction  or  communication.  A  person  shall  not  be 
deemed  interested  for  the  purposes  of  this  section  by  reason  of  being 
a  stockholder  or  officer  of  any  banking  corporation  which  is  a  party 
to  the  proceeding  or  interested  in  the  result  thereof. 

§  831.  A  husband  or  wife  is  not  competent  to  testify  against  the 
other,  upon  the  trial  of  an  action,  or  the  hearing  upon  the  merits  of 
a  special  proceeding,  founded  upon  an  allegation  of  adultery,  except 
to  prove  the  marriage  or  disprove  the  allegation  of  adultery.  A 
husband  or  wife  shall  not  be  compelled,  or,  without  the  consent  of 
the  other  if  living,  allowed  to  disclose  a  confidential  communication 
made  by  one  to  the  other  during  marriage.  In  an  action  for  criminal 
conversation,  the  plaintiff's  wife  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the 
plaintiff,  but  she  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  defendant,  as  to  any 
matter  in  controversy;  except  that  she  cannot,  without  the  plain- 
tiff's consent,  disclose  any  confidential  communication  had  or  made 
between  herself  and  the  plaintiff. 

§  832.  A  person,  who  has  been  convicted  of  a  crime  or  misde- 
meanor, is,  notwithstanding,  a  competent  witness  in  a  civil  or  crim- 
inal action  or  special  proceeding;  but  the  conviction  may  be  proved 
for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the  weight  of  his  testimony,  either  by 
the  record  or  by  his  cross-examination,  upon  which  he  must  answer 
any  question  relevant  to  that  inquiry;  and  the  party  cross-examining 
him  is  not  concluded  by  that  inquiry. 

§  845.  The  usual  mode  of  administering  an  oath,  now  practised, 
by  the  person  who  swears  laying  his  hand  upon  and  kissing  the 
Gospels,  must  be  observed,  where  an  oath  is  administered,  except  as 
otherwise  herein  specially  prescribed  in  this  article. 

§  846.  The  oath  must  be  administered  in  the  following  form,  to 
a  person  who  so  desires,  the  laying  of  the  hand  upon  and  kissing 


782  APPENDIX  I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

the  Gospels  being  omitted :  "You  do  swear,  in  the  presence  of  the 
ever-living  God."  While  so  swearing,  he  may  or  may  not  hold  up 
his  right  hand,  at  his  option. 

§  847.  A  solemn  declaration  or  affirmation,  in  the  following  form, 
must  be  administered  to  a  person  who  declares  that  he  has  conscien- 
tious scruples  against  taking  an  oath,  or  swearing  in  any  form :  "  You 
do  solemnly,  sincerely,  and  truly  declare  and  affirm." 

§  848.  If  the  Court  or  the  officer,  before  which  or  whom  a  person 
is  offered  as  a  witness,  is  satisfied  that  any  peculiar  mode  of  swear- 
ing, in  lieu  of,  or  in  addition  to  laying  the  hand  upon  and  kissing 
the  Gospels,  is,  in  his  opinion,  more  solemn  and  obligatory,  the 
Court  or  officer  may,  in  its  or  his  discretion,  adopt  that  mode  of 
swearing  the  witness. 

§  849.  A  person  believing  in  a  religion,  other  than  the  Christian, 
may  be  sworn  according  to  the  peculiar  ceremonies,  if  any,  of  his 
religion,  instead  of  as  prescribed  in  §  845  or  §  846  of  this  act. 

§  850.  The  Court  or  officer  may  examine  an  infant,  or  a  person 
apparently  of  weak  intellect,  produced  before  it  or  him  as  a  witness, 
to  ascertain  his  capacity  and  the  extent  of  his  knowledge;  and  may 
inquire  of  a  person,  produced  as  a  witness,  what  peculiar  ceremonies 
in  swearing  he  deems  most  obligatory. 

L.  1876,  c.  182,  §  1.  All  persons  jointly  indicted  shall,  upon  the 
trial  of  either,  be  competent  witnesses  for  each  other  the  same  as  if 
not  included  in  the  indictment. 

Penal  Code. 

§  714  (substantially  the  same  as  §  832,  C.  C.  P.). 

§  715.  The  husband  or  wife  of  a  person  indicted  or  accused  of  a 
crime  is  in  all  cases  a  competent  witness,  on  the  examination  or  trial 
of  such  person ;  but  neither  husband  nor  wife  can  be  compelled  to 
disclose  a  confidential  communication,  made  by  one  to  the  other 
during  marriage. 

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure. 

§  10.  No  person  can  be  compelled  in  a  criminal  action  to  be  a 
witness  against  himself. 

NORTH  CAROLINA. 
Constitution,  1875. 

Art.  I,  §  11.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  every  man  has  the  right 
...  to  confront  the  accusers  and  witnesses  with  other  testimony, 
.  .  .  and  not  to  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

Code,  1883. 

§  1192.  No  person  shall  be  deemed  to  be  an  incompetent  witness 
by  reason  of  any  interest  which  a  person  may  have,  or  be  supposed 


NORTH   CAROLINA.  783 

to  have,  in  respect  to  any  deed,  writing,  instrument,  or  other  matter 
whatsoever,  in  support  of  any  prosecution,  wherein  shall  be  ques- 
tioned the  fact  of  forging  such  deed,  writing,  instrument,  or  other 
matter  whatsoever,  or  the  fact  of  uttering,  showing  forth  in  evidence, 
or  disposing  thereof,  knowing  the  same  to  be  forged. 

§  1350.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  be  excluded  by  reason 
of  incapacity  from  interest  or  crime,  from  giving  evidence  either  in 
person  or  by  deposition,  according  to  the  practice  of  the  court,  on 
the  trial  of  any  issue  joined,  or  of  any  matter  or  question,  or  on  any 
inquiry  arising  in  any  suit  or  proceeding,  civil  or  criminal,  in  any 
court,  or  before  any  judge,  justice,  jury,  or  other  person  having,  by 
law,  authority  to  hear,  receive,  and  examine  evidence;  and  every 
person  so  offered  shall  be  admitted  to  give  evidence,  notwithstand- 
ing such  person  may  or  shall  have  an  interest  in  the  matter  in  ques- 
tion, or  in  the  event  of  the  trial  of  the  issue,  or  of  the  suit  or  other 
proceeding  in  which  he  is  offered  as  a  witness.  This  section  shall 
not  be  construed  to  apply  to  attesting  witnesses  to  wills. 

§  1351.  On  the  trial  of  any  issue,  or  of  any  matter  or  question,  or 
on  any  inquiry  arising  in  any  action,  suit,  or  other  proceeding  in 
court,  or  before  any  judge,  justice,  jury,  or  other  person  having,  by 
law,  authority  to  hear  and  examine  evidence,  the  parties  themselves 
and  the  person  in  whose  behalf  any  suit,  or  other  proceeding  may  be 
brought  or  defended,  shall,  except  as  hereinafter  provided,  be  com- 
petent and  compellable  to  give  evidence,  either  viva  voce  or  by  depo- 
sition, according  to  the  practice  of  the  court,  in  behalf  of  either  or 
any  of  the  parties  to  said  action,  suit,  or  other  proceeding.  Noth- 
ing in  this  section  shall  be  construed  to  apply  to  any  action  or  other 
proceeding  in  any  court  instituted  in  consequence  of  adultery,  or  to 
any  action  for  criminal  conversation. 

§  1353.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints,  or  other  pro- 
ceedings against  persons  charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes, 
offences,  and  misdemeanors,  the  person  so  charged  shall  at  his  own 
request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness,  and  his  failure 
to  make  such  request  shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him. 
The  husband,  or  wife  of  the  defendant,  in  all  criminal  actions  or 
proceedings,  shall  be  a  competent  witness  for  the  defendant,  but  the 
failure  of  such  witness  to  be  examined  shall  not  be  used  to  the  preju- 
dice of  the  defence.  But  every  such  person  examined  as  a  witness 
shall  be  subject  to  be  cross-examined  as  are  other  witnesses. 

§  1354.  Nothing  in  this  chapter,  except  as  provided  in  the  pre- 
ceding section,  shall  render  any  person,  who  in  any  criminal  pro- 
ceeding is  charged  with  the  commission  of  a  criminal  offence 
competent  or  compellable  to  give  evidence  against  himself,  nor  shall 
render  any  person  compellable  to  answer  any  question  tending  to 
criminate  himself,  nor  shall  in  any  criminal  proceeding  render  any 
husband  competent  or  compellable  to  give  evidence  against  himself, 


784  APPENDIX  I  :    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

nor  any  wife  competent  or  compellable  to  give  evidence  against  her 
husband :  provided,  that  in  all  criminal  prosecutions  of  a  husband 
for  an  assault  and  battery  upon  the  person  of  his  wife,  or  for  aban- 
doning his  wife,  or  for  neglecting  to  provide  for  her  support,  it  shall 
be  lawful  to  examine  the  wife  in  behalf  of  the  State  against  her 
husband. 

NORTH  DAKOTA. 
Constitution,  1889. 

Art.  I,  §  4.  ...  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  be  a 
witness  or  juror  on  account  of  his  opinion  on  matters  of  religious 
belief. 

§  13.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  ...  be  compelled  in  any  criminal 
case  to  be  a  witness  against  himself. 

§  19.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
evidence  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in 
open  court. 

Revised  Codes,  1895. 

§  5653.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  in  any  action  or  proceeding 
in  any  court,  or  before  any  officer  or  person  having  authority  to  ex- 
amine witnesses  or  hear  evidence,  shall  be  excluded  or  excused  by 
reason  of  such  person's  interest  in  the  event  of  the  action  or  proceed- 
ing; or  because  such  person  is  a  party  thereto,  or  because  such  per- 
son is  the  husband  or  wife  of  a  party  thereto,  or  of  any  person  in 
whose  behalf  such  action  or  proceeding  is  commenced,  prosecuted, 
opposed,  or  defended,  except  as  hereinafter  provided :  — 

1.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife  without 
her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband  without  his  con- 
sent, nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterward,  be,  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication  made 
by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage;  but  this  subdivision  does 
not  apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by  one  against  the  other, 
nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed  by  one 
against  the  other. 

2.  In  civil  actions  or  proceedings  by  or  against  executors,  admin- 
istrators, heirs-at-law,  or  next  of  kin,  in  which  judgment  may  be 
rendered  or  order  entered  for  or  against  them,  neither  party  shall 
be  allowed  to  testify  against  the  other  as  to  any  transaction  what- 
ever with,  or  statement  by  the  testator  or  intestate,  unless  called  to 
testify  thereto  by  the  opposite  party.     But  if  the  testimony  of  a 
party  to  the  action  or  proceeding  has  been  taken  and  he  shall  after- 
wards die,  and  after  his  death  the  testimony  so  taken  shall  be  used 
upon  any  trial  or  hearing  in  behalf  of  his  executors,  administrators, 
heirs-at-law,  or  next  of  kin,  then  the  other  party  shall  be  a  compe- 
tent witness  as  to  any  and  all  matters  to  which  the  testimony  so 
taken  relates. 


OHIO.  785 

§  8188.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  included  in  the  same  infor- 
mation or  indictment,  the  Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defend- 
ants have  gone  into  their  defence,  on  the  application  of  the  State's 
attorney,  direct  any  defendant  to  be  discharged  from  the  information 
or  indictment,  that  he  may  be  a  witness  for  the  State. 

§  8189.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  included  in  the  same  infor- 
mation or  indictment,  and  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  in  regard 
to  a  particular  defendant  there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  put  him 
on  his  defence,  it  must  order  him  to  be  discharged  before  the  evi- 
dence is  closed  that  he  may  be  a  witness  for  his  co-defendant. 

§  8190.  In  the  trial  of  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  before  any 
Court  or  magistrate  of  this  State,  whether  prosecuted  by  informa- 
tion, indictment,  complaint,  or  otherwise,  the  defendant  shall,  at  his 
own  request  and  not  otherwise,  be  deemed  a  competent  witness ;  but 
his  neglect  or  refusal  to  testify  shall  not  create  or  raise  any  presump- 
tion of  guilt  against  him ;  nor  shall  such  neglect  or  refusal  be  re- 
ferred to  by  any  attorney  prosecuting  the  case,  or  considered  by  the 
Court  or  jury  before  whom  the  trial  takes  place. 

OHIO. 
Constitution,  1851. 

Art.  I,  §  7.  .  .  .  Nor  shall  any  person  be  incompetent  to  be  a  wit- 
ness on  account  of  his  religious  belief;  but  nothing  herein  shall  be 
construed  to  dispense  with  oaths  and  affirmations. 

§  10.  ...  In  any  trial,  in  any  court,  the  party  accused  shall  be 
allowed  ...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face ;  .  .  .  nor  shall  any 
person  be  compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself. 

Annotated  Revised  Statutes,  1898  (Bates). 

§  5240.  All  persons  are  competent  witnesses  except  those  of  un- 
sound mind,  and  children  under  ten  years  of  age  who  appear  incap- 
able of  receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  and  transactions 
respecting  which  they  are  examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  5241.  The  following  persons  shall  not  testify  in  certain 
respects :  — 

1.  An  attorney,  concerning  a  communication  made  to  him  by  his 
client  in  that  relation,  or  his  advice  to  his  client;  or  a  physician, 
concerning  a  communication  made  to  him  by  his  patient  in  that  rela- 
tion, or  his  advice  to  his  patient;  but  the  attorney  or  physician  may 
testify  by  express  consent  of  the  client  or  patient;  and  if  the  client 
or  patient  voluntarily  testify,  the  attorney  or  physician   may  be 
compelled  to  testify  on  the  same  subject. 

2.  A  clergyman  or  priest,  concerning  a  confession  made  to  him  in 
his  professional  character,  in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined  by 
the  church  to  which  he  belongs. 

VOL.  i.  —  50 


786  APPENDIX   I  :    CONSTITUTIONS   AND  STATUTES. 

3.  Husband  or  wife,  concerning  any  communication  made  by  one 
to  the  other,  or  an  act  done  by  either  in  the  presence  of  the  other, 
during  coverture,  unless  the  communication  was  made,  or  act  done, 
in  the  known  presence  or  hearing  of  a  third  person  competent  to  be 
a  witness ;  and  the  rule  shall  be  the  same  if  the  marital  relation  has 
ceased  to  exist. 

4.  A  person  who  assigns  his  claim  or  interest,  concerning   any 
matter  in  respect  to  which  he  would  not,  if  a  party,  be  permitted  to 
testify. 

5.  A  person  who,  if  a  party,  would  be  restricted  in  his  evidence 
under  §  5242,  shall,  where  the  property  or  thing  is  sold  or  trans- 
ferred by  an  executor,  administrator,  guardian,  trustee,  -heir,  devisee, 
or  legatee,  be  restricted  in  the  same  manner  in  any  action  or  pro- 
ceeding concerning  such  property  or  thing. 

§  5242.  A  party  shall  not  testify  where  the  adverse  party  is  a 
guardian  or  trustee  of  either  a  deaf  and  dumb  or  an  insane  person, 
or  of  a  child  of  a  deceased  person,  or  is  an  executor  or  administrator, 
or  claims  or  defends  as  heir,  grantee,  assignee,  devisee,  or  legatee  of 
a  deceased  person,  except  — 

1.  To  facts  which  occurred   subsequent   to  the   appointment  of 
the  guardian  or  trustee  of  an  insane  person,  and,  in  the  other  cases, 
subsequent  to  the  time  the  decedent,  grantor,  assignor,  or  testator 
died. 

2.  When  the  action  or  proceeding  relates  to  a  contract  made 
through  an  agent  by  a  person   since   deceased,  and  the  agent  is 
competent  to  testify  as  a  witness,  a  party  may  testify  on  the  same 
subject. 

3.  If  a  party,  or  one  having  a  direct  interest,  testify  to  transac- 
tions or  conversations  with  another  party,  the  latter  may  testify 
as  to  the  same  transactions  or  conversations. 

4.  If  a  party  offer  evidence  of  conversations  or  admissions  of  the 
opposite  party,  the  latter  may  testify  concerning  the  same  conversa- 
tions or  admissions. 

5.  In  an  action  or  proceeding  by  or  against  a  partner  or  joint  con- 
tractor, the  adverse  party  shall  not  testify  to  transactions  with  or 
admissions  by  a  partner  or  joint  contractor  since  deceased,  unless 
the  same  were  made  in  the   presence  of  the  surviving  partner  or 
joint  contractor;  and  this  rule  shall  be  applied  without  regard  to  the 
character  in  which  the  parties  sue  or  are  sued. 

6.  If  the  claim  or  defence  is  founded  on  a  book  account,  a  party 
may  testify  that  the  book  is  his  account-book,  that  it  is  a  book  of 
original  entries,  that  the  entries  therein  were  made  by  himself,  a 
person  since  deceased,  or  a  disinterested  person,  non-resident  of  the 
county;  whereupon  the  book  shall  be  competent  evidence,  and  such 
book  may  be  admitted  in  evidence,  in  any  case,  without  regard  to 
the  parties,  upon  like  proof  by  any  competent  witness. 


OKLAHOMA.  787 

7.  If  a  party,  after  testifying  orally,  die,  the  evidence  may  be 
proved  by  either  party  on  a  further  trial  of  the  case,  whereupon  the 
opposite  party  may  testify  to  the  same  matters. 

8.  If  a  party  die,  and  his  deposition  be  offered  in  evidence,  the 
opposite   party  may   testify  as  to   all  competent   matters   therein. 
Nothing  in  this  section  contained  shall  apply  to  actions  for  causing 
death,  or  actions  or  proceedings  involving  the  validity  of  a  deed, 
will,  or  codicil;  and  when  a  case  is  plainly  within  the  reason  and 
spirit  of  the  last  three  sections,  though  not  within  the  strict  letter, 
their  principles  shall  be  applied. 

§  7284.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any  crim- 
inal prosecution  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  same, 
as  a  party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  any  crime ; 
and  husband  and  wife  shall  be  competent  witnesses  to  testify  in 
behalf  of  each  other  in  all  criminal  prosecutions;  but  such  interest, 
conviction,  or  relationship  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose  of  affect- 
ing his  or  her  credibility.  But  husband  or  wife  shall  not  testify 
concerning  any  communication  made  by  one  to  the  other,  or  act  done 
by  either  in  the  presence  of  each  other  during  coverture,  unless  the 
communication  was  made  or  act  done  in  the  known  presence  or  hear- 
ing of  a  third  person  competent  to  be  a  witness,  or  unless  in  case  of 
personal  injury  by  either  the  husband  and  [or  ?]  wife  to  the  other,  or 
in  case  of  neglect  or  cruelty  of  either  to  their  minor  children  under 
ten  years  of  age.  And  the  rule  shall  be  the  same  if  the  marital 
relation  has  ceased  to  exist;  provided,  that  the  presence  or  where- 
abouts of  the  husband  or  wife  shall  not  be  construed  to  be  an  act 
under  this  section. 

§  7285.  On  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  complaints,  and  other  pro- 
ceedings, against  a  person  charged  with  the  commission  of  an  offence, 
the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request,  but  not  otherwise, 
be  a  competent  witness ;  but  his  neglect  or  refusal  to  testify  shall 
not  create  any  presumption  against  him,  nor  shall  any  reference  be 
made  to,  nor  any  comment  be  made  upon,  such  neglect  or  refusal. 


OKLAHOMA. 
Statutes,  1893. 

Ch.  66,  §  331.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  any 
civil  action  or  proceeding  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of 
the  same,  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of 
a  crime ;  but  such  interest  or  conviction  may  be  shown  for  the  pur- 
pose of  affecting  his  credibility. 

§  333.  Any  party  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  may  compel  any 
adverse  party  or  person  for  whose  benefit  such  action  is  instituted, 
prosecuted,  or  defended,  at  the  trial  or  by  deposition,  to  testify  as 


788        APPENDIX  I  :  CONSTITUTIONS  AND  STATUTES. 

a  witness  in  the  same  manner  and  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  other 
witnesses. 

§  334.  No  party  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  in 
respect  to  any  transaction  or  communication  had  personally  by  such 
party  with  a  deceased  person,  when  the  adverse  party  is  the  exec- 
utor, administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  surviving  partner,  or 
assignee  of  such  deceased  person,  where  they  have  acquired  title  to 
the  cause  of  action  immediately  from  such  deceased  person;  nor  shall 
the  assignor  of  a  thing  in  action  be  allowed  to  testify  in  behalf  of 
such  party  concerning  any  transaction  or  communication  had  per- 
sonally by  such  assignor  with  a  deceased  person  in  any  such  case ; 
nor  shall  such  party  or  assignor  be  competent  to  testify  to  any  trans- 
action had  personally  by  such  party  or  assignor  with  a  deceased 
partner  or  joint  contractor  in  the  absence  of  his  surviving  partner  or 
joint  contractor,  when  such  surviving  partner  or  joint  contractor  is 
an  adverse  party.  If  the  testimony  of  a  party  to  the  action  or  pro- 
ceeding has  been  taken,  and  he  afterwards  die,  and  the  testimony  so 
taken  shall  be  used  after  his  death,  in  behalf  of  executors,  adminis- 
trators, heirs-at-law,  next  of  kin,  assignee,  surviving  partner,  or 
joint  contractor,  the  other  party  or  the  assignor  shall  be  competent 
to  testify  as  to  any  and  all  matters  to  which  the  testimony  so  taken 
relates. 

§  335.    The  following  persons  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify :  — 

First,  persons  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  pro- 
duction for  examination. 

Second,  children  under  ten  years  of  age  who  appear  incapable  of 
receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are 
examined,  or  of  relating  them  truly. 

Third,  husband  and  wife,  for  or  against  each  other,  except  con- 
cerning transactions  in  which  one  acted  as  the  agent  of  the  other,  or 
when  they  are  joint  parties  and  have  a  joint  interest  in  the  action ; 
but  in  no  case  shall  either  be  permitted  to  testify  concerning  any 
communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  marriage,  whether 
called  while  that  relation  subsisted  or  afterwards. 

Fourth,  an  attorney,  concerning  any  communication  made  to  him 
by  his  client  in  that  relation,  or  his  advice  thereon,  without  the 
client's  consent. 

Fifth,  a  clergyman  or  priest  concerning  any  confession  made  to 
him  in  his  professional  character  in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined 
by  the  church  to  which  he  belongs,  without  the  consent  of  the  person 
making  the  confession. 

Sixth,  a  physician  or  surgeon  concerning  any  communication  made 
to  him  by  his  patient  with  reference  to  any  physical  or  supposed 
physical  disease,  or  any  knowledge  obtained  by  a  personal  examina- 
tion of  any  such  patient:  provided,  that  if  a  person  offer  himself  as 
a  witness,  that  is  to  be  deemed  a  consent  to  the  examination;  also, 


OREGON.  789 

if  [also  of  ?]  an  attorney,  clergyman  or  priest,  physician  or  surgeon 
on  the  same  subject,  within  the  meaning  of  the  last  three  subdivisions 
of  this  section. 

Ch.  68,  §  9.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  included  in  the  indict- 
ment, the  Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendants  have  gone 
into  their  defence,  on  the  application  of  the  district  attorney,  direct 
any  defendant  to  be  discharged  from  the  indictment,  that  he  may 
be  a  witness  for  the  Territory. 

§  10.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  included  in  the  same  indict- 
ment, and  the  Court  is  of  opinion  that  in  regard  to  a  particular  de- 
fendant there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  put  him  on  his  defence,  it 
must,  before  the  evidence  is  closed,  in  order  that  he  may  be  a  witness 
for  his  co-defendant,  submit  its  said  opinion  to  the  jury,  who,  if 
they  so  find,  may  acquit  the  particular  defendant  for  the  purpose 
aforesaid. 

§  11.  On  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  informations,  complaints, 
and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged  with  the  commission 
of  a  crime,  offences,  and  misdemeanors  before  any  Court  or  commit- 
ting magistrate  in  this  Territory,  the  person  charged  shall  at  his 
own  request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness,  and  his 
failure  to  make  such  request  shall  not  create  any  presumption  against 
him,  nor  be  mentioned  on  the  trial;  if  commented  upon  by  counsel,  it 
shall  be  ground  for  a  new  trial. 

§  12.  The  rules  of  evidence  in  civil  cases  are  applicable  also  to 
criminal  cases,  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  chapter. 

OREGON. 
Constitution,  1859. 

Art.  I,  §  6.  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  as  a  witness 
or  juror  in  consequence  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  religion,  nor  be 
questioned  in  any  court  of  justice,  touching  his  religious  belief,  to 
affect  the  weight  of  his  testimony. 

§  7.  The  mode  of  administering  an  oath  or  affirmation  shall  be 
such  as  may  be  most  consistent  with  and  binding  upon  the  conscience 
of  the  person  to  whom  such  oath  or  affirmation  may  be  administered. 

§  11.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  have  the 
right  ...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face. 

§  12.  No  person  shall  ...  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  prosecu- 
tion to  testify  against  himself. 

§  24.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  confession  in 
open  court. 

Codes  and  General  Laws,  1892  (Hill). 

§  710.  All  persons  without  exception,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided in  this  title,  who,  having  organs  of  sense  can  perceive,  and 


790  APPENDIX   i:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

perceiving  can  make  known  their  perceptions  to  others,  may  be  wit* 
nesses.  Therefore  neither  parties  nor  other  persons  who  have  an 
interest  in  the  event  of  an  action,  suit,  or  proceeding  are  excluded ; 
nor  those  who  have  been  convicted  of  crime ;  nor  persons  on  account 
of  their  opinions  on  matters  of  religious  belief;  although  in  every 
case,  except  the  latter,  the  credibility  of  the  witness  may  be  drawn 
in  question,  as  provided  in  §  683. 

§  711.    The  following  persons  are  not  admissible:  — 

1.  Those  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production  for 
examination. 

2.  Children  xinder  ten  years  of  age,  who  appear  incapable  of  re- 
ceiving just   impressions  of  the  facts  respecting   which   they  are 
examined,   or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  712.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  encourage  confidence,  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate;  there- 
fore a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following 
cases : — 

1.  A  husband  shall  not  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife  with- 
out her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband  without  his 
consent ;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterwards,  be,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication  made 
by  one  to  the  other  during  marriage.  But  the  exception  does  not 
apply  to  a  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  by  one  against  the  other, 
nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed  by  one 
against  the  other. 

§  713.  If  a  p'irty  to  the  suit,  action,  or  proceeding  offer  himself 
as  a  witness,  that  is  to  be  deemed  a  consent  to  the  examination  also 
of  a  wife,  husband,  attorney,  clergyman,  physician,  or  surgeon  on  the 
same  subject,  within  the  meaning  of  subdivisions  1,  2,  3,  and  4  of 
the  last  section. 

§  1361.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  charged  in  the  same  indict- 
ment, the  Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendant  has  gone  into 
his  defence,  on  the  application  of  the  district  attorney,  direct  any 
defendant  to  be  discharged  from  the  indictment,  so  that  he  may  be  a 
witness  for  the  State. 

§  1362.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  charged  in  the  same  indict- 
ment, and  the  Court  is  of  opinion  that,  in  regard  to  a  particular  de- 
fendant, there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  put  him  on  his  defence, 
it  must,  if  requested  by  another  defendant  then  on  trial,  order  him 
to  be  discharged  from  the  indictment,  before  the  evidence  is  closed, 
that  he  may  be  a  witness  for  his  co-defendant. 

§  1364.  The  law  of  evidence  in  civil  actions  is  also  the  law  of 
evidence  in  criminal  actions  and  proceedings,  except  as  otherwise 
specially  provided  in  this  Code. 

§  1365.  On  the  trial  of  or  examination  upon  all  indictments,  com- 
plaints, information,  and  other  proceedings  before  any  Court,  magis- 


PENNSYLVANIA.  791 

trate,  jury,  grand  jury,  or  other  tribunal,  against  persons  accused  or 
charged  with  the  commission  of  crimes  or  offences,  the  person  so 
charged  or  accused  shall,  at  his  own  request  but  not  otherwise,  be 
deemed  a  competent  witness,  the  credit  to  be  given  to  his  testimony 
being  left  solely  to  the  jury,  under  the  instructions  of  the  Court,  or 
to  the  discrimination  of  the  magistrate,  grand  jury,  or  other  tribunal 
before  which  such  testimony  may  be  given:  provided,  his  waiver  of 
such  right  shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him;  that  such 
defendant  or  accused,  when  offering  his  testimony  as  a  witness  in 
his  own  behalf,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  given  to  the  prosecution  a 
right  to  cross-examination  upon  all  facts  to  which  he  has  testified, 
tending  to  his  conviction  or  acquittal. 

§  1366.  In  all  criminal  actions,  where  the  husband  is  the  party 
accused,  the  wife  shall  be  a  competent  witness,  and  when  the  wife 
is  the  party  accused,  the  husband  shall  be  a  competent  witness ;  but 
neither  husband  nor  wife,  in  such  cases,  shall  be  compelled  or 
allowed  to  testify  in  such  case  unless  by  consent  of  both  of  them; 
provided,  that  in  all  cases  of  personal  violence  upon  either  by  the 
other,  the  injured  party,  husband  or  wife,  shall  be  allowed  to  testify 
against  the  other. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

Constitution,  1874. 

Art.  I,  §  9.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  hath  a  right 
...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face;  ...  he  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

Art.  Ill,  §  32.  Any  person  may  be  compelled  to  testify,  in  any 
lawful  investigation  or  judicial  proceeding,  against  any  person  who 
may  be  charged  with  having  committed  the  offence  of  bribery  or 
corrupt  solicitation,  or  practices  of  solicitation,  and  shall  not  be 
permitted  to  withhold  his  testimony  upon  the  ground  that  it  may 
criminate  himself  or  subject  him  to  public  infamy;  but  such  testi- 
mony shall  not  afterwards  be  used  against  him  in  any  judicial  pro- 
ceeding, except  for  perjury  in  giving  such  testimony. 

Art.  VIII,  §  10.  In  trials  of  contested  elections  and  in  proceed- 
ings for  the  investigation  of  elections,  no  person  shall  be  permitted, 
etc.  [as  in  Art.  Ill,  §  32]. 

Digest  of  Laws,  1896  (Pepper  &  Lewis). 

Title  "  Witnesses,"  §  1.  Except  upon  a  preliminary  hearing  before 
a  magistrate  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  a  person 
charged  with  a  criminal  offence  triable  in  the  Court  of  Oyer  and 
Terminer  ought  to  be  committed  for  trial,  and  except  also  upon  a 
hearing  under  habeas  corpus  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether 
bail  ought  to  be  taken  upon  a  commitment  for  murder  in  the  first 


792  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

degree,  or  for  the  purpose  of  determining  in  any  case  how  much  bail 
ought  to  be  required,  or  for  the  purpose  of  determining  in  any  case 
whether  a  person  committed  for  trial  ought  to  be  further  held,  and 
except,  also,  upon  hearings  before  a  grand  jury,  in  none  of  which 
cases  shall  evidence  for  the  defendant  be  heard,  and  except,  also, 
as  provided  in  §  2  of  this  act,  all  persons  shall  be  fully  competent 
witnesses  in  any  criminal  proceeding  before  any  tribunal. 

§  2.  In  such  criminal  proceedings,  a  person  who  has  been  con- 
victed in  a  court  of  this  Commonwealth  of  perjury,  which  term  is 
hereby  declared  to  include  subornation  of  perjury,  shall  not  be  a 
competent  witness  for  any  purpose,  although  his  sentence  may  have 
been  fully  complied  with,  unless  the  judgment  of  conviction  be 
judicially  set  aside  or  reserved  [reversed  ?],  or  unless  the  proceed- 
ing be  one  to  punish  or  prevent  injury  or  violence  attempted,  done, 
or  threatened  to  his  person  or  property,  in  which  cases  he  shall  be 
competent  to  testify. 

§  3.  Nor  shall  husband  and  wife  be  competent  or  permitted  to 
testify  against  each  other,  or  in  support  of  a  criminal  charge  of 
adultery  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  or  with  the  other,  except 
that,  in  proceedings  for  desertion  and  maintenance,  and  in  any 
criminal  proceeding  against  either  for  bodily  injury  or  violence 
attempted,  done,  or  threatened  upon  the  other,  each  shall  be  a  com- 
petent witness  against  the  other,  and  except,  also,  that  either  shall 
be  competent  merely  to  prove  the  fact  of  marringe  in  support  of  a 
criminal  charge  of  adultery  alleged  to  have  been  committed  by  or 
with  the  other. 

§  4.  Nor  shall  either  husband  or  wife  be  competent  or  permitted 
to  testify  to  confidential  communications  made  by  one  to  the  other, 
unless  this  privilege  be  waived  upon  the  trial. 

§  8.  In  any  civil  proceeding  before  any  tribunal  of  this  Common- 
wealth, or  conducted  by  virtue  of  its  order  or  direction,  no  liability 
merely  for  costs  nor  the  right  to  compensation  possessed  by  an  ex- 
ecutor, administrator,  or  other  trustee,  nor  any  interest  merely  in 
the  question  on  trial,  nor  any  other  interest  or  policy  of  law,  except 
as  is  provided  in  §  5  [11]  of  this  act,  shall  make  any  person  incom- 
petent as  a  witness. 

§  9.    (Provisions  of  §  2,  supra,  applied  to  civil  proceedings.) 

§  10.    (Provisions  of  §  4,  supra,  applied  to  civil  proceedings.) 

§  11.  Nor  shall  husband  or  wife  be  competent  or  permitted  to 
testify  against  each  other,  except  in  those  proceedings  for  divorce  in 
which  personal  service  of  the  subpoena  or  of  a  rule  to  take  deposi- 
tions has  been  made  upon  the  opposite  party,  or  in  which  the  oppo- 
site party  appears  and  defends,  in  which  case  either  party  may 
testify  fully  against  the  other,  and  except  also  that  in  any  proceed- 
ing for  divorce  either  party  may  be  called  merely  to  prove  the  fact 
of  marriage. 


PENNSYLVANIA.  793 

§  12.  In  any  proceedings  brought  by  either  under  the  provisions 
of  section  three  [aliubi]  to  protect  or  recover  the  separate  property 
of  either,  both  shall  be  fully  competent  witnesses,  except  that  neither 
may  testify  to  confidential  communications  made  by  one  to  the  other, 
unless  this  privilege  be  waived  upon  the  trial. 

§  14.  Nor,  where  any  party  to  a  thing  or  contract  in  action  is  dead, 
or  has  been  adjudged  a  lunatic,  and  his  right  thereto  or  therein  has 
passed,  either  by  his  own  act  or  by  the  act  of  the  law,  to  party  on 
the  record  who  represents  his  interest  in  the  subject  in  controversy, 
shall  any  surviving  or  remaining  party  to  such  thing  or  contract,  or 
any  other  person  whose  interest  shall  be  adverse  to  the  said  right  of 
such  deceased  or  lunatic  party,  be  a  competent  witness  to  any  matter 
occurring  before  the  death  of  said  party  or  the  adjudication  of  his 
lunacy;  unless  the  proceeding  is  by  or  against  the  surviving  or 
remaining  partners,  joint  promisors,  or  joint  promisees,  of  such 
deceased  or  lunatic  party,  and  the  matter  occurred  between  such 
surviving  or  remaining  partners,  joint  promisors,  or  joint  promisees 
and  the  other  party  on  the  record,  or  between  such  surviving  or 
remaining  partners,  promisors,  or  promisees  and  the  person  having 
an  interest  adverse  to  them,  in  which  case  any  person  may  testify  to 
such  matters;  or,  unless  the  action  be  ejectment  against  several 
defendants,  and  one  or  more  of  said  defendants  disclaims  of  record 
any  title  to  the  premises  in  controversy  at  the  time  the  suit  was 
brought  and  also  pays  into  court  the  costs  accrued  at  the  time  of  his 
disclaimer,  or  gives  security  therefor  as  the  Court  in  its  discretion 
may  direct,  in  which  case  such  disclaiming  defendant  shall  be  a 
fully  competent  witness;  or,  unless  the  issue  or  inquiry  be  devisavit 
vel  non,  or  be  any  other  issue  or  inquiry  respecting  the  property  of 
a  deceased  owner,  and  the  controversy  be  between  parties  respec- 
tively claiming  such  property  by  devolution  on  the  death  of  such 
owner,  in  which  case  all  persons  shall  be  fully  competent  witnesses. 

§  15.  But  no  person  who  is  incompetent  under  clauses  (a),  (&), 
(c),  and  (d)  [§§  9,  10,  11,  13,  supra]  of  this  section  shall  become 
competent  by  the  general  language  of  clause  (e)  [§  14,  supra.] 

§  16.  Any  person,  who  is  incompetent  under  clause  (e)  [§  14, 
supra]  of  section  five  by  reason  of  interest,  may,  nevertheless,  be 
called  to  testify  against  his  interest,  and  in  that  event  he  shall  be- 
come a  fully  competent  witness  for  either  party;  and  such  person 
shall  also  become  fully  competent  for  either  party  by  a  release  or 
extinguishment  in  good  faith  of  his  interest,  upon  which  good  faith 
the  trial  judge  shall  decide  as  a  preliminary  question. 

§  18.  Hereafter,  in  any  civil  proceeding  before  any  tribunal  of 
this  Commonwealth,  or  conducted  by  virtue  of  its  order  or  direction, 
although  a  party  to  the  thing  or  contract  in  action  may  be  dead  or 
may  have  been  adjudged  a  lunatic,  and  his  right  thereto  or  therein 
may  have  passed,  either  by  his  own  act  or  by  the  act  of  the  law,  to  a 


794  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

party  on  a  record  who  [rejpresents  his  interest  in  the  subject  in 
controversy,  nevertheless,  any  surviving  or  remaining  party  to  such 
tning  or  contract  or  any  other  person  whose  interest  is  adverse  to 
the  said  right  of  such  deceased  or  lunatic  party,  shall  be  a  compe- 
tent witness  to  any  relevant  matter,  although  it  may  have  occurred 
before  the  death  of  said  party  or  the  adjudication  of  his  lunacy ;  if 
and  only  if  such  relevant  matter  occurred  between  himself  and 
another  person  who  may  be  living  at  the  time  of  the  trial  and  may  be 
competent  to  testify,  and  who  does  so  testify  upon  the  trial,  against 
such  surviving  or  remaining  party  or  against  the  person  whose  in- 
terest may  be  thus  adverse,  or  if  such  relevant  matter  occurred  in 
the  presence  or  hearing  of  such  other  living  or  competent  person. 

§  21.  In  any  civil  proceeding,  whether  or  not  it  be  brought  or 
defended  by  a  person  representing  the  interests  of  a  deceased  or 
lunatic  assignor  of  any  thing  or  contract  in  action,  a  party  to  the 
record  or  a  person  for  whose  immediate  benefit  such  proceeding  is 
prosecuted  or  defended,  or  any  other  person  whose  interest  is  adverse 
to  the  party  calling  him  as  a  witness,  may  be  compelled  by  the 
adverse  party  to  testify  as  if  under  cross-examination,  subject  to  the 
rules  of  evidence  applicable  to  witnesses  under  cross-examination, 
and  the  adverse  party  calling  such  witnesses  shall  not  be  concluded 
by  his  testimony;  but  such  person  so  cross-examined  shall  become 
thereby  a  fully  competent  witness  for  the  other  party  as  to  all  rele- 
vant matters,  whether  or  not  these  matters  were  touched  upon  in  his 
cross-examination;  and  also  where  one  of  several  plaintiffs  or 
defendants,  or  the  person  for  whose  immediate  benefit  such  proceed- 
ing is  prosecuted  or  defended,  or  such  other  person  having  an  ad- 
verse interest,  is  cross-examined  under  this  section,  his  co-plaintiffs 
or  co-defendants  shall  thereby  become  fully  competent  witnesses  on 
their  own  behalf  as  to  all  relevant  matters,  whether  or  not  these 
matters  were  touched  upon  in  such  cross-examination. 

§  22.  Except  defendants  actually  upon  trial  in  a  criminal  court, 
any  competent  witness  may  be  compelled  to  testify  in  any  proceeding, 
civil  or  criminal;  but  he  may  not  be  compelled  to  answer  any  ques- 
tion which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  trial  judge,  would  tend  to  criminate 
him ;  nor  may  the  neglect  or  refusal  of  any  defendant,  actually  upon 
trial  in  a  criminal  court,  to  offer  himself  as  a  witness  be  treated  as 
creating  any  presumption  against  him,  or  be  adversely  referred  to 
by  Court  or  counsel  during  the  trial. 

RHODE  ISLAND. 
Constitution,  1842. 

Art.  I,  §  3.  ...  [One's  opinion  in  matters  of  religion]  shall  in 
no  wise  diminish,  enlarge,  or  affect  his  civil  capacity. 

§  10.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the 
right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 


SOUTH   CAROLINA.  795 

§  13.  No  man  in  a  court  of  common  law  shall  be  compelled  to 
give  evidence  criminating  himself. 

General  Laws,  1896. 

Ch.  244,  §  35.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  from  testifying  in 
any  action  at  law,  suit  in  equity,  or  other  proceeding  at  law  or  in 
equity,  by  reason  of  his  being  interested  therein  or  being  a  party 
thereto. 

§  37.  In  the  trial  of  every  civil  cause,  the  husband  or  wife  of 
either  party  shall  be  deemed  a  competent  witness:  provided,  that 
neither  shall  be  permitted  to  give  any  testimony  tending  to  crimi- 
nate the  other  or  to  disclose  any  communication  made  to  him  or  her 
by  the  other,  during  their  marriage,  except  on  trials  of  petitions  for 
divorce  between  them. 

§  40.  No  person  shall  be  deemed  an  incompetent  witness  because 
of  his  conviction  of  any  crime,  or  sentence  to  imprisonment  there- 
for; but  shall  be  admitted  to  testify  like  any  other  witness,  except 
that  conviction  or  sentence  for  any  crime  or  misdemeanor  may  be 
shown  to  affect  his  credibility. 

§  41.  No  respondent  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  offering  himself  as 
a  witness,  shall  be  excluded  from  testifying  because  he  is  such  re- 
spondent; and  neglect  Or  refusal  so  to  testify  shall  create  no  pre- 
sumption nor  be  used  in  argument  against  him. 

§  42.  The  husband  or  wife  of  any  respondent  in  a  criminal  prose- 
cution, offering  himself  or  herself  as  a  witness,  shall  not  be  excluded 
from  testifying  therein  because  he  or  she  is  the  husband  or  wife  of 
such  respondent. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA. 
Constitution,  1882. 

Art.  I,  §  12.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  .  .  . 
or  be  subjected  in  law  to  any  other  restraints  or  disqualifications 
in  regard  to  any  personal  rights  than  such  as  are  laid  upon  others 
under  like  circumstances. 

§  13.  No  person  shall  ...  be  compelled  to  accuse  or  furnish 
evidence  against  himself;  and  every  person  shall  have  a  right  .  .  . 
to  meet  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to  face. 

General  Statutes,  1882. 

§  2231.  In  the  trial  of  all  criminal  cases,  the  defendant  shall  be 
allowed  to  testify  (if  he  desires  to  do  so,  and  not  otherwise)  as  to 
the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case. 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1882. 

§  391.  A  party  to  an  action  may  be  examined  as  a  witness,  at  the 
instance  of  the  adverse  party,  or  of  any  one  of  several  adverse 


796  APPENDIX   I  :    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

parties,  and  for  that  purpose  may  be  compelled,  in  the  same  manner 
and  subject  to  the  same  rules  of  examination  as  any  other  witness, 
to  testify,  either  at  the  trial,  or  conditionally,  or  upon  commission. 

§  397.  A  person  for  whose  immediate  benefit  the  action  is  prose- 
cuted or  defended,  though  not  a  party  to  the  action,  may  be  examined 
as  a  witness,  in  the  same  manner  and  subject  to  the  same  rules  of 
examination  as  if  he  were  named  as  a  party. 

§  399.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  be  excluded  by  reason 
of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  action. 

§  400.  A  party  to  an  action  or  special  proceeding  in  any  and  all 
courts,  and  before  any  and  all  officers  and  persons  acting  judicially, 
may  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  or  in  behalf  of  any 
other  party,  conditionally,  on  commission,  and  upon  the  trial  or 
hearing  in  the  case,  in  the  same  manner  and  subject  to  the  same 
rules  of  examination  as  any  other  witness :  provided,  however,  that 
no  party  to  the  action  or  proceeding,  nor  any  person  who  has  a  legal 
or  equitable  interest  which  may  be  affected  by  the  event  of  the  action 
or  proceeding,  nor  any  person  who  previous  to  such  examination  has 
had  such  an  interest,  however  the  same  may  have  been  transferred 
to  or  come  to  the  party  to  the  action  or  proceeding,  nor  any  assignor 
of  anything  in  controversy  in  the  action,  shall  be  examined  in  re- 
gard to  any  transaction  or  communication  between  such  witness 
and  a  person  at  the  time  of  such  examination  deceased,  insane,  or 
lunatic,  as  a  witness  against  a  party  then  prosecuting  or  defending 
the  action  as  executor,  administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  as- 
signee, legatee,  devisee,  or  survivor  of  such  deceased  person,  or  as 
assignee  or  committee  of  such  insane  person  or  lunatic,  when  such 
examination,  or  any  judgment  or  determination  in  such  action  or 
proceeding,  can  in  any  manner  affect  the  interest  of  such  witness 
or  the  interest  previously  owned  or  represented  by  him.  But  when 
such  executor,  administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  assignee, 
legatee,  devisee,  survivor,  or  committee  shall  be  examined  on  his 
own  behalf  in  regard  to  such  transaction  or  communication,  or  the 
testimony  of  such  deceased  or  insane  person  or  lunatic,  in  regard  to 
such  transaction  or  communication  (however  the  same  may  have 
been  perpetuated  or  made  competent),  shall  be  given  in  evidence  on 
the  trial  or  hearing  in  behalf  of  such  executor,  administrator,  heir- 
at-law,  next  of  kin,  assignee,  legatee,  devisee,  survivor,  or  com- 
mittee, then  all  persons  not  otherwise  rendered  incompetent  shall  be 
made  competent  witnesses  in  relation  to  such  transaction  or  com- 
munication on  said  trial  or  hearing.  Nothing  contained  in  section 
8  of  this  Code  of  Procedure  shall  be  held  or  construed  to  affect  or 
restrain  the  operation  of  this  section. 

1.  In  any  trial  or  inquiry  in  any  suit,  action,  or  proceeding  in 
any  court  or  before  any  person  having,  by  law,  or  consent  of  parties, 
authority  to  examine  witnesses  or  hear  evidence,  the  husband  or 


TENNESSEE.  797 

wife  of  any  party  thereto,  or  of  any  person  in  whose  behalf  any 
such  suit,  action,  or  proceeding  is  brought,  prosecuted,  opposed,  or 
defended,  shall,  except  as  hereinafter  stated,  be  competent  and  com- 
pellable  to  give  evidence,  the  same  as  any  other  witness,  on  behalf 
of  any  party  to  such  suit,  action,  or  proceeding. 

2.  No  husband  or  wife  shall  be  corapellable  to  disclose  any  confi- 
dential communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  marriage. 

SOUTH  DAKOTA.1 

TENNESSEE. 
Constitution,  1870. 

Art.  I,  §  9.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  hath  the 
right  ...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face,  .  .  .  and  shall  not  be 
compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

Annotated  Code,  1896  (Shannon). 

§  5592.  Every  person  of  sufficient  capacity  to  understand  the  obli- 
gation of  an  oath  is  competent  to  be  a  witness. 

§  5593.  Persons  who  do  not  believe  in  a  God  and  a  future  state  of 
rewards  and  punishments  may  be  witnesses  in  any  cause  pending  in 
any  of  the  courts  of  this  State.  Said  unbelievers  may  solemnly 
affirm  instead  of  taking  an  oath,  and  false  testifying  by  such  persons 
shall  be  punished  as  perjury,  as  [provided]  by  law  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. Such  unbelief  in  God  and  a  future  state  of  rewards  and 
punishments  shall  go  only  to  the  credibility  of  the  witness. 

§  5595.  Persons  are  rendered  incompetent  by  conviction  and  sen- 
tence for  the  following  crimes,  unless  they  have  been  restored  to  full 
citizenship,  under  the  law  provided  for  that  purpose,  viz. :  abuse  of 
female  child,  arson  and  felonious  burning,  bigamy,  burglary,  felo- 
nious breaking  and  entering  mansion  house,  bribery,  buggery,  coun- 
terfeiting, or  violating  any  of  the  provisions  to  suppress  the  same, 
destroying  will,  forgery,  housebreaking,  incest,  larceny,  perjury, 
robbery,  receiving  stolen  property,  rape,  sodomy,  stealing  bills  of 
exchange  or  other  valuable  papers,  subornation  of  perjury. 

§  5596.  In  all  civil  actions  in  the  courts  of  this  State,  no  person 
shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  because  he  or  she  is  a  party  to  or  in- 
terested in  the  issue  tried,  or  because  of  the  disabilities  of  coverture, 
but  all  pewons,  including  husband  and  wife,  shall  be  competent  wit- 
nesses, though  neither  husband  nor  wife  shall  testify  to  any  matter 

1  rjThc  Codes  of  the  Territory  of  Dakota,  last  revised  in  1877,  and  last  compiled  in 
1887,  were  adopted  by  the  State  of  South  Dakota  upon  its  formation  in  1889  ;  but  as 
changes  have  since  the  revision  of  1877  been  made  by  session-laws,  and  as  a  new  official 
revision  of  the  Codes  is  now  in  press,  it  has  not  been  thought  necessary  to  set  out  here 
the  terms  of  the  Territorial  Codes.] 


798  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

that  occurred  between  them  by  virtue  of  or  in  consequence  of  the 
marital  relation. 

§  5597.  It  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  party  to  any  action,  suit, 
or  proceeding  in  any  court  of  this  State  to  testify  as  to  any  trans- 
action or  conversation  with  or  statement  by  any  opposite  party  in 
interest,  if  such  opposite  [party]  is  incapacitated  or  disqualified  to 
testify  thereto,  by  reason  of  idiocy,  lunacy,  or  insanity,  unless 
called  by  the  opposite  side,  and  then  [only]  in  the  discretion  of  the 
Court. 

§  5598.  In  actions  or  proceedings  by  or  against  executors,  admin- 
istrators, or  guardians,  in  which  judgments  may  be  rendered  for  or 
against  them,  neither  party  shall  be  allowed  to  testify'  against  the 
other  as  to  any  transaction  with  or  statement  by  the  testator,  intes- 
tate, or  ward,  unless  called  to  testify  thereto  by  the  opposite  party. 

§  5600.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  presentments,  and  other 
criminal  proceedings,  in  any  of  the  courts  of  this  State,  the  party 
defendant  thereto  may,  at  his  own  request  but  not  otherwise,  be  a 
competent  witness  to  testify  therein. 

§  5601.  The  failure  of  the  party  defendant  to  make  such  request 
and  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf  shall  not  create  any  presumption 
against  him.  But  the  defendant  desiring  to  testify  shall  do  so  before 
any  other  testimony  for  the  defence  is  heard  by  the  Court  trying  the 
case. 

TEXAS. 

Constitution,  1876. 

Art.  I,  §  5.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  to  give  evidence  in 
any  of  the  courts  of  this  State  on  account  of  his  religious  opinions  or 
for  want  of  any  religious  belief,  but  all  oaths  or  affirmations  shall  be 
administered  in  the  mode  most  binding  upon  the  conscience,  and 
shall  be  taken  subject  to  the  pains  and  penalties  of  perjury. 

§  10.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  .  .  .  shall  not  be 
compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself,  .  .  .  shall  be  confronted 
with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

§  22.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  except  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession 
in  open  court. 

Revised  Civil  Statutes,  1895. 

§  2300.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  on  account  of 
color,  nor  because  he  is  a  party  to  the  suit  or  proceeding  or  inter- 
ested in  the  issue  tried. 

§  2301.  The  husband  or  wife  of  a  party  to  a  suit  or  proceeding,  or 
who  is  interested  in  the  issue  to  be  tried,  shall  not  be  incompetent  to 
testify  therein,  except  as  to  confidential  communications  between 
such  husband  and  wife. 


TEXAS.  799 

§  2302.  In  actions  by  or  against  executors,  administrators,  or 
guardians,  in  which  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or  against  them 
as  such,  neither  party  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the  others 
as  to  any  transaction  with  or  statement  by  the  testator  intestate,  or 
ward,  unless  called  to  testify  thereto  by  the  opposite  party ;  and  the 
provisions  of  this  article  shall  extend  to  and  include  all  actions  by 
or  against  the  heirs  or  legal  representatives  of  a  decedent  arising 
out  of  any  transaction  with  such  decedent. 

§  2303.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  on  account  of 
his  religious  opinions  or  for  want  of  any  religious  belief. 

Penal  Code,  1895. 

§  768.  All  persons  are  competent  to  testify  in  criminal  actions 
except  the  following :  — 

1.  Insane  persons,  who  are  in  an  insane  condition  of  mind  at  the 
time  when  they  are  offered  as  witnesses,  or  who  were  in  that  condi- 
tion when  the  events  happened  of  which  they  are  called  to  testify. 

2.  Children  or  other  persons  who,  after  being  examined  by  the 
Court,  appear  not  to  possess  sufficient  intellect  to  relate  transactions 
with  respect  to  which  they  are  interrogated,  or  who  do  not  under- 
stand the  obligation  of  an  oath. 

3.  All  persons  who  have  been  or  may  be  convicted  of  felony  in 
this  State,  or  in  any  other  jurisdiction,  unless  such  conviction  has 
been  legally  set  aside,  or  unless  the  convict  has  been  legally  par- 
doned for  the  crime  of  which  he  was  convicted.     But  no  person  who 
has  been  convicted  of  the  crime  of  perjury,  or  false  swearing,  and 
whose  conviction  has  not  been  legally  set  aside,  shall  have  his  com- 
petency as  a  witness  restored  by  a  pardon,  unless  such  pardon  by  its 
terms  specifically  restore  his  competency  to  testify  in  a  court  of 
justice. 

§  770.  Any  defendant  in  a  criminal  action  shall  be  permitted  to 
testify  in  his  own  behalf  therein ;  but  the  failure  of  any  defendant 
to  so  testify  shall  not  be  taken  as  a  circumstance  against  him,  nor 
shall  the  same  be  alluded  to  or  commented  on  by  counsel  in  the 
cause:  provided,  that  where  there  are  two  or  more  persons  jointly 
charged  or  indicted,  and  a  severance  is  had,  the  privilege  of  testify- 
ing shall  be  extended  only  to  the  person  on  trial. 

§  771.  Persons  charged  as  principals,  accomplices,  or  accessories, 
whether  in  the  same  indictment  or  different  indictments,  cannot  be 
introduced  as  witnesses  for  one  another,  but  they  may  claim  a  sever- 
ance ;  and  if  any  one  or  more  be  acquitted,  or  the  prosecution  against 
them  be  dismissed,  they  may  testify  in  behalf  of  the  others. 

§  773.  All  other  persons  except  those  enumerated  in  articles 
768  and  775,  whatever  may  be  the  relationship  between  the  defend- 
ant and  witness,  are  competent  to  testify,  except  that  an  attorney  at 
law  shall  not  disclose  a  communication  made  to  him  by  his  client 


800  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

during  the  existence  of  that  relationship,  nor  disclose  any  other  fact 
which  came  to  the  knowledge  of  such  attorney  by  reason  of  such 
relationship. 

§  774.  Neither  husband  nor  wife  shall  in  any  case  testify  as  to 
communications  made  by  one  to  the  other  while  married;  nor  shall 
they,  after  the  marriage  relation  ceases,  be  made  witnesses  as  to  any 
such  communication  made  while  the  marriage  relation  subsisted, 
except  in  a  case  where  one  or  the  other  is  prosecuted  for  an  offence, 
and  a  declaration  or  communication  made  by  the  wfe  to  the  hus- 
band, or  by  the  husband  to  the  wife,  goes  to  extenuate  or  justify 
an  offence  for  which  either  is  on  trial. 

§  775.  The  husband  and  wife  may  in  all  criminal  actions  be 
witnesses  for  each  other,  but  they  shall  in  no  case  testify  against 
each  other  except  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  an  offence  committed 
by  one  against  the  other. 

§  776.  No  person  is  incompetent  to  testify  on  account  of  his  relig- 
ious opinion  or  for  the  want  of  any  religious  belief. 

§  777.  A  defendant  jointly  indicted  with  others,  and  who  has 
been  tried  and  convicted,  and  whose  punishment  was  fine  only,  may 
testify  for  the  other  defendant  after  he  has  paid  the  fine  and  costs. 

§  782.  In  trials  for  forgery,  the  person  whose  name  is  alleged  to 
have  been  forged  is  a  competent  witness,  and  in  all  cases  not  other- 
wise specially  provided  for,  the  person  injured  or  attempted  to  be 
injured  is  a  competent  witness. 

UNITED  STATES. 
Constitution,  1787. 

Art.  Ill,  §  3.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless 
on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  con- 
fession in  open  court. 

Amendment  V.  No  person  .  .  .  shall  be  compelled  in  any  crim- 
inal case  to  be  a  witness  against  himself. 

Amendment  VI.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall 
enjoy  the  right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him. 

Revised  Statutes,  1878;  Supplements,  1891,  1895. 

§  858.  In  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  no  witness  shall  be  ex- 
cluded in  any  action  on  account  of  color,  or  in  any  civil  action  be- 
cause he  is  a  party  to  or  interested  in  the  issue  tried:  provided,  that 
in  actions  by  or  against  executors,  administrators,  or  guardians,  in 
which  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or  against  them,  neither  party 
shall  be  allowed  to  testify  against  the  other,  as  to  any  transaction 
with  or  statement  by  the  testator,  intestate,  or  ward,  unless  called  to 
testify  thereto  by  the  opposite  party,  or  required  to  testify  thereto 
by  the  Court.  In  all  other  respects,  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which 


UTAH.  801 

the  court  is  held  shall  be  the  rules  of  decision  as  to  the  competency 
of  witnesses  in  the  Courts  of  the  United  States  in  trials  at  common 
law  and  in  equity  and  admiralty. 

§  1078.  No  witness  shall  be  excluded  in  any  suit  in  the  Court  of 
Claims  on  account  of  color. 

§  1079.  No  claimant,  nor  any  person  from  or  through  whom  any 
such  claimant  derives  his  alleged  title,  claim,  or  right  against  the 
United  States,  nor  any  person  interested  in  any  such  title,  claim,  or 
right,  shall  be  a  competent  witness  in  the  Court  of  Claims  in  sup- 
porting the  same,  and  no  testimony  given  by  such  claimant  or  person 
shall  be  used  except  as  provided  in  the  next  section  [i.  e.  when  taken 
and  offered  by  the  government  attorney]. 

St.  1874,  June  22,  ch.  391,  §  8.  No  officer,  or  other  person  entitled 
to  or  claiming  compensation  under  any  provision  of  this  act  [against 
evading  customs  laws]  shall  be  thereby  disqualified  from  becoming 
a  witness  in  any  action,  suit,  or  proceeding  for  the  recovery,  miti- 
gation, or  remission  thereof  .  .  .  [and  the  defendant  may  testify]. 

St.  1878,  March  16,  ch.  37.  In  the  trial  of  all  indictments,  infor- 
mations, complaints,  and  other  proceedings  against  persons  charged 
with  the  commission  of  crimes,  offences,  and  misdemeanors,  in  the 
United  States  Courts,  Territorial  Courts,  and  Courts  martial,  and 
Courts  of  inquiry,  in  any  State  or  Territory  including  the  District 
of  Columbia,  the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request  but  not 
otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness.  And  his  failure  to  make  such 
request  shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him. 

St.  1887,  March  3,  ch.  397,  §  1.  In  any  proceeding  or  examina- 
tion before  a  grand  jury,  a  judge,  justice,  or  a  United  States  com- 
missioner, or  a  Court,  in  any  prosecution  for  bigamy,  polygamy ,  or 
unlawful  cohabitation,  under  any  statute  of  the  United  States,  the 
lawful  husband  or  wife  of  the  accused  shall  be  a  competent  witness, 
and  may  be  called,  but  shall  not  be  compelled  to  testify  in  such  pro- 
ceeding, examination,  or  prosecution,  without  the  consent  of  the 
husband  or  wife,  as  the  case  may  be.  And  such  witness  shall  not 
be  permitted  to  testify  as  to  any  statement  or  communication  made 
by  either  husband  or  wife  to  each  other,  during  the  existence  of  the 
marriage  relation,  deemed  confidential  at  common  law. 

UTAH. 
Constitution,  1895. 

Art.  I,  §  4.  .  .  .  Nor  shall  any  person  be  incompetent  as  a  wit- 
ness or  juror  on  account  of  religious  belief  or  the  absence  thereof. 

§  12.  In  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  to  be  confronted  by  the  witnesses 
against  him.  .  .  .  The  accused  shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evi- 
dence against  himself;  a  wife  shall  not  be  compelled  to  testify 
against  her  husband,  nor  a  husband  against  his  wife. 
VOL  i.  —  51 


802  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

§  19.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act. 

Revised  Statutes,  1898. 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  §  3412.  All  persons  without  exception, 
otherwise,  than  is  specified  in  the  next  two  sections,  who,  having 
organs  of  sense,  can  perceive,  and,  perceiving,  can  make  known  their 
perceptions  to  others,  may  be  witnesses.  Therefore,  neither  parties 
nor  other  persons  who  have  an  interest  in  the  event  of  an  action  or 
proceeding  are  excluded;  nor  those  who  have  been  convicted  of 
crime ;  nor  persons  on  account  of  their  opinions  on  matters  of  relig- 
ious belief;  although,  in  every  case,  the  credibility  of  the  witness 
may  be  drawn  in  question,  by  the  manner  in  which  he  testifies,  by 
the  character  of  his  testimony,  or  by  evidence  affecting  his  character 
for  truth,  honesty,  or  integrity,  or  his  motives,  or  by  contradictory 
evidence;  and  the  jury  are  the  exclusive  judges  of  his  credibility. 

§  3413.    The  following  persons  cannot  be  witnesses:  — 

1.  Those  who  are  of  unsound  mind  at  the  time  of  their  production 
for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age  who  appear  incapable  of  receiv- 
ing just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are  exam- 
ined, or  of  relating  them  truly. 

3.  A  party  to  any  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  and  any  person 
directly   interested  in  the   event  thereof,    and   any  person  from, 
through,  or  under  whom  such  party  or  interested  person  derives  his 
interest  or  title  or  any  part  thereof,  when  the  adverse  party  in  such 
action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  claims  or  opposes,  sues  or  defends,  as 
guardian  of  any  insane  or  incompetent  person,  or  as  the  executor  or 
administrator,  heir,  legatee,  or  devisee  of  any  deceased  person,  or  as 
guardian,  or  assignee,  or  grantee,  directly  or  remotely,  of  such  heir, 
legatee,  or  devisee,  as  to  any  statement  by  or  transaction  with  such 
deceased,  insane,  or  incompetent  person,  or  matter  of  fact,  whatever, 
which  must  have  been  equally  within  the  knowledge  of  both  the 
witness  and  such  insane,  incompetent,  or  deceased  person,  unless 
such  witness  be  called  to  testify  thereto  by  such  adverse  party,  so 
claiming  or  opposing,  suing  or  defending,  in  such  action,  suit,  or 
proceeding. 

§  3414.  There  are  particular  relations  in  which  it  is  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  encourage  confidence  and  to  preserve  it  inviolate;  there- 
fore, a  person  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  the  following 
cases : — 

1.  A  husband  cannot  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife,  with- 
out her  consent,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband,  without  his 
consent ;  nor  can  either,  during  the  marriage  or  afterward,  be,  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  other,  examined  as  to  any  communication 
made  by  one  to  the  other  during  the  marriage;  but  this  exception 


VERMONT.  803 

does  not  apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by  or  against  the  other, 
nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a  crime  committed  by  one 
against  the  other. 

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  §  5011.  The  rules  for  determining 
the  competency  of  witnesses  in  civil  actions  shall  be  applicable  also 
to  criminal  actions  and  proceedings  except  as  otherwise  provided  in 
this  Code. 

§  4515.  The  accused  shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence 
against  himself;  a  wife  shall  not  be  compelled  to  testify  against  her 
husband,  nor  a  husband  against  his  wife. 

§  5014.  Except  with  the  consent  of  both,  or  in  cases  of  criminal 
violence  upon  one  by  the  other,  neither  husband  nor  wife  shall  be 
a  competent  witness  for  or  against  the  other  in  a  criminal  action 
or  proceeding  to  which  one  or  both  shall  be  parties. 

§  5015.  If  the  defendant  offers  himself  as  a  witness  he  may  be 
cross-examined  by  the  counsel  for  the  State  the  same  as  any  other 
witness.  His  neglect  or  refusal  to  be  a  witness  shall  not  in  any 
manner  prejudice  him,  nor  be  used  against  him  on  the  trial  or 
proceeding. 

§  5016.  When  two  or  more  persons  are  jointly  or  otherwise  con- 
cerned in  the  commission  of  an  offence,  any  one  of  such  persons  may 
testify  for  or  against  the  other  in  relation  to  the  offence  committed, 
but  the  testimony  of  such  witness  must  not  be  used  against  him  in 
any  criminal  action  or  proceeding. 

§  4851.  When  two  or  more  persons  shall  be  included  in  the  same 
charge,  the  Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendants  have  gone 
into  their  defence,  on  the  application  of  the  county  attorney,  or  other 
counsel  for  the  State,  direct  any  defendant  to  be  discharged,  that  he 
may  be  a  witness  for  the  State. 

§  4852.  When  two  or  more  persons  shall  be  included  in  the  same 
charge,  and  the  Court  shall  be  of  the  opinion  that  in  regard  to  a 
particular  defendant  there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  put  him  on 
his  defence,  it  must  order  him  to  be  discharged  before  the  evidence 
is  closed,  that  he  may  be  a  witness  for  his  co-defendant. 


VERMONT. 
Constitution,  1793. 

Chap.  I,  Art.  3.  ...  Nor  can  any  man  be  justly  deprived  or 
abridged  of  any  civil  right  as  a  citizen,  on  account  of  his  religious 
sentiments  or  peculia[r]  mode  of  religious  worship. 

Art.  10.  In  all  prosecutions  for  criminal  offences,  a  person  hath  a 
right  .  .  .  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses;  .  .  .  nor  can  he  be 
compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 


804  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 


Statutes,  1894. 

§  1236.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  a  civil  suit 
or  proceeding,  at  law  or  in  equity,  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the 
event  of  the  same,  as  a  party  or  otherwise;  but  such  interest  may  be 
shown  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credit. 

§  1237.  In  actions,  except  actions  of  book  account,  where  one  of 
the  original  parties  to  the  contract  or  cause  of  action  in  issue  and  on 
trial  is  dead,  or  is  shown  to  the  Court  to  be  insane,  the  other  party 
shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own  favor  except  to  meet  or 
explain  the  testimony  of  living  witnesses  produced  against  him  as  to 
facts  or  circumstances  taking  place  after  the  death  or  insanity  of 
the  other  party;  or  upon  a  question  upon  which  the  testimony  of  the 
party  afterward  deceased  or  insane  has  been  taken  in  writing  or  by  a 
stenographer  in  open  court,  to  be  used  in  such  action,  and  is  used 
therein. 

§  1238.  When  an  executor  or  administrator  is  a  party,  the  other 
party  shall  not  be  permitted  to  testify  in  his  own  favor,  unless  the 
contract  in  issue  was  originally  made  with  a  person  who  is  living 
and  competent  to  testify,  except  as  to  acts  and  contracts  done  or 
made  since  the  probate  of  the  will  or  the  appointment  of  the  admin- 
istrator, and  to  meet  or  explain  the  testimony  of  living  witnesses 
produced  against  him,  as  to  facts  or  circumstances  taking  place  after 
the  death  of  the  other  party. 

§  1239.  In  actions  of  book  account,  and  when  the  matter  in 
issue  and  on  trial  is  proper  matter  of  book  account,  the  party  living 
may  be  a  witness  in  his  own  favor,  so  far  as  to  prove  in  whose 
handwriting  his  charges  are  and  when  made,  and  no  further,  except 
to  meet  or  explain  the  testimony  of  living  witnesses  produced  against 
him  as  to  facts  or  circumstances  taking  place  after  death  of  the 
other  party. 

§  1240.  No  married  woman  shall  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  a 
civil  suit  or  proceeding  at  law  or  in  equity,  prosecuted  in  the  name 
of  or  against  her  husband,  whether  joined  or  not  with  her  husband 
as  a  party, 

In  actions  upon  policies  of  insurance  of  property,  so  far  as  relates 
to  the  amount  and  value  of  the  property  alleged  to  be  injured  or 
destroyed, 

In  actions  against  carriers,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  loss  of  the  prop- 
erty, and  the  amount  and  value  thereof,  and  to  personal  injury 
alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  wife  in  consequence  of  the 
wrongful  act  or  neglect  of  such  carriers, 

In  a  suit  brought  against  the  husband  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
wife; 

Nothing  in  this  section  shall  authorize  or  permit  a  married  woman 


VERMONT.  805 

to  testify  to  admissions  or  conversations  of  her  husband  whether 
made  to  herself  or  to  third  persons. 

§  1241.  In  actions  where  the  husband  and  wife  are  properly  joined, 
either  as  plaintiffs  or  as  defendants,  or  where  either  has  acted  as 
the  agent  of  the  other  in  business  transactions,  they  shall  be  com- 
petent witnesses,  except  that  neither  shall  be  permitted  to  testify  as 
to  conversations  or  admissions  of  the  other. 

§  1242.  A  married  man  shall  not  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  a 
civil  suit  or  proceeding  at  law  or  in  equity,  brought  by  his  wife  upon 
a  policy  of  insurance  of  property  so  far  as  relates  to  the  amount  and 
value  of  property  alleged  to  be  injured  or  destroyed. 

§  1243.  The  libellant  and  libellee  shall  be  competent  witnesses  in 
divorce  cases. 

§  1244.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  any  court, 
matter,  or  proceeding,  on  account  of  his  opinions  on  matters  of  re- 
ligious belief;  nor  shall  a  witness  be  questioned,  nor  testimony 
taken  or  received,  in  relation  thereto. 

§  1245.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  any  court, 
matter,  or  proceeding,  by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  a  crime  other 
than  perjury,  subornation  of  perjury,  or  endeavoring  to  incite  or 
procure  another  to  commit  the  crime  of  perjury ;  but  the  conviction 
of  a  crime  involving  moral  turpitude  may  be  given  in  evidence  to 
affect  the  credibility  of  a  witness. 

§  1246.  A  party  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  at  law  or  in  equity 
may  compel  an  adverse  party,  or  person  for  whose  immediate  and 
adverse  benefit  such  action  or  proceeding  is  instituted,  prosecuted, 
or  defended,  to  testify  as  a  witness  in  his  behalf,  in  the  same  manner 
and  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  other  witnesses.  But  the  party  so 
called  to  testify  may  be  examined  by  the  opposite  party  under  the 
rules  applicable  to  the  cross-examination  of  witnesses. 

§  1915.  In  the  trial  of  complaints,  informations,  indictments,  and 
other  proceedings  against  persons  charged  with  crimes  or  offences, 
the  person  so  charged  shall,  at  his  own  request  and  not  otherwise, 
be  deemed  a  competent  witness,  the  credit  to  be  given  to  his  testi- 
mony being  left  solely  to  the  jury,  under  the  instructions  of  the 
Court;  but  the  refusal  of  such  person  to  testify  shall  not  be  consid- 
ered by  the  jury  as  evidence  against  him. 

§  4089.  In  actions  against  a  savings  bank,  savings  institution,  or 
trust  company,  by  a  husband  to  recover  for  moneys  deposited  by  his 
wife  in  her  name  or  as  her  money,  the  wife  may  be  a  witness  as  if 
she  were  an  unmarried  woman. 

§  4510.  [In  actions  for  injury  caused  by  the  sale  of  liquor]  .  .  . 
nor  shall  a  person  be  disqualified  as  a  witness  therein  by  reason  of 
the  marriage  relation. 


806  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND  STATUTES. 

VIRGINIA. 
Constitution,  1869. 

Art.  I,  §  10.  In  all  capital  or  criminal  prosecutions,  a  man  hath  a 
right  ...  to  be  confronted  with  the  accusers  and  witnesses;  .  .  . 
nor  can  he  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

Art.  V,  §  14.  .  .  .  [Men's  opinions  in  matters  of  religion]  shall  in 
no  wise  affect,  diminish,  or  enlarge  their  civil  capacities. 

Code,  1887;  Supplement  to  Code,  1898. 

§  3345.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  because  of 
interest;  or  because  of  his  being  a  party  to  any  action,  suit,  or 
proceeding  of  a  civil  nature ;  but  he  shall,  if  otherwise  competent  to 
testify,  and  subject  to  the  rules  of  evidence  and  practice  applicable 
to  other  witnesses,  be  competent  to  give  evidence  in  his  own  behalf 
and  be  competent  and  compellable  to  attend  and  give  evidence  on 
behalf  of  any  other  party  to  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding ;  but  in 
any  case  at  law,  the  Court,  for  good  cause  shown,  may  require  any 
such  person,  to  attend  and  testify  ore  tenus,  and,  upon  his  failure  to 
so  attend  and  testify,  may  exclude  his  deposition. 

§  3346.  The  preceding  section  is  subject  to  the  following 
qualifications :  — 

The  competency  of  husband  and  wife  as  witnesses  for  or  against 
each  other  during  the  coverture  or  after  its  termination,  and  the 
competency  of  attesting  witnesses  to  wills,  deeds,  and  other  instru- 
ments, shall  be  determined  by  the  law  in  force  the  day  before  this 
Code  takes  effect.1 

Where  one  of  the  original  parties  to  the  contract  or  other  transac- 
tion, which  is  the  subject  of  investigation,  is  incapable  of  testifying 
by  reason  of  death,  insanity,  infancy,  or  other  legal  cause,  the  other 
party  to  such  contract  or  transaction  shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify 
in  his  own  favor  or  in  favor  of  any  other  person  whose  interest  is 
adverse  to  that  of  the  party  so  incapable  of  testifying,  unless  he  be 
first  called  to  testify  in  behalf  of  such  last  mentioned  party,  or 
unless  some  person,  having  an  interest  in  or  under  such  contract  or 
transaction,  derived  from  the  party  so  incapable  of  testifying,  has 
testified  in  behalf  of  the  latter  or  of  himself  to  such  contract  or 
transaction;  or  unless  the  said  contract  or  transaction  was  personally 
made  or  had  with  an  agent  of  the  party  so  incapable  of  testifying 
and  such  agent  is  alive  and  capable  of  testifying. 

§  3347.  But  where  any  of  the  original  parties  to  the  contract  or 
other  transaction  which  is  the  subject  of  investigation  are  partners 
or  other  joint  contractors,  or  jointly  entitled  or  liable,  and  some  of 
them  have  died  or  otherwise  become  incapable  of  testifying,  the 

f1  See  amendment,  post.^\ 


VIRGINIA.  807 

others,  or  such,  of  them  as  there  may  be,  with  whom  the  contract  or 
transaction  was  personally  had  or  made,  or  in  whose  presence  and 
with  whose  privity  it  was  made  or  had,  shall  not,  nor  shall  the  ad- 
verse party,  be  incompetent  to  testify  because  some  of  the  partners 
or  joint  contractors,  or  of  those  jointly  entitled  or  liable,  have  died 
or  otherwise  become  incapable  of  testifying. 

§  3348.  And  where  such  contract  or  transaction  was  personally 
and  solely  made  with  an  agent  of  one  of  the  parties  thereto,  and  such 
agent  is  dead  or  otherwise  incapable  of  testifying,  the  other  party 
shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own  favor  or  in  favor  of  a 
person  having  an  interest  adverse  to  that  of  the  principal  of  such 
agent,  unless  he  be  first  called  to  testify  on  behalf  of  said  principal 
or  some  person  claiming  under  him,  or  the  testimony  of  such  agent 
be  first  read  or  given  in  evidence  by  his  principal  or  other  person 
claiming  under  him,  or  unless  the  said  principal  has  first  testified. 

§  3349.  If  an  original  party  to  such  contract  or  transaction,  with 
whom  it  was  personally  and  solely  made  or  had,  or  his  agent,  be 
examined  as  a  witness  orally  or  in  writing,  at  a  time  when  he  is 
competent  to  testify,  and  he  afterwards  die  or  become  otherwise 
legally  incapable  of  testifying,  his  testimony  may  be  proved  or  read 
in  evidence,  and  in  such  case  the  adverse  party  may  testify  as  to  the 
same  matters. 

§  3742.  [A  person  convicted  of  perjury  or  subornation  of  perjury 
shall]  ...  be  forever  adjudged  incapable  ...  of  giving  evidence 
as  a  witness. 

§  3896.    Approvers  shall  not  be  admitted  in  any  case. 

§  3897.  In  any  case  of  felony  or  misdemeanor,  the  accused  may  be 
sworn  and  examined  in  his  own  behalf,  and  be  subject  to  cross- 
examination  as  any  other  witness;  but  his  failure  to  testify  shall 
create  no  presumption  against  him,  nor  be  the  subject  of  any  com- 
ment before  the  Court  or  jury  by  the  prosecuting  attorney. 

§  3898.  Except  where  it  is  otherwise  expressly  provided,  a  person 
convicted  of  felony  shall  not  be  a  witness,  unless  he  has  been  par- 
doned or  punished  therefor,  and  a  person  convicted  of  perjury  shall 
not  be  a  witness,  although  pardoned  or  punished. 

§  3899.  No  person  prosecuted  for  unlawful  gaming  shall  be  com- 
petent to  testify  against  a  witness  for  the  Commonwealth  in  such 
prosecution,  touching  any  unlawful  gaming  committed  by  him  prior 
to  the  commencement  of  such  prosecution. 

§  3900.  No  person  who  is  not  jointly  tried  with  the  defendant 
shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  in  any  prosecution  by  reason  of  inter- 
est in  the  subject-matter  thereof. 

§  4187.  In  any  such  prosecution  [against  a  convict],  any  convict 
in  the  penitentiary  shall  be  a  competent  witness  for  or  against  the 
accused. 

§  3346  a  [St.  1897-8,  p.  753].    1.    Husband  and  wife  shall  be  com- 


808  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

petent  to  testify  for  or  against  each  other  in  all  civil  cases  except  as 
is  hereinafter  provided:  First,  neither  husband  nor  wife  shall  be 
competent  to  testify  for  or  against  each  other  in  any  proceeding  by 
a  creditor  to  avoid  or  impeach  any  conveyance,  gift,  or  sale  from  the 
one  to  the  other  on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  want  of  consideration, 
but  as  to  said  transaction  the  existing  rules  of  evidence  shall  remain 
unchanged;  second,  where  one  of  the  original  parties  to  a  contract, 
matter,  or  other  transaction  which  is  the  subject  of  investigation, 
is  incapable  of  testifying  by  reason  of  death,  insanity,  infancy,  or 
other  legal  cause,  and  the  other  party  to  such  contract,  matter,  or 
transaction  is  made  incompetent  to  testify  by  sub-section  2  of  section 
3346  of  the  Code  of  Virginia,  then  in  such  case  the  consort  of  either 
party  shall  be  incompetent  to  testify  in  relation  to  such  contract, 
matter,  or  transaction:  and  provided,  further,  that  nothing  herein 
contained  shall  be  deemed  or  construed  to  alter  the  existing  rules 
of  evidence  as  to  proceedings  for  divorce. 

2.  In  criminal  cases  husband  and  wife  shall  be  allowed  to  testify 
on  behalf  of  each  other ;  but  neither  shall  be  compelled  to  testify 
against  the  other.     If  either,  however,  be  examined  in  any  case  as  a 
witness  in  behalf  of  the  other,  the  one  so  examined  shall  be  deemed 
competent  to  testify  in  such  case  as  well  against  as  in  behalf  of 
such  other,  but  the  failure  of  either  husband  or  wife  to  testify  shall 
create  no  presumption  against  the  accused  nor  be  the  subject  of  any 
comment  before  the  Court  or  jury  by  the  prosecuting  attorney. 

3.  Neither  husband  nor  wife  shall  without  the  consent  of  the  other 
be  examined  in  any  case  as  to  any  communication  made  by  one  to  the 
other  while  married,  nor  shall  either  of  them  be  permitted  without 
such  consent  to  reveal  in  testimony  after  the  marriage  relation  ceases 
any  such  communication  made  while  the  marriage  subsisted:  pro- 
vided, that  this  exclusion  shall  not  apply  to  a  criminal  proceeding 
for  a  criminal  offence  committed  by  one  against  the  other,  but  as 
to  such   proceeding  the  existing  rules  of  evidence  shall  remain 
unchanged. 

WASHINGTON. 
Constitution,  1889. 

Art.  I,  §  9.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case 
to  give  evidence  against  himself. 

§  6.  The  mode  of  administering  an  oath  or  affirmation  shall  be 
such  as  may  be  most  consistent  with  and  binding  upon  the  conscience 
of  the  person  to  whom  such  oath  or  affirmation  may  be  administered. 

§  11.  ...  Nor  shall  any  person  be  incompetent  as  a  witness  or 
juror  in  consequence  of  his  opinion  on  matters  of  religion,  nor  be 
questioned  in  any  court  of  justice  touching  his  religious  belief  to 
affect  the  weight  of  his  testimony. 


WASHINGTON.  809 

§  22.  In  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  have  the  right 
...  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  to  meet  the  witnesses  against 
him  face  to  face. 

§  27.  ...  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act  or  confession  in 
open  court. 

Annotated  Code  and  Statutes,  1897  (Ballinger). 

§  5990.  Every  person  of  sound  mind  and  suitable  age  and  discre- 
tion, except  as  hereinafter  provided,  may  be  a  witness  in  any  action 
or  proceeding. 

§  5991.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  be  excluded  from 
giving  evidence  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  action, 
as  a  party  thereto  or  otherwise,  but  such  interest  may  be  shown  to 
affect  his  credibility :  provided,  however,  that  in  an  action  or  pro- 
ceeding where  the  adverse  party  sues  or  defends  as  executor,  admin- 
istrator, or  legal  representative  of  any  deceased  person,  or  as 
deriving  right  or  title  by,  through ,  or  from  any  deceased  person,  or 
as  the  guardian  or  conservator  of  the  estate  of  any  insane  person,  or 
of  any  minor  under  the  age  of  fourteen  years,  then  a  party  in  interest, 
or  to  the  record  shall  not  be  admitted  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf 
as  to  any  transaction  had  by  him  with  or  any  statement  made  to  him 
by  any  such  deceased  or  insane  person  or  by  any  such  minor  under 
the  age  of  fourteen  years :  provided,  further,  that  this  exclusion  shall 
not  apply  to  parties  of  record  who  sue  or  defend  in  a  representative 
or  fiduciary  capacity  and  who  have  no  other  or  further  interest  in 
the  action. 

§  5992.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  shall  be  excluded  from 
giving  evidence  by  reason  of  conviction  of  crime,  but  such  conviction 
may  be  shown  to  affect  his  credibility:  provided,  that  any  person 
who  shall  have  been  convicted  of  the  crime  of  perjury  shall  not  be 
a  competent  witness  in  any  case,  unless  such  conviction  shall  have 
been  reversed,  or  unless  he  shall  have  received  a  pardon. 

§  5993.  The  following  person[s]  shall  not  be  competent  to  tes- 
tify:— 

1.  Those  who  are  of  unsound  mind,  or  intoxicated  at  the  time 
of  their  production  for  examination. 

2.  Children  under  ten  years  of  age  who  appear  incapable  of  receiv- 
ing just  impressions  of  the  facts  respecting  which  they  are  examined, 
or  of  relating  them  truly. 

§  5994.  The  following  persons  shall  not  be  examined  as  wit- 
nesses :  — 

1.  A  husband  shall  not  be  examined  for  or  against  his  wife  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  wife,  nor  a  wife  for  or  against  her  husband 
without  the  consent  of  the  husband;  nor  shall  either,  during  mar- 


810  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

riage  or  afterwards,  without  the  consent  of  the  other,  be  examined  as 
to  any  communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  marriage. 
But  this  exception  shall  not  apply  to  a  civil  action  or  proceeding  by 
one  against  the  other,  nor  to  a  criminal  action  or  proceeding  for  a 
crime  committed  by  one  against  the  other. 

§  6056.  Whenever  the  Court  or  officer  before  which  a  person  is 
offered  as  a  witness  is  satisfied  that  he  has  a  peculiar  mode  of  swear- 
ing connected  with  or  additional  to  the  usual  form  of  administration, 
which,  in  witness'  opinion,  is  more  solemn  and  obligatory,  the  Court 
or  other  officer  may,  in  its  discretion,  adopt  that  mode. 

§  6057.  When  a  person  is  sworn  who  believes  in  any  other  than 
the  Christian  religion,  he  may  be  sworn  according  to  the  ceremonies 
of  his  religion,  if  there  be  any  such. 

§  6058.  Any  person  who  has  conscientious  scruples  against  taking 
an  oath  may  make  his  solemn  affirmation,  by  assenting,  when  ad- 
dressed, in  the  following  manner:  "You  do  solemnly  affirm  that," 
etc.,  as  in  section  6055. 

§  6940.  Witnesses  competent  to  testify  in  civil  cases  shall  be 
competent  in  criminal  prosecutions;  but  no  regular  physicians  or 
surgeons,  clergymen  or  priest[s],  shall  be  protected  from  testifying 
as  to  confessions,  or  information  received  from  any  defendant,  by 
virtue  of  their  profession  and  character;  Indians  shall  be  competent 
as  hereinbefore  provided  [?],  or  in  any  prosecutions  in  which  an 
Indian  may  be  a  defendant. 

§  6941.  .  .  .  Any  person  accused  of  any  crime  in  this  State  by 
indictment,  information,  or  otherwise,  may,  in  the  examination  or 
trial  of  the  cause,  offer  himself  or  herself  as  a  witness  in  his  or  her 
own  behalf,  and  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  as  other  witnesses  in  such 
case,  and  when  accused  shall  so  testify,  he  or  she  shall  be  subject  to 
all  the  rules  of  law  relating  to  cross-examinations  of  other  witnesses ; 
provided,  that  nothing  in  this  Code  shall  be  construed  to  compel  such 
accused  persons  to  offer  himself  or  herself  as  a  witness  in  such  case ; 
and  provided,  further,  that  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Court  to  in- 
struct the  jury  that  no  inference  of  guilt  shall  arise  against  the 
accused  if  the  accused  shall  fail  or  refuse  to  testify  as  a  witness  in 
his  or  her  own  behalf. 


WEST  VIRGINIA. 
Constitution,  1872. 

Art.  II,  §  6.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless 
on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  con- 
fession in  open  court. 

Art.  Ill,  §  5.  ...  Nor  shall  any  person,  in  any  criminal  case, 
be  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself. 


WEST   VIRGINIA.  811 

§  14.  ...  In  all  such  trials  [of  crimes  and  misdemeanors],  the 
accused  shall  ...  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

§  15.  ...  [Men's  opinions  in  matters  of  religion]  shall  in  no 
wise  affect,  diminish,  or  enlarge  their  civil  capacities. 

Code,  Third  Edition,  1891. 

Ch.  130,  §  22.  In  any  civil  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  the  hus- 
band or  wife  of  any  party  thereto,  or  of  any  person  in  whose  behalf 
any  such  action,  suit,  or  proceeding  is  brought,  prosecuted,  opposed, 
or  defended,  shall  be  competent  to  give  evidence  the  same  as  any 
other  witness  on  behalf  of  any  party  to  such  action,  suit,  or  pro- 
ceeding, except  that  no  husband  or  wife  shall  disclose  any  confiden- 
tial communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  their  marriage. 

§  23.  No  person  offered  as  a  witness  in  any  civil  action,  suit,  or 
proceeding  shall  be  excluded  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event 
of  the  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  or  because  he  is  a  party  thereto, 
except  as  follows :  No  party  to  any  action,  suit,  or  proceeding,  nor 
any  person  interested  in  the  event  thereof,  nor  any  person  from, 
through,  or  under  whom  any  such  party  derives  any  interest  or  title 
by  assignment  or  otherwise,  shall  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  regard 
to  any  personal  transaction  or  communication  between  such  witness 
and  a  person  at  the  time  of  examination  deceased,  insane,  or  lunatic, 
against  the  executor,  administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin,  as- 
signee, legatee,  devisee,  or  survivor  of  such  deceased  person  or  the 
assignee  or  committee  of  such  insane  person  or  lunatic.  But  this 
prohibition  shall  not  extend  to  any  transaction  or  communication  as 
to  which  any  such  executor,  administrator,  heir-at-law,  next  of  kin, 
assignee,  legatee,  devisee,  survivor,  or  committee  shall  be  examined 
on  his  own  behalf,  nor  as  to  which  the  testimony  of  such  deceased 
person  or  lunatic  shall  be  given  in  evidence. 

§  24.  No  person  shall  be  incompetent  as  a  witness  on  account  of 
race  or  color. 

Ch.  152,  §  17.  Except  where  it  is  otherwise  expressly  provided, 
a  person  convicted  of  felony  shall  not  be  a  witness,  unless  he  has 
been  pardoned  or  punished  therefor,  but  a  person  convicted  of  felony 
and  sentenced  therefor,  except  it  be  for  perjury,  may  by  leave  of 
Court  be  examined  as  a  witness  in  any  criminal  prosecution,  though 
he  has  not  been  pardoned  or  punished  therefor,  but  a  person  con- 
victed of  perjury  shall  not  be  a  witness  in  any  case,  although  he 
may  have  been  pardoned  or  punished. 

§  18  (analogous  to  §  3899,  Virginia  Code,  but  covering  a  number 
of  offences). 

§  19.  In  any  trial  or  examination  in  or  before  any  Court  or  officer 
for  a  felony  or  misdemeanor,  the  accused  shall,  at  his  or  her  own 
request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness  on  such  trial  and 


812  APPENDIX  I  :    CONSTITUTIONS   AND   STATUTES. 

examination.  The  wife  or  husband  of  the  accused  shall  also,  at  the 
request  of  the  accused,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness  on 
such  trial  and  examination.  But  a  failure  to  make  such  request 
shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him  or  her,  nor  shall  any 
reference  be  made  to  nor  comment  upon  such  failure  by  any  one 
iuring  the  progress  of  the  trial  in  the  hearing  of  the  jury. 

WISCONSIN. 
Constitution,  1848. 

Art.  I,  §  7.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy 
the  right  ...  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face. 

§  8.  No  person  .  .  .  shall  be  compelled  in  any  criminal  case  to 
be  a  witness  against  himself. 

§  10.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the 
testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on  confession  in 
open  court. 

§  19.  .  .  .  No  person  shall  be  rendered  incompetent  to  give  evi- 
dence in  any  Court  of  law  or  equity  in  consequence  of  his  opinions 
on  the  subject  of  religion. 

Statutes,  1898. 

§  4068.  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  in  any  action  or  proceed- 
ing, civil  or  criminal,  by  reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the 
same,  as  a  party  or  otherwise ;  and  every  party  shall  be  in  every  such 
case  a  competent  witness  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  chap- 
ter. But  such  interest  or  connection  may  be  shown  to  affect  the 
credibility  of  the  witness.  Any  party  to  the  record  in  any  civil 
action  or  proceeding,  or  any  person  for  whose  immediate  benefit  any 
such  action  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended,  or  the  presi- 
dent, secretary,  or  other  principal  officer  or  general  managing  agent 
of  any  corporation  which  is  such  a  party  or  for  whose  benefit  the 
action  or  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or  defended,  may  be  examined 
upon  the  trial  of  any  such  action  or  proceeding  as  if  under  cross- 
examination,  at  the  instance  of  the  adverse  party  or  parties  or  any 
of  them,  and  for  that  purpose  may  be  compelled,  in  the  same  manner 
and  subject  to  the  same  rules  for  examination  as  any  other  witness, 
to  testify;  but  the  party  calling  for  such  examination  shall  not  be 
concluded  thereby  and  may  rebut  the  evidence  given  thereon  by 
counter  or  impeaching  testimony. 

§  4069.  No  party,  and  no  person  from,  through,  or  under  whom  a 
party  derives  his  interest  or  title,  shall  be  examined  as  a  witness  in 
respect  to  any  transaction  or  communication  by  him  personally  with 
a  deceased  person  or  with  a  person  then  insane  in  any  civil  action  or 
proceeding  in  which  the  opposite  party  derives  his  title  or  sustains 


WISCONSIN.  813 

his  liability,  to  the  cause  of  action  from,  through,  or  under  such 
deceased  person  or  such  insane  person,  or  in  which  such  insane  per- 
son is  a  party  prosecuting  or  defending  by  guardian,  unless  such 
opposite  party  shall  first  be  examined  or  examine  some  other  witness 
in  his  behalf  to  such  transaction  or  communication  between  the  de- 
ceased or  insane  and  such  party  or  person,  or  unless  the  testimony 
of  such  deceased  person  given  in  his  lifetime  or  of  such  insane  per- 
son be  first  read  or  given  in  evidence  by  the  opposite  party;  and 
then,  in  either  case  respectively,  only  in  respect  to  such  transaction 
or  communication  of  which  testimony  is  so  given  or  to  the  matters  to 
which  such  testimony  relates. 

§  4070.  No  party,  and  no  person  from,  through,  or  under  whom  a 
party  derives  his  interest  or  title,  shall  be  examined  as  a  witness  in 
respect  to  any  transaction  or  communication  by  him  personally  with 
an  agent  of  the  adverse  party  or  an  agent  of  the  person  from, 
through,  or  under  whom  such  adverse  party  derives  his  interest  or 
title,  when  such  agent  is  dead  or  insane  or  otherwise  legally  incom- 
petent as  a  witness,  unless  the  opposite  party  shall  first  be  examined 
or  examine  some  other  witness  in  his  behalf  in  respect  to  some 
transaction  or  communication  between  such  agent  and  such  other 
party  or  person ;  or  unless  the  testimony  of  such  agent,  at  any  time 
taken,  be  first  read  or  given  in  evidence  by  the  opposite  party;  and 
then,  in  either  case  respectively,  only  in  respect  to  such  transaction 
or  communication  of  which  testimony  is  so  given  or  to  the  matters 
to  which  such  testimony  relates. 

§  4071.  In  all  criminal  actions  and  proceedings  the  party  charged 
shall,  at  his  own  request,  but  not  otherwise,  be  a  competent  witness ; 
but  his  refusal  or  omission  to  testify  shall  create  no  presumption 
against  him  or  any  other  party  thereto. 

§  4072.  A  husband  or  wife  shall  not  be  allowed  to  disclose  a  confi- 
dential communication  made  by  one  to  the  other  during  their  mar- 
riage, without  the  consent  of  the  other.  In  an  action  for  criminal 
conversation  the  plaintiff's  wife  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  de- 
fendant as  to  any  matter  in  controversy  except  as  aforesaid. 

§  4073.  A  person  who  has  been  convicted  of  a  criminal  offence  is, 
notwithstanding,  a  competent  witness,  but  the  conviction  may  be 
proved  to  affect  his  credibility,  either  by  the  record  or  by  his  own 
cross-examination,  upon  which  he  must  answer  any  question  relevant 
to  that  inquiry,  and  the  party  cross-examining  him  is  not  concluded 
by  his  answer. 

§  4081.  In  all  cases  in  which  an  oath  or  affidavit  is  required  or 
authorized  by  law,  the  same  may  be  taken  in  any  of  the  usual  forms. 

§  4082.  Whenever  the  Court  before  which  any  person  shall  be 
offered  as  a  witness  shall  be  satisfied  that  such  person  has  any 
peculiar  mode  of  swearing  which  is  more  solemn  and  obligatory,  in 
the  opinion  of  such  person,  than  the  usual  mode,  the  Court  may,  in 


814        APPENDIX  I:  CONSTITUTIONS  AND  STATUTES. 

its  discretion,  adopt  such  mode  of  swearing  such  person;  and  any 
Court  may  inquire  of  any  person  what  are  the  peculiar  ceremonies, 
observed  in  swearing,  which  he  deems  most  obligatory. 

§  4083.  Every  person  believing  in  any  other  than  the  Christian 
religion  shall  be  sworn  according  to  the  peculiar  ceremonies  of  his 
religion,  if  there  be  any  such  ceremonies. 

§  4084.  Every  person  who  shall  declare  that  he  has  conscientious 
scruples  against  taking  any  oath  or  swearing  in  any  form  shall  be 
permitted  to  make  his  solemn  declaration  or  affirmation. 

WYOMING. 
Revised  Statutes,  1887. 

[Civil  Procedure.]  §  2588.  All  persons  are  competent  witnesses, 
except  those  of  unsound  mind  and  children  under  ten  years  of  age 
who  appear  incapable  of  receiving  just  impressions  of  the  facts  and 
transactions  respecting  which  they  are  examined,  or  of  relating  them 
truly. 

§  2589.  The  following  persons  shall  not  testify  in  certain  re- 
spects :  — 

First,  an  attorney,  concerning  a  communication  made  to  him  by 
his  client  in  that  relation,  or  his  advice  to  his  client;  or  a  physician, 
concerning  a  communication  made  to  him  by  his  patient  in  that 
relation,  or  his  advice  to  his  patient;  but  the  attorney  or  physician 
may  testify  by  express  consent  of  the  client  or  patient;  and  if  the 
client  or  patient  voluntarily  testify,  the  attorney  or  physician  may 
be  compelled  to  testify  on  the  same  subject. 

Second,  a  clergyman  or  priest,  concerning  a  confession  made  to 
him  in  his  professional  character,  in  the  course  of  discipline  en- 
joined by  the  church  to  which  he  belongs. 

Third,  husband  or  wife,  concerning  any  communication  made  by 
one  to  the  other  during  coverture,  unless  the  communication  was 
made  in  the  known  presence  or  hearing  of  a  third  person  competent 
to  be  a  witness ;  and  the  rule  shall  be  the  same  if  the  marital  relation 
has  ceased  to  exist. 

Fourth,  a  person  who  assigns  his  claim  or  interest,  concerning  any 
matter  in  respect  to  which  he  would  not,  if  a  party,  be  permitted  to 
testify. 

Fifth,  a  person  who,  if  a  party,  would  be  restricted  in  his  evi- 
dence under  §  2590,  shall,  where  the  property  or  thing  is  sold  or 
transferred  by  an  executor,  administrator,  guardian  or  trustee,  heir, 
devisee,  or  legatee,  be  restricted  in  the  same  manner  in  any  action 
or  proceeding  concerning  such  property  or  thing. 

§  2690.  A  party  shall  not  testify  where  the  adverse  party  is  the 
guardian  or  trustee  of  either  a  deaf  and  dumb  or  an  insane  person, 
or  of  a  child  of  a  deceased  person,  or  is  an  executor  or  administrator, 


WYOMING.  815 

or  claims  or  defends  as  heir,  grantee,  assignee,  devisee,  or  legatee 
of  a  deceased  person;  except, 

First,  to  facts  which  occurred  subsequent  to  the  appointment  of 
the  guardian  or  trustee  of  an  insane  person,  and,  in  other  cases, 
subsequent  to  the  time  the  decedent,  grantor,  assignor,  or  testator 
died; 

Second,  when  the  action  or  proceeding  relates  to  a  contract  made 
through  an  agent,  by  a  person  since  deceased,  and  the  agent  testifies, 
a  party  may  testify  on  the  same  subject; 

Third,  if  a  party,  or  one  having  a  direct  interest,  testify  to  trans- 
actions or  conversations  with  another  party,  the  latter  may  testify  to 
the  same  transactions  or  conversations; 

Fourth,  if  a  party  offer  evidence  of  conversations  or  admissions  of 
the  opposite  party,  the  latter  may  testify  concerning  the  same  con- 
versations or  admissions; 

Fifth,  in  an  action  or  proceeding  by  or  against  a  partner  or  joint 
contractor,  the  adverse  party  shall  not  testify  to  transactions  with 
or  admissions  by  a  partner  or  joint  contractor  since  deceased;  unless 
the  same  were  made  in  the  presence  of  the  surviving  partner  or 
joint  contractor ;  and  this  rule  shall  be  applied  without  regard  to  the 
character  in  which  the  parties  sue  or  are  sued; 

Sixth,  if  the  claim  or  defence  is  founded  on  a  book  account,  a  party 
may  testify  that  the  book  is  his  account  book,  that  it  is  a  book  of 
original  entries,  that  the  entries  therein  were  made  by  himself,  a 
person  since  deceased,  or  a  disinterested  person  non-resident  of  the 
county ;  whereupon  the  book  shall  be  competent  evidence ;  and  such 
book  may  be  admitted  in  evidence  in  any  case,  without  regard  to  the 
parties,  upon  like  proof  by  any  competent  witness ; 

Seventh,  if  a  party,  after  testifying  orally,  die,  the  evidence  may 
be  proved  by  either  party,  on  a  further  trial  of  the  case,  whereupon 
the  opposite  party  may  testify  as  to  the  same  matters ; 

Eighth,  if  a  party  die,  and  his  deposition  be  offered  in  evidence, 
the  opposite  party  may  testify  as  to  all  competent  matters  therein; 

Nothing  in  this  section  contained  shall  apply  to  actions  for  causing 
death,  or  actions  or  proceedings  involving  the  validity  of  a  deed, 
will,  or  codicil ;  and  when  a  case  is  plainly  within  the  reason  and 
spirit  of  the  last  three  sections,  though  not  within  the  strict  letter, 
their  principles  shall  be  applied. 

§  2591.  A  party  may  compel  the  adverse  party  to  testify  orally  or 
by  deposition,  as  any  other  witness  may  be  thus  compelled. 

[Criminal  Procedure.]  §  3288.  The  defendant  in  all  criminal 
cases,  in  all  the  courts  in  this  Territory,  may  be  sworn  and  exam- 
ined as  a  witness,  if  he  so  elect,  but  shall  not  be  required  to  testify 
in  any  case.  If  the  defendant  so  elect,  he  may  make  a  statement  to 
the  jury  without  being  sworn,  but  the  neglect  or  refusal  to  make  a 
statement  shall  not  create  any  presumption  against  him,  nor  shall 


816  APPENDIX   I:    CONSTITUTIONS  AND   STATUTES. 

any  reference  be  made  to  nor  shall  any  comment  be  made  upon  such 
neglect  or  refusal. 

§  3295.  When  two  or  more  persons  shall  be  indicted  together,  the 
Court  may,  at  any  time  before  the  defendant  has  gone  into  his 
defence,  direct  any  one  of  the  defendants  to  be  discharged,  that  he 
may  be  a  witness  for  the  Territory.  An  accused  party  may,  also, 
when  there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  put  him  upon  his  defence,  be 
discharged  by  the  Court,  or,  if  not  discharged  by  the  Court,  shall  be 
entitled  to  the  immediate  verdict  of  the  jury,  for  the  purpose  of  giv- 
ing evidence  for  others  accused  with  him. 


APPENDIX  II. 
\ 

PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE  ORIGINAL  TEXT.1 


§  13  a.  Kinds  of  Circumstantial  Evidence.  Circumstantial  evi- 
dence is  of  two  kinds,  namely,  certain,  or  that  from  which  the  con- 
clusion in  question  necessarily  follows ;  and  uncertain,  or  that  from 
which  the  conclusion  does  not  necessarily  follow,  but  is  probable 
only,  and  is  obtained  by  process  of  reasoning.  Thus,  if  the  body  of 
a  person  of  mature  age  is  found  dead,  with  a  recent  mortal  wound, 
and  the  mark  of  a  bloody  left  hand  is  upon  the  left  arm,  it  may  well 
be  concluded  that  the  person  once  lived,  and  that  another  person  was 
present  at  or  since  the  time  when  the  wound  was  inflicted.  So  far 
the  conclusion  is  certain;  and  the  jury  would  be  bound  by  their 
oaths  to  find  accordingly.  But  whether  the  death  was  caused  by 
suicide  or  by  murder,  and  whether  the  mark  of  the  bloody  hand  was 
that  of  the  assassin,  or  of  a  friend  who  attempted,  though  too  late,  to 
afford  relief,  or  to  prevent  the  crime,  is  a  conclusion  which  does  not 
necessarily  follow  from  the  facts  proved,  but  is  obtained,  from  these 
and  other  circumstances,  by  probable  deduction.  The  conclusion, 
in  the  latter  case,  may  be  more  or  less  satisfactory  or  stringent,  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances.  In  civil  cases,  where  the  mischief  of 
an  erroneous  conclusion  is  not  deemed  remediless,  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  minds  of  the  jurors  be  freed  from  all  doubt;  it  is  their  duty 
to  decide  in  favor  of  the  party  on  whose  side  the  weight  of  evidence 
preponderates,  and  according  to  the  reasonable  probability  of  truth. 
But  in  criminal  cases,  because  of  the  more  serious  and  irreparable 
nature  of  the  consequences  of  a  wrong  decision,  the  jurors  are  re- 
quired to  be  satisfied,  beyond  any  reasonable  doubt,  of  the  guilt  of 
the  accused,  or  it  is  their  duty  to  acquit  him ;  the  charge  not  being 
proved  by  that  higher  degree  of  evidence  which  the  law  demands. 
In  civil  cases,  it  is  sufficient  if  the  evidence,  on  the  whole,  agrees 
with  and  supports  the  hypothesis  which  it  is  adduced  to  prove ;  but 

1  QThe  following  sections  are  those  which  have  been  omitted  from  the  original 
text ;  they  are  chiefly  such  as  deal  with  obsolete  topics  (variance,  disqualification  of 
witnesses  by  interest,  etc.) ;  but  a  few  of  them  concern  topics  not  properly  belonging 
to  the  law  of  evidence  (Statute  of  Frauds,  etc.),  or  have  been  omitted  in  order  to 
give  place  to  a  more  detailed  treatment  of  the  subjects  rendered  necessary  by  the 
modern  development  of  the  principles  involved.] 
VOL.  I.  —  52 


818  APPENDIX  II. 

in  criminal  cases  it  must  exclude  every  other  hypothesis  but  that  of 
the  guilt  of  the  party.  In  both  cases,  a  verdict  may  well  be 
founded  on  circumstances  alone ;  and  these  often  lead  to  a  conclusion 
far  more  satisfactory  than  direct  evidence  can  produce. 

§  51.  (I)  Evidence  must  be  directed  to  the  Allegations  in  Issue. 
The  pleadings  at  common  law  are  composed  of  the  written  allega- 
tions of  the  parties,  terminating  in  a  single  proposition,  distinctly 
affirmed  on  one  side,  and  denied  on  the  other,  called  the  issue.  If  it 
is  a  proposition  of  fact,  it  is  to  be  tried  by  the  jury,  upon  the  evi- 
dence adduced.  And  it  is  an  established  rule,  which  we  state  as  the 
first  rule,  governing  in  the  production  of  evidence,  that  the  evidence 
offered  must  correspond  with  the  allegations,  and  be  confined  to  the 
point  in  issue.1  This  rule  supposes  the  allegations  to  be  material 
and  necessary.  Surplusage,  therefore,  need  not  be  proved;  and  the 
proof,  if  offered,  is  to  be  rejected  The  term  surplusage  compre- 
hends whatever  may  be  stricken  from  the  record,  without  destroying 
the  plaintiff's  right  of  action;  as  if,  for  example,  in  suing  the  defend- 
ant for  breach  of  warranty  upon  the  sale  of  goods,  he  should  set 
forth,  not  only  that  the  goods  were  not  such  as  the  defendant  war- 
ranted them  to  be,  but  that  the  defendant  well  knew  that  they  were 
not.2  But  it  is  not  every  immaterial  or  unnecessary  allegation  that 
is  surplusage;  for  if  the  party,  in  stating  his  title,  should  state  it 
with  unnecessary  particularity,  he  must  prove  it  as  alleged.  Thus, 
if,  in  justifying  the  taking  of  cattle  damage -feasant,  in  which  case 
it  is  sufficient  to  allege  that  they  were  doing  damage  in  his  freehold, 
he  should  state  a  seisin  in  fee,  which  is  traversed,  he  must  prove  the 
seisin  in  fee ; 8  for  if  this  were  stricken  from  the  declaration,  the 
plaintiff's  entire  title  would  be  destroyed.  And  it  appears  that  in 
determining  the  question,  whether  a  particular  averment  can  be  re- 
jected, regard  is  to  be  had  to  the  nature  of  the  averment  itself,  and 
its  connection  with  the  substance  of  the  charge,  or  chain,  rather 
than  to  its  grammatical  collocation  or  structure.4 

§  51  a.  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  that  the  evidence  should 
bear  directly  upon  the  issue.  It  is  admissible  if  it  tends  to  prove 
the  issue,  or  constitutes  a  link  in  the  chain  of  proof;  although, 
alone,  it  might  not  justify  a  verdict  in  accordance  with  it.1  Nor  is 

i  Sec  Best's  Principles  of  Evidence,  §§  229-249. 

3  Williamson  v.  Allison,  2  East  446  ;  Peppin  v.  Solomons,  5  T.  E,  496 ;  Bromfield 
r.  Jones,  4  B.  &  C.  380. 

8  Sir  Francis  Lake's  Case,  Dyer  365  ;  2  Saund.  206  a,  n.  22  ;  Stephen  on  Pleading, 
261,  262  ;  Bristow  v.  Wright,  Doug.  640  ;  Miles  v.  Sheward,  8  East  7,  8,  9  ;  1  Smith  a 
Leading  Cases,  328,  n. 

«  I  Stark.  Evid.  386. 

1  McAllister's  Case,  11  Shepl.  139;  Haughey  v.  Strickler,  2  Watts  &  Serg.  411  ; 
Jones  v.  Vanzandt,  2  McLean,  596  ;  Lake  v.  Munford,  4  Sm.  &  Marsh.  812  ;  Belden  w. 
Lamb,  17  Conn.  441.  Where  the  plaintiff's  witness  denied  the  existence  of  a  material 
fact,  and  testified  that  persons  connected  with  the  plaintiff  had  offered  him  money  to 
aasert  its  existence,  the  plaintiff  was  permitted,  not  only  to  prove  the  fact,  but  to  dis- 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  819 

it  necessary  that  its  relevancy  should  appear  at  the  time  when  it  is 
offered;  it  being  the  usual  course  to  receive,  at  any  proper  and  con- 
venient stage  of  the  trial,  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  any  evi- 
dence which  the  counsel  shows  will  be  rendered  material  by  other 
evidence  which  he  undertakes  to  produce.  If  it  is  not  subsequently 
thus  connected  with  the  issue,  it  is  to  be  laid  out  of  the  case.2 

§  52.  Collateral  Facts  inadmissible.  This  rule  excludes  all  evi- 
dence of  collateral  facts,  or  those  which  are  incapable  of  affording 
any  reasonable  presumption  or  inference  as  to  the  principal  fact  or 
matter  in  dispute;  and  the  reason  is,  that  such  evidence  tends  to 
draw  away  the  minds  of  the  jurors  from  the  point  in  issue,  and  to 
excite  prejudice  and  mislead  them;  and  moreover  the  adverse  party 
having  had  no  notice  of  such  a  course  of  evidence,  is  not  prepared  to 
rebut  it.1  Thus,  where  the  question  between  landlord  and  tenant 
was,  whether  the  rent  was  payable  quarterly,  or  half-yearly,  evidence 
of  .the  mode  in  which  other  tenants  of  the  same  landlord  paid  their 
rent  was  held  inadmissible.8  And  where,  in  covenant,  the  issue  was 
whether  the  defendant,  who  was  a  tenant  of  the  plaintiff,  had  com- 
mitted waste,  evidence  of  bad  husbandry,  not  amounting  to  waste, 
was  rejected.8  So,  where  the  issue  was,  whether  the  tenant  had 
permitted  the  premises  to  be  out  of  repair,  evidence  of  voluntary 
waste  was  held  irrelevant.4  This  rule  was  adhered  to,  even  in  the 
cross-examination  of  witnesses;  the  party  not  being  permitted,  as 
will  be  shown  hereafter,6  to  ask  the  witness  a  question  in  regard  to 
a  matter  not  relevant  to  the  issue,  for  the  purpose  of  afterwards 
contradicting  him.6 

§  53.  Exceptions.  In  some  cases,  however,  evidence  has  been  re- 
ceived of  facts  which  happened  before  or  after  the  principal  transac- 
tion, and  which  had  no  direct  or  apparent  connection  with  it;  and 
therefore  their  admission  might  seem,  at  first  view,  to  constitute 
an  exception  to  this  rule.  But  those  will  be  found  to  have  been 

prove  the  subornation,  on  the  ground  that  this  latter  fact  had  become  material  and 
relevant,  inasmuch  as  its  truth  or  falsehood  may  fairly  influence  the  belief  of  the  jury 
as  to  the  whole  case :  Melhuish  v.  Collier,  15  Q.  B.  878. 

2  McAllister's  Case,  supra;  Van  Buren  ».  Wells,  19  Wend.  203;  Crenshaw  ». 
Davenport,  6  Ala.  390;  Tuggle  v.  Barclay,  ib.  407;  Abney  v.  Kingsland,  10  id.  355; 
Yeatman  v.  Hart,  6  Humph.  375. 

1  Infra,  §  448.     But  counsel  may,  on  cross-examination,  inquire  as  to  a  fact  appar- 
ently irrelevant,  if  he  will  undertake  afterwards  to  show  its  relevancy  by  other  evidence: 
Haigh  v.  Belcher,  7  C.  &  P..  389. 

2  Carter  v.  Pryke,  Peake  95. 

»  Harris  v.  Mantle,  3  T.  R.  307.  See  also  Balcetti  v.  Serani,  Peake  142;  Furneaux 
v.  Hutchins,  Cowp.  807  ;  Doe  v.  Sisson,  12  East  62  ;  Holcombe  v.  Hewson,  2  Campb. 
391  ;  Viney  v.  Brass,  1  Esp.  292 ;  Clothier  v.  Chapman,  14  East  331,  n. 

*  Edge  v.  Pemberton,  12  M.  &  W.  187. 
6  See  infra,  §§  448,  449,  450. 

•  Crowley  v.  Page,  7  C.  &  P.  789 ;  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Campb.  637  ;  R.  o.  Watson, 
2  Stark.   116  ;    Com.  v.   Buzzell,   16  Pick.  157,  158  ;  Ware  ».  Ware,  8  Greenl.  42.     fi. 
further  reason  may  be,  that  the  evidence,  not  being  to  a  material  point,  cannot  be  th« 
subject  of  an  indictment  for  perjury.     Odiorne  v.  Winkley,  2  Gall.  51,  53. 


820  APPENDIX  II. 

cases  in  which  the  knowledge  or  intent  of  the  party  was  a  material 
fact,  on  which  the  evidence,  apparently  collateral,  and  foreign  to 
the  main  subject,  had  a  direct  bearing,  and  was  therefore  admitted. 
Thus,  when  the  question  was,  whether  the  defendant,  being  the 
acceptor  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  either  knew  that  the  name  of  the  payee 
was  fictitious,  or  else  had  given  a  general  authority  to  the  drawer 
to  draw  bills  on  him  payable  to  fictitious  persons,  evidence  was  ad- 
mitted to  show  that  he  had  accepted  other  bills,  dijawn  in  like  man- 
ner, before  it  was  possible  to  have  transmitted  them  from  the  place 
at  which  they  bore  date.1  So,  in  an  indictment  for  knowingly  utter- 
ing a  forged  document,  or  a  counterfeit  bank-note,  proof  of  the  pos- 
session, or  of  the  prior  or  subsequent  utterance  of  other  false  docu- 
ments or  notes,  though  of  a  different  description,  is  admitted,  as 
material  to  the  question  of  guilty  knowledge  or  intent.2  So,  in  ac- 
tions for  defamation,  evidence  of  other  language,  spoken  or  written 
by  the  defendant  at  other  times,  is  admissible  under  the  general  issue 
in  proof  of  the  spirit  and  intention  of  the  party  in  uttering  the 
words  or  publishing  the  libel  charged;  and  this,  whether  the  lan- 
guage thus  proved  be  in  itself  actionable  or  not.8  Cases  of  this  sort, 
therefore,  instead  of  being  exceptions  to  the  rule,  fall  strictly 
within  it. 

§  53  a.  Title  to  Lands.  In  proof  of  the  ownership  of  lands,  by 
acts  of  possession,  the  same  latitude  is  allowed.  It  is  impossible, 
as  has  been  observed,  to  confine  the  evidence  to  the  precise  spot  on 
which  a  supposed  trespass  was  committed;  evidence  may  be  given 
of  acts  done  on  other  parts,  provided  there  is  such  a  common  charac- 
ter of  locality  between  those  parts  and  the  spot  in  question,  as  would 
raise  a  reasonable  inference  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  that  the  place 
in  dispute  belonged  to  the  party,  if  the  other  parts  did.  The  evi- 
dence of  such  acts  is  admissible  proprio  vigore,  as  tending  to*prove 
that  he  who  did  them  is  the  owner  of  the  soil ;  though  if  they  were 
done  in  the  absence  of  all  persons  interested  to  dispute  them,  they 
are  of  less  weight.1 

§54.  General  Character.  To  this  rule  may  be  referred  the  admis- 
sibility  of  evidence  of  the  general  character  of  the  parties.  In  civil 
cases,  such  evidence  is  not  admitted,  unless  the  nature  of  the  action 

i  Oibson  v.  Hunter,  2  H.  Bl.  288  ;  Minet  v.  Gibson,  3  T.  R.  481  ;  1  H.  Bl.  569. 

a  R.  v.  Wylic.  1  New  Rep.  92,  94.  See  other  examples  in  McKenney  v.  Dingley, 
4  Oreenl.  172  ;  Bridge  v.  Eggleston,  14  Mass.  245;  R.  v.  Ball,  1  Campb.  324  ;  R.  v. 
Roberts,  ib.  399  :  R.  v.  Hough,  Russ.  &  Ry.  130 ;  R.  v.  Smith,  4  C.  &  P.  411  ;  Rickman  a 
Case,  2  East  P.  C.  1035  ;  Robinson's  Case,  ib.  1110,  1112  ;  R.  v.  Northampton,  2  M.  & 
8.  262  :  Com.  ».  Turner,  3  Mete.  19.  See  also  Bottomley  v.  U.  S.,  1  Story  143,  14-i, 
where  this  doctrine  is  clearly  expounded  by  Story,  J. 

«  Pearson  v.  I*  Maitre,  6  M.  &  Or.  700  ;  s.  c.  6  Scott  N.  R.  607  ;  Rustell  v.  Mac- 
quister.  1  Campb.  49.  n.;  Saunders  r.  Mills,  6  Bing.  213  ;  Warwick  v.  Foulkes,  12  M. 
It,  W.  507  ;  Long  v.  Barrett,  7  Ir.  Law  439  ;  s.  c.  8  id.  331,  on  error. 

i  .Tom-s  v.  Williams,  2  M.  &  W.  326,  per  Parke,  B.  And  see  Doe  v.  Kemp,  7  Biug. 
832  ;  2  Bing.  N.  C.  102. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  821 

involves  the  general  character  of  the  party,  or  goes  directly  to  affect 
it.1  Thus,  evidence  impeaching  the  previous  general  character  of 
the  wife  or  daughter,  in  regard  to  chastity,  is  admissible  in  an  action 
by  the  husband  or  father  for  seduction;  and  this,  again,  may  be 
rebutted  by  counter  proof.2  But  such  evidence,  referring  to  a  time 
subsequent  to  the  act  complained  of,  is  rejected.8  And,  generally, 
in  actions  of  tort,  wherever  the  defendant  is  charged  with  fraud  from 
mere  circumstances,  evidence  of  his  general  good  character  is  admis- 
sible to  repel  it.4  So,  also,  in  criminal  prosecutions,  the  charge  of  a 


1  Attorney-General  v.  Bowman,  2  B.  &  P.  532,  expressly  adopted  in  Fowler  v. 

Fire  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cowen  673,  675;  Anderson  v.  Long,  10  S.  &  R.  55  ;  Humphrey  v. 
Humphrey,  7  Conn.  116;  Nash  v.  Gilkeson,  5  S.  &  R.  352;  Jeffries  v.  Harris,  3  Hawks 
105. 

2  Bate  v.  Hill,  1  C.  &  P.  100;  Verry  v.  Watkins,  7  id.  308  ;  Carpenter  v.  Wall,  11 
Ad.  &  El.  803  ;  s.  c.  3  P.  &  D.  457  ;  Elsam  v.  Faucett,  2  Esp.  562  ;  Dodd  v.  Norris, 
3  Campb.  519.     See  contra,  McRae  v.  Lilly,  1  Iredell  118. 

3  Elsam  v.  Faucett,  2  Esp.  562  ;  Coot  v.  Berty,  12  Mod.  232.     The  rule  is  the  same 
in  an  action  by  a  woman  for  a  breach  of  promise  of  marriage.     See  Johnston  v.  Caul- 
kins,  1  Johns.  Cas.  116  ;  Boynton  v.  Kellogg,  3  Mass.  189  ;  Foulkes  v.  Sellway,  3  Esp; 
236  ;  Bamfield  v.  Massey,  l"Campb.  460  ;  Dodd  v.  Norris,  3  id.  519. 

*  Ruan  v.  Perry,  3  Caines  120.  See  also  Walker  v.  Stephenson,  3  Esp.  284.  This 
case  of  Ruan  v.  Perry  has  sometimes  been  mentioned  with  disapprobation  ;  but,  when 
correctly  imderstood,  it  is  conceived  to  be  not  opposed  to  the  well-settled  rule,  that 
evidence  of  general  character  is  admissible  only  in  cases  where  it  is  involved  in  the  issue. 
In  that  case  the  commander  of  a  national  frigate  was  sued  in  trespass  for  seizing  and  de- 
taining the  plaintiffs  vessel,  and  taking  her  out  of  her  course,  by  means  whereof  she 
was  captured  by  an  enemy.  The  facts  were  clearly  proved  ;  but  the  question  was, 
whether  the  defendant  acted  in  honest  obedience  to  his  instructions  from  the  navy  de- 
partment, which  were  in  the  case,  or  with  a.  fraudulent,  intent,  and  in  collusion  with  the 
captors,  as  the  plaintiff  alleged  to  the  jury,  and  attempted  to  sustain  by  some  of  the 
circumstances  proved.  It  was  to  repel  this  imputation  of  fraudulent  intent,  inferred 
from  slight  circumstances,  that  the  defendant  was  permitted  to  appeal  to  his  own  "  fair 
and  good  reputation."  And  in  confirming  this  decision  in  bank,  it  was  observed  that, 
"  in  actions  of  tort,  and  especially  charging  a  defendant  with  gross  depravity  and  fraud, 
upon  circumstances  merely,  evidence  of  uniform  integrity  and  good  character  is  often- 
times the  only  testimony  which  a  defendant  can  oppose  to  suspicious  circumstances." 
On  this  ground  this  case  was  recognized  by  the  Court  as  good  law,  in  P'owler  v.  ^Etna 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cowen  675.  And  five  years  afterwards,  in  Townsend  v.  Graves,  3  Paige 
455,  456,  it  was  again  cited  with  approbation  by  Chancellor  Walworth,  who  laid  it  down 
as  a  general  rule  of  evidence,  "  that  if  a  party  is  charged  with  a  crime,  or  any  other  act 
involving  moral  turpitude,  which  is  endeavored  to  be  fastened  upon  him  by  circum- 
stantial evidence,  or  by  the  testimony  of  witnesses  of  doubtful  credit,  he  may  introduce 
proof  of  his  former  good  character  for  honesty  and  integrity,  to  rebut  the  presumption 
of  guilt  arising  from  such  evidence,  which  it  may  be  impossible  for  him  to  contradict 
or  explain."  In  Gough  v.  St.  John,  16  Wend.  646,  the  defendant  was  sued  in  an  action 
on  the  case,  for  a  false  representation  as  to  the  solvency  of  a  third  person.  The  repre- 
sentation itself  was  in  writing,  and  verbal  testimony  was  offered,  tending  to  show  that 
the  defendant  knew  it  to  be  false.  To  rebut  this  charge,  proof  that  the  defendant  sus- 
tained a  good  character  for  honesty  and  fairness  in  dealing  was  offered  and  admitted. 
Cowen,  J.,  held,  that  the  fraudulent  intent  was  a  necessary  inference  of  law  from  the 
falsity  of  the  representation  ;  and  that  the  evidence  of  character  was  improperly  ad- 
mitted. He  proceeded  to  cite  and  condemn  the  case  of  Ruan  v.  Perry,  as  favoring  the 
general  admissibility  of  evidence  of  character  in  civil  actions,  for  injuries  to  property. 
But  such  is  manifestly  not  the  doctrine  of  that  case.  It  only  decides,  that  where  inten- 
tion (not  knowledge)  is  the  point  in  issue,  and  the  proof  consists  of  slight  circum- 
stances, evidence  of  character  is  admissible.  The  other  judges  agreed  that  the  evidence 
was  improperly  admitted  in  that  case,  but  said  nothing  as  to  the  case  of  Ruan  v.  Perry. 
They  denied,  however,  that  fraud  was  in  such  cases  an  inference  of  law. 

The  ground  on  which  evidence  of  good  character  is  admitted  in  criminal  prosecu- 


822  APPENDIX   II. 

rape,  or  of  an  assault  with  intent  to  commit  a  rape,  is  considered  as 
involving  not  only  the  general  character  of  the  prosecutrix  for  chas- 
tity, but  the  particular  fact  of  her  previous  criminal  connection  with 
the  prisoner,  though  not  with  other  persons.5  And  in  all  cases, 
where  evidence  is  admitted  touching  the  general  character  of  the 
party,  it  ought  manifestly  to  bear  reference  to  the  nature  of  the 
charge  against  him.6 

§  55.  It  is  not  every  allegation  of  fraud  that  may  be  said  to  put 
the  character  in  issue ;  for,  if  it  were  so,  the  defendant's  character 
would  be  put  in  issue  in  the  ordinary  form  of  declaring  in  assumpsit. 
This  expression  is  technical,  and  confined  to  certain  actions,  from  the 
nature  of  which,  as  in  the  preceding  instances,  the  character  of  the 
parties,  or  some  of  them,  is  of  particular  importance.  This  kind  of 
evidence  is  therefore  rejected,  whenever  the  general  character  is  in- 
volved by  the  plea  only,  and  not  by  the  nature  of  the  action.1  Nor 
is  it  received  in  actions  of  assault  and  battery ; 2  nor  in  assump- 
sit ;*  nor  in  trespass  on  the  case  of  malicious  prosecution;4  nor  in 
an  information  for  a  penalty  for  violation  of  the  civil,  police,  or 
revenue  laws ; 6  nor  in  ejectment,  brought  in  order  to  set  aside  a  will 
for  fraud  committed  by  the  defendant.6  Whether  evidence  impeach- 
ing the  plaintiff's  previous  general  character  is  admissible  in  an 
action  of  slander,  as  affecting  the  question  of  damages,  is  a  point 
which  has  been  much  controverted;  but  the  weight  of  authority  is 
in  favor  of  admitting  such  evidence.7  But  it  seems  that  the  charac- 

tions  is  this,  that  the  intent  with  which  the  act,  charged  as  a  crime,  was  done,  is  of  the 
essence  of  the  issue ;  agreeably  to  the  maxim,  "  Nemo  reus  est,  nisi  mcns  sit  rea ; "  and 
the  prevailing  character  of  the  party's  mind,  as  evinced  by  the  previous  habit  of  his 
life,  is  a  material  element  in  discovering  that  intent  in  the  instance  in  question.  Upon 
the  same  principle,  the  same  evidence  ought  to  be  admitted  in  all  other  cases,  whatever 
be  the  form  of  proceeding,  where  the  intent  is  material  to  be  found  as  a  fact  involved  in 
the  issue. 

6  R.  v.  Clarke,  2  Stark.  241  ;  1  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  490  ;  Low  v.  Mitchell,  6  Shepl. 
372  ;  Com.  v.  Murphy,  14  Mass.  387  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  (by  Metcalf)  369,  n.  (1);  R.  v. 
Martin,  6  C.  &  P.  562  ;  R.  v.  Hodgson,  Russ.  &  Ry.  211  ;  R.  r.  Clay,  5  Cox  Cr.  Cas. 
146.  But  in  an  action  on  the  case  for  seduction,  evidence  of  particular  acts  of  unchas- 
tity  with  other  persons  is  admissible :  Verry  v.  Watkins,  7  C.  &  P.  308.  Where  one  is 
charged  with  keeping  a  house  of  ill  fame  after  the  statute  went  into  operation,  evidence 
of  the  bad  reputation  of  the  house  before  that  time,  was  held  admissible,  as  conducing 
to  prove  that  it  sustained  the  same  reputation  afterwards  :  Cadwell  v.  State,  17  Conn. 
467. 

•  Douglass  v.  Tousey,  2  Wend.  352. 

1  Anderson  v.  Long,  10  S.  &  R.  55  ;  Potter  v.  Webb  et  al ,  6  Greenl.  14  ;  Gregory 
v.  Thomas,  2  Bibb  286. 

2  Givens  ».  Bradley,  3  Bibb  192.     But  in  the  Admiralty  Courts,  where  a  seaman 
sues  against  the  master  for  damages,  for  illegal   and   unjustifiable   punishment,  his 
general  conduct  and  character  during  the  voyage  are  involved  in  the  issue :  Pettingill 
v.  Dinsmore,  Dnveis  208,  214. 

8  Nash  v.  Gilkeson,  5  S.  &  R.  352. 
4  Gregory  v.  Thomas,  2  Bibb  286. 
*•  Attorney-General  v.  Bowman,  2  B.  &  P.  532,  n. 
«  Goodright  v.  Hicks,  Bull.  N.  P.  296. 

7  2  Starkie  on  Slander,  88,  89-95,  n.;  Root  r.  King,  7  Cowen  613  ;  Bailey  v.  Hyde, 
3  Conn.  463 ;  Bennett  v.  Hyde,  6  id.  24  ;  Douglass  v.  Tousey,  2  Wend.  353  ;  Inman 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  823 

ter  of  the  party,  in  regard  to  any  particular  trait,  is  not  in  issue, 
unless  it  be  the  trait  which  is  involved  in  the  matter  charged  against 
him ;  and  of  this  it  is  only  evidence  of  general  reputation,  which  is 
to  be  admitted,  and  not  positive  evidence  of  general  bad  conduct.8 

§  56.  (II)  Substance  of  the  Issue  need  alone  be  proved.  A  sec- 
ond rule  which  governs  in  the  production  of  evidence  is,  that  it  is 
sufficient,  if  the  substance  of  the  issue  be  proved.  In  the  applica- 
tion of  this  rule,  a  distinction  is  made  between  allegations  of  matter 
of  substance,  and  allegations  of  matter  of  essential  description.  The 
former  may  be  substantially  proved ;  but  the  latter  must  be  proved 
with  a  degree  of  strictness,  extending  in  some  cases  even  to  literal 
precision.  No  allegation,  descriptive  of  the  identity  of  that  which 
is  legally  essential  to  the  claim  or  charge,  can  ever  be  rejected.1 
Thus  in  an  action  of  malicious  prosecution,  the  plaintiff  alleges  that 
he  was  acquitted  of  the  charge  on  a  certain  day  ;  here  the  substance 
of  the  allegation  is  the  acquittal,  and  it  is  sufficient,  if  this  fact  be 
proved  on  any  day,  the  time  not  being  material.  But  if  the  allegation 
be,  that  the  defendant  drew  a  bill  of  exchange  of  a  certain  date  and 
tenor,  here  every  allegation,  even  to  the  precise  day  of  the  date,  is 
descriptive  of  the  bill,  and  essential  to  its  identity,  and  must  be 
literally  proved.2  So  also,  as  we  have  already  seen,  in  justifying  the 

v.  Foster,  8  id.  602  ;  Lamed  v.  Buffington,  B  Mass.  552  ;  Walcott  v.  Hall,  6  id.  514 ; 
Ross  v.  Lapham,  14  id.  275;  Bodwell  v.  Swan,  3  Pick.  378  ;  Buford  v.  M'Luny,  1  Nott 
&  McCord  268  ;  Sawyer  v.  Eifert,  2  id.  511  ;  King  v.  Waring,  et  ux.,  5  Esp.  14  ;  Rod- 
riguez v.  Tadmire,  2  id.  721 ;  v.  Moor,  1  M.  &  S.  284  ;  Earl  of  Leicester  v.  Walter, 

2  Oampb.  251  ;  Williams  v.  Callender,  Holt's  Gas.  307 ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  216.  In  Foot 
v.  Tracy,  1  Johns.  46,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York  was  equally  divided  upon  this 
question  ;  Kent  and  Thompson,  JJ.,  being  in  favor  of  admitting  the  evidence,  and 
Livingston  and  Tompkins,  JJ.,  against  it.  In  England,  according  to  the  later  authori- 
ties, evidence  of  the  general  bad  character  of  the  plaintiff  seems  to  be  regarded  as  ir- 
relevant, and  therefore  inadmissible  :  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  488,  489  ;  Cornwall  v. 
Richardson,  Ry.  &  Mood.  305  ;  Jones  v.  Stevens,  11  Price  235.  In  this  last  case  it  is 
observable,  that  though  the  reasoning  of  the  learned  judges,  and  especially  of  Wood,  B., 
goes  against  the  admission  of  the  evidence,  even  though  it  be  of  the  most  general  nature, 
in  any  case,  yet  the  record  before  the  Court  contained  a  plea  of  justification  aspersing 
the  professional  character  of  the  plaintiff  in  general  averments,  without  stating  any 
particular  acts  of  bad  conduct ;  and  the  point  was,  whether,  in  support  of  this  plea,  as 
well  as  in  contradiction  of  the  declaration,  the  defendant  should  give  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  was  of  general  bad  character  and  repute,  in  his  practice  and  business  of  an 
attorney.  The  Court  strongly  condemned  the  pleading  as  reprehensible,  and  said  that 
it  ought  to  have  been  demurred  to,  as  due  to  the  Court  and  to  the  judge  who  tried  the 
cause.  See  J'Anson  v.  Stuart,  1  T.  R.  748 ;  2  Smith's  Leading  Cases  37.  See  also 
Rhodes  v.  Bunch,  3  McCbrd  66.  In  Williston  u.  Smith,  3  Kerr  443,  which  was  an 
action  for  slander  by  charging  the  defendant  with  larceny,  the  defendant,  in  mitigation 
of  damages,  offered  evidence  of  the  plaintiffs  general  bad  character  ;  which  the  judge 
at  Nisi  Prius  rejected;  and  the  Court  held  the  rejection  proper;  observing  that,  had 
the  evidence  been  to  the  plaintiffs  general  character  for  honesty,  it  might  have  been 
admitted. 

8  Swift's  Evid.  140;  Ross  v.  Lapham,  14  Mass.  275  ;  Douglass  v.  Tonsey.  2  Wend. 
852  ;  Andrews  v.  Vanduzer,  11  Johns.  38  ;  Root  «.  King,  7  Coweu  613  ;  Newsam  v. 
Carr,  2  Stark.  69  ;  Sawyer  v.  Eifert,  2  Nott  &  McCord  511. 

1  Stark.  Evid.  373;  Purcell  v.  Macnamara,  9  East  160;  Stoddart  v.  Palmer,  3  B.  & 
C.  4  ;  Turner  v.  Eyles,  3  B.  &  P.  456  ;  Ferguson  v.  Harwood,  7  Cranch  408,  413. 

2  3  B.  &  C.  4,  5  ;  Glassford  on  Evid.  309. 


824  APPENDIX   II. 

taking  of  cattle  damage  feasant,  because  it  was  upon  the  close  of  the 
defendant,  the  allegation  of  a  general  freehold  title  is  sufficient ;  but 
if  the  party  states,  that  he  was  seised  of  the  close  in  fee,  and  it  be 
traversed,  the  precise  estate,  which  he  has  set  forth,  becomes  an 
essentially  descriptive  allegation,  and  must  be  proved  as  alleged.  In 
this  case  the  essential  and  non-essential  parts  of  the  statement  are 
so  connected  as  to  be  incapable  of  separation,  and  therefore  both  are 
alike  material.8 

§  57.  Matter  of  Description.  Whether  an  allegation  is  or  is  not  so 
essentially  descriptive,  is  a  point  to  be  determined  by  the  judge  in 
the  case  before  him ;  and  it  depends  so  much  on  the  particular 
circumstances,  that  it  is  difficult  to  lay  down  any  precise  rules  by 
which  it  can  in  all  cases  be  determined.  It  may  depend,  in  the  first 
place,  on  the  nature  of  the  averment  itself,  and  the  subject  to  which 
it  is  applied.  But  secondly,  some  averments  the  law  pronounces  for- 
mal which  otherwise  would,  on  general  principles,  be  descriptive. 
And  thirdly,  the  question,  whether  others  are  descriptive  or  not,  will 
often  depend  on  the  technical  manner  in  which  they  are  framed. 

§  58.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  observed  that  any  allegation 
which  narrows  and  limits  that  which  is  essential  is  necessarily  de- 
scriptive. Thus,  in  contracts,  libels  in  writing,  and  written  instru- 
ments in  general,  every  part  operates  by  way  of  description  of  the 
whole.  In  these  cases,  therefore,  allegations  of  names,  sums,  magni- 
tudes, dates,  durations,  terms,  and  the  like,  being  essential  to  the 
identity  of  the  writing  set  forth,  must,  in  general,  be  precisely 
proved.1  Nor  is  it  material  whether  the  action  be  founded  in  con- 
tract or  in  tort ;  for  in  either  case,  if  a  contract  be  set  forth,  every 
allegation  is  descriptive.  Thus,  in  an  action  on  the  case  for  deceit 
in  the  sale  of  lambs  by  two  defendants,  jointly,  proof  of  sale  and 
warranty  by  one  only,  as  his  separate  property,  was  held  to  be  a  fatal 
variance.2  So  also,  if  the  contract  described  be  absolute,  but  the  con- 
tract proved  be  conditional,  or  in  the  alternative,  it  is  fatal.8  The 
consideration  is  equally  descriptive  and  material,  and  must  be  strictly 

8  Stephen  on  Pleading,  261,  262,  419  ;  Turner  v.  Eyles,  SB.  &  P.  456 ;  2  Saund. 
206  a,  n.  22  ;  Sir  Francis  Leke's  Case,  Dyer  364  b.  Perhaps  the  distinction  taken 
by  Lord  Ellen  borough,  inPurcell  v.  Macnamara,  and  recognized  in  Stoddart  v.  Palmer, 

3  B.  &  C.  4,  will,  on  closer  examination,  result  merely  in  this,  that  matters  of  descrip- 
tion are  matters  of  substance,  when  they  go  to  the  identity  of  anything  material  to  the 
action.     Thus  the  rule  will  stand,  as  originally  stated,  that  the  substance,  and  this 
alone,  must  be  proved. 

i  Bristow  ».  Wright,  Doug.  665,  667 ;  Churchill  v.  Wilkins,  1  T.  R.  447  ;  I  Stark. 
Evid.  386,  388. 

*  Weall  v.  King  et  a/.,  12  East  452. 

8  Penny  v.  Porter,  2  East  2  ;  Lopes  v.  De  Tastet,  1  Brod.  &  Bing.  538  ;  Higgins  v. 
Dixon,  10  Jur.  376  ;  Hilt  v.  Campbell,  6  Greenl.  109  ;  Stone  v.  Knowlton,  3  Wend. 
874.  See  also  Saxton  r.  Johnson,  10  Johns.  418  ;  Snell  v.  Moses,  1  Johns.  96  ;  Craw- 
ford  v.  Morrell,  8  Johns.  253  ;  Baylies  t;.  Fettvplaee,  7  Mass.  325  ;  Bobbins  v.  Otis, 
1  Pick.  868  ;  Harris  v.  Rayner,  8  id.  541  ;  White  v.  Wilson,  2  Bos.  &  Pul.  116  ; 
Whitaker  ».  Smith,  4  Pick.  83 ;  Lower  v  Winters,  7  Cowen  263  ;  Alexander  v.  Harris, 

4  Cranch  299. 


PASSAGES    OMITTED   FROM   THE    ORIGINAL   TEXT.  825 

proved  as  alleged.4  Prescriptions,  also,  being  founded  in  grants  pre- 
sumed to  be  lost  from  lapse  of  time,  must  be  strictly  proved  as  laid; 
for  every  allegation,  as  it  is  supposed  to  set  forth  that  which  was 
originally  contained  in  a  deed,  is  of  course  descriptive  of  the  instru- 
ment, and  essential  to  the  identity  of  the  grant.6  An  allegation  of 
the  character  in  which  the  plaintiff  sues,  or  of  his  title  to  damages, 
though  sometimes  superfluous,  is  generally  descriptive  in  its  nature, 
and  requires  proof.6 

§  59.  Secondly,  as  to  those  averments  which  the  law  pronounces 
formal,  though,  on  general  principles,  they  seem  to  be  descriptive  and 
essential,  these  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as  exceptions  to  the  rule 
already  stated,  and  are  allowed  for  the  sake  of  convenience.  There- 
fore, though  it  is  the  nature  of  a  traverse  to  deny  the  allegation  in 
the  manner  and  form  in  which  it  is  made,  and,  consequently,  to  put 
the  party  to  prove  it  to  be  true  in  the  manner  and  form,  as  well  as  in 
general  effect; *  yet  where  the  issue  goes  to  the  point  of  the  action, 
these  words,  modo  etformd,  are  but  words  of  form.3  Thus,  in  trover, 
for  example,  the  allegation  that  the  plaintiff  lost  the  goods  and  that 
the  defendant  found  them  is  regarded  as  purely  formal,  requiring  no 
proof ;  for  the  gist  of  the  action  is  the  conversion.  So,  in  indict- 
ments for  homicide,  though  the  death  is  alleged  to  have  been  caused 
by  a  particular  instrument,  this  averment  is  but  formal ;  and  it  is 
sufficient  if  the  manner  of  death  agree  in  substance  with  that  which 
is  charged,  though  the  instrument  be  different ;  as,  if  a  wound  alleged 
to  have  been  given  with  a  sword  be  proved  to  have  been  inflicted 
with  an  axe.8  But,  where  the  traverse  is  of  a  collateral  point  in 
pleading,  there  the  words  modo  etformd,  go  to  the  substance  of  the 
issue,  and  are  descriptive,  and  strict  proof  is  required  ;  as,  if  a  feoff- 
ment  is  alleged  by  deed,  which  is  traversed  modo  et  forma,  evidence 
of  a  feoffment  without  deed  will  not  suffice.4  Yet,  if  in  issues  upon 
a  collateral  point,  where  the  affirmative  is  on  the  defendant,  partial 
and  defective  proof  on  his  part  should  show  that  the  plaintiff  had  no 
cause  of  action,  as  clearly  as  strict  and  full  proof  would  do,  it  is 
sufficient.6 

*  Swallow  v.  Beaumont,  2  B.  &  Aid.  765  ;  Robertson  v.  Lynch,  18  Johns.  451. 

*  Morewood  v.  Wood,  4  T.  R.  157  ;  Rogers  v.  Allen,  1  Campb.  309,  314,  315,  note 
(a).     But  proof  of  a  more  ample  right  than  is  alleged  will  be  regarded  as  mere  redun- 
dancy: Johnson  v.  Thoroughgood,  Hob.  64  ;  Bushwood  v.  Pond,  Cro.  El.  722;  Bailiffs 
of  Tewkesbury  v.  Bricknell,  1  Taunt.  142 ;  Burges  v.  Steer,  1  Show.  347  ;  s.  c.  4  Mod. 
89. 

«  1  Stark.  Evid.  390  ;  Moises  o.  Thornton,  8  T.  R.  303,  308  ;  Berryman  v.  Wise, 
4  T.  R.  366. 

1  Stephen  on  Pleading,  213. 

2  Trials  per  pais,  308  (9th  ed. ) ;  Co.  Lit.  281  b. 
8  2  Russell  on  Crimes,  711  ;  1  East  P.  C.  341. 

4  Bull.  N.  P.  301  ;  Co.  Lit.  281  b.  Whether  virtute  cujtis,  in  a  sheriffs  pleas  in  jus- 
tification, is  traversable,  and  in  what  cases  is  discussed  in  Lucas  v.  Nockells,  7  Bligh 
N.  s.  140. 

»  Ib. ;  2  Stark.  Ev.  394. 


826  APPENDIX  II. 

§  60.  Thirdly,  as  to  those  averments,  whose  character,  as  being 
descriptive  or  not,  depends  on  the  manner  in  which  they  are  stated. 
Every  allegation,  essential  to  the  issue,  must,  as  we  have  seen,  be 
proved,  in  whatever  form  it  be  stated ;  and  things  immaterial  in 
their  nature  to  the  question  at  issue  may  be  omitted  in  the  proof, 
though  alleged  with  the  utmost  explicitness  and  formality.  There 
is,  however,  a  middle  class  of  circumstances,  not  essential  in  their 
nature,  which  may  become  so  by  being  inseparably  connected  with 
the  essential  allegations.  These  must  be  proved  as  laid,  unless  they 
are  stated  under  a  videlicet /  the  office  of  which  is  to  mark,  that  the 
party  does  not  undertake  to  prove  the  precise  circumstances  alleged  ; 
and  in  such  cases  he  is  ordinarily  not  holden  to  prove  'them.1  Thus 
in  a  declaration  upon  a  bill  of  exchange,  the  date  is  in  its  nature 
essential  to  the  identity  of  the  bill,  and  must  be  precisely  proved, 
though  the  form  of  allegation  were,  "  of  a  certain  date,  to  wit,"  such 
a  date.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  case  before  cited,  of  an  action  for 
maliciously  prosecxiting  the  plaintiff  'for  a  crime  whereof  he  was  ac- 
quitted on  a  certain  day,  the  time  of  acquittal  is  not  essential  to  the 
charge,  and  need  not  be  proved,  though  it  be  directly  and  expressly 
alleged.2  But  where,  in  an  action  for  breach  of  warranty  upon  the 
sale  of  personal  chattels,  the  plaintiff  set  forth  the  price  paid  for  the 
goods,  without  a  videlicet,  he  was  held  bound  to  prove  the  exact  sum 
alleged,  it  being  rendered  material  by  the  form  of  allegation  ; 8  though, 
had  the  averment  been  that  the  sale  was  for  a  valuable  consideration, 
to  wit,  for  so  much,  it  would  have  been  otherwise.  A  videlicet  will 
not  avoid  a  variance,  or  dispense  with  exact  proof,  in  an  allegation  of 
material  matter ;  nor  will  the  omission  of  it  always  create  the  neces- 
sity of  proving,  precisely  as  stated,  matter  which  would  not  other- 
wise require  exact  proof.  But  a  party  may,  in  certain  cases,  impose 
upon  himself  the  necessity  of  proving  precisely  what  is  stated,  if  not 
stated  under  a  videlicet* 

1  Stephen  on  Pleading  309  ;  1  Chitty  on  PI.  261,  262,  348  (6th  ed.) ;  Stukley  v. 
Butler,  Hob.  168,  172  ;  2  Saund.  291,  note  (1)  ;  Gleason  v.  McVickar,  7  Cowen  42. 

2  Supra,  §  56  ;  Purcell  v.  Macnamara,  9  East  160 ;  Gwinnet  v.  Phillips,  3  T.  R. 
643  ;  Vail  v.  Lewis,  4  Johns.  450. 

*  Durston  v.  Tuthan,  cited  in  3  T.  R.  67 ;  Symmons  v.  Knox,  ib.  65  ;  Arn- 
field  v.  Bate,  3  M.  &  S.  173;  Sir  Francis  Leke's  Case,  Dyer  3646;  Stephen  on 
Pleading,  419,  420;  1  Chitty  on  PI.  340  (6th  ed.). 

4  Crispin  v.  Williamson,  8  Taunt.  107,  112;  Attorney-General  v.  Jeffreys,  M'Cl. 
277  ;  2  B.  &  C.  3,  4;  1  Chitty  on  Plead.  348  a;  Grim  wood  v.  Barrit,  6  T.  R.  460, 
463;  Bristow  v.  Wright,  2  Doug.  667,  668.  These  terms,  "immaterial"  and  "im- 
pertinent," though  formerly  applied  to  two  classes  of  averments,  are  now  treated  us 
synonymous  (3  D.  &  R.  209) ;  the  more  accurate  distinction  being  between  these  and 
unnecessary  allegations.  Immaterial  or  impertinent  averments  are  those  which  need 
neither  be  alleged  nor  proved  if  alleged.  Unnecessary  averments  consist  of  matters 
which  need  not  be  alleged ;  but,  being  alleged,  must  be  proved.  Thus,  in  an  action 
of  assumpsit  upon  a  warranty  on  the  sale  of  goods,  an  allegation  of  deceit  on  the  part 
of  the  seller  is  impertinent,  and  need  not  be  proved  :  Williamson  t>.  Allison,  2  East 
446  ;  Panton  v.  Holland,  17  Johns.  92 ;  Twiss  v.  Baldwin,  9  Conn.  292.  So,  where 
the  action  was  for  an  injury  to  the  plaintiff's  reversionary  interest  in  land,  and  it  wa* 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  827 

§  61.  But,  in  general,  the  allegations  of  time,  place,  quantity, 
quality,  and  value,  when  not  descriptive  of  the  identity  of  the 
subject  of  the  action,  will  be  found  immaterial,  and  need  not  be 
proved  strictly  as  alleged.  Thus,  in  trespass  to  the  person,  the  ma- 
terial fact  is  the  assault  and  battery ;  the  time  and  place  not  being 
material,  unless  made  so  by  the  nature  of  the  justification,  and  the 
manner  of  pleading.  And,  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance,  the 
material  allegation  is  the  loss ;  but  whether  total  or  partial  is  not 
material ;  and  if  the  former  be  alleged,  proof  of  the  latter  is  suffi- 
cient. So,  in  assumpsit,  an  allegation  that  a  bill  of  exchange  was 
made  on  a  certain  day  is  not  descriptive,  and  therefore  strict  proof, 
according  to  the  precise  day  laid,  is  not  necessary  ;  though,  if  it  were 
stated  that  the  bill  bore  date  on  that  day,  it  would  be  otherwise.1 
Thus,  also,  proof  of  cutting  the  precise  number  of  trees  alleged  to 
have  been  cut,  in  trespass  ;  or,  of  the  exact  amount  of  rent  alleged 
to  be  in  arrear  in  replevin ;  or  the  precise  value  of  the  goods  taken, 
in  trespass  or  trover,  is  not  necessary.2  Neither  is  matter  of  ag- 
gravation, namely,  that  which  only  tends  to  increase  the  damages, 
and  does  not  concern  the  right  of  action  itself,  of  the  substance  of  the 
issue.  But,  if  the  matter,  alleged  by  way  of  aggravation,  is  essential 
to  the  support  of  the  charge  or  claim,  it  must  be  proved  as  laid. 

§  62.  But  in  local  actions  the  allegation  of  place  is  material,  and 
must  strictly  be  proved,  if  put  in  issue.  In  real  actions,  also,  the 
statement  of  quality,  as  arable  or  pasture  land,  is  generally  descrip- 
tive, if  not  controlled  by  some  other  and  more  specific  designation. 
And  in  these  actions,  as  well  as  in  those  for  injuries  to  real  property, 
the  abuttals  of  the  close  in  question  must  be  proved  as  laid ;  for  if 
one  may  be  rejected,  all  may  be  equally  disregarded,  and  the  identity 
of  the  subject  be  lost.1 

§  63.  Variance.  It  being  necessary  to  prove  the  substance  of  the 
issue,  it  follows  that  any  departure  from  the  substance,  in  the  .evi- 
dence adduced,  must  be  fatal ;  constituting  what  is  termed  in  the  law- 
alleged  that  the  close,  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  was,  and  "continually  from  thence 
hitherto  hath  been,  and  still  is,"  in  the  possession  of  one  J.  V.,  this  latter  part  of 
the  averment  was  held  superfluous,  and  not  necessary  to  be  proved":  Vowles  v.  Miller, 
3  Taunt.  137.  But  if,  in  an  action  by  a  lessor  against  his  tenant,  for  negligently 
keeping  his  fire,  a  demise  for  seven  years  be  alleged,  and  the  proof  be  of  a  lease  at 
will  only,  it  will  be  a  fatal  variance  ;  for  though  it  would  have  sufficed  to  have  alleged 
the  tenancy  generally,  yet  having  unnecessarily  qualified  it,  by  stating  the  precise 
term,  it  must  be  proved  as  laid :  Cudlip  v.  Rondel,  Carth.  202.  So,  in  debt  against 
an  officer  for  extorting  illegal  fees  on  a  fieri  facias,  though  it  is  sufficient  to  allege 
the  issuing  of  the  writ  of  fieri  facias,  yet  if  the  plaintiff  also  unnecessarily  allege  the 
judgment  on  which  it  was  founded,  he  must  prove  it,  having  made  it  descriptive  of 
the  principal  thing  :  Savage  v.  Smith,  2  W.  Bl.  1101  ;  Bristow  v.  Wright,  Doug.  668  ; 
Gould's  PI.  160-165  ;  Draper  v.  Garratt,  2  B.  &  C.  2. 

1  Gardiner  v.  Croasdale,  2  Burr.  904 ;  Coxon  v.  Lvon,  2  Campb.  307,  n. 

3  Harrison  v.  Barnby,  5  T.  R.  248;  Co.  Lit.  282  a ;  Stephen  on  Pleading,  518  ; 
Hutchins  v.  Adams,  3  Greenleaf  174. 

1  Mersey  &  Irwell  Nav.  Co.  v.  Douglas,  2  East  497,  502  :  Bull.  N.  P.  89 ;  Vowles 
».  Miller,  3  Taunt.  139,  per  Lawrence,  J.  ;  R.  v.  Cranage,  1  Salk.  385. 


828  APPENLIX   II. 

a  variance.  This  may  be  defined  to  be  a  disagreement  between  the 
allegation  and  the  proof,  in  some  matter  which,  in  point  of  law,  is 
essential  to  the  charge  or  claim.1  It  is  the  legal,  and  not  the  natural, 
identity  which  is  regarded ;  consisting  of  those  particulars  only, 
which  are  in  their  nature  essential  to  the  action,  or  to  the  justifica- 
tion, or  have  become  so  by  being  inseparably  connected,  by  the  mode 
of  statement,  with  that  which  is  essential ;  of  which  an  example  has 
already  been  given,2  in  the  allegation  of  an  estate  in  fee,  when  a  gen- 
eral averment  of  freehold  would  suffice.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  in 
these  cases,  first  to  ascertain  what  are  the  essential  elements  of  the 
legal  proposition  in  controversy,  taking  care  to  include  all  which  is 
indispensable  to  show  the  right  of  the  plaintiff,  or  party  affirming. 
The  rule  is,  that  whatever  cannot  be  stricken  out  without  getting  rid 
of  a  part  essential  to  the  cause  of  action,  must  be  retained,  and  of 
course  must  be  proved,  even  though  it  be  described  with  unnecessary 
particularity.8  The  defendant  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  this  rule, 
to  protect  himself  by  the  verdict  and  judgment,  if  the  same  rights 
should  come  again  in  controversy.  The  rule,  as  before  remarked, 
does  not  generally  apply  to  allegations  of  number,  magnitude,  quan- 
tity, value,  time,  sums  of  money,  and  the  like,  provided  the  proof  in 
regard  to  these  is  sufficient  to  constitute  the  offence  charged,  or  to 
substantiate  the  claim  set  up ;  except  in  those  cases  where  they  oper- 
ate by  way  of  limitation,  or  description  of  other  matters,  in  them- 
selves essential  to  the  offence  or  claim.4 

§  64.  A  few  examples  will  suffice  to  illustrate  this  subject.  Thus,  in 
tort,  for  removing  earth  from  the  defendant's  land,  whereby  the  foun- 
dation of  the  plaintiff's  house  was  injured,  the  allegation  of  bad  intent 
in  the  defendant  is  not  necessary  to  be  proved,  for  the  cause  of  action 
is  perfect,  independent  of  the  intention.1  So,  in  trespass,  for  driving 

1  Stephen  on  PI.  107,  108. 

2  Supra,  §§  51-56. 

8  Bristow  i>.  Wright,  Doug.  668  ;  Peppin  v.  Solomons,  5  T.  R.  496  ;  Williamson  v. 
Allison,  2  East  446,  452. 

*  Supra,  §  61 ;  Rickets  v.  Salwey,  2  B.  &  Aid.  363  ;  May  v.  Brown,  3  B.  &  C.  113, 
122.  It  has  been  said  that  allegations,  which  are  merely  matters  of  inducement,  do 
not  require  such  strict  proof  as  those  which  are  precisely  put  in  issue  between  the 
parties :  Smith  r.  Taylor,  1  New  Rep.  210,  per  Chambre,  J.  But  this  distinction,  as 
Mr.  Stnrkie  .justly  observes,  between  that  which  is  the  gist  of  the  action  and  that 
which  is  inducement,  is  not  always  clear  in  principle :  1  Stark.  Evid.  391,  n.  (b)  ; 
8  ib.  1551,  n.  (x)  Metcalfs  ed.  Certainly  that  which  may  be  traversed,  must  be  proved, 
if  it  is  not  admitted  ;  and  some  facts,  even  though  stated  in  the  form  of  inducement, 
may  be  traversed,  because  they  are  material  ;  as,  for  example,  in  action  for  slander, 
upon  a  charge  for  perjury,  where  the  plaintiff  alleged,  by  way  of  inducement  that  he 
was  sworn  before  the  Lord  Mayor  :  Stephen  on  Pleading,  258.  The  question  whether 
an  allegation  must  be  proved,  or  not,  turns  upon  its  materiality  to  the  case,  and  not 
upon  the  form  in  which  it  is  stated,  or  its  place  in  the  declaration.  In  general,  every 
allegation  in  an  inducement,  which  is  material,  and  not  impertinent,  and  foreign  to 
the  case,  and  which  consequently  cannot  be  rejected  as  surplusage,  must  be  proved 
as  alleged  :  1  Chitty  on  PI.  262,  320.  It  i»  true  that  those  matters  which  need  not 
be  alleged  with  particularity,  need  not  l>e  proved  with  particularity,  but  still,  all  alle- 
gations, if  material,  must  be  proved  substantially  as  alleged. 

1  Panton  v.  Holland,  17  Johns.  92;  Twiss  v.  Baldwin,  9  Conn.  291. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  829 

against  the  plaintiff's  cart,  the  allegation  that  he  was  in  the  cart  need 
not  be  proved.2  But,  if  the  allegation  contains  matter  of  description, 
and  is  not  proved  as  laid,  it  is  a  variance,  and  is  fatal.  Thus,  in  an 
action  for  malicious  prosecution  of  the  plaintiff,  upon  a  charge  of  fel- 
ony, before  Baron  Waterpark  of  Waterfork,  proof  of  such  a  prosecu- 
tion before  Baron  Waterpark  of  Waterpark  was  held  to  be  fatally 
variant  from  the  declaration.8  So,  in  an  action  of  tort  founded  on  a 
contract,  every  particular  of  the  contract  is  descriptive,  and  a  variance 
in  the  proof  is  fatal.  As,  in  an  action  on  the  case  for  deceit,  in  a  con- 
tract of  sale,  made  by  the  two  defendants,  proof  of  a  sale  by  one  of 
them  only,  as  his  separate  property,  was  held  insufficient ;  for  the 
joint  contract  of  sale  was  the  foundation  of  the  joint  warranty  laid  in 
the  declaration,  and  essential  to  its  legal  existence  and  validity.4 

§  65.  In  criminal  prosecutions,  it  has  been  thought  that  greater 
strictness  of  proof  was  required  than  in  civil  cases,  and  that  the  de- 
fendant might  be  allowed  to  take  advantage  of  nicer  exceptions.1  But 
whatever  indulgence  the  humanity  and  tenderness  of  judges  may  have 
allowed  in  practice,  in  favor  of  life  or  liberty,  the  better  opinion  seems 
to  be  that  the  rules  of  evidence  are  in  both  cases  the  same.2  If  the 
averment  is  divisible,  and  enough  is  proved  to  constitute  the  offence 
charged,  it  is  no  variance,  though  the  remaining  allegations  are  not 
proved.  Thus,  an  indictment  for  embezzling  two  bank-notes  of  equal 
value  is  supported  by  proof  of  the  embezzlement  of  one  only.8  And 
in  an  indictment  for  obtaining  money  upon  several  false  pretences,  it 
is  sufficient  to  prove  any  material  portion  of  them.*  But  where  a  per- 
son or  thing,  necessary  to  be  mentioned  in  an  indictment,  is  described 
with  unnecessary  particularity,  all  the  circumstances  of  the  descrip- 
tion must  be  proved  ;  for  they  are  all  made  essential  to  the  identity. 
Thus,  in  an  indictment  for  stealing  a  black  horse,  the  animal  is  neces- 
sarily mentioned,  but  the  color  need  not  be  stated  ;  yet  if  it  is  stated, 
it  is  made  descriptive  of  the  particular  animal  stolen,  and  a  variance 
in  the  proof  of  the  color  is  fatal.6  So,  in  an  indictment  for  stealing 
a  bank-note,  though  it  would  be  sufficient  to  describe  it  generally  as 
a  bank-note  of  such  a  denomination  or  value,  yet,  if  the  name  of  the 
officer  who  signed  it  be  also  stated,  it  must  be  strictly  proved.6  So, 

8  Howard  r.  Peete,  2  Chitty  315. 

8  Walters  v.  Mace,  2  B.  &  Aid.  756. 

<  Weall  v.  King,  12  East  452  ;  Lopes  v.  De  Tastet,  1  B.  &  B.  538. 

1  Beech's  Case,  1  Leach's  Cas.  (3d  ed.)  158  ;  United  States  v.  Porter,  3  Day  283, 
286. 

2  Roscoe's  Crira.  Evid.  73  ;  1  Deacon's  Dig.  Crim.  Law,  459,  460.     And  see  2  East 
P.  C.  785,  1021;  1  Phil.  Evid.  506  :  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  116,  155,  per  Abbott,  J.; 
Lord  Melville's  Case,  29  How.  St.  Tr.  1376;  2  Russell  on  Crimes,  588;  U.  S.  v.  Brit- 
ton,  2  Mason  464,  468. 

8  Carson's  Case,  Russ.  &  Ry.  303  ;  Furneaux's  Case,  ib.  335  ;  Tyer's  Case,  ib.  402. 
*  Hill's  Case,  Russ.  &  Ry.  190. 
»  1  Stark.  Evid.  374. 

6  Craven's  Case,  Russ.  &  Ry.  14.      So,  where  the  charge  in  an  indictment  was  of 
stealing  70  pieces  of  the  current  coin  called  sovereigns,  and  140  pieces  called  half 


830  APPENDIX   II. 

also,  in  an  indictment  for  murder,  malicious  shooting,  or  other  offence 
to  the  person,  or  for  an  offence  against  the  habitation,  or  goods,  the 
name  of  the  person  who  was  the  subject  of  the  crime,  and  of  the 
owner  of  the  house  or  goods,  are  material  to  be  proved  as  alleged.7 
But  where  the  time,  place,  person,  or  other  circumstances  are  not 
descriptive  of  the  fact  or  degree  of  the  crime,  nor  material  to  the 
jurisdiction,  a  discrepancy  between  the  allegation  and  the  proof  is 
not  a  variance.  Such  are  statements  of  the  house  or  field  where  a 
robbery  was  committed,  the  time  of  the  day,  the  day  of  the  term  in 
which  a  false  answer  in  chancery  was  filed,  and  the  like.8  In  an  in- 
dictment for  murder,  the  substance  of  the  charge  is  that  the  prisoner 
feloniously  killed  the  deceased  by  means  of  shooting,  poisoning,  cut- 
ting, blows,  or  bruises,  or  the  like  ;  it  is,  therefore,  sufficient,  if  the 
proof  agree  with  the  allegation  in  its  substance  and  general  character 
without  precise  conformity  in  every  particular.  In  other  words,  an  iiv- 
dictment  describing  a  thing  by  its  generic  term  is  supported  by  proof 
of  a  species  which  is  clearly  comprehended  within  such  description. 
Thus,  if  the  charge  be  of  poisoning  by  a  certain  drug,  and  the  proof  be 
of  poisoning  by  another  drug ;  or  the  charge  be  of  felonious  assault  with 
a  staff,  and  the  proof  be  of  such  assault  with  a  stone  ;  or  the  charge  be 
of  a  wound  with  a  sword,  and  the  proof  be  of  a  wound  with  an  axe ; 
yet  the  charge  is  substantially  proved,  and  there  is  no  variance.9  But 
where  the  matter,  whether  introductory  or  otherwise,  is  descriptive, 
it  must  be  proved  as  laid,  or  the  variance  will  be  fatal.  As,  in  an 
indictment  for  perjury  in  open  Court,  the  term  of  the  Court  must  be 
truly  stated  and  strictly  proved.10  So,  in  an  indictment  for  perjury 
before  a  select  committee  of  the  House  of  Commons,  in  a  contested 
election,  it  was  stated  that  an  election  was  holden  by  virtue  of  a  pre- 

sovereigns,  and  500  pieces  called  crowns ;  it  was  held,  that  it  was  not  supported  by 
evidence  of  stealing  a  sum  of  money  consisting  of  some  of  the  coins  mentioned  in  the 
indictment,  without  proof  of  some  one  or  more  of  the  specific  coins  charged  to  have 
been  stolen  :  R.  v.  Bond,  1  Den.  C.  C.  517  ;  14  Jur.  390. 

7  Clark's  Case,  Russ.  &  Ry.  358 ;  White's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.  286  ;  Jenk's  Case, 
2  East  P.  C.  514  ;  Durore's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  L.  390.     But  a  mistake  in  spelling  the 
name  is  no  variance,  if  it  be  idem  sonans  with  the  name  proved :  Williams  v.  Ogle, 
2  Str.  889  ;  Foster's  Case,  Russ.  &  Ry.  412  ;  Tannett's  Case,  ib.  351  ;  Bingham  v. 
Dickie,  5  Taunt.   814.     So,  if  one  be  indicted  for  an  assault  upon  A  B,  a  deputy- 
sheriff,  and  in  the  officer's  commission  he  is  styled  A  B  junior,  it  is  no  variance  if  the 
person  is  proved  to  be  the  same  :  Com.  v.  Beckley,  3  Metcalf  330. 

8  Wardle's  Case,  2  East  P.  C.  785 ;  Pye's  Case,  ib. ;  Johnstone's  Case,  ib.  786  ; 
Minton's  Case,  ib.  1021  ;  R.  v.  Waller,  2  Stark.  Evid.  623  ;  R.  v.  Hucks,   1  Stark. 
521. 

•  1  Eant  P.  C.  341;  Martin's  Case,  5  Car.  &  P.  128;  Culkin's  Case,  ib.  121  ; 
supra,  §  58.  An  indictment  for  stealing  "a  sheep"  is  supported  by  proof  of  the 
stealing  of  any  sex  or  variety  of  that  animal  ;  for  the  term  is  nomen  generalissimum  : 
M'Cully's  Case,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  272  ;  R.  v.  Spicer,  1  Den.  C.  C.  82.  So,  if  the  charge 
be  of  death  by  suffocation,  by  the  hand  over  the  mouth,  and  the  proof  be  that  res- 
piration was  stopped,  though  by  some  other  violent  mode  of  strangulation,  it  is  suffi- 
cient :  R.  v.  Waters,  7  C.  &  P.  250. 

w  Where  the  term  is  designated  by  the  day  of  the  month,  as  in  the  Circuit  Courts 
of  the  United  States,  the  precise  day  is  material :  U.  S.  v.  McNeal,  1  GalL  387. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  831 

cept  duly  issued  to  the  bailiff  of  the  borough  of  New  Mai  ton,  and  that 
A  and  B  were  returned  to  serve  as  members  for  the  said  borough  of 
New  Malton ;  but  the  writ  appeared  to  be  directed  to  the  bailiff  of 
Malton.  Lord  Ellenborough  held  this  not  matter  of  description ;  and 
the  precept  being  actually  issued  to  the  bailiff  of  the  borough  of  New 
Malton,  it  was  sufficient.  But  the  return  itself  was  deemed  descrip- 
tive ;  and  the  proof  being  that  the  members  were  in  fact  returned  as 
members  of  the  borough  of  Malton,  it  was  adjudged  a  fatal  variance.11 
So,  a  written  contract,  when  set  out  in  an  indictment,  must  be  strictly 
proved.12 

§  66.  Thus,  also,  in  actions  upon  contract,  if  any  part  of  the  con- 
tract proved  should  vary  materially  from  that  which  is  stated  in  the 
pleadings,  it  will  be  fatal ;  for  a  contract  is  an  entire  thing,  and  indi- 
visible. It  will  not  be  necessary  to  state  all  the  parts  of  a  contract 
which  consists  of  several  distinct  and  collateral  provisions;  the  grava- 
men is,  that  a  certain  act  which  the  defendant  engaged  to  do  has  not 
been  done ;  and  the  legal  proposition  to  be  maintained  is,  that,  for 
such  a  consideration,  he  became  bound  to  do  such  an  act,  including 
the  time,  manner,  and  other  circumstances  of  its  performance.  The 
entire  consideration  must  be  stated,  and  the  entire  act  to  be  done,  in 
virtue  of  such  consideration,  together  with  the  time,  manner,  and  cir- 
cumstances ;  and  with  all  the  parts  of  the  proposition,  as  thus  stated, 
the  proof  must  agree.1  If  the  allegation  be  of  an  absolute  contract, 
and  the  proof  be  of  a  contract  in  the  alternative,  at  the  option  of  the 
defendant;  or  a  promise  be  stated  to  deliver  merchantable  goods,  and 
the  proof  be  of  a  promise  to  deliver  goods  of  a  second  quality  ;  or  the 
contract  stated  be  to  pay  or  perform  in  a  reasonable  time,  and  the 
proof  be  to  pay  or  perform  on  a  day  certain,  or  on  the  happening  of 
a  certain  event ;  or  the  consideration  stated  be  one  horse,  bought  by 
the  plaintiff  of  the  defendant,  and  the  proof  be  of  two  horses ;  in  these 
and  the  like  cases,  the  variance  will  be  fatal.3 

§  67.  Redundancy  of  Allegation,  and  of  Proof.  There  is,  however, 
a  material  distinction  to  be  observed  between  the  redundancy  in  the 
allegation,  and  redundancy  only  in  the  proof.  In  the  former  case,  a 
variance  between  the  allegations  and  the  proof  will  be  fatal,  if  the  re- 
dundant allegations  are  descriptive  of  that  which  is  essential.  But  in 
the  latter  case,  redundancy  cannot  vitiate,  merely  because  more  is 
proved  than  is  alleged  ;  unless  the  matter  superfluously  proved  goes 
to  contradict  some  essential  part  of  the  allegation.  Thus,  if  the  alle- 

"  B.  v.  Leefe,  2  Carapb.  134,  140. 

12  2  East  P.  C.  977,  978,  981,  982  ;  Com.  v.  Parmenter,  5  Pick.  279 ;  People  ». 
Franklin,  3  Johns.  Cas.  299. 

i  Clarke  v.  Gray,  6  East  564,  567,  568  ;  Gwinnet  v.  Phillips,  3  T.  R.  643,  646  ; 
Thornton  v.  Jones,  2  Marsh.  287  ;  Parker  v.  Palmer,  4  B.  &  A.  387 ;  Swallow  v.  Beau- 
mont, 2  B.  &  A.  765. 

a  Penny  v.  Porter,  2  East  2 ;  Bristow  ».  Wright,  2  Doug.  665  ;  Hilt  v.  Campbell, 
6  Greenl.  109  ;  Symonds  v.  Carr,  1  Campb.  361  ;  King  v.  Robinson,  Cro.  El.  79.  See 
post,  Vol.  II,  §  11  d. 


832  APPENDIX   II. 

gation  were  that,  in  consideration  of  £100,  the  defendant  promised  to 
go  to  Rome,  and  also  to  deliver  a  certain  horse  to  the  plaintiff  and 
the  plaintiff  should  fail  in  proving  the  latter  branch  of  the  promise 
the  variance  would  be  fatal,  though  he  sought  to  recover  for  the 
breach  of  the  former  only,  and  the  latter  allegation  was  unnecessary. 
But,  if  he  had  alleged  only  the  former  branch  of  the  promise,  the 
proof  of  the  latter  along  with  it  would  be  immaterial.  In  the  first 
case,  he  described  an  undertaking  which  he  has  not  proved;  but  in  the 
latter,  he  has  merely  alleged  one  promise,  and  proved  that,  and  also 
another.1 

§  68.  But  where  the  subject  is  entire,  as,  for  example,  the  con- 
sideration of  a  contract,1  a  variance  in  the  proof,  as  we  have  just  seen, 
shows  the  allegation  to  be  defective,  and  is,  therefore,  material. 
Thus,  if  it  were  alleged  that  the  defendant  promised  to  pay  £100,  in 
consideration  of  the  plaintiff's  going  to  Borne,  and  also  delivering  a 
horse  to  the  defendant,  an  omission  to  prove  the  whole  consideration 
alleged  would  be  fatal.  And  if  the  consideration  had  been  alleged 
to  consist  of  the  going  to  Rome  only,  yet  if  the  agreement  to  de- 
liver the  horse  were  also  proved,  as  forming  part  of  the  consider- 
ation, it  would  be  equally  fatal ;  the  entire  thing  alleged,  and  the 
entire  thing  proved,  not  being  identical.2  Upon  the  same  principle, 
if  the  consideration  alleged  be  a  contract  of  the  plaintiff  to  build  a 
ship,  and  the  proof  be  of  one  to  finish  a  ship  partly  built ; 8  or  the 
consideration  alleged  be  the  delivery  of  pine  timber,  and  the  proof 
be  of  spruce  timber; 4  or  the  consideration  alleged  be,  that  the  plain- 
tiff  would  indorse  a  note,  and  the  proof  be  of  a  promise  in  consider- 
ation that  he  had  indorsed  a  note ; 6  the  variance  is  equally  fatal. 
But  though  no  part  of  a  valid  consideration  may  be  safely  omitted,  yet 
that  which  is  merely  frivolous  need  not  be  stated ; 6  and,  if  stated, 
need  not  be  proved  ;  for  the  court  will  give  the  same  construction  to 
the  declaration  as  to  the  contract  itself,  rejecting  that  which  is  non- 
sensical or  repugnant.7 

§  69.  In  the  case  of  deeds,  the  same  general  principles  are  applied. 
If  the  deed  is  declared  upon,  every  part  stated  in  the  pleadings,  as 

1  1  Stark.  Evid.  401.  Where  the  agreement,  as  in  this  case,  contains  several  dis- 
tinct promises,  and  for  the  breach  of  one  only  the  action  is  brought,  the  consequences 
of  a  variance  may  be  avoided  by  alleging  the  promise,  as  made  inter  alia.  And  no 
good  reason,  in  principle,  is  perceived,  why  the  case  mentioned  in  the  following  sec- 
tion might  not  be  treated  in  a  similar  manner;  but  the  authorities  are  otherwise.  In 
the  example  given  in  the  text,  the  allegation  is  supposed  to  import  that  the  undertak- 
ing consisted  of  neither  more  nor  less  than  is  alleged. 

1  Swallow  v.  Beaumont,  2  B.  &  A.  765;  White  ».  Wilson,  2  B.  &  P.  116  :  supra 
§58. 

2  1  Stark.  Evid.  401  ;  Lansing  v.  M'Killip,  3  Caines  286;  Stone  v.  Knowlton,  3 
Wend.  374. 

•  Smith  v.  Barker,  3  Day  812. 

*  Kohbins  v.  Otis,  1  Pick.  868. 

6  Bulkloy  v.  Landon,  2  Conn.  404. 

8  Brooks  v.  Lowrie,  1  Nott  &  McCord  342. 

7  Ferguson  v.  Harwood,  7  Cranch  408,  414. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  833 

descriptive  of  the  deed,  must  be  exactly  proved,  or  it  will  be  a  vari- 
ance ;  and  this  whether  the  parts  set  out  at  length  were  necessary  to 
be  stated  or  not.1  If  a  qualified  covenant  be  set  out  in  the  declara- 
tion as  a  general  covenant,  omitting  the  exception  or  limitation,  the 
variance  between  the  allegation  and  the  deed  will  be  fatal.  If  the 
condition,  proviso,  or  limitation  affects  the  original  cause  of  action 
itself,  it  constitutes  an  essential  element  in  the  original  proposition 
to  be  maintained  by  the  plaintiff ;  and,  therefore,  must  be  stated,  and 
as  laid ;  but,  if  it  merely  affects  the  amount  of  damages  to  be  recov- 
ered, or  the  liability  of  the  defendant  as  affected  by  circumstances 
occurring  after  the  cause  of  action,  it  need  not  be  alleged  by  the 
plaintiff,  but  properly  comes  out  in  the  defence.3  And  where  the 
deed  is  not  described  according  to  its  tenor,  but  according  to  its  legal 
effect,  if  the  deed  agrees  in  legal  effect  with  the  allegation,  any  verbal 
discrepancy  is  not  a  variance.  As,  in  covenant  against  a  tenant  for 
not  repairing,  the  lease  being  stated  to  have  been  made  by  the  plain- 
tiff, and  the  proof  being  of  a  lease  by  the  plaintiff  and  his  wife,  she 
having  but  a  chattel  interest ;  or,  if  debt  be  brought  by  the  husband 
alone,  on  a  bond  as  given  to  himself,  the  bond  appearing  to  have  been 
given  to  the  husband  and  wife ;  yet,  the  evidence  is  sufficient  proof 
of  the  allegation.8  But,  where  the  deed  is  set  out,  on  oyer,  the  rule 

1  Bowditch  v.  Mawley,  1  Campb.  195  ;  Dundass  v.  Ld.  Weyraouth,  Cowp.  665  ; 
supra,  §  55  ;  Ferguson  v.  Harwood,  7  Cranch  408,  413  ;  Sheehy  v.  Mandeville,  ib. 
208,  217. 

2  1  Chitty  PI.  268,  269  (5th  Am.  cd.)  ;  Howell  v.  Richards,  11  East  633  ;  Clarke  v. 
Gray,  6  id.  564,  570. 

«"  Beaver  v.  Lane,  2  Mod.  217 ;  Arnold  ».  Revoult,  1  Brod.  &  Bing.  443 ;  Whitlock 
v.  Ramsey,  2  Munf.  510 ;  Ankerstein  v.  Clarke,  4  T.  R.  616.  It  is  said  that  an  alle- 
gation that  J.  S.t  otherwise  R.  S.,  made  a  deed,  is  not  supported  by  evidence,  that  J. 
S.  made  a  deed  by  the  name  of  R.  S. :  1  Stark.  Evid.  513,  citing  Hyckmau  v.  Shotbolt, 
Dyer  279,  pi.  9.  The  doctrine  of  that  case  is  very  clearly  expounded  by  Parke,  B.,  in 
Williams  v.  Bryant,  5  M.  &  W.  447.  In  regard  to  a  discrepancy  between  the  name  of 
the  obligor  in  the  body  of  a  deed,  and  in  the  signature,  a  distinction  is  to  be  observed 
between  transactions  which  derive  their  efficacy  wholly  from  the  deed,  and  those  which 
do  not.  Thus,  in  a  feoffment  at  the  common  law,  or  a  sale  of  personal  property  by 
deed,  or  the  like,  livery  being  made  in  the  one  case,  and  possession  delivered  in  the 
other,  the  transfer  of  title  is  perfect,  notwithstanding  any  mistake  in  the  name  of  the 
grantor  ;  for  it  takes  effect  by  delivery,  and  not  by  the  deed :  Perk.  §§  38-42.  But 
where  the  efficacy  of  the  transaction  depends  on  the  instrument  itself,  as  in  the  case  of 
a  bond  for  the  payment  of  money,  or  any  other  executory  contract  by  deed,  if  the  name 
of  the  obligor  in  the  bond  is  different  from  the  signature,  as  if  it  were  written  John  and 
signed  William,  it  is  said  to  be  void  at  law  for  uncertainty,  \inless  helped  by  proper 
averments  on  the  record.  A  mistake  in  this  matter,  as  in  any  other,  in  drawing  up 
the  contract,  may  be  reformed  by  bill  in  equity.  At  law,  where  the  obligor  has  been 
sued  by  his  true  name,  signed  to  the  bond,  and  not  by  that  written  in  the  body  of  it, 
and  the  naked  fact  of  the  discrepancy,  unexplained,  is  all  which  is  presented  by  the 
record,  it  has  always  been  held  bad.  This  rule  was  originally  founded  in  this,  that  a 
man  cannot  have  two  names  of  baptism  at  the  same  time  ;  for  whatever  name  was 
imposed  at  his  baptism,  whether  single  or  compounded  of  several  names,  he  being  bap- 
tized but  once,  that  and  that  alone  was  his  baptismal  name  ;  and  by  that  name  he  de- 
clared himself  bound.  So  it  was  held  in  Serchor  v.  Talbot,  3  Hen.  VI,  25,  pi.  6,  and 
subsequently  in  Thornton  v.  Wikes,  34  Hen.  VI,  19,  pi.  36 ;  Field  r.  Wintow,  Cro. 
El.  897  ;  Oliver  v.  Watkins,  Cro.  Jac.  658 ;  Maby  v.  Shepherd,  Cro.  Jac.  640  ;  Evans 
v.  King,  Willes  554  ;  Clerke  v.  Isted,  Nelson's  Lutw.  275  ;  Gould  v.  Barnes,  3  Taunt. 
504.  "  It  appears  from  these  cases  to  be  a  settled  point,"  said  Parke,  B.,  in  Williams 
VOL.  I.  —  53 


834  APPENDIX  H. 

is  otherwise;  for  to  have  oyer  is,  in  modern  practice,  to  be  furnished 
with  an  exact  and  literal  copy  of  the  deed  declared  on,  every  word 
and  part  of  which  is  thereby  made  descriptive  of  the  deed  to  be  offered 
in  evidence.  In  such  case,  if  the  plaintiff  does  not  produce  in  evi- 
dence a  deed  literally  corresponding  with  the  copy,  the  defendant 
may  well  say  it  is  not  the  deed  in  issue,  and  it  will  be  rejected.* 

v.  Bryant,  "  that  if  a  declaration  against  a  defendant  by  one  Christian  name,  as,  for 
instance,  Joseph,  state  that  he  executed  a  bond  by  the  name  of  Thomas,  and  there  be 
no  averment  to  explain  the  difference,  such  as  that  he  was  known  by  the  latter  name  at 
the  time  of  the  execution,  such  a  declaration  would  be  bad  on  demurrer,  or  in  arrest  of 
judgment,  even  after  issue  joined  on  a  plea  of  non  est  factum.  And  the  reason  appears 
to  be,  that  in  bonds  and  deeds,  the  efficacy  of  which  depends  on  the  instrument  itself, 
and  not  on  matter  in  pais,  there  must  be  a  certain  designatio  personce  of  the  party, 
•which  regularly  ought  to  be  by  the  true  first  name  or  name  of  baptism,  and  surname  ; 
of  which  the  first  is  the  most  important."  "  But,  on  the  other  hand,"  he  adds,  "it 
is  certain,  that  a  person  may  at  this  time  sue  or  be  sued,  not  merely  by  his  true  name 
of  baptism,  but  by  any  first  name  which  he  has  acquired  by  usage  or  reputation."  "  If 
a  party  is  called  and  known  by  any  proper  name,  by  that  name  he  may  be  sued,  and 
the  misnomer  could  not  be  pleaded  in  abatement ;  and  not  only  is  this  the  established 
practice,  but  the  doctrine  is  promulgated  in  very  ancient  times.  In  Bracton,  188,  b,  it 
is  said,  '  Item  si  quis  binonimis  fuerit,  sive  in  nomine  proprio  sive  in  cognomine,  illud 
nomen  tenendum  erit,  quo  solet  frequentius  appellari,  quia  adeo  imposita  sunt,  ut 
demonstrent  voluntatem  dicentis,  et  utimur  notis  in  vocis  ministerio.'  And  if  a  party 
may  sue  or  be  sued  by  the  proper  name  by  which  he  is  known,  it  must  be  a  sufficient 
designation  of  him,  if  he  enter  into  a  bond  by  that  name.  It  by  no  means  follows, 
therefore,  that  the  decision  in  the  case  of  Gould  v.  Barnes,  and  others  before  referred 
to,  in  which  the  question  arose  on  the  record,  would  hpve  been  the  same,  if  there  had 
been  an  averment  on  the  face  of  the  declaration  that  the  party  was  known  by  the  proper 
name  in  which  the  bond  was  made  at  the  time  of  making  it.  We  find  no  authorities 
for  saying,  that  the  declaration  would  have  been  bad  with  such  an  averment,  even  if 
there  had  been  a  total  variance  of  the  first  names  ;  still  less,  where  a  man,  having  two 
proper  names,  or  names  of  baptism,  has  bound  himself  by  the  name  of  one.  And  on  the 
plea  of  '  non  est  factum,'  where  the  difference  of  name  does  not  appear  on  the  record, 
and  there  is  evidence  of  the  party  having  been  known,  at  the  time  of  the  execution,  by 
the  name  ou  the  instrument,  there  is  no  case,  that  we  are  aware  of,  which  decides  that 
the  instrument  is  void."  The  name  written  in  the  body  of  the  instrument  is  that 
which  the  party,  by  the  act  of  execution  and  delivery,  declares  to  be  his  own,  and  by 
which  he  acknowledges  himself  bound.  By  this  name,  therefore,  he  should  regularly 
be  sued  ;  and  if  sued  with  an  alias  dictus  of  his  true  name,  by  which  the  instrument 
was  signed,  and  an  averment  in  the  declaration  that  at  the  time  of  executing  the  instru- 
ment he  was  known  as  well  by  the  one  name  as  the  other,  it  is  conceived  that  he  can 
take  no  advantage  of  the  discrepancy  ;  being  estopped  by  the  deed  to  deny  this  alle- 
gation :  Evans  v.  King,  Willes  555,  n.  (b)  ;  Reeves  v.  Slater,  7  B.  &  C.  486,  490  ; 
Cro.  El.  897,  n.  (a).  See  also  R.  v.  Wooldale,  6  Q.  B.  549 ;  Wooster  v.  Lyons,  5 
Blackf.  60.  If  sued  by  the  name  written  in  the  body  of  the  deed,  without  any  explan- 
atory averment,  and  he  pleads  a  misnomer  in  abatement,  the  plaintiff,  in  his  replica- 
tion, may  estop  him  by  the  deed:  Dyer  279  6,  pi.  9,  n.  ;  Story's  Pleadings,  43; 
Willes  555,  n.  And  if  he  should  be  sued  by  his  true  name,  and  plead  non  est  factum, 
wherever  this  plea,  as  is  now  the  case  in  England,  since  the  rule  of  Hilary  Term,  4  Wm. 
IV,  K.  21,  "operates  as  a  denial  of  the  deed  in  point  of  fact  only,"  all  other  defences 
against  it  being  required  to  be  specially  pleadea,  the  difficulty  occasioned  by  the  old 
decisions  may  now  ue  avoided  by  proof  that  the  party,  at  the  time  of  the  execution, 
was  known  by  the  name  on  the  face  of  the  deed.  In  those  American  States  which 
have  abolished  special  pleading,  substituting  the  general  issue  in  all  cases,  with  a  brief 
statement  of  the  special  matter  of  defence,  probably  the  new  course  of  practice  thus 
introduced  would  lead  to  a  similar  result. 

«  Waugh  v.  Bussell,  6  Taunt.  707,  709,  per  Gibbs,  C.  J.  ;  James  ».  Walruth,  8 
Johns.  410  ;  Henry  v.  Cleland,  14  id.  400 ;  Jansen  v.  Ostrander,  1  Cowen  670,  ace.  In 
Henry  ».  Brown,  19  Johns.  49,  where  the  condition  of  the  bond  was  "without  fraud 
or  other  delay,"  and  in  the  oyer  the  word  "other"  was  omitted,  the  defendant  moved 
to  set  aside  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  because  the  bond  was  admitted  iu  evideuce  with- 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  835 

§  70.  Where  a  record  is  mentioned  in  the  pleadings,  the  same  dis- 
tinction is  now  admitted  in  the  proof,  between  allegations  of  matter 
of  substance,  and  allegations  of  matter  of  description  ;  the  former 
require  only  substantial  proof,  the  latter  must  be  literally  proved. 
Thus,  in  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution,  the  day  of  the  plaintiff's 
acquittal  is  not  material.  Neither  is  the  term  in  which  the  judg- 
ment is  recovered  a  material  allegation  in  an  action  against  the  sheriff 
for  a  false  return  on  the  writ  of  execution.  For  in  both  cases,  the 
record  is  alleged  by  way  of  inducement  only,  and  not  as  the  founda- 
tion of  the  action ;  and  therefore  literal  proof  is  not  required.1  So, 
in  an  indictment  for  perjury  in  a  case  in  chancery,  where  the  allega- 
tion was,  that  the  bill  was  addressed  to  Robert,  Lord  Henly,  and 
the  proof  was  of  a  bill  addressed  to  Sir  Robert  Henly,  Kt.,  it 
was  held  no  variance ;  the  substance  being,  that  it  was  addressed  to 
the  person  holding  the  great  seal.2  But  where  the  record  is  the 
foundation  of  the  action,  the  term  in  which  the  judgment  was  ren- 
dered, and  the  number  and  names  of  the  parties,  are  descriptive,  and 
must  be  strictly  proved.* 

§  71.  In  regard  to  prescriptions,  it  has  been  already  remarked  that 
the  same  rules  apply  to  them  which  are  applied  to  contracts ;  a  pre- 
scription being  founded  on  a  grant  supposed  to  be  lost  by  lapse  of 
time.1  If,  therefore,  a  prescriptive  right  be  set  forth  as  the  founda- 
tion of  the  action,  or  be  pleaded  in  bar  and  put  in  issue,  it  must  be 
proved  to  the  full  extent  to  which  it  is  claimed ;  for  every  fact  alleged 
is  descriptive  of  the  supposed  grant.  Thus,  if  in  trespass,  for  break- 
ing and  entering  a  several  fishery,  the  plaintiff,  in  his  replication, 
prescribes  for  a  sole  and  exclusive  right  of  fishing  in  four  places, 
upon  which  issue  is  taken,  and  the  proof  be  of  such  right  in  only 
three  of  the  places,  it  is  a  fatal  variance.  Or,  if  in  trespass  the  de- 
fendant justify  under  a  prescriptive  right  of  common  on  five  hundred 
acres,  and  the  proof  be  that  his  ancestor  had  released  five  of  them,  it 
is  fatal.  Or  if,  in  replevin  of  cattle,  the  defendant  avow  the  taking 
damage  feasant,  and  the  plaintiff  plead  in  bar  a  prescriptive  right  of 
common  for  all  the  cattle,  on  which  issue  is  taken,  and  the  proof  be 
of  such  right  for  only  a  part  of  the  cattle,  it  is  fatal.2 

§  72.  But  a  distinction  is  to  be  observed  between  cases  where  the 
prescription  is  the  foundation  of  the  claim,  and  is  put  in  issue,  and 

out  regard  to  the  variance;  but  the  Court  refused  the  motion,  partly  on  the  ground 
that  the  variance  was  immaterial,  and  partly  that  the  oyer  was  clearly  amendable. 
See  also  Dorr  v.  Fenno,  12  Pick.  521. 

1  Purcell  v.  Macnamara,  9  East  157  ;  Stoddart  v.  Palmer,  4  B.  &  B.  2  ;  Phillips  v. 
Shaw,  4  B.  &  A.  435  ;  5  id.  964. 

2  Per  Buller,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Pippett,  1  T.  R.  240 ;  Rodman  v.  Forman,  8  Johns.  29  ; 
Brooks  v.  Bemiss,  ib.  455  ;  State  v.  Caffey,  2  Murphy  320  . 

8  Rastall  v.  Stratton,  1  H.  Bl.  49  ;  Woodford  v.  Ashley,  11  East  508  ;  Black  v. 
Braybrook,  2  Stark.  7;  Baynes  v.  Forest,  2  Str.  892;  U.  S.  v.  McNeal,  1  Gall.  387. 

1  Su-pra,  §  58. 

2  Rogers  v.  Allen,  2  Campb.  313,  315  ;  Rotherham  v.  Green,  Noy  67  ;  Couyers  w 
Jackson,  Clayt.  19 ;  Bull.  N.  P.  539. 


836  APPENDIX   II. 

cases  where  the  action  is  founded  in  tort,  for  a  disturbance  of 
the  plaintiff  in  his  enjoyment  of  a  prescriptive  right.  For  in  the 
latter  cases  it  is  sufficient  for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  a  right  of  the 
same  nature,  with  that  alleged,  though  not  to  the  same  extent ; 
the  gist  of  the  action  being  the  wrongful  act  of  the  defendant, 
in  disturbing  the  plaintiff  in  his  right,  and  not  the  extent  of  that 
right.  Therefore,  where  the  action  was  for  the  disturbance  of  the 
plaintiff  in  his  right  of  common,  by  opening  stone  quarries  there,  the 
allegation  being  of  common,  by  reason  both  of  a  messuage  and  of 
land,  whereof  the  plaintiff  was  possessed,  and  the  proof,  in  a  trial 
upon  a  general  issue,  being  of  common  by  reason  of  the  land  only,  it 
was  held  no  variance  ;  the  Court  observing,  that  the  proof  was  not  of 
a  different  allegation,  but  of  the  same  allegation  in  part,  which  was 
sufficient,  and  that  the  damages  might  be  given  accordingly.1  Yet  in 
the  former  class  of  cases,  where  the  prescription  is  expressly  in  issue, 
proof  of  a  more  ample  right  than  is  claimed  will  not  be  a  variance ; 
as,  if  the  allegation  be  of  a  right  of  common  for  sheep,  and  the  proof 
be  of  such  right,  and  also  of  common  for  cows.3 

§  73.  Amendments  to  remedy  Variance.  But  the  party  may  now, 
in  almost  every  case,  avoid  the  consequences  of  a  variance  between 
the  allegation  in  the  pleadings  and  the  state  of  facts  proved,  by 
amendment  of  the  record.  This  power  was  given  to  the  Courts  in 
England  by  Lord  Tenterden's  Act 1  in  regard  to  variances  between 
matters  in  writing  or  in  print,  produced  in  evidence,  and  the  recital 
thereof  upon  the  record :  and  it  was  afterwards  extended 2  to  all  other 
matters,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Court  or  judge  not  material  to  the 
merits  of  the  case,  upon  such  terms  as  to  costs  and  postponement  as 
the  Court  or  judge  may  deem  reasonable.  The  same  power,  so  essen- 
tial to  the  administration  of  substantial  justice,  has  been  given  by 
statutes  to  the  Courts  of  most  of  the  several  States  as  well  as  of  the 
United  States;  and  in  both  England  and  America  these  statutes  have, 
with  great  propriety,  been  liberally  expounded,  in  furtherance  of  their 
beneficial  design.8  The  judge's  discretion,  in  allowing  or  refusing 

1  Rickets  v.  Salwey,  2  B.  &  A.  360  ;  Eardley  v.  Turnock,  Cro.  Jac.  629  ;  Manifold 
v.  Pennington,  4  B.  &  C.  161. 

2  Bushwood  v.  Pond,  Cro.  El.  722 ;  Tewkesbury  v.  Bricknell,  1  Taunt.  142 ;  supra, 
§§  58,  67,  68. 

i  »  Geo.  IV,  c.  15. 

3  By  Stat.  3  &  4  Wm.  IV,  c.  42,  §  23. 

8  See  Hanbury  v.  Ella,  1  Ad.  &  El.  61 ;  Parry  c.  Fairhuret,  2  Cr.  M.  &  R.  190,  196  ; 
Doe  v.  Edwards,  1  M.  &  Rob.  319;  s.  c.  6  C.  &'P.  208;  Hemming  v.  Parry,  6  C.  & 
P.  580;  Mash  v.  Densham,  1  M.  &  Rob.  442;  Ivey  v.  Young,  ib.  545  ;  Howell  v. 
Thomas,  7  C.  &  P.  342 ;  Mayor,  &c.  of  Carmarthen  v.  Lewis,  6  id.  608  ;  Hill  v.  Salt, 
2  C.  &  M.  420  ;  Cox  v.  Painter,  1  Nev.  &  P.  581  ;  Doe  v.  Long,  9  C.  &  P.  777  ; 
Ernest  v.  Brown,  2  M.  &  Rob.  13  ;  Storr  v.  Watson,  2  Scott  842  ;  Smith  v.  Brandram, 
9  Dowl.  430  ;  Whitwell  v.  Scheer,  8  Ad.  &  El.  301  ;  Read  v.  Dunsmore,  9  C.  &  P. 
688  ;  Smith  v.  Knowelden,  8  Dowl.  40 ;  Norcutt  v.  Mottram,  7  Scott  176  ;  Lepge  v. 
Boyd,  5  Bing.  N.  C.  240.  Amendments  were  refused  in  Doe  v.  Errington,  1  Ad.  & 
Kl.  750  ;  Cooper  v.  Whitehouse,  6  C.  &  P.  545  ;  John  v.  Currie,  ib.  618  ;  Watkins  v. 
Morgan,  ib.  661  ;  Adams  v.  Power,  7  id.  76;  Brashier  v.  Jackson,  6  M.  &  W.  549  ; 
Doe  v.  Rowe,  8  Dowl.  444  ;  Etnnson  v.  Oriffin,  3  P.  &  D.  160.  The  following  are  cases 
of  variance,  arising  under  Lord  Tenterdeu'a  Act :  Bentzing  v.  Scott,  4  C.  &  P.  24  ; 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  837 

amendments,  like  the  exercise  of  judicial  discretion  in  other  cases, 
cannot,  in  general,  be  reviewed  by  any  other  tribunal.*  It  is  only  ia 
the  cases  and  in  the  manner  mentioned  in  the  statutes,  that  the  pro- 
priety of  its  exercise  can  be  called  in  question. 

§  115.  Regular  Entries  by  Third  Persons.  It  is  upon  the  same 
ground  that  certain  entries,  made  by  third  persons,  are  treated  as 
original  evidence.  Entries  by  third  persons  are  divisible  into  two 
classes:  first,  those  which  are  made  in  the  discharge  of  official  duty, 
and  in  the  course  of  professional  employment;  and,  secondly,  mere 
private  entries.  Of  these  latter  we  shall  hereafter  speak.  In  regard 
to  the  former  class,  the  entry,  to  be  admissible,  must  be  one  which  it 
ivas  the  person's  duty  to  make,  or  which  belonged  to  the  transaction 
as  part  thereof,  or  which  was  its  usual  and  proper  concomitant.1  It 
must  speak  only  to  that  which  it  was  his  duty  or  business  to  do,  and 
uot  to  extraneous  and  foreign  circumstances.2  The  party  making  it 
must  also  have  had  competent  knowledge  of  the  fact,  or  it  must  have 
been  part  of  his  duty  to  have  known  it ;  there  must  have  been  no 
particular  motive  to  enter  that  transaction  falsely,  more  than  any 
other ;  and  the  entry  must  have  been  made  at  or  about  the  time  of 
the  transaction  recorded.  In  such  cases,  the  entry  itself  is  admitted 
as  original  evidence,  being  part  of  the  res  gestce.  The  general  interest 
of  the  party,  in  making  the  entry,  to  show  that  he  has  done  his  official 

Moilliet  v.  Powell,  6  id.  233 ;  Limey  v.  Bishop,  4  B.  &  Ad.  479 ;  Briant  v.  Eicke,  M. 
&  M.  359;  Parks  v.  Edge,  1  C.  &  M.  429  ;  Mastermau  P.  Judson,  8  Biug.  224;  Brooks 
v.  Blanshard,  1  C.  &  M.  779  ;  Jelf  v.  Oriel,  4  C.  &  P.  22.  The  American  cases,  which 
are  very  numerous,  are  stated  in  1  Metcalf  &  Perkins's  Digests,  pp.  145-162,  and  in 
Putnam's  Supplement,  vol.  ii,  pp.  727-730. 

*  Doe  v.  Eriiugton,  1  M.  &  Rob.  344,  n.  ;  Hellish  v.  Richardson,  9  Bing.  125 ; 
Parks  v.  Edge,  1  C.  &  M.  429  ;  Jenkins  v.  Phillips,  9  C.  &  P.  766  ;  Merriam  v.  Lang- 
don,  10  Conn.  460,  473  ;  Clapp  v.  Balch,  3  Greeul.  216,  219;  Mandeville  v.  Wilson, 
5  Cranch  15 ;  Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hodgson,  6  id.  206  ;  Walden  v.  Craig,  9  Wheat. 
576;  Chirac  v.  Reinicker,  11  id.  302;  IL  S.  v.  Buford,  3  Pet  12,  32;  Benuer  ». 
Frey,  1  Biun.  366  ;  Bailey  v.  Musgrave,  2  S.  &  R.  219  ;  Bright  v.  Sugg.  4  Dever.  492. 
But  it'  the  judge  exercises  his  discretion  in  a  manner  clearly  and  manifestly  wrong,  it 
is  said  that  the  Court  will  interfere  and  set  it  right :  Hackman  v.  Fernie,  3  M.  &  W. 
505 ;  Geach  v.  Ingall,  9  Jur.  691  ;  14  M.  &  W.  95. 

1  The  doctrine  on  the  subject  of  contemporaneous  entries  is  briefly  but  lucidly  ex- 
pounded by  Mr.  Justice  Parke,  in  Doe  d.  Patteshall  c.  Turford,  3  B.  &  Ad.  890.      See 
also  Poole  v.  Dicas,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  654  ;  Pickering  v.  Bishop  of  Ely,  2  Y.  &  C.  249  ; 
R.  v.  Worth,  4  Q.  B.  132. 

2  Chambers  v.  Bernasconi,  1  C.  &  J.  451  ;  s.  c.  1  Tyrwh.  335 ;  s.  c.  1  Cr.  M.  &  R. 
347,  in  error.     This  limitation  has  not  been  applied  to  private  entries  against  the  intcr- 
e.st  of  the  party.     Thus,  where  the  payee  of  a  note  against  A,  B,  &  C,  indorsed  a  partial 
payment  as  received  from  B,  adding  that  the  whole  sum  was  originally  advanced  to  A 
only;  in  an  action  by  B  against  A,  to  recover  the  money  thus  paid  for  his  use,  the  in- 
dorsement made  by  the  payee,  who  was  dead,  was  held  admissible  to  prove  not  only  the 
payment  of  the  money,  but  the  other  fact  as  to  the  advancement  to  A  :  Davies  v.  Hum- 
phreys, 6  M.  &  W.  153  ;  Marks  v.  Lahee,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  408.     And  in  a  subsequent 
case,  it  was  held,  that,  where  an  entry  is  admitted  as  being  against  the  interest  of  the 
party  making  it,  it  carries  with  it  the  whole  statement;  but  that,  if  the  entry  is  made 
merely  in  the  course  of  a  man's  duty,  then  it  does  not  go  beyond  those  matters  uhich 
it  was  his  duty  to  enter :  Percival  v".  Nanson,  7  Eng.  Law  &  £<£.  538  ;  21  Law  J.  Exch. 
N.  s.  1 ;  s.  c.  7  Excb,  1. 


-  838  APPENDIX  II. 

duty,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  question  of  its  admissibility ; 8  nor  is 
it  material  whether  he  was  or  was  not  competent  to  testify  personally 
in  the  case.4  If  he  is  living,  and  competent  to  testify,  it  is  deemed 
necessary  to  produce  him.5  But,  if  he  is  called  as  a  witness  to  the 
fact,  the  entry  of  it  is  not  thereby  excluded.  It  is  still  an  independ- 
ent and  original  circumstance,  to  be  weighed  with  others,  whether 
it  goes  to  corroborate  or  to  impeach  the  testimony  of  the  witness  who 
made  it.  If  the  party  who  made  the  entry  is  dead,  or,  being  called, 
has  no  recollection  of  the  transaction,  but  testifies  to  his  uniform 
practice  to  make  all  his  entries  truly,  and  at  the  time  of  each  trans- 
action, and  has  no  doubt  of  the  accuracy  of  the  one  in  question ;  the 
entry,  unirn peached,  is  considered  sufficient,  as  original  evidence,  and 
not  hearsay,  to  establish  the  fact  in  question.6 

§  116.  Same.  One  of  the  earliest  reported  cases,  illustrative  of 
this  subject,  was  an  action  of  assumpsit,  for  beer  sold  and  delivered, 
the  plaintiff  being  a  brewer.  The  evidence  given  to  charge  the  de- 
fendant was,  that,  in  the  usual  course  of  the  plaintiff's  business,  the 
draymen  came  every  night  to  the  clerk  of  the  brewhouse,  and  gave 
him  an  account  of  the  beer  delivered  during  the  day,  which  he 
entered  in  a  book  kept  for  that  purpose,  to  which  the  draymen  set 
their  hands  ;  and  this  entry,  with  proof  of  the  drayman's  handwriting 
and  of  his  death,  was  held  sufficient  to  maintain  the  action.1  In 
another  case,2  before  Lord  Kenyou,  which  was  au  action  of  trover  for 
a  watch,  where  the  question  was,  whether  the  defendant  had  delivered 
it  to  a  third  person,  as  the  plaintiff  had  directed ;  an  entry  of  the  fact 
by  the  defendant  himself  in  his  shop-book,  kept  for  that  purpose, 
with  proof  that  such  was  the  usual  mode,  was  held  admissible  in 

8  Per  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Poole  v.  Dicas,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  654 ;  Dixon  v.  Cooper,  3  Wils. 
40  ;  Benjamin  v.  Porteus,  2  H  Bl.  590 ;  Williams  v.  Geaves,  8  C.  &  P.  592  ;  Augusta 
v.  Windsor,  1  Appleton  317.  And  see  Doe  i1.  Wittcomb,  15  Jur.  778. 

*  Gleadow  v.  Atkin,  1  C.  &  M.  423,  424  ;  s.  c.  3  Tyrwh.  302,  303  ;  Short  v.  Lee,  2 
Jac.  &  Walk.  489. 

8  Nichols  v.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  326;  Welsh  v.  Barrett,  15  Mass.  380;  Wilbur  v. 
Selden,  6  Cowen  162;  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Whitehill,  16  S.  &  R.  89,  90;  Stokes  v. 
Stokes,  6  Martin  N.  s.  351  ;  Herring  v.  Levy,  4  Martin  N.  s.  383 ;  Brewster  v.  Doane, 
2  Hill  N.  Y.  537  ;  Davis  v.  Fuller,  12  Vt.  178. 

6  Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Culver,  2  Hill  531  ;  New  Haven  County  Bank  v.  Mitchell,  15 
Conn.  206  ;  Bank  of  Tennessee  v.  Cowan,  7  Humph.  70.  See  infra,  §§  436,  437, 
n.  (4).  But  upon  a  question  of  the  infancy  of  a  Jew,  where  the  time  of  his  circum- 
cision, which  by  custom  is  on  the  eighth  day  alter  his  birth,  was  proposed  to  be 
shown  by  an  entry  of  the  fact  made  by  a  deceased  rabbi,  whose  duty  it  was  to  perform 
the  office  and  to  make  the  entry  ;  the  entry  was  held  not  receivable  :  Davis  v.  Lloyd, 
1  Car.  &  Kir.  275  ;  perhaps  because  it  was  not  made  against  the  pecuniary  interest  of 
the  rabbi. 

1  Price  v.  Lord  Torrington,  1  Salk.  285;  s.  0.  Lcl.  Raym.  873;  1  Smith's  Lead. 
Cas.  139.  But  the  Courts  are  not  disposed  to  carry  the  doctrine  of  this  case  any  farther. 
Thf-rHorn,  whc.re  the  coals  sold  at  a  mine  were  reported  daily  by  one  of  the  workmen 
to  the  foreman,  who,  not  being  able  to  write,  employed  another  person  to  enter  the 
-  in  a  book ;  it  was  held,  the  foreman  and  the  workman  who  reported  the  sale  both 
lii-ing  di-ad,  that  the  book  was  not  admissible  in  evidence  iu  an  action  for  the  price  of 
tin-  .-Lais:  Brain  r.  I'rrwe,  11  M.  &  W.  773. 

a  Digliy  v.  Stedman,  1  Esp.  328. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FEOM   THE   OEIGINAL   TEXT.  839 

evidence.  One  of  the  shopmen  had  sworn  to  the  delivery,  and  his 
entry  was  offered  to  corroborate  his  testimony ;  but  it  was  admitted 
as  competent  original  evidence  in  the  cause.  So,  in  another  case, 
where  the  question  was  upon  the  precise  day  of  a  person's  birth,  the 
account-book  of  the  surgeon  who  attended  his  mother  on  that  occa- 
sion, and  in  which  his  professional  services  and  fees  were  charged, 
was  held  admissible,  in  proof  of  the  day  of  the  birth.8  So  where  the 
question  was,  whether  a  notice  to  quit  had  been  served  upon  the 
tenant,  the  indorsement  of  service  upon  a  copy  of  the  notice  by 
the  attorney  who  served  it,  it  being  shown'  to  be  the  course  of  busi- 
ness in  his  office  to  preserve  copies  of  such  notices,  and  to  indorse 
the  service  thereon,  was  held  admissible  in  proof  of  the  fact  of 
service.4  Upon  the  same  ground  of  the  contemporaneous  character 
of  an  entry  made  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business,  the  books  of  the 
messenger  of  a  bank,  and  of  a  notary-public,  to  prove  a  demand  of 
payment  from  the  maker,  and  notice  to  the  indorser  of  a  promissory 
note,  have  also  been  held  admissible.6  The  letter-book  of  a  merchant, 
party  in  the  cause,  is  also  admitted  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  con- 
tents of  a  letter  addressed  by  him  to  the  other  party,  after  notice  to 
such  party  to  produce  the  original ;  it  being  the  habit  of  merchants  to 
keep  such  a  book.6  And,  generally,  contemporaneous  entries  made 
by  third  persons  in  their  own  books,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  busi- 
ness, the  matter  being  within  the  peculiar  knowledge  of  the  party 
making  the  entry,  and  there  being  no  apparent  and  particular  motive 
to  pervert  the  fact,  are  received  as  original  evidence ; 7  though  the 

8  Higham  v.  Ridgway,  10  East  109.  See  also  2  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  183-197,  n. 
and  the  comments  of  Bayley,  B.,  and  of  Vaughan,  B.,  on  this  case,  in  Gleadow  ». 
Atkin,  1  Cr.  &  M.  410,  423,  424,  427,  and  of  Professor  Parke,  in  the  London  Legal 
Observer  for  June,  1832,  p.  229.  It  will  be  seen,  in  that  case,  that  the  fact  of  the  sur- 
geon's performance  of  the  service  charged  was  abundantly  proved  by  other  testimony 
in  the  cause  ;  and  that  nothing  remained  but  to  prove  the  precise  time  of  performance  ; 
a  fact  in  which  the  surgeon  had  no  sort  of  interest  But,  if  it  were  not  so,  it  is  not 
perceived  what  difference  it  could  have  made,  the  principle  of  admissibility  being  the 
contemporaneous  character  of  the  entry,  as  part  of  the  res  gcstas.  See  also  Herbert  v. 
Tuckal,  T.  Raym.  84 ;  Augusta  v.  Windsor,  1  Appleton  317. 

*  Doe  v.  Turford,  3  Barn.  &  Ad.  890 ;  Champneys  v.  Peck,  1  Stark.  404 ;  R.  v. 
Cope,  7  C.  &  P.  720. 

6  Nicholls  v.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  326 ;  Welsh  v.  Barrett,  15  Mass.  380  ;  Poole  v. 
Dicas,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  649  ;  Halliday  v.  Martinet,  20  Johns.  168  ;  Butler  v.  Wright, 
2  Wend.  369  ;  Hart  v.  Wilson,  ib.  513  ;  Nichols  v.  Goldsmith,  7  id.  160  ;  New  Haven 
Co.  Bank  v.  Mitchell,  15  Conn.  206  ;  Sheldon  v.  Benham,  4  Hill  N.  Y.  129. 

6  Pritt  v.  Fairclough,  3  Campb.  305  ;  Hagedorn  v.  Reid,  ib.  377.     The  letter-book 
is  also  evidence  that  the  letters  copied  into  it  have  been  sent.     But  it  is  not  evidence 
of  any  other  letters  in  it,  than  those  which  the  adverse  party  has  been  required  to  pro- 
duce :  Sturge  v.  Buchanan,  2  P.  &  D.  573  ;  s.  c.  10  Ad.  &  El.  598. 

7  Doe  v.  Turford,  3  B.  fc  Ad.  890,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  Doe  v.  Rohson,  15  East  32  ;  Goss 
D.  Watlington,  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  132;  Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317  ;  Marks  v. 
Lahee,  3  Bing.  N.  C.  408,  420,  per  Parke,  J.  ;  Poole  v.  Dicas,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  649,  653, 
654  ;  Dow  v.  Sawyer,  16  Shepl.  117.     In  Doe  v.  Vowles,  1  M.  &  Rob.  261,  the  trades- 
man's bill,  which  was  rejected,  was  not  contemporaneous  with  the  fact  done  :  Haddow 
v.  Parry,  3  Taunt.  303 ;  Whitnash  v.  George,  8  B.  &  C.  556  ;  Barker  v.  Ray,  2  Russ. 
63.  76  ;  Patton  v.  Craig,  7  S.  &  R.  116,  126 ;  Fanners'  Bank  v.  Whitehall,  16  S.  &  R. 
89 ;  Nonrse  v.  M'Cay,  2  Rawle  70  ;  Clarke  v.  Magruder,  2  H.  &  J.  77 ;  Richardson  o. 
Carey,  2  Rand.  87 ;  "dark  v.  Wilmot,  1  Y.  &  Col.  N.  s.  53. 


840  APPENDIX  II. 

person  who  made  the  entry  has  no  recollection  of  the  fact  at  the  time 
of  testifying ;  provided  he  swears  that  he  should  not  have  made  it,  if 
it  were  not  true.8  The  same  principle  has  also  been  applied  to 
receipts  and  other  acts  contemporaneous  with  the  payment,  or  fact 
attested.9 

§  117.  Same :  Entries  by  Clerk.  The  admission  of  the  party's 
own  shop-books,  in  proof  of  the  delivery  of  goods  therein  charged, 
the  entries  having  been  made  by  his  clerk,  stands  upon  the  same 
principle  which  we  are  now  considering.  The  books  must  have  been 
kept  for  the  purpose;  and  the  entries  must  have  been  made  contem- 
poraneous with  the  delivery  of  the  goods,  and  by  the  person  whose 
duty  it  was,  for  the  time  being,  to  make  them.  In  such  cases  the 
books  are  held  admissible,  as  evidence  of  the  delivery  of  the  goods 
therein  charged,  where  the  nature  of  the  subject  is  such  as  not  to 
render  better  evidence  attainable.1 

§  118.  Party's  Shop-books.  In  the  United  States,  this  principle 
has  been  carried  farther,  and  extended  to  entries  made  by  the  party 
himself  in  his  own  shop-books.1  Though  this  evidence  has  some- 

8  Bunker  ».  Shed,  8  Met.  150. 

9  Sherman  v.  Crosby,  11  Johns.  70  ;  Holladay  v.  Littlepage,  2  Mnnf.  316  ;  Prather 
T.  Johnson,  3  H.  &  J.  487 ;  Shearman  v.  Akins,  4  Pick.  283 ;  Carroll  v.  Tyler,  2  H. 
&  G.  54;  Cluggage  v.  Swan,  4  Binn.  150,  154.     But  the  letter  of  a  third  person,  ac- 
knowledging the  receipt  of  merchandise  of  the  plaintiff,  was  rejected  in  an  action 
against  the  party  who  had  recommended  him  as  trustworthy,  in  Longenecker  v.  Hyde, 
6  Binn.  1 ;  and  the  receipts  of  living  persons  were  rejected  in  Warner  v.  Price,  3  Wend. 
397  ;  Cutbush  v.  Gilbert,  4  S.  &  R.  551  ;  Spargo  v.  Brown,  9  B.  &  C.  935.     See  infra, 
§  120. 

1  Pitman  v.  Maddox,  2  Salk.  690 ;  s.  c.  Ld.  Raym.  732  ;  Lefebure  v.  Worden,  2 
Ves.  54,  55  ;  Glynn  v.  Bank  of  England,  ib.  40  ;  Sterret  v.  Bull,  1  Binn.  234.  See 
also  Tait  on  Evid.  p.  176.  An  interval  of  one  day,  between  the  transaction  and  the 
entry  of  it  in  the  book,  has  been  deemed  a  valid  objection  to  the  admissibility  of  the 
book  in  evidence  :  Walter  v.  Bollman,  8  Watts  544.  But  the  law  fixes  no  precise  rule 
as  to  the  moment  when  the  entry  ought  to  be  made.  It  is  enough  if  it  be  made  "  at 
or  near  the  time  of  the  transaction  :  "  Curren  v.  Crawford,  4  S.  &  R.  3,  5.  Therefore, 
where  the  goods  were  delivered  by  a  servant  during  the  day,  and  the  entries  were  made 
by  the  master  at  night,  or  on  the  following  morning,  from  the  memorandums  made  by 
the  servant,  it  was  held  sufficient :  Ingraham  v.  Bockius,  9  S.  &  R.  285.  But  such 
entries,  made  later  than  the  succeeding  day,  have  been  rejected :  Cook  v.  Ashmead, 
2  Miles,  268.  Where  daily  memoranda  were  kept  by  workmen,  but  the  entries  were 
made  by  the  employer  sometimes  on  the  day,  sometimes  every  two  or  three  days,  and 
one  or  two  at  longer  intervals,  they  were  admitted  :  Morris  v.  Briggs,  3  Cush.  342. 
Whether  entries  transcribed  from  a  slate  or  card  into  the  book  are  to  be  deemed  origi- 
nal entries  is  not  universally  agreed.  In  Massachusetts,  they  are  admitted:  Faxon  v. 
Hollis,  13  Mass.  427.  In  Pennsylvania,  they  were  rejected  in  Ogden  v.  Miller,  1 
Browne  147  ;  but  have  since  been  admitted,  where  they  were  transcribed  forthwith 
into  the  book  :  Ingraham  v.  Bockius,  9  S.  &  R.  285  ;  Patton  v.  Ryan,  4  Rawle  408  ; 
Jones  v.  Long,  3  Watts  325  ;  and  not  later,  in  the  case  of  a  mechanic's  charges  for  his 
work,  than  the  evening  of  the  second  day  :  Hartley  v.  Brooks,  6  Whart.  189.  But 
where  several  intermediate  days  elapsed  before  they  were  thus  transcribed,  the  entries 
have  been  rejected  :  Forsythe  v.  Norcross,  5  Watts  432.  But  see  Koch  v.  Howell,  6 
Watts  &  Serg.  350. 

1  In  the  following  States,  the  admission  of  the  party's  own  books  and  his  own 
entries  has  been  either  expressly  permitted,  or  recognized  and  regulated  by  statute  ; 
namely,  Vermont,  1  Tolman's  Dig.  185  :  Connecticut,  Rev.  Code,  1849,  tit.  1,  §  216; 
Delaware,  St.  25  Geo.  II,  R.-v.  Code,  1829,  p.  89  ;  Maryland,  as  to  sums  under  ten 
pounds  in  a  year,  1  Dorsey's  Laws  of  Maryland,  73,  203  ;  Virginia,  Stat.  1819,  1  Rev. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FBOM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  841 

times  been  said  to  be  admitted  contrary  to  the  rules  of  the  common 
law,  yet  in  general  its  admission  will  be  found  in  perfect  harmony 
with  those  rules,  the  entry  being  admitted  only  where  it  was  evi- 
dently contemporaneous  with  the  fact,  and  part  of  the  res  gestce. 
Being  the  act  of  the  party  himself,  it  is  received  with  greater  cau- 
tion; but  still  it  may  be  seen  and  weighed  by  the  jury.2 

Code,  c.  128,  §§  7-9  ;  North  Carolina,  Stat.  1756,  c.  57,  §  2,  1  Rev.  Code,  1836,  c.  15  ; 
South  Carolina,  St.  1721,  Sept.  20 ;  see  Statutes  at  Large,  vol.  iii,  p.  799,  Cooper's  ed. 

1  Bay  43  ;    Tennessee,  Statutes  of  Tennessee,  by  Carruthers  and  Nicholson,  p.  131. 
In  Louisiana  and  in  Maryland  (except  as  above),  entries  made  by  the  party  himself 
are  not  admitted.     Civil  Code  of  Louisiana,  arts.  2244,  2245  ;  Johnston  v.  Breedlove, 

2  Martin  N.  s.  508;  Herring  v.   Levy,  4  id.  383  ;  Cavelieru.  Collins,  3  Martin  188  ; 
Martinstein  v.  Creditors,  8  Rob.  6;  Owings  v.  Henderson,  5  Gill  &  Johns.  134,  142. 
In  all  the  other  States,  they  are  admitted  at  common   law,  under   various  degrees 
of  restriction.     See  Coggswell  v.  Dolliver,  2  Mass.  217  ;   Poultney  v.  Ross,   1  Dall. 
239  ;  Lynch  v.  McHugo,  1  Bay  33  ;  Foster  v.  Sinkler,  ib.  40  ;    Slade  v.  Teasdale, 

2  id.  173  ;  Lamb  v.  Hart,  ib.  362  ;  Thomas  v.  Dyott,  1  Nott  &  McC.  186  ;  Burn- 
ham  v.  Adams,  5  Vt.  313;  Story  on  Confl.  of  Laws,  526,  527. 

2  The  rules  of  the  several  States  in  regard  to  the  admission  of  this  evidence  are  not 
perfectly  uniform  ;  but,  in  what  is  about  to  be  stated,  it  is  believed  that  they  concur. 
Before  the  books  of  the  party  can  be  admitted  in  evidence,  they  are  to  be  submitted  to 
the  inspection  of  the  Court,  and  if  they  do  not  appear  to  be  a  register  of  the  daily  busi- 
ness of  the  party,  and  to  have  been  honestly  and  fairly  kept,  they  are  excluded.  If 
they  appear  manifestly  erased  and  altered,  in  a  material  part,  they  will  not  be  admitted 
until  the  alteration  is  explained  :  Churchman  t;.  Smith,  6  Whart.  146.  The  form  of 
keeping  them,  whether  it  be  that  of  a  journal  or  ledger,  does  not  affect  their  admisbi- 
bility,  however  it  may  go  to  their  credit  to  the  jury :  Coggswell  v.  Dolliver,  2  Mass. 
217  ;  Prince  v.  Smith,  4  id.  455,  457  ;  Faxon  v.  Hollis,  13  id.  427 ;  Rodman  v. 
Hoops,  1  Dall.  85  ;  Lynch  v.  McHugo,  1  Bay  33  ;  Foster  ».  Sinkler,  ib.  40  ;  Slade 
v.  Teasdale,  2  Bay  173  ;  Thomas  v.  Dyott,  1  Nott  &  McC.  186 ;  Wilson  r.  Wilson, 
1  Halst.  95  ;  Swing  v.  Sparks,  2  id.  59  ;  Jones  v.  De  Kay,  2  Pennington  695 ;  Cole 
p.  Anderson,  3  Halst.  68  ;  Mathes  v.  Robinson,  8  Met.  269.  If  the  books  appear  free 
from  fraudulent  practices,  and  proper  to  be  laid  before  the  jury,  the  party  himself 
is  then  required  to  make  oath,  in  open  court,  that  they  are  the  books  in  which  the 
accounts  of  his  ordinary  business  transactions  are  usually  kept :  Frye  v.  Barker,  2  Pick. 
65  ;  Taylor  v.  Tucker,  1  Kelly  233,  and  that  the  goods  therein  charged  were  actu- 
ally sold  and  delivered  to,  and  the  services  actually  performed  for,  the  defendant : 
Dwinel  w.  Pottle,  3  Me.  167.  An  affidavit  to  an  account,  or  bill  of  particulars,  is 
not  admissible:  Wagoner  v.  Richmond,  Wright  173;  unless  made  so  by  statute. 
Whether,  if  the  party  is  abroad,  or  is  unable  to  attend,  the  Court  will  take  his  oath 
under  a  commission,  is  not  perfectly  clear.  The  opinion  of  Parker,  C.  J.,  in  2  Pick. 
67,  was  against  it ;  and  so  is  Nicholson  v.  Withers,  2  McCord  428  ;  but  in  Spence  v. 
Sanders,  1  Bay  119,  even  his  affidavit  was  deemed  sufficient,  upon  a  writ  of  inquiry, 
the  defendant  having  suffered  judgment  by  default.  See  also  Douglass  v.  Hart 

4  McCord,  257  ;  Furman  v.  Peay,  2  Bail.  394.     He  must  also  swear  that  the  articles 
therein  charged  were  actually  delivered,  and  the  labor  and  services  actually  performed; 
that  the  entries  were  made  at  or  about  the  time  of  the  transactions,  and  are  the  origi- 
nal entries  thereof ;  and  that  the  sums  charged  and  claimed   have   not   been  paid  : 

3  Dane's  Abr.  c.  81,  art.  4,  §§  1,  2 ;  Coggswell  v.  Dolliver,  2  Mass.  217;  Ives  v.  Niles, 

5  Watts  324.     If  the  party  is  dead,  his  books,  though  rendered  of  much  less  weight 
as  evidence,  may  still  be  offered  by  the  executor  or  administrator,  he  making  oath  that 
they  came  to  his  hands  as  the  genuine  and  only  books  of  account  of  the  deceased  ;  that, 
to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief,  the  entries  are  original  and  contemporaneous 
with  the  fact,  and  the  debt  unpaid  ;  with  proof  of  the  party's  handwriting :  Bentley  v. 
Hollenback,   Wright  169;    McLellan  v.  Crofton,  6  Greenl.    807  ;    Prince  v.    Smith, 

4  Mass.  455  ;  Odell  v.  Culbert,  9  W.  &  S.  66.    If  the  party  has  since  become  insane,  the 
book  may  still  be  admitted  in  evidence,  on  proof  of  the  fact,  and  that  the  entries  are 
in  his  handwriting,  with  the  suppletory  oath  of  his  guardian.    And  whether  the  degree 
of  insanity,  in  the  particular  case,  is  such  as  to  justify  the  admission  of  the  book,  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  judge  in  his  discretion  :  Holbrook  v.  Gay,  6  Gush.  215.     The 
book  itself  must  be  the  registry  of  business  actually  done,  and  not  of  orders,  executory 


842  APPENDIX   II. 

§  119.     But,  if  the  American  rule  of  admitting  the  party's  own 
entries  in  evidence  for  him,  under  the  limitations  mentioned  below, 

contracts,  and  things  to  be  done  subsequent  to  the  entry  :  Fairchild  v.  Dennison, 
4  Watts  258 ;  Wilson  v.  Wilson,  1  Halst.  95 ;  Bradley  v.  Goodyear,  1  Day  104,  106  ; 
Terrill  v.  Beecher,  9  Conn.  344,  348,  349 ;  and  the  entry  must  have  been  made  for  the 
purpose  of  charging  the  debtor  with  the  debt ;  a  mere  memorandum,  for  any  other 
purpose,  not  being  sufficient.  Thus,  an  invoice-book,  and  the  memorandums  in  the 
margin  of  a  blank  check-book,  showing  the  date  and  tenor  of  the  checks  drawn  and 
cut  from  the  book,  have  been  rejected  :  Cooper  v.  Morrell,  4  Yates  342 ;  Wilson  v. 
Goodin,  Wright  219.  But  the  time-book  of  a  day  laborer,  though  kept  in  a  tabular 
form,  is  admissible  ;  the  entries  being  made  for  the  apparent  purpose  of  charging  the 
person  for  whom  the  work  was  done  :  Mathes  v.  Robinson,  8  Met.  269.  If  the  book 
contains  marks,  or  there  be  other  evidence  showing  that  the  items  have  been  trans- 
ferred to  a  journal  or  ledger,  these  books  also  must  be  produced  :  Prince  v.  Swett, 
2  Mass.  569.  The  entries,  also,  must  be  made  contemporaneously  with  the  fact  entered, 
as  has  been  already  stated  in  regard  to  entries  made  by  a  clerk  :  supra,  §  117,  and 
n.  (1).  Entries  thus  made  are  not,  however,  received  in  all  cases  as  satisfactory  proof 
of  the  charges  ;  but  only  as  proof  of  things  which,  from  their  nature,  are  not  generally 
susceptible  of  better  evidence :  Watts  v.  Howard,  7  Met.  478.  They  are  satisfactory 
proof  of  goods  sold  and  delivered  from  a  shop,  and  of  labor  and  services  personally  per- 
formed :  Case  v.  Potter,  8  Johns.  211  ;  Vosburgh  v,  Thayer,  12  id.  461 ;  Wilrner  v. 
Israel,  1  Browne  257  ;  Ducoign  v.  Schreppel,  1  Yeates  347 ;  Spence  v.  Sanders, 

1  Bay  119  ;  Charlton  v.  Lawry,  Martin  N.  C.  26;  Mitchell  v.  Clark,  ib.  25;  Easly 
v.  Kakin,  Cooke  388  ;  and,  in  some  States,  of  small  sums  of  money :  Coggswell  v.  Dol- 
liver,  2  Mass.  217  ;  Prince  v.  Smith,  4    id.  455  ;    3  Dane's  Abr.  c.  81,  art.   4,   §§  1, 

2  ;  Craven  v.  Shaird,   2  Halst.  345.     The  amount,  in  Massachusetts   and  Maine,  is 
restricted  to  forty  shilings  :   Dunn  v.  Whitney,  1  Fairf.  9 ;   Burns  v.  Fay,  14  Pick.  8 ; 
Union  Bank  v.  Knapp,  3  Pick.  109.     While  in  North  Carolina,  it  is  extended  to  any 
article  or  articles,  the  amount  whereof  shall  not  exceed  the  sum  of  sixty  dollars.     Stat. 
1837,  c.  15,  §§  1,  5.     But  they  have  been  refused  admission  to  prove  the  fact  of  ad- 
vertising in  a  newspaper :    Richards  v.  Howard,  2    Nott  &  McC.    474  ;    Thomas  v. 
Dyott,   1  id.  186  ;  of  a  charge  of  dockage  of  a  vessel :  Wilmer  v.  Israel,  1  Browne 
257  ;  commissions  on  the  sale  of  a  vessel :  Winsor  v.  Dillaway,  4  Met.  221  ;  labor  of 
servants:  Wright  u.  Sharp,  1  Browne  344  ;  goods  delivered   to   a   third  person,  Kerr 
v.  Love,  1  Wash.  172  ;  Tenbroke  v.  Johnson,  Coxe  288  ;  Townley  ».  Wooly,  ib.  377; 
or  to  the  party,  if  under  a  previous  contract  for  their  delivery  at  different  periods  : 
Lonergan  v.  Whitehead,  10  Watts  249  ;  general  damages,for  value  :  Swing  v.  Sparks, 
2  Halst.  59 ;  Terrill  v.  Beecher,  9  Conn.  348,  349  ;    settlement  of  accounts  :    Prest  v. 
Mercereau,  4  Halst.  268  ;  money  paid  and  not  applied. to  the  purpose  directed  :  Bradley 
v.  Goodyear,  1  Day  104  ;    a  special  agreement :   Pritchard  v.  M  Owen,  1  Nott  &  McC. 
131,  n.  ;  Dunn  v.  Whitney,  1  Fairf.  9  ;  Green  v.  Pratt,  11  Conn.  205  ;  or  a  delivery  of 
goods  under  such  agreement :    Nickle  v.  Baldwin,  4  Watts  &  Serg.  290  ;   an  article 
omitted  by  mistake  in  a  prior  settlement :  Punderson  v.  Shaw,  Kirby  150  ;  the  use  and 
occupation  of  real  estate,  and  the  like  :  Beach  v.  Mills,  5  Conn.  493.     See  also  Newton 
v.  Higgins,  2  Vt.  366  ;  Dunn  v.  Whitney,  1  Fairf.  9.     But  after  the  order  to  deliver 
goods  to  a  third  person  is  proved  by  competent  evidence  aliunde,  the  delivery  itself 
may  be  proved  by  the  books  and  suppletory  oath  of  the  plaintiff',  in  any  case  where 
such  delivery  to  the  defendant  in  person  might  be  so  proved  :  Mitchell  v.  Belknap, 
10  Shepl.  475.    The  charges,  moreover,  must  be  specific  and  particular  ;  a  general  charge 
for  professional  services,  or  for  work  and  labor  by  a  mechanic,  without  any  specifica- 
tion but  that  of  time,  cannot  be  supported  by  this  kind  of  evidence  :  Lynch  v.  Pi-trie, 
1  Nott  &  McC.  130 ;  Hughes  r.  Hampton,  2  Const.  745.    And  regularly  the  prices 
ought  to  be  specified  ;  in  which  cose  the  entry  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  value : 
Hagaman  v.  Case,  1  South,  370  ;    Ducoign  v.  Schreppel,  1  Yeates  347.    But  whatever 
be  the  nature  of  the  subject,  the  transaction,  to  be  susceptible  of  this  kind  of  proof, 
must  have  been  directly  between  the  original  debtor  and  the  creditor ;  the  book  not 
being  admissible  to  establish  a  collateral  fact  :    Mifflin  v.  Bingham,  1  Dall.  276,  per 
McKean,  C.  J. ;  Kerr  v.  Love,   1  Wash.  172  ;   Deas  z;.  Darby,  1  Nott  &  McC.  436  ; 
Poultney  v.  Ross,  1  Dall.  238.     Though  books,  such  as  have   been   described,   are 
admitted  to  lie  given  in  evidence,  with  the  anppletury  oath  of  the  party,  yet  his  testi- 
mony U  still  to  be  weighed  by  the  jury,  like  that  of  any  other  witness  in  the  cause, 
and  his  reputation  for  truth  is  equally  open  to  be  questioned  :    Kitchen  v.  Tyson, 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  843 

were  not  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  common  law,  yet  it 
is  in  conformity  with  those  of  other  systems  of  jurisprudence.  In 
the  administration  of  the  Roman  law,  the  production  of  a  merchant's 
or  tradesman's  book  of  accounts,  regularly  and  fairly  kept  in  the 
usual  manner,  has  been  deemed  presumptive  evidence  (semiplena 
probatio  *)  of  the  justice  of  his  claim ;  and,  in  such  cases,  the  supple- 
tory  oath  of  the  party  (juramentiim  guppletivwn)  was  admitted  to 
make  up  the  plena  probatio  necessary  to  a  decree  in  his  favor.2  By 
the  law  of  France,  too,  the  books  of  merchants  and  tradesmen,  regu- 
larly kept  and  written  from  day  to  day,  without  any  blank,  when 
the  tradesman  has  the  reputation  of  probity,  constitute  a  semi-proof, 
and  with  his  suppletory  oath  are  received  as  full  proof  to  establish 
his  demand.8  The  same  doctrine  is  familiar  in  the  law  of  Scotland, 
by  which  the  books  of  merchants  and  others,  kept  with  a  certain 
reasonable  degree  of  regularity,  satisfactory  to  the  Court,  may  be 
received  in  evidence,  the  party  being  allowed  to  give  his  own  oath 
"  in  supplement "  of  such  imperfect  proof.  It  seems,  however,  that 
a  course  of  dealing,  or  other  "pregnant  circumstances,"  must  in 
general  be  first  shown  by  evidence  aliunde,  before  the  proof  can  be 
regarded  as  amounting  to  the  degree  of  semiplena,  probatio,  to  be 
rendered  complete  by  the  oath  of  the  party.4 

3  Murph.  314  ;  Elder  i>.  Warfield,  7  Har.  &  Johns.  391.  In  some  States,  the  books 
thus  admitted  are  only  those  of  shopkeepers,  mechanics,  and  tradesmen  ;  those  of  other 
persons,  such  as  planters,  scriveners,  schoolmasters,  &c.,  being  rejected :  Geter  v. 
Martin,  2  Bay  173  ;  Pelzer  v.  Cranston,  2  McCord  328 ;  Boyd  v.  Ladson,  4  id.  76. 
The  subject  of  the  admission  of  the  party's  own  entries,  with  his  suppletory  oath,  in  the 
several  American  States,  is  very  elaborately  and  fully  treated  in  Mr.  Wallace's  note  to 
American  edition  of  Smith's  Leading  Cases,  vol.  i,  p.  142. 

1  This  degree  of  proof  is  thus  defined  by  Mascardus:  "  Non  est  ignorandum,  pro- 
bationem  semiplenam  earn  esse,  per  quam  rei  gesfce  fides  aliqua  fit  judici ;  non  tamen 
tanta  ut  jure  debeat  in  pronuncianda  sententia  earn  sequi :"     De  Prob.  vol.  i,  Quaest. 
11  n.  1,  4. 

2  "Juramentum  (suppletivum )  defertur  ubicunque   actor  habet  pro  se — aliquas 
conjecturas,  per  quas  judex  inducatur  ad  suspicionem  vel  ad  opinandum  pro  parte 
actoris  :"  Mascardus,  de  Prob.  vol.  3,  Concl.  1230,  n.  17.    The  civilians,  however  they 
may  differ  as  to  the  degree  of  credit  to  be  given  to  books  of  accounts,  concur  in  opinion 
that  they/ are  entitled  to  consideration  at  the  discretion  of  the  judge.     They  furnish,  at 
least,  the  conjecturce  mentioned  by  Mascardus  ;  and  their  admission  in  evidence,  with 
the  suppletory  oath  of  the  party,  is  thus  defended  by  Paul  Voet,  De  Statutis,  §  5,  c.  2, 
n.  9:  "An  ut  credatur  libris  rationem,   sen  registris  uti  loquuntur,  mercatorum  et 
artificum,  licet  probationibus  testium  non  juventur  ?    Respondeo,   quamvis  exemplo 
pernitiosum  esse  videatur,  quemque  sibi  privata  testatione,  sive  adnotatione  facere  debi- 
torem.     Qui  tamen  hsec  est  mercatorum  cura  et  opera,  ut  debiti  et  crediti  rationes  dili- 
genter  confidant.     Etiam  in  eorum  foro  et  causis,  ex  aequo  et  bono  est  judicandum. 
Insuper  non  admisso  aliquo  (litium  accelerandarum)  remedio,  commerciorum  ordo  et 
usus  evertitur.     Neque  enim  omnes  prsesenti  pecunia  tnerces  sibi  comparant,   neque 
cujusque  rei  venditioni  testes  adheberi,  qui  pretia  mercium  noverint,  aut  expedit  aut 
congruum  est.     Non  iniquuin  videbitur  illud  statutum,  quo  domesticis  talibus  instru- 
luentis  additur  fides,  modo  aliquibus  adminiculis  juventur.''     See  also  Hertius,  De 
Collisione  Legum,  §  4,  n.  68 ;  Strykius,  torn.  7,  De  Semiplena  Probat.  Dis.  1,  c.  4,  §  5  ; 
Menochius,  De  Presump.  lib.  2,  Presump.  57,  n.  20,  and  lib.  3,  Presump.  63,  n.  12. 

8  1  Pothier  on  Obi.,  Part  iv,  c.  1,  art.  2,  §  4.  By  the  Code  Napoleon,  merchants' 
books  are  required  to  be  kept  in  a  particular  manner  therein  prescribed,  and  none  others 
are  admitted  in  evidence :  Code  de  Commerce,  Liv.  1,  tit.  2,  art.  8-12. 

*  Tait  on  Evidence,  pp.  273-277.     This  degree  of  proof  is  there  defined  as  "  not 


84-1  APPENDIX   II. 

§  120.  Entries  by  Third  Persons.  Returning  now  to  the  admis- 
sion of  entries  made  by  clerks  and  third  persons,  it  may  be  remarked 
that  in  most  of,  if  not  all,  the  reported  cases,  the  clerk  or  person 
who  made  the  entries  was  dead;  and  the  entries  were  received  upon 
proof  of  his  handwriting.  But  it  is  conceived  that  the  fact  of  his 
death  is  not  material  to  the  admissibility  of  this  kind  of  evidence. 
There  are  two  classes  of  admissible  entries,  between  which  there  is 
a  clear  distinction,  in  regard  to  the  principle  on  which  they  are  re- 
ceived in  evidence.  The  one  class  consists  of  entries  made  against 
the  interest  of  the  party  making  them ;  and  these  derive  their  admis- 
sibility from  this  circumstance  alone.  It  is,  therefore,  not  material 
when  they  were  made.  The  testimony  of  the  party  who  made  them 
would  be  the  best  evidence  of  the  fact;  but,  if  he  is  dead,  the  entry 
of  the  fact  made  by  him  in  the  ordinary  course  of  his  business,  and 
against  his  interest,  is  received  as  secondary  evidence  in  a  contro- 
versy between  third  persons.1  The  other  class  of  entries  consists  of 
those  which  constitute  parts  of  a  chain  or  combination  of  transac- 
tions between  the  parties,  the  proof  of  one  raising  a  presumption 
that  another  has  taken  place.  Here,  the  value  of  the  entry,  as  evi- 
dence, lies  in  this,  that  it  was  contemporaneous  with  the  principal 
fact  done,  forming  a  link  in  the  chain  of  events,  and  being  part  of 
the  res  gestoe.  It  is  not  merely  the  declaration  of  the  party,  but  it  is 
a  verbal  contemporaneous  act,  belonging,  not  necessarily  indeed,  but 
ordinarily  and  naturally,  to  the  principal  thing.  It  is  on  this 
ground,  that  this  latter  class  of  entries  is  admitted;  and  therefore  it 
can  make  no  difference,  as  to  their  admissibility,  whether  the  party 
who  made  them  be  living  or  dead,  nor  whether  he  was,  or  was  not, 
interested  in  making  them,  his  interest  going  only  to  affect  the  cred- 
ibility or  weight  of  the  evidence  when  received.2 

§  123.  Summary.  Thus,  we  have  seen  that  there  are  four  classes 
of  declarations,  which,  though  usually  treated  under  the  head  of 
hearsay,  are  in  truth  original  evidence;  the  first  class  consisting  of 
cases  where  the  fact  that  the  declaration  was  made,  and  not  its  truth 
or  falsity,  is  the  point  in  question;  the  second,  including  expres- 

merely  a  suspicion,  but  such  evidence  as  produces  a  reasonable  belief,  though  not 
complete  evidence. "  See  also  Glasslbrd  on  Evid.  p.  550;  Bell's  Digest  of  Laws  of 
Scotland,  pp.  378,  898. 

i  Warren  v.  Greenville,  3  Str.  1129  ;  Middleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317  ;  Thomp- 
son v.  Stevens,  2  Nott  &  McC.  493  ;  Chase  v.  Smith,  5  Vt.  556 ;  Spiers  v.  Morris, 
9  Bing.  687  ;  Alston  ».  Taylor,  1  Hayw.  381,  395. 

8  This  distinction  was  taken  and  clearly  expounded  by  Mr.  Justice  Parke  in  Doe  d. 
Patteshall  v.  Turford,  3  B.  &  Ad.  890 ;  cited  and  approved  in  Poole  ?».  Dicas,  1  Bing. 
N.  C.  654.  See  also,  supra,  §§  115,  116;  Cluggage  v.  Swan,  4  Binn.  154  ;  Sherman 
r.  Crosby,  11  Johns.  70  ;  Holladay  v.  Littlepage,  2  Munf.  316  ;  Prnther  v.  Johnson, 
8  H.  &  J.  487;  Shearman  v.  Akins,  4  Pick.  283 ;  Carroll  v.  Tyler,  2  H.  &  0.  54  ;  James 
v.  Wharton,  3  Mctaan  492.  In  several  cases,  however,  letters  and  receipts  of  third 
persons,  living  and  within  the  reach  of  process,  have  been  rejected  :  Longenecker  v. 
Hyde,  6  Binn.  1  ;  Spargo  v.  Brown,  9  B.  &  C.  935;  Warner  v.  Price,  3  Weud.  397; 
Cutbush  v.  Gilbert,  4  S.  &  K.  551. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  845 

sions  of  bodily  or  mental  feelings,  where  the  existence  or  nature  of 
such  feelings  is  the  subject  of  inquiry ;  the  third,  consisting  of  cases 
of  pedigree,  and  including  the  declaration  of  those  nearly  related  to 
the  party  whose  pedigree  is  in  question;  and  the  fourth,  embracing 
all  other  cases  where  the  declaration  offered  in  evidence  may  be  re- 
garded as  part  of  the  res  gestce.  All  these  classes  are  involved  in 
the  principle  of  the  last;  and  have  been  separately  treated,  merely 
for  the  sake  of  greater  distinctness. 

.  ....««.. 

§  125.  Declarations  under  Oath.  The  rule  applies,  though  the 
declaration  offered  in  evidence  was  made  upon  oath,  and  in  the  course 
of  a  judicial  proceeding,  if  the  litigating  parties  are  not  the  same. 
Thus,  the  deposition  of  a  pauper,  as  to  the  place  of  his  settlement, 
taken  ex  parte  before  a  magistrate,  was  rejected,  though  the  pauper 
himself  had  since  absconded,  and  was  not  to  be  found.1  The  rule 
also  applies,  notwithstanding  no  better  evidence  is  to  be  found,  and 
though  it  is  certain,  that,  if  the  declaration  offered  is  rejected,  no 
other  evidence  can  possibly  be  obtained ;  as,  for  example,  if  it  pur- 
ports to  be  the  declaration  of  the  only  eye-witness  of  the  transaction, 
and  he  is  since  dead.2 

§  126.  Exception  for  Attesting  Witness.  An  exception  to  this  rule 
has  been  contended  for  in  the  admission  of  the  declarations  of  a  de- 
ceased attesting  witness  to  a  deed  or  will,  in  disparagement  of  the 
evidence  afforded  by  his  signature.  This  exception  has  been  as- 
serted, on  two  grounds:  first,  that  as  the  party  offering  the  deed 
used  the  declaration  of  the  witness,  evidenced  by  his  signature,  to 
prove  the  execution,  the  other  party  might  well  be  permitted  to  use 
any  other  declaration  of  the  same  witness  to  disprove  it;  and, 
secondly,  that  such  declaration  was  in  the  nature  of  a  substitute  for 
the  loss  of  the  benefit  of  a  cross-examination  of  the  attesting  wit- 
ness ;  by  which,  either  the  fact  confessed  would  have  been  proved,  or 
the  witness  might  have  been  contradicted,  and  his  credit  impeached. 
Both  these  grounds  were  fully  considered  in  a  case  in  the  exchequer, 
and  were  overruled  by  the  Court:  the  first,  because  the  evidence  of 
the  handwriting,  in  the  attestation,  is  not  used  as  a  declaration  by 
the  witness,  but  is  offered  merely  to  show  the  fact  that  he  put  his 
name  there,  in  the  manner  in  which  attestations  are  usually  placed 
to  genuine  signatures;  and  the  second,  chiefly  because  of  the  mis- 
chiefs which  would  ensue,  if  the  general  rule  excluding  hearsay  were 
thus  broken  in  upon.  For  the  security  of  solemn  instruments  would 
thereby  become  much  impaired,  and  the  rights  of  parties  under  them 
would  be  liable  to  be  affected  at  remote  periods,  by  loose  declarations 
of  the  attesting  witnesses,  which  could  neither  be  explained  nor  con- 

1  R.  v.  Nnneham  Courtney,  1  East  373 ;  R.  v.  Ferry  Frystone,  2  id.  54  ;  R  v.  Ens- 
well,  3  T.  R.  707-725,  per  Lord  Kenyon,  C.  J.,  and  Grose,  J.,  whose  opinions  are 
approved  and  adopted  in  Mima  Queen  v.  Hephurn,  7  Cranch  296. 

a  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  220,  221 ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  209,  210. 


846  APPENDIX   II. 

tradicted  by  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  themselves.  In  admit-, 
ting  such  declarations,  too,  there  would  be  no  reciprocity;  for, 
though  the  party  impeaching  the  instrument  would  thereby  have  an 
equivalent  for  the  loss  of  his  power  of  cross-examination  of  the 
living  witness,  the  other  party  would  have  none  for  the  loss  of  his 
power  of  re-examination.1 

§  134.  Declarations  as  to  Pedigree ;  post  litem  motam.  It  has 
sometimes  been  laid  down,  as  an  exception  to  the  rule  excluding 
declarations  made  post  litem  motam,  that  declarations  concerning 
pedigree  will  not  be  invalidated  by  the  circumstance  that  they  were 
made  during  family  discussions,  and  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
future  controversy ;  and  the  instance  given,  by  way  of  illustration,  is 
that  of  a  solemn  act  of  parents,  under  their  hands,  declaring  the 
legitimacy  of  a  child.  But  it  is  conceived  that  evidence  of  this  sort 
is  admissible,  not  by  way  of  exception  to  any  rule,  but  because  it  is, 
in  its  own  nature,  original  evidence ;  constituting  part  of  the  fact  of 
the  recognition  of  existing  relations  of  consanguinity  or  affinity ;  and 
falling  naturally  under  the  head  of  the  expression  of  existing  sen- 
timents and  affections,  or  of  declarations  against  the  interest,  and 
peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of  the  party  making  them,  or  of 
verbal  acts,  part  of  the  res  gestce.1 

§  164.  Former  Testimony.  The  admissibility  of  this  evidence 
seems  to  turn  rather  on  the  right  to  cross-examine  than  upon  the  pre- 
cise nominal  identity  of  all  the  parties.  Therefore,  where  the  witness 
testified  in  a  suit,  in  which  A  and  several  others  were  plaintiffs, 
against  B  alone,  his  testimony  was  held  admissible,  after  his  death, 
in  a  subsequent  suit,  relating  to  the  same  matter,  brought  by  B  against 
A  alone.1  And,  though  the  two  trials  were  not  between  the  parties, 
yet  if  the  second  trial  is  between  those  who  represent  the  parties  to 
the  first,  by  privity  in  blood,  in  law,  or  in  estate,  the  evidence  is  ad- 
missible. And  if,  in  a  dispute  respecting  lands,  any  fact  comes 
directly  in  issue,  the  testimony  given  to  that  fact  is  admissible  to 
prove  the  same  point  or  fact  in  another  action  between  the  same  par- 
ties or  their  privies,  though  the  last  suit  be  for  other  lands.2  The 
principle  on  which,  chiefly,  this  evidence  is  admitted,  namely,  the 
right  of  cross-examination,  requires  that  its  admission  be  carefully 

l  Stobart  v.  Dryden,  1  M.  &  W.  615. 

l  Supra,  §§  102-108,  181  ;  Goodright  v.  Moss,  Cowp.  591  ;  Monkton  v.  Attorney- 
General,  2  Riiss.  &  My.  147,  160, 161,  164  ;  Slaney  v.  Wade,  1  My.  &  Cr.  338  ;  Berkeley 
Peerage  Case,  4  Campb.  418,  per  Mansfield,  C.  J. 

l  Wright  v.  Tatham,  1  Ad.  &  El.  3.     But  see  Matthews  v.  Colburn,  1  Strob.  258. 

3  Outratn  v.  Morewood,  3  East  346,  354,  355,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ;  Peake,  Evid. 
(3d  ed.)  p.  37;  Bull.  N.  P.  232  ;  Doe  v.  Derby,  1  Ad.  &  El.  873  ;  Doe  v.  Foster,  ib. 
791  n. ;  Lewis  r.  Clerges,  3  Bac.  Abr.  614  ;  Sheldon  v.  Bnrbour,  2  Wash.  64  ;  Rush- 
worth  v.  Countess  of  Pembroke,  Hard.  472;  Jackson  v.  Lawson,  15  Johns.  544  ;  Jack- 
won  v.  Bailey,  2  id.  17;  Powell  v.  Waters,  17  id.  176.  See  also  Ephraiins  r.  Murdoch, 
7  Blackf.  10 ;  Harper  v.  Burrow,  6  Ired.  30 ;  Clealand  v.  Huey,  18  Ala.  343. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FKOM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  847 

restricted  to  the  extent  of  that  right ;  and  that  where  the  witness 
incidentally  stated  matter,  as  to  which  the  party  was  not  permitted 
by  the  law  of  trials  to  cross-examine  him,  his  statement  as  to  that 
matter  ought  not  afterwards  to  be  received  in  evidence  against  such 
party.  Where,  therefore,  the  point  in  issue  in  both  actions  was  not 
the  same,  the  issue  in  the  former  action  having  been  upon  a  common 
or  free  fishery,  and,  in  the  latter,  it  being  upon  a  several  fishery,  evi- 
dence of  what  a  witness,  since  deceased,  swore  upon  the  former  trial, 
was  held  inadmissible.8 

§  167.    Interest  subsequently  acquired  ;  Former  Testimony.     The 

effect  of  an  interest  subsequently  acquired  by  the  witness,  as  laying 
a  foundation  for  the  admission  of  proof  of  his  former  testimony,  re- 
mains to  be  considered.  It  is  in  general  true,  that  if  a  person  who 
has  knowledge  of  any  fact,  but  is  under  no  obligation  to  become  a 
witness  to  testify  to  it,  should  afterwards  become  interested  in  the 
subject-matter  in  which  that  fact  is  involved,  and  his  interest  should 
be  on  the  side  of  the  party  calling  him,  he  would  not  be  a  competent 
witness  until  the  interest  is  removed.  If  it  is  releasable  by  the 
part)*,  he  must  release  it.  If  not,  the  objection  remains :  for  neither 
is  the  witness  nor  a  third  person  compellable  to  give  a  release  ;  though 
the  witness  may  be  compelled  to  receive  one.  And  the  rule  is  the 
same  in  regard  to  a  subscribing  witness,  if  his  interest  was  created 
by  the  act  of  the  party  calling  him.  Thus,  if  the  charterer  of  a  ship 
should  afterwards  communicate  to  the  subscribing  witness  of  the 
charter-party  an  interest  in  the  adventure,  he  cannot  call  the  witness 
to  prove  the  execution  of  the  charter-party :  nor  will  proof  of  his 
handwriting  be  received ;  for  it  was  the  party's  own  act  to  destroy 
the  evidence.1  It  is,  however,  laid  down,  that  a  witness  cannot,  by 
the  subsequent  voluntary  creation  of  an  interest,  without  the  concur- 
rence or  assent  of  the  party,  deprive  him  of  the  benefit  of  his  testi- 
mony.3 But  this  rule  admits  of  a  qualification,  turning  upon  the 
manner  in  which  the  interest  was  acquired.  If  it  were  acquired 
wantonly,  as  by  a  wager,  or  fraudulently,  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
off  his  testimony,  of  which  the  participation  of  the  adverse  party 
would  generally  be  proof,  it  would  not  disqualify  him. 

But  "  the  pendency  of  a  suit  cannot  prevent  third  persons  from 
transacting  business,  bona  fide,  with  one  of  the  parties ;  and,  if  an 
interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit  is  thereby  acquired,  the  common 

8  Melvin  v.  Whiting,  7  Pick.  79.  See  also  Jackson  v.  Winchester,  4  Dall.  206  ; 
Ephraims  v.  Murdoch,  7  Blackf.  10. 

1  Hovil  v.  Stephenson,  5  Bing.  493 ;  Hamilton  v.  Williams,  1  Hayw.  139  ;  Johnson 
v.  Knight,  1  N.  C.  Law  93 ;  1  Murph.  293  ;  Bennet  v.  liobison,  3  Stew.  &  Port.  227, 
237  ;  Schall  v.  Miller,  5  Whart.  156. 

3  1  Stark.  Evid.  118  ;  Barlew  v.  Vowell,  Skin.  586  ;  George  v.  Pearce,  cited  by 
Buller,  J.,  in  3  T.  R.  37;  R.  v.  Fox,  1  Str.  652  ;  Long  u.  Bailie,  4  Serg.  &  R.  222  ; 
Burgess  v.  Lane,  3  Greenl.  165;  Jackson  v.  Rumsey,  3  Johns.  Cas.  234,  237;  infra, 
§418. 


848  APPENDIX   II. 

consequence  of  law  must,  follow,  —  that  the  person  so  interested  can- 
not be  examined  as  a  witness  for  that  party,  from  whose  success  he 
will  necessarily  derive  an  advantage."  8  Therefore,  where,  in  an 
action  against  one  of  several  underwriters  on  a  policy  of  insurance, 
it  appeared  that  a  subsequent  underwriter  had  paid,  upon  the  plain- 
tiff's promise  to  refund  the  money,  if  the  defendant  in  the  suit  should 
prevail ;  it  was  held,  that  he  was  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  de- 
fendant to  prove  a  fraudulent  concealment  of  facts  by  the  plaintiff,  it 
being  merely  a  payment,  by  anticipation,  of  his  own  debt,  in  good 
faith,  upon  a  reasonable  condition  of  repayment.4  And  as  the  inter- 
est which  one  party  acquires  in  the  testimony  of  another  is  liable  to 
the  contingency  of  being  defeated  by  a  subsequent  interest  of  the 
witness  in  the  subject-matter,  created  bonafide,  in  the  usual  and  law= 
ful  course  of  business,  the  same  principle  would  seem  to  apply  to  an 
interest  arising  by  operation  of  law,  upon  the  happening  of  an  uncer- 
tain event,  such  as  the  death  of  an  ancestor,  or  the  like.  But  though 
the  interest  which  a  party  thus  acquires  in  the  testimony  of  another 
is  liable  to  be  affected  by  the  ordinary  course  of  human  affairs,  and 
of  natural  events,  the  witness  being  under  no  obligation,  on  that  ac- 
count, either  to  change  the  course  of  his  business,  or  to  abstain  from 
any  ordinary  and  lawful  act  or  employment ;  yet  it  is  a  right  of  which 
neither  the  witness  nor  any  other  person  can  by  voluntary  act  and  de- 
sign deprive  him.  Wherefore,  therefore,  the  subsequent  interest  of 
the  witness  has  been  created  either  wantonly,  or  in  bad  faith,  it  does 
not  exclude  him ;  and  doubtless  the  participation  of  the  adverse  party 
in  the  creation  of  such  interest  would,  if  not  explained  by  other  cir- 
cumstances, be  very  strong  prima  facie  evidence  of  bad  faith ;  as  an 
act  of  the  witness,  uncalled  for,  and  out  of  the  ordinary  course  of 
business  would  be  regarded  as  wanton.6 

§  168.  Same  :  Deposition.  If,  in  cases  of  disqualifying  interest,  the 
witness  has  previously  given  a  deposition  in  the  cause,  the  deposition 
may  be  read  in  chancery,  as  if  he  were  since  deceased,  or  insane,  or 

«  3  Campb.  381,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough.  The  cose  of  Bent  v.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27, 
seems  to  have  been  determined  on  a  similar  principle,  as  applied  to  the  opposite  state 
of  facts  ;  the  subsequent  interest,  acquired  by  the  broker,  being  regarded  as  affected 
with  bad  faith,  on  the  part  of  the  assured,  who  objected  to  his  admission.  The  dis- 
tinction taken  by  Lord  Ellenborough  was  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  in  Winship  v.  Bank  of  the  United  States,  6  Pet.  529,  541,  542,  545,  546,  552, 
but  no  decision  was  had  upon  the  question,  the  Court  being  equally  divided.  But  the 
same  doctrine  was  afterwards  discussed  and  recognized,  as  "founded  on  the  plainest 
reasons,"  in  Eastman  v.  Winship,  14  Pick.  44  ;  10  Wend.  162,  164,  ace. 

*  Forrester  v.  Pigou,  3  Campb.  380  ;  s.  c.  1  M.  &  S.  9  ;  Phelps  v.  Riley,  8  Conn. 
266.     In  Burgess  u.  Lane,  8  Greenl.  165,  the  witness  had  voluntarily  entered  into  an 
agreement  with  the  defendant,  against  whom  he  had  an  action  pending  in  another 
Court,  that  that  action  should  abide  the  event  of  the  other,  in  which,  he  was  now  called 
as  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff;  and  the  Court  held,  that  it  did  not  lie  with  the  defend- 
ant, who  was  party  to  that  agreement,  to  object  to  his  admissibility.    But  it  is  observ- 
able, that  that  agreement  was  not  made  in  discharge  of  any  real  or  supposed  obligation, 
as  in  Forrester  v.  Pigou  ;  but  was  on  a  new  subject,  was  uncalled  for,  and  purely  volun- 
tary ;  and  therefore  subjected  the  adverse  party  to  the  imputation  of  bad  faith  in 
making  it. 

•  See  infra,  §  418,  where  the  subject  is  again  considered. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  849 

otherwise  incapacitated.  It  may  also  be  read  in  the  trial,  at  law,  of 
an  issue  out  of  chancery.  In  other  trials  at  law  no  express  authority 
has  been  found  for  reading  the  deposition ;  and  it  has  been  said,  that 
the  course  of  practice  is  otherwise ;  but  no  reason  is  given,  and  the 
analogies  of  the  law  are  altogether  in  favor  of  admitting  the  evidence.1 
And,  as  it  is  hardly  possible  to  conceive  a  reason  for  the  admission  of 
prior  testimony  given  in  one  form  which  does  not  apply  to  the  same 
testimony  given  in  any  other  form,  it  would  seem  clearly  to  result 
that  where  the  witness  is  subsequently  rendered  incompetent  by  in- 
terest, lawfully  acquired,  in  good  faith,  evidence  may  be  given  of 
what  he  formerly  testified  orally,  in  the  same  manner  as  if  he  were 
dead  ;  and  the  same  principle  will  lead  us  farther  to  conclude,  that  in 
all  cases  where  the  party  has,  without  his  own  fault  or  concurrence, 
irrecoverably  lost  the  power  of  producing  the  witness  again,  whether 
from  physical  or  legal  causes,  he  may  offer  the  secondary  evidence  of 
what  he  testified  in  the  former  trial.  If  the  lips  of  the  witness  are 
sealed,  it  can  make  no  difference  in  principle,  whether  it  be  by  the 
finger  of  death,  or  the  finger  of  the  law.  The  interest  of  the  witness, 
however,  is  no  excuse  for  not  producing  him  in  Court;  for  perhaps 
the  adverse  party  will  waive  any  objection  on  that  account.  It  is 
only  when  the  objection  is  taken  and  allowed,  that  a  case  is  made  for 
the  introduction  of  secondary  evidence. 

§  261.  "Written  Evidence  required.  There  are  also  certain  sales, 
for  the  proof  of  which  the  law  requires  a  deed,  or  other  written 
document.  Thus,  by  the  statutes  of  the  United  States,1  and  of 
Great  Britain,2  the  " grand  bill  of  sale"  is  made  essential  to  the 
complete  transfer  of  any  ship  or  vessel ;  though,  as  between  the 
parties  themselves,  a  title  may  be  acquired  by  the  vendee  without 
such  document.  Whether  this  documentary  evidence  is  required  by 
the  law  of  nations  or  not,  is  not  perfectly  settled  ;  but  the  weight  of 
opinion  is  clearly  on  the  side  of  its  necessity,  and  thab  without  this, 
and  the  other  usual  documents,  no  national  character  is  attached  to 
the  vessel.* 

1  This  is  now  the  established  practice  in  chancery,  Gresley  on  Evid.  366,  367  ;  and 
in  Chess  v.  Chess,  17  Serg.  &  R.  412,  it  was  conceded  by  Tod,  J.,  that  the  reason  and 
principle  of  the  rule  applied  with  equal  force  in  trials  at  law  ;  though  it  was  deemed 
in  that  case  to  have  been  settled  otherwise,  by  the  course  of  decisions  in  Pennsylvania. 
See  also  1  Stark.  Evid.  264,  265  ;  1  Smith's  Chan.  Pr.  344  ;  Gosse  v.  Tracy,  1  P.  W. 
287;  s.  c.  2  Vern.  699  ;  Andrews  v.  Palmer,  1  Ves.  &  B.  21  ;  Luttrell  v.  Reynell, 
1  Mod.  284  ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  1  Cox,  Ch.  R.  184;  Union  Bank  v.  Knapp,  3  Pick."  108, 
109,  per  Putnam,  J.  ;  Wafer  v.  Hemken,  9  Rob.  La.  203.  See  also  Scammon  v.  Scam- 
mon,  33  N.  H.  52,  58. 

1  United  States  Navigation  Act  of  1792,  c.  45,  §  14  ;  Stat.  1793,  c.  52  ;  Stat.  1793, 
•c.  1  ;  ib.  c.  8,  vol.  i,  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large  (Little  &  Brown's  ed. ),  pp.  294,  305  ;  Ab- 
bott on  Shipping,  by  Story,  p.  45,  n.  (2)  ;  3  Kent  Comm.  143,  149.  See  also  Stat.  1850, 
c.  27,  9  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large  (L.  &B.'s  ed.),  440. 

3  Stat.  6  Geo.  IV,  c.  109;  4  Geo.  IV,  c.  48;  3  &  4  W.  IV,  c.  55,  §  31  ;  Abbott  on 
Shipping,  by  Shee,  pp.  47-52. 

8  Abbott  on  Shipping,  by  Story,  p.  1,  n.  (1),  and  cases  there  cited  ;  ib.  p.  27,  n.  (1); 
VOL.  I.  —  54 


850  APPENDIX   II. 

§  262.  Statute  of  Frauds.  Written  evidence  is  also  required  of 
the  several  transactions  mentioned  in  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  passed 
in  the  reign  of  Charles  II,  the  provisions  of  which  have  been  en- 
acted, generally  in  the  same  words,  in  nearly  all  of  the  United 
States.1  The  rules  of  evidence  contained  in  this  celebrated  statute 
are  calculated  for  the  exclusion  of  perjury,  by  requiring,  in  the  cases 
therein  mentioned,  some  more  satisfactory  and  convincing  testimony 
than  mere  oral  evidence  affords.  The  statute  dispenses  with  no 
proof  of  consideration  which  was  previously  required,  and  gives  no 
efficacy  to  written  contracts  which  they  did  not  previously  possess.2 
Its  policy  is  to  impose  such  requisites  upon  private  transfers  of  prop- 
erty as,  without  being  hindrances  to  fair  transactions,  may  be  either 
totally  inconsistent  with  dishonest  projects,  or  tend  to  multiply  the 
chances  of  detection.8  The  object  of  the  present  work  will  not  ad- 

ib.  p.  45,  n.  (2);  Ohl  ».  Eagle  Ins.  Co.,  4  Mason  172  ;  Jacobsen's  Sea  Laws,  b.  1,  c.  2, 
p.  17  ;  3  Kent  Coram.  130. 

1  29  Car.  II,  c.  3  ;  4  Kent  Comm.  95,  and  n.  (b),  (4th  ed.).     The  Civil  Code  of  Lou- 
isiana, art.  2415,  without  adopting  in  terms  the  provisions  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds, 
declares  generally  that  all  verbal  sales  of  immovable  property  or  slaves  shall  be  void. 
4  Kent  Comm.  450,  n.  (a),  (4th  ed.). 

2  2  Stark.  Evid.  341. 

3  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pref.  xxii.     This  statute  introduced  no  new  principle  into  the 
law  ;  it  was  new  in  England  only  in  the  mode  of  proof  which  it  required.     Some  pro- 
tective regulations,  of  the  same  nature,  may  be  found  in  the  early  codes  of  most  of  the 
northern  nations,  as  well  as  in  the  laws  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  princes  ;  the  prevention  of 
frauds  and  perjuries  being  sought,  agreeably  to  the  simplicity  of  those  unlettered  times, 
by  requiring  a  certain  number  of  witnesses  to  a  valid  sale,  and  sometimes  by  restricting 
such  sales  to  particular  places.     In  the  Anglo-Saxon  laws,  such  regulations  were  quite 
familiar ;  and  the  Statute  of  Frauds  was  merely  the  revival  of  obsolete  provisions,  de- 
manded by  the  circumstances  of  the  times,  and  adapted,  in  a  new  mode  of  proof,  to  the 
improved  condition  and  habits  of  the  trading  community.     By  the  laws  of  Lotharius- 
and  Edric,  Kings  of  Kent,  §  16,  if  a  Kentish  man  purchased  anything  in  London,  it 
must  be  done  in  the  presence  of  two  or  three  good  citizens  or  of  the  mayor  of  the  city 
(Canciani,  Leges  Barbarorum  Atiquae,  vol.  iv,  p.  231).     The  laws  of  King  Edward  the 
Elder  (De  jure  et  lite,  §  1)  required  the  testimony  of  the  mayor,  or  some  other  credible 
person,  to  every  sale,  and  prohibited  all  sales  out  of  the  city.    Cancian.  ub.  sup.  p.  256. 
King  Athelstan  prohibited  sales  in  the  country,  above  the  value  of  twenty  pence ;  and, 
for  those  in  the  city,  he  required  the  same  formalities  as  in  the  laws  of  Edward  (ib. 
pp.  261,  262,  LL.  Athelstani,  §  12).     By  the  laws  of  King  Ethelred,  every  freeman 
was  required  to  have  his  surety  (fidejussor),  without  whom,  as  well  as  other  evidence, 
there  could  be  no  valid  sale  or  barter.     "  Null  us  homo  faciat  alterutrum,  nee  emat,  nee 
permutet,  nisi  fidejussorem  habeat,  et  testimonium  "  (ib.  p.  287,  LL.  Ethelredi,  §§  1,  4). 
In  the  Concilium  Seculare  of  Canute,  §  22,  it  was  provided,  that  there  should  be  no 
sale,  above  the  value  of  four  pence,  whether  in  the  city  or  country,  without  the  presence 
of  four  witnesses  (ib.  p.  305).     The  same  rule,  in  nearly  the  same  words,  was  enacted  by 
William  the  Conqueror  (ib.  p.  357,  LL.  Guil.  Conq.  §  43).  Afterwards,  in  the  charter  of 
the  Conqueror  (§  60),  no  cattle  ("  nulla  viva  pecunia,"  scil.  animalia)  could  be  legally 
sold,  unless  in  the  cities,  and  in  the  presence  of  three  witnesses  (Cancian.  ub.  sup. 
p.  360  ;  Leges  Anglo-Saxonicse,  p.  198  (o) ).  Among  the  ancient  Sueones  and  Goths,  no 
sale  was  originally  permitted  but  in  the  presence  of  witnesses,  and  (per  mediatores) 
through  the  medium  of  brokers.     The  witnesses  were  required  in  order  to  preserve  the 
evidence  of  the  sale  ;  and  the  brokers,  or  mediators  (ut  pretium  moderarentur),  to  pre- 
vent extortion,  and  see  to  the  title.     But  these  formalities  were  afterwards  dispensed 
with,  except  in  the  sale  of  articles  of  value  (res  pretiosae),  or  of  great  amount  (Cancian. 
ub.  sup.  p.  231,  n.  4).     Alienations  of  lands  wc.re  made  only  (publicis  literis)  by  docu- 
ments legally  authenticated.     By  the  Danish  law,  lands  in  the  city  or  country  might 
be  exchanged  without  judicial  appraisement  (per  tabulas  mnnu  signoque  permutantis. 
allixos),  by  deed,  under  the  hand  and  seal  of  tne  party  (ib.  p.  261,  n.  4).     The  Roman 


PASSAGES    OMITTED   FROM   THE    ORIGINAL   TEXT.  851 

mit  of  an  extended  consideration  of  the  provisions  of  this  statute, 
but  will  necessarily  restrict  us  to  a  brief  notice  of  the  rules  of  evi- 
dence which  it  has  introduced. 

§  263.  Interest  in  Lands.  By  this  statute,  the  necessity  of  some 
writing  is  universally  required,  upon  all  conveyances  of  lands,  or 
interest  in  lands,  for  more  than  three  years ;  all  interests,  whether 
of  freehold  or  less  than  freehold,  certain  or  uncertain,  created  by 
parol  without  writing,  being  allowed  only  the  force  and  effect  of 
estates  at  will ;  except  leases,  not  exceeding  the  term  of  three  years 
from  the  making  thereof,  whereon  the  rent  reserved  shall  amount 
to  two-thirds  of  the  improved  value.  The  term  of  three  years,  for 
which  a  parol  lease  may  be  good,  must  be  only  three  years  from  the 
making  of  it ;  but  if  it  is  to  commence  in  futuro,  yet  if  the  term  is 
not  for  more  than  three  years,  it  will  be  good.  And  if  a  parol  lease 
is  made  to  hold  from  year  to  year,  during  the  pleasure  of  the  parties, 
this  is  adjudged  to  be  a  lease  only  for  one  year  certain,  and  that 
every  year  after  it  is  a  new  springing  interest,  arising  upon  the  first 
contract,  and  parcel  of  it ;  so  that  if  the  tenant  should  occupy  ten 
years,  still  it  is  prospectively  but  a  lease  for  a  year  certain,  and 
therefore  good,  within  the  exception  of  the  statute ;  though  as  to  the 
time  past  it  is  considered  as  one  entire  and  valid  lease  for  so  many 
years  as  the  tenant  has  enjoyed  it.1  But  though  a  parol  lease  for  a 
longer  period  than  the  statute  permits  is  void  for  the  excess,  and 
may  have  only  the  effect  of  a  lease  for  a  year,  yet  it  may  still  have 
an  operation,  so  far  as  its  terms  apply  to  a  tenancy  for  a  year.  If, 
therefore,  there  be  a  parol  lease  for  seven  years  for  a  specified  rent, 
and  to  commence  and  end  on  certain  days  expressly  named ;  though 
this  is  void  as  to  duration  of  the  lease,  yet  it  must  regulate  all  the 
other  terms  of  the  tenancy.2 

law  required  written  evidence  in  a  great  variety  of  cases,  embracing,  among  many 
others,  all  those  mentioned  in  the  Statute  of  Frauds  ;  which  are  enumerated  by  N. 
De  Lescut,  De  Exam.  Testium,  Cap.  26  (Farinac.  Oper.  Tom.  ii,  App.  243).  See  also 
Brederodii  Eepertorium  Juris,  col.  984,  verb.  Scriptura.  Similar  provisions,  extending 
in  some  cases  even  to  the  proof  of  payment  of  debts,  were  enacted  in  the  statutes  of 
Bologna  (A.  D.  1454),  Milan  (1498),  and  Naples,  which  are  prefixed  in  Danty's  Traite 
de  la  Preuve  par  Temoins.  By  a  perpetual  edict  in  the  Archduchy  of  Flanders  (A.  D. 
1611),  all  sales,  testaments,  and  contracts  whatever,  above  the  value  of  three  hundred 
livres  Artois,  were  required  to  be  in  writing.  And  in  France,  by  the  Ordonnance  de 
Moulins  (A.  D.  1566)  confirmed  by  that  of  1667,  parol  or  verbal  evidence  was  excluded 
in  all  cases,  where  the  subject-matter  exceeded  the  value  of  one  hundred  livres.  See 
Danty  de  la  Preuve,  &c.,  passim;  7  Poth. (Euvres, &c.,  4to,  p.  56  ;  Traite  de  la  Proce"d. 
Civ.  c.  3,  art.  4,  Rfcgle  3me  ;  1  Poth.  on  Obi.  part  4,  c.  2,  arts.  1,  2,  3,  5  ;  Commercial 
Code  of  France,  art.  109.  The  dates  of  these  regulations,  and  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds, 
and  the  countries  in  which  they  were  adopted,  are  strikingly  indicative  of  the  revival 
and  progress  of  commerce.  Among  the  Jews,  lands  were  conveyed  by  deed  only,  from 
a  very  early  period,  as  is  evident  from  the  transaction  mentioned  in  Jer.  xxxii,  10-12, 
where  the  principal  document  was  "sealed  according  to  the  law  and  cusV>m,"  in  the 
presence  of  witnesses;  and  another  writing,  or  "open  evidence,"  was  also  taken,  prob- 
ably, as  Sir  John  Chardiu  thought,  for  common  use,  as  is  the  manner  in  the  East  at 
this  day. 

1  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pp.  241-244. 

2  Doe  v.  Bell,  5  T.  R.  471. 


852  APPENDIX   II. 

§  264.  Leases.  By  the  same  statute,  no  leases,  estates,  or  inter- 
ests, either  of  freehold,  or  terms  of  years,  or  an  uncertain  interest, 
other  than  copyhold  or  customary  interests  in  lands,  tenements,  or 
hereditaments,  can  be  assigned,  granted,  or  surrendered,  unless  by 
deed  or  writing,  signed  by  the  party,  or  his  agent  authorized  by 
writing,1  or  by  operation  of  law.  At  common  law,  surrenders  of 
estates  for  life  or  years  in  things  corporeal  were  good,  if  made 
by  parol ;  but  things  incorporeal,  lying  in  grant,  could  neither  be 
created  nor  surrendered  but  by  deed.2  The  effect  of  this  statute 
is  not  to  dispense  with  any  evidence  required  by  the  common  law, 
but  to  add  to  its  provisions  somewhat  of  security,  by  requiring  a  new 
and  more  permanent  species  of  testimony.  Wherever,  therefore,  at 
common  law,  a  deed  was  necessary,  the  same  solemnity  is  still  requi- 
site ;  but  with  respect  to  lands  and  tenements  in  possession,  which 
before  the  statute  might  have  been  surrendered  by  parol,  that  is,  by 
words  only,  some  note  in  writing  is  now  made  essential  to  a  valid 
surrender.8 

§  265.  Cancellation  of  Deeds.  As  to  the  effect  of  the  cancellation 
of  a  deed  to  divest  the  estate,  operating  in  the  nature  of  a  surren- 
der, a  distinction  is  taken  between  things  lying  in  livery,  and  those 
which  lie  only  in  grant.  In  the  latter  case,  the  subject  being  incor- 
poreal, and  owing  its  very  existence  to  the  deed,  it  appears  that  at 
common  law  the  destruction  of  the  deed  by  the  party,  with  intent  to 
defeat  the  interest  taken  under  it,  will  have  that  effect.  Without 
such  intent,  it  will  be  merely  a  case  of  casual  spoliation.  But  where 
the  thing  lies  in  livery  and  manual  occupation,  the  deed  being,  at 
common  law,  only  the  authentication  of  the  transfer,  and  not  the 
operative  act  of  conveying  the  property,  the  cancellation  of  the  in- 
strument will  not  involve  the  destruction  of  the  interest  conveyed.1 
It  has  been  thought,  that,  since  writing  is  now  by  the  statute  made 
essential  to  certain  leases  of  hereditaments  lying  in  livery,  the  de- 
struction of  the  lease  would  necessarily  draw  after  it  the  loss  of  the 
interest  itself.2  But  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be,  that  it  will  nqt; 
because  the  intent  of  the  statute  is  to  take  away  the  mode  of  trans- 
ferring interests  in  lands  by  symbols  and  words  alone,  as  formerly 
used,  and  therefore  a  surrender  by  cancellation,  which  is  but  a  sign, 
is  also  taken  away  at  law;  though  a  symbolical  surrender  may  still 

1  In  the  statutes  of  some  of  the  United  States,  the  words  "authorized  by  writing" 
are  omitted  ;  in  which  case  it  is  sufficient  that  the  agent  be  authorized  by  parol,  in  order 
to  make  a  binding  contract  of  sale,  provided  the  contract  itself  be  made  in  writing  ;  but 
his  authority  to  convey  must  be  by  deed  :  Story  on  Agency,  §  50  ;  Alna  v.  Plummer, 
4  Greenl.  258. 

8  Co.  Lit.  337  b,  338  a ;  2  Shep.  Touchst.  (by  Preston),  p.  300. 

8  Roberts  on  Frauds,  p.  248. 

1  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pp.  248,  249  ;  Bolton  v.  Bp.  of  Carlisle,  2  H.  Bl.  263,  264  ; 
Doe  v.  Bingham,  4  B.  &  A.  672  ;  Holbrook  v.  Tirrell,  9  Pick.  105  ;  Botsford  v.  More- 
house,  4  Conn.  550  ;  Gilbert  v.  Bulkley,  5  id.  262 ;  Jackson  v.  Chase,  2  Johns.  86. 
See  infra,  §  568. 

8  4  Bac.  Abr.  218,  tit.  Leases  and  Terms  for  Years,  T. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE    ORIGINAL   TEXT.  853 

be  recognized  in  chancery  as  the  basis  of  relief.8  The  surrender  in 
law,  mentioned  in  the  statute,  is  where  a  tenant  accepts  from  his 
lessor  a  new  interest,  inconsistent  with  that  which  he  previously 
had;  in  which  case  a  surrender  of  his  former  interest  is  presumed.4 

§  266.  Declarations  of  Trust.  This  statute  further  requires  that 
the  declaration  or  creation  of  trusts  of  lauds  shall  be  manifested 
and  proved  only  by  some  writing,  signed  by  the  party  creating  the 
trust;  and  all  grants  and  assignments  of  any  such  trust  or  confi- 
dence are  also  to  be  in  writing,  and  signed  in  the  same  manner.  It 
is  to  be  observed,  that  the  same  statute  does  not  require  that  the 
trust  itself  be  created  by  writing,  but  only  that  it  be  manifested  and 
proved  by  writing;  plainly  meaning  that  there  should  be  evidence 
in  writing,  proving  that  there  was  a  trust,  and  what  the  trust  was. 
A  letter  acknowledging  the  trust,  and,  a  fortiori,  an  admission,  in  an 
answer  in  chancery,  has  therefore  been  deemed  sufficient  to  satisfy 
the  statute.1  Resulting  trusts,  or  those  which  arise  by  implication 
of  law,  are  specially  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  statute. 
Trusts  of  this  sort  are  said  by  Lord  Hardwicke  to  arise  in  three 
cases :  first,  where  the  estate  is  purchased  in  the  name  of  one  person, 
but  the  money  paid  for  it  is  the  property  of  another;  secondly,  where 
a  conveyance  is  made  in  trust,  declared  only  as  to  part,  and  the 
residue  remains  undisposed  of,  nothing  being  declared  respecting  it; 
and,  thirdly,  in  certain  cases  of  fraud.2  Other  divisions  have  been 
suggested;8  but  they  all  seem  to  be  reducible  to  these  three  heads. 
In  all  these  cases,  it  seems  now  to  be  generally  conceded  that  parol 
evidence,  though  received  with  great  caution,  is  admissible  to  estab- 
lish the  collateral  facts  (not  contradictory  to  the  deed,  unless  in  the 

8  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pp.  251,  252;  Magennis  v.  McCullogh,  Gilb.  Eq.235  ;  Natch- 
bolt  v.  Porter,  2  Vern.  112 ;  4  Kent  Comm.  104  ;  4  Cruise"s  Dig.  p.  85  (Greenleaf  s 
ed.),  tit.  32,  c.  7,  §§  5-7  (2d  ed.),  (1856),  vol.  ii,  p.  413  et  seq. ;  Roe  v.  Archb.  of  York, 
6  East  86.  In  several  of  the  United  States,  where  the  owner  of  lands  which  he  holds 
by  an  unregistered  deed  is  about  to  sell  his  estate  to  a  stranger,  it  is  not  unusual  for 
him  to  surrender  his  deed  to  his  grantor,  to  be  cancelled,  the  original  grantor  thereupon 
making  a  new  deed  to  the  new  purchaser.  This  re-delivery  is  allowed  to  have  the  prac- 
tical effect  of  a  surrender,  or  reconveyance  of  the  estate,  the  first  grantee  and  those 
claiming  under  him  not  being  permitted  to  give  parol  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the 
deed,  thus  surrendered  and  destroyed  with  his  consent,  with  a  view  of  passing  a  legal 
title  to  his  own  alienee  :  Farrar  v.  Farrar,  4  N.  H.  191  ;  Com.  v.  Dudley,  10  Mass.  403; 
Holbrook  v.  Tirrell,  9  Pick.  105  ;  Barrett  v.  Thorndike,  1  Greenl.  78.'  See  4  Cruise's 
Dig.  tit.  32,  c.  1,  §  15,  n.  (Greenleaf  s  ed.)  [2d  ed.  (1856),  vol.  ii,  p.  300]. 

*  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pp.  259,  260. 

1  Forster  v.  Hale,  3  Ves.  696,  707,  per  Ld.  Alvanley;  4  Kent  Comm.  305  ;  Roberts 
on  Frauds,  p.  95  ;   1  Cruise's  Dig.  (by  Greenleaf)  tit,  12,  c.  1;  §§  36,  37,  p.390  (2ded.) 
(1856),  vol.  i,  p.  369;   Lewin  on  Trusts,  p.  30.     Courts  of  equity  will  receive  parol 
evidence,  not  only  to  explain  an  imperfect  declaration  of  a  testator's  intentions  of  trust, 
but  even  to  add  conditions  of  trust  to  what  appears  a  simple  devise  or  bequest.     But  it 
must  either  be  fairly  presumable,  that  the  testator  would  have  made  the  requisite  dec- 
laration, but  for  the  undertaking  of  the  person  whom  he  trusted,  or  else  it  must  be 
shown  to  be  an  attempt  to  create  an  illegal  trust :  Gresley  on  Evid.  in  Equity,  p.  108 
[292] ;  Strode  v.  Winchester,  1  Dick.  397.     See  White  &  Tudor's  Leading  Cases  in 
Equity,  vol.  ii,  part  1,  p.  591. 

2  Lloyd  v.  Spillet,  2  Atk.  148,  150. 
8  1  Lomax's  Digest,  p.  200. 


854  APPENDIX   II. 

cause  of  fraud)  from  which  a  trust  may  legally  result;  and  that 
it  makes  no  difference  as  to  its  admissibility  whether  the  supposed 
purchaser  be  living  or  dead.4 

§  267.  Executors  and  Administrators.  Written  evidence,  signed 
by  the  party  to  be  charged  therewith,  or  by  his  agent,  is  by  the 
same  statute  required  in  every  case  of  contract  by  an  executor  or 
administrator,  to  answer  damages  out  of  his  own  estate;  every 
promise  of  one  person  to  answer  for  the  debt,  default,  or  miscarriage 
of  another;  every  agreement  made  in  consideration  of  marriage,  or 
which  is  not  to  be  performed  within  a  year  from  the  time  of  making 
it;  and  every  contract  for  the  sale  of  lands,  tenements,  or  heredita- 
ments, or  any  interest  in  or  concerning  them.  The  like  evidence 
is  also  required  in  every  case  of  contract  for  the  sale  of  goods,  for 
the  price  of  £10  sterling  or  upwards *  unless  the  buyer  shall  receive 
part  of  the  goods  at  time  of  sale,  or  give  something  in  earnest,  to 
bind  the  bargain,  or  in  part  payment.2 

§  268.  Evidence  may  be  collected  from  Several  "Writings.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  written  evidence  required  by  the  Statute  of 
Frauds  should  be  comprised  in  a  single  document,  nor  that  it  should 
be  drawn  up  in  any  particular  form.  It  is  sufficient,  if  the  contract 
can  be  plainly  made  out,  in  all  its  terms,  from  any  writings  of  the 
party,  or  even  from  his  correspondence.  But  it  must  all  be  collected 
from  the  writings ;  verbal  testimony  not  being  admissible  to  supply 
any  defects  or  omissions  in  the  written  evidence.1  For  the  policy  of 

*  3  Sugden  on  Vendors,  256-260  (10th  ed.);  2  Story  Eq.  Jurisp.  §  1201,  n.;  Lench 
v.  Lench,  10  Ves.  517  ;   Boyd  v.  McLean,  1  Johns.  Ch.  582 ;   4  Kent  Comm.  305 ; 
Pritchard  v.  Brown,  4  N.  H.  397.     See  also  an  article  in  3  Law  Mag.  p.  131,  where 
the  English  cases  on  this  subject  are  reviewed.     The  American  decisions  are  collected 
in  Mr.  Rand's  note  to  the  case  of  Goodwin  v.  Hubbard,  15  Mass.  218.     In  Massachu- 
setts, there  are  dicta  apparently  to  the  effect  that  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  in 
these  cases  ;  but  the  point  does  not  seem  to  have  been  directly  in  judgment,  unless  it 
is  involved  in  the  decision  in  Bullard  v.  Briggs,  7  Pick.  533,  where  parol  evidence  was 
admitted.     See  Storer  v.  Batson,  8  Mass.  431,  442  ;  Northampton  Bank  v.  Whiting, 
12  id.  104,  109  ;  Goodwin  v.  Hubbard,  15  id.  210,  217. 

1  The  sum  here  required  is  different  in  the  several  States  of  the  Union,  varyiijg  from 
thirty  to  fifty  dollars.     But  the  rule  is  everywhere  the  same.     By  the  statute  of  9  Geo. 
IV,  c.  14,  this  provision  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  is  extended  to  contracts  executory, 
for  goods  to  be  manufactured  at  a  future  day,  or  otherwise  not  in  a  state  fit  for  delivery 
at  the  time  of  making  the  contract.     Shares  in  a  joint-stock  company,  or  a  projected 
railway,  are  held  not  to  be  goods  or  chattels,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute:  Hum- 
ble v.  Mitchell,  11  Ad.  &  El.  205  ;  Tempest  v.  Kilner,  3  C.  B.  251 ;  Bowlby  v.  Bell, 
ib.  284. 

2  2  Kent  Comm.  493-495. 

*  Boydell  v.  Drummond,  11  East  142  ;  Chitty  on  Contracts,  pp.  314-316  (4th  Am. 
ed. );   2  Kent  Comm.  511  ;  Roberts  on  Frauds,  p.  121  ;  Tawney  v.  Crowther,  3  Bro. 
Ch.  161,  318  ;  4  Cruise's  Dig.  (by  Greenleaf)  pp.  33,  35-37,  tit.  32,  c.  3,  §§  3,  16-26 
[Greenleafs  2d  ed.   (1856)  vol.  ii,  pp.  344-351  and  notes];  Cooper  v.  Smith,  15  East 
103 ;  Parkhurst  v.  Van  Cortlnndt,  1  Johns.  Ch.  280-282  ;  Abeel  v.  Radcliff,  13  Johns. 
297  ;  Smith  w.  Arnold,  .1  Mason  414  ;  Ide  v.  Stanton,  15  Vt.  685  ;  Sherburne  v.  Shaw, 
1  N.  H.  157  ;  Ad.iuiM  u.  McMillan,  7  Port.  73  ;  Gale  v.  Nixon,  6  Cowen  445  ;  Mendows 
v.  Meadows,  3  McCord  458  ;  Nichols  v.  Johnson,  10  Conn.  192.     Whether  the  Statute 
of  Frauds,  in  requiring  that,  in  certain  cnses,  the  "agreement"  be  proved  by  writing, 
requires  that  the  "  consideration  "  should  be  expressed  in  the  writing,  as  part  of  the 


PASSAGES    OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  855 

the  law  is  to  prevent  fraud  and  perjury,  by  taking  all  the  enumerated 
transactions  entirely  out  of  the  reach  of  any  verbal  testimony  what- 
ever. Nor  is  the  place  of  signature  material.  It  is  sufficient  if  the 
vendor's  name  be  printed,  in  a  bill  of  parcels,  provided  the  vendee's 
name  and  the  rest  of  the  bill  are  written  by  the  vendor.2  Even  his 
signature,  as  a  witness  to  a  deed,  which  contained  a  recital  of  the 
agreement,  has  been  held  sufficient,  if  it  appears  that  in  fact  he  knew 
of  the  recital.8  Neither  is  it  necessary  that  the  agreement  or  memo- 
randum be  signed  by  both  parties,  or  that  both  be  legally  bound  to 
the  performance;  for  the  statute  only  requires  that  it  be  signed  "by 
the  party  to  be  charged  therewith,"  that  is,  by  the  defendant  against 
whom  the  performance  or  damages  are  demanded.4 

§  269.  "Writings  executed  by  Attorney.  Where  the  act  is  done  by 
procuration,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  agent's  authority  should  be 
in  writing ;  except  in  those  cases  where,  as  in  the  first  section  of  the 
statute  of  29  Car.  II,  c.  3,  it  is  so  expressly  required.  These  ex- 
cepted  cases  are  understood  to  be  those  of  an  actual  conveyance,  not 
of  a  contract  to  convey ;  and  it  is  accordingly  held,  that  though  the 
agent  to  make  a  deed  must  be  authorized  by  deed,  yet  the  agent  to 
enter  into  an  agreement  to  convey  is  sufficiently  authorized  by  parol 
only.1  An  auctioneer  is  regarded  as  the  agent  of  both  parties, 
whether  the  subject  of  the  sale  be  lands  or  goods;  and  if  the  whole 
contract  can  be  made  out  from  the  memorandum  and  entries  signed 
by  him,  it  is  sufficient  to  bind  them  both.8 

agreement,  is  a  point  which  has  been  much  discussed,  and  upon  which  the  English  and 
some  American  cases  are  in  direct  opposition.  The  English  Courts  hold  the  affirmative. 
See  Wain  v.  Warlters,  5  East  10,  reviewed  and  confirmed  in  Saunders  v.  Wakefield, 
4  B.  &  Aid.  595 ;  and  their  construction  has  been  followed  in  New  York,  Sears  v. 
Brink,  3  Johns.  210  ;  Leonard  v.  Vredenburg,  8  id.  29.  In  New  Hampshire,  in  Neel- 
son  v.  Sanborne,  2  N.  H.  413,  the  same  construction  seems  to  be  recognized  and  ap- 
proved. But  in  Massachusetts,  it  was  rejected  by  the  whole  Court,  upon  great 
consideration,  in  Packard  v.  Richardson,  17  Mass.  122.  So  in  Maine,  Levy  v.  Merrill, 
4  Greenl.  180  ;  in  Connecticut,  Sage  v.  Wilcox,  6  Conn.  81  ;  in  New  Jersey,  Buckley 
v.  Beardslee,  2  South.  570  ;  and  in  North  Carolina,  Miller  v.  Irvine,  1  Dev.  &  Batt. 
103  ;  and  now  in  South  Carolina,  Fyler  v.  Givens,  Riley's  Law  Cas.  pp.  56,  62,  over- 
ruling Stephens  v.  Winn,  2  N.  &  McC.  372,  n.;  Woodward  v.  Pickett,  Dudley  30.  See 
also  Violett  v.  Patton,  5  Cranch  142  ;  Taylor  v.  Ross,  3  Yerg.  330  ;  3  Kent  Comm.  122  ; 
2  Stark.  Evid.  350  (6th  Am.  ed.). 

2  Saunderson  v.  Jackson,  2  B.  &  P.  238,  as  explained  in  Champion  v.  Plummer, 
1  N.  R.  254 ;  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pp.  124,  125 ;  Penniman  v.  Hartshorn,  13  Mass.  87. 

8  Welford  v.  Beezely,  1  Ves.  6  ;  s.  c.  1  Wils.  118.  The  same  rule,  with  its  qualifi- 
cation, is  recognized  in  the  Roman  law,  as  applicable  to  all  subscribing  witnesses,  except 
those  whose  official  duty  obliges  them  to  subscribe,  such  as  notaries,  &c.  Menochius, 
De  Praesump.  lib.  3  ;  Praesump.  66,  per  tot. 

4  Allen  v.  Bennet,  3  Taunt.  169;  3  Kent  Comm.  510,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Shirley 
v.  Shirley,  7  Blackf.  452;  Davis  v.  Shields,  26  Wend.  341  ;  Douglass  v.  Spears,  2  N.  & 
McC.  207. 

1  Story  on  Agency,  §  50  ;  Coles  v.  Trecothick,  9  Ves.  250  ;  Clinan  v.  Cooke,  1  Sch. 

6  Lef.  22;    Roberts  on  Frauds,  p.  113,  n.  (54).     If  an  agent,  having  only  a  verbal 
authority,  should  execute  a  bond  in  the  name  of  his  principal,  and  afterwards,  he  be 
regularly  constituted  by  letter  of  attorney,  bearing  date  prior  to  that  of  the  deed,  this 
is  a  subsequent  ratification,  operating  by  estoppel  against  the  principal,  and  rendering 
the  bond  valid  in  law  :  Milliken  v.  Coombs,  1  Greenl.  343 ;  and  see  Ulen  ».  Kittredge, 

7  Mass.  233. 

a  Emmerson  v.  Heelis,  2  Taunt.  38  ;  White  v.  Proctor,  4  id.  209;  Long  on  Sales, 


856  APPENDIX   II. 

§  270.  Meaning  of  the  "Word  "Lands."  The  word  lands,  in  this 
statute,  has  been  expounded  to  include  every  claim  of  a  permanent 
right  to  hold  the  lands  of  another,  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  to 
enter  upon  them  at  all  times,  without  his  consent.  It  has  accord- 
ingly been  held,  that  a  right  to  enter  upon  the  lands  of  another,  for 
the  purpose  of  erecting  and  keeping  in  repair  a  milldam  embank- 
ment, and  canal,  to  raise  water  for  working  a  mill,  is  an  interest  in 
land,  and  cannot  pass  but  by  deed  or  writing.1  But  where  the  in- 
terest is  vested  in  a  corporation,  and  not  in  the  individual  corpora- 
tors, the  shares  of  the  latter  in  the  stock  of  the  corporation  are 
deemed  personal  estate.2 

§  271.  The  main  difficulties  under  this  head  have  arisen  in  the 
application  of  the  principle  to  cases  where  the  subject  of  the  contract 
is  trees,  growing  crops,  or  other  things  annexed  to  the  freehold.  It 
is  well  settled  that  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  fruits  of  the  earth,  ripe, 
but  not  yet  gathered,  is  not  a  contract  for  any  interest  in  lands  and 
so  not  within  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  though  the  vendee  is  to  enter 
and  gather  them.1  And  subsequently  it  has  been  held,  that  a  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  a  crop  of  potatoes  was  essentially  the  same, 
whether  they  were  covered  with  earth  in  a  field,  or  were  stored  in  a 
box;  in  either  case,  the  subject-matter  of  the  sale,  namely,  potatoes, 
being  but  a  personal  chattel,  and  so  not  within  the  Statute  of 
Frauds.2  The  latter  cases  confirm  the  doctrine  involved  in  this  deci- 
sion, namely,  that  the  transaction  takes  its  character  of  realty  or 
personalty  from  the  principal  subject-matter  of  the  contract,  and  the 
intent  of  the  parties ;  and  that,  therefore,  a  sale  of  any  growing  pro- 
duce of  the  earth,  reared  by  labor  and  expense,  in  actual  existence 
at  the  time  of  the  contract,  whether  it  be  in  a  state  of  maturity  or 
not,  is  not  to  be  considered  a  sale  of  an  interest  in  or  concerning 
land.8  In  regard  to  things  produced  annually  by  the  labor  of  man, 
the  question  is  sometimes  solved  by  reference  to  the  law  of  emble- 
ments;  on  the  ground,  that  whatever  will  go  to  the  executor,  the 
tenant  being  dead,  cannot  be  considered  as  an  interest  in  land.4  But 

p.  38  (Rand's  ed.);  Story  on  Agency,  §  27,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Cleaves  v.  Foss, 
4  Greenl.  1  ;  Roberts  on  Frauds,  pp.  113,  114,  n.  (56);  2  Stark.  Evid.  352  (6th  Am. 
ed.);  Davis  v.  Robertson,  1  Mills  (S.  C.)  71;  Adams  v.  McMillan,  7  Port.  73;  4 
Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  32,  c.  3,  §  7,  n.  (Greeiileaf's  ed.)  [2d  ed.  (1856)  vol.  ii,  p.  346.] 

1  Cook  v.  Stearns,  11  Mass.  533. 

2  Bligh  r.  Brent,  2  Y.  &  Col.  268,  295,  296 ;  Bradley  v.  Holdsworth,  3  M.  &  W. 
422. 

1  Parker  v.  Staniland,  11  East  362  ;  Cutler  v.  Pope,  1  Shepl.  377. 

2  Warwick  v.  Bruce,  2  M.  &  S.  205.     The  contract  was  made  on  the  12th  of  October, 
when  the  crop  was  at  its  maturity  ;  and  it  would  seem  that  the  potatoes  were  forthwith 
to  be  digged  and  removed. 

•  Evans  v.  Roberts,  5  B.  &  C.  829  ;  Jones  v.  Flint,  10  Ad.  &  El.  753. 

4  See  observations  of  the  learned  judges,  in  Evans  v.  Roberts,  5  B.  &  C.  829.  See 
also  Kodwell  p.  Phillips,  9  M.  &  W.  501,  where  it  was  held,  that  an  agreement  for  the 
sale  of  growing  pears  was  an  agreement  for  the  sale  of  an  interest  in  land,  on  the  prin- 
ciple, that  the  fruit  would  not  pass  to  the  executor,  but  would  descend  to  the  heir.  The 
learned  Chief  Baron  distinguished  this  ciise  from  Smith  v.  Surman,  9  B.  &  C.  561,  the 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FKOM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  857 

the  case  seems  also  to  be  covered  by  a  broader  principle  of  distinc- 
tion, namely,  between  contracts  conferring  an  exclusive  right  to  the 
land  for  a  time,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  profit  of  the  growing 
surface,  and  contracts  for  things  annexed  to  the  freehold,  in  pros- 
pect of  their  immediate  separation;  from  which  it  seems  to  result, 
that  where  timber,  or  other  produce  of  the  land,  or  any  other  thing 
annexed  to  the  freehold,  is  specifically  sold,  whether  it  is  to  be 
severed  from  the  soil  by  the  vendor,  or  to  be  taken  by  the  vendee, 
under  a  special  license  to  enter  for  that  purpose,  it  is  still,  in  the 
contemplation  of  the  parties,  evidently  and  substantially  a  sale  of 
goods  only,  and  so  is  not  within  the  statute.6 

latter  being  the  case  of  a  sale  of  growing  timber  by  the  foot,  and  so  treated  by  the  parties 
as  if  it  had  been  actually  felled,  —  a  distinction  which  confirms  the  view  subsequently 
taken  in  the  text. 

6  Roberts  on  Frauds,  p.  126  ;  4  Kent  Comm.  450,  451 ;  Lo)ig  on  Sales  (by  Rand), 
pp.  76-81,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  Chitty  on  Contracts,  p.  241  (2d  ed. );  Bank  of  Lan- 
singburg  v.  Crary,  1  Barb.  542.  On  this  subject  neither  the  English  nor  the  American 
decisions  are  quite  uniform  ;  but  the  weight  of  authority  is  believed  to  be  as  stated  in 
the  text,  though  it  is  true  of  the  former,  as  Ld.  Abinger  remarked  in  Rodwell  v.  Phil- 
lips, 9  M.  &  W.  505,  that  "  no  general  rule  is  laid  down  in  any  one  of  them,  that  is 
not  contradicted  by  some  others."  See  also  Poulter  v.  Killingbeck,  1  B.  &  P.  398  ; 
Parker  v.  Staniland,  11  East  362,  distinguishing  and  qualifying  Crosby  v.  Wadsworth, 
6  id.  611  ;  Smith  v.  Surman,  9  B.  &  C.  561  ;  Watts  v.  Friend,  10  id.  446.  The  distinc- 
tion taken  in  Bostwick  v.  Leach,  3  Day  476,  484,  is  this,  that  when  there  is  a  sale  of 
property,  which  would  pass  by  a  deed  of  land,  as  such,  without  any  other  description, 
if  it  can  be  separated  from  the  freehold,  and  by  the  contract  is  to  be  separated,  such 
contract  is  not  within  the  statute.  See,  accordingly,  Whipple  v.  Foot,  2  Johns.  418, 
422  ;  Frear  v.  Hardenbergh,  5  id.  276  ;  Stewart  v.  Doughty,  9  id.  108,  112  ;  Austin  v. 
Sawyer,  9  Cowen  39  ;  Erskine  v.  Plummer,  7  Greenl.  447  ;  Bishop  v.  Doty,  1  Vt.  38  ; 
Miller  v.  Baker,  1  Met.  27  ;  Whitmarsh  v.  Walker,  ib.  313  ;  Claflin  v.  Carpenter,  4  Met. 
580.  Mr.  Rand,  who  has  treated  this  subject,  as  well  as  all  others  on  which  he  has 
written,  with  great  learning  and  acumen,  would  reconcile  the  English  authorities,  by 
distinguishing  between  those  cases  in  which  the  subject  of  the  contract,  being  part  of 
the  inheritance,  is  to  be  severed  and  delivered  by  the  vendor,  as  a  chattel,  and  those  in 
which  a  right  of  entry  by  the  vendee  to  cut  and  take  it  is  bargained  for.  "The 
authorities,"  says  he,  "all  agree  in  this,  that  a  bargain  for  trees,  grass,  crops,  or  any 
such  like  thing,  when  severed  from  the  soil,  which  are  growing,  at  the  time  of  the 
contract,  upon  the  soil,  but  to  be  severed  and  delivered  by  the  vendor,  as  chattels, 
separate  from  any  interest  in  the  soil,  is  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  goods,  wares,  or 
merchandise,  within  the  meaning  of  the  seventeenth  section  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds 
(Smith  v.  Surman,  9  B.  &  C.  561  ;  Evans  v.  Roberts,  5  id.  836  ;  Watts  v.  Friend,  10 
id.  446  ;  Parker  v.  Staniland,  11  East  362 ;  Warwick  v.  Bruce,  2  M.  &  S.  205).  So, 
where  the  subject-matter  of  the  bargain  is  fructus  industriaJes,  such  as  corn,  garden- 
roots,  and  such  like  things,  which  are  emblements,  and  which  have  already  grown  to 
maturity,  and  are  to  be  taken  immediately,  and  no  right  of  entry  forms  absolutely  part 
of  the  contract,  but  a  mere  license  is  given  to  the  vendee  to  enter  and  take  them,  it 
will  fall  within  the  operation  of  the  same  section  of  the  statute  (Warwick  v.  Bruce, 
2  M.  &S.  205;  Parker  v.  Staniland,  11  East  362;  Parke,  B.,  Carrington  v.  Roots, 

2  M.  &  W.  256  ;  Bayley,  B.,  Shelton  v.  Livius,  2  Tyrw.  427,  429  ;    Bayley,  J.,  Evans 
v.  Roberts,  5  B.  &  C.  831  ;  Scorell  v.  Boxall,  1  Y.  "&  J.  398  ;    Mayfield  v.   Wadsley, 

3  B.  &  C.  357).     But  where  the  subject-matter  of  the  contract  constitutes  a  part  of  the 
inheritance,  and  is  not  to  be  severed  and  delivered  by  the  vendor  as  a  chattel,  but  a 
right  of  entry  to  cut  and  take  it  is  bargained  for,  or  where  it  is  emblements  growing, 
and  a  right  in  the  soil  to  grow  and  bring  them  to  maturity,  and  to  enter  and  take  them, 
that  makes  part  of  the  bargain,  the  case  will  fall  within  the  fourth  section  of  the  Statute 
of  Frauds  (Carrington  v.  Roots,  2  M.  &  W.  257  ;   Shelton  v.  Livius,  2  Tyrw.  429  ; 
Scorell  v.   Boxall,  1  Y.  &  J.  398 ;  Earl  of  Falmouth  v.  Thomas,  1  Cr.  &  M.  89 ;  Teal 
v.  Auty,  2  B.  &  Bing.  99  ;  Emmerson  v.  Heelis,  2  Taunt.  38  ;  Waddington  v.  Bristow, 
2  B.  &  P.  452;  Crosby  r.  Wadsworth,  6  East  602)."     See  Long  on  Sales  (by  Rand). 


558  APPENDIX   II. 

§  272.  Devises  of  Lands  and  Tenements.  Devises  of  lands  and 
tenements  are  also  required  to  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the  testator, 
and  attested  by  credible,  that  is,  by  competent  witnesses.  By  the 
statutes  32  Hen.  VIII,  c.  1,  and  34  &  35  Hen.  VIII,  c.  5,  devises 
were  merely  required  to  be  in  writing.  The  Statute  of  Frauds,  29 
Car.  II,  c.  3,  required  the  attestation  of  "three  or  four  credible  wit- 
nesses ; "  but  the  statute  1  Viet.  c.  26,  has  reduced  the  number  of 
witnesses  to  two.  The  provisions  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  on  this 
subject  have  been  adopted  in  most  of  the  United  States.1  It  re- 
quires that  the  witnesses  should  attest  and  subscribe  the  will  in 
the  testator's  presence.  The  attestation  of  marksmen  is  sufficient; 
and,  if  they  are  dead,  the  attestation  may  be  proved  by  evidence, 
that  they  lived  near  the  testator,  that  no  others  of  the  same  name 
resided  in  the  neighborhood,  and  that  they  were  illiterate  persons.2 
One  object  of  this  provision  is,  to  prevent  the  substitution  of  another 
instrument  for  the  genuine  will.  It  is  therefore  held,  that  to  be 
present,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  though  the  testator  need 
not  be  in  the  same  room,  yet  he  must  be  near  enough  to  see  and 
identify  the  instrument,  if  he  is  so  disposed,  though  in  truth  he 
does  not  attempt  to  do  so ;  and  that  he  must  have  mental  knowledge 
and  consciousness  of  the  fact.8  If  he  be  in  a  state  of  insensibility 
at  the  moment  of  attestation,  it  is  void.4  Being  in  the  same  room  is 
held  prima  facie  evidence  of  an  attestation  in  his  presence,  as  an 
attestation,  not  made  in  the  same  room,  is  prima  facie  not  an  attes- 
tation in  his  presence.6  It  is  not  necessary,  under  the  Statute  of 
Frauds,  that  the  witnesses  should  attest  in  the  presence  of  each  other, 
nor  that  they  should  all  attest  at  the  same  time; 6  nor  is  it  requisite 

pp.  80,  81.  But  the  later  English  and  the  American  authorities  do  not  seem  to 
recognize  such  distinction. 

1  In  New  Hampshire  alone  the  will  is  required  to  be  sealed.  Three  witnesses  are 
necessary  to  a  valid  will  in  Vermont,  New  Hampshire,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Rhode 
Island,  Connecticut,  New  Jersey,  Maryland,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama, 
and  Mississippi.  Two  witnesses  only  are  requisite  in  New  York,  Delaware,  Virginia, 
Ohio,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Missouri,  Tennessee,  North  Carolina,  Michigan,  Wisconsin, 
Arkansas,  and  Kentucky.  In  some  of  the  States,  the  provision  as  to  attestation  is 
more  special.  In  Pennsylvania,  a  devise  is  good,  if  properly  signed,  though  it  is  not 
subscribed  by  any  attesting  witness,  provided  it  can  be  proved  by  two  or  more  com- 
petent witnesses  ;  and  if  it  be  attested  by  witnesses,  it  may  still  be  proved  by  others  : 
4  Kent  Comm.  514.  See  post,  Vol.  II,  tit.  Wills  £7th  ed.  (1858)  §§  673-678.  and 
notes]-  See  further,  as  to  the  execution  of  Wills,  6  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  38,  c.  5.  Green- 
leafs  notes  []2d  ed.  (1857)  pp.  47-80,  and  notes]  ;  1  Jannan  on  Wills,  c.  6,  by  Per- 
kins. 

8  Doe  v.  Caperton,  9  C.  &  P.  112  ;  Jackson  v.  Van'Dusen,  5  JohHis.  144  ;  Doe  o. 
Davis,  11  Jur.  182. 

8  Shires  v.  Glascock,  2  Salk.  688  (by  Evans),  and  cases  cited  in  notes;  4  Kent 
Comm.  515,  516  ;  Casson  v.  Dade,  1  Bro.  Ch.  99;  Doe  v.  Manifold,  1  M.  &  S.  294  ; 
Tod  v.  E.  of  Winchdsca,  1  M.  &  M.  12  ;  2  C.  &  P.  488  ;  Hill  v.  Barge,  12  Ala.  687. 

4  Right  v.  Price,  Doug.  241. 

*  Neil  v.  Neil,  1  Leigh  6,  10-21,  where  the  cases  on  this  subject  are  ably  reviewed 
by  Carr,  J.     If  the  two  rooms  have  a  communication  by  folding-doors,  it  is  still  to  be 
ascertained  whether,  in  fact,  the  testator  could  have  seen  the  witnesses  in  the  act  of 
attestation:  In  the  Goods  of  Colman,  3  Curt.  118. 

*  Cook  v.  Parsons,  Prec.  in  Chan.  184;  Jones  v.  Lake,  2  Ath.  177,  in  n.  ;  Grayson 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE    ORIGINAL   TEXT.  859 

that  they  should  actually  have  seen  the  testator  sign,  or  known  what 
the  paper  was,  provided  they  subscribed  the  instrument  in  his  pres- 
ence and  at  his  request.7  Neither  has  it  been  considered  necessary, 
under  this  statute,  that  the  testator  should  subscribe  the  instru- 
ment, it  being  deemed  sufficient  that  it  be  signed  by  him  in  any  part, 
with  his  own  name  or  mark,  provided  it  appear  to  have  been  done 
animo  perficiendi,  and  to  have  been  regarded  by  him  as  completely 
executed.8  Thus,  where  the  will  was  signed  in  the  margin  only,  or 
where,  being  written  by  the  testator  himself,  his  name  was  written 
only  in  the  beginning  of  the  will,  I,  A.  B.,  &c.,  this  was  held  a 
sufficient  signing.9  But  where  it  appeared  that  the  testator  intended 
to  sign  each  several  sheet  of  the  will,  but  signed  only  two  of  them, 
being  unable,  from  extreme  weakness,  to  sign  the  others,  it  was 
held  incomplete.10 

v.  Atkinson,  2  Ves.  455  ;  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Met.  349 ;  1  Williams  on  Executors  (by 
Troubat),  p.  46,  n.  (2).  The  statute  of  1  Viet.  c.  26,  §  9,  has  altered  the  law  in  this 
respect,  by  enacting  that  no  will  shall  be  valid  unless  it  be  in  writing,  signed  by  the 
testator  in  the  presence  of  two  witnesses  at  one  time.  See  Moore  v.  King,  3  Curt. 
243  ;  In  the  Goods  of  Simmonds,  ib.  79. 

7  White  v.  Trustees  of  the  British  Museum,   6  Bing.   310 ;  Wright  v.  Wright, 
7  Bing.  457 ;  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Met.  349 ;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  1  C.  &  M.  140.     In 
these  cases,  the  Court  certainly  seem  to  regard  the  knowledge  of  the  witnesses,  that 
the  instrument  was  a  will,  as  a  matter  of  no  importance ;  since  in  the  first  two  cases 
only  one  of  the  witnesses  knew  what  the  paper  was.     But  it  deserves  to  be  considered 
whether,  in  such  case,  the  attention  of  the  witness  would  probably  be  drawn  to  the 
state  of  the  testator's  mind,  in  regard  to  his  sanity  ;  for  if  not,  one  object  of  the  stat- 
ute would  be  defeated.      See  Rutherford  v.  Rutherford,  1  Den.  33 ;  Brinkerhoof  v. 
Remsen,  8  Paige  488 ;  26  Wend.  325  ;  Chaffee  v.  Baptist  Miss.  Convention,  10  Paige 
85  ;  1  Jarm.  on  Wills  (by  Perkins),  p.  114  ;  6  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  38,  c.  5,  §  14,  n. 
(GreenleaPs  ed.),  2d  ed.  (1857),  vol.  iii,  p.  53,  and  n.      See  further,  as  to  proof  by 
subscribing  witnesses,  infra,  §§  569,  569  a,  572. 

8  That  the  party's  mark  or  initials  is  a  sufficient  signature  to  any  instrument, 
being  placed  there  with  intent  to  bind  himself,  in  all  cases  not  otherwise  regulated  by 
statute,   see  Baker  v.   Dening,   8  Ad.  &  El.  94;    Jackson  v.    Van   Dusen,  5  Johns. 
144 ;  Palmer  v.  Stephens,  1  Den.  471,  and  the  cases  cited  in  6  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  38, 
c.  5,  §§  7,  19,  notes  (Greenleafs  ed.),  2d  ed.  (1857),  vol.  iii,  pp.  50-56  ;  post,  vol.  ii, 
§677. 

9  Lemayne  v.  Stanley,  3  Lev.  1 ;  Morison  v.  Tumour,  18  Ves.  183.     But  this  also  is 
now  changed  by  the  statute  1  Viet.  c.  26,  §  9,  by  which  no  will  is  valid  unless  it  be 
signed  at  the  foot  or  end  thereof,   by  the  testator,  or  by  some  other  person,  in  his 
presence  and  by  his  direction  ;  as  well  as  attested  by  two  witnesses,  subscribing  their 
names  in  his  presence :  see  In  the  Goods  of  Carver,  3  Curt.  29. 

10  Right  v.  Price,  Doug.  241.     The  Statute  of  Frauds,  which  has  been  generally  fol- 
lowed in  the  United  States,  admitted  exceptions  in  favor  of  nuncupative  or  verbal 
wills,  made  under  certain  circumstances  therein  mentioned,  as  well  as  in  favor  of  parol 
testamentary  dispositions  of  personalty,  by  soldiers  in  actual  service,  and  by  mariners 
at  sea  ;  any  further  notice  of  which  would  be  foreign  from  the  plan  of  this  treatise. 
The  latter  exceptions  still  exist  in  England  ;  but  nuncupative  wills  seem  to  be  abol- 
ished there,  by  the  general  terms  of  the  statute  of  1  Viet.  c.  26,  §  9,  before  cited.     The 
common  law,  which  allows  a  bequest  of  personal  estate  by  parol,  without  writing,  has 
been  altered  by  statute  in  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  United  States ;  the  course  of  legis- 
lation having  tended  strongly  to  the  abolition  of  all  distinctions  between  the  requisites 
for  the  testamentary  disposition  of  real  and  of  personal  property.     See  4  Kent  Comrn. 
516-520  ;  Lovelass  on  Wills,  pp.  315-319  ;  1    Williams  on   Executors  (by  Troubat), 
pp.  46-48,  notes  ;  1  Jarman  on  Wills  (by  Perkins),  p.  [90]  132,  n.  ;  6  Cruise's  Dig. 
(by  Greenleaf),  tit.  38,  c.  5,  §  14,  n.,  2d  ed.  (1857),  vol.  iii,  p.  53,  and  note.    See  also 
post,  vol.  ii,  §  674  et  seq. 


860  APPENDIX   II. 

§  273.  Revocation  of  Wills.  By  the  Statute  of  Frauds,  the  revo- 
cation of  a  will,  by  the  direct  act  of  the  testator,  must  be  proved  by 
some  subsequent  will  or  codicil,  inconsistent  with  the  former,  or  by 
some  other  writing,  declaring  the  same,  and  signed  in  the  presence 
of  three  witnesses,  or  by  burning,  tearing,  cancelling,  or  obliterating 
the  same  by  the  testator,  or  in  his  presence,  and  by  his  direction  and 
consent.1  It  is  observable  that  this  part  of  the  statute  only  requires 
that  the  instrument  of  revocation,  if  not  a  will  or  codicil,  be  signed 
by  the  testator  in  presence  of  the  witnesses,  but  it  does  not,  as  in 
the  execution  of  a  will,  require  that  the  witnesses  should  sign  in  his 
presence.  In  regard  to  the  other  acts  of  revocation  he.re  mentioned, 
they  operate  by  one  common  principle;  namely,  the  intent  of  the 
testator.  Revocation  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  demonstrated  by  some 
outward  and  visible  sign  or  symbol  of  revocation ; 2  and  the  words  of 
the  statute  are  satisfied  by  any  act  of  spoliation,  reprobation,  or  de- 
struction, deliberately  done  upon  the  instrument,  anlmo  revocandi.* 
The  declarations  of  the  testator,  accompanying  the  act,  are  of  course 
admissible  in  evidence  as  explanatory  of  his  intention.4  Accordingly, 
where  the  testator  rumpled  up  his  will  and  threw  it  into  the  fire  with 
intent  to  destroy  it,  though  it  was  saved  entire  without  his  knowl- 
edge, this  was  held  to  be  a  revocation.6  So,  where  he  tore  off  a 
superfluous  seal.6  But  where,  being  angry  with  the  devisee,  he 
began  to  tear  his  will,  but  being  afterwards  pacified,  he  fitted  the 
pieces  carefully  together,  saying  he  was  glad  it  was  no  worse,  this 
was  held  to  be  no  revocation.7 

§  274.  Apprenticeship.  Documentary  evidence  is  also  required  in 
proof  of  the  contract  of  apprenticeship;  there  being  no  legal  binding, 
to  give  the  master  coercive  power  over  the  person  of  the  apprentice, 
unless  it  be  by  indentures,  duly  executed  in  the  forms  prescribed  by 
the  various  statutes  on  this  subject.  The  general  features  of  the 
English  statutes  of  apprenticeship,  so  far  as  the  mode  of  binding  is 
concerned,  will  be  found  in  those  of  most  of  the  United  States. 
There  are  various  other  cases,  in  which  a  deed,  or  other  documentary 
evidence,  is  required  by  statutes,  a  particular  enumeration  of  which 
would  be  foreign  from  the  plan  of  this  treatise.1 

1  Stat.  29  Car.  II,  c.  3,  §  6.     The  statute  of  1  Viet.  c.  26,  §  20,  mentions  "burn- 
ing, tearing,  or  otherwise  destroying  the  same,"  &c.     And  see  further,  as  to  the  evi- 
dence of  revocation,  6  Cruise's  Dig.   (by  Greenleaf),  tit.  38,  c.  6,  §§  18,  19,  29,  notes 
[2d  ed.  (1857)  vol.  iii,  p.  81  ct  seq.  ;  2  Greeul.  Evid.  (7th  ed.)  §§  680-687]  ;  1  Jarman 
on  Wills  (by  Perkins),  c.  7,  §  2,  notes. 

2  Bibb  v.  Thomas,  2  W.  Bl.  1043. 

8  Burtenshaw  v.  Gilbert,  Cowp.  49,  52 ;  Burns  v.  Burns,  4  S.  &  R.  567  ;  6  Cruise's 
Dig.  (by  Greenleaf)  tit.  38,  c.  6,  §  54 ;  Johnson  v.  Brailsford,  2  Nott  &  McC.  272  ; 
Winsor  v.  Pratt,  2  B.  &  B.  650  ;  Lovelass  on  Wills,  pp.  346-350  ;  Card  v.  Grinman, 
5  Conn.  168  ;  4  Kent  Comm.  531,  532. 

Dan  v.  Brown,  4  Cowen  490. 

Bibb  v.  Thomas,  2  W.  Bl.  1043. 

Avc.ry  v.  Pixley,  4  MBSS.  462. 

Doe  v.  Perkes,  8  B.  &  Aid.  489. 

In  several  of  the  United  States,  two  subscribing  witnesses  are  necessary  to  the 


PASSAGES   OMITTED    FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  861 

§  329.    Disqualification,   as   Witnesses,   of   Parties   to  the  Record 

And,  first,  in  regard  to  parties,  the  general  rule  of  the  common  law- 
is,  that  a  party  to  the  record,  in  a  civil  suit,  cannot  be  a  witness 
either  for  himself,  or  for  a  co-suitor  in  the  cause.1  The  rule  of  the 
Roman  law  was  the  same.  "Omnibus  in  re  propria  dicendi  testi- 
monii  facultatem  jura  submoverunt." 2  This  rule  of  the  common  law 
is  founded,  not  solely  in  the  consideration  of  interest,  but  partly  also 
in  the  general  expediency  of  avoiding  the  multiplication  of  tempta- 
tions to  perjury.  In  some  cases  at  law,  and  generally  by  the  course 
of  proceedings  in  equity,  one  party  may  appeal  to  the  conscience  of 
the  other,  by  calling  him  to  answer  interrogatories  upon  oath.  But 
this  act  of  the  adversary  may  be  regarded  as  an  emphatic  admission, 
that,  in  that  instance,  the  party  is  worthy  of  credit,  and  that  his 
known  integrity  is  a  sufficient  guaranty  against  the  danger  of  false- 
hood. But  where  the  party  would  volunteer  his  own  oath,  or  a  co- 
suitor,  identified  in  interest  with  him,  would  offer  it,  this  reason  for 
the  admission  of  the  evidence  totally  fails  ;  "  and  it  is  not  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  a  man,  who  complains  without  cause,  or  defends  without 
justice,  should  have  honesty  enough  to  confess  it." 8 

§  330.  The  rule  of  the  common  law  goes  still  further  in  regard  to 
parties  to  the  record  in  not  compelling  them,  in  trials  by  jury,  to  give 
evidence  for  the  opposite  party,  against  themselves,  either  in  civil  or 
in  criminal  cases.  Whatever  may  be  said  by  theorists,  as  to  the 
policy  of  the  maxim,  Nemo  tenetur  seipsum  prodere,  no  inconvenience 
has  been  felt  in  its  practical  application.  On  the  contrary,  after 
oenturies  of  experience,  it  is  still  applauded  by  judges,  as,  "  a  rule 
founded  in  good  sense  and  sound  policy ; "  1  and  it  certainly  preserves 
the  party  from  temptation  to  perjury.  This  rule  extends  to  all  the 
actual  and  real  parties  to  the  suit,  whether  they  are  named  on  the 
record  as  such  or  not.2 

§  331.  Corporators.  Whether  corporators  are  parties  within  the 
meaning  of  this  rule  is  a  point  not  perfectly  clear.  Corporations,  it 
is  to  be  observed,  are  classed  into  public  or  municipal,  and  private, 
corporations.  The  former  are  composed  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  any 
of  the  local  or  territorial  portions  into  which  the  country  is  divided 
in  its  political  organization.  Such  are  counties,  towns,  boroughs, 

execution  of  a  deed  of  conveyance  of  lands  to  entitle  it  to  registration  ;  in  others,  but 
one.  In  some  others,  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  is  requisite,  when  the  deed  is  to 
be  proved  by  witnesses.  See  supra,  §  260,  n.  ;'  4  Cruise's  Dig.  tit.  32,  c.  2,  §  77,  n. 
(Greenleafs  ed.),  2d  ed.  (1856)  vol.  ii,  p.  341  ;  4  Kent  Comrn.  457.  See  also  post, 
vol.  ii,  tit.  Wills,  passim,  where  the  subject  of  Wills  is  more  amply  treated. 

1  3  Bl.  Comm.  371  ;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  221  ;  Frear  v.  Evertson,  20  Johns.  142. 

2  Cod.  lib.  4,  tit.  20,  1.  10.     Nullus  idoneus  testis  in  re  sua  intelligitdr  :  Dig.  lib. 
22,  tit.  5,  1.  10. 

•  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  243. 

1  Worrall  v.  Jones,  7  Bins,'.  395,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  ;  R.  v.  Wobnrn,  10  East  403,  p«r 
Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Marsh,  10  Pick.  57  ;  po.it,  §  353. 

2  R.  v.  Woburn,  10  East  395;  Mauran  v.  Lamb,  7  Cowen,  174;  Appleton  v.  Boyd, 
7  Mass.  131 ;  Fenn  v.  Granger,  3  Camp.  177. 


862  APPENDIX    II. 

local  parishes,  and  the  like.  In  these  cases,  the  attribute  of  indi- 
viduality is  conferred  on  the  entire  mass  of  inhabitants,  and  again  is 
modified,  or  taken  away,  at  the  mere  will  of  the  legislature,  according 
to  its  own  views  of  public  convenience,  and  without  any  necessity  for 
the  consent  of  the  inhabitants,  though  not  ordinarily  against  it.  They 
are  termed  quasi  corporations ;  and  are  dependent  on  the  public  will, 
the  inhabitants  not,  in  general,  deriving  any  private  and  personal 
rights  under  the  act  of  incorporation ;  its  office  and  object  being  not 
to  grant  private  rights,  but  to  regulate  the  manner  of  performing 
public  duties.1  These  corporations  sue  and  are  sued  by  the  name  of 
"  the  Inhabitants  of  "  such  a  place ;  each  inhabitant  is  directly  liable 
in  his  person  to  arrest,  and  in  his  goods  to  seizure  and  sale,  on  the 
execution,  which  may  issue  against  the  collective  body,  by  that  name  ; 
and  of  course  each  one  is  a  party  to  the  suit ;  and  his  admissions,  it 
seems,  are  receivable  in  evidence,  though  their  value,  as  we  have 
seen,  may  be  exceedingly  light.2  Being  parties,  it  would  seem  natu- 
rally to  follow,  that  these  inhabitants  were  neither  admissible  as  wit- 
nesses for  themselves,  nor  compellable  to  testify  against  themselves ; 
but  considering  the  public  nature  of  the  suits,  in  which  they  are 
parties,  and  of  the  interest  generally  involved  in  them,  the  minute- 
ness of  the  private  and  personal  interest  concerned,  its  contingent 
character,  and  the  almost  certain  failure  of  justice,  if  the  rule  were 
carried  out  to  such  extent  in  its  application,  these  inhabitants  are 
admitted  as  competent  witnesses  in  all  cases,  in  which  the  rights  and 
liabilities  of  the  corporation  only  are  in  controversy.  But  where  the 
inhabitants  are  individually  and  personally  interested,  it  is  otherwise.8 

1  Angell  &  Ames  on  Corp.  16,  17  :  Rumford  v.  Wood,  13  Mass.   192.     The  obser- 
vations in  the  text  are  applied  to  American  corporations  of  a  political  character. 
Whether  a  municipal  corporation  can  in  every  case  be  dissolved  by  an  act  of  the  legis- 
lature, and  to  what  extent  such  act  of  dissolution  may  constitutionally  operate,  are 
questions  which  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  discuss.     See  Willcock  on  Municipal  Corpo- 
rations, pt.  1,  §  852  ;  Terrett  v.  Taylor,  9  Cranch  43,  51 ;  Dartmouth  College  v.  Wood- 
ward, 4  Wheat.  518,  629,  663. 

2  Supra,  §  175,  and  n. 

8  Swift's  Evid.  57  ;  R.  v.  Mayor  of  London,  2  Lev.  231.  Thus  an  inhabitant  is 
not  competent  to  prove  a  way  by  prescription  for  all  the  inhabitants  :  Odiorne  v.  Wade, 
8  Pick.  518;  nor  a  right  in  all  the  inhabitants  to  take  shell-fish  :  Lufkin  v.  Haskell, 
3  Pick.  356 ;  for  in  such  cases,  by  the  common  law,  the  record  would  be  evidence  of 
the  custom,  in  favor  of  the  witness.  This  ground  of  objection,  however,  is  now  re- 
moved in  England,  by  Stat.  3  &  4  W.  IV,  c.  42.  The  same  principle  is  applied  to  any 
private,  joint,  or  common  interest:  Parker  v.  Mitchell,  11  Ad.  &  El.  788.  See  also 
Prewit  v.  Tilly,  1  C.  &  P.  140  ;  Ang.  &  Ames  on  Corp.  390-394  ;  Connecticut  t>.  Brad- 
ish,  14  Mass.  296 ;  Gould  v.  James,  6  Cowen  369  ;  Jacobson  v.  Fountain,  2  Johns.  170  ; 
Weller  n.  Governors  of  the  Foundling  Hospital,  Peake  153  ;  infra,  §  405.  In  the 
English  courts,  a  distinction  is  taken  between  rated  and  ratable  inhabitants,  the  former 
being  held  inadmissible  as  witnesses,  and  the  latter  being  held  competent ;  and  this 
distinction  has  been  recognized  in  some  of  our  own  Courts  ;  though,  upon  the  grounds 
stated  in  the  text,  it  does  not  seem  applicable  to  our  institutions,  and  is  now  generally 
disregarded.  See  Corn.  v.  Baird,  4  S.  &  R.  141  ;  Falls  v.  Belknap,  1  Johns.  486,  491  ; 
Corwein  v.  Hames,  11  id.  76  ;  Bloodgood  v.  Jamaica,  12  id.  285  ;  supra,  §  175,  n., 
and  the  cases  above  cited.  But  in  England,  rated  inhabitants  are  now  by  statutes 
made  competent  witnesses  on  indictments  for  non-repair  of  bridges  in  actions  against 
the  hundred,  under  the  statute  of  Winton  ;  in  actions  for  riotous  assemblies  ;  in  actions 
against  church-wardens  for  misapplication  of  funds  ;  in  summary  convictions  under  7  & 


PASSAGES   OMITTED    FROM   THE    ORIGINAL   TEXT.  863 

Whether  this  exception  to  the  general  rule  was  solely  created  by  the 
statutes,  which  have  been  passed  on  this  subject,  or  previously  ex- 
isted at  common  law,  of  which  the  statutes  are  declaratory,  is  not 
perfectly  agreed.4  In  either  case,  the  general  reason  and  necessity, 
on  which  the  exception  is  founded,  seem  to  require,  that  where 
inhabitants  are  admissible  as  witnesses  for  the  corporation,  they 
should  also  be  compellable  to  testify  against  it.  But  the  point  is 
still  a  vexed  question.5 

§  332.  Private  corporations,  in  regard  to  our  present  inquiry,  may 
be  divided  into  two  classes;  namely,  pecuniary  or  moneyed  institu- 
tions, such  as  banks,  insurance,  and  manufacturing  companies,  and 
the  like,  and  institutions  or  societies  for  religious  and  charitable  pur- 
poses. In  the  former,  membership  is  obtained  by  the  purchase  of 
stock  or  shares,  without  the  act  or  assent  of  the  corporation,  except 
prospectively  and  generally,  as  provided  in  its  charter  and  bj'-laws  ; 
and  the  interest  thus  acquired  is  private,  pecuniary,  and  vested,  like 
ownership  of  any  other  property.  In  the  latter,  membership  is  con- 
ferred by  special  election  ;  but  the  member  has  no  private  interest  in 
the  funds,  the  whole  property  being  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  others. 
But  all  these  are  equally  corporations  proper ;  and  it  is  the  corpora- 
tion, and  not  the  individual  member,  that  is  party  to  the  record  in  all 
suits  by  or  against  it.1  Hence  it  follows  that  the  declarations  of  the 
members  are  not  admissible  in  evidence  in  such  actions  as  the  dec- 
larations of  parties,2  though  where  a  member  or  an  officer  is  an 

8  Geo.  IV,  c.  29,  30  ;  on  the  trial  of  indictments  under  the  general  highway  act  and 
the  general  turnpike  act  ;  and  in  matters  relating  to  rates  and  cesses :  Phil.  &  Am. 
on  Evid.  133-138,  395;  1  Phil.  Evid.  138-144.  In  the  Province  of  New  Brunswick, 
rated  inhabitants  are  now  made  competent  witnesses  in  all  cases  where  the  town  or 
parish  may  in  any  manner  be  affected,  or  where  it  may  be  interested  in  a  pecuniary 
penalty,  or  where  its  officers,  acting  in  its  behalf,  are  parties :  Stat.  9  Viet.  c.  4, 
March  7,  1846.  In  several  of  the  United  States,  also,  the  inhabitants  of  counties  and 
other  municipal,  territorial,  or  quasi  corporations  are  expressly  declared  by  statutes  to 
be  competent  witnesses,  in  all  suits  in  which  the  corporation  is  a  party.  See  Maine, 
Rev.  Stat.  1840,  c.  115,  §  75;  Massachusetts,  Rev.  Stat.  c.  94,  §  54;  Vermont,  Rev. 
Stat.  1839,  c.  31,  §  18;  New  York,  Rev.  Stat.  vol.  i,  pp.  408,  439  (3d  ed.) ;  Pennsyl- 
vania, Dunl.  Dig.  pp.  215,  913,  1019,  1165  ;  Michigan,  Rev.  Stat.  1846,  c.  102,  §  81  ; 
Wisconsin,  Rev.  Stat.  1849,  c.  10,  §  21 ;  ib.  c.  98,  §  49 ;  Virginia,  Rev.  Stat.  1849, 
c.  176,  §  17  ;  Missouri,  Rev.  Stat.  1845,  c.  34,  art.  1,  §  25.  In  New  Jersey,  they  are 
admissible  in  suits  for  moneys  to  which  the  county  or  town  is  entitled :  Rev.  Stat. 
1846,  tit.  34,  c.  9,  §  5.  See  Stewart  v.  Saybrook,  Wright  374;  Barada  v.  Carondelet, 
8  Mo.  644. 

*  Supra,  §  175,  and  the  cases  cited  in  note.  See  also  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  395, 
n.  (2)  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  375  ;  City  Council  v.  King,  4  McCord  487  ;  Marsden  v.  Stans- 
field,  7  B.  &  C.  815  ;  R.  v.  Kirdford,  2  East  559. 

6  In  R.  v.  Woburn,  10  East  395,  and  R.  v.  Hardwick,  11  id.  578,  584,  586,  589,  it 
was  said  that  they  were  not  compellable.  See,  accordingly,  Plattekill  v.  New  Paltz, 
16  Johns.  305. 

1  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Cook,  4  Pick.  405.     It  has  been  held  in  Maine,  that  a  cor- 
porator, or  shareholder  in  a  moneyed  institution,  is  substantially  a  party,  and  there- 
fore is  not  compellable  to  testify  where  the  corporation  is  party  to  the  record  :  Bank  of 
Oldtown  v.  Houlton,  8  Shepl.  501,  Shepley,  J.,  dissenting. 

2  City  Bank  v.  Bateman,  7  Har.  &  Johns.  104,  109  ;  Hartford  Bank  v.  Hart,  3  Day 
491,  495  ;  Magill  v.  Kauffman,  4  S.  &  R.  317  ;  Stewart  v.  Huntingdon  Bank,  11  S.  & 


864  APPENDIX   II. 

agent  of  the  corporation,  his  declarations  may  be  admissible,  as  part 
of  the  res  gestce.a 

§  333.  Corporators  excluded  from.  Interest.  But  the  members  or 
stockholders,  in  institutions  created  for  private  emolument,  though 
not  parties  to  the  record,  are  not  therefore  admissible  as  witnesses  ; 
for,  in  matters  in  which  the  corporation  is  concerned,  they  of  course 
have  a  direct,  certain,  and  vested  interest  which  necessarily  excludes 
them.1  Yet  the  members  of  charitable  and  religious  societies,  having 
no  personal  and  private  interest  in  the  property  holden  by  the  cor- 
poration, are  competent  witnesses  in  any  suit  in  which  the  corporation 
is  a  party.  On  this  ground,  a  mere  trustee  of  a  savings  bank,  not- 
being  a  stockholder  or  a  depositor,2  and  a  trustee  of  a  society  for  the 
instruction  of  seamen,8  and  trustees  of  many  other  eleemosynary 
institutions,  have  been  held  admissible  witnesses  in  such  suits.  But 
where  a  member  of  a  private  corporation  is  inadmissible  as  a  witness 
generally,  he  may  still  be  called  upon  to  produce  the  corporate  docu- 
ments, in  an  action  against  the  corporation  ;  for  he  is  a  mere  deposi- 
tary, and  the  party  objecting  to  his  competency  is  still  entitled  to 
inquire  of  him  concerning  the  custody  of  the  documents.4  And  if 
the  trustee,  or  other  member  of  an  eleemosynary  corporation,  is  liable 

R.  267 ;  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  r.  Conard,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  663,  677 ;  Fairfield  Co.  Turnpike 
Comp.  v.  Thorp,  13  Conn.  173. 

8  Supra,  §§  108,  113,  114. 

1  This  rule  extends  to  the  members  of  all  corporations,  having  a  common  fund  dis- 
tributable among  the  members,  and  in  which  they  therefore  have  a  private  interest ; 
the  principle  of  exclusion  applying  to  all  cases  where  that  private  interest  would  be 
affected :  Doe  d.  Mayor  and  Burgesses  of  Stafford  v.  Tooth,  3  Younge  &  Jer.  19  ;  City 
Council  v.  King,  4  McCord  487,  488  ;  Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  Tyrwh.  457.  Where  a  cor- 
poration would  examine  one  of  its  members  as  a  witness,  he  may  be  rendered  compe- 
tent, either  by  a  sale  of  his  stock  or  interest,  where  membership  is  gained  or  lost  in 
that  way  ;  or  by  being  disfranchised  ;  which  is  done  by  an  information  in  the  nature 
of  a  quo  warranto  against  the  member,  who  confesses  the  information,  on  which  the 

plaintiff  obtains  judgment  to  disfranchise  him :  Mayor  of  Colchester  v. ,  1  P.  Wms. 

595.  Where  the  action  is  against  the  corporation  for  a  debt,  and  the  stockholders  are 
by  statute  made  liable  for  such  debt,  and  their  property  is  liable  to  seizure  upon  the 
execution  issued  against  the  corporation,  a  member,  once  liable,  remains  so,  notwith- 
standing his  alienation  of  stock  or  disfranchisement,  and  therefore  is  not  a  competent 
witness  for  the  corporation  in  such  action  :  Mill-Dam  Foundry  v.  Hovey,  21  Pick.  453. 
But  where  his  liability  to  the  execution  issued  against-  the  corporation  is  not  certain, 
but  depends  on  a  special  order  to  be  granted  by  the  Court,  in  its  discretion,  he  is  a 
competent  witness:  Needham  v.  Law,  12  M.  &  W.  560.  The  clerk  of  a  corporation  is 
a  competent  witness  to  identify  its  books  and  verify  its  records,  although  he  be  a  mem- 
ber of  the  corporation  and  interested  in  the  suit :  Wiggin  v.  Lowell,  8  Met.  301.  In 
several  of  the  United  States,  however,  the  members  of  private  corporations  are  made 
competent  witnesses  by  express  statutes  ;  and  in  others,  they  are  rendered  so  by  force 
of  general  statutes,  removing  the  objection  of  interest  from  all  witnesses :  supra, 
§  331. 

a  Middletown  Savings  Bank  v.  Bates,  11  Conn.  519. 

*  Miller  v.  Mariner's  Church,  7  Greenl.  51.  See  also  Anderson  v.  Brock,  8  id. 
243;  Wells  v.  Lane,  8  Johns.  462;  Gilm'n  v.  Vincent,  9  id.  219;  Nayson  v. 
Thatcher,  7  Mass.  398;  Cornwell  v.  Isham,  1  Day  35;  Richardson  i>.  Freeman,  6 
Greenl.  57  ;  Weller  v.  Foundling  Hospital,  Peake  153. 

4  R.  v.  Netherthong,  2  M.  &  S.  337  ;  Willcock  on  Municipal  Corp.  309 ;  Wiggin 
v.  Lowell,  8  Met.  301. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  865 

to  costs,  this  is  an  interest  which  renders  him  incompetent,  even 
though  he  may  have  an  ultimate  remedy  over.6 

§  347.  Parties  Disqualified.  The  rule,  excluding  parties  from 
being  witnesses,  applies  to  all  cases  where  the  party  has  any  interest 
at  stake  in  the  suit,  although  it  be  only  a  liability  to  costs.  Such  is 
the  case  of  a  prochein  ami)1  a  guardian,  an  executor  or  adminis- 
trator, and  so  also  of  trustees  and  the  officers  of  corporations, 
whether  public  or  private,  wherever  they  are  liable  in  the  first  instance 
for  the  costs,  though  they  may  have  a  remedy  for  reimbursement  out 
of  the  public  or  trust  funds.2 

§  348.  Parties  may  testify  in  certain  ezcepted  Cases.  But  to  the 
general  rule,  in  regard  to  parties,  there  are  some  exceptions  in 
which  the  party's  own  oath  may  be  received  as  competent  testimony. 
One  class  of  these  exceptions,  namely,  that  in  which  the  oath  in  litem 
is  received,  has  long  been  familiar  in  courts  administering  remedial 
justice,  according  to  the  course  of  the  Roman  law,  though  in  the 
common-law  tribunals  its  use  has  been  less  frequent  and  more 
restricted.  The  oath  in  litem  is  admitted  in  two  classes  of  cases : 
first,  where  it  has  been  already  proved  that  the  party  against  whom 
it  is  offered  has  been  guilty  of  some  fraud  or  other  tortious  and 
unwarrantable  act  of  intermeddling  with  the  complainant's  goods, 
and  no  other  evidence  can  be  had  of  the  amount  of  damages ;  and, 
secondly,  where,  on  general  grounds  of  public  policy,  it  is  deemed 
essential  to  the  purposes  of  justice.1  An  example  of  the  former  class 
is  given  in  the  case  of  the  bailiffs,  who,  in  the  service  of  an  execution, 
having  discovered  a  sum  of  money  secretly  hidden  in  a  wall,  took  it 
away  and  embezzled  it,  and  did  great  spoil  to  the  debtor's  goods  ;  for 
which  they  were  holden  not  only  to  refund  the  money,  but  to  make 
good  such  other  damage  as  the  plaintiff  would  swear  he  had  sustained.3 

6  R.  v.  St.  Mary  Magdalen  Bermondsey,  3  East  7. 

1  In  Massachusetts,  by  force  of  the  statutes  respecting  costs,  a  prochein  ami  is  not 
liable  to  costs,  Crandall  v.  Slaid,  11  Met.  238  ;  and  would  therefore  seem  to  be  a  com- 
petent  witness.  And  by  Stat.  1839,  c.  107,  §  2,  an  executor,  administrator,  guardian, 
or  trustee,  though  a  party,  if  liable  only  to  costs,  is  made  competent  to  testify  to  any 
matter  known  to  him,  "  before  he  assumed  the  trust  of  his  appointment."  "  In  Vir- 
ginia, any  such  trustee  is  admissible  as  a  witness,  generally,  provided  some  other  per- 
son shall  first  stipulate  in  his  stead  for  the  costs  to  which  he  may  be  liable  :  Rev.  Stat. 
1849,  c.  176,  §  18. 

*  Hopkins  v.  Neal,  2  Stra.   1026  ;  James  v.  Hatfield,  1  id.  548 ;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by 
Lofft,  p.  225  ;  R.  v.  St.  Mary  Magdalen  Bermondsey,  3  East  7  ;  Whitmore  v.  Wilks, 
1  Mood.  &  M.  220,  221  ;  Gresley  on  Evid.  242,  243,  244  ;  Bellew  v.  Rnssel,  1  Ball  & 
Beat.  99  ;  Wolley  v.  Brownhill,  13  Price  513,  514,  per  Hullock,  B. ;  Barret  v.  Gore, 
3  Atk.  401  ;  Fountain  v.  Coke,  1  Mod.  107  ;  Goodtitle  v.  Welford,  1  Doug.  139.     In 
this  country,  where  the  party  to  the  record  is,  in  almost  every  case,  liable  to  costs  in 
the  first  instance,  in  suits  at  law,  he  can  hardly  ever  be  competent  as  a  witness  :  Fox 
v.  Whitney,  16  Mass.  118,  121  ;  Sears  v.  Dillingham,  12  Mass.  360.     See  also  Willis 
on  Trustees,  pp.  227-229  ;  Frear  v.  Evertson,  20  Johns.  142  ;    Bellamy  v.  Cains,  3 
Bich.  354;  supra,  §  329  and  n. 

1  Tait  on  Evid.  280. 

•  Childrens  v.  Saxby,  1  Vern.  207  ;  8.  c.  1  Eq.  Ca.  Ab.  229. 
VOL.  i.  —  55 


866  APPENDIX  II. 

So,  where  a  man  ran  away  with  a  casket  of  jewels,  he  was  ordered  to 
answer  in  equity,  and  the  injured  party's  oath  was  allowed  as  evi- 
dence, in  odium  spoliatoris.8  The  rule  is  the  same  at  law.  Thus, 
where  a  shipmaster  received  on  board  his  vessel  a  trunk  of  goods,  to 
be  carried  to  another  port,  but  on  the  passage  he  broke  open  the 
trunk  and  rifled  it  of  its  contents,  in  an  action  by  the  owner  of 
the  goods  against  the  shipmaster,  the  plaintiff,  proving  aliunde 
the  delivery  of  the  trunk  and  its  violation,  was  held  competent  as  a 
witness,  on  the  ground  of  necessity,  to  testify  to  the  particular  con- 
tents of  the  trunk.4  And,  on  the  same  principle,  the  bailor,  though 
a  plaintiff,  has  been  admitted  a  competent  witness  to  prove  the  con- 
tents of  a  trunk,  lost  by  the  negligence  of  the  bailee.5  Such  evidence 
is  admitted  not  solely  on  the  ground  of  the  just  odium  entertained, 
both  in  equity  and  at  law,  against  spoliation,  but  also  because,  from 
the  necessity  of  the  case  and  the  nature  of  the  subject,  no  proof  can 
otherwise  be  expected  ;  it  not  being  usual  even  for  the  most  prudent 
persons,  in  such  cases,  to  exhibit  the  contents  of  their  trunks  to 
strangers,  or  to  provide  other  evidence  of  their  value.  For,  where 
the  law  can  have  no  force  but  by  the  evidence  of  the  person  in 
interest,  there  the  rules  of  the  common  law,  respecting  evidence  in 
general,  are  presumed  to  be  laid  aside ;  or  rather,  the  subordinate 
are  silenced  by  the  most  transcendent  and  universal  rule,  that  in  all 
cases  that  evidence  is  good,  than  which  the  nature  of  the  subject 
presumes  none  better  to  be  attainable.6 

§  349.  Upon  the  same  necessity,  the  party  is  admitted  in  divers 
other  cases  to  prove  the  facts,  which,  from  their  nature,  none  but  a 
party  could  be  likely  to  know.  But  in  such  cases,  a  foundation  must 
first  be  laid  for  the  party's  oath,  by  proving  the  other  facts  of  the 
case  down  to  the  period  to  which  the  party  is  to  speak.  As,  for 
example,  if  a  deed  or  other  material  instrument  of  evidence  is  lost, 

8  Anon.,  cited  per  the  Lord  Keeper,  in  E.  Ind.  Co.  v.  Evans,  1  Vern.  308.  On  the 
same  principle,  in  a  case  of  gross  fraud,  chancery  will  give  costs,  to  be  ascertained  by 
the  party's  own  oath  :  Dyer  v.  Tymewell,  2  Vern.  122. 

4  Herman  v.  Drinkwater,  1  Greenl.  27.  See  also  Sneider  v.  Geiss,  1  Yeates  34  ; 
Anon.,  coram  Montague,  B.,  12  Viu.  Abr.  24,  Witnesses,  I,  pi.  34.  Sed  vid.  Bingham 
v.  Rogers,  6  Watts  &  Serg.  495.  The  case  of  Herman  v.  Drinkwater  was  cited  and 
tacitly  reaffirmed  by  the  Court  in  Gilmore  v.  Bowden,  3  Fairf.  412 ;  the  admissibility 
of  the  party  as  a  witness  being  placed  on  the  ground  of  necessity.  But  it  is  to  be 
observed  that,  in  Herman  v.  Drinkwater,  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  gross  fraud,  at 
least,  if  not  of  larceny.  It  was  on  this  ground  of  gross  fraud  and  misconduct  that  the 
rule  in  this  case  was  agreed  to  in  Snow  v.  Eastern  Railroad  Co.,  12  Met.  44  ;  the  Court 
denying  its  application  in  cases  of  necessity  alone,  and  in  the  absence  of  fraud.  There- 
fore, where  an  action  on  the  case  was  brought  by  a  mssenger  against  a  railway  com- 
pany, for  the  loss  of  his  trunk  by  their  negligence,  there  being  no  allegation  or  proof 
of  fraud  or  tortious  act,  the  Court  held,  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  admissible  as  a  wit- 
ness, to  testify  to  the  contents  of  his  trunk  ;  ibid. ;  this  decision,  reported  since  the  last 
edition  of  this  work,  is  at  variance  with  that  of  Clark  v.  Spence,  cited  in  the  next  note. 

8  Clark  r.  Spence,  10  Watts  335  ;  Story  on  Bail  in.  §  454,  n.  (3d  ed.).  See  also, 
accord,  David  v.  Moore,  2  Watts  &  Serg.  230  ;  Whitesell  v.  Crane,  8  id.  869  •  McGill 
v,  Rowand,  3  Barr  451 ;  County  v.  Leidy,  10  id.  45. 

«  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lotft,  pp.  244,  245,  supra,  §  82. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  867 

it  must  first  be  proved,  as  we  shall  hereafter  show,  that  such  a 
document  existed;  after  which  the  party's  own  oath  may  be  received 
to  the  fact  and  circumstances  of  its  loss,  provided  it  was  lost  out  of 
his  own  custody.1  To  this  head  of  necessity  may  be  referred  the 
admission  of  the  party  robbed,  as  a  witness  for  himself,  in  an  action 
against  the  hundred,  upon  the  statute  of  Winton.2  So,  also,  in 
questions  which  do  not  involve  the  matter  in  controversy,  but  matter 
which  is  auxiliary  to  the  trial,  and  which  in  their  nature  are  prelimi- 
nary to  the  principal  subject  of  controversy,  and  are  addressed 
to  the  Court,  the  oath  of  the  party  is  received.8  Of  this  nature  his 
affidavit  of  the  materiality  of  a  witness ;  of  diligent  search  made  for  a 
witness,  or  for  a  paper ;  of  his  inability  to  attend ;  of  the  death  of  a 
subscribing  witness ;  and  so  of  other  matters,  of  which  the  books  of 
practice  abound  in  examples. 

§  350.  The  second  class  of  cases,  in  which  the  oath  in  litem 
is  admitted,  consists  of  those  in  which  public  necessity  or  expediency 
has  required  it.  Some  cases  of  this  class  have  their  foundation  in 
the  edict  of  the  Roman  Praetor  ;  "  Nautse,  caupones,  stabularii,  quod 
cujusque  salvum  fore  receperint,  nisi  restituent,  in  eos  judicium 
dabo."1  Though  the  terms  of  the  edict  comprehended  only  ship- 
masters, innkeepers,  and  stablekeepers,  yet  its  principle  has  been 
held  to  extend  to  other  bailees,  against  whom,  when  guilty  of  a 
breach  of  the  trust  confided  to  them,  damages  were  awarded  upon  the 
oath  of  the  party  injured,  per  modum  pvence  to  the  defendant,  and 
from  the  necessity  of  the  case.2  But  the  common  law  has  not 

i  Infra,  §  558  ;  Tayloe  v.  Riggs,  1  Pet.  591,  596  ;  Patterson  v.  Winn,  5  id.  240, 
242 ;  Riggs  v.  Tayloe,  9  Wheat.  486  ;  Taunton  Bank  v.  Richardson,  5  Pick.  436,  442  ; 
Poignard  v.  Smith,  8  id.  278  ;  Page  v.  Page,  15  id.  368,  374,  375  ;  Chamberlain  v. 
Gorham,  20  Johns.  144  ;  Jackson  v.  Frier,  16  id.  193  ;  Douglass  v.  Sanderson,  2  Dall. 
116  ;  8.  c.  1  Yeates  15  ;  Meeker  v.  Jackson,  3  id.  442  ;  Blanton  v.  Miller,  1  Hayw. 
4;  Seekright  v.  Bogan,  ib.  178,  n.  ;  Smiley  v.  Dewey,  17  Ohio  156.  In  Connecticut, 
the  party  has  been  adjudged  incompetent:  Coleman  v.  Wolcott,  4  Day  388.  But 
this  decision  has  since  been  overruled ;  and  it  is  now  held,  that  a  party  to  the  suit 
is  an  admissible  witness,  to  prove  to  the  Court  that  an  instrument,  which  it  is  neces- 
sary to  produce  at  the  trial,  is  destroyed  or  lost,  so  as  to  let  in  secondary  evidence  ; 
that  there  is  no  distinction,  in  this  respect,  between  cases  where  the  action  is  upon 
the  instrument,  and  those  where  the  question  arises  indirectly  ;  and  that  it  is  of  no 
importance,  in  the  order  of  exhibiting  the  evidence,  which  fact  is  first  proved,  whether 
the  fact  of  the  existence  and  contents  of  the  instrument,  or  the  fact  of  its  destruction 
or  loss  :  Fitch  v.  Bogue,  19  Conn.  285.  In  the  prosecutions  for  bastardy,  whether 
by  the  female  herself,  or  by  the  town  or  parish  officers,  she  is  competent  to  testify 
to  facts  within  her  own  exclusive  knowledge,  though  in  most  of  the  United  States 
the  terms  of  her  admission  are  prescribed  by  statute  :  Drowne  v.  Stimpson,  2  Mass. 
441  ;  Judson  v.  Blanchard,  4  Conn.  557  ;  Davis  v.  Salisbury,  1  Day  278  ;  Mariner 
v.  Dyer,  2  Greenl.  172  ;  Anon.,  3  N.  H.  135  ;  Mather  r.  Clark,  2  Aik.  209  ;  State  v. 
Coatney,  8  Yerg.  210. 

3  Bull.  N.  P.  187,  289. 

8  1  Pet.  596,  597,  per  Marshall,  C.  J.  See  also  Anon.,  Cro.  Jac.  429  ;  Cook  v. 
Remington,  6  Mod.  237  ;  Ward  v.  Apprice,  ib.  264  ;  Soresby  v.  Sparrow,  2  Stra.  1186-; 
Jevens  w.  Harridge,  1  Saund.  9 ;  Forbes  v.  Wale,  1  W.  Bl.  532  ;  s.  c.  1  Ksp.  278 ; 
Fortescueand  Coake'sCase,  Godb.  193  ;  Anon.,  ib.  326  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  580,  n.  (2),  6th 
Am.  ed.  ;  infra,  §  558. 

1  Dig.  lib.  4,  tit.  9,  1.  1. 

2  This  head  of  evidence  is  recognized  in  the  Courts  of  Scotland,  and  is  fully  ex« 


868  APPENDIX   II. 

admitted  the  oath  of  the  party  upon  the  ground  of  the  Praetor's 
edict ;  but  has  confined  its  admission  strictly  to  those  cases  where, 
from  their  nature,  no  other  evidence  was  attainable.8  Thus,  in 
cases  of  necessity,  where  a  statute  can  receive  no  execution,  unless 
the  party  interested  be  a  witness,  there  he  must  be  allowed  to 
testify ;  for  the  statute  must  not  be  rendered  ineffectual  by  the 
impossibility  of  proof.4 

§  351.  Answer  in  Equity.  Another  exception  is  allowed  in  equity, 
by  which  the  answer  of  the  defendant,  so  far  as  it  is  strictly 
responsive  to  the  bill,  is  admitted  as  evidence  in  his  favor  as  well  as 
against  him.  The  reason  is,  that  the  plaintiff,  by  appealing  to  the 
conscience  of  the  defendant,  admits  that  his  answer  is  worthy  of 
credit,  as  to  the  matter  of  the  inquiry.  It  is  not  conclusive  evi- 
dence ;  but  is  treated  like  the  testimony  of  any  other  witness,  and  is 
decisive  of  the  question  only  where  it  is  not  outweighed  by  other 
evidence.1 

§  352.  Oath  diverse  intuitu.  So  also  the  oath  of  the  party,  taken 
diverse  intuitu,  may  sometimes  be  admitted  at  law  in  his  favor. 
Thus,  in  considering  the  question  of  the  originality  of  an  invention, 
the  letters-patent  being  in  the  case,  the  oath  of  the  inventor,  made 
prior  to  the  issuing  of  the  letters-patent,  that  he  was  the  true  and 
first  inventor,  may  be  opposed  to  the  oath  of  a  witness,  whose 
testimony  is  offered  to  show  that  the  invention  was  not  original.1 
So,  upon  the  trial  of  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution,  in  causing 
the  plaintiff  to  be  indicted,  proof  of  the  evidence  given  by  the 
defendant  on  the  trial  of  the  indictment  is  said  to  be  admissible  in 
proof  of  probable  cause.2  And,  generally,  the  certificate  of  an  officer, 
when  by  law  it  is  the  evidence  for  others,  is  competent  evidence  for 
himself,  if,  at  the  time  of  making  it,  he  was  authorized  to  do  the  act 
therein  certified.8 

plained  in  Tait  on  Evid.  pp.  280-287.  In  Lower  Canada,  the  Courts  are  bound  to 
admit  the  decisory  oath  (serment  d&isoire)  of  the  parties,  in  commercial  matters,  when- 
ever either  of  them  shall  exact  it  of  the  other:  Rev.  Stat.  1845,  p.  143. 

8  Wager  of  law  is  hardly  an  exception  to  this  rule  of  the  common  law,  since  it  was 
ordinarily  allowed  only  in  cases  where  the  transaction  was  one  of  personal  and  private 
trust  and  confidence  between  the  parties  :  see  3  Bl.  Comm.  345,  346. 

*  U.  S.  v.  Murphy,  16  Peters  203.     See  infra,  §  412. 

1  2  Story  on  Eq.  Jur.  §  1528  ;  Clark  v.  Van  Riemsdyk,  9  Cranch  160.  But  the 
answer  of  an  infant  can  never  be  read  against  him  ;  nor  can  that  of  &feme  covert, 
answering  jointly  with  her  husband :  Gresley  on  Evid.  p.  24.  An  arbitrator  has  no 
right  to  admit  a  party  in  the  cause  as  a  witness,  unless  he  has  specific  authority  so  to 
do  :  Smith  v.  Sparrow,  11  Jnr.  126. 

1  Alden  v.  Dewey,  1  Story  336  ;  8.  c.  3  Law  Reporter  383  ;  Pettibone  v.  Derringer, 
4  Wash.  C.  C.  215. 

8  Bull.  N.  P.  14  ;  Johnson  v.  Browning,  6  Mod.  216.  "  For  otherwise,"  said  Holt, 
C.  J.,  "one  that  should  be  robbed,  &«.,  would  be  under  an  intolerable  mischief;  for 
if  he  prosecuted  for  such  robbery,  &c.,  and  the  party  should  at  any  rate  be  acquitted, 
the  prosecutor  would  be  liable  to  an  action  for  a  malicious  prosecution,  without  a 
possibility  of  making  a  good  defence,  though  the  cause  of  prosecution  were  never  so 
pregnant." 

»  McKnight  v.  Lewis,  5  Barb.  681 ;  McCully  v.  Malcolm,  9  Humph.  187.     So,  the 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  869 

§  353.  Party  not  compellable  to  testify.  The  rule  which  excludes 
the  party  to  the  suit  from  being  admitted  as  a  witness  is  also  a  rule 
of  protection,  no  person  who  is  a  party  to  the  record  being  compel- 
lable to  testify.1  It  is  only  when,  he  consents  to  be  examined,  that 
he  is  admissible  in  any  case ;  nor  then,  unless  under  the  circum- 
stances presently  to  be  mentioned.  If  he  is  only  a  nominal  party, 
the  consent  of  the  real  party  in  interest  must  be  obtained  before  he 
can  be  examined.2  Nor  can  one  who  is  substantially  a  party  to  the 
record  be 'compelled  to  testify,  though  he  be  not  nominally  a  party.8 

§  354.  Co-plaintiffs  incompetent.  It  has  been  said,  that  where 
one  of  several  co-plaintiffs  voluntarily  comes  forward  as  a  witness 
for  the  adverse  party,  he  is  admissible,  without  or  even  against  the 
consent  of  his  fellows ;  upon  the  ground,  that  he  is  testifying  against 
his  own  interest,  that  the  privilege  of  exemption  is  personal  and  sev- 
eral, and  not  mutual  and  joint,  and  that  his  declarations  out  of  Court 
being  admissible,  a  fortiori,  they  ought  to  be  received,  when  made  in 
Court  under  oath.1  But  the  better  opinion  is,  and  so  it  has  been 
resolved,3  that  such  a  rule  would  hold  out  to  parties  a  strong  tempta- 
tion to  perjury;  that  it  is  not  supported  by  principle  or  authority, 
and  that  therefore  the  party  is  not  admissible,  without  the  consent 
of  all  parties  to  the  record,  for  that  the  privilege  is  mutual  and  joint, 
and  not  several.  It  may  also  be  observed,  that  the  declarations  of 

account  of  sales,  rendered  by  a  consignee,  may  be  evidence  for  some  purposes,  in  his 
favor,  against  the  consignor  :  Mertens  v.  Nottebohms,  4  Grant  163. 

*  R.  v.  Woburn,  10  East  395  ;  Worrall  v.  Jones,  7  Bing.  395  ;  Fenn  v.  Granger, 
3  Campb.  177  ;  Mant  v.  Mainwaring,  8  Taunt.  139  ;  ante,  §  330. 

2  Frear  v.  Evertson,  20  Johns.  142.  And  see  People  v.  Irving,  1  Wend.  20  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Marsh,  10  Pink.  57,  per  Wilde,  J.  ;  Columbian  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Dutch,  13 
id.  125  ;  Bradlee  v.  Neal,  16  id.  501.  In  Connecticut  and  Vermont,  where  the  dec- 
larations of  the  assignor  of  a  chose  in  action  are  still  held  admissible  to  impeach  it  in 
the  hands  of  the  assignee,  in  an  action  brought  in  the  name  of  the  former  for  the  ben- 
efit of  the  latter,  the  defendant  is  permitted  to  read  the  deposition  of  the  nominal 
plaintiff,  voluntarily  given,  though  objected  to  by  the  party  in  interest :  Woodruff  v. 
Westcott,  12  Conn.  134  ;  Johnson  v.  Blackman,  11  id.  342  ;  Sargeant  v.  Sargeant,  18 
Vt.  371.  See  supra,  §  190. 

8  Mauran  v.  Lamb,  7  Cowen  174  ;  R.  ».  Woburn,  10  East  403,  per  Ld.  Ellen- 
borough.  In  several  of  the  United  States  it  is  enacted  that  the  parties,  in  actions  at 
law,  as  well  as  in  equit}',  may  interrogate  each  other  as  witnesses.  See  Massachusetts, 
Stat.  1852,  c.  312,  §§  61-75;  New  York,  Code  of  Practice,  §§  344,  349,  350;  Texas, 
Hartley's  Dig.  arts.  735,  739  ;  California,  Rev.  Stat.  1850,  c.  142,  §§  296-303.  See 
vol.  iii,  §  317. 

1  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  158  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  60.  The  cases  which  are  usually  cited 
to  supjxjrt  this  opinion  are  Norden  v.  Williamson,  1  Taunt.  377  ;  Fenn  v.  Granger, 
8  Campb.  177  ;  and  Worrall  v.  Jones,  7  Bing.  395.  But  in  the  first  of  these  cases,  no 
objection  appears  to  have  been  made  on  behalf  of  the  other  co-plaintiff,  that  his  con- 
sent was  necessary ;  but  the  decision  is  expressly  placed  on,  the  ground,  that  neither 
party  objected  at  the  time.  In  Fenn  v.  Granger,  Ld.  Ellenborough  would  have  re- 
jected the  witness,  but  the  objection  was  waived.  In  Worrall  v.  Jones,  the  naked 
question  was,  whether  a  defendant  who  has  suffered  judgment  by  default,  and  has  no 
interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  is  admissible  as  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  by  his 
own  consent,  where  "  the  only  objection  to  his  admissibility  is  this,  that  he  is  party  to 
the  record."  See  also  Willings  v.  Consequa,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  807,  per  Washington,  J.  ; 
Paine  ».  Tilden,  20  Vt.  554. 

"  Scott  v.  Lloyd,  12  Pet.  149.  See  also  2  Stark.  Evid.  580,  n.  e  ;  Bridges  v.  Ar- 
mour, 5  How.  91 ;  Evans  v.  Gibbs,  6  Humph.  405 ;  Sargeant  v.  Sargeant,  18  Vt.  371. 


870  APPENDIX   II. 

one  of  several  parties  are  not  always  admissible  against  his  fellows, 
and  that,  when  admitted,  they  are  often  susceptible  of  explanation 
or  contradiction,  where  testimony  under  oath  could  not  be  resisted. 

§  355.  Effect  of  Default,  Nolle  Prosequi,  and  Verdict.  Hitherto, 
in  treating  of  the  admissibility  of  parties  to  the  record  as  witnesses, 
they  have  been  considered  as  still  retaining  their  original  situation, 
assumed  at  the  commencement  of  the  suit.  But  as  the  situation  of 
some  of  the  defendants,  where  there  are  several  in  the  same  suit, 
may  be  essentially  changed  in  the  course  of  its  progress,  by  default, 
or  nolle  prosequi,  and  sometimes  by  verdict,  their  case  deserves  a  dis- 
tinct consideration.  This  question  has  arisen  in  cases  where  the 
testimony  of  a  defendant,  thus  situated,  is  material  to  the  defence  of 
his  fellows.  And  here  the  general  doctrine  is,  that  where  the  suit  is 
ended  as  to  one  of  several  defendants,  and  he  has  no  direct  interest 
in  its  event  as  to  the  others,  he  is  a  competent  witness  for  them,  his 
own  fate  being  at  all  events  certain.1 

§  356.  Actions  of  Contract.  In  actions  on  contracts,  the  opera- 
tion of  this  rule  was  formerly  excluded ;  for  the  contract  being  laid 
jointly,  the  judgment  by  default  against  one  of  several  defendants,  it 
was  thought,  would  operate  against  him,  only  in  the  event  of  a 
verdict  against  the  others ;  and  accordingly  he  has  been  held  inad- 
missible in  such  actions,  as  a  witness  in  their  favor.1  On  a  similar 
principle,  a  defendant  thus  situated  has  been  held  not  a  competent 
witness  for  the  plaintiff;  on  the  ground  that,  by  suffering  judgment 
by  default,  he  admitted  that  he  was  liable  to  the  plaintiff's  demand, 
and  was  therefore  directly  interested  in  throwing  part  of  that  burden 
on  another  person.2  But  in  another  case,  where  the  action  was  upon 
a  bond,  and  the  principal  suffered  judgment  by  default,  he  was  ad- 
mitted as  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  against  one  of  the  other  defend- 
ants, his  surety ;  though  here  the  point  submitted  to  the  Court  was 
narrowed  to  the  mere  abstract  question,  whether  a  party  to  the 
record  was,  on  that  account  alone,  precluded  from  being  a  witness,  he 
having  no  interest  in  the  event.8  But  the  whole  subject  has  more 

i  Infra,  §§  358-368,  363. 

1  Mant  v.  Mainwaring,  8  Taunt.  139;  Brown  v.  Brown,  4  id.  752  ;  Schermerhorn 
».  Schermerhorn,  1  Wend.  119  ;  Columbian  Man.  Co.  •».  Dutch,  13  Pick.  125  ;  Mills  v. 
Lee,  4  Hill  549. 

2  Green  v.  Sutton,  2  M.  &  Rob.  269. 

8  Worrall  v.  Jones,  7  Bing.  395.  See  Foxcroft  v.  Nevens,  4  Greenl.  72,  ctmtra.  In 
a  case  before  Le  Blanc,  J.,  he  refused  to  permit  one  defendant,  who  had  suffered  judg- 
ment to  go  by  default,  to  be  called  by  the  plaintiff  to  inculpate  the  others,  even  in  an 
action  of  trespass  :  Chapman  v.  Graves,  2  Campb.  333,  334,  n.  See  ace.  Supervisors 
of  Chenango  v.  Birdsall,  4  Wend.  456,  457.  The  general  rule  is,  that  a  party  to  the 
record  can,  in  no  case.be  examined  as  a  witness ;  a  rule  founded  principally  on  the 
policy  of  preventing  perjury,  and  the  hardship  of  calling  on  a  party  to  charge  him- 
self:  Frazier  v.  Laughlin,  1  Gilm.  111.  347  ;  Flint  v.  Allyn,  12  Vt.  615  ;  Kennedy  v. 
Nile*,  2  Shepl.  54 ;  Stone  v.  Bibb,  2  Ala.  100.  And  this  rule  is  strictly  enforced 
against  plaintiffs,  because  the  joining  of  so  many  defendants  is  generally  their  own 
a<-t,  though  sometimes  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity  :  2  Stark.  Evid.  581,  n.  a ;  Blncki-tt 
.«.  Wi-ir,  fl  B.  &  C.  887;  Barret  r.  Gore,  »  Atk.  401  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  285 ;  Cas.  temp. 
Hardw.  163. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  871 

recently  been  reviewed  in  England,  and  the  rule  established,  that 
where  one  of  two  joint  defendants  in  an  action  on  contract  has  suf- 
fered judgment  by  default,  he  may,  if  not  otherwise  interested  in  pro- 
curing a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  be  called  by  him  as  a  witness 
against  the  other  defendant.4  So,  if  the  defence,  in  an  action  ex  con- 
tractu  against  several,  goes  merely  to  the  personal  discharge  of  the 
party  pleading  it,  and  not  to  that  of  the  others,  and  the  plaintiff 
thereupon  enters  a  nolle  prosequi  as  to  him,  which  in  such  cases  he 
may  well  do,  such  defendant  is  no  longer  a  party  upon  the  record, 
and  is  therefore  competent  as  a  witness,  if  not  otherwise  disqualified. 
Thus,  where  the  plea  by  one  of  several  defendants  is  bankruptcy,5 
or,  that  he  was  never  executor,  or,  as  it  seems  by  the  latter  and 
better  opinions,  infancy  or  coverture,6  the  plaintiff  may  enter  a  nolle 
prosequi  as  to  such  party,  who,  being  thus  disengaged  from  the 
record,  may  be  called  as  a  witness,  the  suit  still  proceeding  against 
the  others.7  The  mere  pleading  of  the  bankruptcy,  or  other  matter 
of  personal  discharge,  is  not  alone  sufficient  to  render  the  party  a 
competent  witness  ;  and  it  has  been  held,  that  he  is  not  entitled  to  a 
previous  verdict  upon  that  plea,  for  the  purpose  of  testifying  for  the 
others.8 

4  Pipe  v.  Steel,  2  Q.  B.  733  ;  Clipper  v.  Newark,  2  C.  &  K.  24.  Thus,  he  has  been 
admitted,  with  his  own  consent,  as  a  witness  to  prove  that  he  is  the  principal  debtor, 
and  that  the  signatures  of  the  other  defendants,  who  are  his  sureties,  are  genuine  : 
Mevey  v.  Matthews,  9  Barr  112.  But  generally  he  is  interested  ;  either  to  defeat  the 
action  against  both,  or  to  throw  on  the  other  defendant  a  portion  of  the  demand,  or  to 
reduce  the  amount  to  be  recovered:  Bowman  v.  Noyes,  12  N.  H.  302;  George  v.  Sar- 
gent, ib.  313 ;  Vinal  v.  Burrill,  18  Pick.  29 ;  Bull  v.  Strong,  8  Met.  8  ;  Walton  v. 
Tomlin,  1  Ired.  593 ;  Turner  v.  Lazarus,  6  Ala.  875. 

6  Noke  »>.  Ingham,  1  Wils.  89 ;  1  Tidd's  Pr.  602  ;  1  Saund.  207  a.  But  see  Mills 
v.  Lee,  4  Hill  549. 

6  1  Paine  &  Duer's  Pr.  642,  643  ;  Woodward  v.  Newhall,  1  Pick.  500 ;  Hartness  v. 
Thompson,  5  Johnson  160 ;  Pell  v.  Pell,  20  Johns.  126  ;  Burgess  v.  Merrill,  4  Taunt. 
468.     The  ground  is,  that  these  pleas  are  not  in  bar  of  the  entire  action,  but  only  in 
bar  as  to  the  party's  pleading ;  and  thus  the  case  is  brought  within  the  general  prin- 
ciple, that  where  the  plea  goes  only  to  the  personal  discharge  of  the  party  pleading  it, 
the  plaintiff  may  enter  a  nolle  prosequi :  1  Pick.  501,  502  ;  see  also  Minor  v.  Mechanics' 
Bank  of  Alexandria,  1  Pet.  74.    So,  if  the  cause  is  otherwise  adjudicated  in  favor  of 
one  of  the  defendants,  upon  a  plea  personal  to  himself,  whether  it  be  by  the  common 
law,  or  by  virtue  of  a  statute  authorizing  a  separate  finding  in  favor  of  one  defendant, 
in  an  action  upon  a  joint  contract,  the  result  is  the  same  :  Blake  v.  Ladd,  10  N.  H. 
190  ;  Essex  Bank  v.  Rix,  ib.  201  ;  Brooks  v.  M'Kinney,  4  Scam.  309  ;  and  see  Camp- 
bell r.  Hood,  6  Mo.  211. 

7  Mclver  v.  Humble,  16  East  171,  per  Le  Blanc,  J.,  cited  7  Taunt.  607,  per  Park, 
J.  ;  Moody  v.  King,  2  B.  &  C.  558  ;  Aflalo  ».  Fourdrinier,  6  Bing.  306.    But  see  Irwin 
v.  Shumaker,  4  Barr  199. 

8  Raven  r.  Dunning,  8  Esp.  25  ;  Emmet  v.  Butler,  7  Taunt.  599  ;  s.  c.  1  Moore 
322  ;  Scherrnerhorn  v.  Schermerhorn,  1  Wend.  119.     But,  in  a  later  case,  since  the  49 
G.  Ill,  c.  121,  Park,  J.,  permitted  a  verdict  to  he  returned  upon  the  plea,  in  order  to 
admit   the   witness:    Bate  v.  Russell,  1  Mood.  &  M.  332.      Where,   by  statute,   the 
plaintiff,  in  an  action  on  a  parol  contract  against  several,  may  have  judgment  against 
one  or  more  of  the  defendants,  according  to  his  proof,  there  it  has  been  held,  that  a 
defendant  who  has  been  defaulted  is,  with  his  consent,  a  comi>etent  witness  in  favor 
of  his  co-defendants  :  Bradlee  v.  Neal,  16  Pick.  501.     But  this  has  since  been  ques- 
tioned, on  the  ground  that  his  interest  is  to  reduce  the  demand  of  the  plaintiff  against 
the  others  to  nominal  damages,  in  order  that  no  greater  damages  may  be  assessed 
against  him  upon  his  default :  Vinal  v.  Bun-ill,  18  Pick.  29. 


872  APPENDIX  II. 

§  357.  Actions  of  Tort.  In  actions  on  torts,  these  being  in  their 
nature  and  legal  consequences  several,  as  well  as  ordinarily  joint^ 
and  there  being  no  contribution  among  wrong-doers,  it  has  not  been 
deemed  necessary  to  exclude  a  material  witness  for  the  defendants, 
merely  because  the  plaintiff  has  joined  him  with  them  in  the  suit,  if 
the  suit,  as  to  him,  is  already  determined,  and  he  has  no  longer  any 
legal  interest  in  the  event.1  Accordingly,  a  defendant  in  an  action 
for  a  tort,  who  has  suffered  judgment  to  go  by  default,  has  uniformly 
been  held  admissible  as  a  witness  for  his  co-defendants.2  Whether, 
being  admitted  as  a  witness,  he  is  competent  to  testify  to  the  amount 
of  damages,  which  are  generally  assessed  entire  against  all  who  are 
found  guilty,8  may  well  be  doubted.4  And  indeed  the  rule,  admitting 
a  defendant  as  witness  for  his  fellows  in  any  case,  must,  as  it  should 
seem,  be  limited  strictly  to  the  case  where  his  testimony  cannot 
directly  make  for  himself ;  for  if  the  plea  set  up  by  the  other  de- 
fendants is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  has  no 
cause  of  action  against  any  of  the  defendants  in  the  suit,  the  one 
who  suffers  judgment  by  default  will  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
defence,  if  established,  and  therefore  is  as  directly  interested  as  if 
the  action  were  upon  a  joint  contract.  It  is,  therefore,  only  where 
the  plea  operates  solely  in  discharge  of  the  party  pleading  it,  that 
another  defendant,  who  has  suffered  judgment  to  go  by  default,  is 
admissible  as  a  witness."  6 

§  358.  Misjoinder  of  Parties.  If  the  person  who  is  a  material  wit- 
ness for  the  defendants  has  been  improperly  joined  with  them  in  the 
suit,  for  the  purpose  of  excluding  his  testimony,  the  jury  will  be 
directed  to  find  a  separate  verdict  in  his  favor ;  in  which  case,  the 
cause  being  at  an  end  with  respect  to  him,  he  may  be  admitted  a 

1  As,  if  one  had  been  separately  tried  and  acquitted :  Carpenter  v.  Crane,  5  Blackf. 
119. 

2  Ward  v.  Haydon,  2  Esp.  552,  approved  in  Hawkesworth  v.  Showier,  12  M.  &  W. 
48  ;  Chapman  v.  Graves,  2  Catnpb.  334,  per  Le  Blanc,  J.  ;  Com.  v.  Marsh,  10  Pick.  57, 
58.     A  defendant,  in  such  case,  is  also  a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff :  Had- 
rick  v.  Heslop,  12  Jur.  600  ;  17  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  s.  313  ;  12  Q.  B.  267.     The  wife  of  one 
joint  trespasser  is  not  admissible  as  a  witness  for  the  other,  though  the  case  is  already 
fully  proved  against  her  husband,  if  he  is  still  a  party  to  the  record  :  Hawkesworth  v. 
Showier,  12  M.  &  W.  45. 

»  2  Tidd's  Pr.  896. 

4  In  Mash  v.  Smith,  1  C.  &  P.  577,  Best,  C.  J.,  was  of  opinion,  that  the  witness 
onght  not  to  be  admitted  at  all,  on  the  ground  that  his  evidence  might  give  a  different 
complexion  to  the  case,  and  thus  go  to  reduce  the  damages  against  himself  ;  but  on 
the  authority  of  Ward  v.  Haydon,  and  Chapman  v.  Graves,  he  thought  it  best  to  re- 
ceive the  witness,  giving  leave  to  the  opposing  party  to  move  for  a  new  trial.  But  the 
point  was  not  moved  ;  and  the  report  does  not  show  which  way  was  the  verdict.  It 
has,  however,  more  recently.been  held  in  England,  that  a  defendant  in  trespass,  who 
has  suffered  judgment  by  default,  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  his  co-defendant, 
where  the  jury  are  summoned  as  well  to  try  the  issue  against  the  one  as  to  assess 
damages  against  the  other  :  Thorpe  ».  Barber,  5  M.  G.  &  Sc.  675  ;  17  L.  J.  N.  8.  C.  P. 
113.  And  see  Ballard  v.  Noaks,  2  Pike  45. 

*  2  Tidd's  Pr.  895  ;  Briggs  v.  Greenfield  et  al,  1  Str.  610  ;  8  Mod.  217  ;  s.  C.  2  Ld. 
Raym.  1372 ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  63,  n.  (3);  1  Phil.  Evid.  52,  n.  (1)  ;  Bowman  v. 
Noyes,  12  N.  H.  302. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  873 

witness  for  the  other  defendants.  But  this  can  be  allowed  only 
where  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  against  him,  for  then  only  does 
it  appear  that  he  was  improperly  joined  through  the  artifice  and  fraud 
of  the  plaintiff.  But  if  there  be  any  evidence  against  him,  though, 
in  the  judge's  opinion,  not  enough  for  his  conviction,  he  cannot  be 
admitted  as  a  witness  for  his  fellows,  because  his  guilt  or  innocence 
must  wait  the  event  of  the  verdict,  the  jury  being  the  sole  judges  of 
the  fact.1  In  what  stage  of  the  cause  the  party,  thus  improperly 
joined,  may  be  acquitted,  and  whether  before  the  close  of  the  case  on 
the  part  of  the  other  defendants,  was  formerly  uncertain ;  but  it  is 
now  settled,  that  the  application  to  a  judge,  in  the  course  of  a  cause, 
to  direct  a  verdict  for  one  or  more  of  several  defendants  in  trespass, 
is  strictly  to  his  discretion ;  and  that  discretion  is  to  be  regulated, 
not  merely  by  the  fact  that,  at  the  close  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  no 
evidence  appears  to  affect  them,  but  by  the  probabilities  whether  any 
such  will  arise  before  the  whole  evidence  in  the  cause  closes.2  The 
ordinary  course,  therefore,  is  to  let  the  cause  go  on  to  the  end  of  the 
evidence.8  But  if,  at  the  close  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  there  is  one 
defendant  against  whom  no  evidence  has  been  given,  and  none  is 
anticipated  with  any  probability,  he  instantly  will  be  acquitted.4  The 
mere  fact  of  mentioning  the  party  in  the  simul  cum,  in  the  declara- 
tion, does  not  render  him  incompetent  as  a  witness  ;  but,  if  the  plain- 
tiff can  prove  the  person  so  named  to  be  guilty  of  the  trespass,  and 
party  to  the  suit,  which  must  be  by  producing  the  original  process 
against  him,  and  proving  an  ineffectual  endeavor  to  arrest  him,  or 
that  the  process  was  lost,  the  defendant  shall  not  have  the  benefit  of 
his  testimony.6 

1  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  250  ;   Brown  v.  Howard,  14  Johns.  119,  122  ;  Van 
Deusen  v.  Van  Slyck,  15  id.   223.     The  admission  of  the  witness,  in  all  these  cases, 
seems  to  rest  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge :  Brotherton  v.  Livingston,  3  Watts  &  Serg. 
334. 

2  Sowell  v.  Champion,  6  Ad.  &  El.  407 ;  White  v.  Hill,  6  Q.  B.  487,  491  ;  Com. 
v.  Eastman,  1  Cush.  189  ;  Over  v.  Blackstone,  8  Watts  &  Serg.  71  ;  Prettyman  v.  Dean, 
2  Harringt.  494  ;  Brown  v.  Burrus,  8  Mo.  26. 

8  6  Q.  B.  491,  per  Ld.  Denman. 

4  Child  v.  Chamberlain,  6  C.  &  P.  213.  It  is  not  easy  to  perceive  why  the  same 
principle  should  not  be  applied  to  actions  upon  contract,  where  one  of  the  defendants 
pleads  a  matter  in  his  own  personal  discharge,  such  as  infancy  or  bankruptcy,  and 
establishes  his  plea  by  a  certificate,  or  other  affirmative  proof,  which  the  plaintiff  does 
not  pretend  to  gainsay  or  resist ;  see  Bate  v.  Russell,  1  Mood.  &  M.  332.  Upon  Emmet 
v.  Butler,  7  Taunt.  599,  where  it  was  not  allowed,  Mr.  Phillips  very  justly  observes, 
that  the  plea  was  not  the  common  one  of  bankruptcy  and  certificate  ;  but  that  the 
plaintiffs  had  prot>ed  (under  the  commission),  and  thereby  made  their  election  ;  and 
that  where  a  plea  is  special,  and  involves  the  consideration  of  many  facts,  it  is  obvious 
that  there  would  be  much  inconvenience  in  splitting  the  case,  and  taking  separate 
verdicts ;  but  there  seems  to  be  no  such  inconvenience  where  the  whole  proof  consists 
of  the  bankrupt's  certificate  :  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  29,  n.  (3). 

6  Bull.  N.  P.  286  ;  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  251  ;  Lloyd  v.  Williams,  Cas.  temp. 
Hardw.  123  ;  Cotton  v.  Luttrell,  1  Atk.  452.  "  These  cases  appear  to  have  proceeded 
upon  the  ground,  that  a  co-trespasser,  who  had  originally  been  made  a  party  to  the  suit 
upon  sufficient  grounds,  ought  not  to  come  forward  as  a  witness  to  defeat  the  plaintiff, 
after  he  had  prevented  the  plaintiff  from  proceeding  effectually  against  him,  by  his  own 


874  APPENDIX   II. 

§  359.  "Witness  made  Party  by  Mistake.  If  the  plaintiff,  in  tres- 
pass, has  by  mistake  made  one  6*f  his  own  intended  witnesses  a 
defendant,  the  Court  will,  on  motion,  give  leave  to  omit  him,  and  have 
his  name  stricken  from  the  record,  even  after  issue  joined.1  In 
criminal  informations  the  same  object  is  attained  by  entering  a  nolle 
prosequi  as  to  the  party  intended  to  be  examined ;  the  rule  that  a 
plaintiff  can  in  no  case  examine  a  defendant  being  enforced  in  crim- 
inal as  well  as  in  civil  cases.2 

§  360.  If  a  material  witness  for  a  defendant  in  ejectment  be  also 
made  a  defendant,  he  may  let  judgment  go  by  default,  and  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  witness  for  the  other  defendant.  But  -if  he  plead, 
thereby  admitting  himself  tenant  in  possession,  the  Court  will  not 
afterwards,  upon  motion,  strike  out  his  name.1  But  where  he  is 
in  possession  of  only  a  part  of  the  premises,  and  consents  to  the 
return  of  a  verdict  against  him  for  as  much  as  he  is  proved  to  have 
in  possession,  Mr.  Justice  Buller  said,  he  could  see  no  reason  why  he 
should  not  be  a  witness  for  another  defendant.2 

§  361.  Rule  in  Chancery.  In  Chancery,  parties  to  the  record  are 
subject  to  examination  as  witnesses  much  more  freely  than  at  law. 
A  plaintiff  may  obtain  an  order,  as  of  course,  to  examine  a  defendant, 
and  a  defendant  a  co-defendant,  as  a  witness,  upon  affidavit  that  he 
is  a  material  witness,  and  is  not  interested  on  the  side  of  the  appli- 
cant, in  the  matter  to  which  it  is  proposed  to  examine  him,  the  order 
being  made  subject  to  all  just  exceptions.1  And  it  may  be  obtained 

wrongful  act  in  eluding  the  process :  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  p.  60,  n.  (2)  ;  but  see 
Stockham  v.  Jones,  10  Johns.  21,  contra;  see  also  1  Stark.  Evid.  132.  In  Wakely  v. 
Hart,  6  Bin.  316,  all  the  defendants,  in  trespass,  were  arrested,  but  the  plaintiff  went 
to  issue  with  some  of  them  only,  and  did  not  rule  the  others  to  plead,  nor  take  judg- 
ment against  them  by  default  ;  and  they  were  held  competent  witnesses  for  the  other 
defendants.  The  learned  Chief  Justice  placed  the  decision  partly  upon  the  general 
ground,  that  they  were  not  interested  hi  the  event  of  the  suit  ;  citing  and  approving 
the  case  of  Stockham  v.  Jones,  supra.  But  he  also  laid  equal  stress  upon  the  fact  that 
the  plaintiff  might  have  conducted  his  cause  so  as  to  have  excluded  the  witnesses,  by 
laying  them  under  a  rule  to  plead,  and  taking  judgment  by  default.  In  Purviance  v. 
Dryden,  3  S.  &  R.  402,  and  Gibbs  v.  Bryant,  1  Pick.  118,  both  of  which  were  actions 
upon  contract,  where  the  process  was  not  served  as  to  one  of  the  persons  named  as 
defendant  with  the  ot,her,^t  was  held  that  he  was  not  a  party  to  the  record,  not  being 
served  with  process,  and  so  was  not  incompetent  as  a  witness  on  that  account.  Neither 
of  these  cases,  therefore,  except  that  of  Stockham  v.  Jones,  touches  the  ground  of  pub- 
lic policy  for  the  prevention  of  fraud  in  cases  of  tort,  on  which  the  rule  in  the  text 
seems  to  have  been  founded :  ideoquasre.  See  also  Curtis  v.  Graham,  12  Mart.  289  ; 
Heckert  v.  Fegely,  6  Watts  &  Serg.  139. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  285  ;  Berrington  d.  Dormer  v.  Fortescue,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  162,  163. 

«  Ibid. 

1  Ibid. 

2  Bull.  N.  P.  286.     But  where  the  same  jury  are  also  to  assess  damages  against 
the  witness,  it'  seems  he  is  not  admissible :  see  Mash  v.  Smith,  1  C.  &  P.  677 ;  supra, 
$356. 

l  2  Daniel's  Chan.  Pr.  1035,  n.  (Perkin's  ed.) ;  ib.  1043 ;  Ashton  v.  Parker,  14 
Sim.  632.  But  where  there  are  several  defendants,  one  of  whom  alone  has  an  interest 
in  defeating  the  plaintiff's  claim,  the  evidence  of  the  defendant  BO  interested,  though 
tukcn  in  behalf  of  a  co-defendant,  is  held  inadmissible  :  Clarke  v.  Wyburn,  12  Jur.  613. 
It  has  been  held  in  Massachusetts,  that  the  answer  of  one  defendant,  so  far  as  it  is 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  875 

ex  parte,  as  well  after  as  before  decree.2  If  the  answer  of  the  de- 
fendant has  been  replied  to,  the  replication  must  be  withdrawn  before 
the  plaintiff  can  examine  him.  But  a  plaintiff  cannot  be  examined 
by  a  defendant,  except  by  consent,  unless  he  is  merely  a  trustee,  or 
has  no  beneficial  interest  in  the  matter  iu  question.8  Nor  can  a  co- 
plaintiff  be  examined  by  a  plaintiff  without  the  consent  of  the 
defendant.  The  course  in  the  latter  of  such  cases  is,  to  strike  out  his 
name  as  plaintiff,  and  make  him  a  defendant ;  and,  in  the  former,  to 
file  a  cross-bill.4 

§  362.  Rule  in  Criminal  Cases  ;  Prosecutor.  The  principles  which 
govern  in  the  admission  or  exclusion  of  parties  as  witnesses  in  civil 
cases  are  in  general  applicable,  with  the  like  force,  to  criminal  prose- 
cutions, except  so  far  as  they  are  affected  by  particular  legislation, 
or  by  considerations  of  public  policy.  In  these  cases,  the  State  is 
the  party  prosecuting,  though  the  process  is  usually,  and  in  some 
cases  always,  set  in  motion  by  a  private  individual,  commonly  styled 
the  prosecutor.  In  general,  this  individual  has  no  direct  and  certain 
interest  in  the  event  of  the  pfosecution  ;  and  therefore  he  is  an  ad- 
missible witness.  Formerly,  indeed,  it  was  supposed  that  he  was 
incompetent,  by  reason  of  an  indirect  interest  arising  from  the  use 
of  the  record  of  conviction  as  evidence  in  his  favor  in  a  civil  suit; 
and  this  opinion  was  retained  down  to  a  late  period  as  applicable  to 
cases  of  forgery,  and  especially  to  indictments  for  perjury.  But  it  is 
now  well  settled,  as  will  hereafter  more  particularly  be  shown,1  that 
the  record  in  a  criminal  prosecution  cannot  be  used  as  evidence  in  a 
civil  suit,  either  at  law  or  in  equity,  except  to  prove  the  mere  fact  of 
the  adjudication,  or  a  judicial  confession  of  guilt  by  the  party  indi- 
cated.3 The  prosecutor,  therefore,  is  not  incompetent  on  the  ground 

responsive  to  the  bill,  may  be  read  bv  another  defendant,  as  evidence  in  his  own  favor  • 
Mills  v.  Gore,  20  Pick.  28. 

2  Steed  v.  Oliver,  11  Jur.  365  ;  Paris  y.  Hughes,  1  Keen  1  :  Van  v.  Corpe,  3  Mv. 
&  K.  269. 

8  The  reason  of  this  rule  has  often  been  called  in  question  ;  and  the  opinion  of 
many  of  the  profession  is  inclined  in  favor  of  making  the  right  of  examination  of  par- 
ties in  equity  reciprocal,  without  the  intervention  of  a  cross-bill :  see  1  Smith's  Ch. 
Pr.  459,  n.  (1)  ;  Report  on  Chancery  Practice,  App.  p.  153,  Q.  49.  Sir  Samuel  Romilly 
was  in  favor  of  such  change  in  the  practice :  ib.  p.  54,  Q.  266  ;  1  Hoffman's  Ch.  Pr.  345. 
In  some  of  the  United  States  this  has  already  been  done  by  statute  ;  see  New  York, 
Code  of  Practice,  §§  390,  395,  396  (Blatchford's  ed.)  ;  Ohio,  Rev.  Stat.  1841,  c.  87, 
§  26  ;  Missouri,  Rev.  Stat.  1845,  c.  137,  art.  2,  §§  14,  15  ;  New  Jersey,  Rev.  Stat.  1846, 
tit.  23,  c.  1,  §  40;  Texas,  Hartley's  Dig.  arts.  735,  739  ;  Wisconsin,  Rev.  Stat.  1849, 
c.  84,  §  30  ;  California,  Rev.  Stat.  1850,  c.  142,  §§  296-303. 

*  1  Smith's  Ch.  Pr.  343,  344  ;  1  Hoffman's  Ch.  Pr.  485-488.  See  further,  Gresley 
on  Evid.  242-244  ;  2  Mad.  Chan.  415,  416  ;  Neilson  v.  McDonald,  6  Johns.  Ch.  201  ; 
Souverbye  v.  Arden,  1  id.  240  :  2  Daniel's  Ch.  Pr.  455,  456  ;  Piddock  v.  Brown,  3  P.  W. 
288 ;  Murray  ».  Shadwell,  2  V.  &  B.  401  ;  Hoffm.  Master  in  Chanc.  18,  19  ;  Cotton  v. 
Luttrell,  1  Atk.  451. 

l  Infra,  §  537. 

8  R.  v.  Boston,  4  East  572  ;  Bartlett  v.  Pickersgill,  ib.  577,  n.;  Gibson  v.  McCarty, 
Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  311;  Richardson  v.  Williams,  12  Mod.  319;  R.  v.  Moreu,  36  Leg. 
Obs.  69  ;  11  Ad.  &  El.  1028  ;  infra,  §  537.  The  exception  which  had  grown  up  in  the 
case  of  forgery  was  admitted  to  be  an  anomaly  in  the  law,  iu  4  East  582,  per  Lord 


876  APPENDIX   II. 

that  he  is  a  party  to  the  record  ;  but  whether  any  interest  which  ne 
may  have  in  the  conviction  of  the  offender  is  sufficient  to  render  him 
incompetent  to  testify  will  be  considered  more  appropriately  under 
the  head  of  incompetency  from  interest.8 

§  363.  Same ;  Defendant.  In  regard  to  defendants  in  criminal 
cases,  if  the  State  would  call  one  of  them  as  a  witness  against  others 
in  the  same  indictment,  this  can  be  done  only  by  discharging  him 
from  the  record ;  as,  by  the  entry  of  a  nolle  prosequi l  or,  by  an  order 
for  his  dismissal  and  discharge,  where  he  has  pleaded  in  abatement 
as  to  his  own  person,  and  the  plea  is  not  answered ;  2  or,  by  a  verdict 
of  acquittal,  where  no  evidence,  or  not  sufficient  evidence,  has  been 
adduced  against  him.  In  the  former  case,  where  there  is  no  proof,  he 
is  entitled  to  the  verdict ;  and  it  may  also  be  rendered  at  the  request 
of  the  other  defendants,  who  may  then  call  him  as  a  witness  for 
themselves,  as  in  civil  cases.  In  the  latter,  where  there  is  some 
evidence  against  him,  but  it  is  deemed  insufficient,  a  separate  verdict 
of  acquittal  may  be  entered,  at  the  instance  of  the  prosecuting  officer, 
who  may  then  call  him  as  a  witness  »against  the  others.8  On  the 
same  principle,  where  two  were  indicted  for  assault,  and  one  sub- 
mitted and  was  fined,  and  paid  the  fine,  and  the  other  pleaded  "  not 
guilty,"  the  former  was  admitted  as  a  competent  witness  for  the 
latter,  because  as  to  the  witness  the  matter  was  at  an  end.4  But  the 
matter  is  not  considered  as  at  an  end,  so  as  to  render  one  defendant 
a  competent  witness  for  another,  by  anything  short  of  a  final  judg- 
ment or  a  plea  of  guilty.6  Therefore,  where  two  were  jointly  indicted 
for  uttering  a  forged  note,  and  the  trial  of  one  of  them  was  postponed, 
it  was  held,  that  he  could  not  be  called  as  a  witness  for  the  other.* 
So,  where  two,  being  jointly  indicted  for  an  assault,  pleaded  sepa- 
rately "  not  guilty,"  and  elected  to  be  tried  separately,  it  was  held, 
that  the  one  tried  first  could  not  call  the  other  as  a  witness  for  him.7 

Ellenborough,  and  in  4  B.  &  Aid.  210,  per  Abbott,  C.  J.  ;  and  was  finally  removed  by 
the  declaratory  act,  for  such  in  effect  it  certainly  is,  of  9  Geo.  IV,  c.  32,  §  2.  In  this 
country,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  early  cases,  the  party  to  the  forged  instrument 
has  been  held  admissible  as  a  witness,  on  the  general  principles  of  the  criminal  law  ; 
see  Corn.  v.  Snell,  3  Mass.  82  ;  People  v.  Dean,  6  Cowen  27;  Furber  v.  Milliard,  2  N.  H. 
480  ;  Rospublica  v.  Ross,  2  Dall.  239  ;  State  v.  Foster,  3  McCord  442. 

«  Infra,  §§  412-414. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  28o  ;  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.  163. 

3  R.  v.  Sherman,  Cas.  temp.  Hardw.   303. 

•  R.  v.   Rowland,  Ry.  &  M.  401  ;  R.  v.   Mutineers  of  the  "  Bounty,     cited  arg. 
1  East  312.  313. 

*  R.  ».  Fletcher,  1  Stra.  633  ;  R.  v.  Lyons,  9  C.  &  P.  555  ;  R.  v.  Williams,  8  id.  285  ; 
supra,  §  358  ;  Com.  v.  Eastman,  1  Gush.  189. 

6  R.  v.  Hinks,  1  Denis.  C.  C.  84. 

•  Con).  0.  Marsh,  10  Pick.  57. 

*  People  v.  Bill,  10  Johns.  95.     In  R.  v.  Lafone,  6  Esp.  154,  where  one  defendant 
suffered  judgment  by  default,  Lord  Ellenborough  held  him  incompetent  to  testify  for 
the  others  ;  apparently  on  the  ground,  that  there  was  a  community  of  guilt,  and  that 
the  offence  of  one  was  the  offence  of  all.     But  no  authority  was  cited  in  the  case,  and 
the  decision  is  at  variance  with  the  general  doctrine  in  cases  of  tort.     The  reason 
given,  moreover,  assumes  the  very  point  in  dispute,  namely,  whether  there  was  any 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  877 

§  365.  Competency  of  "Witnesses  ;  Mental  Deficiencies.  "We  pro- 
ceed now  to  consider  the  second  class  of  persons  incompetent  to  tes- 
tify as  witnesses ;  namely,  that  of  persons  deficient  in  understanding. 
We  have  already  seen,1  that  one  of  the  main  securities,  which  the 
law  has  provided  for  the  purity  and  truth  of  oral  evidence,  is,  that  it 
be  delivered  under  the  sanction  of  an  oath;  and  that  this  is  none 
other  than  a  solemn  invocation  of  the  Supreme  Being,  as  the  Omnis- 
cient Judge.  The  purpose  of  the  law  being  to  lay  hold  on  the  con- 
science of  the  witness  by  this  religious  solemnity,  it  is  obvious,  that 
persons  incapable  of  comprehending  the  nature  and  obligation  of  an 
oath  ought  not  to  be  admitted  as  witnesses.  The  repetition  of  the 
words  of  an  oath  would,  in  their  case,  be  but  an  unmeaning  formality. 
It  makes  no  difference  from  what  cause  this  defect  of  understanding 
may  have  arisen ;  nor  whether  it  be  temporary  and  curable,  or  per- 
manent ;  whether  the  party  be  hopelessly  an  idiot,  or  maniac,  or  only 
occasionally  insane,  as  a  lunatic ;  or  be  intoxicated ;  or  whether  the 
defect  arises  from  mere  immaturity  of  intellect,  as  in  the  case  of  chil- 
dren. While  the  deficiency  of  understanding  exists,  be  the  cause  of 
what  nature  soever,  the  person  is  not  admissible  to  be  sworn  as  a 
witness.  But  if  the  cause  be  temporary,  and  a  lucid  interval  should 
occur,  or  a  cure  be  effected,  the  competency  also  is  restored.2 

§  366.    Deaf  and  Dumb  Persons.     In  regard  to  persons  deaf  and 

guilt  at  all.  The  indictment  was  for  a  misdemeanor,  in  obstructing  a  revenue  officer 
in  the  execution  of  his  duty.  See  1  Phil.  Evid.  68.  But  where  two  were  jointly  in- 
dicted for  an  assault  and  battery,  and  one  of  them,  on  motion,  was  tried  first,  the  wife 
of  the  other  was  held  a  competent  witness  in  his  favor:  Moffitv.  State,  2  Humph.  99. 
And  see  Jones  v.  State,  1  Kelly  Ga.  610  ;  Com.  v.  Hanson,  2  Ashm.  31;  supra,  §  335,  n. ; 
State  v.  Worthing,  1  Reddingt.  (31  Me.)  62. 

1  Supra,  §  327. 

2  6  Com.   Dig.  351,  352,  Testmoigne,  A,  1  ;  Livingston  ».  Kiersted,  10  Johns.  362  ; 
Evans  v.  Hettich,  7  Wheat.  453,  470  ;  White's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  430 ;  Tait  on 
Evid.  pp.  342,  343.     The  fact  of  want  of  understanding  is  to  be  proved  by  the  object- 
ing party,  by  testimony  aliunde  :  Robinson  v.  Dana,  16  Vt.  474.     See,  as  to  intoxica- 
tion, Hartford  v.  Palmer,  16  Johns.  143;  Gebhart  v.  Shindle,  15  S.  &  R.  235  ;  Heinec. 
ad  Pandect  Par.  3,  §  14.    Whether  a  monomaniac  is  a  competent  witness  is  a  point  not 
known  to  have  been  directly  decided ;  and  upon  which  text-writers  differ  in  opinion  ; 
Mr.  Roscoe  deems  it  the  safest  rule  to  exclude  their  testimony  :  Rose.  Crim.  Evid. 
p.  128;  Mr.  Best  considers  this  "hard  measure:"  Best,  Princ.  Evid.  p.  168.     In  a 
recent  case  before  the  Privy  Council,  where  a  will  was  contested  on  the  ground  of  in- 
capacity in  the  mind  of  the  testator,  it  was  held,  that  if  the  mind  is  unsound  on  one 
subject,  and  this  unsoundness  is  at 'all  times  existing  upon  that  subject,  it  is  erroneous 
to  suppose  the  mind  of  such  a  person  really  sound  on  other  subjects ;  and  that  therefore 
the  will  of  such  a  person,  though  apparently  ever  so  rational  and  proper,  was  void : 
Waring  r.  Waring,  12  Jur.  947,  Priv.  C.     Here,  the  power  of  perceiving  facts  is  sound, 
but  the  faculty  of  comparing  and  of  judging  is  impaired.    But  where,  in  a  trinl  for  man- 
slaughter, a  lunatic  patient  was  admitted  as  a  witness,  who  had  been  confined  in  a 
lunatic  asylum,  and  who  labored  under  the  delusion,  both  at  the  time  of  the  transac- 
tion and  of  the  trial,  that  he  was  possessed  by  twenty  thousand  spirits,  but  whom  the 
medical  witness  believed  to  be  capable  of  giving  an  account  of  any  transaction  that  hap- 
pened before  his  eyes,  and  who  appeared  to  understand  the  obligation  of  an  oath,  and 
to  believe  in  future  rewards  and  punishments,  —  it  was  held,  that  his  testimony  was 
properly  received  ;  and  that  where  a  person,  under  an  insane  delusion,  is  offered  as  a 
witness,  it  is  for  the  judge  at  the  time  to  decide  upon  his  competency  as  a  witness,  and 
for  the  iury  t<>  judge  of  the  credibility  of  his  evidence  :  R.  v.  Hill,  15  Jur.  470  ;  5  Eng. 
Law  &  E.t.  547  ;  5  Cox  C.  C.  259. 


878  APPENDIX   II. 

dumb  from  their  birth,  it  has  been  said  that,  in  presumption  of  law, 
they  are  idiots.  And  though  this  presumption  has  not  now  the  same 
degree  of  force  which  was  formerly  given  to  it,  that  unfortunate 
class  of  persons  being  found  by  the  light  of  modern  science  to  be 
much  more  intelligent  in  general,  and  susceptible  of  far  higher  cul- 
ture, than  was  once  supposed;  yet  still  the  presumption  is  so  far 
operative,  as  to  develop  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  party  adducing 
the  witness,  to  show  that  he  is  a  person  of  sufficient  understanding. 
This  being  done,  a  deaf  mute  may  be  sworn  and  give  evidence,  by 
means  of  an  interpreter.1  If  he  is  able  to  communicate  his  ideas 
perfectly  by  writing,  he  will  be  required  to  adopt  that,  as  the  more 
satisfactory,  and  therefore  the  better  method ; 2  but  if  his  knowledge 
of  that  method  is  imperfect,  he  will  be  permitted  to  testify  by  means 
of  signs.8 

§  372.  Competency  of  Witnesses  ;  Infamy.  Under  this  general  head 
of  exclusion,  because  of  insensibility  to  the  obligation  of  an  oath, 
may  be  ranked  the  case  of  persons  infamous ;  that  is,  persons  who, 
whatever  may  be  their  professed  belief,  have  been  guilty  of  those 
heinous  crimes  which  men  generally  are  not  found  to  commit,  unless 
when  so  depraved  as  to  be  unworthy  of  credit  for  truth. 

§  383.     Competency    of    Parties    to    testify    to    their    own    Fraud. 

Whether  a  party  to  a  negotiable  instrument,  who  has  given  it  credit 
and  currency  by  his  signature,  shall  afterwards  be  admitted  as  a  wit- 
ness, in  a  suit  between  other  persons,  to  prove  the  instrument  origi- 
nally void,  is  a  question  upon  which  judges  have  been  much  divided 
in  opinion.  The  leading  case  against  the  admissibility  of  the  wit- 
ness is  that  of  Walton  v.  Shelley,1  in  which  the  indorser  of  a  prom- 
issory note  was  called  to  prove  it  void  for  usury  in  its  original  con- 
coction. The  security  was  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  holder.  Lord 
Mansfield  and  the  other  learned  judges  held  that  upon  general  grounds 
of  public  policy  the  witness  was  inadmissible;  it  being  "of  conse- 
quence to  mankind  that  no  person  should  hang  out  false  colors  to 
deceive  them,  by  first  affixing  his  signature  to  a  paper,  and  then  after- 
wards giving  testimony  to  invalidate  it."  And,  in  corroboration  of 
this  opinion,  they  referred  to  the  spirit  of  that  maxim  of  the  Roman 
law,  "Nemo,  allegans  suam  turpitudinem,  est  audiendus."  2 

1  Huston's  Case,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  408 ;  Tait  on  Evid.  343  ;  1  Russ.  on  Crimes, 
p.  7  ;  1  Hale  P.  C.  34.  Ixmi  Hale  refers,  for  authority  as  to  the  ancient  presumption, 
to  the  Laws  of  Knight  Alfred,  c.  14.  which  is  in  these  words  :  "  Si  quis  nnitus  vel  sur- 
dus  natussit,  ut  peccata  sua  confiteri  nequeat,  nee  inficiari,  eraendet  pater  scelera  ipsius." 
Vid.  Leges  Barbaror.  Antiq.  vol.  iv,  p.  249  ;  Ancient  Laws  and  Statutes  of  England, 
vol.  i,  p.  71. 

3  Morrison  v.  Lennard,  3  C.  &  P.  127. 

8  State  v.  De  Wolf,  8  Conn.  93 ;  Com.  v.  Hill,  14  Mass.  207 ;  Snyder  v.  Nations, 
5  Black f.  295. 

1  1  T.  H.  296. 

2  This  maxim,  though  it  is  said  not  to  be  expressed,  in  terms,  in  the  text  of  the 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  879 

§  384.  The  doctrine  of  this  case  afterwards  came  under  discussion 
in  the  equally  celebrated  case  of  Jordaine  v.  Lashbrooke.1  This 
was  an  action  by  the  indorsee  of  a'  bill  of  exchange  against  the 
acceptor.  The  bill  bore  date  at  Hamburg;  and  the  defence  was, 
that  it  was  drawn  in  London,  and  so  was  void  at  its  creation,  for 
want  of  a  stamp,  the  statute  2  having  declared  that  unstamped  bills 
should  neither  be  pleaded,  given  in  evidence,  nor  allowed  to  be  avail- 
able in  law  or  equity.  The  indorser  was  offered  by  the  defendant  as 
a  witness  to  prove  this  fact,  and  the  Court  held  that  he  was  admis- 
sible. This  case  might,  perhaps,  have  formed  an  exception  to  the 
general  rule  adopted  in  Walton  v.  Shelley,  on  the  ground  that  the 
general  policy  of  the  law  of  commerce  ought  to  yield  to  the  public 
necessity  in  matters  of  revenue;  and  this  necessity  was  relied  upon 
by  two  or  three  learned  judges  who  concurred  in  the  decision.  But 
they  also  concurred  with  Lord  Kenyon  in  reviewing  and  overruling 
the  doctrine  of  that  case.  The  rule,  therefore,  now  received  in  Eng- 
land is,  that  the  party  to  any  instrument,  whether  negotiable  or  not, 
is  a  competent  witness  to  prove  any  fact  to  which  any  other  witness 
would  be  competent  to  testify,  provided  he  is  not  shown  to  be  legally 
infamous,  and  is  not  directly  interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit..  The 
objection,  that  thereby  he  asserts  that  to  be  false  which  he  has  sol- 
emnly .attested  or  held  out  to  the  world  as  true,  goes  only  to  his  credi- 
bility with  the  jury.8 

§  385.  The  Courts  of  some  of  the  American  States  have  adopted 
the  later  English  rule,  and  admitted  the  indorser,  or  other  party  to 
an  instrument,  as  a  competent  witness  to  impeach  it  in  all  cases  where 
he  is  not  on  other  grounds  disqualified.  In  other  States,  decisions 
are  found  which  go  to  the  exclusion  of  the  party  to  an  instrument  in 
every  case,  when  offered  as  a  witness  to  defeat  it,  in  the  hands  of  a 

Corpus  Juris  (see  Gilmer's  Rep.  p.  275,  n.),  is  exceedingly  familiar  among  the  civilians  ; 
and  is  found  in  their  commentaries  on  various  laws  in  the  Code  ;  see  Corpus  Juris  Glos- 
satum,  torn,  iv,  col.  461,  1799;  Corp.  Juris  Gothofredi  (fol.  ed.)  Cod.  lib.  7,  tit.  8, 1.  5, 
in  margine ;  Codex  Justiniani  (4to  Parisiis,  1550),  lib.  7,  tit.  16,  1.  1  ;  ib.  tit.  8,  1.  5, 
in  margine  ;  1  Mascard.  De  Prob.  Concl.  78,  n.  42.  And  see  4  Inst.  279.  It  seems 
formerly  to  have  been  deemed  sufficient  to  exclude  witnesses,  testifying  to  their  own 
turpitude  ;  but  the  objection  is  now  held  to  go  only  to  the  credibility  of  the  testimony: 
2  Stark.  Evid.  9,  10  ;  2  Hale  P.  C.  280 ;  7  T.  R.  609,  per  Grose,  J. ;  ib.  611,  per  Law- 
rence, J.  Thus,  a  witness  is  competent  to  testify  that  his  former  oath  was  corruptly 
false :  R.  v.  Teal,  11  East  309  ;  Rands  p.  Thomas,  5  M.  &  S.  244. 

l  7  T.  R.  599. 

3  31  Geo.  Ill,  c.  25,  §§  2,  16.  This  act  was  passed  subsequent  to  the  decision  of 
Walton  v.  Shelley,  1  T.  R.  296. 

8  1  Phil.  Evid.  89,  40.  On  this  ground,  parties  to  other  instruments,  as  well  as 
subscribing  witnesses,  if  not  under  some  other  disability,  are,  both  in  England  and  in 
the  United  States,  held  admissible  witnesses  to  impeacn  the  original  validity  of  such 
instruments  :  7  T.  R.  611,  per  Lawrence,  J.  ;  Heward  v.  Shipley,  4  East  180  ;  Lowe  v. 
Jolliffe,  1  W.  Bl.  365  ;  Austin  v.  Willes,  Bull.  N.  P.  264  ;  Howard  v.  Braithwaite, 
1  Ves.  &  B.  202,  208  ;  Title  v.  Grevett,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1008 ;  Dickinson  v.  Du-kinson, 
9  Met.  471  ;  Twambly  v.  Henley,  4  Mass.  441.  It  has,  however,  been  held  in  Louis- 
iana, that  a  notary  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness,  to  contradict  a  statement  made  by 
him  in  a  protest ;  and  that  the  principle  extends  to  every  public  officer,  in  regard  to  a 
certificate  given  by  him  in  his  official  character :  Peet  v.  Dougherty,  7  Rob.  La.  85. 


880  APPENDIX  II. 

third  person ;  thus  importing  into  the  Law  of  Evidence  the  maxim 
of  the  Koman  law  in  its  broadest  extent.  In  other  States,  the  Courts, 
referring  the  rule  of  exclusion  to  the  ground  of  public  convenience, 
have  restricted  its  application  to  the  case  of  negotiable  security  actu- 
ally negotiated  and  put  into  circulation  before  its  maturity,  and  still 
in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  indorsee,  without  notice  of  the  alleged 
original  infirmity,  or  any  other  defect  in  the  contract.  And  in  this 
case  the  weight  of  American  authority  may  now  be  considered  as 
against  the  admissibility  of  the  witness  to  impeach  the  original  valid- 
ity of  the  security;  although  the  contrary  is  still  holden  in  some 
Courts,  whose  decisions,  in  general,  are  received  with  the  highest 
respect.1 

1  The  rule,  that  the  indorser  of  a  negotiable  security,  negotiated  before  it  was  due, 
is  not  admissible  as  a  witness  to  prove  it  originally  void,  when  in  the  hands  of  an  inno- 
cent indorsee,  is  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  Bank  of  the 
United  States  v.  Dunn,  6  Pet.  51,  57,  explained  and  confirmed  in  Bank  of  the  Metrop- 
olis v.  Jones,  8  id.  12,  and  in  the  United  States  v.  Leffler,  11  id.  86,  94,  95 ;  Scott  v. 
Lloyd,  12  id.  149  ;  Henderson  v.  Anderson,  3  How.  73  ;  Taylor  v.  Luther,  2  Sumner 
235,  per  Story,  J.  It  was  also  adopted  in  Massachusetts  :  Churchill  v.  Suter,  4  Mass. 
156  ;  Fox  v.  Whitney,  16  id.  118  ;  Packard  v.  Richardson,  17  id.  122  ;  see  also  the  case 
of  Thayer  v.  Grossman,  1  Metcalf  416,  in  which  the  decisions  are  reviewed,  and  the  rule 
clearly  stated  and  vindicated  by  Shaw,  C.  J. ;  and  in  New  Hampshire  :  Bryant  v.  Hit- 
tersbush,  2  N.  H.  212  ;  Hadduck  v.  Wilmarth,  5  id.  187  ;  and  in  Maine :  Deering  v. 
Sawtel,  4  Greenl.  191  ;  Chandler  v.  Morton,  5  id.  374  ;  and  in  Pennsylvania :  O'Brien 
v.  Davis,  6  Watts  498  ;  Harrisburg  Bank  v.  Forster,  8  Watts  304,  309  ;  Davenport  v. 
Freeman,  3  Watts  &  Serg.  557.  In  Louisiana,  the  rule  was  stated  and  conceded  by 
Porter,  J.,  in  Shamburg  v.  Commagere,  10  Martin  18  ;  and  was  again  stated,  but  an 
opinion  withheld,  by  Martin,  J.,  in  Cox  v.  Williams,  5  Martin  N.  s.  139.  In  Vermont, 
the  case  of  Jordaine  u.  Lashbrooke  was  followed,  in  Nichols  v.  Holgate,  2  Aik.  138;  but 
the  decision  is  said  to  have  been  subsequently  disapproved  by  all  the  judges,  in  Chand- 
ler v.  Mason,  2  Vt.  198,  and  the  rule  in  Walton  v.  Shelley  approved.  In  Ohio,  the 
indorser  was  admitted  to  prove  facts  subsequent  to  the  indorsement ;  the  Court  express- 
ing no  opinion  upon  the  general  rule,  though  it  was  relied  upon  by  the  opposing 
counsel  :  Stone  v.  Vance,  6  Ohio  246  ;  but  subsequently  the  rule  seems  to  have  been 
admitted:  Rohreru.  Morningstar,  18  id.  579.  In  Mississippi,  the  witness  was  admitted 
for  the  same  purpose  ;  and  the  rule  in  Walton  v.  Shelley  was  approved  :  Drake  v.  Henly, 
Walker  541.  In  Illinois,  the  indorser  has  been  admitted,  where,  in  taking  the  note,  he 
acted  as  the  agent  of  the  indorsee,  to  whom  he  immediately  transferred  it,  without  any 
notice  of  the  rule  :  Webster  v.  Vickers,  2  Scam.  295.  But  the  rule  of  exclusion  has 
been  rejected,  and  the  general  doctrine  of  Jordaine  v.  Lashbrooke  followed  in  New  York: 
Stafford  v.  Rice,  5  Cowen  23;  Bank  of  Utica  v.  Hillard,  ib.  153  ;  Williams  ».  Wai- 
bridge,  3  Wend.  415;  and  in  Virginia  :  Taylor  v.  Beck,  3  Randolph  316  ;  and  in  Con- 
necticut :  Townsend  v.  Bush,  1  Conn.  260  ;  and  in  South  Carolina :  Knight  v.  Packard, 
8  McCord  71  ;  and  in  Tennessee  :  Stump  v.  Napier,  2  Yerger  35.  In  Maryland,  it  was 
rejected  by  three  judges  against  two  in  Ringgold  v.  Tyson,  3  H.  &  J.  172.  It  was  also 
rejected  in  New  Jersey,  in  Freeman  v.  Brittin,  2  Harrison  192;  and  in  North  Carolina  : 
Guy  v.  Hall,  3  Murphy  151  ;  and  in  Georgia  :  Slack  o.  Moss  Dudley  161 ;  and  in  Ala- 
bama :  Todd  v.  Stafford,  1  Stew.  199  ;  Gnffing  v.  Harris,  9  Porter  226.  In  Kentucky, 
in  the  case  of  Gorham  v.  Carroll,  3  Littell  221,  where  the  indorsee  was  admitted  as  a 
witness,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  note  was  indorsed  without  recourse  to  him,  and 
thereby  marked  with  suspicion  ;  and  that  the  general  rule  was  not  considered.  More 
recently  in  New  Hampshire,  doctrine  of  Walton  v.  Shelley  has  been  denied,  and  the  rule 
of  the  Roman  law  has  been  admitted  only  as  a  rule  of  estoppel  upon  the  parties  to  the 
transaction  and  in  regard  to  their  rights,  and  not  as  a  rule  of  evidence,  affecting  the 
competency  of  witnesses  ;  and  therefore  the  maker  of  a  note,  being  released  by  his  surety, 
was  held  competent  in  an  action  by  an  indorsee  against  the  surety,  to  testify  to  an 
alteration*  of  the  note,  made  by  himself  and  the  payee,  which  rendered  it  void  as  to  the 
surety:  Haines  v.  Dennett,  11  N.  H.  180.  See  further,  2  Stark.  Evid.  179  n.  (a)  ; 
Bayley  on  Bills,  p.  586,  n.  b  (Phillips  and  Sewall's  ed.).  But  all  these  decisions  against 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  881 

§  386.  "Witness's  Disqualification  by  Interest.  Another  class  of 
persons  incompetent  to  testify  in  a  cause  consists  of  those  who  are 
interested  in  ics  result.1  The  principle  on  which  these  are  rejected 
is  the  same  with  that  which  excludes  the  parties  themselves,  and 
which  has  already  been  considered; 2  namely,  the  danger  of  perjury, 
and  the  little  credit  generally  found  to  be  due  to  such  testimony,  in 
judicial  investigations.  This  disqualifying  interest,  however,  must 
be  some  legal,  certain,  and  immediate  interest,  however  minute, 
either  in  the  event  of  the  cause  itself,  or  in  the  record,  as  an  instru- 
ment of  evidence,  in  support  of  his  own  claims,  in  a  subsequent 
action.8  It  must  be  a  legal  interest,  as  distinguished  from  the  preju- 
dice or  bias  resulting  from  friendship  or  hatred,  or  from  consanguin- 
ity, or  any  other  domestic  or  social  or  any  official  relation,  or  any 
other  motives  by  which  men  are  generally  influenced ;  for  these  go 
only  to  the  credibility.  Thus,  a  servant  is  a  competent  witness  for 
his  master,  a  child  for  his  parent,  a  poor  dependant  for  his  patron, 
an  accomplice  for  the  government,  and  the  like.  Even  a  wife  has 
been  held  admissible  against  a  prisoner,  though  she  believed  that  his 
conviction  would  save  her  husband's  life.4  The  rule  of  the  Roman 
law  — "  Idonei  non  videntur  esse  testes,  quibus  imperari  potest  ut 

the  rule  in  Walton  v.  Shelley,  except  that  in  New  Jersey  and  the  last  cited  case  in  New 
Hampshire,  were  made  long  before  that  rule  was  recognized  and  adopted  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.  The  rule  itself  is  restricted  to  cases  where  the  witness  is 
called  to  prove  that  the  security  was  actually  void  at  the  time  when  he  gave  it  currency 
as  good  ;  and  this  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business,  and  without  any  mark  or  intima- 
tion to  put  the  receiver  of  it  on  his  guard.  Hence  the  indorser  is  a  competent  witness, 
if  he  indorsed  the  note  "  without  recourse  "  to  himself  (Abbott  v.  Mitchell,  6  Shepl. 
355);  or,  is  called  to  prove  a  fact  not  going  to  the  original  infirmity  of  the  security 
(Buck  v.  Appleton,  2  Shepl.  284 ;  Wendell  v.  George,  R.  M.  Charlton,  51) ;  or,  if  the  in- 
strument was  negotiated  out  of  the  usual  course  of  business  (Parke  v.  Smith,  4  Watts 
&  Serg.  287).  So,  the  indorser  of  an  accommodation  note,  made  for  his  benefit,  being 
released  by  the  maker,  is  admissible  as  a  witness  for  the  latter,  to  prove  that  it  has  sub- 
sequently been  paid  :  Greenough  v.  West,  8  N.  H.  400  ;  and  see  Kinsley  v.  Robinson, 
21  Pick.  327. 

1  In  Connecticut,  persons  interested  in  the  cause  are  now,  by  statute,  made  compe- 
tent witnesses,  the  objection  of  interest  going  only  to  their  credibility  :  Rev.  Stat.  1849, 
tit.  1,  §  141.     In  New  York,  persons  interested  are  admissible,  except  those  for  whose 
immediate  benefit  the  suit  is  prosecuted  or  defended,  and  the  assignor  of  a  thing  in 
action,  assigned  for  the  purpose  of  making  him  a  witness :  Rev.  Stat.  vol.  iii,  p.  769 
(3d  ed.).     In  Ohio,  the  law  is  substantially  the  same :  Stat.  March  23,  1850,  §  3.     lu 
Michigan,  all  such  persons  are  admissible,  except  parties  to  the  record,  and  persons  for 
whose  immediate  benefit  the  suit  is  prosecuted  or  defended  ;  and  their  husbands  and 
wives :  Rev.  Stat.  1846,  c.  102,  §  99.     In  Virginia,  persons  interested  are  admissible 
in  criminal  cases,  when  not  jointly  tried  with  the  defendant :  Rev.  Stat.  1849,  c.  199, 
§  21.     In  Massachusetts,  the  objection  of  interest  no  longer  goes  to  the  competency  of 
any  witnesses,  except  witnesses  to  wills:  Gen.  Stat.  c.  131,  §  14.     See  supra,  §§  327, 
329,  notes. 

2  Supra,  §§  326,  327,  329.     And  see  the  observations  of  Best,  C.  J.,  in  Hovill  ». 
Stephenson,  5  Bing.  493. 

«  1  Stark.  Evid.  102  ;  Bent  v.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27  ;  Doe  v.  Tyler,  6  Bing.  390,  per 
Tindal,  C.  J. ;  Smith  u.  Prager,  7  T.  R.  62  ;  Wilcox  v.  Farrell,  1  H.  L.  C.  93  ;  Bailey 
v.  Lumkin,  1  Kelly  392. 

*  R.  v.  Rudd,  1  Leach  Cr.  Gas.  115,  131.     In  weighing  the  testimony  of  witnesses 
naturally  biased,  the  rule  is  to  give  credit  to  their  statements  of  facts,  and  to  view  theil 
deductions  from  facts  with  suspicion  :  Dillon  v.  Dillon,  3  Curt.  96. 
VOL.    I.  —  56 


882  APPENDIX  II. 

teste  fient,"  5 — has  never  been  recognized  in  the  common  law,  as 
affecting  the  competency  ;  but  it  prevails  in  those  countries  in  whose 
jurisprudence  the  authority  of  the  Roman  law  is  recognized.  Neither 
does  the  common  law  regard  as  of  binding  force  the  rule  that 
excludes  an  advocate  from  testifying  in  the  cause  for  his  client,  — 
"  Mandatis  cavetur,  ut  Prsesides  attendant,  ue  patroni,  in  causa  cui 
patrocinium  praestiterunt,  testimonium  dicant." 6  But  on  grounds  of 
public  policy,  and  for  the  purer  administration  of  justice,  the  rela-. 
tiou  of  lawyer  and  client  is  so  far  regarded  by  the  rules  of  prac- 
tice in  some  Courts,  as  that  the  lawyer  is  not  permitted  to  be  both 
advocate  and  witness  of  his  client  in  the  same  cause.7 

§  387.  Nature  of  Disqualifying  Interest.  The  interest,  too,  must 
be  real,  and  not  merely  apprehended,  by  the  party.  For  it  would  be 
exceedingly  dangerous  to  violate  a  general  rule,  because  in  a  particu- 
lar case  an  individual  does  not  understand  the  nature  or  extent  of  his 
rights  and  liabilities.  If  he  believes  and  states  that  he  has  no  inter- 
est, the  very  statement  of  the  objection  to  his  competency  may 
inform  him  that  he  has ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  erroneously 
thinks  and  declares  that  he  is  interested,  he  may  learn,  by  the 
decision  of  the  Court,  that  he  is  not.  Indeed,  there  would  be  danger 
in  resting  the  rule  on  the  judgment  of  a  witness,  and  not  on  the  fact 
itself ;  for  the  apprehended  existence  of  the  interest  might  lead  his 
judgment  to  a  wrong  conclusion.  And,  moreover,  the  inquiry  which 
would  be  necessary  into  the  grounds  and  degree  of  the  witness's 
belief  would  always  be  complicated,  vague,  and  indefinite,  and  pro- 
ductive of  much  inconvenience.  For  these  reasons,  the  more  simple 
and  practicable  rule  has  been  adopted  of  determining  the  admissibil- 
ity  of  the  witness  by  the  actual  existence,  or  not,  of  any  disqualify- 
ing interest  in  the  matter.1 

§  388.  Honorary  Obligation.  If  the  witness  believes  himself  to 
be  under  an  honorary  obligation,  respecting  the  matter  in  contro- 
versy, in  favor  of  the  party  calling  him,  he  is  nevertheless  a  com- 

6  Dig.  lib.  22,  tit.  5, 1.  6 ;  Poth.  Obi.  [793].     In  Ix>wer  Canada,  the  incorapetency 
of  the  relations  and  connections  of  the  parties,  in  civil  cases,  beyond  the  degree  of  cou- 
sins-german,  is  removed  by  Stat.  41  Geo.  Ill,  c.  8.     See  Rev.  Code,  1845,  p.  144. 

«  Dig.  Lib.  22,  tit.  5,  1.  25  ;  Poth.  Obi.  [793]. 

7  Stones  v.  Byron,  4  Dowl.  &  L.  393  ;  Dunn  v.  Packwood,  11  Jnr.  242  ;  Reg.  Gen. 
Snp.  Court,  N.  H.  Reg.  23,  6  N.  H.  580  ;  Mishler  v.  Baumgardner,  1  Amer.  Law  Jour. 
N.  s.  304.     But  see  contra,  Little  v.  Keon,  1  N.  Y.  Code  Rep.  4  ;  Sandf.  607 ;  Potter  v. 
Ware,  1  Cush.  519,  524,  and  cases  cited  by  Metcalf,  J. 

1  1  Phil.  Evid.  127,  128;  1  Stark.  Evid.  102;  Gresley  on  Evid.  p.  253;  Tait  on 
Evid.  p.  351.  In  America  and  in  England,  there  are  some  early  but  very  respectable 
authorities  to  the  point,  that  a  witness  believing  himself  interested  is  to  be  rejected  as 
incompetent.  See  Fotheringham  v.  Greenwood,  1  Stra.  129 ;  Trelawney  v.  Thomas, 
1  H.  Bl.  307,  per  Ld.  Loughborough,  C.  J.,  and  Gould,  J.;  L'Amitie,  6  Rob.  Adm.  269, 
n.  (a);  Plumb  v.  Whiting,  4  Mass.  518  ;  Richardson  v.  Hunt,  2  Mimf.  148;  Freeman 
v.  Luckclt,  2  J.  J.  Marsh  390.  But  the  weight  of  modem  authority  is  clearly  the  other 
way.  See  Commercial  Bank  of  Albany  v.  Hughes,  17  Wend.  94,  101,  102;  Stall  v. 
Catskill  Bank,  18  id.  466,  475,  476  ;  Smith  v.  Downs,  6  Conn.  371  ;  Long  v.  Bailie, 
4  S.  &  R.  222 ;  Dellone  v.  Rehmer,  4  Watts  9 ;  Stimmel  v.  Underwood,  8  G.  &  J.  282 ; 
Havia  v.  Barkley,  1  Harper's  Law  Rep.  63 ;  and  infra,  §  423,  n. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  883 

petent  witness,  for  the  reasons  already  given;  and  his  credibility  is 
left  with  the  jury.3 

§  389.  Interest  must  be  in  the  Event  of  the  Suit.  The  disqualify- 
ing interest  of  the  witness  must  be  in  the  event  of  the  cause  itself, 
and  not  in  the  question  to  be  decided.  His  liability  to  a  like  action, 
or  his  standing  in  the  same  predicament  with  the  party,  if  the  ver- 
dict cannot  be  given  in  evidence  for  or  against  him,  is  an  interest  in 
the  question  only,  and  does  not  exclude  him.1  Thus,  one  under- 
writer may  be  a  witness  for  another  underwriter  upon  the  same 
policy ; 2  or,  one  seaman  for  another,  whose  claim  for  wages  is 
resisted,  on  grounds  equally  affecting  all  the  crew;8  or,  one  free- 
holder for  another,  claiming  land  under  the  same  title,  or  by  the 
same  lines  and  corners ; 4  or  one  devisee  for  another,  claiming  under 
the  same  will ; 5  or,  one  trespasser  for  his  co-trespasser ; 6  or  a  cred- 
itor for  his  debtor ; 7  or  a  tenant  by  the  courtesy ;  or  tenant  in. 
dower,  for  the  heir  at  law,  in  a  suit  concerning  the  title.8  And 
the  purchaser  of  a  license  to  use  a  patent  may  be  a  witness  for  the 
patentee,  in  an  action  for  infringing  the  patent.9 

§  390.  Test  of  Interest.  The  true  test  of  the  interest  of  a  witness 
is,  that  he  will  either  gain  or  lose  by  the  direct  legal  operation  and  effect 
of  the  judgment,  or  that  the  record  will  be  legal  evidence  for  or 
against  him,  in  some  other  action.1  It  must  be  a  present,  certain, 
and  vested  interest,  and  not  an  interest  uncertain,  remote,  or  con- 
tingent. Thus  the  heir  apparent  to  an  estate  is  a  competent  witness 
in  support  of  the  claim  of  his  ancestor ;  though  one,  who  has  a 
vested  interest  in  remainder,  is  not  competent.2  And  if  the  interest 
is  of  a  doubtful  nature,  the  objection  goes  to  the  credit  of  the  wit- 
ness, and  not  to  his  competency.  For,  being  always  presumed  to  be 

«  Pederson  v.  Stoffles,  1  Campb.  144  ;  Solarte  v.  Melville,  1  Man.  &  Ryl.  198  ;  Gilpin 
v.  Vincent,  9  Johns.  219  ;  Moore  v.  Hitchcock,  4  Wend.  292  ;  Union  Bank  v.  Knapp, 
3  Pick.  96,  108 ;  Smith  v.  Downs,  6  Conn.  365  ;  Stimmel  v.  Underwood,  3  Gill  & 
Johns.  282  ;  Howe  v.  Howe,  10  N.  H.  88. 

1  Evans  o.  Eaton,  7  Wheat.  356,  424,  per  Story,  J. ;  Van  Nuys  v.  Terhune,  3  Johns. 
Cas.  82  ;  Stewart  v.  Kip,  5  Johns.  256  ;  Evans  v.  Hettich,  7  Wheat.  453 ;  Clapp  w. 
Mandeville,  5  How.  Miss.  197. 

«  Bent  v.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27. 

8  Spurr  ».  Pearson,  1  Mason  104  ;  Hoyt  v.  Wildfire,  3  Johns.  518. 

*  Richardson  v.  Carey,  2  Rand.  87  ;  Owings  v.  Speed,  5  Wheat.  423. 
6  Jackson  v.  Nelson,  6  Co  wen  248. 

6  Per  Ashurst,  J.,  in  Walton  v.  Shelley,  1  T.  R.  301.     See  also  Blackett  ».  Weir, 

5  B  &  C.  387,  per  Abbott,  C.  J.;  Duncan  v.  Meikleham,  3  C.  &  P.  172  ;  Curtis  v. 
Graham,  12  Martin  289. 

*  Paul  v.  Brown,  6  Esp.  34  ;  Nowell  v.  Davies,  5  B.  &  Ad.  368. 

8  Jackson  v.  Brooks,  8  Wend.  426  ;  Doe  v.  Maisey,  1  B.  &  Ad.  439. 

*  De  Rosne  v.  Fairlie,  1  M.  &  Rob.  457. 

1  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by  Lofft,  p.  225  ;   Bull.  N.  P.  284  ;  Bent  o.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27  ; 

6  King.  394,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.;  supra,  §  386;  R.  v.  Boston,  4  East  581,  per  Ld. 
Ellenborough. 

2  Smith  v.  Blackham,  1  Salk.  283  ;  Doe  v.  Tyler,  6  Bing.  390.     But  in  an  actiou 
for  waste,  brought  by  a  landlord,  who  is  tenant  for  life,  the  remainder-man  is  a  com- 
petent witness  for  the  plaintiff;  for  the  damages  would  not  belong  to  the  witness,  but 
to  the  plaintiff's  executor:  Leach  v.  Thomas,  7  C.  &  P.  327. 


884  APPENDIX   II. 

competent,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  objecting  party,  to  sustain 
his  exception  to  the  competency ;  and  if  he  fails  satisfactorily  to 
establish  it,  the  witness  is  to  be  sworn.8 

§  391.  Degree  of  Interest  Immaterial.  The  magnitude  or  degree 
of  the  interest  is  not  regarded  in  estimating  its  effect  on  the  mind  of 
the  witness;  for  it  is  impossible  to  measure  the  influence  which  any 
given  interest  may  exert.  It  is  enough,  that  the  interest  which  he 
has  in  the  subject  is  direct,  certain,  and  vested,  however  small  may 
be  its  amount;1  for,  interest  being  admitted  as  a  disqualifying  cir- 
cumstance in  any  case,  it  must  of  necessity  be  so  in  every  case,  what- 
ever be  the  character,  rank,  or  fortune,  of  the  party  interested.  Nor 
is  it  necessary  that  the  witness  should  be  interested  in  that  which 
is  the  subject  of  the  suit ;  for,  if  he  is  liable  for  the  costs,  as  in  the 
case  of  a  prochein  amy,  or  a  guardian,  or  the  like,  we  have  already 
seen,2  that  he  is  incompetent.  And  though,  where  the  witness  is 
equally  interested  on  both  sides,  he  is  not  incompetent ;  yet  if  there 
is  a  certain  excess  of  interest  on  one  side,  it  seems  that  he  will  be 
incompetent  to  testify  on  that  side;  for  he  is  interested,  to  the 
amount  of  the  excess,  in  procuring  a  verdict  for  the  party,  in  whose 
favor  his  interest  preponderates.8 

§  392.  Nature  of  Interest  The  nature  of  the  direct  interest  in  the 
event  of  the  suit  which  disqualifies  the  witness  may  be  illustrated  by 
reference  to  some  adjudged  cases.  Thus,  persons  having  become 
bail  for  the  defendant  have  been  held  incompetent  to  testify  as  wit- 
nesses on  his  side;  for  they  are  immediately  made  liable,  or  dis- 
charged, by  the  judgment  against  or  in  favor  of  the  principal.  And 
if  the  bail  have  given  security  for  the  appearance  of  the  defendant, 
by  depositing  a  sum  of  money  with  the  officer,  the  effect  is  the  same.1 

8  Bent  v.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27,  32 ;  Jackson  v.  Benson,  2  Y.  &  J.  45  ;  R.  v.  Cole 
1  Esp.  169 ;  Duel  v.  Fisher,  4  Denio  515 ;  Comstock  v.  Rayford,  12  S.  &  M.  369 ; 
Story  v.  Saunders,  8  Humph.  663. 

1  Burton  r.  Hinde,  5  T.  R.  174  ;  Butler  v.  Warren,  11  Johns.  57;  Doe  v.  Tooth, 
3  Y.  &  J.  19. 

8  Supra,  §  347.     See  also  infra,  §§  401,  402. 

8  Larbalestier  v.  Clark,  1  B.  &  Ad.  899.  Where  this  preponderance  arose  from  a 
liability  to  costs  only,  the  rule  formerly  was  to  admit  the  witness ;  because  of  the  ex- 
treme difficulty  which  frequently  arose,  of  determining  the  liability  of  his  question  to 
pay  the  costs;  see  Ilderton  v.  Atkinson,  7  T.  R.  480;  Birt  v.  Kershaw,  2  East  458. 
But  these  cases  were  broken  in  upon,  by  Jones  v.  Brooke,  4  Taunt.  464  ;  and  the  wit- 
ness is  now  held  incompetent,  wherever  there  is  a  preponderancy  of  interest  on  the  side 
of  the  party  adducing  him,  though  it  is  created  only  by  the  liability  to  costs:  Townsend 
v.  Downing,  14  East  565  ;  Hubbly  v.  Brown,  16  Johns.  70 ;  Scott  v.  McLellan,  2  Greenl. 
199 ;  Bottomley  v.  Wilson,  3  Stark.  148  ;  Harman  v.  Lasbrey,  1  Holt's  Cas.  390 ;  Ed- 
monds v.  Lowe,  8  B.  &  C.  407.  And  see  Mr.  Evans's  observations,  in  2  Poth.  Obi. 
p.  269,  App.  No.  16 ;  and  pott,  §  401.  The  existence  of  such  a  rule,  however,  was 
regretted  by  Mr.  Justice  Littledale,  in  1  B.  &  Ail.  903 ;  and  by  some  it  is  still  thought 
the  earlier  cases,  above  cited,  are  supported  by  the  better  reason.  See  further  Barretto 
v.  Snowden,  5  Wend.  181  ;  Hall  v.  Hale,  8  Conn.  336. 

1  Ucon  r.  Higgins,  3  Stark.  182  ;  1  T.  R.  164,  per  Buller,  J.  But  in  such  cases, 
if  the  defendant  wishes  to  examine  his  bail,  the  Court  will  either  allow  his  name  to  be 
stricken  out,  on  the  defendant's  adding  and  justifying  another  person  as  his  bail  ;  or, 
even  at  the  trial,  will  permit  it  to  be  stricken  out  of  the  bail-piece,  upou  the  defend- 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE  ORIGINAL   TEXT.  885 

If  an  underwriter,  who  has  paid  his  proportion,  is  to  be  repaid  in  the 
event  of  the  plaintiff's  success  in  a  suit  against  another  underwriter 
upon  the  same  policy,  he  cannot  be  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff.2  A 
creditor,  whether  of  a  bankrupt,  or  of  an  etsate,  or  of  any  other  per- 
son, is  not  admissible  as  a  witness  to  increase  or  preserve  the  fund, 
out  of  which  he  is  entitled  to  be  paid,  or  otherwise  benefited.8  Nor 
is  a  bankrupt  competent,  in  an  action  by  his  assignees  to  prove  any 
fact  tending  to  increase  the  fund ;  though  both  he  and  his  creditors 
may  be  witnesses  to  diminish  it.4  The  same  is  true  of  a  legatee, 
without  a  release,  and  also  of  an  heir  or  distributee,  in  any  action 
affecting  the  estate.6  So,  where  the  immediate  effect  of  the  judg- 

ant's  depositing  a  sufficient  sum  with  the  proper  officer  :  1  Tidd's  Pr.  259  ;  Baillie  v. 
Hole,  1  Mood.  &  M.  289  ;  s.  c.  3  C.  P.  560  ;  Whartley  v.  Fearnley,  2  Chitty,  103. 
And  in  like  manner  the  surety  in  a  replevin  bond  may  be  rendered  a  competent  wit- 
ness for  the  plaintiff :  Bailey  v.  Bailey,  1  Bing.  92.  And  so  of  the  indorser  of  a  writ, 
who  thereby  becomes  surety  for  payment  of  the  costs  :  Robert  v.  Adams,  9  Greenl.  9. 
So  in  Indiana,  of  a  prockein  amy :  Harvey  v.  Coffin,  5  Blackf.  566.  See  further, 
Salmon  v.  Ranee,  3  S.  &  R.  311,  314;  Hall  v.  Baylies,  15  Pick.  51,  53;  Beckley  v. 
Freeman,  ib.  468  ;  Allen  v.  Hawks,  13  Pick.  79  ;  McCulloch  v.  Tyson,  2  Hawks  336  ; 
infra,  §  430  ;  Comstock  v.  Paie,  3  Rob.  La.  440. 

2  Forrester  u.  Pigou,  3  Campb.  380 ;  s.  c.  1  M.  &  S.  9. 

8  Craig  v.  Cundell,  1  Campb.  381  ;  Williams  v.  Stephens,  2  id.  301  ;  Shuttleworth 
v.  Bravo,  1  Stra.  507  ;  Powel  v.  Gordon,  2  Esp.  735  ;  Stewart  v.  Kip,  5  Johns.  256  ; 
Holden  v.  Hearn,  1  Beav.  445.  But  to  disqualify  the  witness,  he  must  be  legally 
entitled  to  payment  out  of  the  fund  :  Phoenix  v.  Ingraham,  5  Johns.  427  ;  Peyton  v. 
Hallett,  1  Caines  363,  379  ;  Howard  v.  Chadbourne,  3  Greenl.  461 ;  Marland  v.  Jeffer- 
son, 2  Pick.  240  ;  Wood  v.  Braynard,  9  id.  322.  A  mere  expectation  of  payment, 
however  strong,  if  not  amounting  to  a  legal  right,  has  been  deemed  insufficient  to 
render  him  incompetent :  Seaver  v.  Bradley,  6  Greenl.  60. 

*  Butler  v.  Cooke,  Cowp.  70  ;  Ewens  v.  Gold,  Bull.  N.  P.  43;  Green  v.  Jones,  2 
Campb.  411 ;  Loyd  v.  Stretton,  1  Stark.  40  ;  Rudge  v.  Ferguson,  1  C.  &  P.  253;  Mas- 
ters v.  Drayton,  2  T.  R,  496 ;  Clay  v.  Kirkland,  4  Martin  406.  In  order  to  render 
the  bankrupt  competent,  in  such  cases,  he  must  release  his  allowance  and  surplus  ;  and 
he  must  also  have  obtained  his  certificate,  without  which  he  is  in  no  case  a  competent 
witness  for  his  assignees :  Masters  v.  Drayton,  2  T.  R.  496;  Goodhay  v.  Hendry,  1 
Mood.  &  M.  319.  And  though  his  certificate  has  been  allowed  by  the  competent 
number  of  creditors,  and  no  opposition  to  its  final  allowance  is  anticipated,  yet  until 
its  allowance  by  the  Lord  Chancellor,  he  is  still  incompetent ;  nor  will  the  trial  for 
that  purpose  be  postponed  •  Tennant  v.  Strachan,  1  Mood.  &  M.  377.  So,  if  his  cer- 
tificate has  been  finally  obtained,  yet,  if  his  future  effects  remain  liable  (as  in  the  case 
of  a  second  bankruptcy,  where  he  has  not  yet  paid  the  amount  necessary  to  exempt  his 
future  acquisitions),  he  is  still  incompetent  as  a  witness  for  the  assignees,  being  inter- 
ested to  increase  the  fund  :  Kennett  ».  Greenwollers,  Peake's  Cas.  3.  The  same  rules 
apply  to  the  case  of  insolvent  debtors  :  Delafield  v.  Freeman,  6  Bing.  294 ;  8.  c.  4  C. 
&  P.  67  ;  Rudge  v.  Ferguson,  1  C.  &  P.  253.  But  upon  grounds  of  public  policy  and 
convenience,  a  bankmpt  is  held  inadmissible  to  prove  any  fact  which  is  material  to 
support  or  to  defeat  the  fiat  issued  against  him.  Nor  is  a  creditor  competent  to  sup- 
port the  fiat,  whether  he  has  or  has  not  availed  himself  of  the  right  of  proving  under 
the  bankruptcy  :  see  1  Phil.  Ev.  94-96,  and  cases  there  cited. 

6  Helliard  v.  Jennings,  1  Ld.  Raym.  505  ;  1  Burr.  424  ;  2  Stark.  546  ;  Green  v. 
Salmon,  3  N.  &  P.  388  ;  Bloor  v.  Davies,  7  M.  &  W.  235.  And  if  he  is  a  residuary 
legatee,  his  own  release  of  the  debt  will  not  render  him  competent  for  the  executor,  in 
an  action  against  the  debtor  ;  for  he  is  still  interested  in  supporting  the  action,  in  order 
to  relieve  the  estate  from  the  charge  of  the  costs:  Baker  v.  Tyrwhitt,  4  Campb.  27  ; 
6  Bing.  294,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  ;  Matthews  v.  Smith,  2  Y.  &  J.  426  ;  Allington  v.  Bear- 
croft,  Peake  Add.  Cas.  212  ;  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason  181 ;  Randall  v.  Phillips,  3  id. 
378  ;  Campbell  v.  Tousey,  7  Cowen  64 ;  Carlisle  o.  Burley,  3  Greenl.  250.  Nor  is  a 
legatee  competent  to  testify  against  the  validity  of  the  will,  if  it  is,  on  the  whole,  fol 
his  interest  to  defeat  it :  Robert  v.  Trawick,  13  Ala.  68. 


886  APPENDIX  IT. 

ment  for  the  plaintiff  is  to  confirm  the  witness  in  the  enjoyment  of 
an  interest  in  possession,6  or,  to  place  him  in  the  immediate  posses- 
sion of  a  right,7  he  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff. 
Neither  can  a  lessor  be  admitted  as  a  witness,  to  prove  a  right  of 
possession  in  his  lessee  to  a  portion  of  land  claimed  as  part  of  the 
premises  leased.8 

§  393.  So  where  the  event  of  the  suit,  if  it  is  adverse  to  the  party 
adducing  the  witness,  will  render  the  latter  liable  either  to  a  third 
person,  or  to  the  party  himself,  whether  the  liability  arise  from  an 
express  or  implied  legal  obligation  to  indemnify,  or  from  an  express 
or  implied  contract  to  pay  money  upon  that  contingency,  the  witness 
is  in  like  manner  incompetent.  The  cases  under  this  branch  of  the 
rule  are  apparently  somewhat  conflicting;  and  therefore  it  may  de- 
serve a  more  distinct  consideration.  And  here  it  will  be  convenient 
to  distinguish  between  those  cases  where  the  judgment  will  be  evi- 
dence of  the  material  facts  involved  in  the  issue,  and  those  where  it 
will  be  evidence  only  of  the  amount  of  damages  recovered,  which 
the  defendant  may  be  compelled  to  pay.  In  the  former  class, 
which  will  hereafter  be  considered,  the  interest  of  the  party  is  in 
the  record,  to  establish  his  entire  claim;  in  the  latter,  which 
belongs  to  the  present  head,  it  is  only  to  prove  the  amount  of  the 
injury  he  has  suffered. 

§  394.  Thus,  in  an  action  against  the  principal  for  damage  occa- 
sioned by  the  neglect  or  misconduct  of  his  agent  or  servant,  the  latter 
is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  defendant  without  a  release;  for 
he  is,  in  general,  liable  over  to  his  master  or  employer,  in  a  subse- 
quent action,  to  refund  the  amount  of  damages  which  the  latter  may 
have  paid.  And  though  the  record  will  not  be  evidence  against  the 
agent,  to  establish  the  fact  of  misconduct,  unless  he  has  been  duly 
arid  seasonably  informed  of  the  pendency  of  the  suit,  and  required 
to  defend  it,  in  which  case  it  will  be  received  as  evidence  of  all  the 
facts  found; 1  yet  it  will  always  be  admissible  to  show  the  amount  of 
damages  recovered  against  his  employer.2  The  principle  of  this  rule 
applies  to  the  relation  of  master  and  servant,  or  employer  and  agent, 
wherever  that  relation  in  its  broadest  sense  may  be  found  to  exist; 
as,  for  example,  to  the  case  of  a  pilot,  in  an  action  against  the  cap- 
tain and  owner  of  a  vessel  for  mismanagement,  while  the  pilot  was 
in  charge;8  or,  of  the  guard  of  a  coach,  implicated  in  the  like  mis- 

«  Doe».  Williams,  Cowp.  621. 

7  R.  r.  Williams,  9  B.  &  C.  549. 

8  Smith  v.  Chambers,  4  Esp.  164. 

i  Hamilton  v.  Cutts,  4  Mass.  349  ;  Tyler  v.  Ulraer,  12  id.  163.  See  infra,  §§  523, 
627,  538,  539. 

a  Cn-cii  v.  New  River  Co.,  4  T.  R.  589. 

•  Hawkins  v.  Finlayson,  3  C.  &  P.  305.  But  the  pilot  has  been  held  admissible  in 
an  action  by  the  owners  against  the  underwriters,  for  the  loss  of  the  vessel  while  in  his 
charge,  on  the  ground  that  his  interest  was  balanced :  Vairin  v.  Canal  Ins.  Co.,  10 
Ohio  223. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  887 

management,  in  an  action  against  the  proprietor;4  or,  of  a  broker, 
in  an  action  against  the  principal  for  misconduct  in  the  purchase  of 
goods,  which  he  had  done  through  the  broker;6  or,  of  a  sheriff's 
officer,  who  had  given  security,  for  the  due  execution  of  his  duty,  in 
an  action  against  the  sheriff  for  misconduct  in  the  service  of  process 
by  the  same  officer; fl  or,  of  a  shop-master,  in  an  action  by  his  owner 
against  underwriters,  where  the  question  was,  whether  there  had 
been  a  deviation;7  neither  of  whom  is  competent  to  give  testimony, 
the  direct  legal  effect  of  which  will  be,  to  place  himself  in  a  situa- 
tion of  entire  security  against  a  subsequent  action.  But  the  liability 
must  be  direct  and  immediate  to  the  party;  for  if  the  witness  is 
liable  to  a  third  person ,  who  is  liable  to  the  party,  such  circuity  of 
interest  is  no  legal  ground  of  exclusion.8  The  liability  also  must  be 
legal;  for  if  the  contract  be  against  law,  as  for  example,  if  it  be  a 
promise  to  indemnify  an  officer  for  a  violation  of  his  duty  in  the 
service  of  process,  it  is  void ;  and  the  promisor  is  a  competent  wit- 
ness, the  objection  going  only  to  his  credibility.9 

§  395.  The  same  principle  applies  to  other  cases,  where  the  direct 
effect  of  the  judgment  will  be  to  create  any  other  legal  claim  against 
the  witness.  Thus,  if  he  is  to  repay  a  sum  of  money  to  the  plaintiff, 
if  lie  fails  in  the  suit  he  is  incompetent  to  be  sworn  for  the  plaintiff. l 
So,  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance,  where  there  has  been  a 
consolidation  rule,  an  underwriter,  who  is  a  party  to  such  rule,  is 
not  a  competent  witness  for  others.2  The  case  is  the  same,  wher- 
ever a  rule  is  entered  into,  that  one  action  shall  abide  the  event  of 
another ;  for  in  both  these  cases  all  the  parties  have  a  direct  interest 
in  the  result.  And  it  makes  no  difference  in  any  of  these  cases, 
whether  the  witness  is  called  by  the  plaintiff  or  by  the  defendant; 
for,  in  either  case,  the  test  of  interest  is  the  same;  the  question 
being,  whether  a  judgment,  in  favor  of  the  party  calling  the  witness, 
will  procure  a  direct  benefit  to  the  witness.  Thus,  in  assumpsit,  if 
the  non-joinder  of  a  co-contractor  is  pleaded  in  abatement,  such  per- 
son is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  defendant  to  support  the  plea, 

*  Whitamore  v.  Waterhouse,  4  C.  &  P.  383. 

6  Field  v.  Mitchell,  6  Esp.  71 ;  Gevers  v.  Mainwaring,  1  Holt  139  ;  Boorman  v. 
Browne,  1  P.  &  D.  364  ;  Morish  v.  Foote,  8  Taunt.  454. 

6  Powel  v.  Hord,  1  Stra.  650;  s.  c.  2  Ld.  Raym.  1411;  Whitehouse  v.  Atkinson, 
3  C.  &  P.  344  ;  Groom  v.  Bradley,  8  id.  500.  So,  the  creditor  is  incompetent  to  testify 
for  the  officer,  where  he  is  liable  over  to  the  latter,  if  the  plaintiff  succeeds  :  Keightley 
v.  Birch,  3  Campb.  521.  See  also  Jewett  v.  Adams,  8  GreenL  30  ;  Turner  v.  Austin, 
16  Mass.  181 ;  Rice  v.  Wilkins,  8  Shepl.  558. 

T  De  Symonds  v.  De  la  Cour,  2  N.  R.  374. 

«  Clark  v.  Lucas,  Ry.  &  M.  32. 

9  Hodsdon  v.  Wilkins,  7  Greenl.  113. 

1  Fotheringham  v.  Greenwood,  1  Stra.  129;  Rogers  v.  Turner,  5  West.  LawJourn. 
406. 

'  The  same  principle  also  applies  where  the  underwriter,  offered  as  a  witness  for  the 
defendant,  has  paid  the  loss,  upon  an  agreement  with  the  assured  that  the  money 
should  be  repaid,  if  he  failed  to  recover  against  the  other  underwriters :  Forrester  v. 
Pigou,  1  M.  &  8.  9  ;  s.  c.  3  Campb.  380. 


888  APPENDIX   II. 

unless  he  is  released ;  for  though,  if  the  defence  succeed,  the  witness 
will  still  be  liable  to  another  action,  yet  he  has  a  direct  interest  to 
defeat  the  present  action,  both  to  avoid  the  payment  of  costs,  and 
also  to  recover  the  costs  of  the  defence.8  The  case  is  the  same, 
where,  in  a  defence  upon  the  merits,  a  witness  is  called  by  the  de- 
fendant, who  is  confessedly,  or  by  his  own  testimony,  a  co-contractor, 
or  partner  with  him  in  the  subject  of  the  action.4  So,  in  a  suit 
against  one  on  a  joint  obligation,  a  co-obligor,  not  sued,  is  not  a 
competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  to  prove  the  execution  of  the 
instrument  by  the  defendant;  for  he  is  interested  to  relieve  himself 
of  part  of  the  debt,  by  charging  it  on  the  defendant.5  And  upon  a 
similar  principle,  where  an  action  was  brought  upon  a  policy  of  in- 
surance, averred  in  the  declaration  to  have  been  effected  by  the  plain- 
tiffs, as  agents,  for  the  use  and  benefit  and  on  the  account  of  a  third 
person,  it  was  held  that  this  third  person  was  not  a  competent  wit- 
ness for  the  plaintiffs ;  and  that  his  release  to  the  plaintiffs,  prior  to 
the  action,  of  all  actions,  claims,  &c.,  which  he  might  have  against 
them  by  reason  of  the  policy,  or  for  any  moneys  to  be  recovered  of 
the  underwriters,  did  not  render  him  competent;  neither  could  his 
assignment  to  them,  after  action  brought,  of  all  his  interest  in  the 
policy,  have  that  effect;  for  the  action  being  presumed  to  have  been 
brought  by  his  authority,  he  was  still  liable  to  the  attorney  for  the 
costs.6  So,  in  an  action  on  a  joint  and  several  bond  against  the 
surety,  he  cannot  call  the  principal  obligor  to  prove  the  payment  of 
money  by  the  latter  in  satisfaction  of  the  debt;  for  the  witness  has 
an  interest  in  favor  of  his  surety  to  the  extent  of  the  costs.7  So, 
also,  where  a  legatee  sued  the  executor,  for  the  recovery  of  a  specific 
legacy,  namely,  a  bond;  it  was  held,  that  the  obligor,  having  a 
direct  interest  in  preventing  its  being  enforced,  was  not  a  competent 
witness  to  prove  that  the  circumstances,  under  which  the  bond  was 
given,  were  such  as  to  show  that  it  was  irrecoverable.8 

§  396.  Interest  as  Agent  or  Servant.  It  may  seem,  at  the  first 
view,  that  where  the  plaintiff  calls  his  own  servant  or  agent  to  prove 
an  injury  to  his  property,  while  in  the  care  and  custody  of  the  ser- 
vant, there  could  be  no  objection  to  the  competency  of  the  witness 

»  Young  v.  Bairner,  1  Esp.  103  ;  Lefferts  w.  DeMott,  21  Wend.  136. 

*  Birt  v.  Hood,  1  Esp.  20  ;  Goodacre  v.  Breaine,  Peake  174  ;  Cheyne  v.  Koops,  4 
Esp.  112;  Evans  v.  Yeatherd,  2  Bing.  133;  Hall  v.  Cecil,  6  Bing.  181;  Russell  v. 
Blake,  2  M.  &  G.  374,  381,  382  ;  Vanzant  v.  Kay,  2  Humph.  106,  112.  But  this  point 
has  in  some  cases  been  otherwise  decided;  see  Cossham  v.  Goldney,  2  Stark.  414  ; 
Blackett  v.  Weir,  5  B.  &  C.  385  ;  see  also  Poole  v.  Palmer,  9  M.  &  W.  71. 

6  Marshall  v.  Thrailkill,  12  Ohio  275  ;  Ripley  v.  Thompson,  12  Moore  55  ;  Brown 
v.   Brown,  4  Taunt.  752;  Marquand  v.  Webb,  16  Johns.  89;  Purviance  v.  Dryden, 
3  S.  &  R.  402,  407  ;  and  see  Latham  v.  Kenniston,  13  N.  H.  203. 

a  Bell  v.  Smith.  5  B.  &  C.  188. 

7  Townsend  v.  Downing,  14  East  565,  567,  per  Ld.  Ellenborongh.     In  an  action 
against  the  sheriff,  for  a  negligent  escape,  the  debtor  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  th« 
defendant,  he  being  liable  over  to  the  defendant  for  the  damages  and  costs  :  Griffin  v. 
Brown,  2  Pick.  304. 

8  Davies  v.  Morgan,  1  Beav.  405. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  889 

to  prove  misconduct  in  the  defendant;  because,  whatever  might  be 
the  result  of  the  action,  the  record  would  be  no  evidence  against  him 
in  a  subsequent  action  by  the  plaintiff.  But  still  the  witness,  in 
such  case,  is  held  inadmissible;  upon  the  general  principle  already 
mentioned,1  in  cases  where  the  master  or  principal  is  defendant, 
namely,  that  a  verdict  for  the  master  would  place  the  servant  or 
agent  in  a  state  of  security  against  any  action,  which,  otherwise,  the 
master  might  bring  against  him;  to  prevent  which  he  is  directly 
interested  to  fix  the  liability  on  the  defendant.  Thus,  in  an  action 
for  an  injury  to  the  plaintiff's  cart,  or  coach,  or  horses,  by  negli- 
gently driving  against  them,  the  plaintiff's  own  driver  or  coachman 
is  not  a  competent  witness  for  him  without  a  release.2  So,  in  an 
action  by  the  shipper  of  goods,  on  a  policy  of  insurance,  the  owner 
of  the  ship  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the 
seaworthiness  of  the  ship,  he  having  a  direct  interest  to  exonerate 
himself  from  liability  to  an  action  for  the  want  of  seaworthiness,  if 
the  plaintiff  should  fail  to  recover  of  the  underwriter.8  The  only 
difference  between  the  case  where  the  master  is  plaintiff  and  where 
he  is  defendant,  is  this,  that  in  the  latter  case  he  might  claim  of  the 
servant  both  the  damages  and  costs  which  he  had  been  compelled  to 
pay;  but  in  the  former,  he  could  claim  only  such  damages  as 
directly  resulted  from  the  servant's  misconduct,  of  which  the  costs 
of  an  unfounded  suit  of  his  own  would  not  constitute  a  part.4 

§  397.  Interest  from  Liability  Over.  Where  the  interest  of  the 
witness  arises  from  liability  over,  it  is  sufficient  that  he  is  bound  to 
indemnify  the  party  calling  him  against  the  consequence  of  some  fact 
essential  to  the  judgment.  It  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be 
an  engagement  to  indemnify  him  generally  against  the  judgment 
itself,  though  this  is  substantially  involved  in  the  other;  for  a  cove- 
nant of  indemnity  against  a  particular  fact,  essential  to  the  judg- 
ment, is  in  effect  a  covenant  of  indemnity  against  such  a  judgment. 
Thus,  the  warrantor  of  title  to  the  property  which  is  in  controversy 
is  generally  incompetent  as  a  witness  for  his  vendee,  in  an  action 
concerning  the  title.  And  it  makes  no  difference  in  what  manner 
the  liability  arises,  nor  whether  the  property  is  real  or  personal 
estate.  If  the  title  is  in  controversy,  the  person  who  is  bound  to 

1  Supra,  §  393.     This  principle  is  applied  to  all  cases,  where  the  testimony  of  the 
witness,  adduced  by  the  plaintiff,  would  discharge  him  from  the  plaintiffs  demand  by 
establishing  it  against  the  defendant.     Thus,  in  an  action  by  A  against  B  for  the  board 
of  C,  the  latter  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the  claim  :  Emer- 
ton  v.  Andrews,  4  Mass.  653  ;  Hodson  v.  Marshall,  7  C.  &  P.  16  ;  infra,  §  416. 

2  Miller  v.  Falconer,  1  Campb.  251  ;  Morish  v.  Foote.  8  Taunt.  454  :  Kerrison  v. 
Coatsworth,  1  C.  &  P.  645  ;  Wake  v.  Lock,  5  id.  454.     In  Sherman  v.   Barnes,  1  M. 
&  Rob.  69,  the  same  point  was  so  ruled  by  Tindal,  C.  J.,  upon  the  authority  of  Mor- 
ish t1.  Foote,  though  he  seems  to  have  thought  otherwise  upon  principle,  and  perhaps 
with  better  reason. 

8  Rotheroe  v.  Elton,  Peake  84,  cited  and  approved,  per  Gibbs,  C.  J.,  in  8  Taunt 
457. 

*  Per  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in  Fancourt  v.  Bull,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  688,  69L 


890  APPENDIX   II. 

make  it  good  to  one  of  the  litigating  parties  against  the  claim  of  the 
other  is  identified  in  interest  with  that  party,  and  therefore  cannot 
testify  in  his  favor.1  And  if  the  quality  or  soundness  is  the  subject 
of  dispute,  and  the  vendee  with  warranty  has  resold  the  article  with 
similar  warranty,  the  principle  is  still  the  same.  If  the  effect  of 
the  judgment  is  certainly  to  render  him  liable,  though  it  be  only  for 
costs,  he  is  incompetent,2  but  if  it  is  only  to  render  it  more  or  less 
probable  that  he  will  be  prosecuted,  the  objection  goes  only  to  his 
credibility.  But  whatever  the  case  may  be,  his  liability  must  be 
direct  and  immediate  to  the  party  calling  him,  and  not  circuitous  and 
to  some  other  person,  as,  if  a  remote  vendor  with  warranty  is  called 
by  the  defendant  as  a  witness,  where  the  article  has  been  successively 
sold  by  several  persons  with  the  same  warranty,  before  it  came  to 
the  defendant.8 

§  398.  "Warrantor.  In  order  to  render  the  witness  liable,  and 
therefore  incompetent,  as  warrantor  of  the  title,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  show  an  express  contract  to  that  effect;  for  an  implied  warranty 
is  equally  binding.  Thus,  the  vendor  of  goods,  having  possession 
and  selling  them  as  his  own,  is  held  bound  in  law  to  warrant  the 
title  to  the  vendee ; l  and  therefore  he  is  generally  not  competent  as 
a  witness  for  the  vendee  in  support  of  the  title.2  This  implied  war- 

1  Serle  v.  Serle,  2  Roll.  Abr.  685  ;  21  Vin.  Abr.  362,  tit.  Trial,  G,  f,  pi.  1  ;  Steers 
v.  Carwardine,  8  0.  &  P.  570.     But  if  the  vendor  sold  without  any  covenant  of  title, 
or  with  a  covenant  restricted  to  claims  set  up  under  the  vendor  himself  alone,  the  ven- 
dor is  a  competent  witness  for  his  vendee  :  Busby  v.  Greenslate,  1  Stra.  445  ;  Twam- 
bly  v.  Henley,  4  Mass.  441  ;  Beidelnmn  v.  Foulk,  5  Watts  308 ;  Adams  v.  Cuddy,  13 
Pick.  460  ;  Bridge  v.  Eggleston,  14  Mass.  245  ;  Davis  v.  Spooner,  3  Pick.  284  ;  Lothrop 
v.  Muzzy,  5  Greenl.  450. 

2  Lewis  v.  Peake,  7  Taunt.  153.     In  this  case  the  buyer  of  a  horse  with  warranty 
resold  him  with  a  similar  warranty,  and,  being  sued  thereon,  he  gave  notice  of  the 
action  to  his  vendor,  offering  him  the  option  of  defending  it  ;  to  which  having  received 
no  answer,  he  defended  it  himself,  and  failed  ;  it  was  holden,  that  he  was  entitled  to 
recover  of  his  vendor  the  costs  of  defending  that  action,  as  part  of  the  damages  he  had 
sustained  by  the  false  warranty.     In  the  later  case  of  Baldwin  v.  Dixon,  1  M.  &  Rob. 
59,  where  the  defendant,  in  an  action  on  a  warranty  of  a  horse,  called  his  vendor,  who 
hud  given  a  similar  warranty,  Lord  Teuterden,  after  examining  authorities,  admitted 
the  witness.     A  vendor  was  admitted,  under  similar  circumstances,  by  Lord  Alvanley, 
in  Briggs  v.  Crick,  5  Esp.  99.     But  in  neither  of  these  cases  does  it  appear  that  the 
witness  had  been  called  upon  to  defend  the  suit.     In  the  still  more  recent  case  of  Biss 
v.  Mountain,  1  M.  &  Rob.  302,  after  an  examination  of  various  authorities,  Alderson, 
J.,  held  the  vendor  incompetent,  on  the  ground  that  the  effect  of  the  judgment  for  the 
defendant  would  be  to  relieve  the  witness  from  an  action  at  his  suit. 

8  Clark  a.  Lima*,  R.  Y.  &  M.  32  ;  1  C.  &  P.  156  ;  Briggs  v.  Crick,  5  Esp.  99  ;  Mar- 
tin  r.  Kelly,  1  Stew.  Ala.  198.  Where  the  plaintiffs  goods  were  on  the  wagon  of  a 
carrier,  which  was  driven  by  the  carrier's  servant ;  and  the  goods  were  alleged  to  lie 
injured  by  reason  of  a  defect  in  the  highway  ;  it  was  held,  in  an  action  against  the 
town  for  this  defect,  that  the  carrier's  servant  was  a  competent  witness  for  the  owner 
of  the  goods  :  Littlefield  v.  Portland,  13  Shepl.  37. 

1  Bl.  Conim.  451  ;  bee  also  2  Kent  Comm.  478,  and  cases  there  cited  ;  see  also 
Emerson  v.  Brigham,  10  Mass.  203  (Rand's  ed.)  n. 

a  Heermance  v.  Vernoy,  6  Johns.  5  ;  Hale  v.  Smith,  6  Greenl.  416  ;  Baxter  v.  Gra- 
ham, 5  Watts  418.  In  the  general  doctrine,  stated  in  the  text,  that  where  the  vendor 
is  liable  over,  though  it  be  only  for  costs,  he  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  ven- 
dee, the  English  and  American  decisions  agree.  And  it  is  believed  that  the  weight 
of  English  authority  ia  on  the  side  of  the  American  doctrine,  as  stated  in  the  text : 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE  ORIGINAL   TEXT.  891 

ranty  of  title,  however,  in  the  case  of  sales  by  sheriffs,  executors, 
administrators  and  other  trustees,  is  understood  to  extend  no  farther 
than  this,  that  they  do  not  know  of  any  infirmity  in  their  title  to  sell 
in  such  capacity,  and  therefore  they  are  in  general  competent 
witnesses.8 

§  399.  Parties  to  Negotiable  Instruments  :  Commercial  Paper.  In 
regard  to  parties  to  bills  of  exchange  and  negotiable  promissory  notes, 
we  have  already  seen  that  the  persons  who  have  put  them  into  circula- 
tion by  indorsements  are  sometimes  held  incompetent  witnesses,  to 
prove  them  originally  void.1  But,  subject  to  this  exception,  which  is 
maintained  on  grounds  of  public  policy,  and  of  the  interest  of  trade, 
and  the  necessity  of  confidence  in  commercial  transactions,  and  which, 
moreover,  is  not  everywhere  conceded,  parties  to  these  instruments  are 
admitted  or  rejected,  in  suits  between  other  parties,  like  any  other 
witnesses,  according  as  they  are  interested  or  not  in  the  event  of  the 
suit.  In  general,  their  interest  will  be  found  to  be  equal  on  both 
sides ;  and  in  all  cases  of  balanced  interest,  the  witness,  as  we  shall 
hereafter  see,  is  admissible.2  Thus,  in  an  action  against  one  of 
several  makers  of  a  note,  another  maker  is  a  competent  witness  for 
the  plaintiff  as  he  stands  indifferent;  for  if  the  plaintiff  should  re- 
cover in  that  action,  the  witness  will  be  liable  to  pay  his  contribu- 
tory share;  and  if  the  plaintiff  should  fail  in  that  action,  and  force 
the  witness  to  pay  the  whole,  in  another  suit,  he  will  still  be  entitled 
to  contribution.8  So,  in  an  action  against  the  acceptor  of  a  bill, 
the  drawer  is  in  general  a  competent  witness  for  either  party;  for  if 
the  plaintiff  recovers,  the  witness  pays  the  bill  by  the  hands  of  the 

namely,  that  the  vendor  in  possession  stipulates  that  his  title  is  good.  But  where  the 
witness  claims  to  have  derived  from  the  plaintiff  the  same  title  which  he  conveyed  to 
the  defendant,  and  so  is  accountable  for  the  value  to  the  one  party  or  the  other,  in 
either  event  of  the  suit,  unless  he  can  discharge  himself  by  other  proof,  he  is  a  com- 
petent witness  for  the  defendant;  unless  he  has  so  conducted  as  to  render  himself 
accountable  to  the  latter  for  the  costs  of  the  suit,  as  part  of  the  damages  to  be  recov- 
ered against  him.  Thus,  where,  in  trover  for  a  horse,  the  defendant  called  his  vendor 
to  prove  that  the  horse  was  pledged  to  him  for  a  debt  due  from  the  plaintiff,  with 
authority  to  sell  him  after  a  certain  day,  and  that  he  sold  him  accordingly  to  the  de- 
fendant;  he  was  held  a  competent  witness:  Nix  v.  Cutting,  4  Taunt.  18.  So,  in  as- 
sumpsit,  for  the  price  of  wine  sold  to  the  defendant,  where  the  defence  was,  that  he 
bought  it  of  one  Faircloth,  and  not  of  the  plaintiff,  Faircloth  was  held  a  competent 
witness  for  the  defendant  to  prove  that  he  himself  purchased  the  wine  of  the  plaintiff, 
and  sold  it  to  the  defendant,  who  had  paid  him  the  price :  Larbalastier  v.  Clark,  1  B. 
&  Ad.  899.  So,  the  defendant's  vendor  has  been  held  competent,  in  trover,  to  prove 
that  the  goods  were  his  own,  and  had  been  fraudulently  taken  from  him  by  the  plain- 
tiff :  Ward  v.  Wilkinson,  4  B.  &  Aid.  410,  where  Nix  v.  Cutting  is  explained  by  Hoi- 
royd,  J.  See  also  Baldwin  v.  Dixon,  1  M.  &  Rob.  59  ;  Briggs  v.  Crick,  5  Esp.  99,  and 
Mr.  Starkie's  observations  on  some  of  these  cases  :  1  Stark.  Evid.  109,  n.  n  ;  2  Stark 
Evid.  894,  n.  d. 

8  Peto  v.  Blades,  5  Taunt.  657 ;  Mockbee  v.  Gardner,  2  Ear.  &  Gill.  176 ;  Peters- 
mans  v.  Laws,  6  Leigh  523,  529. 

1  Supra,  §§  384,  385. 

2  Infra,  §  420. 

8  York  v.  Blott,  5  M.  &  S.  71.  He  has  also  been  held  admissible  for  the  defend- 
ant :  Thompson  v.  Armstrong,  5  Ala.  383.  But  see  the  cases  cited  supra,  §  395,  notes, 
and  12  Ohio  279. 


892  APPENDIX  II. 

acceptor;  if  not,  he  is  liable  to  pay  it  himself.4  And  in  an  action 
by  the  indorsee  of  a  note  against  the  indorser,  the  maker  is  a  compe- 
tent witness  for  the  plaintiff;  for  if  the  plaintiff  prevails,  the  witness 
will  be  liable  to  pay  the  note  to  the  defendant;  and  if  the  defendant 
prevails,  the  witness  will  be  liable,  to  the  same  extent,  to  the 
plaintiff.5 

§  400.  And  though  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses,  by  defeating 
the  present  action  on  the  bill  or  note,  may  probably  deter  the  holder 
from  proceeding  in  another  action  against  the  witness,  yet  this  only 
affords  matter  of  observation  to  the  jury,  as  to  the  credit  to  be  given 
to  his  testimony.  Thus,  in  an  action  by  the  indorsee  of  a  note 
against  the  indorser,  the  maker  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  de- 
fendant, to  prove  that  the  date  has  been  altered.8  And  in  an  action 
by  the  indorsee  of  a  bill  against  the  drawer  or  acceptor,  an  indorser 
is ,  in  general,  a  competent  witness  for  either  party ;  for  the  plaintiff, 
because,  though  his  success  may  prevent  him  from  calling  on  the  in- 
dorser,  it  is  not  certain  that  it  will;  and  whatever  part  of  the  bill  or 
note  he  may  be  compelled  to  pay,  he  may  recover  again  of  the 
drawer  or  acceptor;  and  he  is  competent  for  the  defendant,  be- 
cause, if  the  plaintiff  fails  against  the  drawer  or  acceptor,  he  is 
driven  either  to  sue  the  indorser  or  abandon  his  claim.7 

§  401.  Liability  for  Costs.  But  if  the  verdict  would  necessarily 
benefit  or  affect  the  witness,  as  if  he  would  be  liable,  in  one  event, 
to  the  costs  of  the  action,  then,  without  a  release,  which  will  annul 
his  interest  in  the  event,  he  will  not  be  admissible  as  a  witness  on 
the  side  of  the  party  in  whose  favor  he  is  so  interested.  Thus,  the 
party  for  whose  use  and  accommodation  note  or  bill  has  been  drawn 
or  accepted,  is  incompetent  as  a  witness,  when  adduced  by  him  who 
has  lent  his  own  name  and  liability  for  the  accommodation  of  the 
witness.1  So,  in  an  action  against  the  drawer  of  a  bill  of  exchange, 
it  has  been  held,  that  the  acceptor  is  not  a  competent  witness  for  the 
defendant,  to  prove  a  set-off;  because  he  is  interested  in  lessening 
the  balance,  being  answerable  to  the  defendant  only  for  the  amount 
which  the  plaintiff  may  recover  against  him.2 

4  Dickinson  v.  Prentice,  4  Esp.  32  ;  Lowber  v.  Shaw,  5  Mason  241,  per  Story,  J.  ; 
Rich  v.  Topping,  Peake  224.  But  if  he  is  liable  in  one.  event  for  the  costs,  he  has 
an  interest  on  that  side,  and  is  inadmissible  :  Scott  v.  McLellan,  2  Greenl.  199  ;  supra, 
§391,  and  n.  (3). 

6  Yenning  v.  Shuttleworth,  Bayley  on  Bills,  p.  593  ;  Hubbly  v.  Brown,  16  Johns. 
70.  But  the  maker  of  an  accommodation  note,  made  for  his  own  benefit,  is  incom- 
petent: Pierce  v.  Butler,  14  Mass.  303,  312  ;  infra,  401. 

6  Levi  ».  Essex,  MSS.,  2  E«p.  Dig.  708,  per  Ld.  Mansfield;  Chitty  on  Bills,  p.  654, 
n.  (6).  (8th  ed.) 

7  Bayley  on  Bills,  594,  595  (2d  Am.  ed.  by  Phillips  &  Sewall).     And  see  Bay  v. 
Gunn,  1  Denio  108. 

1  Jones  v.  Brooke,  4  Taunt.  463  ;  snpra,  §  391,  and  n.     See  also  Bottomley  v.  Wil- 
son, 3  Stark.  148  ;  Harman  v.  Lasbrey,  Holt's  Cas.  390 ;  Edmonds  v.  Lowe,  8  B.  &  C. 
407  ;  Hall  n.  Cecil,  6  Bin?.  181  :  Scott  v.  McLellan,  2  Greenl.  199  ;  Peirce  v.  Butler, 
14  Mass.  303,  312  ;  Southard  v.  Wilson.  8  Shepl.  494. 

2  Mainwaring  v.  Mytton,  1  Stark.  83.     It  is  deemed  unnecessary  any  further  to 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  893 

§  402.  Where  a  liability  to  costs  in  the  suit  arises  in  any  other 
manner,  it  is  still  an  interest  sufficient  to  render  the  witness  incom- 
petent.1 Thus,  where  the  witness  called  by  the  plaintiff  had  himself 
employed  the  attorney,  to  whom  he  had  made  himself  liable  for  the 
costs,  he  was  held  incompetent,  without  a  release  from  the  attorney.8 
So,  where  he  had  given  the  plaintiff  a  bond  of  indemnity  against  the 
costs  of  the  suit,  he  was  held  incompetent  as  a  witness  for  the  plain- 
tiff, as  to  any  point  arising  in  the  action ;  even  such  as  the  service  of 
a  notice  on  the  defendant,  to  produce  certain  papers  at  the  trial.8 
Thus,  also,  where  an  attorney,4  or  an  executor,6  or  the  tenant,  on  whose 
premises  the  goods  of  the  plaintiff  in  replevin  had  been  distrained 
for  rent,6  or  the  principal  in  an  administration  bond,  the  action  being 
only  against  the  surety,7  have  been  found  personally  liable  for  the 
costs  of  the  suit,  they  have  been  held  incompetent  as  witnesses  on  the 
side  of  the  party  in  whose  favor  they  were  thus  interested.  But  if 
the  contract  of  indemnity  is  illegal,  as,  for  example,  if  it  be  a  con- 
tract to  bear  each  other  harmless  in  doing  wrong,  it  creates  no  legal 
liability  to  affect  the  witness.8 

§  403.  Criminal  Cases.  This  doctrine  is  applied  in  the  same  man- 
ner in  criminal  cases,  where  the  witness  has  a  direct,  certain,  and  im- 
mediate interest  in  the  result  of  the  prosecution.  Thus,  in  cases  of 
summary  convictions,  where  a  penalty  is  imposed  by  statute,  and  the 
whole  or  a  part  is  given  to  the  informer  or  prosecutor,  who  becomes 
entitled  to  it  forthwith  upon  the  conviction,  he  is  not,  at  the  common 
law,  a  competent  witness  for  the  prosecution.1  So,  in  a  prosecution 
under  the  statutes  for  forcible  entry,  where  the  party  injured  is  en- 
titled to  an  award  of  immediate  restitution  of  the  lands,  he  is  not  a 
competent  witness.2  This  rule,  however,  is  subject  to  many  excep- 
tions, which  will  hereafter  be  stated.8  But  it  may  be  proper  here  to 

pursue  this  subject  iu  this  place,  or  particularly  to  mention  any  of  the  numerous  cases, 
in  which  a  party  to  a  bill  or  note  has  been  held  competent,  or  otherwise,  on  the  ground 
of  being  free  from  iuterest,  or  interested,  under  tne  particular  circumstances  of  the 
case.  It  will  suffice  to  refer  the  reader  to  the  cases  collected  in  Bayley  on  Bills,  pp. 
586-599  (2d  Am.  ed.  by  Phillips  &  Sewall),  with  the  notes  of  the  learned  editors; 
Chitty  on  Bills,  654-659  (8th  ed.)  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  179,  182  (6th  Am.  ed.  with  Met- 
calf's,  Ingraham's,  and  Gerhard's  notes)  ;  Thayer  v.  Grossman,  1  Metcalf  416. 

1  See  supra,  §  395. 

2  York  v.  Gribble,  1  Esp.  319  ;  Marland  v.  Jefferson,  2  Pick.  240 ;  Handley  v.  Ed- 
wards, 1  Curt.  722. 

8  Butler  v.  Warren,  11  Johns.  57. 
*  Chadwick  v.  Upton,  3  Pick.  442. 

6  Parker  v.  Vincent,  3  C.  &  P.  38. 
8  Rush  v.  Flick  wire,  17  S.  &  R.  82. 

7  Owens  v.  Collinson,  3  Gill  &  Johns.  26.     See  also  Cannon  v.  Jones,  4  Hawks  368  ; 
Riddle  v.  Moss,  7  Cranch  206. 

8  Humphreys  v.  Miller,   4  C.  &  P.   7,  per  Ld.  Tenterden ;  Hodson  v.  Wilkins, 
7  Greenl.  113. 

1  R.  w.  Williams,  9  B.  &  C.  549  ;  Com.  v.  Paull,  4  Pick.  251  ;  R.  v.  Tilly,  1  Stra. 
316  ;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  601,  602.     But  where  the  penalty  is  to  be  recovered  by  the 
witness  in  a  subsequent  civil  action,  he  is  not  an  incompetent  witness  upon  the  indict/ 
ment  :  R.  ».  Luckup,  Willes,  425,  n.  ;  9  B.  &  C.  557,  558. 

2  R.  v.  Beavan,  Ry.  &  M.  242. 
»  See  infra,  §  412. 


894  APPENDIX   II. 

remark,  that,  in  general,  where  the  penalty  or  provision  for  restitu- 
tion is  evidently  introduced  for  the  sake  of  the  party  injured,  rather 
than  to  insure  the  detection  and  punishment  of  the  offender,  the  party 
is  held  incompetent.4 

§  404.  Interest  in  the  Record.  Having  thus  briefly  considered  the 
subject  of  disqualification,  resulting  from  a  direct,  certain,  and  im- 
mediate interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  we  come  now  to  the  second 
branch  of  the  general  rule,  namely,  that  of  interest  in  the  record,  as 
an  instrument  of  evidence  in  some  other  suit,  to  prove  a  fact  therein 
alleged.  The  record  of  a  judgment,  as  hereafter  will  be  seen,  is  always 
admissible,  even  in  an  action  between  strangers,  to  prove  the  fact  that 
such  a  judgment  was  rendered,  and  for  such  a  sum ;  but  it  is  not 
always  and  in  all  cases  admissible  to  prove  the  truth  of  any  fact,  on 
which  the  judgment  was  founded.  Thus  the  record  of  a  judgment 
against  the  master,  for  the  negligence  of  his  servant,  would  be  ad- 
missible in  a  subsequent  action  by  the  master  against  the  servant  to 
prove  the  fact,  that  such  a  judgment  had  been  recovered  against 
the  master  for  such  an  amount,  and  upon  such  and  such  allegations ; 
but  not  to  prove  that  either  of  those  allegations  was  true ;  unless  in 
certain  cases,  where  the  servant  or  agent  has  undertaken  the  defence, 
or,  being  bound  to  indemnify,  has  been  duly  required  to  assume  it. 
But  under  the  present  head  are  usually  classed  only  those  cases  in 
which  the  record  is  admissible  in  evidence  for  or  against  the  witness, 
to  establish  the  facts  therein  alleged  or  involved,  in  order  to  acquire 
a  benefit  or  repel  a  loss ; 1  and  it  is  in  this  view  alone  that  the  subject 
will  now  be  considered. 

§  405.  Claims  of  Customary  Right.  The  usual  and  clearest  illus- 
tration of  this  branch  of  the  rule  is  the  case  of  an  action  brought  by 
or  against  one  of  several  persons,  who  claim  a  customary  right  of  com- 
mon, or  some  other  species  of  customary  right.  In  general,  in  all  cases 
depending  on  the  existence  of  a  particular  custom,  a  judgment  estab- 
lishing that  custom  is  evidence,  though  the  parties  are  different. 
Therefore,  no  person  is  a  competent  witness  in  support  of  such  cus- 
tom, who  would  derive  a  benefit  from  its  establishment;  because  the 
record  would  be  evidence  for  him  in  another  suit,  in  which  his  own 
right  may  be  controverted.  Thus,  where  the  plaintiff  prescribed  for 
common  of  pasture  upon  Hampton  Common,  as  appurtenant  to  his 
ancient  messuage,  and  charged  the  defendant  with  neglect  to  repair 
the  fence  ;  it  was  held,  that  another  commoner,  who  claimed  a  sim- 
ilar prescription  in  right  of  another  tenement,  was  not  a  competent 
witness  to  prove  the  charge  j1  and  a  fortiori  he  is  not,  where  the  pres- 
cription is,  that  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  place  have  common  there.4 

4  R.  v.  Williams,  9  B.  &  C.  549,  yx-r  Bayley,  J. 

i  1  Stark.  Evid.  114,  115  ;  Hunter  v.  King,  4  B.  &  Aid.  210. 

1  Anscomb  v.  Shore,  1  Taunt.  261.     See  also  Parker  v.  Mitchell,  11  Ad.  &  EL 
788. 

2  Hockley  v.  Lamb,  1  Ld.  Raym.  731. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  895 

Thus,  also,  an  inhabitant  of  a  town  is  not  a  competent  witness  to  prove 
a  prescription  for  all  the  inhabitants  to  dig  clams  in  a  certain  place ;  * 
nor  to  prove  a  prescriptive  right  of  way  for  all  the  inhabitants.*  So 
where  the  right  to  a  seat  in  the  common  council  of  a  borough  was  in 
controversy,  and  it  was  insisted  that  by  prescription  no  person  was 
entitled,  unless  he  was  an  inhabitant  and  also  had  a  burgage  tenure ; 
it  was  held,  that,  though  a  person  having  but  one  of  these  qualifica- 
tions was  a  competent  witness  to  prove  the  prescription,  one  who  had 
them  both  was  not ;  for  he  would  thereby  establish  an  exclusive  right 
in  favor  of  himself.6  So,  where  a  corporation  was  lord  of  a  manor, 
and  had  approved  and  leased  a  part  of  the  common,  a  freeman  was 
held  incompetent  to  prove  that  a  sufficiency  of  common  was  left  for 
the  commoners.6  So,  one  who  has  acted  in  breach  of  an  alleged  cus- 
tom by  the  exercise  of  a  particular  trade,  is  not  a  competent  witness 
to  disprove  the  existence  of  such  custom.7  Nor  is  the  owner  of 
property  within  a  chapelry  a  competent  witness  to  disprove  an  im- 
memorial usage,  that. the  land-owners  there  ought  to  repair  the  chapel.8 
And  it  is  proper  here  to  add,  that  in  order  to  exclude  a  witness,  where 
the  verdict  depends  on  a  custom,  which  he  is  interested  to  support, 
it  seems  to  be  necessary  that  the  custom  should  be  stated  on  the 
record ; 9  for  it  is  said,  that  the  effect  of  the  verdict  to  support  the 
custom  may  be  aided  by  evidence.10 

§  406.  Interest  both  in  Suit  and  Record.  There  are  some  cases, 
in  which  the  interest  of  the  witness  falls  under  both  branches  of  this 
rule,  and  in  which  he  has  been  rejected,  sometimes  on  the  ground  of 
immediate  interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit,  and  sometimes  on  the 
ground  of  interest  in  the  record,  as  an  instrument  of  evidence.  Such 
is  the  case  of  the  tenant  in  possession  in  an  action  of  ejectment; 
who  is  held  incompetent  either  to  support  his  landlord's  title,1  or,  to 
prove  that  himself,  and  not  the  defendant,  was  the  tenant  in  posses- 
sion of  the  land.2  And  where  a  declaration  was  served  on  two 
tenants,  in  possession  of  different  parts  of  the  premises,  and  a  third 
person  entered  into  a  rule  to  defend  alone  as  landlord,  it  was  held, 
that  neither  of  the  tenants  was  a  competent  witness  for  the  landlord, 

8  Lufkin  v.  Haskell,  3  Pick.  356  ;  Moore  v.  Griffin,  9  Shepl.  350. 

*  Odiorne  v.  Wade,  8  Pick.  518.  The  statutes  which  render  the  inhabitants  of 
towns  f-onipetent  witnesses,  where  the  corporation  is  a  party,  or  is  interested,  apply 
only  to  cases  of  corporate  rights  or  interest,  and  not  to  cases  of  individual  and  private 
interest,  though  these  may  extend  to  every  inhabitant.  See  supra,  §  331. 

6  Stevenson  v.  Nevinson,  Mayor,  &c.,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1353. 
«  Burton  v.  Hinde,  5  T.  R.  174. 

7  The  Carpenters,  &c.  of  Shrewsbury  v.  Hayward,  1  Doug.  374. 

8  Rhodes  v.  Ainsworth,  1  B.  &  Aid.  87.     See  also  Lord  Falmouth  v.  George,  5  Bing. 
286. 

9  Lord  Falmouth  v.  George,  5  Bing.  286  ,  Stevenson  v.  Nevinson  et  al.,  2  Ld.  Raym 
1 353 

10  1  Stark.  Evid.  115,  n.  e. 

1  Doe  v.  Williams,  Cowp.  621  ;  Bourne  v.  Turner,  1  Stra.  632. 

2  Doe  v.  Wilde,  5  Taunt.  183  ;  Doe  v.  Bingham,  4  B.  &  Aid.  672. 


896  APPENDIX  II. 

to  prove  an  adverse  possession  by  the  other  of  the  part  held  by  him; 
for  as  they  were  identified  with  the  landlord  in  interest,  the  judg- 
ment for  the  plaintiff  would  be  evidence  of  his  title,  in  a  future 
action  against  them  for  the  mesne  profits.8 

§  407.  Criminal  Cases ;  Interest  in  Record.  So,  in  criminal  cases, 
a  person  interested  in  the  record  is  not  a  competent  witness.  Thus 
an  accessory,  whether  before  or  after  the  fact,  is  not  competent  to 
testify  for  the  principal. *  And  where  several  were  indicted  for  a 
conspiracy,  the  wife  of  one  was  held  not  admissible  as  a  witness  for 
the  others ;  a  joint  offence  being  charged,  and  an  acquittal  of  all  the 
others  being  a  ground  of  discharge  for  her  husband.2  Nor  is  the 
wife  of  one  joint  trespasser  a  competent  witness  for  another,  even 
after  the  case  is  already  clearly  proved  against  her  husband.8 

§  408.  Illustrations  of  Competency  for  "Want  of  Interest;  Remote 
Interest.  The  extent  and  meaning  of  the  rule,  by  which  an  inter- 
ested witness  is  rejected  as  incompetent,  may  be  further  illustrated 
by  reference  to  some  cases,  in  which  the  witness  has  been  deemed 
not  disqualified.  We  have  already  seen  that  mere  wishes  or  bias  on 
the  mind  of  the  witness  in  favor  of  the  party  producing  him,  or 
strong  hopes  or  expectations  of  benefit,  or  similarity  of  situation,  or 
any  other  motive,  short  of  an  actual  and  legal  interest  in  the  suit, 
will  not  disqualify  the  witness.1  Such  circumstances  may  influence 
his  mind,  and  affect  his  opinions,  and  perhaps  may  tempt  him  at 
least  to  give  a  false  color  to  his  statements;  and  therefore  they 
should  be  carefully  considered  by  the  jury,  in  determining  the  weight 
or  credibility  to  be  given  to  his  testimony ;  but  they  are  not  deemed 
sufficient  to  justify  its  utter  exclusion  from  the  jury.  It  may  now 
be  further  observed,  that  a  remote,  contingent,  and  uncertain  interest, 
does  not  disqualify  the  witness.  Thus,  a  -paid  legatee  of  a  specific 
sum,  or  of  a  chattel,  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  executor;  for 
though  the  money  paid  to  a  legatee  may  sometimes  be  recovered  back, 
when  necessary  for  the  payment  of  paramount  claims,  yet  it  is  not 
certain  that  it  will  be  needed  for  such  purpose;  nor  is  it  certain,  if 

8  Doe  v.  Preece,  1  Tyrwh.  410.  Formerly,  it  was  not  material  in  England,  as  it 
still  is  not  in  the  United  States,  to  determine  with  precision  in  which  of  these  modes 
the  witness  was  interested.  But  by  Stat.  3  &  4  W.  IV,  c.  42,  §§  26,  27,  the  objection 
arising  from  interest  in  the  record,  as  a  future  instrument  of  evidence,  is  done  away  ; 
the  Court  being  directed,  whenever  this  objection  is  taken,  to  indorse  the  name  of  the 
witness  on  the  record  or  document  on  which  the  trial  shall  be  had,  and  of  the  party  on 
whose  behalf  he  was  called  to  testify  ;  after  which  the  verdict  or  judgment  in  that 
action  shall  never  be  evidence  for  or  against  the  witness,  or  any  one  claiming  under 
him.  The  practice  under  this  statute  seems  to  be  not  yet  completely  settled  ;  nut  the 
cases  which  have  arisen,  and  which  it  is  deemed  unnecessary  here  to  examine,  are 
stated  and  discussed  in  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  pp.  108-113  ;  1  Phil.  Evid.  114-117. 
See  also  Poole  v.  Palmer,  9  M.  &  W.  71. 

1  1  Stark.  Evid.  130.  But  the  principal  is  a  competent  witness  against  the  acces- 
sory:  People  v.  F ,olnnan,  2  Barb.  8.  C.  216. 

3  R.  v.  Locker,  5  Esp.  107;  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  602  ;  supra,  403 ;  Com.  v.  Robin- 
son, 1  Gray  555. 

»  Hawkesworth  v.  Showier,  12  M.  &  W.  45. 

l  Supra,  §§  387,  389. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL  TEXT.  897 

the  legacy  has  not  been  paid,  that  there  are  not  other  funds  sufficient 
to  pay  it.2  So,  also,  a  creditor  of  an  estate,  not  in  a  course  of  liqui- 
dation as  an  insolvent  estate,  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  admin- 
istrator; for  he  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  the  estate  now  as  he 
did  to  the  debtor  in  his  lifetime;  and  the  probability  that  his  testi- 
mony may  be  beneficial  to  himself,  by  increasing  the  fund  out  of 
which  he  is  to  be  paid,  is  equally  remote  and  contingent  in  both 
cases.8  It  is  only  where  his  testimony  will  certainly  have  that 
effect,  as  in  the  case  of  a  creditor  to  an  insolvent  estate,  or  a  residu- 
ary legatee,  or  a  distributee,  that  the  witness  is  rendered  incompe- 
tent.4 Yet  in  these  cases,  and  in  the  case  of  a  creditor  to  a  bank- 
rupt estate,  if  the  legatee,  distributee,  or  creditor  has  assigned  his 
interest  to  another  person,  even  equitably,  his  competency  is  re- 
stored.6 In  an  action  of  covenant  against  a  lessee,  for  not  laying 
the  stipulated  quantity  of  manure  upon  the  land ;  upon  a  plea  of  per- 
formance, a  sub-lessee  of  the  defendant  is  a  competent  witness  for 
him,  to  support  the  plea;6  for  it  does  not  appear  that  he  is  under 
the  like  duty  to  the  defendant,  or  that  a  recovery  by  the  latter  would 
place  the  witness  in  a  state  of  security  against  a  similar  action.7 
Upon  the  same  principle,  a  defendant  against  whom  a  civil  action  is 
pending  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  government  on  the  trial  of 
an  indictment  for  perjury,  against  one  who  has  been  summoned  as  a 
witness  for  the  plaintiff  in  the  civil  action.8 

§  409.  Thus,  also,  the  tenant  in  possession  is  a  competent  witness 
to  support  an  action  on  the  case,  brought  by  the  reversioner,  for  an 
injury  done  to  the  inheritance.1  So,  in  an  action  against  an  admin- 
istrator for  a  debt  due  by  the  intestate,  a  surety  in  the  administra- 
tor's bond  in  the  ecclesiastical  Court  is  a  competent  witness  for  him, 
to  prove  a  tender;  for  it  is  but  a  bare  possibility  that  an  action  may 
be  brought  upon  the  bond.2  So,  in  an  action  against  a  debtor,  who 
pleads  the  insolvent  debtor's  act  in  discharge,  another  creditor  is  a 
competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  to  prove  that,  in  fact,  the  de- 
fendant is  not  within  the  operation  of  the  act.8  An  executor  or 

*  Clarke  r.  Gannon,  R.  &  M.  31. 

8  Paull  v.  Brown,  6  Esp.  34  ;  Davies  v.  Davies,  1  Mood.  &  M.  345 ;  Carter  v. 
Pearce,  1  T.  R.  164.  An  annuitant  under  the  will  is  also  a  competent  witness  for  the 
executor,  in  an  action  against  him  for  the  debt  of  the  testator :  Nowell  v.  Davies  5 
B.  &  Ad.  368. 

*  Supra,  §  392. 

6  Heath  v.  Hall,  4  Taunt.  326  ;  Boyntou  v.  Turner,  13  Mass.  391. 

6  Wishaw  v.  Barnes,  1  Campb.  341. 

1  Supra,  §  394. 

8  Hart's  Case,  2  Rob.  Va.  819. 

1  Doddington  v.  Hudson,  1  Bing.  257.  Where  the  defence  rested  on  several  cogni- 
zances, it  was  held,  that  the  person  under  whom  one  of  the  cognizances  was  made,  was 
competent  to  prove  matters  distinct  from  and  independent  of  that  particular  cognizance  • 
Walker  v.  Giles,  2  C.  &  K.  671. 

8  Carter  v.  Pearce,  1  T.  R,  163. 

8  Norcot  v.  Orcott,  1  Stra.  650. 
VOL.  i.  —  57 


898  APPENDIX   II. 

trustee  under  a  will,  taking  no  beneficial  interest  under  the  will,  is 
a  good  attesting  witness.4  And  in  an  action  against  an  administrator 
upon  a  bond  of  the  intestate,  and  a  plea  of  plene  administravit  by 
the  payment  of  another  bond  debt,  the  obligee  in  the  latter  bond  is 
a  competent  witness  to  support  the  plea.5  A  trespasser,  not  sued,  is 
a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  against  his  co-trespasser.6  In 
a  qui  tarn  action,  for  the  penalty  for  taking  excessive  usury,  the 
borrower  of  the  money  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff.7  A 
person  who  has  been  arrested  on  mesne  process,  and  suffered  to 
escape,  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  against 
the  sheriff  for  the  escape;8  for  though  the  whole  debt  may  be  re- 
covered against  the  sheriff,  yet,  in  an  action  on  the  judgment  against 
the  original  debtor,  the  latter  can  neither  plead  in  bar,  nor  give  in 
evidence,  in  mitigation  of  damages,  the  judgment  recovered  against 
the  sheriff.  And  one  who  has  been  rescued  is  a  competent  witness 
for  the  defendant,  in  an  action  against  him  for  the  rescue.9  So,  a 
mariner,  entitled  to  a  share  in  a  prize,  is  a  competent  witness  for 
the  captain  in  an  action  brought  by  him  for  part  of  the  goods  taken.10 
In  all  these  cases,  it  is  obvious  that  whatever  interest  the  witness 
might  have,  it  was  merely  contingent  and  remote;  and  on  this 
ground,  the  objection  has  been  held  to  go  only  to  his  credibility. 

§  410.  Witness  may  testify  against  his  Interest.  It  is  hardly  nec- 
essary to  observe  that,  where  a  witness  is  produced  to  testify  against 
his  interest,  the  rule,  that  interest  disqualifies,  does  not  apply,  and 
the  witness  is  competent. 

§  411.  Exceptions  to  Rule  disqualifying  by  Interest.  The  general 
rule,  that  a  witness  interested  in  the  subject  of  the  suit,  or  in  the 
record,  is  not  competent  to  testify  on  the  side  of  his  interest,  having 
been  thus  stated  and  explained,  it  remains  for  us  to  consider  some  of 
the  exceptions  to  the  rule,  which,  for  various  reasons,  have  been 
allowed.  These  exceptions  chiefly  prevail  either  in  criminal  cases, 
or  in  the  affairs  of  trade  and  commerce,  and  are  admitted  on  grounds 

4  Phipps  v.  Pitcher,  6  Taunt.  220  ;  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme,  8  Conn.  254.  In  Mas- 
sachusetts, the  executor  has  been  held  incompetent  to  prove  the  will  in  the  Court  of 
probate,  he  being  party  to  the  proceedings,  and  liable  to  the  cost  of  the  trial :  Sears  v. 
Dillingham,  12  Mass.  358.  But  the  will  may  be  proved  by  the  testimony  of  the  other 
witnesses,  he  having  been  a  competent  witness  at  the  time  of  attestation  :  ibid.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  any  trustee  may  be  a  witness,  if  he  has  no  interest  in  the  matter  ;  but 
not  otherwise:  Main  v.  Newson,  Anthon  11  ;  Johnson  v.  Cunningham,  1  Ala.  249  ; 
George  v.  Kimball,  24  Pick.  234  ;  Norwood  v.  Marrow,  4  Dev.  &  Bat.  442. 

•  Bull.  N.  P.  143  ;  1  Ld.  Kaym.  745. 

8  M  orris  0.  Daubigny,  5  Moore  319.  In  an  action  against  the  printer  of  a  news- 
paj)er  for  a  libel,  a  proprietor  of  the  paper  is  a  competent  witness,  as  he  is  not  liable  to 
contribution :  Moscati  v.  Lawson,  7  C.  &  P.  32. 

*  Smith  v.  Prager,  7  T.  R.  60. 

8  Cass  i'.  Cameron,  Peake  124  ;  Hunter  v.  King,  4  B.  &  Aid.  210.  If  the  escape 
was  committed  while  the  debtor  was  at  large,  under  a  bond  for  the  prison  liberties, 
the  jailer  who  took  the  bond  is  a  competent  witness  for  the  sheriff :  Stewart  v.  Kip, 
5  Johns.  256. 

»  Wilson  v.  Gary,  6  Mod.  211. 
1°  Anon.,  Skin.  403. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  899 

of  public  necessity  and  convenience,  and  to  prevent  a  failure  of  jus- 
tice. They  may  be  conveniently  classed  thus :  (1)  Where  the  wit- 
ness, in  a  criminal  case,  is  entitled  to  a  reward,  upon  conviction  of 
the  offender;  (2)  Where,  being  otherwise  interested,  he  is  made 
competent  by  statute;  (3)  The  case  of  agents,  carriers,  factors, 
brokers,  or  servants,  when  called  to  prove  acts  done  for  their  prin- 
cipals, in  the  course  of  their  employment;  and  (4)  The  case  of  a 
witness,  whose  interest  has  been  acquired  after  the  party  had  become 
entitled  to  his  testimony.  To  these  a  few  others  may  be  added,  not 
falling  under  any  of  these  heads. 

§  412.  Witnesses  entitled  to  Reward.  And  in  the  first  place,  it  is 
to  be  observed,  that  the  circumstance  that  a  witness  for  the  prosecu- 
tion will  be  entitled  to  a  reward  from  the  government  upon  convic- 
tion of  the  offender,  or  to  a  restoration,  as  owner  of  the  property 
stolen,  or  to  a  portion  of  the  fine  or  penalty  inflicted,  is  not  admitted 
as  a  valid  objection  to  his  competency.  By  the  very  statute,  con- 
ferring a  benefit  upon  a  person,  who,  but  for  that  benefit,  would 
have  been  a  witness,  his  competency  is  virtually  continued,  and  he 
is  as  much  a  witness  after  that  benefit,  as  he  would  have  been  before. 
The  case  is  clear  upon  grounds  of  public  policy,  with  a  view  to  the 
public  interest,  and  because  of  the  principle  on  which  rewards  are 
given.  The  public  has  an  interest  in  the  suppression  of  crime,  and 
the  conviction  of  criminals;  it  is  with  a  view  to  stir  up  greater 
vigilance  in  apprehending,  that  rewards  are  given;  and  it  would 
defeat  the  object  of  the  legislature  to  narrow  the  means  of  convic- 
tion, by  means  of  those  rewards,  and  to  exclude  testimony,  which 
otherwise  would  have  been  admissible.1  The  distinction  between 
these  excepted  cases,  and  those  which  fall  under  the  general  rule, 
is,  that  in  the  latter,  the  benefit  resulting  to  the  witness  is  created 
chiefly  for  his  own  sake,  and  not  for  public  purposes.  Such  is  the 
case  of  certain  summary  convictions  heretofore  mentioned.2  But 
where  it  is  plain,  that  the  infliction  of  a  fine  or  penalty  is  intended 
as  a  punishment,  in  furtherance  of  public  justice,  rather  than  as  an 
indemnity  to  the  party  injured,  and  that  the  detection  and  convic- 
tion of  the  offender  are  the  objects  of  the  legislature,  the  case  will  be 
within  the  exception,  and  the  person  benefited  by  the  conviction 
will,  notwithstanding  his  interest,  be  competent.8  If  the  reward  to 
which  the  witness  will  be  entitled  has  been  offered  by  a  private  in- 

1  R.  v.  Williams,  9  B.  &  C.  549,  556,  per  Bayley,  J.     See  also  1  Gilb.  Evid.  by 
Loflft,  245-250. 

2  Supra,  §  403, 

»  R.  v.  Williams,  9  B.  &  C.  549,  560,  per  Bayley,  J.  See  also  the  case  of  the 
Rioters,  1  Leach  Or.  Cas.  314,  n.  a,  where  the  general  question  of  the  admissibility  of 
witnesses,  to  whom  a  reward  was  offered  by  the  government,  being  submitted  to  the 
twelve  judges,  was  resolved  in  the  affirmative :  McNally's  Evid.  p.  61,  Rule  12  ;  U.  S. 
v.  Murphy,  16  Pet.  203  ;  U.  S.  v.  Wilson,  1  Baldw.  99  ;  Com.  v.  Moulton,  9  Mass.  30 ; 
R.  v.  Teasdale,  3  Esp.  68.  and  the  cases  cited  iu  Mr.  Day's  note  ;  Salisbury  v.  Con« 
necticut,  6  Conn.  101. 


900  APPENDIX   II. 

dividual,  the  rule  is  the  same,  the  witness  being  still  competent;  but 
the  principle  on  which  it  stands  is  different;  namely,  this,  that  the 
public  have  an  interest  upon  public  grounds,  in  the  testimony  of 
every  person  who  knows  anything  as  to  a  crime;  and  that  nothing 
which  private  individuals  can  do  will  take  away  the  public  right.4 
The  interest,  also,  of  the  witness  is  contingent;  and,  after  all,  he 
may  not  become  entitled  to  the  reward. 

§  413.  Pardon.  The  reason  of  this  exception  extends  to,  and  ac- 
cordingly it  has  been  held  to  include,  the  cases  where,  instead  of  a 
pecuniary  reward,  a  pardon  or  exemption  from  prosecution  is  offered 
by  statute  to  any  person  participating  in  a  particular  offence,  pro- 
vided another  of  the  parties  should  be  convicted  upon  his  evidence. 
In  such  cases,  Lord  Ellenborough  remarked,  that  the  statute  gave  a 
parliamentary  capacitatiou  to  the  witness,  notwithstanding  his 
interest  in  the  cause;  for  it  was  not  probable  that  the  legislature 
would  intend  to  discharge  one  offender,  upon  his  discovering  another, 
so  that  the  latter  might  be  convicted,  without  intending  that  the 
discoverer  should  be  a  competent  witness.1 

§  414.  Other  Benefit.  And  in  like  manner,  where  the  witness  will 
directly  derive  any  other  benefit  from  the  conviction  of  the  offender, 
he  is  still  a  competent  witness  for  the  government,  in  the  cases 
already  mentioned.  Formerly,  indeed,  it  was  held  that  the  person 
whose  name  was  alleged  to  be  forged  was  not  admissible  as  a  wit- 
ness against  the  prisoner,  on  an  indictment  for  the  forgery,  upon  the 
notion  that  the  prosecution  was  in  the  nature  of  a  proceeding  in 
rein,  and  that  the  conviction  warranted  a  judicial  cancellation  of  the 
instrument.  And  the  prosecutor  in  an  indictment  for  perjury  has 
been  thought  incompetent,  where  he  had  a  suit  pending,  in  which 
the  person  prosecuted  was  a  material  witness  against  him,  or  was 
defendant  against  him  in  a  suit  in  equity  in  which  his  answer  might 
be  evidence.  But  this  opinion  as  to  cases  of  perjury  has  since  been 
exploded;  and  the  party  is,  in  all  such  cases,  held  admissible  as  a 
witness,  his  credibility  being  left  to  the  jury.  For  wherever  the 
party  offers  as  evidence,  even  to  a  collateral  point,  a  record  which 
has  been  obtained  on  his  own  testimony,  it  is  not  admitted;  and, 
moreover,  the  record  in  a  criminal  prosecution  is  generally  not  evi- 
dence of  the  facts  in  a  civil  suit,  the  parties  not  being  the  same.' 
And  as  to  the  person  whose  name  has  been  forged,  the  unsound' 
ness  of  the  rule  by  which  lie  was  held  incompetent  was  tacitly  con- 
ceded in  several  of  the  more  recent  cases,  which  were  held  not  to 
be  within  the  rule;  and  at  length  it  was  repealed  in  England  by  an 

«  9  B.  k  C.  556,  per  Bayley,  .T. 

*  Reward  v.  Shipley,  4  East  180,  183.  See  also  R.  v.  Rudd,  1  Leach,  Or.  Cns.  115  ,' 
Bush  r.  Railing,  Sayer  1289 ;  Mead  v.  Robinson,  Willes  422  ;  Sutton  v.  Bishop,  4  Burr 
2283. 

i  Oilli.  Eviil.  by  Lofft,  pp.  33,  34  ;  Bull.  N.  P.  232.  245  ;  R.  v.  Boston,  4  East  572; 
Arahams  v.  Dunn,  4  Burr.  2251.  See  further,  infra,  §  537. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  901 

express  statute,2  which  renders  the  party  injured  a  competent  wit- 
ness in  all  criminal  prosecutions  for  forgery.  In  America,  though  in 
some  of  the  earlier  cases  the  old  English  rule  of  exclusion  was  fol- 
lowed, yet  the  weight  of  authority,  including  the  later  decisions,  is 
quite  the  other  way,  and  the  witness  is  now  almost  universally  held 
admissible.8 

§  415.  Informers.  The  second  class  of  cases  in  which  the  general 
rule  of  incompetency  by  reason  of  interest  does  not  apply,  consists 
of  exceptions  created  by  express  statutes,  and  which  otherwise  would 
not  fall  within  the  reason  of  the  first  exception.  Of  this  sort  are 
cases  where  the  informer  and  prosecutor,  in  divers  summary  con- 
victions and  trials  for  petty  offence,  is,  by  the  statutes  of  different 
States,  expressly  made  a  competent  witness,  notwithstanding  his 
interest  in  the  fine  or  forfeiture;  but  of  which  the  plan  of  this  Trea- 
tise does  not  require  a  particular  enumeration. 

§  416.  Agents,  Factors,  Brokers,  &c.  The  third  class  of  cases  ex- 
cepted  out  of  the  general  rule,  is  that  of  agents,  carriers,  factors, 
brokers,  and  other  servants,  when  offered  to  prove  the  making  of 
contracts,  the  receipt  or  payment  of  money,  the  receipt  or  delivery 
of  goods,  and  other  acts  done  within  the  scope  of  their  employment. 
This  exception  has  its  foundation  in  public  convenience  and  neces- 
sity;1 for  otherwise  affairs  of  daily  and  ordinary  occurrence  could 
not  be  proved,  and  the  freedom  of  trade  and  commercial  intercourse 
would  be  inconveniently  restrained.  And  it  extends,  in  principle, 
to  every  species  of  agency  or  intervention,  by  which  business  is 
transacted;  unless  the  case  is  overborne  by  some  other  rule.  Thus, 
where  the  acceptor  of  a  bill  of  exchange  was  also  the  agent  of  the 
defendant,  who  was  both  drawer  and  indorser,  he  was  held  incom- 
petent, in  an  action  by  the  indorsee,  to  prove  the  terms  on  which  he 

2  9  Geo.  IV,  c.  32. 

8  Respubliea  v.  Keating,  1  Dall.  110 ;  Pennsylvania  v.  Farrel,  Addis.  246  ;  People 
v.  Howell,  4  Johns.  296,  302  ;  People  v.  Dean,  6'Cowen  27  ;  Com.  v.  Frost,  5  Mass.  53; 
Coin.  v.  Waite,  ib.  261  ;  State  r.  Stanton,  1  Ired.  424  ;  Simmons  v.  State,  7  Ham. 
Ohio  116.  Lord  Denman  is  reported  to  have  ruled,  at  Nisi  Prius,  that  where  the 
prosecutor,  in  an  indictment  for  perjury,  expected  that  the  prisoner  would  be  called  as 
a  witness  against  him  in  a  civil  action  about  to  be  tried,  he  was  incompetent  as  a  wit- 
ness to  support  the  indictment :  R.  v.  Hulme,  7  C.  &  P.  8.  But  qucerc,  and  see  R.  v. 
Boston,  4  East  572  ;  supra,  §  362.  In  several  of  the  United  States,  the  party  injured, 
or  intended  to  be  injured,  or  entitled  to  satisfaction  for  the  injury,  or  liable  to  pay  the 
costs  of  the  prosecution,  is  by  statute  made  a  competent  witness  upon  a  criminal  prose- 
cution for  the  offence:  see  Missouri,  Rev.  Stat.  1845,  c.  148,  §22  ;  Illinois,  Rev.  Stat. 
1833,  Crim.  Code,  §§  154,  169,  pp.  208,  212;  California,  Rev.  Stat.  1850,  c.  99,  §  13. 
In  New  Hampshire,  no  person  is  disqualified  as  a  witness  in  a  criminal  prosecution  by 
reason  of  interest,  "  except  the  respondent :  "  Rev.  Stat.  1842,  c.  225,  §  17.  As  to  the 
mode  of  examining  the  prosecutor,  in  a  trial  for  forgery,  see  post,  vol.  iii,  §  106,  n. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  289  ;  10  B.  &  C.  864,  per  Parke,  J. ;  Benjamin  v.  Porteus,  2  H.  Bl. 
591  ;  Matthews  v.  Haydon,  2  Esp.  509.  This  necessity,  says  Mr.  Evans,  is  that  which 
arises  from  the  general  state  and  order  of  society,  and  not  that  which  is  merely  founded 
on  the  accidental  want  or  failure  of  evidence  in  the  particular  case  :  Poth.  on  Obi.  by 
Evans,  App.  No.  16,  pp.  208,  267.  In  all  the  cases  of  this  class,  there  seems  also  to 
be  enough  of  contingency  in  the  nature  of  the  interest,  to  render  the  witness  admissible 
under  the  general  rule. 


902  APPENDIX   II. 

/r 

negotiated  the  bill  to  the  indorsee,  in  order  to  defeat  the  action, 
though  the  facts  occurred  in  the  course  of  his  agency  for  the  defend- 
ant, for  whose  use  the  bill  was  negotiated ;  it  being  apparent  that 
the  witness  was  interested  in  the. costs  of  the  suit.2  But  in  cases  not 
thus  controlled  by  other  rules,  the  constant  course  is  to  admit  the 
witness  notwithstanding  his  apparent  interest  in  the  event  of  the 
suit.8  Thus,  a  porter,  a  journeyman,  or  salesman,  is  admissible  to 
prove  the  delivery  of  goods.4  A  broker,  who  has  effected  a  policy, 
is  a  competent  witness  for  the  assured,  to  prove  any  matters  con- 
nected with  the  policy;  even  though  he  has  an  interest  in  it  arising 
from  his  lien.5  A  factor,  who  sells  for  the  plaintiff,  and  is  to  have 
a  poundage  on  the  amount,  is  a  competent  witness  to  prove  the  con- 
tract of  sale.6  So,  though  he  is  to  have  for  himself  all  he  has  bar- 
gained for  beyond  a  certain  amount,  he  is  still  a  competent  witness 
for  the  seller.7  A  clerk,  who  has  received  money,  is  a  competent 
witness  for  the  party  who  paid  it,  to  prove  the  payment,  though  he 
is  himself  liable  on  the  receipt  of  it.8  A  carrier  is  admissible  for 
the  plaintiff,  to  prove  that  he  paid  a  sum  of  money  to  the  defendant 
by  mistake,  in  an  action  to  recover  it  back.9  So  of  a  bankers' 
clerk.10  A  servant  is  a  witness  for  his  master,  in  an  action  against 
the  latter  for  a  penalty;  such,  for  example,  as  for  selling  coals  with- 
out measure  by  the  bushel,  though  the  act  were  done  by  the  ser- 
vant.11 A  carrier's  book-keeper  is  a  competent  witness  for  his 
master,  in  an  action  for  not  safely  carrying  goods.12  A  shipmaster 
is  a  competent  witness  for  the  defendant  in  an  action  against  his 
owner,  to  prove  the  advancement  of  moneys  for  the  purposes  of  the 
voyage,  even  though  he  gave  the  plaintiff  a  bill  of  exchange  on  his 
owner  for  the  amount.18  The  cashier  or  teller  of  a  bank  is  a  compe- 
tent witness  for  the  bank,  to  charge  the  defendant  on  a  promissory 
note,14  or  for  money  lent,  or  overpaid,15  or  obtained  from  the  officer 
without  the  security  which  he  should  have  received;  and  even  though 
the  officer  has  given  bond  to  the  bank  for  his  official  good  conduct.14 

»  Edmonds  v.  Lowe,  8  B.  &  C.  407. 

«  Theobald  o.  Tregott,  11  Mod.  262,  per  Holt,  C.  J. 

<  Bull.  N.  P.  289  ;  4  T.  R.  590  :  Adams  v.  Davis,  3  Esp.  48. 

6  Hunter  v.  Leathley,  10  B.  &  C.  858. 

6  Dixon  v.  Cooper,  3  Wils.  40  ;  Shepard  v.  Palmer,  6  Conn.  95 ;  Depeau  v.  Hyams, 
2  MeCord  146  ;  Scott  v.  Wells,  6  Watts  &  Serg.  357. 

7  Benjamin  v.  Porteus,  2  H.  Bl.  590;  Caune  v.  Sagory,  4  Martin  81. 

8  Matthews  v.  Haydon,  2  Esp.  509. 

9  Barker  v.  Macrae,  3  Campb.  144. 
w  Martin  v.  Horrell,  1  Stra.  647. 

"  E.  Ind.  Co.  v.  Gosling,  Bull.  N.  P.  289,  per  Lee,  C.  J. 

"  Spencer  v.  Colliding,  Parke's  Cas.  129. 

18  Descadillas  v.  Harris,  8  Greenl.  S98  ;  Milward  v.  Hallett,  2  Caines  77.  And  see 
Martineau  v.  Woodland,  2  C.  &  P.  65. 

»  Strafford  Bank  v.  Cornell,  1  N.  H.  192. 

16  O'Brien  v.  Louisiana  State  Bank,  5  Martin  N.  s.  805;  U.  S.  Bank  v.  Johnson,  ib. 
310. 

M  Franklin  Bank  v.  Freeman,  16  Pick.  635  ;  U.  S.  Bank  v.  Stearns,  15  Wend.  314. 


PASSAGES  OMITTED  FROM  THE  ORIGINAL  TEXT.       903 

And  an  agent  is  also  a  competent  witness  to  prove  his  own  author- 
ity, if  it  be  by  parol." 

§  417.  This  exception  being  thus  founded  upon  considerations  of 
public  necessity  and  convenience,  for  the  sake  of  trade  and  the 
common  usage  of  business,  it  is  manifest  that  it  cannot  be  extended 
to  cases  where  the  witness  is  called  to  testify  to  facts  out  of 
the  usual  and  ordinary  course  of  business,  or  to  contradict  or  deny 
the  effect  of  those  acts  which  he  has  done  as  agent.  He  is  safely 
admitted,  in  all  cases,  to  prove  that  he  acted  according  to  the  direc- 
tions of  his  principal,  and  within  the  scope  of  his  duty;  both  on  the 
ground  of  necessity,  and  because  the  principal  can  never  maintain 
an  action  against  him  for  any  act  done  according  to  his  own  direc- 
tions, whatever  may  be  the  result  of  the  suit  in  which  he  is  called 
as  a  witness.  But  if  the  cause  depends  on  the  question,  whether  the 
agent  has  been  guilty  of  some  tortious  act  or  some  negligence  in  the 
course  of  executing  the  orders  of  his  principal,  and  in  respect  of 
which  he  would  be  liable  over  to  the  principal  if  the  latter  should 
fail  in  the  action  pending  against  him,  the  agent,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  not  a  competent  witness  for  his  principal,  without  a  release.1 

§  418.  Subsequently  Acquired  Interest.  In  the  fourth  class  of 
exceptions  to  the  rule  of  incompetency  by  reason  of  interest,  regard 
is  paid  to  the  time  and  manner  in  which  the  interest  was  acquired. 
It  has  been  laid  down  in  general  terms,  that  where  one  person  be- 
comes entitled  to  the  testimony  of  another,  the  latter  shall  not  be 
rendered  incompetent  to  testify  by  reason  of  any  interest  subse- 
quently acquired  in  the  event  of  the  suit.1  But  though  the  doctrine 
is  not  now  universally  admitted  to  that  extent,  yet  it  is  well  settled 
and  agreed,  that  in  all  cases  where  the  interest  has  been  subse- 
quently created  by  the  fraudulent  act  of  the  adverse  party,  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  off  his  testimony,  or  by  any  act  of  mere  wanton- 
ness and  aside  from  the  ordinary  course  of  business  on  the  part  of 
the  witness,  he  is  not  thereby  rendered  incompetent.  And  where 
the  person  was  the  original  witness  of  the  transaction  or  agreement 
between  the  parties,  in  whose  testimony  they  both  had  a  common 
interest,  it  seems  also  agreed,  that  it  shall  not  be  in  the  power,  either 
of  the  witness  or  of  one  of  the  parties,  to  deprive  the  other  of  his 
testimony  by  reason  of  any  interest  subsequently  acquired,  even 
though  it  were  acquired  without  any  such  intention  on  the  part  of 

17  Lowber  v.  Shaw,  5  Mason  242,  per  Story,  J.  ;  McGunnagle  r.  Thornton,  10  S.  & 
R.  251  ;  Ilderton  v.  Atkinson,  7  T.  R.  480 ;  'Birt  v.  Kershaw,  2  East  458. 

1  Su;)ra,  §§  394-396  ;  Miller  »>.  Falconer,  1  Caniph.  251  ;  Theohald  ».  Tregott, 
]  1  Mod.  262  ;  Gevers  v.  Mainwaring,  1  Holt  139  ;  Me  Brain  v.  Fortune,  3  Campb.  317 ; 
1  Stark.  Evid.  118  ;  Fuller  v.  Wheelock,  10  Pick.  135,  138  ;  McDowell  v.  Simpson, 
3  Watts  129,  135,  per  Kennedy,  J. 

1  See  Bent  v.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27,  per  Ld.  Kenyon,  and  Ashlmrst,  J. ;  Barlow  v. 
Vowell,  Skin.  586,  per  Ld.  Holt ;  s.  c.  Cowp.  736  ;  Jackson  o.  Rumsey,  3  Johns.  Cas. 
234,  237  :  supra,  §  167. 


904  APPENDIX   II. 

the  witness  or  of  the  party.2  But  the  question  upon  which  learned 
judges  have  been  divided  in  opinion  is,  whether,  where  the  witness 
was  not  the  agent  of  both  parties,  or  was  not  called  as  a  witness  of 
the  original  agreement  or  transaction,  he  ought  to  be  rendered  in- 
competent by  reason  of  an  interest  subsequently  acquired  in  good 
faith  and  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business.  On  this  point  it  was 
held  by  Lord  Ellenborough  that  the  pendency  of  a  suit  could  not  pre- 
vent third  persons  from  transacting  business  bona  fide  with  one  of 
the  parties;  and  that,  if  an  interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit  is 
thereby  acquired,  the  common  consequence  of  law  must  follow,  that 
the  person  so  interested  cannot  be  examined  as  a  witness  for  that 
party  from  whose  success  he  will  necessarily  derive  an  advantage.8 
And  therefore  it  was  held,  that  where  the  defence  to  an  action  on  a 
policy  of  insurance  was  that  there  had  been  a  fraudulent  conceal- 
ment of  material  facts,  an  underwriter,  who  had  paid  on  a  promise 
of  repayment  if  the  policy  should  be  determined  invalid,  and  who 
was  under  no  obligation  to  become  a  witness  for  either  party,  was 
not  a  competent  witness  for  another  underwriter  who  disputed  the 
loss.4  This  doctrine  has  been  recognized  in  the  Courts  of  several 
of  the  United  States  as  founded  in  good  reason,6  but,  the  question 
being  presented  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  the 
learned  judges  were  divided  in  opinion,  and  no  judgment  was  given 
upon  the  point.6  If  the  subsequent  interest  has  been  created  by  the 
agency  of  the  party  producing  the  witness,  he  is  disqualified;  the 
party  having  no  right  to  complain  of  his  own  act.7 

§  419.  "Witness  may  divest  himself  of  Interest.  It  may  here  be 
added,  that  where  an  interested  witness  does  all  in  his  power  to 
divest  himself  of  his  interest,  by  offering  to  surrender  or  release  it, 
which  the  surrenderee  or  releasee,  even  though  he  be  a  stranger,  re- 
fuses to  accept,  the  principle  of  the  rule  of  exclusion  no  longer 
applies,  and  the  witness  is  held  admissible.  Thus,  in  an  ejectment, 
where  the  lessors  of  the  plaintiff  claimed  under  a  will,  against  the 
heir  at  law,  and  the  executor  was  called  by  the  plaintiff  to  prove 
the  sanity  of  the  testator,  and  was  objected  to  by  the  defendant, 
because  by  the  same  will  he  was  devisee  of  the  reversion  of  certain 
copyhold  lands,  to  obviate  which  objection  he  had  surrendered  his 

*  Forrester  ».  Pigou,  3  Campb.  381  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  118  ;  Long  v.  Bailie,  4  S.  &  R. 
222  ;  14  Pick.  47  ;  Phelps  v.  Riley,  3  Conn.  266,  272 ;  R.  v.  Fox,  1  Stra.  652  ;  supra, 
§  167. 

8  Forrester  v.  Pigou,  8  Campb.  381  ;  s.  c.  1  M.  &  S.  9  ;  Hovill  v.  Stephensou,  5  Bing. 
493  ;  supra,  §  167. 

«  Forrester  v.  Pigou,  3  Campb.  381  ;  8.  c.  1  M.  &  S.  9. 

6  Phelps  r.  Riley,  8  Conn.  266,  272  ;  Eastman  v.  Winship,  14  Pick.  44,  47  ;  Long 
v.  Bailie,  4  Serg.  &  R.  222  ;  Manchester  Iron  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Sweeting,  10  Wend. 
162.  In  Maine,  the  Court  seems  to  have  held  the  witness  admissible  in  all  cases,  where 
the  party  objecting  to  the  witness  is  himself  a  party  to  the  agreement  by  which  hia 
interest  is  acquired  :  Burgess  v.  Lane,  3  Greenl.  165,  170  ;  supra,  167. 

«  Wiiinhip  v.  Bank  of  United  States,  5  Pet.  529,  552. 

T  Horill  o.  Stephenson,  5  Bing.  493 ;  *«;>n/,  §  167. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  905 

estate  in  the  copyhold  lands  to  the  use  of  the  heir  at  law,  but  the 
heir  had  refused  to  accept  the  surrender,  —  the  Court  held  him  a 
competent  witness.8  So,  if  the  interest  may  be  removed  by  the 
release  of  one  of  the  parties  in  the  suit,  and  such  party  offers  to 
remove  it,  but  the  witness  refuses,  he  cannot  thereby  deprive  the 
party  of  his  testimony.9 

§  420.  Equal  Interest  no  Disqualification.  Where  the  witness, 
though  interested  in  the  event  of  the  cause,  is  so  situated  that  the 
event  is  to  him  a  matter  of  indifference,  he  is  still  a  competent  wit- 
ness. This  arises  where  he  is  equally  interested  on  both  sides  of 
the  cause,  so  that  his  interest  on  one  side  is  counterbalanced  by  his 
interest  on  the  other.1  But  if  there  is  a  preponderance  in  the 
amount  or  value  of  the  interest  on  one  side,  this  seems,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  to  render  him  an  interested  witness  to  the  amount  of 
the  excess,  and  therefore  to  disqualify  him  from  testifying  on  that 
side.2  Whether  the  circumstance  that  the  witness  has  a  remedy  over 
against  another,  to  indemnify  him  for  what  he  may  lose  by  a  judg- 
ment against  the  party  calling  him,  is  sufficient  to  render  him  com- 
petent by  equalizing  his  interest,  is  not  clearly  agreed.  Where  his 
liability  to  costs  appears  from  his  own  testimony  alone,  and  in  the 
same  mode  it  is  shown  that  he  has  funds  in  his  hands  to  meet  the 
charge,  it  is  settled  that  this  does  not  render  him  incompetent.8  So, 
where  he  stated  that  he  was  indemnified  for  the  costs,  and  considered 
that  he  had  ample  security.4  And  where,  upon  this  objection  being 
taken  to  the  witness,  the  party  calling  him  forthwith  executed  a 
bond  to  the  adverse  party,  for  the  payment  of  all  costs,  with  sureties, 
whom  the  counsel  for  the  obligee  admitted  to  be  abundantly  respon- 
sible, but  at  the  same  time  he  refused  to  receive  the  bond,  the  Court 
held  the  competency  of  the  witness  to  be  thereby  restored ;  observ- 
ing, however,  that  if  the  solvency  of  the  sureties  had  been  denied, 
it  might  have  presented  a  case  of  more  embarrassment,  it  being  very 
questionable  whether  the  judge  could  determine  upon  the  sufficiency 
of  the  obligors  so  as  to  absolve  the  witness  from  liability  to  costs.6 
The  point  upon  which  the  authorities  seem  to  be  conflicting  is  where 

•  Goodtitle  v.  Welford,  1  Doug.  139 ;  5  T.  R.  35,  per  Buller,  J.     The  legatee  in  a 
will,  who  has  been  paid,  is  considered  a  competent  witness  to  support  the  will  in  a  suit 
at  law :  Wyndham  v.  Chetwynd,  1  Burr.  414. 

9  1  Phil.  Evid.  149. 

1  Supra,  §  399.     See  also  Cushman  v.  Loker,  2  Mass.  108  ;  Emerson  v.  Providence 
Hat  Manuf.  Co.,  12  id.  237  ;  Roberts  v.  Whiting,  16  id.  186  ;  Rice  v.  Austin,  17  id. 
197  ;  Prince  v.  Shepard,  9  Pick.  176  ;  Lewis  v.  Hodgdon,  5  Shepl.  267. 

2  Supra,  §§  391,  399,  and  cases  there  cited.     Where  the  interest  of  the  witness  is 
prima  facie  balanced  between  the  parties,  the  possibility  of  a  better  defence  against 
one  than  the  other  will  not  prevent  hia  being  sworn :    Starkweather  v.   Mathews, 
2  Hill  131. 

8  Collins  v.  Crummen,  3  Martin  jr.  s.  166 ;  Allen  v.  Hawks,  13  Pick.  79. 

*  Chaffee  v.  Thomas,  7  Cowen  358  ;  contra,  Pond  v.  Hartwell,  17  Pick.  272,  per 
Shaw,  C.  J. 

8  Braudigee  v.  Hale,  13  Johns.  125 ;  8.  P.  Lake  v.  Auburn,  17  Wend.  18  ;  supra, 
§392. 


906  APPENDIX   IL 

there  is  merely  a  right  of  action  over,  irrespective  of  the  solvency  of 
the  party  liable ;  the  productiveness  of  the  remedy,  in  actual  satis- 
faction, being  wholly  contingent  and  uncertain.  But  in  such  cases 
the  weight  of  authority  is  against  the  adraissibility  of  the  witness. 
Thus,  in  an  action  against  the  sheriff  for  taking  goods,  his  officer, 
who  made  the  levy,  being  called  as  a  witness  for  the  defence,  stated 
upon  the  voir  dire  that  he  gave  security  to  the  sheriff,  and  added 
that  he  was  indemnified  by  the  creditor,  meaning  that  he  had  his 
bond  of  indemnity.  But  Lord  Tenterden  held  him  not  a  competent 
witness;  observing  that  if  the  result  of  the  action  were  against  the 
sheriff,  the  witness  was  liable  to  a  certainty,  and  he  might  never 
get  repaid  on  his  indemnity ;  therefore  it  was  his  interest  to  defeat 
the  action.6  So,  where  the  money  with  which  the  surety  in  a  re- 
plevin bond  was  to  be  indemnified,  had  been  deposited  in  the  hands 
of  a  receiver  designated  by  the  judge,  it  was  held  that  this  did  not 
restore  the  competency  of  the  surety  as  a  witness  in  the  cause  for 
the  principal;  for  the  receiver  might  refuse  to  pay  it  over,  or  be- 
come insolvent,  or,  from  some  other  cause,  the  remedy  over  against 
him  might  be  unproductive.7  The  true  distinction  lies  between  the 
case  where  the  witness  must  resort  to  an  action  for  his  indemnity, 
and  that  in  which  the  money  is  either  subject  to  the  order  of  the 
Court,  and  within  its  actual  control  and  custody,  or  is  in  the  wit- 
ness's own  hands.  Therefore  it  has  been  laid  down  by  a  learned 
judge,  that  where  a  certain  sum  of  money  can  be  so  placed,  either 
with  the  witness  himself  or  with  the  Court  and  its  officers,  under  a 
proper  rule  directing  and  controlling  its  application  according  to 
the  event,  as  that  the  interest  creating  the  disability  may  be  met 
and  extinguished  before  the  witness  is  or  can  be  damnified,  it  shall 
be  considered  as  balancing  or  extinguishing  that  interest,  so  as  to 
restore  the  competency  of  the  witness.8 

§  421.  Mode  of  Objecting  on  Account  of  Interest.  In  regard  to 
the  time  of  taking  the  objection  to  the  competency  of  a  witness, 
on  the  ground  of  interest,  it  is  obvious  that,  from  the  preliminary 
nature  of  the  objection,  it  ought  in  general  to  be  taken  before  the 
witness  is  examined  in  chief.  If  the  party  is  aware  of  the  existence 
of  the  interest,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  examine  the  witness,  and 
afterwards  to  object  to  his  competency  if  he  should  dislike  his  testi* 
mony.  He  has  his  election,  to  admit  an  interested  person  to  testify 
against  him  or  not;  but  in  this,  as  in  all  other  cases,  the  election 

6  Whitehouse  v.  Atkinson,  3  C.  &  P.  344  ;  Jewett  v.  Adams,  8  Greenl.  30 ;  Paiiie 
v.  Hussey,  5  Shepl.  274. 

i  Wallace  v.  Twyman,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  459-461.  See  also  Owen  v.  Mann,  2  Day  899, 
404  ;  Brown  v.  Lynch,  1  Paige  147,  157  ;  Allen  v.  Hawks,  13  Pick.  85,  per  Shaw,  C.  J.; 
Schilling  v.  McCann,  6  Greenl.  364  ;  Kendall  v.  Field,  2  Shepl.  80  ;  Shelby  v.  Smith, 
2  A.  K.  Marsh.  504.  The  cases  in  which  a  mere  remedy  over  seems  to  have  been  thought 
sufficient  to  equalize  the  interest  of  the  witness,  are  Martineau  v.  Woodland,  2  C.  &  P. 
65  :  Bank*  v.  Kain,  ib.  697  ;  Gregory  v.  Dodge,  14  Wend.  693. 

*  Pond  v.  Hartwell,  17  Pick.  269,  272,  per  Shaw,  C.  J. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  907 

must  be  made  as  soon  as  the  opportunity  to  make  it  is  presented ;  and 
failing  to  make  it  at  that  time,  he  is  presumed  to  have  waived  it 
forever.1  But  he  is  not  prevented  from  taking  the  objection  at  any 
time  during  the  trial,  provided  it  is  taken  as  soon  as  the  interest  is 
discovered.2  Thus,  if  discovered  during  the  examination  in  chief  by 
the  plaintiff,  it  is  not  too  late  for  the  defendant  to  take  ithe  objec- 
tion.8 But  if  it  is  not  discovered  until  after  the  trial  is  concluded, 
anew  trial  will  not,  for  that  cause  alone,  be  granted;4  unless  the 
interest  was  known  and  concealed  by  the  party  producing  the  wit- 
ness.5 The  rule  on  this  subject,  in  criminal  and  civil  cases,  is  the 
same.6  Formerly,  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  take  the  objection  to 
the  competency  of  a  witness  on  the  voir  dire ;  and  if  once  sworn  in 
chief,  he  could  not  afterwards  be  objected  to,  on  the  ground  of 
interest.  But  the  strictness  of  this  rule  is  relaxed;  and  the  objec- 
tion is  now  usually  taken  after  he  is  sworn  in  chief,  but  previous  to 
his  direct  examination.  It  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge  to  permit 
the  adverse  party  to  cross-examine  the  witness,  as  to  his  interest, 
after  he  has  been  examined  in  chief;  but  the  usual  course  is  not  to 
allow  questions  to  be  asked  upon  the  cross-examination,  which 
properly  belong  only  to  an  examination  upon  the  voir  dire."1  But 
if,  notwithstanding  every  ineffectual  endeavor  to  exclude  the  wit- 
ness on  the  ground  of  incompetency,  it  afterwards  should  appear 
incidentally,  in  the  course  of  the  trial,  that  the  witness  is  interested, 
his  testimony  will  be  stricken  out,  and  the  jury  will  be  instructed 
wholly  to  disregard  it.8  The  rule  in  equity  is  the  same  as  at 

1  Donelson  v.  Taylor,  8  Pick.  390,  392 ;  Belcher  v.  Magnay,  1  New  Pr.  Cas.  110. 

2  Stone  v.  Blackburn,  1  Esp.  37;   1  Stark.  Evid.  124  ;  Shurtleff  v.  Willard,  19 
Pick.  202  ;   Monfort  v.  Rowland,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  183.     Where  a  party  has  been  fully 
apprised  of  the  grounds  of  a  witness's  incompetency  by  the  opening  speech  of  counsel, 
or  the  examination  in  chief  of  the  witness,  doubts  have  been  entertained  at  Nisi  Prius 
whether  an  objection  to  the  competency  of  a  witness  can  be  postponed  :  1  Phil.  Evid. 
154,  n.  (3). 

8  Jacobs  v.  Layborn,  11  M.  &  W.  685.    And  see  Yardley  v.  Arnold,  10  M.  &  W. 
141;  6  Jur.  718. 

*  Turner  v.  Pearte,  1  T.  R.  717  ;  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  5  Cowen  173. 

6  Niles  v.  Brackett,  15  Mass.  378. 

8  Com.  v.  Green,  17  Mass.  538  ;  Roscoe's  Grim.  Evid.  124. 

7  Howell  v.  Lock,  2  Camph.  14  ;   Odiorne  v.  Winkley,  2  Gallis.  51  ;   Perigal  v. 
Nicholson,  1  Wightw.  64.     The  objection  that  the  witness  is  the  real  plaintiff,  ought 
to  be  taken  on  the  voir,  dire:  Dewdney  v.  Palmer,  4  M.  &  W.  664  ;  s.  c.  7  Dowl. 

8  Davis  v.  Barr,  9  S.  &  R.  137  ;  Schillinger  v.  McCann,  6  Greenl.  364  ;  Fisher  v. 
Willard,  13  Mass.  379 ;  Evans  v.  Eaton,  1  Peters  C.  C.  338  ;  Butler  P.  Tufts,  1  Shepl. 
302  ;  Stout  v.  Wood,  1  Blackf.  71  ;  Mitchell  v.  Mitchell,  11  G.  &  J.  388.    The  same 


2  Vern.  464.  In  one  case,  however,  where  the  examination  of  a  witness  was  concluded, 
and  he  was  dismissed  from  the  box,  but  was  afterwards  recalled  by  the  judge,  for  the 
purpose  of  asking  him  a  question,  it  was  ruled  by  Gibbs,  C.  J.,  that  it  was  then  too 
late  to  object  to  his  competency:  Beeching  v.  Gower,  1  Holt's  Cas.  313:  and  see 
Heely  v.  Barnes,  4  Denio  73.  And  in  chancery  it  is  held,  that  where  a  witness  has 
been  cross-examined  by  a  party,  with  full  knowledge  of  an  objection  to  his  competency, 


908  APPENDIX   II. 

law ; 9  and  the  principle  applies  with  equal  force  to  testimony  given 
in  a  deposition  in  writing,  and  to  an  oral  examination  in  Court.  In 
either  case,  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be,  that  if  the  objection  is 
taken  as  soon  as  may  be  after  the  interest  is  discovered,  it  will  be 
heard;  but  after  the  party  is  in  mora,  it  comes  too  late.10  One  rea- 
son for  requiring  the  objection  to  be  made  thus  early  is,  that  the 
other  party  may  have  opportunity  to  remove  it  by  a  release ;  which 
is  always  allowed  to  be  done,  when  the  objection  is  taken  at  any 
time  before  the  examination  is  completed.11  It  is  also  to  be  noted  as 
a  rule,  applicable  to  all  objections  to  the  reception  of  evidence,  that 
the  ground  of  objection  must  be  distinctly  stated  at  the  time,  or  it 
will  be  held  vague  and  nugatory.12 

§  422.  Where  the  objection  to  the  competency  of  the  witness 
arises  from  his  own  examination,  he  may  be  further  interrogated  to 
facts  tending  to  remove  the  objection,  though  the  testimony  might, 
on  other  grounds,  be  inadmissible.  When  the  whole  ground  of  the 
objection  comes  from  himself  only,  what  he  says  must  be  taken 
together  as  he  says  it.1  Thus,  where  his  interest  appears,  from  his 
own  testimony,  to  arise  from  a  written  instrument,  which  is  not 
produced,  he  may  also  testify  to  the  contents  of  it;  but  if  he  pro- 
duces the  instrument,  it  must  speak  for  itself.2  So  where  the  wit- 
ness for  a  chartered  company  stated  that  he  had  been  a  member,  he 
was  permitted  also  to  testify  that  he  had  subsequently  been  disfran 
chised.8  So,  where  a  witness  called  by  an  administrator  testified 
that  he  was  one  of  the  heirs  at  law,  he  was  also  permitted  to  testify 

the  Court  will  not  allow  the  objection  to  be  taken  at  the  hearing :  Flagg  v.  Mann, 
2  Sumn.  487. 

9  Swift  v.  Dean,  6  Johns.  523,  538 ;  Needham  v.  Smith,  2  Vern.  463  ;  Vaughan  v. 
Worral,  2  Swanst.  400.  In  this  case,  Lord  Eldon  said,  that  no  attention  could  be  given 
to  the  evidence,  though  the  interest  were  not  discovered  until  the  last  question,  after  he 
has  been  "cross-examined  to  the  bone."  See  Gresley  on  Evid.  234-236  ;  Rogers  v. 
Dibble,  3  Paige  238  ;  Town  v.  Needham,  ib.  545,  552  ;  Harrisou  v.  Courtauld,  1  Russ. 
&  M.  428  ;  Moorhouse  ».  De  Passou,  G.  Cooper  Ch.  Cas.  300;  s.  c.  19  Ves.  433.  See 
also  Jacobs  v.  Laybourn,  7  Jur.  562. 

w  Donelson  v.  Taylor,  8  Pick.  390.  Where  the  testimony  is  by  deposition,  the  objec- 
tion, if  the  interest  is  known,  ought  regularly  to  be  taken  in  limine ;  and  the  cross- 
examination  should  be  made  de  betie  esse,  under  protest,  or  with  an  express  reservation 


_T judge 

1  Paine~46o;  falbot  v.  Clark,  8  Pick.  51  ;  Smith  v.  Sparrow,  11  Jur.  126  ;  Mohawk 
Bank  v.  Atwater,  2  Paige  54  ;  Ogle  v.  Paleski,  1  Holt  485  ;  2  Tidd's  Pr.  812.  As 
to  the  mode  of  taking  the  objection  in  chancery,  see  1  Hoffm.  Chan.  489  ;  Gasa  v. 
Stinson,  3  Sumn.  605. 

11  Tallman  v.  Dutcher,  7  Wend.  180  ;  Doty  v.  Wilson,  14  Johns.  378 ;  Wake  v. 
Lock,  5  C.  &  P.  454. 

"  Cnmden  v.  Doremus,  8  How.  515,  530  ;  Elwood  v.  Deifendorf,  5  Barb.  398  ;  Carr 
v.  Daveis,  ib.  337. 

1  Abrahams  v.  Bunn,  4  Burr.  2256,  per  Ld.  Mansfield  ;  Bank  of  Utica  v.  Mersereau, 
3  Barb.  Ch.  528. 

8  Butler  v.  Carver,  2  Stark.  433.     See  also  R.  v.  Gisburn,  15  East  57. 

»  Butchers'  Company  v.  Jones,  1  Esp.  160.     And  see  Botham  v.  Swingler,  Peake 
218. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  909 

that  he  had  released  all  his  interest  in  the  estate.4  And,  generally, 
a  witness  upon  an  examination  in  Court  as  to  his  interest  may  testify 
to  the  contents  of  any  contracts,  records,  or  documents  not  produced, 
affecting  the  question  of  his  interest.6  But  if  the  testimony  of  the 
witness  is  taken  upon  interrogatories  in  writing,  previously  tiled  and 
served  on  the  adverse  party,  who  objects  to  his  competency  on  the 
ground  of  interest,  which  the  witness  confesses,  but  testifies  that  it 
has  been  released;  the  release  must  be  produced  at  the  trial,  that  the 
Court  may  judge  of  it.6 

§  423.  Mode  of  Proving  Interest  The  mode  of  proving  the  in- 
terest of  a  witness  is  either  by  his  own  examination,  or  by  evidence 
aliunde.  But  whether  the  election  of  one  of  these  modes  will  pre- 
clude the  party  from  afterwards  resorting  to  the  other  is  not  clearly 
settled  by  the  authorities.  If  the  evidence  offered  aliunde  to  prove 
the  interest  is  rejected  as  inadmissible,  the  witness  may  then  be  ex- 
amined on  the  voir  dire.1  And  if  the  witness  on  the  voir  dire  states 
that  he  does  not  know,  or  leaves  it  doubtful  whether  he  is  interested 
or  not,  his  interest  may  be  shown  by  other  evidence.2  It  has  also 
been  held,  that  a  resort  to  one  of  these  modes  to  prove  the  interest 
of  the  witness  on  one  ground  does  not  preclude  a  resort  to  the  other 
mode,  to  prove  the  interest  on  another  ground.8  And  where  the 
objection  to  the  competency  of  the  witness  is  founded  upon  the  evi- 
dence already  adduced  by  the  party  offering  him,  this  has  been  ad- 
judged not  to  be  such  an  election  of  the  mode  of  proof,  as  to  preclude 
the  objector  from  the  right  to  examine  the  witness  on  the  voir  dire.* 
But,  subject  to  these  modifications,  the  rule  recognized  and  adopted 
by  the  general  current  of  authorities  is,  that  where  the  objecting 
party  has  undertaken  to  prove  the  interest  of  the  witness,  by  inter- 
rogating him  upon  the  voir  dire,  he  shall  not,  upon  failure  of  that 
mode,  resort  to  the  other  to  prove  facts,  the  existence  of  which  was 
known  when  the  witness  was  interrogated.5  The  party  appealing  to 

*  Ingram  v.  Dada,  Lond.  Sittings  after  Mich.  T.  1817 ;  1  C.  &  P.  234,  n.;  Wandless 
v .  Cawthorne,  B.  R.  Guildhall,  1829 ;  1  M.  &  M.  321,  n. 

6  Miller  v.  Mariner's  Church,  7  Greenl.  51  ;  Fifield  v.  Smith,  8  Shepl.  383 ;  Sewell 
v.  Stubbs,  1  C.  &  P.  73 ;  Quarterman  v.  Cox,  8  id.  97 ;  Lunnis  ».  Row,  2  P.  &  D.  538 ; 
Hays  v.  Richardson,  1  Gill  &  J.  366  ;  Stebbins  v.  Sackett,  5  Conn.  258  ;  Baxter  v. 
Rodman,  3  Pick.  435.  The  case  of  Goodhay  v.  Hendry,  1  M.  &  M.  319,  apparently 
cvntra,  is  opposed  by  Carlisle  v.  Eady,  1  C.  &  P.  234,  and  by  Wandless  v.  Cawthorne, 
1  M  &  M.  321,  n. 

*  Southard  v.  Wilson,  8  Shepl.  494  ;  Hobart  v.  Bartlett,  5  id.  429. 

1  Main  v.  Newson,  Anthon's  Cas.  18.  But  a  witness  cannot  be  excluded  by  proof 
of  his  own  admission  that  he  was  interested  in  the  suit :  Bates  ».  Ryland,  6  Ala.  668  ; 
Pierce  v.  Chase,  8  Mass.  487,  488 ;  Com.  v.  Waite,  5  id.  261  ;  George  v.  Stubbs,  13 
Shepl.  243. 

a  Shannon  v.  Com.,  8  S.  &  R.  444  ;  Galbraith  v.  Galbraith,  6  Watts  112;  Bank  of 
Columbia  v.  Magruder,  6  Har.  &  J.  172. 

»  Stebbins  v.  Sackett,  5  Conn.  258. 

*  Bridge  v.  Wellington,  1  Mass.  221,  222. 

6  In  the  old  books,  including  the  earlier  editions  of  Mr.  Starkie's  and  Mr.  Phillips's 
Treatise  on  Evidence,  the  rule  is  clearly  laid  down,  that,  after  an  examination  njion 
the  voir  dire,  no  other  mode  of  proof  cau  in  any  case  be  resorted  to  ;  excepting  only  the 


910  APPENDIX  II. 

the  conscience  of  the  witness,  offers  him  to  the  Court  as  a  credible 
witness;  and  it  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  law  of  evidence  to 
permit  him  afterwards  to  say,  that  the  witness  is  not  worthy  to  be 
believed.  It  would  also  violate  another  rule,  by  its  tendency  to  raise 
collateral  issues.  Nor  is  it  deemed  reasonable  to  permit  a  party  to 
sport  with  the  conscience  of  a  witness,  when  he  has  other  proof  of 
his  interest.  But  if  evidence  of  his  interest  has  been  given  aliunde, 
it  is  not  proper  to  examine  the  witness,  in  order  to  explain  it  away.6 

§  424.  Examination  upon  the  voir  dire.  A  witness  is  said  to  be 
examined  upon  the  voir  dire,  when  he  is  sworn  and  examined  as  to 
the  fact  whether  he  is  not  a  party  interested  in  the  cause.1  And 
though  this  term  was  formerly  and  more  strictly  applied"  only  to  the 
case  where  the  witness  was  sworn  to  make  true  answers  to  such  ques- 
tions as  the  Court  might  put  to  him,  and  before  he  was  sworn  in  chief, 
yet  it  is  now  extended  to  the  preliminary  examination  to  his  interest, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  form  of  the  oath  under  which  the  in- 
quiry is  made. 

§  425.  Question  of  Interest  for  the  Court.  The  question  of  inter- 
est, though  involving  facts,  is  still  a  preliminary  question,  preceding, 
in  its  nature,  the  admission  of  the  testimony  to  the  jury.  It  is  there- 
fore to  be  determined  by  the  Court  alone,  it  being  the  province  of  the 
judge  and  not  of  the  jury,  in  the  first  instance,  to  pass  upon  its 
efficiency.1  If,  however,  the  question  of  fact,  in  any  preliminary 
inquiry,  —  such,  for  instance,  as  the  proof  of  an  instrument  by  sub- 
scribing witnesses,  —  is  decided  by  the  judge,  and  the  same  question 
of  fact  afterwards  recurs  in  the  course  of  the  trial  upon  the  merits, 
the  jury  are  not  precluded  by  the  decision  of  the  judge,  but  may,  if 
they  are  satisfied  upon  the  evidence,  find  the  fact  the  other  way.3 

case  where  the  interest  was  developed  in  the  course  of  trial  of  the  issue.  But  in  the  last 
editions  of  those  works,  it  is  said,  that,  "if  the  witness  discharged  himself  on  the  voir 
dire,  the  party  who  objects  may  still  support  his  objection  by  evidence ;  "  but  no  au- 
thority is  cited  for  the  position  :  1  Stark.  Evid.  124  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  149  ;  1  Phil. 
Evid.  154.  Mr.  Starkie  had  previously  added  these  words  :  "  as  part  of  his  own  case  " 
(see  2  Stark.  Evid.  p.  756,  1st  ed.);  and  with  this  qualification  the  remark  is  supported 
by  authority,  and  is  correct  in  principle.  The  question  of  competency  is  a  collateral 
question  ;  and  the  rule  is,  that  when  a  witness  is  asked  a  question  upon  a  collateral 
point,  his  answer  is  final,  and  cannot  be  contradicted ;  that  is,  no  collateral  evidence 
is  admissible  for  that  purpose:  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Carnpb.  637;  Philadelphia  & 
Trenton  Co.  ».  Stimpson,  14  Pet.  448,  461 ;  Harris  v.  Wilson,  7  Wend.  57  ;  Odiorne  r. 
Winkley,  2  Gallis.  53  ;  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  149-157.  But  if  the  evidence,  subse- 
quentiy  given  upon  the  matter  in  issue,  should  also  prove  the  witness  interested,  his 
testimony  may  well  be  stricken  out,  without  violating  any  rule  :  Brockbank  v.  Ander- 
son, 7  M.  &G.  295,  313.  The  American  Courts  have  followed  the  old  English  rule, 
as  stated  in  the  text :  Butler  v.  Butler,  3  Day  214 ;  Stebbins  v.  Sackett,  5  Conn.  258, 
261  ;  Chance  v.  Hine,  6  id.  231  ;  Welden  v.  Buck,  Anthon's  Cas.  15  ;  Chatfield  v. 
Lathrop,  6  Pick.  418;  Evans  ».  Eaton,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  322;  Stuart  v.  Lake,  33  Maine  87. 

•  Mott  v.  Hicks,  1  Cowen  513  ;  Evan  v.  Gray,  1  Martin  N.  s.  709. 

1  Termes  de  la  Ley,  Verb.  Voicr  dire.  And  see  Jacobs  v.  Lay  born,  11  M.  &  W. 
685,  where  the  nature  and  us«  of  an  examination  upon  the  voir  dire  are  stated  and  ex- 
plained by  Lrt.  Abinger,  C.  B. 

1  Harris  v.  Wilson,  7  Wend.  57;  supra,  §  49. 

8  Ross  v.  Gould,  5  Greenl.  204. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE  ORIGINAL  TEXT.  911 

In  determining  the  question  of  interest,  where  the  evidence  is  de- 
rived aliunde,  and  it  depends  upon  the  decision  of  intricate  questions 
of  fact,  the  judge  may,  in  his  discretion,  take  the  opinion  of  the  jury 
upon  them.0  And  if  a  witness,  being  examined  on  the  voir  dire,  tes- 
tifies to  facts  tending  to  prove  that  he  is  not  interested,  and  is  there- 
upon admitted  to  testify ;  after  which  opposing  evidence  is  introduced, 
to  the  same  facts,  which  are  thus  left  in  doubt,  and  the  facts  are 
material  to  the  issue,  —  the  evidence  must  be  weighed  by  the  jury, 
and  if  they  thereupon  believe  the  witness  to  be  interested,  they  must 
lay  his  testimony  out  of  the  case.4 

§  426.  Disqualification  removed  by  a  Release.  The  competency  of 
a  witness,  disqualified  by  interest,  may  always  be  restored  by  a  proper 
release.1  If  it  consists  in  an  interest  vested  in  himself,  he  may 
divest  himself  of  it  by  a  release,  or  other  proper  conveyance.  If  it 
consists  in  a  liability  over,  whether  to  the  party  calling  him,  or  to 
another  person,  it  may  be  released  by  the  person  to  whom  he  is  liable. 
A  general  release  of  all  actions  and  causes  of  action  for  any  matter 
or  thing,  which  has  happened  previous  to  the  date  of  the  release,  will 
discharge  the  witness  from  all  liability  consequent  upon  the  event  of 
a  suit  then  existing.  Such  a  release  from  the  drawer  to  the  acceptor 
of  a  bill  of  exchange  was  therefore  held  sufficient  to  render  him  a 
competent  witness  for  the  drawer,  in  an  action  then  pending  by  the 
payee  against  him;  for  the  transaction  was  already  passed,  which 
was  to  lay  the  foundation  of  the  future  liability ;  and  upon  all  such 
transactions  and  inchoate  rights  such  a  release  will  operate.2  A  re- 
lease, to  qualify  a  witness,  must  be  given  before  the  testimony  is 
closed,  or  it  comes  too  late.  But  if  the  trial  is  not  over,  the  Court  will 
permit  the  witness  to  be  re-examined,  after  he  is  released  ;  and  it 
will  generally  be  sufficient  to  ask  him  if  his  testimony,  already  given, 
is  true ;  the  circumstances  under  which  it  has  been  given  going  only 
to  the  credibility.8 

§  427.  "Who  must  release.  As  to  the  person  by  whom  the  release 
should  be  given,  it  is  obvious  that  it  must  be  by  the  party  holding  the 
interest  to  be  released,  or  by  some  person  duly  authorized  in  his  be- 

«  See  supra,  §  49. 

*  Walker  v.  Sawyer,  13  N.  H.  191. 

1  Where  the  witness  produces  the  release  from  his  own  possession,  as  part  of  his 
testimony,  in  answer  to  a  question  put  to  him,  its  execution  needs  not  to  be  proved  by 
the  subscribing  witnesses  ;  but  it  is  to  be  taken  as  a  part  of  his  testimony.  If  the 
question  is  asked  by  the  party  calling  the  witness,  who  thereupon  produce  the  release, 
the  party  is  estopped  to  deny  that  it  is  a  valid  and  true  release.  But  where  the  release 
is  produced  or  set  up  by  the  party  to  the  suit,  to  establish  his  own  title,  he  must  prove 
its  execution  by  the  subscribing  witness  :  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Nantucket  Steamboat  Co., 
2  Story  16,  42.  And  see  Moises  v.  Thornton,  8  T.  K.  303  ;  Jackson  v.  Pratt,  10  Johns. 
381  ;  Carlisle  v.  Eady,  1  C.  &  P.  234;  Ingram  v.  Dada,  ib.  n.  ;  Goodhay  v.  Hendry, 
1  M.  &  M.  319.  See  also  Southard  v.  Wilson,  8  Shepl.  494  ;  Hall  v.  Steamboat  Co., 

13  Conn.  319. 

8  Scott  v.  Lifford.  1  Cam  ph.  249,  250  ;  Cartwright  v.  Williams,  2  Stark.  340. 

3  Wake  v.  Lock,  5  C.  &  P.  545  ;  Tallman  v.  Butcher,  7  Wend.  180  ;  Doty  «;.  Wilson, 

14  Johns.  378.     And  see  Clark  v.  Carter,  4  Moore  207. 


912  APPENDIX  II. 

half.  A  release  of  a  bond  debt  lay  one  of  several  obligees,  or  to  one 
of  several  obligors,  will  operate  as  to  them  all.1  So,  where  several 
had  agreed  to  bear  the  expense  of  a  joint  undertaking,  in  preferring  a 
petition  to  Parliament,  and  an  action  was  brought  against  one  of 
them,  another  of  the  contractors  was  held  a  competent  witness  for 
the  defendant,  after  being  released  by  him;  for  the  event  of  the 
suit  could  at  most  only  render  him  liable  to  the  defendant  for  his 
contributory  share.2  But  if  there  is  a  joint  fund  or  property  to  be 
directly  affected  by  the  result,  the  same  reason  would  not  decisively 
apply ;  and  some  act  of  divestment,  on  the  part  of  the  witness  him- 
self, would  be  necessary.8  Thus,  in  an  action  on  a  charter-party,  a 
joint-owner  with  the  plaintiff,  though  not  a  registered  owner,  is  not  a 
competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  unless  cross-releases  are  executed 
between  them.4  A  release  by  an  infant  is  generally  sufficient  for  this 
purpose ;  for  it  may  be  only  voidable,  and  not  void ;  in  which  case,  a 
stranger  shall  not  object  to  it.6  But  a  release  by  a  guardian  ad  litem,6 
or  by  a  prochein  amy,  or  by  an  attorney  of  record,7  is  not  good.  A 
surety  may  always  render  the  principal  a  competent  witness  for  him- 
self, by  a  release.8  And  it  seems  sufficient,  if  only  the  costs  are  re- 
leased.' 

§  428.  Interests  not  removed  by  a  Release.  Though  there  are  no 
interests  of  a  disqualifying  nature  but  what  may,  in  some  manner,  be 
annihilated,1  yet  there  are  some  which  cannot  be  reached  by  a  release. 

1  Co.  Lit.  232  a ;  Cheetham  v.  Ward,  1  B.  &  P.  630.     So,  by  one  of  several  part- 
ners, or  joint  proprietors,  or  owners :  Whitamore  v.  Waterhouse,   4  C.  &  P.   383  ; 
Hockless  v.  Mitchell,  4  Esp.  86  ;  Bulkley  v.  Dayton,  14  Johns.  387  ;  Haley  r.  Godfrey, 
4  Shepl.  305.     But  where  the  interest  of  the  parties  to  the  record  is  several,  a  release 
by  one  of  them  only  is  not  sufficient :   Betts  v.  Jones,  9  C.  &  P.  199. 

2  Duke  r.  Pownall,  1  M.  &  Malk.  430  ;   Ransom  v.  Keyes,  9  Cowen  128.     So,  in 
other  cases  of  liability  to  contribution  :   Bayley  v.  Osborn,  2  Wend.  527  ;  Robertson  v. 
Smith,  18  Johns.  459;   Gibbs  v.  Bryant,!  Pick.  118;  Ames  v.  Withington,  3  N.  H. 
116;   Carleton  v.   Whitcher,  5  id.   196.     One  of  several  copartners,  not  being  sued 
with  them,  may  be  rendered  a  competent  witness  for  them  by  their  release:   Lefferts 
v.  De  Mott,  21  Wend.  136  (sed  vide  Cline  v.  Little,  5  Blackf.  486)  ;  but  quaere,  if  he 
ought  not  also  to  release  to  them  his  interest  in  the  assets  of  the  firm,  so  far  as  they 
may  be  affected  by  the  demand  in  controversy  :  ib. 

»  Waite  v.  Merrill,  4  Greenl.  102  ;  Richardson  v.  Freeman,  6  Greenl.  57;  1  Holt's 
Cas.  430,  n.  ;  Anderson  v.  Brock,  8  Greenl.  243.  The  heir  is  rendered  a  competent 
witness  for  the  administrator,  by  releasing  to  the  latter  all  his  interest  in  the  action  ; 
provided  it  does  not  appear,  that  there  is  any  real  estate  to  be  affected  by  the  result : 
Boynton  v.  Turner,  13  Mass.  391. 

«  Jackson  v.  Galloway,  8  C.  &  P.  480. 

6  Rogers  v.  Berry,  10  Johns.  132;  Walker  v.  Ferrin,  4  Vt.  523. 

•  Fraser  v.  Marsh,  2  Stark.  41 ;  Walker  v.  Ferrin,  ub.  sup. 

7  Murray  v.  House,  11  Johns.  464  ;  Walker  v.  Ferrin,  ub.  sup. 

8  Reed  v.  Boardman,  20  Pick.  441 ;   Harmon  v.  Arthur,  1  Bail.  83  ;   Willard  v. 
Wickham,  7  Watts  292. 

•  Perryman  v.  Steggall,  5  C.  &  P.  197.    See  also  Van  Shaack-r.  Stafford,  12  Pick.  565. 
1  In  a  writ  of  entry  by  a  mortgagee,  the  tenant  claimed  under  a  deed  from  the 

mortgagor,  subnequent  in  date,  but  prior  in  registration,  and  denied  notice  of  the  mort- 
gage. To  prove  that  he  purchased  with  notice,  the  mortgagor  was  admitted  a  com- 
petent witness  for  the  mortgagee,  the  latter  having  released  him  from  so  much  of  the 
debt  R8  should  not  be  satisfied  by  the  land  mortgaged,  and  covenanted  to  resort  to  the 
laud  as  the  sole  fund  for  payment  of  the  debt :  Howard  v.  Chadbourue,  5  Greeul.  15. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  913 

Such  is  the  case  of  one  having  a  common  right,  as  an  inhabitant  of  a 
town ;  for  a  release  by  him,  to  the  other  inhabitants,  will  not  render 
him  a  competent  witness  for  one  of  them,  to  maintain  the  common 
right.2  So  where,  in  trover,  the  plaintiff  claimed  the  chattel  by  pur- 
chase from  B,  and  the  defendant  claimed  it  under  a  purchase  from 
W,  who  had  previously  bought  it  from  B,  it  was  held  that  a  release 
to  B,  from  the  defendant  would  not  render  him  a  competent  witness 
for  the  latter ;  for  the  defendant's  remedy  was  not  against  B,  but 
against  W  alone.8  And  in  the  case  of  a  covenant  real,  running  with 
the  land,  a  release  by  the  covenantee,  after  he  has  parted  with  the 
estate,  is  of  no  avail ;  no  person  but  the  present  owner  being  compe- 
tent to  release  it.4  Where  the  action  is  against  the  surety  of  one  who 
has  since  become  bankrupt,  the  bankrupt  is  not  rendered  a  competent 
witness  for  the  surety,  by  a  release  from  him  alone;  because  a  judg- 
ment against  the  surety  would  still  give  him  a  right  to  prove  under 
the  commission.  The  surety  ought  also  to  release  the  assignees  from 
all  claim  on  the  bankrupt's  estate,  it  being  vested  in  them ;  and  the 
bankrupt  should  release  his  claim  to  the  surplus.5  So,  a  residuary 
legatee  is  not  rendered  a  competent  witness  for  the  executor,  who 
sues  to  recover  a  debt  due  to  the  testator,  merely  by  releasing  to  the 
executor  his  claim  to  that  debt ;  for,  if  the  action  fails,  the  estate 
will  still  be  liable  for  the  costs  to  the  plaintiff's  attorney,  or  to  the 
executor.  The  witness  must  also  release  the  residue  of  the  estate ; 
or,  the  estate  must  be  released  from  all  claim  for  the  costs.6 

§  429.  Delivery  of  Release  not  necessary.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
the  release  be  actually  delivered  by  the  releasor  into  the  hands  of 
the  releasee.  It  may  be  deposited  in  Court,  for  the  use  of  the  absent 
party.1  Or,  it  may  be  delivered  to  the  wife,  for  the  use  of  the  hus- 
band.2 But  in  such  cases  it  has  been  held  necessary  that  the  delivery 
of  the  release  to  a  third  person  should  be  known  to  the  witness  at  the 
time  of  giving  his  testimony.8  The  objection  of  interest,  as  before 
remarked,  proceeds  on  the  presumption  that  it  may  bias  the  mind  of 
the  witness  ;  but  this  presumption  is  taken  away  by  proof  of  his 
having  done  all  in  his  power  to  get  rid  of  the  interest.4  It  has  even 
been  held,  that  where  the  defendant  has  suffered  an  interested  wit- 

2  Jacobson  v.  Fountain,  2  Johns.  170  ;  Abby  v.  Goodrich,  3  Day,  433 ;  supra, 
§  405. 

8  Radburn  v.  Morris,  4  Bing.  649. 

*  Leighton  v.  Perkins,  2  N.  H.  427  ;   Pile  v.  Benham,  3  Hayw.  176. 
8  Perryman  v.  Steggall,  8  Bing.  369. 

6  Baker  v.  Tyrwhitt,  4  Campb.  27. 

1  Perry  v.  Fleming,  2  N.  C.  Law  Repos.  458  ;   Lily  v.  Kitzmiller,  1  Yeates  30  ; 
Matthews  v.  Merchant,  3  Dev.  &  Bat.  40  ;  Brown  v.  Brown,  5  Ala.  508.     Or,  it  may 
be  delivered  to  the  attorney  :  Stevenson  v.  Mudgett,  ION.  H.  338. 

2  Van  Deusen  v.  Frink,  15  Pick.  449  ;  Peaceable  v.  Keep,  1  Yeates  576. 

8  Seymour  v.  Strong,  4  Hill  255.  Whether  the  belief  of  the  witness  as  to  his  in- 
terest, or  the  impression  under  which  he  testifies,  can  go  further  than  to  effect  the 
credibility  of  his  testimony,  qucere ;  and  see  supra,  §§  387,  388,  419. 

*  Goodtitle  v.  Welford,  1  Doug.  139,  141,  per  Ashhurst,  J. 
VOL.  I.  —  58 


914  APPENDIX  n. 

ness  to  be  examined,  on  the  undertaking  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney  to 
execute  a  release  to  him  after  the  trial,  which,  after  a  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff,  he  refused  to  execute,  this  was  no  sufficient  cause  for  a  new 
trial ;  for  the  witness  had  a  remedy  on  the  undertaking.5  But  the 
witness,  in  such  cases,  will  not  be  permitted  to  proceed  with  his  tes- 
timony, even  while  the  attorney  is  preparing  or  amending  the  release, 
without  the  consent  of  the  adverse  party.6 

§  430.  Other  Modes  of  Restoring  Competency.  There  are  other 
modes,  besides  a  release,  in  which  the  competency  of  an  interested 
witness  may  be  restored.  Some  of  those  modes,  to  be  adopted  by 
the  witness  himself,  have  already  been  adverted  to  ; 1  namely,  where 
he  has  assigned  his  own  interest,  or  done  all  in  his  power  to  assign 
it ;  or,  where  he  refuses  to  accept  a  release  tendered  to  him  by  an- 
other. So,  where,  being  a  legatee  or  distributee,  he  has  been  fully 
paid.2  An  indorser  is  made  a  competent  witness  for  the  indorsee,  by 
striking  off  his  name  from  the  back  of  the  note  or  bill ;  but  if  the  bill 
is  drawn  in  sets,  it  must  appear  that  his  name  is  erased  from  each 
one  of  the  set,  even  though  one  of  them  is  missing  and  is  supposed 
to  be  lost ;  for  it  may  be  in  the  hands  of  a  bonafide  holder.8  A  guar- 
antor, also,  is  rendered  a  competent  witness  for  the  creditor,  by  de- 
livering up  the  letter  of  guaranty,  with  permission  to  destroy  it.4 
And  this  may  be  done  by  the  attorney  of  the  party,  his  relation  as 
such  and  the  possession  of  the  paper  being  sufficient  to  justify  a  pre- 
sumption of  authority  for  that  purpose.5  The  bail  or  surety  of  an- 
other may  be  rendered  a  competent  witness  for  him,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  by  substituting  another  person  in  his  stead;  which, 
where  the  stipulation  is  entered  into  in  any  judicial  proceeding,  as  in 
the  case  of  bail,  and  the  like,  the  Court  will  order  upon  motion.  The 
same  may  be  done  by  depositing  in  Court  a  sufficient  sum  of  money ; 
or,  in  the  case  of  bail,  by  a  surrender  of  the  body  of  the  principal.6 
So,  where  the  liability,  which  would  have  rendered  the  witness  incom- 
petent, is  discharged  by  the  operation  of  law  ;  as,  for  example,  by  the 
bankrupt  or  the  insolvent  laws,  or  by  the  statute  of  limitations.7 
Where,  in  trespass,  several  justifications  are  set  up  in  bar,  one  of 

»  Hemming  v.  English,  1  Cr.  M.  &  R.  568;   s.  c.  5  Tyrwh.  185. 
8  Doty  v.  Wilson,  14  Johns.  378. 

1  Supra,  §  419. 

2  Clarke  v.  Gannon,  Ry.  &  M.  31  ;   Gebhart  v.  Shindle,  15  S.  &  R.  235. 
8  Steinmetz  v.  Currey/1  Dall.  234. 

*  Merchants'  Bank  t>.  Spicer,  6  Wend.  443. 

6  Ibid.  ;  Watson  v.  McLaren,  189  Wend.  557. 

•  Supra,  §  392,  n.  (1)  ;  Bailey  v.  Hole,  3  C.  &  P.  660  ;  s.  0.  1  Mood.  &  M.  289  ; 
Leggett  v.   Boyd,  3  Wend.   376  ;  Tompkins  v.  Curtis,  3  Cowen  251  ;  Grey  v.  Young, 
1  Harper  38  ;  Allen  v.  Hawks,  13  Pick.  79  ;  Beckley  v.  Freeman,  15  id.  468  ;  Pearcey 
v.  Fleming,  5  C.  &  P.  503;  Lees  v.  Smith,  1  M.  &  Rob.  329 ;  Comstock  v.  Paie,  3  Rob. 
La.  440  ;  Fraser  v.  Harding,  3  Kerr  94. 

7  Murray  v.  Judah,  6  Cowen   484  ;  Ludlow  v.   Union  Ins.   Co.,  2  S.  &  R.  119; 
U.   8.  v.  Smith,  4  Day,   121  ;  Quimby  v.  Wroth,  3  H.  &  J.  249 ;  Murray  v.  Marsh, 
Hayw.  290. 


PASSAGES    OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  915 

which  is  a  prescriptive  or  customary  right  in  all  the  inhabitants  of  a 
certain  place,  one  of  those  inhabitants  may  be  rendered  a  competent 
witness  for  the  defendant,  by  his  waiving  that  branch  of  the  defence.8 
In  trover  by  a  bailee,  he  may  render  the  bailor  a  competent  witness 
for  him,  by  agreeing  to  allow  him,  at  all  events,  a  certain  sum  for  the 
goods  lost.9  The  assignee  of  a  chose  in  action,  who,  having  com- 
menced a  suit  upon  it  in  the  name  of  the  assignor,  has  afterwards 
sold  and  transferred  his  own  interest  to  a  stranger,  is  thereby  ren- 
dered a  competent  witness  for  the  plaintiff.10  But  the  interest  which 
an  informer  has  in  a  statute  penalty  is  held  not  assignable  for  that 
purpose.11  So,  the  interest  of  a  legatee  being  assigned,  he  is  thereby 
rendered  competent  to  prove  the  will ;  though  the  payment  is  only 
secured  to  him  by  bond  which  is  not  yet  due.12  So,  a  stockholder  in 
any  money-corporation  ma}*  be  rendered  a  competent  witness  for  the 
corporation,  by  a  transfer  of  his  stock,  either  to  the  company  or  to  a 
stranger ;  even  though  he  intends  to  repossess  it,  and  has  assigned  it 
merely  to  qualify  himself  to  testify  ;  provided  there  is  no  agreement 
between  him  and  the  assignee  or  purchaser  for  a  reconveyance.18 
Where  a  witness  was  liable  to  the  plaintiff's  attorney  for  the  costs, 
and  the  attorney  had  prepared  a  release,  in  order  to  restore  his  com- 
petency in  case  it  should  be  questioned,  but,  no  objection  being  made 
to  the  witness,  he  was  examined  for  the  plaintiff  without  a  release, 
this  was  considered  as  a  gross  imposition  upon  the  Court;  and  in  a 
subsequent  action  by  the  attorney  against  the  witness,  for  his  costs, 
he  was  nonsuited.14  These  examples  are  deemed  sufficient  for  the 
purpose  of  illustrating  this  method  of  restoring  the  competency  of  a 
witness  disqualified  by  interest. 

§  433.  Direct  Examination.  When  a  witness  has  been  duly  sworn, 
and  his  competency  is  settled,  if  objected  to,1  he  is  first  examined 
by  the  party  producing  him;  which  is  called  his  direct  examination. 
He  is  afterwards  examined  to  the  same  matters  by  the  adverse  party ; 
which  is  called  his  cross-examination.  These  examinations  are  con- 
ducted orally  in  open  Court,  under  the  regulation  and  order  of  the 

8  Prewit  v.  Tilly,  1  C.  &  P.  140. 

9  Maine  Stage  Co.  u.  Longley,  2  Shepl.  444. 
a'J  Soulden  v.  Van  Rensselaer,  9  Wend.  293. 

11  Com.  v.  Hargesheimer,  1  Ashm.  413. 

12  Mcllroy  ».  Mcllroy,  1  Rawle  433. 

13  Gilbert  v.  Manchester  Iron  Co.,  11  Wend.  627  ;  Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cadwell,  3  id. 
296  ;  Stall  v.  Catskill  Bank,  18  id.  466  ;  Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smaller,  2  Cowen,  770 ; 
Bell  v.  Hull,  &c.  Railroad  Co.,  6  M.  &  W.  701 ;  Illinois  Ins.  Co.  v.  Marseilles  Co., 
1  Gilm.  236  ;  Union  Bank  v.  Owen,  4  Humph.  338. 

14  Williams  v.  Goodwin,  11  Moore  342. 

1  The  course  in  the  Scotch  Courts,  after  a  witness  is  sworn,  is,  first,  to  examine  him 
in  initialibits,  —  namely,  whether  he  has  been  instructed  what  to  say,  or  has  received 
or  has  been  promised  any  good  deed  for  what  he  is  to  say,  or  bears  any  ill-will  to  the 
adverse  party,  or  has  any  interest  in  the  cause  or  concern  in  conducting  it ;  together 
with  his  age,  and  whether  he  is  married  or  not,  and  the  degree  of  his  relationsliip  to 
the  party  adducing  him  :  Tait  on  Evid.  424. 


916  APPENDIX   II. 

judge,  and  in  his  presence  and  that  of  the  jury,  and  of  the  parties 
and  their  counsel. 

§434.  .  .  .  The  witness,  except  in  certain  cases  hereafter  to  be 
mentioned,  is  to  be  examined  only  to  matters  of  fact  within  his 
own  knowledge,  whether  they  consist  of  words  or  actions;  and 
to  these  matters  he  should  in  general  be  plainly,  directly,  and 
distinctly  interrogated.  Inferences  or  conclusions,  which  may  be 
drawn  from  facts,  are  ordinarily  to  be  drawn  by  the  jury  alone; 
except  where  the  conclusion  is  an  inference  of  skill  and  judgment; 
in  which  case  it  may  be  drawn  by  an  expert,  and  testified  by  him 
to  the  jury. 

§  436.  Refreshing  Recollection.  Though  a  witness  can  testify 
only  to  such  facts  as  are  within  his  own  knowledge  and  recollection, 
yet  he  is  permitted  to  refresh  and  assist  his  memory,  by  the  use  of  a 
written  instrument,  memorandum,  or  entry  in  a  book,  and  may  be 
compelled  to  do  so,  if  the  writing  is  present  in  Court.1  It  does  not 
seem  to  be  necessary  that  the  writing  should  have  been  made  by  the 
witness  himself,  nor  that  it  should  be  an  original  writing,  provided, 
after  inspecting  it,  he  can  speak  to  the  facts  from  his  own  recollec- 
tion.2 So,  also,  where  the  witness  recollects  that  he  saw  the  paper 
while  the  facts  were  fresh  in  his  memory,  and  remembers  that  he 
then  knew  that  the  particulars  therein  mentioned  were  correctly 
stated.8  And  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  writing  thus  used  to 
refresh  the  memory  should  itself  be  admissible  in  evidence;  for  if 
inadmissible  in  itself,  as  for  want  of  a  stamp,  it  may  still  be  referred 
to  by  the  witness.4  But  where  the  witness  neither  recollects  the 
fact,  nor  remembers  to  have  recognized  the  written  statement  as 
true,  and  the  writing  was  not  made  by  him,  his  testimony,  so  far  as 
it  is  founded  upon  the  written  paper,  is  but  hearsay;  and  a  witness 
can  no  more  be  permitted  to  give  evidence  of  his  inference  from 

1  Reed  v.  Boardman,  20  Pick.  441. 

2  Doe  v.  Pel-kins,  3  T.  R.  749,  expounded  in  R.  v.  St.  Martin's  Leicester,  2  Ad.  & 
El.  215  ;  Burton  v.  Plummer,  ib.  341  ;  Burrough  v.  Martin,  2  Campb.   112;  Duchess 
of  Kingston's  Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  619  ;  Henry  v.  Lee,  2  Chitty,  124  ;  Rambert  ». 
Cohen,  4  Esp.  213.     In  Meagoe  v.  Simmons,  3  C.  &  P.  75,  Lord  Tenterden  observed, 
that  the  usual  course  was  not  to  permit  the  witness  to  refresh  his  memory  from  any 
paper  not  of  his  own  writing.     And  so  is  the  Scotch  practice  :  Tait  on  Evid.  133.     But 
a  witness  has  been  allowed  to  refresh  his  memory  from  the  notes  of  his  testimony,  taken 
by  counsel  at  a  former  trial :  Lawes  v.  Reed,  2  Lewin  Cr.  Cas.  152.    And  from  his  depo- 
sition :  Smith  v.  Morgan,  2  M.  &  Rob.  259.     And  from  a  printed  copy  of  his  report : 
Home  v.  Mackenzie.  6  Cl.  &  Fin.  628.     And  from  notes  of  another  person's  evidence, 
at  a  former  trial,  examined  by  him  during  that  trial :  R.  v.  Philpotts,  Cox  Cr.  C.  829. 
Or,  within  two  days  afterwards :  ib.,  per  Erie,  J.      But  the  counsel  for  the  prisoner, 
on  cross-examining  a  witness  for  the  prosecution,  is  not  entitled  to  put  the  deposition 
of  the  witness  into  his  hand,  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his  memory,  without  giving 
it  in  evidence:  R.  v.  Ford,  ib.  184. 

8  Burrough  v.  Martin,  2  Campb.  112;  Burton  v.  Plummer,  2  Ad.  &  El.  843,  per 
Ld.  Denman ;  Jacob  v.  Lindsay,  1  East  460  ;  Downer  v.  Rowell,  24  Vt.  343.  But  see 
Butler  D.  Benson,  1  Barb.  526. 

4  Maugham  v.  Hubbard,  8  B.  &  C.  14  ;  Kensington  v.  Inglis,  8  East  273  ;  supra, 
§§  90,  228  (and  post,  §§  463-466). 


PASSAGES.  OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  917 

what  a  third  person  has  written,  than  from  what  a  third  person  has 
said.5 

§  437.  The  cases  in  which  writings  are  permitted  to  be  used  for 
this  purpose  may  be  divided  into  three  classes.  (1)  Where  the 
writing  is  used  only  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  memory  of  the 
witness.  In  this  case,  it  does  not  seem  necessary  that  the  writing 
should  be  produced  in  Court,1  though  its  absence  may  afford  matter 
of  observation  to  the  jury ;  for  the  witness  at  last  testifies  from  his 
own  recollection.  (2)  Where  the  witness  recollects  having  seen 
the  writing  before,  and  though  he  has  now  no  independent  recollec- 
tion of  the  facts  mentioned  in  it,  yet  he  remembers  that,  at  the  time 
he  saw  it,  he  knew  the  contents  to  be  correct.  In  this  case,  the 
writing  itself  must  be  produced  in  Court,  in  order  that  the  other 
party  may  cross-examine;  not  that  such  writing  is  thereby  made 
evidence  of  itself;  but  that  the  other  party  may  have  the  benefit  of 
the  witness's  refreshing  his  memory  by  every  part.2  And  for  the 
same  reason,  a  witness  is  not  permitted  to  refresh  his  memory  by 
extracts  made  from  other  writings.8  (3)  Where  the  writing  in 
question  neither  is  recognized  by  the  witness  as  one  which  he  re- 
members to  have  before  seen,  nor  awakens  his  memory  to  the  recol- 
lection of  anything  contained  in  it;  but,  nevertheless,  knowing  the 
writing  to  be  genuine,  his  mind  is  so  convinced,  that  he  is  on  that 
ground  enabled  to  swear  positively  as  to  the  fact.  An  example  of 
this  kind  is,  where  a  banker's  clerk  is  shown  a  hill  of  exchange, 
which  has  his  own  writing  upon  it,  from  which  he  knows  and  is  able 
to  state  positively  that  it  passed  through  his  hands.  So,  where  an 
agent  made  a  parol  lease,  and  entered  a  memorandum  of  the  terms 
in  a  book  which  was  produced,  but  the  agent  stated  that  he  had  no 
memory  of  the  transaction  but  from  the  book,  without  which  he 

6  2  Phil.  Evid.  413. 

1  Kensington  v.  Inglis,  8  East  273  ;  Burton  v.  Plummer,  2  Ad.  &  El.  341. 

2  Supra,  §§  115,  436;  R.  v.  St.  Martin's  Leicester,  2  Ad.  &  El.  215,  per  Patteson, 
J. ;  Sinclair  v.  Stevenson,  1  C.  &  P.  582  ;  s.  c.  2  Bing.  516 ;  s.  c.  10  Moore  46  ;  Loyd 
v.  Freshfield,  2  C.  &  P.  325  ;  s.  c.  9  D.  &  R.  19.     It  the  paper  is  shown  to  the  witness, 
directly  to  prove  the  handwriting,  it  has  been  ruled  that  the  other  party  has  not, 
therefore,  a  right  to  use  it:  Sinclair  v.  Stevenson,  supra.     But  the  contrary  has  since 
been  held,  by  Bosanquet,  J.,  in  Russell  v.  Rider,  6  C.  &  P.  416,  and  with  good  reason  ; 
for  the  adverse  party  has  a  right  to  cross-examine  the  witness  as  to  the  handwriting : 
2  Phil.  Evid.  400.     But  if  the  counsel,  in  cross-examination,  puts  a  paper  into  a  wit- 
ness's hand,  in  order  to  refresh  his  memory,  the  opposite  counsel  has  a  right  to  look  at 
it  without  being  bound  to  read  it  in  evidence ;  and  may  also  ask  the  witness  when  it 
was  written,  without  being  bound  to  put  it  into  the  case:  R.  r.  Ratnsden,  2  C.  &  P. 
603.     The  American  Courts  have  sometimes  carried  the  rule  farther  than  it  has  been 
carried  in  England,  by  admitting  the  writing  itself  to  go  in  evidence  to  the  jury,  in  all 
cases  where  it  was  made  by  the  witness  at  the  time  of  the  fact,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
serving the  memory  of  it,  if  at  the  time  of  testifying  he  can  recollect  nothing  further 
than  that  he  had  accurately  reduced  the  whole  transaction  to  writing :  Farmers'  and 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Boraef,  1  Bawle  152  ;  Smith  v.  Lane,  12  S.  &  R.  84,  per  Gibson, 
J.  ;  State  v.  Rawls,  2  Nott  &  McCord  331 ;  Clark  v.  Vorce,  15  Wend.  193  ;  Merrill  v. 
Ithaca  &  Oswego  Railroad  Co.,  16  id.  586,  596-598  :  Haven  v.  Wendell,  11  N.  H.  112. 
But  see  Lightner  v.  Wike,  4  S.  &  R.  203  ;  infra,  §  466. 

8  Doe  v.  Perkins,  3  T.  R.  749  ;  2  Ad.  &  El.  215. 


918  APPENDIX   II. 

should  not,  of  his  own  knowledge,  be  able  to  speak  to  the  fact,  but 
on  reading  the  entry  he  had  no  doubt  that  the  fact  really  happened; 
it  was  held  sufficient.4  So,  where  a  witness,  called  to  prove  the 
execution  of  a  deed,  sees  his  own  signature  to  the  attestation,  and 
says,  that  he  is  therefore  sure  that  he  saw  the  party  execute  the 
deed;  that  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  execution  of  a  deed,  though  he 
adds  that  he  has  no  recollection  of  the  fact.5  In  these  and  the  like 
cases,  for  the  reason  before  given,  the  writing  itself  must  be 
produced.6 

§  438.  As  to  the  time  when  the  writing,  thus  used  to  restore  the 
recollection  of  facts,  should  have  been  made,  no  precise  rule  seeins 
to  have  been  established.  It  is  most  freqiiently  said,  that  the  writ- 
ing must  have  been  made  at  the  time  of  the  fact  in  question,  or  re- 
cently afterwards.1  At  the  farthest,  it  ought  to  have  been  made 
before  such  a  period  of  time  has  elapsed,  as  to  render  it  probable 
that  the  memory  of  the  witness  might  have  become  deficient.2  But 
the  practice,  in  this  respect,  is  governed  very  much  by  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case.  In  one  case,  to  prove  the  date  of  an 
act  of  bankruptcy  committed  many  years  before,  a  witness  was  per- 
mitted to  recur  to  his  own  deposition,  made  some  time  during  the 
year  in  which  the  fact  happened.8  In  another  case,  the  witness  was 
not  permitted  to  refresh  his  memory  with  a  copy  of  a  paper,  made 
by  himself  six  months  after  he  made  the  original,  though  the  orig- 
inal was  proved  to  have  been  so  written  over  with  figures  as  to  have 
become  unintelligible;  the  learned  judge  saying,  that  he  could  only 
look  at  the  original  memorandum,  made  near  the  time.4  And  in  a 

4  1  Stark.  Evid.  154,  155  ;  Alison's  Practice,  pp.  540,  541  ;  Tait  on  Evid.  432. 

5  R.  v.  St.  Martin's  Leicester,  2  Ad.  &  El.  210.     See  also  Haig  v.  Newton,  1  Mills 
Const.  423  ;  Sharpe  v.  Bingley,  ib.  373. 

6  Maugham  v.  Hubbard,  8  B.  &  C.  16,  per  Bailey,  J. ;  Russell  v.  Coffin,   8  Pick. 
143,  150  ;  Den  v.  Downam,  ]  Green  135,  142  ;  Jackson  v.  Christman,   4  Wend.   277, 
282  ;  Merrill  v.  Ithaca,  &c.  Railroad  Co.,  16  Wend.  598 ;  Patterson  v.  Tucker,  4  Halst. 
322,  332,  333 ;  Wheeler  v.  Hatch,  3  Fairf.  389 ;  Pigott  v.  Holloway,  1  Binn.  436;  Col- 
lins v.  Lemasters,  2  Bail.  141. 

1  Tanner  v.  Taylor,  cited  by  Buller,  J.,  in  Doe  v.  Perkins,  3  T.  R.  754  ;  Howard 
v.  Canfield,  5  Dowl.  P.  C.  417  ;  Dupuy  v.  Truman,  2  Y.  &  Col.  341.  Where  A  was 
proven  to  have  written  a  certain  article  in  a  newspaper,  but  the  manuscript  was  lost, 
and  A  had  no  recollection  of  the  fact  of  writing  it,  it  was  held  that  the  newspaper 
might  be  used  to  refresh  his  memory,  and  that  he  might  then  be  asked  whether  he  had 
any  doubt  that  the  fact  was  as  therein  stated  :  Topham  v.  McGregor,  1  Car.  &  Kir.  320. 
So,  where  the  transaction  had  faded  from  the  memory  of  the  witness,  but  he  recol- 
lected, that  while  it  was  recent  and  fresh  in  his  memory,  he  had  stated  the  circum- 
Rtances  in  his  examination  before  commissioners  of  bankruptcy,  which  they  had  reduced 
to  writing,  and  lie  had  signed  ;  he  was  allowed  to  look  at  his  examination  to  refresh 
his  memory  :  Wood  v.  Cooper,  ib.  645. 

8  Jones  v.  Stroud,  2  C.  &  P.  196. 

*  Vaughan  v.  Martin,  1  Esp.  440. 

*  Jones  v.  Stroud,  2  C.  &  P.  196,  per  Best,  C.  J.     In  this  case,  the  words  in  the 
copy  and  as  sworn  to  by  the  witness  were  spoken  to  the  plaintiff,  but  on  producing  the 
original,  which,  on  further  reflection,  was  confirmed  by  the  witness,  it  appeared  that 
they  were  spoken  of  him.     The  action  was  slander;  and  the  words  being  laid  accord- 
ing to  the  copy,  for  this  variance  the  plaintiff  was  nonsuited. 


PASSAGES    OMITTED   FROM   THE    ORIGINAL   TEXT.  919 

still  later  case,  where  it  was  proposed  to  refer  to  a  paper,  which  the 
witness  had  drawn  up  for  the  party  who  called  him,  after  the  cause 
was  set  down  for  trial,  the  learned  judge  refused  it;  observing  that 
the  rule  must  be  confined  to  papers  written  contemporaneously  with 
the  transaction.6  But  where  the  witness  had  herself  noted  down 
the  transactions  from  time  to  time  as  they  occurred,  but  had  re- 
quested the  plaintiff's  solicitor  to  digest  her  notes  into  the  form  of  a 
deposition,  which  she  afterwards  had  revised,  corrected,  and  tran- 
scribed, the  Lord  Chancellor  indignantly  suppressed  the  deposition.6 

§  439.  If  a  witness  has  become  blind,  a  contemporaneous  writing 
made  by  himself,  though  otherwise  -  inadmissible,  may  yet  be  read 
over  to  him  in  order  to  excite  his  recollection.1  So,  where  a  receipt 
for  goods  was  inadmissible  for  want  of  a  stamp,  it  was  permitted  to 
be  used  to  refresh  the  memory  of  a  witness  who  heard  it  read  over 
to  the  defendant,  the  latter  at  the  same  time  admitting  the  receipt 
of  the  goods.2 

§  440.  Opinion  Rule.  In  general,  though  a  witness  must  depose  to 
such  facts  only  as  are  within  his  own  knowledge,  yet  there  is  no  rule 
that  requires  him  to  speak  with  such  expression  of  certainty  as  to 
exclude  all  doubt  in  his  mind.  If  the  fact  is  impressed  on  his  mem- 
ory, but  his  recollection  does  not  rise  to  positive  assurance,  it  is  still 
admissible,  to  be  weighed  by  the  jury  ;  but  if  the  impression  is  not 
derived  from  recollection  of  the  fact,  and  is  so  slight  as  to  render  it 
probable  that  it  may  have  been  derived  from  others,  or  may  have 
been  some  unwarrantable  deduction  of  the  witness's  own  mind,  it 
will  be  rejected.1  And  though  the  opinions  of  witnesses  are  in  gen- 
eral not  evidence,  yet  on  certain  subjects  some  classes  of  witnesses 
may  deliver  their  own  opinions,  and  on  certain  other  subjects  any 
competent  witness  may  express  his  opinion  or  belief;  and  on  any 
subject  to  which  a  witness  may  testify,  if  he  has  any  recollection  at 
all  of  the  fact,  he  may  express  it  as  it  lies  in  his  memory,  of  which 
the  jury  will  judge.2  Thus,  it  is  the  constant  practice  to  receive  in 
evidence  any  witness's  belief  of  the  identity  of  a  person,  or  that  the 
handwriting  in  question  is  or  is  not  the  handwriting  of  a  particular 
individual,  provided  he  has  any  knowledge  of  the  person  or  hand- 
writing ;  and  if  he  testifies  falsely  as  to  his  belief,  he  may  be  con- 
victed of  perjury.8  On  questions  of  science,  skill,  or  trade,  or  others 
of  the  like  kind,  persons  of  skill,  sometimes  called  experts,*  may  not 

6  Steinkeller  v.  Newton,  9  C.  &  P.  313. 

6  Anon.,  cited  by  Lord  Kenyon,  in  Doe  v.  Perkins,  3  T.  R.  752.  See  also  Sayer  v. 
Wajjstaff,  5  Beav.  462. 

1  Catt  v.  Howard,  3  Stark.  3. 

2  Jacob  v.  Lindsay,  1  East  460. 

1  Clark  u.  Bigelow,  4  Shepl.  246. 

2  Miller's  Case,  3  Wils.  427,  per  Ld.  Ch.  Just.  DeGrey ;  McNally's  Evid.  262,  263. 
And  see  Carmalt  v.  Post,  8  Watts  411,  per  Gibson,  C.  J. 

• 8  R.  u.  Pedley,  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  4th  ed.  325,  case  163. 
4  Experts,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  are  "  persona  instructed  by  experience  :  * 


920  APPENDIX   II. 

only  testify  to  facts,  but  are  permitted  to  give  their  opinions  in  evi- 
dence. Thus,  the  opinions  of  medical  men  are  constantly  admitted 
as  to  the  cause  of  disease,  or  of  death,  or  the  consequences  of  wounds, 
and  as  to  the  sane  or  insane  state  of  a  person's  mind,  as  collected 
from  a  number  of  circumstances,  and  as  to  other  subjects  of  profes- 
sional skill.5  And  such  opinions  are  admissible  in  evidence,  though 
the  witness  founds  them,  not  on  his  own  personal  observation,  but  on 
the  case  itself,  as  proved  by  other  witnesses  on  the  trial.6  But  where 
scientific  men  are  called  as  witnesses,  they  cannot  give  their  opinions 
as  to  the  general  merits  of  the  cause,  but  only  their  opinions  upon 
the  facts  proved.7  And  if  the  facts  are  doubtful,  and  remain  to  be 
found  by  the  jury,  it  has  been  held  improper  to  ask  an  expert  who 
has  heard  the  evidence,  what  is  his  opinion  upon  the  case  on  trial, 
though  he  may  be  asked  his  opinion  upon  a  similar  case,  hypotheti- 
cally  stated.8  Nor  is  the  opinion  of  a  medical  man  admissible,  that 
a  particular  act,  for  which  a  prisoner  is  tried,  was  an  act  of  insanity.9 
So,  the  subscribing  witnesses  to  a  will  may  testify  their  opinions,  in 
respect  to  the  sanity  of  the  testator  at  the  time  of  executing  the  will, 
though  other  witnesses  can  speak  only  as  to  facts ;  for  the  law  has 
placed  the  subscribing  witnesses  about  the  testator,  to  ascertain  and 
judge  of  his  capacity.10  Seal  engravers  may  be  called  to  give  their 

1  Bouvier's  Law  Diet,  in  verb.  But  more  generally  speaking,  the  term  includes  all 
"  men  of  science,"  as  it  was  used  by  Ld.  Mansfield  in  Folkes  v.  Chadd,  3  Doug.  157  ; 
or  "persons  professionally  acquainted  with  the  science  or  practice"  in  question  : 
Strickland  on  Evid.  p.  408  ;  or  "conversant  with  the  subject-matter,  on  questions  of 
science,  skill,  trade,  and  others  of  the  like  kind  :  "  Best's  Principles  of  Evidence,  §  346. 
The  rule  on  this  subject  is  stated  by  Mr.  Smith  in  his  note  to  Carter  v.  Boehm,  1 
Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  286  :  "On  the  one  hand,"  he  observes,  "it  appears  to  be  admitted 
that  the  opinion  of  witnesses  possessing  peculiar  skill  is  admissible,  whenever  the 
subject-matter  of  inquiry  is  such,  that  inexperienced  persons  are  unlikely  to  prove  capable 
of  forming  a  correct  judgment  upon  it  without  such  assistance ;  in  other  words,  when 
it  so  far  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  science,  as  to  require  a  course  of  previous  habit,  or 
study,  in  order  to  the  attainment  of  a  knowledge  of  it ;  see  Folkes  v.  Chadd,  3  Doug. 
157  ;  R.  v.  Searle,  2  M.  &  M.  75 ;  Thornton  v.  R.  E.  Assur.  Co.,  Peake  25  ;  Chaurand 
v.  Angerstein,  ib.  44  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  does  not,  seem  to  be  contended  that 
the  opinions  of  witnesses  can  be  received,  when  the  inquiry  is  into  a  subject-matter, 
the  nature  of  which  is  not  such  as  to  require  any  peculiar  habits  or  study,  in  order  to 
qualify  a  man  to  understand  it."  It  has  been  held  unnecessary  that  the  witness  should 
be  engaged  in  the  practice  of  his  profession  or  science  ;  it  being  sufficient  that  he  has 
studied  it.  Thus,  the  fact  that  the  witness,  though  he  had  studied  medicine,  was  not 
then  a  practising  physician,  was  held  to  go  merely  to  his  credit;  Tullis  v.  Kidd,  12 
Ala.  648. 

6  Stark.  Evid.  154  ;  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  899  ;  Tnit  on  Evid.  433  ;  Hathorn  v. 
King,  8  Mass.  371  ;  Hose  v.  Fisher,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  163  ;  Folkes  «>.  Chadd,  3  Doug.  157  ; 
per  Ld.  Mansfield  ;  McNally's  Evid.  329-335,  c.  30. 

«  H.  v.  Wright,  Russ.   &  Ry.  456;  R.   v.  Searle,  1  M.  &  Rob.  75;  McNaghten's 
Case,  10  Cl.  &  F.  200,  212  ;  Paige  v.  Hazard,  5  Hill  603. 

7  Jameson  v.  Drinkald,  12  Moore  148.     But  professional  books,  or  books  of  science 
(e.  g.,  medical  books),  are  not  admissible  in  evidence  ;  though  professional  witnesses 
may  be  asked  the  grounds  of  their  judgment  and  opinion,  which  might  in  some  degree 
be  founded  on  these  books  as  a  part  of  their  general  knowledge  :  Collier  v.  Simpson, 
6  C.  &  P.  73  ;  contra,  Bowman  v.  Woods,  1  Iowa  441. 

»  Sills  v.  Brown,  9  C.  &  P.  601. 
»  R.  v.  Wright,  Russ.  &  R.  456. 
10  Chase  v.  Lincoln,  3  Mass.  237  ;  Poole  ».  Richardson,  ib.  330  ;  Rambler  v.  Tryon, 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  921 

opinion  upon  an  impression  whether  it  was  made  from  an  original 
seal  or  from  an  impression.11  So,  the  opinion  of  an  artist  in  paint- 
ing is  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  a  picture.12  And  it  seems  that 
the  genuineness  of  a  postmark  may  be  proved  by  the  opinion  of  one 
who  has  been  in  the  habit  of  receiving  letters  with  that  mark.18  In 
an  action  for  breach  of  a  promise  to  marry,  a  person  accustomed  to 
observe  the  mutual  deportment  of  the  parties  may  give  in  evidence 
his  opinion  upon  the  question,  whether  they  were  attached  to  each 
other.14  A  ship-builder  may  give  his  opinion  as  to  the  seaworthiness 
of  a  ship,  even  on  facts  stated  by  others.15  A  nautical  person  may 
testify  his  opinion  whether,  upon  the  facts  proved  by  the  plaintiff, 
the  collision  of  two  ships  could  have  been  avoided  by  proper  care  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant's  servants.16  Where  the  question  was, 
whether  a  bank,  which  had  been  erected  to  prevent  the  overflowing 
of  the  sea,  had  caused  the  choking  up  of  a  harbor,  the  opinions  of 
scientific  engineers,  as  to  the  effect  of  such  an  embankment  upon  the 
harbor,  were  held  admissible  in  evidence.17  A  secretary  of  a  fire 
insurance  company,  accustomed  to  examine  buildings  with  reference 
to  the  insurance  of  them,  and  who,  as  a  county  commissioner,  had 
frequently  estimated  damages  occasioned  by  the  laying  out  of  rail- 
roads and  highways,  has  been  held  competent  to  testify  his  opinion, 
as  to  the  effect  of  laying  a  railroad  within  a  certain  distance  of  a 
building,  upon  the  value  of  the  rent,  and  the  increase  of  the  rate  of 
insurance  against  fire.18  Persons  accustomed  to  observe  the  habits  of 
certain  fish  have  been  permitted  to  give  in  evidence  their  opinions  as 
to  the  ability  of  the  fish  to  overcome  certain  obstructions  in  the  rivers 

7  S.  &  R.  90,  92 ;  Buckminster  v.  Perry,  4  Mass.  593  ;  Grant  v.  Thompson,  4  Conn. 
203.  And  see,  Sheafe  v.  Rowe,  2  Lee  415  ;  Kinleside  v.  Harrison,  2  Phil.  523  ;  Wogan 
v.  Small,  11  S.  &  R.  141.  But  where  the  witness  has  had  opportunities  for  knowing 
and  observing  the  conversation,  conduct,  and  manners  of  the  person  whose  sanity  is  in 
question,  it  has  been  held,  upon  grave  consideration,  that  the  witness  may  depose,  not 
only  to  particular  facts,  but  to  his  opinion  or  belief  as  to  the  sanity  of  the  party, 
formed  from  such  actual  observation  :  Clary  v.  Clary,  2  Ired.  78.  Such  evidence  is  also 
admitted  in  the  ecclesiastical  Courts :  see  Wheeler  v.  Alderson,  3  Hagg.  Eccl.  574, 
604,  605. 

11  Per  Ld.  Mansfield,  in  Folkes  v.  Ohadd,  3  Doug.  157. 

«  Ibid. 

18  Abbey  v.  Lill,  5  Bing.  299,  per  Gaselee,  J. 

14  McKee  v.  Nelson,  4  Co  wen  355. 

15  Thornton  v.  Royal  Exch.  Assur.  Co.,  1  Peake  25  ;  Chaurand  v.  Angerstein,  ib.  43  ; 
Beckwith  v.  Sydebotham,  1  Campb.  117.     So  of  nautical  men,  as  to  navigating  a  ship: 
Malton  v.  Nesbit,  1  C.  &  P.  70.     Upon  the  question,  whether  certain  implements  were 
part  of  the  necessary  tools  of  a  person's  trade,  the  opinions  of  witness  are  not  admis- 
sible ;  but  the  jury  are  to  determine  upon  the  facts  proved :  Whitmarsh  v.  Angle,  3 
Am.  Law  Journ.  N.  8.  274. 

16  Fenwick  v.  Bell,  1  Car.  &  Kir.  312. 
l?   Koikes  v.  Chadd,  3  Doug.  157. 

18  Webber  v.  Eastern  Railroad  Co.,  2  Met.  147.  Where  a  point  involving  questions 
of  practical  science  is  in  dispute  in  chancery,  the  Court  will  advise  a  reference  of  it  to 
an  expert  in  that  science,  for  his  opinion  upon  the  facts  ;  which  will  be  adopted  by  the 
Court  as  the  ground  of  its  order :  Webb  v.  Manchester  &  Leeds  Railw.  Co.,  4  My.  & 
C.  116,  120  ;  1  Railw.  Cas.  576. 


922  APPENDIX  II. 

which  they  were  accustomed  to  ascend.19  A  person  acquainted  for 
many  years  with  a  certain  stream,  its  rapidity  of  rise  in  times  of 
freshet,  and  the  volume  and  force  of  its  waters  in  a  certain  place, 
may  give  his  opinions  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  a  dam  erected  in  that 
place  to  resist  the  force  of  the  flood.20  A  practical  surveyor  may 
express  his  opinion,  whether  the  marks  on  trees,  piles  of  stone,  &c., 
were  intended  as  monuments  of  boundaries ; 21  but  he  cannot  be  asked 
whether,  in  his  opinion,  from  the  objects  and  appearances  which  he 
saw  on  the  ground,  the  tract  he  surveyed  was  identical  with  the  tract 
marked  on  a  certain  diagram.22 

§  440  b.  In  weighing  the  testimony  of  biased  witnesses,  however, 
a  distinction  is  observed  between  matters  of  opinion  and  matters  of 
fact.  Such  a  witness,  it  is  said,  is  to  be  distrusted  when  he  speaks 
to  matters  of  opinion;  but  in  matters  of  fact,  his  testimony  is  to 
receive  a  degree  of  credit  in  proportion  to  the  probability  of  the 
transaction,  the  absence  or  extent  of  contradictory  proof,  and  the 
general  tone  of  his  evidence.1 

§  441.  But  witnesses  are  not  receivable  to  state  their  views  on 
matters  of  legal  or  moral  obligation,  nor  on  the  manner  in  which 
other  persons  would  probably  be  influenced,  if  the  parties  acted  in 
one  way  rather  than  in  another.1  Therefore  the  opinions  of  medical 
practitioners  upon  the  question,  whether  a  certain  physician  had 
honorably  and  faithfully  discharged  his  duty  to  his  medical  breth- 
ren, have  been  rejected.2  So  the  opinion  of  a  person  conversant  with 
the  business  of  insurance,  upon  the  question,  whether  certain  parts  of 
a  letter,  which  the  broker  of  the  insured  had  received,  but  which  he 
suppressed  when  reading  the  letter  to  the  underwriters,  were  or  were 

w  Cottrill  v.  Myrick,  3  Fairf.  222. 

30  Porter  v.  PoquonocMan.  Co.,  17  Conn.  249. 

21  Davis  v.  Mason,  4  Pick.  156. 

22  Farar  v.  Warfield,  8  Mart.  N.  s.  695,  696.     So,  the  opinion  of  an  experienced  sea- 
man has  been  received,  as  to  the  proper  stowage  of  a  cargo  :  Price  v.  Powell,  3  Comst. 
322  ;  and  of  a  mason,  as  to  the  time  requisite  for  the  walls  of  a  house  to  become  so  dry 
as  to  be  safe  for  human  habitation  :  Smith  v.  Gugerty,  4  Barb.  614  ;  and  of  a  master, 
engineer,  and  builder  of  steamboats,  as  to  the  manner  of  a  collision,  in  view  of  the  facts 
proved  :  The  Clipjier  v.  Logan,  18  Ohio  375.     But  mere  opinions  as  to  the  amount  of 
damages  are  not  ordinarily  to  be  received  :  Harger  v.  Edmonds,  4  Barb.  256  ;  Gilles  v. 
O'Toole,  ib.  261.     See  also  Walker  v.  Protection  Ins.  Co.,  16Shepl.  317.     Nor  are  mere 
opinions  admissible  respecting  the  value  of  property  in  common  use,  such  as  horses  and 
wagons,  or  lands,  concerning  which  no  particular  study  is  required,  or  skill  possessed : 
Robertson  v.  Stark,  15  id.  109  ;  Rochester  v.  Chester,  3  id.  349  ;  Peterborough  v.  Jaffrey, 
6  id.  462.     And  see  Whipple  v.  Wai  pole,  10  id.  130,  where  this  rule  is  expounded. 

1  Lock  wood  v.  Lockwood,  2  Curt.  281 ;  Dillon  v.  Dillon,  3  Curt.  96,  102. 

1  Per  Ld.  Denman,  C.  J.,  in  Campbell  v.  Rickards,  5  B.  &  Ad.  840  ;  s.  c.  2  N.  & 
M.  542.     But  where  a  libel  consisted  in  imputing  to  the  plaintiff  that  he  acted  dis- 
honorably, in  withdrawing  a  horse  which  had  been  entered  for  a  race  ;  and  he  proved 
by  a  witness  that  the  rules  of  the  jockey  club  of  which  he  was  a  member  permitted 
owners  to  withdraw  their  horses  before  the  race  was  run  ;  it  was  held  that  the  witness, 
on  cross-examination,  might  be  asked  whether  such  conduct  as  he  had  described  as  law- 
ful under  those  rules  would  not  be  regarded  by  him  as  dishonorable  :  Greville  v.  Chap- 
man, 5  Q.  B.  731. 

2  Ramadge  v.  Kyan,  9  Bing.  333. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  923 

not  material  to  be  communicated,  has  been  held  inadmissible;*  for, 
whether  a  particular  fact  was  material  or  not  in  the  particular  case 
is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  decide  under  the  circumstances.4 
Neither  can  a  witness  be  asked,  what  would  have  been  his  own  con- 
duct in  the  particular  case.8  But  in  an  action  against  a  broker  for 
negligence,  in  not  procuring  the  needful  alterations  in  a  policy  of 
insurance,  it  has  been  held,  that  other  brokers  might  be  called  to 
say,  looking  at  the  policy,  the  invoices,  and  the  letter  of  instruc- 
tions, what  alterations  a  skilful  broker  ought  to  have  made.6 

§  449.  Cross-examination.  ...  It  is  not  irrelevant  to  inquire  of 
the  witness,  whether  he  has  not  on  some  former  occasion  given  a 
different  account  of  the  matter  of  fact,  to  which  he  has  already  tes- 
tified, in  order  to  lay  a  foundation  for  impeaching  his  testimony  by 
contradicting  him.  The  inquiry,  however,  in  such  cases,  must  be 
confined  to  matters  of  fact  only;  mere  opinions  which  the  witness 
may  have  formerly  expressed  being  inadmissible,  unless  the  case  is 
such  as  to  render  evidence  of  opinions  admissible  and  material.1 
Thus,  if  the  witness  should  give,  in  evidence  in  chief,  his  opinion 
of  the  identity  of  a  person,  or  of  his  handwriting,  or  of  his  sanity, 
or  the  like,  he  may  be  asked  whether  he  has  not  formerly  expressed 

8  Campbell  v.  Rickards,  5  B.  &  Ad.  840,  in  which  the  case  of  Rickards  v.  Murdock, 
10  B.  &  C.  527,  and  certain  other  decisions  to  the  contrary,  are  considered  and  over- 
ruled. See  accordingly,  Carter  v.  Boehm,  3  Burr.  1905,  1918  ;  Durrell  v.  Bederley, 
1  Holt's  Cas.  283  ;  Jefferson  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cotheal,  7  Wend.  72,  79. 

*  Rawlins  v.  Desborough,  1  M.  &  Rob.  329  ;  Westbury  v.  Aberdein,  2  M.  &  W.  267. 

6  Berthon  v.  Loughman,  2  Stark.  258. 

6  Chapman  v.  Walton,  10  Bing.  57..  Upon  the  question,  whether  the  opinion  of  a 
person,  conversant  with  the  business  of  insurance,  is  admissible,  to  show  that  the  rate  of 
the  premium  would  have  been  affected  by  the  communication  of  particular  facts,  there 
has  been  much  diversity  of  opinion  among  judges,  and  the  cases  are  not  easily  recon- 
ciled. See  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  899  ;  2  Stark.  Evid.  886.  But  the  later  decisions 
are  against  the  admissibility  of  the  testimony,  as  a  general  rule.  See  Campbell  v.  Rick- 
ards,  5  B.  &  Ad.  840.  Perhaps  the  following  observations  of  Mr.  Starkie,  on  this  sub- 
ject, will  be  found  to  indicate  the  true  principle  of  discrimination  among  the  cases  which 
call  for  the  application  of  the  rule.  "  Whenever  the  fixing  the  fair  price  and  value 
upon  a  contract  to  insure  is  matter  of  skill  and  judgment,  acting  according  to  certain 
general  rules  and  principles  of  calculation,  applied  to  the  particular  circumstances  of 
each  individual  case,  it  seems  to  be  matter  of  evidence  to  show  whether  the  facts  sup- 
pressed would  have  been  noticed  as  a  term  in  the  particular  calculation.  It  would  not 
be  difficult  to  propound  instances,  in  which  the  materiality  of  the  fact  withheld  would 
be  a  question  of  pure  science  ;  in  other  instances,  it  is  very  possible  that  mere  common 
sense,  independent  of  any  peculiar  skill  or  experience,  would  be  sufficient  to  compre- 
hend that  the  disclosure  was  material,  and  its  suppression  fraudulent,  although  not  to 
understand  to  what  extent  the  risk  was  increased  by  that  fact.  In  intermediate  cases, 
it  seems  to  be  difficult  in  principle  wholly  to  exclude  the  evidence,  although  its  impor- 
tance may  vary  exceedingly  according  to  circumstances."  See  2  Stark.  Evid.  887,  888 
(3.1  London  ed.),  649  (6th  Am.  ed.). 

1  Elton  v.  Larkins,  5  C.  &  P.  385  ;  Daniels  v.  Conrad,  4  Leigh  401,  405.  But  a 
witness  cannot  be  cross-examined  as  to  what  he  has  sworn  in  an  affidavit,  unless  the 
affidavit  is  produced :  Sainthill  v.  Bound,  4  Esp.  74  ;  R.  v.  Edwards,  8  C.  &  P.  26  ; 
R.  v.  Taylor,  ib.  726.  If  the  witness  does  not  recollect  saying  that  which  is  imputed  to 
him,  evidence  may  be  given  that  he  did  say  it,  provided  it  is  relevant  to  the  matter  in 
issue  :  Crowley  v.  Page,  7  id.  789. 


924  APPENDIX   II. 

a  different  opinion  upon  the  same  subject;  but  if  he  has  simply  tes- 
tified to  a  fact,  his  previous  opinion  of  the  merits  of  the  case  is 
inadmissible.  Therefore,  in  an  action  upon  a  marine  policy,  where 
the  broker,  who  effected  the  policy  for  the  plaintiff,  being  called  as 
a  witness  for  the  defendant,  testified  that  he  omitted  to  disclose  a 
certain  fact,  now  contended  to  be  material  to  the  risk,  and  being 
cross-examined  whether  he  had  not  expressed  his  opinion  that  the 
underwriter  had  not  a  leg  to  stand  upon  in  the  defence,  he  denied 
that  he  had  said  so;  this  was  deemed  conclusive,  and  evidence  to 
contradict  him  in  this  particular  was  rejected.2 

§  457.  Cross-examination.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  where  the 
question  involves  the  fact  of  a  previous  conviction,  it  ought  not  to 
be  asked ;  because  there  is  higher  and  better  evidence  which  ought 
to  be  offered.  If  the  inquiry  is  confined,  in  terms,  to  the  fact  of  his 
having  been  subjected  to  an  ignominious  punishment,  or  to  impris- 
onment alone,  it  is  made,  not  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  he 
was  an  innocent  sufferer,  but  that  he  was  guilty;  and  the  only  com- 
petent proof  of  this  guilt  is  the  record  of  his  conviction.  Proof  of 
the  same  nature,  namely,  documentary  evidence,  may  also  be  had  of 
the  cause  of  his  commitment  to  prison,  whether  in  execution  of  a 
sentence,  or  on  a  preliminary  charge.1 

§  458.  There  is  another  class  of  questions,  which  do  not  seem  to 
come  within  the  reasons  already  stated  in  favor  of  permitting  this 
extent  of  cross-examination;  namely,  questions,  the  answers  to 
which,  though  they  may  disgrace  the  witness  in  other  respects,  yet 
will  not  affect  the  credit  due  to  his  testimony.  For  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered, that  the  object  of  indulging  parties  in  this  latitude  of  in- 
quiry is,  that  the  jury  may  understand  the  character  of  the  witness, 
whom  they  are  asked  to  believe,  in  order  that  his  evidence  may  not 
pass  for  more  than  it  is  worth.  Inquiries,  therefore,  having  no 
tendency  to  this  end,  are  clearly  impertinent.  Such  are  the  ques- 

2  Elton  v.  Larkins,  5  C.  &  P.  385. 

1  People  v.  Herrick,  13  Johns.  84.  per  Spencer,  J. ;  Clement  v.  Brooks,  13  N.  H.  92. 
In  R.  v.  Lewis,  4  Esp.  225,  the  prosecutor,  who  was  a  common  informer,  was  asked 
whether  he  had  not  been  in  the  house  of  correction  in  Sussex  ;  but  Lord  Ellenborough 
interposed  and  suppressed  the  question,  partly  on  the  old  rule  of  rejecting  all  questions 
the  object  of  which  was  to  degrade  the  witness,  but  chiefly  because  of  the  injury  to  the 
adminstration  of  justice,  if  persons,  who  came  to  do  their  duty  to  the  public,  might  be 
subjected  to  improper  investigation.  Inquiries  of  this  nature  have  often  beea refused  on 
the  old  ground  alone  :  as  in  State  v.  Bailey,  Pennington  415  ;  Millman  v.  Tucker, 
2  Peake  222  ;  Stout  v.  Rassel,  2  Yeates  334.  A  witness  is  also  privileged  from  an- 
swering respecting  the  commission  of  an  offence,  though  he  has  received  a  pardon  ; 
"for,"  said  North,  C.  J.,  "if  he  hath  his  pinion,  it  doth  take  away  as  well  all  cal- 
umny, as  liubleness  to  punishment,  and  sets  him  right  against  all  objection  : "  R.  v. 
Reading,  7  How.  St.  Tr.  296.  It  may  also  b«  observed,  as  a  further  reason  for  not  in- 
terrogating a  witness  respecting  his  conviction  and  punishment  for  a  crime,  that  he  may 
not  understand  the  legal  character  of  the  crime  for  which  he  was  punished,  and  so  may 
admit  himself  guilty  of  an  offence  which  he  never  committed.  In  R.  v.  Edwards,  4  T.  R. 
440,  the  question  was  not  asked  of  a  witness,  but  of  one  who  offered  himself  as  bail  for 
another,  indicted  of  grand  larceny. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED  FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  925 

tions  frequently  attempted  to  be  put  to  the  principal  female  witness, 
in  trials  for  seduction  per  quod  servitium  amisit,  and  on  indictments 
for  rape,  &c.,  whether  she  had  not  previously  been  criminal  with 
other  men,  or  with  some  particular  person,  which  are  generally  sup- 
pressed.1 So,  on  an  indictment  of  a  female  prisoner,  for  stealing 
from  the  person,  in  a  house,  the  prosecutor  cannot  be  asked,  whether 
at  that  house  anything  improper  passed  between  him  and  the 
prisoner.2 

§  459.  But  where  the  question  does  not  fall  within  either  of  the 
classes  mentioned  in  the  three  preceding  sections,  and  goes  clearly  to 
the  credit  of  the  witness  for  veracity,  it  is  not  easy  to  perceive  why 
he  should  be  privileged  from  answering,  notwithstanding  it  may 
disgrace  him.  The  examination  being  governed  and  kept  within 
bounds  by  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  all  inquiries  into  transactions 
of  a  remote  date  will  of  course  be  suppressed;  for  the  interests  of 
justice  do  not  require  that  the  errors  of  any  man's  life,  long  since 
repented  of  and  forgiven  by  the  community,  should  be  recalled  to 
remembrance,  and  their  memory  be  perpetuated  in  judicial  docu- 
ments, at  the  pleasure  of  any  future  litigant.  The  State  has  a  deep 
interest  in  the  inducements  to  reformation,  held  out  by  the  project- 
ing veil,  which  is  thus  cast  over  the  past  offences  of  the  penitent. 
But  where  the  inquiry  relates  to  transactions  comparatively  recent, 
bearing  directly  upon  the  present  character  and  moral  principles  of 
the  witness,  and  therefore  essential  to  the  due  estimation  of  his  tes- 
timony by  the  jury,  learned  judges  have  of  late  been  disposed  to 
allow  it.1  Thus  it  has  been  held,  that  a  witness  called  by  one  party 
may  be  asked,  in  cross-examination,  whether  he  had  not  attempted 
to  dissuade  a  witness  for  the  other  party  from  attending  the 
trial.2  So  where  one  was  indicted  for  larceny,  and  the  principal 
witness  for  the  prosecution  was  his  servant-boy,  the  learned  judge 
allowed  the  prisoner's  counsel  to  ask  the  boy,  whether  he  had  not 
been  charged  with  robbing  his  master,  and  whether  he  had 
not  afterwards  said  he  would  be  revenged  of  him,  and  would  soon 

1  Dodd  v.  Norris,  3  Campb.  519 ;  R.  v.  Hodgson,  Russ.  &  Ry.  211  ;  Vaughan  v. 
Perrine,  2  Penningt.  534.  But  where  the  prosecution  is  under  a  bastardy  act,  the  issue 
being  upon  the  paternity  of  the  child,  this  inquiry  to  its  mother,  if  restricted  to  the 
proper  time,  is  material,  and  she  will  be  held  to  answer  :  Swift's  Evid.  p.  81  ;  see  also 
Macbride  v.  Macbride,  4  Esp.  242  ;  Bate  v.  Hill,  1  C.  P.  100.  In  R.  v.  Teal,  11  East 
307,  311,  which  was  an  indictment  for  conspiring  falsely  to  charge  one  with  being  the 
father  of  a  bastard  child,  similar  inquiries  were  permitted  to  be  made  of  the  mother, 
who  was  one  of  the  conspirators,  but  was  admitted  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  :  People 
v.  Blakeley,  4  Parker  Cr.  R.  176.  See  post,  Vol.  II,  §  577. 

«  R.  v."  Pitcher,  1  C.  &  P.  85. 

1  This  relaxation^  of  the  old  rule  was  recognized,  some  years  ago,  by  Lord  Eldon. 
"It  used  to  be  said,"  he  observed,  "  that  a  witness  could  not  be  called  on  to  discredit 
himself ;  but  there  seems  to  be  something  like  a  departure  from  that ;  I  mean,  that  in 
modern  times,  the  Courts  have  permitted  questions  to  show,  from  transactions  not  in 
issue,  that  the  witness  is  of  impeached  character,  and  therefore  not  so  credible."  Park- 
hurst  v.  Lowten.  2  Swanst.  216. 

8  Harris  v.  Tippet,  2  Campb.  637. 


926  APPENDIX   II. 

fix  him  in  jail.8     Similar  inquiries  have  been  permitted  in  other 


cases. 


§  460.  Question  allowable,  though  Answer  Privileged.  Though 
there  may  be  cases,  in  which  a  witness  is  not  bound  to  answer  a 
question  which  goes  directly  to  disgrace  him,  yet  the  question  may 
be  asked,  wherever  the  answer,  if  the  witness  should  waive  his 
privilege,  would  be  received  as  evidence.1  It  has  been  said,  that  if 
the  witness  declines  to  answer,  his  refusal  may  well  be  urged 
against  his  credit  with  the  jury.2  But  in  several  cases  this  in- 
ference has  been  repudiated  by  the  Court;  for  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  Court,  as  well  as  the  object  of  the  rule,  to  protect  the  witness 
from  disgrace,  even  in  the  opinion  of  the  jury  and  other  persons 
present;  and  there  would  be  an  end  of  this  protection,  if  a  demurrer 
to  the  question  were  to  be  taken  as  an  admission  of  the  fact  in- 
quired into.8 

§  461.  Impeachment  of  Credit.  After  a  witness  has  been  examined 
in  chief,  his  credit  may  be  impeached  in  various  modes,  besides  that 
of  exhibiting  the  improbabilities  of  a  story  by  a  cross-examination. 
(1)  By  disproving  the  facts  stated  by  him,  by  the  testimony  of  other 
witnesses.  (2)  By  general  evidence  affecting  his  credit  for  veracity. 
But  in  impeaching  the  credit  of  a  witness,  the  examination  must  be 
confined  to  his  general  reputation,  and  not  be  permitted  as  to  partic- 
ular facts ;  for  every  man  is  supposed  to  be  capable  of  supporting  the 
one,  but  it  is  not  likely  that  he  should  be  prepared  to  answer  the 
other,  without  notice ;  and  unless  his  general  character  and  behavior 
be  in  issue,  he  has  no  notice.1  This  point  has  been  much  discussed, 
but  may  now  be  considered  at  rest.2  The  regular  mode  of  examining 
into  the  general  reputation  is  to  inquire  of  the  witness  whether  he 
knows  the  general  reputation  of  the  person  in  question  among  his 
neighbors;  and  what  that  reputation  is.  In  the  English  Courts,  the 
course  is  further  to  inquire  whether,  from  such  knowledge,  the  wit- 
ness would  believe  that  person,  upon  his  oath.8  In  the  American 

8  R.  v.  Yewin,  cited  2  Campb.  638. 

*  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark.  116,  149 ;  R.  v.  Teal  et  al.,  11  East  311  ;  Cundell  v.  Pratt 

I  M.  &  Malk.  108;  R.  i>.  Barnard,  1  C.  &  P.  86,  n.  (a) ;  R.  v.  Gilroy,  ib.;  Frost  v. 
Holloway,  cited  in  2  Phil.  Evid.  425. 

i  2  Phil.  Evid.  423-428  ;  Stark.  Evid.  172;  Southard  v.  Rexford,  6  Cohen  254. 
8  1  Stark.  Evid.  172  ;  Rose  v.  Blakemore,  Ry.  &  M.  382,  per  Brougham,  arg. 
8  Rose  v.  Blakemore,  Ry.  &  M.  382,  per  Abbott,  Ld.  Ch.  J.  ;  R.  v.  Watson,  2  Stark. 
158,  per  Holroyd,  J.  ;  Lloyd  v.  Passingham,  16  Ves.  64  ;  supra,  §  451. 

1  Bull.  N.  P.  296,  297.     The  mischief  of  raising  collateral  issues  is  also  adverted  to 
as  one  of  the  reasons  of  this  rule.     "  Look  ye,"  said  Holt,  Ld.  C.  J.,  "  you  may  bring 
witnesses  to  give  an  account  of  the  general  tenor  of  the  witness's  conversation  ;  but 
you  do  not  think,  sure,  that  we  will  try,  at  this  time,  whether  he  be  guilty  of  rob- 
bery :  "  R.  v.  Rookwood,  4  St.  Tr.  681  ;  8.  c.  13  How.  St.Tr.  211  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  182. 
It  is  competent,  however,   for  the  party  against  whom  a  witness  has  been  called  to 
show  that  he  haa  been  bribed  to  give  his  evidence  :    Attorney-General  v.  Hitchcock, 

II  .Tnr.  478. 

2  Layer's  Case,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  246,  286  ;  Swift's  Evid.  143. 

8  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  925  ;  Mawson  v.  Hartsink,  4  Esp.  104,  per  Ld.  Ellenborough  ; 
1  Stark.  Evid.  182  ;  Carlos  v.  Brook,  10  Ves.  60. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM   THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  927 

Courts,  the  same  course  has  been  pursued ; 4  but  its  propriety  has  of 
late  been  questioned,  and  perhaps  the  weight  of  authority  is  now 
against  permitting  the  witness  to  testify  as  to  his  own  opinion.6 
In  answer  to  such  evidence,  the  other  party  may  cross-examine  those 
witnesses  as  to  their  means  of  knowledge,  and  the  grounds  of  their 
opinion;  or  may  attack  their  general  character,  and  by  fresh  evi- 
dence support  the  character  of  his  own  witness.6  The  inquiry  must 
be  made  as  to  his  general  reputation,  where  he  is  best  known.  It  is 
not  enough  that  the  impeaching  witness  professes  merely  to  state 
what  he  has  heard  "others  say;  "  for  those  others  may  be  but  few. 
He  must  be  able  to  state  what  is  generally  said  of  the  person,  by 
those  among  whom  he  dwells,  or  with  whom  he  is  chiefly  conver- 
sant; for  it  is  this  only  that  constitutes  his  general  reputation  or 
character.7  And,  ordinarily,  the  witness  ought  himself  to  come 
from  the  neighborhood  of  the  person  whose  character  is  in  question. 
If  he  is  a  stranger,  sent  thither  by  the  adverse  party  to  learn  his 
character,  he  will  not  be  allowed  to  testify  as  to  the  result  of  his 
inquiries;  but  otherwise,  the  Court  will  not  undertake  to  determine, 
by  a  preliminary  inquiry,  whether  the  impeaching  witness  has  suffi- 
cient knowledge  of  the  fact  to  enable  him  to  testify;  but  will  leave 
the  value  of  his  testimony  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.8 

*  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  257,  258  ;  State  v.  Boswell,  2  Dev.  209,  211  ;  Anon., 

1  Hill  S.  C.  258  ;  Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  92. 

5  Gass  v.  Stinson,  2  Sumn.  610,  per  Story,  J.  ;  Wood  v.  Mann,  ib.  321 ;  Kiminel 
v.  Kimmel,  3  S.  &  R.  336-338  ;  Wike  v.  Lightner,  11  S.  &  R.  198  ;  Swift's  Evid.  143  ; 
Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  1  Appleton  275  ;  in  this  last  case  the  subject  was  ably  examined 
by  Shepley,  J.     But  qucere,   whether  a  witness  to  impeach  reputation  may  not  be 
asked,  in  cross-examination,  if  he  would  not  believe  the  principal  witness  on  oath. 

6  2  Phil.  Evid.  432 ;  Mawson  v.   Hartsink,  4  Esp.    104,  per  Lord   Ellenborough ;  1 
Stark.  Evid.  182.     It  is  not  usual  to  cross-examine  witnesses  to  character,  unless  there 
is  some  definite  charge  upon  which  to  cross-examine  them  :  R.  v.  Hodgkiss,  7  C.  & 
P.  298.     Nor  can  such  witness  be  contradicted  as   to  collateral   facts :   Lee's   Case, 

2  Lewin  Cr.  C.  154. 

7  Boynton  v.  Kellogg,  3  Mass.  189,  per  Parsons,  C.  J.  ;  Wike  v.  Lightner,  11  S.  & 
R.  198-200  ;  Kimmel  v.  Kimmel,  3  S.  &  R.  337,  338;  Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  1  Applet. 
375.    The  impeaching  witness  may  also  be  asked  to  name  the  persons  whom  he  has 
heard  speak  against  the  character  of  the  witness  impeached :  Bates  v.  Barber,  4  Cush.  107. 

8  Douglass  v.  Tousey,  2  Wend.  352 ;  Bates  v.  Barber,  4  Cush.  107  ;  Sleeper  v.  Van 
Middlesworth.  4  Den.  431.     Whether  this  inquiry  into  the  general  reputation  or  char- 
acter of  the  witness  should  be  restricted  to  his  reputation  for  truth  and  veracity,  or  may 
be  made  in  general  terms  involving  his  entire  moral  character  and  estimation  in  society, 
is  a  point  upon  which  the  American  practice  is  not  uniform.     All  are  agreed,  that  the 
true  and  primary  inquiry  is  into  his  general  character  for  truth  and  veracity,  and  to 
this  point,  in  the  Northern  States,  it  is  still  confined.     But  in  several  of  the  other 
States  greater  latitude  is  allowed.     In  South  Carolina,  the  true  mode  is  said  to  be, 
first,  to  ask  what  is  his  general  character,  and  if  this  is  said  to  be  bad,  then  to  inquire 
whether  the  witness  would  believe  him  on  oath  ;  leaving  the  party  who  adduced  him 
to  inquire  whether,  notwithstanding  his  bad  character  in  other  respects,  he  has  not 
preserved  his  character  for  truth  :  Anon.,  1  Hill  S.  C.  251,   258,   259.     In  Kentucky, 
the  same  general  range  of  inquiry  is  permitted :  Hume  v.  Scott,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  261, 
262,  per  Mills,  J.     This  decision  has  been  cited  and  approved  in  North  Carolina,  where 
a  similar  course  prevails  :  State  v.  Boswell,  2  Dev.  Law  209,  210  ;  see  also  People  i>. 
Mather,  4  Wend.  257,  258,  per  Marcy,  J.     See  also  3  Am.  Law  Jour.  N.  s.  154-162, 
where  all  the  cases  on  this  point  are  collected  and  reviewed.     Whether  evidence  of 
common  prostitution  is  admissible  to  impeach  a  female  witness,  qucere ;  see  Com.  v. 


928  APPENDIX   II. 

§  462.  Contradicting  a  Witness.  .  .  .  And  this  rule  [that  the  wit- 
ness's attention  must  first  be  called  to  the  contradiction]  is  extended, 
not  only  to  contradictory  statements  by  the  witness,  but  to  other  de- 
clarations, and  to  acts  done  by  him,  through  the  medium  of  verbal  com- 
munications or  correspondence,  which  are  offered  with  the  view  either 
to  contradict  his  testimony  in  chief,  or  to  prove  him  a  corrupt  wit- 
ness himself,  or  to  have  been  guilty  of  attempting  to  corrupt  others.1 

§  469.  Corroboration  by  Similar  Statements.  Where  evidence  of 
contradictory  statements  by  a  witness,  or  of  other  particular  facts, 
as,  for  example,  that  he  has  been  committed  to  the  house  of  correc- 
tion, is  offered  by  way  of  impeaching  his  veracity,  his  general  char- 
acter for  truth  being  thus  in  some  sort  put  in  issue,  it  has  been 
deemed  reasonable  to  admit  general  evidence,  that  he  is  a  man  of 
strict  integrity,  and  scrupulous  regard  for  truth.1  But  evidence, 
that  he  has  on  other  occasions  made  statements,  similar  to  what  he 
has  testified  in  the  cause,  is  not  admissible ; 2  unless  where  a  design 
to  misrepresent  is  charged  upon  the  witness,  in  consequence  of  his 
relation  to  the  party,  or  to  the  cause;  in  which  case,  it  seems,  it 
may  be  proper  to  show  that  he  made  a  similar  statement  before  that 
relation  existed.8  So,  if  the  character  of  a  deceased  attesting  wit- 
ness to  a  deed  or  will  is  impeached  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  evidence 
of  his  general  good  character  is  admissible.4  But  mere  contradic- 
tion among  witnesses  examined  in  Court  supplies  no  ground  for 
admitting  general  evidence  as  to  character.6 

§  582.  Where  the  sources  of  primary  evidence  of  a  written  instru- 
ment are  exhausted,  secondary  evidence,  as  we  have  elsewhere  shown, 

Muq>hy,  14  Mass.  387,  2  Stark.  Evid.  869,  n.  (1),  by  Metcalf,  that  it  is  admissible  ; 
Spears  V.  Forrest,  15  Vt.  435,  that  it  is  not. 

1  See  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  300,  313  ;  1  Mood.  &  Malk.  473.  If  the  witness  does  not 
recollect  the  conversation  imputed  to  him,  it  may  be  proved  by  another  witness,  pro- 
vided it  is  relevant  to  the  matter  in  issue  :  Crowley  v.  Page,  7  C.  &  P.  789,  per  Parke, 
B.  The  contrary  seems  to  have  been  ruled  some  years  before,  in  Pain  v.  Beeston,  1 
M.  &  Rob.  20,  per  Tindal,  C.  J.  But  if  he  is  asked,  upon  cross-examination,  if  he 
will  swear  that  he  has  not  said  so  and  so,  and  he  answers  that  he  will  not  swear  that 
he  has  not,  the  party  cannot  be  called  to  contradict  him  :  Long  v.  Hitchcock,  9  C.  & 
P.  619,  supra,  §  449.  If  he  denies  having  made  the  contradictory  statements  inquired 
of,  and  a  witness  is  called  to  prove  that  he  did,  the  particular  words  must  not  be  put, 
but  the  witness  must  be  required  to  relate  what  passed  :  Hallett  v.  Cousens,  2  M.  & 
Rob.  238.  This  contradiction  may  be  made  out  by  a  series  of  documents :  Jackson  v. 
Thomaaon,  8  Jur.  N.  s.  134. 

l  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.  944  ;  R.  v.  Clarke,  2  Stark.  241.  And  see  supra,  §§  54, 
55  ;  Paine  v.  Tilden,  5  Washb.  554  ;  Hadjo  v.  Gooden,  13  Ala.  718  ;  Sweet  v.  Sherman, 
6  Washb.  23. 

»  Bull.  N.  P.  294. 

»  2  Phil.  Evid.  445,  446. 

4  Doe  v.  Stephenson,  3  Esp.  284  ;  8.  c.  4  id.  50,  cited  and  approved  by  Ld.  Ellen- 
borough,  in  Bishop  of  Durham  v.  Beaumont,  1  Campb.  207-210,  and  in  Provis  v.  Reed, 
5  Bin-.  435. 

6  Bishop  of  Durham  v.  Beaumont,  1  Campb.  207  ;  1  Stark.  Evid.  186  ;  Russell  v. 
Coffin,  8  Pick.  143,  154  ;  Starks  «;.  People,  5  Denio  106. 


PASSAGES   OMITTED   FROM  THE   ORIGINAL   TEXT.  929 

is  admissible ;  but  whether,  in  this  species  of  evidence,  any  degrees 
are  recognized  as  of  binding  force,  is  not  perfectly  agreed ;  but  the 
better  opinion  seems  to  be,  that,  generally  speaking,  there  are  none. 
But  this  rule,  with  its  exceptions,  having  been  previously  discussed, 
it  is  not  necessary  here  to  pursue  the  subject  any  further. 

§  583.  The  effect  of  private  writings,  when  offered  in  evidence, 
has  been  incidentally  considered,  under  various  heads,  in  the  preced- 
ing pages,  so  far  as  it  is  established  and  governed  by  any  rules  of  law. 
The  rest  belongs  to  the  jury,  into  whose  province  it  is  not  intended 
here  to  intrude. 


VOL.   I.  —  59 


APPENDIX   III. 

CONFESSIONS    ON    EXAMINATION    BEFORE   A   MAGIS- 
TRATE OR  IN  OTHER  LEGAL  PROCEEDINGS.1 


§  A.  Orthodox  Principle.  [The  question  here  presented  (ante, 
§§  219,  224)  is  in  effect:  Is  there  anything  in  the  fact  of  arrest,  as 
such,  or  in  the  fact  of  presence  before  a  magistrate,  as  such,  or  of 
examination  on  oath,  as  such,  which  tends  to  produce  an  untrue 
confession  of  guilt  ?  It  must  be  understood  that  we  now  assume  the 
absence  of  any  of  the  other  kinds  of  inducements  anywhere  deemed 
fatal ;  we  assume  that  no  threats,  promises,  assurances,  urgings,  or 
other  inducements  sufficient  in  themselves  to  exclude,  have  been  held 
out;  we  are  to  consider  merely  the  effect  of  the  above  facts  in  them- 
selves. Remembering  this,  and  applying  the  test  already  indicated 
as  the  orthodox  one  (ante,  §§  219,  219  a),  "  Was  the  inducement  such 
that  there  was  any  fair  risk  of  a  false  confession  ?  "  there  can  be  on 
principle  but  one  answer,  viz.,  no  such  risk  exists,  and  the  confession 
is  admissible.  For  the  circumstances  of  arrest  and  of  presence 
before  a  magistrate,  no  argument  can  be  necessary ;  and  even  for  the 
extreme  case  of  an  answer  under  oath,  it  must  be  obvious  that  so  far 
as  any  answer  at  all  is  thereby  compellable,  it  is,  according  to  the 
terms  of  the  oath,  to  be  a  true  answer ;  that  is  all  that  is  demanded 
or  compelled.2  There  is  on  principle  not  the  vestige  of  an  argument 
for  excluding  a  confession  merely  because  of  such  a  circumstance ; 
and,  as  a  matter  of  history,  such  an  exclusion  was  not  thought  of 
until  the  novel  judicial  attitude  of  the  present  century  gave  it  a 

1  The  following  pages  deal  with  the  subject  of  §§  224-226,  ante,  and  attempt  to 
examine  more  fully  the  history  and  present  state  of  the  decisions  in  this  the  most 
complicated  and  difficult  part  of  the  law  of  Confessions.     This  treatment  is  intended 
as  a  substitute  for  the  sections  above  mentioned,  but  is  too  long  for  insertion  in  the 
text. 

2  1838,  Morton,  J".,  in  Faunce  v.  Gray,  21  Pick.  245  :  "The  fact  that  it  was  made 
under  oath  cannot  diminish  its  force  or  render  its  competency  Questionable.     If  it  con- 
tain a  true  narrative  of  facts,  justice  requires  that  they  should  be  admitted.     And  no 
man  will  be  likely  to  make/aZse  admissions  against  himself,  because  he  has  boon  sworn 
to  tell  the  truth  ;  "  Smith,  C.  J.r  in  Wood  v.  "Weld,  Smith  N.  H.  367,  referring  to  a 
similar  examination  on  oath  :  "  What  hardship  is  it  to  be  obliged  to  tell  the  truth  ? 
No  means  [were]  used  to  produce  anything  but  the  truth ; "  and  see  R.   v.  Scott, 
§  B.post;  and  U.  S.  v.  Kirkwood,  Utah,  post,  §  K. 


932  APPENDIX   III. 

partial  sanction  and  opened  the  way  for  that  misuse  of  precedents  by 
which  extreme  results  have  been  reached  in  a  few  jurisdictions. 

But  we  find  also  in  use,  and  competing  for  recognition,  certain 
other  tests,  which  are  all  derived  from  the  phrase  "  voluntary,"  but 
as  applied  and  worked  out  for  the  situations  now  in  hand  have  a 
meaning  and  effect  very  different  from  the  ordinary  one  as  expounded 
ante,  §  219  a.] 

§  B.  Principle  of  Voluntariness  :  Common  Form.  [The  common 
form,  in  the  present  application,  consists  in  taking  the  phrase  "  vol- 
untary," considering  it  without  any  reference  to  promises  or  threats, 
and  erecting  it  into  an  absolute  and  final  test,  —  in  short,  in  translating 
it  as  "  spontaneous."  The  notion  is  a  broad  one,  and  is  in  effect : 
Was  the  situation  such  that  the  person  had  to  speak,  felt  obliged  to 
speak,  or  was  it  a  matter  of  pure  choice  with  him  to  speak  or  not  ? 
The  radical  difference  here,  it  will  be  observed,  is  that  we  no  longer 
care  whether  his  speaking  involves  a  false  avowal  of  guilt ;  the  thing 
is  that  a  speaking  not  voluntary  cannot  be  received,  and  hence  the 
speaking  is  excluded  irrespective  of  the  danger  of  falsity.  If,  then, 
we  take  the  phrase  "voluntary  "  and  treat  it  as  the  final  and  self- 
sufficient  test,  and  if  thus  we  discard  the  fundamental  theory  of  con- 
fessions  (ante,  §  219)  — that  our  object  is  to  exclude  those  which  may 
be  false  —  and  conceive  our  purpose  as  being  to  exclude  confessions 
as  such  (even  though  true)  unless  they  are  "  voluntary,"  we  thus 
have  good  reason  to  consider  how  far  under  such  a  canon  the  fact  of 
arrest  or  of  presence  before  a  magistrate  or  of  examination  on  oath 
may  prevent  the  confession  from  being  in  the  above  sense  "  volun- 
tary ; "  for  it  may  at  least  be  argued  that  either  of  these  circum- 
stances may  in  a  given  case  make  the  confession  practically 
compulsory.  Now  this  is  the  form  of  principle  which  was  unsuccess- 
fully championed  by  many  English  judges  during  the  first  half  of 
this  century,  and  thus  was  introduced  into  our  rulings ;  and  it  is 
under  this  form  that  the  questions  we  are  now  to  consider  have  been 
able  to  be  raised.  It  is  not  the  best  principle ;  but  it  is  at  least 
superior  to  those  we  have  later  to  examine,  which  to-day  also  com- 
pete for  recognition.  Different  Courts  apply  the  doctrine  in  differing 
spirits  of  strictness  or  liberality;  the  difference  often  practically 
shows  itself  in  the  circumstance  whether  the  giving  of  a  caution  (or 
notice  not  to  answer  except  voluntarily)  is  deemed  to  admit  the 
answer ;  a  Court  of  narrow  tendencies  will  not  even  then  admit  it, 
since  (it  is  said)  the  moral  compulsion  remains;  but  with  most 
Courts  a  caution  removes  the  reason  for  exclusion. 

Types  of  the  foregoing  form  of  test  and  the  arguments  expounding 
it  are  found  in  the  following  passages :  — 

1K.VJ,  Pollock,  C.  B.,  in  R.  v.  Bnldry,  2  Den.  Cr.  C.  441 :  "  The  true  dis- 
tinction between  the  present  case  and  a  case  of  that  kind  ['  you  had  better  tell 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       933 

the  truth  ']  is  that  [here]  it  is  left  to  the  prisoner  a  matter  of  perfect  indiffer- 
ence whether  he  should  open  his  mouth  or  not." 

1864,  Hayes,  J.,  dissenting,  in  R.  v.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  60,  83  :  "AH 
that  the  common  law  requires  is  that  the  confession  in  pais  [meaning  other 
than  in  court  or  before  a  magistrate]  be  voluntary.  Upon  this  principle  it  is 
that  ...  a  confession  will  be  rejected  if  it  appears  to  have  been  extracted  by 
the  presumed  pressure  and  obligation  of  an  oath,  or  by  pestering  interroga- 
tories, or  if  it  have  been  made  by  the  party  to  rid  himself  of  importunity,  or 
if,  by  subtle  and  ensnaring  questions,  as  those  which  are  framed  so  as  to  con- 
ceal their  drift  or  object,  he  has  been  taken  at  a  disadvantage  and  thus  en- 
trapped into  a  statement  which,  if  left  to  himself,  and  in  the  full  freedom  of 
volition  he  would  not  have  made.  ...  I  am  not  aware  of  any  law  which  de- 
clares, as  an  abstract  proposition,  that  a  confession  is  undeserving  of  that 
character  [of  voluntarinessj  if  it  has  been  made  in  answer  to  questions  fairly 
put,  while  the  party  has  been  left  at  full  liberty  to  answer  or  not,  as  he  may 
think  right.  These  principles  will  apply  to  the  confession  in  pais,  whether  it 
has  been  made  by  a  person  at  liberty  or  under  arrest.  But  it  is  manifest  to 
every  one's  experience  that  from  the  moment  a  person  feels  himself  in  custody 
on  a  criminal  charge,  his  mental  condition  undergoes  a  very  remarkable  change, 
and  he  naturally  becomes  much  more  accessible  to  every  influence  that  ad- 
dresses itself  either  to  his  hopes  or  fears.  .  .  .  [To  counteract  this  influence  a 
caution  is  customary ;  yet  the  presence  or  absence  of  a  caution  is  not  in  itself 
decisive  ;  it  is  merely  a  circumstance  for  the  judge.  But  from  the  moment  of 
arrest,  the  person  must  be  assumed  to  be  acting  under  pressure.]  On  the 
whole  of  the  case  now  before  us,  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  statement  to  the 
constable,  having  been  made  at  a  time  when  the  party  neither  was  a  prisoner 
nor  felt  or  supposed  herself  to  be  a  prisoner,  and  not  appearing  to  have  been 
obtained  by  any  threat  or  promise  or  other  undue  or  unfair  means,  was  prop- 
erly receivable  in  evidence.  But  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  of  opinion  that  if 
the  defendant  had  at  the  time  of  that  conversation  felt  herself  to  be  in  custody 
on  the  criminal  charge,  then  her  statements  in  answer  to  the  questions  would 
not  have  been  receivable,  unless  prefaced  by  a  caution." 

1862,  Rice,  J.,  in  State  v  Oilman,  51  Me.  223:  "  Does  it  follow  that  be- 
cause a  statement  is  made  upon  oath  in  a  proceeding  where  the  circumstances 
of  the  commission  of  the  crime  are  being  investigated,  and  the  person  making 
such  statements  is  a  suspected  or  accused  person,  that  it  must  necessarily  be 
involuntarily  made?  .  .  .  The  argument  is  that  the  impressiveness  of  obliga- 
tion and  the  solemnity  of  the  occasion  would  have  a  tendency  to  wring  from 
the  party  thus  situated  facts  and  circumstances  which  he  is  not  bound  to  dis- 
close, and  therefore  can  in  no  just  sense  be  said  to  be  voluntary  As  a  general 
proposition  this  may  be  true,  especially  if  the  party  is  uninformed  with  regard 
to  his  rights.  But  when  he  is  fully  apprised  of  his  rights  and  informed  that 
he  is  under  no  legal  obligation  to  disclose  any  facts  prejudicial  to  himself,  or 
to  give  evidence  against  himself,  and  then  deliberately  makes  statements  under 
oath,  no  good  reason  is  perceived  why  such  statements  should  not  be  given  in. 
evidence  against  him.  .  .  .  If  it  be  said  that,  though  a  party  in  such  a  situa- 
tion may  be  under  no  legal  constraint,  he  may  nevertheless  feel  under  a  degree 
of  moral  compulsion,  and  from  that  cause  feel  impelled  to  make  self-incrimina- 
tive  statements,  the  answer  is  that  this  moral  pressure  bears  with  no  greater 
force  upon  him  when  on  the  stand  voluntarily  than  in  other  situations.  A 
party  who  finds  himself  surrounded  with  circumstances  calculated  to  cast  sus- 


934  APPENDIX    III. 

picion  on  him  will  undoubtedly  feel  the  necessity  of  making  explanations. 
But  such  considerations  have  never  been  deemed  good  cause  for  excluding 
declarations  which  he  may  choose  voluntarily  to  make." 

1879,  Chalmers,  J.,  in  Jackson  v.  State,  59  Miss.  312, rejecting  an  examination 
as  witness  after  a  caution  :  "  The  principle  is  that  no  statement  made  upon 
oath  in  a  judicial  investigation  of  a  crime  can  ever  be  used  against  the  party 
making  it,  in  a  prosecution  of  himself  for  the  same  crime ;  because  the  fact 
that  he  is  under  oath  of  itself  operates  as  a  compulsion  upon  him  to  tell  the 
truth  and  the  whole  truth,  and  his  statement,  therefore,  cannot  be  regarded  as 
free  and  voluntary." 

The  first  answer  to  this  test  is  of  course  (1)  that  the  fundamental 
question  for  confessions  is  whether  there  is  any  danger  that  they  may 
be  untrue  (ante,  §  219),  and  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  mere  circum- 
stance of  compulsion  to  speak  in  general,  or  of  the  use  of  oath-com- 
pulsion in  particular,  which  creates  any  risk  of  untruth.1  (2)  Another 
answer  is  that  the  privilege  against  self-crimination  assuriies  that  if 
the  person  chooses  to  give  such  testimony  on  the  stand  or  in  custody, 
it  will  be  received,  and  there  would  have  been  no  need  for  such  a 
privilege  if  this  rule  had  existed  for  confessions ;  that  privilege  as- 
sumes in  its  very  existence  that  statements  made  without  using  it  are 
admissible,  and  answers  all  the  purposes  which  the  above  doctrine  is 
aiming  at.2  (3)  There  is,  however,  a  third  way  of  dealing  with  this 
doctrine  ;  and  that  is  to  accept  its  principle  —  i.  e.  that  a  statement  not 
voluntary  is  to  be  excluded,  irrespective  of  its  truth  or  falsity,  —  but 
to  deny  that  there  can  be  any  compulsion  in  the  mere  facts  of  custody 
or  of  examination  upon  oath,  because  the  person  is  always  at  liberty 
to  refuse  to  speak.  This  answer  may  still  leave  open  to  dispute  the 
question  whether  at  least  a  "caution"  (or  notification  to  the  person 
of  his  privilege)  is  not  essential;  but  the  theory  that  the  person  must 
be  supposed  to  know  that  he  need  not  answer  (as  applied  in  State  v. 

1  This  answer  is  well  set  forth  in  the  opinion  of  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.,  for  four 
judges  (Coleridge,  J.,  dissenting  on  another  ground),  in  R.  v.  Scott,  1  D.  &  B.  47 
(1856)  :  — 

"  We  will  consider  the  several  grounds  on  which  the  defendant's  counsel  has 
argued  that  it  [the  examination]  is  not  admissible.  The  first  is  that  the  examina- 
tion of  the  defendant  was  taken  after  making  a  declaration  tantamount  to  an  oath,  and 
that  if  on  oath  it  would  have  been  inadmissible.  But  in  the  case  referred  to  in 
support  of  this  objection  [R.  v.  Britton,  supra],  the  oath  had  been  improperly  admin- 
istered without  authority  ;  and  if  the  examination  is  taken  under  an  oath  admin- 
istered by  proper  authority,  there  is  no  reason  for  saying  that  it  is  less  likely  to 
be  true  than  if  it  had  been  without  an  oath  or  any  similar  solemnity.  The  next  ob- 
jection is  that  the  examination  was  compulsory.  It  is  a  trite  maxim  that  the  con- 
fession of  a  crime,  to  be  admissible  against  the  party  confessing,  must  be  voluntary  ; 
but  this  only  means  that  it  shall  not  be  induced  by  improper  threats  or  promises,  be- 
cause under  such  circumstances  the  party  may  have  been  influenced  to  say  what  is 
not  true,  and  the  supposed  confession  cannot  be  safely  acted  on.  Such  an  objection 
i-Miiimt  apply  to  ...  a  lawful  examination  in  the  course  of  a  judicial  proceeding." 
Si-c  also  the  epigrammatic  passages  from  Morton,  J.,  in  Fannce  v.  Gray,  and  Smith, 
C.  J.,  in  Wood  ».  Weld,  quoted  ante,  §  A. 

3  This  argument  is  suggested  in  the  following  passage  :  1878,  Benedict,  J.,  in  TJ.  S. 
v.  (JrnlF,  14  Blatch.  886:  "The  reason  why  a  sworn  witness  is  permitted  to  decline 
answering  is  because  his  answers  under  oath  can  be  used  as  evidence  against  him." 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFOKE   A   MAGISTRATE.       935 

Vaigneur,  infra)  would   practically  repudiate   such  a  requirement. 
The  passage  below  illustrates  the  form  of  this  answer.8] 

§  C.  Same  :  Modern  English  Form.  [In  the  last  half  century  there 
has  been  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  English  judges  to  revive  this  test 
in  an  altered  form,  for  a  certain  class  of  cases  at  least.  The  notion  is 
fundamentally  the  same,  L  e.  Was  the  situation  such  that  the  person 
had  to  speak  ?  But  it  proceeds  by  a  different  test,  viz.  Was  the  speak- 
ing obtained  by  asking  questions  of  a  person  while  in  custody  ?  In 
other  words,  statements  are  deemed  not  voluntary  and  therefore  inad- 
admissible  when  they  have  been  made  in  answer  to  questions  put 
while  in  custody.  Moreover,  it  thus  becomes  immaterial  whether  the 
answers  amount  to  a  confession  or  not.  The  attitude  is  illustrated 
by  tho  following  passages :  — 

1885,  A.  L.  Smith,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Gavin,  15  Cox  Cr.  C.  656  :  "  When  a  pris- 
oner is  in  custody,  the  police  have  no  right  to  ask  him  questions.  Reading 
a  statement  over,  and  then  saying  to  him,  '  What  have  you  to  say?  '  is  cross- 
examining  the  prisoner,  and  therefore  I  shut  it  out.  A  prisoner's  mouth 
is  closed  after  he  is  once  given  in  charge,  and  he  ought  not  to  be  asked 
anything." 

1864,  L.  C.  J.  Lef roy,  dissenting,  in  R.  v.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  66 :  "  The 
law  of  England,  since  the  time  of  Judge  Jeffreys,  is  against  any  kind  of  ex- 
traction of  evidence  from  a  prisoner,  not  only  by  torture,  but  by  anything  that 
could  be  calculated  to  excite  the  prisoner  to  confess  ;  any  answer  given  under 
such  circumstances  is  not  admissible.  .  .  .  Ought  we  not  to  say  that  the  law 
of  England  does  not  allow  evidence  to  be  obtained  by  questioning  a  prisoner, 
except  in  the  particular  way  prescribed  by  the  statute?  .  .  .  There  appears  to 
have  been  a  new  current  of  opinion  setting  in  after  the  passing  of  14-15 
Viet." 

This  attitude  can  by  no  means  be  taken  as  the  prevailing  one  in 
modern  English  Courts ;  it  is  merely  a  tendency,  though  a  marked 
one.  It  is  doubtless  partly  due  to  a  feeling  (unfounded,  as  we  shall 
see,  in  the  law)  that  the  statute  of  1850  should  be  treated  as  in  spirit 
excluding  all  evidence  from  accused  persons  in  custody  not  obtained  by 
the  statute-sanctioned  method.  Partly,  also,  it  is  due,  as  the  preceding 
form  is,  to  a  confusion  of  confession-law  with  the  privilege  against 
self-crimination;  the  privilege,  of  course,  does  not  affect  statements 
not  made  on  the  stand  but  made  while  in  custody ;  and  in  applying  the 
law  of  confessions  to  the  latter  situation,  the  judges  have  modified  it 

*  1852,  Withers,  J.,  in  State  v.  Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  L.  403  (after  dealing  with  other 
objections)  :  "  There  remains  nothing  but  the  supposed  duress  of  an  oath,  adminis- 
tered by  a  power  capable  (as  is  said)  of  applying  a  sanction  that  shall  exact  an  answer. 
Now  in  reality  there  is  no  power,  in  any  tribunal  known  to  the  common  law,  to  ex- 
act an  answer  that  may  implicate  a  witness  in  or  tend  to  expose  him  to  a  criminal 
charge.  .  .  .  Mr.  Joy  .  .  .  [assigns  the  reason]  that  one  in  his  capacity  of  witness 
might  refuse  to  answer  a  question  that  has  a  tendency  to  expose  him  to  a  criminal 
charge  ;  hence  an  answer  to  such  becomes  a  voluntary  statement,  since  he  might  re- 
fuse to  make  any.  This  appears  to  be  a  sound  legal  theory.  It  cannot  he  met  by  the 
circumstance  of  a  particular  case  that  a  witness  may  not  know  the  extent  of  his  per- 
sonal security  under  the  law,  for  ignorance  of  the  law  excuses  no  one."  , 


936  APPENDIX   III. 

by  an  infusion  of  the  spirit  of  the  above  privilege ;  so  that  we  find 
presented  under  the  head  of  confession-law  a  notion  excluding  state- 
ments made  merely  in  answer  to  questions  by  a  custodian,  —  a  result 
which  would  be  natural  enough  as  an  extension  of  the  privilege  against 
self-crimination,  but  quite  anomalous  in  the  law  of  confessions.1] 

§  D.  Seldeu's  Principle  of  Mental  Agitation.  Another  form  of 
test  derived  from  the  phrase  "voluntary"  is  still  broader  in  its 
excluding  effect,  and  differs  radically  in  one  point  from  the  preced- 
ing two.  Like  them,  (1)  it  takes  "  voluntariness  "  as  a  final  stand- 
ard ;  but  (2)  it  does  not  discard,  but  retains,  the  fundamental  notion 
of  confession-law  that  a  probable  untruth  is  that  which  we  are  seek- 
ing to  reject ;  and  furthermore  (3)  it  includes,  as  the  second  does, 
under  "confession"  anything  and  everything  said  by  the  person, 
whether  an  avowal  of  guilt  or  an  assertion  intended  to  exculpate  and 
to  demonstrate  innocence.  Its  peculiar  different  result  arises  from 
applying  the  idea  (2)  to  the  statements  included  in  (3).  Thus,  it 
argues  :  Persons  suspected  wrongly  of  a  crime,  especially  when  offi- 
cially charged  with  it  and  questioned  about  it,  are  apt,  particularly 
when  the  circumstances  are  strongly  inculpatory  and  demand  explana- 
tion, to  make  the  first  explanation  that  occurs  to  them,  to  deny  incrim- 
inating facts,  and,  in  short,  to  assert  and  try  to  prove  their  innocence 
by  inventing  false  stories,  which  if  true  would  show  their  innocence ; 
hence,  statements  so  made  cannot  fairly  be  trusted,  and  should  be 
rejected.  The  chief  representative  statements  of  this  theory  are  found 
in  the  following  passages  :  — 

1854,  Selden,  J.,  dissenting,  in  Hendrickson  v.  People,  10  N.  Y.  33:  "  The 
mental  disturbance  produced  by  a  direct  accusation,  or  even  a  consciousness 
of  being  suspected  of  crime,  is  always  great,  and  in  many  cases  incalculable. 
The  foundation  of  all  reliance  upon  human  testimony  is  that  moral  sentiment 
which  universally  leads  men,  when  not  under  some  strong  counteracting  influ- 
ence, to  tell  the  truth.  This  sentiment  is  sufficiently  powerful  to  resist  a  tri- 
fling motive,  but  will  not  withstand  the  fear  of  conviction  for  crime.  Hence, 
the  moment  that  fear  seizes  the  mind,  the  basis  of  all  reliance  upon  its  mani- 
festations is  gone.  .  .  .  The  mind,  confused  and  agitated  by  the  apprehension 
of  danger,  cannot  reason  with  coolness,  and  it  resorts  to  falsehood  when  truth 
would  be  safer,  and  is  hurried  into  acknowledgments  which  the  facts  do  not 
warrant.  Neither  false  statements  nor  confessions,  therefore,  afford  any  cer- 
tain evidence  of  guilt  when  made  under  the  excitement  of  an  impending 
prosecution  for  crime." 

1864,  Pigot,  C.  B.,  dissenting,  with  Lefroy,  C.  J.,  and  O'Brien,  J.,  in  R.  v. 
Johnston.  15  Ir.  C.  L.  60,  121 :  "It  must  be  shown  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
judge  that  the  statements  have  been  purely  voluntary  statements  of  the  pris- 
oner. .  .  .  The  danger  to  be  guarded  against  is  not,  in  the  far  greatest  num- 

1  This  passage  illustrates  it  :  1867,  Kelly,  C.  B.,  in  10  Cox  Cr.  C.  576  :  " I  have 
always  felt  that  we  ought  to  watch  jealously  any  encroachment  on  the  principle  that 
no  man  is  bound  to  criminate  himself,  and  that  we  ought  to  see  that  no  one  is  in- 
duced cither  by  a  threat  or  a  promise  to  say  anything  of  a  criminatory  character 
against  himself  ; '"  an  utter  confusion  of  two  things  distinct  in  history  and  in  principle. 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE  A  MAGISTRATE.       937 

ber  of  cases,  that  an  innocent  man  will  fabricate  a  statement  of  his  own  guilt, 
although  instances  of  this  have  occurred,  too  well  attested  to  be  doubted. 
The  danger  is  that  an  innocent  person,  suddenly  arrested,  and  questioned  by 
one  having  the  power  to  detain  or  set  free,  will  (when  subjected  to  interroga- 
tories, which  may  be  administered  in  the  mildest  or  may  be  administered  in 
the  harshest  way,  and  to  persons  of  the  strongest  and  boldest  or  of  the  most 
feeble  and  nervous  natures)  make  statements  not  consistent  with  truth,  in 
order  to  escape  from  the  pressure  of  the  moment.  .  .  .  The  process  of  ques- 
tioning impresses  on  the  greater  part  of  mankind  the  belief  that  silence  will 
be  taken  as  an  assent  to  what  the  questions  imply.  The  very  necessity  which 
that  impression  suggests,  of  answering  the  question  in  some  way,  deprives 
the  prisoner  of  his  free  agency,  and  impels  him  to  answer  from  the  fear  of  the 
consequences  of  declining  to  do  so.  Daily  experience  shows  that  witnesses, 
having  deposed  the  strict  truth,  become  on  a  severe  or  artful  cross-examina- 
tion involved  in  contradictions  and  excuses  destructive  of  their  credit  and  of 
their  direct  testimony.  A  prisoner  is  still  more  liable  to  make  statements  of 
that  character  under  the  pressure  of  interrogatories  urged  by  the  person  who 
holds  him  in  custody ;  and  thus  truth,  the  object  of  the  evidence  of  admissions 
so  elicited,  is  defeated  by  the  very  method  ostensibly  used  to  attain  it.  This 
relative  position  of  the  parties  does  not,  therefore,  tend  to  truth  as  the  result 
of  the  inquiry.  It  does  tend  in  the  strongest  way  to  make  the  statement  of 
the  prisoner  the  reverse  of  voluntary.  ...  In  my  judgment,  the  relative  posi- 
tions of  the  constable  who  has  custody  of  the  prisoner  and  of  the  prisoner  who 
is  in  custody  of  the  constable  negative  the  fact  that  the  prisoner  is  a  free 
agent.  It  rebuts  any  presumption  that  the  prisoner's  statement  is  voluntary, 
and  furnishes  the  strongest  presumption  that  it  is  not." 

Now,  (a)  conceding  this  argument  to  be  good  so  far  as  it  goes,  what 
it  shows  is  that  statements  professing  innocence,  and  calculated  to 
prove  it,  are  not  trustworthy ;  it  does  not  show  that  a  plain  avowal  of 
guilt  is  untrustworthy ;  on  the  contrary,  the  whole  underlying  notion 
is  that  an  innocent  person  will  lie  to  prove  his  innocence  and  explain 
away  apparent  guilt.  Therefore,  when  we  find  him  confessing  guilt,  it 
is  obvious  that  it  cannot  be  under  the  influence  of  any  such  motive  as 
the  above,  and  is  totally  inconsistent  with  the  presence  of  that  motive.1 
Thus,  by  the  Courts  adopting  this  principle,  a  reason  which  applies 
exclusively  to  assertions  of  innocence  is  made  to  support  a  rule  ex- 
cluding confessions  of  guilt.2  That  is  the  first  fallacy ;  and  it  must 
be  clearly  appreciated,  because  its  insidious  error  is  concealed  in  a 
triple  process,  viz.,  first,  taking  a  principle  fundamentally  appropriate 
to  the  confession-rules  (that  they  are  excluded  because  of  the  risk  of 

1  This  answer  is  represented  in  the  following  passage  :  1878,  Benedict,  J.,  in  U.  8. 
v.  Graff,  14  Blatchf.  387  :  "To  say  that  the  administering  of  an  oath  to  one  under 
suspicion  of  crime  will  of  necessity  cause  a  mental  disturbance  that  must  render  unre- 
liable the  sworn  admission  of  the  crime  and  raise  the  legal  presumption  that  the 
statement  is  untrue,  is  going  further  than  I  can  go,  unless  compelled  by  authority.  I 
know  of  no  authority  binding  upon  the  Courts  of  the  United  States,  which  compels 
the  holding  that  an  arrest,  or  a  charge  of  crime,  or  being  sworn,  or  all  three  combined, 
are  sufficient  to  exclude  a  confession  that  otherwise  appears  to  have  been  freely  made, 
without  the  influence  of  threat  or  promise." 

8  See  §  213,  ante,  "  What  is  a  Confession." 


938  APPENDIX   III. 

falsity),  secondly,  working  out  its  reason  for  a  totally  different  class  of 
statements  (assertions  intended  to  show  innocence),  and  thirdly,  going 
back  to  confessions,  and  testing  them  according  to  the  rule  thus 
borrowed. 

(£>)  The  further  answer  to  this  principle  is  found  in  the  denial 
that  the  principle  has  any  validity  even  for  the  class  of  statements, 
viz.,  assertions  of  facts  showing  innocence,  as  to  which  it  is  worked  out. 
In  that  department  of  evidence  such  a  principle  is  without  precedent, 
and  is  in  conflict  with  all  analogies.  The  conduct  of  a  suspected  per- 
son, in  concealing  or  destroying  incriminating  evidence  or  in  fleeing 
from  justice,  has  always  been  admitted  (subject  to  any  innocent 
explanation  that  can  be  made)  (ante,  §  14  p,  in  the  text,  and  §  195  a), 
and  his  false  assertions  of  an  alibi  and  other  false  explanations  of 
conduct  have  always  been  admitted  (ante,  §  14  r)  ;  yet  if  the  above 
principle  were  good,  it  would  necessarily  exclude  all  conduct  and 
statements  while  under  suspicion,  and  not  merely  while  in  custody 
or  on  the  stand.  Thus  the  principle  is  without  precedent  or  analogy, 
and  is  unworkable  in  practice.8] 

§  E.  The  above  Principles  all  applied  to-day.  [The  first  of  the 
above  three  principles  is  less  recognized  to-day,  though  it  gains  ground 
steadily.  The  second  is  that  which  prevails  in  most  jurisdictions, 
though  it  is  not  uniformly  nor  consistently  applied,  and  it  rather  loses 
ground.  The  third  can  hardly  be  said  to  prevail  completely  in  any 
jurisdiction,  its  chief  function  having  been  to  throw  precedents  and 
principles  into  confusion,  to  unsettle  the  course  of  decision,  and  to 
suggest  confusing  arguments  while  not  commanding  complete  adher- 
ence. It  was  first  judicially  advanced  by  the  eminent  Mr.  J.  Selden,1 
in  1854,  in  the  Teachout  Case  (post)  in  New  York,  at  nearly  the  same 

3  Tbis  answer  is  represented  in  the  following  passage  :  1869,  Woodruff,  J.,  in 
Teachout  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  11  :  "  If  the  declarations  made  under  consciousness  of 
suspicion  are  for  that  reason  unreliable,  they  must  be  unreliable  whenever  and  wher- 
ever made  .  .  .  and  equally  when  the  suspected  party  encounters  that  suspicion  while 
fully  at  large  among  third  parties,  as  when  called  as  a  witness  to  state  if  he  sees  fit 
what  he  knows  of  the  cause  of  the  death.  And  if  consciousness  of  suspicion  renders 
proof  of  his  declarations  unreliable,  so  also  should  it  render  proof  of  his  acts  unreliable, 
and  they  should  be  equally  excluded.  And  yet  it  has  not,  I  think,  been  doubted  that 

[)roof  of  the  acts  of  tne  party  under  the  very  pressure  of  suspicion  is  competent.  .  .  . 
Flight,  concealment,  etc.]  may  be  proved  as  some  indication  of  conscious  guilt,  and 
yet  it  is  consistent  with  innocence,  and  rnay  be  the  mere  result  of  fear,  and  the  pressure 
of  circumstances  may  lead  the  innocent  man  to  resort  to  this  as  a  measure  of  safety. 
This  is  quite  as  true  as  that  suspicion  will  lead  a  man  to  false  statements  for  the 
same  purpose.  There  must  be  some  limit  to  the  rule  excluding  declarations,  short  of 
the  test  that  they  be  made  when  he  is  under  no  consciousness  that  he  is  under  sus- 
picion ;  tflse  the  whole  conduct  of  the  party,  from  the  moment  he  is  apprised  that  he 
is  susjiected,  must  be  declared  to  be  too  unreliable  to  be  made  the  subject  of  any  infer- 
ence whatever." 

1  It  had  already  been  advanced,  however,  by  the  counsel,  Dundas,  in  1838,  in 
Wheater's  Case,  post ;  and  Mr.  J.  Selden  probably  found  it  there.  But  a  spurious 
passage,  much  quoted,  in  Gilbert's  Evidence  and  Hawkins's  Pleas  of  the  Crown  also 
served  as  a  source ;  this  passage  is  examined  in  an  article,  by  the  present  editor,  on 
the  history  of  confession-Jaw,  in  33  Amer.  Law  Rev.  376,  May-June,  1899. 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A  MAGISTRATE.       939 

time  that  it  was  being  repudiated  by  the  English  judges,  in  1856,  in 
Scott's  Case  (post) ;  it  was  subsequently  championed  by  the  dissent- 
ing judges  in  the  Irish  case  of  R.  v.  Johnston,  in  1864 ;  but  it  has  not 
obtained  any  further  footing  in  England  or  Ireland,  and  had  vogue 
as  a  determining  doctrine  iu  only  a  few  American  jurisdictions. 
Apart  from  its  lack  of  precedent,  the  false  basis  of  supposed  prin- 
ciple by  which  it  is  reached,  and  its  conflict  with  analogies,  it  is  work- 
able simply  and  consistently  up  to  a  certain  point  only,  i.  e.  quite  as 
far  as  Mr.  J.  Seldeu  and  the  Irish  judges  wished  to  carry  it.  But  it 
is  radically  different  from  and  opposed  to  the  other  principles  ;  and  the 
unfortunate  thing  has  been,  for  many  Courts,  that  they  have  not  seen 
this,  that  they  have  thought  to  recognize  it  partially,  but  not  wholly, 
and  in  connection  with  other  principles,  —  an  unfortunate  thing,  be- 
cause this  test  is  not  reconcilable  in  any  degree  with  either  of  the  other 
tests  (except  in  part  the  last  preceding  one)  and  cannot  coexist  with 
them  in  the  same  body  of  law,  and  because  the  result  of  this  laudable 
endeavor  to  carry  water  on  both  shoulders  is  that  neither  vessel 
maintains  its  equilibrium,  to  the  confusion  of  the  Courts  and  the  law. 
The  best  interests  of  the  law  of  confessions  would  be  served  by  a  clear 
recognition  on  the  part  of  the  Courts  that  one  of  those  three  prin- 
ciples must  be  selected  and  logically  carried  out  and  the  other  two  be 
repudiated;  thus  we  should  have  at  least  consistency,  instead  of  a 
tangle  of  rulings  guided  now  by  one  principle,  now  by  another,  and 
leaving  the  law  in  a  state  of  desperate  uncertainty. 

Owing  to  the  state  of  the  decisions,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  them 
by  jurisdictions;  for  this  alone  will  furnish  an  opportunity  for  ex- 
amining the  state  of  the  law  with  reference  to  the  various  competing 
principles;  and  the  English  precedents,  as  furnishing  the  original 
distinctions  and  illustrating  the  history  of  the  theories,  must  first 
be  taken  by  themselves. 

In  applying  each  of  the  principles,  there  are  four  kinds  of  situa- 
tions, involving  distinctions  about  which  the  controversy  within  each 
principle  has  chiefly  turned.  These  four  are  :  1.  Under  arrest  as 
accused ;  2.  Examined  before  a  magistrate  as  accused,  without  oath  ; 

3.  Examined  before  a  magistrate  or  on  trial  as  accused,  under  oath  ; 

4.  Testifying  on  oath  as  a  witness.     Confessions  made  in  these  four 
different  situations  may  be  differently  treated  even  under  the  same 
principle,  and  the  course  of  the  law  must  be  examined  separately  for 
each.] 

§  F.  History  of  English  Practice  :  (l)  Confessions  •while  under 
Arrest.  [It  was  for  a  long  time  the  clear  and  unquestioned  law  in 
England  that  the  mere  circumstance  of  arrest,  even  when  combined 
with  the  circumstance  that  the  confession  was  made  in  answer  to 
questions  put  by  the  custodian,  did  not  exclude  the  confession.  This 
was  taken  for  granted  and  expressly  asserted  as  unquestioned  by 
Grose,  J.,  in  1791,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  twelve  judges  in 


940  APPENDIX   III. 

Lambds  Case.1  The  next  two  landmarks  of  the  rule  are  Thornton's  * 
and  Gilhairi's  *  Cases,  also  decisions  in  bane.  These  were  followed, 
in  the  next  ten  years,  by  other  rulings,4  among  which  Wild's  Case, 
a  decision  in  bane,  became  the  leading  one.  Such  was  the  law  at 
this  period  that  Mr.  Joy  was  able  correctly  to  say,  in  1842 ,  — 

Joy,  Confessions,  38 :  "  It  may  be  proper  that  the  police  authorities  should 
forbid  the  practice  of  questioning  a  prisoner  by  a  constable,  and  it  might  rea- 
sonably induce  caution,  and  perhaps  suspicion,  and  a  scrutinizing  jealousy 
in  jurors,  in  investigating  the  credit  of  a  witness  who  obtains  a  confession 
through  such  means ;  but  the  cases  before  the  twelve  judges,  both  in  England 
and  Ireland,  already  cited,  seem  to  establish  that  statements  made  in  answer 
to  questions  put,  without  any  caution  and  by  a  person  who  has  no  authority 
to  question  the  prisoner,  are  admissible  in  evidence.  .  .  .  [46.]  Such  confes- 
sion, if  voluntary  and  free,  is  admissible,  although  it  appears  that  he  was  not 
cautioned." 

It  is  to  be  noticed  (1)  that  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  "  threat  or 
promise  "  test  (ante,  §  219  a)  the  result  was  a  necessary  one,  because 
by  hypothesis  no  threat  or  promise  was  employed ;  (2)  that  in  the 
absence  of  a  threat  or  a  promise,  the  test  of  "  voluntariness "  was 
regarded  as  satisfied  ;  (3)  that  no  caution  was  required ;  and  (4)  that 
the  rule  was  repeatedly  affirmed  in  bane. 

In  the  meantime,  in  Ireland,  the  same  result  had  been  reached 
in  Gibney's  Case,  by  all  the  judges.5  But  some  twenty  years  after- 
wards came  a  series  of  Irish  rulings  by  individual  judges  excluding 

1  1791,  Lambe's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  C.  3d  ed.  C25  ;  see  the  quotation,  post,   §  G. 
So  also  before  that  time:  1722,  R.  v.  Woodburne,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  62  (to police-officer); 
1746,  Berwick's  Case,  Foster's  Cr.  C.  10  (officers  of  a  rebel  garrison  after  capture,  giving 
their  rank  to  the  official  inspectors  while  in  prison). 

2  1824,  R.  v.  Thornton,  1   Moody  Cr.  C.  27,  1   Lew.  Cr.  C.  49,  by  seven  judges 
against  two  (the  accused,  fourteen  years  old,  was  in  custody  and  severely  questioned 
by  the  police  ;  held  admissible,  because  "no  threat  or  promise  had  been  used"). 

8  1828,  R.  v.  Gilham,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C.  186,  191,  before  all  the  judges  but  one  (in 
jail,  to  the  jailer  ;  admitted). 

4  1831,  R.  v.  Swatkins,  4  C.  &  P.  549,  Patteson,  J.,  semble;  1832,  R.  v.  Richards, 
6  id.  318,  Bosanquet,  J.  (to  a  constable,  in  custody  on  the  way  to  jail);  1883,  R.  v. 
Long,  6  id.  179,  Gurney,  B.  (just  after  arrest,  after  hearing  the  charge)  ;  1835,  R.  v. 
Wild,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C.  452  (in  custody  in  an  inn)  ;  1837,  R.  v.  Kerr,  8  C.  &  P.  177, 
Park,  J.  (to  a  policeman,  searching  the  accused's  room,  questioning  her  and  about  to 
arrest  her). 

6  1822,  R.  v.  Gibney,  Jebb  Cr.  C.  15,  by  all  the  Irish  judges  (statements  in  answer 
to  questions  by  a  constable,  while  under  arrest  on  the  way  to  jail,  with  a  crowd  about 
him  asking  questions  ;  no  caution  given.  "  They  held  the  rule  to  be  well  established 
that  a  voluntary  confession  shall  be  received  in  evidence,  but  if  hope  has  been  excited, 
or  threats  or  intimidation  held  out,  it  shall  not,"  and  admitted  it  here).  This  was 
followed  in  1842  :  R.  v.  Hughes,  quoted  in  Joy,  Confessions,  89  (a  statement  had  been 
made  while  in  custody,  in  answer  to  a  constable's  questions)  ;  Crompton,  J.,  "had 
frequently  had  occasion  to  decide  this  question,  and  all  these  [cases  cited]  had  been 
before  him.  The  confession  of  a  man,  to  be  admitted,  is  not  to  be  extorted  by  fear  nor 
educed  by  flattery :  but  where  a  prisoner  voluntarily  gives  it,  it  may  be  received,  whether 
the  questions  be  put  to  him  by  an  authorized  or  unauthorized  person.  Wherever  the 
declaration  is  voluntary,  he  would  receive  it,  and  the  doctrine  in  Wild's  Case  was  the 
true  one." 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       941 

such  confessions ; '  the  reasons  being  variously  given.  The  uncer- 
tainty of  practice  thus  introduced  was  finally  settled  in  1864  by  the 
great  case  of  R.  v.  Johnston,"1  and  the  original  and  orthodox  view  was 
maintained  by  the  majority,  that  confessions  made  under  such  circum- 
stances were  not  in  themselves  inadmissible,  and  were  to  be  tested, 
like  other  confessions,  according  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  some 
other  and  specific  inducement  in  the  way  of  a  threat  or  a  promise. 

Meantime,  in  1850,  a  statute  (see  post,  §  G)  had  prescribed  a  new 
method  of  examining  accused  persons  for  commitment,  and  in  the 
opinion  of  Lefroy,  C.  J.,  its  spirit  had  contributed  to  the  opposing 
result  reached  by  him  in  this  case.  But  the  supposed  spirit  of  the 
statute  had  not  affected  the  English  judges,  who  continued  to  rule 
as  before.8  But  about  the  same  time  as  J?.  v.  Johnston  the  form  of 
test  described  ante,  §  C,  made  its  appearance  in  England ; 9  i.  e.,  any 
answers  obtained  by  questions  put  by  an  officer  to  a  person  in  custody 
were  excluded.  It  has  not  yet  been  given  a  standing  by  a  Court  of 
appeal,  but  it  certainly  is  a  candidate  for  supremacy.] 

§  G.  History  of  English  Practice  :  (2)  Confessions  as  Accused  with- 
out Oath  on  Examination  before  a  Magistrate.  [The  examination  of 

6  1839,  R.  v.  Hughes,  1  Cr.  &  D.  13,  Doherty,  C.  J.  (an  authorized  person  visiting 
the  accused  in  jail,  and  questioning  him  ;  excluded,  on  the  ground  that  no  caution  was 

g'ven,  and  that  on  magistrates'  examinations  a  caution  is  always  given)  ;  1840,  R.  v. 
oyle,  ib.  396,  Buslie,  C.  J.  (a  constable  visiting  the  accused  in  jail,  and  questioning 
her,   after  a  caution)  ;  1841,  R.  v.  Devlin,  2  id.  151,  Burton,  J.,  and  Brady,  C.  B.  (a 

Eolice  inspector  questioning  the  accused  in  jail;  excluded);  1856,  R.  v.  Toole,  7  Cox 
r.  C.  244 ;  Pigot,  C.  B.,  and  Richards,  B.  (statement  in  answer  to  a  police-inspector 
while  under  arrest,  after  caution  ;  excluded,  the  current  difference  of  opinion  among 
the  judges  being  noted) ;  1861,  R.  v.  Hassett,  8  id.  511,  Christian,  J.  (similar  facts  ; 
evidence  requested  to  be  withdrawn  as  doubtful)  ;  1863,  R.  v.  Bodkin,  8  Ir.  Jur.  N.  8. 
340,  Pigot,  C.  B.  (statement  in  answer  to  a  question  by  a  constable  while  under  arrest, 
after  caution  ;  excluded,  because  constables  "  ought  to  abstain  from  asking  questions  "). 

7  1864,  B.  v.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  60,  before  eleven  Irish  judges;  the  accused  made 
statements  in  answer  to  the  police,  just  after  notice  of  the  charge,  but  before  arrest, 
no  caution  being  given  ;   Deasy,  B.,  with  whom  concurred  Hughes  and  Fitzgerald, 
BB.,  Monahan,  C.  J.,  and  Fitzgerald,  Ball,  and  Keogh,  JJ.,  held  the  statement  admis- 
sible because  of  the  absence  of  threat  or  inducement;  Ball,  J.  (109):    "  The  general 
result  of  the  foregoing  cases  appears  to  be  that  from  the  year  1822  down  to  the  present 
time  —  that  is,  for  a  period  of  upwards  of  forty  years  —  it  has  been  recognized  as  the 
law  of  the  land,  both  in  England  and  Ireland,  that  admissions  or  statements  obtained 
from  prisoners  through  the  instrumentality  of  questions  from  police  constables,  with- 
out any  previous  caution,  are  admissible  in  evidence  against  them  ;  provided  that  such 
admissions  or  statements  be  the  voluntary  acts  of  the  prisoners,  not  induced  by  either 
hope  or  threat  operating  upon  their  minds.  *'    The  views  of  Hayes,  J.,  and  Lefroy,  C.  J., 
dissenting,  represented  the  test  of  §  C,  ante,  the  view  of  Pigot,  C.  B. ,  and  O'Brien,  J., 
dissenting,  represented  the  test  of  §  D,  ante ;  see  the  quotations  in  those  sections. 

8  1853,  R.  v.  Sleeman,  6  Cox  Cr.  C.  245  (in  custody  in  a  private  house  ;  admitted); 
1862,  R.  v.  Cheverton,  2  F.  &  F.  833,   Erie,  C.  J.,  and  Wightman,  J.  (statement  to  a 
police-superintendent,  while  under  arrest,  in  answer  to  questions,  without  caution ; 
admitted). 

9  1863,  R.  v.  Mick,  3  F.  &  F.  822,  Mellor,  J.  (statements  to  the  police,  under  arrest, 
answering  a  question,  but  after  a  caution  ;  admitted,  but  the  method  disapproved)  ; 
1885,  A.  L.  Smith.  J.,  in  R.  v.  Gavin,  15  Cox  Cr.  C.  656  (quoted  ante,  §  C).     No 
doubt  such  a  decision  is  apt  to  be  reached  through  the  influence  of  other  considerations; 
as  where  Cave,  J.,  in  1893, 2  Q.  B.  18,  frankly  expresses  doubts  as  to  the  credibility  of 
police-officers  producing  alleged  confessions  in  doubtful  cases. 


942  APPENDIX   IIL 

an  accused  person  before  a  magistrate,  for  preliminary  investigation 
and  for  commitment  if  necessary,  was  of  course  at  common  law  taken 
without  putting  the  accused  upon  oath,  because  as  accused  he  was  not 
competent  to  testify.  Furthermore,  the  proceeding  was  for  some 
three  centuries  regulated  by  a  statute  (widely  copied  in  this  country) 
the  material  provisions  of  which  are  as  follows :  — 

1554,  St.  1-2  P.  &  M.  c.  13,  s.  4:  "Justices  of  the  peace  .  .  .  shall  be- 
fore any  bailment  or  mainprise  take  the  examination  of  the  said  prisoner  and 
the  information  of  them  that  bring  him,  .  .  .  and  the  same,  or  as  much  as 
may  be  material  thereof  to  prove  the  felony,  shall  be  put  in  writing  before 
they  make  the  bailment ;  which  said  examination,  together  with  the  said  bail- 
ment, the  said  justices  shall  certify  at  the  next  general  gaol-delivery.  ..." 
St.  2-3  P.  &  M.  c.  10:  "  The  said  justice,  or  justices,  before  he  or  they  shall 
commit  or  send  snch  prisoner  to  ward,  shall  take  the  like  examination  of  the 
prisoner  and  the  information  of  those  who  bring  him,  and  shall  put  the  same 
in  writing  within  two  days  after  the  said  examination,  and  the  same  shall 
certify,"  etc. 

Now  the  propriety  of  receiving  confessions  made  at  such  a  time, 
never  questioned  (from  the  present  point  of  view)  until  the  end  of 
the  1700s,1  was  then  settled,  both  as  a  common-law  question  and 
under  the  statute,  in  a  decision  so  clear  and  emphatic  that  its 
exposition  must  be  quoted :  — 

1791,  Lambe's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  L.  (3d  ed.)  625;  the  accused  was  arrested 
and  examined  before  a  magistrate,  and  on  having  the  written  examination 
read  over  to  him  for  signing,  he  said :  "  It  is  all  true  enough,"  but  would  not 
sign  it.  Whether  it  was  admissible  apart  from  the  statute,  was  the  first  ques- 
tion ;  Grose,  J.,  for  the  twelve  Judges:  "The  general  rule  respecting  this 
species  of  testimony  is  that  a  free  and  voluntary  confession,  made  by  a  per- 
son accused  of  an  offence,  is  receivable  in  evidence  against  him,  whether  such 
confession  be  made  at  the  moment  he  is  apprehended,  while  those  who  have 
him  in  custody  are  conducting  him  to  the  magistrate's,  or  even  after  he  has 
entered  the  house  of  the  magistrate  for  the  purpose  of  undergoing  his  exami- 
nation. But  in  the  present  case  the  confession  of  the  prisoner  was  made  not 
only  in  the  presence  of  the  magistrate,  but  while  he  was  undergoing  a  judicial 
examination.  .  .  .  First,  then,  to  consider  this  question  as  it  is  governed  by 
the  rules  and  principles  of  the  common  law.  Confessions  of  guilt  made  by  a 
prisoner,  to  any  person,  at  any  moment  of  time,  and  at  any  place,  subsequent 
to  the  perpetration  of  the  crime  and  previous  to  his  examination  before  the 
magistrate,  are  at  common  law  received  in  evidence  as  the  highest  and  most 
satisfactory  proof  of  guilt,  because  it  is  fairly  presumed  that  no  man  would 
make  such  a  confession  against  himself  if  the  facts  confessed  were  not  true. 
It  may,  however,  be  said  [in  opposition]  that  this  rule  only  applies  to  confes- 
sions by  parol,  and  not  to  confession  (as  in  the  present  case)  reduced  into 
writing  and  afterwards  admitted  by  parol  to  be  true.  But  surely  if  what  a 
man  says,  though  not  reduced  into  writing,  may  be  given  in  evidence  against 

1  1741,  White's  Trial,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1085;  Goodere's  Trial,  ib.  1054;  and  see 
other  cases  in  33  Ainer.  Law  Rev.  376,  May-June,  1899. 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A  MAGISTRATE.       943 

him,  a  fortiori  what  he  says  when  reduced  into  writing  is  admissible,  for  the 
fact  confessed  being  rendered  less  doubtful  by  being  reduced  into  writing,  it 
is  of  course  entitled  to  greater  credit,  and  it  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  an 
instrument  is  invalidated  by  a  circumstance  from  which  it  derives  additional 
strength  and  authenticity.  And  for  this  reason  it  is  clear  that  the  present 
confession  having  been  taken  by  a  magistrate  under  a  judicial  examination 
can  be  no  objection  to  receiving  it  in  evidence,  for  it  gains  still  greater  credit 
in  proportion  to  the  solemnity  under  which  it  was  made.  .  .  .  [He  then 
points  out  that  the  statute  methods  were  not  intended  to  replace  all  others 
by  exclusion,  but  merely  to  add  a  new  and  acceptable  form,  thus  leaving 
all  other  proper  ones  still  admissible,  even  though  the  statutory  form  could 
not  be  availed  of.]  "  [The  examination]  is  more  authentic  on  account  of  the 
deliberate  manner  in  which  it  is  taken,  and,  when  it  contains  a  confession,  is 
admitted,  not  by  force  of  the  statutes,  but  by  the  common  law,  as  strong  evi- 
dence of  that  fact ;  .  .  .  and  it  is  clear  that  what  a  prisoner  confessed  before 
a  justice  of  the  peace,  previous  to  the  reign  of  Philip  and  Mary,  if  not 
induced  by  hope  or  extorted  by  fear,  whether  reduced  into  writing  or  not;  or 
if  reduced  into  writing,  whether  signed  or  not,  if  admitted  by  the  prisoner  to 
be  true ;  was  and  is  as  good  evidence  as  if  made  in  the  adjoining  room 
previous  to  his  having  been  carried  into  the  presence  of  the  justice,  or  after 
he  had  left  him,  or  in  the  same  room  before  the  magistrate  comes,  or  after  he 
quits  it." 

This  ruling  was  emphasized  in  an  opinion  delivered  a  few  years 
later : — 

1794,  R.  v.  Thomas,  2  Leach  Cr.  L.  (3d  ed.)  727;  Grose,  J.  (the  facts 
being  similar  to  those  of  Lambe's  Case,  supra)  :  "  There  can  be  no  doubt  but 
that  these  minutes  may  be  read  in  evidence.  ...  In  Lambe's  Case,  which  iu 
its  circumstances  was  precisely  like  the  present,  the  judges  were  of  opinion 
that  if  such  written  examination  were  to  be  adjudged  not  admissible,  this 
monstrous  proposition  would  follow,  that  whatever  a  prisoner  says  when  not 
before  a  magistrate  would  be  admissible,  though  depending  on  the  faculty  of 
memory ;  but  that  the  moment  a  prisoner  gets  before  a  magistrate  it  would  not 
be  admissible,  though  taken  down  in  writing  under  circumstances  of  the  great- 
est solemnity." 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  confessions  so  made  were  declared  to  be 
equally  admissible  (1)  at  common  law,  (2)  under  the  statute,  and  (3) 
when  intended  to  be  taken  under  the  statute,  but  not  successfully 
so  taken.  Furthermore,  it  will  be  observed,  there  is  no  intimation 
that  it  is  of  any  consequence  (1)  whether  the  accused  was  cautioned 
or  not,  or  (2)  whether  his  statements  were  made  spontaneously,  or 
in  answer  to  a  general  inquiry  as  to  what  he  had  to  say,  or  in  answer 
to  repeated  specific  questions.  Finally,  it  is  clear  that  confessions 
made  in  such  a  situation  were  treated  on  exactly  the  same  footing  as 
any  others,  i.  e.  the  only  question  would  be  as  to  the  influence  of 
some  positive  threat  or  promise ;  the  mere  situation  did  not  affect 
the  result  or  constitute  an  inducement. 

The  admissibility  of  such  a  confession  was  subsequently  reiter 


944  APPENDIX  III. 

ated  in  a  series  of  rulings  extending  through  the  next  half-century  ;  * 
and  Mr.  Joy  adds  his  authority  as  to  the  practice  at  the  end  of  that 
time.8  In  the  meantime,  only  one  contrary  ruling  had  appeared ;  * 
but  it  served  to  keep  alive  the  possibility  of  controversy.  It  will 
be  noted  that,  in  the  cases  confirming  the  orthodox  doctrine  (of 
which  R.  v.  Ellis  and  R.  v.  Gilham  are  most  frequently  cited),  some  of 
the  confessions  received  were  given  under  a  caution  and  some  were 
made  without  questions  preceding;  but  neither  of  these  circumstances 
seems  to  have  been  treated  as  essential  to  their  reception.  The  doc- 
trine of  R.  v.  Wilson*  however,  came  to  the  surface  once  again 
in  1850.5  But  in  the  preceding  year  a  statute  had  entirely  revised 
the  method  of  conducting  such  examinations  ; 6  the  effect  of  which 
was  to  raise  the  question  whether  its  methods  were  to  exclude 

2  1790,  R.  v.  Hall,  quoted  in  2  Leach  Cr.  L.  3d  ed.  635  ;  1799,  R.  v.  Magill,  McNally 
on  Evid.  37,  Chamberlain,  J.  (statement  as  accused  before  a  magistrate  ;  no  caution); 
1826,  R.  r.  Ellis,  Ry.  &  Moo.  432,  Littledale,  J.  (a  statement  as  accused  on  examina- 
tion before  a  magistrate,  without  threat  or  promise,  but  upon  questioning  and  after  re- 
fusal to  allow  counsel ;  following  an  unreported  ruling  of  Holroyd,  J.,  and  disapproving 
Wilson's  Case  of  1817,  in  the  next  note  but  one);  1828,  R.  v.  Gilham,  1  Mood.  Cr.  C. 
186,  191,  before  all  the  judges  but  one  (on  examination  before  a  magistrate  after 
a  caution  ;  admitted);  1830,  Wright's  Case,  1  Lew.  Cr.  C.  48  (on  examination  as 
accused  before  a  magistrate  ;  admitted);  1831,  R.  v.  Fagg,  4  C.  &  P.  566,  Garrow,  B. 
(examination  as  accused  before  magistrate  ;  disapproved  because  taken  before  all  evi- 
dence for  prosecution  was  in;  but  admitted);  1831,  R.  v.  Bell,  5  id.  162,  Gaselee,  J., 
and  Lord  Tenterden,  C.  J.  (statement  as  accused  before  magistrate,  without  questions  ; 
admitted,  and  Garrow,  B.'s  objection,  supra,  disapproved);  1831  (?),  Anon.,  ib.,  note, 
Lord  Lyndhurst,  C.  B.  (same  point);  1832,  R.  v.  Green,  ib.  312,  Gurney,  B.  (state- 
ments as  accused  before  a  magistrate,  after  a  caution);  1836,  R.  v.  Court,  7  id.  486, 
Littledale,  J.  (statement  as  accused  before  magistrate  in  answer  to  question);  1836,  R. 
v.  Rees,  ib.  569,  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.  (statement  as  accused  before  magistrate  in  answer 
to  questions);  1837,  R.  v.  Bartlett,  ib.  832,  Bolland,  B.  (same);  1838,  R.  v.  Arnold, 
8  id.  622,  Lord  Denman,  C.  J.  (advising  a  caution ;  but  omitting  to  say  whether  it  is 
essential).  There  were  also  other  rulings  indicating  clearly,  though  indirectly,  an  ac- 
ceptance of  this  practice  :  1833,  R.  v.  Tubby,  5  C.  &  P.  530,  Vaughan,  B.,  semble; 
1835,  R.  v.  Rivers,  7  id.  177,  Park,  J.,  semble;  1838,  R.  v.  Wheeley,  8  id.  250,  Alder- 
son,  B.,  semble. 

8  1842,  Joy,  Confessions,  40. 

*  1817,  R.  v.  Wilson,  Holt  N.  P.  597,  Richards,  C.  B.  (a  statement  as  accused  on 
examination  before  a  magistrate,  without  threats  or  promises,  but  without  caution  and 
upon  questions  ;   "an  examination  of  itself  imposes  an  obligation  to  speak  the  truth  ; 
if  a  prisoner  will  confess,  let  him  do  so  voluntarily").     There  is  another  and  earlier, 
sometimes  quoted  to  the  same  effect ;   but  it  has  no  bearing :   1793,  R.  v.  Bennet, 
2  Leach  Cr.  L.  3d  ed.  627  (where  the  accused  had  refused  to  sign  the  examination 
before  the  magistrate,  though  acknowledging  his  guilt ;  this  acknowledgment  the  Court 
rejected,  because  the  prisoner  had  the  right  "to  retract  what  he  had  said,  and  to  say 
that  it  was  false ; "  yet  here  the  accused  did  not  say  that  it  was  false ;  he  admitted  his 
guilt). 

•  1850,  B.  v.  Pettit,  4  Cox  Cr.  C.  164,  Wilde,  C.  J.  (examination  as  accused  before 
magistrates,  upon  questioning ;  excluded,  the  decision  being  independent  of  the  statute : 
"  I  reject  it  upon  the  general  ground  that  magistrates  have  no  right  to  put  [such]  ones- 
lions  to  a  prisoner.  .  .  .  The  law  is  so  extremely  cautious  in  guarding  against  anything 
like  torture  that  it  extends  a  similar  principle  to  every  case  where  n  man  is  not  a  free 
agent  in  meeting  an  inquiry ;  .  .  .  the  accused  might  think  himself  bound  to  answer 
for  fear  of  being  sent  to  gaol.") 

8  11-12  Viet.,  c.  42,  s.  18;  enacted  for  Ireland  in  12-13  Viet,  c.  69,  s.  18,  and 
again  in  14-15  Viet,  c.  93,  s.  14.  The  statute  of  Philip  and  Mary  had  already  been 
revised  without  materially  affecting  the  portions  concerned  with  the  present  question, 
in  7  G.  IV.  (1826),  c.  64,  ss.  2  and  3  (for  Ireland  in  9  G.  IV.,  c.  54,  ss.  2  and  3). 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE    A   MAGISTRATE.       945 

entirely  and  to  forbid  the  common-law  methods,  and  thus  to  leave 
an  opportunity  still  to  inquire  judicially  what  methods  were  receiv- 
able at  common  law.7  Of  the  various  questions  which  have  arisen 
in  applying  this  statute,8  three  only  need  here  concern  us.  (1)  Did  it 
exclude  a  confession  before  admissible  at  common  law?  That  it 
does  not,  has  been  decided  in  England  ; 9  and  very  properly,  since  in 
the  face  of  the  language  of  the  last  clause  any  other  interpretation 
would  have  left  it  impossible  to  believe  that  words  can  mean  any- 
thing. (2)  Was  a  caution  necessary  at  common  law  ?  This  also  has 
been  settled  in  the  negative,  and  the  orthodox  doctrine  already 
described  has  been  affirmed  and  perpetuated.10  (3)  Finally,  does  it 
matter  that  the  statement  was  called  forth  by  specific  questions  put 
by  the  magistrate  about  the  offence  ?  This  has  not  been  author- 
itatively answered  since  the  passing  of  the  statute.  It  had  already 
been  settled  at  common  law,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  putting  of 
questions  was  immaterial ;  but  some  individual  rulings  since  the 
statute11  have  excluded  statements  so  obtained,  on  the  principle 

7  The  statute's  peculiar  features  were :    ( 1 )  It  required  two  cautions  to  be  given  ; 
and  (2)  it  apparently  sanctioned  all  confessions  previously  admissible  :   1849,  11-12 
Viet.,  c.  42,  8.  18 :   "After  the  examination  of  all  witnesses  on  the  part  of  the  prose- 
cution, .  .  .  the  justice  .  .  .  shall  say  to  the  accused  these  words  or  words  to  the  like 
effect :    '  Having  heard  the  evidence,  do  you  wish  to  say  anything  in  answer  to  the 
charge  ?    You  are  not  obliged  to  say  anything  unless  you  desire  to  do  so,  but  whatever 
you  say  will  be  taken  down  in  writing  and  may  be  given  in  evidence  against  you  upon 
your  trial ; '  .  .  .  Provided  always,  that  the  said  justice  or  justices,  before  such  accused 
person  shall  make  any  statement,  shall  state  to  him  and  give  him  clearly  to  understand 
that  he  has  nothing  to  hope  from  any  promise  of  favor  and  nothing  to  fear  from  any 
threat  which  may  have  been  holden  out  to  him  to  induce  him  to  make  any  admission 
or  confession  of  his  guilt,  but  that  whatever  he  shall  then  say  may  be  given  in  evidence 
against  him  upon  his  trial,  notwithstanding  such  promise  or  threat ;  provided,  never- 
theless, that  nothing  herein  enacted  or  contained  shall  prevent  the  prosecution  in  any 
case  from  giving  in  evidence  any  admission  or  confession  or  other  statement  of  the  per- 
son accused  or  charged  made  at  any  time,  which  by  law  would  be  admissible  as  evidence 
against  such  person." 

8  That  the  statute  has  presented  some  difficulties  will  hardly  serve  as  a  moral  against 
statutory  revision  and  codification;  for,  whether  owing  to  the  statute  or  to  other  rea- 
sons, it  is  certain  that  the  proportion  of  rulings  upon  confession-law  in  that  field  after 
and  before  the  statute  is  as  one  to  ten. 

9  The  statute  is  not  exclusive  ;  all  confessions  formerly  admitted  are  still  admissible  : 
1850,  R.  v.  Sansome,  4  Cox  Cr.  C.  207,  before  five  judges ;   disposing  of  the  doubts  of 
Coleridge  and  Cresswell,  JJ.,  in  R.  v.  Kimber,  3  Cox  Cr.  C.  223,  and  approving  the 
ruling  of  Erie,  J.,  in  R.  v.  Steel,  13  Just.  P.  606.     A  similar  opinion  was  expressed  by 
a  majority  in  the  Irish  case  of  1864,  R.  v.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  82,  89,  per  Deasy, 
Hughes,  Fitzgerald,  BB.,    Fitzgerald   and  Keogh,  JJ.,  against  Hayes,  O'Brien,  and 
Ball,  JJ. 

10  The  question  arises,  it  will  be  seen,  when  the  statutory  caution  has  been  omitted, 
and  thus  the  confession  is  not  receivable  under  the  statute  ;  this  was  the  case  in  R.  v. 
Sansome,  supra,  the  decision  being  as  above  ;  the  same  opinion  was  expressed  by  the 
majority  in  R.  ».  Johnston,  supra ;  a  subsequent  English  ruling  confirms  the  result : 
1856,  R.  v.  Stripp,  7  Cox  Cr.  C.  97  (interpolated  remarks,  made  before  evidence  ended). 
It  may  be  added  that  under  the  statute  it  has  been  held  that  the  omission  of  the  second 
caution  does  not  exclude  the  confession  :  1850,  R.  v.  Sansome,  4  Cox  Cr.  C.  207  ;  1850, 
R.  v.  Bond,  ib.  231,  241,  Alderson,  B. 

11  1854,  R.  v.  Berriman,  6  Cox  Cr.  C.  388,  Eric,  J.;  1863.  R.  v.  Mick,  3  F.  &  F. 
822,  Mellor,  J.,  semble.     In  the  Irish  case  this  view  was  repudiated  by  the  majority  : 
1864,  R.  v.  Johnston,  15  Ir.  C.  L.  82,  per  Deasy,  Hughes,  and  Fitzgerald,  BB.,  and 
Fitzgerald  and  Keogh,  JJ.,  against  Lefroy,  C.  J.,  Pigot,  C.  B.,  O'Brien  and  Ball,  JJ. 

VOL.  I.— 60 


946  APPENDIX  IIL 

already  described  in  §  C,  ante,  that  the  very  putting  of  questions  is 
improper  and  involves  a  compulsion.  It  is  apparent  how  little  this 
view  is  sanctioned  by  precedent ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the 
argument  of  Lefroy,  C.  J.,  that  "  questioning  is  not  allowed,  except 
in  the  way  prescribed  by  the  statute,"  can  be  accepted,  unless  we 
believe  (as  he  does)  that  the  statute  introduces  an  exclusive  method; 
but  this  view  is  expressly  repudiated,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the 
Sansome  decision ;  and  the  deduction  of  such  a  view  from  the  mere 
spirit  of  the  statute  amounts  to  nothing  less  than  an  overturning  of 
the  common  law  without  any  express  authority.] 

§  H.  History  of  English  Practice  :  (3)  Confessions  as  Accused, 
under  Oath,  on  Examination  before  a  Magistrate.  [Under  the  stat- 
utory provisions  of  the  1500s,  the  examinations  of  the  witnesses 
were  to  be  upon  oath,  but  of  the  accused  without  oath.  This  was 
construed  (and  not  improperly)  as  a  practical  prohibition  against 
putting  an  oath  to  the  accused.1  It  might  well  follow  that,  if  an 
oath  was  put,  his  examination  under  it  should  not  be  received ;  and 
as  a  matter  of  practice  such  an  examination  was  always  rejected.2 
But  the  reason  was,  not  that  there  was  anything  fatal  in  the  oath  as 
such  (as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  section),  but  simply  that  the  statute 
forbade  the  administration  of  the  oath,  and  by  implication  prevented 
the  admission  of  statements  obtained  in  the  way  thus  specifically 
forbidden.  It  was  thus  not  the  oath,  but  the  specific  statutory  ille- 
gality of  its  application,  that  prevented  the  admission ;  for  there  was 
no  method  of  enforcing  the  prohibition  except  by  rejecting  the  state- 
ment so  obtained.8  This  it  is  essential  to  keep  in  mind ;  for  in  the 

1  1767,  Buller,  Trials  at  Nisi  Prius,  242:    "But  the  examination  of  the  prisoner 
shall  be  without  oath,  and  of  the  others  upon  oath."    This  passage  is  often  cited  for 
the  statement  that  an  examination  of  the  accused  on  oath  is  inadmissible  ;  but  that  is 
not  its  purport. 

2  1817,  R.  v.  Wilson,   Holt  N.  P.  597,  Richards,  C.  B.  (statement  on  oath  as 
accused  before  a  magistrate);  1830,  R.  v.  Haworth,  4  C.  &  P.  256,  Parke,  J.,  semble 
(examination  on  oath  as  accused  before  magistrate);  1831,  R.  v.  Webb,  ib.  564,  Garrow, 
B.  (examination  on  oath  as  accused  before  magistrate,  excluded);  1833,  R.  v.  Tubby, 
5  id.  530,  Vaughan,  B.  (same);  1833,  R.  r.  Lewis,  6  id.  162,  Gurney,  B.,  semble  (same); 
1835,  R.  v.  Rivers,  7  id.  177,  Park,  J.  (same);  1838,  R.  v.  Wheeley,  8  id.  250,  Alder- 
son,  B.  (same);  1838,  R.  v.  Wheater,  2  Moody  Cr.  C.  45,  2  Lew.  Cr.  C.  157,  semble 
(same);   1842,  Joy,  Confessions,  62.      There  are  few  decisions,   simply  because  th« 
inadmissibility  was  conceded. 

8  That  this  was  the  reason  is  clearly  shown  by  the  language  of  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J., 
delivering  the  judgment  of  the  Court  (Coleridge,  J.,  dissenting  on  another  ground)  in 
R.  v.  Scott,  1  D.  &  B.  47  (1856) :  "  The  first  [objection]  is  that  the  examination  of  the 
defendant  was  taken  after  making  a  declaration  tantamount  to  an  oath,  and  that  if  on  oath 
it  would  have  been  inadmissible.  But  in  the  case  referred  to  in  support  of  this  objec- 
tion the  oath  had  been  improperly  administered  without  authority  ;  and  if  the  examina- 
tion is  taken  under  an  oath  administered  by  proper  authority,  there  is  no  reason  for 
saying  that  it  is  less  likely  to  be  true  than  if  it  had  been  without  an  oath  or  any 
similar  solemnity."  This  is  the  explanation  accepted  in  the  following  ruling,  and  in 
other  American  cases  post,  §  K ;  1878,  Benedict,  J.,  in  U.  S.  v.  Graff,  14  Blatch.  387  : 
"  I  am  aware  that  statements  taken  under  oath,  by  committing  magistrates  of  this 
State,  are  not  admitted  in  evidence.  But  the  statute  of  the  State  forbids  the  taking  of 
statements  under  oath  by  committing  magistrates,  and  by  implication  the  use  of  such 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       947 

controversy  (dealt  with  in  the  next  section)  which  arose  as  to  the 
use  of  a  mere  witness'  statements  on  oath,  the  fact  that  the  state- 
ments of  an  accused  person  before  a  magistrate  were  admissible,  if 
mere  unsworn  statements  of  the  ordinary  sort  (as  noted  in  §  G),  but 
inadmissible  if  sworn,  seemed  to  many  to  furnish  a  strong  analogy, 
and  led  them  to  the  deduction  that  it  was  the  oath  as  such  which 
produced  the  difference  of  results.4  It  was  not,  in  truth ;  but  this 
misleading  circumstance  undoubtedly  helped  to  create  the  opinion 
(t.  e.  adverse  to  receiving  witness'  statements)  which  for  a  time  (as 
we  see  in  the  next  section)  threatened  to  prevail.] 

§  I.  History  of  English  Practice  :  (4)  Confessions  by  a  "Witness 
upon  Oath.  [This  case  presents  the  most  difficult  situation  of  the 
four,  because  it  involves  not  only  the  effect  of  the  oath  as  involving 
compulsion,  but  also  the  necessity  of  distinguishing  the  different 
bearings  of  compulsion  as  disapproved  by  confession-law  and  of 
compulsion  as  opprobrious  to  the  privilege  against  self-crimination. 
That  conflicting  and  confused  views  were  from  time  to  time  put 
forth  is  not  unnatural. 

Remembering  the  results  already  reached  —  that,  at  common  law 
(practically  unquestioned  until  the  1800s  and  repeatedly  maintained 
during  the  first  half  of  the  1800s),  neither  the  fact  of  custody  nor 
the  fact  of  magisterial  examination  in  custody  and  without  caution 
excluded  a  confession,  and  that  the  exclusion  of  a  sworn  examination 
was  due  solely  to  the  statutory  prohibition,  —  it  is  natural  enough  to 
find  the  judges,  at  the  opening  of  this  century,  treating  the  confes- 
sions of  a  witness  upon  oath  as  not  in  themselves  objectionable. 
Down  to  1816  we  find  no  exclusion.  Between  that  time  and  1840 
we  find  a  long  and  tangled  series  of  rulings,  representing  conflicting 
views  and  furnishing  a  fruitful  source  of  later  misunderstanding.1 

illegal  statements  as  evidence  is  forbidden."  In  Wheater*s  Case,  Lord  Abinger  had 
gone  even  further,  and  thought  even  such  a  statement  admissible  on  principle  ;  but  his 
language  at  least  adds  to  the  proof  that  it  was  the  illegality,  and  not  the  oath,  which 
excluded  :  1838,  R.  v.  Wheater,  2  Moody  Cr.  C.  45,  2  Lew.  Cr.  C.  157,  before  all  the 
judges,  except  Park,  J.,  and  Gurney,  B.;  Starkie,  for  the  prosecution,  conceded  that 
"a  prisoner's  examination  taken  on  oath  is  inadmissible; "  and  Lord  Abinger,  C.  B., 
said  :  "  I  understand,  if  a  prisoner's  examination  be  on  oath  it  shall  not  be  received 
in  evidence,  without  reference  to  a  duress  or  threat ;  I  see  no  reason  for  it ;  in  prin- 
ciple, the  answer  may  be  quite  voluntary  ; "  the  other  judges  expressed  no  opinion. 

*  Mr.  Starkie's  language  may  serve  as  a  specimen  of  the  misunderstanding  which 
grew  up  about  this  rule:  1822,  Starkie  Evid.  II,  38:  "The  prisoner  is  not  to  l>e 
examined  upon  oath,  for  this  would  be  a  species  of  duress,  and  a  violation  of  the 
maxim  that  no  one  is  bound  to  criminate  himself." 

1  1803,  Collett  v.  Lord  Keith,  4  Esp.  212,  Le  Blanc,  J.  (defendant  a  witness  in  a 
former  cause  ;  objected  to  as  not  voluntary  ;  admitted)  ;  1806,  R.  v.  Walker,  6  C.  &  P. 
162,  Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.  (affidavit  in  Ecclesiastical  Court  ;  admitted) ;  1807, 
Smith  v.  Beadnall,  1  Camp.  30,  Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.  (examination  as  witness 
before  bankruptcy  commissioners,  upon  questions,  without  caution  or  counsel,  but 
without  objection  by  him  ;  admitted  ;  he  "is  like  any  other  witness  called  to  give  evi- 
dence by  virtue  of  a  subpoena  ;  he  speaks  at  the  peril  of  the  examination  being  turned 
against  himself ;  "  here  the  privilege  of  self-crimination  did  not  exclude  the  use  of 
the  answer,  because  no  claim  was  made  for  it) ;  1814,  Stockfleth  v.  De  Tastet,  4  id.  10, 
Lord  Ellenborough,  C.  J.  (examination  as  witness  before  bankruptcy  commissioners  ; 


948  APPENDIX   III. 

Certain  things,  however,  appear  definitely  enough,  upon  a  careful 
examination  in  chronological  order. 

(1)  In  a  great  number  of  the  excluding  rulings,  i,  e.  those  cases 
where  the  witness  had  been  examined  before  a  coroner  while  in  custody 
or  under  suspicion,  the  simple  reason  for  the  exclusion  was  that  the 
witness'  position  was  thought  to  be  assimilated  to  that  of  an  accused 
person,  and  thus  the  case  came  within  the  statutory  prohibition 
(treated  in  the  preceding  section)  against  examinations  of  accused 
persons  taken  under  oath.2  It  was  not  the  oath,  but  the  statutory 
prohibition,  that  excluded  them.  These  rulings  were  the  supposed 

"if  he  was  imposed  upon  when  he  signed  it,  or  was  under  duress,  he  will  not  be 
bound  by  it,"  or  if  the  examination  was  not  lawful  ;  but  here  it  was  assumed  to  be  law- 
fully taken) ;  1816,  B.  v.  Smith,  1  Stark.  N.  P.  242,  Le  Blanc,  J.  (examination  on 
oath  as  witness  before  magistrate  ;  rejected  because  on  oath)  ;  1818,  R.  v.  Merceron, 
2  id.  366,  Abbott,  J.  (examination  as  witness  before  Commons  Committee  ;  objected 
to  as  therefore  not  voluntary,  but  admitted ;  afterwards  said  by  Abbott,  J.,  in  1  Moo. 
Cr.  C.  203,  not  to  have  been  taken  on  oath,  and  to  have  been  admitted  for  that  reason 
only ;  the  Commons  afterward  disapproved  of  the  ruling  in  a  Resolution  quoted  in 
2  C.  &  K.  483,  note);  1828,  Tucker  v.  Barrow,  7  B.  &  C.  624,  Littledale,  J.  (examina- 
tion as  witness  before  bankruptcy  commissioners;  "I  am  disposed  to  say  that  an 
.admission  obtained  under  compulsory  examination  is  not  evidence  of  an  account 
stated  ")  ;  1828,  Robson  v.  Alexander,  1  Moo.  &  P.  448,  Common  Pleas  (examination 
as  witness  before  bankruptcy  commissioners,  without  caution  ;  claimed  to  have  been 
taken  in  excess  of  authority ;  admitted  ;  Lord  Ellenborough's  language  in  Stockfleth 
v.  De  Tastet  adopted) ;  1830,  R.  v.  Haworth,  4  C.  &  P.  255,  Purke,  J.  (examination  as 
witness  for  prosecution  before  magistrate  ;  admitted;  "he  might  as  a  witness  have 
objected  to  answer  any  questions  which  might  have  a  tendency  to  expose  him  to  a 
criminal  charge,  and  not  having  done  so,  his  deposition  is  evidence  against  him  ") ; 
ante  1830,  Anon.,  ex  rel.  reporter,  ib.,  note,  Park,  J.  (examination  as  witness,  before 
suspicion,  by  coroner ;  rejected)  ;  1833,  R.  v.  Tubby,  5  id.  630,  Vaughan,  B.  (state- 
ment upon  oath  as  witness,  not  suspected;  admitted,  "as  no  suspicion  attached  to 
the  party  at  the  time  ;  the  question  is,  Is  it  the  statement  of  a  prisoner  upon  oath  ? 
Clearly  it  is  not,  for  he  was  not  a  prisoner  at  the  time  when  he  made  it ") ;  1833,  R. 
v.  Lewis,  6  id.  161,  Gurney,  B.  (examination  as  witness  by  magistrate,  before  sus- 
picion, but  witness  committed  at  end  of  examination ;  Tubby's  Case  approved,  but,  this 
being  taken  "at  the  same  time  as  all  the  other  depositions  on  which  she  was  com- 
mitted, and  on  the  very  same  day  on  which  she  was  committed,  I  think  it  is  not  receiv- 
able ;  1  do  not  think  this  examination  was  perfectly  voluntary")  ;  1833,  E.  v.  Davis, 
ib.  178,  Gurney,  B.  (examination  as  witness  before  magistrate;  excluded;  "if,  after 
having  been  a  witness  you  make  her  a  prisoner,  nothing  of  what  was  then  said  can 
be  admitted  as  evidence  ");  1833,  R.  v.  Britton,  1  Moo.  &  R.  297,  Patteson  and  Alder- 
son,  JJ.  (balance-sheet  of  bankrupt  in  civil  proceedings  offered  to  prove  the  petition- 
ing creditor's  debt  on  an  indictment  for  concealing  effects,  etc.  ;  objected  to  as  having 
been  made  on  oath ;  excluded  for  other  reasons,  Patteson,  J.,  explaining  in  1  Moo.  Cr. 
C.  51,  that  the  above  objection  was  not  approved  by  him) ;  1838,  R.  ».  Wheeley,  8  C. 
&  P.  250,  Aldereon,  B.  (examination  before  coroner,  as  a  witness,  but  under  arrest; 
excluded) ;  1839,  R.  v.  Owen,  9  id.  84,  Williams,  J.  (examination  as  witness  before 
coroner,  but  under  arrest  ;  on  Wheeley's  Case  being  cited,  "since  that,  there  has 
been  a  reaction  in  opinion  (if  I  may  be  allowed  the  expression) ;  "  admitted)  ;  1840, 
same  case,  postponed,  ib.  238,  before  Gurney,  B.  ("  I  am  not  aware  of  any  instance  in 
whirl  i  an  examination  on  oath  before  a  coroner  or  a  magistrate  has  been  admitted  as 
evidence  by  the  person  making  it ;  I  have  known  depositions  before  magistrates,  made 
by  prisoners  on  oath,  and  they  have  been  uniformly  rejected  ; "  after  the  nisi  priua 
ruling  in  Whoater's  Case,  post,  he  admitted  its  conllict,  but  still  excluded  the 
evidence). 

8  Such  is  the  explanation  of  the  following  cases  :  Lewis',  Davis',  Wheeley's,  and  per- 
haps Owen's  before  Gurney,  B.  In  Tubby's  Case  and  Owen's  Case  before  Williams,  J., 
the  admission  amounted  to  saying  that  the  prohibition  applied  strictly  to  persons  then 
charged  as  accused,  and  to  no  others. 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       949 

foundation  of  the  Selden  theory  of  mental  agitation  (described  ante, 
§  D) ;  but  it  will  easily  be  seen,  in  the  light  of  the  law  of  the  times, 
how  far  these  judges  were  from  proceeding  upon  any  such  far-fetched 
and  unprecedented  theory.  It  has  no  foundation  whatever  in  these 
rulings ;  and  the  circumstance  of  suspicion  or  of  custody  was  mate- 
rial in  their  minds  merely  as  bringing  the  person  within  the  statutory 
prohibition,  and  not  as  producing  mental  disturbance ;  as  is  also  seen 
from  the  fact  that  these  same  judges  were  accepting  at  the  same 
time  the  confessions  of  persons  in  custody  or  on  examination  with- 
out oath  before  a  magistrate  (ante,  §§  F,  G).  The  Selden  theory, 
then  (the  third  of  the  spurious  forms,  described  ante,  §  D),  has  no 
support  in  the  extremest  rulings  of  this  period. 

(2)  It  is  clear,  secondly,  that  the  second  spurious  form  of  theory 
(described  ante,  §  C)  had  not  then  appeared  at  all;  it  is  distinctly 
a  modern  notion,  and  is  applied  peculiarly  to  the  case  of  an  accused 
person  questioned  in  custody. 

(3)  It  appears,  thirdly,  that  the  first  spurious  form  of  test  (described 
ante,  §  B,  as  the  "  common  form  ")  had  made  its  appearance  and  gained 
some  headway.  The  theory  of  this  test  —  so  far  as  any  was  offered  — 
was  that  the  oath  involved  a  compulsion,  and  a  compulsory  disclosure 
was  inadmissible.  Now  (a)  this  theory,  in  its  broadest  and  most 
sweeping  form,  regards  the  oath  as  necessarily  involving  a  compul- 
sion, and  ignores  the  choice  which  the  witness  has  to  use  his  privi- 
lege and  decline  to  answer ;  by  this  theory,  the  mere  fact  of  the 
administration  of  the  oath,  in  spite  of  the  giving  of  a  caution, 
excludes  his  statements.8  But  (&)  in  this  form  it  was  disowned  by 
the  greater  number  of  judges  in  these  rulings ;  *  for,  as  was  pointed 
out,  the  witness  had  a  choice  between  disclosing  and  keeping  silent ; 
in  the  words  of  Parke,  J.,  "  he  might  as  a  witness  have  objected  to 
answer  any  questions  which  might  have  a  tendency  to  expose  him 
to  a  criminal  charge ;  and  not  having  done  so,"  there  was  no  com- 
pulsion. But  the  significance  of  this  answer  (£»)  is  that  it  accepts 
the  principle  of  (a),  but  denies  the  propriety  of  its  application ;  i.  e., 
it  concedes  that  an  answer  actually  compelled  from  the  witness  would 
be  inadmissible,  but  it  denies  that  there  is  in  truth  any  compulsion  in 
such  cases.  Thus,  of  course,  this  theory  (more  liberal  though  it  is 
than  the  first)  contains  within  itself  the  germ  of  a  further  difference 
of  opinion ;  i.  e.  (b1)  one  attitude  prefers,  as  the  test  of  compul- 
sion, to  ask  whether  there  was  de  facto  in  the  specific  case  a  feeling 
of  compulsion, — in  other  words,  to  take  the  subjective  standard 

8  Such  seems  to  be  the  notion  in  the  following  cases  of  the  preceding  list :  Smith's 
(introducing  the  doctrine),  Merceron's,  Tucker  v.  Barrow,  Anon.,  and  perhaps  Owen's 
before  Gurney,  B. ;  see  its  theory  fully  stated  in  the  quotation  from  Jackson  v.  State, 
ante,  §  B. 

4  Such  were  the  following  cases:  Collett  v.  Keith,  Walker's,  Smith  v.  Beadnnll, 
Stockfleth  v.  De  Tastet,  Robson  v.  Alexander,  Haworth's,  Tubby's,  Britton's,  and  Owen's 
before  Williams,  J. 


950  APPENDIX   III. 

of  the  witness;  while  (b")  the  other  prefers,  as  its  test,  to  ask 
whether  the  law  actually  used  compulsion,  —  in  other  words,  to 
take  an  objective  or  external  standard.  The  practical  effect  of  the 
former  attitude  is  seen  in  rulings  which  hold  that  unless  the  witness 
appears  clearly  to  have  known  of  his  privilege  he  must  be  supposed 
to  have  thought  himself  compelled  to  answer ; 5  while  the  practical 
effect  of  the  latter  attitude  is  seen  in  rulings  which  hold  that  his 
answer  will  be  supposed  to  be  voluntary  unless  it  clearly  appears 
that  he  was  compelled  to  answer  after  a  refusal  under  claim  of  privi- 
lege.6 Now,  reverting  to  the  English  rulings  of  Parke,  J.,  and 
others  just  mentioned,  it  is  clear  that,  so  far  as  any  of  them  go  upon 
this  principle  (&)  at  all,  they  adopt  the  more  liberal  form  just  de- 
scribed as  (b").  Thus,  in  none  of  them  does  it  appear  that  a  caution 
was  given  or  that  the  witness  was  otherwise  informed  of  his  rights, 
while  in  /Smith  v.  Beadnall,  Stockfteth  v.  De  Tastet,  and  R.  v.  Haworth 
it  clearly  appears  that  the  Court  thought  he  should  have  expressly 
claimed  and  been  refused  his  right  in  order  to  make  the  answer  really 
compulsory.7 

The  majority  of  these  rulings,  then,  in  this  period  (those  named  in, 
note  4,  ante),  at  least  repudiate  the  principle  (a)  and  adopt  the  more 
liberal  one  (b").  But  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  they  were  not 
impossibly  proceeding  upon  a  still  more  liberal  principle,  which  we 
may  designate  as  (c),  —  in  short,  the  orthodox  one,  already  described 
in  §  A.  This  principle  is  that  a  compelled  confession  is  not  neces- 
sarily and  ipso  facto  a  false  one,  and  that  therefore,  in  the  absence 
of  any  threat  or  promise  tending  to  produce  an  untruth,  the  mere 
fact  that,  the  answer  was  compelled  —  i.  e.  in  spite  of  his  express 
refusal  and  wish  not  to  answer  —  does  not  exclude  it.  Now  it  is 
impossible  to  tell,  in  these  cases  just  dealt  with  (Stockfteth  v.  De 
Tastet,  Britten's,  Haworth's,  and  the  others  in  that  list),  whether 
they  proceed  on  this  principle  (c)  or  on  the  preceding  one  (b") ;  and 
the  reason  for  this  ambigxiity  is  an  important  one ;  it  is  that,  though  it 
was  conceded  that  answers  ordered  in  spite  of  a  claim  of  privilege 
against  self-crimination  would  have  been  inadmissible,  the  violation 

«  This  again  offers  further  opportunity  for  distinctions  ;  for  some  Courts  are  satis- 
fied with  nothing  short  of  a  caution  from  the  judge,  while  others  are  satisfied  if  the 
witness  was  warned  or  presumably  wamed  by  counsel,  — a  distinction  illustrated  in 
the  American  cases  post. 

•  In  other  words,  the  witness'  ignorance  of  his  choice  either  will  not  bo  assumed 
or  will  be  treated  as  his  own  loss,  —  an  attitude  illustrated  in  State  v.  Vaigneur,  quoted 
ante,  §  B,  note. 

7  This  was  treated  by  Mr.  Joy  ns  the  better  and  prevailing  principle  of  his  time  : 
1842,  Joy,  Confessions,  62 :  "A  statement,  not  compulsory,  made  by  a  party  not  at 
the  time  a  prisoner  under  a  criminal  charge,  is  admissible  in  evidence  agninst  him, 
although  it  is  made  upon  oath.  There  are  conflicting  opinions  of  judges  at  nisi  prius 
on  this  jK>int,  but  the  proposition  appears  to  be  established  by  high  authority.  The 
principle  seems  to  be  that  the  party  in  his  capacity  as  witness  might  refuse  to  answer 
any  question  that  has  a  tendency  to  expose  him  to  a  criminal  charge  ;  any  statement, 
therefore,  which  he  makes  is  a  free  and  voluntary  statement  and  is  receivable  in 
evidence." 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.      951 

of  the  privilege  would  be  a  sufficient  ground  for  their  rejection.  An 
answer  ordered  in  spite  of  a  legitimate  claim  of  privilege  is  rejected 
because  that  is  the  significance  of  the  privilege,  which  otherwise 
would  amount  to  nothing  ; 8  and  this  would  amply  suffice  to  justify 
such  an  exclusion  without  any  reference  to  the  law  about  confessions. 
It  is  thus  obvious  that,  when  we  are  trying  to  discover  the  principle 
on  which  the  judges  acted  in  such  cases,  there  is  just  one  situation 
which  will  inevitably  disclose  it,  — one  situation  in  which  no  lawful 
privilege  against  self-crimination  is  violated,  and  in  which,  therefore, 
if  a  confession  is  ordered  after  an  expressed  desire  not  to  answer,  the 
exclusion  of  that  answer  must  mean  the  adoption  of  the  confession- 
principle  (b)  above,  while  the  admission  of  the  answer  must  mean 
the  rejection  of  that  confession-principle  and  the  adoption  of  the 
principle  (c).  That  situation  occurs  when  the  privilege  against  self- 
crimination  is  abolished  by  the  Legislature  (as  it  may  be  in  England) 
for  a  certain  class  of  cases,  and  a  witness  is  thus  no  longer  entitled 
to  refuse  to  answer ;  if  then  he  is  ordered,  after  protest,  to  answer  a 
question  involving  an  avowal  of  guilt,  and  that  answer  is  offered 
against  him  in  a  subsequent  case,  a  question  is  squarely  presented 
which  necessarily  involves  the  adoption  of  either  one  or  the  other  of 
the  above  principles  for  such  confessions.  But  that  peculiar  situation 
had  not  at  this  time  presented  itself ;  and  that  is  the  significance  of 
this  period  and  this  series  of  rulings ;  some  things  had  apparently 
been  settled  —  for  instance,  that  principle  (b)  would  prevail  against 
principle  (a),  —  but  the  important  question  whether  principle  (c)  — 
i.  e.  the  orthodox  theory  of  confessions  —  should  prevail  over  both 
the  others  had  not  been  answered. 

Nor  did  a  clear  answer  come  for  nearly  twenty  years.     The  first 
opportunity  presented  itself  in  1838,  in  Wheater's  Case;9  here  the 

8  1856,  R.  v.  Scott,  1  D.  &  B.  47,  before  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.,  and  four  others  ; 
Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.  :   "  Where  evidence  is  unlawfully  obtained,   and  the  witness 
objects,  no  doubt  it  cannot  be  admitted." 

9  1838,  R.  v.  Wheater,  2  Moo.  Cr.  C.  45,2  Lew.  Cr.  C.  157,  before  all  the  judges 
except  Park,  J.,  and  Gurney,  B.  ;  an  examination  before  bankruptcy  commissioners  as 
to  certain  bills  of  exchange,  after  the  committing  magistrate  had  refused  to  hold  him  on 
a  charge  of  forging  them  ;  the  counsel  had  informed  him  of  his  privilege,  and  where  he 
claimed  it,  an  answer  was  not  forced  ;  other  objections  were  overruled,  and  he  was 
compelled  to  answer  in  those  cases  ;  Dundas,  for  the  accused:  "  The  evidence  was  in- 
admissible, inasmuch  as  it  was  a  compulsory  answer  upon  oath.  .  .  .  When  therefore  it 
is  recollected  that  the  prisoner  himself  considered  that  he  was  compelled  to  answer, 
and  that  his  objections,  however  erroneous  they  might  have  been,  had  been  overruled, 
can  it  be  said  that  his  examination  was  voluntary  ?     It  is  submitted  that  he  was  under 
duress,  his  mind  disturbed  by  the  extraordinary  situation  in  which  he  found  himself 
placed,  and  called  on  in  the  midst  of  these  trying  circumstances  to  weigh  and  consider 
the  nature  of  each  question  and  the  consequences  of  his  answers ;  and  if  so,  the  law 
cannot  estimate  the  exact  degree  of  influence  of  the  duress  upon  the  human  mind.  .  .  . 
I  submit,  therefore,  on  these  grounds,  —  first,  that  the  examination  was  in  its  nature  com- 
pulsory, and  likely  to  operate  so  as  to  disturb  the  mind  of  the  prisoner  ;  and,  secondly, 
that  it  was  an  examination  upon  oath, — that  the  evidence  was  inadmissible."     "The 
judges  present  were  all  of  opinion  that  the  evidence  was  properly  received,  and  the  con- 
viction was  good,  except  Lord  A  binder,  C.  B.,  and  Littledale,  J." 


952  APPENDIX   III. 

argument  of  counsel  presented  the  question  squarely  enough ;  but,  as 
no  opinion  was  published,  the  exact  principle  of  the  decision  remained 
undisclosed.  One  thing  is  clear  from  it,  that  the  Selden  theory  of 
mental  agitation  (ante,  §  D ;  here  advanced  by  the  counsel  Dundas) 
was  again  and  permanently  repudiated  for  England ;  but,  though  we 
may  well  infer  that  the  principle  (c),  supra,  was  the  controlling  reason, 
yet  principle  (b")  would  suffice  on  the  facts  to  account  for  the  admis- 
sion, since  the  specific  answers  accepted  had  not  been  objected  to  on 
the  score  of  privilege,  i.  e.  as  the  witness  had  not  chosen  to  refuse  when 
he  might  have  done  so,  the  answers  must  be  taken  to  have  been  volun- 
tary. The  next  opportunity  offered  in  1847,  in  Garbett's  Case  ; 10  but 
here  the  answer  was  obtained  by  an  unlawful  violation  of  privilege, 
and  that  alone  would  suffice  to  exclude  it,  and  seems  to  have  been  the 
reason  for  exclusion ;  the  only  indication  to  the  contrary  being  the 
use  of  the  ambiguous  word  "compulsion"  in  the  reporter's  brief 
statement  of  the  opinion.  A  third  opportunity  seemed  to  present 
itself  in  B.  v.  Sloggett,  in  1856,11  but  here,  too,  the  important  question 
was  not  settled,  since  the  witness  (it  was  held)  might  have  refused 
to  answer,  and,  since  he  did  not,  was  treated  as  acting  voluntarily. 
But  the  ruling  at  least  enforces  the  principle  (b")  in  its  most  liberal 
extent. 

Meantime,  in  the  same  year,  but  by  different  judges  (except  one), 

10  1847,  E.  v.  Garbett,  2  C.  &  K.  474,  1  Den.  Cr.  C.  262,  2  Cox  Or.  448,  before  the  fif- 
teen  judges;  examination  as  witness  in  a  civil  suit,  the  Court  having  told  him,  after 
his  declining  to  answer,  that  he  must  answer  ;  Chambers,  for  the  defence,  argued  that 
"  in  the  present  case,  the  impression  on  the  mind  of  the  witness  was  that  he  must  an- 
swer, and  that  after  trying  to  evade  the  questions  and  to  exert  his  privilege,  and  find- 
ing  both   hopeless,  he  made  the   confession  "  under  compulsion  ;    Martin,  for  the 
prosecution,  was  asked  by  Parke,  B.  :  "  If  a  judge  was  clearly  wrong,  — as,  if  he  said 
to  a  witness,  '  Did  you  commit  that  murder  ?'  and  added,  '  I  will  commit  you  if  you 
do  not  answer,'  and  the  witness  then  confessed  it,  —  would  that  confession  be  after- 
wards receivable?"  and  answered  :  "I  should  say  it  would.  ...  I  submit  that  if 
the  witness  does  answer,  there  is  no  rule  to  exclude  what  he  says  from  being  evidence 
afterwards  ;  "  nine  of  the  judges  were  for  excluding  the  evidence  on  the  ground  that, 
where  a  witness  is  obliged  to  answer,  notwithstanding  a  lawful  claim  of  privilege, 
"  what  he  says  must  be  considered  to  have  been  obtained  by  compulsion  ; "  and  six 
were  for  receiving  it,  on  various  grounds  unspecified.     Two  other  individual  rulings 
had  intervened  between  this  and  Wheater's  Case ;  but  these  are  explainable  also  on 
principle  (b")  and  are  not  conclusive  for  principle  (c)  :  1841,  R.  v.  Sandys,  C. &Mar. 
345,   Erskine,  J.   (examination  as  witness  before  coroner ;  received,  and  question  re- 
served, but  never  decided) ;  1844,  R.  v.  Goldshede,  1  C.  &  K.  657,  Lord  Denman,  C.  J. 
(answer  in  Chancery  on  oath  as  defendant ;  objected   to  as  compulsory  and  upon 
oath  ;  both  arguments  rejected  and  the  answer  received). 

11  1856,  R.  v.  Sloggett,  7  Cox  Cr.  C.  139,  before  Jervis,  C.  J.,  Coleridge,  J.,  Cress- 
well  and  Erie,  J.I.,  and  Martin,  B.  ;  examination  as  bankrupt  on  oath  before  bank- 
ruptcy commissioners,  without  claim  of  privilege  against  incrimination  ;  at  a  certain 
stage  he  was  told  to  consider  himself  in  custody,  and  the  examination  up  to  that 
point  WHS  offered ;  whether  the  privilege  was  destroyed  by  the  Bankruptcy  Act,  and 
compulsion  to  answer  would  therefore  have  been  lawful  in  any  case,  was  disputed  by 
counsel  ;  the  judges  unanimously  held  that  the  matters  were  covered  by  the  privilege 
and  hence  his  answers  made  without  claim  of  privilege  were  voluntary  and  admissible  ; 
but  whether,  if  the  matters  had  not  been  privileged  and  he  had  been  lawfully  com- 
piled after  objection  to  answer,  the  answers  would  be  inadmissible  as  not  voluntary, 
Wiii  left  undetermined,  and  was  the  question  in  the  ensuing  case  of  R.  v.  Scott. 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       953 

the  important  question  was  being  decided.  In  R.  v.  Scott 12  there  was 
the  fullest  acceptance 18  of  the  principle  (c)  as  the  controlling  and 
orthodox  principle.  It  is  true  that  as  no  claim  of  privilege  was  in 
fact  made  by  the  witness,  the  decision  might  have  been  reached  with- 
out this ;  but  if  we  are  looking  for  the  reasons  regarded  by  judges  as 
indicating  the  law  and  actually  controlling  their  rulings,  a  full  and 
deliberate  expression  of  those  reasons  must  be  the  highest  evidence, 
even  though  the  ruling  might  by  possibility  be  reached  without  such 
an  expression.1*  The  language  is  so  direct  and  clear  that  it  must  be 
quoted : 16  — 

Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.  (after  declaring  that,  as  for  the  oath  in  itself,  '•  there 
is  no  reason  for  saying  that  it  [the  answer]  is  less  likely  to  be  true  than  if  it 
had  been  without  an  oath  or  any  similar  solemnity  ")  :  "  The  next  objection 
is  that  the  examination  was  compulsory.  It  is  a  trite  maxim  that  the  confes- 
sion of  a  crime,  to  be  admissible  against  the  party  confessing,  must  be  volun- 
tary ;  but  this  only  means  that  it  shall  not  be  induced  by  improper  threats  or 
promises,  because  under  such  circumstances  the  party  may  have  been  influ- 
enced to  say  what  is  not  true,  and  the  supposed  confession  cannot  be  safely 
acted  on.  Such  an  objection  cannot  apply  to  ...  a  lawful  examination  in  the 
course  of  a  judicial  proceeding." 

In  short,  mere  compulsion  in  itself  is  nothing,  so  far  as  any 
confession-principle  is  concerned;  for  that  is  taken  care  of  by  the 
rule  against  being  compelled  to  criminate  one's  self;  an  objection  on 
that  score  alone  must  invoke  that  privilege,  and  the  question  then 
arises  whether  that  privilege  covers  the  case  in  hand,  —  a  question 
which  in  the  opinion  above  the  judges  next  addressed  themselves 
to,  and  which  they  treated  as  entirely  distinct  from  any  confession- 
question.  For  a  correct  understanding  of  the  total  separation  between 
the  two,  and  an  antidote  to  the  confusing  expressions  of  a  few  modern 
English  judges  (e.  g.  ante,  §  C),  a  perusal  of  this  opinion  may  be 
recommended. 

The  result,  then,  of  Scott's  and  Wheater's  Cases  in  England  was : 
(1)  that  the  Dundas-Selden  theory  of  mental  agitation  was  entirely 

12  1856,  R.  v.  Scott,  1  D.  &  B.  47,  before  Lord  Campbell,  C.  J.,  Alderson,  Cole- 
ridge, Willes,  and  Bramwell,  JJ.  ;  examination  as  bankrupt  before  Bankruptcy  Court  ; 
the  magistrate  secured  answers  by  threatening  to  commit  (as  he  hud  a  right  to  do 
under  the  Baukruptcy  Act)  for  failing  to  answer  completely ;  but  no  claim  of  privi- 
lege  was  made  ;  the  Act  had  abrogated  the  privilege  for  bankrupt's  examinations  ;  ad- 
mitted. 

18  It  is  true  that  Coleridge,  J.,  dissented,  but  this  was  on  the  ground  (denied  by 
the  others)  that  the  Bankruptcy  Act  had  not  abrogated  the  privilege  against  self-incrimi- 
nation,  and  hence  the  answers  were  obtained  by  a  violation  of  the  privilege.  On  the 
other  question,  his  well-known  views  leave  us  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  agreed  with 
his  colleagues. 

14  The  case  is  strengthened  by  the  circumstance  (above  noted)  that  the  magistrate 
had  threatened  to  commit  the  witness  (as  he  might  lawfully)  if  he  persisted  in  his  re- 
fusal; this  was  properly  explained  by  Lord  Campbell  as  "merely  an  explanation  of 
the  enactment  of  the  legislature  upon  the  subject." 

16  Quoted  more  fully  ante,  §  B. 


954  APPENDIX  m. 

repudiated;  (2)  that  as  between  the  theories  (a)  and  (5),  ante,  the 
former  was  equally  repudiated,  and  the  liberal  form  of  (6")  was  the 
only  one  that  could  by  possibility  be  maintainable,-  (3)  while  by 
Scott's  Case  the  orthodox  theory  (c)  was  given  the  deliberate  sanction 
of  at  least  one  English  Court. 

Since  that  time  (1856)  Scott's  Case  has  been  repeatedly  treated  as 
law  in  England,1'  though  no  Court  of  last  resort  has  affirmed  it,  and 
though  (as  might  be  expected  from  the  tendency  shown  ante,  §  C)  it 
is  regarded  as  not  satisfactory  by  some  English  judges. 

The  lessons  to  be  drawn  as  to  our  own  use  of  the  English  precedents 
are  three :  (1)  that  it  is  impossible  to  use  them  indiscriminately  and 
measure  them  by  mere  numbers ;  they  mean  little  apart  from  the  prin- 
ciple controlling  the  Court  or  the  judge  that  makes  them ;  (2)  that  what- 
ever principle  is  selected  should  be  logically  and  consistently  carried 
out;  and  (3)  that  all  the  doubts  and  confusion  are  of  comparatively 
recent  creation,  and  that  the  orthodox  and  settled  practice  of  the 
early  1800s  entertained  no  doubts  upon  any  of  the  four  classes  of 
situations  we  have  been  considering,  and  treated  them  as  amenable 
to  exactly  the  same  tests  as  confessions  of  any  other  sort,  except  that 
a  statement  on  oath  as  accused  before  a  magistrate  was  excluded 
because  of  the  implied  statutory  prohibition.] 

§  J.  Rulings  in  the  United  States:  (1)  Confessions  made  under 
Arrest.  [In  this  country,  the  orthodox  English  and  Irish  doctrine 
declining  to  consider  the  mere  fact  of  arrest  as  sufficient  to  exclude  a 
confession  has  been  universally  accepted.1  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
of  course  this  result  could  not  be  reached  under  a  strict  and  logical 
application  of  the  Selden  theory  of  mental  agitation  (and  such  con- 
fessions were  thus  expressly  declared  inadmissible  by  him  in  the 
Mf.Mahon  Case,  post,  and  by  the  dissenting  Irish  judges  in  Johnston'* 
Case,  ante);  but  to-day  (as  we  shall  see)  that  theory  is  nowhere 
allowed  to  have  this  natural  and  consistent  effect.] 

§  K.  Same:  (2),  (3),  and  (4);  Confessions  made  as  Accused  be- 
fore a  Magistrate  with  or  without  Oath  or  as  a  Witness  on  the  Stand. 
[Owing  to  the  confused  application  of  the  various  competing  princi- 

»  1859,  Skeen's  Case,  Bell  Cr.  C.  97,  127,  129  (R.  v.  Scott  treated  by  the  minority 
of  the  judges  as  perhaps  not  unimpeachable)  ;  1867,  R.  r.  Robinson,  L.  K.  1  Cr.  C.  R.  80 
(examination  as  witness  before  bankruptcy  commissioners ;  no  caution  and  no  claim 
of  privilege :  the  answers  were  compellable  and  without  privilege ;  three  judges  de- 
clared R.  v.  Scott  to  be  the  law,  and  two  decided  upon  other  grounds) ;  1872,  K.  v.  Wid- 
dop,  2  id  3  (same;  R,  v.  Scott  followed  by  all  five  judges,  though  the  reasons  of  Kelly, 
C.  B.,  were  perhaps  peculiar)  ;  1896,  R.  r.  Erdh«?im,  2  Q.  B.  260,  267  (bankrupt's  ex- 
amination on  oath,  admissible ;  following  R.  v.  Scott).  The  indications  of  its  sanction 
in  Ireland  are  doubtful  ;  1857,  R.  r.  McHugh,  7  Cox  Cr.  483  (information  on  oath  as 
witness,  while  under  arrest  as  a  joint  accused ;  the  magistrate  thought  that  the  in- 
formant was  to  turn  Crown  witness ;  excluded,  partly  because  the  informant  was  not 
cautioned  as  an  accused) ;  IBM,  R.  r.  Gillis,  11  "id.  69  (statement  as  witness  to 
magistrate;  O'Hagan,  J.,  all  the  jndges  agreeing  or  not  dissenting:  "I  do  not 
consider  the  fact  of  their  being  made  on  oath  would  render  the  inforraanous  inad- 
BUarible,  provided  they  wen  made  voluntarily  and  spontaneously  "). 

1  [Except  by  statute  in  Texas  ;  Me  the  authorities  cited  ante,  §  220  c,  note  3-3 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION    BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.      955 

pies,  it  is  here  useless  to  treat  the  several  situations  separately,  and 
the  rulings  have  therefore  been  arranged  according  to  jurisdictions. 
Those  of  New  York  have  been  placed  first  and  liberally  quoted  from, 
because  the  comparatively  early  promulgation  there  of  the  Selden 
theory  in  the  Hendrickson  and  McMahon  Cases,  and  its  repudiation 
in  the  Teachout  Case,  greatly  influenced  the  discussion  in  the  other 
jurisdictions,  in  most  of  which  the  controversy  is  comparatively 
recent,  —  a  further  testimony,  perhaps,  to  the  unnaturalness  and 
heterodoxy  (shown  by  the  early  English  practice)  of  any  controversy 
at  all.  No  attempt  is  made  to  label  in  detail  or  to  comment  upon 
the  exact  variety  of  principle  which  a  given  ruling  represents,  because 
a  comparison  of  it  with  the  preceding  discussion  of  the  English  cases 
will  show  where  it  stands,  — so  far  as  that  may  be  ascertainable.1  It 

1  Where  no  oath  is  mentioned,  it  is  understood  that  the  statement  was  not  on  oath. 
The  term  "  magistrate  "  means  the  committing  judge,  not  including  the  coroner.  The 
list  of  cases  is,  no  doubt,  not  complete.  New  York  :  1854,  Hendrickson  v.  People,  10 
N.  Y.  13  ;  examination  as  witness  before  coroner,  not  under  suspicion  or  charge,  but 
not  cautioned  ;  admitted  ;  Parker,  J.  :  "I  do  not  see  how,  upon  principle,  the  evi- 
dence of  a  witness,  not  in  custody  and  uot  charged  with  crime,  taken  either  on  a 
coroner's  inquest  or  before  a  committing  magistrate,  could  be  rejected.  It  ought  not 
to  be  excluded  on  the  ground  that  it  was  taken  upon  oath.  The  evidence  is  certainly 
none  the  less  reliable  because  taken  under  the  solemnity  of  an  oath.  .  .  .  Nor  can 
the  exclusion  of  the  evidence  depend  on  the  question  whether  there  was  any  sus- 
picion of  the  guilt  of  the  witness  lurking  in  the  heart  of  any  person  at  the  time  the 
testimony  was  taken  ;  that  would  be  the  most  dangerous  of  all  tests,  as  well  because 
of  the  readiness  with  which  proof  of  such  suspicion  might  be  secured,  as  of  the  im- 
possibility of  refuting  it.  ...  The  witness  may  refuse  to  answer,  and  his  answers 
are  to  be  deemed  voluntary  unless  he  is  compelled  to  answer  after  having  declined 
to  do  so ;  in  the  latter  case  only  will  they  be  deemed  compulsory  and  excluded  ; " 
Selden,  J.  (language  already  quoted,  ante,  §  D),  dissented  solely  on  the  ground  that 
the  testimony  was  given  under  suspicion ;  Gardiner,  C.  J.,  thought  that  on  the  facts 
the  examination  had  been  purely  in  the  character  of  a  witness,  but  would  have 
excluded  his  oath  as  unlawful,  had  he  been  substantially  an  accused  person  ;  the 
majority  conceded  that  an  examination  on  oath  as  accused  before  a  magistrate  would 
have  been  inadmissible,  because  the  putting  an  oath  to  the  accused  was  forbidden 
by  the  statute  ;  1857,  People  u.  McMahon,  15  id.  384  (the  Court's  membership  hav- 
ing almost  entirely  changed) ;  examination  as  witness  before  coroner,  but  in  custody 
without  warrant,  charged  as  the  offender,  rejected;  Selden,  J.  :  "  [The  word  'volun- 
tary '  in  judicial  examinations  means]  proceeding  from  the  spontaneous  suggestion 
of  the  party's  own  mind,  free  from  the  influence  of  any  disturbing  cause.  ...  It 
is  considered  that  a  judicial  oath,  administered  when  the  mind  is  disturbed  and  agi- 
tated by  a  criminal  charge,  may  have  that  effect  [of  preventing  free  and  voluntary 
mental  action],  and  hence  the  exclusion.  .  .  .  [Hence,  such  an  examination  under 
oath  is  not  to  be  rejected]  unless  that  oath  was  administered  in  the  course  of  some 
judicial  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  crime  itself  for  which  the  prisoner  is  on  trial;  .  .  . 
[while  it  is  also  necessarily  admissible]  if  at  the  time  it  was  made  the  prisoner  was 
not  himself  resting  under  any  charge  or  suspicion  of  having  committed  the  crime  ;  "  as 
for  examinations  of  accused  persons  on  oath,  Selden,  J.,  for  the  Court,  adopts  the  the- 
ory "that  the  evidence  is  too  uncertain  to  be  safely  relied  upon,"  and  rejects  the 
theory  that  "a  mere  arbitrary  rule,  which  prohibits  magistrates  from  taking  the 
examination  of  prisoners*  charged  with  crime  upon  oath,  has  been  violated;"  1869,  . 
Teachout  v.  People,  41  id.  7 ;  examination  as  witness  before  coroner,  while  under  sus- 
picion and  after  notice  of  probable  arrest ;  a  caution  being  given  by  the  coroner,  held 
by  the  majority,  per  Woodruff,  J.,  that  the  single  fact  that  the  witness  was  under  sus- 
picion was  not  sufficient  to  exclude  the  testimony,  expressly  repudiating  the  reasoning 
of  Mediation's  Case  and  the  dictum  therein  as  to  the  effect  of  suspicion  (language 
quoted  ante.  §  D),  but  holding  that  "  declarations  made  under  the  influence  of  a  charge 
of  guilt,  under  actual  arrest  or  under  examination  with  such  a  charge  impending,  should 


956  APPENDIX   III. 

will  be  noticed  that,  through  the  influence  of  the  Selden  theory, 
mere  exculpative  statements  are  often  improperly  treated  as  confes- 
sions; this  fallacy  has  been  already  explained  ante,  §  213.] 

be  excluded,  except  where  a  careful  obedience  to  the  statutory  precautions  is  observed  ;  " 
thus  adopting  the  English  theory  of  statutory  prohibition  as  the  basis  of  that  exclu- 
sion, though  taking  a  liberal  view  of  the  cases  coming  within  its  application,  like  the 
rulings  ante  in  §  I ;  Grover  and  Lott,  JJ.,  dissenting,  following  McMahon's  Case  and 
its  theory;  1878,  Abbott  v.  People,  75  id.  602  ;  schedules  put  in  by  the  debtor  in 
bankruptcy  proceedings  ;  admitted ;  1883,  People  v.  McGloin,  91  id.  242  ;  examina- 
tion under  oath  before  a  coroner  while  under  arrest  charged  with  the  crime  in  question, 
the  coroner  having  been  summoned  to  the  police  station  and  not  acting  officially  ;  the 
conflicting  theories  of  the  preceding  rulings  were  mentioned,  and  it  was  held  (1)  that 
the  fact  of  the  oath  having  been  administered  was  not  illegal  so  as  to  exclude ;  since 
only  examinations  taken  under  the  statute  could  be  so  objected  to,  and  this  was  not 
under  it,  and  (2)  that  the  examination  was  not  compulsory,  the  theory  of  McMahon's 
Case  being  thus  impliedly  repudiated  ;  (3)  that  under  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure 
of  1881,  §  395,  "a  confession  of  a  defendant,  whether  in  the  course  of  judicial  proceed- 
ings or  to  a  private  person,  can  be  given  in  evidence  against  him,  unless  made  under 
the  influence  of  fear  produced  by  threats,  or  unless  made  upon  a  stipulation  of  the 
district  attorney  that  he  shall  not  be  prosecuted  therefor,"  the  confession  was  equally 
admissible  ;  1886,  People  v.  Mondon,  103  id.  213 ;  examination  on  oath  before  coroner, 
under  arrest  without  a  warrant,  on  suspicion  of  the  crime  in  question  ;  without  counsel, 
not  cautioned,  excluded  on  the  authority  of  McMahon's  Case,  and  the  Code  provision 
above  held  (overturning  McGloin's  Case)  "  not  to  apply  to  any  but  voluntary  confes- 
sions, nor  to  change  the  statutory  rules  relating  to  the  examination  of  prisoners  charged 
with  crime  ;  "  "  the  mere  fact  that  at  the  time  of  his  examination  he  was  aware  that 
a  crime  was  suspected,  and  that  he  was  suspected  of  being  the  criminal,  will  not  pre- 
vent his  being  regarded  as  a  mere  witness,"  and  his  testimony  may  be  used;  but  "if 
he  is  in  custody  as  the  supposed  criminal,  he  is  not  regarded  merely  as  a  witness,  but 
as  a  party  accused,"  and  the  examination  is  excluded,  unless  in  conformity  with  the 
statute  as  to  preliminary  examinations  ;  1890,  People  r.  Chapleau,  121  id.  266  ;  exam- 
ination at  his  own  request,  while  in  custody,  before  the  coroner,  after  a  caution  ;  the 
preceding  cases  were  reviewed  and  treated  as  harmonious,  (!)  and  the  examination  ad- 
mitted as  being  "  in  all  respects  and  however  viewed,  the  voluntary  and  uninfluenced 
statements  of  the  individual ;  "  no  solution  of  the  difficulties  being  offered,  except, 
perhaps,  that  the  voluntariness  of  the  confession,  in  view  of  "  their  nature  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  made,"  is  to  be  the  final  test  in  each  case;  1892,  People  v. 
Wright,  136  id.  625,  632,  examination  before  coroner,  received  ;  following  the  Chapleau 
Case.  As  a  result  of  this  series  of  decisions  it  may  be  said  :  (1)  that  the  theory  of 
statutory  prohibition  as  the  reason  for  excluding  tlie  examination  of  accused  persons 
on  oath  has  been  clearly  recognized  in  all  the  cases  except  McMahon's ;  (2)  that 
apart  from  this  nothing  has  been  clearly  settled;  (3)  that  by  the  Mondon  decision  a 
coach  and  four  has  been  driven  through  the  Penal  Code,  which  was  intended  to 
settle  the  controversy  and  was  so  taken  in  the  McGloin  Case,  and  which  (if  prop- 
erly and  naturally  interpreted)  accepts  fully  the  orthodox  principle  of  Scott's  Case  in 
England  ;  (4)  that  it  is  entirely  impossible  to  tell  what  the  next  decision  will  be,  not 
merely  because  the  Court  has  changed  its  principles  so  often,  but  (more  than  all)  be- 
cause in  the  latest  cases  it  ignores  the  irreconcilable  conflict  in  its  own  precedents  and 
treats  them  as  harmonious,  —  a  complaisant  attitude  which  is  found  in  no  other  Court 
dealing  with  them. 

Alabama:  1852,  Seaborn  v.  State,  20  Ala.  15,  17  (examination  as  accused  before 
magistrate,  without  caution  ;  admitted,  because  voluntary  upon  the  facts) ;  1875, 
Sampson  v.  State,  54  id.  241,  243  (statement  as  accused  on  examination  before  mngis- 
trnte,  admitted) ;  1882,  Kelly  v.  State,  72  id.  244  (statement  on  examination  before 
magistrate,  after  questioning  ;  inadmissible  "  unless  a  prisoner  comprehends  his  rights 
fully,  and  is  informed  by  the  Court"  that  a  refusal  to  answer  is  lawful  and  will  not  be 
tnken  against  him  ;  also  partly  because  no  questioning  by  the  magistrate  was  expressly 
authorized  by  statute;  preceding  cases  ignored);  1896,  Wilson  v.  State,  110  id.  1 
(sworn  as  witness  before  a  coroner,  not  charged  or  arrested,  but  suspected  ;  excluded, 
apparently  on  the  theory  that  the  oath  involved  compulsion);  California:  1873, 
People  o.  Kelley,  47  Cal.  125  (examination  under  oath  before  magistrate  as  accused; 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       957 

admitted,  as  voluntary;  distinguishing  People  v.  Gibbons,  43  id.  551  (1872),  be- 
cause under  the  statute  at  that  time  (since  changed)  such  examinations  upon  oath 
were  unlawful  j  "  if  his  voluntary,  unsworn  statement  may  be  proved  against  him 
as  a  confession,  his  voluntary  testimony  under  oath,  given  in  a  proceeding  in 
which  he  elects  and  is  authorized  to  testily,  ought  to  stand  upon  at  least  as  favorable 
a  footing") ;  1881,  People  v.  Taylor,  59  id.  650  (examination  as  accused  before  coro- 
ner, apparently  on  oath  ;  admitted,  since  "T.  could  not  have  been  compelled  to 
testify ;  .  .  .  the  statement  having  been  voluntary,  the  evidence  was  admissible, 
whether  made  in  a  judicial  proceeding  or  any  other") ;  1893,  People  v.  Weiger,  100 
id.  352,  357  (defendant's  examination  on  oath,  when  cited  in  his  own  voluntary  pro- 
ceedings in  insolvency,  admitted)  ;  Colorado :  1894,  Torris  r.  People,  19  Colo.  438 
(affidavits  to  procure  witnesses,  voluntarily  made  by  defendant,  received)  ;  Florida : 
1892,  Ortiz  v.  State,  30  Fla.  256,  283  (examination  as  accused  on  oath  at  trial  by  his 
own  offer,  admissible) ;  1895,  Jenkins  v.  State,  35  id.  737  (before  grand  jury  ;  the 
caution  had  been  given  as  to  his  privilege,  but  he  was  told  he  was  under  sus- 
picion ;  admitted)  ;  1898,  Green  v.  State,  id.,  24  So.  537  (plea  of  guilty  before  magis- 
trate, after  warning,  admitted) ;  Georgia  :  1875,  Cicero  v.  State,  54  Ga.  156  (examination 
as  accused  before  magistrate  ;  excluded,  because  the  magistrate  put  questions  to  get 
contradictory  statements) ;  Indiana  :  1866,  Anderson  v.  Estate,  26  Ind.  89  (examination 
as  witness  in  another  cause  ;  admitted  as  voluntary)  ;  1893,  Davidson  v.  State,  135  id. 
254,  260  (statements  "  voluntarily  "  made  and  signed  at  inquest  as  witness,  admitted) ; 
Iowa:  1886,  State  v.  Briggs,  68  la.  416,  424  (plea  of  guilty  on  preliminary  examina- 
tion ;  admitted,  even  though  not  told  by  magistrate  of  his  right  to  counsel)  ;  1892, 
State  v.  Carroll,  85  id.  1  (testifying  before  grand  jury  as  witness,  while  under  arrest  on 
the  charge  ;  caution  by  foreman ;  admitted)  ;  1892,  State  v.  Clifford,  86  id.  550,  551 
(under  arrest  and  examined  on  oath  as  accused  before  grand  jury,  without  warning ; 
excluded)  ;  1897,  State  v.  Van  Tassel,  103  id.  6  (voluntary  appearance  at  the  inquest, 
admitted)  ;  Kansas:  1893,  State  v.  Sorton,  52  Kan.  531,  539  (preliminary  examination 
as  defendant  on  oath,  received)  ;  Louisiana:  1873,  State  v.  Garvey,  25  La.  An.  191 
(examination  as  witness  before  coroner,  while  under  arrest  on  a  charge  of  the  crime,  but 
made  at  his  own  request ;  excluded,  because  made  as  an  accused)  ;  Maine :  1862,  State 
v.  Oilman,  51  Me.  206  (examination  as  witness  on  oath  before  coroner,  after  knowledge 
of  suspicion,  but  a  caution  was  given  ;  admitted,  because  the  statements  were  voluntary, 
"  the  manifestation  of  his  own  free  will ; "  quoted  ante,  §  B) ;  1873,  State  v.  Bowe,  62  id. 
174  (plea  of  gnilty  before  the  lower  Court ;  admitted,  as  not  appearing  to  have  been  ob- 
tained "  by  threats  or  promises  ")  ;  Massachusetts :  1838,  Faunce  v.  Gray,  21  Pick.  245 
(admissions  by  an  administrator  in  a  civil  examination  on  oath,  admitted  ;  the  fact  that 
it  was  made  on  oath,  held  immaterial ;  quoted  ante,  §  A)  ;  1855,  Judd  v.  Gibbs,  3  Gray 
539,  543  (examination  of  an  insolvent  before  commissioners,  admitted  ;  but  his  oath 
taken  not  as  a  part  of  the  examination,  excluded,  apparently  because  it  could  not  lie 
used  as  against  the  present  parties) ;  1857,  Com.  v.  King,  8  id.  503  (examination  as 
witness  at  fire  inquest ;  no  caution  ;  admitted  ;  whether  caution  was  essential,  was  ex- 
pressly not  decided)  ;  1866,  Com.  v.  Lannan,  13  All.  563,  569  (special  plea  in  bar,  held 
bad  by  the  Court  below  ;  not  admitted,  chiefly  because  drawn  by  the  attorney,  and 
thus  inadmissible  by  statute)  ;  J877,  Com.  v.  Reynolds,  122  Mass.  455,  458  (examina- 
tion as  defendant  at  a  former  trial  of  the  same  charge  ;  admitted,  because  "  they  were 
voluntary  .  .  .  and  it  is  immaterial  when  or  where  they  were  made  ")  ;  1896,  Com  v. 
Wesley,  140  id.  248,  252  (testimony  of  the  defendant  at  an  inquest,  sworn,  but  not 
summoned,  and  warned  ;  admitted,  as  "appearing  to  have  been  made  voluntarily,  and 
not  under  threat  or  duress  or  in  consequence  of  any  inducement"):  1897,  Com.  v. 
Huuton,  168  id.  130  (testimony  before  an  investigating  committee  at  the  City  Hall, 
admitted);  Mississippi:  1860,  Josephine  v.  State,  39  Miss.  626,  650  (examination  as 
witness  on  the  trial  of  another  person  for  the  same  charge;  excluded );  1879,  Jackson 
v.  State,  56  id.  312  (examination  as  witness  on  the  trial  of  another  person  jointly  in- 
dicted for  the  same  offence,  after  a  caution  ;  excluded,  because  the  oath  itself  involves 
a  compulsion ) ;  1897,  Ford  v.  State,  id.,  21  So.  524  (a  thirteen-year  old  negro  boy,  sworn 
ns  defendant  on  a  preliminary  examination,  without  caution  ;  excluded  );  Missouri:  1859, 
State  v.  Lamb,  28  Mo.  218,  228  (examination  as  accused  before  magistrate,  after  cau- 
tion ;  admitted)  ;  1893,  State  v.  Young,  119  id.  495,  507,  517  (ignorant  German  boy, 
under  suspicion,  summoned  as  witness  before  coroner,  and  examined  on  oath  without 
warning  ;  excluded)  ;  1894,  State  y.  Wisdom,  ib.  539,  546,  551  (accused  under  arrest,  on 
oath,  before  the  coroner,  but  of  his  own  motion  ;  admitted  ;  the  fact  of  oath  is  immate- 
rial; the  test  is  whether  the  statement  was  voluntary);  1895,  State  v.  David,  131  id. 


958  APPENDIX  III. 

380  (the  witness  attended  the  inquest  voluntarily  and  testified  without  subpoena  ;  ad- 
mitted) ;  1896,  State  v.  Punshon,  133  id.  44  (accused  before  the  coroner  on  oath,  after 
caution,  but  under  a  promise  that  the  statements  would  not  be  used  against  him  ; 
admitted)  ;  Montana  :  1896,  State  v.  O'Brien,  18  Mont.  1  (testimony  before  coroner, 
in  what  capacity  does  not  appear,  but  without  caution  ;  excluded)  ;  New  Hampshire  : 
1814,  Wood  v.  Weld,  Smith  N.  H.  367  (answers  on  oath  by  the  defendant  to  interrog- 
atories put  by  an  administrator  in  a  Court  of  Probate  on  a  complaint  for  concealing 
the  intestate's  goods,  received  in  an  action  between  the  same,  parties  for  money  had  and 
received,  covering  the  same  concealment  of  goods ;  notes  of  Smith,  C.  J.  :  "  What  hard- 
ship is  it  to  be  obliged  to  tell  the  truth  ?  No  means  used  to  produce  anything  but  the 
truth")  ;  1863,  Carr  v.  Griffin,  44  N.  H.  510  (deposition  irregularly  taken  ;  not  inad- 
missible as  involuntary)  ;  New  York :  see  supra,  at  the  beginning  of  the  list ;  North 
Carolina :  1846,  State  v.  Broughton,  7  Ired.  96  (examination  as  witness  before  grand 
jury  ;  held  inadmissible,  if  it  had  involved  a  confession,  as  within  the  spirit  of  the 
statutes  against  imposing  oaths  on  accused  persons,  "because  the  statute  intended  to 
have  the  party  free  to  admit  or  deny  his  guilt,  and  the  oath  deprives  him  of  that  free- 
dom") ;  1847,  State  v.  Cowan,  ib.  239  (examination  as  accused  before  a  magistrate, 
without  oath,  after  a  caution  ;  admitted,  as  "  free  and  voluntary,"  though  the  magis- 
trate warned  him  that  he  would  be  committed  unless  he  accounted  for  his  possession  of 
the  stolen  property)  ;  1873,  State  v.  Patterson,  68  N.  C.  292  (examination  as  accused 
before  magistrate,  without  oath,  but  after  caution,  the  caution  not  being  as  full  as  the 
statute  prescribed  ;  admitted)  ;  1893,  State  v.  Rogers,  112  id.  874,  876  (accused  on 
oath  at  preliminary  examination,  after  warning,  admitted  ;  warning  need  not  be  in 
words  of  statute  ;  shackling  of  the  accused  not  in  itself  fatal)  ;  1893,  State  v.  De  Graff, 
113  id.  688,  693  (accused  on  oath  before  magistrate,  after  warning,  admitted)  ;  1897, 
State  v.  Melton,  120  id.  591  (accused  at  preliminary  examination,  after  asking  to  tes- 
tify and  being  cautioned ;  admitted);  Oregon:  1896,  State  v.  Hatcher,  29  Or.  309  (de- 
fendant before  magistrate,  without  caution  ;  excluded,  because  by  statute,  §  1958,  the 
caution  is  required) ;  1897,  State  v.  Robinson,  id.,  48  Pac.  357  (before  the  grand  jury, 
in  what  capacity  not  stated,  but  voluntary ;  admitted)  ;  Pennsylvania:  1846,  Com.  ». 
Harman,  4  Pa.  St.  269 '(examination  upon  oath  as  accused  before  magistrate,  without 
caution,  and  under  threats  and  promises;  excluded,  as  "a  gross  outrage  upon  the  ac- 
cused ")  ;  1857,  Williams  v.  Com.,  29  Pa.  102,  105  (examination  as  witness  before  coro- 
ner, not  suspected  nor  charged;  admitted,  because  "he  might  have  declined  to  testify," 
and  it  thus  "  was  a  voluntary  statement ") ;  1890,  Com.  v.  Clark,  130  id.  641,  650  (exam- 
ination on  oath  before  magistrate  (but  not  under  the  statute)  after  a  caution,  while  under 
arrest  on  the  charge ;  the  accused  said  "  he  was  making  it  of  his  own  free  will ;  "  admit- 
ted, as  a  voluntary  statement  :  the  fact  of  the  oath  being  improperly  administered  was 
held  immaterial);  Smith  Carolina:  1852,  State  v.  Vaigneur,  5  Rich.  L.  395,  402  (ex- 
amination as  witness  before  coroner,  not  arrested  nor  suspected,  and  not  cautioned, 
but  arrested  after  his  testimony ;  admitted,  because  he  might  have  refused  to  an- 
swer;  quoted  ante,  §  B)  ;  1879,  State  v.  Branham,  13  S.  C.  389  (examination  before 
magistrate  as  accused,  without  caution  ;  admitted)  ;  Tennessee :  1875,  Beggarly  v.  State, 
8  Baxt.  521,  525  (examination  before  magistrate,  after  caution  ;  admitted,  because  he 
was  "not  so  intimidated  as  to  prevent  his  acting  freely")  ;  Texas:  1874,  Alston  v. 
State,  41  Tex.  40  (examination  before  magistrate  on  a  charge  against  another  person, 
not  arrested  and  not  cautioned,  but  knowing  herself  to  be  suspected ;  admitted,  because 
voluntary  upon  the  facts) ;  1894,  Bell  v.  State,  33  Tex.  Cr.  163  (former  testimony  in  a 
civil  case,  admitted);  United  States  Courts:  1878,  U.  S.  v.  Graff,  14  Blatch.  381,  385 
(examination  under  oath  before  a  special  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department,  the  witness 
having  been  notified  that  he  was  suspected  and  having  consented  to  be  examined ;  ad- 
mitted, on  the  grounds  that  (1)  mere  suspicion  or  charge  of  crime  is  not  sufficient  to 
exclude  (repudiating  McMahon's  Case)  ;  (2)  mere  arrest  is  not  sufficient  ;  (3)  mere  ad- 
ministration of  an  oath  is  not  sufficient ;  (4)  all  three  together  are  not  sufficient ;  quoted 
ante,  §§  B,  D,  F);  1896,  Wilson  v.  U.  S.,  162  U.  S.  613  (accused,  without  oath,  but  not 
warned'nor  furnished  with  counsel ;  admitted  ;  the  result  being  partly  based  on  the  dis- 
tinction that  the  statements  were  not  confessions  of  guilt,  but  exculpatory  assertions) ; 
Utah:  1886,  U.  S.  ».  Kirkwood,  5  Utah  124,  127  (examination  as  witness  before  grand 
jury  investigating  the  charge  against  him  ;  his  appearance  was  voluntary,  and  he  was 
cautioned  ;  admitted  ;  "  if  of  his  own  choice,  after  being  warned,  he  takes  an  oath  which 
the  law  provides  that  he  may  take,  and  makes  a  confession,  we  are  unable  to  understand 
why  such  a  confession  is  not  as  voluntary  as  if  made  not  under  oath  ;  it  certainly  is  as 
reliable,  for  the  obligations  of  an  oath  are  usually  an  incentive  to  speak  the  truth  ")  ; 


CONFESSIONS   ON   EXAMINATION   BEFORE   A   MAGISTRATE.       959 

Virginia:  1830,  Moore  v.  Com.,  2  Leigh  702,  704  (examination  as  accused  before  ma- 
gistrate ;  admitted,  because  no  threats  or  promises  were  made);  Washington :  1895,  State 
v.  Hopkins,  13  Wash.  5  (testimony  at  a  civil  trial  as  then  defendant,  admitted) ;  West 
Virginia:  1893,  State  v.  Hobbs,  37  W.  Va.  812,  818  (statements  to  coroner  before 
swearing  witnesses,  admitted) ;  Wisconsin :  1854,  Schoeffler  v.  State,  3  Wis.  823,  839 
(examination  before  coroner  as  witness,  while  under  suspicion,  and  without  caution  ; 
admitted,  because  voluntary  ;  (1)  the  oath  not  excluding,  (2)  the  suspicion  not  exclud- 
ing, (3)  the  absence  of  a  caution  not  excluding,  because  "  ignorance  of  the  law  is  no 
excuse;"  (4)  a  possible  exception  reserved  for  a  witness  so  circumstanced  that  his  posi- 
tion was  "  equivalent  to  an  actual  arrest;"  (5)  examination  on  oath  as  accused  before 
magistrate  conceded  to  be  inadmissible);  1879,  Dickerson  v.  State,  48  id.  288  (examina- 
tion as  witness  before  magistrate  on  a  charge  against  another  person,  but  while  under 
arrest  on  suspicion  of  complicity  ;  admitted,  as  voluntary). 


INDEX  OF  TOPICS. 


VOL.  I.  — 61 


INDEX  OF  TOPICS, 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


A. 

ABDUCTION,  wife  competent  to  prove,  343. 

ACCEPTANCE  AND  INDORSEMENT,  not  explicable  by  parol,  276. 
ACCESS,  when  presumed,  28. 

ACCESSORY,  not  a  competent  witness  for  the  principal,  407. 
ACCIDENT,  evidence  of  other  injuries,  etc.,  at  same  place,  14  v. 
ACCOMPLICE,   may  be  convicted  on  his  own  confession,  if  he  refuse  to 
testify,  219,  379. 

who  is,  382. 

when  admissible  as  witness,  379. 

must  be  corroborated,  380. 
ACCOUNT,  rendered,  as  an  admission,  212. 
ACCOUNT-BOOKS;  see  BOOKS. 

ACCOUNTS,  voluminous,  secondary  evidence  of,  563  h. 
ACCUSED,  character  of,  14  b,  14/. 

as  witness,  333  a,  444  b. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT,  joint  debtor,  184  b,  174. 

of  payment  by  receipt,  212. 

certificate  of,  whether  impeachable  by  parol,  276. 
ACQUITTAL,  record  of,  when  evidence,  583. 
ACT,  public,  judicial  notice  of,  6  b. 

of  State,  how  proved,  479,  487. 

of  Legislature,  480,  491. 

ADJUSTMENT  OF  LOSS,  when  and  how  far  conclusive,  212. 
ADMINISTRATION,  letters  of,  how  proved,  519. 

prima  facie  evidence  of  death,  41,  550. 

foreign,  effect  of,  544. 
ADMINISTRATOR,  competency  of,  as  a  witness,  347,  402. 

admissions  by,  179. 

promise  by,  when  it  must  be  in  writing,  267. 

sales  by,  presumed  regular,  20. 
ADMIRALTY,  courts  of,  and  seals,  judicially  noticed,  5,  479. 

judgments,  when  and  how  far  conclusive,  525,  541. 
ADMISSIONS,  in  general ;  see  table  of  contents  to  Chap.  XVII,  169. 

distinguished  from  confessions,  170,  213  a. 

to  prove  contents  of  writing,  563  it. 

to  relieve  from  calling  attesting  witness,  569  b. 


964  INDEX   OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

ADULTERY,  evidence  of,  14  o. 

provable  by  confession  in  divorce  case,  217. 

competency  of  husband  or  wife,  in  proceedings  based  on,  334. 
ADVERSE  POSSESSION,  presumption  from,  16. 

words  as  characterizing,  108. 
AFFIDAVIT,  when  admissible,  163  a. 

made  by  parties,  348,  349,  558. 

made  by  wife,  344. 

AFFIRMATION,  substituted  for  an  oath,  370  a. 
AGE,  appearance  as  evidence  of,  14  /. 

testimony  to  one's  own  age,  113  c,  430  k. 
AGENT,  presumption  in  favor  of  authority  of,  21. 

admissions  of,  184  c,  23i. 

when  a  competent  witness  for  the  principal,  416  417. 

may  prove  his  own  authority,  if  parol,  416. 

when  his  authority  must  be  in  writing,  269. 
AGREEMENT ;  see  CONTRACT. 
ALIBI,  burden  of  proof  of,  81  b. 

evidence  of,  14  r. 
ALMANAC,  as  evidence,  162 ./. 
ALTERATION,  of  written  contracts  by  oral  agreements,  302. 

of  instruments,  effect  of,  564. 

presumption  as  to  time  of,  565. 

burden  of  proof  as  to,  564. 

expert  testimony  to,  581  a. 

AMBIGUITIES,  parol  evidence  admissible  to  explain,  275-305  m. 
ANCIENT  BOUNDARIES;  see  BOUNDARY. 
ANCIENT  WRITINGS;  see  WRITINGS. 
ANIMAL,  character  of,  14  6,  14  g,  Up. 

evidence  by  scent,  etc.,  14  s. 

pedigree,  114e. 
ANSWER,  to  interrogatory,  admission  by,  552. 

in  chancery,  as  an  admission,  178,  210. 

what  amount  of  evidence  necessary  to  disprove,  260. 

admissible  for  defendant,  351,  551. 

proof  of,  512. 

by  mail,  assumed  genuine,  575  c. 

APPOINTMENT  TO  OFFICE,  how  proved,  38,  83,  563  g. 
APPRENTICESHIP,  contract  of,  must  be  in  writing,  274. 
ARBITRATOR,  as  witness,  254  c. 
ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL,  who  entitled  to  begin,  75. 

not  to  contain  hearsay,  162  p. 

ARMORIAL  BEARINGS,  as  evidence  of  pedigree,  105. 
ARREST,  witness'  exemption  from,  316. 

as  evidence  of  bad  character  of  witness,  461  b. 
ARTICLES  OF  THE  PEACE,  by  wife  against  husband,  343. 
ARTICLES  OF  WAR,  449. 

ASSAULT  AND  BATTERY,  of  wif«,  by  husband,  343. 
ASSESSMENT  BOOKS,  admissibility  and  effect  of,  484. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  965 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

ASSIGNMENT,  of  chases  in  action,  173. 

ASSIGNOR,  admissions  by,  190. 

ASSUMPSIT,  action  of,  when  barred  by  prior  recovery  in  tort,  532. 

ATHEISTS,  as  witnesses,  368. 

ATTACHMENT,  of  witness,  for  contempt,  319. 

ATTENDANCE  OF  WITNESS,  how  procured,  309. 

ATTESTATION  OF  COPIES,  mode  of,  506. 

ATTESTING  WITNESS,  must  be  called,  569. 

declarations  of  deceased,  462. 

character  of,  impeachable,  444  d. 

ATTORNEY,  privilege  for  client's  communications  to,  237-245. 

admissions  of,  186. 

whether  a  competent  witness,  254  c. 
AUCTIONEER,  agent  of  both  buyer  and  seller,  269. 
AUDITOR'S  REPORT,  presumed  correct,  44. 
AUTOPTIC  PROFERENCE,  13  a,  13  j. 
AWARD,  arbitrators  not  bound  to  disclose  grounds  of,  254  c. 

generally  conclusive,  183,  184. 


B. 

BAIL,  as  a  competent  witness  for  principal,  430. 

BAILOR,  as  a  competent  witness,  348. 

BANK  BILL,  holder  not  bound  to  explain  possession,  81. 

other  forgeries,  etc.,  as  evidence,  14  q. 
BANK-BOOKS,  474,  484. 
BANKRUPT,  admission  by  omission  of  debt  from  schedule,  196. 

when  competent  as  a  witness,  392. 

declarations  of,  108,  162  c. 
BANKRUPTCY,  effect  of  discharge  to  restore  competency,  430. 

examination  of  bankrupt  as  confession,  226. 

see  SOLVENCY. 

BAPTISM,  register  of,  483,  493. 
BASTARDY,  constancy  of  accusation,  162  A,  469  c. 

other  acts  of  intercourse,  14  o. 

resemblance,  as  showing  paternity,  14  s. 

cross-examination  of  complainant,  14  o. 

see  LEGITIMACY. 
BELIEF,  as  evidence,  430  i. 

religious,  369,  370,  378  b. 

BEST   EVIDENCE,  defined,  81  ft-84,  97  a-97  d. 
BIBLE,  family  record  in,  as  evidence,  114  d. 
BIGAMY,  proof  of,  140  c,  339. 

RILL  OF  EXCHANGE,  parties  to,  when  incompetent  to  impeach,  383-385. 
BILL  OF  PARCELS,  may  be  explained  by  parol,  305. 
BILL  OF  SALE,  absolute,  may  be  shown  conditional,  284. 
BIRTH,  register  of,  484. 

certificate  of,  497. 


966  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.'] 

BIRTHPLACE,  provable  by  family  repute,  114  / 

BISHOP'S   REGISTER,  474,  483,  484. 

BLANK,  in  an  instrument,  when  and  by  whom  it  may  be  filled,  567,  568,  568  a 

parol  evidence  to  interpret,  3051'. 
BOND,  absolute,  may  be  shown  by  parol  to  be  conditional,  284. 

consideration  for,  presumed,  19, 

office,  how  proved,  573. 
BOOK  CHARGES,  120  c. 
BOOKS,  of  science,  162  i. 

shop,  120  b. 

of  account,  120  a. 

of  deceased  rectors,  155. 

office  books,  corporation  books,  474-476,  493-495. 

possession  of,  or  access  to,  as  an  admission,  199. 

possession  of,  as  showing  knowledge,  14  p. 
BOUNDARY,  surveyor's  marks,  provable  by  parol,  94. 

judicially  noticed,  when,  6. 

provable  by  reputation,  128a-140. 

provable  by  declarations,  140  a. 

BREACH  OF  PROMISE  of  marriage,  character  as  evidence,  14  d,  14  k. 
BURDEN  OF  PROOF,  in  general,  14u;-14&  74-81  d. 

of  testator's  capacity,  77. 

of  insanity,  81  a. 

of  alibi,  81  b. 

alteration,  564. 
BUSINESS,  usual  course  of,  presumption  from,  38,  40. 

C. 

CANCELLATION,  of  deed  or  will,  effect  of,  265,  268,  568. 

CAPACITY,  presumed,  28,  367. 

CARRIER,  as  a  witness,  416. 

CERTIFICATES,  of  Secretary  of  State,  proof  by,  479. 

by  public  officers,  in  what  cases  admissible,  485,  498. 
CERTIORARJ,  to  remove  records,  502. 

CESTUI  QUE  TRUST,  admissions  as  evidence  against  his  trustee,  ISO. 
CHANCERY  ;  see  ANSWER,  BILL,  DEPOSITIONS,  EQUITY. 
CHARACTER,  of  party  or  third  person,  14  6-14  h. 

of  witness,  in  impeachment,  442-444  d,  461  a-461  d. 

of  witness,  in  support,  469  a. 

of  animal,  14  b,  14 \  g,  14/>. 
CHILDREN7,  competency  as  witnesses,  367,  370 d. 

legitimacy  presumed,  28. 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE,  definition  of,  13,  13  a. 

principles  of,  14-14  v. 
CLERGYMEN,  confessions  to,  229. 

confessions  as  privileged,  247. 


INDEX    OF    TOPICS.  967 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

CLERK,  of  attorney,  when  not  compellable  to  testify,  239. 
COERCION,  of  wife  by  husband,  when  presumed,  28. 
COHABITATION,  as  presumptive  evidence  of  legitimacy,  82. 
COLLATERAL,  facts,  when  excluded,  14,  14  a. 

writings,  contents  of,  563  m,  563  o. 

contradiction  of  witnesses,  461  e,  461y. 
COLOR,  as  affecting  competency  of  witness,  378  b. 

as  a  material  averment,  65. 
COMMISSION,  to  take  testimony,  320. 
COMMITMENT,  proved  by  calendar,  493. 
COMMON,  customary  right  of,  provable  by  reputation,  137. 
COMMUNICATIONS,  privileged,  237-254. 
COMPARISON  OF  HANDWRITING,  576-581. 
COMPETENCY;  see  WITNESS. 
COMPLAINT;  see  RAPE. 
COMPROMISE,  offer  of,  as  an  admission,  192. 
CONDEMNATION,  of  prize,  541. 

CONFESSION  OF    GUILT,   difference   between    confessions   and   admis- 
sions, 170. 

admissibility,  in  general,  213-234. 

by  third  persons,  152  d,  233,  234. 

weight  of,  214. 

sufficiency  for  conviction,  216. 

CONFIDENTIAL  COMMUNICATION;  see  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATION. 
CONFIRMATION,  of  testimony  of  accomplices,  when  required,  380-382. 
CONFRONTATION,  necessity  of,  163/. 
CONGRESS,  public  acts  of,  judicially  noticed,  6  b. 

see  JOURNALS,  LAW,  WRITINGS. 
CONSCIOUSNESS,  of  guilt,  Up. 
CONSENT,  when  implied  from  silence,  197-199. 
CONSIDERATION,  failure  of,  burden  of  proof,  81. 

whether  required  in  writing  under  Statute  of  Frauds,  268. 

want  of,  provable  by  parol,  284,  285,  304. 

for  specialty,  presumed,  19. 

CONSOLIDATION  RULE,  party  to,  incompetent  as  a  witness,  395. 
CONSPIRATORS,  declarations  of  other,  184  a. 

as  witnesses  for  each  other,  407. 

flight  of  one,  HO  evidence  against  another,  233. 
CONSTABLE,  confessions  made  under  inducements  by,  222. 
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW,  affecting  rules  of  evidence,  2  a. 
CONSTRUCTION,  of  documents,  for  court  or  jury,  81 /,  81  g. 

defined,  277,  287. 
CONTEMPT,  attachment  of  witness  for,  319. 

in  arresting  a  witness,  or  preventing  his  attendance,  316. 
CONTINUANCE,  presumption  of,  14  t,  41. 

of  insanity,  14  I. 
CONTRACT,  when  presumed,  47. 

proved  by  other  contracts,  14  n. 


968  INDEX   OF  TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

CONTRACT,  —  Continued. 

must  be  proved  as  laid,  66. 

what  is  matter  of  description  in,  66-68. 

parol  evidence  to  contradict  or  vary,  275-305. 
CONTRADICTING  a  witness,  461  e. 
CONVEYANCE  of  legal  estate,  when  presumed,  45. 
CONVEYANCER,  communications  to,  privileged,  241. 
CONVICTION,  record  of,  as  evidence,  372,  461  b. 
COPY,  may  be  used  to  refresh  recollection,  439  b,  439  c. 

see  WRITINGS. 
COPY  OF  A  COPY,  563  r. 
CORONER,  testimony  before,  163  a. 

confession  before,  App.  III. 
CORPORATIONS,  books  of,  how  proved,  493. 

access  to,  as  an  admission,  199. 
CORPORATOR,  when  admissible  as  a  witness,  331-333. 

admissions  by,  175,  199. 

CORPUS  DELICTI,  confession  as  proof  of,  217. 
CORRESPONDENCE,  the  whole  read,  201. 

diplomatic,  admissibility  and  effect  of,  491. 
CORROBORATION,  accomplices,  380. 

answer  in  chancery,  260. 

perjury,  257. 

rape,  260  b. 

seduction,  260  b. 

of  witness  by  prior  similar  statements,  469  b. 

of  witness  by  good  character,  469  a. 
COSTS,  liability  to,  as  rendering  incompetent,  401,  402. 
CO-TRESPASSER,  when  admissible  as  a  witness,  357,  359. 
COUNSEL,  client's  communications  to,  privileged,  237-245. 

stating  facts  in  argument,  162  p. 

reading  treatises  to  jury,  162  k. 
COUNTERFEIT,  whether  provable  by  admission,  563  I. 

other  forgeries  as  evidence,  14  q. 
COUNTERPART,  as  original  evidence,  563  p. 

must  be  accounted  for,  before  secondary  evidence  is  used,  563  b. 
COURT,  questions  for  court  or  jury,  81  e. 

judicial  notice,  6. 

jurisdiction  of,  518,  544,  545,  558. 
not  presumed,  38  a. 

proceedings  in,  how  proved,  510,  518,  550. 

admiralty,  seals  of,  judicially  noticed,  5,  479. 
judgments  of,  525,  541. 

exchequer,  judgments  in,  525,  541. 

foreign,  judgments  in,  540-546. 

probate,  decrees  of,  when  conclusive,  518,  550. 

COVENANT,  effect  of  alteratinn.1  upon,  564-568. 


INDEX   OF  TOPICS.  969 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

COVERTURE;  see  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE. 
CREDIT  OF  WITNESSES  is  for  the  jury,  81  «. 

see  WITNESSES. 

CREDITOR,  when  competent  as  a  witness,  392. 
CRIME,  how  far  one  is  evidence  of  another,  14  q. 

burden  of  proof  of,  74,  81  b. 

amount  of  proof  necessary,  81  c. 

conviction  of,  as  affecting  witness,  372,  461  ft. 

showing  innocence  of  crime  used  to  discredit,  467. 

competency  of  husband  and  wife,  on  trial  of  the  other  for,  334. 
CRIMINAL   CONVERSATION,  letters  of  wife  to  a  husband,  102. 

other  acts  of  intercourse,  14  o. 

wife  competent  to  prove,  254,  337,  344. 
CRIMINAL  LAW,  difference  of  rules  of  evidence  in,  2  a. 
CRIMINATION,  privilege  against  self-crimination,  469  d. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION,  in  general,  446. 

necessity  of,  for  depositions  and  former  testimony,  163  a-163  e. 

order  of  examination,  466  a. 

to  character,  461  a. 

to  contents  of  letters,  463. 
CURRENCY,  when  judicially  noticed,  5. 
CURTESY;  tenant  by,  a  competent  witness  for  the  heir,  389. 
CUSTODY,  of  ancient  writings,  575  b. 
CUSTOM,  proved  circumstantially,  14  n. 

provable  by  reputation,  128.. 

number  of  witnesses,  260  a. 

as  evidence  of  an  act,  14  j. 

of  law  merchant,  judicially  noticed,  5. 

used  to  explain  writing,  292-294. 
CUSTOM-HOUSE  books,  inspection  of,  475. 

contents  of,  how  proved,  563  /. 


D. 

DAMAGES,  proof  of,  right  to  begin,  75. 

character  as  mitigating,  14  d. 

waiver  of,  parol  evidence,  304. 

presumption  as  to  amount,  48. 
DATE,  when  material,  65,  304. 
DAY,  fractions  of,  presumption  as  to,  40. 
DEADLY  WEAPON,  presumption  from  use  of,  18. 
DEAF  AND  DUMB,  competent  witness,  370  c. 

mode  of  communication,  439  e. 
DEATH,  when  presumed,  29,  30,  35,  41. 

letters  of  administration  as  proof  of,  41,  5">0. 
DECEASED  PERSON,  character  of,  14  b,  14  c,  Up. 

witness  to  transaction  with,  333  b. 
DECEASED  WITNESS,  testimony  of,  when  admissible,  163  g,  163  h. 


970  INDEX   OF  TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

DECLARATIONS,  dying,  156. 

of  agents,  bind  principal,  when,  181  c. 

as  to  domicile,  162  c. 

of  partners,  184  b. 

of  husband  and  wife  against  each  other,  345. 

of  war,  adrnissibility  and  effect  of,  491. 

of  intention,  to  interpret,  289,  305  k. 

see  HEARSAY  RULE. 
DECREE;  see  WRITINGS. 
DECREES  IN  CHANCERY,  proof  of,  511. 

admissibility  and  effect,  550,  551. 
DEED,  estoppel  by,  22-24,  211. 

when  presumed,  45,  46. 

how  to  be  set  out  in  pleading,  69. 

cancellation  of,  when  it  divests  the  estate,  265,  568. 

number  of  witnesses  required  to,  274. 

delivery  of,  568  a. 

may  be  shown  by  parol  to  be  mortgage,  284. 

false  description  in,  301. 

proof  of  recorded,  485  a. 

estoppel  by,  24,  211. 

execution  of,  569,  575. 

ancient,  570,  575  b. 

contents,  how  proved,  563  a. 

alterations  in,  564. 

presumption  as  to  date,  38.  • 

DEFAMATION,  character  as  mitigating  damages,  14  d,  14  h. 

other  utterances  as  showing  malice,  14  o. 

intent  in  libel,  as  a  question  of  law  or  fact,  81 /. 
DEFAULT,  judgment  by,  its  effect  on  admissibility  of  the  party  as  a 

witness  for  co-defendants,  333  a,  355,  356,  357. 
DEFENDANT,  in  criminal  cases  ;  see  ACCUSED. 
DEGREES,  in  secondary  evidence,  97  a,  563  <?,  563  r. 
DELIVERY,  of  deed,  568  a. 

entry  in  shop-books,  evidence  of,  120  c. 

DEMONSTRATIO  FALSA,  parol  evidence  to  correct.  301. 
DEMURRER,  answer  and  plea  in  chancery,  effect  of,  5ol 
DEPOSIT,  of  money,  to  restore  competency  of  a  witness,  430. 
DEPOSITIONS,  necessity  of  cross-examination,  163  b,  553. 

when  and  how  taken,  320. 

deceased  or  absent  witness,  163  h. 

mode  of  proof,  516,  552. 

in  perpetuam  memoriam,  163  c,  324,  325,  552. 

may  be  used  to  assist  memory,  439  c. 
DESCRIPTION,  what  is  matter  of,  in  pleading,  56-72. 

false,  in  deeds  and  wills,  301,  305  m. 
DESTRUCTION,  of  evidence,  presumption  from,  37,  195  a. 

of  original,  as  allowing  secondary  evidence,  563  b. 

of  deed,  as  re- vesting  title,  568. 


INDEX   OF   TOPICS.  97  i 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

DEVISE,  must  be  in  writing,  272. 

admissibility  of  parol  evidence  to  explain,  287,  289-291. 
DILIGENCE,  as  a  question  for  jury,  81 /. 

in  search  for  lost  writing,  563  b. 

in  search  for  attesting  witness,  572  a. 

DIPLOMA,  of  physician,  when  necessary  to  be  shown,  195. 
DISCHARGE,  in  bankruptcy,  restores  competency,  430. 

of  written  contract,  by  parol,  302-304. 

on  execution,  receipt,  variable  by  parol,  305. 
DISCRETION,  presumed,  28. 

of  judge,  as  to  witnesses;  see  WITNESS. 
DISFRANCHISEMENT,    of    a    corporator,   to    render  him    a    competent 

witness,  430. 

DISPARAGEMENT   OF   TITLE,  declarations  in,  152  c,  189. 
DIVORCE,  upon  confession  of  adultery,  217. 

competency  of  husband  and  wife  as  witness  in  proceedings  for,  334. 

foreign  sentence  of,  its  effect,  544,  545. 

decree  against,  as  evidence  of  facts  set  up  in  defence,  525. 
DOCUMENTS;  see  WHITINGS. 
DOMICILE,  declarations  as  to,  108,  162  c. 
DOUBT,  reasonable,  in  criminal  cases,  81  c. 
DOWER,  tenant  in,  a  competent  witness  for  heir,  389. 
DRIVER,  of  carriage,  when  incompetent  as  a  witness,  396. 
DRUNKENNESS,  confession  during,  229. 

as  rendering  witness  incompetent,  370  e. 

as  discrediting  witness,  450  b. 

of  party  or  employee,  14  i. 

evidence  to  prove,  14  I. 

DUCES  TECUM,  subpoena;  see  WITNESSES,  WRITINGS. 
DUPLICATE,  must  be  accounted  for,  before  secondary  proof  admitted,  503  f> 

as  an  original,  563  p. 
DURESS,  admissions  made  under,  193. 
DUTY,  performance  of,  presumed,  227. 
DYING   DECLARATIONS,  when  admissible,  156-162. 


E. 

ECCLESIASTICAL  COURTS,  number  of  witnesses  required  in.  2CO  a. 

jurisdiction,  518,  559. 

proceedings  in,  how  proved,  510,  518. 

effect,  550. 

EJECTMENT,  defendant  in,  as  witness,  360. 
EMPLOYEE,  character  of,  14  c,  14  g,  14  /j,  Up. 
ENROLMENT,  of  deeds,  485  a,  573. 
ENTRIES,  in  the  course  of  business,  120  «-120c. 

against  interest,  147-155. 

made  in  course  of  duty;  see  PUBLIC  DOCUMENTS. 

in  books  of  account,  120  a-120  c. 


972  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

ENTRY,  forcible,  tenant  incompetent  witness  in,  403. 
EQUITY,  parol  evidence  to  rebut,  296  a. 

evidence  rules  in,  2  a. 

see  ANSWER,  BILL,  DECREE,  DEPOSITION. 
ERASURE,  564-568  a. 
ESTOPPEL,  principle  and  nature  of,  22,  204-211. 

by  written  instructions,  276. 

ratification  by,  269. 

by  admissions,  27,  204. 
EXAMINATION,  of  prisoner,  how  proved,  520. 

as  a  confession,  224,  App.  III. 
certificate  of,  how  far  conclusive,  227. 

of  witness,  order  of,  466  a. 

in  bankruptcy,  as  admissible  against  the  bankrupt  on  a  criminal  charge, 
226. 

exclusion  of  witness  while  others  are  being  examined,  432. 
EXCHEQUER,  judgments  in,  as  conclusive,  525,  541. 
EXCLAMATIONS,  of  pain,  alarm,  pleasure,  162  a,  162 /. 
EXCLUSION,  of  witnesses  from  court-room,  432. 
EXECUTION,  of  document,  proof  of,  569-575  c,  485  a. 
EXECUTIVE,  acts  of,  how  proved,  479. 
EXECUTOR,  admissions  by,  179. 

foreign,  544. 

sales  by,  presumed  regular,  20. 
EXEMPLIFICATION,  501. 
EXPENSES  of  witnesses,  310. 
EXPERIMENTS,  13  c,  14  v,  162  p. 
EXPERTS,  tender  of  fees,  310. 

qualifications  as  witnesses,  430  a. 

application  of  opinion  rule,  441  b. 

hypothetical  questions,  441  k. 

testimony  to  decipher  writings,  280. 

to  explain  terms  of  art,  280. 

testimony  in  comparison  of  handwriting,  579,  581  a. 
EX  POST  FACTO  LAW,  2  a. 
EXPRESSIONS,  of  bodily  or  mental  feelings,  162  a. 
EXTRADITION,  proof  by  deposition  in,  552. 

F. 

FABRICATION,  of  evidence,  inference  and  presumption  from,  14 p,  37,  195  a. 

FACT,  presumption  of,  14  y,  44. 

FACTOR ;  see  AGENT. 

FAILURE  to  produce  evidence,  as  an  admission,  19.5  b. 

to  testify  as  accused,  not.  to  be  commented  on,  469  d. 
FALSE   PRETENCE,  proof  of  fraudulent  intent,  14  7. 
FAMILY  history,  declarations  about,  114  &-114  g. 


INDEX   OF   TOPICS.  973 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

FEDERAL  COURTS,  rules  of  evidence  in,  2  a 

FEES  of  witnesses,  310. 

FELONY,  conviction  of,  as  affecting  witness,  372,  461  b. 

FIXTURES,  what  are,  271. 

FLAGS  of  other  nations  judicially  noticed,  4. 

FLIGHT  as  evidence  of  guilt,  14  p. 

FORCIBLE   ENTRY,  tenant  incompetent  as  a  witness,  403. 

FORCIBLE   MARRIAGE,  wife  competent  to  prove,  343. 

FOREIGN   COURTS,  judgments  in,  effect  of,  540-546.' 

proof  of,  514. 
FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS  of  infamy,  as  affecting  competency,  376. 

proof  of,  514. 

effect  of,  543-549. 
FOREIGN   LAWS,  not  judicially  noticed,  6  6. 

presumption  as  to,  43. 

proof  of,  486. 

FOREIGN   STATES;  see  JUDICIAL  NOTICE  ;  PRESUMPTIONS;  WRITINGS. 
FORFEITURE,  privilege  from  answering  as  to  matters  involving,  401*  h. 
FORGERY,  conviction  of,  as  affecting  witness,  373,  461  b. 

party  whose  name  is  forged,  when  competent,  414. 

evidence  of  other  forgeries,  14  q. 
FORMER   RECOVERY,  whether  conclusive  as  evidence,  531. 

in  tort,  effect  of,  533. 

FORMER   TRIAL,  testimony   at,  necessity  of  cross-examination   on  same 
issues,  etc.,  163  a. 

absence,  decease,  etc.,  of  witness,  163  g. 

mode  of  proving,  165,  166. 
FRAUD,  presumption  as  to,  34,  35,  43  a,  80. 

parol  proof  of,  284,  296  a. 

evidence  of  other,  14  q. 
FRAUDS,  Statute  of,  262-274. 


G. 

GAME   LAWS,  want  of  qualifications  under,  must  be  proved  by  affirmant,  76 

GAZETTE,   GOVERNMENT,  492. 

GENERAL  INTEREST,  matters  of,  proved  by  reputation,  128. 

GOODS,  what  are,  under  Statute  of  Frauds,  271. 

GOVERNMENT,  existence  of,  how  proved,  4. 

acts  of,  how  proved,  478,  491,  492. 
GOVERNOR,  when  not  bound  to  testify,  251. 

communications  privileged,  251. 

GRAND   BILL    OF    SALE,  requisites  on  sale  of  ship,  261. 
GRAND  JURY,  transactions  before,  how  far  privileged,  252. 
GRANT,  when  presumed,  17,  45,  46. 


974  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

GRANTOR,  admissions  of,  189. 
GRAVESTONES,  inscriptions  on,  114  d,  563  i. 
GROANS,  as  evidence  of  feelings,  162  b. 
GUARDIAN,  admission  by,  binds  himself  only,  179. 
GUILTY   POSSESSION,  evidence  of,  34,  35. 

H. 

HABEAS    CORPUS,  ad  testificandum,  312. 

HABIT,  as  evidence  of  an  act,  14  j. 

mode  of  proving,  14  n. 

HANDWRITING,  proof  of  genuineness  by  comparison,  577. 
attorney  competent  to  prove  client's  writings,  242. 
of  attesting  witness,  575. 
HEALTH,  proof  of,  430  c,  430  /,  441  /. 
HEARSAY   RULE,  general  principle,  98,  99  a. 
not  applicable  to  words  used  indirectly,  101. 
nor  to  verbal  acts,  108. 
nor  to  words  a  part  of  res  gestce,  110  a. 
exceptions  : 

pedigree  cases  ;  family  history,  114  6-114  g. 
regular  entries,  120  a-120  c. 

reputation  on  property-rights  and  boundaries,  128-140  a. 
reputation  on  other  matters,  140  /;,  140  c. 
declarations  against  interest,  147-155. 
dying  declarations,  156-162. 

declarations  of  mental  or  physical  condition,  162  a-162  d. 
declarations  by  a  testator,  162  e. 
spontaneous  declarations  (res  gestce),  162/. 
complaint  of  rape,  162  h. 
accusation  of  bastardy,  162  h. 
learned  treatises  and  statistical  tables,  162  t-162  k. 
market  reports,  162  I. 
reports  of  decisions,  162  I. 
official  statements,  162  m. 
application  to  jury's  view,  162  o. 

counsel's  argument,  162  p. 
interpreter,  162  p. 

rule  satisfied  by  oath,  cross-examination,  and  confrontation,  16i>  a. 
depositions,  163  ft,  163  h. 
testimony  at  former  trial,  163  a,  163  g. 
in  search  for  lost  document,  563  b. 
HEIR,  as  competent  witness,  390,  392. 
IIKKALD'S  BOOKS,  when  admissible,  105. 

HIGHWAY,  judgment  for  non-repair  of,  when  admissible  in  favor  of  other 

defendants,  534. 

HISTORY,  matters  of,  judicially  noticed,  5. 
books  of,  when  admissible,  139,  162  t,  497. 


INDEX   OF   TOPICS.  975 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

HOMICIDE,  when  malice  presumed  from,  34. 

see  table  of  contents  to  Chap.  V,  14. 

HONORARY   OBLIGATION,  does  not  incapacitate  witness,  388. 
HOUSE;  see  LEGISLATURE. 
HUSBAND  AND   WIFE,  admissions  of,  against  each  other,  185,  345,  346. 

competent  for  or  against  the  other,  333  c-346. 

incompetent  as  to  non-access,  28. 

coercion  of  wife  by  husband,  when  presumed,  28. 

communications  privileged,  254. 
HYPOTHETICAL   QUESTIONS,  441  k. 

I. 

IDENTITY,  of  name,  as  evidence  of  identity  of  person,  43  a,  512,  575,  575  «. 

proof  of,  when  requisite,  381,  493,  575. 

by  attorney,  245. 
IDIOT,  as  a  witness,  370  c. 
ILLEGAL  means,  evidence  procured  by,  254  a. 
ILLEGALITY   OF   CONTRACT,  provable  by  parol,  284,  304. 
ILLEGITIMACY;  see  LEGITIMACY. 

ILL-FAME,  house  of,  character  of  house  and  inmates,  14  d. 
IMPEACHMENT  of  witness,  442-465  a. 

of  security  by  maker  or  indorser,  383-385. 
IMPRESSION  of  witness,  when  admissible,  430  i. 
IMPRISONMENT,  prima  facie  tortious,  80. 
INACCURACIES,  distinguished  from  ambiguities,  299. 
INCIDENTS,  parol  evidence  to  annul,  294. 
INCOMPETENCY;  see  WITNESSES. 

INCORPOREAL   RIGHTS,  how  effected  by  destruction  of  deeds,  265,  568- 
INDECENT  evidence,  13  g,  254  6. 
INDEMNITY,  when  it  restores  competency,  420. 
INDICTMENT,  inspection  and  copy  of,  right  to,  471. 

matter  of  description  in,  65. 

as  evidence  of  character  of  witness,  461  b. 

of  bias  of  witness,  450. 
INDIRECT   EVIDENCE,  14. 

INDORSEE,  how  affected  by  admissions  of  iudorser,  190. 
INDORSEMENT, 

of  part  payment  on  a  bond  or  note,  152  a. 

not  explicable  by  parol,  276,  305  c. 
INDORSER  not  competent  to  impeach  indorsed  instrument,  385. 

when  a  competent  witness,  190. 
INDUCEMENT,  in  pleading,  when  it  must  be  proved,  63. 

to  confession,  220. 

INFAMOUS  PERSONS,  who  are,  375. 
INFAMY,  as  rendering  a  witness  incompetent,  372. 

privilege  against  questions  involving,  469  i. 
INFANCY,  as  disqualifying  a  witness,  367,  370  d. 


976  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

INFERIOR   COURTS,  inspection  of  their  records,  473. 

proof  of  their  records,  513. 
INFIDEL,  as  witness,  368. 
INFORMER,  as  witness,  412-415. 

privilege,  250. 
INHABITANT,  admissions  by,  175. 

as  witness,  331. 

INNOCENCE,  presumed,  34,  35,  36. 
INQUEST,  testimony  at  coroner's,  163  a. 

admissibility  of  findings,  556. 

INQUISITIONS,  admissibility  and  effect  of,  515,  556. 
INSANITY,  burden  of  proof  of,  in  general,  81  a. 

in  probate  of  wills,  77. 

non-experts  may  testify  to,  430  p,  441 /. 

presumed  to  continue,  42. 

conduct  as  evidence  of,  14  I. 

prior  and  subsequent,  as  evidence,  14 1. 

proved  by  reputation,  140  b. 

disqualifying  a  witness,  370  c. 

discrediting  a  witness,  450  b. 

ground  for  using  deposition  or  former  testimony,  163  g,  163  h. 
for  not  calling  attesting  witness,  572. 

provable  by  inquest,  556. 
INSCRIPTIONS,  as  hearsay,  114  d. 

provable  by  secondary  evidence,  563  i. 
INSOLVENCY;  see  BANKRUPTCY,  SOLVENCY. 
INSOLVENT ;  see  BANKRUPT. 
INSPECTION,  of  public  records  and  documents  471-478. 

of  private  writings,  559-562. 

of  corporation  books,  474. 

of  plaintiff's  or  defendant's  person,  13  e-13  g. 

of  handwriting  by  jury,  577. 

INSTRUCTIONS,  to  counsel,  privileged,  240,  241. 
INSTRUMENTS;  see  WRITINGS. 
INSURANCE,  opinion  as  to  increase  of  risk,  441  e. 

of  party,  as  affecting  bias,  450. 

of  party  against  liability,  as  an  admission,  195  </. 
INTENT,  question  for  judge  or  jury,  81 /. 

when  presumed,  18. 

as  evidence,  14  k. 

proved  circumstantially,  14  m,  14  q. 

declarations  of  plan,  162  c. 

declarations  in  domicile  cases,  108. 

declarations  of  testator's,  162  e. 

parol  evidence  to  explain,  275-305  m. 

provable  by  opinion,  441  A. 
INTEREST,  declarations  against,  147-155. 

as  disqualifying  a  witness,  328  b. 

as  rendering  deposition  admissible,  163  g. 

as  dispensing  with  production  of  attesting  witness,  572. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  977 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

INTERLINEATIONS,  564-568  a. 
INTERNATIONAL   COMITY,  43. 
INTERPRETATION,  rules  in  general,  275-305, 

for  court  or  jury,  81  f. 
INTERPRETER,  162  p,  439  e. 

communications,  when  privileged,  239. 

admissions  by,  162  p,  183. 

INTESTATE,  declarations  admissible  against  his  administrator,  189. 
INTOXICATION,  confession  during,  229. 

of  party,  or  third  person,  14  i,  14  L 

of  witness,  370  e,  450  b. 

J. 

JOINT  OBLIGOR,  admission  by,  174. 

competency  of,  395. 
JOURNALS,  of  Legislature,  how  proved,  482. 

admissibility  and  effect  of,  491. 
JUDGE,  questions  for,  81  e. 

as  a  witness,  254  c./ 

notes,  when  admissible,  166. 

may  ask  questions,  434. 
JUDGMENT,  effect  of,  531-549. 

foreign,  540. 

ecclesiastical  courts,  550. 

how  proved,  501,  514. 
JUDICIAL  NOTICE,  3  a-6  e,  479. 

JUDICIAL  PROCEEDINGS,  presumption  in  favor  of,  19,  227. 
JURISDICTION,  of  foreign  courts  must  be  shown,  540. 

of  inferior  courts,  not  presumed,  38. 

document  out  of,  563  e. 

deposing  or  former  witness  out  of,  163  g. 

attesting  witness  out  of,  572. 
JURORS,  questions  of  fact  for,  81  e. 

knowledge  may  be  used,  6  c,  162  o. 

view  by,  13  t,  13  j,  162  o. 

testimony  at  view,  162  o. 

grand,  proceedings  not  to  be  disclosed,  252. 

traverse  jurors,  proceedings  privileged,  252  a. 
as  witnesses,  254  c. 

K. 
KNOWLEDGE,  evidence  of,  Up,  14  q. 

L. 

LANDLORD,  title  of,  tenant  cannot  deny,  25. 
LANDS,  meaning  of,  in  Statute  of  Frauds,  270. 
LAPSE   OF   TIME,  not  conclusive  bar  to  title,  45. 
LARCENY,  presumption  of,  from  possession,  11,  34. 
VOL.  I.  — 62 


978  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.'] 

LAW  and  fact,  questions  of,  81  e,  81  g. 

presumptions  of,  14  y. 

merchant,  its  customs  judicially  noticed,  5. 

judicially  noticed,  when,  6  b. 

witness  to  foreign  law,  430  b,  430  m,  488. 

opinion  on  matters  of  law,  441  c. 

proof  of  foreign  law  by  copy,  488. 

proof  of  law  of  domestic  State,  489. 
LAWFULNESS,  of  acts,  when  presumed,  34. 
LEADING   QUESTIONS,  when  permitted,  434. 
LEASE,  when  it  must  be  by  writing,  263,  264. 

expounded  by  local  custom,  when,  294. 

as  evidence  of  reputation,  139. 
LEDGER;  see  ENTRIES. 

LEGAL  ESTATE,  conveyance  of,  when  presumed,  46. 
LEGATEE,  when  competent  as  a  witness,  333  b,  392. 
LEGISLATURE,  public  acts,  judicially  noticed,  6  b. 

journals,  how  proved,  482. 

admissibility  and  effect,  491. 

transactions,  how  proved,  480-482. 

proceedings,  how  far  privileged  from  disclosure,  251. 
LEGITIMACY,  when  presumed,  28,  291. 

presumption  of,  how  rebutted,  81. 

declaration  in  disparagement  of,  254  b. 

evidence  of,  14  s. 

see  BASTARDY. 

LESSEE,  identity  of,  with  lessor,  as  party  to  suit,  535. 
LESSOR,  of  plaintiff  in  ejectment,  regarded  as  the  real  party,  535. 
LETTERS,  duly  mailed  and  addressed,  presumption  of  delivery,  40-. 

parol  evidence  of  contents ;  see  WRITINGS. 

may  be  explained  by  replies,  or  by  parol,  201. 

admission  of  truth  of  statements  in,  by  silence,  198,  199 . 

how  used  in  cross-examination,  465. 

proof  of,  by  letter-book,  563  p. 

to  one  alleged  to  be  insane,  101. 

by  one  conspirator,  evidence  against  others,  111. 

of  wife  to  husband,  162  d. 

whole  correspondence,  when  it  may  be  read,  201. 

prior  letters,  by  whom  they  must  be  produced,  201. 

answers  by  mail,  as  genuine,  575  c. 
LETTERS   OF   ADMINISTRATION,  how  proved,  519. 

as  proof  of  death,  41,  550. 
LETTERS   ROGATORY,  320. 

LIABILITY   OVER,  its  effect  on  competency  of  witness,  393-397. 
LIBEL,  published  by  agent  or  servant,  liability  of  principal  for,  36,  234. 

see  DEFAMATION. 

LICENSE,  must  be  shown  by  the  party  claiming  its  protection,  79,  81. 
LIFE    AND    DEATH,  presumptions  of,  35,  41. 

LIMITATIONS,  joint  debtor,  acknowledgment  as  affecting  statute,  152  a, 
174,  1846. 

entry  of  part  payment  by  creditor,  as  affecting  statute,  152  a. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  979 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

LIS   MOT  A,  as  excluding  hearsay,  114  e,  131. 

LLOYD'S    LIST,  admissible  against  underwriter,  198. 

LOCAL   CUSTOM,  to  explain  leases,  294. 

LOG-BOOK,  as  evidence,  495. 

LOSS,  adjustment  of,  when  conclusive,  212. 

LOST   RECORDS    AND   WRITINGS;  see  WRITINGS. 

LUNACY;  see  INSANITY. 

M. 

MAGISTRATE,  report  of  confession  or  testimony  ;  see  EXAMINATION. 
MAIL,  presumption  of  delivery  of  letter  mailed,  40. 

genuineness  of  answer  by  mail,  575  c. 
MALICE,  when  presumed,  18,  34. 

evidence  of,  14  o,  14  q. 
MALICIOUS    PROSECUTION,  character  of  plaintiff,  14  d,  Uh,  Up. 

testimony  of  defendant  given  before  grand  jury,  admissible  in,  352. 

judgment  of  acquittal,  when  admissible  in,  538. 

copy  of  judgment  of  acquittal,  whether  plaintiff  entitled  to,  471. 
MALICIOUS    SHOOTING,  wife  competent  to  prove,  343. 
MAPS   AND    SURVEYS,  when  evidence,  139,  439(7. 
MARK,  signing  by,  272,  572,  575. 
MARRIAGE,  provable  by  reputation,  140  c. 

by  town  clerk's  record,  115. 

forcible,  wife  admissible  to  prove,  343. 

second,  in  case  of  polygamy,  by  whom  proved,  339. 

time  of,  included  in  pedigree,  114/. 

when  presumed  from  cohabitation,  27,  207. 

foreign  sentences  as  to,  effect  of,  544,  545. 

register  of,  484,  493. 

certificate  of,  497. 

MARRIED    WOMAN;  see  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE,  MARRIAGE,  WIFB. 
MASTER,  when  liable  for  crime  of  servant,  234. 

when  servant  witness  for,  396,  416. 
MEANING,  provable  by  opinion,  441  h. 

interpretation  of,  305  f. 
MEDICAL    WITNESS,  privilege,  248. 

opinions,  441  j. 

knowledge  and  experience,  430  c,  430 1. 
MEMORANDUM,  to  refresh  memory  of  witness,  439  a. 
MEMORY,  refreshed  by  writing,  439  a. 
MIND,  state  of,  presumed  to  continue,  42,  370. 

declarations  expressing,  162  a. 

see  INSANITY. 
MINUTES,  of  recording  officer,  unextended,  provable  by  parol,  86. 

of  proceedings  at  corporation  meeting,  115. 
MISJOINDER   OF    PARTIES,  effect  on  competency,  358. 


980  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

MISTAKE,  mutual  parol  evidence  to  correct,  296,  305  d. 

admissions  by,  206. 

of  law  apparent  in  a  foreign  judgment,  effect  of,  547. 
MODELS,  as  evidence,  439  g. 

MONEY,  lack  or  possession  of,  as  evidence,  14  i,  14  o. 
MONOMANIAC,  as  witness,  370  c. 
MONUMENTS,  inscriptions  on,  563  i. 

MORAL    CERTAINTY,  meaning  of,  in  criminal  cases,  81  c. 
MOTIVE,  evidence  of,  14  o,  162  d. 
MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION,  acts  of  incorporation  of,  judicially  noticed,  5. 

books,  493. 
MURDER,  when  malice  presumed,  18. 

evidence  of  other  crimes,  14  q. 

N. 

NAME,  identity  of,  as  evidence  of  identity  of  person,  43  a,  575  a. 
NAVY    OFFICE,  books  of,  493. 
NEGATIVE,  by  whom  to  be  proved,  74. 
NEGLIGENCE,  proof  of,  burden,  81. 

question  for  jury  or  judge,  81  f. 

character  for,  14  b,  14  c,  14  dt  14  g,  14  h,  14  p. 

conduct  of  other  persons,  14  v. 

NEGOTIABLE   INSTRUMENT,  unimpeachable  by  party  to,  383-385. 
NEUTRALITY    OF    SHIP,  when  presumed,  31. 

NEW    PROMISE,  by  one  partner,  binding  upon  the  other,  184  b,  207,  527  a. 
NOLLE   PROSE  QUI,  effect  of,  to  restore  competency,  333  a,  356,  363. 
NON-ACCESS,  husband  and  wife,  when  incompetent  to  prove,  28,  2546. 
NON-PAYMENT,  twenty  years,  presumption  from,  39. 
NOTARIES,  seals  of,  judicially  noticed,  5. 

NOTES,  brokers',  bought  and  sold,  whether  original  evidence,  563 1. 
NOTICE,  judicial,  3  a. 

circumstantial  evidence  of,  14  p. 

to  produce  writings,  563  c. 

to  quit,  service  of,  how  proved,  563  d,  563 p. 

to  take  deposition,  163  6,  320. 
NOTORIETY,  evidence  of  notice,  14/>. 
NULLUM    TEMP  US    OCCURRIT   REG1,   when  overthrown  by  pro- 

sumption,  45. 

NUL    TIEL   RECORD,  plea  of,  how  tried,  502. 
NUMBER  OF   WITNESSES,  255-260  a. 

0. 

OATH,  364  a. 

OBLIGEE,  release  by  one  of  several  binds  all,  427. 
OBLIGOR,  competency  of,  395. 

release  to  one  of  several  discharges  all,  427. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  981 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

OFFER  OF  COMPROMISE,  192. 

OFFICE,  appointment,  83,  563  g. 

OFFICE   BOND,  how  proved,  573. 

OFFICE-BOOKS,  474-476,  493-495. 

OFFICE-COPY ;  see  WRITINGS. 

OFFICER,  proof  of  appointment,  83,  563  g, 

OFFICIAL  APPOINTMENTS,  when  provable  by  parol,  83,  563  g. 

OFFICIAL   CERTIFICATES,  when  admissible,  498. 

OFFICIAL  COMMUNICATIONS,  when  privileged,  252. 

OFFICIAL   REGISTERS,  484,  485,  496. 

ONUS  PROBANDI ;  see  BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 

OPEN  AND  CLOSE,  right  to,  75. 

OPINION,  when  admissible,  430  g,  430  i,  441  b. 

ORAL   EVIDENCE,  to  prove  contents  of  writing,  82,  563  a. 

to  contradict  or  vary  a  writing,  275-305. 
ORDINANCES,  judicially  noticed,  5. 
ORIGINAL ;  see  REAL  EVIDENCE,  WRITINGS. 
OUTLAWRY,  judgment  of,  works  infamy,  375. 
OVERT   ACT,  proof  of,  in  treason,  235. 
OWNER,  of  property  stolen,  a  competent  witness,  412. 
OWNERSHIP,  proved  by  possession,  34. 


P. 

PAIN,  assertions  or  exclamations  of,  162  b. 
PAPERS;  see  WRITINGS. 
PARCELS,  bill  of,  explained  by  parol,  305. 
PARDON,  its  effect  to  restore  competency,  377. 
PARISH,  boundaries,  proof  of,  128. 

judgment  against,  when  evidence  for  another  parish,  534. 

books.  493. 

PARISHIONER,  rated,  admissions  by,  179. 
PARLIAMENT;   see  LEGISLATURE. 

PAROL  EVIDENCE,  rule  in  general  ;  see  table  of  contents  to  Chap.  XXI, 
275. 

to  show  contents  of  document,  563  a. 

to  contradict  magistrate's  report,  97  d,  227,  305  g. 
PARTIES,  competency  as  witnesses,  328  c. 

against  deceased  opponent,  333  b. 
in  criminal  cases,  333  a. 

impeachable  like  ordinary  witnesses,  444  a. 

refusal  of,  to  testify,  presumption  from,  195  b. 

privilege  as  to  corporal  inspection,  469  e,  469  m. 

when  witnesses,  entitled  to  witness  fees,  310. 

books  of  account,  120  b. 

need  not  withdraw  from  court,  432  a. 
PARTITION,  when  presumed.  46. 


982  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

PARTNERS,  admissions  by,  184  6. 

see  LIMITATIONS. 
PARTNERSHIP,  once  proved  presumed  to  continue,  42. 

how  proved,  184  b. 

PART  PAYMENT,  effect  of  indorsement  of,  on  statute  of  limitations,  152  a. 
PAYEE,  admissibility  of,  to  impeach  the  security,  383-385. 
PAYMENT,  provable  by  parol,  302-305,  563  o. 

of  money,  effect  of,  to  restore  competency,  408-430. 

presumption  of,  39. 

into  court,  when  conclusive,  205. 
PEACE,  articles  of,  husband  and  wife,  343. 

PEDIGREE,  declarations  excepted  from  hearsay  rule,  114  6-114  g. 
PENALTY,  privilege  from  answering  as  to  matters  involving,  469  d,  469  g, 

469  A. 

PERAMBULATIONS,  declarations  during,  140  a. 
PERFORMANCE,  time  of,  parol  evidence  to  show,  304. 
PERJURY,  corroborative  proof,  257. 
PERSONALTY,  presumptions  as  to,  47. 

what  is,  though  annexed  to  land,  271. 
PHOTOGRAPHS,  as  evidence,  439  h. 
PHYSICIANS,  confidential  communications,  248. 

PLAINTIFF,  when  admissible  as  a  witness,  328  c,  333  b,  348,  349,  361,  563  6. 
PLAN,  in  evidence,  139,  439  g,  498. 

see  INTENT. 

PLEA,  answer  and  demurrer  in  chancery,  admissibility  and  effect  of,  551. 
PLEADINGS,  rules  of  proof  for,  52-68. 

as  admissions,  171,  186. 
POSSESSION,  character  of,  when  provable  by  declarations  of  possessor,  189. 

as  evidence  of  ownership,  34. 

of  stolen  goods,  34. 

of  document  by  opponent,  563  c. 

of  document,  as  snowing  knowledge,  14/>. 

whether  necessary  to  be  proved,  under  an  ancient  deed,  21,  570,  575  b. 

adverse,  presumption  from,  16. 

of  unanswered  letters,  presumption  from,  198. 

of  money,  as  evidence,  14  o. 
POST-MARKS,  40. 
POST-OFFICE,  books,  484. 

presumption  of  delivery  of  mailed  letter,  40. 

genuineness  of  answer  by  mail,  575  c. 
PREPONDERANCE   OF  EVIDENCE,  81  d. 
PRESCRIPTION,  presumption  of  title  from,  17. 

variance  in  the  proof  of,  56,  58,  71,  72. 
PRESIDENT  OF   THE  UNITED  STATES;  see  EXECUTIVE,  PRIVILEGE, 

PRIVILKOKD  COMMUNICATIONS. 

PRESUMPTIONS,  theory,  and  various  kinds;  see  table  of  contents  to  Chap. 
VI,  14  if. 

constitutionality  of  statutes  as  to,  2  a. 
PRICES;  see  VALUE. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  983 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

PRIEST,  privileged  communications,  247. 

confessions  induced  by  exhortations  of,  2206. 
PRIMARY  and  secondary  evidence,  81  A,  97  a,  563  a. 
PRINCIPAL   DEBTOR,  when  his  admissions  bind  the  surety,  187. 
PRINCIPAL   FELON,  accessory,  not  a  competent  witness  for,  407. 
PRINTED  papers,  as  originals,  90,  563  p. 

volume  of  laws,  488,  489. 
PRISON   BOOKS,  when  admissible,  484,  493. 

PRISONER   OF   WAR,  mode  of  procuring  attendance  of,  as  a  witness,  312 
PRISONERS,  examination  of,  227,  520,  App.  III. 
PRIVATE  ACTS,  what  are,  6  b. 

PRIVATE   RIGHTS,  not  provable  by  reputation,  137,  138  a,  140  a. 
PRIVIES,  parties  and  strangers,  in  judgments,  523,  536. 

in  admissions,  23,  189,  190,  211. 
PRIVILEGE,  of  witness,  from  arrest,  316. 

from  answering  in  self-crimination,  469  d. 

from  answering  on  matters  of  infamy,  469  i. 

from  corporal  inspection,  469  c,  469  m. 

from  producing  title-deeds,  469  n. 

of  officials,  251. 
PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS,  to  attorney,  237-245. 

to  clergymen,  247. 

to  medical  men,  247  a. 

to  arbitrators,  254  c. 

to  judges,  254  c. 

to  government  officials,  250,  251. 

to  grand  jurors,  252. 

to  traverse  jurors,  252  a. 

between  husband  and  wife,  254. 

to  friends,  248. 

to  telegraph  office,  248. 

to  post-office,  248. 

PRIZE,  foreign  sentence  of  condemnation,  541. 
PROBABLE   CAUSE,  for  court,  or  jury,  81  / 
PROBATE   COURTS,  decrees  of,  as  conclusive,  518,  550. 
PROBATE  OF  WILLS,  effect  of,  550. 
PROCHEIN  AMY,  admissions  by,  179. 

inadmissible  as  a  witness,  347,  391. 
PROCLAMATIONS,  proof  of,  6  a,  479,  491. 
PRODUCTION   OF   WRITINGS;  see  WRITINGS. 
PROFESSIONAL   COMMUNICATIONS,  when  privileged,  237-248. 
PROMISE,  new,  by  partner  binding  copartner,  184  b,  189,  207,  527  a. 

as  inducing  confession,  220. 

PROMISSORY   NOTE,  parties  to,  when  competent  to  impeach  it,  190,  383- 
385. 

alterations  in,  564,  566,  568. 

stolen,  holder  must  show  that  he  took  it  in  good  faith,  81. 


984  INDEX   OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

PROOF,  burden  of  ;  see  BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 

PROPERTY,  when  presumed  from  possession,  34. 

PROSECUTION,  malicious,  judgment  of  acquittal,  in  actions  for,  471,  563  b. 

PROSECUTOR,  when  competent  as  a  witness,  362. 

PROVINCIALISMS,  may  be  explained  by  experts,  280. 

PUBLIC   ACT,  what  is  6,  b. 

PUBLIC   INTEREST,  matters  proved  by  reputation,  128. 

PUBLIC   BOOKS;  see  WRITINGS. 

PUBLIC   MEETINGS,  doings  of,  provable  by  parol,  90. 

PUBLIC  POLICY,  evidence  excluded  from,  236-254,  469  £-469  n. 

PUBLIC   RECORDS  AND  DOCUMENTS;  see  WRITINGS. 

PUBLIC  RIGHTS,  provable  by  reputation,  128. 

PUBLICATION,  of  libel  by  agent,  when  principal  liable  for,  36,  234. 

PUNISHMENT,  endurance  of,  whether  it  restores  competency,  378. 


QUAKERS,  judicial  affirmation  by,  371. 

QUALIFICATION,  by  decree,  when  proof  of,  dispensed  with,  195. 

by  license,  must  be  shown  by  party  licensed,  78,  79. 
QUESTIONS,  leading,  when  allowed,  434. 

of  fact,  for  jury,  81 /. 
QUO    WARRANTO,  judgment  of  ouster  in,  conclusive,  536. 


E. 

RAPE,  character  of  prosecutrix,  14  b,  14  g,  14  o. 

corroboration  of  prosecutrix,  260  b. 

complaint  of,  162  h,  469  c. 

wife  competent  to  prove,  343. 
RATABLE   INHABITANTS,  as  witnesses,  331. 
RATED  INHABITANTS,  admissions  by,  175,  331. 
RATIFICATION,  by  estoppel,  269. 
REAL  EVIDENCE,  13  a-13y. 
REALTY,  what  is,  271. 

REASONABLE   DOUBT,  proof  beyond,  81  c,  81  d. 
REASONABLE    TIME,  question  for  jury,  81  e. 
REBUTTAL,  evidence  in,  466  a. 
RECEIPT,  effect  of,  as  an  admission,  212. 

contradicted  by  parol,  305,  305 /. 

of  part  payment,  by  indorsement  on  the  security,  152  a. 
RECITAL,  contradicted  by  parol,  285. 

in  statutes,  effect  of,  491. 

in  deeds,  when  conclusive,  23,  211. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  985 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

RECOGNITION,  family,  in  pedigree,  114  d. 

of  new  and  independent  States,  4. 
RECOGNIZANCE,  of  witness,  313. 
RECOLLECTION,  refreshed,  439  a. 
RECORD ;  see  WRITINGS. 

presumption  of  correctness,  19. 

varying  by  parol  evidence,  305  g. 

proving  by  opponent's  admissions,  86,  563  k. 
RECORDED   DEED,  485  a,  573. 

RECOVERY,  prior,  in  tort,  bars  assumpsit,  when,  532. 
RE-CROSS-EXAMINATION,  466  a. 
RE-EXAMINATION,  of  witnesses,  466  a. 
REFEREE,  statements  of,  as  admissions,  182. 
REFRESHING   MEMORY,  of  witness,  439  a. 
REGISTER,  official  nature  and  proof  of,  483-485,  493,  496,  497. 
REGISTRY,  of  vessels,  494. 
REGULAR    ENTRIES;  see  ENTRIES. 
RELATIONSHIP,  family  repute  of,  114  6-114  g, 
RELEASE,  competency  of  witness  restored  by,  426,  430. 
RELEVANCY,  general  principles,  13  a,  14,  14  a. 

rules  of,  14-14  v. 
RELIGIOUS  BELIEF,  as  affecting  witness,  369,  378  b. 

how  proved,  370. 

RENT,  presumption  from  payment  of,  38. 
REPAIRS,  as  an  admission,  195  d. 
REPLEVIN,  surety  in,  how  rendered  competent,  392. 
REPLIES,  of  persons  referred  to,  as  admissions,  182. 

by  mail,  as  genuine,  575  c. 

as  part  of  a  correspondence,  201. 
REPORT,  official,  497. 
REPUTATION,  to  prove  marriage,  140  c. 

to  prove  boundaries  and  other  property-rights,  128. 

on  matters  of  public  and  general  interest,  128,  555. 

to  prove  character  of  parties  and  witnesses,  461  d. 

to  prove  insanity,  solvency,  etc.,  140ft. 

as  involved  in  verdict,  139,  555. 

to  prove  knowledge  or  notice,  14 p. 
RES    GESTJE,  words  in  issue,  110  a. 

words  characterizing  an  act,  108. 

declarations  of  bankrupt,  108,  162  c. 

exclamations  admissible  as  an  exception,  162/. 

admissions  of  agents,  as  part  of  res  gestce,  184  c. 
RESIGNATION,  of  corporator  restores  competency,  430. 
RESOLUTIONS,  legislative,  479. 

at  public  meeting  may  be  proved  by  parol,  90. 
RESULTING    TRUSTS,  when  they  arise,  266. 
REVOCATION    OF    WILLS,  273. 


986  INDEX   OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

REVOLUTIONARY    GOVERNMENT,  when  judicially  noticed,  4. 
REWARD,  title  to,  does  not  render  incompetent,  412,  414. 
RIGHT    TO    BEGIN,  74-76. 
ROENTGEN  RAY  photographs  as  evidence,  439  h. 
ROGATORY    LETTERS,  what,  320. 


S. 

SALE,  by  administrator,  presumed  regular,  20. 

when  to  be  proved  only  by  writing,  261,  267,  563  k,  563  o. 

of  liquor,  by  bar-tender,  presumed  to  be  authorized,  44. 
SAMPLES,  as  evidence,  14  w. 
SANITY;  see  INSANITY. 
SCIENCE,  processes  of,  judicially  noticed,  5. 
SC1ENTER,  evidence  of,  14  p. 

SCRIVENER,  communications  to,  whether  privileged,  244. 
SEALS,  of  independent  power,  how  proved,  4. 

of  notaries,  judicially  noticed,  5. 

of  foreign  nations,  judicially  noticed,  4. 

of  admiralty  courts,  5. 

of  courts,  4-6,  503,  504. 

of  corporations,  whether  to  be  proved  after  thirty  years,  570. 

of  State,  479. 
SEARCH,  for  private  writings  lost,  5636. 

for  subscribing  witnesses,  572  a. 

SECONDARY   EVIDENCE ;  see  PRIMARY  EVIDENCE,  WRITINGS. 
SECRETARY    OF    STATE,  certificate  admissible,  479. 
SECRETS   OF    STATE,  privileged,  250. 
SECURITY,  parol  evidence  to  show  deed  a  security  only,  284. 

impeachment  of,  by  payee,  383-385. 
SEDUCTION,  character  as  evidence,  14  d. 

corroboration  of  woman,  260  6. 

particular  acts  of  unchastity,  14  h,  14  o. 
SELF-DEFENCE,  burden  of  proof,  81  b. 
SENTENCE,  of  foreign  courts,  as  conclusive,  543-547. 
SERVANT,  competency  as  a  witness  for  master,  416. 
SERVICE,  of  subpoena,  314. 

of  notice  to  produce  papers,  563  d. 
SHERIFF,  admissions  of  deputy,  180. 

of  indemnifying  creditor,  180. 
SHIP,  registry  of,  494. 

log-book,  495. 

neutrality  of,  when  presumed,  81. 

grand  bill  of  sale  requisite  on  sale  of,  261. 
SHOOTING,  malicious,  wife  may  prove,  343. 
SHOP-BOOKS,  1206,  c. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  987 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

SIGNATURE   of  attesting  witness,  575. 

SIGNING  BY   TELEGRAPH,  Statute  of  Frauds,  268. 

by  mark,  272,  572,  575. 
SILENCE,  admissions  by,  197-199. 
SLANDER  ;  see  DEFAMATION. 
SOLICITOR;  see  ATTORNEY. 
SOLVENCY,  proved  by  reputation,  140  b. 

knowledge  of,  proved  by  reputation,  14  p. 

see  BANKRUPTCY. 

SPECIALTY,  consideration  for,  presumed,  19. 
SPELLING,  as  evidence  of  genuineness  of  document,  581  a. 
SPIES ;  see  ACCOMPLICES. 

SPOLIATION,  of  papers,  presumption  raised  by,  37,  195  a. 
difference  between,  and  alteration,  566,  568. 

STATE,  existence,  how  proved,  4. 

secrets  not  to  be  disclosed,  250. 
STATISTICAL  TABLES,  162 1. 
STATUTE,  how  proved,  480. 

interpretation,  293. 

STATUTE   OF   FRAUDS,  262-274. 

STATUTES  ;  see  ACT,  LAW,  WRITINGS. 

STENOGRAPHER,  report  of  former  testimony,  166. 

STEWARD,  entries  by,  154. 

STOCK,  transfer  of,  proved  by  bank-books,  484. 

STOLEN   PROPERTY,  possession  of,  evidence  of  theft,  34,  35. 

STRANGER,  right  to  inspection  of  record,  474. 

admissions  by,  181. 

judgment  against,  523,  536. 

depositions  admissible  against,  555. 
SUBORNATION,  as  an  admission,  195a. 
SUBPCENA,  to  procure  attendance  of  witnesses,  309. 

duces  tecum,  309,  538,  563  c,  563  e. 

to  secure  document  held  by  third  person,  563  e. 
SUBSCRIBING   WITNESS;  see  ATTESTING  WITNESS. 
SUBSTANCE,  of  issue,  proof  of,  sufficient,  56-73. 

of  former  testimony,  165. 

SURETY,  admissions  of,  187. 

as  competent  witness  for  principal,  430. 

in  replevin,  how  rendered  competent,  392. 

SURGEON,  confidential  communications  to,  as  privileged,  247  a. 
SURREBUTTAL,  466  a. 
SURRENDER,  when  writing  necessary,  265. 
SURVEYS   AND   MAPS,  as  evidence,  139,  140 a,  439 g,  498. 
SURVEYOR,  declarations  of,  140  a. 
SURVIVORSHIP,  not  presumed,  29,  30. 


988  INDEX   OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 


T. 

TAXES,  books  of  assessors,  150,  493. 
TELEGRAM,  presumed  to  be  received,  40. 

as  original  writing,  563 p. 
not  privileged,  248. 
genuineness  of  answer,  575  c. 

TELEPHONE,  testimony  based  on  communication  by,  430  q. 
TENANT,  estopped  to  deny  title  of  landlord,  25. 
TERM,  satisfied,  presumed  to  be  surrendered,  46. 
TERMS   OF   ART,  may  be  explained  by  experts,  280. 
TERRIER,  when  admissible,  484,  496. 
TESTAMENT  ;  see  WILL. 
TESTATOR ;  see  WILL. 
TESTIMONY ;  see  WITNESS. 
THREATS,  inducing  confession,  220, 

of  defendant,  14  k. 

of  deceased,  14  k,  \bp. 
TIME,  reasonable,  question  for  jury,  81  f. 

when  not  material,  56,  61,  62. 

fractions  of  day,  presumption  as  to,  40. 
TITLE,  possession  as  evidence,  34. 

of  landlord,  tenant  cannot  deny,  25. 

not  conclusively  barred  by  lapse  of  time,  45. 

presumptions  for  quieting,  46. 

declarations  of  former  owner  as  to,  189. 

not  transferred  by  judgment  in  trover  and  trespass,  533. 

declarations  in  disparagement  of,  152  c,  189. 
TITLE-DEEDS,  privilege  in  general,  469  n. 

in  hands  of  attorney,  241. 

destruction  of,  as  re-vesting  title,  568. 
TITLES  OF   SOVEREIGNS,  judicially  noticed,  4. 
TOMBSTONE,  inscription  on,  provable  by  parol,  114  d,  563  i. 
TRANSFER,  of  stock  proved  by  books  of  bank,  484. 
TREASON,  amount  of  evidence  necessary,  255. 

•wife  incompetent  to  prove,  against  husband,  345. 

confession  of,  217  a. 

proof  of  overt  acts  in,  256. 
TREATIES,  judicially  noticed,  66. 
TREATISES,  learned,  162 1. 

TRESPASS,  defendant  in,  when  admissible  for  co-defendant,  357,  359. 
TRIAL,  order  of  proof,  466  a. 

when  put  off  on  account  of  absent  witnesses,  320. 

for  religious  instruction  of  witness,  367. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  989 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

TROVER,  whether  barred  by  prior  judgment  in  trespass,  533. 

notice  to  produce  document  converted,  563  c,  563  o. 
TRUSTEE,  when  competent  as  a  witness,  333,  409. 

presumed  to  convey  where  he  ought  to  convey,  46. 

TRUSTEE'S  PROOF,  judgment  in,  effect  of,  542. 
TRUSTS,  to  be  proved  by  writing,  266. 

U. 

UNDERSTANDING,  evidence  of,  430  i,  441  h. 
UNDERTAKING,  to  release,  its  effect  on  competency,  420. 

UNDERWRITER,  party  to  a  consolidation  rule  incompetent,  395. 

who  has  paid  loss,  to  be  repaid  on  plaintiff's  success,  incompetent,  392. 
opinons  of,  when  not  admissible,  441  e. 

UNITED  STATES;  see  JUDGMENT,  LAWS. 

USAGE,  interpreting  written  contracts,  etc.,  280,  292. 
number  of  witnesses  to  prove,  260  b. 
judicially  noticed,  5. 
as  evidence  of  an  act,  14  j. 
proved  by  acts  of  others,  14  n. 

V. 

VALUE,  other  sales  as  evidence,  14  v. 
knowledge  of,  430  n.,  430  p. 
opinion  of,  441  g. 
proved  by  price  lists,  162  /. 

VARIANCE,  60-73. 
VENDOR,  admissions  of,  190. 
VERBAL  ACTS,  108. 

VERDICT,  how  proved,  510,  523. 
separate,  when  allowed,  358,  363. 
restores  competency,  when,  355." 
to  prove  reputation,  139,  555. 
court  may  direct,  14  to. 

VESSEL;  see  SHIP. 

VIDELICET,  its  nature  and  office,  60. 

VIEW  BY  JURY,  13  i,  13  j,  162  o. 

testimony  at,  162  o. 

VOIR  DIRE,  examination  on,  424. 
production  of  documents  on,  563  J. 

VOLUMINOUS,  facts  and  accounts,  result  of,  provable  by  parol,  563  A. 
VOLUNTARY  CONFESSION  ;  see  CONFESSION. 
VOTER,  declaration  of  intention  of,  162  c,  328  c,  441  A. 


990  INDEX   OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

w. 

WAIVER,  of  damages,  parol  evidence  of,  304. 

WAR,  notoriety,  proof  of  existence  of,  491. 

articles  of,  how  proved,  479. 

WARRANTY,  limited,  in  deed,  cannot  be  extended  by  parol,  281. 
WAY,  judgment  for  non-repair  of,  534. 

WIDOW,  incompetent  to  testify  to  admissions  by  deceased  husband,  254,  337 

see  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE. 
WIFE,  presumption  of  coercion  of,  by  husband.  28. 

letters  of,  to  husband  admissible  in  action  of  crim.  con.,  162  d. 

admissions  of,  against  husband,  185. 

competency  of,  as  witness,  for  or  against  husband,  333  c. 

communications  with  husband,  254,  337. 

see  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE;  MARRIAGE. 

WILL,  requisites  of  execution,  272. 
declarations  in  revocation,  108. 
number  of  attesting  witnesses  called,  569  d. 
declarations  of  testator,  in  general,  162  e. 
admissibility  of  parol  evidence,  275-305. 
proof  of,  518. 

effect  of  the  probate  of,  550. 
alterations  in,  564,  566. 

WITNESS. 

1.  Attendance. 

subpoena,  309. 

fees,  310. 

recognizance,  313. 

service  of  subpoena,  314,  315. 

protection  from  arrest,  316. 

failure  to  attend,  319. 

2.  Deposition. 

mode  of  taking,  320-325. 
cross-examination  necessary,  163  b,  553. 
used  in  case  of  death,  etc.,  163  h. 

3.  Competency  as  to  interest. 

interest  in  general,  328  b. 
parties,  328  c,  333  a. 
survivors,  333  b. 
husband  and  wife,  333  c,  346. 

4.  Competency  as  to  oath. 

nature  and  form  of  oath,  364  a,  364  b. 

children,  367. 

atheists,  368. 

theological  belief,  369,  370. 

statutory  changes,  370  a. 

5.  Competency  as  to  mental  and  moral  capacity. 

insanity,  370  c. 
infancy,  370  d. 
intoxication,  370  «. 


INDEX    OF   TOPICS.  991 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

WITNESS,  —  Continued. 

5.  Competency  as  to  mental  and  moral  capacity,  —  continued. 

infamy,  372-378  a. 

race  and  religious  belief,  378  6. 

accomplices,  380-382. 

6.  Competency  as  to  experience. 

foreign  law,  430  b. 
medical  matters,  430  c. 
value,  430  e. 
handwriting,  576-581. 

7.  Competency  as  to  knowledge,  430  h-430  q 

8.  Examination. 

sequestrating  witnesses,  432. 

leading  questions,  434. 

refreshing  recollection,  439  a. 

maps,  drawings,  photographs,  439  g,  439 

opinion  rule,  441  6-441  /. 

hypothetical  questions,  441  k. 

9.  Impeachment  and  discrediting. 

impeaching  one's  own  witness,  442. 
accused  as  witness,  444  b. 
impeaching  impeached  witness,  444  c. 
impeaching  attesting  witness,  444  d, 
cross-examination  in  general,  445. 
bias,  450. 
corruption,  450  a. 
insanity,  intoxication,  450  b. 
character,  461  a-461  d. 
contradiction,  461  e. 
inconsistencies,  461  f. 

10.  Re-examination  and  rehabilitation. 

order  of  examination,  466  a. 
re-examination,  468. 
good  character,  469  a. 
consistent  statements,  469  b. 

11.  Privilege. 

self-crimination,  469  d. 

civil  liability,  469  g. 

infamy,  469  f. 

corporal  inspection,  469  m. 

title-deeds,  469  n. 

see  PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS. 

12.  Sundries. 

calling  attesting  witness,  569. 
deposition  of  deceased  witness,  163  h. 
testimony  at  former  trial,  163  a,  163  g,  165,  166. 
number  of  witnesses  for  usage,  260. 

for  treason,  255. 

for  perjury,  257. 

for  wills  and  deeds,  260  a. 

of  attesting  witnesses,  569  d. 

WRIT;  see  WRITINGS. 


992  INDEX    OF   TOPICS. 

[References  are  to  sections.] 

WRITINGS. 

1.  Public  documents. 

inspection  of  records  and  official  books,  471-478. 
mode  of  proof  of,  acts  of  State,  479. 
legislative  acts,  480. 
legislative  journals,  482. 
official  registers,  483. 
recorded  conveyances,  485  a. 
foreign  laws,  486. 

admissibility  and  effect  of,  legislative  recitals  and  journals,  diplo- 
matic correspondence,  etc.,  491. 
government  gazette,  492. 
official  registers,  493. 
ship's  register,  494. 
ship's  log-book,  495. 
official  certificates,  surveys,  and  reports,  498. 

2.  Judicial  records. 

inspection,  471. 

production,  502. 

seal  recognized,  503. 

domestic  States ;  Federal  statute,  504. 

office  copies,  507. 

examined  copies,  508. 

lost  records,  509. 

verdicts,  510. 

decrees  in  chancery,  511,  551. 

answers  in  chancery,  512. 

records  of  inferior  courts,  513. 

foreign  judgments,  514. 

inquisitions,  515,  556. 

depositions,  516,  517,  552. 

letters  of  administration,  magistrates'  examination,  520. 

writs,  521. 

validity  of  judgments  in  other  actions,  522-551. 

3.  Private  writings  in  general. 

inspection  and  production,  309,  559-563. 
proving  contents. 

original  must  be  produced  or  accounted  for,  563  a-563  i. 

exceptions,  563 /-563  m. 

rule  not  applicable,  563  n-563  p. 

kinds  of  secondary  evidence ;  copy  of  a  copy,  563  q,  563  r. 
alteration  of  writings. 

presumption  as  to  time,  564. 

legal  effect,  565-568  a. 
proving  execution  of  attesting  document. 

general  principle  ;  attesting  witness  must  be  called,  569. 

exceptions;  ancient  writings,  etc.,  570-575. 
proving  execution  of  other  writings. 

in  general,  575  a. 

ancient  writings,  575  6. 

answers  by  mail,  575  c. 

comparison  of  handwriting,  576-581. 


INDEX   OF   TOPICS,     i  9S3 

[References  are  to  section*.] 

WRITINGS,  —  Continued. 
4.    Sundries. 

privilege  for  writings  in  hands  of  attorney,  241. 

privilege  for  writings  in  possession  of  accused,  469/1 

privilege  for  title-deeds,  469  n. 

presumption  as  to  date,  38. 

best  evidence  rule  explained,  97  a. 

what  is  a  writing,  within  rule  requiring  production,  563  n. 


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